About the Report

Colonel John M. “Matt” Venhaus is the Jennings Randolph 

Army Fellow. He is a career psychological operations officer 

experienced with foreign media influence operations 

throughout Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. This 

study marries his operational experience gained while 

commanding the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, 

whose missions included reducing the flow of foreign fighters 

in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, with 

his academic research as a Senior Service College Fellow. The 

views expressed in this article are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 236 May 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Colonel John M. ”Matt” Venhaus, U.S. Army

Why Youth Join al-Qaeda 

Summary

•	 Interviews and personal histories of 2,032 “foreign fighters” show that rather than be 

recruited, young men actively seek out al-Qaeda and its associated movements.

•	 Al-Qaeda is more than just an organization; it is an ideology and a popular global brand 

that spins a heroic narrative with an idealized version of Islamic jihad. 

•	 Al-Qaeda’s ubiquitous message of anti-Muslim oppression and global jihad appeals to the 

developmental needs of adolescents.

•	 To defeat al-Qaeda, it is crucial to understand who seeks to join and why.

•	 Common myths and misconceptions about why young men join extremist movements 

ignore the proximate causes.

•	 Potential recruits have an unfulfilled need to define themselves. Al-Qaeda’s ability to turn 

them to violence is rooted in what each seeks: Revenge seekers need an outlet for their 

frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill 

seekers need adventure.

•	 To prevent radicalization, calm the revenge seeker with programs to vent his frustration 

(e.g., sports, creative arts, political discussion outlets, young adult mentors); promote the 

status seeker with opportunities to show off his self-perceived talents (e.g., local political 

participation, international exchange programs, positive public media depictions of young 

Muslims); give the identity seeker groups to join (sports leagues, model governments, 

student societies, community service programs, adventure groups); and turn off the thrill 

seeker by tarnishing al-Qaeda’s image.

•	 Fragmented efforts of public diplomacy, strategic communications, and information operations are underresourced, poorly coordinated, and understaffed given the strength and 

pervasiveness of al-Qaeda’s message.

•	 A U.S. Strategic Communications Agency should be established to consolidate efforts under 

a cabinet-level secretary of strategic communications; execute a presidentially approved 

national communications strategy; manage funding of all U.S. communications programs; 

enable, empower, support, and reinforce credible existing voices in the Muslim world; build 

U.S. message credibility with honest, transparent dialogue that closes the “say-do” gap in 

recent foreign policy; and collect, synthesize, and analyze public opinion research.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

Common Myths about Al-Qaeda Recruits 4

Al-Qaeda’s Message and the Media Environment 6

The Four Seekers 8

A Radicalization Prevention Strategy 11

Policy Recommendations 16

Conclusion 18
2

Introduction

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber,” wrote in an online forum, “I do not 

have a friend, I have no one to speak to, no one to consult, no one to support me, and I 

feel depressed and lonely. I do not know what to do.”1 His sentiments are typical of the 

isolated youth who finds an Internet chat room or a local student group where the friendly, 

welcoming voice of al-Qaeda is waiting. To inform a prevention strategy that diminishes the 

appeal of Islamic radicalization and dissuades potential recruits, the United States must 

understand this relationship.

When young men such as Abdulmutallab ponder the great questions of life, they are 

given a very short list of choices. Al-Qaeda presents itself as the most direct path to satisfying their needs, by providing a clear narrative that appeals to their concerns. To defeat 

al-Qaeda, it is crucial to understand who seeks to join and why, and what makes al-Qaeda 

appeal to them. This study traces al-Qaeda fighters’ paths backward from violent extremist 

actions to the thoughts and decisions of confused and malleable adolescents. This allows a 

better understanding of what motivates those who join al-Qaeda.

Several contributing factors and environmental conditions are frequently proffered as 

root causes of terrorism. This study debunks some of the myths and popular misconceptions 

about extremist motivations, focusing instead on potential recruits’ early development. 

Al-Qaeda seekers have characteristics common to other youths coming of age, but they 

choose the path toward violent extremism because al-Qaeda’s message fulfills specific 

needs. Individual seekers have distinct psychological, societal, economic, and cultural factors motivating them to pursue al-Qaeda membership or affiliation. 

Seekers of al-Qaeda are relatively few in number, but they are not homogeneous in motivation. There are revenge seekers looking for an outlet for their frustration, status seekers 

looking for recognition, identity seekers looking for a group they can belong to, and thrill 

seekers looking for adventure. This study attempts to clarify each group’s motivations and 

explain how individuals within each group view the world.

The principal contribution of this study is a prevention-and-communications strategy 

targeting the specific mental framework and psychological needs of each type of seeker. It 

is designed to reduce al-Qaeda’s appeal and present youths who are highly susceptible to 

radicalization, or “at risk,” with an alternative narrative to the al-Qaeda message. The alternative narrative meets the underlying needs and desires while providing appealing choices 

besides al-Qaeda membership. This will lead to a reduced number of al-Qaeda members and 

hasten the organization’s overall defeat.

What is “al-Qaeda”?

The term “al-Qaeda” has become a popular shorthand for a specific type of violent Islamic 

extremism and includes several different terrorist organizations and groups. Like most terms 

of convenience, it sacrifices some accuracy for utility. For purposes of this study, “al-Qaeda” 

is considered in its broadest sense: as the consolidation of global Islamic terrorist organizations and affiliations that share a common philosophy and worldview. The broad group has 

five parts:

•	 Strategic leadership: Often referred to as “al-Qaeda Central,” and most likely residing in 

Pakistan, this includes the movement’s core leadership and senior-level managers and 

strategists.2 Although it provides guidance, funding, and strategic direction, it does not 

directly control many aspects of al-Qaeda in the broader sense. It does, however, provide 

a powerful message to followers and actively foments unrest throughout the Muslim world 

and beyond.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

• Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

•	 Affiliated and associated movements: These are groups that receive varying levels of support 

from the strategic leadership, but they are independent franchises of the brand rather than 

direct subordinates. Some have taken funding and received training; others have simply 

adopted the moniker to declare their commitment to al-Qaeda’s principles. These include 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabab in Somalia, the Salafist Group for Call and 

Combat (also known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and a host of smaller groups and 

movements that have aligned themselves with al-Qaeda’s principles.

•	 Independent adherents: These are either former combatants no longer associated with an 

organized group or organization, or self-radicalized individuals who declare their membership. Some may have spent time in al-Qaeda training camps, but many have merely read 

about the movement and decided to adopt its teachings. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and 

Major Nadal Hasan are examples from this group.

•	 Ideology: Rooted in the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and Abu Muhammad 

al-Maqdisi, the ideology rejects pluralism and democracy to portray an Islamic world under 

siege by the West. In the ideologues’ view, the only solution is for a vanguard of Muslims to 

mobilize the entire Muslim world to rise up and destroy the West and the apostate regimes 

that support it, through violent jihad, until every country in the Middle East is ruled by 

Islamic law.3

•	 Brand identity: Despite the violent, nihilistic, antirational, millenarian ideology espoused 

by its theorists, al-Qaeda is a popular brand identity widely recognized and sought after by 

many in the Muslim world. It is also the label that Western journalists immediately attach 

to most acts of violence even when there is no evidence to support a connection.4

The most important distinction between al-Qaeda and other organizations or individuals 

who use or espouse violent measures to achieve political ends is that al-Qaeda’s primary 

objective is to reestablish an Islamic caliphate through violent conflict with the United 

States and its allies in the West. It believes that the nationalistic anti-imperialism and PanArabism that arose in the twentieth century failed to solve the endemic problems of the 

Islamic community. It advocates complete upheaval of the global order and sees no room 

for compromise, gradual change, or reform within the existing states that occupy the lands 

where its caliphate is to be.5

The Dataset

This analysis focuses on al-Qaeda members and affiliates who travel outside their home 

countries to train or fight under the banner of al-Qaeda. These “foreign fighters” are nonindigenous, nonterritorialized combatants who left the relative safety of home to participate 

in a conflict primarily against the United States and its allies. This excludes local insurgents 

and ethnonationalistic fighters and includes the 9/11 hijackers, 7/7 bombers, and others 

who used terrorist tactics to attack or attempt to attack the United States, its foreign 

interests, or other Western countries.

Those traveling across international boundaries under the auspices of foreign governments or traveling against their will were excluded from study. To accurately assess motivation, voluntary association with al-Qaeda or its objectives is required.

The data include only men because there was no reliable information showing that 

women crossed international boundaries to fight, and no conclusive evidence of women 

from foreign countries on any of the battlefields. It may be that the restrictions on travel 

for Muslim women contributed to this phenomenon, but there is insufficient data to derive 

reliable conclusions. 

Finally, the data is limited to those who professed an association with al-Qaeda or 

another global Islamic extremist movement whose objectives were not limited to local 

Despite the violent, nihilistic, 

antirational, millenarian 

ideology espoused by its 

theorists, al-Qaeda is a popular 

brand identity widely recognized 

and sought after by many in the 

Muslim world.
4

issues. In all, 2,032 individuals met the screening criteria and provided sufficient information for analysis. 

The analysis of these cases draws on various sources. The most prevalent were interview 

reports from fighters detained by Coalition forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba.6 These data were augmented with information from captured documents,7 journalists’ interviews with families and friends, and public records of personal histories. The 

depth, nature, and quality of the reports vary widely, which introduces some uncertainty 

into the analysis. 

This population represents one of the largest datasets of al-Qaeda recruits studied to 

date. Still, comprehensive data on all aspects of any elusive and chameleonic organization 

is difficult to obtain. Continued study is necessary as more information becomes available. 

Because this sample relies heavily on which fighters are captured and which ones destroy 

themselves before capture, it cannot be perfectly random; nevertheless, clear trends emerge 

across cases from various situations and time periods. The data allows the identification of 

trends, commonalities, general impressions, and recurrent themes, but it does not provide 

the statistical rigor necessary to support classic academic or predictive analysis. There was 

no control group or baseline study against which to compare the results of the interviews.

Common Myths about Al-Qaeda Recruits

The al-Qaeda terrorist who, quite literally, explodes onto the world stage is in a much different mental state from the impressionable young person who entered the recruiting and 

training pipeline. Many al-Qaeda fighters appear to have led normal lives before leaving the 

relative safety and security of home and family. When they become foreign fighters, they 

travel great distances to kill innocent people they have never met, in the name of an organization they may not even have joined, for a cause they may not fully comprehend. They 

make a mental transition so that distant events seem so personal and so egregious that they 

are compelled to join someone else’s fight. Each has his own motivation to join an extremist 

movement, but there are five things that he is not.

8

First, he is not crazy. After the radicalization and indoctrination process, his actions 

may appear utterly insane and irrational to an outside observer, but the young person 

who entered the process was mentally stable. As forensic psychiatrist and counterterrorism expert Marc Sageman has noted, individuals who suffer from antisocial personality 

disorders are untrustworthy and likely to compromise the security of a clandestine organization such as al-Qaeda. They are either kicked out or choose to leave when they discover 

that the essence of suicide terrorism is a willingness to sacrifice for the greater good.9

The difficulties of locating information and training, combined with the need to maintain 

secrecy and interact reliably with other members during the vetting process, could not 

be managed by an unstable mind. In a review of the social psychology of a wide range of 

terrorist groups, Clark McCauley and M. E. Segal conclude, “The best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology.”10 The foreign 

fighters studied for this report who were in custody were all given full medical and psychiatric evaluations, and they show similar results. Antisocial behavior was clearly present 

in all, but they did not show signs of any clinical psychosis. This seems obvious when one 

considers insanity and recruiting. If all al-Qaeda recruits were insane, there would be a far 

smaller pool to draw from. And there would be far fewer potential recruits in the pipeline, 

because clinical psychoses are not easily or quickly acquired. During processing through 

the al-Qaeda pipeline, the recruit might well take on the outward appearance of instability 

infused with zealotry, but true mental disorders were almost entirely absent.

The al-Qaeda terrorist who, 

quite literally, explodes onto 

the world stage is in a much 

different mental state from the 

impressionable young person 

who entered the recruiting and 

training pipeline.
5

Second, the al-Qaeda recruit does not fit easily into an economic profile. Some individuals studied had been unemployed for years and were living in poverty, while others came 

from privileged backgrounds and relative wealth. Those with the means financed their own 

travel, and those without means found sponsors willing to pick up the tab. As Daniel Pipes of 

the Middle East Forums notes, radical Islamic ideologies, like other contemporary ideologically based movements, use the rhetoric of economic oppression to enhance their argument; 

however, their subjects are generally not drawn from the ranks of the desperately poor.11 A 

young Saudi captured while trying to cross into Iraq revealed that he was promoted at work 

and in line for a substantial pay raise just before he joined a local jihadist group. His is not 

an isolated case. Among the subjects studied, economic motivations were the least cited 

reason for joining a terrorist organization.

Third, al-Qaeda recruits do not become terrorists because they are Muslim. They actually 

have an inadequate understanding of their own religion, which makes them vulnerable to 

misinterpretations of the religious doctrines. In general, they do not come from strong religious backgrounds. Almost universally, they either had an incomplete religious education or 

were raised in a household where the faith was routinely practiced but was not a dominating 

force. Whether their instruction came from a poorly funded madrassa in Pakistan or radical 

preaching at the only mosque in their small European town, they typically were exposed to 

a very narrow interpretation of Islam. Their teachers and religious leaders valued memorization of key phrases over rigorous analysis of the texts. They were not exposed to the 

over 1,400 years of Quranic commentary and scholarship, nor were they invited to question 

their instructors on finer points. For al-Qaeda to insert a skewed view of Islamic teachings 

into their heads, there was clearly some religious wiggle room in their early development, 

because they did not clearly define themselves in terms of a particular sect or religious 

dogma. As a result, they could become zealous adherents to an unorthodox and distorted 

version of Islam. History is replete with examples of religious arguments being used to 

justify the violent redress of grievances. Regardless of the primary religion involved, small 

groups play up selected passages of religious texts into guiding principles to manipulate the 

uninformed and justify violent behavior.12 The same was true in these cases.

The fourth myth is that these young men were initially approached by an al-Qaeda 

recruiter. Partly because of their nomadic lifestyle, al-Qaeda cadres do not actively approach 

potential recruits to join the movement. The young men studied in this project more often 

followed the “bunch of guys” theory proposed by Marc Sageman, in which individual recruits 

sought out information about al-Qaeda through friends and associates.13 The first step was 

usually taken by the individual, not the organization. 

To generate interest, al-Qaeda has developed and aggressively promoted a global brand. 

Al-Qaeda is coterminous with the arrival of new media capabilities, most notably satellite 

television and Internet chat, which have allowed it to create an aspirational brand identity 

through careful public positioning worthy of the savviest product marketers. Individuals 

become aware of the brand and seek more information about it long before they meet an 

al-Qaeda member or recruiter.

The al-Qaeda legend portrays the group as the acme of jihad, and this legend is its greatest asset. It is a glorious, wispy presence, just out of reach, which only the most dedicated, 

most committed, and purest of heart can hope to obtain. The posters are much better than 

the reality, but the legend is nonetheless pervasive and persuasive. Al-Qaeda does not so 

much recruit as position itself for only the most driven; then it allows them to petition for 

membership. The vast majority of subjects in this study had either approached a friend 

or relative in the movement or independently sought information on the Internet or in a 

mosque known for supporting al-Qaeda.

Although radical Islamic 

ideologies use the rhetoric of 

economic oppression to enhance 

their argument, their subjects 

are generally not drawn from 

the ranks of the desperately 

poor.

The al-Qaeda legend portrays 

the group as the acme of jihad. 

It is a glorious, wispy presence, 

just out of reach, which only 

the most dedicated, most 

committed, and purest of heart 

can hope to obtain.
6

Finally, al-Qaeda is not everywhere. There are more than 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide, 

yet those who have joined al-Qaeda, both living and dead, number only in the thousands. 

Most of the world has seen al-Qaeda’s message, but few travel to another country to fight. 

U.S. and other Western governmental policies that restrict Muslims’ freedom or target 

restrictive security practices at Muslims alienate entire populations. A belief that Western 

civilization is hurtling toward an existential clash with Islam does not help us understand 

and reduce the pool of potential recruits to violent extremist movements, because statistically, these policies more often target innocent people who are seeking to live peacefully.

With the common myths removed, the young men under study who were attracted to 

al-Qaeda displayed the emotional struggle for purpose, direction, and identity that is common in adolescent development in most cultures.14 Their experiences and surroundings have 

shaped them, but their desire to establish a role in society, and the thwarting of that desire 

are the true catalyst for their affiliation with al-Qaeda. 

Al-Qaeda’s Message and the Media Environment

Al-Qaeda is an ideology and a popular global brand that employs terrorism as a tactic to 

further its goals. Like other groups throughout history, it uses terrorism as a “genre of 

symbolic communications” rather than a military tactic.15 The psychological impact of the 

deed is more important than the physical results of the fight. Al-Qaeda stands out for its 

focus on martyrdom and death. As al-Qaeda spokesman Maulana Inyadullah once said, “The 

Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we love death.”16 Al-Qaeda elevates death to its most heroic 

and fabled abstractions. Among the subjects of this study, the Quranic passages relating to 

ishtishad, or the act of martyrdom, were among the most frequently quoted. The subjects 

often spoke of “achieving” death, and their disappointment at being prevented from killing 

themselves was readily apparent.

Al-Qaeda is peripatetic, migrating from place to place as conditions warrant or allow. 

When enough attention or combat power is focused on its current location, it relocates to 

a place where the local government is either supportive or ineffective. Therefore, it cannot 

be defeated in a place; it must be defeated as a concept. A successful countermessaging 

strategy would destroy the psychological appeal of the al-Qaeda brand by dissolving and 

displacing the feelings that draw young men to it. If no one seeks out al-Qaeda, it will cease 

to exist. If no one makes the sacrifice necessary to become a member or start a franchise 

operation, al-Qaeda will disappear. And if those who seek al-Qaeda continue their steady 

aspiration to belong, no amount of physical force will adequately protect the United States 

and its allies from future attacks. 

Al-Qaeda uses satellite television and ubiquitous user-generated content on the Internet 

to reinvigorate pan-Muslim identity with a vengeful, defiant underdog narrative in which 

Islam is under constant and global attack by a monolithic adversary. Al-Qaeda’s leaders 

are effective and prolific communicators who have benefited from the extended reach of 

modern communications, continuous news coverage, sympathetic television outlets, and 

the Internet in ways unimaginable to leaders of previous movements. Unlike newspapers, 

pamphlets, radio, or even terrestrial television broadcasts, the Internet has the ability to 

carry al-Qaeda’s message quickly and directly to millions of people around the world.17 With 

each new posting or forwarded link, al-Qaeda’s message is repeated and echoed throughout 

cyberspace. Constant repetition increases both its likelihood of retention and its credibility 

in the minds of its target audiences.

Al-Qaeda uses a shifting array of forums, primarily through three media entities—Fajr, 

the Global Islamic Media Front, and As Sahab—to maintain a daily flow of consistently and 

systematically branded information on the Internet and in traditional media.18 These three 

As al-Qaeda spokesman Maulana 

Inyadullah once said, “The 

Americans love Pepsi-Cola, we 

love death.”
7

media production and distribution enterprises receive information for various groups that 

are either affiliated with or sympathetic to al-Qaeda, and post them to locations around the 

Internet where they will be most easily viewed by the largest number of people. Al-Qaeda 

uses these organizations to distance itself from direct distribution, for security purposes. No 

other terrorist organization is so adept at using the Internet to allow unprompted recruits 

to seek membership.19

Terrorist movements of earlier decades often had to struggle for notoriety outside the 

geographic area of their activities. The rapid advancement of Internet technology, with social 

networking and user-generated content becoming widely available, has made it possible for 

al-Qaeda and its associated movements in the twenty-first century to expand their reach. The 

brand is globally referenced, and its leaders frequently state the importance of managing its 

public reputation. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared, “More than half of this battle is taking place 

in the battlefield of the media.”20 Al-Qaeda’s chief propagandist and the emir of the Global 

Islamic Media Front, who goes by the nom de guerre Saladin II, exhorted the faithful, “Unite, 

O Muslims of the World. . . . Set up squadrons of media jihad to break Zionist control over the 

media and terrorize the enemies.”21 Because it relies so heavily on global redistribution of its 

message beyond local news media, al-Qaeda must be more aware of its public identity than 

other terrorist organizations in history.22 In managing its global identity, it must maintain 

constant flow of information and updates to remain prominent in the public consciousness.

Besides constant references on satellite television and the Internet, al-Qaeda also uses 

low-tech methods of distribution. Audiotapes, written sermons, and CDs or DVDs were given 

to almost all subjects of this study to answer their questions about current events. Typically, 

a young person who was confused or curious about an aspect of Islam or current events 

would be given a taped sermon or taken to a local mosque where he would be presented 

with al-Qaeda’s perspectives and interpretations. Many fighters were captured with tapes 

in their possession, and they revealed during their interviews that these tapes were highly 

valued. The new members carried them as status symbols, and cell leaders encouraged 

recruits to share the tapes with friends. 

When radical sermons, both live and taped, are combined with regular Internet glorification, a constant buzz develops around al-Qaeda, and it becomes the aspirational brand. It 

can easily be seen as the only answer to a young man whose head is full of questions. As 

noted veteran terrorism researcher Brian Michael Jenkins explains, “The recruiting vocabulary focuses on humiliation, shame and guilt, contrasted with dignity, duty and honor.”23

The seeker eventually sees al-Qaeda as having a ready answer for everything, and the path 

to success is clearly illuminated.

In every conceivable form of media, including talk on the streets, the seeker finds 

al-Qaeda mentioned as a legendary entity. Al-Qaeda offers a coherent worldview with a 

simplistic, unitary explanation of ostensibly disparate phenomena that neatly packages the 

seeker’s frustrations with the struggles of Muslims across the globe.24 In this narrative, 

there are only two choices: continue to suffer or join us and fight.

Symbols of glory are mixed with honors bestowed on young men who have found their 

calling, their place, and defined their lives. This idealized version of Islamic jihad spins a 

heroic narrative and removes the doubt that young men feel about their place in the world, 

replacing it with purpose and direction. Al Qaeda’s message offers the opportunity for selfselection, and an inroad to joining the virtual umma, or community of the faithful. Although 

the young seeker may have previously experienced disappointment in his interactions with 

Muslim society, he sees this as a chance to reconnect to something greater than himself.

It is difficult for Westerners to comprehend the level of glorification that exists. Before 

a seeker crosses the threshold to knock on the al-Qaeda clubhouse door, his ears are filled 

with a cacophonous din of extremist rhetoric. The current media environment in portions 

Al-Qaeda offers a coherent 

worldview that neatly packages 

the seeker’s frustrations with 

the struggles of Muslims across 

the globe. In this narrative, 

there are only two choices: 

continue to suffer or join us and 

fight.
8

of the Middle East presents impressionable youths with the idea that there are no viable 

positive alternatives to al-Qaeda. In 2007, over 4,500 jihadist Web sites were disseminating 

al-Qaeda’s ideology, sponsoring chats, and facilitating discussions about the role of young 

Muslims in the modern world.25 The number of sites continues to grow, as do blogs and 

postings on YouTube and other social networking sites. Al-Qaeda also maintains an online 

library of several thousand books and articles by major jihadist authors. 

On television news in Lebanon, the “Mothers of Martyrs” are interviewed regularly. They 

speak of pride in their sons’ accomplishment, and they are portrayed as pillars of both 

the faith and the community. Videos of past and future volunteers; photos of martyrs on 

leaflets, posters, and calendars; and the reenactment of martyrdom operations in pageants 

and school plays all serve to justify and glorify the act of suicide bombing.26 Regardless of 

its originating location, the glorification of fighting is generalized when satellite television 

broadcasts local information to regional audiences.

The Four Seekers

The potential al-Qaeda recruits who live in this highly charged media environment are vectorless energy looking for guidance and direction. They want to understand who they are, why 

they matter, and what their role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled need to define 

themselves, which al-Qaeda offers to fill. Throughout the interviews and in all the statements 

of those who crossed the threshold and began the indoctrination process, the recurring theme 

was that they all were looking for something. Al-Qaeda’s ability to turn them to violence is 

rooted in the fundamental nature of their search. Based on what they are seeking, they fall into 

one of four broad categories: revenge seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, and thrill seekers. A discussion of what they are looking for leads directly into how their path can change.

It is important to note that these are categories of potential recruits, not of al-Qaeda 

members or vigorous supporters. Once a young man has “crossed the threshold” and begun 

the indoctrination process, his information environment changes dramatically. He is isolated 

and indoctrinated and his worldview altered to a point of cultlike zealotry that makes him 

psychologically unlike his preindoctrination state. Once a potential recruit has entered the 

pipeline, he is no longer an appropriate target for counterradicalization through positive 

influence, because he is unlikely even to hear an opposing message, and the chance that he 

will be free to respond to it or interpret it objectively is minuscule.

Second, these are not homegrown insurgents rising up against their government to join 

insurgent or separatist movements. Their willingness to leave their homeland makes them 

distinct in their motivations and uniquely dangerous to the United States and its allies. 

Problems of domestic terrorism or insurgent violence, although related, are drawn from 

different motivations.

The Revenge Seeker: Looking for an Outlet for Frustration

The first of the four seekers, the revenge seeker, perceives himself as a victim in society. 

In his logic, external forces are causing his unhappiness and making it hard for him to succeed. More accurately, he doesn’t know why he feels angry, so he is looking for something 

to be angry about. The flames of his anger can be fueled by any number of minor slights, 

from a schoolyard rivalry to a romantic rebuff, until he is filled with frustration and rage. 

Psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut described this as “narcissistic rage . . . the need for revenge, for 

righting a wrong, for undoing a hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting 

compulsion in the pursuit of all of these aims.”27 Many of the subjects interviewed for this 

study initially claimed that their reason for fighting was to punish the West for its attacks on 

Videos of past and future 

volunteers; photos of martyrs 

on leaflets, posters, and 

calendars; and the reenactment 

of martyrdom operations in 

pageants and school plays all 

serve to justify and glorify the 

act of suicide bombing.
9

Muslims. As the discussions progressed, however, it became clear that they had been angry 

with members of their families, especially their fathers, or had been involved in neighborhood disputes and squabbles before becoming interested in al-Qaeda.

Middle Eastern Muslim culture expert Marvin Zonis notes that Arab societies value the honor 

and dignity of the individual more than personal liberty. When the principles of honor and 

dignity confront the devastating failures of many Middle Eastern states to achieve prominence 

in the world, the result is a profound and omnipresent humiliation and rage that is palpable 

throughout the region.28 Although separating the anger that they felt before joining al-Qaeda 

from the anger generated by extremist rhetoric was occasionally difficult, it was clear in nearly 

30 percent of the cases that young men had sought al-Qaeda because they were angry.

In many ways, the revenge seeker is similar to someone who joins a local movement, 

whether political or militant, to try to change the political conditions he lives in. The major 

difference is that the revenge seeker who becomes a foreign fighter must elevate his anger 

to perceive a slight that he has never personally or physically experienced. To satisfy his 

need for revenge, he must rage against something that he has only vicariously experienced. 

Foreign fighters who fell into the revenge seekers’ category often showed signs of an inflated sense of self-worth. They believed that only they could set the world aright. Al-Qaeda’s 

propaganda fuels their anger and channels it toward the United States, giving them both 

purpose and direction. 

Since the revenge seeker is most attracted to al-Qaeda’s message of intent to lash out 

against the West, which he sees as responsible for the ills of the Muslim community, he must 

be shown other ways to vent his anger. To divert a revenge seeker from the path of violent 

extremism, he must be given an outlet for his anger and a means to direct it toward meaningful change in the world. Opening a channel of communication for the revenge seeker by 

encouraging political discourse and participation, supporting the creative arts, and offering 

sports programs can help him meet the need to release his anger.

The Status Seeker: Looking for Recognition

Whereas revenge seekers were more common among those living primarily in Middle Eastern 

Muslim societies, the second group, status seekers, was more prevalent among the diaspora, 

especially those living in the West. The status seeker sees a world that does not understand 

or appreciate him as he perceives himself. His frustration stems from unrealized expectations that he will be successful in his new home and recognized by his community. This 

is especially prevalent in recent immigrants looking for work, and in international college 

students looking to assimilate in a foreign country. They are often not shown the kind of 

respect that they got before leaving their home countries. 

Take, for example, the young North African who travels to Europe in search of better 

wages or a better life. When he arrives, he finds only menial work, though the pay is much 

greater than in his home country. He dutifully sends money home, all the while seething 

over the fact that he is restricted to certain sections of town or certain jobs by a society 

that is interested in him only as cheap labor.29 One young Moroccan proclaimed, “I was 

like a slave in France. I could work in the kitchen but was not welcome in the dining room. 

When I left my neighborhood, people avoided me on the street as if I were unclean.”30

Young men in these situations believe that they have value and abilities and a worth to the 

world that their position in society doesn’t reflect. More than 25 percent of the fighters in 

the sample were seeking either to improve their status in the community or to demonstrate 

their prominence to the world.

Albert Bandura’s social learning theory is illustrative in these cases because young 

men who are frustrated with their roles and development seek “high-status” members of 

The revenge seeker who becomes 

a foreign fighter must elevate 

his anger to perceive a slight 

that he has never personally or 

physically experienced.
10

The motivation to define 

oneself by the group identity 

is almost universal among 

developing adolescents. It 

draws young people to street 

gangs and chess clubs, to 

marching bands and al-Qaeda.

the community after whom they can model their behavior.31 In ethnically divided Western 

communities, these young men find few fellow countrymen who have achieved high status, 

and they begin to perceive that prejudice and persecution is preventing their entire group 

from improving its lot. This sets off an “I’ll show you” response and drives them to demand 

acknowledgment of their intrinsic worth. Personal honor and respect are hallmarks of the 

societies where these young men have grown up. They begin to feel that they must do 

something to show the world their value. Racism and mistrust of Middle Easterners only 

exacerbates the isolation and sense of undervaluation. With no other outlets or opportunities to excel, they can easily be seduced to believe that al-Qaeda’s status would transfer to 

them if they joined.

At this point, the legend of al-Qaeda presents its martyrs and operatives as glorious, 

heroic figures who have gained great respect in their communities. Older Muslims living 

among the diaspora, to enhance their own bona fides, may recount tales of personal glory 

achieved while fighting in distant lands. Before long, the status seeker begins to perceive 

that the surest route to respect is to join the global jihad. For him to turn away from this 

belief, he must be reflected publicly in a manner more consistent with his self-perception. 

Foreign exchanges that confer status, provide positive media depictions of Muslims, and 

desegregate communities all help turn the status seeker away from al-Qaeda.

The Identity Seeker: Looking for a Place to Belong

Unlike the status seeker, who wants to stand out from the masses, the identity seeker is 

more concerned with assimilating into a defining organization. Being part of something is 

the principal motivation for the identity seeker. The strength and stability of one’s personality rests on the formation of a satisfying and functioning identity, and the motivation 

to define oneself by the group identity is strong and, indeed, almost universal among 

developing adolescents. It draws young people to street gangs and chess clubs, to marching 

bands and al-Qaeda. This springs from the innate need to internalize the behavior, mores, 

and attitudes of a social grouping.32 The identity seeker needs the structure, rules, and 

perspective that come from belonging to a group, because belonging defines him, his role, 

his friends, and his interaction with society. 

As a young man struggles to define himself, the norms of group identity and the acceptance of his peers are crucial. Group identity also provides outward symbols of his affiliation, 

announcing him to the world and defining him in the eyes of others. Identity seekers comprised the largest percentage of foreign fighters studied. For them, al-Qaeda is more than 

just a legend—it is the best possible club to join. As with other highly exclusive groups, 

from fraternal orders to religious cults, al-Qaeda’s ideology demands strict obedience to a 

state of mind and prescribes how members should think, feel, and behave. These clear rules 

and coherent vision of the world appeal to identity seekers because they neatly package an 

identity into the ideology. A young man casting about for guidance and direction finds it 

in abundance with al-Qaeda.

The behavioral framework and guiding principles provided by group affiliation also 

explain the culture of suicide and violence that exists within an al-Qaeda cell. Violence and 

death become the norm. Anyone who rejects violence is cast out by the group and loses 

the positive benefits and defining principles that came from belonging.33 Thus, it is critical 

to turn young men away from al-Qaeda membership before they have joined. Once they are 

inside, the dynamic of distancing from society and clinging to the group is continuously 

reinforced. 

Just as in the struggle against urban gang violence, the greatest challenge is to provide 

viable alternatives and other groups to which a young man can belong. The United States 
11

and its allies must support organizations that create positive identity groups, from community service organizations to sports and adventure clubs. The structure and purpose of 

an organized group, along with the symbols of membership, will make the identity seeker 

less likely to fulfill his needs by joining an al-Qaeda cell.

The Thrill Seeker: Looking for Adventure

Thrill seekers represent the smallest percentage of those studied, accounting for less than 

5 percent of the sample. They also represent a very distinct motivation from the other 

three. The thrill seeker is filled with energy and drive. He wants to prove his manhood by 

accomplishing an arduous task or surviving a harrowing adventure. Bored or unchallenged 

at home, he looks for the next trial or newest adventure. Often from a middle- or uppermiddle-class family, he has no interest in the family business or what he perceives as the 

mundane life on his horizon. 

The thrill seeker is often attracted to violent video games and the fanciful tales of 

returning fighters. He is most impressed by the images of glory and adventure portrayed by 

al-Qaeda propaganda. For the thrill seeker, al-Qaeda is a horror action brand that promises 

spectacular violence and unimaginable glory. 

The thrill seeker is also the most likely to quit the movement if the reality fails to live up 

to the legend or he is not challenged. One young Syrian said in his interview that he spent 

the first few months cooking, cleaning, and driving the other members around the city. “I 

was like a woman for them; they did not trust me to do any real fighting.” In reality, most 

al-Qaeda cells are initially suspicious of newcomers because they fear infiltration by intelligence organizations. New recruits are often given menial work until they can prove their 

trustworthiness. This makes it possible to dissuade the thrill seeker simply by exposing the 

reality of life inside al-Qaeda.

A Radicalization Prevention Strategy

Since defeating al-Qaeda does not involve fighting in a particular physical place, the central 

tenet of the radicalization prevention strategy is to discredit the brand image and dissuade those who seek membership or affiliation. Physical confrontation should continue, 

because discrediting the brand requires that al-Qaeda operations be continuously and publicly destroyed, dismantled, and disrupted with an active combination of military and law 

enforcement actions. Concurrently, a parallel effort should plant doubts about the viability 

and effectiveness of al-Qaeda operations in the minds of those who seek to join al-Qaeda or 

establish an associated movement. 

Psychological defeat of al-Qaeda also requires the United States to engage fully across 

the broad spectrum of communications, in a campaign of active listening and robust participation. Much of this effort will take place in new media forums such as chat rooms, blogs, 

and video postings, in which members of the Muslim community are encouraged to express 

their opinions and generate discussion. The counter–al-Qaeda narrative must present seekers with more choices and alternative definitions that allow them to find productive and 

positive self-definition. These young men want to grow into their decisions and choices. The 

United States must help make the right choices available.

Specific strategies address each seeker’s distinct needs, but strategies also share characteristics. Messages appearing to emanate from the U.S. government to Muslim populations 

struggle for credibility in the minds of a skeptical public. Recent public opinion polling 

shows that while most Muslims have mixed feelings about al-Qaeda and its objectives, many 

also view the U.S. government as hypocritical and disrespectful of Muslims.34 This leads to 

For the thrill seeker, al-Qaeda 

is a horror action brand that 

promises spectacular violence 

and unimaginable glory.
12

mistrust of any message coming directly from the United States and makes it more important 

that partner nations and independent organizations be more engaged on behalf of the United 

States. While the United States must pursue this strategy with vigor and purpose, it cannot 

be an externally imposed, U.S.-only solution. The weight of effort must be toward encouraging, facilitating, and nurturing indigenous efforts to create the competing narrative.

The most important step for each strategy is to listen. The seekers tell the world their feelings and are often frustrated because no one listens. In one noteworthy interview, a young 

man said, “I felt like I could not be heard. No one heard me when I spoke, so I started to shout. 

No one heard me shout, so I started to throw things. Still no one listened, so I went to a place 

where my voice could not be ignored. They will hear me now.” Market research is a critical component of any communications strategy, but it is especially important in helping the United 

States bridge vast cultural and religious divides between Muslim societies and the West.

Second, the United States must engage seekers in their media. This will include technological steps both forward and backward. Al-Qaeda’s activities on the Internet often make 

news in the West, but many extremists report that they first heard the call to fight on a 

cassette tape or CD passed around their community.35 Despite the allure of new media 

strategies, values, ideas, and coping strategies are most routinely presented in traditional 

media, public sermons, comic books, video games, and children’s literature. Positive depiction of the Muslim faith, presented in a “kid friendly” context, is the hallmark of The 99, a 

comic book series aimed at Muslim youth and produced by Kuwaiti psychologist Dr. Naif A. 

al-Mutawa.36 This and other similar projects that are culturally appropriate and designed to 

follow current popular trends should be nurtured and promoted.

There are important lessons from reeducation and reintegration programs, especially 

concerning religious education. The prevailing characteristic of the subjects studied is 

incorrect or incomplete religious education during their formative years. The lack of a complete understanding of their own faith made the subjects vulnerable to al-Qaeda’s skewed 

appeal. Reintegration programs in Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Indonesia 

have successfully rehabilitated former extremists by directly refuting al-Qaeda’s religious 

interpretations with knowledgeable Islamic scholars.37 If reeducation through religious 

teaching can cause a fighter to renounce al-Qaeda, it stands to reason that religious education programs conducted with younger participants could inoculate them against the appeal 

of al-Qaeda. The United States must overcome its squeamishness over religious issues and 

actively support clerics whose interpretations of Islam support peaceful coexistence with 

Western culture. These ideas are active throughout the Muslim world, but their voices must 

be amplified, rebroadcast, and retransmitted to wider audiences.

To defuse the sense of persecution and isolation that Muslims feel, especially if they are 

living in Western societies, programs such as those provided by the International Center for 

Journalists and by Search for Common Ground should be promoted and encouraged. Journalism training, media outreach training, distribution of positive articles, and broadcasts on 

Muslim-Western relations counter biased reporting and curtail present and future negative 

images of Islam and Muslims in Western media.

Also, moderate organizations such as the Council on American Islamic Relations; and 

programs such as Soliya, initiated under the World Economic Forum, and Project Nur, created by the American Islamic Congress, provide more accurate depictions of Islam and 

allow moderates to voice their disapproval of Islamic fundamentalists. The U.S. government should therefore support them. These programs support Muslim-Western dialogue 

and foster religious education to transform interpersonal relationships between Muslims 

and Western non-Muslims. Respectful depiction of Muslims erodes al-Qaeda’s argument that 

the United States is at war with Islam, calling into question one of al-Qaeda’s main appeals 

to disgruntled Muslim youth. It also erodes the separation between Muslim communities 

Reintegration programs in 

Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, 

Singapore, and Indonesia 

have successfully rehabilitated 

former extremists by 

directly refuting al-Qaeda’s 

religious interpretations with 

knowledgeable Islamic scholars.
13

and the broader societies where they live, which reduces the isolation that many young 

Muslims feel.

Service projects provide outlets for at-risk youths to connect with their communities. 

Service activities can create a sense of interconnectedness and of belonging to a larger 

community—ideal for the identity seeker. Service provides opportunities to create new 

friendships, and often the intergenerational mixture of volunteers creates an environment 

for revenge seekers to develop mentors. Also, public service connects young men with 

their communities, fosters civic engagement opportunities, and opens the door to political 

involvement for status seekers.

Few of the subjects studied fit exclusively into one of the four seeker categories. Most 

displayed aspects of at least two of the characterizations, with one generally more prominent. Individual strategies address specific needs for the various groups but are not solely 

for a specific group’s consumption. Messages and activities within each set work in concert 

with the others to produce a holistic message, broadly accessible to all young Muslims who 

are struggling to define themselves.

Calming the Revenge Seeker

For the revenge seeker, the most pressing need is an outlet to vent his frustration. The 

United States should not simply monitor the conversation; it must help create a space where 

alternative voices can be heard. Creating additional escape valves helps vent the pressure of 

frustration. Creative outlets, especially music and poetry, are particularly effective at giving angry young men a way to vocalize their frustration. The wildly popular “Afghan Star” 

program in Afghanistan is just one example of how musical expression creates an outlet. In 

a country where music was systematically and brutally repressed, young people continued 

to yearn for an opportunity to express their emotions in song.38 Similar programs enabling 

youth to write and perform their own music are burgeoning across the Middle East and 

should be promoted and enhanced.

For the less artistic revenge seeker, sports competition provides another meaningful 

outlet. It satisfies the need both for an in-group/out-group dichotomy and for glorification 

of the victors. The revenge seeker who effectively vents his aggressive frustrations on the 

playing field is less susceptible to messages that tap unfocused rage. Building sports programs also gives young people the opportunity to interact with peers who may have similar 

feelings and frustrations.

Since the revenge seeker is often unsure of the source of his anger and is ill equipped to 

vent it effectively, mentoring programs that link young men with older role models reduce 

the likelihood that they will be enticed by al-Qaeda. Revenge seekers partnered with a positive role model can define their role in society in a productive rather than a destructive 

framework. 

Promoting the Status Seeker

The status seeker believes that he is smarter and more capable than the world has acknowledged, so programs designed for him must provide an opportunity to show off his gifts. 

Status seekers are drawn to political discourse at universities and on call-in radio shows. 

Al-Qaeda will lose its appeal to the umma when Muslims understand that al-Qaeda is not 

serving their best interests. Al-Qaeda will be defeated when its supporters see that its 

violent strategy will never realize the utopian vision of a global Islamic caliphate. There is 

a great internal debate within Islam over the utility and viability of violent extremism, and 

the United States can help foster that debate by actively promoting and encouraging public 

discourse on local, regional, and international levels.

The revenge seeker who 

effectively vents his aggressive 

frustrations on the playing field 

is less susceptible to messages 

that tap unfocused rage.

Al-Qaeda will be defeated 

when its supporters see that 

its violent strategy will never 

realize the utopian vision of a 

global Islamic caliphate.
14

The study of political science at universities in the Middle East is all but nonexistent. Many 

Middle Eastern regimes, fearing a threat to the status quo, censor political discourse and the 

writings of prominent Muslim political scholars.39 Offering classic works of Islamic and Western political thought fosters more discussion of the role of government in the lives of citizens. 

Encouraging the removal of barriers to open political debate and study and supporting the 

promulgation of religious and political scholarly works helps intellectually disarm al-Qaeda.

The status seeker needs not only to discuss politics but also to participate. Young Muslims, especially in the diaspora, often find themselves excluded from local governance and 

community activities. Building political participation at all levels of government begins with 

encouraging student groups and political advocacy. An example is the Muslim Public Affairs 

Committee in the UK. In 2006, when extremist protesters used the depiction of the Prophet 

Mohammed in European newspapers as an excuse to promote violence and jihad on the 

streets of London, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee not only denounced their activities 

but was given a platform by the British government to help disseminate the message.40 

Groups like this, bolstered with government support and fueled by publicity, can give status 

seekers a position of prominence they desire.

International exchange programs expose young people to an alternative view of the 

world. Current exchanges are mostly available to the children of the elite and well connected. New exchanges should be targeted specifically at youth in higher-risk communities. To avoid isolation and despair, the exchanges should be as short as one month and 

should focus on a “Middle East meets Middle America” strategy rather than on elite degree 

programs at American universities. When the young men return home, they will have not 

only direct experience with America and its principles, but also a newfound status in their 

communities since their selection and participation in the program.

Finally, the depiction of their peers in the public media dramatically affects status seekers. The United States should foster and promote positive public depictions of Muslim youth 

in the media. Unlike the ill-fated “Muslims in America” programs, which tried to show Muslim 

assimilation into American culture, these programs must show Muslims thriving within their 

own cultural context and being valued for their distinct contribution to Western society. 

One of the defining characteristics of early Muslim society was its tolerant and transparent 

nature compared with other societies in the seventh and eighth centuries. This history can 

be recounted to remind Muslims of the more productive eras in their own history and to 

portray their stories positively in the media. Negative stereotypes in the media only feed the 

preexisting feelings of oppression among isolated youth, so the West must promote positive 

images and celebrate the accomplishments of its Muslim citizens.

Giving the Identity Seeker a Group

For the young identity seeker struggling to belong, programs must first acknowledge the 

existence of Muslim subcultures within Western societies and foster their healthy growth. 

Muslim subcultures exist throughout the world, but young immigrants often cannot easily 

connect with their countrymen without encountering al-Qaeda’s message. Among immigrant 

populations, the first encounter that a young person has with al-Qaeda often occurs in a 

mosque or Islamic community center, but these places are also among the best opportunities for him to meet with others who share his experiences of isolation. Promoting moderate 

religious education and actively fostering programs to bring these communities together 

provides an alternative to radical views.

Within the Muslim communities of the Middle East, a young man is surrounded by people 

who look, dress, and talk as he does, but he may still feel isolated until he finds a group to 

identify with that will accept him. Within these communities, the United States should help 

Negative stereotypes in the 

media only feed the preexisting 

feelings of oppression among 

isolated youth, so the West must 

promote positive images and 

celebrate the accomplishments 

of its Muslim citizens.
15

partner governments develop, foster, and encourage collective activities that give young 

men a set of defining principles to guide their development and frame their world. Identity 

seekers use these venues to define themselves. Sports leagues, model governments, student 

societies, community service programs, and adventure groups all offer outlets that include 

symbols of membership and a brand to adopt. Further, they alleviate the feeling of isolation 

and provide a place and sense of belonging. 

Sports heroes are especially effective in providing group identity. Unlike the revenge 

seeker, who craves the competition and victory of participating in a sport, the identity 

seeker enjoys the vicarious benefit of following a professional or national team, because he 

displays outward support for the team and is immediately accepted by other fans. Sports 

personalities are closer in age to at-risk populations and use more accessible language than 

political figures do, so they are more credible sources of information for young people. Like 

other role models within a society, sports figures give young people someone to admire and 

an aspirational goal without encouraging detachment from the mainstream of society.

Turning Off the Thrill Seeker

Thrill seekers are obsessed with the legend of al-Qaeda, so the most direct component of 

a communications strategy aimed at them is to debunk the legend by demonstrating the 

reality of al-Qaeda. Those who have left the movement after negative experiences should be 

encouraged to tell their stories and explain the realities of living on the run and performing menial tasks in deplorable conditions. Care must be taken to ensure that they are not 

humiliated in the process, but their tales of actual events can be compelling. Graduates of 

deradicalization and reintegration programs are effective spokespersons because they have 

seen both the reality of al-Qaeda activities and the indignities of capture and incarceration. 

Encouraging them to speak and broadcasting their stories tarnishes the legend of al-Qaeda 

and dissuades the thrill seeker.

Thrill seekers, like many young men and boys, love first-person shooter games because 

they provide vicarious thrills. One of the most popular in the Middle East, Special Force, lets 

the young fighter defend Palestine through a series of missions and adventures.41 Winning 

the game requires the player to assassinate the Israeli prime minister. Kids are often so 

caught up in trying to get to the next level, they are unaware that they are learning to hate. 

The United States and its allies can offer a much more positive message while accepting that 

something on the screen (zombies, aliens, criminals, or terrorists) will still have to explode 

if anyone is expected to play the games.

Discrediting the al-Qaeda brand in the eyes of potential thrill seekers also requires that 

al-Qaeda operations be publicly portrayed as inglorious and shameful. The military and law 

enforcement activities that are used to thwart attacks must be determined and aggressive, 

but the public recounting should question al-Qaeda’s effectiveness and delegitimize its 

struggle by making it appear bumbling, inept, and illegal.

Al-Qaeda’s adventurous appeal also wanes dramatically for the thrill seeker when the 

reality of living in squalid conditions, fighting for a lost cause, and dying an ignominious 

death is prominently displayed. The disparity between the professed global aspirations and 

the local ethnonationalist activities of some of al-Qaeda’s associated movements highlights 

disunity and cross-purposes within the organization, making it appear less monolithic and 

less prestigious in the process.

Discrediting the al-Qaeda 

brand in the eyes of potential 

thrill seekers also requires that 

al-Qaeda operations be publicly 

portrayed as inglorious and 

shameful.
16

Policy Recommendations

Why do young men join al-Qaeda? Because they see no other viable choice. A continuing 

and compelling case must be made for something else to give their lives meaning. If those 

who seek al-Qaeda continue their steady aspiration to belong, no amount of physical force 

will adequately protect the United States and its allies from future attacks. 

To make this case to a skeptical Muslim population requires a focused and coordinated 

effort to present an alternative narrative through every available means of communication. 

These ideas are hardly new, but they have too often been words without funds, and visions 

without programs. This ambitious strategy cannot be successfully accomplished within 

the current framework of U.S. communications capabilities and organizations. Fragmented 

efforts of strategic communication, public diplomacy, and information operations to date 

are underresourced, poorly coordinated, and understaffed given the strength and pervasiveness of al-Qaeda’s message.42 Ambassador-at-large for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin 

noted with pride during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the 

Department of State had recently formed a six-person unit responsible for creating programs 

to counter violent extremism.43 Even when combined with the State Department’s two dedicated Arabic-language bloggers and the ability to make grants of up to $100,000 from the 

Ambassadors’ Fund for Counterterrorism, it is clear that the level of effort toward countering 

al-Qaeda’s message must be significantly bolstered. The size, shape, and composition of the 

U.S. government must change to reflect the reality of the times. The cost of doing anything 

less is too high.

The first step is to create the capability to break through what Jeff Jones, the former 

National Security Council director of strategic communications and information, called the 

“bureaucratic turf battles, misperceptions, and the absence of visible, sustained interagency 

commitment that are detriments to progress.”44 The United States must establish an independent national organization responsible for conducting strategic communications. This 

new agency would be responsible for all U.S. government messaging and communications 

and would consolidate all current efforts under a single cabinet-level secretary of strategic 

communications.

Discussions of U.S. communications strategy frequently elicit the vocal but fallacious 

contention that the United States can never have credibility with Muslim audiences. Based 

on our recent history of poor communications, officious foreign policies, and lack of strategic appreciation for Muslim culture, the United States currently struggles for credibility, 

but this is a temporary condition and not sufficient justification to relinquish all speaking 

parts on the world stage. A cursory review of the founding documents of the world’s former 

colonial holdings shows that the United States was once considered a major thought leader 

on the relationships between citizens, their creator, and their governments. In many ways, 

this intellectual leadership continued through most of the Cold War, framing the debate 

between free-market democracy and Communism. Centered as it was in the political debates 

of Christian nations, it did not escape the gaze, or the commentary, of Muslim scholars 

and political thinkers who have for centuries been trying to define those relationships in a 

uniquely Muslim context.

A U.S. Strategic Communications Agency would begin its existence following two distinct 

but parallel paths. First, enable, empower, support, and reinforce the existing moderate 

voices on the world stage that have credibility with Muslim audiences. This is accomplished 

primarily by remaining in the background and helping willing partners, whether states, 

organizations, or individuals, move the dialogue in a direction consistent with our national 

interests. Simultaneously, the United States must slowly build its message credibility with 

honest, transparent dialogue that closes the “say-do” gap that has plagued much of recent 
17

U.S. foreign policy. Sustainable credibility, built over time, will allow the United States to 

engage in constructive dialogue with Muslim audiences without constantly struggling for 

legitimacy in the debate. The United States will thereby regain a position of prominence in 

the political debates of the world.

With the responsibilities and capabilities consolidated, the U.S. Strategic Communications Agency must also be empowered with the funding necessary to control the implementation of programs. Current interagency coordinating bodies, no matter how well meaning, 

lack the power of the purse strings; thus, disparate agencies and organizations conduct 

their own programs, using dedicated funding, with little regard for coordinated effects. This 

erodes the power, cohesiveness, and credibility of any U.S. message.

Once a U.S. Agency for Strategic Communications is established and appropriately funded, it must be further empowered with a comprehensive and presidentially directed National 

Communications Strategy. The Strategic Communications Acts of 2008 and 2009 (S 3546 

and HR 489, respectively) and the Smith-Thornberry Amendment (HA 5 to HR 5658) have 

all called for a National Communications Strategy and sweeping reform of U.S. communications capabilities and structure, but none of this legislation has yet been fully considered or 

implemented. The communications stakeholders, whether at the State Department, Department of Defense, Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any of the other entities involved, 

cannot reform themselves without the external pressure generated by strong legislation.

To implement a National Communications Strategy against al-Qaeda, the regional 

engagement strategies of the military’s Geographic Combatant Commands must complement 

and reinforce the country-specific strategies of U.S. embassies abroad. In some countries, 

Military Information Support Teams (MIST), deployed at the specific request of U.S. ambassadors, reside in embassies to provide support to U.S. public diplomacy efforts in support 

of the mission strategic plan. MISTs also give the ambassador a link to regional military 

information programs. These linkages should be enhanced, and MISTs deployed more extensively around the globe. Coordinated efforts abroad between the Department of State and 

Geographic Combatant Commands ensure message consistency and clarity, letting each 

leverage the unique capabilities of the other toward a unified goal.

There must be a similarly coordinated effort between influence programs and development programs. While some tension will always exist between focused strategic communications activities and the creation of viable, independent media in developing countries, the 

exchange of ideas that occurs in a robust and credible media is crucial to challenging the 

appeal of violent extremism. Coordination across the government, non-governmental organizations, and private media groups is essential. The role of the U.S. Strategic Communications 

Agency in coordinating media actions would be similar to that of the U.S. Agency for International Development in coordinating humanitarian relief and development projects.

The U.S. military can play a supporting role in these efforts and temporarily augment 

each as its capability builds. It can also continue to provide security assistance and military 

training to willing partners who wish to bolster their own internal security capabilities. 

Also, military activity must be framed within the context of the National Communications 

Strategy so that the gap between actions and statements continues to narrow, as it has 

recently in Afghanistan.

Overseas programs where the Department of State holds primacy and the military and 

other agencies support it must also be effectively coordinated with domestic programs 

targeting Muslim diaspora communities in the United States. The prospect of self-radicalization, as displayed by Major Nadal Hasan at Fort Hood and the self-proclaimed “Jihad Jane” 

in Philadelphia, combined with ready domestic access to Arabic-language programming from 

overseas, has increased the need to ensure consistency of messaging at home and abroad. 

This will require review and amendment of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 

The United States must slowly 

build its message credibility 

with honest, transparent 

dialogue that closes the “saydo” gap that has plagued much 

of recent U.S. foreign policy.

Military activity must be 

framed within the context of 

the National Communications 

Strategy so that the gap 

between actions and statements 

continues to narrow, as it has 

recently in Afghanistan.
18

Act of 1948 (popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act) to account for the globalization 

of the media environment.

The U.S. Strategic Communications Agency should also house a robust capability to 

collect, synthesize, and analyze public opinion research. Managing a complex message in a 

nuanced and responsive fashion requires that adjustments be made to the message based 

on changes in popular perceptions of U.S. actions and previous messages. Despite improvements in open-source reporting, and partnering agreements with public opinion research 

firms, there remains no central point of coordination for the measures of effectiveness that 

are critical to strategic communications. Individual agencies and stakeholders, each with 

their own small research staffs, can get only part of the picture, and the intelligence community is better suited to analysis of more concrete physical information. With a synthesized 

research capability working in partnership with indigenous market researchers around the 

globe, all communications actors would share a common frame of reference for events.

Conclusion

Studying individuals who sought out al-Qaeda and fought for its principles gives unique 

insight into both the recruiting appeal of al-Qaeda as an organization and the path that 

takes young men to it. These young men were following developmental paths like those 

of young men in other societies, but they were presented with too few options to satisfy 

their developmental needs. Al-Qaeda has spent years promoting and perfecting its brand 

management strategy to appear to young Muslims as if it were the only answer to all their 

problems.

Creating a new dialogue with the Muslim community, one that fosters positive relations 

and erodes the appeal of al-Qaeda, requires the United States to reject the myths that 

extremism is somehow caused by religion, poverty, or insanity. Instead, U.S. policies and 

programs must focus on understanding the depths of personal need and the peculiar nature 

of adolescent development that make al-Qaeda’s message resonate with young men. When 

that understanding is coupled with significant increases in the amount and efficiency of 

U.S. communications capabilities and managed under the umbrella of a comprehensive, 

whole-of-government strategy, the defeat of al-Qaeda and its associated movements will 

become inevitable.

Despite improvements in opensource reporting, and partnering 

agreements with public opinion 

research firms, there remains no 

central point of coordination for 

the measures of effectiveness 

that are critical to strategic 

communications. 
19

Notes

1. Jon Gambrell, “Web Posts Suggest Lonely, Depressed Terror Suspect,” Seattle Times, Dec. 29, 2009, 

www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010621860_apafairlinerattackinternetpostings.html 

(accessed Jan. 12, 2010).

2. Discussion of the components of al-Qaeda and the history of its development and evolution is greatly informed 

by Bruce Hoffman, “Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat” (testimony presented to House 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Washington, 

DC, Feb. 16, 2006); Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003); and Marc 

Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

3. Although this ideology has been referred to by various different names, some either counterproductive or 

insulting (e.g., “islamofacsism”), it was most accurately described as “Qutbism” by the Combating Terrorism 

Center in its comprehensive survey of existing militant ideological writings. William McCants and Jarret 

Brachman, Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).

4. Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror.

5. David Aaron, In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad: Compilation and Commentary (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2008).

6. The author was able to review these reports directly, draw conclusions about their content, and request 

limited follow-up questions but did not participate directly in the interview process.

7. Most notable among these were the Sinjar Records, which have been analyzed by the Combating Terrorism Center 

at West Point. See Peter Bergen, Joseph Felter, Vahid Brown, and Jacob Shapiro, Bombers, Bank Accounts, and 

Bleedout: Al-Qa`ida’s Road In and Out of Iraq (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008).

8. Some of these myths have recently been articulated in Jessica Stern, “5 Myths about Who Becomes a 

Terrorist,” Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2010, B4. While I agree with some of Stern’s points, we diverge on the 

role of religion and levels of belief in the cause—I lean more toward the analysis in Daveed GartensteinRoss, “Threat Matrix: Is the Importance of Terrorist Ideology a Myth?” Long War Journal, Jan. 11, 2010, 

www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/01/is_the_importance_of_terrorist.php (accessed 

Apr. 2, 2010).

9. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

10. Clark R. McCauley and M. E. Segal, “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups,” in Group Processes and Intergroup 

Relations, Vol. 9 of Annual Review of Social and Personality Psychology, ed. C. N. Hendrick (Beverly Hills, CA: 

Sage, 1987).

11. Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches America (New York: Norton, 2003).

12. James F. Rinehart, Apocalyptic Faith and Political Violence: Prophets of Terror (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 

2006).

13. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. 

14. Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968).

15. Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessey and Paul R. Baines, “Selling Terror: The Symbolization and Positioning of 

Jihad,” Marketing Theory 9, no. 2 (2009): 227–41.

16. Jihad Watch, Jihad Watch, Feb. 4, 2004, www.jihadwatch.org/archives/00800.php (accessed Mar. 10, 2010).

17. Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2006).

18. Daniel Kimmage, The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network behind the Global Message (Washington, 

DC: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2008).

19. Ibid.

20. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

News Release no. 2-05, Oct. 11, 2005, www.dni.gov/press_releases/letter_in_english.pdf (accessed Feb. 

16, 2010).

21. Billah, Ahmad al-Watheq. “Al-Qaeda Takes Jihad to Media Four Years after 9/11: Al-Qaeda Fighters Become 

Producers, Film Directors, Video Cameras Have Become Their Most Potent Weapon,” Middle East Online, Sept. 

9, 2005, www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=14500=14500&format=0 (accessed Feb. 16, 2010).
22. Jarret M. Brachman and James J. F. Forest, “Terrorist Sanctuaries in the Age of Information: Exploring the 

Role of Virtual Training Camps,” in Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, ed. Michael 

Innes (London: Praeger Security International, 2007).

23. Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation.

24. O’Shaughnessey and Baines, “Selling Terror.”

25. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2007): 24–41.

26. Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the ‘Human Bombs,’” New Yorker, Nov. 19, 2001.

27. Heinz Kohut, “Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage,” in The Search for the Self: Selected Writings 

of Heinz Kohut, ed. Paul H. Ornstein, 615–58 (New York: International University Press, 1978).

28. Marvin Zonis, “Values, Narcissistic Wounds, and Violence in the Middle East” (paper delivered at the 

26th Annual Conference on the Psychology of the Self, International Association for Psychoanalytic Self 

Psychology, Chicago, Nov. 6–9, 2003).

29. This is a representative story derived from multiple accounts of detainees who traveled to Europe from the 

Magreb, all of whom recounted similar tales. In many ways, it is similar to the experiences of the 9/11 

hijackers who lived in Germany before deciding to join al-Qaeda.

30. This quote came from an individual interview with a fighter captured in Iraq, although his sentiment was 

shared by many others in the same situation.

31. Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (New York: General Learning Press, 1977).

32. William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 1990).

33. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.

34. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, Evan Lewis, and Ebrahim Mohseni, “Muslim Publics Oppose Al 

Qaeda’s Terrorism, but Agree With Its Goal of Driving U.S. Forces Out,” World Public Opinion, Feb. 24, 2009, 

www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/591.php (accessed Apr. 2, 2010).

35. Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” Studies in Conflicts and 

Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 309–21.

36. Naif A. al-Mutawa, “The 99,” www.the99.org (accessed Apr. 5, 2010).

37. Christopher Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008); Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed 

Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore,” Religious Rehabilitation Group, 

Sept. 23, 2008, www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/The_roles_of_RRG.pdf (accessed Jan. 8, 2010); Kirsten E. Schulze, 

“Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 8 (Jul. 2008): 8–10; Lorenzo 

Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-radicalization in the Netherlands,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 9 (Aug. 

2008): 12–14.

38. Alastair Leithead, “Afghanistan’s Pop Idol Breaks Barriers,” BBC News, Feb. 25, 2008: http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7262967.stm (accessed Apr. 2, 2010).

39. Lowell H. Schwartz, Todd C. Helmus, Dalia Dassa Kaye, and Nadia Oweidat, Barriers to the Broad 

Dissemination of Creative Works in the Arab World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).

40. Russell Razzaque, Human Being to Human Bomb: Inside the Mind of a Terrorist (Cambridge, UK: Icon, 

2008).

41. Tony Harnden, “Children Play Israeli-Killers in Bloody New Video Game,” Daily Mail, Aug. 17, 2007, 

www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-475966/Children-play-Israeli-killers-bloody-new-game.html (accessed 

Apr. 2, 2010).

42. Tony Blankley, Helle C. Dale, and Oliver Horn, Reforming U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century 

(Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2008).

43. Daniel Benjamin, “U.S. Government Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism” (statement for the record before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Washington, DC, 

Mar. 10, 2010), www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/138175.htm (accessed Oct. 7, 2009).

44. Jeffrey B. Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States,” Joint Forces Quarterly no. 

39 (fourth quarter 2005): 108–14.

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