1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v

. VULLO

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–842. Argued March 18, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024

Petitioner National Rifle Associat ion (NRA) sued respondent Maria

Vullo—former superintendent of th e New York Department of Finan

cial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim.

The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U. S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. DFS regulates insurance companies an d financial services institutions doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investiga

tions and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for crim

inal prosecution. The NRA contra cted with DFS-regulated entities— affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)—to administer insur

ance polices the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of Lo ndon (Lloyd’s) would then under

write. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insur

ance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured gun owners from intentional crimina l acts in violation of New York law, and that the NRA promoted Ca rry Guard without the required insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently sus

pended Carry Guard. Vullo then ex panded her investigation into the NRA’s other affinity insurance programs.

On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s,2 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Syllabus
expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloyd’s exec

utives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing” infractions unre

lated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insur

ance to gun groups, especially the N RA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199– 200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insuran ce enforcement action solely on those syndicates whic h served the NRA.” Id., at 223, ¶69.

On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, “Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organ

izations.” Id ., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters). In the Guidance Letters, Vullo “encourage[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluat

ing and managing their risks, includ ing reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with th e NRA or similar gun promotion or

ganizations”; (2) “review any relation ships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion or ganizations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.” Id ., at 248, 251. Vullo and Governor Cuomo also issued a joint press release echoing many of the letters’ statem ents, and “ ‘urg[ing] all insurance companies and banks doing business in New York’ ” to join those “ ‘that have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.’ ” Id ., at 244. DFS subsequently entered into separate consent decrees with Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s, in wh ich the insurers admitted violations of New York’s insurance law, agreed not to provide any NRA-endorsed insurance programs (even if lawful ), and agreed to pay multimillion dollar fines.
Held : The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First

Amendment by coercing regulated enti ties to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in orde r to punish or suppress gun-promo

tion advocacy. Pp. 8–20. (a) At the heart of the First Am endment’s Free Speec h Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimina tion is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society. When government officials are “engaging in their own expressive conduct,” thou gh, “the Free Speech Clause has no application.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U. S. 460, 467. “When a government entity embarks on a course of action, it neces

sarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others,” and thus does not need to “maintain viewpoint-neutrality when its officers and em

ployees speak about that venture.” Matal v. Tam , 582 U. S. 218, 234. While a government official can share her views freely and criticize particular beliefs in the hopes of persuading others, she may not use the power of her office to punish or suppress disfav ored expression.

In Bantam Books

, Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U. S. 58, this Court explored3 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Syllabus

the distinction between permissible attempts to persuade and imper

missible attempts to coerce. The Court explained that the First Amendment prohibits government offi cials from relying on the “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve the suppression” of di sfavored speech. Id ., at 67. Although the defend

ant in Bantam Books , a state commission that blacklisted certain pub

lications, lacked the “power to apply formal legal sanctions,” the co

erced party “reasonably understood” the commission to threaten adverse action, and thus its “comp liance with the [c]ommission’s direc

tives was not voluntary.” Id ., at 66–68. To reach this conclusion, the Court considered things like: the commission’s authority; the commis

sion’s communications; and the coer ced party’s reaction to the commu

nications. Id ., at 68. The Courts of Appeals have since considered similar factors to determine whether a challenged communication is reasonably understood to be a c oercive threat. Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot di

rectly or indirectly coerce a privat e party to punish or suppress disfa

vored speech on her behalf. Pp. 8–11. (b) To state a claim that the government violated the First Amend

ment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff must plausibly allege conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to con

vey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or sup

press speech. See Bantam Books , 372 U. S., at 67–68. Here, the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities into disassoc iating with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.

As DFS superintendent, Vullo ha d direct regulatory and enforce

ment authority over a ll insurance companies an d financial service in

stitutions doing business in New York. She could initiate investiga

tions, refer cases for prosecution, notice civil charges, and enter into consent decrees. Vullo’s communica tions with the DFS-regulated en

tities, particularly with Lloyd’s, must be considered against the back

drop of Vullo’s authority. Vullo ma de clear she wanted Lloyd’s to dis

associate from all gun groups, althou gh there was no indication that such groups had unlawful insurance policies similar to the NRA’s. Vullo also told the Lloyd’s execut ives she would “focus” her enforce

ment actions “solely” on the syndicat es with ties to the NRA, “and ig

nore other syndicates writing similar policies.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 223, ¶69. The message was loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid liabil

ity for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s campaign against gun groups” by terminating its business relationships with them. Ibid . As the reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms, Vullo’s alleged communica

tions—whether seen as a threat or as an inducement—were reasona

bly understood as coercive. Other a llegations concerning the Guidance4 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Syllabus

Letters and accompanying press releas e, viewed in context of their is

suance, reinforce the NRA’s First Amendment claim. Pp. 12–15.

(c) The Second Circuit conclude d that Vullo’s alleged communica

tions were “examples of permissibl e government speech” and “legiti

mate enforcement action.” 49 F. 4th 700, 717–719. The Second Circuit could only reach this conclusion, ho wever, by taking the complaint’s allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor.

Vullo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. The conceded illegal

ity of the NRA-endorsed insurance programs does not insulate Vullo from First Amendment scrutiny under Bantam Books . Nor does her argument that her actions targeted “nonexpressive” business relation

ships change the fact that the NRA alleges her actions were aimed at punishing or suppressing speech. Finally, Vullo claims that the NRA’s position, if accepted, would stifle government speech and hamper le

gitimate enforcement efforts, but th e Court’s conclusion simply reaf

firms the general principle that where, as here, the complaint plausi

bly alleges coercive threats aimed at punishing or suppressing disfavored speech, the plaintiff stat es a First Amendment claim. Pp. 15–18.

(d) The NRA’s allegations, if tr ue, highlight the constitutional con

cerns with the kind of strategy th at Vullo purportedly adopted. Alt

hough the NRA was not the directly regulated party here, Vullo alleg

edly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after the NRA’s business partners. Nothing in this case immunizes the NRA from regulation nor prevents gove rnment officials from condemning disfavored views. The takeaway is that the First Amendment prohib

its government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private inter

mediaries. P. 19. 49 F. 4th 700, vacated and remanded.

S OTOMAYOR , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. G ORSUCH , J., and J ACKSON , J., each filed a concurring opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the Unit ed States, Washingt on, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov , of any typographical or other formal errors. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22–842

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May 30, 2024]

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Six decades ago, this Court held that a government en

tity’s “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion” against a third party “to achieve the suppression” of disfavored speech violates the First Amendment. Ban

tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan , 372 U. S. 58, 67 (1963). Today, the Court reaffirms what it sa id then: Government officials cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to punish or suppress views that the government disfavors. Peti

tioner National Rifle Association (NRA) plausibly alleges that respondent Maria Vullo did just that. As superinten

dent of the New York Departm ent of Financial Services, Vullo allegedly pressured regula ted entities to help her sti

fle the NRA’s pro-gun advocacy by threatening enforcement actions against those entities that refused to disassociate from the NRA and other gun-promotion advocacy groups. Those allegations, if true, state a First Amendment claim.

I A
Because this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court assumes the truth of “well-pleaded factual2 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court allegations” and “reasonable inference[s]” therefrom. Ash

croft v. Iqbal , 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009). Unless stated otherwise, the allegations aver as follows: The New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) oversees insurance companies and financial services insti

tutions doing business in the State. See N. Y. Fin. Servs. Law Ann. §201(a) (West 2012). DFS can initiate investiga

tions and civil enforcement actions against regulated enti

ties, and can refer potential criminal violations to the State’s attorney general for prosecution. §§301(b), (c)(4). The DFS-regulated entities in this case are insurers that had business relationships with the NRA. Since 2000, the NRA has offered a variety of insurance programs as a benefit to its members. The NRA contracted with affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton), to ad

minister the various policies of these affinity insurance pro

grams, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of Lon

don (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In return, the NRA received a percentage of its members’ premium payments. One of the NRA’s affinity products, Carry Guard, covered personal-injury and criminal-d efense costs related to li

censed firearm use, and “insured New York residents for intentional, reckless, and crimi nally negligent acts with a firearm that injured or killed another person.” 49 F. 4th 700, 707 (CA2 2022). In September 2017, a gun-control advocacy group con

tacted the New York County District Attorney’s office to tip them off to “compliance infirmities in Carry Guard.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 206, Second Amended Complaint ¶34. That office then passed on the allegations to DFS. The next month, then-Superintendent of DFS Vullo began investi

gating Carry Guard, focusing on Chubb and Lockton. The investigation revealed at least two kinds of violations of New York law: that Carry Guard insured intentional crim

inal acts, and the NRA promoted Carry Guard without an3 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court insurance producer license. By mid-November, upon find

ing out about the investigation following DFS information requests, Lockton and Chubb suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her invest igation into the NRA’s other affinity insurance programs, many of which were under

written by Lloyd’s and administered by Lockton. These NRA-endorsed programs provided similar coverage and suffered from the same legal infirmities. In the midst of the investigation, tragedy struck Park

land, Florida. On February 14, 2018, a gunman opened fire at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, murdering 17 students and staff members. Following the shooting, the NRA and other gun-advocacy groups experienced “intense backlash” across the country. 49 F. 4th, at 708. Major busi

ness institutions, including DFS-regulated entities, spoke out against the NRA, and some even cut ties with the or

ganization. App. to Pet. for Cert. 244. MetLife, for exam

ple, ended a discount program it offered with the NRA. On February 25, 2018, Lockton’s chairman “placed a dis

traught telephone call to the NRA,” in which he privately shared that Lockton would sever all ties with the NRA to avoid “ ‘losing [its] license’ to do business in New York.” Id

., at 298, Complaint ¶42. Lockton publicly announced its de

cision the next day. Follo wing Lockton’s decision, the NRA’s corporate insurance carrier also severed ties with the organization and refused to renew coverage at any price. The NRA contends that Lockton and the corporate insurance carrier took these steps not because of the Park

land shooting but because they feared “reprisa[l]” from Vullo. Id ., at 210, ¶44; see id ., at 209–210, ¶¶41–43. Around that time, Vullo also began to meet with execu

tives at the insurance companies doing business with the NRA. On February 27, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s. There, speaking on behalf of DFS and then-Gover

nor Andrew Cuomo, Vullo “presented [their] views on gun control and their desire to leve rage their powers to combat4 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court the availability of firearms, including specifically by weak

ening the NRA.” Id ., at 221, ¶67. She also “discussed anarray of technical regulatory infractions plaguing the affinityinsurance marketplace” in New York. Id ., at 199, ¶21. Vullo told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing the[se] infractions” unrelated to any NRA busi

ness “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” Id ., at 199–200, ¶21; accord, id ., at 223, ¶69 (alleging that Vullo made it clear to Lloyd’s that it “could avoid liability for infractions relating to other, similarly situated insurance policies, so long as it aided DFS’s campaign against gun groups”). 1 Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related po licies and would scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would fo

cus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates wh ich served the NRA, and ig

nore other syndicates writing similar policies.” Ibid ., ¶69. On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued two virtually identical guidance letters on DFS letterhead entitled, “Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.” Id ., at 246–251 (Guidance Let

ters). Vullo sent one of the letters to insurance companies and the other to financial services institutions. In the let

ters, Vullo pointed to the “soc ial backlash” against the NRA and other groups “that promote guns that lead to senseless violence” following “several recent horrific shootings, in

cluding in Parkland, Florida.” Id ., at 246, 249. Vullo then cited recent instances of busine sses severing their ties with the NRA as examples of companies “fulfilling their corpo

rate social responsibility.” Id ., at 247, 250.

——————

1 According to the complaint, other affinity organizations offered simi

lar insurance policies, including the New York State Bar Association, the New York City Bar, and the New York State Psychological Association, among others. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 207–208, Complaint ¶36.5 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court In the Guidance Letters’ final paragraph, Vullo “encour

age[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluating and managing their risks, includ ing reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; (2) “review any relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion organi

zations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.” Id ., at 248, 251. 2 The same day that DFS issued the Guidance Letters, Vullo and Governor Cuomo issued a joint press release that echoed many of the letters’ statements. The press release included a quote from Vullo “ ‘urg[ing] all insurance compa

nies and banks doing business in New York’ ” to join those

“ ‘that have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.’ ” Id ., at 244. The press release cited Chubb’s de

cision to stop underwriting Carry Guard as an example to emulate. The next day, Cuomo tweeted: “ ‘The NRA is an extremist organization. I urge companies in New York State to revisit any ties they have to the NRA and consider their reputations, and responsibility to the public.’ ” Id ., at 213, Complaint ¶51. Less than two weeks after the Guidance Letters and press release went out, DFS entered into consent decrees with Lockton (on May 2), and Chubb (on May 7). The de

crees stipulated that Carry G uard violated New York insur

-

——————

2 The financial-regulatory term “reputational risk” is “ ‘the risk to cur

rent or projected financial condition and resilience arising from negative public opinion,’ which ‘may impair a bank’s competitiveness by affecting its ability to establish new relationship s or services or continue servicing existing relationships.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27– 28, and n. 10 (quoting Office of th e Comptroller of the Currency, Comp

troller’s Handbook, Examination Pr ocess, Bank Supervision Process 28 (Sept. 2019)). DFS monitors the repu tational risk of regulated institu

tions because of its potential effect on market stability. See Brief for Respondent 6.6 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court ance law because it provided insurance coverage for inten

tional criminal acts, and because the NRA promoted Carry Guard, along with other NRA-endorsed programs, without an insurance producer license. The decrees also listed other infractions of the State’s insurance law. Both Lockton andChubb admitted liability, agreed not to provide any NRAendorsed insurance programs (even if lawful) but were per

mitted to sell corporate insurance to the NRA, and agreed to pay fines of $7 million and $1.3 million respectively. On May 9, Lloyd’s officially instructed its syndicates to termi

nate existing agreements with the NRA and not to insure new ones. It publicly announced its decision to cut ties with the NRA that same day. On December 20, 2018, DFS and Lloyd’s entered into their own consent decree, which im

posed similar terms and a $5 million fine.

B The NRA sued Cuomo, Vullo, and DFS. The only claims before the Court today are those against Vullo—namely, claims that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress “the NRA’s pro-Second Amendment viewpoint” and “core political speech.” Id ., at 231, ¶91, 234, ¶101. The complaint asserts both censorship and retaliation First Amendment claims, which the parties and lower courts have analyzed together. Vullo moved to dismiss, arguing that the alleged conduct did not constitute impermissible coercion and that, in the alternative, she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not violate clearly established law. The District Court denied Vullo’s motion to dismiss the NRA’s First-Amendment damages claims. The court held that the NRA plausibly alleged that “the combination of [Vullo’s and Cuomo’s] actions . . . could be interpreted as a veiled threat to regulated indu stries to disassociate with the NRA or risk DFS enforcement action.” NRA of Am. v. Cuomo , 525 F. Supp. 3d 382, 402–403 (NDNY 2021). That7 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
threat, the court said, crossed a First Amendment line. The District Court concluded that Vu llo was not entitled to qual

ified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Second Circuit reversed. It concluded that Vullo’s alleged actions constituted pe rmissible government speech and legitimate law enforceme nt, and not unconstitutional coercion. The Second Circuit determined that the Guidance Letters and accompanying press release were not unconsti

tutionally coercive because they “were written in an even

handed, nonthreatening tone and employed words intended to persuade rather than intimidate.” 49 F. 4th, at 717. The court found it significant that Vullo “did not refer to any pending investigations or po ssible regulatory action” and alluded only to business-relate d risks “amid growing public concern over gun violence.” Ibid. As for Vullo’s meeting with the Lloyd’s executives, the court admitted that the al

legations presented a “closer call.” Id ., at 718. Nonetheless, just as with the consent decrees, it found that Vullo “was merely carrying out her regu latory responsibilities.” Id., at 718–719. The Second Circuit also held that, even if the complaint stated a First Amendment violation, the law was not clearly established, and so Vullo was entitled to quali

fied immunity. The NRA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking either summary reversal or review of the First Amendment and qualified immunity holdings. This Court granted cer

tiorari on only the first question presented whether the complaint states a First Amendment claim against Vullo. See 601 U. S. ___ (2023). 3

——————

3 Vullo argues that the Court must dismiss the case as improvidently granted because the Court deprived itse lf of jurisdiction by limiting its review to the First Amendment questi on and declining to review the Sec

ond Circuit’s alternative holding that Vullo is entitled to qualified im

munity. See Brief for Respondent 21–24. Not so. In this case, “[a]n order limiting the grant of certiorari does no t operate as a jurisdictional bar.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U. S. 235, 247, n. 12 (1981). Because the8 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

II As discussed below, Vullo wa s free to criticize the NRA and pursue the conceded violations of New York insurance law. She could not wield her power, however, to threaten enforcement actions against DFS-regulated entities in or

der to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advo

cacy. Because the complaint plausibly alleges that Vullo did just that, the Court holds that the NRA stated a First Amendment violation.

A At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society. The Clause prohibits government entities and actors from “abridging the freedom of speech.” When government offi

cials are “engaging in their own expressive conduct,” though, “the Free Speech Clause has no application.” Pleas

ant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U. S. 460, 467 (2009). The government can “ ‘say what it wishes’ ” and “select the views that it wants to express.” Id. , at 467–468 (quoting Rosen

berger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U. S. 819, 833 (1995)). That makes sense; the government could barely function otherwise. “When a government entity em

barks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others,” and thus does not need to “maintain viewpoint-neutrality when its officers and em

ployees speak about that venture.” Matal v. Tam , 582 U. S. 218, 234 (2017). A government official can share her views freely and crit

icize particular beliefs, and she can do so forcefully in the

—————— Second Circuit is free to revisit the qualified immunity question in light of this Court’s opinion, th e NRA still could obtain “ ‘effectual relief ’ ” on remand. Chafin v. Chafin , 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013). In such circum

stances, it cannot be said that th e resolution of the First Amendment question is merely advisory.9 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court hopes of persuading others to follow her lead. In doing so, she can rely on the merits and force of her ideas, the strength of her convictions, and her ability to inspire others. What she cannot do, however, is use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression. See Rosen

berger , 515 U. S., at 830 (explaining that governmental ac

tions seeking to suppress a speaker’s particular views are presumptively unconstitutional). In such cases, it is “the application of state power which we are asked to scruti

nize.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson , 357 U. S. 449, 463 (1958). In Bantam Books , this Court explored the distinction be

tween permissible attempts to persuade and impermissible attempts to coerce. There, a state commission used its power to investigate and recommend criminal prosecution to censor publications that, in its view, were “ ‘objectiona

ble’ ” because they threatened “youthful morals.” 372 U. S., at 59–62, 71. The commission sent official notices to a dis

tributor for blacklisted public ations that highlighted the commission’s “duty to recommend to the Attorney General” violations of the State’s obscenity laws. Id ., at 62–63, and

n. 5. The notices also informed the distributor that the lists of blacklisted publications “w ere circulated to local police departments,” and that the dis tributor’s cooperation in re

moving the publications from the shelves would “ ‘eliminate the necessity’ ” of any referral for prosecution. Ibid. A local police officer also conducted followup visits to ensure com

pliance. In response, the distributor took “steps to stop fur

ther circulation of copies of the listed publications” out of fear of facing “ ‘a court action.’ ” Id ., at 63. The publishers of the blacklisted publications sued the commission, alleging that this scheme of informal censor

ship violated their First Amendment rights. The commis

sion responded that “it d[id] not regulate or suppress ob

scenity but simply exhort[ed] booksellers and advise[d] them of their legal rights.” Id ., at 66. This Court sided with10 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court
the publishers, holding that the commission violated their free-speech rights by coercing the distributor to stop selling and displaying the listed publications. The Court explained that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from relyin g on the “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve the suppression” of disfavored speech. Id ., at 67. Although the commission lacked the “power to apply formal legal sanctions,” the distributor “reasonably understood” the commission to threaten adverse action, and thus the dis

tributor’s “compliance with the [c]ommission’s directives was not voluntary.” Id ., at 66–68. To reach this conclusion, the Court considered things like: the commission’s coordi

nation with law enforcement and its authority to refer mat

ters for prosecution; the no tices themselves, which were “phrased virtually as orders” containing “thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings” if the distributor did not come around; and the distributor’s reaction to the notices and followup visits. Id., at 68. Since Bantam Books , the Courts of Appeals have consid

ered similar factors to determine whether a challenged communication is reasonably understood to be a coercive threat. Take the decision below, for example. The Second Circuit purported to consider: “(1) word choice and tone; (2) the existence of regulatory authority; (3) whether the speech was perceived as a threat; and, perhaps most im

portantly, (4) whether the speech refers to adverse conse

quences.” 49 F. 4th, at 715 (citations omitted). 4 Other Cir

cuits have taken similarly fact-intensive approaches,

——————

4 The NRA posits a three-factor test that looks to: (1) the actor’s au

thority; (2) the content and purpose of the actor’s communications; and (3) the reactions of the recipient. Brief for Petitioner 26. The NRA con

cedes, however, that its test is the same as the Second Circuit’s, as it considers the fourth factor in the Second Circuit’s test of “ ‘whether the speech refers to adverse consequences’ ” to be an “aspect of the inquiry into the content and purpose of the communication.” Id ., at 27, n. 8.11 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court utilizing a multifactor test or a totality-of-the-circum

stances analysis. See, e

. g ., Missouri v. Biden , 83 F. 4th 350, 380 (CA5 2023) (“[T]o help distinguish permissible persua

sion from impermissible coerci on, we turn to the Second (and Ninth) Circuit’s four-factor test”); Kennedy v. Warren

, 66 F. 4th 1199, 1207 (CA9 2023) (applying the Second Cir

cuit’s “useful non-exclusive four-factor framework”); Backpage.com , LLC v. Dart , 807 F. 3d 229, 230–232 (CA7 2015) (considering the same factors as part of a totality-of-the-cir

cumstances analysis); R. C. Maxwell Co. v. New Hope , 735 F. 2d 85, 88 (CA3 1984) (same). The Courts of Appeals thatemploy a multifactor test agree that “[n]o one factor is dispositive.” 49 F. 4th, at 715; accord, Kennedy , 66 F. 4th, at 1210 (explaining that the absence of direct regulatory au

thority is not dispositive). Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly: A governme nt official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf. See, e

. g ., 372 U. S., at 67–69; see also Backpage.com , 807 F. 3d, at 231 (holding that the First Amend

ment barred a sheriff from “using the power of his office to threaten legal sanctions against . . . credit-card companies for facilitating future speech”); Okwedy v. Molinari , 333 F. 3d 339, 344 (CA2 2003) ( per curiam ) (holding that a reli

gious group stated a First Amendment claim against a bor

ough president who wrote a letter “contain[ing] an implicit threat of retaliation” against a billboard company display

ing the group’s disfavored message); cf. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd.

v. Meese , 939 F. 2d, 1011, 1016 (CADC 1991) (“[W]hen the government threatens no sanction—criminal or other

wise—we very much doubt that the government’s criticism or effort to embarrass the [intermediary] threatens any

one’s First Amendment rights”).12 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

B The parties and the Solicitor General, who filed an ami

cus brief supporting vacatur, agree that Bantam Books pro

vides the right analytical framework for claims that the government has coerced a third party to violate the First Amendment rights of another. They also embrace the lower courts’ multifactor test as a useful, though nonexhaustive, guide. Rightly so. Considerations like who said what and how, and what reaction followed, are just helpful guideposts in answering the question whet her an official seeks to per

suade or, instead, to coerce. Where the parties differ is on the application of the Bantam Books framework. The NRA and the Solicitor General reject the Second Circuit’s appli

cation of the framework, while Vullo defends it. The Court now agrees with the NRA and the Solicitor General. To state a claim that the government violated the First Amendment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff must plausibly allege conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse gov

ernment action in order to punish or suppress the plaintiff ’s speech. See 372 U. S., at 67–68. Accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, the NRA plau

sibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities into disassociating with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-pro

motion advocacy. Consider first Vullo’s authority, which serves as a back

drop to the NRA’s allegations of coercion. The power that a government official wields, wh ile certainly not dispositive, is relevant to the objective inquiry of whether a reasonable person would perceive the official’s communication as coer

cive. See id ., at 66–67. Generally speaking, the greater and more direct the government official’s authority, the less likely a person will feel free to disregard a directive from the official. For example, imagine a local affinity group in New York that receives a strongly worded letter. One13 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court would reasonably expect that organization to react differ

ently if the letter came from, say, the U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York than if it came from an out

of-state school board. As DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and enforcement authority over all insurance companies and fi

nancial service institutions doing business in New York. See N. Y. Fin. Servs. Law Ann. §§202, 301. Just like the commission in Bantam Books , Vullo could initiate investi

gations and refer cases for prosecution. Indeed, she could do much more than that. Vullo also had the power to notice civil charges and, as this case shows, enter into consent de

crees that impose significant monetary penalties. Against this backdrop, consider Vullo’s communications with the DFS-regulated entities, particularly with Lloyd’s.According to the NRA, Vullo brought a variety of insurancelaw violations to the Lloyd’s executives’ attention during a private meeting in February 2018. The violations included technical infractions that allegedly plagued the affinity in

surance market in New York and that were unrelated to any NRA business. App. to Pet. for Cert. 199–200, Com

plaint ¶21; accord, id., at 207–208, ¶¶36–37; id ., at 223, ¶69. Vullo allegedly said she would be “less interested in pursuing the[se] infractions . . . so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” Id ., at 199–200, ¶21. Vullo therefore wanted Lloyd’s to dis

associate from all gun groups, although there was no indi

cation that such groups had unlawful insurance policies similar to the NRA’s. Vullo also told the Lloyd’s executives she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndi

cates writing similar policies.” Id ., at 223, ¶69. The mes

sage was therefore loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid lia

bility for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s campaign against gun groups” by terminating its business relationships with them. Ibid.14 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court As alleged, Vullo’s communications with Lloyd’s can be reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement. Ei

ther of those can be coercive. As Vullo concedes, the “threat need not be explicit,” Brief for Respondent 47, and as the Solicitor General explains, “[t] he Constitution does not dis

tinguish between ‘comply or I’ ll prosecute’ and ‘comply and I’ll look the other way,’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18, n. 7. So, whether analyzed as a threat or as an inducement, the conclusion is the same: Vullo allegedly co

erced Lloyd’s by saying she wo uld ignore unrelated infrac

tions and focus her enforcement efforts on NRA-related business alone, if Lloyd’s ceased underwriting NRA policies and disassociated from gun-promotion groups. The reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms the communi

cations’ coercive nature. Cf. Bantam Books , 372 U. S., at 63, 68 (noting that the distributor’s “reaction on receipt of a notice was to take steps to stop further circulation of copies of the listed publications”). At the meeting itself, Lloyd’s “agreed that it would instruct its syndicates to cease under

writing firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 223, Com

plaint ¶69. Minutes from a subsequent board of directors’ meeting reveal that Lloyd’s thought “the DFS investigation had transformed the gun issue into ‘a regulatory, legal[,] and compliance matter.’ ” 2 App. to Pet. for Cert. 29 (Sealed). That reaction is co nsistent with Lloyd’s public an

nouncement that it had directed its syndicates to “termi

nate all insurance related to the NRA and not to provide any insurance to the NRA in the future.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 224, Complaint ¶72; accord, id ., at 306, ¶20 (consent decree memorializing commitment not to underwrite, or participate in, NRA-endorsed programs). Other allegations, viewed in context, reinforce the NRA’s First Amendment claim. Consider the April 2018 Guidance Letters and accompanying pre ss release, which Vullo is

sued on official letterhead. Cf. Bantam Books , 372 U. S., at15 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court 61–63, and n. 5 (discussing notice issued in “official Com

mission stationery”). Just like in her meeting with the Lloyd’s executives, here too Vullo singled out the NRA and other gun-promotion organizations as the targets of her callto action. This time, the Guidance Letters reminded DFSregulated entities of their ob ligation to consider their “rep

utational risks,” and then tied that obligation to an encour

agement for “prompt actio[n] to manag[e] these risks.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 248, 251. Evocative of Vullo’s private con

versation with the Lloyd’s executives a few weeks earlier, the press release revealed how to manage the risks by en

couraging DFS-regulated entities to “ ‘discontinu[e] their arrangements with the NRA,’ ” just like Chubb did when it stopped underwriting Carry Guard. App. to Pet. for Cert. 244. A follow-on tweet from Cuomo reaffirmed the mes

sage: Businesses in New York should “ ‘consider their rep

utations’ ” and “ ‘revisit any ties they have to the NRA,’ ” which he called “ ‘an extremist organization.’ ” Id ., at 213, ¶51. In sum, the complaint, assessed as a whole, plausibly al

leges that Vullo threatened to wield her power against those refusing to aid her campaign to punish the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. If true, that violates the First Amendment.

C In holding otherwise, the Second Circuit found that: (1) the “Guidance Letters and Press Release are clear examples of permissible government speech”; and (2) the Lloyd’s meeting was “legitimate enforcement action” in which Vullo was “merely carrying out her re gulatory responsibilities” by offering “leniency in the course of negotiating a resolution of the apparent insurance law violations.” 49 F. 4th, at 717–719. The Second Circuit could only reach this conclu

sion by taking the allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor in violation16 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court of this Court’s precedents. Cf. Iqbal , 556 U. S., at 678–679; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007). For example, the Second Circuit failed to analyze the Guidance Letters and press release against the backdrop of other allegations in the complaint, including the Lloyd’s meeting. Moreover, as discussed above, the complaint al

leges that Vullo made a not-so-subtle, sanctions-backed threat to Lloyd’s to cut all business ties with the NRA and other gun-promotion groups, although there was no sign that other gun groups also had unlawful insurance policies. See supra , at 13. It is also relevant that Vullo made this alleged threat in a meeting where she presented her “desire to leverage [her] powers to co mbat the availability of fire

arms, including specifically by weakening the NRA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 221, Complaint ¶67; id ., at 223, ¶69 (alleg

ing Vullo hoped to enlist DFS-regulated entities in “aid[ing] DFS’s campaign against gun groups”). Given the obligation to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor and con

sider the allegations as a whole, the Second Circuit erred in reading the complaint as involving only individual in

stances of “permissible government speech” and the execu

tion of Vullo’s “regulatory responsibilities.” 49 F. 4th, at 717–719. For the same reasons, this Court cannot simply credit Vullo’s assertion that “pursuing conceded violations of the law,” Brief for Respondent 29, is an “ ‘obvious alternative explanation’ ” for her actions that defeats the plausibility of any coercive threat raising First Amendment concerns, id

., at 37, 40, 42 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U. S., at 682). Of course, discovery in this case might show that the allegations of co

ercion are false, or that certain actions should be under

stood differently in light of newly disclosed evidence. At this stage, though, the Court must assume the well-pleaded17 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court factual allegations in the complaint are true. 5 Moreover, the conceded illegality of the NRA-endorsed in

surance programs does not insulate Vullo from First Amendment scrutiny under the Bantam Books framework. Indeed, the commission in that case targeted the distribu

tion and display of material that, in its view, violated the State’s obscenity laws. Nothing in that case turned on the distributor’s compliance with state law. On the contrary, Bantam Books held that the commission violated the First Amendment by invoking legal sanctions to suppress disfa

vored publications, some of which may or may not contain protected speech ( i

. e ., nonobscene material). See 372 U. S., at 64, 67. Here, too, although Vullo can pursue violations of state insurance law, she cannot do so in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s protected expression. So, the con

tention that the NRA and the insurers violated New York law does not excuse Vullo from allegedly employing coercive threats to stifle gun-promotion advocacy. Vullo next argues that this case does not involve uncon

stitutional coercion because her challenged actions in fact targeted business practices and relationships, which qual

ify as “nonexpressive activity.” Brief for Respondent 32. The argument is misplaced. That Vullo “regulate[d]” busi

ness activities stemming from the NRA’s “relationships with insurers and banks,” ibid. , does not change the allega

tions that her actions were aimed at punishing or suppress

ing speech. In Bantam Books , the commission interfered with the business relationship between the distributor and

——————

5 Vullo also argues that she is enti tled to absolute prosecutorial im

munity for her enforcement actions. See Brief for Respondent 25–28. Putting aside whether a financial regula tor like Vullo is entitled to such immunity in the administrative context, because Vullo did not raise this defense below with respect to the First Amendment claim (or even with respect to allegations unrelated to the consent decrees), the Court de

clines to consider that argument here in the first instance.18 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court the publishers in order to suppress the publishers’ disfa

vored speech. 372 U. S., at 66–71. Similarly, in Backpage.com , a sheriff interfered with a website’s business re

lationships with payments-service providers in order to eliminate the website’s “adult section” (if not the website itself ). 807 F. 3d, at 230–232, 235–236. In that case, the sheriff wanted to “suffocat[e]” the website, “depriving the company of ad revenues by scaring off its payments-service providers.” Id ., at 231. “The analogy,” the Seventh Circuit explained, “is to killing a person by cutting off his oxygen supply rather than by shooting him.” Ibid. So too here. One can reasonably infer from the complaint that Vullo co

erced DFS-regulated entities to cut their ties with the NRA in order to stifle the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy and ad

vance her views on gun control. See, e

. g ., supra , at 12–15; App. to Pet. for Cert. 221, 230–235, Complaint ¶¶67, 87– 105. Vullo knew, after all, that the NRA relied on insurance and financing “to disseminate its message.” Id ., at 231, ¶92;

see id

., at 203–204, ¶¶28–29. 6 Lastly, Vullo falls back on the argument that a ruling in the NRA’s favor would interfere with the government’s abil

ity to function properly. Sh e claims that the NRA’s posi

tion, if accepted, would stifle government speech and ham

per legitimate enforcement efforts . This argument falls flat for the simple reason that it requires the Court to accept Vullo’s limited reading of the complaint. The Court does not break new ground in deciding this case. It only reaf

firms the general principle from Bantam Books that where, as here, the complaint plausibly alleges coercive threats aimed at punishing or suppressing disfavored speech, the plaintiff states a First Amendment claim.

——————

6 Vullo’s boss, Governor Cuomo, also urged businesses to disassociate with the NRA to put the organization “into financial jeopardy” and “shut them down.” App. 21 (Aug. 3, 2018, tweet).19 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

III The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitu

tional concerns with the kind of intermediary strategy that Vullo purportedly adopted to target the NRA’s advocacy. Such a strategy allows govern ment officials to “expand their regulatory jurisdiction to suppress the speech of or

ganizations that they have no di rect control over.” Brief for First Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Pe

titioner 8. It also allows government officials to be more effective in their speech-suppression efforts “[b]ecause in

termediaries will often be less invested in the speaker’s message and thus less likely to risk the regulator’s ire.” Ibid. The allegations here bear this out. Although “the NRA was not even the directly regulated party,” Brief for Respondent 32, Vullo allegedly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after the NRA’s business partners. Insurers in turn followed Vullo’s lead, fearing regulatory hostility. Nothing in this case gives advocacy groups like the NRA a “right to absolute immunity from [government] investiga

tion,” or a “right to disregar d [state or federal] laws.” Pat

terson , 357 U. S., at 463. Similarly, nothing here prevents government officials from forcefully condemning views with which they disagree. For those permissible actions, the Constitution “relies first and fo remost on the ballot box, not on rules against viewpoint dis crimination, to check the gov

ernment when it speaks.” Shurtleff v. Boston , 596 U. S. 243, 252 (2022). Yet where, as here, a government official makes coercive threats in a private meeting behind closed doors, the “ballot box” is an especially poor check on that official’s authority. Ultimately, the critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as allege d here) through private inter

mediaries.20 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

* * * For the reasons discussed above, the Court holds that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amend

ment by coercing DFS-regulate d entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA’s advocacy. The judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated, and the case remanded for further pro

ceedings consistent with this opinion. 7 It is so ordered.

——————

7 On remand, the Second Circuit is free to reconsider whether Vullo is entitled to qualified immunity._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22–842

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May 30, 2024]

J USTICE G ORSUCH , concurring. I write separately to explain my understanding of the Court’s opinion, which I join in full. Today we reaffirm a well-settled principle: “A government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.” Ante, at 11. As the Court mentions, many lower courts have taken to analyz ing this kind of coercion claim under a four-pronged “multifactor test.” Ibid . These tests, the Court explains, might serve “as a useful, though nonexhaustive, guide.” Ante, at 12. But sometimes they might not. Cf. Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC , 598 U. S. 175, 205–207 (2023) (G ORSUCH , J., concurring in judgment). In

deed, the Second Circuit’s decision to break up its analysis into discrete parts and “tak[e] the [complaint’s] allegations in isolation” appears only to have contributed to its mis

taken conclusion that the Nati onal Rifle Association failed to state a claim. Ante, at 15. Lower courts would therefore do well to heed this Court’s directive: Whatever value these “guideposts” serve, they remain “just” that and nothing

more. Ante, at 12. “Ultimately, the critical” question is whether the plaintiff has “plaus ibly allege[d] conduct that, viewed in context, could be re asonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or suppress the plaintiff ’s speech.” Ante, at 12, 19._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., concurring 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22–842

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May 30, 2024]

J USTICE J ACKSON , concurring. Applying our decision in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan

, 372 U. S. 58 (1963), the Court today explains that a “gov

ernment official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.” Ante, at 11. I agree. I write separately to stress the important distinction between government coercion, on the one hand, and a vio

lation of the First Amendment, on the other.

I Coercion of a third party can be the means by which the government violates the First Amendment rights of an

other. But the fact of coercion, without more, does not state a First Amendment claim. Rather, in addition to finding that the government has crossed a line from persuasion to coercion, courts must assess how that coercion actually vio

lates a speaker’s First Amendment rights. Our decision in Bantam Books provides one example of how government coercion of a third party can indirectly bring about a First Amendment vi olation. As the majority explains, ante, at 9–10, Bantam Books held that a Rhode Island commission’s efforts to coerce intermediary book dis

tributors into pulling certain publications from circulation violated the First Amendment rights of the books’ publish

-2 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

J ACKSON , J., concurring ers, 372 U. S., at 61–62, 66–67. Even though the state com

mission had not itself “seized or banned” any books, “the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coer

cion, persuasion, and intimidation” against the distributors “directly and designedly stopped the circulation of publica

tions in many parts of Rhode Island.” Id ., at 67–68. Essentially, the State’s threats to third parties—the distributors—erected through private hands an “effective state regulation . . . of obscenity.” Id ., at 69. And the gov

ernment could not escape respon sibility for the distributors’ actions merely because the commission did not itself seize any books. See id ., at 66–67. Notably, however, the government’s coercion of the dis

tributors into doing its bidding was not—in and of itself— what offended the First Amendment. Rather, by threaten

ing those third-party conduits of speech, the state commis

sion had effectively “subject[ed] the distribution of publica

tions to a system of prior administrative restraints” lacking the requisite constitutional safeguards. Id ., at 70. Put an

other way, by exerting pressure on a third party, the State had constructed a “system of informal censorship.” Id ., at 71. The lesson of Bantam Books is that “a government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly.” Ante, at 11. That case does not hold that government coer

cion alone violates the First Amendment. And recognizing the distinction between government coercion and a First Amendment violation is important because our democracy can function only if the government can effectively enforce the rules embodied in legislation; by its nature, such en

forcement often involves coercion in the form of legal sanc

tions. The existence of an allegation of government coercion of a third party thus merely invites, rather than answers, the question whether that coercion indirectly worked a vio

lation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.3 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., concurring

II Whether and how government coercion of a third party might violate another party’s First Amendment rights will depend on the facts of the case. Indeed, under our prece

dents, determining whether gove rnment action violates the First Amendment requires application of different doc

trines that vary depending on the circumstances. Different circumstances—who is being coerced to do what, and why— may implicate different First Amendment inquiries. In Bantam Books and many cases applying it, the coer

cion and First Amendment inquiries practically merge. This is because those cases te nd to follow a similar fact pat

tern: The plaintiff claims that the government coerced a dis

tributor, purveyor, or condui t of expression—like a bill

board company, television statio n, or book retailer—to shut down the speech of another party that relies on that distrib

utor, purveyor, or conduit to spread its message.* Coercing an entity in the business of disseminating speech to stop disseminating someone else’s speech obviously implicates the First Amendment, insofar as it may result in censorship similar to the prior restraint identified in Bantam Books

. But, in my view, that cens orship theory is an awkward fit with the facts of this case. According to the complaint, Vullo coerced various regulated entiti es to cut business ties with the National Rifle Association (NRA). See ante, at 3–5. The

——————

* See, e

. g ., Okwedy v. Molinari , 333 F. 3d 339, 340, 342–344 (CA2 2003) ( per curiam ) (billboard company); R. C. Maxwell Co. v. New Hope , 735 F. 2d 85, 85–88 (CA3 1984) (same); American Family Assn., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco , 277 F. 3d 1114, 1119–1120 (CA9 2002) (tel

evision stations); Kennedy v. Warren , 66 F. 4th 1199, 1204–1205 (CA9 2023) (online book retailer); Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Meese , 939 F. 2d 1011, 1013–1016 (CADC 1991) (convenience stores carrying porno

graphic magazines); Hammerhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Brezenoff , 707 F. 2d 33, 34–38 (CA2 1983) (department stores carrying satirical board game); VDARE Foundation v. Colorado Springs , 11 F. 4th 1151, 1156– 1157 (CA10 2021) (resort hosting advocacy group conference).4 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

J ACKSON , J., concurring NRA does not contend that its (concededly unlawful) insur

ance products offered through those business relationships were themselves “speech,” akin to a billboard, a television ad, or a book. Nor does the complaint allege that Vullo pres

sured the printer of American Rifleman (a longstanding NRA periodical) to stop printing the magazine, or coerced a convention center into canceling the NRA’s annual meeting. See VDARE Foundation v. Colorado Springs , 11 F. 4th 1151, 1157 (CA10 2021). In other words, the effect of Vullo’s alleged coercion of regulated entities on the NRA’s speech is significantly more attenuated here than in Bantam Books or most decisions applying it. It is, for instance, far from obvious that Vullo’s conduct to ward regulated entities es

tablished “a system of prior administrative restraints” against the NRA’s expression. Bantam Books , 372 U. S., at 70. Of course, as the majority correctly observes, none of that means that Vullo may target with impunity the NRA’s

“ ‘nonexpressive’ ” activity if she is doing so to punish the NRA for its expression. See ante, at 17. But it does suggest that our First Amendment retaliation cases might provide a better framework for analyzing these kinds of allega

tions— i

. e ., coercion claims that are not directly related to the publication or distribution of speech. And, fortunately for the NRA, the complaint in this case alleges both censor

ship and retaliation theories for how Vullo violated the First Amendment—theories that, in my opinion, deserve separate analyses. “ ‘[A]s a general matter,’ the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subje cting individuals to ‘retalia

tory actions’ after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.” Houston Community College System v. Wilson , 595 U. S. 468, 474 (2022) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett , 587 U. S. 391, 398 (2019)). “[A] plaintiff pursuing a First Amendment retaliation claim must show, among other things, that the government took an ‘adverse action’ in response to his5 Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)

J ACKSON , J., concurring speech that ‘would not have been taken absent the retalia

tory motive.’ ” Wilson , 595 U. S., at 477 (quoting Nieves , 587 U. S., at 399). Although our analysis has varied by context,

see Lozman v. Riviera Beach , 585 U. S. 87, 96–99 (2018), we have generally required pl aintiffs claiming First Amendment retaliation to “e stablish a ‘causal connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury,’ ” Nieves , 587 U. S., at 398 (quoting Hartman v. Moore , 547 U. S. 250, 259 (2006)). Requiring that causal connecti on to a retaliatory motive is important, because “[s]ome official actions adverse to . . . a speaker might well be unexceptionable if taken on other grounds.” Id. , at 256. In this case, for example, analyzing causation matters because much of Vullo’s alleged conduct, if not done for retaliatory reas ons, might otherwise be legit

imate enforcement of New York’s insurance regulations. How a retaliation analysis should proceed in this case was not addressed below, so th e Court rightly leaves that question unanswered today. But, importantly, any such analysis requires more than aski ng simply whether the gov

ernment’s actions crossed the threshold from permissible persuasion to impermissible c oercion. The NRA concedes that, at the very least, our burden-shifting framework from Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle , 429 U. S. 274 (1977), likely applies. See Reply Brief 16–17. Should that test gov

ern, the NRA would have to plausibly allege that a retalia

tory motive was a “ ‘substantial’ ” or “ ‘motivating factor’ ” in Vullo’s targeting of the regulated entities doing business with the NRA. Mt. Healthy , 429 U. S., at 287. Vullo, in turn, could rebut that allegation by showing that she would have taken the same action “even in the absence of the [NRA’s] protected conduct.” Ibid. ; see Lozman , 585 U. S., at 96 (“[E]ven if retaliation might have been a substantial motive for the board’s action, still there was no liability un

less the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause of the employment termination”).6 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

J ACKSON , J., concurring

* * * The NRA’s complaint advances both censorship and re

taliation claims, yet the lower courts in this case lumped these claims together and ultimately focused almost exclu

sively on whether Vullo’s conduct was coercive. See ante, at 6–7. Consequently, the strength of the NRA’s claim un

der the Mt. Healthy framework has received little attention thus far. On remand, the parties and lower courts should consider the censorship and retaliation theories inde

pendently, mindful of the distinction between government coercion and the ways in which such coercion might (or might not) have violated the NRA’s constitutional rights. That analysis can and should likewise consider which First Amendment framework best captures the NRA’s allega

tions in this case. See, e

. g ., VDARE , 11 F. 4th, at 1159– 1175 (separately analyzing censorship and retaliation claims).