alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Richard BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONACO COACH CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-16575

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 22, 2006.

*894Richard Bailey, Martinez, GA, pro se.

Michael David Hostetter, Mark D. Lefkow, Nall *&*Miller, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Bailey appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor or Defendant-Appellee Monaco Coach Corporation (“Monaco”) in Bailey’s suit for breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, *et seq.*No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

Bailey purchased a motor home manufactured by Monaco which he claimed was beset by many defects which remained unrepaired after Bailey afforded Monaco sufficient opportunity to correct the defects. The district court considered fully Bailey’s claims and concluded that Bailey — who was represented by trial counsel but proceeds *pro se*on appeal — (i) presented no evidence that Monaco failed to repair any defect that timely was brought to Monaco’s attention and was within the terms of the express Limited Warranty; and (ii) because Bailey was not in privity of contract with Monaco, a claim for breach of implied warranty fails as a matter of Florida law.1

*895We see no error in the district court’s conclusions. About Bailey’s claims that Monaco breached its limited written warranty, no genuine issue of material fact exists because (i) a number of the alleged defects were excluded expressly by the terms of Monaco’s limited warranty; (ii) Bailey admitted that certain claimed defects were repaired; (iii) Monaco was not given reasonable notice of certain defects; and (iv) Bailey failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that certain problems constituted defects. Absent sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue that Monaco failed to repair a covered defect that was brought appropriately to its attention, Bailey could show no breach of express warranty. About Bailey’s claim that Monaco breached implied warranties, the absence of privity between Bailey and Monaco is dispositive: Bailey’s claim of breach of implied warranty fails as a matter of law.

AFFIRMED.

1

. While the MMWA, (15 U.S.C. § 2301(7)), gives consumers a private right of action against warrantors for breach of implied warranty, implied warranty claims under the MMWA arise out of and are defined by state law. *Id.*Bailey purchased the motor home from a dealer and not directly from Monaco. No privity exists between Bailey and Monaco. Under Florida law, privity of contract is an essential element of a claim for breach of implied warranty. *See Mesa v. BMW of North America, LLC,*904 So.2d 450, 458 (Fla.App. 2005) (“Under Florida law, a plaintiff cannot recover economic losses for breach of implied *895warranty in the absence of privity;)” *Baker v. Danek Medical,*35 F.Supp.2d 875, 878 (N.D.Fla.1998); *Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,*520 So.2d 37, 38 (Fla. 1988).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS ANTONIO GUTIERREZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-73260

Agency No. A094-228-984

ORDER

Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges. 

On October 31, 2011, the Board of Immigration Appeals reopened and

remanded the proceedings in this case to the immigration judge. Consequently,

there is no final order of removal currently in effect and this court lacks

jurisdiction over the petition for review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Lopez-Ruiz v.

Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (order).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

FILED

FEB 14 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
### §2542. Establishment and operation of technical offices

#### (a) Establishment

#### (1) For nonagricultural products

The Secretary of Commerce shall establish and maintain within the Department of Commerce a technical office that shall carry out the functions prescribed under subsection (b) with respect to nonagricultural products.

#### (2) For agricultural products

The Secretary of Agriculture shall establish and maintain within the Department of Agriculture a technical office that shall carry out the functions prescribed under subsection (b) with respect to agricultural products.

#### (b) Functions of offices

The President shall prescribe for each technical office established under subsection (a) such functions as the President deems necessary or appropriate to implement this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 96–39, title IV, §412, July 26, 1979, 93 Stat. 244.)

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Delegation of Functions

Functions of President under subsec. (b) of this section delegated to Secretary of Commerce regarding technical office established under subsec. (a)(1) of this section, and to Secretary of Agriculture regarding technical office established under subsec. (a)(2) of this section, see section 1–103(a) of Ex. Ord. No. 12188, Jan. 2, 1980, 45 F.R. 990, set out as a note under section 2171 of this title.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 6167** 

BRANDON L. LEWIS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the Un ited States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Raymond A. Jackson , District Judge. ( 2:09

- cv - 00259

- RAJ

- JEB )

Submitted : May 20, 2010 Decided : May 27, 2010

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS , Circuit Judges.

Dismi ssed by un published per curiam opinion
. Brandon L. Lewis, Appellant Pro Se. Alice Theresa Armstrong, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CU RIAM: Brandon L. Lewis seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a cert ificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the m erits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutio nal right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lewis has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the app eal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
###### Editorial Note on Part 28

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 28 appear by T.D. ATF-477, 67 FR 18087 through 18090, Apr. 15, 2002.

#### § 28.243 Shipment to armed services.

On removal of distilled spirits, wines, or beer for export to the armed services of the United States, the shipment shall be consigned to the commanding officer or supply officer at the supply base or other place of delivery.

(72 Stat. 1334, 1335, 1336, 1362, 1380; 26 U.S.C. 5053, 5055, 5062, 5214, 5362)
FILED U.S. COURT OF AP P EALS E LEVEN T HC IRC UIT OCTOB ER 23, 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 06- 11386 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C. D o c k e tN o . 0 5 - 0 0 0 0 5 - CR- FTM - 3 3 - SPC U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f - A p p e lle e , v ersu s A R M A N D O V I D A L E N C I N A S , D e f e n d an t- A p p e llan t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( O c t ob e r 23, 2006) B efo re B L A C K , M A R C U S an dW IL S O N , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M: C ouns e l i n thi s di r e c tc r i m i na l appe a l ha s m ove d t o w i thdr aw and f i l e d a2

br i e f pur s uantt o A nde r s v. C a l i f orni a , 386 U . S . 738, 87 S . C t . 1396, 18 L . E d. 2d 4 9 3 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . T h e d e f

e n d an t h a s m o v e d , p r o s e , f o rth e ap p o in tm e n t o f

s ub s titu te co u n se l. O u r in d ep en d en t rev iew o f th e e n ti re re co rd re v ea ls th at co u n se l’ s a s s e s s m e ntof

the r e l a t i ve m e r i tof

the appe a l i s c orr e c t . B e c aus e i nde pe nde nt e x a m in a tio n o f

th e r e c o r dr e v e a ls n o is s u e s o f ar g u ab le m e r it, c o u n s e l’s m o tio n to w i th d raw i s G R A N TED , V id a l E n c in a s ’s m o tio n f o rth e ap p o in tm e n t o f

s ub s titu te co u n sel i s D EN I ED , and V i dal E nci nas’ s c on vi ct i on s and se nt ence s are A FFI R M ED .
(No. 77-CC-1076

#### Marvin Carter, Jr., Claimant, *v.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order filed May 24, 1978.*

Per Curiam.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent to dismiss, due notice being given, and the Court being fully advised;

Finds that the Claimant has received an amount in excess of the statutory limit on damages allowable in this Court on the basis of a loan agreement executed by a joint tortfeasor in favor of the Claimant. The Claimant is entitled to one satisfaction and the recovery of an amount in excess of the statutory limit on damages in this Court is a bar to further recovery of damages in this Court. See, *Powers v. State, 28 Ill.Ct. Cl. 130, 131 (1972); William v. State, 25 Ill.Ct.Cl. 249, 255 (1965);*and *Laboda v. State, 24 Ill.Ct.Cl. 172, 176 (1961).*

It is hereby ordered that the motion of the Respon*232dent to dismiss be, and the same is hereby granted and the cause is dismissed.
### §2418. Request for information

#### (a) In general

Upon receipt of written request therefor from any person, the Trade Representative shall make available to that person information (other than that to which confidentiality applies) concerning—

(1) the nature and extent of a specific trade policy or practice of a foreign country with respect to particular goods, services, investment, or intellectual property rights, to the extent that such information is available to the Trade Representative or other Federal agencies;

(2) United States rights under any trade agreement and the remedies which may be available under that agreement and under the laws of the United States; and

(3) past and present domestic and international proceedings or actions with respect to the policy or practice concerned.

#### (b) If information not available

If information that is requested by a person under subsection (a) is not available to the Trade Representative or other Federal agencies, the Trade Representative shall, within 30 days after receipt of the request—

(1) request the information from the foreign government; or

(2) decline to request the information and inform the person in writing of the reasons for refusal.

#### (c) Certain business information not made available

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), and notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 552 of title 5), no information requested and received by the Trade Representative in aid of any investigation under this subchapter shall be made available to any person if—

(A) the person providing such information certifies that—

(i) such information is business confidential,

(ii) the disclosure of such information would endanger trade secrets or profitability, and

(iii) such information is not generally available;

(B) the Trade Representative determines that such certification is well-founded; and

(C) to the extent required in regulations prescribed by the Trade Representative, the person providing such information provides an adequate nonconfidential summary of such information.

(2) The Trade Representative may—

(A) use such information, or make such information available (in his own discretion) to any employee of the Federal Government for use, in any investigation under this subchapter, or

(B) may make such information available to any other person in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, the person providing the information.

(Pub. L. 93–618, title III, §308, as added Pub. L. 100–418, title I, §1301(a), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1175.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section applicable to petitions filed, and investigations initiated, under section 2412 of this title on or after Aug. 23, 1988, and petitions filed, and investigations initiated, before Aug. 23, 1988, if by such date no decision had been made under section 2414 of this title regarding the petition or investigation, see section 1301(c) of Pub. L. 100–418, set out as an Effective Date of 1988 Amendment note under section 2411 of this title.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lorne Lally, Appellant.

Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied. Present — Taylor, P. J., Harris, McCurn, Larkin and Love, JJ. [See *ante,*p. 801.]
#### Walter M. Wagor and Others, Respondents, v. The Erie Railroad Company, Appellant.

Appeal dismissed, without costs, upon stipulation filed.
Exhibit 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Jeffrey F. Joseph, Chief Executive Officer of Presidential Realty Corporation
(the "Company") certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
   untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
   necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
   under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to
   the period covered by this quarterly report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
   information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
   material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
   cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in
   this quarterly report;

4. The Company's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
   establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
   defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
   Company and we have:

      a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
           material information relating to the Company, including its
           consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
           entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly
           report is being prepared;

      b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and
           procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
           effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
           end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
           and

      c)   disclosed in this report any changes in the Company's internal
           control over financial reporting that occurred during the Company's
           most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
           reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company's internal
           control over financial reporting; and

5. The Company's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
   most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
   the Company's auditors and the Audit Committee of the Company's Board of
   Directors:

      a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
          operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
          reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company's ability to record,
          process, summarize and report financial information; and

      b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal
          control over financial reporting.



  DATE:   August 8, 2007          By: /s/ Jeffrey F. Joseph
                                      --------------------------
                                      Jeffrey F. Joseph
                                      Chief Executive Officer
#### Emanuel D. King, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Stockholders of A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc., v. A. G. Spalding *&*Bros., Inc., et al., Impleaded with Charles F. Robbins et al.

Present — Martin, P. J., Untermyer, Dore, Cohn and Callahan, JJ.
§ 463.737 How are one-stop partner programs' proportionate shares of infrastructure costs determined under the State one-stop infrastructure funding mechanism? ( a ) The Governor must direct the one-stop partners in each local area that have not reached agreement under the local funding mechanism to pay what the Governor determines is each partner program's proportionate share of infrastructure funds for that area, subject to the application of the caps described in § 463.738.
( b ) ( 1 ) The Governor must use the cost allocation methodology—as determined under § 463.736—to determine each partner's proportionate share of the infrastructure costs under the State funding mechanism, subject to considering the factors described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
( 2 ) In determining each partner program's proportionate share of infrastructure costs, the Governor must take into account the costs of administration of the one-stop delivery system for purposes not related to one-stop centers for each partner (such as costs associated with maintaining the Local WDB or information technology systems), as well as the statutory requirements for each partner program, the partner program's ability to fulfill such requirements, and all other applicable legal requirements. The Governor may also take into consideration the extent to which the partners in the local area have agreed in determining the proportionate shares, including any agreements reached at the local level by one or more partners, as well as any other materials or documents of the negotiating process, which must be provided to the Governor by the Local WDB and described in § 463.735(a).
#### § 6.94 Educational seminars.

An industry member may give or sponsor educational seminars for employees of retailers either at the industry member's premises or at the retail establishment. Examples would be seminars dealing with use of a retailer's equipment, training seminars for employees of retailers, or tours of industry member's plant premises. This section does not authorize an industry member to pay a retailer's expense in conjunction with an educational seminar (such as travel and lodging). This does not preclude providing nominal hospitality during the event.

[T.D. ATF-74, 45 FR 63251, Sept. 23, 1980, as amended by T.D. ATF-364, 60 FR 20423, Apr. 26, 1995]
#### Frederick Thomas, Appellant, v. Solvay Process Company, Respondent.

—Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Robson, J., who dissented.
#### James N. Jarvie, Appellant, *v.*Christina Arbuckle and Charles A. Jamison, as Administrators, etc., of John Arbuckle, Deceased, and William A. Jamison, Respondents. (Action No. 2.)

Second Department,

June 5, 1914.

See head note in *Jarvie*v. *Arbuckle, No. 1 (ante,*p. 199).

Appeal by the plaintiff, James N. Jarvie, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 10th day of May, 1913, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 27th day of May, 1913, denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 10th day of May, 1913, granting defendants’ motion for an extra allowance.

*Lewis H. Freedman [Adrian H. Larkin*and *Albert Stickney*with him on the brief], for the appellant.

*William N. Dykman,*for the respondents.

Burr, J.:

The questions of fact in this case as to whether the sums due to the employees' of the Pittsburg house were obligations of the firm or a personal indebtedness of John Arbuckle, have been resolved by the verdict of the jury in favor of defendants, and the evidence fully sustains such finding. Within the authority of *Jarvie*v. *Arbuckle, No. 1*(163 App. Div. 199), decided herewith, it follows that the judgment entered in this action in favor of defendants, and the orders denying the motion for a new trial and granting defendants’ motion for an extra allowance, should be affirmed, with costs.

Jenks, P. J., Thomas, Stapleton and Putnam, JJ., concurred.

Judgment and orders affirmed, with costs.
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## Table 9.5e: Social Security Disability Insurance—Number of Beneficiaries by Disability Type: December 2010

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#### Jacob H. Snyder, Respondent, v. Hygeia Refrigerating Company, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concurred.