2020 IL App (1st) 191532-U 

FIRST DIVISION

September 30, 2020 

No. 1-19-1532 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

TOCCARRA WILSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and THE 

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S MERIT BOARD, 

 Defendants 

(Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, DefendantAppellee). 

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Appeal from the

 Circuit Court of 

 Cook County 

 No. 15 CH 4000 

 The Honorable 

 Raymond W. Mitchell, 

 Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Griffin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The merit board’s final administrative decision terminating plaintiff from her 

employment as a correctional officer wass not against the manifest weight of the

evidence, and the circuit court’s judgment affirming the merit board’s decision is 

affirmed.

¶ 2 Defendant, the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board (Board), terminated plaintiff, Toccarra 

Wilson, from her position as a correctional officer following an administrative hearing. Wilson 

sought administrative review in the circuit court, which affirmed the Board’s decision. Wilson 
No. 1-19-1532 

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appeals, arguing that the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the 

doctrine of laches should have been applied to bar the sheriff’s complaint, and, alternatively, her 

termination was not for just and sufficient cause. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In April 2014, defendant, Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, filed a complaint against 

Wilson with the Board and made the following allegations. In July 2011, Wilson was a correctional 

officer with the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) assigned to the trust 

department, which handles the personal property of detainees in Cook County jail. Wilson violated 

CCDOC policies governing detainee trust accounts when she generated two intake property 

receipts for a detainee, Kashawn Williams,1 with different amounts of currency (#338701 for $69, 

and #338704 for $39), and when she produced a cash summary report reflecting the intake receipt 

with the lesser amount of currency. Kashawn purportedly signed both receipts. Kashawn filed a 

grievance in September 2011 alleging that he had $69 in cash when his property was inventoried 

but his trust account was only credited with $39. Wilson told investigators from the Office of 

Professional Review (OPR) that the discrepancy was a result of a mistake on her part, she was not 

required to show a voided receipt, and Kashawn signed the property receipt for $39. The sheriff’s

complaint asserted that Wilson violated the sheriff’s general orders regarding trust accounting 

procedures, her conduct was unbecoming, and she made a false report. The complaint sought 

Wilson’s termination. In September 2014, the Board conducted a hearing, heard testimony from 

several witnesses, and admitted numerous exhibits into evidence. 

¶ 5 Erica Queen gave the following testimony. In July 2011, she was the lieutenant in the 

receiving department, which included the trust department. The trust department was staffed by 

1

To avoid confusion due to the similarity between the last names of plaintiff (Wilson) and Mr. 

Williams, we will refer to Mr. Williams as Kashawn. 
No. 1-19-1532 

3 

sworn correctional officers (trust officers). As lieutenant, Queen was a supervisor of the trust 

officers. At the beginning of a trust officer’s shift, they would get a cash box and would sign for 

bundles of premarked triplicate receipts to use during their shift. Trust officers would receive 

sealed bags of detainee property, along with any accompanying documentation, i.e., a signed 

receipt, from the transportation department or from the criminal court buildings. The trust officers 

would sign for the sealed bags. Detainees would approach the trust officer’s window and the officer 

would open the sealed bag containing the detainee’s property, count out the currency, enter the 

amount in the CCDOC’s IMAC computer system used to inventory property, and generate a 

receipt in triplicate. Both the trust officer and the detainee would sign the receipt. One copy of the 

receipt went into the inventory bag, one copy went to the detainee, and one copy went to the finance 

department. If a receipt needed to be voided, the trust officer needed to initial the receipt, notify a 

supervisor, and attach the voided receipt to the cash summary report that would be turned over the 

trust department. Trust officers used cash summary reports “to tally up their banks at the end of 

the night,” and a supervisor would verify and sign the report. Each night, Queen would “verify the 

bank,” sign the appropriate paperwork, and ensure that all currency was sealed in a bag and placed 

in a locked safe. 

¶ 6 In September 2011, Queen’s superintendent asked her to investigate a grievance filed by 

Kashawn. Queen contacted the finance department and was informed that $39 was placed in 

Kashawn’s trust account. The finance department provided her with the copy of the receipt it 

received, #338704 for $39. Queen checked Kashawn’s property bag, which contained a Chicago 

police department receipt reflecting $69, as well as receipt #338701 signed by Wilson and 

Kashawn reflecting $69. She also reviewed the cash summary report created by Wilson on July 

18, 2011, which did not reflect any voided receipts. She was unable to find an IMAC record for 
No. 1-19-1532 

4 

Kashawn’s property. Queen testified that July 18, 2011, Wilson voided a receipt for a different 

detainee that was properly recorded in IMAC and was properly documented. In September 2011, 

Queen created an incident report regarding the $30 discrepancy “[b]ecause it was unusual to have 

the [police department] receipt and a pink receipt in the property bag that didn’t match what was 

submitted to the [f]inance [d]epartment.” Queen complained about Wilson to OPR. Queen 

recommended in September 2011 that Wilson be transferred, and the transfer was approved on 

September 29, 2011. 

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Queen testified that she had no knowledge of what happened to 

cause the $30 discrepancy and did not know which sergeant was on duty on July 18, 2011. She 

acknowledged that mistakes happen in the trust department and that sometimes the IMAC system 

would glitch. If there was a mistake on a receipt, the trust officer would consult with a supervisor

who would then direct the trust officer to generate a voided receipt. It was not uncommon for a 

trust officer to create more than one cash summary report for a shift. The sheriff’s general orders 

did not contain a procedure for dealing with mistakes. She could not identify the supervisor’s

signature on Wilson’s cash summary report for July 18, 2011, relative to Kashawn’s $39 receipt. 

She acknowledged that she did not speak with Wilson as part of her investigation, she only 

interviewed one person in the finance department during her investigation, and she did not speak 

to OPR during its investigation or give an interview. 

¶ 8 On redirect, Queen testified that the sheriff’s general orders provided that “[a]ll receipt 

numbers shall be accounted for with copies of voided receipts attached.” Trust officers were not 

allowed to make corrections to receipts if a mistake was made. 

¶ 9 Daniel Cramer testified that he was a former FBI clinical scientist with experience in 

comparison sciences, including handwriting comparisons. In 2013, an OPR director assigned him 
No. 1-19-1532 

5 

to lead the OPR investigation of Queen’s complaint against Wilson, which he concluded in 

December 2013. He reviewed (1) the Chicago police department receipt showing that Kashawn 

was arrested carrying $69; (2) the receipts created by Wilson for Kashawn reflecting $69 and $39; 

(3) Wilson’s cash summary report for July 18, 2011; (4) the cash summary and IMAC reports for 

all the other detainees Wilson processed; (5) Kashawn’s grievance; and (6) Queen’s complaint to

OPR. Kashawn’s signature on the $39 receipt did not match his signature on the $69 receipt or his 

September 2011 grievance. 

¶ 10 Cramer interviewed Wilson in June 2013. A memorandum of that interview, signed by 

Wilson, was admitted into evidence. During the interview, Wilson stated that she had not voided 

any receipts on the night of July 18, 2011. There was a discrepancy between the $69 and $39 

receipts because she made a mistake while inventorying Kashawn’s property and made a 

correction with the second receipt for $39. Wilson also stated that making mistakes was typical, 

there were no forms to fill out, there was no way to void a receipt, and officers would just fill out 

a new receipt if there was an error. Kramer reviewed receipts #338701 and #338704 and confirmed 

in his interview with Wilson that her signature appeared on both receipts. The signature on 

Kashawn’s grievance was consistent with the signature on receipt #338701 for $69 but was not 

consistent with his signature on receipt #338704 for $39. Wilson explained to Cramer that she 

would generate a cash summary report with only one receipt if the inmate had come in late during 

shift and the cash drawer was already cashed out. Kashawn was allegedly processed through the 

CCDOC around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m. Wilson stated in the interview that she received a text 

message the day after the incident in July 2011 informing her that she had been transferred, but 

Cramer reviewed personnel records and learned that Wilson was transferred in September 2011. 

Wilson told Cramer that she spoke with Queen on the day of the incident in July 2011, but Queen 
No. 1-19-1532 

6 

did not indicate that she would file a complaint. Wilson said that it was common for incoming 

property receipts to be incorrect. Wilson said that she put the $39 receipt with Kashawn’s property, 

but Cramer later learned that the $39 receipt never made it into Kashawn’s property bag. Cramer 

believed that Wilson made false statements during his interview regarding when she was 

transferred out of the trust department and amount of money Kashawn had, and she falsely stated 

that there was no way to void a receipt. Cramer testified that Wilson made false statements during 

her interview and in the signed written memorandum containing her statements, that she lied to 

OPR, and that she falsely stated that specific serialized receipts were not assigned to correctional 

officers. Cramer was not able to interview Kashawn as part of his investigation because he could 

not locate him. 

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Cramer acknowledged that he did not investigate who Wilson’s 

supervisor was on July 18, 2011. After Cramer filed his written report, he was able to interview 

Kashawn, but did not ask him to verify his signatures on the receipts.2 The memorandum of his 

interview with Wilson was not a verbatim transcript. He did not have the ability to order Wilson 

to sign the statement. Wilson stated that she did not know which detainee’s property she would be 

checking in to inventory, but Cramer concluded that Wilson’s statement was false because Queen 

indicated that trust officers were given batches of receipts and they did know which detainees they 

would be processing. The sheriff’s general orders did not set forth the procedure for voiding 

receipts. Wilson’s interview occurred more than two years after the incident and Cramer did not 

know why there was a delay. 

¶ 12 Juanita Peterson testified that she was a sergeant in the trust department in July 2011 and 

was a supervisor. She was not Wilson’s supervisor on July 18, 2011. Trust officers made mistakes 

2

Kashawn did not testify before the Board, and the Board sustained Wilson’s objection to an attempt 

to elicit testimony as to what Kashawn told Cramer during Cramer’s interview. 
No. 1-19-1532 

7 

in the trust department multiple times. There were no policies for dealing with mistakes, and trust 

officers “were not given any basic way” to correct mistakes. Instead, “you feel your way through 

it” and “try to figure out what’s going on and fix the problem.” Trust officers did not know which 

inmates they would be processing on any given shift. She acknowledged that when officers made 

a mistake counting cash, they had to void the incorrect receipt. In her experience, there were no 

occasions where a trust officer made a mistake and did not need to fill out a voided receipt, and 

there were no occasions where a trust officer made a mistake and she learned that a voided receipt 

had not been filled out. 

¶ 13 Wilson gave the following testimony. She had no accounting or banking experience when 

she was assigned to the trust department in 2010. She was not given any training prior to the 

assignment and learned how to do the job from her peers. She described the environment as 

chaotic, hectic, and stressful. She had no advance knowledge of which inmates she would be 

processing during any given shift. She made mistakes on more than one occasion and would tell 

her supervisor when she made a mistake. She could not recall who the supervisor was on July 18, 

2011. There was no specific policy explaining how to correct mistakes and she would rely on a 

supervisor for direction if she made a mistake. She had no independent recollection of July 18, 

2011. She did inform a supervisor that she had made a mistake with Kashawn’s property and did 

not recall the supervisor telling her to complete a voided receipt. She would only void a receipt if 

she were told to do so by a supervisor. More than two years passed from July 18, 2011, to the time 

she was interviewed by OPR in 2013. During that time, she worked in three other capacities and 

could not recall all the details of how the trust department operated. She denied stealing any money 

from any detainees.
No. 1-19-1532 

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¶ 14 On March 5, 2015, the Board filed its written decision. The Board found Queen’s and 

Cramer’s testimony credible and found that Wilson’s testimony was “not credible and not 

believable.” The Board further found that (1) Wilson created two receipts for Kashawn, the first 

receipt for $69 and the second receipt for $39; (2) the $39 receipt was submitted to the finance 

department, which credited Kashawn’s trust account for $39; and (3) Kashawn’s property bag 

contained a Chicago police department receipt reflecting that Kashawn had $69 in cash when he 

was arrested. The Board did not believe Wilson’s testimony that she was told by a supervisor not 

to void Kashawn’s receipt because Wilson attached a voided receipt for a different detainee to a 

cash summary report for July 18, 2011. The Board concluded that Wilson violated (1) the sheriff’s 

general order 2.3(II)(E) governing inmate trust fund accounting when she created the $39 receipt 

for Kashawn’s property when he was not present, failed to place the $39 receipt in Kashawn’s

property bag, and failed to attach the $69 to her cash summary report as a voided receipt; (2) the 

sheriff’s general order 4.1 governing internal investigations when she made a false report by 

creating two receipts for the same inmate on the same date; and (3) sheriff’s order 11.2.20.0(II), 

(IV) setting forth rules of conduct because Wilson was untruthful during OPR’s investigation. The 

Board ordered that Wilson be terminated from her employment with the sheriff’s office effective 

April 18, 2014. 

¶ 15 Wilson filed a timely complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking administrative 

review of the Board’s final administrative decision.3 Relevant to this appeal, Wilson argued that 

3

The circuit court initially found that the Board’s March 5, 2015, decision was void under this 

court’s decisions in Taylor v. Dart, 2016 IL App (1st) 143684 and Taylor v. Dart, 2017 IL App (1st) 

143684-B, and remanded the matter to the Board for a new hearing under a “legally constituted” Board. 

The circuit court, however, subsequently granted defendants’ motion to reconsider in light of this court’s 

decisions in Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915 and Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, applying 

the de facto officer doctrine. The circuit court vacated its order finding the Board’s decision void and 

remanding the matter for a new hearing and addressed Wilson’s complaint on the merits. On appeal, Wilson 
No. 1-19-1532 

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(1) the Board’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the Board should 

have applied the doctrine of laches based on how long the Department’s investigation took, and 

(3) dismissal was too harsh of a penalty. After briefing and hearing argument, the circuit court 

entered a writing order affirming the Board’s decision. Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, Wilson argues—as she did in the circuit court—that the Board’s decision is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, that laches should be applied, and that her termination 

was not for just or sufficient cause.

¶ 18 A. Laches

¶ 19 We first address Wilson’s argument that the doctrine of laches should have been applied 

to bar the Sheriff’s complaint against her. She argues that none of the witnesses “could credibly 

remember this incident due to the passage of time,” and other potential witnesses—such as 

Kashawn and her unidentified supervisor on July 18, 2011—did not testify. She asserts that “there 

is no competent evidence whatsoever of what occurred, and it is the Sheriff’s knowing and 

voluntary delay in pursuing an investigation that caused this.” She argues that (1) Queen filed her 

OPR complaint in September 2011, (2) OPR’s investigation did not start until 2013, (3) OPR did 

not interview her until June 5, 2013, (4) the Board filed its complaint on April 21, 2014, and ( all 

of which undermined the witnesses’ recollections of the events following July 18, 2011. We reject 

Wilson’s laches argument. 

¶ 20 Laches may be raised as an affirmative defense and is an equitable defense that may bar a 

plaintiff from obtaining relief due to the prejudice a defendant suffers because of an unreasonable 

delay in bringing an action. Mo v. Hergan, 2012 IL App (1st) 113179, ¶ 35. The party asserting 

does not advance any argument that the circuit court erred by reconsidering its finding the Board’s decision 

to be void, and she does not advance any argument that the Board’s March 5, 2015, decision was void. 
No. 1-19-1532 

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laches must establish a plaintiff’s lack of diligence in presenting its claim and prejudice to the 

defendant because of the delay. Chisem v. McCarthy, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 18. Courts are 

reluctant to impose laches on government entities, and the doctrine should only be applied against 

them under “ ‘compelling,’ ‘unusual[,] or extraordinary circumstances.’ ” City of Countryside v. 

City of Countryside Police Pension Board of Trustees, 2018 IL App (1st) 171029, ¶ 65 (quoting 

Van Milligan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the Village of Glenview, 158 Ill. 2d 85, 

90 (1994)). “[T]he nonaction of government officials will not support a laches defense.” Wabash 

County v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 408 Ill. App. 3d 924, 933 (2011). “Rather, laches

will apply only if the government officials initiated an affirmative act that induced the opposing 

party to act, making it inequitable to permit the government entity to retract what the government 

officials have done.” Id. at 933-34 (citing City of Chicago v. Alessia, 348 Ill. App. 3d 218, 229 

(2004)). We ordinarily review a decision to apply laches for an abuse of discretion. See Finley v. 

Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 330 (1980) (“laches is an equitable doctrine to be invoked or rejected in the 

trial court’s discretion.”); see also Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 119518, ¶ 51 (“The 

applicability of laches to a given case lies within the discretion of the circuit court.”). 

¶ 21 The Sheriff argues on appeal that Wilson forfeited any laches argument by failing to raise 

it before the Board. The Sheriff contends that Wilson never filed any pleadings before the Board

asserting the affirmative defense of laches and that the administrative record contains no mention 

of the doctrine. Wilson responds that her counsel argued the issue of timeliness in her opening 

statement to the Board by pointing out that two years had passed between the date of the incident 

and Wilson’s interview with OPR. Wilson, however, fails to point to any portion of the 

administrative record that might establish that she sought to have the Sheriff’s complaint dismissed 

or summarily denied due to the prejudicial passage of time. Her counsel’s closing statement to the 
No. 1-19-1532 

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Board at the hearing highlighted that two years passed between the incident and the OPR interview 

but did not argue that Wilson was prejudiced by the delay. Instead, counsel argued the merits of 

the Sheriff’s complaint and challenged the credibility of the witnesses. Wilson argues on appeal 

that there was evidence of prejudice in the form of the witnesses having little to no independent 

recollection of the incident by the time OPR interviewed Wilson and the Board’s hearing. The 

presence of some arguable evidence of prejudice, however, does not save Wilson from the fact 

that she never advanced any argument before the Board that she was prejudiced by any delay, and 

never requested any relief premised on prejudicial delay. In our view, Wilson did not adequately 

raise the issue of laches before the Board such that the Board would have reason to consider a 

laches defense. Laches is an affirmative defense that Wilson bore the burden of pleading and 

proving; by failing to raise the affirmative defense of laches and failing to raise any argument 

regarding prejudice before the Board, Wilson forfeited the issue of laches for our review. In re 

Marriage of Heinrich, 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, ¶ 44 (observing that laches must be pleaded and 

proved by the party seeking to raise it, and that absent an express pleading of the defense, the 

failure to advance any argument as to each element of a laches defense results in forfeiture). 

¶ 22 Forfeiture aside, the administrative record does not support the application of laches to this 

matter. Queen filed her complaint with OPR two months after the incident. It is undisputed that 

there was a delay between Queen’s OPR complaint and OPR’s interview with Wilson. The 

Sheriff’s complaint was filed four months after OPR concluded its investigation, Wilson was 

suspended the same month the Sheriff filed its complaint, and the Board held a hearing five months 

after the complaint was filed. Any delay between the incident and Wilson’s OPR interview is 

nothing more than inaction on the part of OPR, and nonaction by a government entity is insufficient 
No. 1-19-1532 

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to support the application of laches. Wabash County, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 933. We therefore reject 

Wilson’s argument that laches should have been applied to bar the Sheriff’s complaint. 

¶ 23 B. The Board’s Misconduct Findings 

¶ 24 Next, Wilson argues that the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. On administrative review, we review the administrative agency’s final decision, not the 

circuit court’s decision. Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 

368, 386 (2010). Our standard of review depends on the question presented. Lopez v. Dart, 2018 

IL App (1st) 170733, ¶ 67. The degree of deference afforded to the Board’s decision depends on 

whether “the issue presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law 

and fact.” Horsehead Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 2019 IL 124155, ¶ 27. The findings and 

conclusions of the Board on questions of fact are considered prima facie true and correct. Engle v. 

Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2018 IL App (1st) 162602, ¶ 30. We “will 

not reweigh the evidence or substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency.” Id. Instead, we 

review whether the agency’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

“An agency’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion 

is clearly evident.” Id. When reviewing an agency’s decision to terminate an employee, we employ 

a two-step process. Lopez, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, ¶ 68. First, we evaluate whether the agency’s 

factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.4

 

¶ 25 The Board’s finding that Wilson violated the sheriff’s general order 2.3(II)(E) was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. The sheriff’s general order 2.3(II)(E) requires in part 

that all detainee cash “is to be recorded on the pre-numbered triplicate intake receipt form,” the 

receipt be signed by the trust officer and the detainee, and all receipt numbers be accounted for on 

4

We discuss the second step below. See infra ¶ 29. 
No. 1-19-1532 

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a cash summary report with all voided receipts attached. Wilson testified that she told OPR that 

she realized there was a mistake after cashing out her drawer and there was a discrepancy between 

the amount of cash in her drawer and the total amounts on her receipts, and that she had given 

Kashawn “the wrong amount.” She claimed that she told a supervisor and was instructed not to 

void out the $69 receipt. She testified that she retrieved the $69 receipt from Kashawn but did not 

create the receipt for $39 in Kashawn’s presence and did not give him a copy of the $39 receipt. 

She testified that she gave the $39 receipt to her supervisor and “figured that they would handle it 

from there.” Therefore, there was evidence before the Board that Wilson did not follow the 

sheriff’s general order 2.3(II)(E) because the $39 receipt was not signed by Kashawn at the time 

his property was inventoried and that Kashawn was not given a copy of the $39 receipt when it 

was created. Furthermore, it is undisputed that two receipts were generated for the same inmate on 

the same day reflecting different amounts of cash and that neither receipt was voided and attached 

to the cash summary report. The Board’s finding that Wilson violated the sheriff’s general was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 26 Wilson contends that there are serious evidentiary gaps because (1) Kashawn did not 

testify; (2) neither she nor Queen had an independent recollection of July 18, 2011, at the time of 

the hearing; and (3) no one, including Kramer, could determine who Wilson’s supervisor was on 

July 18, 2011. She contends that there was no evidence that cash was not recorded on the intake 

receipt and no evidence that she “failed to ‘void’ one of the receipts.” She asserts that there was 

simply a lack of evidence as to whether she voided any receipts for Kashawn. We note, however, 

that Wilson testified that she did not void any receipts for Kashawn, and Queen testified that she 

searched the IMAC system and did not locate any voided receipts generated by Wilson. None of 

Wilson’s arguments are persuasive enough to find that the Board’s finding is against the manifest 
No. 1-19-1532 

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weight of the evidence. Kashawn’s testimony was not necessary on this issue because Wilson’s 

testimony was sufficient to show that she did not follow the sheriff’s general order 2.3(II)(E) in 

creating the $39 receipt and that no voided receipts were created for Kashawn. 

¶ 27 Next, the Board’s finding that Wilson violated the sheriff’s general order 4.1 governing 

internal investigations by making a false report is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

General order 4.1(III)(A)(17)-(18) provides that it is serious misconduct to engage in conduct 

unbecoming of an employee of CCDOC that tends to reflect discredit on the CCDOC or the 

Sheriff’s office, and to make false official reports, either written or oral. Wilson contends that she 

gave “a good explanation” for the existence of the two receipts when she testified that she was 

“trying to single it out and trying to figure out who I issued the wrong amount of money to.” The 

fact remains, however, that Wilson admittedly created two reports as to the amount of cash 

Kashawn had at the time he was processed on July 18, 2011. The $69 receipt was included in his 

inventory bag and the $39 receipt was given to the finance department. The Board concluded that 

Wilson was not credible when she testified that she was instructed by a supervisor not to void the 

$69 receipt because, “on the same date [July 18, 2011], she had a voided receipt (no. 529216) that 

was attached to the cash summary report.” Wilson argues that there is no evidentiary support for 

the Board’s credibility determination because “there is nothing in the record about what the receipt 

numbered 529216 even is.” Queen testified, however, that Wilson voided a different receipt on 

July 18, 2011. Receipt#. 529216 is in the administrative record and clearly reflects the word 

“VOID” written on the receipt. There was at least some evidence in the record to show that Wilson 

had voided a receipt for a different inmate on July 18, 2011, and the Board’s conclusion that 

Wilson’s testimony that she was told not to void Kashawn’s receipt was not credible is not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, Cramer testified that the signature for Kashawn 
No. 1-19-1532 

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on the $39 receipt was not consistent with his signatures on the $69 receipt and his grievance, 

suggesting that the $39 receipt was falsely created.5 The Board’s finding that Wilson created a 

false report by creating the $39 receipt and submitting it to the finance department while 

simultaneously failing to void the $69 receipt—thus creating two receipts for the same inmate on 

the same date, one of which was false—is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 28 The Board’s finding that Wilson violated sheriff’s order 11.2.20.0 by making false 

statements to OPR is also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. One of the requirements 

of the sheriff’s order is that officers be truthful during investigations. Wilson’s sole argument on 

appeal is that the sheriff’s order was not in effect in July 2011, but instead became effective in 

January 2013. Her argument, however, borders on frivolous given that she was charged with being 

untruthful during her OPR investigation for falsely claiming that Kashawn was carrying $39 and 

that she was not required to void the $69 receipt. Wilson’s OPR interview indisputably took place 

in June 2013, when the sheriff’s order was in effect. Wilson does not challenge any of the Board’s 

factual findings and has not presented any argument that would lead us to conclude that the Board’s 

decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 29 C. Discipline Imposed

¶ 30 Finally, Wilson argues that her termination was not for just cause. We must determine 

whether the Board’s factual findings “provide a sufficient basis for its conclusion that cause for 

discharge exists.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733, ¶ 68. 

“Cause is defined as some substantial shortcoming that renders the employee’s continued 

employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and something 

5

We note that Cramer never gave any opinion as to who created Kashawn’s signature on the $39 

receipt; he merely observed that that signature was different. There was no testimony suggesting that 

Wilson forged Kashawn’s signature, but Wilson herself testified that she filled out the receipt for $39 and 

allegedly gave that version of the receipt to a supervisor.
No. 1-19-1532 

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which the law and a sound public opinion recognize as a good cause for his no longer occupying 

the place.” Id. ¶ 75 (citing Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Village of Orland 

Park, 96 Ill. 2d 101, 105 (1983)). We will not reverse the Board’s finding that cause exists to 

discharge an employee unless the Board’s decision is unreasonable or unrelated to the 

requirements of service. Id. We have long held that a single violation of a single department rule 

may be sufficient grounds for discharge. See Caliendo v. Martin, 250 Ill. App. 3d 409, 418 (1993).

¶ 31 The Board’s decision to terminate Wilson was not unreasonable or unrelated to the 

requirements of her service. After hearing all the evidence, the Board determined that Wilson 

violated three separate orders governing her position. Her violation of sheriff’s order 4.1—making 

a false report—constituted serious misconduct, and it is evident that handling and properly 

accounting for detainee property—particularly cash—is a sensitive role implicating the public’s 

trust in the sheriff’s office and its correctional officers. Wilson does not direct our attention to any 

evidence suggesting that the Board has meted out different punishments to other officers found to 

have violated similar rules under similar circumstances. She asserts that Queen “would have issued 

Wilson a mere SPAR [summary punishment action request] for the error had she not been directed 

otherwise.” She further asserts that Peterson testified that for first-time mistakes, she would “might 

try to talk to [the officer] to see what the problem is and how we can fix it.” Contrary to Wilson’s 

claim, Queen did not testify one way or the other as to what discipline she would have imposed if 

she had the authority to do so. And while there was testimony from Queen and Peterson that 

supervisors had the authority to impose lower levels of discipline, Queen testified that she was 

instructed by her superintendent to refer the matter to OPR and thus no longer had any authority 

to impose any discipline. Wilson does not assert that Queen’s superintendent somehow exceeded 

his authority or acted arbitrarily when he ordered Queen to refer the matter to OPR. The Board 
No. 1-19-1532 

17 

determined that serious misconduct occurred, and Wilson does not offer any persuasive argument 

that termination is not an available option to the Board upon a finding of serious misconduct. 

¶ 32 We will not substitute our judgment for that of the Board’s after determining that there was 

a factual basis for the Board’s conclusion that cause for discharge exists. “It is only our purview 

to consider whether the Board’s punishment was unreasonable given the circumstances, not 

whether we would have imposed a more lenient sentence.” Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, 

¶ 25. 

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s final administrative decision is affirmed, and the 

judgment of the circuit court affirming the Board’s decision is also affirmed.

¶ 35 Affirmed.