About the Report

This research was undertaken as part of a project on nonstate 

conflict management and the opportunities and limits of 

NGOs engaging nonstate armed groups, funded by the German 

Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). The information on the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva 

Call are based on interviews with representatives of the 

two organizations.

About the Authors

Claudia Hofmann is a visiting scholar at the Center for 

Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at the Paul H. Nitze School of 

Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins 

University and was at the USIP as part of a transatlantic 

postdoctoral fellowship for international relations and security 

(TAPIR) supported by the German Academic Exchange Service 

(DAAD). Her research concentrates on nonstate armed actors, 

civilian approaches to conflict management, and civil-military 

coordination. Ulrich Schneckener is professor of international 

relations and peace and conflict studies at the University of 

Osnabrück, Germany. His research focuses on international 

conflict management, state building, peacebuilding, and 

nonstate armed actors.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 284 July 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener

NGOs and Nonstate 

Armed Actors 

Improving Compliance with International Norms

Summary

•	 Transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have developed strategies to improve 

the diffusion of and general adherence to international norms among nonstate armed 

actors, with the goal of persuading armed actors to adapt their behavior accordingly.

•	 The ICRC offers trainings in international humanitarian law to armed actors that explain 

their responsibilities for protecting civilians in military operations. Geneva Call provides 

education on the effects of antipersonnel landmines and supports armed actors in their 

efforts to clear mined areas, destroy stockpiles, and provide victim assistance.

•	 The NGOs’ efforts in dealing with nonstate armed actors reveal limitations and problems 

but also offer new avenues for states and international organizations to engage with armed 

groups. With greater support from the international community, NGOs’ contributions could 

become more substantive and complement other ongoing efforts to change armed actors’ 

behavior.

Armed actors dominate the environment during and after armed conflict in many ways 

apart from the conflict itself.1 They are responsible for violence against unarmed civilians 

in breach of international humanitarian law and can facilitate the establishment of criminal 

and informal economies typically seen in postwar societies. However, they also may see 

themselves as representing distinct interests within the populace and may build broad 

support from them. Nonstate armed actors—such as rebel groups, militias, warlords, clan 

chiefs, terrorists, criminals, and mercenaries—can disturb, undermine, or completely truncate state- and peacebuilding processes, leading to further violence that affects the efforts 

of humanitarian aid workers, representatives of governments, and peacekeepers. Nonstate 

armed actors are defined as actors who are willing and able to use violence to pursue their 

objectives; are not integrated into formal state institutions, such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or special forces; possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

NGOs’ Interactions with Armed Actors 2

Possibilities for and Limits to Changing 

Armed Actors’ Behavior 9

Conclusions and Recommendations 11
2

to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure; and have an organizational 

structure (i.e., unlike spontaneous riots). The definition encompasses politically and ideologically motivated actors as well as profit-oriented actors. 

The international community has employed a number of strategies when dealing with 

nonstate armed actors, ranging from counterinsurgency and containment to negotiation 

and mediation to integration and co-optation.2 However, these approaches reveal that 

state actors, such as the affected government and third countries involved in the conflict, 

still have difficulties in dealing with nonstate armed actors.3 These difficulties are often 

based on states’ commitment to international treaties, the decisions of the UN Security 

Council, diplomatic customs between sovereign states, and other political considerations, 

such as the fear of legitimizing armed actors. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 

private individuals—such as elder statesmen, including influential persons and retired high 

officials—command more freedom and flexibility to contact armed actors or react to their 

requests. Accordingly, they are often involved in the facilitation of talks, informal prenegotiations, the preparation of nonpapers, and direct mediation with armed actors on different 

policy levels during and after conflict. 

Specialized NGOs engage nonstate armed actors to reduce the violence and instability 

they cause during and after conflict. Two of the most prominent civil society organizations 

in the field are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva Call.4 They 

use different approaches in dealing with armed actors, but they have the same goal: to 

persuade rebel groups, militias, tribal chiefs, and other armed actors to accept international 

norms and change their behavior as well as their internal rules and doctrines accordingly. 

The international norms involve, for example, the protection of civilians, the ban of certain 

means of warfare (such as landmines and child soldiers), and the appropriate treatment of 

prisoners. The primary intent of such initiatives is not necessarily more peace, but rather less 

violence, particularly regarding civilians and, more generally, the prevention of an increasing erosion of international humanitarian law during conflicts.5 These processes of persuasion and norm diffusion can also be a starting point for further engagement with armed 

actors that focus on the possibility of changing their self-image or identity—an approach 

to which actors with postconflict political aspirations may be particularly susceptible. This 

engagement can, in turn, positively affect a beginning or ongoing peace process and, thus, 

contribute to constructive conflict management. Criminalizing such NGO efforts, as through 

the U.S. Patriot Act with its extended definition of terrorism and terrorist organizations, 

passes up such constructive opportunities to work with nonstate armed groups.

This report analyzes the approaches of civil society organizations such as the ICRC and 

Geneva Call in communicating international norms to nonstate armed actors. It elaborates 

on the different methods as well as the basic conditions and factors that affect the success 

of their approaches in order to evaluate the strengths and limits of NGOs in constructively 

dealing with nonstate armed actors. Under specific circumstances armed actors can be 

open-minded regarding international norms, especially if they are striving to become political actors governed by normative behavior and are willing to be judged by this behavior. 

Such aspirations create new avenues for internal and external actors when interacting with 

armed actors.

NGOs’ Interactions with Armed Actors

NGOs deal with armed actors in several ways as they work in the world’s conflict regions.6

Both NGOs and aid agencies have become an attractive resource for armed actors and thus 

continuously run the risk of instrumentalization.7 Employees of international and local NGOs 

are victims of looting, blackmail, intimidation, kidnappings, and targeted attacks.8 Often 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy •

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University • Judy Ansley,

Former Assistant to the President and Deputy Security 

Adviser under President George W. Bush • Anne H. Cahn,

Former Scholar in Residence, American University 

• Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of 

Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 

University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan,

President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC • Stephen D. Krasner,

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, 

Stanford University • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director of the National Council on Independent Living 

• Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, George Mason School of Law 

• Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International 

Republican Institute • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

aid deliveries, vehicles, and technical equipment are stolen or extorted. That said, more constructive forms of interaction exist between NGOs and armed actors as well, ranging from ad 

hoc contacts and agreements to long-term cooperation that offers NGOs personnel security, 

access to the local population, and promotion of a peace process. For nonstate armed actors, 

interaction with NGOs can bring more aid to their local constituency, improving the actors’ 

chances of gaining legitimacy, acknowledgment, and access to other internal and external 

actors in order to end their political isolation and marginalization.

NGOs’ different activities create different reasons for interaction with armed actors (figure 1).9 Operational services as conducted by humanitarian and development NGOs, such 

as Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE, InterAction, and parochial development organizations, 

primarily consist of tasks that aid a suffering population during and after conflict. While 

NGOs often work with nonstate armed actors to carry out relief projects in specific regions, 

contact is selective and only with regard to a dispute or an emergency; the armed actors 

are means to an end, as the services’ main focus is the population. Public policy work concentrates mainly on lobbying, monitoring, awareness raising, and education. Organizations 

including Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, and the International Crisis 

Group denounce drawbacks and misconduct (i.e., naming and shaming), sensitize the international public to specific problems, and appeal publicly to the conflict parties to do—or 

not do—something. As such work focuses mainly on states and international organizations, 

which are in turn supposed to act against the misconduct of other actors, the engagement 

of nonstate armed actors is indirect.10 Conflict resolution, such as that conducted by the 

Carter Center, International Alert, or the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), involves 

conflict management, the provision of good offices, and facilitation, be it in official or 

unofficial mission, of negotiations from the local to the international level.11 These activities lead to direct contact with nonstate armed actors to support negotiation processes. 

The duration of contact depends on a favorable occasion for negotiations and does not last 

beyond them. Finally, norm diffusion involves persuading nonstate armed actors to adhere 

to specific international norms. Contact with armed actors is direct and often long-term, 

for example if concluded agreements regarding international norms require a monitoring 

process. The two organizations described in this report, the ICRC and Geneva Call, are paradigmatic for this field of action.

The typology in figure 1 only roughly characterizes NGOs themselves, as numerous NGOs 

engage in multiple activities simultaneously and with different intensities. The Carter Center 

Figure 1. Modes of NGO Interaction with Nonstate Armed Actors

Acute

(conflict/emergency)

Long-term

(independent from

individual developments)

Direct/purposeful

contact with nonstate 

armed groups

Indirect contact

with nonstate

armed groups

Conflict Resolution

For nonstate armed actors, 

interaction with NGOs can 

bring more aid to their local 

constituency, improving the 

actors’ chances of gaining 

legitimacy, acknowledgment, 

and access to other internal 

and external actors in order to 

end their political isolation and 

marginalization.

Operational services

Norm diffusion Public policy
4

is involved in conflict resolution but also—and more extensively—in operational services, 

in the fields of health and democracy. It also engages in public policy by reporting on 

grievances and problems and by attracting the attention of the American public. Similarly, 

the ICRC and Geneva Call are active in public policy and political lobbying to consolidate 

international humanitarian law and strengthen the ban on antipersonnel landmines. But 

distinguishing among categories of activity is instructive: There is a qualitative difference 

between delivering aid in conflict regions and lobbying political decision makers, on one 

hand, and supporting mediation between conflicting parties and promoting the adherence 

of international norms, on the other. The latter two are formative attributes of the ICRC and 

Geneva Call, regardless of their other activities.

The ICRC

When the ICRC was founded as a civil organization in 1863 by Henry Dunant, its main concern was to bring relief to wounded soldiers on the battlefield and to develop international 

treaties that would protect the wounded as well as the medical personnel assisting them. 

These principles still represent the foundation for the ICRC’s work, though its scope has 

expanded considerably. The number of employees indicates the magnitude of the ICRC’s 

efforts: Around 800 staff work at the organization’s headquarters in Geneva, around 1,400 

are active as specialized staff and delegates, and around 11,000 local employees work for 

the organization in the field. The ICRC’s specific mandate is anchored in the 1949 Geneva 

Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, in which the organization is given specific 

rights and tasks during and after armed conflict, such as visiting prisoners of war, supplying food and other necessities for the civil population, reuniting families, and searching for 

missing persons. Furthermore, according to the Statutes of the International Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Movement, the ICRC also must “work for the understanding and dissemination 

of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare 

any development thereof.”12 Legally, the ICRC is a private association formed under the 

Swiss civil code that is made up of fifteen to twenty-five Swiss citizens. Internationally, 

however, the ICRC enjoys the status of a legal entity under international humanitarian law 

and is, therefore, different from conventional NGOs. Accordingly, the organization possesses 

certain privileges—such as exemptions from taxes and customs—similar to those of other 

international organizations. Most important, however, is immunity regarding courts of law, 

including international war crimes tribunals and the International Criminal Court.

The ICRC strongly values impartiality, neutrality, and independence, and thus does not 

distinguish between state and nonstate conflict actors systematically or normatively. In 

practice, this means that the ICRC seeks out direct contact with state and nonstate armed 

actors, independent of whether they fight on the side of or against the government, and 

offers each the same services. At the time of writing, the ICRC is engaging more than one 

hundred nonstate armed actors in about thirty countries, concentrating particularly on the 

provisions encoded in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This article concerns 

humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands; the prohibition of murder, mutilation, and 

torture as well as cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment; and the taking of hostages 

and unfair trials.13 The ICRC employs two mechanisms to increase respect for international 

humanitarian law in armed conflicts: formally expressing commitment to humanitarian 

norms and gradually implementing them. Ideally, these mechanisms are mutually supportive, and practically, they are often pursued in parallel.

First, a range of legal tools give all actors in a conflict an opportunity to make an express 

commitment to international humanitarian norms. This not only instills the armed-actor 

leadership with a sense of self-determination and responsibility, but also circumvents their 

The ICRC is engaging more than 

one hundred nonstate armed 

actors in about thirty countries, 

concentrating particularly 

on Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions.
5

feeling not to be bound by international law when they are neither involved in its creation 

nor allowed to sign the relevant international treaty. An express commitment may contain 

new legal obligations that go beyond the existing provisions (i.e., a constitutive agreement) or restate law that is already binding in noninternational conflict (i.e., a declaratory 

agreement). In 1992, the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded a 

declaratory agreement vowing respect for the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions and adding provisions regulating the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; of hospitals and medical units; and of the civilian population. Similar agreements 

were made in Yemen in 1962 and Nigeria in 1967. Constitutive agreements were concluded 

with the government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 

Nacional (FMNL) in 1990, and between the government of the Philippines and the National 

Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) in 1998, accepting human rights norms that went 

beyond the commitments of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. 

Unilateral declarations give armed actors another opportunity to express commitment to 

international humanitarian norms and human rights independent from any other party. In 

September 1987 the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB), a short-lived umbrella 

organization of rebel groups in Colombia, declared its intention to respect international 

humanitarian norms. In 1991 and 1996, the ICRC received declarations from the National 

Democratic Front of the Philippines. Such agreements have also been part of cease-fire or 

peace agreements. The 2002 cease-fire agreement between the government of Angola and 

the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) contained an additional 

section that guaranteed the halting of all force movements in the reinforcement or occupation of new military positions. The cease-fire agreement between the government of the 

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 

also in 2002, included an additional article on protecting the population against hostile 

acts, such as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion, and harassment.

The second mechanism represents the main part of the ICRC’s concept. It follows the 

premise that, if violations are to be avoided, rules and regulations need to become an 

integral part of the behavior of armed actors in military operations. Generally, the process 

begins by disseminating information about existing humanitarian regulations, as it cannot 

be assumed that armed actors have comprehensive knowledge of international law or its 

implications for their operations. Subsequent work addresses four dimensions in particular: 

doctrine, education and training, equipment, and effective sanctions. Ideally, changes in 

these four dimensions are mutually reinforcing, so that the entire process is a comprehensive 

approach requiring continual and long-term interaction with an armed actor, accounting for 

the time the actor needs to execute and implement all necessary organizational changes. 

To influence behavior, international humanitarian norms have to become a common and 

integral part of an actor’s doctrine. For this to happen, the humanitarian norms have to 

be incorporated into all directives, procedures, rules of behavior, and handbooks concerning the training, terminology, and decision-making processes of fighters, strategically and 

tactically. Special handbooks need to be compiled that speak to the relevant levels and 

specializations of the armed organization, such as different levels of command or fighters 

in populated areas. Even if no systematic curriculum exists, nonstate armed actors have 

some form of educational system that at least covers weapons training, which can be used 

for humanitarian purposes. Additionally, the ICRC offers training courses for teachers, trainers, and legal advisers of nonstate armed actors. The highest level of command must equip 

fighters to minimize or avoid violations of international humanitarian norms, and the ICRC 

is authorized to inspect would-be combatants during training to determine whether they 

are equipped to carry out the provisions of international humanitarian law. During these 

training situations, the ICRC also aims to demonstrate to fighters the effects their weapons 

The ICRC is authorized to 

inspect would-be combatants 

during training to determine 

whether they are equipped 

to carry out the provisions of 

international humanitarian law.
6

have on civilian victims. Finally, the ICRC stresses that sanctions within the group itself 

must not violate international law and human rights: While commanders must be able to 

discipline fighters, especially punish violations of rules and regulations, sanctions must be 

applied consistently and reasonably to demonstrate the earnestness of the leadership and 

their commitment to international humanitarian norms.

To subject the entire integration process to a continuous evaluation, the ICRC developed 

a scorecard for state military and police that records the state of an actor’s integration—and 

violations—of international humanitarian law. The first practical applications of the scorecard have met serious challenges, such as the confidentiality of documentation necessary 

for an evaluation, the organizational complexity of developed military and police forces, and 

the need to repeat an evaluation periodically. The ICRC has not yet been able to design a 

corresponding scorecard for nonstate armed actors at all, as the groups in question are too 

different from one another to summarize according to common criteria.

Independent from which particular engagement strategy is used for a particular armed 

actor, the ICRC focuses on strategic argumentation.14 To be effective, discussions and dissemination sessions with armed actors need to be adapted to the motivations and interests 

of the actors. They need to explain why it is in the actors’ best interests to adhere to international humanitarian law. The ICRC has used several arguments in the past. First, adhering 

to international humanitarian law might improve actors’ reputations, on the international 

and local levels and among their allies and constituency. Additionally, the actor may gain 

the moral high ground that could lead to political gains. Second, if an actor develops a 

reputation for treating prisoners of war well, people might surrender to it more easily. Third, 

while reciprocity is not necessary for international humanitarian law to apply, it is more 

likely that the other side will treat an actor’s members well after taking them prisoner if 

it sees the actor treat its prisoners in a similar manner. Fourth, violations of international 

humanitarian law may be disadvantageous in the long run, in damage to an actor’s reputation, a loss of support, or ostracism by the population. By the same logic, compliance might 

benefit the actor. Adherence to international humanitarian norms also may help facilitate 

postconflict reconciliation. Fifth, international humanitarian norms may preserve military 

interests; they were originally developed by military commanders, accounting for the balance between military needs and humanity. It is not only more humane, but also in the 

commander’s interest to have well-disciplined troops and a functioning command structure. 

Sixth, adherence to international humanitarian law may save resources, especially in keeping infrastructure intact. Finally, recent developments in the prosecution of violations of 

international law during conflict, such as through the International Criminal Tribunal for 

Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), have strengthened the international legal framework, making 

prosecution of violations more likely.

Whether the above mechanisms and arguments succeed in changing armed actors’ 

behavior depends mostly on whether the ICRC is granted access to actors’ leadership, and 

whether this contact can be maintained over a longer period. The ICRC’s approach to armed 

actors is top down, relying on the cooperation of both political and military leadership. In 

its efforts, however, the ICRC is supported by its distinct status and reputation as a neutral 

humanitarian organization that engages nonstate armed actors in the same way it engages 

state actors regarding their obligations under international humanitarian law. All weapons 

bearers are subject to the same normative demands. This transparency awards the ICRC an 

exceptional credibility; at the same time, this credibility has to be reaffirmed in each individual case through the personal interactions of ICRC delegates.

The ICRC focuses on strategic 

argumentation adapted to the 

motivations and interests 

of the actors.
7

Geneva Call

Geneva Call, founded in 2002, directly engages nonstate armed actors to increase their 

adherence to international humanitarian norms, particularly international humanitarian law 

and international human rights law. The NGO currently addresses three issue areas: adherence to the universal antipersonnel mine ban, respect for children in armed conflict, and 

respect for the rights of women in conflict. The bulk of Geneva Call’s work, however, focuses 

on landmines, specifically in territory that nonstate armed actors control. Many nonstate 

armed actors maintain antipersonnel landmines as a part of their standard arsenal due to 

their low cost, availability, uncomplicated production, and simple use. Actors manufacture, 

trade, sell, and use landmines to advance their goals. Today, more than seventy states are 

believed to be affected by mines; in the past ten years, landmines, explosive remnants of 

war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IED) have caused approximately 74,000 casualties. An inquiry conducted in 2006 found that forty nonstate armed 

actors in at least seven countries reportedly used landmines between 2003 and 2005.15 

Experts estimate that 10 to 40 percent of landmines fail to explode as intended, then remain 

active and make access to certain areas highly dangerous. Landmines used by nonstate 

armed actors in particular tend to be first-generation mines without activity limits, possibly 

remaining active for decades. Landmines can impede a country’s development for multiple 

generations; simultaneously, they impair the nonstate armed actor by killing and maiming 

its own fighters, restricting troop movements, and diminishing support that they might 

otherwise have enjoyed in the affected population.

The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer 

of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction—otherwise known as the Ottawa Treaty—

internationally regulates the use of landmines. Nonstate actors did not participate in the 

negotiation process and are not eligible to sign the treaty because they lack appropriate 

status. They are subject to the provisions of the Ottawa Treaty if their home state is a signatory party, but in practice, they often do not know about their responsibilities regarding 

the landmines ban and do not feel bound by them because they did not expressly agree to 

the provisions. Without the active inclusion and assistance of nonstate armed actors, however, the landmines problem is not being addressed in its entirety. For this reason, Geneva 

Call aims to persuade armed actors to change their behavior and respect the international 

landmines ban. For this purpose, it has designed an innovative mechanism that allows armed 

actors to commit to the norms of the Ottawa Treaty by signing the Deed of Commitment 

for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action 

between the NGO and the armed actor. The mechanism attempts to balance the shortcomings of international law by offering a parallel process for nonstate armed actors that enables 

them to actively enter a formal commitment to the ban of antipersonnel landmines. Under 

the deed, the armed actor agrees to several conditions: first, to acknowledge the norm of 

a total ban on antipersonnel landmines established by the 1997 Ottawa Treaty; second, to 

adhere to a total ban of antipersonnel landmines, which includes the complete prohibition 

on all use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of 

mines; third, to cooperate in and undertake stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim 

assistance, mine awareness, and various other forms of mine action; fourth, to allow and 

cooperate in the monitoring and verification of the commitment, which entails visits and 

inspections by Geneva Call and other independent international and national organizations, 

as well as the provision of necessary information to those organizations; and fifth, to issue 

the necessary orders and directives to commanders and fighters, including measures for 

information dissemination, training, and disciplinary sanctions.

The bulk of Geneva Call’s 

work focuses on landmines, 

specifically in territory that 

nonstate armed actors control.
8

Additionally, Article 6 of the deed explains that signing the deed does not alter the legal 

status of the nonstate armed actor, pursuant to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The deed itself is most commonly seen as a unilateral declaration by the armed actor, 

with Geneva Call and the government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva serving as 

witnesses. It is signed by an individual representing and acting in the name of the armed 

actor, often in the historic Alabama Room at the Hôtel-de-Ville in Geneva, where the Geneva 

Convention was signed in 1864.

Geneva Call currently engages approximately sixty armed actors. Forty-one armed actors 

have signed the deed, seventeen from Somalia alone and six from Myanmar. The others 

are from Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara.16

Several other actors have not signed the deed but have pledged to prohibit or limit the use 

of antipersonnel landmines, either through individual unilateral declarations or as a part of 

a cease-fire agreement with the government. Still others have undertaken mine clearance 

and victim assistance in areas under their control. The government of Somaliland refuses 

to sign the deed because it considers itself to be a state and aspires to sign the Ottawa 

Treaty instead. 

In most cases the armed actors have already begun mine clearings and other action. 

Geneva Call supports the implementation of the deed and monitors the progress made. 

In 2008, the NGO facilitated technical assistance through specialized organizations to 

destroy stockpiles held by two signatory groups in Western Sahara and Somalia. Two other 

signatories in Burundi and Sudan reported to Geneva Call the complete destruction of their 

stockpiles after having joined the respective government; a signatory in the Republic of 

Myanmar/Burma reported clearing all its landmines and mine components; one signatory 

reported a stockpile located in Northern Iraq as destroyed. In Somalia, Geneva Call arranged 

for the assistance of a specialized organization to undertake explosive ordnance disposal 

(EOD) and to provide emergency support to mine victims. Additionally, Geneva Call organized workshops, mine risk education (MRE) seminars, and surveys in areas under signatories’ control in cooperation with partner organizations.

Geneva Call establishes contact with nonstate armed actors in three ways. First is directly, for the purpose of a dialogue on landmines, as with the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la 

Justice (MNJ), the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), the Partîya Demokrata Kurdistan (PDK), 

the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Al Houtis in Yemen. Second, contact has been 

facilitated indirectly through third parties, most commonly through local NGOs or civil society groups, but also through other nonstate armed actors, as occurred with the Mouvement 

des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi, the Ejército de 

Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 

Lanka, and the Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê (PJAK). Third, some actors have contacted 

Geneva Call directly to begin a dialogue on antipersonnel landmines after having heard of 

Geneva Call’s initiative, as did Chin National Front in Myanmar/Burma. Geneva Call does not 

begin a dialogue with an armed actor until it has thoroughly analyzed the group’s character, 

aims, leadership, internal structure, past practices, and the like; assessed the dynamics of 

conflict and other factors, such as the capabilities of armed actors and their assumed commitment, to assure maximum security; considered the probability of success; and developed 

the right arguments that persuade the particular nonstate armed actor to give up landmines 

and adhere to a total ban. According to Geneva Call, armed actors are willing to sign and 

commit to the deed for several reasons. These include improving the quality of life in the 

territory controlled by them, enabling mine action programs, and protecting their constituency; improving political stability; confirming for itself that it is respected as an organization and taken seriously by an international (non-governmental) actor, coming from an 

internationally highly respected country (i.e., the Swiss factor); demonstrating the ability to 

Geneva Call does not begin a 

dialogue with an armed actor 

until it has thoroughly analyzed 

the group’s character, aims, 

leadership, internal structure, 

past practices, and developed 

the right arguments that 

persuade the particular 

nonstate armed actor to give 

up landmines and adhere to 

a total ban. 
9

uphold the principles of international humanitarian law and, consequently, aspiring to gain 

international reputation and respect; and accepting the relatively limited military utility 

of antipersonnel mines, which may indiscriminately wound, maim, and kill enemies, their 

constituencies, and their own fighters, and harm their military capacity.

To follow up allegations of deed violations, Geneva Call has developed a monitoring 

mechanism that can, in practice, be difficult to employ, as the parties to the conflict 

may not actually have an interest in verifying claims. This is true for armed actors as well 

as governments if allegations are only made to discredit the opposition internationally. 

Monitoring, therefore, may involve self-reporting and progress reports (e.g., the Polisario 

Front), evaluation through local NGOs and civil society (e.g., PKK in Turkey), and following 

up on accusations (e.g., Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines). In practice, this 

method may not be entirely satisfying and convincing (see, e.g., Puntland, Somalia, and 

the Philippines). The NGO maintains, however, that most nonstate armed actors abide by 

the core of the prohibitions on the use, production, acquisition, and transfer of landmines. 

Armed actors are also undertaking demining, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, 

and victim assistance, and often collaborate with specialized humanitarian organizations 

for this purpose. Moreover, armed actors’ decisions to abstain from using landmines have 

in the past facilitated the ascension of states to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, as social pressure 

on the state government built up once a local nonstate armed actor had signed the deed of 

commitment. This happened in Sudan after the signature of the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and in Iraq after the ascension of the Kurdistan Democratic Party 

(KDP) and regional governments led by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Although 

not party to the Ottawa Treaty, Morocco submitted a voluntary report to Geneva Call and 

invited the organization in 2008 to form recommendations for the government after Geneva 

Call had engaged the rebel Polisario Front successfully in 2005.17

Efforts to ban landmines have a strong technical dimension, as armed actors often need 

more information to avoid mistakes when handling and disposing of these weapons. Unlike 

the ICRC, Geneva Call does not have special status; it depends on host governments to at 

least tolerate its activities. But even if governments attempt to obstruct Geneva Call’s efforts 

and refuse to give access to territory controlled by the armed actors, even state actors have 

an interest in controlling and containing antipersonnel landmines. They are equally affected, 

and responsible for protecting civilians. Whether Geneva Call’s approach can be transferred 

to other issue areas, such as women and child soldiers, remains to be seen.

Possibilities for and Limits to Changing Armed Actors’ Behavior 

Despite their different sizes, histories, and goals, the ICRC and Geneva Call employ similar 

mechanisms regarding norm diffusion. They focus heavily on transmitting information and 

knowledge, including technical knowledge. They aim to persuade armed actors with arguments that speak to their particular positions in a conflict (i.e., an empathic approach). They 

are interested in a long-term relationship based on trust and offer targeted measures to 

build the armed actors’ capacities in a particular field. In short, ICRC and Geneva Call explain 

to armed actors what they are supposed to do and why—and, furthermore, lay out concrete 

ways for them to implement the norms in question. Using the language developed in the 

literature on norm diffusion, both organizations practice first and foremost informational 

diffusion through strategic communication, procedural diffusion through institutionalized 

forms of cooperation, and transference through aid and support for implementing norms.18 

ICRC and Geneva Call work with different intensities, depending on the consistency, duration, and level of trust in the interaction with nonstate armed actors.

ICRC and Geneva Call explain 

to armed actors what they are 

supposed to do and why—and, 

furthermore, lay out concrete 

ways for them to implement the 

norms in question. 
10

Both organizations benefit from their reputations as neutral and independent actors, 

even if not all share this perception. The ICRC’s reputation is supported by the activities of 

the national Red Cross societies and by their special status in international humanitarian 

law. For Geneva Call, the Swiss factor is significant, as the organization consciously uses 

Switzerland’s reputation as a neutral country when inviting armed actors to talks and holding conferences with all deed signatories. This alone would not be possible in many other 

countries, if only for the difficulties of obtaining visas for members of armed actors. Moreover, the success of the ICRC and Geneva Call depends on how the interaction with armed 

actors has been established. The personal commitment of the NGO representatives, the 

cautious handling of the interlocutors, a willingness to demonstrate empathy, and the issue 

of which matters should be discussed first are extremely important. Experience has shown 

that it is more productive to begin dialogue with more practical matters rather than delving 

into abstract issues of international norms. This approach gives both sides an opportunity 

to assess and get to know each other. To start off talks, the ICRC has used inquiries into the 

condition of prisoners, requesting access to specific areas or a particular checkpoint along 

with the offer of humanitarian assistance.

Besides the organizations’ credibility and independence, their flexible but principled 

approaches are one of their strengths because they can be adjusted to the situation of the 

individual nonstate armed actor. The organizations do not offer take-it-or-leave-it programs 

but gradual processes through which the armed actors become acquainted with international norms step by step. Thus, the decision about whether and which norms armed actors 

incorporate is not a precondition for further dialogue but the result of a long-term effort 

that begins with awareness training and convincing. After their first steps, the ICRC and 

Geneva Call have developed more or less formalized forms of cooperation, depending on the 

actors’ willingness to be part of such a process. However, practice has also shown that the 

degree of formalization does not indicate an actor’s degree of norm adherence. A declaratory public acknowledgement of international humanitarian norms and the deed signing 

remain important signals but do not allow for conclusions regarding how much actors have 

internalized norms.

The promise of success in an interaction with a nonstate armed actor depends on external 

factors that may be outside the NGOs’ influence. First, the timing of first contact with the 

phase of the conflict is significant—success is more likely if there is an ongoing peace process with existing regulations that the ICRC and Geneva Call can build on. At the same time, 

both organizations endeavor to intensify contact with armed actors before violence escalates (again) and before the government restricts or completely prohibits access to the armed 

actor. ICRC experience, in particular, shows that the earlier a channel of communication can 

be opened with an armed actor, the sooner a trusted relationship can be established, and 

the sooner the actor feels that its grievances are being considered—potentially before the 

lines of conflict become hardened. Such a situation can be exploited to broach the issue of 

protecting civilians at an early stage, in the hope that such behavior persists even if the conflict intensifies. If a conflict has already escalated and the armed actor is already conducting 

military operations, a dialogue on humanitarian issues is less of a priority.

Second, much depends on armed actors’ abilities to cooperate with organizations 

such as the ICRC and Geneva Call. Their willingness to do so tends to be greater the more 

anchored the armed actor is in society and the more support it requires from the population. In these cases, the armed actor probably has an interest in increasing its legitimacy 

among civilians. This is particularly true for politically and ideologically oriented actors led 

by politically ambitious individuals. Additionally, a somewhat coherent and hierarchical 

organizational and command structure is relevant, as well as, in the case of landmines, a 

somewhat stable control over territory. This structure includes effective leadership as well 

The organizations do not offer 

take-it-or-leave-it programs 

but gradual processes through 

which the armed actors become 

acquainted with international 

norms step by step. 
11

as a regulated system for recruitment, education, and training that norm diffusion can 

build on. The more splintered and fragmented an armed actor, and the less assertive the 

leadership, the more unlikely it is that international humanitarian norms are understood, 

accepted, and complied with.

Both aspects touch on the issue of the sustainability of norm-diffusion processes. 

Although the ICRC—and Geneva Call even more so—aim to establish functioning monitoring mechanisms to supervise compliance with norms, both organizations are reaching their 

limits. This is due partly to the limited resources at their disposal compared with state 

actors. Both organizations also lack functioning sanctioning mechanisms because of their 

very nature. The only sanctions available to the ICRC and Geneva Call are to end any form 

of cooperation and publicly denounce violations of international norms. Both options have 

severe consequences as channels of communication are cut, contacts lost—potentially 

for a long time—and the possibilities diminished to at least partially improve security 

for the population. Additionally, such measures may negatively affect engagement with 

other nonstate armed actors. Thus, both the ICRC and Geneva Call sanction actors only in 

extreme cases.

The discrepancies between the declarations of nonstate armed actors and their actual 

behaviors spur the accusations—often made by governments—that armed actors are using 

NGOs solely to gain legitimacy and international recognition. Both the ICRC and Geneva Call 

know about this danger but have experiences with armed actors that put it in perspective. 

Often this sweeping argument is made to discredit the work of NGOs in general, mostly 

when the NGOs’ engagement with armed actors is too successful from the government’s 

perspective; it is not made when the engagement has no effect. Also, state actors often 

use this accusation to distract the international community from their own noncompliance 

with humanitarian norms. Furthermore, so ICRC and Geneva Call representatives argue, the 

gain in prestige for armed actors through cooperating with international NGOs is very small 

compared with the gains when armed actors change their behavior toward other (state) 

conflict actors, and particularly toward civilians. The problem for many states is not that 

NGOs fail in diffusing international norms with but that they help armed actors in a battle 

for the population’s favor—and, thus, power in the country.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The ICRC and Geneva Call approaches toward norm diffusion assume that nonstate armed 

actors are led by norms and values, which the organizations refer to in their statements and 

declarations. A fundamental reason for this assumption is that a number of nonstate armed 

actors value their public reputation, moral authority, and source of legitimacy, as well as the 

expectations that are put on them. For this reason, so the line of thought goes, their normative statements should be taken seriously and their behavior evaluated accordingly. Armed 

actors’ self-awareness can be the start of a debate about norms and regulations, which is 

part of both the ICRC and Geneva Call approaches. The mechanisms these organizations 

have developed aim at pressuring armed actors to justify their actions. On an argumentative 

level, this justification becomes more difficult for the actors the more they have committed 

to humanitarian norms. For this reason, the declaratory acceptance of norms should be seen 

as a first step, opening the opportunity to entangle armed actors in an argument about the 

diffusion and internalization of norms—the same mechanism that is used to diffuse norms, 

such as human rights, among state actors.

However, the limits of the approach have also become apparent: It is more hazardous 

to employ the mechanism with regard to nonstate armed actors, who often need to take 

serious precautions for their security. Additionally, the mechanism appears particularly to 

The more splintered and 

fragmented an armed actor, and 

the less assertive the leadership, 

the more unlikely it is that 

international humanitarian 

norms are understood, accepted, 

and complied with.

The ICRC and Geneva Call 

approaches assume that a 

number of nonstate armed 

actors value their public 

reputation, moral authority, 

and source of legitimacy, as 

well as the expectations that 

are put on them.
12

affect a certain type of nonstate armed actor, namely those actors and leaders that follow 

a political program, see themselves as representatives of a distinct population, and are 

interested in providing governance in the territory controlled by them. These actors already 

anticipate a role in the state, either through revolution and regime change or separation. 

This profile suggests that NGOs can be far more effective working with classic rebel groups, 

clan chiefs, and militias than with terrorists, warlords, criminals, or mercenaries, who do not 

typically have such national-level political ambitions. 

External actors dealing with nonstate armed actors need to be aware of the existing range 

of approaches used by different actors in the field, as well as their possibilities and limits. In 

any particular case, they need to know about the capabilities of all possible external actors, 

such as NGOs, to develop a joint effort or at least a complementing approach toward armed 

groups. The independent activities of NGOs in engaging nonstate armed groups in a humanitarian dialogue may facilitate a change of behavior, make such groups more approachable, 

and convey norms that other actors can build on, such as in future peace processes. In this 

respect, NGO activities may well work toward stabilization and peacebuilding even if they 

remain entirely independent of state efforts. However, the regulations set down in the U.S. 

Patriot Act specifically make it illegal for any U.S.-based civil society organization to interact with armed groups on the U.S. government’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, let 

alone transfer knowledge to them, even if this knowledge addresses human rights norms and 

international humanitarian law. The so-called material support law, as part of the Patriot 

Act, bans any expert advice, defined as “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,” that would counsel groups to abandon terrorism or to 

use legal and peaceful means to achieve political change.19 This argument was upheld in a 

U.S. Supreme Court ruling on June 21, 2010, which confirmed the ban on training, personnel, service, and expert advice and assistance to any group on the State Department list of 

terrorist organizations.20 The court ruled that even advice intended to be used for peaceful 

purposes amounted to material support for terrorism. This expanded definition of terrorism 

and terrorists actively prevents U.S. NGOs from helping to reduce indiscriminate violence by 

armed groups. Similar problems may occur regarding the lists of terrorist organizations set 

up by the United Nations, the European Union, and individual countries, although no other 

court has issued judgments or rulings on these matters yet.

The successes that organizations such as the ICRC and Geneva Call have achieved 

through their norm-diffusion approach reveal the deficiencies and shortcomings of the onedimensional view of nonstate armed actors conveyed in the global war on terror. This view 

makes little sense conceptually and is shortsighted politically. It is necessary to differentiate 

among types of armed groups independent of U.S. antiterrorism efforts and to develop more 

flexible operational procedures that include NGO activities early on. Revising U.S. policy and 

legislation is advisable to allow, in particular, U.S.-based and international NGOs to use norm 

diffusion to reduce violence.

External actors dealing with 

nonstate armed actors need to 

be aware of the existing range 

of approaches used by different 

actors in the field, as well as 

their possibilities and limits. 
13

Notes

1. A German edition of this paper was published as Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, “Verhaltensänderung 

durch Normdiffusion? Die Ansätze von IKRK und Geneva Call im Umgang mit bewaffneten Gruppen,” Die FriedensWarte—Journal of International Peace and Organization 85, no. 4 (2010), 73–98.

2. Véronique Dudouet, “Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups,” Special Report no. 239, United States 

Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2010; Ulrich Schneckener, “Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed 

Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood,” SFB Working Papers no. 21, Berlin, October 2009.

3. Claudia Hofmann, “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action,” International Peacekeeping 13, 

no. 3 (2006), 396–409.

4. Legally, the ICRC is a private association formed under the Swiss civil code. Internationally, however, the 

ICRC enjoys the status of a legal entity under international humanitarian law and is, therefore, different from 

conventional NGOs.

5. See Leonard S. Rubenstein and Melanie D. Bittle, “Responsibility for Protection of Medical Workers and Facilities 

in Armed Conflict,” The Lancet, no. 375 (January 2010), 329–340; Kathleen Newland, “Refugee Protection 

and Assistance,” in P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 508–33.

6. See Jörn Grävingholt, Claudia Hofmann, and Stephan Klingebiel, Development Cooperation and Non-State Armed 

Groups (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2007).

7. Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

8. Particularly during the height of the war in Afghanistan, NGOs suffered increased attacks by nonstate armed 

actors. See the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, ANSO Quarterly Data Reports, http://www.afgnso.org/index_files/

Page595.htm. While this trend has often been attributed to a loss of humanitarian space after increased civilmilitary cooperation on the ground, incidences of looting, blackmail, intimidation, and kidnappings of members 

of civil society organizations in conflict countries are common.

9. See also Tobias Debiel and Monika Sticht, Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian and ConflictResolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization (Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, 2005).

10. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

11. See Larry A. Dunne and Louis Kriesberg, “Mediating Intermediaries: Expanding Roles of Transnational 

Organisations,” in Jacon Bercovitch, ed., Studies in International Mediation: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin

(London: Palgrave, 2002), 194–212.

12. See Article 5.2 (g) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, http://www.icrc.

org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-statutes-080503.htm.

13. ICRC, Integrating the Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2007). See also Lisbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition 

Groups in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

14. ICRC, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts (Geneva: ICRC, 

2008), 30–31.

15. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World 

(Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2009), http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2009/res/Landmines_Report_2009.pdf; 

Anki Sjöberg, Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines 1: A Global Report Profiling NSAs and their Use, Acquisition, 

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling of Landmines (Geneva: Geneva Call, 2006).

16. See Geneva Call, “Anti-Personnel Mines and Armed Non-State Actors,” http://www.genevacall.org/Themes/

Landmines/landmines.htm.

17. Geneva Call, Annual Report 2008 (Geneva: Geneva Call, 2008), 17, http://www.genevacall.org/resources/annualreports/f-annual-reports/2001-2010/gc-annual-report-2008.pdf.

18. Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 

(2002), 235–58.

19. Editorial, “Redefining ‘Support’ of Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, February 20, 2010, http://articles.latimes.

com/2010/feb/20/opinion/la-ed-material20-2010feb20.

20. Holder, Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., June 21, 2010, http://www.supremecourt.gov/

opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf.


United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

•	 Engaging Extremists edited by I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (2011)

•	 Talking to Groups That Use Terror edited by Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne (2011)

•	 Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups by Véronique Dudouet (Special Report, June 

2010)

•	 When Should We Talk to Terrorists? by Audrey Kurth Cronin (Special Report, May 2010)

•	 When Is International Peacemaking Illegal? by Stephanie Schwartz (Peace Brief, November 

2010)