J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF R.B.S., A MINOR 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.W.S., A MINOR 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF H.M.S., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: E.W.S., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1912 MDA 2015

 No. 1913 MDA 2015

 No. 1914 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 2, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 2015-0060, 2015-0061, and 2015-0062

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.M.S., A MINOR

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.B.S., A MINOR

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.W.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.W.S., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1926 MDA 2015

 No. 1927 MDA 2015

 No. 1928 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order October 2, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Juvenile Division, at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000060-2014, 

CP-67-DP-0000062-2014, CP-67-DP-0000061-2014

BEFORE: MUNDY, DUBOW, and STRASSBURGER,* J.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2016

In these consolidated appeals, E.W.S. (Father) appeals from (1) the 

decrees that terminated his parental rights to his children C.W.S. (born in 

2009), R.B.S. (born in 2012), and H.M.S. (born in 2013) (Children, 

collectively);1and (2) the orders that effectuated goal changes for Children 

from reunification to adoption. We affirm.

 

1 The decrees also terminated the parental rights of T.E.C., the biological 

mother of Children. 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 2 -

The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (CYF) became 

involved with Father and Children in December of 2013, following allegations 

of abuse, neglect, and substance abuse. N.T., 9/1/2015, at 68. An 

application for emergency protective custody was filed and granted in March 

2014. Id. Five family service plans were given to Father between 

March 2014 and August 2015. Id. at 69-70. During that time, Father was 

incarcerated on three separate occasions, id. at 72; never obtained stable 

employment or housing, id. at 74-76, 78; failed to attend a psychological 

evaluation, id. at 105; did not follow through with counseling, id. at 104; 

and declined to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation despite his huffing 

and use of synthetic marijuana being “an ongoing concern since the agency 

initially became involved.” Id. Although Father regularly attended visits 

with Children when he was not incarcerated, he never progressed past 

supervised visits. Id. at 69, 87. 

On May 13, 2015, CYF filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental 

rights involuntarily based upon several subsections of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), 

as well as § 2511(b). The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petitions on 

September 1, 2015. At that point, Children had been in placement for 18 

months, had been living together with the same foster family for 

approximately one year, and had not seen father in six months. CYF 

presented evidence that Father still was no closer to being in a position to 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 3 -

take custody of Children than he had been at the time of the initial 

placement. N.T., 9/1/2015, at 108, 122. Indeed, Father acknowledged at 

the hearing that the best case scenario was that he would be able to care for 

Children “by next year, the end of next year.” Id. at 173.

On October 2, 2015, the court entered orders changing each child’s 

goal from reunification to adoption, as well as decrees terminating Father’s 

parental rights to each child. Father timely filed notices of appeal from each 

order and decree, along with concise statements of the errors complained of 

on appeal.

Father presents this Court with a single question: 

Whether the trial court erred in applying the test contained in In 

re Adoption of S.P., [47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012),] in terminating 

the parental rights of Father and changing the goal to adoption 

from reunification when Father had utilized all available 

resources to maintain his relationship with [Children] during his 

incarceration, and his incarceration will conclude in a time frame 

that would allow him to parent his [Children].

Father’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We consider Father’s question mindful of the following.

In cases involving the termination of a parent’s rights, our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether the order of 

the trial court is supported by competent evidence, and whether 

the trial court gave adequate consideration to the effect of such 

a decree on the welfare of the child.

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the 

decree must stand.... We must employ a broad, comprehensive 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 4 -

review of the record in order to determine whether the trial 

court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court determined that CYF met its burdens under 

subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, as well 

as its subsection (b) burden. Those portions of the governing statute 

provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the 

parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 5 -

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) ... or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

Father presents this Court with the question of whether the orphans’ 

court erred in its consideration of Father’s incarceration in determining that 

CYF met its burden of proof. Father maintains that the circumstances of this 

case warrant the opposite conclusion under the law enunciated by our 

Supreme Court in In re Adoption of S.P. Therein, the Court held as 

follows:
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 6 -

[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be 

determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of 

providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and 

the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as 

highly relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for 

termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830. Because his incarceration is of a 

short duration, and because he attempted to maintain his relationship with 

Children, Father claims that the fact of his incarceration cannot establish his 

failure or refusal to parent or to remedy conditions which led to placement. 

Father’s Brief at 17-18.

However, because we agree with the orphans’ court’s determination 

that CYF met its burden under subsection (a)(8), we need not consider 

Father’s incarceration-related argument. In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 344 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (“This Court must agree with only one subsection of [] 

2511(a), in addition to subsection 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination 

of parental rights.”). 

Unlike the requirements of subsection (a)(2) at issue in In re 

Adoption of S.P., or of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5), the reasons for 

Children remaining in placement and Father’s ability or willingness to resume 

parental duties at some future time are irrelevant under subsection (a)(8). 

Section 2511(a)(8) represents the determination that “a parent’s basic 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 7 -

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his ... child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill ... parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper 

parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759-60 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (quoting In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004)). 

By allowing for termination when the conditions that led to 

removal of the child continue to exist after a year, the statute 

implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

The only questions under subsection (a)(8) are whether (1) Children 

have been in placement for a year or more, (2) the conditions which led to 

placement still exist, and (3) termination of Father’s parental rights will best 

serve Children. Father concedes that CYF proved that Children were in 

placement more than one year and that the conditions which led to the 

placement continued to exist. Father’s Brief at 18. Father’s argument to 

this Court concerns only whether terminating his rights will best serve the 

interest of Children.2

 

2 This Court has noted that the analysis of Children’s needs and welfare 

under subsection (a)(8) is distinct from its subsection (b) evaluation of the 

needs and welfare of Children. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 

1008–09. However, Father’s brief does not address the needs-and-welfare 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 8 -

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved 

when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.” K.Z.S., 946 A.2d

at 760 (quoting In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006)). 

The court should also consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships to the child.... The court must consider whether a 

natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and 

whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. Most importantly, adequate consideration 

must be given to the needs and welfare of the child.

Id. (internal citations omitted). “The extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends upon the unique facts and circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Father fails to direct this Court to any evidence of record that 

severance of his ties with Children will destroy a necessary and beneficial 

relationship. Instead, Father blames any dearth of a bond with Children on 

the domestic relations court for incarcerating him and for giving “little 

review” of Father’s two requests for prison visits. Father’s Brief at 21. 

Father claims that CYF failed to meet a burden of proving that Children “do 

 

question separately for subsections (a) and (b). Father’s Brief at 17-20. 

Because the same testimony and considerations are applicable to both 

analyses, we likewise address the needs and welfare of Children only once. 

See, e.g., In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d at 352 (affirming the subsection (b) 

determination by stating “Likewise, we conclude that the totality of the 

record evidence supports the court’s decision that terminating Father’s 

parental rights would serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of Children pursuant to § 2511(b)” after conducting the 

subsection (a)(8) analysis of the needs and welfare of the children). 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 9 -

not have a bond with Father.” Id. Father posits that “[i]t would be hard to 

believe that there would not be a detrimental impact on at least the oldest 

child if Father’s rights were terminated.” Id. at 23.

First, we note that subsection (a)(8) “does not require an evaluation of 

the remedial efforts of either the parent or [CYF].” In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d at 

346. Thus, we do not evaluate the actions Father took to maintain his bond 

with Children or his complaints that more should have been done to help him 

do so. At this point, we focus only upon the status of the bond at the time 

of the hearing.

Further, contrary to Father’s argument, CYF’s burden was not to prove 

that Children had no bond with Father; instead, CYF had to present evidence 

concerning “the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent 

and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing any such bond.” In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

The orphans’ court then had to decide whether severing ties with Father was 

in Children’s best interests despite any bond with Father. 

The orphans’ court offered the following analysis in this regard:

The [c]ourt has thoroughly evaluated [Children’s] 

relationships in this matter. The [c]ourt finds that [Children] 

have some level of bond with Father. However, [Children] have 

not seen Father since his incarceration. ... The [c]ourt also finds 

that the bond between [Children] and foster parents is strong 

and healthy. Testimony established that [Children] are happy 

and feel comfortable in their care. [Children] know who their 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 10 -

Mother and Father are but it is the foster parents who take care 

of their daily needs and act as [Children’s] parental figures. The 

bond that [Children] have with the foster family can provide 

safety, security and permanency for [Children]. Termination of 

parental rights will best meet the needs of [Children] and permit 

[Children] to achieve the stability that they deserve.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/2/2015, at 15.

The factual determinations of the orphans court are supported by the 

record. As discussed above, the evidence showed that Children had not 

received parental care from Father in 18 months, and had not even seen 

Father in six months; with Children at ages 6, 3, and 2, that is a substantial 

portion of their lives. Children have been together with the same foster 

family for more than a year. N.T., 9/1/2015, at 94-95. They refer to foster 

parents as “mother and father.” Id. at 95. At the time of the hearing, 

Children were more strongly bonded with their foster parents than with 

Father. Id. at 97. In particular, H.M.S., the youngest, “flourished and made 

great improvements” once she was placed with the foster family. Id. at 

116. Even the eldest child, C.W.S., is “very bonded with the foster parents” 

and “definitely sees them as parental figures who provide for his needs....” 

Id. at 98. 

Regarding the impact of severing Father’s ties with Children, the CYF 

caseworker who observed Children with Father and with the foster parents 

testified that H.M.S. “wouldn’t know any different” if Father’s rights were 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 11 -

terminated. Id. at 120. R.B.S. “would notice not going for visits but would 

easily adjust.” Id. Although the caseworker opined that it might be “rough 

for [C.W.S.] at first,” she indicated that in the end there would be no 

negative impact: “given the consistency that [termination] would allow and 

the stability, he would improve long term.” Id. 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless 

only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining 

what is in the best interest of the child.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 

A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the 

child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The record demonstrates that Children have been in a safe and stable 

environment with foster parents for a year now. Even by Father’s 

estimation, he will not be able to care for his children for another year. 

Children deserve better than what Father can offer. See, e.g., In re C.L.G., 

956 A.2d at 1008 (“[I]f we were to permit Mother further opportunity to 

cultivate an environment where she can care for C.L.G., we would be 

subjecting a child, who has been waiting for more than two years for 
J-S22018-16

J-S22019-16

- 12 -

permanency, to a state of proverbial limbo in anticipation of a scenario that 

is speculative at best.”). 

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the orphans’ 

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of Children is best served by 

terminating Father’s parental rights and freeing Children for the permanency 

and stability of adoption.3 See, e.g., In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 923 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (affirming decision that termination of parental rights and 

freeing T.D. for adoption was in T.D.’s best interests despite testimony that 

severing T.D.’s bond with parents would be detrimental, where parents had 

demonstrated inability to provide parental care).

Decrees and orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/9/2016

 

3

Father’s challenge to the goal changes for Children is contingent upon his 

prevailing on his challenge to the termination decrees. Father’s Brief at 23 

(“In turning next to the change of goal, if the agency has not proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that a termination of parental rights is in the 

best interests of [Children], then the primary goal should not be adoption.”). 

Because we have held that the orphans’ court properly terminated Father’s 

parental rights, now adoption clearly is the appropriate goal for Children.