U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

72–799 PDF 2012

WHAT THE EURO CRISIS MEANS FOR TAXPAYERS

AND THE U.S. ECONOMY, PART I

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TARP, FINANCIAL SERVICES

AND BAILOUTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROGRAMS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 15, 2011

Serial No. 112–97

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform
(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

CONNIE MACK, Florida

TIM WALBERG, Michigan

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee

JOE WALSH, Illinois

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking

Minority Member

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JACKIE SPEIER, California

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TARP, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND BAILOUTS OF PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE PROGRAMS

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, Chairman

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire, Vice

Chairman

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania

JOE WALSH, Illinois

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois, Ranking Minority

Member

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

JACKIE SPEIER, California

JIM COOPER, Tennessee
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on December 15, 2011 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Lachman, Desmond, Ph.D., resident fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Anthony Sanders, Ph.D., distinguished professor of real estate

finance; Douglas J. Elliott, fellow, economic studies, Initiative on Business and Public Policy, Brookings Institute; Joshua Rosner, managing

director, Graham Fisher & Co., Inc.; and Bert Ely, principal, Ely &

Co., Inc. .......................................................................................................... 7

Elliott, Douglas J. ...................................................................................... 31

Ely, Bert ..................................................................................................... 46

Lachman, Desmond, Ph.D. ....................................................................... 7

Rosner, Joshua .......................................................................................... 39

Sanders, Anthony, Ph.D. .......................................................................... 20

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Elliott, Douglas J., fellow, economic studies, Initiative on Business and

Public Policy, Brookings Institute, prepared statement of ........................ 33

Ely, Bert, principal, Ely & Co., Inc., prepared statement of ......................... 48

Lachman, Desmond, Ph.D., resident fellow, American Enterprise Institute, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 10

McHenry, Hon. Patrick T., a Representative in Congress from the State

of North Carolina, prepared statement of ................................................... 4

Rosner, Joshua, managing director, Graham Fisher & Co., Inc., prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 42

Sanders, Anthony, Ph.D., distinguished professor of real estate finance,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 22

(1)

WHAT THE EURO CRISIS MEANS FOR

TAXPAYERS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY, PART I

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TARP, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND

BAILOUTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROGRAMS, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Patrick T. McHenry

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives McHenry, Meehan, Ross, Issa, Quigley,

Maloney, Welch, and Cooper.

Staff present: Michael R. Bebeau, assistant clerk; Molly Boyl,

parliamentarian; Katelyn E. Christ, research analyst; Linda Good,

chief clerk; Peter Haller, senior counsel; Ryan M. Hambleton, professional staff member; Christopher Hixon, deputy chief counsel,

oversight; Ryan Little, manager of floor operations; Mark D. Marin,

senior professional staff member; Jaron Bourke, minority director

of administration; Ashley Etienne, minority director of communications; Adam Koshkin, minority staff assistant; Lucinda Lessley, minority policy director; Jason Powell and Steven Rangel, minority

senior counsels; and Brian Quinn, minority counsel.

Mr. MCHENRY. Good morning. This is the Subcommittee on

TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs. Our hearing today is, What the Euro Crisis Means for Taxpayers and the U.S. Economy. This is the first of two hearings; we

have an additional hearing tomorrow morning at 9:30 a.m. in this

room with the New York Fed President, a representative from our

Central Bank right downtown, and a representative from Treasury

as well.

It is the tradition of this subcommittee to read the mission statement of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

We exist to secure two fundamental principles: first, Americans

have a right to know that the money Washington takes from them

is well spent and, second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective

Government that works for them. Our duty on the Oversight and

Government Reform Committee is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold Government accountable to taxpayers

because taxpayers have a right to know what they get from their

Government. We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen

watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and bring

genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is the mission of

the Oversight and Government Reform Committee.
2

I recognize myself now for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

Over 3 years ago Americans witnessed domestic and global markets deteriorate, resulting in missions of job losses and unprecedented measures by governments and central banks to prop up financial institutions. As the U.S. economy remains vulnerable in

the midst of our recovery, just across the Atlantic, the European

Union, our friends, fight to fend off a second wave of economic and

financial turmoil.

Today’s hearing examines the economic unrest facing Europe, actions undertaken by central banks and international organizations

in response, options that remain in our disposal, and potential consequences to the U.S. economy and taxpayers.

In 2010, what first appeared as a Greek crisis spread throughout

the EU and now dictates global headlines, stock markets, and the

way European nations are categorized. As events worsened this

summer, the crisis began to take out heads of European states and

even managed to build the closest of relationships between President Sarkozy of France and Chancellor Merkel of Germany in their

efforts to save the Euro.

Notably, the EU instituted the European Financial Stability Facility and encouraged the European Central Bank and the IMF to

take extraordinary measures to address the liquidity and perhaps

the solvency issue in the crisis generally facing European nations

and their banks.

Thus far, it seems their actions have failed to be the bazooka

markets desired. Consequently, the Greek crisis transformed into

a full-fledged and full-blown Eurozone crisis, intensifying the contagion to the larger economies of Italy and Spain that have a cumulative sovereign debt of roughly $4 trillion.

Today, as European leaders work to strengthen the framework of

the EU, financial markets have become more dependent on the continued willingness of central banks to use their balance sheets to

rescue the global economy. The central banks are not shying away

from this. Just last month, in an effort to aid European banks that

had trouble accessing dollars due to market skepticism about their

health, six central banks, led by the Federal Reserve, made it

cheaper for banks to borrow dollars to ease Europe’s sovereign debt

crisis.

While welcomed by the markets, some financial experts have

warned that the Federal Reserve is allowing the European Central

Bank to create unlimited amounts of claims against the Fed. Since

Fed currency swaps reached nearly $600 billion during the height

of the 2008–2009 crisis, it is important to recognize what the Federal Reserve determines is prudent exposure to the European Central Bank.

Furthermore, it is prudent for the Fed to review whether this

precedent reduced the incentives of European banks to sell underperforming assets during the intervening calm. For instance, would

European banks have acted to raise capital and sell bad assets

sooner if they could not rely on capital injection from the Fed?

Another item worth examination is the role of the Eurozone leaders in determining the conditions of credit default swaps on Greek

bonds. After leaders declared that holders of Greek bonds would

take voluntary haircuts, billions of dollars of credit default swaps
3

were unable to serve their purpose. By these actions, the sanctity

of a contract is questioned. Such uncertainty may have long-term

consequences as market participants must now factor in such risk

to a great degree in the agreements that they make.

If we learned anything from the last crisis, it is that impromptu

precedents by governments increases uncertainty and the likelihood of capital injections on behalf of the taxpayers. In addition to

market uncertainty, the reality of European banks’ spreadsheets

and spreading their assets and reducing lending due to undercapitalization has global markets fearful of another recession.

The implications of a European recession on a recovering U.S.

economy are significant. A second recession out of Europe would reduce U.S. exports, negatively impact the health of our banks and

non-bank financials, and visibly influence the value of the U.S. dollar.

With that said, the severity of these effects on the U.S. economy

is anyone’s guess. Consequently, the only certainty is Europe’s crisis is now a global crisis. As daily headlines proclaim, capital injections to the tune of billions and trillions of Euros and dollars, reinforcing the interconnectedness of the global economy, it is vital that

the Congress conduct vigorous oversight on rescue proposals and

threats to our economy, threats to American jobs, threats to American people’s way of life, threats to American people’s value of the

currency that they hold, their savings.

Simple questions still need to be answered, such as, Are the actions of the Federal Reserve consistent with its mandate and are

the firms that are seeking liquidity simply illiquid or perhaps insolvent? I am interested to hear from our expert witnesses today

about their views on the Eurozone current potential rescue efforts

and the consequences the crisis may have on the U.S. economy and

its citizens.

I appreciate your attendance on the panel and I now recognize

the ranking member, Mr. Quigley of Illinois, for 5 minutes.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Patrick T. McHenry follows:]
4
5
6

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today’s hearing will examine what the European debt crisis

means for U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy. Trillions of Euros

in debt remain outstanding for Eurozone countries like Italy,

Spain, Greece, Portugal, and others. Weak revenues from a weak

economy have imperilled the capacity of these governments to

repay their debts, thereby risking default. A default by a major European economy would have devastating consequences for the

American taxpayer.

As Mr. Elliott will testify, in 2010, our exports to the European

Union totaled $400 billion. We have over $1 trillion of foreign direct investment in the European Union and we are exposed to

nearly $5 trillion in potential losses on loans and commitments to

European governments, banks, and corporations.

If economic powerhouses like Spain or Italy were to become insolvent, the ripple effect throughout the global economy would be catastrophic. If Europe sinks into prolonged recession, American small

businesses that export to Europe would lose out on valuable customers, retirees whose retirement plans are invested in European

assets would be put at risk, our economy would grow more slowly

or slide into recession, and American standards of living would decline.

There can be no question that a healthy European economy is

vital to the national interest of the United States and the American

taxpayer. But we must protect the American taxpayer if the Euro

crisis is not successfully resolved. I look forward to hearing testimony from our Government witnesses on what they see as the

proper role, if any, of the U.S. Government.

Either way, Europe must reform itself. Countries like Greece,

Italy, and others need to address their short-term financial challenges, but they also need to develop credible, long-term debt reduction plans. Of course, if this sounds to you like the pot calling

the kettle black, you would be right. Here in the United States we

have repeatedly failed to legislate a credible long-term debt reduction plan. Politics, not economics, nearly saw the U.S. Government

default on its debt in early August.

Europe’s challenge is also political. While Europe surely has the

economic resources to resolve this crisis, it has repeatedly failed to

do so. European leaders will have to surmount their political differences and agree that saving the European Union will require a

shared sacrifice. It would be a tragedy if the post-war European

spirit of cooperation floundered on this crisis. It would be equally

tragic if our own leaders were unable to come to an agreement on

steps to reduce our own long-term debt.

The truth is that the mission of government matters, but reckless decisions have made it harder to fulfill that mission. I join my

colleague, Chairman McHenry, in urging leaders at home and

abroad to take the necessary steps to resolve this crisis and help

restore the global economy to a sustainable growth.

Thank you and I yield back.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the ranking member.

Members may have 7 days to submit opening statements for the

record.
7

We will now recognize our panel before us today. Dr. Desmond

Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute

and holds a Ph.D. in economics from Cambridge University; Dr.

Anthony Sanders is professor of finance in the School of Management at George Mason University; Mr. Douglas J. Elliott is a fellow

at the Brookings Institute; Mr. Joshua Rosner is a partner at

Graham Fisher & Co.; Mr. Bert Ely is a principal of Ely & Co.,

Inc., and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.

I believe I know at least four of you have testified before, but it

is the standard practice of the Oversight and Government Reform

Committee that all witnesses be sworn, so if you would please rise

and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MCHENRY. All right, you may be seated.

Let the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Seeing as you have testified before, if you will summarize your

statement. You see the red, yellow, and green lights before you.

When yellow pops up, that means, well, it means just what it

means when you are at a stop light: hurry up. And obviously green

means go and red means stop.

So, with that, we will recognize Dr. Lachman for 5 minutes.

STATEMENTS OF DESMOND LACHMAN, PH.D., RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; ANTHONY SANDERS, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF REAL ESTATE

FINANCE; DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, FELLOW, ECONOMIC STUDIES, INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE; JOSHUA ROSNER, MANAGING DIRECTOR,

GRAHAM FISHER & CO., INC.; AND BERT ELY, PRINCIPAL,

ELY & CO., INC.

STATEMENT OF DESMOND LACHMAN, PH.D.

Dr. LACHMAN. Thank you, Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member

Quigley, members of the committee, for giving me this honor to testify before you this morning.

In my oral statement, what I would like to do is three things: I

would like to set out the reasons that I think that there is going

to be a significant intensification of the Euro debt crisis in the

months immediately ahead that could result in the Euro’s unraveling within the next 12 months, so this is a crisis that really does

have a sense of urgency; I would then like to draw out the serious

risks that the Euro crisis poses to the U.S. economic recovery

should there be an intensification of the Euro crisis; and, last, I

want to consider the potential cost to the U.S. taxpayer of the various measures that have been undertaken by the IMF and by the

Federal Reserve to diffuse the crisis.

Over the past few months there has been a marked intensification of the European debt crisis that suggests we could get an unraveling even as early as 2012. The Greek economy now appears

to be in virtual free fall. Its banks are losing deposits. It is only

a matter of time, a matter of months, before we are going to get

a hard default of Greece.
8

Second, there is contagion from the Greek crisis that is now affecting Italy and Spain, Europe’s third and fourth largest economies, which are regarded in the markets as too big to fail, but too

big to bail. Should those problems intensify, the question of the

Euro’s existence would be very much in question.

The European debt crisis is also having a material impact on the

European banking system, which is in the throes of a credit crunch

that is likely to intensify in the months ahead, and what we are

seeing is we are seeing the German and French economies showing

the clearest of signs of slowing, moving into recession.

Now, European policymakers and the IMF are hoping that the

countries in the European periphery can correct their large public

finance and external imbalances by several years of the severest of

fiscal austerity within the framework of a fixed exchange rate system that doesn’t allow them to devalue to boost exports as an offset

to the fiscal tightening. I very much doubt whether such an approach can work because it is more than likely to throw those countries into the deepest of recessions that is going to make the collection of taxes difficult and is going to have a very big political backlash.

A deepening of the European crisis could very well derail the

U.S. recovery. We have already had mentioned the idea that it

could diminish U.S. export prospects, it could result in a weakening

of the Euro that would make it difficult for the United States in

third markets, but the most important channel through which the

European crisis could affect the United States would be through

the financial crisis. U.S. money market funds have close to a trillion dollars deposited with European banks. The U.S. banks are

very exposed to Germany and France.

Let me touch on the IMF and the Federal Reserve. The IMF

lending commitments to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal already total

around $100 billion. Considering that the United States has a 17.5

percent share in the IMF, this lending puts U.S. taxpayers at risk

to the tune of $20 billion. In assessing how serious is the risk for

U.S. taxpayers, it is of note that the IMF has never lent money on

this scale to any country in relation to the size of those countries

as it has to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. The IMF’s commitment

to these countries are as much as 10 percent of their GDPs and

one-quarter to a third of their tax collections.

At the recent European Summit, the European countries are proposing to make bilateral loans to the IMF to the tune of $260 billion, or $200 billion Euros, that would be intended to loan to Italy

and Spain. It is important to recognize that if those bilateral loans

by the European countries give those countries a claim on the IMF,

as opposed to a claim on Italy and Spain, the U.S. taxpayer would

be put at risk for those loans to Italy and Spain.

If Italy and Spain do have to go to the IMF for large-scale loans,

the exposure to the U.S. taxpayers to those countries could be enormous. Considering that the IMF’s combined lending commitment to

Italy and Spain could well exceed a trillion dollars, what we are

talking about is U.S. taxpayers could be at risk for up to $200 billion.

In assessing the potential risk to the U.S. taxpayer from IMF

lending to European periphery, one has to consider that the risk
9

of the unraveling of the Euro is a distinct possibility. Were that unraveling to occur in a disorderly manner, it would have a devastating impact on the European periphery’s economic outlook and

its public finances. Considering that IMF loans to the periphery

could reach levels that would be unprecedentedly high in relation

to those countries’ taxpayers, there would be a material chance

that those countries would have difficulty in repaying those loans.

Last, judging by its 2008–2009 experience with currency swaps, the Federal Reserve’s dollar swap lines could reach $600 billion in

the event that the European crisis were to intensify. However, one

must suppose that the risk to the U.S. taxpayer from the Federal

Reserve swaps would be circumscribed by the fact that the main

counter-party to those swaps would be the European Central Bank,

rather than the countries in the European periphery, and one

should suppose that the European Central Bank could print the

Euros to buy the dollars to repay those loans.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lachman follows:]
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Dr. Lachman.

Dr. Sanders.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY SANDERS, PH.D.

Dr. SANDERS. Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Quigley,

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to

testify today.

The Eurozone is teetering on collapse and it has been decades in

the making. The cause of their problems is excessive government

spending, leading to excessive government debt, coupled with slow

GDP growth.

The largest European countries are expected to have real GDP

growth of 1.3 percent for 2012 and unemployment of 9.9 percent.

The IMF has also produced a long-term real GDP forecast in which

they have discovered that most of the European zone will have less

than 2 percent GDP growth by 2016.

And if we take a look at the household and financial debt in Europe, we find out that the U.K.’s debt-to-GDP ratio, including

households and financials, is over 900 percent. Japan is over 600

percent and Europe is almost 500 percent debt-to-GDP. The United

States is over 300 percent. In summary, the Eurozone, Japan, and

the United States are drowning in debt.

In a recent article from an economist at the European Central

Bank itself shows that there is a significant negative effect of the

size of government on growth.

The European Union will unify, break up, or downsize, but regardless of what option they choose, they are still spending too

much money and have taken on too much debt and have reduced

the ability to pay for it, which is slow GDP growth. Additional debt

is not the answer; it is the problem.

The obvious solution is austerity. But making loans to the European Central Bank and individual countries does not solve the underlying structural problem, it only makes the debt-to-GDP problem even worse; it is simply a short-term solution to lower GDP

growths. And how is this possibly going to help bail out the European situation?

Now, if Germany and France are successful in creating a fiscally

integrated Europe, there will be less of a rush to purchase U.S.

treasuries, leading Treasury rates to rise as people flee our markets. But given that the Fed is already the largest purchaser of

U.S. treasuries, this could be a problem. China is flat on Treasury

purchases and the U.K. and Japan continue to increase their purchases of treasuries. But the U.K. and Japan are not enough to

pick up the slack from China’s flat-line Treasury purchases.

Now, the Fed has been active in the European bailout starting

in 2007, actually, a little bit before, with its discount window of operations, and it peaked in 2008. The largest European borrower

from the Fed was the failed Belgian bank Dexia. While most of the

discount window loans have been repaid, we are still in the dark

on the guarantees.

Recently, the ECB drew $552 million from the Fed’s swap line

last week, in November. These are 7 day swaps at an interest rate

of 1.08 percent. The Central Bank also borrowed the same amount

in the prior week, etc. It begs the question, how long will the Fed
21

keep the swap line open? While we cannot see the swap line in real

time, the evidence indicates that the basis swap has a very short

half-life, meaning that it is able to drive down the Euro rate momentarily, then immediately rises back up, showing that this is ineffective.

A recent disagreement about the size of the Fed’s intervention,

discount window, and guarantees was in the media between the

Fed and the Bloomberg Markets Magazine. The Bloomberg Markets said that the Fed had committed $7.7 trillion as of March

2009, almost the size of our national debt at one point recently, to

rescuing the financial system when all guarantees and lending limits were added up. The Fed disagreed and said that any given day

the Fed emergency credit from its liquidity programs was never

more than $1.5 trillion. Whether we are looking at any given day

or the cumulative impact, these are very large numbers historically, indicating the Fed is in fact attempting a bailout of the

Eurozone.

Now, on the Fed side, it is clear that the guarantees of the

Eurozone could be problematic to U.S. taxpayers if things do not

improve, and I just don’t see the story for improvement in the

Eurozone. And the swaps with Europe could be costly as well.

Since there is little transparency on the Fed’s discount window and

guarantees, it is difficult to measure taxpayer exposure.

In addition to the Fed, the IMF, which is the U.S.’s largest stakeholder, is also active. They have a line of credit for IMF crisis funding in the amount of $100 billion. Given the structural problems

facing the Eurozone, there is little likelihood that the Eurozone will

continue to have problems since there is a lack of will to cut government spending and entitlements, so I would expect that $100

billion LOC to be used and not paid back.

In summary, the Eurozone’s structural problems cannot be

solved by low interest rates and guarantees from the Fed or the

IMF. In fact, engaging in a bailout of Europe could actually jeopardize U.S. taxpayers and is a perverse solution to the problem.

The best way to protect U.S. taxpayers is to increase transparency

of the Fed, take back the $100 billion line of credit at the IMF, and

undertake spending cuts ourselves in order to reduce our deficit

and massive debt loan exposure.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:]
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Dr. Sanders.

Mr. Elliott.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT

Mr. ELLIOTT. Let me add my own thanks to you, Chairman

McHenry, Ranking Member Quigley, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me here today. As has been noted, I am a

fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution, but I am

here in an individual capacity and not representing the Institution,

which does not take policy positions.

I commend you for calling this hearing, since the Euro crisis is

deeply worrying. There is a significant chance that the crisis could

go badly enough wrong that Europe plunges into a deep recession

that puts the United States into at least a mild recession. Trouble

in Europe will communicate itself to our shores strongly and quickly because, as the ranking member noted, we have $400 billion of

exports to Europe annually, a trillion dollars of direct investment

there, and our banks have almost $5 trillion of credit exposure.

Now, the good news is that the Eurozone as a whole does have

the resources to avoid that kind of disaster if the 17 nations stick

together effectively. Europe is one of the world’s largest economies

and the Eurozone as a whole has debt ratio similar to the United

States, meaning that their fiscal problems require serious action,

as ours do, but the situation can certainly be remedied.

I personally believe there is a three in four chance that Europe

will muddle through, but very complicated political constraints in

Europe still leave us with a one in four chance of disaster, again,

in my view. Even assuming a good outcome, the crisis is likely to

get worse before it gets better, as it will probably take the imminent possibility of catastrophe to allow politicians over there to

break through those tough political constraints. At that point of crisis, it may be necessary for European leaders to produce a comprehensive package backed by as much as two trillion Euros of

available funds. Not all of this would be used in practice, as long

as a backstop this large is credibly committed. The markets need

to know that there is insurance for the worst emergency, in which

case they are likely to go back to supplying at least some of the

necessary funds themselves.

I believe the IMF could play a very useful role in any comprehensive solution. First, adding some IMF funding to the mix would

help reassure financial markets that the total resources necessary

would in fact be available. Second, it would be a clear sign that the

rest of the world stands ready to help Europe through its troubles,

which should also be viewed positively by the markets. But most

importantly, the IMF is in the best position to impose conditions

on lending to troubled Eurozone countries since it is viewed as

more dispassionate and less political about Europe’s situation than

would be true for purely European institutions. Further, it can provide a great deal of technical advice, which is more likely to be

taken when the IMF is also a provider of funding. We all listen

more carefully to people who are also providing money to us.

If Europe produces a credible and comprehensive plan that involves the IMF appropriately, then we should support that IMF

role. I do not believe that this would require additional U.S. fund-
32

ing of the IMF, but just the use of resources we have already provided. The IMF has almost $400 billion of uncommitted resources

and Europe is planning to commit another $200 billion Euros to

the IMF, with the possibility of some matching funds from certain

non-European nations not including the United States.

The risk to the U.S. taxpayer from IMF lending, I believe, would

be small for a variety of reasons. A key one is that IMF lending

is in a legally privileged position that makes it much safer than,

for example, the TARP funds that were invested by U.S. taxpayers.

IMF loans are effectively senior in their claims to all other borrowings; whereas, the TARP funds were deliberately invested at

the level of equity, which is much riskier. This was done in order

to stabilize the financial markets by protecting other suppliers of

funds to the banks. In addition, even if everything does go wrong,

the United States bears less than a fifth of the risk from IMF lending.

I want to emphasize our taxpayers and other citizens are already

at great risk from the Euro crisis. If it goes badly wrong, our citizens and the businesses they own will lose large sums of money

both here and abroad. Federal Government tax receipts will fall

significantly, eventually requiring taxpayers to pay more than they

otherwise would have done. In my view, supporting IMF intervention would reduce the total risk to America by much more than the

quite modest financial risk that our share of the IMF funding

would represent. Sometimes the riskiest choice is to take no

chances at all.

There are a few other things that America can do, principally

along the lines of the Fed swap facilities with the European Central Bank that have been described and the provision of technical

advice. However, this is a European problem and they will need to

provide the backbone of any solution.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I welcome any questions when we get to that point.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:]
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Elliott.

Mr. Rosner.

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA ROSNER

Mr. ROSNER. Thank you, Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member

Quigley, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me to testify on this important subject.

To fully assess the risks to the United States and our proper role

in the Eurozone crisis, it must first be clear what the crisis is and

is not. It is not a bailout of populations of the weaker European

economy such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Hungary,

or Belgium. After all, the populations of those countries are being

forced to give up portions of their sovereignty in the name of austerity toward a fiscal union.

Rather, it is partially a bailout of banks in the core countries of

Europe, of their stockholders and creditors who, failing to gain sufficient access to capital markets, would need to be recapitalized by

their host country governments. It is a transfer of losses from bank

creditors onto the backs of ordinary people without requiring any

cost to those banks whose practices helped lead us to the problem.

It is much a tale of overlending as it is of overborrowing. And just

as nobody should feel undue sympathy for those who miscalculated

the amount of debt they could service, nobody should feel for those

who miscalculated their lending risks.

The fundamental construct of the Euro is flawed, and its basis

depends on substantially different economies and different levels of

competitiveness among those economies sharing the same currency.

Those economies have proven unable to rationalize their differences

in a monetary union. In the United States we have a transfer

mechanism allowing tax dollars to be reallocated from the wealthiest states toward those less fortunate. The core European countries

have demonstrated an unwillingness to accept such as necessity.

The solution is either to move forward with a fiscal union complete

with transfer of payments or break up. Ultimately, these are political decisions and currently there appears to be little popular support in Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands for such a real fiscal union. Unless that changes, the Eurozone will have to shrink

its membership or dissolve. Either result will inevitably lead to significant stakeholder losses, which importantly may now include the

Fed.

Proper U.S. policy should support our values around the world,

not undermine them. We should support the apportioning of losses

first to equity investors and then to unsecured lenders according to

long-established and well understood rules of priority. We should

no longer support privatization of gain and socialization of loss.

Doing so leads to distortion of market incentives and further risktaking by those who have demonstrated an inability to properly

manage risk.

The European crisis demonstrates all too clearly that the problem is now well beyond moral hazard. A great many of the decisions being made in the name of crisis management are not being

made by the elective representatives of the people of the countries

of Europe. Rather, they are being made by technocrats. Accordingly, the crisis is moving into a stage where it may represent the
40

death of representative democracy, but also the destruction of global markets. I urge you to consider whether this is truly the approach to crisis management that our country should be supporting

and endorsing.

In May 2010, the Fed reopened swap lines to the European Central Bank in an effort to bolster liquidity for institutions in these

markets, but at what cost? On November 30, 2011, to increase the

attractiveness of these lines, the Fed lowered the interest rate by

a half percentage point. Since then, 3-month lending through the

lines increased from $400 million to over $50 billion. While the actions of the Fed may well be justified and consistent with U.S. policy goals, they are nonetheless being made in near darkness and

without substantial involvement by our own elected officials. As a

result of this commitment of financial support, we are now supporting undemocratic approaches implemented largely by authorities who have demonstrated an ongoing inability to either recognize

the scope and scale of the problems or come to a consensus on how

to address the rolling crisis and prevent it from spreading. They

have, instead, sought to deny the problems and downplay the impacts. When they don’t like the market’s assessment of the problems, they have chosen to shoot the messenger and imperil market

function through limitations of trading of sovereign bonds and credit default swaps. Are these proper policies for the United States to

endorse?

By providing unlimited swap lines to be used by institutions in

the Eurozone, institutions which may in fact be insolvent, not just

illiquid, we have effectively allowed the Fed to direct U.S. foreign

policy in support of a single currency for the Eurozone. As the risks

of the losses of the Fed rise in the event of a breakup of the

Eurozone, they seem likely to commit us further to support of that

union in its current form. While the Fed has technical expertise in

these matters, such policy decisions should not be made without informing Congress. I suggest that you consider whether the Fed’s efforts should be directed more toward quantification of the problem

and providing technical advice to Congress.

Dodd-Frank sought to reduce the opacity and require the Fed to

disclose which firms receive loans from the discount window. In the

spirit of that legislative intent, why hasn’t the Fed required the

ECB to inform them of recipients of funds from swap lines as condition of the arrangement?

While there are many more questions to be asked and answered,

these questions suggest there are real reasons for the Fed to have

concern about ongoing instability in highly interrelated markets of

Europe. There also appears to be a real and rational basis for the

actions they have taken toward short-term stability goals during

the crisis. Furthermore, we can believe the Fed is acting appropriately, but without more information and a broad discussion, we

don’t know whether the Fed’s focus on short-term stabilization

properly aligns with longer term U.S. policy goals.

Perhaps we should support a European Union, but have our

elected representatives affirmatively decided in favor of continued

support for a single currency? It seems fair to consider that such

foreign policy decisions should rightly be made not by an independent central bank, but, instead, by the Secretary of State, U.S.
41

Trade Representative, and the Secretary of Treasury with informed

consent of the President and Congress.

Thank you, and I would be pleased to address your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosner follows:]
42
43
44
45
46

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you so much, Mr. Rosner.

Mr. Ely.

STATEMENT OF BERT ELY

Mr. ELY. Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Quigley, and

members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify to you today about the Euro crisis and what it could mean for

U.S. taxpayers and our economy.

I wish I could speak more positively about the Euro situation

than my fellow panelists, but I feel that I cannot.

Europe would not be experiencing its economic crisis if the Euro

had never been created or if at least the Eurozone had not been

expanded to 17 countries. The fundamental problem with the

Eurozone is that it ties 17 quite dissimilar economies to a common

currency. While the total population of the Eurozone approaches

that of the United States, the Eurozone lacks the economic, cultural, and language integration that has long benefited the United

States. The Eurozone’s insufficient integration greatly impairs the

sustainability of the Eurozone as it is now constituted.

A key characteristic of a sustainable currency are such as the

United States is that there are minimal barriers to the movement

of goods, services, and labor within the currency area.

Unfortunately, these keys to sustainability are not present in the

Eurozone as it is now constituted, as there still are many practical

barriers to the movement of goods, services, and labor within the

EU. Arguably, the Euro subsidized the retention of national laws,

which impair the efficiency of industry in the Eurozone countries,

and especially export-oriented industries. Consequently, export

goods produced in these countries have steadily lost international

competitiveness. This is especially true across the southern tier of

the Eurozone, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

In many regards, the Euro suffers the same weaknesses as the

classic gold standard, which the United States abandoned in 1933,

or any commodity standard which ties several or many countries

to a fixed relationship between the currency units of account of

those countries. Because national economies evolve at different

rates of economic growth and public policy innovation, economic

tensions develop among countries tied to each other by a common

currency. The fixed relationships between units of account become

increasingly difficult to maintain until a breaking point is reached

and the fixed relationships are irretrievably broken. The same phenomena is occurring within the Eurozone.

Abandoning a common currency represents a country’s shift to a

fixed to a floating exchange rate. Abandoning the Euro, though,

would be quite painful for a country. First, debts such as mortgages

and bonds denominated in Euros would have to be abrogated and

rewritten in the new local currency to spare debtors from being

crushed by repayment obligations in a now suddenly more expensive Euro.

Second, owners of Euros in the weak Euro nations fearful of

being forced to convert their Euros into their country’s new, less

valuable currency appear to be shifting their Euros to banks in

stronger Eurozone countries. The recent last ditch attempt to fix

the Euro by amending the EU treaty to impose greater fiscal dis-
47

cipline in the EU will not work in the short-term because the fiscal

problems in many Eurozone countries are so deeply imbedded that

they cannot be fixed within a few years. It will be a decades-long

process that will not move at a uniform pace throughout the

Eurozone. My written testimony discusses these problems.

Bottom line, the weaker Eurozone countries have much to do to

enhance their ability to stay in the Eurozone. How many will succeed in doing so is a huge question with global implications.

Turning to how a Euro crisis could impact the U.S. economy and

U.S. taxpayers, a Euro crisis could throw the EU into a recession.

However, if enough dominoes topple within the Eurozone, Europe

could experience a long, deep recession or worse. Given the highly

interconnected nature of the global economy, U.S. experts to Europe would decline, which would harm the U.S. economy. A European recession could trigger a global economic slowdown, with the

United States possibly falling into a recession as the European

economy sorted itself out.

A slowing U.S. economy would increase the already enormous

U.S. budget deficit as tax receipts declined and Federal spending

rose. Consequently, the U.S. economy would increasingly look like

the most troubled European countries, huge amounts of deficits

and rapidly rising debt-to-GDP ratio. It would not be a pretty picture.

Unfortunately, the United States has few options for dealing

with a Euro crisis. The best it can is urge the EU to aggressively

address its problems in order to hold the Eurozone together as best

it can. I am skeptical as to how much help the IMF can be. In particular, the United States should encourage the weaker Eurozone

countries to address structural problems to improve their competitiveness, thereby improving the likelihood that they can stay in the

Eurozone.

Given its financial weaknesses, the Federal Government should

not supply any direct assistance to help the Euro such as buying

the debt of any Eurozone country. However, I do support the U.S.

dollar swap arrangements the Fed recently entered into with five

other central banks. These arrangements provide liquidity to help

the European financial system function while the EU works

through its problems. I foresee no taxpayer risk from these swaps.

The United States should take the Euro crisis as yet another

wake-up call that it must put its economic house in order by trimming budget deficits, reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio, increasing domestic savings, reducing the U.S.’s net debtor position with the rest

of the world, addressing entitlement challenges, removing taxes

and disincentives for savings and investing, and increasing the

economy’s international competitiveness. This is an enormous politically challenging task, but as a country we must undertake it,

for we are not immune to being laid low by excessive debt and deficit spending, as has Greece and possibly other Eurozone countries.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ely follows:]
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the panel’s testimony. We will now go to

questions. I recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Dr. Sanders, let’s begin at the beginning The Federal Reserve

has foreign currency swaps, it is a normal function of the Federal

Reserve for quite a number of years. Explain what that means.

Dr. SANDERS. Well, in a nutshell, what it means is that the

Eurozone can actually swap currencies with us. In other words, we

send cheap dollars over to Europe and they ship expensive Euros

over to the United States.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. So why is this an issue to the Federal Reserve in this current environment? Why is this foreign currency

swap agreement an issue right now?

Dr. SANDERS. Well, again, it is not being done at parity, which

means we are just not providing them, swapping the currencies at

a market rate; it is actually a subsidized rate, we cut the rate on

it.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay.

Dr. SANDERS. So, in other words, we are, again, subsidizing Europe for the swap.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. So really the issue here is that we have reduced the cost of this exchange and made it below what is the current market rate; therefore, incentivizing the European Central

Bank to transact this type of swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve.

So, in light of that, Dr. Lachman, I have asked you this question

before, what do you see, in your view, the likelihood that the Euro

makes it out of this, that the Euro actually exists as a currency in

the medium term?

Dr. LACHMAN. Well, I think you need to distinguish between losing a number of countries and the whole Euro disappearing. I

think that it is very likely that within the next year, 18 months,

we are going to see several countries exit the Euro, we are going

to see countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland, probably Spain be

forced to leave the Euro. But the Euro itself as a currency between

Germany and like countries, the northern European countries,

probably including France, that is very likely to continue to exist.

Mr. MCHENRY. Let’s go across the panel. Dr. Sanders, do you

agree?

Dr. SANDERS. Again, as I have said in my reply, I don’t think the

Euro can be saved. They can save the core, but the fantasy that

they can bail out the pigs, whether it is the pig banks or the loans

to the pigs, whatever, it is mission impossible, they can’t do it, so

it has to break up.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. Portugal, Italy, Ireland.

Dr. SANDERS. Greece.

Mr. MCHENRY. Greece.

Dr. SANDERS. Spain.

Mr. MCHENRY. Spain. Thank you. Just want to make sure, because Occupy Wall Streeters have a different analysis for what a

pig is.

Mr. Elliott.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, I am completely confident the Euro will continue to exist, certainly the core absolutely, and I think it is highly

likely that all 17 members stay.
56

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ROSNER. I think it is likely in the medium term that the

Euro continues to exist. I think that it will be difficult to have

members exit, but I do expect there to be an exit of some peripheral members within the medium term.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay.

Mr. Ely.

Mr. ELY. Yes. I think I am generally in agreement with my fellow panelists. I think the weaker countries are going to have to

exit, and basically it is the southern tier countries plus possibly

Ireland. If they leave relatively soon, despite the problems of

transitioning back to their previous currencies, this may actually

be positive for them and for the global economy because they will

have cheaper currencies, their exports will become more competitive, and this may be, as painful as it is going to be for them to

exit, this may be better both for those countries and for the global

economy if they leave sooner, rather than later, so they can go

through the adjustment process. For the remaining countries in the

core, again, they have to address the classic problem of any kind

of common currency area, and that is that within any one country

the policies are not too far out of sync from what they are in the

other countries in that currency area. That is a huge long-term

challenge.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ROSNER. Yes. You have to remember, though, part of the

problem that we have watched in the way they have tried to address the crisis thus far is that they have tried to avoid that default from occurring in the periphery by any means. So we have

watched attempts to come to voluntary write-downs of debts, of

Greece, as example, and tried to do so without it becoming a default in name, triggering the CDS. That is part of the problem of

the core, is they don’t want to allow it to be called a default because of what that would mean for CDS. It creates a problem,

though, in the timing and the delay. We have delayed this. So at

the point where Greece was recognized as a problem, the credit

was probably trading or should have been valued at about 80; and

today we are trying to get 50 percent write-downs, and the truth

is the Greek debt is not even worth that. The longer we wait, the

larger the write-downs will be, but that is being stymied, the timing of that, by this intent to do everything we can to avoid calling

it a default, when ultimately it will end up a disorderly default unless we recognize it as something that needs to happen sooner,

rather than later.

Mr. MCHENRY. Now, my time has expired, but the point here,

why this is a discussion and why we are having this hearing today,

is in light of opening up a below market swap rate with the Federal Reserve and the view that the survivability of the Euro as it

currently exists does expose the taxpayer to risk, that is the concern we have today as policymakers and that is why we are trying

to have this oversight hearing today.

With that, I recognize Mr. Quigley for 5 minutes.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ely, you said something that made me alter what I was

originally going to ask. You said it might be better for these small-
57

er countries to be forced out than go through this adjustment period. Are you assuming that they are going to get significant help

before they are forced out, or they are just going to have to go

through this painful adjustment process to get to that on their

own?

Mr. ELY. Again, this is all highly speculative because we haven’t

had any exits from the Euro before. My sense is that they would

not get much help, but what the exiting would do would help in:

number one, it would probably lead to the kind of debt restructuring that Joshua was just talking about, but, also, it would enable them to—their currency would be more competitive, their export goods would be more competitive, they would be more attractive for tourism. That is particularly thought to be the case with

Greece. And I think that this would allow them to start to turn

around their economies.

The alternative, by staying in the Eurozone, is just an increasingly Draconian austerity which potentially can create some very

serious political problems. But I think it is like in any kind of

bankruptcy situation; at some point in time you have to recognize

the reality of it, go through the debt adjustment process and deal

with competitiveness issues. And I think that for some of these

countries the only way they can do that is by leaving the Eurozone.

Mr. QUIGLEY. If anyone else on the panel would like to chime in.

I guess I want to understand more thoroughly, Mr. Elliott, why

standing alone would be good for them and what impact it might

have on the United States.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would like to say two things. First is a background point which I would be happy to expand on. You are hearing, in large part, political judgments here. You are hearing judgments as to whether these countries have the political will and capability to deal with their longstanding problems.

Mr. QUIGLEY. And while you are into that, sorry for interrupting,

if you could add. It seems to me, from your previous statements,

that they have the financial capability of solving this and this is

all about political will.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is certainly my view. If you take the Eurozone

as a whole, they have, clearly, the ability to deal with this economically. So then the question is will they take the political actions

necessary to do so. As you can tell from my testimony, I am significantly more positive about that than my fellow panelists. One reason for that is I think too often we look at what has been agreed

to date and think that tells us what the ultimate outcome will be.

This is like looking at the debt ceiling debate here a few days before the agreement and concluding there will never be an agreement because they are so far apart, or looking at the current budget negotiations and assuming that, because we can’t seem to agree,

the Government will shut down and never startup again.

I think there is very strong political will within Europe to get

through this together. They have made a lot of mistakes. I am not

trying to say they have been brilliant about this at all. But my

view is, when they get to the edge of the abyss, they really will be

likely to do what they have to do.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Dr. Sanders, you seem——

Dr. SANDERS. Agitated?
58

Mr. QUIGLEY [continuing]. Interested in——

Dr. SANDERS. I just want to throw in my two cents and agree

with something Josh said.

Mr. QUIGLEY. That is one of our jobs here.

Dr. SANDERS. I think one of the only solutions for them is to

write down the debt. But again, that is politically, as Mr. Elliott

said, dangerous, but it is also economically dangerous and perhaps

impossible. They just came out with a report the other day saying

Greece is not following austerity, they are not moving fast enough,

in fact, they are kind of dragging their feet. Is that a surprise? Absolutely not. This was predicted a long time ago. So, in other

words, any bailout is going to have to be serious. Banks are going

to have to take it on the chin, governments are going to have to

take it on the chin, and, again, look at the debt loads and government spending of even Germany and France. They have massive

social states. They can’t do this either, in the long run. Maybe they

can do it for a year, but forget it over the long run. There is all

too debt-laden and all too big.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Dr. Lachman.

Dr. LACHMAN. I think that the essence of the problem in countries like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland is that these countries are

insolvent, and providing them with additional funding isn’t a solution. It is not just a question that this is a political problem; it is

a problem that they can’t reduce those imbalances within a fixed

exchange rate system. If they try to do massive amount of fiscal

austerity within a fixed exchange rate system, you get the result

that we are seeing in Greece, with a country collapsing. When a

country’s economy collapses, they don’t collect the taxes; the debt

ratios rise. Greece’s debt ratio at the start of the IMF program was

supposed to peak at 130 percent. The latest IMF estimates are that

it is going to peak at 190 percent of GDP. This country is clearly

insolvent. One has to write down the debt and then one has to deal

with the problems that that causes for the banking system.

If I might just add one point just in connection with the swaps

that the Fed is making. To be sure, they are providing a cheaper

credit, but part of the reason for that is the U.S. money market

funds have huge amounts of deposits on the banks of the European

banks that they are trying to repatriate back home. So by providing those kinds of lines of credit, we are not simply helping the

Europeans, we are helping ourselves by avoiding any of these

money market funds eventually having to break the buck as they

did in 2008.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you. My time has expired.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Cooper for 5 minutes.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the distinguished panelists.

I think perhaps the most important question is the simplest: Is

this a crisis of the Eurozone or really more of a crisis of the west?

As most of you have pointed out that just the trade implications

alone mean that we have a stake in this crisis, whether we want

one or not. So when you globally talk about taxpayer exposure, we

have to remember that countless Americans are shareholders, and

they are shareholders in institutions that perhaps have lent tens,
59

hundreds of billions, maybe even trillions of dollars to countries or

entities in the Eurozone.

It goes without saying that we share many cultural and other

ties with this troubled area, and sometimes unspoken is the idea

that the entire capitalist system is built, to some degree, on confidence and leverage and trust. Just a few years ago there was a

prominent banker at Citicorp, Walter Wristin, who had the famous

doctrine that no sovereign country could ever default. And he was

not a creature of government; he was one of the preeminent

spokesmen of the U.S. private sector. So things have a way of

changing.

Mr. ELY. If I could address that. Mr. Wristin obviously didn’t

know his history because there certainly have been plenty of sovereign defaults before he made that statement and we have seen

them since, and unfortunately they will probably continue.

With regard to the question whether this is a crisis of the west

or of capitalism, I think things have become so intertwined globally

that it is really a global or potentially a global crisis, and when we

look beyond the west, let’s say to Japan or to China, to pick two

countries in Asia, each of them have some very serious problems;

different in some regards, but in Japan, for instance, we have a

debt-to-GDP ratio that exceeds, I believe, any country in Europe,

and in China I think a lot of people are just waiting for that bubble

to blow up. So I think that it is more than just a crisis of the west

or of capitalism; I think it comes back to the issue of just too much

debt. I believe Josh made that point, that there is just too much

spending on the global credit card, so to speak, and that that is

what has to be reined in, including in the United States.

Mr. COOPER. Those are all valid points. This is a complex issue.

Too much debt generally depends on the ability to repay, and that

is itself subject to many different factors. David Walker, the former

Comptroller General of the United States, pointed out that, at least

according to his measure of fiscal responsibility, of the top 34 nations, that the United States ranks 28th, behind some of the countries in Europe, in terms of our fiscal responsibility. Now, there are

different ways to measure this and none of us wants to be unduly

alarmist, but we clearly have a lot of work to do in our own country

since our own credit rating was threatened this summer for the

first time in modern history.

So as we approach these issues, another dimension seems to be

almost the longer you wait to deal with it, the more the contagion

spreads and the greater the risk to confidence. I wonder almost if

we had intervened early with Ireland and Greece or one of these

most troubled nations, if the contagion could have been limited. Of

course, the origin of all this seems to be excessive debt, inability

to repay, promises that can’t be kept, and we are certainly subject

to that in this country, when so often we even refuse to acknowledge the real debts of our own country, the real obligations.

So I see that my time is expiring. I recall that one person has

called for a competition to have the best idea to calmly allow a sovereign nation to default or a sovereign nation to leave the

Eurozone. Are you aware of any good ideas in that area so that the

dismemberment can be managed in a sensible way, if indeed that

is what it comes to?
60

Mr. ELY. I believe I am the one who made that comment. There

actually is a little bit of historical experience with currency arrangements, currency common areas and the like coming unglued.

It is not quite, certainly nothing of the magnitude that we have

today. It is not going to be an easy process, but I think it comes

down to a question of what are the alternatives. As bad as it may

be for someone to exit, it is potentially worse not only for the particular country, but for the broader economy, to delay the inevitable, and I frankly think, the more I look at this, the more I think

the sooner the problems are addressed the better.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Meehan of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank each

of the panelists for your preparation for this and the remarkable

capacity you had to take these complex issues and try to put them

down into 5 minutes. That, in and of itself, is a challenge, but this

is a sobering issue and I thank you for the work you are putting

into it.

Dr. Sanders, you mentioned something that I wasn’t quite sure

I understood, that there was a discrepancy in the identification of

whether some of these commitments were $7 trillion or $1.5 trillion, the Fed disagreed. What is that about and why aren’t we getting unanimity about something that fundamental?

Dr. SANDERS. What that is about was the Fed did not disclose

the discount window operations, and they still haven’t disclosed exactly fine details on it and they have not disclosed their guarantee

programs yet. But what happened was, with the Freedom of Information Act, Fox News and Bloomberg asked for the discount window information, it was produced, but the Fed and Bloomberg

counted it differently.

Mr. MEEHAN. I think it was Mr. Rosner that used the word opacity, but isn’t this the essence? Why are they entitled to be able to

keep that kind of fundamental information, if it is tying back to

guarantees from U.S. taxpayers, private?

Dr. SANDERS. Well, I think the way I would answer that is I

think they are worried about bank runs. So if they don’t disclose

the discount window, then there is not information out there. Although, again, I would argue the exact opposite. I would say if

there is a threat of a bank run, I want to know that information

in advance. I don’t think the Fed should be putting American taxpayers at risk, although they have lowered interest rates so low

that retirees and fixed income households are already getting pummeled, but that is a different issue, so they are getting harmed by

the Euro crisis that way. But, again, I think Chairman Bernanke

will defend the Fed being secret. I think a lot of these problems

would be settled down a little bit if we had made them transparent. They really should be.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Rosner, you used the word opacity. I was

struck by that, I made a note on it, and I think that why isn’t the

European Central Bank being asked to tell who is getting the

loans? Or respond to my first question. I am interested in your insight.
61

Mr. ROSNER. Well, I think it is a great question and I think that

part of the problem here is that there is a huge difference between

illiquidity and insolvency, and one has to wonder whether part of

the reason of the opacity is to protect those who were seen as illiquid from being shown to be insolvent. Okay? And I think that

is something——

Mr. MEEHAN. What do you see is the difference? What is the difference between illiquidity and insolvency?

Mr. ROSNER. If you have short-term funding issues, but the assets on your balance sheet actually allow you to be well capitalized

over the longer term, you are solvent. If you are fundamentally insolvent, you are insolvent, and no amount of liquidity will repair

that, it will just smooth over the market impact of that for the

short-term. But this is part of the problem that is going on, is the

Europeans have taken step after step to make claims of solvency

over institutions that are fundamentally insolvent and mask it in

illiquidity or liquidity problems.

Mr. MEEHAN. And would they be principally the countries

Italy——

Mr. ROSNER. No, I think it is also the core. I think, as we have

seen, you have had problems at Dexia, you have had problems at

Commerce Bank, you have had problems at several of the German

and French banks, and it is not clear to me that there just is liquidity problems; it seems to me that in some cases there are insolvency problems. In fact, I think we also have to realize that part

of the fiscal disciplines that everyone is talking about, everyone is

calling for includes getting governments out of the business of providing funding for creditors’ benefit on institutions that are fundamentally insolvent. That is a commitment of fiscal resources toward private creditors, as opposed to allowing market discipline to

force losses to be recognized by——

Mr. MEEHAN. And what do we do, then, to make those creditors,

who I guess are passing on that risk, so to speak, how do we put

them back into their appropriate place in the line so that they are

the ones who accept both the benefit of the risk, but the impact of

the downturn?

Mr. ROSNER. I think to some degree it is by stepping away. It is

certainly not by doing what the Troika in Europe did to Ireland,

which is force the Irish government to recognize the debts of its

banks as sovereign obligations as a way of preventing core banks

from having to take losses on those obligations.

Mr. MEEHAN. Would the run on the banks, then, cause there to

be an overall run on the whole European system?

Mr. ROSNER. I think there would be runs on insolvent institutions if we had enough information. I don’t think that there is a

problem if regulators stepped in ahead of that run and shut down

or forced good bank, bad bank resolutions of those institutions that

were fundamentally insolvent. We would head off the bank runs,

as opposed to what we are doing, which is the capital markets keep

trying to give information to the European leadership, telling them

where the problems are, and the leadership does everything they

can to avoid that coming out. We saw a bank stress test in Europe

in the spring of 2010 saying that only 7 of 91 institutions had real

problems. Now, we have seen since then that that stress test was
62

deeply flawed and inaccurate. We have done quite a bit to cover up

insolvency issues in the name of illiquidity or liquidity issues.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank you.

Mr. Rosner, I know you detail that in the American financial system in your book, Reckless Endangerment, which is quite a read.

Mr. Welch for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing.

I thank the panel.

Is it basically the consensus that Congressman Meehan’s question that implied more information is better is a point that all of

you agree with?

Mr. ROSNER. No.

Mr. WELCH. Do the others agree with it?

Dr. LACHMAN. Yes.

Dr. SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. ELY. I agree that more information is better, but the key

question is how do people and how do policymakers, specifically,

react on it. What counts is not what is spoken, but what actions

are taken.

Mr. WELCH. So is that a you can’t handle the truth?

Mr. ELY. That is, to a great extent.

Mr. WELCH. Let’s go to Mr. Elliott. You say no. It is hard to understand—what sounds like what we like; as long as we can confuse voters, we may be alright. But voters don’t like that, and

rightly so. So why do we have that standard that appears to apply

to bankers? Mr. Elliott, you seem to be saying there is some upside

to keeping things obscure.

Mr. ELLIOTT. It is a question of balance. That is, I agree in many

ways with what Josh was saying, but the problem is, in practice,

particularly in the middle of a crisis, it is often very hard to tell

the difference between illiquidity and insolvency, so there is a fear

that, for example, if you publish the discount window borrowings

in the short-term so people know very quickly, that if a bank does

borrow a lot of the discount window, which is secured borrowing,

they actually bring good assets, generally, to get that money, that

if they do that, which is important for liquidity, they will be seen

as potentially insolvent.

Mr. WELCH. So let me ask——

Mr. ELLIOTT. So I think most people agree that the discount window, if you do publish it, that you do at least want a delay of time.

Mr. WELCH. So there would be a difference, in your view, if I understand what you are saying, about managing information in the

midst of a crisis, where the market may react emotionally and

hair-trigger. But what about having systems that allow markets to

digest over time in realtime what is going on?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think if there is enough of a gap of time, then I

am definitely comfortable with that. Figuring out what the right

gap is is hard, and it is very important not to create a stigma——

Mr. WELCH. Let me go to Mr. Rosner. I don’t have that much

time, so I appreciate that.

Mr. ROSNER. If we believe that these shareholder-owned corporations have an obligation to shareholders, and we believe that markets can only work efficiently where there is symmetry of informa-
63

tion, how can we argue against the disclosure of that information

on the belief that there is no such thing as a rational investor who

can read a balance sheet, understand an income statement, and

know what assets are on a bank’s balance sheet?

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Dr. Sanders and then Mr. Ely.

Dr. SANDERS. Again, I see Mr. Elliott’s point. A delay may make

some sense; however, the problem is if you look at many major

banks around the world, Europe, the United States, if you mark

their books to market on all their asset-backed securities and MBS,

they would all be insolvent. So I think that signal is already out

there. So under those set of circumstances I don’t see the necessity

to the Fed keeping everything blind.

Mr. WELCH. Okay, let’s go to Mr. Ely and then finish with Dr.

Lachman.

Mr. ELY. Just very quickly, I just think in this day and age it

is naive to think that you can keep the markets ignorant of what

is really going on. There is an enormous amount of chatter that

takes place in the money markets and you have the analysts. But

the real downside of trying not to disclose information in any approaching realtime basis is rumors develop, so people may make

judgments and basically kind of see false negatives in the sense

that they will assume that maybe the problem is more widespread

or is spread by a particular institution, when in fact it is not. So

there is a downside to not disclosing information.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.

My remaining time to Dr. Lachman.

Dr. LACHMAN. I think in the European context the problem is a

lot deeper, it is that the Europeans have allowed the banks to keep

the sovereign debt of the periphery on their banking books at 100

cents on the dollar, which is patently not correct. So we get the ridiculous result that we had that Mr. Rosner mentioned, that you

have a stress test that says all of these banks are just fine because

we are assuming that it is impossible for any of the countries to

default. So I think that they are not doing a service by being very

opaque and actually encouraging the perpetuation of some sort of

myth that these debts are in fact going to be repaid.

Mr. WELCH. Okay, I want to thank the panel. Great panel.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank my colleague.

We will now start a second round and I recognize myself for 5

minutes.

So I guess the question is how large do you envision the swap

line? How large do you think it can get? In the crisis in 2008–2009,

we hit about $600 billion in the swap line. Dr. Lachman, what is

your view?

If you all could just keep it brief on this round.

Dr. LACHMAN. No, I think that you could quite easily go up to

$600 billion Euro. You are talking about a European banking system that is huge in relation to that of the United States. You are

talking about an economy that is a third of the global economy,

that the banking sector is really very important. So the chances of

you going to $600 billion, I am just thinking in terms of the

amount of money that the U.S. money market funds have parked
64

a trillion dollars, so to get above $600 billion wouldn’t seem to me

a stretch.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Sanders.

Dr. SANDERS. Oh, I agree with Dr. Lachman. I think, in fact, it

could get above that amount and get to the $1 trillion level or perhaps even higher. And, again, the problem is, since we are not seeing what is going on in real time, I know Chairman Bernanke, yesterday, said no plans to bail out Europe, but again, since it is all

off balance sheet, we can’t see it, I would say that they probably

are going to expand the swap lines.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Elliott.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Short answer is I don’t know. I am not deeply worried about it, though; the European Central Bank is a very, very

good credit.

Mr. ROSNER. I don’t think you can know until you have a sense

to how they are going to move forward in trying to resolve the crisis, recognize the losses, address it. Obviously, from a dollar funding need in the European banking system today, if we continue on

this trajectory, I don’t disagree with either Dr. Sanders or Dr.

Lachman. But it is unknowable at this point.

Mr. MCHENRY. Sure.

Mr. ELY. I agree that it is unknowable; however, the longer these

problems continue and the greater the continued uncertainty about

the strength of these banks and their parent governments, then

one can easily see the amount drawn under the swap lines going

up and up and up.

So what I worry about as much as anything else is the prolongation of it. When is the fever going to break? When will things start

to turn around? When will banks be able to resume or be able to

fund themselves more in the private markets? That, to me, is what

the real key issue is. And until we get to that point where there

is greater market confidence in the banks, we are going to see substantial amounts drawn on the lines and maybe even approaching

a trillion dollars.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Elliott, let’s say the Fed goes beyond simply

the swap line, which they have in the last crisis. We are expressing

concern now based on our view of the survivability of Europe and

the Eurozone as it is currently constructed. What if they go beyond

that? What policy options do you believe the Fed has in the event

of even greater stress in the European financial markets? Throw

out some scenarios that you could envision happening.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Sure. The scenarios I am going to throw out, I

think, are extremely unlikely, and I don’t think we would probably

want them to do it. I mean, look, the Fed could do the same thing.

Actually, I haven’t checked legally, but I imagine that they could

do the same thing that the various central banks in Europe are

doing, which is find a way to get some money into the IMF, for example, or find a way to loan money to the European Financial Stability Fund or something like that. But I just don’t see, nor do I

think it would be desirable, for the Fed to be putting money directly into any of these rescue funds.

I think mostly the Fed is at the limit of what it can do directly

as regard to Europe. Obviously, it could do more monetary stim-
65

ulus here to deal with concerns about Europe, but I don’t think

there is a lot of room to do things.

Mr. MCHENRY. And European banks that have a presence in the

United States already have an open line with the Fed as it stands

now, with their open markets function, because they too are American banks, have a presence here.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Exactly.

Mr. MCHENRY. Could you envision the Fed purchasing Americanoriginated assets held by European banks? Could they do that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they could. I think it is hard to imagine

unless they were making the same opportunity available to other

banks to sell the same kind of assets.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. But American-originated, I mean, that

would be sort of the nexus there.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yeah.

Mr. MCHENRY. Could you imagine a TALF-like facility for European assets, European bank assets?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think if the assets are U.S. assets, yes, I could

imagine doing another version of the TALF. If the assets are basically European-based assets, it is hard for me to imagine us doing

that.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. I am just asking scenarios because the

range of options. What we saw the Fed do in the last crisis, and

to Dr. Sanders’ point, this question about was it $7 trillion or was

it $1 trillion or a trillion and a half, the real question that the average American citizen has is what is the Federal Reserve doing.

So this lack of information means that many Americans will just

simply fill in the blanks on what happens in that black box.

To Mr. Rosner’s point, which is a bank’s actual assets, as a stockholder of a bank, it is hard to tell if the bank is doing great or awfully or what the range is in between. So that lack of information,

that is the reason why I want to at least have some scenarios, so

we are not completely surprised by the Fed.

Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ROSNER. I was just going to say in the short-term it doesn’t

seem like the Fed is going to have to take a lot more action than

they have done with the swap line, in part because, again, in an

attempt to kick the can down the road, we have seen the European

Central Bank offer 1 percent money for 3 years to their banks.

It seems increasingly likely that the way they are going to deal

with sovereign debt auctions next year is banks within each sovereign nation are going to be increasingly called on to be the large

purchasers of those issuances, which has negative implications for

economic growth and for the overall economies on the other side,

as much as they are helpful in the short-term. But I would think

that the approaches to kicking the can actually are going to, in the

short-term, ameliorate much further need for U.S. involvement, or

Fed involvement, I should say.

Mr. MCHENRY. Because the ECB will actually do what is necessary or will it be the policymakers that are kicking the can down

the road?

Mr. ROSNER. Well, the policymakers are kicking the can and the

ECB is, at this point, trying to step back from the fold and the
66

pressure of stepping in. I think ultimately they will end up folding

and stepping in in a large way.

Mr. MCHENRY. Well, my time is expired. I now recognize Mr.

Meehan for 5 minutes.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Where do you jump in

with all of this?

We are talking here about monetary policy sort of in the current

situation. Is there anything that is being implicated here by a failure for certain of these countries to really adopt austerity measures

that may be able to address some of this, or do we need to continue

the sort of IMF support and otherwise to sustain it from a meltdown? Anybody can jump in on that.

Dr. SANDERS. I will start off. Again, to start off at the top, bear

in mind that Commerce Bank is in deep problem in Germany,

Dexia is gone, Credit Agricole in France. If we have any of these

write-downs, it is just going to sink the European banks, which will

then result in who is going to come to the rescue. I just don’t think

this is a solvable solution. Greece, there are riots; Italy, there are

riots about austerity.

Mr. MEEHAN. Right.

Dr. SANDERS. I just don’t think it is solvable. Again, it is not a

liquidity problem; it is definitely a problem of the fact that they are

all insolvent. The Titanic sank in a highly liquid environment.

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, then if that is the conclusion, then are we

just—if we kick this can down the road, so to speak, when is the

day of reckoning? Dr. Lachman.

Dr. LACHMAN. The trouble is that the road is getting shorter. We

can’t keep kicking this can down the road. My view is that we are

going to come to some resolution fairly quickly. It is difficult to see

how you can string this along for another year given the state of

the economies, given the political resistance to adopting different

measures. The point is that a number of these countries are insolvent, but the second point I would make is you are talking about

huge amounts of debts in question.

So if we just look at Portugal, Greece, Ireland, we are talking

about a trillion dollars. If you add in Spain you are talking about

another trillion. If you throw in Italy you are talking about another

two trillion. We are talking about $4 trillion that is going to have

to be written down at some stage, so that is going to have a huge

impact on the European banking system when that occurs. And

given the interconnections between the European banking system

and the U.S. banking system, it is very difficult to see how the

United States avoids a financial crisis if you do get Europe playing

out in a bad way.

Mr. MEEHAN. And what would be the specific implications on the

United States from that scenario?

Dr. LACHMAN. Well, the specific impact on the United States is

that U.S. banks would be put under huge amount of stress, that

you would have a credit crunch in the United States, the United

States would go into a meaningful recession. That would compound

the problems. I think that the way to look at it is like what occurred in the United States during the Lehman crisis.

Mr. MEEHAN. That is what I was going to say. We are right back

where we were before, right?
67

Dr. LACHMAN. The same way as that ricocheted around the

world, now what we would be having is we would be having a crisis

where the origin was in Europe, the world’s third largest economy,

a much larger economy than that of the United States. That would

have reverberations through the globe and the United States would

be impacted.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Elliott, then Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thank you. I just wanted to say, to give you a

wider view, I think that the countries that much of the panel here

thinks are insolvent aren’t necessarily insolvent. Greece, clearly.

But Italy, for example, Italy, this year, is going to run a primary

surplus, meaning that absent the interest payments, it is actually

in surplus. It has had, in the past decade, a number of years in

which the primary surplus was 4 percent or 5 percent of GDP.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is that attributable to?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Basically, in the last decade or so they have managed their deficits much better than they had historically, and certainly far better than us. In the last decade, they had deficits—and

these aren’t primary, these are actual deficits as we normally look

at—they have had deficits lower than Germany over that decade,

lower than France. So my point about the politics earlier is assuming that Italy is insolvent essentially assumes their political system

is so bad they can’t find a way to pair a few more points of GDP

off of their deficit; and they have shown in the past they can, even

under worse political environment.

Mr. ROSNER. Two things. First of all, just in response to this, you

have to remember that we are talking about the problems in Europe that we are talking about with the backdrop of the past 3

years having had decent growth in the Eurozone, and that is over.

They are heading into recession. Even the core is going to be suffering that.

Second, though, I think it is important to remember the more recent European bank authority stress tests and the agreement that

the banks raise core capital to 9 percent by next summer are being

done in a way that is even more damaging to growth and is going

to put more risk——

Mr. MEEHAN. Because there is going to be less capital out in the

European market?

Mr. ROSNER. Well, because rather than forcing them to, in short

order, regardless of the dilution, issue equity to raise real capital,

we are giving the banks enough time that they are going to try and

get there by reducing their books, by de-leveraging; and that deleveraging is going to create further problems, kicking the can further and shrinking growth further, as opposed to forcing dilutive

equity raises, which should be forced. That is where the capital

should be coming from, the markets, regardless of price right now.

I would point back to our crisis. Had we forced Freddie Mac to

raise equity in January and February 2008, and not accepted their

arguments that those would have been highly dilutive capital

raisings, we might not have ended up where we ended up. Instead,

we allowed it to string along, and that had a zombie institution

that was fundamentally increasingly taking risks, with less economic returns on those risks, to cover up or try and hide the problem.
68

So we are now partaking in a game of allowing the European

banks to get their house in order by reducing credit availability to

the Eurozone, instead of forcing them to dilute shareholders’——

Mr. MEEHAN. That is going to have an impact as well on the

overall ability for that economy to——

Mr. ROSNER. Absolutely, which is why I find it so offensive that

we are supporting policies that put the burden on taxpayers rather

than on equity holders, preferred holders, subdebt, unsecured creditors, rather than in manners that allow them to negatively impact

the economy in another way, which is the de-leveraging.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Ely, you have some thoughts?

Mr. ELY. If I could just put another angle on this. The problem

in many of the European countries, particularly the weaker ones,

isn’t just the current level of debt and the debt-to-GDP ratio, but

it is the ongoing deficits, many of which reflect structural barriers

in the economy, entitlement programs, early retirement, and so

forth. So these countries are in a situation where it is not only at

a high debt level, but it is a debt level that is continuing to rise,

so these countries not only face the challenge of rolling over existing debt, but also having to borrow more and more in order to finance the continuing——

Mr. MEEHAN. That was the implication of my question about austerity. Is that what you are talking—that is the language I used,

austerity, but are you——

Mr. ELY. Right. Now, it gets worse than that. When the austerity

starts kicking in and unemployment starts rising, you have a

shrinking GDP, you are going to have shrinking government receipts, increased spending. So the financing needed in an absolute

sense goes up, and what we are starting to see in some of these

countries now are increasing interest rates on government debt as

they try to roll it over, and the question then becomes one of when

will some of these countries hit the wall and they simply can’t roll

all their debt.

We got a little bit of a wake-up call on that a couple weeks ago

when Germany could not sell all of some 10-year debt that it came

to market with, and where I think the real crunch comes is when

a country has debt coming due and it simply can’t roll it over at

any interest rate; the markets won’t buy it. This is essentially the

same as a bank not being able to roll over its funding. And then

that is when the real crunch hits and you get an honest to God government debt default.

Mr. MEEHAN. When we get default, we get hyperinflation, what

will be the result?

Mr. ELY. Well, I don’t think we can have hyperinflation because

governments don’t pay their bills in currency anymore. But I think

what happens is that governments, I would think, would be in a

situation where they just would have to cut back on the payments

they make, whether they cut back on social security or pension

payments or whatever. And again going to a point that I think

Josh referenced earlier, that is when you start to see the riots. So

I think that that is a very, very serious concern, when these countries simply can’t not just roll over their debt, but also finance the

ongoing deficits.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
69

Mr. MCHENRY. This was an amazing exchange and fascinating,

fascinating discussion.

Mr. Rosner, you mentioned in your testimony and you have mentioned a number of times you believe many of these European

banks are insolvent, so to that point the ECB actually levied a penalty in order to force European banks to pay off the swap line, the

Fed swap line. Would that be an indication of insolvency, that they

are using short-term paper for long-term debt?

Mr. ROSNER. It could be, but it could be just, on the other side,

that could be just liquidity. Depends on the funding of assets. It depends on the assets. So it is unclear, which is, again, part of the

reason it would be nice to understand who was drawing, so we

could then actually trace it back, take a better look at the assets

that they have, if we got those disclosures, to see what they are

funding.

Mr. MCHENRY. But at a time when the Fed——

Mr. ROSNER. And, by the way, it would be nice to be assured that

the Fed knows who is drawing on the swap lines and what the assets are that the ultimate borrower from——

Mr. MCHENRY. Actually, to that point, Mr. Elliott, do you agree

that the disclosure of those swap lines would be helpful?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am of mixed minds about it because the thing is

our swap is with the European Central Bank. That is our credit

risk. It is up to them what they do with that. Now, the reason I

might agree that it would be useful is, to the extent that we are

deliberately helping them with their policy, I could see a desire to

know what they are doing. But I don’t know what we need the

level of detail that is being asked for in terms of that.

Mr. MCHENRY. Even with our U.S. banks have risk, counterparty risk associated with that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I mean, that we would want to know in general, obviously. We would want our banks to have reasonable information

about the situation of their counter-parties. But there are multiple

ways to get that information, it doesn’t necessarily have to be

knowing whether and when they have been using the swap line.

I might also add the dollar is the world’s currency. The fact——

Mr. MCHENRY. And we are hopeful to retain that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would love to retain that too. The fact that there

are European banks who have trouble getting enough dollars in

this environment, as Joshua was saying, might be a problem of solvency, but it might very easily not be. I would worry that, again

about the stigma issue, that in this environment that investment

managers who want to keep their jobs by just not taking chances

would look at the information and say, oh, good, those guys use the

swap line; I better just stay away from them because staying away

from them won’t hurt me that much and being there, if it turns out

they go under, means I lose my job.

Mr. MCHENRY. Well, we are only disclosing—I think the Fed discloses 2 years after the fact on this, so is it a year, is it 6 months?

But it certainly——

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don’t have a problem with something like 2 years.

I thought you were talking about in this case with the ECB——

Mr. MCHENRY. Well, we don’t even know with the disclosure of

$600 billion with this swap line, at the height of the crisis, we don’t
70

even know where that went. That is really the crux of this discussion; that is the reason why that came up.

Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ROSNER. Yes, I just wanted to say whether the Fed discloses

the information or not, I can’t imagine why the Fed wouldn’t and

shouldn’t demand of the ECB to know who is ultimately drawing

upon those lines so the Fed can see whether their swap lines,

which were intended to provide liquidity in dollar funding markets,

were being used to prop up insolvent institutions. Whether that is

disclosed broadly or not to the public is an area that I think deserves debate. I know where I fall on it, but I can understand the

arguments on both sides. That the Fed should not want that information for their own analysis, for their own prudential purposes

doesn’t make sense to me.

Mr. MCHENRY. So here is a broad question. What is the American financial system’s exposure to Europe? Because the question

is if we have an extraordinary exposure, then we have an extraordinary policy desire to bail them out in order to save our institutions.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The BIS figure, Bank for International Settlement,

says that our banking system, not insurers and pension funds, but

the banking system has about $2 trillion of credit exposure of various kinds to the Eurozone, or 2.7, I think, and 2 to the U.K. or

I may have the two reversed. I usually roll the U.K. into this because it is so closely tied in with the Eurozone.

Mr. MCHENRY. Even though they are trying to extricate themselves.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Exactly. If you combine those, that is about $5 trillion. But, again, that doesn’t count some other parts of our financial system.

Mr. ELY. Could I add to that?

Mr. MCHENRY. Sure.

Mr. ELY. Talk also in terms of what I will call direct exposure,

as Doug was talking about, and then what I am going to call an

indirect or macro exposure, and that is that if Europe really blows

up, and I certainly hope it doesn’t, but if it really does blow up and

they get an enormous economic contraction in Europe, that is going

to have dramatic global effects on the macro economies, certainly

on the United States; and then you ask what kind of new problems

does that create for the U.S. financial system and the banks, for

instance, with regard to house prices.

Will we have rising unemployment? So we have to be cognizant

not only of what I will call the direct balance sheet risk, but then

the indirect, but potentially very expensive, macro economic indirect risk.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Some of which we are already seeing as the dollar

continues to strengthen, right? The dollar strengthening is going to

have a negative impact on the export markets; it will, on the other

side, have positive impact on some of our domestic asset prices, as

capital flows back into the country. So it is very hard to quantify.

I would just point out that when we keep throwing out this

multi-trillion dollar number, that we also have to remember that

that is a total exposure. You need to net out of that private capital

and private capital structures, which I think at some point we are
71

there with a priority of capital for an understanding that that was

risk capital. That capital may end up being wiped out and needs

to be backed out of those assumptions, because I am not sure it is

necessarily prudent for us to consider that obligations that the

Government really needs to consider, as opposed to private creditors and shareholders to consider.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Lachman, do you want to follow up with that?

Dr. LACHMAN. Back to a point that Mr. Rosner raised, which I

think is crucial. The idea that the European banks do have an

enormous hole in their balance sheets. The IMF has estimated that

number is at least something like $300 billion, and what that is

producing, because of the way in which they are letting the banks

get to the capital ratio of 9 percent by June, is they are going to

have a capital production, they are going to be reducing credit to

the tune of something like $2 trillion over the next year.

When you have that kind of credit contraction at the same time

that you are asking the countries to engage in massive fiscal tightening, it is the equivalent of tightening monetary policy, tightening

fiscal policy in the middle of economic weakening. That is a recipe

for deep recession, and that is the reason that I don’t think this

can work.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Sanders.

Dr. SANDERS. To build on what Dr. Lachman said, the ECB announced, I believe it was yesterday, that they are going to modify

capital requirements for the banks in Europe. Why? Because they

see credit contraction being very serious, as we just saw here. And

so what that probably means is they are going to require less capital, which again just makes the financial institutions more risky,

which will eventually put American taxpayers at more risk. This

is kind of a never-ending game.

Mr. MCHENRY. Well, they were thinly capitalized going in, because Basel said if you are holding sovereigns, there is no risk associated with it. It is kind of a fascinating situation. So there are

so many questions about this.

Dr. Lachman, you mentioned the exposure through money markets. We had one money market, one fund that broke the buck.

Most investors don’t quite understand what a money market fund

is, it is not FDIC insured. And part of what happened in the crisis

is actually making that worse in people’s mind, that there will be

some government savior of the money market fund. What is that

exposure to the European financial system, all money market funds

to their European financial system?

Dr. LACHMAN. The estimates made around about June by the

Fitz rating agency suggested that U.S. money market funds had

around about 45 percent of their funds on deposit with European

banks. The money market industry is something like an industry

of $2.7 trillion, so if you take 45 percent of $2.7 trillion, you are

well over a trillion. What has occurred in recent months is that

they have brought down that exposure to 35 percent. But that is

still a very large exposure.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ROSNER. It was, as recently as, if I recall, 12 or 18 months

ago, over 60 percent, but a lot of that was peripheral economies in

Europe. There is almost no exposures to peripheral economies at
72

this point by U.S. money market funds, it is almost all the core,

with some smattering, until recently, of Spain and Italy.

Dr. LACHMAN. Yes, but I don’t take much comfort in that argument, because if the banks in the core are exposed to the periphery, then so are the money market funds exposed to the periphery

if they have deposits on with the core.

Mr. ROSNER. I agree completely with that point and would suggest that I made it just to point out that this is not a peripheral

problem, as it is constantly being fund; it is a problem of the core

banks as much as it is a problem of anything else.

Mr. MCHENRY. So, okay. Mr. Elliott, you mentioned in your

opening three out of four chance basically that the Euro will survive, to paraphrase you. Give me your view on Greece remaining

in the Euro. Give me your percentage chance that they are still in

the Euro a year, whatever the timeframe is you want to choose.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Sure. And just to clear up any potential confusion,

the three in four probability that I put out, which is obviously a

quantification of an intuition, because this is very, very hard to

know. But what I meant was more than just the Euro surviving,

but that there would be no defaults beyond Greece. So I meant it

stronger than you may have seen that.

Mr. MCHENRY. Oh, okay.

Mr. ELLIOTT. And then in terms of Greece staying in the Euro,

I actually think it is pretty likely that Greece will stay in the Euro

in that there are a lot of advantages, even with defaulting, which

they clearly are going to do, whatever it is called, there are a lot

of advantages to staying within the Euro. Now, I know Dr.

Lachman very much disagrees with that, but there are pros and

cons. Most of the people I talk to feel that Greece will actually try

very hard to stay in the Euro.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay, but since Greece has become a modern

country, the last 150, 170 years, they don’t really have a great

track record on paying people back. That is just history.

Mr. ELLIOTT. They are defaulting. There is no question they are

defaulting. I am saying that is a different thing from pulling out

of the Euro.

Mr. MCHENRY. So it is a matter of what they call it and when

it happens is what you are saying?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. I don’t think there is anybody on this planet

at this point that thinks the Greeks are going to pay back 100 Euro

cents on the Euro on their debt. We know that is not going to happen. And then, as has been pointed out, there has been this rather

dangerous thing of trying to arrange it so it doesn’t technically act

as a default, which I think has done terrible damage to the credit

default swap market.

Mr. MCHENRY. And everybody agrees on that on the panel? Does

anybody disagree that the harm in the credit default swap market

is serious when we have this type of action? Okay.

So about Greece, so everybody agrees they are going to default,

is that true? Okay. Now, it is a question of what they call it when

it happens. Is that really the question?

Mr. ELLIOTT. And how much.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay.
73

Mr. ELY. And if I could add to that, to what extent are the

issuers of CDS going to have to take a loss. And then you get

into—this is where another set of dominoes could start toppling, in

terms of where is the CDS risk on the German debt and how are

those losses going to hit, and who are they going to hit; and I assume it is not just banks, but insurers and insurance companies

and other types of institutional risk takers. And that is unknown,

from what I can tell.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Lachman.

Dr. LACHMAN. I think when you are discussing Greece defaulting

on its debts and having a disorderly default that might involve

writing down the debt by 70, 80 cents on the dollar, what you also

have to take into account is the contagion effect that that is going

to have through the rest of the periphery. The European Central

Bank, for the past year and a half, has been trying to fight the idea

of default. Because they know that if Greece defaults, what you are

going to have is the Greek banking system wiped out, you are

going to have capital controls, you are going to have runs on banks,

and all the rest that will set an example for depositors in Portugal,

in Ireland, and so on.

So it is very likely that if you do get a disorderly Greek default,

you are going to get real pressure on the rest of the periphery that

is going to cause a chain of defaults, and that is the reason that

the European Central Bank has been putting up this fight, which

I am pretty sure that they won’t when—in the case of Greece it is

really a matter of time; we are talking about months, if not weeks

before this event is going to occur.

Mr. MCHENRY. Now, I have heard the one theory that they just

need a current account balance, then it is absolutely in their national interest to simply walk away from their debt, as long as they

can cash-flow their government, in essence. Is that similar to your

point of view?

Dr. LACHMAN. But it is a question that Greece is not in a position

to pay the debt, that what is occurring is that over the last 2 years

Greece’s GDP has contracted by 12 percent, the unemployment rate

is at 18.5 percent. Their economy is literally now in free-fall. That

is eroding their tax base. They can’t meet the budget target, so

they have to do more austerity, and the people are out in the

streets.

Greece is not in a position to take more fiscal measures, and at

that stage it is very difficult for the IMF to keep throwing more

and more money at a country that is palpably insolvent. That is

the point at which Greece defaults, and we are not far away from

it. There is a new government; there are going to be elections in

Greece around about February, middle of February, end of February. I would expect that round about that time that you will see

Greece leaving.

Mr. MCHENRY. So, with my accent, that would sound like doom

and gloom, but you make it sound more upbeat. I am only joking.

So, Mr. Elliott, you believe the IMF doesn’t need further capitalization. There is this authorization within Dodd-Frank that has

been discussed that Treasury could authorize another $100 billion

for the IMF and they have that legal right; the administration

would just simply have to make that decision. But your view is
74

that the IMF is fully capitalized enough to take on what you would

view as sort of the crest of this crisis in your scenarios.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is my view in the sense I believe this has to

be basically solved in Europe. I think it is very useful to have the

IMF bring in enough funds to be a serious player, but I don’t think

that takes it beyond its present resources.

Mr. MCHENRY. What is that dollar amount?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, they have $390 billion now that is available

and they will have more if the various central banks within Europe

do contribute to the IMF.

Mr. MCHENRY. Does anyone on the panel disagree? Dr.

Lachman.

Dr. LACHMAN. I think that if you look at the amount of money

that the IMF would have to provide to Italy and Spain if they did

the same thing as they did to Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, you

would be talking about $750 billion for Italy alone, you would be

talking about another $400 billion for Spain. The IMF simply does

not have that kind of money.

I totally agree with Mr. Elliott that the onus of sorting this out

should be Europe, it should not be the U.S. taxpayer. What the Europeans are trying to do is they are trying to loan money to the

IMF, get a claim on the IMF and have the IMF loan money to

Italy, which would put the U.S. taxpayer on the hook for 17.75 percent of whatever the size of the loan is. I think that that should

not be permitted.

Mr. MCHENRY. Now, the opportunity for China to inject themselves in the IMF and put forward the equivalent amount in order

to take on that sort of crest, another $200 billion, let’s say. Is that

sort of in your range of options that are likely?

Dr. LACHMAN. Well, that could very well occur, but you have the

same problem as you do with the Europeans lending to the IMF:

if the loans are made in a form that China has a claim on the IMF

and the IMF then goes and uses that money to lend to Italy, the

U.S. taxpayer is exposed to that loan to Italy as a shareholder having 17.75 percent in the IMF. The way that those loans should be

made is they should be made through an administered account

where the IMF is just a conduit and it doesn’t expose the shareholders to any risk of those loans.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Ely.

Mr. ELY. Yes. One of the things that I think we have to do is

step back a little bit and realize that, whether it is through the

IMF or other lending facilities, you essentially have governments,

either directly or through the IMF, becoming funders of these really deeply indebted countries. In other words, the private market

pulls back, governments step into the void and fill it.

But as I mentioned earlier in an earlier reply, you still have

these ongoing deficits in these countries, so all this does is kind of

keep the ship afloat for a little bit longer. We are kind of bailing

faster, but the ship still has big holes in it and is sinking.

So the question is do you have enough time for these liquidity

provisions to enable these governments to make the structural reforms they need and get back on track? And I don’t think the liquidity can keep things afloat long enough for these countries to

make those changes. Plus, we are seeing backsliding in Greece, for
75

instance, as has mentioned earlier. So the question is are we really

solving anything or are we just digging a deeper and deeper hole

with now the taxpayers, not just the United States, but elsewhere,

increasingly at risk as we try to protect creditors by the governments being, if you will, taking out, if you will, paying off private

sector creditors that have lent to these countries.

Mr. MCHENRY. All right. Thank you.

I now yield to Mr. Meehan, and we will finish after that, just so

the panel is aware of our timeframe. After his line of questioning,

we will finish.

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank you again for your very interesting testimony.

Mr. Ely, what you were just discussing, wasn’t Dr. Lachman,

didn’t you, in your testimony, more or less suggest that the combination of austerity and the growing challenges in Greece make

them incapable of taking on more right now? We are starting to see

this, potentially, then, those same demands, as we talked about

austerity, if you move them into Ireland and Italy and other kinds

of places, this just becomes a cascading effect. Is that what we are

seeing?

Mr. ELY. I will let Desmond speak for himself, but I think that

is a very serious risk in the most indebted of the countries who are

experiencing the greatest degrees of austerity with all the negative

consequences, that of rising unemployment and declining tax receipts and increased government spending. It just means that the

current deficit in these countries just continues on, and that means

that they have to borrow more, their debt-to-GDP ratio goes up.

The question is how high can it go before they simply can’t roll

over existing debt and fund next month’s deficit.

Dr. LACHMAN. I would say that the problem certainly extends beyond Greece, that countries like Portugal and Ireland are in not

that much better shape than Greece. Italy and Spain, their positions are stronger than that of Greece, but they conceptually have

to do the same sort of thing that Greece had to do, which is tighten

the budget by a large amount. We are talking about 2 percent of

GDP in Italy in 2012, again in 2013, again in 2014. And as Josh

Rosner was pointing out, they are having to do it in the context

where there is a credit crunch and where there is a deterioration

in the external environment. So it remains to be seen whether

countries like Spain and Italy can withstand many years of fiscal

austerity, declining growth, rising unemployment, calls for more

austerity. The social fabric generally doesn’t hold up well to this.

It is just of note that already relatively, early in the crisis, we

have seen five governments fall in the five affected countries, so I

am not sure that they can stick to this road of austerity and very

poor economic outlook for a very long time, when it would be perceived that the reason that they are doing it is to keep the banks

in France and Germany afloat.

Mr. ELLIOTT. May I make one quick point?

Mr. MEEHAN. Sure.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Each of the governments that fell was replaced by

a government that was more favorable to the austerity measures.

Mr. MEEHAN. I just really have two other questions. We have

talked a lot about this in the context, as I have been following this,
76

Europe having to deal with its internal crisis and its relationship

back to the United States because of our involvement with supporting the IMF and, therefore, assuming some of this responsibility.

I also take from this that we are worried about the recessionary

implications on our own economy if we have problems in Europe.

How about other thriving economies, the Asian economy, South

America? Are we watching them being isolated in any way or are

they similarly going to be impacted by this and effectively we are

seeing the front end of a global recession? And please jump in.

Mr. ROSNER. I think it is an important point to raise because I

think that is another piece of it. Large portions of the Chinese

economy are funded through European banks. Europe is obviously

China’s largest export market. Much of the South and Central

American economies are funded also through European banks. So

it definitionally is a global crisis. How deep it impacts various parts

of the globe are obviously going to be different and dependent on

the outcomes here. But it certainly is worth considering as far more

than just a European crisis, especially since many of those economies to which we export, to the degree that we do, get their funding from Europe.

Mr. ELY. If I could just add to that. I think it is not just a funding issue, but particularly for China it is ultimately a social unrest

potential because, again, they export so much to Europe and, of

course, the United States, and if we have a slowdown in both the

United States and Europe, that is going to have a negative impact

on China and on its level of employment.

And I have always been concerned about China being somewhat

of a tinderbox. It is amazing how often we read of local disturbances in China, so there is a fabric there that is not as socially

strong as it is in this country. So I think we do have to be worried

about those secondary and tertiary effects, and particularly in

China, since it is such an export-driven economy.

Mr. MEEHAN. My last questions relate to points that I wasn’t

really able to fully understand. As I was listening to American exposure, it largely was discussed in the context of our participation

in the IMF. How about some of our other institutions, and how

does that relate back to the typical American investor, the guy who

buys into a money market fund, whose retirement is dependent, to

some extent, on these kinds of things?

So my questions relate to how does the everyday American who

has some portfolio of investments going to be impacted by these

things and do we have impacts on our pension funds or any other

kinds of insurers like we had with AIG that aren’t really being considered or being discussed as much, but may have genuine exposure? This is the last question that I have.

Mr. ELY. I will take a stab at that. Ultimately, individuals are

the owners of the economy. There are various levels of financial institutions, and you have rattled off insurance companies, pension

funds, and so forth. To the extent that there are capital losses

borne by American financial institutions, that is going to reverberate back to individuals either in terms of losses in their own

portfolio, a hit on, let’s say, corporate pension funds, union pension

funds.
77

It could be across a broad range of financial intermediaries, but

ultimately that loss is going to come back to individuals and families in this country, it is unavoidable. There is no someone standing

behind the curtain that is going to absorb those losses; they come

back onto us, everybody in this room.

Mr. ELLIOTT. And if I could emphasize a point Bert made earlier

that I am sure we all agree on, the indirect effects will be larger.

If you think about what it would be like to go through another recession after we are still in this very slow recovery, that is going

to be an even bigger effect than the direct market impacts.

Dr. SANDERS. And I want to add one other thing. I do agree with

Mr. Elliott, but if you look at my Figure 11 in my presentation, the

Fed is literally out of bullets. We are not going to have really a

great ability for the Fed to step in and provide any sort of intervention, or the Government issuing more treasuries. This doesn’t affect

GDP anymore; we are kind of numb to further Government intervention. So now we are in a rock and a hard place.

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, on that bright note, Mr. Chairman, I yield

back.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank my colleague, Mr. Meehan. Thank you so

much.

Now, I said that was the end of the questions. I have one more,

if you don’t mind, and we will just start with Mr. Ely and go

across. Tomorrow we will have President Dudley of the New York

Fed, we have the individual of the Federal Reserve Board downtown here who deals with international markets, we also have a

representative from Treasury. I know it is a long commute from

them; they are even closer than the Fed and certainly closer than

New York. But what questions would you ask tomorrow? What

question, if you had to boil it down, would you ask in tomorrow’s

hearing?

Mr. ELY. The question I would ask is, ladies and gentlemen, how

is this going to play out over the next 6 months to a year? Now,

I don’t expect you to get a very candid answer, but I think that

that is the question. What are various scenarios as to how this situation will play out over the next 6 months to a year and what are

going to be the feedback effects on the U.S. economy?

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Rosner.

Mr. ROSNER. I provided specific questions in my testimony.

Mr. MCHENRY. Yes. What is your number one?

Mr. ROSNER. Well, what comfort do they have that 17 countries,

each with different political dynamics at home, are going to be able

to come to a solution and what is the purpose of their policy tied

to that, short-term, medium-term, long-term? What is the Fed’s

policy purpose here in an environment where, while most of the 17

leaders actually do have some agreement as to what they would

like to see have happen, they have very different social dynamics

in their home countries with their population of constituents, making it difficult to achieve that. So what is the purpose of Fed policy

and Treasury policy in the short-term, in the medium-term, in the

long-term as it relates to the single currency?

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay.

Mr. Elliott.
78

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think if I had one question, I would ask them to

talk about the solvency versus liquidity question. Do they believe

that the weaker countries in Europe, X, Greece, are suffering from

a liquidity problem or is it a solvency problem? And I assume they

are going to say liquidity. And then the followup question would be

how do you come to that conclusion.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Sanders.

Dr. SANDERS. I would ask the question, if you had one bullet left,

would you use it for the American economy? Not to shoot ourselves,

I mean to help us out. [Laughter.]

Or would you use it for Europe? And then for the Treasury,

which I would be most interested in hearing, I want to hear their

assessment. And I agree with Dr. Lachman, I have the same calculation, $4 trillion is really the tab to really bail out Italy and

those peripherals. And if we are talking about $100 billion of the

additional $200 billion, is that like throwing the money away or is

this going to end up being a much, much, much bigger amount?

And I don’t want to say that will never happen. Come on, we have

already seen a lot of bad things happen.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Lachman.

Dr. LACHMAN. I would just suggest a couple of questions. One of

them would be the variant of Mr. Elliott’s solvency versus liquidity

problem. I would phrase it differently. I would phrase it why do

you expect imposing fiscal austerity on countries at a time of economic weakening and at a time of major credit crunch in Europe

is not going to lead to a big recession that is going to unravel the

public finances of the countries involved?

A second question I would ask is why do they think that a policy

approach to Italy and Spain that they have tried and has failed in

Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, is going to work this time around.

And I guess the most important question I would want to ask

would be how are they going to be safeguarding U.S. taxpayers’

money from these loans that the Europeans are making to the

IMF, which is putting the U.S. taxpayer on the hook if that money

is then used to lend to Italy and Spain.

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. Quite a number of questions.

What is clear about this hearing, and I thank you so much for

being here. This is very helpful, very useful information, and a very

wide-ranging discussion. I appreciate the panel’s willingness to engage in that conversation. What is clear is there are enormous

number of questions that experts have about Fed policy and about

this administration’s policy and American taxpayer exposure to the

European financial crisis that they are facing.

Dr. Sanders, in your opening, this was about excessive government spending and excessive debt, as well as what Mr. Rosner

said, this was about over-lending and over-borrowing. One is more

focused on the government; the other is more focused on the banking and the institutions.

But the economic risk is real to the American taxpayer. It is a

question of the magnitude of that risk. Our exposure to Europe is

real, both to the American taxpayer and these institutions, such as

the IMF, as well as to the American worker and their ability to get

a job and to have a growing economy.
79

But there is some consensus here about the likelihood of a Greek

default. The question is what does that look like, when does that

happen, and what is that raw cost in terms of currency. But obviously a mixed assessment on the survival and the ability of the

Euro to survive in the medium and long-term; there is not consensus there.

But this has been very helpful and very instructive. I appreciate

your time.

Members will have 7 legislative days to submit opening statements.

With that, this meeting is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88Æ