U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

72–239 PDF 2012

DENYING SAFE HAVENS: HOMELAND SECURITY’S 

EFFORTS TO COUNTER THREATS FROM PAKISTAN, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 3, 2011 

Serial No. 112–29 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/General Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management ........................................................................ 8 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Ms. Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director, International Affairs 

and Trade, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

Ms. Shari Villarosa, Deputy Coordinator for Regional Affairs, U.S. Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

Mr. James Q. Roberts, Principal Director for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office of Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and 

Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 33 

PANEL II 

Mr. Steve Coll, President and CEO, New America Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 47 

Mr. Bruce Hoffman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Director, 

Security Studies Program, Georgetown University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 52 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

Mr. Daniel L. Byman, Security Studies Program, School of Foreign Service 

at Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle 

East Policy, The Brookings Institution: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 60 

(1) 

DENYING SAFE HAVENS: HOMELAND SECURITY’S EFFORTS TO COUNTER THREATS 

FROM PAKISTAN, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA 

Friday, June 3, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Bilirakis, Long, Duncan, 

Keating, and Clarke. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Good morning. The committee will come to order. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses to this hearing entitled ‘‘Denying Safe Havens: Homeland Security’s Efforts to Counter 

Threats from Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.’’ 

Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda and its affiliates 

are not. They are hiding in safe havens, areas of relative security 

that are exploited by terrorists to recruit, train, raise funds, and 

plan operations. 

The Department of State has identified 13 countries acting as 

safe havens today. Today, we examine three that we believe pose 

the most serious threat to the United States—and that is Pakistan, 

Yemen, and Somalia—and what is the U.S. Government doing to 

deny these places as a refuge for terrorists. 

Osama bin Laden was the most-wanted terrorist. Yet he lived 

comfortably in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in a town that serves as a 

headquarters for frontier force and infantry regiments only 31 

miles from Islamabad, contrary to our belief that he was hiding in 

some cave in the FATA or the frontier. He was not hiding in a 

cave. He was not in the mountains. His compound was less than 

1 mile—or about half the distance from here to the Washington 

Monument—from the Pakistan Military Academy, or their equivalent of West Point, where over 2,000 cadets are trained, 600 instructors teach, and approximately 2,000 representatives from 

other countries visit and receive training each year. 

CNN recently reported that Osama bin Laden sought a deal with 

Pakistan in which he would not attack Pakistan in exchange for 

protection. At this point, we do not know who in the Pakistani government was aware of Osama bin Laden’s presence, but I am certain that some Pakistan officials knew that he was living in plain 
2 

sight, not exactly the average house in an ordinary neighborhood. 

It stuck out like a sore thumb. 

It is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups operate out 

of Pakistan, but we do know al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and 

the Pakistani Taliban and other groups use this country as a staging ground for attacks on U.S. troops, to kill American citizens, and 

terrorize countries throughout the world. 

For example, Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban, 

is believed to be in Pakistan. Anwar al-Awlaki is hiding in Yemen. 

He is the equivalent of the bin Laden of the internet. He provides 

spiritual guidance and recruits terrorists via YouTube and 

Facebook. He has inspired more than 2 dozen terror plots against 

the United States in the past 2 years. The Fort Hood shooter, Nidal 

Hasan, e-mailed al-Awlaki on numerous occasions before he killed 

13 people, including soldiers, and wounding 30 others. 

Abdulmutallab, the Christmas bomber, was in contact with alAwlaki before attempting to set off an explosive on board Northwest Flight 254, an international flight bound for Detroit. 

With the death of bin Laden, many experts believe al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula based in Yemen will attempt to become the 

successor. Because there is no central authority in Somalia, alQaeda and other associated terrorist groups will also use it as a 

base of operations to attack Western targets. 

According to the 2009 Report on Terrorism issued by the National Counterterrorism Center, al-Shabaab is also considered by 

U.S. officials as one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the 

world. Not only is Somalia a base for terrorists, but pirates operating off the coast are a threat to international shipping. This has 

contributed to an increase in shipping costs and the delivery of food 

aid shipments. Ninety percent of the world’s food programs’ shipments into Somalia arrive by sea and ships and now require a military escort. 

Numerous documents have addressed the problem of terrorist 

safe havens. The 9/11 Commission’s report to Congress concluded 

the safe haven of Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda operational space 

to gather recruits and build logistical networks to conduct attacks 

against the United States. 

The Obama administration’s National Security Strategy states: 

We will deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states. This NSS 

report points out a whole-government approach that is needed to 

include information sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter terrorists. The document also 

requires the United States to help countries build capacities for responsible governance and security. 

Existing U.S. law, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010, requires the administration to produce a list of 

what each agency is doing to deny terrorists safe havens. 

The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, examined the 

U.S. Government approach and concluded, No. 1, that safe havens 

are a threat to the United States; and No. 2, a more comprehensive 

list of agency efforts is needed so Congress can adequately oversee 

and assess how the United States is denying safe havens to terror-
3 

ists. In other words, GAO concludes that this administration is not 

complying with these requirements. 

We currently have an incomplete picture of what each of these 

countries is doing to eliminate safe havens, what they are doing to 

prevent the proliferation and tracking of weapons of mass destruction, and what they are doing to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism officials. This knowledge is vital to Congress’ ability to craft 

foreign policy that holds countries accountable for aiding terrorists 

by looking the other way. 

I applaud our Government’s efforts, but more has to be done. 

Eliminating the terrorist’s base of operations where they have the 

ability to recruit, train, and plan their operations is the key to preventing future attacks on American soil. Osama bin Laden orchestrated the 9/11 attacks from his safe haven in Afghanistan. Anwar 

al-Awlaki has been able to inspire more than 2 dozen plots against 

the United States over the past 2 years, including the Fort Hood 

shootings and the Christmas bomber. 

This hearing will assess the role of the U.S. Government in denying the terrorists the ability to reconstitute. 

Before I yield my time to the Ranking Member, I do want to 

thank the brave men and women of our Armed Services, the civilians in the Departments of State and Homeland Security, and 

those across Government agencies who serve overseas. They constitute our best defense against the terrorists who want to kill us. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

JUNE 3, 2011 

Good morning. Welcome to this Oversight, Investigations, and Management Subcommittee hearing titled ‘‘Denying Terrorist Safe Havens: Homeland Security’s Efforts to Counter Threats From Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia’’. 

Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not. They are 

hiding in safe havens—areas of relative security that are exploited by terrorists to 
4 

recruit, train, raise funds, and plan operations. The Department of State has identified 13 countries acting as safe havens. Today we examine three that we believe 

pose the most serious threat to the United States—Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia— 

and what the U.S. Government is doing to deny these places as a refuge for terrorists. 
5 

Osama bin Laden was a hunted man, yet he lived comfortably in Abbottabad, 

Pakistan, a town that serves as the headquarters for Frontier Force and Infantry 

regiments only 31 miles from Islamabad. He was not hiding in a cave. He was not 

in the mountains. His compound was less than 1 mile—or about half the distance 

from here to the Washington Monument—from the Pakistan Military Academy 

where over 2,000 cadets are trained, 600 instructors teach, and approximately 2,000 

representatives from other countries visit and receive training each year. 

CNN recently reported that Osama bin Laden sought a deal with Pakistan in 

which he would not attack Pakistan in exchange for protection. At this point we do 

not know who in the Pakistani Government was aware of Osama bin Laden’s presence, but I am convinced some Pakistani officials knew that he was living in plain 

sight. Not exactly the average house in an ordinary neighborhood. It stuck out like 

a sore thumb. 

It is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups operate out of Pakistan. But 

we do know al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and other groups 

use this country as a staging ground for attacks on U.S. troops, to kill American 

citizens, and terrorize countries throughout the world. For example, Mullah Omar, 

the spiritual leader of the Taliban, is believed to be in Pakistan. 
6 

Anwar al Awlaki is hiding in Yemen. He is the bin Laden of the internet because 

he provides spiritual guidance and recruits terrorists via YouTube and Facebook. He 

has inspired more than 2 dozen terror plots against the United States over the past 

2 years. The Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan emailed al Awalaki on numerous occasions before killing 13 people and wounding 30 others. Umar Farouk 

Abdulmuttalab, the Christmas bomber, was in contact with al Awalaki before attempting to set off an explosive on-board Northwest Flight 254, an international 

flight on approach to Detroit. 

With the death of bin Laden, many experts believe al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen, will attempt to become the successor to al-Qaeda. 
7 
8 

Because there is no central authority in Somalia, al-Qaeda and other associated 

terrorist groups will use it as a base of operations to attack Western targets. According to the 2009 Report on Terrorism issued by the National Counterterrorism Center, al-Shabaab is considered by U.S. officials as one of the most deadly terrorists 

groups in the world. 

Not only is Somalia a base for terrorists, but pirates operating off its coast are 

a threat to international shipping. This has contributed to an increase in shipping 

costs and impeded the delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the World 

Food Program’s shipments into Somalia arrive by sea, and ships into this area now 

require a military escort. 

Numerous documents have addressed the problem of terrorist safe havens. 

• The 9/11 Commission’s report to Congress concluded the safe haven of Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda operational space to gather recruits and build logistical 

networks to conduct attacks against the United States. 

• The Obama administration National Security Strategy (NSS) states we will 

‘‘Deny Safe Havens and Strengthen At-Risk States.’’ The NSS points out a 

whole-of-government approach (interagency collaboration) is needed including 

information sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter terrorists. The document also requires the United States to help 

countries build capacities for responsible governance and security. 

• Existing U.S. law (the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010) requires 

the administration to produce a list of what each agency is doing to deny terrorists safe havens. 

• The Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the U.S. Government 

approach and concluded: (1) Safe havens are a threat to the United States, and 

(2) a more comprehensive list of agency efforts is needed so Congress can adequately oversee and assess how the United States is denying safe havens to terrorists. 

We currently have an incomplete picture of what each of these countries is doing 

to eliminate safe havens, what they are doing to prevent the proliferation and tracking of weapons of mass destruction, and what they are doing to cooperate with U.S. 

counter-terrorism officials. This knowledge is vital to Congress’s ability to craft foreign policy that holds countries accountable for aiding terrorists by looking the other 

way. 

I applaud our Government’s efforts but more has to be done. 

Eliminating the terrorists’ base of operations where they have the ability to recruit, train, and plan their operations is the key to preventing attacks on American 

soil. Osama bin Laden orchestrated the 9/11 attacks from a safe haven in Afghanistan. Anwar al Awlaki has been able to inspire more than 2 dozen plots against the 

United States over just the past 2 years including the Fort Hood shootings and 

Christmas bomber. This hearing will assess the role of the U.S. Government in denying the terrorists the ability to reconstitute. 

Before I yield my time I would like to thank the brave men and women of our 

armed services, the civilians in the Departments of State and Homeland Security 

and all those from other U.S. Government agencies who serve overseas. They constitute our best defense against the terrorist who want to kill us. 

Also I want to thank our witnesses today and look forward to hearing their testimonies. 

Mr. McCaul. With that, I yield and recognize the Ranking Member of this committee, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for convening today’s hearing on U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens 

and counter threats from Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were coordinated, as we all know, 

from a safe haven in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commissioners later 

stated that the U.S., ‘‘strategy should include offensive operations 

to counterterrorism,’’ and terrorists should no longer find safe havens where their organizations can grow and flourish. 

Terrorism in America right now is our No. 1 security threat. Denying safe haven to terrorists is a paramount concern to our homeland security and an important step in keeping our communities 

safe from terrorism. 
9 

We know that safe havens exist in ungoverned, under-governed, 

and ill-governed areas of the world. These havens provide terrorists 

with cover and allow them the space to operate and plan vicious 

terrorist attacks. 

There are multiple agencies that play a role in implementing 

U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and I thank the panel for taking 

their time today to join us as part of that grouping. 

The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense are all but a few of the U.S. agencies that combine their efforts in countering this threat; and I am interested in hearing 

today from our witnesses the level of cooperation that presently exists among the various agencies and whether this multi-agency approach is producing positive results for our homeland security. I 

think cooperation is one of the challenges that we all face in a 

threat so complicated and serious as this, and it is important that 

coordination exist as seamlessly as possible. 

I am concerned that Congress receive a full and comprehensive 

listing of our Government’s efforts, especially in light of the risk 

safe havens pose to the safety and security of U.S. interests, both 

at home and abroad. One hand needs to know what the other hand 

is doing, and the production of this report in the manner intended 

by Congress will allow that to happen. 

While today’s focus is on physical safe havens, we must also consider the broader safe havens of the future. Electronic infrastructure and global communications play an important role in terrorist 

operations and allow for virtual safe havens that are much harder 

to track, disrupt, and dismantle than physical safe havens. 

Furthermore, the May 1 killing of Osama bin Laden, who escaped detection by hiding in a safe haven located in a heavily populated area, governed area, that indicates that the terms of safe 

haven does not always equate with remoteness, in scarcely populated areas, or lawless areas. 

I look forward to hearing from both panels and receive their recommendations on strategies on the best approach for addressing 

terrorist safe havens, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member, and I couldn’t agree 

with you more that the virtual safe havens are a threat as well. 

I know we have had hearings on radicalization over the internet, 

which I think poses one of the biggest threats we have today. 

Other Members are reminded that opening statements may be 

submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 3, 2011 

Thank you, Chairman McCaul, for convening this hearing. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for their participation, and I look forward 

to hearing their testimony. 

Last month, the United States achieved a major milestone in our on-going effort 

to secure our homeland from acts of terrorism. 

The killing of Osama bin Laden, without a doubt, made the United States, in particular, and the entire world, in general, a safer place to live. 

However, it did not remove the on-going threat from terrorist forces that continue 

to seek to do us harm. 

We know that terrorists rely on safe havens to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative obscurity. 
10 

They also use safe havens to plan attacks—some of which focus on killing innocent Americans—in an effort to further their ideological goals. 

These safe havens provide security for terrorists because in these areas they are 

able to operate outside of the law, in uncontrolled territory, with little or no government interference. 

In August 2010, the Department of State identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including areas in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. 

These areas experience widespread terrorist activities that illustrate the danger 

in identified safe haven locations. 

According to the National Counterterrorism Center, in 2010 alone, there were approximately 200 terrorist attacks in Yemen, more than 580 in Somalia, and 1,331 

in Pakistan. 

Terrorists from these countries have also sought to attack United States interests. 

For example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, which operates in 

Yemen, claimed responsibility for the attempted 2009 Christmas day bombing of a 

plane headed to the United States; in addition to the attempted package bombings 

on U.S.-bound aircraft in October 2010. 

Congress has mandated that the U.S. Government issue reports that identify 

where terrorist safe havens exist and assess U.S. Government efforts in addressing 

them. 

The reporting of this vital information to Congress is the first step in ensuring 

Congressional oversight of Government-wide efforts in denying terrorist safe havens 

and taking efforts to dismantle and disrupt their existence. 

Unless the United States identifies where safe havens are located and the steps 

being taken to protect the homeland in light of their existence, Congress cannot 

fully measure the adequacy of U.S. efforts. 

Unfortunately, GAO will release a report today that indicates that since 2004 

Federal Government agencies have not fully complied with Congressional reporting 

requirements. 

As a result, not once has Congress received a comprehensive Government-wide 

list of U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists, as required by law. 

Last year, several efforts were implemented to improve the U.S. Government response to addressing terrorist safe havens. 

The 2010 National Security Strategy declared that ‘‘denying safe haven to terrorists is an essential component of the U.S. strategy to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates.’’ 

Furthermore, the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 

reiterated safe haven reporting requirements and I am pleased to learn that for the 

first time ever, a more comprehensive report is underway. 

I look forward to receiving testimony from our Government panel which should 

shed light on U.S. Government efforts. 

I am also interested in hearing from our panel of experts regarding the extent 

to which terrorist safe havens pose a threat to U.S. homeland security. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel 

of witnesses before us today on this important topic, and I want to 

introduce each of you. I hope we can get through your testimony. 

We have a series of votes coming up probably in about 30 minutes 

from now. It will be two votes, and then we will return to the hearing. 

First, we have Ms. Jacquie Williams-Bridgers, who is the Managing Director of the International Affairs and Trade Team for the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office. She began her professional 

career in the GAO in 1978. 

Ms. Williams-Bridgers has also been Inspector General of the 

U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and it is a pleasure to have you here today. 

Next, we have Mr. Mark Koumans, who is the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security. He is responsible for coordinating the Department’s international programs and policies. 
11 

Prior to joining DHS, he served in the U.S. Foreign Service, concentrating on counterterrorism and security issues; and it is an 

honor to have you here today as well, sir. 

Next, we have Ms. Shari Villarosa, who is the Deputy Coordinator for Regional Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Previously, she served as Chief of Mission in Burma; and her expansive Foreign Service career has included overseas assignments in 

Thailand, Brazil, and Ecuador, among others. 

Next, we have Mr. James Roberts. He serves as the Principal Director for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism in the Office of Secretary of Defense. Mr. Roberts began his Government career as a U.S. Army private in 1968 and served 24 years on active 

duty as a military intelligence officer. We thank you for your service to our country and thank all of you for being here today. 

I have been informed that we are going to have votes in about 

probably 5 minutes or so. In fact, they just called it just now. 

I think we can proceed with some of the testimony. They usually 

keep the votes open for about 30 minutes. 

So, with that, Ms. Williams-Bridgers is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 

Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be 

here to discuss the report the GAO is releasing today on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. 

Safe havens, as we all know, allow terrorists the freedom to 

train, recruit, and plan deadly operations that constitute a threat 

to the United States. As you mentioned in your opening statement, 

Chairman McCaul, such was the case with the attempted airliner 

bombing on December 25, 2009, which was planned from safe havens in Yemen. Most recently, the discovery of Osama bin Laden 

in a compound near a military base in Pakistan makes this hearing 

particularly timely. 

My testimony focuses on three questions: To what extent do U.S. 

agency strategies focus on terrorist safe havens? What terrorist 

safe havens have been identified? Has the U.S. Government developed a comprehensive assessment of its efforts to deny terrorists 

the ability to train, recruit, plan deadly operations against us? 

My first point is that the U.S. Government emphasizes the importance of denying safe havens to terrorists in several strategic 

documents. Three National security strategies released since 2002 

and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which was last 

updated in 2006, identify safe havens as a National security concern. 

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism noted that the 

elimination of terrorist safe havens requires the attention of all elements of National power, with a particular focus on information 

sharing, law enforcement, and foreign capacity-building and security governance in development sectors. 

In addition to National strategies, Defense, Justice, State, 

USAID, and the Office of Director of National Intelligence have 

issued strategic plans that include language emphasizing the im-
12 

portance of addressing safe havens. However, other agencies such 

as DHS that are significantly involved in relevant law enforcement 

efforts overseas do not specify the need to address threats from 

safe havens in their strategic plans. 

My second point, in compliance with Congressional mandates, 

State Department annually identifies safe havens around the globe 

which threaten U.S. National security. Congress mandated that 

State perform a detailed assessment of each foreign country whose 

territory is being used as a sanctuary to terrorists. Since 2006, 

State has published this information in its annual country reports 

on terrorism. Of note, since 2007, only one country, Indonesia, and 

one region, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, have been removed 

from the list of safe havens. State most recently, in its Country Report issued in August of last year, identified 13 countries as safe 

havens. 

Each of the three countries that are the focus of this hearing 

today have areas that terrorists use as safe havens. 

For example, in Pakistan, several terrorist organizations maintain safe havens, including the core of al-Qaeda, the Pakistani 

Taliban, the LET. Each group has either attempted attacks against 

the United States or views American interests as legitimate targets. For example, the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for 

the failed vehicle bombing in New York City’s Times Square in 

2010. 

In Yemen, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, 

planned the attempted bombing of a plane headed to the United 

States on December 25, 2009, and also claimed responsibility for 

the attempted package bombing in cargo planes in late 2010. Also, 

in 2010, the United States designated Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of terrorism on behalf of AQAP. 

In Somalia, al-Shabaab, whose core leadership is linked ideologically to al-Qaeda, has claimed responsibility for several bombings 

and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as the deadly suicide 

bombings in Uganda. Just last year, the FBI indicted 12 people, including five U.S. citizens, on charges of providing support to alShabaab. 

In addition, the FBI has expressed concerns about Americans 

trained in Somalia who might plan to conduct attacks inside the 

United States. 

My third point is that, despite the express desire of the Congress 

to receive comprehensive assessments of the United States’ efforts 

to deny terrorists safe harbor, the United States Government has 

not developed such an evaluation. Beginning in 2004, Congress required the administration to submit reports outlining U.S. Government efforts to deny or disrupt safe havens. In response, State submitted a report to Congress in 2006 and subsequently updated its 

information in its annual Country Reports. 

While these reports, including the most recent update issues in 

August, 2010, identify several U.S. efforts to address safe havens, 

we found that State’s report is not complete for two reasons. 

First, the Country Reports do not include at least 13 programs 

and activities that State funds to address safe havens. For exam-
13 

1GAO, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe 

Havens, GAO–11–561 (Washington, DC: June 3, 2011). 2See GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the 

Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 

GAO–08–622 (Washington, DC: Apr. 17, 2008). 3The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that, in addition to physical terrorist safe havens in geographic territories, terrorist safe havens can also be nonphysical or virtual, existing within legal, cyber, and financial systems. In this statement, however, we focus 

on physical terrorist safe havens. 

ple, foreign military financing and State-funded training provided 

through DHS to combat bulk cash smuggling were not included. 

Second, programs and activities funded by agencies other than 

State Department, such as Defense, Justice, Treasury, were not included. For example, DOD’s Afghanistan and Iraqi security forces 

funds and the 1206 program that is used to train and equip foreign 

security forces were not included. 

To enhance the usefulness of State’s reporting we recommended 

that State include an assessment of key U.S. agency programs that 

addressed terrorist safe havens. State concurred that its reporting 

should be more comprehensive but did not agree that such a list 

should be part of its Country Reports, citing another report that it 

issued. We examined that report, an anti-terrorism report, and determined that it does not constitute a Government-wide assessment 

of key U.S. efforts because it, too, does not include the contributions of the agencies, such as DOD. 

In 2010, Congress again required the President to report on U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of safe havens. We 

understand that the National Security Council has been assigned 

responsibility for completing this report, but no report has yet been 

submitted to Congress. To address this reporting gap, we recommended that the NSC, in collaboration with other agencies, complete the Congressional reporting requirement to identify and assess Government-wide efforts related to denial of terrorist safe harbors. 

Chairman McCaul, Mr. Keating, that concludes my prepared 

statement. I will be happy to answer questions at the appropriate 

time. 

[The statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS

JUNE 3, 2011 

GAO–11–713T

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report GAO is releasing today on U.S. efforts 

to address terrorist safe havens.1 Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists, allowing them to train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have concluded that various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers emanating from terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, planned, 

in part, from safe havens in Pakistan,2 and the attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe havens in Yemen. The discovery of Osama bin 

Laden in a compound in Pakistan, from which, according to U.S. officials, he played 

an active role in al-Qaeda focused on attacking the United States, makes this hearing particularly timely. 

My testimony today focuses on: (1) U.S. National strategies related to addressing 

terrorist safe havens, (2) terrorist safe havens 3 identified by the Department of 

State (State) and the threats emanating from these havens, and (3) the extent to 

which the U.S. Government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe havens. 
14 

In our report, we found that U.S. National strategies emphasize the importance 

of denying safe haven to terrorists and that, since 2006, State has annually identified terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism. However, we also 

found that, although there are multiple reporting requirements, the U.S. Government has not provided to Congress a comprehensive, Government-wide list of its efforts to address terrorist safe havens. We made recommendations to both State and 

the National Security Council to improve reporting on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. State agreed with the importance of comprehensive information 

regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, but did not agree that this 

information needs to be included in the Country Reports on Terrorism. The National 

Security Council reviewed the report but provided no comments on the recommendation. 

U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIES EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF DENYING SAFE HAVENS TO

TERRORISTS

The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key National security concern in several U.S. Government strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the 

importance of denying safe haven to terrorists. The current National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism, which was last updated September 2006, also stresses the importance of eliminating terrorist safe havens. The document identifies eliminating 

terrorist safe havens as a priority action against which all elements of National 

power—including military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement— 

should be applied. According to National Security Staff officials, an updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is currently being drafted and its release 

is expected in the coming months. However, these officials stated that denying safe 

haven to terrorists will remain an important element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 

In addition to National strategies, plans issued by various U.S. agencies, such as 

the Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and State/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the National Intelligence Strategy issued 

by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, include language emphasizing 

the importance of addressing safe havens. Figure 1 shows excerpts from these documents, which discuss terrorist safe havens. However, other agencies that are involved in U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens do not include specific language on safe havens in their strategic plans. For example, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS)—which contributes to the law enforcement element of 

U.S. National power—does not specifically address safe havens in its strategic plan 

but does have a goal to ‘‘protect the homeland from dangerous people,’’ which includes objectives related to effective border control. 

FIGURE 1: SELECTED U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS EMPHASIZING THE

IMPORTANCE OF DENYING SAFE HAVEN TO TERRORISTS
15 

4Pub. L. 108–458, section 7102. 

5We use the term terrorist safe haven, which, according to State, has the same meaning as 

terrorist sanctuaries. 6State annually releases the Country Reports on Terrorism. State’s August 2010 report includes a strategic overview of terrorist threats and country-by-country discussions of foreign government counterterrorism cooperation. While released by State’s Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, the Country Reports on Terrorism incorporates the views of the National 

Counterterrorism Center and National Security Staff, as well as key agencies involved in addressing international terrorism. 

State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates policies and 

programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas. According to State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism works with all appropriate elements of 

the U.S. Government to ensure integrated and effective counterterrorism efforts 

that utilize diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military 

power. These elements include those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, 

the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), USAID, and the intelligence community. For instance, State funds programs to build the capacity of U.S. foreign partners to counter terrorism financing implemented by agencies such as DHS, Treasury, and DOJ. 

SINCE 2006, STATE HAS ANNUALLY IDENTIFIED TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS POSING RISKS

TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) 4 requires 

State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism 

with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a terrorist 

sanctuary, also known as a terrorist safe haven.5 State defines terrorist safe havens 

as ‘‘ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical 

areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. National security interests 

are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in 

relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.’’ 

Since 2006, State has identified existing terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter 

of its Country Reports on Terrorism.6 As shown in figure 2, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens in its August 2010 report. 

FIGURE 2: TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS IDENTIFIED IN STATE’S COUNTRY REPORTS ON

TERRORISM RELEASED IN AUGUST 2010
16 

7Pub. L. 108–458, Section 7120(b). 

Terrorist safe havens pose a threat to U.S. National security. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) noted that 

safe havens in Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda the operational space to gather recruits and build logistical networks to undertake planning for the attacks on September 11, 2001. State reports that denying safe havens is central to combating terrorism, which it cited as the United States’ top security threat. According to U.S. 

agencies, a variety of groups that pose threats to the United States operate in countries identified by State as terrorist safe havens. For example: 

• Pakistan.—Various terrorist organizations operate in Pakistan. First, al-Qaeda 

leader Osama bin Laden was located in a compound in Pakistan from which 

U.S. officials have stated he was actively involved in planning attacks against 

the United States. Additionally, according to State, al-Qaeda also uses the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to launch attacks in Afghanistan, 

train and recruit terrorists, and plan global operations. State also reports that 

the Pakistani Taliban has used the FATA to plan attacks against civilian and 

military targets across Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban have claimed responsibility for several attacks against U.S. interests, including an attack on the U.S. 

Consulate in Peshawar in April 2010. Moreover, according to the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Pakistani Taliban has repeatedly threatened to attack the U.S. homeland and claimed responsibility for the failed vehicle bombing in New York City’s Times Square in May 2010. In addition, according to State, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—the group responsible for attacks in Mumbai, 

India, in November 2008, which killed at least 183 people—continues to plan 

operations from Pakistan and views American interests as legitimate targets. 

• Yemen.—The foreign terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) is based in Yemen. According to the NCTC, AQAP is pursuing a global 

agenda. For example, the group attempted to bomb a plane headed to the 

United States on December 25, 2009. AQAP also claimed responsibility for the 

attempted package bombings of cargo planes in October 2010. More recently, in 

response to the killing of Osama bin Laden, AQAP issued a press release vowing revenge against the United States. In addition, members of AQAP have 

been named Specially Designated Nationals by the United States Government. 

In July 2010, the United States designated Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and 

key leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of terrorism and for acting for or on 

behalf of AQAP. 

• Somalia.—Al-Shabaab is a foreign terrorist organization active in Somalia. AlShabaab has claimed responsibility for several bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as the July 2010 suicide bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which killed more than 70 people. State reports that rank-and-file members 

of al-Shabaab are predominantly interested in issues within Somalia, rather 

than pursuing a global agenda. However, NCTC and State note that alShabaab’s core leadership is linked ideologically to al-Qaeda and that some 

members of the group previously trained and fought with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In 2009, the Deputy Director of Intelligence at the NCTC testified that 

a number of young Somali-American men traveled to Somalia, possibly to train 

and fight with al-Shabaab, including one who conducted a suicide bombing attack. While noting there is no specific evidence that the Americans previously 

trained in Somalia planned to conduct attacks inside the United States, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has expressed concern that this threat remains a possibility. In August 2010, the FBI arrested two U.S. citizens and indicted 12 others, including five U.S. citizens, on charges of providing support 

to al-Shabaab. 

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FULLY ADDRESSED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO

IDENTIFY EFFORTS TO DENY TERRORISTS SAFE HAVEN

The U.S. Government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify 

U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. Government efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws—the IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

for fiscal year 2010. 

The IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that includes 

an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools the U.S. Government uses to disrupt 

or eliminate the security provided to terrorists by terrorist safe havens,7 and recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its Coun-
17 

8Pub. L. 108–458, Section 7102(d)(2)(E). 

9We reviewed the fiscal year 2012 Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (MSRP) for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen, submitted in April 2010, which included program funding information for goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. 10GAO–11–561. 

try Reports on Terrorism.8 In response to these provisions, State submitted a report 

to Congress in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its Country Reports on Terrorism. These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and 

tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In the 

Country Reports on Terrorism released in August 2010, State identified several U.S. 

efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State’s Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism Assistance programs. 

However, State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism does not fully identify U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven. For example: • Some State-funded efforts are not included.—Selected State strategic documents 9 identify efforts funded by State that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven—such as Foreign Military Financing activities and USAID development assistance—that were not included in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. In addition, agency officials identified additional State-funded efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens—such as activities funded through State’s Peacekeeping Operations and State-funded DHS 

training to combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—but were not 

included in the report. • Efforts funded by other U.S. agencies are not included.—For example, according 

to DOD officials, the Department’s Afghanistan and Iraq Security Forces Funds 

and Section 1206 program efforts to train and equip the security forces abroad 

address terrorist safe havens but are not included in State’s report. Additionally, according to DOJ and Treasury, their training programs to build the capacity of foreign partners to counter terrorism financing address terrorist safe havens, but they are also not included in State’s report. 

In the IRTPA, Congress noted that it should be the policy of the United States 

to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent terrorists from using safe havens 

and to assess the tools used to assist foreign governments in denying terrorists safe 

haven. State’s report is incomplete without a comprehensive overview of its own 

contributions and those of its various interagency partners to address terrorist safe 

havens. 

To enhance the comprehensiveness of State’s reporting on U.S. efforts to deny safe 

haven to terrorists, we recommended that State include a Government-wide list of 

U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested 

under the IRTPA.10 In response, State concurred that reporting on U.S. efforts to 

deny terrorist safe havens should be more comprehensive. However, State did not 

agree that such a list should be part of its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, 

citing the fact that they have completed other reporting requirements related to 

counterterrorism. We maintain that the provisions in the IRTPA recommend annual 

updates related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens be included in the 

Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, while it is possible that other reports produced by State address IRTPA provisions, the antiterrorism report cited by State 

in its comments does not constitute a Government-wide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens as the report does not include the contributions of key 

agencies, such as DOD. 

In addition to the provisions in the IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an on-going 

interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens in the 

NDAA for fiscal year 2010. The conference report accompanying the act noted that 

existing Executive branch reporting on counterterrorism does not address the full 

scope of U.S. activities or assess overall effectiveness. The NDAA for fiscal year 

2010 requires the President to submit to Congress a report on U.S. counterterrorism 

strategy, including an assessment of the scope, status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in fighting al-Qaeda and its affiliates and a provision to create a 

list of U.S. counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe havens. 

The required report is intended to help Congress in conducting oversight, enhance 

the public’s understanding of how well the Government is combating terrorism, and 

assist the administration in identifying and overcoming related challenges. As of 

March 2011, no report had been submitted to Congress. While National Security 

Staff officials taking the lead on the report stated they were working on a draft, 

they were unsure when it would be completed. 

To address this reporting gap, we recommended that the National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies as appropriate, complete the require-
18 

11GAO–11–561. 

ments of the NDAA of fiscal year 2010 to report to Congress on a list of U.S. efforts 

related to the denial of terrorist safe havens.11 The National Security Council reviewed our report but provided no comments on the recommendation. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you so much for your testimony. 

I have been informed we just have one vote, so I would ask that 

we take a very short break, go make our one vote, and then come 

right back to the hearing. I appreciate your patience. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. 

I appreciate the patience from the witnesses and everybody in 

the room. Hopefully, we can now finish the hearing before the next 

series of votes. 

With that, Mr. Koumans, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARK KOUMANS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. KOUMANS. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security’s role in support of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. 

Protecting the United States from terrorism is the cornerstone of 

homeland security, and denying terrorists safe havens is one of the 

best ways to undermine their capacity to operate. 

The State Department defines terrorist safe havens as 

ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas where terrorists 

that threaten national security are able to organize, plan, raise 

funds, communicate, recruit, and train because of inadequate governance, political will, or both. 

Let me first clarify that DHS is concerned about threats from 

terrorists, foreign or domestic, whether or not they come from safe 

havens. DHS bases its actions, for example, in deciding who should 

be allowed entry into the United States on the experience of our 

officers in the field and the best available intelligence. We take the 

source and transit countries for terrorist movements into account 

when making our screening decisions and in the other work we do, 

but DHS does not base those decisions on whether a particular 

area is designated a safe haven. 

To address the problem of safe havens, to prevent threats, and 

to reduce risks, DHS works closely with the Departments of State 

and Defense and other departments and agencies to protect the 

homeland from terrorist attack and to deny terrorists the ability to 

travel and finance their activities. 

One important way the DHS conducts these efforts is to 

strengthen the capabilities of foreign partners. We believe that 

these efforts make partner countries stronger and make them and 

the United States more secure by improving governance and economic opportunity, fighting criminality, and supporting the rule of 

law and so decreasing the likelihood of safe havens. 
19 

DHS carries out many programs around the world to provide 

training and technical assistance to strengthen our partners’ ability 

to confront terrorists. DHS is generally not authorized to use its 

appropriated funds for foreign capacity building purposes. Therefore, when our interests and priorities overlap, DHS works with the 

U.S. agencies that hold the authority to fund such foreign assistance. These cooperative efforts to work with our international partners do not hinge exclusively on whether a particular area is a terrorist safe haven but instead are based on where our assistance 

can help build the partner’s capacity to increase security, fight 

transnational crime, and combat terrorism. 

For example, in Afghanistan, DHS has led efforts that have significantly improved the ability of the Afghan government to control 

its borders, increase customs revenue collection, and facilitate legal 

trade, while increasingly preventing the movement of illegal goods, 

including the components for improvised explosive devices. This effort is based on previous border security efforts DHS carried out in 

Iraq, efforts Defense Department officials had supported and encouraged DHS to carry out in Afghanistan. 

Our work has included mentoring Afghan border and customs officials at border posts, tackling bulk cash smuggling through Kabul 

International Airport, and establishing a training academy for Afghan customs officials. 

To cite another example, following the attempted terrorist attacks last October after two printers rigged with explosives were 

found, TSA deployed a team to Yemen to assess air cargo security 

programs. Subsequently, TSA trained Yemeni officials to mitigate 

threats to air cargo security in Yemen. 

Also, this April, ICE and CBP provided training in Pakistan to 

counter bulk cash smuggling and identify homemade explosives. 

We trained more than 50 officers from four different Pakistani border control agencies, including the Federal Investigative Agency, 

Customs Force, and Airport Security Force. 

At the same time, DHS is strengthening coordination among its 

many components and offices operating internationally. DHS has 

established its first international strategy and is consolidating information about all DHS training and technical assistance activities worldwide, in part to ensure that our activities are closely 

aligned with our priorities. These advances will help us work more 

effectively with the Departments of State and Defense. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, I look forward to working with you 

as we explore opportunities to advance our efforts and our cooperation with international partners to deny terrorists safe haven. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I have provided 

a more complete written testimony. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Koumans follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK KOUMANS

JUNE 3, 2011 

Good Morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) role in support of the U.S. Government’s 
20 

1There are exceptions for training and the sharing of best practices by TSA in locations that 

have non-stop flights to the United States. 

efforts to address the problem of terrorist safe havens. Terrorists operate without 

regard to national boundaries. Protecting the United States and its people from terrorism is the cornerstone of homeland security, and denying terrorists’ safe haven 

is one of the best ways to undermine their capacity to operate effectively. 

As set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, preventing terrorist attacks 

against the United States and enhancing our Nation’s security have been and continue to be two of DHS’s most important objectives. The Department’s first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), released on February 1, 2010, reiterates 

that preventing terrorist attacks in the United States is the first of five primary 

missions for the homeland security enterprise. DHS also integrates preventing terrorism into the four other missions of the homeland security enterprise—securing 

and managing our borders, enforcing and administering our customs and immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters of all kinds. 

The State Department defines terrorist safe havens as ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country where terrorists that constitute a threat 

to U.S. National security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both. Safe havens provide security for terrorist leaders, allowing them to plan acts of terrorism around the world. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 requires 

the State Department (DOS) to include in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism 

the identification of terrorist safe havens. Further, the 2004 IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2010 requests that the 

President submit reports identifying U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens. DOS 

identifies terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism, and in its most 

recent report, issued in August 2010, DOS identified 13 terrorist safe havens. 

To prevent threats and reduce risk, DHS works closely with DOS and other departments and agencies to protect the homeland and U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks, to deny terrorists the ability to travel, to deny them the ability to finance 

their activities, and to deny them access to areas of the world where they can plot 

and train for their attacks. 

DHS directly supports these efforts—funded by DOS or other Government departments—to strengthen the capacity of foreign governments to deny terrorists safe 

haven. 

HOW DHS COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AFFECT TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

DHS is concerned about threats from terrorists, foreign or domestic, whether they 

come from safe havens or not. DHS bases its actions—for example in deciding who 

should be allowed entry to the United States—on the experience of our officers in 

the field and on the best available intelligence collected throughout the U.S. Government. We take the source and transit countries for terrorist movements into account 

when making our screening decisions and in all the other work we do. DHS also 

does its part to support the work of other departments and agencies that are more 

directly focused in disrupting terrorist safe havens. While we base our screening decisions on intelligence and other factors, DHS does not base screening decisions on 

whether a particular area is designated a safe haven or not. 

DHS carries out significant programs around the world to provide training and 

technical assistance to build the capacity of foreign governments to confront terrorists and strengthen our own security. DHS generally is not authorized to use its appropriated funds for foreign capacity-building purposes;1 therefore, when our interests and priorities overlap, DHS works with the U.S. agencies that hold authority 

to fund foreign assistance, including capacity-building efforts. These cooperative efforts to work with our international partners, and often to provide training and 

technical assistance, do not hinge on whether a particular area is a terrorist safe 

haven, but instead are based on where our assistance can help build a partner’s capacity to combat terrorism. Below are several of these key technical assistance programs. 

CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS/MONEY LAUNDERING TRAINING

DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conduct training on enforcement efforts and interdiction of 

bulk cash smuggling, which includes cash courier interdiction training for various 

nations. The training, conducted in partnership with the Department of State, en-
21 

courages countries’ efforts to comply with international standards, such as those established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Training is scheduled based 

on a number of factors, including the status of the country’s financial reporting 

laws, available resources, political will to enforce the laws and the current security 

situation. The training includes such topics as the host country’s money laundering 

reporting requirements and laws, currency smuggling techniques, interviewing, 

source development, red flag indicators of currency smuggling, conducting investigations, and evidence processing. 

ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), coordinated and funded by the State 

Department, routinely conducts cross-border financial investigations and money 

laundering enforcement training for key foreign partner nations. HSI’s training provides participating countries with the capability to effectively implement relevant 

FATF 40 Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations (which provide the 

international standards for combating money-laundering and terrorism financing), 

with special emphasis on R8 (New Technologies), R17 (Dissuasive Actions), R26– 

R32 (Competent Authorities), SR V (International Cooperation), SR VI (Alternative 

Remittance), and SR IX (Cash Couriers). These recommendations were developed to 

ensure that terrorist and other criminal organizations cannot easily finance their activities or launder the proceeds of their crimes simply by leaving one jurisdiction 

and seeking refuge in another. 

The HSI-led training and technical assistance workshops cover a range of topics, 

including money laundering, movement and smuggling of bulk currency, money 

service businesses, informal value transfer systems, trade-based money laundering, 

cross-border fraud, investigative techniques, kleptocracy, and asset forfeiture. The 

training includes practical exercises that exhibit how terrorist and/or criminal organizations collect, store, and move funds. Here are a few examples of training and 

technical assistance activities designed to address terrorist safe havens, as identified 

in the State Department’s 2010 report: 

• Over the last 6 years, HSI has conducted cross-border financial investigations 

training in: 

• Afghanistan; 

• The Philippines; 

• Indonesia; 

• Malaysia; 

• Pakistan; 

• Algeria; 

• Mali; 

• Mauritania; 

• Iraq; 

• Argentina; 

• Brazil; 

• Paraguay. 

• ICE Attache ́ Sana’a has provided training to counter bulk cash smuggling and 

money laundering to Yemen’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Financial Information Unit officials. 

• ICE Attache ́ Casablanca has regional responsibility for Algeria, and provided 

training in Algeria on bulk cash smuggling investigations and interdiction in 

August 2010. 

• In April 2011, ICE Attache ́ Islamabad and CBP provided bulk cash smuggling 

and the identification of homemade explosives and bulk explosives training to 

53 officers from the following four Pakistan border control agencies: Federal Investigation Agency, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) Customs, FBR Customs 

Intelligence and Investigations, and the Airport Security Force. 

FRAUDULENT DOCUMENT DETECTION

In February 2011, ICE special agents and CBP officers shared best practices and 

techniques with their Afghan counterparts on detecting forged documents used by 

individuals and criminal organizations seeking to circumvent the established immigration process in Kabul, Afghanistan at Kabul International Airport. CBP currently has a fraudulent document expert detailed to Iraq, where he is providing ongoing passport examination training to Iraqi immigration officers and police investigators to enhance their fraudulent document detection skills. 

EXPORT ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND WMD

The Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) program is 

funded through agreements with DOS. CBP and ICE are responsible for training 

foreign law enforcement counterpart agencies in other countries, chiefly customs 
22 

and border guard officials. Foreign officials are taught to investigate, conduct surveillance, detect, enforce transfer and control laws, and interdict unauthorized 

transfers of items and technology, including dual-use technologies, which are covered by control lists of the multilateral nonproliferation regimes and arrangements. 

Items that may contribute to a weapon of mass destruction or missile program are 

also included. 

CBP has recently conducted or will soon conduct EXBS-funded border control and 

enforcement training for Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Yemen. 

BORDER, CUSTOMS, AND IMMIGRATION POLICE TRAINING

CBP builds capacity to implement more effective customs operations, border policing, and immigration inspections through relevant training programs including: Border Patrol Primary, Border Patrol Checkpoint, Weapons of Mass Destruction, AntiNarcotics, and Border Enforcement; as well as targeting and risk management seminars and short- and long-term advisory assistance. 

In addition to the border control and enforcement training that is provided directly to a number of the countries identified as safe havens, CBP also provides this 

training to neighboring countries not designated as safe havens to increase their capability, including: Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This demonstrates how DHS employs a number of criteria to determine which countries 

would benefit from the kinds of technical assistance we can offer to help disrupt terrorist groups that threaten the United States and U.S. interests. 

In support of the World Customs Organization’s Program Global Shield, representatives from ICE and CBP are working with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and Customs Department (ACD) to train and equip border police to detect improvised explosive devices and drug precursors. In addition, ICE Kabul is 

providing training in investigative techniques and intelligence gathering to further 

exploit illicit shipments of precursor chemicals. 

ICE introduced the Kabul International Airport Action Plan (KIAAP) in response 

to U.S. Embassy interest in enhancing the capacity of the ACD, Afghan Border Police and MOI officials to increase revenue collection and security at Kabul International Airport (KBL). KIAAP focuses on capacity building while simultaneously 

allowing ICE access to KBL, which is believed to be the conduit for much of the 

bulk cash smuggling. The April 2011 approval of the Bulk Cash Flow (BCF) Action 

Plan at KBL will be the centerpiece for the successful implementation of KIAAP, 

which will improve security and revenue collection. ICE Attache ́ Kabul, in conjunction with other law enforcement components, was instrumental in drafting the BCF 

Action Plan. ICE Attache ́ Kabul personnel have also completed formal document 

fraud and bulk cash smuggling training for KBL Customs officers. 

In June 2011, ICE and CBP, with funding provided by the Department of Defense, are providing counternarcotics training tailored to the needs of Afghan law 

enforcement agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities. This training will highlight Program Global Shield initiatives, and is designed to improve Afghan and U.S. 

capacity to track shipping routes and compile and share targeting information about 

legal shipments. There will be two 1-week courses provided to students from the 

ACD, Afghan Customs Police, Border Police, and Counter Narcotics Police. 

In July 2011, ICE Attache ́ Casablanca plans to provide training in Algeria focusing on inspectional techniques and methodologies providing foreign counterparts the 

skills and knowledge necessary to carry out the effective inspection, detection and 

interdiction of contraband and/or illegal aliens. 

BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION AND INFORMATION SHARING

DHS’s US–VISIT and Science and Technology Directorate together build and leverage international partnerships to develop and promote the use of biometrics 

using standards that allow for interoperability with other countries’ border and immigration biometric systems in order to share actionable data. This sharing reinforces the security and integrity of immigration and international travel between 

the United States and our key international partners. 

One of US–VISIT’s notable projects is the Five Country Conference (FCC) High 

Value Data Sharing Protocol (HVDSP). The HVDSP allows for biometrically-based 

information sharing between the United States and the four other FCC member 

countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Separate bilateral memoranda of understanding were developed between the partner countries 

to facilitate the matching of immigration and nationality cases against each other’s 

biometric databases, and to exchange relevant information on cases where biometric 

matches are made. All participating countries are using this biometric information 

exchange to aid immigration decisions. There have been cases where immigration 
23 

or law enforcement officials of participating countries have received new case information or taken direct action as a result of sharing this biometric information. All 

information exchanges are undertaken in full compliance with all U.S. laws and regulations related to privacy and civil liberties. 

In 2008, the United States began signing Preventing and Combating Serious 

Crime (PCSC) agreements primarily with countries that participate in the Visa 

Waiver Program (VWP). The agreements—which in part satisfy a statutory information-sharing requirement to obtain or maintain VWP designation—formalize the 

sharing of biometric and biographic data for the purposes of preventing and combating serious crime and terrorism. US–VISIT is currently working with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division to begin 

implementing PCSC agreements with Germany and Spain. 

MARITIME SECURITY AND SEAPORT INTERDICTION

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) assists partner nations in the development of maritime security. USCG advocates Global Maritime Domain Awareness as the foundation of these efforts, to enable collective protection of the region’s maritime transportation system. USCG also assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in 

foreign ports using a country’s implementation of the International Ship and Port 

Facility Security (ISPS) Code as a benchmark. The USCG shares the results of its 

findings with other Federal agencies, including DOS. In the countries where port 

security is inadequate, the USCG imposes conditions of entry, including additional 

security measures, on vessels arriving to the United States from those countries. 

Conditions of entry are currently imposed on 16 countries. Among the USCG’s most 

important capacity-building activities is the International Port Security Program 

country visit, where they work collaboratively with foreign partners to fully implement the ISPS Code and related requirements in their ports and waterways. The 

USCG also works Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and the Organization 

of American States in the development and execution of capacity-building activities 

in Asia and the Americas, respectively. 

In another example of maritime cooperation, the CBP National Marine Training 

Center is planning to conduct Maritime Law Enforcement Officer training for the 

Ecuadorian Navy during late summer 2011. Ecuador is a neighbor of Colombia, 

which has been identified as a safe haven country. 

USCG international training partners include Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen. USCG engagement in Yemen dates back to 2002, and the creation of the Yemeni Coast Guard was under the guidance of the USCG. Several 

maritime capacity-building initiatives are planned for Yemen pending the resolution 

of the current political crisis and an improvement in the internal security situation. 

In 2011, the USCG has facilitated the delivery of two new coastal patrol boats to 

Yemen, one legacy high endurance cutter to the Philippines, and another high endurance cutter to Nigeria. Once in service, these vessels will substantially increase 

the maritime law enforcement capabilities of these nations. 

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports the efforts of other 

governments to prevent their territories from being used by terrorists, organized 

crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. security by assisting with the development of transportation security systems, programs, and facilities. Specific assistance includes technical and managerial expertise to assist with developing, improving, and operating the civilian aviation security infrastructure, standards, procedures, policies, training, and equipment. The tools TSA uses to provide this assistance include tailored training, personnel exchanges, information sharing, and lessons learned/best practices. TSA works closely with its foreign government counterparts in these locations to determine the exact tools used to meet the needs of the 

host government. 

TSA’s authority for assessing security standards at foreign airports is codified in 

49 USC 44907. Specifically, the TSA shall conduct an assessment of each foreign 

airport that serves as a last point of departure to the United States. TSA uses the 

standards and recommended practices contained in Annex 17 to the Convention on 

International Civil Aviation as the baseline for these security assessments. Additionally, TSA has the authority to conduct aircraft operator inspections of both U.S. 

Aircraft Operators and Foreign Air Carriers at foreign locations that serve as the 

last point of departure to the United States. This authority is codified in 49 CFR 

1544.3 and 49 CFR 1546.3 respectively. Further, the authorities vested to TSA by 

the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Pub. L. 107–71, 115 Stat. 587 

(2001)), include the authority to issue, rescind, and revise TSA regulations, orders, 
24 

and Security Directives/Emergency Authorities that affect both domestic and foreign 

transportation providers, and to enforce these authorities through civil penalties 

and denials of authorization to operate in U.S. transportation venues. 

In fiscal year 2010, 45 TSA assistance and training sessions were provided to 28 

countries. In fiscal year 2011, TSA is scheduled to provide 51 sessions in 35 countries. For example, following the attempted terrorist attacks on cargo operations this 

past October, TSA immediately deployed a team to Yemen to assess cargo security 

programs. Subsequently, TSA provided training to mitigate threats to the cargo security network emanating from Yemen. TSA also works closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization and other foreign partners to eliminate duplicative efforts by coordinating training given by various countries to nations in need 

of technical assistance. 

In addition, CBP’s Carrier Liaison Program (CLP) enhances border security by increasing commercial carrier effectiveness in identifying improperly documented passengers destined to the United States. In 2010, CLP provided training to carrier and 

airport security personnel in Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil on fraudulent document identification, passenger assessment, impostor identification, and travel document verification. 

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

National Security Presidential Directive 44 on Reconstruction and Stabilization 

tasks DOS with coordinating a unified, whole-of-government approach to help fragile and failing foreign governments exercise sovereignty over their own territories 

and prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven 

for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to 

U.S. security, foreign policy, or economic interests. 

Under this initiative, DHS participates by training and deploying ICE special 

agents and CBP officers to Afghanistan and other locations worldwide to help nations secure their borders and disrupt illicit travel and trade. 

In Afghanistan, CBP’s primary mission is to oversee the Border Management 

Task Force (BMTF), a mixed civilian and military task force whose primary goal is 

to assist the Afghan government by providing subject matter expertise relating to 

customs and border operations. The BMTF initiatives are a critical part of U.S. efforts to assist the Afghan government to gain control over its borders, defeat the 

insurgency by attacking links to narco-trafficking, and promote economic growth 

and stability. 

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Following the outbreak of war in Iraq in 2003, the Department of Defense requested CBP assistance in developing Iraq’s border control agencies. In 2004–2005, 

CBP teams trained more than 3,700 Iraqi border officers in the areas of border patrol and customs and immigration operations at the Jordanian International Police 

Training Center outside Amman, Jordan. Since January 2005, CBP has deployed 

personnel to Iraq to provide training and advisory assistance to Iraqi border control 

officials. More recently, DHS personnel provided advanced mentoring in Baghdad to 

senior Iraqi border control officials with the Department of Border Enforcement and 

the Port of Entry Directorate within the Ministry of Interior. 

DHS efforts have helped strengthen the capacity of the Iraqi government to control its borders. While there is more to do, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior directorates 

dealing with Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry have improved their capabilities from what they were only a few years ago. 

The current Department of Defense-funded CBP assistance project in Iraq will 

terminate at the end of fiscal year 2011. Following negotiations between the State 

Department and DHS to determine the appropriate level of future support, DHS has 

committed to provide an 8-person advisory team to support the U.S. mission in Iraq 

beginning in fiscal year 2012. Funding for the CBP presence in Iraq will be provided 

by State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

In Afghanistan, DHS efforts have significantly improved the ability of the Afghan 

government to control its borders, increase customs revenue collection, and facilitate 

legal trade, while increasingly preventing the movement of illegal goods, including 

components for improvised explosive devices. 

For example: 

• Working together, ICE and CBP personnel have been successful in facilitating 

numerous changes at Kabul International Airport to enhance security. Terminal 

controls of employees, passengers, cargo, baggage, and currency have been implemented in fiscal year 2011. 
25 

• CBP officials assisted in the development of the Afghan Customs Academy. The 

ACD and BMTF will collaborate to expand the Academy, which graduated its 

first class of 48 in March 2010. The Afghan government and CBP have also broken ground on a new Afghan Customs Academy in Kabul. • In December 2010, ICE officials established the Afghan Vetted Investigative 

Unit, composed of 12 investigators from the Afghanistan MOI Criminal Investigations Division. • CBP officials are assisting the Afghan government with infrastructure improvements at a number of border locations, as well as four international airports, 

which include baggage and cargo scanners in addition to life support facilities 

for civilian contract mentors and Afghan government border officials. 

• CBP officials continue to provide training and mentorship to the Ministry of Finance (Customs Officials), Ministry of Interior (Afghan Border Police), and Afghan National Security Directorate on the use of ammonium nitrate detection 

kits. 

• CBP officials continue to provide training and mentorship to Afghan Airport 

Authorities on cargo/passenger enforcement operations, and assist the Airport 

Interdiction Task Force with bulk cash/capital flight operations at Kabul International Airport. 

• CBP officials continue to assist senior Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior officials in the crafting of a unified Afghan national border strategy. 

• By the end of fiscal year 2011, CBP will increase its presence in Afghanistan 

to a total of 11 permanent CBP representatives utilizing DOS funding. 

• The BMTF will expand the border/customs mentoring program to more than 50 

contract mentors by the end of fiscal year 2011. CBP representatives will manage and oversee the continued operation and deployment of BMTF civilian contract mentors at various border crossing points, inland customs depots and 

international airports. 

• By the end of fiscal year 2011, CBP representatives will identify requirements 

and oversee infrastructure improvements to 14 Afghan border crossing points. 

CONCLUSION

DHS is continuing to strengthen coordination and cooperation across all of its relevant components involved in the activities described above. For example, efforts to 

establish agreed-upon international priorities across all of DHS in key thematic engagement areas are well advanced. At the same time, significant achievements have 

been made in creating a departmental information-sharing architecture to consolidate information about all DHS training and technical assistance activities worldwide. We are now working to assemble this information and ensure that DHS activities are closely aligned with our priorities. These advances will allow us to work 

more effectively with those who help fund our efforts, mainly the State and Defense 

Departments. 

At the same time, we are also strengthening our outreach to DOS and to embassies around the world, with more frequent and robust interaction and informationsharing efforts to expand our partners’ understanding of the tools and capabilities 

that DHS brings to the fight against terrorism. We are increasingly seeing the fruits 

of these efforts as our programs are sought out by other departments and by international partners. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, I look forward to working with you as we explore opportunities to advance our efforts and our cooperation with international partners to deny safe haven 

to terrorists. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer 

any questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. All right. Thank you for the testimony. 

The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Villarosa for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SHARI VILLAROSA, DEPUTY COORDINATOR 

FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. VILLAROSA. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, and 

distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss State Department’s efforts, in coordination with 

our other agency partners, to eliminate terrorist safe havens. 

Our ultimate success against terrorism depends on eliminating 

these safe havens which have generally developed in remote areas 
26 

where there is little to no effective governance, frequently in border 

regions. This requires a whole-of-government effort and a strategic 

approach to address both the immediate security needs while building long-term governance and rule of law, including the capacity to 

counter violent extremism, to reduce terrorist recruitment, and 

delegitimize violence in those virtual safe havens. 

In order for our strategy to be effective, we must develop regional 

approaches with the neighboring countries to shrink the space in 

which terrorists can operate. We build this regional cooperation by 

bringing our ambassadors together with senior interagency officials 

to devise collaborative strategies and action plans. 

State works with Defense to build the capacity of military and 

civilian law enforcement officials. State works with Homeland Security to tighten border security. State works with Treasury to restrict the flow of funds in and out of terrorist safe havens. State 

works with Justice and FBI to improve investigative and prosecutorial capacity so countries can build effective criminal cases 

against terrorists. State works with USAID to improve governance 

by establishing the rule of law, assisting with the provision of basic 

services such as health and education, and promoting peaceful conflict resolution. 

We have achieved success with this approach. Jemaah Islamiya 

can no longer travel freely between Indonesia and the Philippines 

due to improved maritime surveillance procedures, Indonesia’s success in prosecuting terrorists, and greater Philippine government 

control over territory formerly used by JI for its training camps. 

In the Trans-Sahara, the countries have a political will to fight 

terrorism but lack the capacity and have welcomed our assistance 

to build capacity and to counter violent extremists. The countries 

of the region, with our assistance, have begun to work together to 

take action against the al-Qaeda affiliates operating in their territories. 

The committee has asked us to address three of the toughest 

challenges we still face: Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Our complex relationship with Pakistan is well known. It is also important 

to remember that, as a result of our cooperation, we have been able 

to strike major blows against al-Qaeda’s ability to seek safe haven 

in Pakistan. The challenge remains to make these advances durable and sustainable. 

We are assisting the Pakistanis with delivery of basic services 

and improved governance in the federally administered tribal areas 

bordering Afghanistan. We will continue to press Pakistan for increased action against terrorist groups operating within its borders, 

but we must also continue to help Pakistan help itself to eliminate 

terrorist safe havens. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, operating out of Yemen, has 

tried multiple times to attack us. We had some success in 2009 and 

2010 with our strategy. We worked with the Yemenis to take action 

against imminent threats, and we also helped the Yemeni government deliver basic services and security to its people. We are hopeful that future Yemeni leaders will be solid counterterrorism partners once the political situation there is resolved. 

Somalia has not had a functioning central government for 20 

years. The main terrorist group, al-Shabaab, has links with al- 
27 

Qaeda and conducted a major attack outside of Somalia last July, 

killing 76 people in Uganda. An offense launched earlier this year 

by Somalian partner nation forces has reduced al-Shabaab’s territorial control and caused defections from al-Shabaab. Clearly, more 

needs to be done to consolidate political control over the newly liberated areas. 

We have also begun a more incentive outreach to the Somali diaspora and civil society to foster peaceful reconciliation. 

In conclusion, our threat is formidable, but we are making 

progress. Our strategic approach of capacity building, countering 

violent extremism, and broader regional cooperation provides us 

with the tools to make lasting progress. 

Thank you very much, and I welcome your questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Villarosa follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHARI VILLAROSA

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today. 

Denying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity 

to operate effectively and forms a key element of what we’re doing in the State Department on counterterrorism. Terrorists operate without regard to national boundaries. Safe havens allow terrorists to recruit, organize, plan, train, and claim turf 

as a symbol of legitimacy. Physical safe havens usually straddle national borders 

or exist in regions where ineffective governance allows their presence. Examples include the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, Yemen, the Trans-Sahara region, and Somalia. 

To effectively counter safe havens, we increasingly operate in a regional context 

with the goal of shrinking the space in which terrorists operate. Through the Regional Strategic Initiative, we seek to build regional cooperation to constrain terrorist activities. Under Chief-of-Mission authority, we bring Embassy officials, Military, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence agencies together to collectively assess the 

threats, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies and action plans. We 

have established nine RSIs covering South East Asia, Iraq and its neighbors, the 

Eastern Mediterranean, the Western Mediterranean, East Africa, the Trans-Sahara, 

South Asia, Central Asia, and Latin America. 

I’d like to note that there are examples of success against terrorist safe havens, 

particularly in Southeast Asia where we formed our first RSI. Terrorists traveled 

freely among the nations of the region by sea. So, through the U.S. military and 

Coast Guard we worked with the nations of the region to improve maritime security 

first in the Straits of Malacca, then in the Sulu Sea terrorist safe haven area. With 

combined U.S. military and development assistance, the Government of the Philippines now has increasing control of the island of Basilan and is beginning to create stability on the island of Jolo. Both areas are exploited by Indonesia-based terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya and the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group. 

Improved law enforcement and criminal justice also works to shrink safe havens 

as we have seen in Indonesia. After the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia enacted new 

anti-terrorism laws and established a special police force working together with 

trained prosecutors. As a result, the police have successfully disrupted operations, 

such as the Aceh terrorist training camp in February 2010, captured terrorists, collected intelligence, and arrested additional suspects based on that intelligence. Since 

2003, over 500 JI operatives have been captured. Since its formation in September 

2006, the special prosecutor task force has conducted 166 prosecutions, secured 133 

verdicts, including those responsible for the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings, and is 

currently prosecuting 36 defendants with additional cases being prepared for prosecution. We also embarked on a program with the Government of Indonesia to diversify the curriculum of religious schools, with math and science, so children would 

develop the skills needed in a global economy. 

KEY TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

The State Department defines terrorist safe havens as ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, 

raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security be-
28 

cause of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both. This definition includes consideration of both political will and the capacity of host countries. 

Pakistan/Afghanistan 

I’ll begin our discussion of terrorist safe havens with the Afghanistan/Pakistan 

border. Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed to maintain its safe haven and to continue plotting attacks. After he took office, President Obama launched a thorough review of 

our policy and set out a clear goal: To disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ, and prevent it from threatening America and our allies in the future. In pursuit of this goal, 

the USG is following a strategy with three mutually reinforcing tracks—three 

surges: A military offensive against AQ terrorists and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan; a civilian campaign to bolster the governments, economies, and civil societies 

of Afghanistan and Pakistan to undercut the pull of the insurgency; and an intensified diplomatic push to bring the Afghan conflict to an end, and a more secure future for the region. 

Since 2009, we have worked with the Government of Pakistan and its people at 

all levels. Secretary Clinton was there in late May. Pakistan has been a victim of 

terrorism many times in the last few years. At the same time, we are looking forward to Pakistan launching its own inquiry as to how Osama bin Ladin was able 

to live in Abbottabad for more than 5 years. 

We are working closely with the Government of Pakistan on a range of counterterrorism-related capacity building projects. These include numerous training 

courses for Pakistani police, which are administered by the State Department’s Diplomatic Security bureau. Our Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement also works closely on border security and other law-enforcement matters. It 

routinely provides Pakistani security and police forces with equipment to counter 

extremism. And it is truly a whole-of-government effort. For example, the FBI and 

Department of Justice work with their Pakistani counterparts on investigatory, 

prosecutorial, and training matters. Treasury and DHS are also interacting with 

Pakistan on several important matters relating to terrorism finance and improvised 

explosive devises, respectively. Through USAID we are assisting the Pakistanis with 

delivery of basic services and improved governance in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas. Even as we’ve endured serious challenges to the relationship, some of 

which continue to make headlines, we’ve continued civilian and military assistance 

throughout the country and solidified our cooperation. 

It is no secret that we have not always seen eye-to-eye with Pakistan on how to 

deal with its terrorist threats or on the future of Afghanistan. But as a result of 

U.S. and Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation and Pakistani military operations 

aimed at eliminating militant strongholds in the FATA, the AQ core has had significant leadership losses—including the recent demise of Osama bin Laden and is finding it more difficult to raise money, train recruits, and plan attacks outside of the 

region. Although the AQ core is clearly weaker, it retains the capability to conduct 

regional and transnational attacks. In addition, AQ has forged closer ties with other 

militant groups in the region—for example Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the 

Haqqani Network providing the group with additional capabilities to draw on. 

While Pakistan is making some progress on the counterterrorism front, specifically against TTP, the challenge remains to make these gains durable and sustainable. To this end, Pakistan must sustain its efforts to deny AQ safe haven in the 

tribal areas of western Pakistan. And we must continue to press Pakistan for increased action against Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and terrorist groups that undermine the 

security of Pakistan, the region, and beyond. Secretary Clinton just concluded a trip 

to Islamabad and discussed in great detail our cooperation with Pakistan to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat AQ, and to drive them from Pakistan and the region. We will 

do our part and we look to the Government of Pakistan to take decisive steps in 

the days ahead. Joint action against AQ and its affiliates will make Pakistan, America, and the world safer and more secure. 

Yemen 

While the AQ core has weakened operationally, the affiliates have become stronger. Consequently, the broader AQ threat has become more geographically diversified. At the top of the affiliates list is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in 

Yemen. It continues to demonstrate its growing ambitions and strong desire to carry 

out attacks outside of its region. AQAP is the first of the AQ affiliates to make attacks against the United States homeland a central goal. As you know, the group 

made its debut in this regard with its December 25, 2009 attempt to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit. Then, in October 2010 it sought to blow up several U.S.- 

bound airplanes by shipping bombs that were intended to detonate while in the 

planes’ cargo holds. As those efforts and AQAP’s failed attempt in August 2009 on 
29 

1This includes funding from bilateral programs funded by DA, ESF, and GHCS accounts, 

funding from regional and global programs/accounts that were attributed to/spent in Yemen 

(CCF, TI, MEPI, and DCHA funds), and Sec. 1207 transfer authority funds from DoD. 

the life of Saudi Arabia’s Assistant deputy interior for security affairs minister demonstrated, the group is trying to evade existing detection capabilities. 

Obviously, we are talking here about a country in the middle of a political crisis, 

that we see in the headlines every day. But to put things in perspective, let me back 

up a bit. The gravity of the AQAP threat was clear to the Obama administration 

from Day 1, and we’ve been focused on Yemen since the outset. In the spring of 

2009, the administration initiated a full-scale review of Yemen policy that led to a 

whole-of-government approach to Yemen. As part of that approach, we strengthened 

our engagement with the Yemeni government on counterterrorism. We also increased our efforts to coordinate with other international actors. Our strategy seeks 

to deal with imminent and developing threats at the same time that it addresses 

the root causes of instability in Yemen to improve governance. Central to this is 

building the capacity of Yemen’s government to be responsive to the Yemeni people, 

delivering the security and services they require. 

Given that Yemen’s political, economic, security, and governance challenges are 

interrelated and mutually reinforcing, U.S. policy must be holistic and flexible to be 

effective in both the short- and long-term. U.S. strategy in Yemen is two-pronged: 

No. 1, strengthen the Government of Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists within its borders, and, No. 2, mitigate 

Yemen’s economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of services, and transparency. 

To help meet immediate security concerns, we have provided training and equipment to particular units of the Yemeni security forces. In coordination with our security efforts, the USG has also increased development assistance to Yemen significantly. Development and stabilization assistance for Yemen went from roughly $9 

million in fiscal year 2008 to $75 million in fiscal year 2010.1

While we are in a period of uncertainty, I’d stress that our shared interest with 

the Yemeni government in fighting terrorism, particularly defeating AQAP, does not 

rely solely on one individual; we are hopeful that any future Yemeni leaders will 

be solid counterterrorism partners. 

The Trans-Sahara 

Before I talk about Somalia, I’d like to talk about West Africa, where no group 

has made a bigger name for itself in the kidnapping-for-ransom business than alQaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM has raised tens of millions of 

Euros in the past several years through kidnap-for-ransom operations. We believe 

much of this ransom money goes to logistically sustain the organization but there 

is plenty as well to build truck bombs, which have been used in Mauritania and 

Niger with limited success. AQIM has attacked and ambushed military forces in 

Mauritania and Algeria recently as well as others in Niger and Mali; the group is 

also working to increase its operational reach in West Africa. 

A moment ago I mentioned the importance of operating in a regional context in 

our efforts to counter terrorist safe havens. The United States created a regional 

partnership in North and West Africa, the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in 2005 with the following strategic goals: To build military and law enforcement capacity; foster regional cooperation; and counter violent extremism. We want 

the region to lead counterterrorism efforts, rather than have those efforts be led by 

a group of Western allies. TSCTP is working to enhance a range of military and 

civilian capabilities in the Sahel and Maghreb. It is also facilitating cooperation between Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso and our 

TSCTP partners in the Maghreb—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. 

We believe this program is beginning to pay off with partners taking a greaterthan-ever role in counterterrorism operations in the region. We have also seen positive signs of greater regional cooperation among these countries, particularly between Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali. Moreover, select Allies, such as Canada and 

France, have also joined to bolster TSCTP efforts with their own programs that complement our own. 

Given all that is going on in Maghreb, successful democratic transitions in Tunisia and Libya will be the best bar to inroads by violent extremists in both countries 

and in North Africa more broadly. In the short term, however, the instability in 

Libya and the transition in Tunisia may provide AQIM with new openings, and we 

must continue to adjust our strategy in response to evolving conditions, work with 

our partners in the region to preserve the gains we’ve made through TSCTP and 
30 

bilaterally, and ensure that we remain on track to achieve our goal of containing 

and marginalizing AQIM. 

Somalia 

The chronic instability in Somalia and the fragile hold on power that the Somalia 

Transitional Federal Government exert, combined with a protracted state of violent 

insecurity, long unguarded coasts, and porous borders, have made Somalia an appealing location for exploitation by terrorists, criminals, and other nefarious actors. 

The terrorist and insurgent group al-Shabaab and other anti-TFG clan-based militias exercise control over strategic locations in south and central Somalia. AlShabaab is composed of a range of groups with varying motivations and interests. 

Some of al-Shabaab’s senior leaders have links to al-Qaeda and are interested in 

waging a global struggle, while other members have a purely Somali agenda or simply are in it for the money. Al-Shabaab’s widening scope of operations makes it a 

continuing threat to East Africa and U.S. interests in the region. Last July, we saw 

it conduct its first major attack outside of Somalia when it claimed responsibility 

for twin suicide bombings at the time of the soccer World Cup that killed 76 people 

in Kampala, Uganda. In addition, al-Shabaab has a cadre of Westerners, including 

fighters of ethnic Somali descent drawn from the global Somali diaspora and American converts, which make it a particular concern. 

The United States continues to pursue a dual track approach to create stability 

in Somalia. On track No. 1, we support the Djibouti Peace Process, while continuing 

to encourage the TFG to reach out to moderates that support peace and stability 

in Somalia. On track No. 2, we are broadening our outreach to include greater engagement with Somaliland, Puntland, and regional and local anti-al-Shabaab actors 

and groups throughout south-central Somalia in order to broaden security and stabilization efforts throughout the country. We are also reaching out to diaspora communities and civil society to foster dialogue and peaceful reconciliation. 

Additionally, the United States actively supports the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. The recent offensive by the combined AMISOM and TFG forces 

has shown some promise in fighting al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. Outside of 

Mogadishu, Ethiopia- and Kenya-supported militia in the western regions of south 

central Somalia are having some success in reducing al-Shabaab’s territorial control. 

However, a great deal more work remains to be done to translate the success of the 

offensives into political gains through the consolidation of political control in these 

newly liberated areas. 

We are also engaging with regional partners to build and sustain their counterterrorism capabilities to address the threats emanating from Somalia. The Partnership 

for Regional East African Counterterrorism is the USG’s program for long-term engagement and counterterrorism capacity-building in East Africa not only in Somalia, 

but also its neighbors to shrink terrorists’ ability to transit the region. PREACT has 

an expanded set of strategic objectives and program indicators to more effectively 

systematize and streamline interagency contributors and resources to support the 

program’s counterterrorism capacity-building objectives in East Africa. 

HOW WE ARE ADDRESSING TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

To begin with, we are working with our various interagency partners, such as 

Homeland Security, USAID, the military, and the intelligence community to keep 

Americans safe and our interests secure. With this whole-of-government approach, 

we are comprehensively strengthening our partnerships around the world by ensuring that all U.S. Government assistance providers are working from the same playbook, making sure that our assistance is more balanced to improve both immediate 

security and long-term governance and rule of law. Helping our partners more effectively confront the threat within their borders is both good counterterrorism and 

good statecraft. 

What we are doing in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere is balancing military programs with robust civilian efforts that include rule of law, political and fiscal reforms; better governance through competent institutions, reduced corruption and 

civil service reform; economic diversification to generate employment and enhance 

livelihoods, and strengthened natural resource management. I’d like to note that 

many USG programs and activities simultaneously contribute to various foreign policy goals. Governance and economic reform are not specifically designed to counter 

terrorist safe havens but indirectly serve that function and should be considered an 

essential part of the assistance package we provide for a truly whole-of-Government 

approach to shrink terrorists’ operating spaces. 

Since coming into office, the administration has been emphasizing a more strategic approach to counterterrorism. The United States has made great strides in tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the street, disrupting cells, 
31 

and thwarting conspiracies. But at the strategic level, we continue to see a strong 

flow of new recruits into many of the most dangerous terrorist organizations. Addressing the factors that drive radicalization—a mixture of local grievances and the 

global terrorist narrative—is necessary to further diminish terrorist safe havens. 

One emphasis of strategic counterterrorism is building our foreign partners’ capacity. The heart of these efforts is to improve the rule of law and governance. Ultimately, counterterrorism and rule of law goals are closely aligned and reinforce one 

another. We are working to make the counterterrorism training of police, prosecutors, border officials, and members of the judiciary more systematic, more innovative, and more far-reaching. We are addressing the state weaknesses that terrorism 

thrives on—helping our partners to more effectively counter the threat that they 

and we both face. 

One of our most effective capacity building programs is the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the primary provider of U.S. Government antiterrorism training and 

equipment to law enforcement agencies of partner nations. Last year, in fiscal year 

2010, $215 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs funds supported approximately 350 ATA courses, workshops, and technical 

consultations that trained almost 7,000 participants from 64 countries. In fiscal year 

2010, the ATA Program also completed 23 capabilities assessments and program review visits. These on-site assessments looked at critical counterterrorism capabilities and served as a basis for Country Assistance Plans and the evaluation of subsequent progress. 

The ATA program is most effective where countries have a combination of political will and basic law enforcement skills to be most receptive to the advanced training ATA provides. This relatively successful formula has been especially evident in 

Indonesia, Colombia, Turkey, and parts of North Africa. Through an emphasis on 

train-the-trainer courses, we are working with partner nations toward the goal of 

institutionalization and self-sustainment of capacities. We also are moving toward 

giving advising and mentoring an importance similar to training and equipping. Finally, we ensure that our programs are based on long-term strategic country and 

regional plans, integrated with other providers of security sector assistance at the 

State Department and in the interagency. 

In Colombia, ATA training of civilian and police law enforcement has paid particular dividends, as Colombia now uses the lessons learned to help train more than 

20 countries, 11 of those in the Western Hemisphere. USAID has supported efforts 

enabling Colombia to establish an effective reconciliation and transition program for 

those willing to lay down their arms. These efforts along with the Colombian military’s success in identifying the location of terrorist safe havens—which we have assisted—has resulted in significant progress in reducing the FARC’s operating space 

in Colombia. 

All of this work goes on in the context of vigorous diplomatic and multilateral engagement. While we work in regional fora, I’d also point to our bilateral engagement, which remains important. We have formal bilateral counterterrorism consultations with numerous countries. Among them are Australia, Canada, China, 

Israel, Egypt, Japan, Pakistan, Algeria, Russia, and India; these consultations have 

strengthened our counterterrorism partnerships so we can complement one another’s efforts in pursuit of a comprehensive approach to our common challenges. 

Before closing, I want to mention one other area of activity where we are innovating—namely in our program to counter violent extremism, a key part of our strategic counterterrorism work. Compared to capacity-building work, which has been 

going on for many years, this activity has a new focus. CVE focuses on three main 

lines of effort that will reduce terrorist recruitment: delegitimizing the violent extremist narrative in order to diminish its ‘‘pull’’; developing positive alternatives for 

youth vulnerable to radicalization to diminish the ‘‘push’’ effect of grievances and 

unmet expectations; and building partner capacity to carry out these activities. We 

are working with the interagency to develop programs that address the upstream 

factors of radicalization in communities particularly susceptible to terrorist recruitment overseas. Efforts include providing alternatives for at-risk youth, encouraging 

the use of social media to generate local initiatives, and enhancing the resilience of 

communities against extremism. 

Research has shown that radicalization occurs primarily at the local level. To be 

effective, CVE work needs to be driven by local needs, informed by local knowledge, 

and responsive to the immediate concerns of the community. Furthermore, programs 

owned and implemented by local civil society of government partners have a better 

chance succeeding and enduring. These initiatives can enable communities to address recruitment and radicalization, and can help deny terrorists avenues to create 

ideological safe haven in such communities. 
32 

In conclusion, the threat is formidable but we are making progress. I firmly believe that countering violent extremism, multilateral engagement, and building local 

capacity—through our various programs and with our Department and interagency 

partners—provide us with the tools to make lasting progress in our fight against 

terrorism. Al-Qaeda is having a tougher time now more than ever, although AQ and 

its affiliates are still extremely dangerous and capable of attacking the United State 

and our allies. In the race to protect the United States and to stay ‘‘one step ahead’’ 

we should ensure that the tools of civilian power continue to serve National Security 

interests. This is an enduring challenge. Staying sharp, improving our offense, 

strengthening our defense, and maintaining our intellectual edge—these are all essential. I believe that we are on the right track. Thank you again for providing the 

opportunity to testify. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Roberts for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES Q. ROBERTS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR 

FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM, 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. ROBERTS. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today and share with you the 

Department of Defense’s efforts to address under- or ungoverned 

territories to preclude their use by terrorists in safe havens. 

DOD recognizes that such efforts require close interagency coordination, in fact, cooperation, as is reflected by our panel here 

this morning. Eliminating terrorist safe havens is a core element 

of the Defense Department’s counterterrorism efforts. 

As Secretary Gates has written and said on numerous occasions, 

in the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United 

States’ safety and security are likely to emanate from states that 

cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territories, not from strong states or pure competitors. Dealing with 

these fractured and failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. 

Your focus today on Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia highlights 

the many and diverse challenges such states can present. Today’s 

strategic calculus demands that the U.S. Government focus on 

building partner capacity, helping other countries develop the tools 

for their security and governance to defend themselves and to defend us by extension. We do this by providing them with education, 

equipment, training, and other forms of security assistance. 

America’s efforts to build the capacity of our partners will always 

be defined by support for healthy civil-military relations, respect 

for human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of international 

humanitarian law, and the professionalization of partner military 

forces. 

Finally, as a long-standing member of the Special Operations 

family, I would like to take a moment to congratulate the special 

operators who killed Osama bin Laden early last month. Even as 

we work to eliminate terrorist safe havens, we remain grateful for 

the risks our Armed Forces take in directly eliminating threats 

when necessary. 
33 

The Department is also grateful for the outstanding support you 

in the Congress provide to our Nation’s military forces in general 

and, in my case, to our Special Operations Forces in particular. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. I ask that 

the written statement that I provided be entered in its entirety in 

the record. I will be pleased to respond to any questions. Thank 

you. 

[The statement of Mr. Roberts follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES Q. ROBERTS

JUNE 3, 2011 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify today and for the opportunity to share with you 

the Department of Defense’s efforts to decrease under- or un-governed territories, 

thereby striving to preclude their use by terrorists as safe havens. 

Eliminating terrorist safe havens is a core element of the Department’s counterterrorism efforts. As the Secretary of Defense has written and said on numerous occasions, in the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety 

and security are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with these fractured or failing states 

is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. Your focus today on Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia highlights the challenges such states can present. 

What has been called the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and 

those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the longterm effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the 

United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the 

military refers to as kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed 

at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists 

recruit. In short, we recognize that the elimination of safe havens is a prerequisite 

to winning the current conflict and inherently requires an interagency, whole-of-government approach. To that end, Secretary Gates has repeatedly called for increased 

resources for the Department of State to enable the important work our friends 

across the river do in advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy, foreign assistance, and development. 

The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing states. Terrorist networks can 

find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation, and recruits within the chaos 

of social breakdown. The most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland are 

more likely to emanate from these zones of instability than from aggressor states. 

This strategic calculus demands that the U.S. Government focus on building partner capacity: Helping other countries develop the tools for their security and governance, to defend themselves and us by extension. We do this by providing them with 

equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance. Where possible, U.S. 

strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity 

of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems 

from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct U.S. military 

intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and 

partners may be as important as our own, and building their capacity is arguably 

as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself. 

Given these realities, the Department of Defense has sought to enhance the tools 

at its disposal for dealing with the threats from terrorist groups that currently exploit opportunities provided by weak, fractured, or failing states. Notably, new train 

and equip programs allow for quicker improvements in the security capacity of partner nations. Training and education programs allow us to make contact with, and 

enhance the capabilities of, counterterrorism professionals in key states. 

We refer to these training, equipping, advising, and assisting activities collectively 

as security force assistance (SFA). SFA supports the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces 

and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional 

security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations and 

spectrum of conflict as well as during all phases of military operations. These efforts 

shall be conducted with, through, and by foreign security forces. 
34 

SFA activities are conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against 

internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the Department of Defense 

may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external 

threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country’s security forces or supporting institutions. The objective of all SFA 

activities is to directly increase the capacity or capability of a foreign security force 

or their supporting institutions. 

This indirect approach, working by, through, and with our partners also reduces 

the risk to—and burdens on—U.S. military personnel. We train partners so that 

they—not U.S. forces—can patrol their waterways and territories, take on terrorists, 

or undertake stability operations. More capable partners in these missions will lessen the pressure on U.S. forces. By engaging early in building a Nation’s capacity 

we may be able to avoid committing troops in the future. We are better off helping 

our partners handle their own security than ‘‘calling in the Marines’’ when a longsimmering problem ultimately blossoms into conflict. Furthermore, when a partner 

executes an operation it confirms its sovereignty—when we conduct an operation on 

their behalf, our mutual enemies will claim that partner has ceded its sovereignty 

to the United States. 

DOD ACTIVITIES TO DENY SAFE HAVENS

A subset of the Department of Defense’s capacity-building activities are directly 

focused on combating terrorist safe havens around the world in places such as 

Yemen and the Philippines. Two primary tools in this regard are our Global Train 

and Equip authority (otherwise known as ‘‘Section 1206’’) and the Combating Terrorism (CbT) Fellowship Program. Section 1206 is one of our most important tools 

in the counterterrorism fight. This authority gives the Department the ability—with 

the concurrence of the Secretary of State—to quickly respond to build our partners’ 

capabilities to confront urgent and emerging terrorism threats and support those 

fighting alongside us in Coalition operations. Using Section 1206 authority, the Department can provide training, equipment, and supplies to partner nation military 

counterterrorism forces. Both of these programs adhere to the requirements to accomplish ‘‘Leahy vetting’’ for human rights in accordance with relevant statutes on 

security assistance and related activities. 

The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was established to meet 

emergent defense requirements to build partnerships and partner knowledge about 

the struggle against terror. The program provides targeted, non-lethal, CbT education and training. CTFP directly supports DoD efforts by providing CbT education 

and training for mid- to senior-level international military officers, ministry of defense civilians and security officials. Education and training is a mixture of existing, 

traditional classroom and mobile programs, and innovative activities designed to 

strengthen individual, country, and regional combating terrorism capabilities and 

capacities. CTFP provides education and training at U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or as part of other education and 

training programs. 

I should note that this indirect approach is not without challenges. We focus our 

efforts and resources on places where the terrorist threat profile is high and partner 

nation capability—for whatever reason—is insufficient to meet that threat. Of 

course, the political will of the partner nation is also a crucial determinant. In this 

complex environment, our ability to conduct and sustain effective capacity-building 

programs can be challenged by many factors, including political instability and competing security concerns in the host nation. For example, in addition to terrorism, 

Yemeni forces have historically dealt with the Huthi rebellion in the north and the 

secessionist movement in the south. Although the Yemenis clearly recognize the 

threat AQAP poses to their internal security, CT is but one of several security concerns. Even in cases where instability or other security concerns do not distract our 

partners, factors such as education levels, literacy rates, technological know-how, or 

appreciation of the value of maintenance can make absorption and sustainment of 

both the equipment and the training problematic. 

We recognize the need to assess our building partner capacity efforts across the 

board, to include those targeted at eliminating terrorist safe havens. For example, 

DoD is initiating a more formal assessment effort to better evaluate Section 1206 

train and equip programs. This effort will be built on information collected in the 

program proposal process, which includes baseline information, expected program 

milestones, and quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure the program’s effectiveness. We are designing a system with the intent of measuring outcomes, not just 

outputs. 
35 

I’ll outline below how we use both Section 1206 and CTFP along with other authorities to build the capacity of our partners to counter terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines, by way of example. 

In Pakistan 

The core objective of the United States in Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and 

defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and to prevent their use of safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To this end, our ‘‘train and equip’’ programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces are central to pursuing our near-term objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuary and disrupting and defeating the al-Qaeda 

network. 

The Department of Defense’s train and equip programs in Pakistan have helped 

the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces address terrorist threats in 

ungoverned spaces along its borders and particularly in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Area (FATA). Section 1206 programs for the Pakistan Army Aviation helped 

improve its airlift capability to support counterterrorism operations in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan against enemies common to both Pakistan 

and the United States. 

We also provided training and equipment to the Pakistan forces to help improve 

maritime counterterrorism capabilities and counterterrorism efforts focused on the 

western border area and coast. More recently, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Fund has focused training and equipping programs on building Pakistan’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4/ISR) capability and its ability to conduct intelligence-driven operations; expanding its air-mobility capacity; and improving close air support capabilities, night operations, and its counter-improvised explosive device (C–IED) capability. 

The Department has also used CTFP in Pakistan to fund confidence-building seminars with Afghanistan on border issues with the aim of preventing al-Qaeda from 

establishing safe havens. Since 2009, CTFP has funded a 4-day Bilateral Seminar 

that has engaged senior-level Pakistani officials focusing on the benefits of a wholeof-government approach to denying al-Qaeda safe havens, controlling the volatile 

border with Afghanistan and strengthening civil-military relations in a larger national security strategy. In 2010, the CTFP funded 10 Pakistani Members of Parliament to spend 3 days in Washington to meet with representatives from the Departments of Defense, State, Transportation, and Justice. The goal was to strengthen their understanding and ability to provide good governance in Pakistan. In 2011, 

CTFP funded a Pakistani Brigadier General to serve as a visiting professor and fellow at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National Defense 

University. He will provide first-hand knowledge of dealing with a terrorist organization embedded in a society as well as lessons learned from Pakistani efforts to 

execute counterterrorism operations. 

We find ourselves at a critical juncture in our relationship with Pakistan. Despite 

inevitable setbacks, our train-and-equip efforts paired with persistent diplomatic engagement have tangibly enhanced the Pakistani military’s efforts against militants. 

The operations conducted by their forces today would have been unthinkable 2 years 

ago. Because of our enduring interests, and the fragile nature of the gains made by 

the Pakistani military, we must continue to assist Pakistan in dismantling militant 

safe havens and extending the reach of its government into the remote tribal areas 

of Pakistan. 

U.S. personnel have worked with select Pakistani military units to provide them 

with an enhanced understanding of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fundamentals, inherent in which is the significance of adopting a population-centric approach designed to turn the populace away from supporting terrorists and thus, 

deny them established or prospective safe haven. However, counterinsurgency is a 

methodical process, and if the Pakistani government continues to lack adequate capacity to conduct all facets—clear, hold, and build—of COIN operations, it will be 

less able to transition to the follow-on phases. Our efforts have bolstered Pakistani 

capabilities and capacity, but much more remains to be done. 

In Yemen 

In fiscal year 2011 our Combating Terrorism Fellowship Fund supported seminars 

and workshops in Sana’a, Yemen. Seminar speakers included Yemen’s Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Defense Staff, a representative 

from the President’s Office, the Director for the National Security Bureau (the Yemeni security, intelligence, and counterterrorism service), the U.S. Ambassador to 

Yemen, and U.S. Congresswoman McCollum. The events focused on the benefits of 

a whole-of-government approach to national security strategy. Attendees included 
36 

650 Yemeni military and civilian officials to include: Members of the Council of Ministers, Al-Shura Council (U.S. Senate equivalent), House of Representatives, members of civil society, Embassy representatives and students from the host High Military Academy, and Yemeni CTFP alumni. The program specifically discussed alQaeda safe havens in the south, the spread of al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology and influence, and how to counter it. 

Our Section 1206 train-and-equip programs in Yemen have focused on improving 

the Yemenis’ ability to control its own territory and territorial waters to combat terrorists currently exploiting ungoverned and under-governed spaces. Programs have 

focused on improving border security and increasing mobility, and have provided 

equipment to the Yemeni Special Operations Forces, Air Force, Border Security 

Force, and Coast Guard to help them deter, detect, and detain terrorists along land 

borders, and at sea, though the security environment has been challenging of late. 

The programs in fiscal year 2010 centered on improving the operational reach and 

reaction time of counterterrorism forces so that they could confront terrorists in previously unreachable areas. 

In Somalia 

Because Somalia lacks an internationally-recognized permanent government, 

many of our capacity-building programs are limited in their ability to address safe 

haven there. As such Somalia has not directly benefited from either Section 1206 

funding or CTFP funding. However, we are working closely with the Department 

of State to enhance the capabilities of the multinational African Union Mission in 

Somalia (AMISOM) forces and the National Security Force of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). These forces are currently operating in Somalia to stabilize 

the security situation and create a safe and secure environment in support of the 

Djibouti Peace Process and in which the TFG can function in the midst of current 

threats. 

Further, Somalia’s lack of governance and sparse population make it appealing 

as a potential safe haven for al-Qaeda. The U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization al-Shabaab currently operates freely throughout much of south/central Somalia. While al-Shabaab is not a monolithic structure, its leadership has strong and 

increasing connections to al-Qaeda. As al-Qaeda undergoes changes in its central 

leadership and regroups from counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, we need to 

ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia. 

It is critical that we view Somalia from a regional Horn of Africa perspective, not 

least because so many of the USG’s traditional security cooperation tools are restricted from being used in Somalia. The Department of Defense is reviewing the 

status of its Joint Task Forces to determine if any should be considered for transition to a more permanent status, such as Joint Interagency Task Force. This review 

includes the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) based at 

Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, whose mission is to build partner nation capacity in 

order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. 

interests. 

U.S. Africa Command is concurrently undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military efforts in the region can be most efficiently applied to 

work in concert with those of our interagency partners to achieve our collective regional goals. This review of our East Africa strategy will also inform the Department’s recommendations on basing and funding for CJTF–HOA and Camp 

Lemonnier. Our ultimate goal is a fully integrated DoD strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners, 

and counterterrorism actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and 

stability that is in the interests of the United States, our regional partners, and the 

appropriate international organizations. 

In the Philippines 

I will include some comments about DoD’s capacity-building programs in the Philippines, as they have enjoyed a degree of quiet success in helping the central government in its efforts to expand governance. Our education, equipping, and training 

programs there have helped deny safe haven to a variety of malign actors. Some 

examples follow. 

The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program has funded Philippine counterterrorism professionals to attend the Master’s degree-granting program at both the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs and the Naval 

Postgraduate School’s College of International Security Affairs. Both degree programs address strategic security to include courses on countering the ideological 

support for terrorism and countering violent extremism. Senior level CTFP-funded 

Filipino leadership have led efforts mainly in the south against groups such as the 
37 

Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Moro National Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf, Rajah 

Sulaiman Movement, and Jemaah Islamiyah. 

Section 1206 train-and-equip programs in the Philippines have focused on increasing maritime border security and decreasing land and maritime ungoverned spaces. 

Although still in the stages of development, United States Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) believes 1206 programs will be one of the highlights of the command’s 

bilateral counterterrorism effort. These efforts have expanded and broadened into 

a growing maritime domain awareness network with links to command-and-control 

centers in Manila that are capable of guiding air- and sea-borne interdiction assets. 

Importantly, we also have provided maritime domain awareness assets to the 

Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in an effort to build regional capacity to monitor waters that have historically been areas of ‘‘safe transit’’ for terrorist and criminal elements alike. Section 1206 programs have also supported the development of 

naval special operations forces and key air units who engage day to day with the 

most acute terrorist threats in previously unreachable areas. 

Civil Military Operations.—Since 2002, Joint Special Operations Task Force— 

Philippines (JSOTF–P) has engaged the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in a Foreign Internal Defense mission with one of its primary objectives 

being to neutralize the safe haven that Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago afford to Jemaah Islamiyah, the Abu Sayaaf Group, and potentially to other 

regional and transnational terrorist groups. As part of this mission, the JSOTF’s advisers have continued to mentor their Philippine counterparts in the utility and 

planning of targeted Civil Military Operations (CMO) as part of a larger counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy, and have worked shoulder-to-shoulder 

with them in the execution of these activities. 

Over the 2010 calendar year, U.S. and Filipino civilian and uniform personnel 

have worked together to plan and execute over $5.2 million in CMO activities, 

amounting to 44 civic action projects, 38 km of road construction, over 19,000 medical treatments, and close to 6,000 veterinary services performed. All of this has 

been part of the larger U.S. effort to assist the Government of the Philippines in 

establishing a stable environment in the Southern Philippines, garnering local popular support, and increasing the legitimacy and governance of the Government of 

the Philippines in these remote areas. The goal, of course, is to separate terrorist 

group members from their local support base and deny access to this prospective 

safe haven. 

BUILDING DOD’S SFA TOOLKIT FOR THE FUTURE

Recognizing the important role that assisting our partners plays in furthering our 

U.S. National security, and the enduring nature of this requirement, the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review laid out a series of initiatives to support this mission 

area. Key themes were: 

Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force 

assistance.—Conducting missions to train, advise, and assist partner forces has long 

been the domain of U.S. Special Operations Forces. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the irregular nature of today’s conflict, have taught us that we need 

all our forces to have these skill sets. 

Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability.—Operating in partnership with 

host-nation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign 

language skills and regional and cultural knowledge. 

Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces.—Providing training to partner aviation forces is an area that QDR analysis suggests will 

continue to grow. 

Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training.—The Department recognizes 

that in order to ensure that enhancements developed among security forces are sustained, the supporting institutions in partner nations must also function effectively. 

Create mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel.—We are 

exploring and beginning to implement options for expediting the acquisition and 

transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces. 

Strengthen the capacities for training regional and international security organizations.—The Department will improve its capacity for enabling the United Nations 

and other multinational peacekeeping efforts. 

CONCLUSION

Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and 

under-governed areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train 

fighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied interests. Where appropriate, 

U.S. forces will work with the military forces of partner nations to strengthen their 
38 

capacity and capabilities for internal security. We will coordinate those activities 

with those of other U.S. Government agencies as they work to strengthen civilian 

capacities, thus denying terrorists the time, space, and resources they require. For 

reasons of political legitimacy, as well as sheer economic necessity, there is no substitute for professional, motivated, local security forces protecting populations 

threatened by terrorists operating in their midst. 

Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale military campaigns. We have seen this 

approach work in the Philippines where, over the past 8 years, U.S. forces and their 

Philippine counterparts have trained together and worked to understand the organization and modus operandi of the adversary. As their equipment and skills have improved, Philippine forces have patrolled more widely and more frequently, bringing 

security to previously contested areas. 

As we place greater emphasis on building the capacity of our partners, our efforts 

will continue to be informed by our long-term determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is manifested in human rights vetting and other controls 

that shape our efforts to educate, train, equip, advise, and assist foreign forces and 

partner security institutions. America’s efforts to build the capacity of our partners 

will always be defined by support for healthy civil-military relations, respect for 

human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of international humanitarian law, 

and the professionalization of partner military forces. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Roberts. Let me, too, associate myself with your remarks regarding the Navy SEAL operation to kill 

bin Laden. No one will ever know the names or the faces, but they 

are truly the unsung heroes. 

In addition, I would like to also commend and recognize the intelligence community and the analysts who were able to track 

down the information that led us to bin Laden. They, too—we will 

never know their names or faces—the public, at least—but they deserve our congratulations as well. 

With that, Ms. Williams-Bridgers, the GAO came out with your 

report, and I want to go through some of the conclusions with you 

and assess how that impacts our ability to go after these terrorists 

in the safe havens. 

But essentially, as I understand it, your report concludes that 

the State Department did not fully comply with the level of detail 

required by two laws, two statutes, one being the National Defense 

Authorization Act and the second one being the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act. These Acts require the President to 

submit to the Congress a report on the strategy and activities of 

the U.S. Government to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. Can you 

tell me or tell this committee how these reports were deficient and 

what impact that will have on our ability to hunt down the terrorists in the safe havens? 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 

question. I would be glad to respond. 

With regard to the report that was mandated by the National 

Defense Authorization Act, that required the President to complete 

an overall assessment of U.S. Government-wide efforts to address 

terrorist safe havens. That report has not yet been completed. We 

understand the responsibility has been delegated to the National 

Security Council. 

In our conversations during the course of our review, the National Security Council says they are in the process of developing 

that report, so we are looking forward to receiving it and having 

an examination of it. We think it is critically important for there 

to be a high-level National statement of the priorities, the goals, 

the objectives; and, hopefully, we will see the level of detail in that 
39 

assessment that will afford the Congress the opportunity to measure over time progress being made. 

With regard to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention 

Act, it specifically mandated that State Department produce reports on an annual basis that rendered country by country assessments, those countries that had been identified as terrorist safe havens, and then to assess these countries in terms of the actions the 

countries have taken to prevent terrorism, actions that the countries have demonstrated as being cooperative with the United 

States, and to explain the level of knowledge that exists within 

these governments about terrorist activity or the presence of safe 

havens in their countries. 

The one provision that Congress recommended that we did not 

see in any of the country reports related to the provision that 

would require State Department to report on actions taken by 

countries to prevent the proliferation and trafficking of weapons of 

mass destruction. This was absent in every single country report. 

To State’s credit, during the course of our review they acknowledged that that provision had not been adequately responded to 

and they intended to incorporate in their next report, which we expect to be issued some time this year. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. So, in other words, your testimony indicates, 

and your report you issued, that these reports are incomplete—— 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. Are not in compliance with the requirements under these two statutes. 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

In addition, sir, I would also add that in the assessment what we 

expected to see—and not what I believe Congress expected to see 

in its articulation of its need to have a full assessment of information on which it could provide adequate oversight—we expected to 

see a listing of all activities undertaken by the whole of the U.S. 

Government, all agencies that have a presence and contribute in a 

relevant and significant way toward the detection and elimination 

of terrorist safe havens. That assessment was complete. That listing of all other agency activities and programs was not clear and 

it was not complete. 

In the course of our own review, we identified at least 13 programs that are funded by State Department that we consider to be 

most relevant, programs that speak to governance, capacity-building, security, economic development activities, this whole-of-government approach that was articulated in the most recent National 

strategic statement. 

We also did not see the listing of other agencies, not all other 

agencies’ programs and activities, such as DHS. As I mentioned in 

my opening statement, activities that DHS advances with regard to 

cash smuggling that leads to money laundering that leads to financing of terrorist groups and operations, that, too, was not included in the State country reports. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So there’s a lack of reporting by the National Security Council—which they assured you that they will be coming out 

with a report soon? 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. Yes. 
40 

Mr. MCCAUL. But, coupled with the deficiencies in this report by 

both DHS and the State Department, it is not allowing Congress 

to do its oversight responsibility; is that correct? 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. I believe it does not provide Congress 

with sufficient detail and explanation and evaluation that allows 

you to measure over time what progress has been made. 

For example, the removal of Indonesia from the country reports. 

It took some digging for our team to look over time to see what 

countries were in, what countries were out. There is no explicit 

statement in any—the most current country report that a country 

had been removed or the Afghan-Pakistan border area had been removed. That took some concerted effort and examining and data 

mining, if you will, of each of the country reports over time. That 

kind of information needs to be provided in order to give you a 

sense of progress or lack thereof. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So, as I understand it, there are no metrics reported. Is that correct? 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. That is correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So this committee, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, the Intelligence Committee cannot adequately perform its job 

without this information. 

Ms. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS. It cannot adequately perform the job 

without this information. This information is not currently available in open sources. However, it may be available in classified environment, and it might be most appropriate in a classified reporting environment. 

The Congress did allow State Department to provide it that type 

of more sensitive information in a classified report. State Department has chosen not to issue that type of report. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would like to give, obviously, the State Department, Ms. Villarosa and Mr. Koumans, would like to give you the 

opportunity to respond to the allegations in this report. We will 

start with Ms. Villarosa. 

Ms. VILLAROSA. Thank you, Chairman. 

Again, we took to heart, we have talked with the GAO about the 

deficiencies in our Country Reports of Terrorism and are in the 

process of finalizing the 2010 version to make them more comprehensive, as the GAO has recommended; and this will include 

specifically addressing efforts that are done with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

We are working with the Bureau of ISN, International Security 

and Nonproliferation Affairs, to provide that information so that it 

is as comprehensive as possible. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. I mean, tracking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction seems to be a pretty serious thing that we 

should be reporting. Why was that not included? 

Ms. VILLAROSA. Again, I know that this is—our Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation tracks this very closely, and 

I do not know in terms of what their reporting requirements are. 

But we understand that we need to include this information in the 

Country Reports of Terrorism and are in the process of doing so 

now. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I certainly hope so. I mean, that seems to be a 

major oversight in the reporting requirement that is by law. I think 
41 

it harms our ability in the Congress, as the Chairman of the Oversight Investigations Committee on Homeland Security, it does not 

allow us to do our job. So I would hope that this report would be 

updated as soon as possible. 

I want to commend the GAO for calling this to our attention. I 

don’t think many people knew about that, certainly, either on this 

committee or in the Congress as a whole, and I think that is a 

major gap in the reporting requirement. 

Mr. Koumans, do you have any comments? 

Mr. KOUMANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I come at this question from the point of view of having been a 

Foreign Service Officer, as you mentioned in your opening remarks, 

for 17 years before I came to Homeland Security and, perhaps similarly to Ms. Villarosa, was posted overseas during times when I 

had to write the first draft of the counterterrorism Country Reports 

that are then submitted back to Washington and further amplified 

by the Washington interagency community. I know that the State 

Department sends specific instructions with respect to legal 

changes that took place in the country at that time, significant 

prosecutions, et cetera. From our point of view, absolutely, if the 

training that ICE and CBP have done with respect to bulk cash 

smuggling, if that should be included, we report that through other 

channels, we are more than happy to include that, absolutely. 

Mr. MCCAUL. It is June 2011. This is a 2010 report. I would hope 

that both DHS and State can update this report so that the other 

branch of Government, that being the Congress, can do its job. 

So my time is way over expired. But I thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Clarke. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I would 

like to associate myself with your opening comments. 

As a New Yorker, we are indebted and indeed grateful to our 

armed services, our special forces and intelligence community for 

eliminating the threat that was Osama bin Laden; and I would like 

to just state that for the record. 

Let me ask the entire panel, although terrorist safe havens have 

been identified in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, they each are 

unique and present different challenges for U.S. officials. How do 

the three countries differ, especially as it relates to our counterterrorism strategy? How does the United States adapt to the differences? 

Ms. VILLAROSA. I guess I will start with that. 

Each of these are very unique countries. In the case of Somalia, 

there hasn’t been a functioning government for over 20 years. So 

we have a multi-pronged strategy in order to start building stability with the Transitional Federal Government forces. We are 

working with the African Union, who have provided troops to assist 

the TFG in providing security and stability in Mogadishu. We are 

also working with the nations that surround Somalia, because they 

are also very threatened by the threat that comes from Somalia. So 

we are helping strengthen their borders. 

We are also, because of the attraction of the turmoil in Somalia 

to members of the Somali diaspora in the West and in the United 

States and in Europe and in Australia, we are reaching out more 
42 

broadly to the Somali diaspora to educate them about the situation, 

hopefully prevent people from traveling to take part in the violence. 

But this will be a long-term effort. 

We are providing training for both the AMISOM forces as well 

as the TFG forces. We are getting ready to—we are also working 

with some of the other sort of islands of stability that we find in 

Somalia. But our goal is a peaceful, stable Somalia; and it will take 

a while. 

In Pakistan, again, you have an established government which 

has its challenges that we are trying to address. There are some 

severe economic challenges. There are a lot of local grievances. So 

we have tried to address those local grievances through a lot of our 

USAID programs. 

But, at the same time, we are trying to work—we have been 

working closely with Homeland Security in terms of building up 

border security and also preventing the movement of improvised 

explosive materials into Afghanistan where they are killing our 

troops. So we need to work on that. We need to work very much 

with the security forces. 

Pakistan has 147,000 troops in the border provinces that they 

have been working to eliminate the terrorist threat there, so we 

need to continue working with them through DOD to help build 

their ability to take action. Once they clear out these terrorists, 

then we want to help them hold that and start providing those 

basic services that the people have not—that have not been forthcoming in the past. 

In the case of Yemen, it is on the front page of the newspapers 

today. There is a very serious political dispute going on. But, at the 

same time, there is a very real terrorist threat in that country. Obviously, the political uncertainty right now makes it difficult for us 

to do very much. But we had been working to train the Yemeni security forces again to exercise more control. As I mentioned earlier, 

we had a lot of success in 2009 and 2010. 

We are also working through USAID to reach out and, again, assist in the provision of services and promote countering violent extremism to delegitimize the violence. We have been working with— 

there is a lot of European partners. The Saudis, the Gulf states are 

interested in working with us to delegitimize violence, prevent people from being recruited. 

So we do—again, we have multi-faceted approaches to take on 

the particular challenges of each one of these very complex countries. 

Ms. CLARKE. I want to thank you. 

My time has expired, and if time permits we will continue on 

that question. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you all for 

being here today and your testimony. 

To Ms. Villarosa in particular, I would like to state that since I 

have been—I am a freshman, and since I have been here, January 

5 I believe we were sworn in, I believe I have been to 5,417 dif-
43 

ferent events, one of which was at the State Department where the 

Secretary of State invited the freshman class over. I was just 

struck that night with the dedication of everyone over there. You 

go to these events. When you have been to 5,417 of them, it is kind 

of like, hi, how are you? Getting moved in? Is everything going 

okay in the District of Columbia for you? 

But at the Department of State everyone was excited about what 

they do. They were very engaging. People, some dating back to 

working in the Reagan administration, are over there. If you can 

just carry a message back to the Secretary and to your coworkers 

how much that I appreciated that and their dedication to what 

they do, I would appreciate it. 

Ms. VILLAROSA. I am glad to deliver that message. Thank you so 

much. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. That should be an easy one for you to carry 

back. 

Mr. Koumans, in your opinion, do you think that the Department 

of Homeland Security is doing all that it should to deny terrorists 

safe havens today? 

Mr. KOUMANS. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman. 

There is an enormous amount that can be done. I am satisfied 

with the amount of work that we are doing in partnership with the 

Departments of State and Defense. There is always more to do, and 

I think it becomes a question for leadership in partnership with 

Congress, in partnership with the Departments of State and Defense to determine where the priority should be, where to direct the 

resources and to remain nimble so always to be prepared to shift 

resources as circumstances warrant. 

Mr. LONG. In your testimony, you kind of reiterated or said, I 

guess, that you do work closely with the Departments of State and 

Defense. In your opinion, to what extent does the Department of 

State coordinate its efforts with DHS personnel overseas? 

Mr. KOUMANS. Mr. Congressman, I thank you for your comment, 

your question. 

I think we cooperate very closely. On the ground at the embassies overseas, typically DHS personnel, ICE, CBP, TSA, and others, 

are part of the ambassador’s country team and partner with the 

other members of the country team, with the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and others who are in the law enforcement and intelligence and security cooperation groups that get established at the post, coordinating with respect to assistance, with 

respect to visits, with respect to high-level engagement with the 

country leadership. It is an on-going effort and one that requires 

a lot of work there on the ground. 

We try to copy that cooperation and build on it here back in 

Washington, and I think the cooperation that we have is of extremely high level. 

Mr. LONG. Ms. Villarosa made mention a minute ago—and I am 

still on you, Mr. Koumans—made mention about Yemen. Can you 

tell us how many DHS personnel you have in Pakistan and Yemen 

and what their duties are? 

Mr. KOUMANS. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

We currently have three people in Pakistan, three ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, officers. We normally have two in 
44 

Yemen, also from ICE, but we currently have one there due to the 

security situation and the departure that was ordered. We are 

down to just one person there. 

To answer your question as to their responsibilities, they carry 

out the full range of ICE responsibilities with respect to countering 

smuggling and trafficking of contraband of every kind, partnership 

with local law enforcement in carrying out investigations that could 

have roots to other parts of the world where ICE is operating, and, 

of course, chiefly, of course, the United States, carrying out those 

investigations, partnering with the State Department with respect 

to travelers to the United States, carrying out joint investigations, 

and training and mentoring with local officials. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Ms. Villarosa, you didn’t think you would get 

off that easy, so I do have a question for you. 

It has been suggested that the Pakistan government has an increasingly questionable partnership between known terrorist organizations and the Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI, if you will. Do 

you think the United States should continue to involve Pakistan in 

anti-terror training programs and provide foreign aid? 

Ms. VILLAROSA. Mr. Congressman, thank you for that question. 

I very much believe that we should remain very closely engaged 

with Pakistan. If we are going to succeed in our ultimate goal of 

defeating al-Qaeda, we must work with Pakistan. The security assistance that we are providing is enabling them to take action 

against terrorists in Pakistan. 

We have our differences with the Pakistani government, and we 

reiterate them regularly. Secretary Clinton was just there last 

week and highlighted the many concerns that we have. The operation of terrorist groups represent not only a threat to us but to 

Pakistanis themselves, are very serious, and I think Secretary 

Clinton found that the Pakistani officials do want to continue to cooperate. 

We must find—we have to do it. It may be frustrating, but I 

think it is very important that we stay engaged over the long term. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. I know I am past my time, but if you will allow 

me, Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank DHS. 

Joplin, Missouri, is in my district, and we had a half-mile, threequarter mile by 11 miles wiped out by an F–5 last week. 

I got there at daylight the next morning. The White House liaison for FEMA, which is under DHS, called and said, we want you 

to know that we are coming, you will have everything you need, 

and also said we will have boots on the ground shortly. I said, no, 

you won’t. They are already there. They came about an hour ago 

and made introductions. Greg Fugate came in and Rich Serino 

came in, the director and the deputy director. 

So just everybody needs to keep Joplin in their prayers, and I 

very much appreciate the attitude. The President came in on Sunday, and I was thrilled with that, because he got to see it with his 

own eyes. 

So, anyway, if you can take the message to FEMA, we appreciate 

what they are doing. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Long. 

Just in conclusion, let me say that proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction has always been a central threat and issue for 
45 

the Congress. We are talking about Pakistan, going back to A.Q. 

Kahn who proliferated his nuclear capability to Syria, North Korea, 

Iran. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. So the idea that the report required by law under the National Defense Authorization Act and 

the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act would not 

include information about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to me is a woefully inadequate report. 

We are debating a Libya resolution today, and the issue is what 

weapons of mass destruction do they have, whether it be chemical 

weapons, 10,000 MANPADS. 

So I would ask that all three agencies represented here today, 

both DHS, Department of State, and Department of Defense, fully 

comply with the law here and update these reports in a more comprehensive way as soon as possible so that Congress can do its job 

for the American people. The ultimate job of this committee is to 

protect the American people, and without that information we can’t 

adequately do our jobs. So I would ask you go back to your bosses 

and tell them we need that information as soon as possible. 

With that, we will go ahead and dismiss this panel of witnesses. 

I want to thank you for your testimony and your expertise and ask 

that the second panel take their seats as well. 

Our next panel, Panel II, has three distinguished witnesses. 

First, Mr. Steve Coll, who is President and CEO of The New 

American Foundation. Previously, he spent 20 years as a senior 

editor and foreign correspondent at the Washington Post, serving 

as the paper’s managing editor from 1998 to 2004. He is the recipient of numerous professional awards, including two Pulitzer Prizes. 

On a sort of point of personal privilege, I recall reading your book 

Ghost Wars many years ago, which is, in my judgment, the definitive piece for the Afghan-Soviet and now the current situation we 

find ourselves in today with Afghanistan and Pakistan. It provides 

still I think the greatest insights into the threat that we face today. 

So thank you for your great contributions. 

Second, we have Professor Bruce Hoffman, who is currently a 

tenured professor at Georgetown University and director of both 

the Center for Peace and Security Studies Program. He was a 

scholar in residence for counterterrorism at the CIA between 2004 

and 2006. Professor Hoffman also previously held the Corporate 

Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the Rand 

Corporation. 

Finally, Professor Daniel Byman, who is currently a professor 

also at Georgetown University—we have some great professors at 

Georgetown, it sounds like—and the research director and senior 

fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy for the Brookings 

Institution. From 2005 to 2010, Dr. Byman was a director for the 

Center for Peace and Security Studies also at Georgetown. He has 

worked as a professional staff member for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States and the joint 9/11 

inquiry, U.S. House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Thank 

you for being here today. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Coll for his statement. 
46 

STATEMENT OF STEVE COLL, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NEW 

AMERICA FOUNDATION 

Mr. COLL. Chairman McCaul, thank you for the kind words. 

Ranking Member Clarke and Members of the committee, thanks 

for the opportunity to testify. 

Almost a decade after the September 11 attacks, the threat to 

the United States from al-Qaeda-related groups is diminishing but 

remains persistent. 

Most encouragingly, al-Qaeda has failed politically and by doing 

so has isolated itself. Its violence and absence of constructive ideas 

and programs has caused Muslim populations to turn away, limiting its potential in recruitment and fund-raising. The death of 

Osama bin Laden will challenge the group to manage the first leadership succession crisis in al-Qaeda’s history. 

The group’s claims on the grievances and imaginations of 

disenfranchised Muslims is waning. Yet no terrorist organization 

requires a mass following to inflict substantial and disruptive damage. Al-Qaeda remains capable from time to time of killing dozens, 

even hundreds of American citizens at once, including on American 

soil, as evidence from recent plotting makes clear. 

Mention has already been made of the Najibullah Zazi case and 

the near-miss on Northwest flight 253. Both of these plots involved 

safe havens abroad, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the case of 

Zazi and Yemen in the case of the Christmas day bombing attempt. 

The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism have identified 13 terrorist safe havens. Of these 13, at least six currently 

contain al-Qaeda or related groups that have historically displayed 

international ambitions. The most prominent areas are the TransSahara, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In my 

judgment, two of these havens currently stand out as the places 

most likely to produce potent cross-border attacks, Yemen and 

Pakistan. 

In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, headed by bin 

Laden’s personal secretary, has emerged as the organization’s most 

internationally ambitious and capable franchise. Because of political changes and conflicts in Yemen resulting from anti-government 

protests of this Arab Spring, the political and territorial spaces enjoyed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are likely to expand in 

Yemen during the next few years. The country now seems to be 

falling into civil war. It is likely that al-Qaeda and historically 

aligned Yemeni Islamic groups will seek and gain advantage in the 

country’s coming turmoil, as they have done in previous eras of 

Yemeni civil conflict. 

In Pakistan, too, the current trend lines for American counterterrorism goals look difficult. The discovery and killing of Osama bin 

Laden in a walled compound not far from the Pakistan Military 

Academy has brought U.S.-Pakistani relations, already troubled, to 

a low point. This deterioration will have an impact on American intelligence collection and paramilitary activity in Pakistan. 

The United States has an obvious interest in Pakistan’s success 

and stability. The country possesses the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and is adopting defense policies that are likely to destabilize its military balance with India in the years ahead. The 

level of violence and pressure within Pakistan caused primarily by 
47 

the Pakistani Taliban is very disturbing. Ultimately, only a stable, 

economically growing, pluralistic Pakistan with much stronger civilian leadership, healthier civil-military relations, and a more sustainable defense policy can prevent the country from remaining a 

terrorist haven. 

Over the long run, a more successful Pakistan will only emerge 

if its military and civilian elites decide that it is in the country’s 

national interest to increase cooperation with India, particularly cooperation that will lead to greater economic integration in South 

Asia. Full peace is not necessary to produce the economic growth 

that has altered similar patterns of internal violence, government 

dysfunction, terrorism, and failed civil-military relations in countries such as Indonesia, Columbia, the Philippines, and Turkey. 

Another reset in American policy toward Pakistan is on the horizon. In the security realm, what seems required is a clearer, more 

focused, more manageable effort to identify and act on shared interests against al-Qaeda and in the transition ahead in Afghanistan. Both countries may benefit now from a period of less hopeful 

transformative America ambition and more clear-eyed focus on 

shared interests. At the same time, it would be helpful for the 

United States to reset its longer-term planning to construct a pragmatic vision to promote regional economic integration in South 

Asia as well as Pakistani economic growth. 

Thanks again for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. 

[The statement of Mr. Coll follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVE COLL

JUNE 3, 2011 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

In my testimony, I will address several of the questions the committee is exploring, with an emphasis on those areas where my experience is greatest. In particular, 

I will review: (1) An estimate of the threat al-Qaeda poses today; (2) which overseas 

havens currently pose the greatest threat to the United States; (3) the struggle of 

the United States to construct a successful policy toward Pakistan; and (4) some opportunities for improved Government reporting on terrorism raised by the findings 

of the General Accountability Office report, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government 

Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens.’’ 

AL-QAEDA AFTER THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN LADEN

Almost a decade after the September 11 attacks, the threat to the United States 

from al-Qaeda-related groups is diminishing but persistent. 

Most encouragingly, al-Qaeda has failed politically, and by doing so, has isolated 

itself. Its violence and absence of constructive political ideas and programs has 

caused Muslim populations and important constituencies to turn away, limiting its 

potential in recruitment and fundraising. The death of Osama bin Laden will challenge the group to manage the first leadership succession crisis in its history. AlQaeda will likely struggle continue in the forms it has presented since its founding 

in 1988. The odds are rising that it will fragment into even more autonomous regional groups and that some of those groups will turn increasingly to criminal activity such as kidnapping-for-ransom. Such criminality will accelerate a positive trend, 

namely, that al-Qaeda’s claim on the grievances and imaginations of disenfranchised 

Muslims is waning. 

Yet no terrorist organization requires a mass following to inflict substantial and 

disruptive damage. Al-Qaeda remains capable from time to time of killing dozens, 

even hundreds of American citizens at once, including on American soil, as evidence 

from recent plotting makes clear. In September 2009, an Afghan-American who had 

been recruited by al-Qaeda, Najibullah Zazi, planned an attack against subway 

trains in Manhattan; Zazi had the intent and means to succeed, but fortunately, in-
48 

telligence and law enforcement officers intercepted him. Three months later, Umar 

Farouq Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who was recruited by al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula, attempted to destroy Northwest Flight 253 as it vectored to land in Detroit. He, too, had the intention and means to succeed, but fortunately, his bomb 

makers were imperfect. 

External attacks of this scale have been attempted by al-Qaeda and related 

groups at regular intervals since September 11. Attempts of this magnitude are certain to continue. It is also conceivable that a small, talented, clandestine group, 

probably originating from Pakistan, could carry out a larger-scale, even more spectacular attack, for example, of the media-driven type witnessed in Mumbai, India, 

in November 2008. It would be very difficult for such a group to act within the 

United States without being detected first, but the possibility cannot be ruled out 

entirely, as the capacity and intention of some radicals in Pakistan to attack the 

United States directly clearly remains. Some Pakistani groups with international 

ambitions, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, draw on well-educated volunteers who include 

scientists, doctors, and other talented urban professionals who might have the creativity and resources required. In addition, the ability of dangerous, determined 

groups to form and plan in Yemen is likely to grow as that country’s internal conflicts worsen. 

More recently, homegrown attacks by radicalized individuals living in the United 

States have increased in frequency and seriousness. The most serious of these was 

the attack carried out by Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, who killed 13 people at Fort 

Hood, Texas, in 2009. 

The nature and scale of all these threats must be kept in perspective. Last year, 

the New America Foundation and the Maxwell School at Syracuse University surveyed and analyzed the cases of the 180 individuals indicted or convicted in Islamist 

terrorism cases in the United States since the September 11 attacks. The research 

found that only four of the homegrown attacks caused casualties in the United 

States, and that these attacks resulted in a total of 17 deaths—13 from the Fort 

Hood attack. By way of comparison, according to the FBI, between 2001 and 2009, 

73 people were killed in hate crimes in the United States. About 15,000 Americans 

are murdered each year. 

THE SAFE HAVEN MAP

In August, 2010, responding to a Congressional mandate, the State Department’s 

Country Reports on Terrorism identified 13 terrorist safe havens: The Trans-Sahara 

(Algeria, Mali, Maritania, and Niger); Venezuela; the Colombia Border Region 

(Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela); the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, 

Brazil, and Paraguay); Yemen; Somalia; Pakistan; the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral 

(the maritime boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines); the Southern 

Philippines; Afghanistan; Northern Iraq; Iraq; and Lebanon. 

Of these 13, at least six currently contain al-Qaeda or related groups that have 

historically displayed international ambitions. These most prominent areas are the 

Trans-Sahara, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Inside all of these 

havens violence and kidnapping have been regular occurrences in recent years. 

In the case of Somalia there is incipient evidence of international terrorism, but 

most of the violence is local. But of the six havens with an al-Qaeda presence, two 

currently stand out in the open sources for the extent to which they have recently 

and will likely produce potent attacks beyond the borders of the haven: Yemen and 

Pakistan. 

Before we turn to those two cases, it is worth examining what is not marked on 

the State Department map. Understandably, for reasons of definition and foreign 

policy clarity, State defines safe havens in a way that emphasizes the impunity that 

terrorists or financiers may enjoy when they take root in ungoverned spaces or 

areas where local authorities find it convenient to collaborate with terrorist groups, 

for ideological or financial reasons, or because they are too weak to oppose the terrorists. This approach to thinking about safe havens inevitably produces a map biased toward weak states. 

Consider, by way of contrast, what a map of the actual planning, travel, and transit of convicted terrorists would look like. It would show many individuals spending 

many hours in hotel rooms, dormitories, and residential housing in the United 

States, Europe, Dubai, Asia and elsewhere—very often undetected. It would show 

almost all of those individuals using communications technologies rooted in the 

United States and distributed globally. The point here is that in conceptualizing the 

challenge of safe havens, it would be a mistake to locate our thinking only in the 

cartoonish image of a Dr. Evil holed up in a cave or foggy compounds beyond the 

reach of the law and Special Forces. Modern terrorism is a media-leveraging tactic 
49 

embedded in the structures of our prosperous, globalized economy. It cannot be successfully contained if it is only considered as an external threat from weak states. 

An implication of this argument is that in addition to the sort of mapping analysis 

mandated of State in its Country Reports, it might be useful to Congress, in its oversight role, to obtain analysis of the terrorist threat that is more reverse-engineered 

from actual terrorist activity. What does this activity show about their use of actual 

havens and transit and communications corridors, whether of the traditional 

ungoverned-territory type or the post-modern, internet-and-airport-lounge type? 

What policy-relevant insights might be obtained from such bottom-up analysis? 

Certainly, traditional, external havens in weak states, such as Pakistan and 

Yemen, remain very important. As I have argued, considering the residual international threat posed by al-Qaeda, they remain the two most important cases. 

In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, headed by Bin Laden’s former personal secretary Nasir al-Wahayshi, has emerged as the organization’s most internationally ambitious and capable franchise. Because of political changes and conflicts in Yemen resulting from anti-government protests of this Arab Spring, the political and territorial spaces enjoyed by AQAP are likely to expand in Yemen during 

the next few years. The country seems now to be falling into civil war. In recent, 

earlier eras of civil conflict in Yemen, al-Qaeda has exploited the fighting to gain 

space and allies, and it is likely to attempt this again. 

Al-Qaeda’s roots in Yemen trace back decades. The bin Laden family immigrated 

to Saudi Arabia from the Hadramawt, an interior region of Yemen. Osama bin 

Laden identified with his family’s roots in Yemen, particularly after he was deprived 

of Saudi citizenship; he financed and otherwise participated in Islamist uprisings 

there during the country’s civil conflicts between 1990 and 1992; he reportedly explored moving to Yemen at later points; he took a wife from the country; and alQaeda has continually funded violent activity there. The most significant of these 

attacks was the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Yemen’s weak strongman President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, sought to co-opt Islamist groups and to contain al-Qaeda, 

particularly to the extent that its activity jeopardized American aid flows. His position became more difficult after 2003, when a crackdown on al-Qaeda cells in neighboring Saudi Arabia sent dozens of terrorist refugees scurrying to Yemen. They regrouped, particularly in the southern Abyan Governate. In general, Saleh’s political 

influence has been weakened in the south by a succession movement there. 

The arrival in Yemen of American-born media innovator Anwar al-Awlaki amplified these changes. Through his on-line magazine Inspire and various self-produced 

videos, al-Awlaki has become a significant voice in English-medium discourse for alQaeda, filling an important gap in the group’s language channels. The extent of his 

operational role is not entirely clear from the open sources, but it is plain that he 

has participated in plotting international violence and recruiting, and that he has 

both the intent and the capability to facilitate significant violence. 

The course of anti-government protests against Saleh and their implications for 

Yemen’s political future are unclear. Civil war increasingly seems a possibility, although who will win the current military confrontation between Saleh and some of 

his tribal opposition is difficult to predict. It is all but certain, however, that Yemen’s weak central government will weaken further and that its recent internal conflicts—a mostly sectarian uprising in the north, a secession movement in the 

south—will accelerate and mix in with new conflicts. 

On May 29, news reports indicated that armed men had seized the town of 

Zinjibar in the Abyan Governate; officials in the capital of Sanaa claimed the rebels 

had ties to al-Qaeda. Such claims by a besieged dictator whose legitimacy in Western eyes has derived from his (partial) willingness to accommodate Western counterterrorism policy should be taken with a shaker full of salt. Nonetheless, it is likely 

that al-Qaeda and historically aligned Islamist groups will seek and gain advantage 

in Yemen’s coming turmoil. During the civil war 20 years ago, they played a role 

in the fighting and, following victory, were rewarded by Saleh’s relatively accommodating policies. They will likely seek a fighting role again. 

Saleh’s irrational resistance to proposals for his resignation, and the violence his 

resistance has precipitated, has already weakened the state that his successor will 

inherit. All of this will make intelligence collection and the pursuit of pressure on 

AQAP through collaboration with Yemeni security forces more difficult. So far as is 

apparent in the open sources, the ability of the United States to collect intelligence 

and act unilaterally against al-Qaeda in Yemen is considerably more limited than 

in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The collapse of the Yemeni political order, the fragmentation of its security forces and the prospect of sustained internal conflict will 

make this harder still. Full-on civil war or a series of concurrent, intensifying internal conflicts may draw AQAP into local battles for a time but it may also provide 

them more resources and freedom of maneuver, particularly in southern Yemen, 
50 

which faces pirate-infested sea channels across from ungoverned and al-Qaeda-influenced Somalia. 

In Pakistan, too, the current trend lines for American counterterrorism policy look 

unfavorable. The discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden in a walled compound 

in Abbottabad, not far from the Pakistan Military Academy, has brought U.S.-Pakistani relations, already troubled, to a low point, comparable at least in the levels 

of mutual mistrust to the breach in relations in the early 1990s. This deterioration 

of relations will have an impact on American intelligence collection and paramilitary 

activity in Pakistan. For example, Pakistan has demanded that the United States 

reduce the number of American military, diplomatic, and administrative personnel 

in the country; one of Pakistan’s motivations is to reduce American intelligence collection capabilities within the country, and to channel a greater share of American 

intelligence activity through joint operations, where Pakistan can maintain greater 

control. 

The discovery of bin Laden in Abbottabad has raised questions about how and 

why sections of Pakistan’s Army and intelligence service, the I.S.I., might provide 

haven to al-Qaeda. Many of the specific questions about whom in Pakistan’s security 

services knew what about bin Laden’s sanctuary may never be answered satisfactorily. But a few points can be made with relatively high confidence. 

First, in the Pakistani political economy, it is simply not possible to build an expensive, heavily secured, walled compound in a closely-policed town such as 

Abbottabad without collaboration from at least some government officials. For example, Pakistan has one of the lowest rates of tax participation in the world, even 

among countries of its economic profile. The reason is that police, intelligence officers, and other government officials routinely extort payments from wealthy householders to protect them from tax raids. It seems likely that at least some Pakistani 

officials were on the payroll of bin Laden’s compound for this reason. Whether they 

would have known that bin Laden was living there, or where the money came from, 

is another matter. If I.S.I. officers were among those extracting supplemental incomes from the Abbottabad compound, as would seem possible, if not likely, they 

may or may not have informed their superiors. I.S.I. is a large, complex organization, a state within the Pakistani state; it is also an organized economic or criminal 

enterprise with diverse, autonomous, self-rewarding cells scattered throughout. 

Second, the circumstances in which bin Laden was discovered were not by themselves unusual. Listed terrorist leaders from anti-Indian organizations such as 

Lashkar e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have lived for years in similarly ambiguous walled compounds and apartment buildings around Pakistan. The fugitive 

mastermind of the 1993 bombings in Mumbai, the underworld figure Ibrahim 

Daoud, has reportedly lived and prospered in Karachi for many years. Sometimes 

the circumstances of these listed terrorists are described by the Pakistani government as ‘‘house arrest;’’ other times they are described as ‘‘fugitives in hiding.’’ The 

ambiguity is deliberately constructed by I.S.I. and the Pakistani state to maintain 

the greatest degree of flexibility at home and in its long-running struggle against 

India. Afghan Taliban leaders known to be living in exile in Pakistan presumably 

enjoy the same haven policies. That bin Laden, too, found a place in this much larger system is shocking to Americans because of the scale of murderous violence he 

authored on September 11. In the local context, however, the circumstances of his 

hiding place were not unusual among terrorists sheltering in the country. 

In Yemen, ‘‘safe haven’’ is largely a function of weak state formation. In Pakistan, 

the state is weak but the sources of haven are more varied and more directly tied 

to state policy. Fundamentally, Pakistan provides safe haven for violent Islamist 

groups, including listed terrorists such as al-Qaeda, for two reasons. First, the Army 

and I.S.I. find some of these groups to be useful levers in regional competition with 

India and Afghanistan. Second, having nurtured Islamist groups for three decades 

(initially, during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, in collaboration with the 

United States), Pakistan has been weakened by their virulence and revolutionary 

ambition, and the state now lacks the capacity to wipe out the groups without paying a very high price and incurring great risks; accommodation, therefore, seems the 

wiser policy, even in the face of rising evidence that this approach may not work. 

AMERICAN POLICY IN PAKISTAN

The United States has an obvious interest in Pakistan’s success and stability. The 

country possesses the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and is adopting defense policies that are likely to destabilize its military balance with India in the 

years ahead. The Pakistani Taliban, influenced and perhaps aided by al-Qaeda, has 

mounted an insurgency aimed at overthrowing the country’s military and civilian 

leadership. The Pakistan Army has contained the insurgency at a high price, but 
51 

the level of violence and pressure the Taliban is producing within Pakistan is very 

disturbing. 

Ultimately, only a stable, economically growing, pluralistic Pakistan with much 

stronger civilian leadership, healthier civil-military relations, and a more sustainable defense policy can prevent the country from remaining a terrorist haven. American attempts to construct a policy that will aid the emergence of this Pakistan— 

a ‘‘normal’’ if chronically troubled country—have evidently failed to date. Unfortunately, it may be beyond the capacity of the United States to decisively influence 

the outlook of the Pakistan Army and the I.S.I. about India and Pakistani National 

security, and it is the Army’s outlook on security matters, more than any other factor, that has created the landscape in Pakistan we see today. 

Over the long run, a more successful Pakistan will only emerge if its military and 

civilian elites decide that it is in the country’s national interest to increase cooperation with India, particularly cooperation that will lead to greater economic integration in South Asia. Full peace is not necessary to produce the sort of incentivechanging trade and internal growth that has altered similar patterns of internal violence, terrorism, and failed civil-military relations during the past two decades, to 

varying degrees, in countries such as Indonesia, Colombia, the Philippines, and Turkey. India’s high rates of economic growth are proving to be transformative within 

that country; to change, Pakistan needs greater access to that regional engine of 

growth and middle class formation. 

American policy toward Pakistan has long been imprisoned by compelling but narrow security imperatives—the invasion of Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation and the 

rise of al-Qaeda and related groups, to name three—at the expense of sustained, 

highly prioritized policy to pursue regional economic integration and broadly distributed Pakistani economic growth. Only the latter policy offers the hope of a Pakistan 

capable of delivering on its obligations and interests in the international system. 

In the mean time, once again, the United States’ security interests remains 

trapped by short-term security needs. These are, currently, not only the problem of 

terrorism and safe havens, but also supply lines that run through Pakistan to support more than 100,000 American troops in Afghanistan. The need to reduce troop 

levels without empowering the Taliban or touching off civil war, a project that will 

require some degree of Pakistan’s cooperation. 

Another ‘‘reset’’ in American policy toward Pakistan is on the horizon. In the security realm, what seems required is a clearer, more manageable effort to identify and 

act on shared interests—against al-Qaeda, and in the transition ahead in Afghanistan. Both countries will benefit from a period of less hopeful, transformative ambition and more clear-eyed focus on shared interests. At the same time, it would be 

helpful for the United States to reset its medium-term and long-term planning to 

construct a pragmatic vision to promote regional economic integration and Pakistani 

growth. 

THE GAO REPORT

In their report, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens,’’ researchers at the General Accounting Office 

raise a number of interesting question about Congressionally-mandated reports on 

safe havens and terrorism more generally. Although this is not my particular area 

of experience or putative expertise, as an independent analyst who often makes use 

of this Government reporting, I thought I would offer a modest idea about how the 

reporting might be improved. 

Annual reporting on terrorism by State serves a number of purposes. It provides 

Congress with a sound, specific basis for oversight. It informs the public. It also coerces governments and security services that harbor or might consider harboring 

terrorists by calling attention to their activity in an influential way. 

It should be the ambition of the United States to produce credible reporting about 

states that support terrorism that is as effective and impactful as the reporting the 

State Department publishes annually about human rights. The State Department’s 

annual human rights reports are credible and constructive. They provide a basis for 

substantial media reporting in countries where abuses occur; they provide cover for 

international civil society activists challenging local authoritarians and dictators; 

and they coerce and influence governments that receive unfavorable, embarrassing 

notice. In my judgment, State’s human rights reports pull the occasional punch but 

in comparison to other Government reporting of this type they are generally honest, 

forthright, and highly credible. Partly this is because civil society investigators at 

groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International produce their own 

highly credible investigations; this marketplace effect helps keep State’s work honest. 
52 

The GAO points out a number of ways in which State’s reports on safe havens 

and the counterterrorism policies of foreign governments could be improved. In my 

reading of the reporting, one problem is the extent to which the published assessments are compromised by the need not to offend flawed foreign security and intelligence services on which the United States depends for cooperation. In comparison 

to its human rights reporting, that is, the United States’ counterterrorism reporting 

is less forthright and convincing. 

One way to counter this problem would be to commission annual analytic reports 

by independent experts—perhaps a standing commission, perhaps a rotating panel. 

Just as American economic policy benefits from the diverse views and debates generated by independent Federal Reserve governors, so might American counterterrorism policy benefit from assessments of safe havens, foreign government performance, and U.S. policy from experts who have no bureaucratic or policy equities at 

stake, and no operational need to shave the facts in order to get along with a particular foreign government. Such work need not be expensive; it would also have the 

benefits of aiding Congressional oversight, informing the public, and putting pressure on under-performing governments. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Coll. 

Now the Chairman recognizes Professor Hoffman. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, DIRECTOR, SECURITY 

STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 

Clarke, and Congressman Long for the opportunity to testify. 

History has shown that al-Qaeda is nothing without a physical 

sanctuary or safe haven. Indeed, this is why al-Qaeda has invested 

so much of its energy in recent years to strengthening the capabilities of its affiliated and associated movements in Pakistan, Yemen, 

and Somalia. 

Al-Qaeda has thus created a networked transnational movement 

in order to ensure its survival. Accordingly, rather than the single, 

monolithic entity of a decade ago, today there are several alQaedas, not just one, each of which has different capabilities and 

presents different, often unique, challenges. 

This effectively negates a one-size-fits-all strategy on our part. 

Indeed, countermeasures have to be tailored to the specific conditions and realities in each of these places where al-Qaeda and its 

franchises have taken root and indeed flourished. 

Al-Qaeda’s strategy of survival in recent years has been predicated on the expansion and consolidation of its safe havens and 

sanctuaries in both South Asia and beyond. Its greatest success, of 

course, has been in Pakistan, but significant strides have been 

made in Yemen and Somalia as well. Indeed, since 2004, every 

major terrorist attack or plot against the United States or our European allies has emanated from al-Qaeda or its affiliates and associates based in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia. The majority of these 

attacks and plots have originated from Pakistan. Sizable numbers 

of Arabs, Turks, Chechens, Chinese, and Uzbeks comprise an international jihadi contingent based in Pakistan that, along with their 

indigenous allies and hosts have planned local, regional, and international terrorist operations on an ambitious scale. 

Although fewer in number, the plots that have originated from 

Yemen by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have been no less serious and, if anything, even more ambitious. Not surprisingly, a 

succession of U.S. intelligence officials have expressed concern at 
53 

the rapidity with which AQAP has emerged as a potent force in 

international terrorism, posing perhaps an even greater threat to 

U.S. security than its parent body. 

In al-Shabaab’s case as well, American and European intelligence officials have been alarmed by the global ambitions and 

international radicalization and recruitment capabilities of this relative new Somali militant organization. 

All these incidents represent the fruition of al-Qaeda’s strategy 

to fight its enemies on multiple fronts and from multiple bases. Accordingly, it conducts local campaigns of subversion and destabilization in critical operational theatres where failed or failing 

states provide new opportunities for al-Qaeda to extend its reach 

and consolidate its presence. Countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, 

and especially Yemen figure prominently within this category. 

Al-Qaeda also deliberately seeks to seek out citizens and residents of enemy countries who can then be brought to these sanctuaries and safe havens for training. Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia again figure prominently in this strategy. 

Failing to deprive al-Qaeda and its affiliates and associates of 

these safe havens and sanctuaries will almost certainly give alQaeda new momentum and greater freedom of action than an expanded geographical ambit facilitates. This will require both continued U.S. military and intelligence operations in South Asia, 

alongside a continual scanning of the horizon to counter al-Qaeda’s 

presence in and prevent its expansion to other failed and failing 

states. 

An effective strategy will combine the tactical elements of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities alongside 

the equally critical, broader strategic imperative of breaking the 

cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and replenishment that 

have respectively sustained al-Qaeda and fueled its allies in Yemen 

and Somalia as well. Enhanced and improved and better-coordinated information operations will be a critical element of this approach. This will also entail the building of host nation capabilities 

to a greater and more sustained extent than currently exists. 

In conclusion, it would be dangerously precipitous at this time to 

declare a total victory. Al-Qaeda’s hopes of renewal and regeneration in the aftermath of bin Laden’s killing rest on its continued 

access to the geographical sanctuaries and safe havens that the 

movement has always depended on and historically has used as 

bases from which to plot and plan and launch international terror 

strikes. Only by depriving al-Qaeda of those sanctuaries, destroying 

the organization’s leadership, and disrupting the continued resonance of its message will al-Qaeda finally be defeated. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Bruce Hoffman follows:] 
54 

* Bruce Hoffman is Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and Director of the 

Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Military 

Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center. 1Quoted in BBC News, ‘‘Extracts from MI5 Chief’s Speech,’’ November 10, 2006 accessed at 

http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hl/news/6135000.stm. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN* 

JUNE 3, 2011 

History has shown that al-Qaeda is nothing without a physical sanctuary or safe 

haven. Indeed, this is why al-Qaeda has invested so much of its energy in recent 

years to strengthening the capabilities of its affiliated and associated movements in 

Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Al-Qaeda has thus created a networked 

transnational movement in order to ensure its survival. Accordingly, rather than the 

single, monolithic, entity of a decade ago, today there are several al-Qaedas, not just 

one: Each of which has different capabilities and presents different, often unique, 

challenges. This effectively negates a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ strategy. Instead, countermeasures have to be tailored to the specific conditions and realities in each of these 

places where al-Qaeda and its franchises have taken root and indeed have flourished. 

THE ROLE OF SAFE HAVENS AND SANCTUARIES IN AL-QAEDA’S STRATEGY

Al-Qaeda’s strategy of survival in recent years has been predicated on the expansion and consolidation of its safe havens and sanctuaries in both South Asia and 

beyond. It’s greatest success has of course been in Pakistan but significant strides 

have been made in Yemen and Somalia as well. Indeed, since 2004 every major terrorist attack or plot against the United States or our European allies has emanated 

from al-Qaeda or its affiliates and associates based in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia. 

The majority of these attacks and plots have originated from Pakistan. Arabs, 

Turks, Chinese, Uzbeks, and Chechens comprise an international jihadi contingent 

based in Pakistan that, along with their indigenous allies and hosts have planned 

local, regional, and international terrorists operations on an ambitious scale. As 

Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, then-Director General of the British Security Service (MI5), explained in a November 2006 speech, upwards of 30 terrorist plots and 

attacks in the United Kingdom alone had been ‘‘linked back to al-Qaeda in 

Pakistan... through those links al-Qaeda gives guidance and training to its 

largely British foot soldiers here on an extensive and growing scale.’’1 Among the 

30 incidents she referred were: • The planned bombing of a London nightclub and a shopping center in April 

2004; • The 7 July 2005 suicide attacks on London transport that killed 52 persons and 

wounded nearly a thousand others; • The abortive follow-on plot against the same target set in London 2 weeks later; 

and 

• The attempt in August 2006 to bomb seven U.S. and Canadian aircraft departing from London’s Heathrow Airport. 

More recently, the following additional plots and attacks emanating from Pakistan, including several planned to occur in the United States have been detected. 

They include: 

• The January 2008 plan to attack transportation targets in Barcelona, Spain 

that in turn was linked to another plot by a sister terrorist cell in Germany; 

• The abortive plan to bomb New York City’s Pennsylvania Station on Thanksgiving day 2008; 

• The plots uncovered to stage attacks in Manchester, England in April 2009 and 

in New York City against its subway system in September 2009; 

• The attempt to detonate an explosive-packed SUV in New York City’s Times 

Square; and, 

• The plan to attack transportation targets in Berlin, Germany that was uncovered just days before bin Laden’s killing on 2 May 2010. 

Although fewer in number, the plots that have originated from Yemen by alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have been no less serious and, if anything, 

even more ambitious. Among them were: 

• The September 2009 attempted assassination of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef 

in Saudi Arabia, the Deputy Interior Minister responsible for counterterrorism 

in that country; 

• The Christmas day 2009 plot to explode a bomb aboard a Northwest Airlines 

flight en route From Amsterdam to Detroit; and, 
55 

2 United States District Court Eastern District of New York, United States of America v. Adis 

Medunjanin, Abid Nasser, Adnan El Shukrijumah, Tariq Ur Rehman, and FNU LNU, 7 July 

2010. 

• The attempt to blow up American cargo planes uncovered in September 2010 

involving bombs disguised as photocopier printer cartridges. 

Not surprisingly, a succession of U.S. intelligence officials have expressed concern 

at the rapidity with which AQAP has emerged as a potent force in international terrorism posing perhaps an even greater threat to U.S. security than its parent body. 

And, from Somalia a January 2010 plot by members of the al-Qaeda affiliate in 

that country, al-Shabaab (‘‘The Youth’’) to kill the Danish cartoonist responsible for 

drawings of the Prophet Muhammad that enraged the Muslim world. In alShabaab’s case as well, American and European intelligence officials have been 

alarmed by the global ambitions, and international radicalization and recruitment 

capabilities of this relatively new Somali militant organization. 

AL-QAEDA’S STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL

All these incidents represent the fruition of al-Qaeda’s strategy to fight its enemies on multiple fronts and from multiple bases. Accordingly, it conducts local 

campaigns of subversion and destabilization in critical operational theatres where 

failed or failing states provide new opportunities for al-Qaeda to extend its reach 

and consolidate its presence. Countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and especially, 

Yemen prominently fall within this category. 

Al-Qaeda accordingly provides guidance, assistance, and other help to its local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. This support often appreciably enhances 

attack capabilities and strengthens the resilience of these groups thus presenting 

more formidable challenges to national and local police, military forces, and intelligence agencies. Al-Qaeda actively works behind the scenes to ‘‘plus up’’ the capabilities of indigenous terrorists both in terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic operations—including information operations, propaganda, and psychological 

warfare. 

Al-Qaeda’s role in each of these theaters is thus critical. It serves as a ‘‘force multiplier’’: providing training and advice and otherwise building existing capacity 

among indigenous insurgent groups. The standard basic insurgent training package 

of riflery and field craft, for instance, is augmented by al-Qaeda instruction in advanced ambush techniques and the use and emplacement of increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices. Al-Qaeda additionally provides overall strategic 

guidance and assists in the coordination of operations between a variety of terrorist 

and insurgent groups. It imparts useful non-combat skills as well: Teaching local 

jihadis how to plan and execute psychological and information operations, make use 

of the internet for radicalization and recruitment purposes, and generally improve 

and strengthen operational expertise and organizational resiliency. 

Al-Qaeda also deliberately seeks out citizens and residents of enemy countries, 

who can then be brought to these sanctuaries and safe havens for training. Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have figured prominently in this strategy. 

For example, members of each of the British terrorist cells involved in the aforementioned plots and attacks in the United Kingdom between 2004 and 2006 were 

trained at the same al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan’s Malakand Agency. 

Like these British plotters, Najibullah Zazi, the Afghan-born, Green Card holder 

who lived in Queens, New York, and ring-leader of the 2009 plot to stage suicide 

attacks against the New York City subway, was also instructed in the fabrication 

of powerful homemade explosives using ordinary commercial ingredients like hair 

bleach (hydrogen peroxide) and acetone at an al-Qaeda facility in Pakistan. 

Zazi and his two fellow conspirators told FBI agents, that they had been trained 

in bomb making at an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan. Senior al-Qaeda commanders had 

overseen and directed the operation, which was linked to another set of attacks 

planned from Pakistan to occur in Manchester, England in April 2009. The superseding indictment of Zazi and the two other men filed by the U.S. Department of 

Justice on 7 July 2010 unambiguously describes how this ‘‘American-based al-Qaeda 

cell’’ was commanded by ‘‘leaders of al-Qaeda’s external operations program [based 

in Pakistan who were] dedicated to terrorist attacks in the United States and other 

Western countries.’’2

Umer Farouk Abdulmuttalab, the would-be Christmas day 2009 airline bomber, 

for example, was trained and prepared for his operation in Yemen by AQAP. It is 

believed that the group may have been responsible for recruiting, training, and deploying at least 7 other bombers—and, according to some reports, as many as 20— 

from Europe and the United States. 
56 

3Spencer S. Hsu, ‘‘Concern Grows Over Recruitment of Somali Americans by Islamists,’’ 

Washington Post, 4 October 2009. 4General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2008 (The Hague: Ministry of the 

Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2009). The report can be accessed at: http://www.fas.org/irp/ 

world/netherlands/aivd-2008.pdf. 5The AIVD reportedly employs some 1,100 people. See DutchNews LG accessed at: http:// 

www.dutchnews.nl/dictionary/2006/11/aivd.php. 6General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2008, p. 17. 7 Ibid., p. 19. 

8 Ibid., p. 17. 

According to Western intelligence sources, as of 2010, al-Qaeda has been able to 

train and deploy back to their home or adopted countries some 100 and 150 persons 

from Europe and the United States, among other locales. 

Finally, lest there be any remaining doubts about the importance of physical safe 

haven and training facilities to terrorist organizations in general and those within 

al-Qaeda’s orbit in particular, the case of the nearly 30 young Somali-Americans 

who left the United States between 2007 and 2008 to train in terrorism and guerrilla warfare in Somalia provides a salutary remainder. 

The youths were radicalized and recruited in the United States and trained in Somalia by al-Shabaab, the local al-Qaeda ally that deliberately emulates its mentor 

organization—down to its reliance on training camps and use of the internet for 

propaganda purposes. 

Indeed, it is believed that their trainer in Somalia was Saleh Ali Nabhan, the 

longtime al-Qaeda commander implicated in both the 1998 bombing of the American 

embassy in Nairobi and the 2002 attack on Israeli tourists at a hotel in Mombassa, 

who was reportedly killed in September 2009 by U.S. special operations forces in 

Somalia. Two of these youths have become the first-known Americans to have carried out suicide terrorist attacks.3

The Annual Report 20084 of the Netherlands’ General Intelligence and Security 

Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, or AIVD), had specifically called 

attention to the growing threat then posed by al-Qaeda and its allies because of the 

sanctuary they had established in Pakistan and elsewhere. The AIVD, it should be 

noted, is among the most professional and prescient of the world’s intelligence and 

security agencies. Though far smaller than many of its Western counterparts,5 the 

AIVD is an elite and perspicacious service that is impressive for its early identification and incisive analysis of emerging trends. 

‘‘Al Qaeda’s ability to commit and direct terrorist attacks has increased in recent 

years,’’ the report, which was released in April 2009, unequivocally states. ‘‘The 

AIVD received a growing number of indications that individuals from Europe are 

receiving military training at camps in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.’’6

Further elucidating this key point, the report goes on to explain how 

‘‘An analysis conducted in 2008 by the AIVD and verified by fellow services indicates that core Al Qaeda’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks has increased in recent years. To a great extent, this is explained by the many alliances Al Qaeda has 

forged with other networks and groups, both in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region itself and elsewhere in the Islamic world...

‘‘One development of particular concern is the growing evidence that people from 

Europe are undergoing military training at camps in the border region.’’7

The report’s conclusion was as disquieting as it was sobering: ‘‘This could increase 

the ability of (core) al-Qaeda and its allies to commit or direct attacks in Europe.’’8

Earlier in 2008, Spanish authorities had uncovered a terrorist cell in Barcelona, 

that was planning terrorist attacks against transportation targets in that city. It 

was directed by the late Pakistani Taliban leader Beituallah Meshud (who was 

killed in a predator airstrike in 2009). In addition, terrorist cells of other Pakistanis 

in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, among other places that were subsequently uncovered had similar plans and were also directed by Meshud’s Taliban 

faction from Pakistan. Further, the German terrorists who in September 2008 were 

arrested and charged with plotting to bomb U.S. military targets in that country 

had also been trained in Pakistan at a camp run by the IJU (Union of Islamic 

Jihad), an Uzbek jihadi group closely allied to al-Qaeda. 

SANCTUARIES AND SAFE HAVENS MATTER TO AL-QAEDA

Despite the evidence to the contrary, the centrality of sanctuaries and safe havens 

to al-Qaeda and its allies and affiliates is often dismissed or discounted. This willful 

ignoring of recent history may be found in arguments claiming that al-Qaeda ‘‘re-
57 

9Dr. Austin Long of Columbia University coined this phrase in an exchange on the foreign 

policy list-serve managed by Professor Robert Art, 8 September 2009. 10Paul R. Pillar, ‘‘Who’s Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?’’ Washington Post, 16 September 2009. 11Stephen M. Walt, ‘‘The ‘safe haven’ myth,’’ Foreign Policy.com, 18 August 2009 accessed at: 

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/thelsafelhavenlmyth. 12 Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 

9/11 Commission Report: Authorized Edition (New York & London, W.W. Norton & Company, 

2004). 13 Ibid., pp. 149–150. 14 Ibid., p. 153. 15 Ibid., p. 155. 16 Ibid., pp. 156–159. 17 Ibid., pp. 160–166. 18 Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack Ever Seen (NY: Arcade, 2003), pp. 123–128. 19 Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 

9/11 Commission Report, pp. 177, 261 & fn. 5, p. 500. 20Karl Vick, ‘‘Al Qaeda’s Hand In Istanbul Plot: Turks Met With Bin Laden,’’ Washington 

Post, 13 February 2007, accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 

2007/02/12/AR2007021201715lpf.html. 

quires apartments and not acres’’9 and therefore that the risk of al-Qaeda sanctuaries in failed or failing states is distorted and over-blown. It has been most cogently articulated by Paul R. Pillar, a former senior CIA officer, who maintains that 

planning for the 9/11 attacks did not take place in Afghanistan but in ‘‘apartments 

in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.’’10 Harvard University professor Stephen M. Walt made the same point on his Foreign Policy.com blog in 2008 arguing that, ‘‘The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, 

not Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to Germany 

to make sure there aren’t ‘safe havens’ operating there.’’11

However, while it is true that follow-on, tactical planning did indeed occur in 

those places; according to the authoritative 9/11 Commission Report,12 among other 

sources, the location and strategic genesis of the 9/11 attacks, however, indisputably 

came from al-Qaeda’s physical sanctuary in Afghanistan. In late 1998/early 1999, 

for instance, the operation’s mastermind, Khaled Sheik Mohammed (KSM), moved 

to Afghanistan at bin Laden’s invitation precisely for this purpose.13 KSM had admittedly been mulling over such an operation ever since his nephew, Ramzi Ahmed 

Yousef, had returned to Pakistan following the 1993 Trade Center bombing—but the 

concrete steps towards the plot’s execution did not take shape until KSM accepted 

bin Laden’s invitation.14 Bin Laden subsequently took the idea forward in discussions with his military chief, Mohammed Atef, and KSM at al-Qaeda’s al Matar 

complex near Kandahar in the spring of 1999.15 An ‘‘elite’’ training course was then 

organized for the four operatives originally selected to pilot the hijacked aircraft at 

al-Qaeda’s Mes Aynak camp—also in Afghanistan.16

It was only later, towards the end of 1999, that Mohammed Atta and the three 

other Hamburg operatives entered the picture when they came to Afghanistan to 

undergo training at al-Qaeda camps pursuant to fulfilling their desire to fight (and 

die) in Chechnya. It was at these al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan that they were 

then recruited for the 9/11 operation.17 KSM confirmed all this when he was interviewed by Pakistani journalist Yosri Fouda in 2002.18 And bin Ladin himself, in the 

famous ‘‘Kandahar Tape,’’ captured by U.S. forces in that city in November 2001 

that was broadcast the following month, detailed his own intimate involvement in 

the planning of the 9/11 attacks—from exactly where he was sitting in Khandahar. 

Additional al-Qaeda operations also were planned in Afghanistan. The 1999 ‘‘Millennium Bomber,’’ Ahmad Ressam, was trained by KSM at al-Qaeda’s al Farouk facility in Afghanistan.19 And, the 2003 Istanbul suicide bombings were originally conceived at al-Qaeda’s camp outside of Kandahar immediately following the 9/11 attacks.20

CONCLUSION

To sum up, al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia largely account for the movement’s survival. These three safe havens figure prominently in 

the threat that al-Qaeda continues to present to the United States and the West 

but also to stability and security of each of those countries today. Failing to deprive 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates and associates of these safe havens and sanctuaries will 

almost certainly give al-Qaeda new momentum and the greater freedom of action 

that an expanded geographical ambit facilitates. Accordingly sanctuary—and in the 

form of something larger than an apartment’s confines and in the kind of permissive 

environment that the border straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan and parts of 
58 

21Secretary Gates made exactly this point in his September 2008 speech at the National Defense University. ‘‘In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists, we 

know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over 

the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations 

should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur 

development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit.’’ See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Public Affairs), Speech: National Defense University (Washington, DC), As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Monday, September 29, 2008 accessed at: 

http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/ 

speech.aspx?speechid=1279. 22Secretary Gates was explicit on this point as well. ‘‘Retired Marine Colonel T.X. Hammes 

has noted that where past insurgencies consisted of military campaigns supported by information operations, they now often consist of strategic communications campaigns supported by 

military operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, extremists have made deft use of the internet and 

propaganda to misinform and intimidate local populations. See Ibid. 

Yemen and Somalia afford—appears to be extremely important to, and highly valued by, al-Qaeda and its allies. 

Al-Qaeda has been compared to the archetypal shark in the water that must keep 

moving forward—no matter how slowly or incrementally—or die. Whether al-Qaeda 

can in fact do so—and thereby prove that it can survive following its founder and 

leader’s killing last month—is surely the most pressing question of the moment. 

In these circumstances, the United States must remain vigilant and avoid complacency and the temptation to lower our guard. Al-Qaeda has always regarded this 

as a generational struggle that goes beyond the purview or interests of any one individual. The loss of Osama bin Laden will not affect that calculus. 

Accordingly, the United States should continue to kill and capture al-Qaeda leaders and operatives as it has so effectively done, especially during the past 3 years 

of stepped-up aerial drone attacks. At the same time, the United States must also 

continue to deprive al-Qaeda and its leaders of the sanctuaries and safe havens that 

it depends on. 

Thus, the highest priority for the United States must be to concentrate our attention on al-Qaeda as a networked global phenomenon—not as in the past as one 

enemy, in one place, at one time. Today, there are several al-Qaedas in a variety 

of places, each with different capabilities. This will require both continued U.S. military and intelligence operations in South Asia alongside a continual scanning of the 

horizon to counter al-Qaeda’s presence in, and prevent its expansion to, failing and 

failed states. 

At the foundation of the type of dynamic and adaptive strategy needed to defeat 

terrorists and insurgents alike in these variegated locales is the ineluctable axiom 

that successfully countering these threats is not exclusively a military endeavor but 

also involves fundamental parallel political, social, economic, and ideological activities. 

The predominantly tactical ‘‘kill or capture’’ approach and metric encapsulated by 

the targeted assassination-focused drone program is too narrow and does not sufficiently address the complexities of these unique operational environments. The adversaries and the threats that the United States faces today in Pakistan, Yemen, 

Somalia and elsewhere are much more elusive and complicated to be vanquished by 

mere decapitation. What is required to ensure success is a more integrated approach 

to a threat that is at once operationally durable, evolutionary, and elusive in character. 

An effective strategy will thus combine the tactical elements of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities alongside the equally critical, broader 

strategic imperative of breaking the cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and 

replenishment that have respectively sustained al-Qaeda and fueled and its allies 

in Yemen and Somalia as well.21 Enhanced, improved and better-coordinated information operations will be a critical element of this approach.22 These also will entail 

the building of host-nation capabilities to a greater and more sustained extent than 

currently exists. 

In conclusion, it would be dangerously precipitous at this time to declare total victory. Al-Qaeda’s hopes of renewal and re-generation in the aftermath of bin Laden’s 

killing rest on its continued access to the geographical sanctuaries and safe havens 

that the movement has always depended on and historically have used as bases 

from which to plot and plan and launch international terrorist strikes. Only by depriving al-Qaeda of those sanctuaries, destroying the organization’s leadership, and 

disrupting the continued resonance of its message will al-Qaeda finally be defeated. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 
59 

The Chairman now recognizes Professor Byman for his statement. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE AT GEORGETOWN 

UNIVERSITY, AND SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR 

MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. BYMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present my views 

today. Let me briefly summarize some of the points in my written 

testimony. 

As I think we all agree on this panel, the al-Qaeda core has an 

active operational as well as strategic role and has helped inspire 

and direct jihadists around the globe. The core has recovered from 

its low point in 2002 and now has a base in Pakistan from which 

it can plan and train. Maintaining pressure on the core is vital to 

keep it off-balance. 

Core operators also try to attract and direct the attentions and 

the actions of affiliate groups. These affiliated groups pose a range 

of dangers to the United States. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen, is increasingly important, given its 

record of near successes against the United States. 

The Shabaab in Somalia is another concern, given the 

radicalization of small numbers of Somali Americans. 

Affiliate groups, however, have different relations with the core 

and often do not fully embrace its objectives. 

The death of bin Laden is a serious blow to al-Qaeda. It is a blow 

to its image of strength. Bin Laden was a charismatic and capable 

leader, and in-fighting may occur now. In addition, recruitment and 

fund-raising may suffer. These problems in turn may make alQaeda less able to influence affiliate groups. The core, however, is 

likely to survive, even if it is less capable. It will be eager to conduct attacks to prove its relevance. 

The drone campaign is extremely important for striking the alQaeda core. The United States has few alternatives to acting in remote parts of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has a finite number of skilled 

leaders, and their loss is a tremendous blow to it. The drone attacks also force the organization to communicate less, forces leaders to reduce the number of associates, and these leaders must also 

spend much of their time in hiding. This is difficult for any organization, but it is especially difficult for an organization that is having to deal with a major leadership transition. 

The Arab Spring also requires fundamental changes in U.S. 

counterterrorism policy. The change sweeping the Arab world undermines the al-Qaeda message, but, at the same time, it offers terrorists far more operational freedom. The United States must exploit the threat to al-Qaeda’s message and encourage a smooth 

transition to democracy in countries like Egypt and Tunisia, while 

continuing counterterrorism partnerships and building new ones. 

In addition to aggressive efforts abroad, U.S. officials must consider how American foreign policy can lead to domestic 

radicalization. The case of the radicalization of Somalia Americans 

is instructive, as a relatively minor counterterrorism operation 
60 

1For a leading proponent of the view that al-Qaeda was weak and decentralized, see Marc 

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: University of 

Pennsylvania Press, 2008). However, several official U.S. and U.K. government statements and 

documents support the assessment that the al-Qaeda core remains active. National Intelligence 

Council, ‘‘National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,’’ unclassioverseas helped create a potentially dangerous problem at home. 

Also at home, the FBI and State officials should redouble their efforts to know Muslim communities and to gain their trust. 

In the end, however, it is difficult to separate over there from 

here. U.S. intelligence and Homeland Defense should focus particular attention on seam areas where the United States is 

attackable outside of U.S. soil, such as on airplanes transiting from 

airports overseas to airports in the United States. 

I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I would welcome 

your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Byman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN

JUNE 3, 2011 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the subcommittee and 

subcommittee staff, thank you for this opportunity to present my views before you 

today. 

The death of bin Ladin poses a major setback for al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, the alQaeda core remains a danger to the United States, as do al-Qaeda affiliates. These 

organizations are capable of mounting attacks against the U.S. homeland in the 

years to come, and the danger they pose to U.S. allies in Europe and in the Muslim 

world is even greater. However, al-Qaeda and its allies suffer from many weaknesses, are fractious in the best of times, and in general are under considerable 

strain. 

I would urge this subcommittee to consider several recommendations as it strives 

to improve U.S. homeland security. Fighting the al-Qaeda core in Pakistan should 

remain at the center of U.S. counterterrorism policy, even after bin Ladin’s death. 

With the death of bin Ladin there is an additional opportunity to weaken al-Qaeda’s 

relationship with affiliate groups, one of the core’s most important sources of 

strength. The aggressive U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has played an important 

role in weakening al-Qaeda and should be continued. The drone campaign will not 

end the al-Qaeda presence in Pakistan, but it does keep the organization on the run 

and reduces its operational effectiveness. 

The ‘‘Arab Spring’’ also requires fundamental changes in U.S. counterterrorism 

policy. The change sweeping the Arab world undermines al-Qaeda’s message but, at 

the same time, offers terrorists more operational freedom. The United States must 

exploit the threat to al-Qaeda’s message and encourage a smooth transition to democracy while continuing counterterrorism partnerships and building new ones. 

In addition to aggressive efforts abroad, U.S. officials must consider how American foreign policy can lead to domestic radicalization and ensure that U.S. policy 

does not unnecessarily alienate key domestic constituencies. At home the FBI and 

State officials should redouble efforts to know local Muslim communities and gain 

their trust. 

In the end, however, it is difficult to separate ‘‘over there’’ from ‘‘here.’’ U.S. intelligence and homeland defense should focus on ‘‘seam’’ areas—where the United 

States is attackable outside of U.S. soil, such as on airplanes transiting from airports overseas to airports in the United States. 

My testimony will address several issues: 1. The danger from the al-Qaeda core 

in Pakistan after the death of bin Ladin; 2. The importance of the drone campaign; 

3. The role of al-Qaeda-linked affiliate groups; 4. The nature of the threat to the 

U.S. homeland; 5. The impact of the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ on counterterrorism; and 6. Policy recommendations for increasing the security of the U.S. homeland. 

I. THE STATE OF THE AL-QAEDA CORE

Despite claims that the al-Qaeda core became largely irrelevant after 9/11, in reality it remained active in proselytizing, plotting anti-Western terrorist attacks, and 

supporting insurgencies in the Muslim world.1 The al-Qaeda core revived after the 
61 

fied key judgments (July 2007), p. 1; Dennis C. Blair, ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,’’ February 12, 2009, pp. 5– 

6; ‘‘Speech by the Director General of the Security Service,’’ Queen Mary’s College, London, November 9, 2006; and Jonathan Evans, ‘‘Intelligence, Counter Terrorism and Trust,’’ November 

5, 2007. Available at: www.mi5.gov.uk. 2See ‘‘Were They Directed from Abroad?’’ Honourable House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on the July 2005 (London: The Stationary Office, May 

2006), pp. 20–21; Robert Winnett and David Leppard, ‘‘Leaked No 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s 

British Recruits,’’ Sunday Times, July 10, 2005 available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 

news/uk/article542420.ece; Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda (Brookings, 2008); Bruce 

Hoffman, ‘‘Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist 

Threat: Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?’’ written testimony submitted to the U.S. House 

of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats, and Capabilities, February 14, 2007,’’ pp. 11–13; Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘Radicalization and 

Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32 (2009), p. 1102; and Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘The 7 July 2005 Bombings,’’ unpublished paper. 3Peter Bergen, ‘‘Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five Year Forecast,’’ Annals of the American 

Association of Political Science (July 2008), p. 15. 4 Hoffman, ‘‘Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command,’’ pp. 11, 13–14; Richard 

Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, ‘‘Inside the Terror Plot that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’ ’’ 

MSNBC.com, September 16, 2008. 5Sarah Laville, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Vikram Dodd, ‘‘Student visa link to terror raids 

as Gordon Brown points finger at Pakistan,’’ Guardian, available at: http:// 

www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/10/student-visa-terror-arrests-link; House of Commons, ‘‘Examination of Witnesses,’’ statement of James Fergusson, available at: http:// 

www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/302/9042103.htm. 6 Hoffman, ‘‘Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command,’’ p. 11. 

7 Craig Whitlock, ‘‘Germany Says It Foiled Bomb Plot,’’ Washington Post, September 6, 2007. 8 Riedel, The Search for Al-Qaeda, p. 125. 9Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner. Serialized in Al-Sharq al Awsat (London) 2– 

10 December 2001, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, document FBIS–NES–2001– 

1202, maintained on-line by the Federation of American Scientists, http://fas.org/irp/world/ 

para/aymanhlbk.html. 

collapse of the Taliban in 2001 and its loss of a haven in Afghanistan. Over time, 

the group became more entrenched in parts of Pakistan. While Islamabad had made 

fitful efforts to uproot it, some of the jihadist groups that the regime nurtured and 

tolerated to fight India and advance Pakistani interests in Afghanistan have turned 

against the regime. Al-Qaeda now has close ties to Laskkar-e Janghvi, Jaish-e Mohammed, and other groups that have tens of thousands of supporters in Pakistan, 

and its reach is considerable in non-tribal parts of the country. 

In this sanctuary al-Qaeda has planned, recruited, issued propaganda, and 

trained the next round of attackers. Al-Qaeda played a major role in the 2005 attacks on the transportation system in London.2 Writing in 2008, terrorism expert 

Peter Bergen describes the bombings as ‘‘a classic al-Qaeda plot.’’3 Al-Qaeda appears 

to have organized, coordinated, or otherwise played a major role in foiled 2004 attacks in the United Kingdom on a nightclub or a shopping mall; plans to bomb economic targets in several American cities; and the 2006 plan to simultaneously blow 

up perhaps ten airplanes as they went from the United Kingdom to the United 

States.4 Press reporting indicates that operatives with links to Pakistan played a 

role in the spring 2009 Manchester plot that British security services disrupted— 

all those alleged to be involved were of Pakistani origin.5 Terrorism expert Bruce 

Hoffman found that al-Qaeda was actively involved in virtually all major terrorist 

plots in the United Kingdom since 2003.6

Outside of the United Kingdom, German government officials claimed that they 

disrupted a plot to attack U.S. and German targets in Germany in 2007 involving 

three men, none of whom were of Pakistani origin, who trained at camps in Pakistan.7 The Danish government also reported a disrupted plot linked to Pakistan in 

2007. France and Italy have also reported al-Qaeda-linked plots. 

Al-Qaeda has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Pakistan today, working 

both on its own and with various Pakistani groups. It tried to kill former President 

Pervez Musharraf several times and probably was responsible for the assassination 

of Benazir Bhutto in 2007.8

Al-Qaeda’s own thinkers stress the importance of maintaining a haven and seem 

to have little faith in decentralized, bottom-up efforts. Al-Qaeda itself was consciously constituted as a vanguard. Bin Ladin’s deputy and heir-apparent, Ayman 

al-Zawahiri contended even as his movement was being expelled from Afghanistan 

that, ‘‘the mujahid [fighter for the faith] Islamic movement will not triumph against 

the world coalition unless it possesses a Islamist base in the heart of the Islamic 

world.’’9
62 

10 Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘The Leaderless Jihad’s Leader,’’ Foreign Affairs, May 13, 2011, http:// 

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67851/bruce-hoffman/the-leaderless-jihads-leader. 11See data compiled by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ‘‘The Year of the Drone’’ at 

http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones. 12Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ‘‘There Were More Drone Strikes—And Far Fewer 

Civilians Killed,’’ Foreign Policy, December 22, 2010, available at: http://newamerica.net/node/ 

41927. 

The al-Qaeda core issues propaganda to radicalize Muslims and helps recruit potential terrorists, trains them, and offers guidance for specific attacks. As a result, 

local individuals become far more dangerous when they are able to interact with alQaeda core members. 

Impact of the Death of bin Ladin 

Bin Ladin’s death is a significant blow to al-Qaeda. Bin Ladin, Hoffman notes, 

‘‘played an active role at every level of al-Qaeda operations: from planning to targeting and from networking to propaganda. ‘‘10 Beyond his operational role, his survival was a form of successful defiance. The world’s biggest military and most powerful country made him public enemy No. 1 for almost 10 years and failed to find 

him. To bin Ladin’s supporters, only God’s protection explained this mystery. 

Because of the successful U.S. attack, the aura of divine protection has diminished 

not only for bin Ladin, but by association his cause. A new leader like Zawahiri is 

an effective operator but has far less starpower than bin Ladin and is unlikely to 

inspire Muslims as effectively. More prosaically, but no less importantly, al-Qaeda 

will find it hard to recruit and fundraise without bin Ladin to lead their cause. 

Within the jihadist movement, bin Ladin often pushed back against the tendency 

toward slaughter that manifested in Iraq and Algeria. In such countries, so-called 

‘‘taqfiris’’ (who saw other Muslims who did not adhere to their extreme views as 

apostates) made war on their own societies, killing other Muslims and often making 

civil strife a priority over striking U.S. or regime targets. Bin Ladin counseled 

against this tendency and tried to put his resources behind leaders who embraced 

his agenda rather than killed their co-religionists on a mass scale. 

In short, bin Ladin was both a symbol of the movement and an effective strategic 

and operational leader. It would be glib to assume his death means the movement 

is finished. At the same time, however, the organization has suffered a tremendous 

blow. 

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DRONE CAMPAIGN

The U.S. drone campaign against al-Qaeda, begun under Bush and put on steroids 

under Obama, has taken out dozens of al-Qaeda figures, primarily in Pakistan. In 

2010, the United States launched over 100 drone attacks in Pakistan, according to 

the New America Foundation.11 Those killed were far less prominent than bin 

Ladin, but in many cases their skills were in short supply and difficult to replace. 

Al-Qaeda struggles to find seasoned and skilled new leaders, and even when it can 

it takes time to integrate them into the organization. Even more important, but 

even harder to see, al-Qaeda lieutenants must limit communications to stop U.S. 

eavesdropping that could lead to airstrikes, reduce their circle of associates to avoid 

spies, and avoid public exposure, all of which make them far less effective as leaders. This makes it harder, though not impossible, for them to pull off sophisticated 

attacks that require long-term planning. 

Although innocent civilians do die in these attacks, the number of non-combatant 

deaths is often exaggerated and has been declining. According to Peter Bergen and 

Katherine Tiedemann, ‘‘According to our estimates, the nonmilitant fatality rate 

since 2004 is approximately 25 percent, and in 2010, the figure has been more like 

6 percent—an improvement that is likely the result of increased numbers of U.S. 

spies in Pakistan’s tribal areas, better targeting, more intelligence cooperation with 

the Pakistani military, and smaller missiles.’’12 Such innocent deaths are still considerable, and errant strikes have the potential to worsen U.S.-Pakistan relations, 

but drone strikes are often far less bloody than alternatives such as Pakistani military attacks or U.S. attacks by manned fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, drone 

strikes involve no risk of U.S. personnel. 

Killing terrorist group lieutenants on a large scale can devastate a group. There 

may still be thousands of people who hate the United States and want to take up 

arms, but without bomb-makers, passport-forgers, and leaders to direct their actions 

they are often reduced to menacing bumblers, easier to disrupt and often more a 

danger to themselves than to their enemies. 
63 

13 AQIM remains focused on the greater Maghreb area, but it is more anti-Western in its operations than in the past. On the road to becoming AQIM the GPSC expanded its primary focus 

to include France as well as the Algerian regime. The group also began to strike U.N. and 

Israeli targets and go after Algeria’s energy infrastructure, none of which were a priority in the 

past. Suicide bombings, hitherto one of the few horrors the GSPC did not inflict, grew more frequent, along with Iraq-style car bombs. In addition, with the NATO intervention in Libya AQIM 

should be a concern to Western officials. In Pakistan, where al-Qaeda’s influence has spread 

since 9/11, there were two suicide attacks in 2002; by 2010 there were over 50, which killed 

over 1,000 people. Al-Qaeda allies in Pakistan attack both the Pakistani state and support antiU.S. forces in Afghanistan. And AQI, of course, attacks U.S. forces in Iraq. See Lianne Kennedy 

Boudali, ‘‘The GSCP: Newest Franchise in Al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad,’’ April 2, 2007, available at: 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-gspc-newest-franchise-in-al-qaidas-global-jihad; ‘‘2010 bloodiest year in Pakistan since 2001,’’ The Economic Times Online, December 24, 2010, available 

at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-12-24/news/27599872l1lsuicide-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-province-personnel. 14See in particular ‘‘Testimony of Gregory D. Johnsen,’’ before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, January 20, 2010. 15For an overview of this danger, see Christopher Boucek, ‘‘Terrorist Threat to the U.S. 

Homeland—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),’’ Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, March 2, 

2011. 16For an excellent recent review of how al-Qaeda views affiliation, see Barak Mendelsohn, 

‘‘Al-Qaeda’s Franchising Strategy,’’ Survival (Summer 2011), http://www.iiss.org/publications/ 

survival/survival-2011/year-2011-issue-3/al-qaedas-franchising-strategy/. 17 International Crisis Group, ‘‘Somalia’s Divided Islamists,’’ May 18, 2010. 18See Bronwyn Burton, ‘‘In the Quicksands of Somalia,’’ Foreign Affairs (November/December 

2009), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-the-quicksands-of-somalia. 

III. AL-QAEDA AFFILIATES

Because of the blows the al-Qaeda core has suffered, attention is increasingly focused on al-Qaeda affiliates. The most notable of these affiliates include al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda of Iraq (AQI), al-Qaeda of the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al-Qaeda also has ties to a range of 

other salafi-jihadist groups, at times working with them against U.S. or allied interests and in other cases simply supporting the local groups’ struggles against various 

regimes.13

The Yemen-based AQAP began to receive far more attention from U.S. homeland 

security officials after the 2009 Christmas day bombing plot, in which a Nigerian 

recruit almost blew up a passenger airplane landing in Detroit. Al-Qaeda has long 

had operatives and associates in Yemen, but for most of the last decade they focused 

on targets in Yemen or in the region. The Yemeni regime effectively crushed the 

threat after 9/11, but a 2006 jailbreak and a lapse in U.S. and Yemeni attention 

reinvigorated the jihadists.14 At the same time the Saudi government successfully 

suppressed what had briefly seemed to be a serious jihadist threat to the regime, 

and many Saudi fighters fled to Yemen. In 2009 the Saudi and Yemeni branches 

claimed to merge under the AQAP banner and took a more global focus, attacking 

not just Yemeni and Western targets in the region but also conducting international 

terrorism such as the Christmas bombing plot and the October 2010 plan to blow 

up two cargo planes as they neared U.S. cities.15 Some U.S. officials claim that 

AQAP is more dangerous than al-Qaeda. 

It is difficult to come to firm conclusions about how to view al-Qaeda affiliates.16

There is no single way to join al-Qaeda, nor is it always clear when a group should 

be viewed as under the al-Qaeda core’s control. Al-Qaeda does not demand sole allegiance: it supports local struggles even as it pursues its own war against the United 

States and its allies. So group members can be part of al-Qaeda’s ranks and loyal 

fighters in their local organizations. 

Groups often straddle their old and new identities, trying to keep up their local 

activities while also attacking more global targets. Often this is a time of infighting 

within a group, with key leaders pulling in different directions. Somalia’s alShabaab, for instance, appears to be in such a phase today.17 Some parts of the organization cooperate with al-Qaeda, with foreign jihadis playing leading roles in tactics and operations. But others within the movement—probably the majority, in 

fact—oppose the control of the foreigners, with some even publicly condemning terrorism and even working with international humanitarian relief efforts. Al-Shabaab 

could become ‘‘al-Qaeda of the Horn of Africa,’’ but this is not yet a done deal. And 

if it happens, it could split the group.18

The Benefits and Risks of Affiliation 

Al-Qaeda seeks not only to change the Islamic world, but also to shift the orientation of jihad from the local to the global—and here affiliates play a crucial role. His-
64 

19See ‘‘Somali-American accused of plotting to bomb Oregon tree-lighting event,’’ November 

27, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-27/justice/oregon.bomb.plotl1ltree-lighting-justicedepartment-portland-resident?ls=PM:CRIME. 

torically, most jihadist resistance movements have focused on their own territory or 

on throwing out foreign troops, but bin Ladin successfully convinced groups that 

striking the United States and its allies is more important to this victory than fighting more proximate enemies. 

For the al-Qaeda core, affiliates provide hundreds or even thousands of fighters, 

donors, smuggling networks, and sympathetic preachers who offer religious legitimacy. For example, when al-Qaeda needed to get its fighters out of Afghanistan 

after the fall of the Taliban, they relied on the logistical assistance of Sunni radicals 

in Pakistan; the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group helped them obtain false travel documents. 

Al-Qaeda affiliates also offer access to immigrant and diaspora communities—a 

group like Somalia’s al-Shabaab, with its connections to the Somali-American population, would be a prize asset. In 2010 a Somali-American from Portland was arrested for planning to bomb a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland.19

(There is no indication I have seen, however, that the individual was linked to the 

al-Qaeda core). 

Al-Qaeda franchises, in turn, often get money from the al-Qaeda core or others 

in its fundraising network. Al-Qaeda also has web and media specialists, recruiters, 

trainers, and other experts in its global rolodex, all available to help a local franchise. 

In the past, an al-Qaeda label is also a potential recruiting boon—it may help a 

group attract new members who hate the West and the United States but were not 

motivated by the group’s past, more local, rhetoric. Less tangibly, the al-Qaeda 

brand also can give credibility to groups struggling at home. Groups like al-Shabaab 

often have an inchoate ideology; al-Qaeda offers them a coherent alternative. The 

death of bin Ladin, for now at least, diminishes the attractiveness of the al-Qaeda 

brand. 

Gaining affiliates may raise al-Qaeda’s profile and extend its reach, but it also 

poses risks for the core. The biggest is the lack of control. Nowhere was this more 

apparent than Iraq. Beginning at least in 2005, al-Qaeda core leaders tried to push 

Iraqi fighters waging guerrilla war under the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq not to 

slaughter Shi’a Muslims, and especially not Sunni civilians, but to no avail. As the 

bloodshed rose, al-Qaeda funders and supporters pointed their fingers not only at 

AQI leaders, but also at the al-Qaeda core. 

The risk is even greater for affiliates. When they take on the al-Qaeda label, they 

also take on al-Qaeda enemies. The United States not only conducts direct attacks 

on al-Qaeda-related individuals and targets their recruiting and financial infrastructure, but Washington also can offer its allies intelligence, financial support, paramilitary capabilities, and other vital forms of assistance, creating new headaches for 

groups that are already beleaguered. They also move farther away from their original goal of fighting the local regime. Because of these risks, the decision to join alQaeda’s ranks often angers more sensible group members who retain local ambitions. 

IV. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

The U.S. homeland is safer than it was in the months before 9/11, and the death 

of bin Ladin is a further blow to al-Qaeda. Yet the danger of terrorism remains real. 

As I and others have noted, there is a real chance that in revenge an al-Qaeda sympathizer or member will attack a U.S. target, ideally (from the terrorists’ point of 

view) in the U.S. homeland but also, primarily for operational reasons, on U.S. persons and facilities overseas. Al-Qaeda itself also has a strong incentive to conduct 

an attack in order to prove its relevance at a time when many question whether 

it can continue after bin Ladin’s death. 

There have been few attacks on the U.S. homeland since 9/11, and one only serious terrorist success—Major Nidal Malik Hasan’s shooting of 13 Americans at Fort 

Hood in Texas. Hasan does not appear to have any direct linkages to the al-Qaeda 

core, but he was in email contact with AQAP member, and U.S. citizen, Anwar alAwlaki, the ideologue and operator who was also linked to AQAP’s attempted attacks on U.S. aviation targets in 2009 and 2010. 

Despite Hasan’s action, in general the U.S. homeland has enjoyed far more freedom from terrorism than I and many experts predicted in the months after 9/11. 

I believe this good fortune stems from several factors. The destruction of al-Qaeda’s 

haven in Afghanistan and the global intelligence and law enforcement hunt for 
65 

20 United States Department of Justice, ‘‘Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use 

Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing 

Material Support to Al-Qaeda,’’ February 22, 2010. 21 In 2009, al-Qaeda’s No. 2 Zawahiri called Shabaab advances in Somalia ‘‘a step on the path 

of victory of Islam,’’ while Shabaab would pledge allegiance to bin Laden. The group even used 

Alabama native Omar Hammani, who spoke under the name Abu Mansoor al-Amriki (‘‘the 

American’’), to do a video critique of President Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo earlier in the 

year. 22Testimony of Ken Menkhaus, ‘‘Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in 

America,’’ before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States 

Senate, March 11, 2009. 23 BBC News, ‘‘ ‘Airliners Plot’: The Allegations,’’ April 3, 2008, available at: http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uklnews/7329221.stm; Riedel, The Search for Al-Qaeda, p. 131. 

group members and supporters dealt major blows to the core’s operational capability 

and global reach. At home, the FBI and other organizations focused intensely on alQaeda, making it harder for the terrorists to pass unnoticed. Although there are individual exceptions, the U.S. Muslim community is not radicalized. Indeed, in several important terrorism cases community members have worked with U.S. law enforcement, providing invaluable tips. 

Ironically, the terrorism charges levied against various Americans in the years 

immediately after 9/11 seemed to confirm how much safer our country was. The FBI 

would often announce arrests of suspects with great drama, but those charged were 

often common criminals or unskilled dreamers, talking big but with little ability to 

carry out their schemes. Those arrested had little or no training, and—just as importantly—they did not seem to know how to get in touch with the al-Qaeda core. 

In the end, the Government would often charge them with minor, non-terrorism related crimes such as fraud or violating their immigration status. 

Yet there is reason to believe that all these factors are changing for the worse 

in recent years. As discussed above, al-Qaeda has revived somewhat in Pakistan, 

enabling it to plan and train more effectively than it could in the years after losing 

its base in Afghanistan. This revival is why the September 19, 2009, arrest of 

Najibullah Zazi is so disturbing to homeland defense officials. Zazi, a legal Afghan 

resident of the United States for many years, pled guilty in 2010 to planning to 

bomb several targets in New York. Unlike the unskilled attackers who were arrested in the past, Zazi admitted he was trained in Pakistan where he was instructed to carry out a suicide bombing.20

Nor is Pakistan the only problem. On October 28, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed became 

the first American suicide bomber, killing himself in Somalia’s civil war on behalf 

of the Islamist group al-Shabaab.21 Ahmed was part of two groups of perhaps 20 

Somali-Americans who grew up in Minneapolis and became radicalized after the 

Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. The Somali-American community from which 

he came has more in common with the Algerians in the banlieues in Paris than the 

affluent Arab Muslim community of the United States. By one estimate 60 percent 

of the Somalis in the United States, a community estimated as high as 200,000 people, live in poverty, and many young men drop out of school and turn to crime. 

While the conflict in Somalia may seem distant to most Americans, the U.S. role 

there is considerable—and Somali-Americans know it well. In the minds of many 

Somalis, the 2008 U.S. airstrike that killed Aden Hashi Ayro, a Shabaab leader, 

fused Somalia’s historic enemy Ethiopia and the United States. The result, in Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus’ words, was that ‘‘fierce levels of anti-Americanism took 

root among many Somalis at home and abroad.’’22 In September 2009, the United 

States struck again, killing another al-Qaeda figure there, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. 

So far, none of the Somali-Americans who went overseas have planned to return 

home and attack, but the Shabaab’s move toward al-Qaeda and the anger at U.S. 

policy are a disturbing combination. 

One of the biggest dangers involves ‘‘seam’’ areas that involve borders, airspace, 

and other security spots that are the responsibility of multiple countries—areas 

where homeland security meets foreign policy. Al-Qaeda and affiliate groups have 

far more sympathizers in foreign countries and better logistics networks there as 

well, making it easier for them to launch attacks from there rather than in the 

United States. Several of the most deadly terrorist plots in the last decade—the 

2003 ‘‘shoebomber’’ attempt to blow up American Airlines flight 63 in 2001, the 2009 

and 2010 AQAP attempts on civil and commercial aviation, a United Kingdom cell’s 

2006 plan to bomb as many as ten transatlantic flights—would have had devastating effects on the U.S. homeland but were not based in the United States. Instead, these involved the al-Qaeda core in Pakistan working with members and 

sympathizers, usually in Europe, to attack the U.S. homeland.23
66 

24See for example http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-protests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-extremism. 

Radicalization from abroad is another homeland security problem. Anwar alAwlaki left the United States in 2002 and went to Yemen in 2004. From there, his 

fluent English and comprehensive understanding of U.S. culture enabled him to 

radicalize individuals like Major Hasan and perhaps others—activities that would 

have led to his arrest had he remained in the United States. 

V. COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE ARAB SPRING

Al-Qaeda is dangerous not just because it has hundreds of skilled fighters under 

arms, but also because tens of thousands of Muslims have found its calls for violent 

change compelling. When dictators reigned supreme in Arab lands, al-Qaeda could 

score points by emphasizing its struggle against despotism. When dictators like Mubarak fall, however, al-Qaeda loses one of its best recruiting pitches: the repression 

Arab governments inflict on their citizens and the stagnant societies that result. 

The possible emergence of less repressive and more dynamic leaders would remove 

a popular issue from al-Qaeda propagandists. 

Although the word democracy itself often means different things to different audiences, polls suggest that the generic concept is quite popular in the Arab world, as 

befits a region that knows first-hand how brutal autocracy can be.24 In contrast, alQaeda believes that democracy is blasphemous because it places man’s word above 

God’s. 

Even more ominous for al-Qaeda is the way in which Mubarak and Ben Ali fell. 

Al-Qaeda’s narrative is that violence carried out in the name of God is the only way 

to force change. Further damaging al-Qaeda’s message, change occurred without 

blows being struck first at the United States. Al-Qaeda has long insisted that you 

must first destroy the region’s supposed puppetmaster in Washington (or Jerusalem) 

before change will come to Cairo or Tripoli. Events have shown idealistic young people dreaming of a new order—in, say, Jordan or Morocco—that you do not need to 

strike at Westerners and that peaceful change is possible. 

Finally, bin Ladin must also have lamented that the youth of various Arab countries are leading the revolution. Young people, especially young men, are al-Qaeda’s 

key demographic, the ones al-Qaeda propagandists expect to take up arms. For over 

a decade, al-Qaeda portrayed it fighters as audacious and honorable defenders of 

Muslim lands. In some circles they are cool. Now youth in the Arab world are afire 

with ideas of freedom and non-violent action. 

Though the revolutions make al-Qaeda’s message less compelling, it may still gain 

traction in the Arab world through greater freedom of operation. Arab tyranny often 

served U.S. purposes. U.S. counterterrorism officials have long praised countries 

like Egypt for their aggressive efforts against terrorism and their cooperation with 

the United States. Even Qaddafi—long derided as the ‘‘Mad Dog of the Middle 

East’’—since 9/11 has been valued as a partner against al-Qaeda. 

New governments in the Arab world will not necessarily be anti-American, but 

if they take popular opinion into account, cooperation will not be as close as it had 

been with governments like Mubarak’s. The security services that have fought alQaeda and its affiliates have also imprisoned peaceful bloggers, beat up Islamist organizers to intimidate them, and censored pro-democracy newspapers. Indeed, one 

measure of how much progress the Arab regimes are making toward democracy will 

be how much these services are purged. New security officials will be inexperienced, 

and conspiracy theories about U.S. intelligence have run amok in the Arab world. 

U.S. intelligence officers would probably be seen as coup plotters rather than partners. Islamists are likely to be particularly suspicious of intelligence cooperation. 

In addition, during the unrest some jails in Libya and Egypt have emptied, and 

the ranks of newly-freed jihadists multiplied. In both countries, many of the jailed 

jihadists turned away from violence in the last decade, producing bitter polemics 

against al-Qaeda (and an even more vitriolic al-Qaeda response) in recent years. 

Nevertheless, among those released are some true believers in jihad who are willing 

to wreak havoc upon their perceived enemies. 

Even in countries where the autocrats cling to power, security services are likely 

to be less effective against jihadists. At the very least, the security services of Morocco, Algeria, and other countries that have seen protests will make the democratic 

dissenters their top priority, not suspected terrorists. 

For now, there is reason to hope that revolutions in the Arab world will end up 

a net plus for counterterrorism. But hope should be balanced with the recognition 

that in the short-term al-Qaeda will gain operational freedom and that the United 
67 

States and its allies need to act now if they are to prevent al-Qaeda from reaping 

long-term benefits from the upheavals. 

VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I would urge this subcommittee to consider several recommendations as it strives 

to improve U.S. homeland security. First, fighting the al-Qaeda core in Pakistan 

should remain at the center of U.S. counterterrorism policy, even after bin Ladin’s 

death. Having a secure haven is often a make or break issue for terrorist groups, 

and al-Qaeda’s strength there is a deadly danger. Because of the danger this haven 

presents, and because Pakistan is at best a fitful counterterrorism partner, the 

United States must continue an aggressive drone campaign. Drone strikes, however, 

are not a substitute for forcing Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups and secure its own territory. Zazi, for example, managed to receive training after the drone 

strikes began in earnest, and other terrorist recruits can do so too. 

Second, we need to consider how American foreign policy can lead to domestic 

radicalization. Killing an al-Qaeda leader in Somalia can be a blow to the organization there, but the decision on whether to pull the trigger or not should also factor 

in the risk of radicalizing an immigrant group here at home, not just the operational 

benefit of removing one leader from the organization. 

Third, bin Ladin’s death also offers a further opportunity to reduce links between 

the al-Qaeda core and al-Qaeda affiliates. Zawahiri does not have bin Ladin’s charisma, and in the past his leadership has been more polemical and divisive. Affiliates may be more reluctant to follow him, particularly if al-Qaeda core fundraising 

efforts suffer after bin Ladin’s death and the drone campaign makes it difficult for 

Zawahiri to communicate regularly with affiliate leaders. Conversely, atrocities by 

one branch of al-Qaeda discredit the core, as has happened with AQI. 

Fourth, the United States needs to prepare for low-end threats as well as highlevel dangers. For homeland defense purposes, the al-Qaeda core represents an unusual set of leaders and operatives: Most are highly skilled and dedicated, welltrained, and meticulous about operational security. Affiliate members, however, are 

often less careful—their organizations grew up amidst a civil war, and accordingly 

focused more on maintaining an insurgency as opposed to a limited number of highprofile terrorist attacks. 

A vexing dilemma for U.S. policy concerns groups that may be moving toward alQaeda but have not yet made the leap. Many al-Qaeda affiliates always hated the 

United States and its allies and, even before they took on the al-Qaeda label, had 

members who trained or worked with al-Qaeda in a limited way. Their focus, however, was primarily on local issues. Because their groups had some ties to al-Qaeda, 

the Bush and Obama administrations began to target them and encourage others 

to do so. As a result, the groups became more anti-American, creating a vicious circle. Administrations are damned either way: ignoring the group allows potential 

threat to grow worse and risks an attack from out of the blue. But taking them on 

may mean driving some deeper into al-Qaeda’s fold. 

Fourth, U.S. intelligence and homeland defense should focus on ‘‘seam’’ areas— 

where the U.S. homeland is attackable from outside the country, such as on airplanes transiting from airports overseas to U.S. soil. U.S. officials should continue 

to try to improve integration between domestic and foreign-focused agencies and, at 

the same time, ensure that domestic-focused agencies are in touch with the relevant 

non-U.S. agencies in key countries. 

Fifth, at home the FBI and State officials should redouble efforts to know local 

Muslim communities and gain their trust. Counterterrorism involves not only drone 

attacks, but also social services for immigrant communities and courtesy calls to 

local religious leaders to hear their concerns and assure them that the United 

States continues to welcome them. Whether it be concerns over radicalization of Somali-Americans or other recent immigrant groups, outreach and successful immigration is vital for counterterrorism. 

Finally, U.S. counterterrorism policy must incorporate the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ into its 

strategic planning, and U.S. regional policy toward the new regimes (and surviving 

old ones) must continue to emphasize counterterrorism. U.S. public diplomacy efforts should relentlessly highlight al-Qaeda’s criticisms of democracy and emphasize 

the now-credible argument that reform can come through peaceful change. The message should be spread by television and radio, as always, but specific attention 

should be given to the internet given the importance of reaching young men in particular. 

Washington also needs a new policy towards Islamists. Ignoring the Muslim 

Brotherhood and other Islamist movements seemed prudent to both Republican and 

Democratic administrations when they had little chance of gaining power. In par-
68 

ticular, the United States should make it clear that it does not want these movements frozen out of government, but rather wants them to participate. The price for 

this participation is more moderate policies at home and abroad. Inevitably, this will 

lead to tension, as these Islamist groups seek policies that do not jibe with U.S. 

preferences, but their alienation could be a disaster for U.S. counterterrorism. 

More quietly, the United States should renew efforts to train the intelligence and 

security forces of new regimes, particularly if there are widespread purges. The first 

step is simply to gain their trust, as the new leaders are likely to see their U.S. 

counterparts as bulwarks of the old order and a possible source of counterrevolution. 

Many of the security services’ leaders will be new to counterterrorism. Even more 

important, they will be unaccustomed to the difficult task of balancing civil liberties 

and aggressive efforts against terrorism. Here the FBI and Western domestic intelligence services have much to offer. 

Recognizing these dilemmas and implementing (or continuing to implement) these 

policy recommendations will not end the threat from terrorism. However, they can 

make the United States more secure as the terrorism threat continues to evolve. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Professor Byman. 

Let me start out with just a personal experience I had. 

A couple of years ago I visited Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in 

Afghanistan I visited our troops around the 4th of July on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. At that time, they told me at one 

of the bases three of their soldiers had been killed the day before 

we arrived, and they are very barbaric in the way they kill our soldiers. But they said to me, Congressman, they are coming out of 

there—and they point at Pakistan—and they are coming over here, 

and they are killing us. 

I remember coming back here and met with the President, then 

President Bush, and talked to him about the threat of the tribal 

area in Pakistan, in the Fattah, that they were breeding there, 

they were training in the tribal area. He recognized that that was 

a serious concern, and I think not too long after that conversation 

we had the drone project that you mentioned, Professor Byman, 

which I think has been very successful in terms of taking out highvalue targets, and I think their command-and-control structure has 

been greatly damaged by the drone project. 

But the question I wanted to ask before I go on about that issue 

is, just Pakistan in general, Mr. Coll, I think all of you are experts, 

but I wanted to ask you particularly, when I visited them, they 

would talk about Madiyar, for instance, and they would study his 

battle plans from the Soviet days and how can we battle with him. 

But the ISI continues to be a troubling issue for the American 

people and the Congress in the sense that they always play this 

double game, if you will, or they like to play both sides of the fence, 

while on the one hand cooperating with us on some high-value targets and on the other hand protecting extremists when it is in their 

best interests, like for interest in the Kashmir area where you 

mentioned the issue with India. Cooperation with India I think 

would go a long ways. 

But this double game I think really came to a head when we saw 

the killing of bin Laden and we saw where he was living for quite 

a few years. It is very troubling to me, because if you look, there 

is a diagram up there about the compound, the location. As I mentioned in my opening statement, it is less than a mile away, which 

is half the distance between here and the Washington Monument, 

to what is the equivalent of Pakistan’s West Point Academy. You 

have retired military in this community surrounding this compound; and you have ISI agents, as I understand, in the area as 
69 

well. This is not a normal house. It really was a large compound, 

very heavily fortified, very suspicious looking in a sort of military 

area. 

It leads me to the question of our relationship with Pakistan and 

where do we go from here. Because, in my judgment, it is hard for 

anybody to believe that they didn’t know he was there, and the 

question is at what level did the Pakistani government know about 

this. I believe that either they are complicit or they are incompetent. Either they are complicit in providing material support to 

the most wanted terrorist by providing him a safe haven, or they 

are totally incompetent to not know he was there. 

So, with that, let me just throw that question out first to you, 

Mr. Coll, in terms of what is your assessment of this picture and 

how does this affect and impact our relationship with a very dicey 

country, Pakistan, who has been known to proliferate nuclear 

weapons? 

Mr. COLL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would associate myself with your observations and analysis. I think you described the picture well. 

The circumstantial evidence about the house in Abbottabad 

raises very disturbing questions about the knowledge that almost 

certainly must have been present in at least some sections of the 

Pakistani government about this unusual compound. I hope that 

over time we will discover more about how far up the chain of command in Pakistan such knowledge might have gone. 

Just a couple of quick observations about the compound. 

Pakistan has one of the lowest rates of tax participation in the 

world, even for a poor country. One of the reasons why official tax 

participation is so low is that if you build a million dollar house 

in the middle of a security town, someone knocks on your door and 

says, I have a way for you to avoid taxes, and that is put me on 

your payroll. 

The person who knocks on the door is almost always at least a 

regional official of the government, the police. In a town like 

Abbottabad, it certainly raises the question of whether ISI wouldn’t 

have been involved in such a racket. ISI is best understood as a 

criminal enterprise as well as a security agency. It is involved in 

many rackets around the country. 

Second, it is important for Americans to understand I think that 

the ambiguity and the nature of the haven that bin Laden found 

in Pakistan is not by itself unusual in the country. From India’s 

perspective, there are five or six listed terrorists living around the 

country in similar circumstances. Sometimes they are judged to be 

under house arrest. Sometimes they are notional fugitives. Sometimes they really are difficult to find. But many of these people 

have either admitted to or been credibly charged with mass killings 

on Indian soil. 

So these patterns look outrageous to the United States when the 

personality is somebody like Osama bin Laden, but in the context 

of the way Pakistan has evolved over the last 10 years, his circumstances were not by themselves unusual. 

Just on the question of what it poses by way of challenge to the 

United States and Pakistan, I think it is a useful wake-up call to 

both sides. The fundamental problem, as you point out, is that the 
70 

Pakistani military and intelligence service has not been held accountable over a long period of time adequately by its partners or 

by its own people. It has made it difficult for its own people to hold 

the services accountable by often ruling directly or suppressing 

those who question the military’s supremacy. 

But I think for the United States this is an opportunity to come 

to a more effective grip with the fact that the United States and 

Pakistan do not always see these very important security questions 

the same way and to try to hold Pakistan’s military to greater account, even while acknowledging the sacrifices that its soldiers 

have made in their own war on terrorism and the shared interests 

that will endure between the two countries. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

I think it also calls into question as we go into the appropriations 

cycle the billions of dollars we provide to Pakistan in foreign aid. 

We have known they have played this game for quite some time. 

Like you, boy, they need to be held accountable; and we need some 

answers as to whether they are complicit with us or not. 

Professor Hoffman and Professor Byman, do you have any observations? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you, sir. 

I agree with your remarks and also Mr. Coll’s. But I would suggest there may even be a third explanation that goes beyond complicity or incompetence but rather willful ignorance, is that it was 

simply better and preferable not to ask. 

But I think on this question of the double game you talk about, 

it extends even beyond whatever protection may have been afforded to Osama bin Laden. As I am sure you know, right now in 

Federal District Court in Chicago there is a trial of someone named 

Tahawwur Rana, and testimony is being made by David Headley, 

who is an agent of the ISI, to the effect that one of his ISI handlers, someone named Major Iqbal, not only knew of the Mumbai 

plot but also made absolutely no effort to stop the plans of LeT to 

target American citizens, both at the Jewish Chabat House but also 

at the hotel. Yet we haven’t seen any convincing denials from Pakistan. We haven’t seen any, at least to my knowledge, any investigations about who this Major Iqbal is and what his role is, and I 

think this is another area where we need to hold Pakistan very accountable. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is a great point. How many other of these 

wanted terrorists are being provided with safe haven by Pakistan, 

who we provide so much aid to and purportedly work together with 

to eradicate the terrorists? 

Professor Byman, do you have any comments? 

Mr. BYMAN. To briefly add, Pakistan has long had what it feels 

are strategic interests in both Afghanistan and India in terms of 

ensuring a friendly government to Afghanistan and I would say one 

dominated by Pakistan and India in preventing Kashmir from becoming I will say a normal part of the Indian union and, as a result, its work with a range of militant groups. 

We think of al-Qaeda, of course, as a terrorist group, but it is 

also an organization that has put a tremendous amount of energy 

into working with insurgencies around the region. In this capacity, 

I will say it is hard to say where al-Qaeda begins and where some 
71 

of the components of its network begin. But certainly components 

of the network have been extremely useful to Pakistan and India 

and in Afghanistan. So it is very hard for us to make progress on 

the counterterrorism front without making progress on Afghanistan and Kashmir, which makes this exceptionally difficult. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think you and Mr. Coll have raised that same 

issue, and I think it is a very good point. 

My time has now expired. I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Ms. 

Clarke, too. I appreciate that. 

I think the greatest concern we have right now is the possibility 

of terrorists getting hold of nuclear weapons, and that brings Pakistan front and center in that regard, the way we are proceeding 

with Pakistan, I think clearly some of the issues about weak governance and some of the strong anti-American sentiment that exists there and the limited ability we have to really monitor the programs. 

Now, the President has said he is going to call forth now to really 

measure accountability in metrics, in real metrics. For the entire 

panel, could you comment on what kind of metrics this could be 

measured in? How can this be tangibly monitored and how can we 

hold Pakistan accountable? 

Most everyone now, I think Senator Kerry when he returned 

from a meeting in Pakistan, had said that it is going to be more 

what you do, not what you say. So it seems like Senator Kerry and 

the President are on the same page. They are looking for tangible 

metrics that can be measured. 

So if you can comment on how you think we could measure what 

those metrics should consist of, I would be appreciative. 

Mr. COLL. I think that is an excellent question and subject and 

a very important direction for U.S. policy. 

You can start with the observations that the Chairman made 

about these compounds in Pakistan. The first metric would be the 

status under the law of listed terrorists known to be residing in 

Pakistan. There is a substantial body of open-source evidence about 

a number of listed terrorists, a U.N. list of terrorist, so it doesn’t 

even have to be something coming directly from the United States, 

whose status under the law is confused or unsatisfactory. 

I think there are two other important areas where the United 

States has the capacity itself to monitor the conduct of Pakistani 

security services in its relations with militant groups. There is always a debate about what the true capacity of the Pakistani state 

is to do more. 

The Pakistanis use their own weakness as a defense against accountability, but there are some areas where the state’s capacity to 

control terrorist activity is clear. One of those is in the cross-border 

movements of militants from Pakistani territory into Indian-held 

Kashmir, for example. 

That border is essentially a military zone. Nobody moves across 

that border without the Pakistan Army’s permission. The Indians 

have been watching the Army send armed young men with groups 

like Lashkar across that border with impunity for years, and the 

United States has not made a priority of holding Pakistan to ac-
72 

count for the rates of infiltration. It would be unreasonable to say 

you should have zero infiltration in this complex territory, big 

mountains, but the rates of infiltration that Pakistan has allowed 

suggests state policy. 

Similarly, on the Afghan border where American lives and security interests are even more directly at stake, surely there are 

metrics to monitor the actual conduct of Pakistani security services 

to prevent cross-border infiltration, applying some rule of reason as 

to what the state’s capacity really is and then holding the state to 

that account. 

Mr. KEATING. Do any of the other panelists wish to comment on 

that? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, I agree completely with what Mr. Coll has 

said. I would only add that I think some of the metrics are the degree of cooperation, and I think now at least publicly cooperation 

is flattening rather than increasing. The number of, for instance, 

U.S. military trainers in Pakistan has decreased. The number of 

CIA intelligence operatives has also decreased. So I think it is really the strength of cooperation. 

Some of these things, the metrics may be able to be publicly stated but the reporting of them may have to remain classified. But I 

think these are enormously illustrative of the degree and extent 

that Pakistan is sincere about cooperation against terrorism. 

Mr. KEATING. I just have a few seconds left, so I apologize for 

giving a difficult question so quickly. But how would you suggest 

and what would be some of the benefits or dangers of linking our 

foreign aid to these measurable metrics? Do you think there is a 

way to do that? Do you think there is a danger in doing it too closely, or do you think there is a benefit? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I don’t think we have much choice. I think that 

the problem is that from the Pakistani perspective, they believe in 

essence they have us over the barrel. They know that we require 

their cooperation. Yet I think it has been either a blank check during the Musharraf time, or now what they see as an open checkbook. So I think it is our only leverage that we can exert over 

them. 

Mr. KEATING. Do any of you think that that could be measured 

so that there is some accountability for their own actions? 

Mr. COLL. I think there has always been or there has often been 

from Congress sources of conditionality attached to U.S. aid to 

Pakistan. But it has often been the Executive branch’s prerogative 

to judge Pakistan’s performance and the criteria have often been 

general or abstract. Whatever the degree of sort of automatic trigger that such accountability might involve, I think it would be a 

helpful change to attach specific metrics of the sort we are talking 

about to that finding. Even if the Executive branch retains some 

discretion, our Executive branch ought to be held accountable 

around some of these same specific issues, rather than just a generalized sense that things are good enough. 

Mr. KEATING. I just want to thank you. I couldn’t agree with you 

more. I think that some countries use their own weaknesses as an 

excuse. So thank you very much. 

I yield back my time. 
73 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. I agree. This is excellent testimony as 

we go into the foreign aid appropriations cycle that we need to use 

these metrics, because clearly the location of the bin Laden compound I think calls into serious question Pakistan’s cooperation 

with the United States. 

With that, I recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for all three of you, I guess, however you can best answer it. But it has been said that al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula has put its American supporters on a noble quest to vanquish 

injustice and save the world from invading evil. However, we know 

that al-Qaeda has killed far more Muslims than it has Americans. 

So how do we as the U.S. Government go about debunking and 

countering this message? 

Mr. BYMAN. Mr. Long, I will take the first shot at this one. To 

me this is the great weakness of al-Qaeda, and it is something that 

Muslim thinkers and commentators have noticed and repeatedly 

mentioned and it has caused tremendous dissent within the broader, certainly Islamist, but even within the jihadist community, the 

question of killing Muslims, especially Muslim noncombatants. 

To me, I would recommend several things to emphasize this. One 

is that when the United States does public diplomacy we not make 

it about the United States. I think if we end up trying to sell our 

policies, whether it is in Iraq or Israel-Palestine, we are not going 

to win on that one. But we do put it in their court when we make 

it about the killing of Muslim noncombatants. 

Also, we should be elevating credible voices that make these 

statements that condemn al-Qaeda. Here I would say this is a particularly difficult issue for Congress, however, because many of 

these credible voices are actually quite anti-American on a number 

of other things. So you might have a quite eminent sheikh who 

says you should not kill Muslim women and children, al-Qaeda is 

wrong and evil, but you should go to Iraq and kill American soldiers there. 

Of course, I understand why we do not want to support anyone 

making that statement. But if you are trying to reach into the radical community, someone who is on the other extreme is not going 

to have any resonance there. So people with credibility to condemn 

al-Qaeda are going to have views that we often disagree with, at 

times quite strongly. 

Mr. LONG. When you say public diplomacy, walk me through that 

again. Our public diplomacy should what? 

Mr. BYMAN. I am sorry, in my view often our public diplomacy 

emphasizes how good it is to be a Muslim in the United States, the 

validity and justice of U.S. policies, and these are legitimate activities. But to me it is far more credible, given the unpopularity of 

al-Qaeda’s message, when we make the public diplomacy about 

their message, in a way this is negative campaigning. They have 

done many things and stand for many things that are extremely 

unpopular in the Muslim world and have been criticized even by 

elements within the radical fringe, and we need to amplify those 

voices and make that what the debate is about rather than trying 

to insert ourselves into this, which I think backfires. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Professor Hoffman. 
74 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think this question of al-Qaeda and its affiliates 

claiming far more Muslim lives than its enemies is a very important one and an unexploited one, but I would say generally we do 

a very bad job in countering the al-Qaeda narrative and countering 

their message of radicalization and recruitment. 

First, I think within the United States Government these types 

of activities are both poorly resourced and have a very low priority. 

I think we also tend to look at the world through our own eyes, 

not through the eyes of the audience we have to communicate with. 

For example—— 

Mr. LONG. How do we change that attitude? How do we change 

that? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, I think we have to understand our enemy 

and understand our target audience much better than we do. I 

think just as Professor Byman was saying, that too often it is either directed from an American prison or through an American 

lens. 

I will give you a specific example. Much has been made in recent 

weeks about the videotape of Osama bin Laden sitting on the floor 

with the blanket around him in very austere surroundings wearing 

a wool cap. It almost gives the sense that this is some broken pathetic old man watching old films of himself. But yet we haven’t 

thought of what that image actually portrays to Muslims elsewhere, to the Muslim world. 

For example, they see a man who lived until the end, who was 

true to his own commitment to forsake a life of comfort and luxury 

to wage jihad. Someone who lived simply, who like the prophet 

cloaked himself in a blanket as a pious Muslim, wore a head covering. So we see this as someone sitting there humiliated in essence, but that is not necessarily the image that other people, especially the audience that we need to reach, sees him as. 

In terms of how we can better counter this narrative than we 

have done, the victims of terrorism, especially the Muslim victims 

of terrorism, a young woman in Washington named Carie Lemack 

literally on her own with a very small network has created a survivor’s group that has been motivated, and their mission basically 

is to better illuminate the role that victims and survivors of terrorism can play in countering this message. Of course, the documentary that she made on a shoestring ‘‘Killing in the Name’’ was 

nominated for an Academy Award. But this is an important message that I think we have really under-exploited and under-used. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. Coll. 

Mr. COLL. Well, I agree entirely with Professor Byman and Professor Hoffman. I guess the only thought I would add is that the 

Arab Spring does offer an opportunity to advance the recommendations that both of the previous speakers have outlined. There is 

going to be an opportunity for the United States and many other 

countries around the world, wishing well to the nascent democracies forming in countries like Egypt and Tunisia to support civil 

society groups, credible voices, to strengthen speech and to bring 

forward the underlying opinion in many of these societies that alQaeda does not represent their ambitions and is in fact an evil in 

their midst. So that indirect opportunity speaks to the strategies 

that they have both outlined. 
75 

Mr. LONG. Thank you all for being here today. I have no time 

to yield back, but if I did, I would. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you for your generosity. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentleman for being here. The little bit of time I have been in here has 

been very enlightening. 

I will direct this question to Dr. Hoffman. I am just trying to understand some of the relationships on the Arabian Peninsula and 

North Africa. What is the relationship, if any, between al-Qaeda 

and the Muslim Brotherhood? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, it is a relationship that perhaps at one time 

in history ideologically was similar, but I think in recent years 

really they have been two inimical forces, where Ayman alZawahri, I suppose the titular leader of al-Qaeda now, but until recently bin Laden’s deputy, certainly in recent months has attacked 

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, also Hamas, which is part of the 

Muslim Brotherhood network in Gaza, for even attempting to make 

peace, for instance, with Israel or enter into any kind of negotiations in Egypt, for deigning to participate in any kind of a democratic process. 

So I think we are actually talking about phenomena that, as I 

said at one time, had some ideological similarities, but really now 

is quite separate and different. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Any other gentlemen have anything to add to that? 

Mr. BYMAN. Zawahri managed to write a book denouncing the 

Muslim Brotherhood essentially while on the run and being hunted. I have difficulty writing a book sitting in my office for years on 

end without such interruptions. So the fact that he put such effort 

into it. He has also had quite bitter relations with Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that is also a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot. 

So I think it is what the people refer to as the narcissism of little 

differences, where they were close enough ideologically that their 

subsequent split in terms of where they have gone, where they 

moved to, grates all the more. 

With the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt now, you have an alternative, you have a political alternative. This is a group that is, so 

far, and we should perhaps knock wood here, is so far moving on 

the path to being part of regular elections in a democratic society. 

If that is a success, that is quite a different message and quite a 

different hope that should be encouraged. It will come with a lot 

of bumps, even if it is a success, but that in itself could be a blow 

to al-Qaeda. 

Conversely, if the Muslim Brotherhood is excluded from power, 

that will send a message to many young members that the world 

will not allow them to take power peacefully, so that exclusion 

could be quite dangerous and radicalizing to a small group of these 

people. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Just kind of a follow-up about al-Qaeda. What is 

the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps, is that the Qods Force? Can you talk about that, because I am reading a lot about that now and I really would love 

to hear some testimony on that. 
76 

Mr. BYMAN. Congressman, I would urge you to try to get a classified briefing on this, because the unclassified material, which I 

have studied extensively, is actually noticeable by its absence. 

There is clearly significant things going on. We have had senior alQaeda members transit Iran. Some have found haven in Iran, but 

perhaps under different degrees of house arrest. Iran has a history 

of working with a wide range of groups that it actually does not 

see eye-to-eye to, and certainly in this case they are often violently 

in disagreement. But Iran is quite pragmatic. 

So we have seen cooperation in the past. We have seen some degree of cooperation since 9/11. But in my judgment it is a very 

fraught relationship. There are ideological differences. Iran is much 

more cautious in its use of terrorism than al-Qaeda. These groups 

in the end strongly, I would say, even hate one another is the right 

word, but they have other problems as well. 

But this is an area I think where both Iran and al-Qaeda for 

their own reasons have been trying to keep any relationship as secret as possible. It is politically damaging to both of them. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Clearly al-Qaeda is in Iran, the CIA just canceled 

a program over there tracking those individuals. I was going to ask 

a question how you feel about the CIA canceling that tracking program. 

Mr. BYMAN. In my view, tracking where al-Qaeda individuals are 

should always be a priority. I cannot speak to this particular program though. I don’t know its strength and weaknesses. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A news report just came out today. I read it this 

morning. 

So thank you very much. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Just in closing, I want to make a couple of comments. When we heard from the previous panel that the administration is not providing a complete and accurate picture of the 

threat assessment, specifically as it relates to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, so when we look at countries like Pakistan 

and others that have nuclear capability, I think that is absolutely 

essential that they come forward as required by law and report 

these findings to the Congress. I would assume you would all agree 

with that assessment as well. 

AQAP, Awlaki has troubled me for the last 2 years, almost more 

so than bin Laden did, because of his ability to impact Muslim 

youth in the United States and radicalize them. As the Ranking 

Member talked about, this is a virtual safe haven, and he is in a 

safe haven in Yemen, a failed state. But his ability to use the internet very deceptively to radicalize remains—I think the testimony 

I have heard, you probably agree that Awlaki is emerging as one 

of the top leaders of al-Qaeda and one of the biggest threats. 

My last question, and if anybody else would like to ask a question, I will recognize them. We talked about the Predator drones, 

Professor Byman. I believe they have been very effective, the surgical strikes, but they have had some controversy obviously within 

Pakistan and Yemen as well. How effective are these drone strikes? 

Mr. BYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my view, the drone 

strikes are effective. But let me begin with three caveats: When 

you bomb people, at times you miss or at times you kill innocent 

people nearby. The drones are far more surgical than our tradi-
77 

tional fixed-wing aircraft that are manned, and, of course, they are 

far more surgical than Pakistani military range. But nevertheless, 

we have to accept innocent death as part of this. 

Second, the drones are unpopular in Pakistan. When you are 

conducting military operations on the soil of another country, that 

is understandable. Often they are less popular farther away from 

the areas where the drones are operating. I think that in some 

ways people are farther away, it is easier to take offense when you 

don’t have to deal with the militants nearby. 

The third caveat is the drone itself is not a strategy that solves 

the problem. In my view, it reduces the problem, but this is something that will be solved more fundamentally or not by the actions 

of the Pakistani state. 

But the drones do reduce the skilled number of al-Qaeda leaders, 

and their bench, while deep, is not infinite. I think even more important, it forces them to operate in a different way. They spend 

much of their time playing defense. It is very hard to quantify, but 

if instead of spending 12 hours a day organizing, planning and 

training, they spend 2 because the other remaining 10 are spent 

moving from place to place, avoiding dangerous communications, 

that is a huge impact on an organization, and I will say especially 

given the leadership transition going on. 

With the death of bin Laden, Zawahri needs to lead. He needs 

to be out there, he needs to be communicating, he needs to be 

showing that he is taking over, and that is much harder because 

he risks exposing himself to U.S. intelligence and the U.S. military 

if he does, and his death in a short period of time would be an extreme blow to this organization, reducing continuity. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Coll and Professor Hoffman, do you agree with 

that assessment? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do. I would just add a couple of points. I think 

it has been a highly effective tactic. I think though we have run 

the risk of confusing an effective tactic with an overall strategy, 

and I think this is just one arm of the war on terrorism. 

But I think what concerns me the most is I predict we are going 

to see diminishing returns from the drone program. I think we already are. When we see the publicly-released lists of targets that 

have been killed, the 130 or so people, you look at that list, there 

is a diminishing number of actual high value targets of the senior 

leaders of al-Qaeda. There is nothing wrong with disrupting the 

mid-level as well, but I think as a means of decapitation, we are 

going to find it that it pays fewer dividends. I think also that our 

opponents will take increasing countermeasures to frustrate the 

drones and to make sure that they are not the victims. 

But I would end with the point that one of the lessons or messages we should take from the highly successful SEAL operation in 

Abbottabad is that we also have the capacity perhaps in the future 

not just to take out and kill high-value targets, but also to use that 

capability to capture them and therefore gain the necessary intelligence, both tactically and also strategically, that often high-value 

targeted killings don’t enable us to obtain. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is a great point. The treasure trove we found 

in the compound, do you believe Pakistan is fully cooperating with 

us on getting that information? 
78 

Mr. HOFFMAN. One hopes so, but it is difficult to say. At least 

publicly it is not clear. I mean, they did of course let the CIA— 

there was one important development. They did let the CIA team 

into the compound to do their forensic scans with equipment and 

with capabilities that the Pakistanis don’t have. But beyond that, 

how the treasure trove of information is actively being applied in 

terms of actionable intelligence, it is just not clear. It may be happening, but I am not aware of it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Coll. 

Mr. COLL. Just on that last point, it is my understanding that 

the access to the wives and other civilians who were in the compound and who were left behind was difficult for the United States 

to obtain in the early days and the circumstances in which those 

individuals were held by Pakistan raised questions about the Pakistani government’s intent in terms of maximizing cooperation. So 

it does seem as if from the open source evidence things have improved, but certainly in the first 48 hours or 72 hours there were 

some real breaches in cooperation, I think. 

On the larger subject, I agree very much with both of the previous speakers. I do think that, to Professor Hoffman’s points about 

the diminishing returns, I think the open source evidence makes 

clear what he asserts, and also bin Laden’s own circumstances suggest what life is like if you are on the run from a world of drones. 

You do not sit in the spaces that you know the drones will be actively patrolling. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would say that is a great point. 

Okay, with that, I want to thank the witnesses for an excellent 

discussion here today. 

Members have 10 days to submit questions in writing. If they do 

so, I would hope you would answer those. Thank you so much 

again for appearing here today. 
79 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ