UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4326

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KALIFE CRENSHAW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:11-cr-00456-RDB-1)

Submitted: October 26, 2012 Decided: November 2, 2012

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Staff 

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kalife Crenshaw pled guilty to one count of possession 

of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2006), and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 180 

months’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed 

by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). Crenshaw appeals his sentence, 

arguing that the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme in § 924(e) 

conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). We affirm.

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. 

United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Section 924(e)(1) requires a minimum sentence of 180 months’ 

imprisonment for a violation of § 922(g) by a person with three 

or more previous convictions for either violent felonies or 

serious drug offenses. Section 3553(a), the general sentencing 

statute, sets forth factors for the district court to consider 

during sentencing and mandates that a court “impose a sentence 

sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” Section 3551(a) 

defines the scope of § 3553(a) so as to eliminate any conflict 

with mandatory minimum sentences, providing that sentencing 

shall be effected pursuant to § 3553(a) “except as otherwise 

specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006).

Courts have rejected the assertion that § 3553(a) 

conflicts with statutorily-mandated sentences, finding that the 

“otherwise specifically provided” language of § 3551(a) includes 
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mandatory minimum sentences. E.g., United States v. Sutton, 625

F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 

285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004) (mandatory minimum sentences “clearly 

fit within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ 

exclusion of 3551(a)”). In addressing a similar issue, we have

likewise recognized that “a district court has no discretion to 

impose a sentence outside of the statutory range established by 

Congress for the offense of conviction.” United States v. 

Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005).

Applying this reasoning, we conclude that no conflict 

exists between § 3553(a) and the statutorily-imposed mandatory 

minimum sentence in § 924(e). Crenshaw’s challenge to his 

sentence thus fails. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED