Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) 

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 On Arrangements with 

Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, 

and Transparency of Filings by Issuers 

Submitted to the President of the United States, the Committee on 

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate and 

the Committee on Financial Services of the United States House of 

Representatives 

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 

DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

This is a report by the Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The 

Commission has expressed no view regarding the analysis, findings, or conclusions 

contained herein. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ABBREVIATIONS iii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 

I Introduction 6 

A. How the Study and Report Fulfill the Statutory Mandate 6 

1. The Statutory Mandate 6 

2. The Structure of this Report 8 

B. The Financial Reporting Framework 10 

1. The Balance Sheet 11 

2. Other Basic Financial Statements 12 

3. Notes to the Financial Statements, MD&A and Other Disclosures 14 

C. Historical Context of the Study and Report 15 

1. Enron 15

2. Standard Setting Environment 19 

3. Accounting Motivated Transaction Structuring 22 

4. Improvements in the Financial Reporting Regime Since the Passage of the 

Sarbanes-Oxley Act 23 

II Study Methodology 27 

III Arrangements with Potential Off-Balance Sheet Implications 32 

A. Investments in the Equity of Other Entities 32 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 32 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Investments 36 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 38 

B. Transfers of Financial Assets With Continuing Involvement 40 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 40 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets 44 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 46 

C. Retirement Arrangements 49 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 49 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Retirement Arrangements 52 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 53 

D. Leases 60

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 60 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Leases 62 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 63 

E. Contingent Obligations and Guarantees 65 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 65 

i
2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Contingent Obligations and 

Guarantees 68 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 69 

F. Derivatives 72

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 72 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Derivatives 78 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 80 

G. Other Contractual Obligations 86 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting Requirements 86 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Contractual Obligations 88 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 89 

IV Empirical Findings on Certain Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Improvements in Financial 

Reporting On Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements 91 

A. Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities 91 

1. Discussion 91

2. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 92 

B. Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance 

Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations 96 

1. Discussion 96

2. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 97 

 

V Initiatives to Improve Financial Reporting Transparency 98 

A. Eliminate (or at least Reduce) Accounting Motivated Transactions 99 

B. Continue Implementation of Objectives-Oriented Approach to Standard 

Setting 101

C. Improve the Consistency and Relevance of Disclosures 103 

D. Improve Communication Focus in Financial Reporting 103 

VI Recommendations Related to Accounting Standards 105 

A. Standards on Accounting for Leases 105 

B. Standards on Accounting for Defined-Benefit Retirement Arrangements 107 

C. Continue Work on Consolidation Policy 109 

D. Continue to Explore the Feasibility of Reporting All Financial Instruments at 

Fair Value 110 

E. Develop a Disclosure Framework 113 

ii
ABBREVIATIONS 

ABO Accumulated Benefit Obligation 

APBO Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligations

Act The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 

AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 

AIMR Association for Investment Management and Research (currently 

known as the Certified Financial Analyst Institute) 

APB Accounting Principles Board 

ARB Accounting Research Bulletin 

Board Financial Accounting Standards Board 

CFA Institute Certified Financial Analyst Institute (formerly known as the 

Association for Investment Management and Research) 

Commission United States Securities and Exchange Commission 

DIG Derivatives Implementation Group 

EDGAR Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system

EITF Emerging Issues Task Force 

ERISA Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 

FR Final Reporting Release 

Interpretation No. FASB Interpretation Number 

GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 

GSE Government Sponsored Enterprise 

IASB International Accounting Standards Board 

IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 

LIBOR London Inter-bank Offering Rate 

MD&A Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Position and 

Results of Operations 

OBS Off-Balance Sheet 

OPEB Other Post-Employment Benefits 

PBO Projected Benefit Obligation 

QSPE Qualifying Special Purpose Entity 

SAB Staff Accounting Bulletin 

Sarbanes Oxley Act The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 

SEC United States Securities and Exchange Commission 

SFAC Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 

SFAS Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 

SOP Statement of Position 

SPE Special Purpose Entity 

Staff Staff of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 

VaR Value at Risk 

VIE Variable Interest Entity 

iii
Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) 

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 On Arrangements with 

Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, 

and Transparency of Filings by Issuers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2001 and 2002, a spate of major corporate accounting scandals came to light 

that exposed weaknesses in corporate governance, audit practices, and financial 

reporting. Congress responded by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the 

“Sarbanes-Oxley Act” or “Act”),1

 the most significant piece of securities legislation since 

the 1930s. Among the many provisions of the Act, Section 401(c) mandates that the 

Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) conduct a study of 

filings by issuers (the “Study”) and issue a report (the “Report”) that addresses two 

primary questions: (1) the extent of off-balance sheet (“OBS”) arrangements, including 

the use of special purpose entities (“SPEs”), and (2) whether current financial statements 

of issuers transparently reflect the economics of off-balance sheet arrangements. To 

answer these questions, the staff of the Commission (the “Staff”) conducted an empirical 

analysis of the filings of issuers as well as a qualitative analysis of pertinent U.S. 

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) and Commission disclosure rules. 

The mandate also asks for recommendations, if any. In this Report, which is intended to 

fulfill the statutory mandate, the Staff describes the Study, reports its findings and 

provides recommendations. 

For purposes of the Study and Report, the Staff takes a relatively expansive 

approach to the scope and meaning of the term “off-balance sheet.” The Staff examines a 

variety of business arrangements that may be viewed as having off-balance sheet 

implications and that are deemed important from a policy perspective. The arrangements 

examined in the Study include investments in the equity of other entities, transfers of 

financial assets (where there is continuing involvement), certain retirement arrangements, 

leases, contingent obligations and guarantees, derivatives, and other contractual 

obligations—with an emphasis on the use of special purpose entities where relevant. The 

Staff broadly concludes that significant progress has been made in several areas since the 

passage of the Act, but that there remains room for improvement in the financial 

reporting of several types of arrangements with off-balance sheet implications. The Staff 

also believes that reducing the complexity of the financial reporting requirements should 

increase transparency and understanding. 

The Study was performed by analyzing data collected from the filings of a sample

of 200 issuers, including the notes to the financial statements, and Management’s 

 

1

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002. 

1
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Position and Results of Operations (“MD&A”).2

 

The Staff determined that a sample size of 200 was sufficient to construct a representative 

sample of the population of active U.S. issuers.3

 Given the possibility that the use of 

arrangements with off-balance sheet implications, as well as special purpose entities,

might be disproportionately concentrated in the very largest issuers, a “stratified” 

sampling approach was adopted such that the sample would consist of the 100 largest 

issuers (in terms of market capitalization)4

 and 100 additional issuers, randomly 

selected.5

The Staff reports findings on the extent to which issuers report the existence of

certain business arrangements with off-balance sheet implications, how such 

arrangements are presented on issuer balance sheets, and the transparency of the 

supporting disclosures in the financial reports. The empirical findings and estimates are 

limited by what is actually reported and/or disclosed in issuers’ financial reports. The 

Staff was not in a position to address whether and to what extent there may be other

arrangements that are not reflected in the financial reports. The empirical portion of the 

Study is largely descriptive in nature. 

In addition to the empirical work, the Report is also informed by the Staff’s 

experience in reviewing periodic financial statements filed with the Commission, which 

provides it with information about the application of accounting and disclosure standards. 

In particular, the qualitative analysis of the content and application of pertinent 

accounting standards relies in part on the collective experience of the Staff. Further, the 

Report is informed by the Staff’s experience in dealing with standard setters and 

international regulators that are grappling with comparable issues. For example, both the 

Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) and the International Accounting

Standards Board (“IASB”) have dealt with (and continue to consider) the accounting for

each of the topics addressed in this Report, and the Technical Committee of the

International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) has recently released 

its Report on Strengthening Capital Markets Against Financial Fraud, which, among 

other things, discusses whether additional disclosures related to the use of SPEs are 

warranted. 

In excess of 100 Staff members directly contributed to the Study and Report 

through participation in project planning, methodology design, data collection and 

analysis, research, critical analyses of standards and rules, and the drafting, editing, and 

review of the Report. Primarily, this included Staff from the Office of the Chief 

Accountant, the Office of Economic Analysis and the Division of Corporation Finance. 

 

2

Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations is required by

Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Items 303(a), (b) and (c) of Regulation S-B, Item 5 of Form 20-F and

Paragraphs 11 and 12 of General Instruction B of Form 40F.

3

In statistical terms, the sample size is sufficient to test for a 20% difference from the sample mean at 95%

significance and with 90% power.

4

This is with certain exceptions, as explained below. 

5

See Section II for more details on the sample selection methodology.

2
In many cases, when considering the appropriateness of accounting for various 

transactions, the focus is on the standards themselves and recommendations tend to focus 

on what changes the FASB, as the accounting standard-setter in the U.S., should 

consider. However, the Staff believes that to focus only on the FASB activities is too 

narrow, as the FASB is only one part of the financial reporting framework. Thus, in

formulating its recommendations, the Staff considered potential improvements that could 

be made to improve transparency by various participants in the financial reporting

process. 

The Staff identified several key initiatives to improve transparency in reporting,

as follows: 

i. Discourage transactions and transaction structures primarily motivated by 

accounting and reporting concerns, rather than economics. The Staff believes

that use of transaction structuring to achieve accounting and reporting goals that 

do not conform to the economic substance of the arrangements reduces 

transparency in financial reporting. As discussed below, many of the areas 

dealing with off-balance sheet arrangements involve significant use of 

accounting-motivated structured transactions. 

ii. Expand the use of objectives-oriented standards, which would have the 

desirable effect of reducing complexity in accounting standards. The Staff’s 

previous report on objectives-oriented standards6

 described many of the benefits 

of such standards, as well as the risks inherent in accounting standards that rely 

to a significant extent on rules and bright lines. The Staff continues to support 

the recommendations in its prior study. 

iii. Improve the consistency and relevance of disclosures that supplement the basic

financial statements. In many cases, the Staff does not believe issuer

disclosures are as informative as they could be. Nowhere is this clearer than in 

regards to financial instruments disclosures. While new standards might help in 

this area, substantial progress can be made through attention of issuers in 

improving disclosures under existing standards. 

iv. Improve communication focus in financial reporting. The Staff believes that 

many issuers interpret financial reporting narrowly, and regard technical 

compliance with the requirements as satisfactory. However, if investors and

other users are misled or have insufficient information to understand the 

activities of the issuer, such “compliance” does not serve the purpose of 

financial disclosure. Moreover, such a mindset puts the burden on regulators 

and standard-setters to drive all improvements in reporting. The Staff believes 

that if issuers focus on clear and transparent communication with investors in

preparing financial statements, both accounting and disclosures will improve. 

 

6

Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States 

Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System (“Objectives-Oriented Accounting 

Standards Study”). 

3
In addition, the Report includes several standard-setting recommendations that 

would help further these initiatives. 

a. The Staff recommends that the FASB continue its work on the accounting 

guidance that determines whether an issuer would consolidate other entities. 

While it may be too early to fully understand the effects of recent improvements 

in consolidation guidance for SPEs, the consolidation guidance continues to be

complex and decisions regarding consolidation greatly affect which items are on 

the balance sheet. 

b. The Staff recommends the accounting guidance for defined-benefit pension 

plans and other postretirement benefit plans be reconsidered. Under the current 

accounting guidance (circa 1985), the trusts that administer these plans, which 

are conceptually similar to SPEs, are exempt from consolidation by the issuers

that sponsor them, effectively resulting in the netting of assets and liabilities on

the balance sheet. In addition, issuers have the option to delay recognition of 

certain gains and losses related to the retirement obligations and the assets used 

to fund these obligations. An extrapolation of the findings from the sample of 

issuers in the Study to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers 

suggests that there may be approximately $535 billion in retirement obligations 

that are not recognized on issuer balance sheets. 

c. The Staff recommends that the accounting guidance for leases be reconsidered.

The current accounting for leases takes an “all or nothing” approach to 

recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a clustering of lease 

arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not cross, the “bright lines” 

in the accounting guidance that would require the lease to be recognized on the 

balance sheet. An extrapolation of the findings from the sample of issuers in the 

Study to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that there 

may be approximately $1.25 trillion in non-cancelable future cash obligations 

committed under operating leases that are not recognized on issuer balance 

sheets, but are instead disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.7

 

d. The Staff recommends the continued exploration of the feasibility of reporting 

all financial instruments at fair value. Supporters of greater use of fair values on 

the balance sheet argue that the most useful information is that which reflects

the current values of assets and obligations. Fair value accounting for all 

financial instruments also would appear to have benefits in terms of reduced 

complexity (for example, by eliminating the need for hedge accounting and its 

attendant documentation and effectiveness testing requirements, in many 

instances), more understandability, and less motivation to structure transactions 

so as to achieve certain accounting treatments. Of course, some have expressed 

significant concerns with requiring fair value accounting for all financial 

instruments, such as the potential manipulability and degree of difficulty in 

auditing some fair values. However, in light of the potential benefits, the Staff

 

7

This figure is not discounted to its present value, as would be the case if these cash flows were recognized

as a liability on issuer balance sheets. 

4
believes that methods should be sought to eliminate the obstacles to this 

treatment. 

e. The Staff believes that, in general, disclosures in the filings of issuers need to be 

better organized and integrated. More useful and consistent disclosure

requirements could be achieved if a framework were developed that clearly and 

concisely set forth the objectives and limitations of the notes to the financial 

statements. In addition, the Staff hopes to work with the FASB, users, 

preparers, and others to improve disclosures for financial instruments, so that 

information is organized, streamlined, and provides adequate specificity and

detail, without overburdening preparers and auditors. 

While the Staff concludes in this Report that there remains room for improvement 

in the transparency of financial reporting related to the balance sheet, it also wishes to 

acknowledge that much has been accomplished since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 

Act in terms of improving the financial reporting of arrangements with off-balance sheet 

implications.

8

 This includes, among other things, additional guidance from the FASB—

for example, Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised 

December 2003)—an interpretation of ARB No. 51—which is intended to address some 

of the concerns with the failure of issuers to consolidate certain special purpose entities

under earlier guidance.9

 The FASB has also promulgated new guidance in several other 

areas, including the accounting for guarantees in Interpretation No. 45 and distinguishing 

liabilities from equity in SFAS No. 150. Further improvements come from regulatory 

requirements promulgated by the Commission that an issuer explain its off-balance sheet 

arrangements in a separately captioned subsection of its MD&A.10 While not directly 

related to the topics addressed in this Report, the Staff also notes the substantial 

improvement in transparency that will result from the implementation of SFAS No. 123R 

“Share-Based Payment”, which requires accounting for stock options based on their fair 

values. 

Underpinning this Report is the Staff’s focus on “full and fair disclosure.” The 

Staff believes that investors—and the market as a whole—are best served by financial 

information that is presented fully and clearly. For example, the Staff believes that 

investors will benefit from an income statement that reflects changes in asset values so 

long as the sources of those changes are disclosed, and the manner in which those values 

are determined (i.e., what measurement attribute is used and what assumptions underlie 

the value) is understandable. What presents difficulties for investors, as well as the 

market as a whole, is a lack of information about potential positive and negative cash 

flows. Thus, while some participants in the financial reporting process favor accounting 

standards that enable the presentation of consistent or smooth income statement figures, 

 

8

For a more complete list of improvements in financial reporting since the Act see Section I.C.4. 

9

See Section IV infra. for discussion. 

10See Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and 

Aggregate Contractual Obligations Release No. 33-8182 (January 28, 2003) (“FR-67”). This rule was

promulgated by the Commission in January 2003 in response to Section 401(a) of the Act. 

5
the Staff believes that transparent balance sheets are very important and that investors are 

better served by seeing any volatility that exists, along with explanations for why such 

volatility exists. To that end, it seems desirable to the Staff for standard setters to focus 

on balance sheet measures and to consider transparent ways in which to address concerns

about showing volatility in the income statement. 

Finally, it is important that both regulation and standard setting keep pace with 

business changes in the private sector, which are extremely fast paced. That being said,

the Staff appreciates the extraordinary resource demands that have been imposed on 

preparers and auditors as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act coupled with the various 

other efforts at improving financial reporting, auditing, and standard setting that have 

followed in its wake. Nonetheless, the Staff believes that the issues raised in this Report 

should be addressed to improve the transparency of the balance sheet in particular and of 

financial reporting in general. 

I. Introduction 

A. How the Study and Report Fulfill the Statutory Mandate 

1. The Statutory Mandate 

The mandate for this Report comes from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 

introduced a broad array of reforms to the U.S. financial reporting system.

11 The Act

called for increased oversight of auditors of public companies through the creation of the 

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.12 It directed the Commission to establish

rules prohibiting auditors from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients

13 and 

requiring management and auditor reporting on the effectiveness of public companies’ 

internal controls.14 It increased penalties for violations of securities laws and required 

certification of financial results by key corporate officers.15 Through these and other 

provisions, the Act called for improvement in the system of checks and balances that 

govern the production of financial information provided to investors. 

The Act also mandated that the Commission conduct a Study of off-balance sheet

transactions and the use of special-purpose entities. Specifically, Section 401(c)(1) of the

Act requires the Commission to: “complete a study of filings by issuers and their 

disclosures to determine— 

(A) the extent of off-balance sheet transactions, including assets, liabilities, leases, 

losses, and the use of special purpose entities; and 

 

11See the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 

12See sections 101-109 of the Act.

13See section 201 of the Act.

14See section 404 of the Act.

15See sections 901 to 906 of the Act.

6
(B) whether generally accepted accounting rules result in financial statements of 

issuers reflecting the economics of such off-balance sheet transactions to investors 

in a transparent fashion.” 

In addition, Section 401(c)(2) requires the Commission to: “submit a report to the 

President, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the 

Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, setting forth— 

(A) the amount or an estimate of the amount of off-balance sheet transactions, 

including assets, liabilities, leases, and losses of, and the use of special purpose 

entities by, issuers filing periodic reports pursuant to section 13 or 15 of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 

(B) the extent to which special purpose entities are used to facilitate off-balance 

sheet transactions; 

(C) whether generally accepted accounting principles or the rules of the 

Commission result in financial statements of issuers reflecting the economics of 

such transactions to investors in a transparent fashion; 

(D) whether generally accepted accounting principles specifically result in the 

consolidation of special purpose entities sponsored by an issuer in cases in which 

the issuer has the majority of the risks and rewards of the special purpose entity; 

and 

(E) any recommendations of the Commission for improving the transparency and 

quality of reporting off-balance sheet transactions in the financial statements and 

disclosures required to be filed by an issuer with the Commission.” 

In order to fulfill the mandate and produce this Report, the Staff has characterized

the terms “off-balance sheet transaction,” “economics” of an arrangement, and

“transparency” of financial reporting. When used in other contexts, these terms may 

have different definitions or meanings. 

In recent times, following the accounting scandals exposed in 2001 and 

subsequently, the term “off-balance sheet” has sometimes carried the connotation of 

something underhanded, or at least less than fully transparent. The insinuation is that 

something that should be on the balance sheet is not, and that the reporting issuer has 

designed the transaction or arrangement to produce that result. However, questions about 

whether items should be reflected on the balance sheet do not arise only when there is an 

attempt to deceive financial statement users. Many legitimate transactions generate such 

questions, and there are, of course, bounds as to what should be included on a balance 

sheet. It is this broader, more-inclusive question of the proper bounds of what should be 

included on the balance sheet that draws the Staff’s attention in this Report. The common 

characteristic of the arrangements addressed in this Report is that they create or involve a 

situation in which there may be a legal or economic nexus between the issuer and risks, 

rewards, rights or obligations not reflected (or not fully-reflected) on the balance sheet. 

Sections 401(c)(1)(B) and 401(c)(2)(C) both use the term “economics,” with the 

latter section asking “whether generally accepted accounting principles or the rules of the 

7
Commission result in financial statements of issuers reflecting the economics of such 

transactions to investors in a transparent fashion.”16 For purposes of this Report, when 

the Staff refers to the “economics” of an arrangement, the reference is meant to speak 

generally to the risks, rewards, rights, and obligations associated with the arrangement, 

rather than a formal categorization. 

The words “transparent” or “transparency” appear in sections 401(c)(1)(B), 

401(c)(2)(C) and 401(c)(2)(E), with the final subsection asking for “any 

recommendations of the Commission for improving the transparency and quality of 

reporting off-balance sheet transactions in the financial statements and disclosures 

required to be filed by an issuer with the Commission.”17 The Staff believes transparency

can best be gauged in terms of the informational needs of investors, creditors and other 

users of financial statements. For purposes of this Report, the Staff characterizes

“transparent” financial reporting as reporting that provides investors and other users of 

financial statements with appropriate information to assess the material risks, rewards,

rights, and obligations associated with arrangements. The Staff notes that transparency is

not always improved with the provision of more information.18 Thus, while some might 

argue that the greatest transparency would come from putting all things on the balance 

sheet, thereby eliminating “off-balance sheet” arrangements entirely, the Staff believes 

that putting too many things on the balance sheet could result in less understanding of the

differences between the rights and obligations associated with each of the items reported. 

 2. The Structure of this Report 

The Report is arranged topically, analyzing the accounting and reporting for 

various types of arrangements in turn. This structure allows the Staff to provide the 

requested information for various types of arrangements in an integrated manner that is 

intended to facilitate understanding. 

By way of background, the next sub-section presents a short primer summarizing 

the financial reporting framework, including the basic accounting concepts necessary to 

understand the issues discussed in the Report. Those who are familiar with the financial 

reporting framework may skip this section of the Report with no loss of continuity. The

remainder of the introduction provides a discussion of the historical context of the Study 

and Report, including, among other things, a discussion of certain arrangements

involving Enron. 

 

16Emphasis added. 

17Emphasis added. 

18For example, as noted in the December 29, 2003 Release No. 33-2950 Commission Guidance Regarding

Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations: 

MD&A must specifically focus on known material events and uncertainties that would cause

reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating performance or 

of future financial condition. Companies must determine, based on their own particular facts and 

circumstances, whether disclosure of a particular matter is required in MD&A. However, the 

effectiveness of MD&A decreases with the accumulation of unnecessary detail or duplicative or 

uninformative disclosure that obscures material information. 

8
Section II of the Report—entitled “Study Methodology”—addresses 

methodological issues including the construction of a stratified sample, the data 

collection process, descriptive statistics on the sample and a description of the technique 

for extrapolating to the population. 

Section III of the Report—entitled “Arrangements with Potential Off-Balance

Sheet Implications”—addresses particular types of arrangements with potential offbalance sheet implications. Section III covers investments in the equity of other entities,

transfers of financial assets with continuing involvement, retirement arrangements, 

leases, contingent liabilities and guarantees, derivatives, and other contractual 

obligations. Each of the sub-sections includes the following: 

i.) A description of the transactions or reporting issues being addressed combined 

with a discussion of the related accounting and financial reporting requirements; 

ii.) A discussion of the potential off-balance sheet questions that arise from the 

arrangements and a discussion of why standard setters have made the decisions

currently reflected in the accounting guidance; and 

iii.)A presentation and discussion of the empirical data gathered from the Study of 

filings by issuers to provide information regarding the percentage of issuers 

reporting the arrangements discussed in the Report, and how these arrangements 

are recognized on issuer balance sheets and in notes to the financial statements. 

The discussions of each area are intended to be illustrative. The Staff focuses on

different ways that the arrangements in question could be analyzed in terms of what 

assets or liabilities would be recorded. Sections 401(c)(1)(A), (2)(A) and (2)(B) of the 

Act require a study of “the extent of” off-balance sheet transactions. Where the data were 

obtainable, this portion of the mandate is answered in the subsections of Section III titled 

“Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers.” 

Sections 401(c)(1)(B) and (2)(C) of the Act require a study of whether generally 

accepted accounting principles and the rules of the Commission result in financial 

statements of issuers “reflecting the economics of such off-balance sheet transactions to 

investors in a transparent fashion.” The Staff addresses this question for each of the 

substantive accounting areas addressed in Section III in the subsections entitled “OffBalance Sheet Issues in Accounting for [...]” 

Section IV addresses certain post-Sarbanes Oxley improvements to the financial 

reporting regime as they relate to off-balance sheet arrangements. This section includes a 

discussion of FASB Interpretation No. 46(R), which was meant to achieve more 

consistent application of consolidation policies for special purpose entities. Section 

401(c)(2)(D) of the Act inquires as to “whether generally accepted accounting principles 

specifically result in the consolidation of special purpose entities sponsored by an issuer 

in cases in which the issuer has the majority of the risks and rewards of the special 

purpose entity.” This can simply be answered in the affirmative in that Interpretation No. 

46(R) essentially requires this.19 However, as is discussed in Section IV, the

 

19See Section IV for additional information on Interpretation No. 46(R). 

9
determination of which party has “the majority of the risks and rewards of the special 

purpose entity” may involve complex judgments in some circumstances. 

Section 401(c)(2)(E) of the Act calls for recommendations, if any, for “improving 

the transparency and quality of reporting off-balance sheet transactions” in financial

statements. Section V discusses several goals toward which all those involved in the 

financial reporting community should work. The discussion explains the goal and its 

benefits to financial reporting, and explains how various constituents in the capital 

markets can help to achieve the goals. Section VI provides recommendations for changes 

in accounting and reporting requirements that would further the initiatives discussed in 

Section V. The recommendations in Sections V and VI do not, in all cases, follow only 

from the analysis of the various types of transactions. That is, the Staff draws as well

from its own experiences in dealing with issuer financial statements on a daily basis. 

B. The Financial Reporting Framework 

The Commission has responsibilities under the securities laws to specify 

acceptable standards for the preparation of financial statements.20 However, the 

Commission has for virtually its entire existence looked to the private sector for 

assistance in this task. Currently, the body that the Commission looks to for the setting of 

financial reporting standards is the FASB.21 The FASB has promulgated accounting 

standards in many areas, and has also created a conceptual framework for accounting and 

financial reporting that it uses in setting accounting standards. This framework specifies 

that the objective of financial reporting is to provide information useful to investors and 

creditors in their decision-making processes.22 

Filings by issuers include four main financial statements: the balance sheet, the 

income statement, the cash flow statement, and the statement of changes in equity.23 

Each financial statement provides different types of information, but they are interrelated 

in that they “reflect different aspects of the same transactions or other events affecting an 

entity,” as well as complementary in that “none is likely to serve only a single purpose or 

provide all the financial statement information that is useful for a particular kind of 

assessment or decision.”

24 A complete set of financial statements also includes notes,

which disclose quantitative and qualitative information not in the basic four financial 

statements. Public filings may also be required to include additional information, 

 

20See, for example, sections 7, 19(a) and Schedule A, items (25) and (26) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15

U.S.C. 77g, 77s(a), 77aa(25) and (26); sections 3(b), 12(b) and 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(b), 78l(b) and 78m(b); sections 5(b), 14, 15 and 20 of the Public Utility Holding

Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 79e(b), 79n, 79o and 79t; sections 8, 30(e), 31 and 38(a) of the 

Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-8, 80a-29(e), 80a-30 and 80a-37(a).

21See Release No. 33-8221 (April 25, 2003), Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a

Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter. 

22Statement of Financial Accounting Concept No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business

Enterprises, November 1978, paragraph 32. 

23SFAC No. 5, paragraphs 39-41 and 55-57. 

24SFAC No. 5, paragraph 23, see also paragraph 24. 

10
including information about the company’s business, the risk factors it faces, and a

discussion of its financial condition and results of operations. 

1. The Balance Sheet 

Given the topic of this Report, our main focus is on the balance sheet. The 

balance sheet portrays an issuer’s financial position at a point in time. Its basic 

components include: 

• Assets, which are “probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a

particular entity as a result of past transactions or events”;

25

• Liabilities, which are “probable future sacrifices of economic benefits arising 

from present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or provide services 

to other entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events”;26 and 

• Equity, which is “the residual interests in the assets of an entity that remains after

deducting its liabilities.”27

While the above definitions appear straightforward, many questions and issues 

arise in determining which items should be reflected on the balance sheet. Additionally,

questions arise regarding whether certain items that are included in the balance sheet 

should be reported as liabilities or as equity. 

Perhaps the most pervasive question is whether, in deciding which assets and 

liabilities to include in the balance sheet, one should look to those assets and liabilities 

legally controlled by an issuer, or to those assets and liabilities that expose an issuer to

risks and rewards. In most simple structures, these two approaches to analyzing the 

question produce similar answers as to whether or not to consolidate. However, more 

complex structures have developed in business practice for which these two different

philosophies produce different answers. 

Determining the contents of the balance sheet using a control approach generally 

makes sense if one is interested in what value company management can generate from 

the resources that it manages. That is, a control approach is compatible with a

“stewardship” view of the financial statements. On the other hand, a risks and rewards 

analysis makes sense to those who see the financial statements as a way to understand 

how various events might affect the value of their holdings in the entity. Current GAAP 

generally relies on a control approach to determine which items appear in the balance

sheet. Thus, even when a majority of the risks and rewards of an asset belong to other 

parties, the controlling entity will record the asset on its books. Furthermore, an issuer 

that owns a controlling voting interest in another entity will generally consolidate that

other entity, even if its controlling interest represents a minority of the total capital 

invested. 

 

25SFAC No. 6, paragraph 25. 

26Id., paragraph 35. 

27Id., paragraph 49. 

11
While the focus on control has been generally consistent, there are various 

analyses that are used to identify the controlling party. The common indicator of control 

is a legal analysis regarding the ability to direct the use of the asset in question or, in a 

consolidation situation, voting control over the entity in question. However, there are 

some instances in which a legal control analysis has been found lacking, and therefore is 

not used. The decision of whether to consolidate certain SPEs is one such area. Even

before the Enron and other scandals, many had realized that looking for the more

common indicators of control does not work well in regard to SPEs, mainly because so

many SPEs have all of their significant activities “pre-programmed” at their formation, 

such that voting control is rendered rather irrelevant.28 Under recent accounting guidance 

for SPEs, a risks and rewards analysis is performed in order to get at which party, if any, 

should consolidate the SPE. 

Another issue that pervasively affects which assets and liabilities are included in 

the balance sheet is whether to record assets and liabilities individually in the financial 

statements, or to net them. This is particularly important in that most contracts provide

both counterparties with rights that could be considered assets, while simultaneously 

subjecting them to obligations that could be considered liabilities. Pension obligations, 

when recognized, are generally reported net of assets set aside to fund them,

29 while other 

obligations for which funds are set aside generally are reported on a “gross” basis—that 

is, both the obligation and the funds set aside are separately reported in the balance sheet. 

In contrast, transfers of financial assets may be reported on either a gross or net basis, 

depending on a myriad of factors. Similar to questions of control vs. risk and rewards, 

both gross and net reporting can provide information that is useful to investors. For

example, in the partial transfer of a financial asset, a gross reporting approach may signal 

to investors that an issuer still owns the entire asset, and has merely agreed, through a 

separate contract, to forward a portion of the payments received to another party, in

return for the payments received from that other party. Net reporting, however, lets 

investors know that the issuer is really no longer exposed to the full change in value of 

the financial asset, because a portion of the related risks and rewards has passed to the 

purchaser. 

2. Other Basic Financial Statements 

The other three basic financial statements describe, each in its own way, the 

changes in various balance sheet items from one period to the next. We discuss each in 

turn. 

The income statement reflects the issuer’s revenues and expenses, gains and 

losses, and, thus, is intended to capture “the extent to which and the ways in which the 

equity of an entity increased or decreased from all sources other than transactions with 

 

28See, for example, page 82 of the Commission’s 2000 Report to Congress, which comments that “existing

[consolidation] standards do not adequately address circumstances involving entities with specific limits on

their powers, also referred to as SPEs. The FASB is urged to continue its efforts to provide guidance 

concerning these entities.” 

29See discussion in Section III. 

12
owners during a period.”30 Over the years, tremendous controversy about what should be

reported in the income statement has arisen. In large part, the controversy can be traced 

to the fact that net income (often expressed as a per share measure) has been focused on

more than any other single characteristic in evaluating performance. As such, the 

decision to change accounting standards in a way that would result in more volatility 

being reported has often prompted controversy. 

Due to the complementary and integrated nature of the balance sheet and income

statement, choosing the accounting treatment for one statement has implications for the 

other.31 One of the most critical and timely examples to illustrate such conflicts relates to

recent standards that require the recognition of more assets and liabilities on the balance 

sheet at their fair values. Moving to fair values on the balance sheet requires that a 

decision also be made regarding whether the unrealized changes in these fair values are 

reported on the income statement. Unrealized gains and losses related to assets and 

liabilities are those that occur while an issuer holds the asset or liability, as opposed to 

realized gains and losses that occur when an asset or liability is sold or settled. 

Proponents of the “all inclusive” approach to defining net income would argue 

that it is appropriate to include both realized and unrealized gains and losses in net

income because this information enables users to better predict future earnings or cash 

flows. However, others point out that recording unrealized gains and losses in the 

income statement may lead to increased earnings volatility such that earnings become

less predictive of future earnings or cash flows. The alternative to reporting unrealized

gains and losses as part of net income is to report these changes in “other comprehensive 

income,” which most often appears in the statement of shareholder equity, until the gain 

or loss is realized through sale of the asset or settlement of the liability. 

The statement of changes in equity reflects the ways in which assets and liabilities 

have changed due to transactions with owners during the period, such as declarations of 

dividends, issuances of stock options, exchanges of shares in mergers and acquisitions, 

and items that are classified as “other comprehensive income,” as discussed above.32 

The cash flow statement reflects “an entity’s cash receipts classified by major 

sources and its cash payments classified by major uses during a period.”33 This statement 

 

30SFAC No. 5, paragraph 30. In truth, there are several transactions that meet the criteria to be included in

the income statement, but have nonetheless been excluded from net income, and instead categorized as 

“other comprehensive income”. 

31Historically, the relative focus of standard setters on the balance sheet versus the income statement (or 

vice versa) has varied. The balance sheet was emphasized in the early part of the 20th Century (and before),

in part because creditors had little reliable information available to them. Liquidation values and 

conservatism were of central importance. By the late 1930s, the focus shifted to a shareholder orientation, 

the income statement and value in use rather than liquidation value. Hendriksen, Elden S., 1982, 

Accounting Theory, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 257. 

32With the exception of the changes in the value of international subsidiaries that result from translating 

their financial statements into U.S. dollars, these issues are discussed in detail in Section III. 

33Id., paragraph 52. 

13
groups the inflows and outflows of cash into three broad categories: operating cash flows, 

investing cash flows, and financing cash flows. 

Operating cash flows include cash received from customers, cash spent on

materials and labor, cash paid for utilities, insurance, executive salaries, and many other

types of operating items. When the operating section of the cash flow statement is

presented based on categories such as these, it is known as a “direct method” cash flow 

statement. The FASB noted that “[t]he principal advantage of the direct method is that it 

shows operating cash receipts and payments [and that] [k]nowledge of the specific 

sources of operating cash receipts and the purposes for which operating cash payments

were made in past periods may be useful in estimating future operating cash flows.”34

Another option, known as the “indirect method,” allows issuers to prepare this 

section by reconciling net income to operating cash flow. Using this method involves 

adjusting net income for non-cash items, such as depreciation and changes in certain 

current assets or liabilities. For example, issuers would adjust net income for changes in 

accounts receivable (which indicate a difference between accrual basis revenue and cash 

received from customers) or changes in accounts payable (which indicate a difference 

between accrual basis expenses and cash received to providers of goods and services). 

The FASB noted that “[t]he principal advantage of the indirect method is that it focuses 

on the differences between net income and net cash flow from operating activities.”35

When the FASB promulgated SFAS No. 95, The Statement of Cash Flows, it 

required presentation of the indirect method in all cases, and expressed a preference that 

the direct method36 also be presented, but did not require its use. Most issuers do not 

present direct method cash flow statements.37 

The other two sections of the cash flow statement report investing cash flows and 

financing cash flows. Investing cash flows include cash inflows and outflows related to 

purchases or sales of property, plant and equipment, investments in equity or debt of 

other entities, and other types of investments. Financing cash flows include cash inflows 

from raising capital through issuing stock or debt, cash outflows to repay mortgages and 

other liabilities, cash paid for dividends, and the like. 

3. Notes to the Financial Statements, MD&A, and Other 

Disclosures 

The basic financial statements alone often do not provide sufficient information 

for investment decisions. The FASB’s concept statements note that: “[s]ome useful 

information is better provided by financial statements and some is better provided, or can 

only be provided, by notes to financial statements or by supplementary information or 

 

34SFAS No. 95, paragraph 107.

35SFAS No. 95, paragraph 108.

36SFAS No. 95, paragraph 119.

37The Staff agrees with the FASB’s preference and encourages issuers to voluntarily present their cash flow

statements using the direct method. 

14
other means of financial reporting.”38 These disclosures in the notes to the financial 

statements are intended to provide information that balance sheets, income statements, 

and cash flow statements cannot (or do not) provide. 

In addition, although the notes provide much information that is not provided in 

the basic financial statements, they generally do not provide an explanation of the

business activities underlying the numbers. Recognizing that such information may be as 

important to investors as the information in the financial statements and notes, the 

Commission requires issuers to include a section called Management’s Discussion and 

Analysis of Financial Position and Results of Operations in many filings. MD&A

requires a discussion of significant events, trends, and uncertainties, explanations of key 

financial statement figures, disclosures regarding events reasonably likely to affect the 

issuer’s operations or liquidity in the near future and other information that provides 

context to the financial statements. As noted in FR 67: 

The disclosure in MD&A is of paramount importance in increasing the 

transparency of a company's financial performance and providing investors with 

the disclosure necessary to evaluate a company and to make informed investment

decisions. MD&A also provides a unique opportunity for management to provide 

investors with an understanding of its view of the financial performance and 

condition of the company, an appreciation of what the financial statements show 

and do not show, as well as important trends and risks that have shaped the past or 

are reasonably likely to shape the future.

Because of the importance of the notes to the financial statements and other 

disclosures, including MD&A, in providing information that is not provided by the basic 

financial statements themselves, questions of whether items should or should not be 

included on the balance sheet and whether sufficient transparency in reporting has been 

achieved must be assessed in light of the presence and role of these other reporting tools. 

C. Historical Context of the Study and Report 

 1. Enron 

While the Act does not discuss why off-balance sheet arrangements and SPEs are 

identified for special attention, looking back at the scandals that preceded the passage of 

the Act appears instructive. At the beginning of 2001, Enron Corp. enjoyed a market 

capitalization that exceeded $60 billion, ranked as the seventh largest corporation in the 

world by revenue,39 and had won Fortune magazine’s award as the ‘most innovative 

company in the United States’ six years running.40 Yet, toward the end of 2001, Enron 

 

38SFAC No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises, (Dec. 1984),

paragraph 7. 

39Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner (“Second Interim Batson Report”), In 

re: Enron Corp., et al., Jan. 21, 2003, page 5. 

40The award was won in 1996 through 2001. See Christopher L. Culp and Hanke, Steve H., “Empire of the 

Sun: An Economic Interpretation of Enron’s Energy Business,” Policy Analysis, Cato Project on Corporate 

Governance, Audit and Tax Reform, Feb. 20, 2003, page 2. 

15
collapsed within a matter of months, filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. 

Its collapse constituted the largest corporate bankruptcy up to that point in time. 

This event acted as a catalyst—especially after it was rapidly followed by other 

high-profile business and financial reporting failures, including those at Worldcom and 

Adelphia —and raised many questions about corporate governance, the audit process, 

and financial reporting in general. It eventually was reported that aspects of Enron’s 

business were built on non-substantive trades and related-party transactions with no valid

business purpose. There were multiple violations of the company’s code of conduct, 

some of which were specifically approved by the Board of Directors.41 Compounding all 

of this, it quickly became apparent that Enron’s financial reports had not revealed the 

company’s true economic position to the market. Upon closer scrutiny, it also appeared 

the use of and accounting for OBS arrangements and SPEs had hidden the risks that 

played an important role in its rapid collapse.42 The Enron scandal, along with other 

financial reporting failures (several of which also involved OBS transactions and SPEs), 

preceded the wave of reforms that included passage of the Act. 

While it is beyond the scope of this Report to look in detail at Enron’s 

transactions, a brief description of a few transactions may serve to illustrate the lack of 

transparency that can result from some off-balance sheet arrangements. Enron’s 

transactions have been examined in detail by others. For the examples provided below, 

the Staff relies solely on the Powers Report and the Second Interim Batson Report, both 

of which are publicly available. 

Enron’s court appointed bankruptcy examiner, Neal Batson, preliminarily 

concluded that “through the pervasive use of structured finance techniques involving 

SPEs and aggressive accounting practices, Enron so engineered its reported financial 

position and results of operations that its financial statements bore little resemblance to

its actual financial condition or performance.”43 The impact of these “techniques” was 

profound. For 2000, barring the use of these techniques, Enron’s reported debt would 

have been $22.1 billion rather than $10.2 billion.44

On November 19, 2001, Enron filed its third quarter financial statements and 

reported debt on its balance sheet of approximately $13 billion. Yet, on the same day, at 

a meeting designed to help relieve its liquidity crisis, Enron informed its bankers that its

debt was approximately $38 billion; the difference of $25 billion was explained as being 

either off-balance sheet or on the balance sheet as something other than debt. Batson 

notes that approximately $14 billion of this off-balance sheet debt was “incurred through 

structured finance transactions involving the use of SPEs.”45

 

41See, for example, Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of 

Directors of Enron Corp. William C. Powers, Jr. Chair (Feb. 1, 2002) (“Powers Report”), page 3.

42See Second Interim Batson Report; see also Powers Report. 

43Second Interim Batson Report, page 15. 

44Id., page 3. 

45Id., page 9-10. 

16
Similarly, a report by a Special Investigative Committee on Enron—i.e., the

Powers Report—found, among other things, that transactions with certain SPEs “allowed 

Enron to conceal from the market very large losses resulting from Enron’s merchant 

investments by creating an appearance that those investments were hedged.”46 We rely

on the Powers Report for the following example of an arrangement combining the use of 

SPEs with derivatives to reduce transparency. 

Enron had invested in a “high-tech” stock—Rhythms NetConnections, Inc.47 The

investment had grown approximately 30-fold in value. Enron reflected this investment

on the balance sheet at its (estimated) fair value,

48 and recognized the increases in value 

in the income statement. Theoretically, a decrease in value, if it occurred, would also

flow through the income statement. While there was concern that the value of the 

investment might fall, Enron was not in a position to sell the shares due to a lock-up 

agreement.49 Further, as the Powers Report explains, “[g]iven the size of Enron’s 

position, the relative illiquidity of Rhythms stock, and the lack of comparable securities 

in the market, it would have been virtually impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to 

hedge Rhythms commercially.”50

Enron resolved this dilemma by entering into a “hedging” transaction with an SPE 

that was designed (from an accounting perspective) to permit Enron to offset losses 

associated with any potential decrease in the value of Rhythms NetConnections shares.51 

Enron received, from an SPE that had no other operations, a put option on Rhythms 

NetConnections shares which appeared to protect Enron from decreases in the value of 

those shares.

52 However, Enron provided the SPE with a large quantity of restricted

Enron stock, which the SPE would use to cover its obligations to Enron.53 As a

consequence of this arrangement, the SPE would not be able to meet its obligations under 

the derivatives contract if the value of Enron shares decreased (sufficiently) at the same

time as the value of Rhythms NetConnections shares did.54 

This transaction was one of many that highlighted problems with the then-existing 

accounting guidance on the consolidation of SPEs. In the most egregious uses of SPEs, 

most objective observers would have concluded that the “sponsor” of the SPE really was 

in control of its actions, either through voting provisions, economic compulsion, or, most 

likely, because the SPE’s activities were set forth upon its formation, and were entirely, 

or almost entirely, performed for the benefit of the sponsor. The accounting guidance at 

 

46Powers Report, page 4. 

47Id., page 77. 

48Id. 

49Id. 

50Id., page 78. 

51Id. 

52Id., page 80 and 81. 

53Id., page 80. 

54Id., page 82. 

17
the time, however, generally focused on voting control to determine whether all entities,

including SPEs, should be consolidated. By giving an independent third party who had 

made a “substantive” investment (3% of the value of the assets of the SPE was generally

considered substantive) voting control of the SPE, a sponsor could generally avoid 

consolidation, despite the fact that the activities of the SPE could not be substantively 

changed by the “controlling” investor. Recognizing this as a problem, the FASB, 

subsequent to the passage of the Act, issued new guidance, Interpretation No. 46(R), 

regarding the consolidation of SPEs.55 Interpretation No. 46(R) is discussed in Section 

IV. 

Another structuring technique used by Enron, again combining the use of SPEs

and derivatives, appears to have been designed to create the impression of operating cash 

flows while disguising debt financing. The Staff relies on the Second Interim Batson 

Report for this example, which refers to these particular transactions as “prepay” 

arrangements.56 A typical Enron “prepay” involved three parties: an Enron affiliate, an 

investment bank, and a conduit entity formed at the direction of the investment bank. 

More specifically, a prepay had three component parts: 

i.) The investment bank paid the conduit entity up-front in exchange for the conduit 

entity’s future deliveries of a commodity at periodic intervals; 

ii.) The conduit entity paid the Enron affiliate up-front for future deliveries of a 

commodity; and 

iii.)Enron promised to buy a commodity from the investment bank in the future, at 

amount in excess of the amounts paid by the investment bank in step (i).57

The circular nature of delivery and payments with respect to the commodities had 

the effect of eliminating any material risk or any potential gain with respect to the 

changes in the price of the underlying commodity. Each party’s apparent assumption of 

price risk was illusory. With the elimination of price risk, “prepays” were effectively 

debt. In other words, the conduit entity was an alter ego of the investment bank. 

Therefore, the transaction was essentially between two parties—Enron and the 

investment bank. The investment bank was making a large payment to Enron in 

exchange for Enron’s promise to pay the bank an amount in excess of what Enron 

received in the initial prepayment. 

Each aspect of this arrangement, if considered separately, appears to have a 

different economic intent than the economics of the transactions when analyzed together. 

For example, cash today in exchange for a forward contract on oil and gas appears to be

nothing more than a common derivatives transaction. However, taking the totality of the

arrangement, the individual futures contracts have the effect of canceling price risk, 

leaving money given today for a promise of money returned tomorrow as the economic 

 

55Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities

56See Second Interim Batson Report, pages 58-67 and at Appendix E of that Report. 

57Id., page 64. 

18
essence of the arrangement—i.e., a loan, and loan accounting would have been the 

appropriate accounting to apply to this series of transactions. 

Enron’s accounting, however, inappropriately focused on its constituent parts. 

Thus, the cash received by Enron in Step (ii) above was not recorded as cash flow from 

financing (as would be appropriate for loan proceeds), but as cash flow from operations58

(on the argument that it was associated with the forward contract on the oil and gas). 

With respect to the balance sheet, Enron also failed to treat the liability associated with 

Step iii—the promised future payments to the investment bank—as a debt liability.

Instead, the liability was recorded as a risk management liability.59 Thus, these prepay

transactions allowed Enron to hide debt,60 lower key financial ratios followed by 

analysts,61 and provide the illusion of cash flow from operations.62

This structure also highlights what is referred to by accountants as the “unit of 

account” problem. The economics of a transaction may look quite different depending on 

how broadly or narrowly one defines the boundaries of the transaction. That is, a 

particular contract may appear to have certain economic characteristics when viewed in 

isolation—and may be given a certain accounting treatment that corresponds to those 

economic characteristics—but if understood as a piece of a larger agreed-upon 

transaction may actually have quite different economics, and be properly accorded 

different accounting treatment. Thus, determining the actual bounds of a transaction is 

fundamental to understanding both the underlying economics and the proper accounting 

treatment. Determining these bounds has been and will remain an ongoing challenge to

standard setters, auditors, and regulators.63 

2. The Standard Setting Environment 

The series of financial reporting scandals indicated to many that the system of 

corporate governance and financial reporting was in need of repair. In response to these 

scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act called for improvement in the checks-and-balances that 

govern the production of financial information provided to investors. In addition, various 

enforcement actions served notice on bad actors that they would be discovered and dealt 

with for their misrepresentations. But, for some, a question remained as to whether these 

immediate legislative and enforcement responses completely addressed all of the causes 

of these financial scandals. In particular, many asked whether, beyond the bad actors, the 

 

58Id., page 59. 

59Id. 

60Id. 

61Id., page 61. 

62Id. 

63See, for example, SFAS No. 150, Accounting for Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics of 

both Liabilities and Equity, paragraphs 14 and A25-A29; EITF Issue No. 00-21, Accounting for Revenue

Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables, and Derivatives Implementation Group Issue K1, Determining 

Whether Separate Transactions Should Be Viewed as a Unit.

19
accounting standards themselves might have played some role in facilitating or even 

encouraging the bad behavior. 

In a static world, one might expect standard setters and regulatory agencies to 

examine each type of arrangement, determine how information about that arrangement

could best be communicated, and create standards that require specific financial reporting

treatments. Experience, however, suggests that such an approach to standard setting lags 

behind the requirements of the marketplace and, ultimately, results in rules-based

guidance that lacks conceptual coherence. The volume of different arrangements that 

must be analyzed under this approach—and the unexpected variants in these 

arrangements—present substantial challenges. The fact is that we live in a world of 

accelerating technological change, financial innovation, and globalization with rapidly

shifting competitive dynamics and regulatory action. Moreover, there is a constant 

interaction among these forces, with each stimulating further change in the others. In 

such a dynamic world, standard setters cannot possibly anticipate—and pre-determine 

precise accounting rules for—every transactional innovation. 

In light of these concerns, the Act mandated a study be conducted by the 

Commission regarding the current form of U.S. accounting standards. More specifically, 

section 108(d) of the Act called upon the Commission to conduct a study on the adoption 

of “principles-based” accounting standards by the United States financial reporting

system.

64 This report has been completed and submitted to Congress on July 30, 2003. 

In this study, the Staff noted several shortcomings of what are often denoted as 

“rules-based” standards. Such standards often:65

• Contain numerous bright-line tests, which ultimately can be misused by financial 

engineers as a roadmap to comply with the letter but not the spirit of standards; 

• Further a need and demand for voluminously detailed implementation guidance 

on the application of the standard, creating complexity in and uncertainty about 

the application of the standard; and 

• Contain numerous exceptions to the principles purportedly underlying the 

standards, resulting in inconsistencies in accounting treatment of transactions and 

events with similar economic substance. 

The Staff recommended a continued movement in the direction of (what the Staff 

referred to as) “objectives-oriented” accounting standards. Objectives-oriented standards 

are those which:66

• Clearly state the accounting objective of the standard, with the objective 

incorporated in the standard; 

• Minimize the use of exceptions from the standard; 

 

64See Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standards Study. 

65Id. 

66Id. 

20
• Avoid use of percentage tests (“bright-lines”) that allow financial engineers to 

achieve technical compliance with the standard while evading the intent of the

standard; 

• Are based on an internally consistent and consistently applied conceptual

framework; and 

• Provide sufficient detail and structure so that the standard is operational and can 

be applied on a consistent basis. 

The study also notes that objectives-oriented standards have the potential to more 

quickly adapt to today’s faster paced business environment better than rules-based

standards for (at least) two reasons:67

First, standard setters should be able to move faster to address emerging 

practice issues under an objectives-oriented regime. It is easier to come

to an agreement on a principle than on a highly detailed rule, even if the 

principle is substantive and relatively specific in nature. It also takes

more time to develop and provide extensive implementation guidance on 

a wide variety of hypothetical scenarios, as required by the rules-based 

approach. 

Second, by its very nature, a standard setting body cannot respond as

quickly to changes in the environment as can the professionals directly

involved in the marketplace. Because, when properly constructed, 

objectives-oriented accounting standards are solidly based on a 

conceptual framework, yet cabined by the specific, substantive 

objectives embodied in each standard, they provide for a framework 

within which the application of professional judgment can be exercised. 

As such, managers and accountants should be able to draw upon the

objectives of the standard so that their accounting decisions better

capture economic reality in response to market developments. This 

should render objectives-oriented accounting standards more durable 

once they are in place than are rules-based standards. The latter tend to 

be in greater need of constant tinkering by standard setters to reflect 

changes in the environment than do objectives-oriented standards. 

 

67Id. (footnotes deleted from quotation). 

21
Finally, the study also notes that significant hurdles exist to creating objectivesoriented standards. Indeed, the bright lines, numerous exceptions, and voluminous

interpretive guidance that many see as problems with rules-based standards are

characteristics of many parts of U.S. GAAP precisely because constituents requested that 

the FASB and other standard-setters include them in the guidance. The development of

objectives-oriented standards is continuously challenged by the constant requests 

received by standard-setters that they provide new interpretive guidance and exceptions 

to the principles underlying the accounting standards. 

In addition, standard-setters must contend with the fact that just about any 

proposed change will be unpopular with at least a segment of preparers, auditors and 

other participants, including users. Even the improvements to the accounting guidance 

identified in Section I.C.4 below—that have happened since the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act—generated significant debate, and these changes were made during a period 

in which the FASB, the Commission and others were being actively encouraged to make 

such improvements. The expectation that proposals for change will generate controversy 

should not stop standard-setters from taking up a project in a needed area, but standardsetters must nonetheless factor this into its processes and agenda decisions, ensuring that 

sufficient opportunity for deliberation, comment, discussion, and dialogue will exist. In 

addition, where new standards will result in the need for significant changes to internal 

controls and financial reporting systems, adequate implementation time must also be built 

into the process. 

3. Accounting Motivated Transaction Structuring 

Standard-setting is rendered difficult not only by the fast-paced business

environment, but also by the fact that the transactions themselves evolve in reaction to 

the standards. As soon as a new standard is issued, questions immediately arise regarding 

whether specific structures are within the scope of the new guidance, how interactions

between the new standard and existing standards should be addressed, and whether more 

detail on the new guidance can or should be provided. Indeed, in many instances, the 

issuance (or even expectation) of a new standard triggers a search to determine 

techniques to structure and/or restructure transactions to avoid reporting the very 

information sought by the new standard. 

For example, when the FASB issued a standard in 1976 that required some lease 

obligations to be recorded on the balance sheet as liabilities,68 many lessees immediately

began to restructure their leases to avoid recognizing liabilities. Their efforts were aided 

by parties who sought to profit from offering their expertise in structuring leases in ways 

that provided “preferable” accounting. Such structuring tends to reduce transparency. 

Indeed, oftentimes that is its point. 

When we refer to accounting-motivated structured transactions, we are speaking

of those transactions that are structured in an attempt to achieve reporting results that are

not consistent with the economics of the transaction, and thereby impair the transparency 

 

68SFAS No. 13, Accounting for Leases. 

22
of financial reports.69 Standard setters have sometimes responded to structuring efforts 

by refining and expanding the standards. However, this process can be a never-ending 

circle, where restructuring of contracts and the creation of innovative new financial 

structures lead to revisions in GAAP, which are then followed by the creation of 

additional financial structures. As a result, the rules themselves come to provide a 

roadmap for avoiding their intent, as issuers adjust arrangements to fall just outside the 

scope of a particular accounting treatment. 

Although this dynamic has long been recognized by regulators and standard 

setters, there have been sweeping innovations in capital markets during recent years that 

have substantially increased the potential (and in many cases, the expectation) for issuers

to engage in this type of structuring. With dramatically lowered transaction costs due to

technological and financial innovations, it has become economically feasible to isolate, 

price and trade rights to specified streams of cash flows. This ability to un-bundle risk 

and return, re-bundle it into new instruments, and sell these new instruments in the 

marketplace has revolutionized capital markets. Economists sometimes refer to this 

availability of a full range of financial alternatives as the “completion” of financial 

markets (although markets remain far from fully complete).70 

Progress in the “completion” of financial markets has undeniable benefits, 

allowing issuers to enhance liquidity, better manage risk exposure, and reduce borrowing 

costs, while permitting investors to invest in instruments or entities best suited to their 

investment preferences and risk tolerance. Nevertheless, as noted above, the very 

complexity and flexibility inherent in these new financial tools and practices renders the 

goal of transparency substantially more difficult to achieve. These innovative financial 

instruments provide a new set of tools to those who would attempt to hide their exposure 

to risk, or otherwise manipulate their financial statements. As one author who writes 

about derivative markets states:71

it is generally possible to create a given payoff in multiple ways. The 

construction of a given financial product from other products is 

sometimes called financial engineering. ... [B]ecause there are multiple 

ways to create a payoff, ... regulatory arbitrage ... [in which the author 

includes the circumvention of accounting rules] can be difficult to stop. 

The propensity of certain issuers to combine engineered transactions with

aggressive accounting interpretations in order to obtain “desirable” accounting results 

 

69Thus, we do not mean to include situations where, for example, an issuer increases its sales efforts at the 

end of a period to generate revenue. In that situation, the reporting of revenue would generally mirror the

economics if additional sales are generated. Such situations may, however, result in the need for 

explanatory disclosures, particularly in MD&A. 

70See, for example, Mario Draghi, Giavazzi, Francesco, and Merton, Robert C. Transparency, Risk

Management and International Financial Fragility NBER Working Paper 9806, June 2003 (“[t]he role of

swaps and other privately negotiated derivative instruments is to complete financial markets, thus

increasing the ability of individuals, financial institutions, corporations and governments to manage risk.”) 

71McDonald, Robert L. Derivatives Markets (2003), pages 3 and 4. 

23
poses difficult challenges to auditors, standard setters, and regulators, and reduces 

investor understanding. 

4. Improvements in the Financial Reporting Regime Since the 

Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 

There have been a number of significant events in the financial reporting system

since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Among others, these have included: 

Accounting Developments: 

• Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 2003)—an 

interpretation of ARB No. 51 (“Interpretation No. 46(R)”)72, which requires a 

“risks and rewards” approach to the consolidation of “variable interest entities” as

opposed to an approach based on control by ownership or legal authority, 

addressing, among other things, some of the concerns with the failure of issuers 

under earlier guidance to consolidate certain special purpose entities; 

• Guarantor’s Accounting and Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees, Including 

Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others (“Interpretation No. 45”), which 

requires the recognition of liabilities for obligations undertaken upon issuing 

certain guarantees, as well as other disclosures;73

• Share-Based Payment, SFAS No. 123(R), which requires a fair-value based 

method of accounting for stock options and other equity instruments used to 

purchase goods and services, including employee services, eliminating the 

previous accounting guidance that allowed compensation paid in a particular form

to go unreported in the financial statements;74

• Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits—An 

Amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, and 106, SFAS No. 132(R), which 

revised employers’ disclosures about pension plans and other postretirement 

benefit plans;75 

• Accounting for Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics of both 

Liabilities and Equities, SFAS No. 150, which established standards for how an 

issuer classifies and measures certain financial instruments with characteristics of 

both liabilities and equity;76 

 

72More specifically, the FASB issued Interpretation No. 46 in January 2003 and 46(R)—the revised

interpretation—in December 2003. 

73The FASB issued Interpretation No. 45 in November 2002. 

74This Statement, revised in 2004, was a revision of FASB Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based 

Compensation. It superseded APB Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, and its 

related implementation guidance. 

75This was revised in December 2003. 

76This was issued by the FASB in May 2003. 

24
• Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the 

Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based 

Accounting System, which is a Staff study that recommended that accounting 

standards should be developed using an “objectives-oriented” approach;77 and 

• The FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption of a Principles-Based 

Accounting System,

78 in which the FASB indicated it’s general agreement with

the Staff’s recommendations regarding objectives-oriented accounting standards; 

Regulatory and Other Developments: 

• Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet 

Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations (“FR 67”),79 which requires 

an issuer to explain its off-balance sheet arrangements in a separately captioned 

subsection of its MD&A and to provide an overview of certain known contractual 

obligations in a tabular format;80

• Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and 

Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (“FR 72”),81 which 

explains how MD&A can provide more meaningful disclosure in a number of 

areas, including its overall presentation and focus, with general emphasis on the 

discussion and analysis of known trends, demands, commitments, events and

uncertainties, and specific guidance on disclosures about liquidity, capital 

resources and critical accounting estimates; 

• Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,

82

which adds certain disclosure requirements for public companies regarding 

material changes in financial condition or operations, including (among other 

things) disclosures if an issuer becomes directly or contingently liable for an

obligation that arises out of an off-balance sheet arrangement or if a triggering 

event occurs causing an issuer obligation under an off-balance sheet arrangement

to increase or be accelerated, or its contingent obligation under an off-balance 

sheet arrangement to become a direct on-balance sheet financial obligation; 

• Summary by the Division of Corporation Finance of Significant Issues Addressed 

in the Review of the Periodic Reports of the Fortune 500 Companies,

83 in which

 

77The Staff study on the adoption of objectives-oriented accounting standards was published by the 

Commission in July 2003. 

78This was released by FASB in July 2004. 

79This rule was promulgated by the Commission in January 2003 in response to Section 401(a) of the Act. 

80Much of the language and many of the concepts in FR 67 are consistent with the language and concepts

embodied in the Commission’s January 2002 statement, which discussed the desirability of enhance

disclosure in MD&A of off-balance sheet arrangements. 

81FR 72 was promulgated by the Commission in December 2003. 

82This rule, which was proposed prior to the passage of the Act, is also responsive to the current disclosure

goals of Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

83This document is dated February 27, 2003, as modified. 

25
the Division focused on disclosures that appeared to be critical to an

understanding of each company’s financial position and results, but which, at 

least on their face, seemed to depart significantly from either GAAP or

Commission rules, or to be materially deficient in explanation or clarity; this

document included a discussion of the Division’s comments to issuers on offbalance sheet arrangements, including securitized financial assets; 

• Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Report, as 

directed in part by Section 302(a) of the Act, adopted rules to require, among 

other things, that an issuer's principal executive and financial officers each certify: 

the financial and other information contained in the issuer's quarterly and annual 

reports; that they are responsible for establishing, maintaining and regularly 

evaluating the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls; that they have made 

certain disclosures to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the board of

directors about the issuer's internal controls; and that they have included 

information in the issuer's quarterly and annual reports about their evaluation and 

whether there have been significant changes in the issuer's internal controls or in

other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the 

evaluation;84 

• Management’s Report on Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting and 

Certification Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, which, as directed by 

Section 404 of the Act, adopted rules requiring, among other things, that 

companies subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 

1934, other than registered investment companies, include in their annual reports 

a report of management on the company's internal control over financial 

reporting;85

• Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, which, as directed by 

Section 301 of the Act, adopted a new rule to direct the national securities 

exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any 

security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the audit committee

requirements mandated by the Act, relating to the independence of audit 

committee members; the audit committee's responsibility to select and oversee the

issuer's independent accountant; procedures for handling complaints regarding the 

issuer's accounting practices; the authority of the audit committee to engage

advisors; and funding for the independent auditor and any outside advisors 

engaged by the audit committee;86 

• Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 

which, consistent with the direction of Section 208(a) of the Act, adopted 

amendments to existing requirements regarding auditor independence to enhance 

 

84The effective date for these rules was August 29, 2002. Release Nos. 33-8124; 34-46427. 

85The effective date for these rules was August 14, 2003. Release Nos. 33-8238; 34-47986. 

86The effective date for this rule was April 25, 2003. Release Nos. 33-8220; 34-47654. 

26
the independence of accountants that audit and review financial statements and 

prepare attestation reports filed with the Commission; and 

• Proposed Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex 

Structured Finance Activities, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,

Treasury; Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury; Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Securities 

and Exchange Commission, which, among other things, provided that financial 

institutions should have effective policies and procedures in place to identify 

those complex structured finance transactions that may involve heightened legal 

and reputation risk, to ensure that the transactions receive enhanced scrutiny by 

the institution, and to ensure that the institution does not participate in illegal or 

inappropriate transactions.

87 

To the extent possible, we consider the effects of these recent changes in financial 

reporting throughout this Report. In addition, as part of the Study the Staff collected data 

about the initial implementation of Interpretation No. 46(R) and FR 67. The Staff 

presents these empirical findings in Section IV. 

II. Study Methodology 

This section presents the methodology for the Study, including 1) methodological 

issues related to the construction of a representative sample of filings by issuers

appropriate to the questions addressed in the Study, and 2) the process by which the 

sample findings are extrapolated to estimate the extent of arrangements with off-balance 

sheet implications for the population. Descriptive statistics relating to the sample are also 

presented in this section. 

Certain characteristics common to many arrangements with off-balance sheet 

implications were identified that could complicate the selection of a sample for the Study. 

The prevalence of off-balance sheet arrangements may vary across issuers and is apt to be 

correlated with size. Indeed, a disproportionate amount of certain off-balance-sheet 

arrangements may occur in a small number of issuers.88 Thus, in order to construct a 

sample that will be representative of the population, it is important to stratify89 the sample 

 

87On May 19, 2004, the Agencies requested public comment on a proposed Interagency statement. (69 FR

28980, May 19, 2004)

88For example, see Credit Suisse First Boston Equity Research FIN 46: New Rule Could Surprise Investors, 

page 6 (June 24, 2003). 

89The principle of stratification is to partition the population so that the units within a particular stratum are

similar in terms of the variable being measured. Then, even though the strata may differ markedly from

each other in terms of other measures, a stratified sample with the appropriate number of units in each 

stratum will tend to be representative of the population as a whole. Then, the formula for the variance of 

the estimator of the population mean with stratified sampling is a function of within-stratum variance 

terms. In other words, the population estimate will be most precise if the population is partitioned into 

strata such that within each stratum the units are similar. This point will underlie much of the analysis 

below. 

27
to ensure that the influence of different sized firms is appropriately captured in the Staff 

estimates of the extent of off-balance sheet arrangements.90 

The Staff determined that a sample of n=94 issuers would satisfy the required 

levels of power and hypothesis sensitivity for a stated level of significance.91, 92 To

ensure observations from the largest issuers are included, the Staff constructed the sample 

to include the 100 largest issuers (as measured by market capitalization) and randomly

selected an additional 100 issuers from the rest of the population. This results in a total 

sample of n=200 observations within 2 strata. Thus, the Study sample is composed of 

two sub-samples: 100 large issuers93 (the “large issuer sub-sample”) and 100 randomly 

selected issuers from the rest of the population (the “random issuer sub-sample”).94 This

 

90For a given total sample size n, one may choose how to allocate observations among the L strata. In the 

absence of other information about the variances of a specified measure of interest across strata, a

reasonable initial choice may be to assume equal sample sizes for the strata. In this case, however, the 

variance of the measure of interest in the stratum of largest issuers is likely to be very different from the 

variance of the stratum of the smallest issuers for the distribution of total assets. In addition, the costs of

including additional observations differ substantially across strata. To construct an estimate that accounts

for this, the Staff first determined the stratum size allocations across the population that minimizes the 

variance of the population estimate. Note that these estimates are dependent on the underlying assumed 

parameter values. This method allowed the Staff to determine the appropriate strata sizes given the 

importance of size and the importance of requiring that specific issuers be included in the sample. 

91The Staff follows the discussion of the stratification principle and optimal allocation in Chapter 11 of 

Sampling, Steven K. Thompson, Wiley Interscience (2002) and also referred to Chapter 4 of Sampling

Techniques, William G. Cochran, Wiley (1977). The Staff used size (as measured by total assets) as the 

stratification variable and then used the Compustat universe to estimate the optimal allocation of the sample

across strata to minimize the variance of the estimator and determine the appropriate sample size for the

study. This calculation depends on population variance so we use the natural log of total assets, which is

approximately normal, as the basis of the population distribution. The first two moments of the distribution 

were used to establish the total sample size appropriate to ensuring the designated levels of power and

precision. The other variables in the study are assumed to be distributed like the natural log of total assets.

To the extent that other variables have distributions similar to the distribution of the natural log of total 

assets, the above analysis is appropriate. Where possible, the Staff made conservative assumptions in order

to preserve the statistical integrity of the sampling method. 

92The Staff chose to construct a sample large enough to ensure that the power of the tests is no lower than

90% with an α level of significance of 5% throughout. More powerful tests and/or higher levels of

significance would require larger sample sizes. To establish the level of sensitivity of the hypotheses we 

would expect from tests based on our sample, the sample sizes were determined assuming the difference 

between the null and alternative hypotheses is 20%. The subsequent power calculations require a sample of 

at least N=94 to satisfy these conditions. 

93With certain exceptions as discussed below.

94As discussed above, the sample size that would be sufficiently representative to make inferences for the 

total population subject to the required power, level of significance and hypothesis is less than 100. To 

accommodate the prevalence of the variables of interest in the 100 largest issuers, a (much larger) total 

sample of n=200, composed of 2 strata of 100 issuers each was constructed. The 2 strata are composed of

the 100 largest issuers and a random sample of size 100 from the rest of the population. This oversampling ensures the statistical validity of the results throughout. In addition, over-sampling large issuers 

allowed statistically supportable observations to be made about these large issuers, which is a goal of the 

Study. This is particularly relevant because the variables of interest may be more prevalent in the larger

issuers. The importance of large issuers to the Study was considered to justify the additional cost of 

collecting information from all of the largest 100 issuers. 

28
stratification method results in a sample that is sufficiently large to ensure the validity of 

the statistical results subject to the specified power, hypothesis sensitivity, and 

significance level requirements. In fact, this sampling method accommodates variation 

across issuers and the importance of including the largest issuers in the Study. 

The actual sample issuers in the large issuer sub-sample were selected based on 

U.S. market capitalization as of December 31, 2003.95 The random sample of issuers was

selected using a random number generator to identify issuers from a list of all issuers on 

the Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (“EDGAR”)

system.

96 As noted above, the final sample that passed all the screening criteria and for 

which data was successfully collected includes a total of 200 issuers. The tables below 

describe the characteristics of the sample as well as each sub-sample, in terms of 

securities registered with the Commission, size, industry membership, fiscal year-ends, 

and the forms used by each issuer for their annual filings with the Commission. 

Table II(A)(1) describes the securities registered with the Commission by our 

sample of issuers. Approximately 93% of the sample issuers report common stock 

registered with the Commission, and this average includes 100% of the large issuer subsample. In contrast, only 6% of the sample issuers had registered preferred stock with the

Commission. Slightly more, almost 13% had registered debt securities. 

 

95Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were excluded from the population and sample, even though they would 

otherwise fall into the ranks of the top 100 issuers. This was done given the relatively unique features of

these two extremely large Government Sponsored Entities (“GSEs”). Two market indices (which would 

otherwise fall into the ranks of the top 100 issuers) were also excluded from the sample because their assets 

are predominantly the securities of other issuers that are eligible for the study. Two foreign private issuers 

(which would otherwise fall into the ranks of the top 100 issuers) were also excluded from the sample. 

Such issuers file 20-F annual reports and are not included in the study because foreign private issuers have 

a one-year lag before they are required to implement some of the pertinent new standards. 

96Upon initial selection, the issuer was subjected to a screening to ascertain its viability as a participant in

the Study. If it was determined that an issuer was not a viable participant, the issuer was dropped and 

another selected from the original list. Issuers were excluded if they were registered under the Investment 

Act or if they were foreign private issuers. Issuers were also excluded if they did not have current financial 

statements, notes to the financial statements, and MD&A disclosures available via annual filings (i.e., 

forms 10-K or 10KSB) and quarterly filings (i.e., form 10-Q or 10QSB), as the pertinent data would not be

available for such issuers. The selection and screening process was performed for a total of 276 issuers to

obtain a sample of 100 issuers that met all the requirements for membership in the sample. 

29
TABLE II (A)(1): Major Classes of Securities Registered by Issuers in Samplea

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

(%) 

Large Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Issuers with Registered Common Stock 93 100 86

Issuers with Registered Preferred Stock 6 6 6 

Issuers with Registered Debt Securities 12.5 23 2

a

 These data were collected from the cover page of each issuer’s 10-K or 10KSB filing, which designates securities

registered under Sections 12(b) and 12(g) of the Securities Act of 1934. Additional types of securities (e.g., 

registered preferred stock rights, trust preferred securities, and partnership units) are not reported in this table. Some 

issuers not included in the categories above may have securities that are exempt from registration. 

Table II(A)(2) describes the size of the issuers in the sample, in terms of U.S. 

market capitalization, total assets, and total liabilities. The sample includes issuers with a 

total equity market capitalization of $7.75 trillion. For comparison, the total U.S. equity 

market capitalization for all issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) 

and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”) 

as of December 31, 2003 was approximately $15 trillion.97 The market capitalization of 

the large issuer sub-sample is approximately 75 times that of the random issuer subsample. 

TABLE II (A)(2): Size of Issuers in Sample

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

(million)

Large Issuers 

(n=100)

(million)

Random Issuers 

(n=100)

(million)

U. S. Market Capitalization of Common

Stock a $7,771,753 $7,670,538 $101,215

Total Assets b $12,418,041 $12,242,146 $175,895

Total Liabilities b $10,219,198 $10,089,973 $129,225

a

 These data were collected directly from the NYSE and the NASDAQ, for issuers traded on those exchanges. These 

values do not include market capitalizations of issuers in the sample that were not traded on these two exchanges,

however, this omission is estimated to affect the total market capitalization for the random issuer sub-sample by less 

than 1%. b

 These data were collected from the face of the balance sheet in the 10-K or 10KSB filing.

Total assets for the sample issuers are $12.4 trillion, virtually all of which relate to 

the large issuers. Total assets for the large issuer sub-sample are almost 70 times as large 

as total assets for the random issuer sub-sample. Total liabilities for the sample are $10.2 

trillion, virtually all of which relate to the large issuer sub-sample. Total liabilities for the 

large issuer sub-sample are approaching 90 times as large as total liabilities for the 

random issuer sub-sample. 

 

97U.S. market capitalization figures for all issuers on the NYSE and the NASDAQ were obtained directly

from these markets as of December 31, 2003. 

30
Table II(A)(3) describes the industry membership of the issuers in the sample. 

Note that our sample has a relatively large representation of manufacturing issuers and 

finance, insurance, and real estate issuers. These relative emphases are largely consistent

in the sub-samples. 

TABLE II(A)(3): Industry Membership of Issuers in Samplea

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

(%) 

Large Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Mining, Oil & Gas, and Construction 3.5 1 6 

Manufacturing 38.5 50 27

Transportation, Communication, Electric, 

Gas, & Sanitary Services 11.5 9 14 

Wholesale & Retail Trade 6.5 8 5 

Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 24 24 24 

Services 15 8 22

Non-Classifiable 1 0 2

a

 These data were collected from the cover page of each issuer’s 10-K or 10KSB filing. 

Table II(A)(4) describes the year-ends of the issuers in the sample. The majority

of issuers in our sample had December 31 year-ends. 

TABLE II(A)(4): Year Ends of Issuers in Samplea

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

(%) 

Large Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

June-November 2003 Year End 17 16 18 

December 2003 Year End 75 77 73 

January-May 2004 Year End 8 7 9

a

 These data were collected from the cover page of each issuer’s 10-K or 10KSB filing. 

Table II(A)(5) describes the distribution of the sample in terms of issuers that file

Form 10-K vs. Form 10KSB. Small business issuers may file form 10KSB instead of 

form 10-K. Form 10-K was filed by 87% of the sample issuers and form 10KSB was 

filed by the remaining 13%. 

31
TABLE II(A)(5): Forms Filed by Issuers in Sample

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

(%) 

Large Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Issuers filing Form 10-K 87 100 74

Issuers filing Form 10KSB 13 0 26

a

 These data were collected from the cover page of each issuer’s 10-K or 10KSB filing. 

For each issuer in the sample, data was collected from the 10-K or 10KSB filing 

corresponding to the fiscal year-ends described in Table II(A)(4) above.98 The Staff 

focused on collecting data that facilitated the measurement of the extent of off-balance

sheet arrangements, both in terms of the extent of issuers involved in such arrangements 

and any related dollar amounts. 

The Staff extrapolates the findings from the sample to estimate amounts for the 

approximate population of active U.S. issuers. The Staff estimates the population of 

active U.S. issuers to be approximately 10,100.99 Subtracting the 100 issuers in the large 

issuer sub-sample results in 10,000 issuers in the population that are represented by the 

random issuer sub-sample. The Staff performs extrapolations by multiplying amounts 

from the random issuer sub-sample by a factor of 100 (i.e., 10,000 issuers in the 

population divided by 100 issuers in the random issuer sub-sample) and adding amounts 

from the large issuer sub-sample. If the extrapolated amounts are percentages, this 

calculation is performed using the absolute counts in each sub-sample, after which the 

total is divided by 10,100. 

III. ARRANGEMENTS WITH POTENTIAL OFF-BALANCE SHEET 

IMPLICATIONS

A. Investments in the Equity of Other Entities 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

Issuers regularly invest in the equity of other entities. An issuer may invest for 

the short term or the long term, for income or capital appreciation, or for strategic 

 

98 As discussed in Section IV, some data related to the implementation of FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) 

was also collected from the 10-Q or 10QSB filings of each issuer for the quarter that included May 15, 

2004, which would include information about the full adoption of Interpretation No. 46(R) for many of the 

issuers in the sample. 

99The estimate of the approximate number of active U.S issuers in the population (not including

international issuers filing form 20-F or issuers under the Investment Act) is based on the Staff’s judgment.

The actual number of active issuers is constantly changing. Some issuers discontinue filing because they 

no longer meet the reporting requirements, while others are delinquent in their filings and still others 

choose to file voluntarily. The estimate of 10,100 (versus the round number 10,000) is not meant to imply 

a high level of precision, but, as noted above, is based on the Staff’s judgment, and also is chosen to render

the extrapolation calculations straightforward and easily understood by the reader. 

32
purposes, such as expanding its product offerings into new territory, integrating the other 

entity’s products or technology with its own, or diversifying its business. Investments 

may be purely passive in nature, or may provide the issuer with some level of influence,

or even control, over the other entity. The accounting for investments in other entities 

differs based on the level of the investor’s involvement with the other entity. 

a. Investments Giving Rise to Neither Influence Nor

Control 

Investments that give rise to neither influence nor control are common. These

investments are equivalent in nature to those an individual might hold in an investment

portfolio. Assuming the investment is in publicly traded equity, SFAS No. 115, 

Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, provides the relevant

accounting guidance for these investments. SFAS No. 115 requires the investment to be 

re-measured and presented on the issuer’s balance sheet at its fair value.100 The

requirement to report these investments at fair value (i.e., “mark to market”) raises the 

issue of how to account for changes in these fair values (market fluctuations) that occur

during the period the issuer owns the stock of the other entity. Historically, the 

accounting for these “unrealized holding gains and losses” has been the subject of much 

debate.101 

During development of SFAS No. 115 there was some objection to recognizing 

the effects of changes in the market price of investments held (i.e., recognizing the effects 

of market volatility) in an issuer’s earnings. Those expressing objections argued that 

these unrealized holding gains and losses are different in character from income and 

expense items that arise from past transactions with other parties. As such, some argued 

(and still believe) that the gains and losses are only “potential” gains and losses, rather

than gains and losses that have already occurred, and therefore do not belong in an 

issuer’s earnings. 

In light of these views, the standard provides for alternative treatments of the 

unrealized holding gains and losses. If the “purpose” of the investment is for

“trading,”102 unrealized holding gains and losses must be recognized in earnings each 

period. Investments held for other than trading purposes that do not provide the holder 

 

100See SFAS No. 115, paragraphs 3 and 12. 

101A realized gain or loss occurs if the issuer actually sells the shares; an unrealized holding gain or loss 

occurs when the price of the shares increases or decreases, but the issuer continues to hold the shares. Once 

the investment has been liquidated and any gain or loss realized, there is no longer a question as to

recognition of that gain or loss. 

102Paragraph 12(a) of SFAS No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities,

states that “Securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling them in the near term

(thus held for only a short period of time) shall be classified as trading securities. Trading generally

reflects active and frequent buying and selling, and trading securities are generally used with the objective

of generating profits on short-term differences in price.” 

33
with either significant influence or control are classified as “available for sale,”

103 in 

which case the investment is still recorded at fair value, but unrealized holding gains and 

losses are excluded from earnings until the investment is ultimately sold and the gain or 

loss is realized.104 In the meantime, unrealized holding gains and losses are recorded in

the “other comprehensive income” section of the shareholder’s equity section of the 

balance sheet. 

As noted above, these investments are only “marked to market” each period if the

equity instruments are publicly-traded. If the instruments are not publicly traded, the 

investment is accounted for under the cost method.105 Under the cost method, changes in 

value (i.e., unrealized gains and losses) are not recognized in earnings until the 

investment is sold. However, if the value of the investment declines (i.e., the investment

is impaired) and this decline is “other than temporary,” a loss should be recognized.106 

Determining whether a loss is “other than temporary” is a judgmental assessment, based

on the relevant facts and circumstances. 

In addition to the accounting described above, SFAS No. 115 requires disclosures 

regarding investments where the issuer has neither significant influence nor control, 

including, but not limited to: 

• Gross unrealized holding gains and gross unrealized holding losses (separately 

reported) for investments classified as “available for sale;” 

• Proceeds from the sale of “available for sale” securities; gross realized gains and

gross realized losses on those sales; 

• Gross gains and gross losses included in net income related to transfers of

securities from “available for sale” to “trading” categories; and 

• Detailed information regarding the gains and losses included in other 

comprehensive income and net income. 

b. Investments Giving Rise to Influence but Not Control 

An issuer’s investment in another entity may give rise to “significant influence” 

over the other entity. The term “significant influence” refers to the ability of an issuer to 

impact the other entity’s operating and financial policies. Such ability to exercise

influence may be attained, for example, through ownership of voting stock of the other 

entity,107 board representation, participation in policy making processes, or technological

 

103Paragraph 12(b) of SFAS No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities,

states that “Investments not classified as trading securities (nor as held-to-maturity securities) shall be

classified as available-for-sale securities.” 

104SFAS No. 115, Paragraph 16.

105See APB No. 18, paragraph 6a. 

106See SFAS No. 115, paragraph 16 and APB Opinion No. 18, paragraph 19h. 

107Paragraph 17 of APB No. 18 includes a presumption that an issuer has “significant influence” over 

another entity if the issuer owns more than 20% but no more than 50% of the voting stock of that entity. 

However, the determination of whether an investor has significant influence often requires judgment. 

34
dependency. If an investment in the equity of another entity affords the issuer the ability 

to exercise “significant” influence over operating and financial policies of the other 

entity, APB No. 18, The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common 

Stock, requires that the issuer follow the “equity method” of accounting for this 

investment. If, instead, an investment does not afford the issuer the ability to exercise 

significant influence, the cost or fair value methods are used. Under the equity method, 

the investment is recognized on the issuer’s balance sheet at its initial cost, adjusted over 

time for the issuer’s share of changes in the other entity’s changes in net assets (i.e., 

assets less liabilities). The issuer’s share of the other entity’s net income (loss) is

recognized as an increase (decrease) in the investment. Dividends received by the issuer 

from the other entity are treated as a reduction of the investment. By way of these 

mechanics, the equity method attempts to reflect an issuer’s share in the other entity’s

equity, and changes therein, in the issuer’s investment in the other entity recognized as an 

asset on the issuer’s balance sheet. As with other unconsolidated investments, 

impairment losses are recognized if the value of the investment declines below its 

carrying value and the decline is deemed “other than temporary.” 

APB No. 18 has its own set of disclosure requirements, including: 

• Name of the entity whose shares the issuer owns; 

• Particulars of the issuer’s accounting policies under the equity method; 

• Value of each investment based on current quoted market prices, if available; and 

• Summarized financial information about assets, liabilities, and result of operations 

of the other entities, if the investment is “significant.” 

In addition to the requirements of APB 18, Rule 3-09 of the Commission’s 

Regulation S-X requires that issuers file as part of their annual report on Form 10-K the 

separate financial statements of investments in entities accounted for under the equity 

method, if they meet the definition of a “significant subsidiary” under Regulation S-X 1-

02.108 Presenting these separate financial statements of the other entity is intended to 

provide added information regarding investments that comprise a significant portion of 

an issuer’s assets, equity, or earnings. 

c. Investments Giving Rise to Control 

If an issuer controls another entity such that the issuer can direct the other entity’s 

operations, ARB No. 51, Consolidated Financial Statements, requires the issuer to 

“consolidate” that other entity.109 When consolidation is required, the issuer no longer 

 

108See 17 CFR 210.1-02(w) for definition of a significant subsidiary. 

109ARB No. 51, paragraph 1, states that “consolidated statements are more meaningful than separate

statements and that they are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one of the companies in the

group directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest in the other companies.” SFAS No. 94,

Consolidation of All Majority Owned Subsidiaries, eliminated certain exceptions to the general rule under 

ARB No. 51 that majority owned entities should be consolidated. These exceptions had allowed certain 

controlled entities that were foreign, “non-homogeneous”, and where there were significant non-controlling 

35
presents information about its investment in the other entity in terms of a “one-line”

investment account on the balance sheet, but rather, the assets and liabilities of the other 

entity are combined with (or added to) the assets and liabilities of the issuer, and the

combined amounts are presented on the issuer’s consolidated financial statements. For 

example, the cash of the other entity is combined with the issuer’s cash; the equipment of

the other entity is combined with the issuer’s equipment; the debt of the other entity is 

combined with the issuer’s debt; and so on. Likewise, the consolidated income statement 

combines the revenues and expenses of the other entity with those of the issuer. 

One of the important benefits of consolidating entities controlled by the investor 

is similar reporting for all of the assets, liabilities, equity and operating results of the 

issuer and entities under the issuer’s direction. If entities are consolidated, an issuer 

cannot simply transfer an asset or liability to another entity that it controls and remove 

that asset or liability from its balance sheet. Issuers might be motivated to make such 

transfers by a desire to move poorly performing assets off the balance sheet or a desire to 

reduce the debt outstanding on the balance sheet to improve the appearance of the 

issuer’s financial position and liquidity. However, if the other entity is consolidated by

the issuer, these assets and liabilities will be reflected on the consolidated balance sheet,

regardless of which entity (the issuer or a controlled entity) legally “owns” them. Indeed, 

a part of the rationale for the consolidation standard was to prevent substantial 

obligations and/or losses from being “hidden” in unconsolidated controlled entities. 

In most instances, the balance sheet of an issuer that consolidates another entity

would reflect the same net assets (i.e., assets less liabilities) as if the investment in the

stock of that entity had been accounted for using the equity method of accounting.

However, under the equity method of accounting the issuer “nets” the assets and

liabilities of the other entity and reports them on one line on the balance sheet. Similarly, 

the income statement of an issuer that consolidates another entity would generally reflect 

the same net income as if that entity had been accounted for using the equity method. 

Again, the difference lies in the level of detail provided to the user of the financial 

statements. 

There are no specific disclosures related to consolidated entities. Rather,

disclosures are provided related to the assets and liabilities of the consolidated entities

just as they are for the issuer’s own assets and liabilities. 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Investments 

The fact that so many different accounting treatments exist for these investments 

certainly raises the question of whether each is necessary. Of course, multiple methods 

are appropriate if each is used to reflect substantively different circumstances. In 

analyzing the accounting for investments in other entities, the sub-section immediately 

below begins by considering the guidance for determining which approach to use. Since 

the largest difference in accounting, especially as it relates to whether assets or liabilities 

 shareholders (minority interests). The exception in ARB No. 51 for temporarily controlled entities was 

eliminated through the issuance of SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of LongLived Assets. 

36
are on or off the balance sheet, is between consolidation and any of the other methods, we

begin with the consolidation guidance. 

a. Consolidation 

As discussed above, the accounting guidance generally relies on the concept of 

control to determine which entities to consolidate. Using control as the criterion for 

consolidation has been the generally accepted standard for decades, and the standardsetters have gradually eliminated exceptions to this general rule over time.

110 This 

approach provides consistency, and is a concept the Staff believes users can readily 

understand, even if determining whether control exists is sometimes a difficult 

question.111 

Even before the Enron and other scandals, standard-setters had concluded that an 

approach focused on legal or voting control was often not effective in addressing the 

question of consolidation of special purpose entities. The nature of many SPEs is that 

they are designed so that all of their significant activities are “pre-programmed” or built 

into the operating structure of the entity at formation, such that voting control is 

irrelevant. The FASB recently issued an interpretation of the general consolidation rule 

under ARB No. 51 (i.e., Interpretation No. 46(R)) which seeks to identify the party that

effectively controls the entity through an analysis of the risks and rewards of the SPE.112 

The addition of Interpretation No. 46(R) to the consolidation guidance has improved the 

guidance for assessing consolidation of SPEs. 

Since the issuance of Interpretation No. 46(R), an investor must determine

whether the investee is a Variable Interest Entity or a Voting Interest Entity. This 

determines which consolidation approach—voting control or risks and rewards—is used 

in evaluating whether the other entity needs to be consolidated. Once an issuer identifies 

an entity that is required to be analyzed under the risks and rewards approach, additional

analysis is required to measure the exposure to risks and rewards of the entity. We 

discuss Interpretation No. 46(R) in more detail in Section IV of this Report. 

b. Unconsolidated Investments 

As discussed above, investments in the equity of another entity that do not 

provide the issuer with control are accounted for using four different methods. In

general, the Staff believes that the number of potential methods for these investments

should be reduced, as the different methods do not always correspond to investments with 

 

110See SFAS No. 94, paragraph 9 and paragraph C2.a of SFAS No. 144. 

111Including: when minority shareholders have significant participatory rights (EITF 96-16, Investor’s 

Accounting for an Investee When the Investor Has a Majority of the Voting Interest but the Minority

Shareholder or Shareholders Have Certain Approval or Veto Rights), and where control may exist due to 

contractual relationships rather than ownership (EITF 97-2, Application of FASB Statement No. 94 and 

APB No. 16 to Physician Practice Management Entities and Certain Other Entities with Contractual 

Management Arrangements). 

112As noted previously, Interpretation No. 46(R), discussed in detail in Section IV of this Report, addresses 

the accounting for Variable Interest Entities, which are generally understood to include the subset of 

entities typically referred to as SPEs.

37
differing economics. Some support the equity method by arguing that significant 

influence over another entity is a trigger that should change the accounting. Others 

suggest that equity method investments should be reported at fair value. Still others 

argue that fair value should not be used when that value is not evident from public market 

transactions. Although all of these views have merit, the Staff nonetheless believes that 

exploring the approach of recording all investments in other entities that do not result in

consolidation at fair value is warranted. 

The benefits of reducing the number of alternative accounting treatments for

unconsolidated investments would include: 1) increased transparency for financial 

statement users, 2) reduced complexity for financial statement preparers, 3) reduced 

likelihood that investments with similar underlying economic characteristics are 

presented differently in the financial statements, and 4) reduced incentives to structure

investments in an effort to achieve a particular accounting treatment. For example, an 

issuer investing in another entity that is likely to incur losses in the short term may 

currently have an incentive to structure its investment to avoid the equity method,113

because it would require the investor to recognize its share of these losses.

 3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

In this section the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to investments in other entities. The Staff also extrapolates from these 

findings to estimate amounts related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

Table III(A)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting investments in the 

equity of other entities. Almost 96% of the sample issuers present financial reports that 

consolidate one or more other entities. As indicated in the table, approximately 50% of 

the sample issuers report equity-method investments, and approximately 36% report costmethod investments. Approximately 58% and 18% of the sample issuers report 

investments categorized as “available for sale” and “trading”, respectively.114 An

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that approximately 24% of the population of issuers report equitymethod investments, approximately 17% report cost method investments, approximately 

37% report available-for-sale investments and approximately 6% report trading 

investments. 

 

113See, for example, EITF Issue No. 02-14, Whether an Investor Should Apply the Equity Method of 

Accounting to Investments Other Than Common Stock. 

114 Two-thirds of those issuers reporting trading investments are large banks, financial institutions, 

insurance companies, and the like. 

38
TABLE III(A)(1): Issuers Reporting Investments in the Equity of Other Entities

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Accounting

Treatment a Full Sample 

(n=200)

(%) 

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%) 

Issuers presenting consolidated

financial statements b 95.5 100 91 91.1

Issuers reporting equity method

investments c 50.5 78 23 23.5

Issuers reporting cost method 

investments c 36 55 17 17.4

Issuers reporting available-for-sale 

investments c 58 79 37 37.4

Issuers reporting trading

investments c 17.5 29 6 6.2

a

 These categories are not mutually exclusive. b

 Determined by observation of the face of the balance sheet; issuers presenting consolidated financial statements will 

include the term “Consolidated” in the titles of each statement. c

 Determined by examining the notes to the financial statements of issuers that report “Investments” to ascertain 

whether these investments are accounted for as “trading,” “available for sale,” “cost method,” or “equity method 

investments.” 

Table III(A)(2) presents reported amounts related to equity method investments, 

where such amounts can be determined. As discussed above, the amount presented on 

the balance sheet for equity method investments represents the issuer’s interest in the net 

assets of the other entity. For our sample of issuers, the total value on the balance sheet 

for equity-method investments is reported at approximately $146 billion. A total of

almost $18 billion in income related to equity method investments is reported on the 

sample issuers’ income statements. 

TABLE III(A)(2): Reported Amounts Related to Equity Method Investments a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Equity method investments reported

on issuer balance sheet a $145,914 $143,318 $2,596 $402,918

Income (loss) from equity method

investments reported on issuer

income statements a $17,664 $17,462 $202 $37,662

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements and supplemental exhibits. 

It is important to note that disclosure of the amount on the balance sheet related to 

equity method investments may not be required, absent other factors that make the 

39
information material to investors. For example, if the investment does not meet certain 

requirements that designate it as “significant,”115 the amount reported for the investment 

may be combined with other items on the balance sheet and presented as “other assets” 

with no further breakdown of the other asset categories required. In this case, investors 

may not be able to determine the existence of some equity method investments (or other

types of investments) from the issuer’s filing. 

If the investment is “significant,” disclosures about the financial position and 

operating results of the other entity may be required in the notes to the financial 

statements or in supplemental exhibits. The Staff notes that, due to the varying 

placement of the disclosures and the different levels of disclosures required, it may 

sometimes be difficult for investors to fully comprehend the extent of an issuer’s

involvement with equity method investments and to compare such involvements across 

issuers. As a result, the Staff acknowledges that the values reported in Table III(A)(2) 

may be understated. 

In reviewing the sample data, the Staff notes that fair values of equity method 

investments are not disclosed in many cases.116 Where fair values were reported, the 

Staff notes that there is little, if any, correlation among the fair values, the value reported 

on the issuer’s balance sheet under the equity method, and the underlying equity in the

other entity. 

B. Transfers of Financial Assets with Continuing Involvement 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

Issuers often transfer financial assets (e.g., customer receivables, notes, 

mortgages, bonds) to other parties. In this subsection, we discuss the “derecognition” of

financial assets; that is, when is it appropriate for an issuer to consider financial assets to

be sold, and remove them from the balance sheet. If the transfer is treated as a sale (i.e., 

if it receives “sale accounting”), the issuer would record the receipt of cash, remove (i.e., 

“derecognize”) the assets from its balance sheet, and report any gain or loss in the income

statement. If a transfer of financial assets does not qualify for sale accounting, it is 

instead accounted for as a borrowing. In these cases, the issuer transferring the assets

would record the receipt of cash, but would not remove the assets from its balance sheet,

and would not report any gain or loss in the income statement. Further, the issuer

transferring the assets would recognize a liability for the full amount of cash received 

from the other party. 

In a simple example, consider an issuer selling $1 million in customer receivables 

to a finance company without recourse or further obligation on either party’s part. The

issuer receives cash today and its customers’ future payments are sent to the finance 

 

115See Regulation S-X Rules 3-09 and 4-08(g).

116Paragraph 20(b) of APB No. 18 indicates that the “For those investments in common stock for which a

quoted market price is available, aggregate value of each identified investment based on the quoted market

price usually should be disclosed.” 

40
company. In this case the finance company bears all the risk and, assuming no fraud or 

other irregularities, the issuer is not required to reimburse the finance company if its 

customers default. In this case, since the issuer surrenders all rights and retains no 

obligations associated with ownership of the receivables, the transfer would typically be 

treated as a sale. 

In other arrangements, the issuer may continue to be involved with the transferred 

assets. For example, an issuer might transfer customer receivables to a finance company

for cash, but accept an obligation to reimburse the finance company in the event that the 

issuer’s customers default. Consider a transfer of $1 million in customer receivables 

similar to that above, except that the issuer guarantees up to $10,000 of the amounts

transferred. Such a transfer would typically still be treated as a sale, since the continuing 

obligation to which the issuer is exposed is relatively small, and does not result in the 

issuer continuing to control the transferred assets.. 

The transaction looks less like a sale as the continuing involvement increases. 

Indeed, in some cases, a transfer of financial assets with extensive continuing 

involvement might be economically indistinguishable from a borrowing secured by the 

“sold” assets. Consider a similar transfer of $1 million in customer receivables where the

issuer guarantees 100% of the amounts transferred, such that the issuer must reimburse 

the finance company for any and all customer defaults. This transaction clearly has

economic similarities to a secured borrowing since the issuer has received cash today and 

is obligated to remit cash to the finance company in the future, regardless of whether or 

not its customers pay. 

SFAS No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 

Extinguishments of Liabilities, provides the guidance for determining whether all, or any 

portion of, a transfer of financial assets should be accounted for as a sale, in cases where 

there is continuing involvement. SFAS No. 140 focuses on the concept of “control” of 

the transferred financial assets; if control is deemed to be relinquished, the transaction is

treated as a sale. However, SFAS No. 140 does not impose a “sale” or “no sale” 

determination for the entire transaction. Instead, what has been dubbed a “financial 

components” approach is taken, such that the issuer continues to record as an asset any 

portion of the original asset that it continues to control after the transfer, and removes 

from its balance sheet the portion that it no longer controls. Thus, if control over only a 

portion of the assets has been given up, an issuer would account for only that portion as 

sold. The issuer would continue to include in its financial statements any portion of the 

assets it did not sell and recognize any other assets or liabilities related to its continuing 

involvement with the portion of the assets sold. 

In our example above where the issuer guaranteed up to $10,000 of the amounts

transferred, assuming that sale accounting were appropriate, the issuer would recognize 

the receipt of the cash, remove the customer receivables from its balance sheet, and 

recognize a liability related to the $10,000 guarantee. If, in addition to the guarantee, the 

issuer retained an undivided interest in 20% of the receivables, then the issuer would 

recognize the receipt of the cash, remove only 80% of the receivables’ carrying value 

41
from its balance sheet, and recognize a liability related to the $10,000 guarantee.117 In

the example above where the issuer guaranteed 100% of the amounts transferred, it is 

likely that the transfer of the customer receivables would not receive sale accounting. In 

this circumstance, as described above, a liability will be recorded to reflect the issuer’s

obligation to repay the full amount received to the finance company. 

It is noteworthy that, under this approach, transfer of control remains the key 

criterion (as opposed to, say, some measure of risks and rewards), albeit applied to each 

component of the transaction. In this context, transfer of control is generally considered 

to have occurred for accounting purposes if:118

• The assets have been “isolated” from the issuer transferring the assets119 (that is, 

put presumptively beyond the reach of the issuer or its creditors even in 

bankruptcy); 

• The purchaser120 is not restricted from selling the assets or using them as 

collateral for a loan; and

• The issuer transferring the assets does not continue to maintain effective control 

over the assets by keeping a right or obligation to repurchase or redeem the assets 

before their maturity. 

Transfers of financial assets often take more complex forms than the simple 

scenarios discussed above. For example, financial assets are often transferred into a 

special purpose entity, which issues securities or commercial paper in order to fund the 

purchase of the financial assets. If the SPE issues securities, the transaction is commonly 

described as a “securitization” of those financial assets.121 If the transaction involves the 

transfer of mortgage loans and a related guarantee (such as one from a governmentsponsored agency), it is referred to as a “guaranteed mortgage securitization.” If the SPE 

issues commercial paper, it might be referred to as a commercial paper conduit. 

There are several reasons why issuers engage in these more complex transactions,

such as to enhance liquidity, manage risks, and/or to obtain lower-cost funding. In order 

to achieve lower-cost funding, issuers generally maintain at least some level of 

continuing involvement in the transferred assets that provides protection (i.e., from credit, 

interest rate, or other risks) to the purchasers of the securities or commercial paper issued 

by the SPE. For example, a seller may provide credit enhancement through overcollateralization of the assets sold. In a common type of over-collateralization, the seller 

 

117This would assume that all the criteria to qualify for sale accounting in paragraph 9 of SFAS No. 140 

have been met.

118See SFAS No. 140, paragraph 9. 

119This is a facts and circumstances determination, and often requires the advice of outside attorneys. 

120When the purchaser is a QSPE (as is discussed below), this criteria applies to restrictions on the QSPE’s 

interest holder. 

121Paragraph 364 of SFAS No. 140, defines a securitization as “the process by which financial assets are 

transformed into securities.” 

42
would sell assets worth, say, $100 for $90, while retaining the right to the last $10 

collected on those assets. Other types of continuing involvement include derivative 

transactions with the SPE,122 cash reserve accounts,123 guarantees,124 and/or servicing 

obligations for the underlying assets. In the context of a securitization, the assets and 

liabilities related to an issuer’s continuing involvement in the transferred assets are often 

referred to as “retained interests.” Both the economics and the structural forms of these 

contracts have evolved rapidly in recent years, in order to take advantage of opportunities 

in financial markets and, at times, to achieve specific accounting results. 

When an SPE is involved, in addition to determining whether or not sale 

accounting is appropriate, there is also a need to determine whether the transferor is 

required to consolidate the SPE for accounting purposes. If an issuer transfers financial 

assets to an SPE in a transaction qualifying for sale accounting, but the SPE is 

consolidated, the sale accounting allowed by SFAS No. 140 would be effectively 

negated. That is, the issuer would recognize the outstanding portion of the assets 

transferred on its consolidated balance sheet, as well as a liability reflecting the SPE’s 

obligation to its debt-holders. 

In order to facilitate sale accounting in securitization transactions, the accounting 

guidance includes an exception to the consolidation requirements for certain SPE’s 

commonly used in securitization transactions. In many cases the SPE in a securitization 

transaction can be described as being on “auto-pilot”—i.e., it merely collects cash flows 

on the financial assets and pays those cash flows to investors, but does nothing else, such

that, in essence, no one controls or needs to control the operations of the entity. In such 

cases, since all decisions are preprogrammed by the legal documents that create the SPE, 

it has been argued that there is no need for any party to be deemed to control the entity—

and thus, no justification for consolidation. The FASB denoted this type of SPE as a 

“qualifying” SPE or “QSPE” to differentiate it from other SPEs.125 

SFAS No. 140 also requires the following disclosures (among others): 126

• Total outstanding amounts of securitized assets, the portion that has been 

derecognized, and the portion that continues to be recognized on the balance sheet 

(e.g., as retained interests); and 

• Amounts of, delinquencies on, and net credit losses related to securitized assets 

plus any other assets the issuer manages with them; 

 

122See discussion on derivatives in Section III(F). 

123A cash reserve account is a form of credit protection provided by the seller and is typically funded from a

portion of the seller’s proceeds from the securitization transaction. Losses of principal and/or interest in the

entity generally would be borne first by the cash reserve account up to the amount funded in such account, 

thus providing a form of credit enhancement to the third-party investors. 

124See discussion on guarantees in Section III(E). 

125See SFAS No. 140, paragraph 46 and Interpretation No. 46(R), paragraph 4(c). 

126See SFAS No. 140, paragraph 17 a complete list of the disclosure requirements. 

43
In addition, SFAS No. 140 requires the following disclosures for each 

securitization asset type (such as credit card receivables, mortgage loans or automobile 

loans): 

• The characteristics of the securitization—that is, a description of the issuer’s

continuing involvement with the securitized assets and the amount of gain or loss

on sale; 

• Cash flows between the issuer and the SPE; 

• The issuer’s accounting policies for initially and subsequently measuring any 

retained interests;

• Key assumptions in measuring the fair value of the retained interests; and

• Sensitivity analysis showing the effects of changes in the key measurement 

assumptions. 

The Commission’s Financial Reporting Release No. 67 (known as FR 67)

mandated by section 401(a) of the Act, also requires additional disclosures in the OffBalance Sheet section of MD&A regarding certain off-balance sheet arrangements. FR 

67 requires issuers to provide disclosures about securitization transactions that involve 

transfers to an unconsolidated entity with the issuer having retained or contingent 

interests in the unconsolidated entity. Disclosure is required to the extent necessary to

provide an understanding of the issuer’s material off-balance sheet arrangements as well 

as the material effects of those arrangements. For securitization transactions these 

disclosures may include: 

• Nature and business purpose of the arrangement, including a description of the 

retained or contingent interests in assets transferred that serve as credit, liquidity,

or market risk support for the assets; 

• Importance of the arrangement to liquidity, capital resources, market risk or credit 

risk support, or other benefits; 

• The financial impact of the arrangements and the issuer’s exposure to risk as a 

result of the arrangements (e.g., retained interests or contingent liabilities); and 

• Known events, demands, commitments, trends or uncertainties that affect the 

availability or benefits of such arrangements. 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Transfers of 

Financial Assets 

During the development of the guidance related to transfers of financial assets, the

FASB noted that transfers of financial assets in which the seller has some continuing 

involvement (either with the transferred assets or with the purchaser) had grown 

significantly in volume, variety, and complexity.127 With this in mind, the FASB set out

 

127See SFAS No. 140, paragraph 116.

44
to develop an approach that would be more responsive to developments in the financial 

markets. The financial components approach was designed to be consistent with the way 

market participants deal with financial assets, recognizing that the financial marketplace 

can contractually separate and repackage the cash flows associated with financial assets

in many ways. The financial components approach was also designed to reflect the 

economic consequences of contractual provisions underlying the financial assets and 

liabilities, and conform to the FASB’s conceptual framework. 

Application of the financial components approach may be challenging, as many of 

these transactions (e.g., securitizations) can be complex and highly structured. For 

example, it is often necessary to obtain legal opinions from attorneys with specific 

expertise in these transactions. Additionally, determining the fair value of the various

components of the transaction, including any retained interests, requires the exercise of 

judgment and may also involve subjective estimations, raising questions about the

preciseness of both the fair values and of gains or losses recorded upon the sale of the 

financial assets. Nevertheless, the financial components approach, in general, provides a 

consistent approach to derecognition, and is a substantial improvement from the 

incomplete and sometimes inconsistent guidance that existed before that approach was 

adopted. The financial components approach is also more flexible than an “all or 

nothing” approach that would look at each instrument only as whole.128

As discussed above, an alternative to using control as a basis for determining 

which assets to record is a “risks and rewards” approach. Those who support a risks and 

rewards approach to derecognition often suggest that an approach that focuses on control 

of the financial assets makes it possible to have economically similar transactions treated 

differently for accounting purposes. For example, consider an issuer selling customer 

receivables and specifying in the sale agreement that it could, at some later date, select 

from among those receivables a small portion to repurchase at a fixed price. Since any

individual receivable could be repurchased under this provision, according to SFAS No. 

140 the issuer is deemed to have retained control over the entire pool of assets, even 

though the issuer might not participate significantly in the risks and rewards associated 

with the asset pool. As a consequence of this retained control, this transfer would not 

qualify for sale accounting under SFAS No. 140. 

Although there is debate about whether the guidance in SFAS No. 140 is

effective, much of the controversy is caused not by the standards themselves, but by 

transaction structuring. Issuers often structure transfers in order to achieve or avoid sale 

accounting, trigger or avoid the recognition of losses (or gains), or change the 

measurement attribute applied to the recorded assets and liabilities. The Staff believes, 

based on its reviews of issuer filings, that the most frequent structuring goal is to achieve

sale treatment without consolidation of any related SPEs. While economic motivations 

for most asset transfers exist, some transfers of financial assets appear to be significantly, 

primarily, or even solely entered into with accounting motivations in mind. 

 

128In contrast, lease accounting, discussed in Section III.D, takes such an “all or nothing” approach. 

45
Some of this structuring has been undertaken by using QSPEs in situations that

appear to the Staff to be beyond those originally contemplated by the FASB. The FASB 

originally intended a QSPE to be merely a pass-through entity to essentially serve as

custodian of the underlying financial assets,129 and attempted to define it in such a way as

to ensure that this was the case. There are restrictions on the types of assets that an SPE 

can hold while remaining “qualified,” and when it is acceptable for the QSPE to dispose 

of certain non-cash financial assets.130 Although the limitations on the activities of 

QSPEs do not permit the QSPE to manage the assets on its balance sheet, there are few 

explicit limitations on managing the balance sheet liabilities.

131 That is, in structures 

where the QSPE holds longer term assets and funds the purchase of such assets through 

the issuance of shorter term interests to investors, decisions have to be made regarding 

the nature of the new interests to be issued when the original short term interests mature. 

In practice, these decisions are made by the issuer transferring the financial assets.

Accountants and auditors have concluded that the SPE – despite such management of 

liabilities -- is a QSPE under SFAS No. 140, and is therefore exempt from consolidation. 

These and other interpretations of the QSPE guidance have expanded the activities of

QSPEs beyond the simple pass-through entities originally envisioned by the FASB.132

Despite persistent work by the FASB133 and the Commission, the Staff considers 

the accounting for sales of financial assets to be in need of improvement. Indeed, the 

FASB already has several projects on its agenda relating to transfers of financial assets. 

However, this area is challenging to standard setters, in large part because financial 

structures are virtually limitless and continue to evolve at a rapid pace. However,

because the areas in need of improvement in their accounting stem mainly from 

structured transactions that have accounting motivations, improvement in transparency 

and comparability across issuers can perhaps most directly and quickly be accomplished 

by eliminating the use of such structured transactions. 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

In this section the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to transfers of financial assets. The Staff also extrapolates from these 

findings to estimate amounts related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

Table III(B)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting transfers of financial 

assets. As indicated in the table, approximately 17% of the sample issuers report 

 

129See SFAS No. 140, paragraph 177.

130See SFAS No. 140, paragraph 35. 

131The FASB is currently considering these and other issues as part of a project to amend SFAS No. 140. 

132In acknowledging these interpretations, the Staff does not intend to signify its agreement with them. 

133For example, the FASB previously amended and added to the guidance in SFAS No. 125 through the 

issuance of SFAS No. 140. Additionally, the FASB staff addressed 123 interpretive questions in a Special

Report, A Guide to Implementation of Statement 140 on Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of

Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities. More recently, the FASB has undertaken a project to 

amend the guidance in SFAS No. 140. 

46
transfers of financial assets, mainly via securitizations, and most of these issuers are 

members of the large issuer sub-sample. Approximately 13% of issuers report retained 

interests related to these transfers and, again, most of these issuers are members of the 

large issuer sub-sample. An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the 

approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that approximately 4% of the 

population of issuers report transfers of financial assets, and approximately 3% report 

retained interests from their continuing involvement with these assets. 

TABLE III(B)(1): Issuers Reporting Transfers of Financial Assets

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%) 

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%) 

Issuers reporting transfers of 

financial assets a 17 30 4 4.3 

Issuers reporting retained interests a 13 23 3 3.2 

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study.

Table III(B)(2) presents reported amounts related to transferred financial assets. 

Our sample of issuers reports approximately $791 billion in financial assets that were 

transferred, and moved off issuer balance sheets, but are still outstanding. In addition, 

our sample of issuers reported net gains of approximately $10 billion related to the sale of 

financial assets during 2003. Our sample issuers report approximately $161 billion in 

assets and liabilities related to the issuer’s continuing involvement with these assets. An

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that financial assets reported by the population as transferred but

still outstanding are close to $1 trillion, and that assets and liabilities reported by the 

population as representing their continuing involvement in these transferred assets are 

approximately $186 billion. 

 

47
TABLE III(B)(2): Reported Amounts Related to Financial Assets Transferred a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Financial assets transferred off 

issuer balance sheets but still 

outstanding $790,925 $789,325 $1,600 $949,325

Gain/loss on transfers of financial 

assets reported on issuer income 

statements $10,287 $10,047 $240 $34,047

Retained interests reported on issuer 

balance sheets $161,175 $160,928 $247 $185,628

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements.

Table III(B)(3) presents reported amounts for some of the major classes of 

retained interests reported by our sample of issuers. Interest-only strips,134 recorded as

assets on the issuer’s balance sheet, total approximately $5.6 billion for the sample. Of 

the various types of retained interests, these are typically the most subordinate, and 

consequently carry the highest concentration of risk. Servicing assets,135 which carry risk

primarily related to prepayments, total approximately $23 billion for the sample. The 

remainder of the retained interests, approximately $133 billion, includes but is not limited 

to various types of more senior interests that, by their nature, are apt to carry lower risk 

concentrations. 

TABLE III(B)(3): Reported Amounts Related to Major Classes of Retained 

Interests a

Sub-Samples 

Type of Retained Interest Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Interest-only Strip $5,628 $5,540 $88 $14,340 

Servicing Assets $22,677 $22,518 $159 $38,418 

Other Retained Interests b $132,870 $132,870 $0 $132,870

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements. b These interests would include amounts representing, for example, overcollateralizations, senior or mezzanine bond

interests, and seller’s interests in credit card securitizations. 

It appears that some issuers exclude information regarding securitization 

transactions from their disclosures if they did not retain a subordinate interest, such as an 

 

134Interest-only strips are instruments that entitle the holder to a portion of the interest payments made on a 

pool of loans or debt securities 

135Servicing assets involve the right to payments similar to an interest-only strip in return for collecting and

dispersing payments made on the underlying loans. 

48
interest-only strip, following the transactions. Further, the Staff notes that the sample 

issuers disclosed relatively little information regarding transactions with commercial 

paper conduits, such as transfers of trade receivables. 

C. Retirement Arrangements 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

Many companies provide employees with retirement benefits. Cash payments

under pension plans are the most common, but other benefits, such as health-care

insurance, are also offered. Due in part to the magnitude of the obligations under these 

plans, the significance of the unfunded or underfunded status of plans, and the 

uncertainty inherent in measuring the obligations, the accounting for certain retirement

benefits has long been controversial. However, with the aging population, concerns over 

the future of the social security system, and companies reducing or eliminating retirement 

benefits altogether, discussions regarding the accounting for employee retirement benefits 

occur at the highest levels within the U.S. government, corporate-America and the 

workforce. 

There are two primary types of pension benefit plans: defined contribution and 

defined benefit. Under a defined contribution plan, the employer provides contributions 

to the plan based upon its agreements with employees and its policies, but has no further 

obligation to provide benefits under the plan. The future risks and rewards of these plans 

rest with employees, not employers. Thus, the accounting for defined contribution plans 

is quite straightforward and does not raise significant off-balance sheet questions; as 

such, the accounting for these plans is not addressed in this Report. 

In contrast, under a defined benefit plan, the employer is at risk and is obligated to 

ensure that employees receive the predetermined benefits after retirement. An employer 

might simply choose to pay such benefits as they become due. However, most issuers set 

up a separate legal entity (usually a type of trust) to hold and manage retirement assets 

and make the related payments. Even when a separate entity is established to accumulate 

assets to fund pension benefits, the employer’s obligation is not satisfied merely by 

making contributions to the plan. Because of its responsibility to ensure there are 

sufficient assets to pay plan benefits, the employer retains the risk of underperforming 

assets, and receives the benefit when those assets perform better than expected. Subject 

to certain limitations in employment law, the employer, or a representative appointed by 

the employer, also generally determines the plan’s investments. 

Based on our discussions in the previous sections, and in view of the employer’s 

continuing involvement and risk, it might seem that a separate legal entity that is

established to hold and manage pension plan assets and that is controlled by the issuer

should be consolidated. If consolidated, plan assets and liabilities would be separately 

recognized on the issuer’s balance sheet. However, defined benefit pension plans are 

exempt from consolidation.136 Instead, the retirement plan assets and liabilities, to the

 

136See, for example, Interpretation 46(R), paragraph 4(b), and SFAS No. 87, paragraphs 35-37. 

49
extent recognized, are netted against each other, with only the net asset or net liability for

each plan recognized on the issuer’s balance sheet.137 

It is generally accepted that any liability for pension-related costs should be 

recognized by the employer as its employees perform service. Pension and other 

retirement plan costs are determined by developing best estimates of future benefit 

payments, taking into account a number of factors, to the extent such factors are relevant, 

including the employee’s age, length of service, retirement date, salary, expected trends

in medical costs, expected mortality. These estimated future benefit payments are then

discounted to their present value. Due to the complexities involved in estimating pension 

obligations, actuaries are typically involved. Given the long-term nature of pension 

plans, changes in the estimates and assumptions over time are expected. The accounting

guidance for these plans does not require adjustments to the pension obligation as a result 

of changes in the estimates and assumptions to be recognized immediately.138 Similarly, 

differences between expected and actual returns on assets need not be recognized 

immediately. All of these items, which are collectively referred to as pension gains and 

losses, may be deferred and factored into the pension obligation or asset reported on the 

balance sheet over future periods. 

The approach to accounting for defined benefit pensions is designed to ensure that 

the related pension costs are recorded over the service lives of the employees and that the 

recorded obligation is sufficient to reflect all benefit payments obligations before they 

become due. However, companies are afforded discretion under the guidance as to when

gains and losses are recorded during the service period, so long as they are recorded by 

the time the obligations become due. An issuer that does not elect to defer pension gains 

or losses as permitted by the accounting guidance will report a net retirement plan asset 

or liability that is determined based on the fair value of the assets in the plan, and the

then-current best estimate of the retirement obligation. That issuer would likely report 

significant volatility in its pension expense, as any changes in actuarial estimates and 

assumptions would be immediately recognized, as would actual returns on pension plan 

assets. On the other hand, an issuer that elects to defer pension gains and losses would 

report much smoother pension expense from period to period, but would report a net 

retirement plan asset or liability that could be affected as much by deferrals of gains and 

losses as by actual changes in assets and obligations. 

The FASB attempted to mitigate the effects of smoothing pension expense and

reduce the amount of retirement liability that may be off-balance sheet, by instituting a 

“minimum liability rule.”

139 If issuers choose to defer pension gains and losses, they 

 

137In part, this acknowledges the fact that under U.S. employment law, there are certain protections of 

retirement benefits so long as the company funds its pension plans adequately and meets other 

requirements. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

138SFAS No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions and SFAS No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for

Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, are the primary accounting standards related to accounting 

for retirement benefits. 

139See SFAS No. 87, paragraph 36. Health-care and other postretirement benefit plans are not subject to the 

minimum liability rule. 

50
must recognize a liability of at least the amount by which the accumulated benefit 

obligation (“ABO”), which is defined as the best estimate of the present value of future 

pension payments without taking into account future salary increases, exceeds the fair 

value of pension plan assets.140 However, even with recognizing the minimum liability, a 

significant amount of an issuer’s pension obligation may remain off-balance sheet, since 

the determination of the minimum liability is based on the ABO, rather than the projected 

benefit obligation (“PBO”), a projection of benefit obligations which considers the effects 

of expected future salary increases. 

Extensive disclosures are required for pensions and other postretirement benefit 

plans.141 These disclosure requirements are intended to provide financial statement users 

a more complete picture of the retirement plans. More particularly, the disclosures are 

generally designed to accomplish three tasks. First, they provide consistent information

about benefit plans, no matter what choices have been made regarding balance sheet and 

income statement presentation of retirement plan amounts. Second, they provide the 

reader with information about certain key assumptions and estimates used in the pension 

and postretirement benefit plan calculations. And finally, they explain whether the issuer 

has elected to defer any of the gains or losses and provide information about the effect of 

deferral. 

Required disclosures include: 

• A reconciliation of changes in employers’ retirement obligations from period to 

period, and a reconciliation of changes in fair values of retirement plan assets 

from period to period; 

• Funded status of the plan (i.e., the extent to which the retirement obligations ((as

measured by PBO for pensions and ABO for other postretirement benefit plans)) 

are funded with retirement assets to cover those obligations) and the amounts of 

retirement-related obligations that are off-balance sheet; 

• Qualitative and quantitative information about how retirement plan assets are 

invested; 

• Estimates of amounts expected to be contributed to the plan in the subsequent 

year and the benefits to be paid to employees in the near term; 

• The amount of net periodic benefit cost recognized in earnings; and 

 

140 However, any such increase in liability does not appear on the income statement as a loss. Rather, the 

“other side” of the accounting entry is also to the balance sheet, either to an intangible asset or to other

comprehensive income (a component of equity). 

141The accounting for other postretirement benefit plans is similar to defined benefit pension plans in that

the issuer is required to estimate and recognize the obligation and related cost of providing such benefits as 

the employees perform services. Further, many of the same issues regarding estimation of the obligation, 

netting plan assets and liabilities and deferral of certain changes in plan assets and liabilities exist under 

other postretirement benefit plan accounting. However, other postretirement benefit plans are often not

funded through the establishment of a separate legal entity. 

51
• Key assumptions used in measurement of plan assets, liabilities and retirement 

cost, including the dates such measurements were determined.142 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Retirement 

Arrangements 

Some investors have expressed concerns about the transparency of pension and 

other postretirement benefit accounting and disclosure. The CFA Institute (formerly the

Association for Investment Management and Research or “AIMR”), a nonprofit

membership organization for investment professionals, recently commented that, because 

the pension and other postretirement benefit accounting standard “fails to provide full 

recognition in the financial statements of the effects on the firm of the pension and 

postretirement benefit contracts, a huge and very costly burden has been shifted to those 

for whom the statements are prepared, analysts and other users.”143 Accordingly, some 

investors have called for issuers to report actual gains and losses from changes in 

expected assumptions versus actual plan results by eliminating the smoothing of gains

and losses currently allowed under GAAP and to separately recognize pension and other 

postretirement benefit plan assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. The Staff agrees

that, under the current standards, the balance sheet is often not transparent as to the true 

funded status of pension plans and that additional clarity is necessary. 

In the deliberations that led to the issuance of the retirement accounting standards 

that were in the mid-1980s and early-1990’s, the FASB stated that it would be preferable

conceptually to recognize retirement liabilities and assets with either no delay in 

recognition of gains and losses in net income, or with gains and losses reported currently 

in other comprehensive income, but not in net income.

144 However, it was strongly 

argued by issuers that recognizing these short-term gains and losses in the income

statement of the issuer may overwhelm the effects of the issuer’s continuing operations 

and thus would not fairly reflect the primary business activities of the issuer.

Furthermore, as noted above, preparers argued that retirement plans are a long-term 

commitment, and that the accounting should take a similar long-term view that avoids 

excessive short-term volatility, so long as the obligation is recognized by the time it 

becomes due. Ultimately, the FASB acknowledged that not permitting the deferral of

certain gains or losses would be “too great of a change from past practice” and was 

satisfied that the standards “as a whole represented an improvement in financial

reporting.” However, the FASB also acknowledged that the issuance of such guidance 

was only one step toward gradual, evolutionary change.145

 

142See paragraph 5 et. seq. of SFAS No. 132 Revised. 

143See the CFA Institute (formerly AIMR) Comment Letter to the FASB: Re: File Reference No. 1025-200-

Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards: Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other 

Postretirement Benefits, Oct. 27, 2003. See also CFA Institute (formerly AIMR) letter to the IASB: Re:

Improvement of IAS 19, Employee Benefits, June 16, 2002, in which CFA Institute states that they are not

in favor of smoothing pension losses and gains. 

144SFAS 87, paragraph 107. 

145SFAS No. 87, paragraph 107.

52
While the merits of the various positions can be debated, it is true that retirement

plan accounting is at times inconsistent with the accounting for similar assets and 

liabilities. For example, there are many liabilities whose ultimate payment amount 

depends on future events. When the estimate of the amount to be paid changes, those 

other liabilities are adjusted to reflect the change in estimate. However, when estimates

of the amounts of retirement benefits to be paid change, the related liability is not 

required to be adjusted immediately, as gains and losses may be deferred. Also, as noted

previously, assets held in retirement plans are not accounted for using the guidance that 

would apply to such assets if not held in retirement plans. In addition, the existence of so 

many optional treatments is itself a difference between retirement plan accounting and 

the accounting for other significant assets and liabilities. 

Application of the current pension and other postretirement benefit accounting 

guidance has raised other questions. As noted above, estimation of retirement plan 

liabilities depends upon multiple actuarial and other estimates and assumptions. Because 

of the size of retirement obligations and their sensitivity to certain assumptions, even 

relatively small changes in those assumptions or estimates can significantly change the

estimated obligation or pension expense. The Staff has therefore focused on retirement

plan assumptions in its reviews of issuer filings in the past. For example, pension plan 

assumptions were identified as a significant issue in the “Summary by the Division of 

Corporation Finance of Significant Issues Addressed in the Review of the Periodic 

Reports of the Fortune 500 Companies” issued in 2003. That report noted that several 

topics which merit improved MD&A disclosures, including information about the 

significant assumptions used and how they were determined, sensitivity of the financial 

statements to changes in assumptions, and the impact of any planned changes in 

assumptions. The selection of appropriate assumptions and the use of judgment in 

making estimates of retirement obligations would likely be as important even if the 

accounting guidance were changed. 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

In this section the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to retirement plans. The Staff also extrapolates from these findings to 

estimate amounts related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

Table III(C)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting defined-benefit 

retirement plans. Approximately 48% of the sample issuers report defined-benefit 

pension plans, while approximately 44% report other postretirement benefit plans.146 The 

large issuer sub-sample reports a higher incidence of these plans in that 81% (74%) of 

these issuers report defined-benefit pension (other postretirement benefit) plans. In 

contrast, in the random issuer sub-sample, only 15% (14%) of the issuers report 

information about defined-benefit pension (other postretirement benefit) plans. An 

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that approximately 16% of the total population of issuers report 

 

146Issuers may have many individual plans, but often report information on an aggregate basis. 

53
sponsoring defined-benefit pension plans, and 15% report sponsoring other definedbenefit postretirement plans.147 

TABLE III(C)(1): Issuers Reporting Defined-Benefit Retirement Plans a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Plan b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Issuers reporting defined-benefit

pension plan(s) 48 81 15 15.7 

Issuers reporting other postretirement benefit plan(s) 44 74 14 14.6 

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. b

 These categories are not mutually exclusive. 

Table III(C)(2) presents the reported obligations, plan assets, and funded status

related to defined-benefit pension plans. These issuers report pension benefit obligations 

(“PBOs”) of approximately $764 billion and plan assets set aside for pension plans of 

approximately $678 billion. Defined-benefit pension plans for our sample of issuers are 

thus underfunded, based on this set of measurements, by approximately $86 billion 

(approximately 11% of total PBO), which means that the assets set aside for the plan(s)

are less than the estimated obligations related to the plan(s). In an economic sense, this

“underfundedness” represents the net economic liability of an issuer related to pension 

plans. 

 

147Ciesielski, J.T., “Ugly OPEBs: Surveying the S&P 500,” The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, November 

24, 2004, reports that 14.7% of the 9,852 companies reviewed from S&P’s Research Insight database have

other post-employment benefit plans (which includes other postretirement benefit plans). 

54
TABLE III(C)(2): Amounts Reported Related to Funded Status of Defined-benefit 

Pension Plans a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Reported PBOs $764,497 $758,882 $5,615 $1,320,382

Reported ABOs $537,522 $533,498 $4,024 $935,898

Reported values of plan assets $678,019 $673,564 $4,455 $1,119,064

Funded Status b

$86,478 

(underfunded) 

$85,318 

(underfunded) 

$1,160

(underfunded) 

$201,318

(underfunded) 

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. b The funded status is calculated as the value of reported plan assets less the reported PBO. 

These amounts for the sample as a whole are dominated by the large issuer subsample, which reports 99% of both the total reported obligation and the total value of 

plan assets for the sample. An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the 

approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that defined-benefit pension plan 

obligations and assets reported by the population approximate $1.320 trillion and $1.119 

trillion, respectively. This extrapolation suggests that pension plans for the population 

may be underfunded by approximately $201 billion on a net basis. 

Table III(C)(3) presents amounts that are reported on issuer balance sheets related 

to defined-benefit pension plans. The sample issuers report pension assets on the balance 

sheet of approximately $181 billion and pension liabilities on the balance sheet of almost 

$90 billion. Thus, issuers in the Study report a net asset position on the balance sheet for 

defined benefit pension plans of approximately $91 billion. The $177 billion difference 

between the liability implied by the $86 billion underfundedness (as shown in Table 

III(C)(2)) and the $91 billion net asset recognized on the balance sheet is the portion of 

the net pension liability that remains off-balance sheet for the sample of issuers in the 

Study due to the smoothing allowed by current pension accounting standards. 

55
TABLE III(C)(3): Amounts Reported on Issuer Balance Sheets Related to Definedbenefit Pension Plans a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Pension asset reported on issuer 

balance sheets b $181,045 $179,544 $1,501 $329,644

Pension liability reported on issuer 

balance sheets $89,960 $89,682 $278 $117,482

Other comprehensive income

reported in equity section of issuer 

balance sheets $50,181 $50,134 $47 $54,834 

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. 

These items are presented on the balance sheets of issuers, but since balance sheet items are often aggregated, the

detailed data can often only be obtained from the notes. b This total includes reported prepaid pension benefits of $172,248 (representing those retirement plans in a net asset 

positions and intangible assets of $8,797. The intangible assets relate to prior service costs and exist only to offset part 

of the additional minimum pension liability.

An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of 

active U.S. issuers suggests that net pension assets and net pension liabilities reported on 

issuer balance sheets approximate $330 billion and $117 billion, respectively, which nets 

to approximately a $213 billion asset position. The underfundedness estimated for the 

population and presented in Table III(C)(2) suggests that there may be a net economic

liability related to defined benefit pension plans of approximately $201 billion. Thus, 

these extrapolations suggest that a total of approximately $414 billion in net pension 

liability may remain off-balance sheet for the approximate population of active U.S. 

issuers. 

Table III(C)(4) presents the reported obligations, plan assets, and funded status

related to other postretirement benefit plans, as well as any associated amounts reported 

on issuer balance sheets. The issuers in our sample report total obligations, denoted as 

accumulated postretirement benefit obligations (“APBOs”),148 of almost $260 billion, but 

they report total plan assets set aside for other postretirement benefit plans of only 

approximately $42 billion (i.e., 16% funded). As a result, other postretirement benefit 

plans for our sample of issuers are underfunded by approximately $217 billion 

(approximately 84% of the total APBO), which represents the net economic liability for 

these issuers related to other postretirement benefit plans. Note that other postretirement 

benefit plans are substantially more underfunded than defined-benefit pension plans—in 

fact, other postretirement benefit plans are often not funded at all. An extrapolation of 

the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers

suggests that other postretirement benefit obligations and assets reported by the 

population approximate $389 billion and $52 billion, respectively. This extrapolation

 

148Note that GAAP does not require the calculation of a PBO for other postretirement benefit plans; in

general, such benefits are not affected by future salary increases. 

56
suggests that other postretirement benefit plans may be underfunded by approximately 

$337 billion for the population.149 

TABLE III(C)(4): Amounts Reported Related to Funded Status of Other 

Postretirement Benefit Plans and Amounts on Issuer Balance Sheets Related to 

Other Postretirement Benefit Plans a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Reported APBOs $259,865 $258,560 $1,305 $389,060

Reported Values of plan assets $42,406 $42,306 $100 $52,306 

Funded status b $217,459

(underfunded) 

$216,254

(underfunded) 

$1,205

(underfunded) 

$336,754

(underfunded) 

Other postretirement benefit plan 

assets reported on issuer balance 

sheets $693 $693 $0 $693

Other postretirement benefit plan 

liabilities reported on issuer balance 

sheets $146,741 $146,034 $707 $216,734 a These data were collected from the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study b The funded status is defined as the reported value of plan assets less the reported APBO. However, not all issuers 

reported the funded status directly—some simply reported the value of plan assets and the APBO. Issuers directly

reported total underfundedness of $210,056 for the sample as a whole, $208,929 for the large issuer sub-sample, and

$1,127 for the random issuer sub-sample.

Table III(C)(4) also presents amounts that are reported on issuer balance sheets

related to other postretirement benefit plans. The sample issuers report net liabilities on 

the balance sheet related to other postretirement benefit plans of almost $147 billion, as 

compared to net assets of less than $1 billion (i.e., $693 million). The underfundedness 

presented in Table III(C)(4) implies that there is a net economic liability related to other 

postretirement benefit plans of $217 billion. The difference between the 

underfundedness of $217 billion and the $146 billion net liability recognized on the

balance sheet is approximately $71 billion. This $71 billion net other postretirement 

benefit liability remains off-balance sheet for the sample of issuers in the Study. 

An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of 

active U.S. issuers suggests that the liability for other postretirement benefit plans 

reported on the balance sheet may be approximately $216 billion. The underfundedness

estimated for the population and presented in Table III(C)(4) suggests that there may be a 

net economic liability related to other postretirement benefit plans of $337 billion. Thus,

 

149 Ciesielski, J.T., (2004), (cited previously) reports APBO of approximately $382 billion and plan assets

of approximately $65 billion from S&P 500 issuers with have other post-employment benefit plans (which

includes other postretirement benefit plans). 

57
these extrapolations suggest that approximately $121 billion in other postretirement

benefit liability may remain off-balance sheet for the population.150 For retirement plans

overall (i.e., including pension and other postretirement benefit plans), the extrapolations 

from the sample data suggest that liabilities of approximately $535 billion may remain

off-balance sheet. 

The values reported above are all based on the amounts reported in financial 

statements. However, given the sensitivity of retirement obligations to various estimates

and assumptions, it is important to also discuss some of these assumptions. For example, 

one of the most critical assumptions is the choice of discount rate used to calculate the

present value of future benefit payments. Current accounting guidance specifies that 

issuers should select discount rates that reflect the yield on high quality bonds of duration 

similar to that of their projected annual benefit payments.151 

Table III(C)(5) presents information about discount rates used by issuers to

calculate the obligations for defined-benefit pension plans. The rates used by our sample

of issuers range from approximately 5.10% to 6.75% and the average is 6.18%. The 

average discount rate is slightly higher for the random issuer sub-sample (at 6.26%) than 

for the large issuer sub-sample (at 6.18%). By way of comparison, using the Bloomberg 

fair value index bond yields for maturities of 10 years to 30 years, AA bond rates as of 

December 31, 2003 ranged from 4.7% to 5.7%.152 As another point of comparison, 

S&P’s Creditweek Corporate Industrial AA Bond Yields for maturities of 10 years to 25 

years, ranged from 5.09% to 6.0%. The Staff understands that there are a variety of other 

indices that issuers rely on when selecting discount rates for pension calculations. 

However, it appears that on average issuers may be using discount rates that are at the 

high end.153

 

150It is important to note that a portion of the amount of liability that remains off the balance sheet likely 

results from issuer’s elections to recognize the effects of applying the new accounting guidance under

SFAS No. 106, which became effective in the early 1990s, over long periods of time. 

151SFAS No. 87, SFAS No. 106 as well as EITF Topic D-36 Selection of Discount Rate Used for 

Measuring Defined Benefit Pension Obligations and Obligations of PostRetirement Benefit Plans Other

Than Pensions provide explicit instructions on how issuers should select the discount rate used to calculate

their obligations. 

152The Staff notes that this index is based on coupon-bearing bonds. To match maturities with precision

would theoretically require rates equivalent to those of zero-coupon bonds, which rates would likely be

slightly higher. 

153 One of the principal subjects of comment by the Division of Corporation Finance in their reviews of the 

annual reports filed by the Fortune 500 in 2002 was pension accounting and disclosure. One of the 

requested disclosures was of the assumptions, estimates, and data source used to determine the discount

rate. See the Staff document Summary by the Division of Corporation Finance of Significant Issues

Addressed in the Review of the Periodic Reports of the Fortune 500 Companies at

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm. In addition, the Division Staff provides 

information and guidance to registrants on accounting and disclosure issues in various ways. For example, 

see the Staff document Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues in the Division of Corporation Finance at 

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/acctdis030405.pdf, as well as the Staff document Frequently

Requested Accounting and Financial Reporting Interpretations and Guidance at 

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfactfaq.htm, which contain information on the selection of 

discount rates for pension and post retirement benefit plans.

58
TABLE III(C)(5): Reported Discount Rates used in Defined-benefit Pension 

Calculations a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Minimum 5.10c 5.10c 6.00 NA 

Average b 6.18 6.18 6.26 NA 

Maximum 6.75d 6.75d 6.75 NA 

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. 

These items are presented on the balance sheets of issuers, but since balance sheet items are often aggregated, the

detailed data can often only be obtained from the notes. b The average is weighted by PBO and is calculated only for issuers reporting discount rates in the notes to the financial 

statements. c

 This is the minimum reported for a U.S. defined benefit pension plan. The actual minimum of the reported discount 

rates for a defined benefit pension plan of 3.7% relates to a non-U.S. plan. d

 This is the maximum reported for a U.S. pension plan. The actual maximum of the reported discount rates of 6.8%

relates to a non-U.S. plan. 

For illustrative purposes, the Staff notes that a 1⁄2% increase (e.g., from 5.5% to 

6%) in the discount rate applied to a stream of annual cash flows of equal amounts for 20 

years (compounded daily) would reduce the present value of that stream of cash flows by 

approximately 4%. While it is not possible to illustrate the effect on PBOs because the 

timing of payments is unknown, the Staff’s estimate of pension underfundedness may 

itself be understated due to the interest rates selected by issuers for discounting. 

Further, the accounting measure of underfundedness represents only one method 

of calculating this measure. For example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

(“PBGC”) measures retirement liabilities based on the estimated cost of purchasing

annuities to settle pension obligations when a company no longer can afford to maintain 

its plan. Thus, the discount rate used by the PBGC is based on periodical surveys of 

insurance companies which, in combination with a mandated mortality table, results in a 

present value representative of group annuity purchase prices. The 20 year select 

discount rate used by the PBGC as included in its fiscal year 2003 annual report was 

4.40%. On the other hand, discount rates used to determine minimum funding of plan 

liabilities are calculated using rates either selected by a company’s actuary (ERISA 

Liability) based on how pension assets are invested or the current liability which is based

on a statutory range of rates. The statutory range at December 31, 2003 approximated 

5.90% to 6.60%. 

 

59
D. Leases

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

A lease is a contractual obligation that allows assets owned by one party to be 

used by another party, for specified periods of time, in return for a payment or series of 

payments. Assets that are commonly leased include automobiles, airplanes, buildings 

and other real estate, machinery, computer equipment, and many other tangible assets. 

An issuer may be motivated to lease, rather than purchase, an asset for many reasons, 

including economies of scale or scope, increased flexibility, tax advantages, improved

access to capital, reduced costs of upgrading equipment, and improved risk sharing.154 

SFAS No. 13, Accounting for Leases (issued in 1976), provides the basic 

guidance for leases.155 Leases that transfer most of the benefits and responsibilities of

ownership to the party using the asset may be economically similar to sales with attached

financing agreements. This is recognized in SFAS No. 13, which states that “a lease that 

transfers substantially all of the benefits and risks incident to the ownership of property 

should be accounted for as the acquisition of an asset and the incurrence of an obligation 

by the lessee and as a sale or financing by the lessor.”156 Otherwise, the lease should be

accounted for as a rental contract. We concentrate on the case where an issuer is the 

lessee, that is, where the issuer is the party using the asset, as this is the scenario most 

likely to result in no elements of the lease or leased asset being on the balance sheet.

Leases can transfer control of the asset from the lessor to the lessee for as much of 

the asset’s life as desired, and can also transfer as many of the risks and rewards of 

ownership as desired. Leasing transactions can take many forms and include many 

different terms. Yet, despite this diversity in leasing arrangements, all leases receive one 

of two opposing accounting treatments; either the lease is treated as if it were a sale or as 

if it were a rental. 

If “most” of the risks and rewards of ownership are transferred to an issuer leasing 

an asset, the lease is treated as a sale of the entire asset by the owner (i.e., the lessor) and 

a purchase of an asset financed with debt by the issuer using the asset (referred to as the 

‘whole-of-the-asset’ approach). This kind of lease is called a “capital lease.”157 In these 

cases, the lessor removes the cost of the asset from its balance sheet and reports a sale of

the asset for proceeds equal to the present value of the required lease payments, plus the 

expected remaining value of the leased asset at the end of the lease term. The issuer 

 

154The Equipment Leasing Association indicates that of the $668 billion of productive assets acquired by

businesses in 2003, $208 billion, or 31 percent, was acquired through leasing. See the Equipment Leasing 

Association’s website: http://www.elaonline.com/industrydata/overview.cfm.

155Leases are defined as the right to use property, plant, or equipment for stated periods of time and can

include agreements that are not nominally identified as leases. See paragraph 1 of SFAS 13, Accounting 

for Leases. Also see EITF Issue 01-8, Determining Whether an Arrangement Contains a Lease, which 

describes other arrangements than are not nominally identified as leases but may contain a lease. 

156See SFAS No. 13, paragraph 60. 

157Such a lease would be referred to as either a “sales-type” or “direct financing” lease for lessors. 

60
using the asset records the asset and a related liability for the present value of the required

lease payments on its balance sheet. 

If the lease does not transfer sufficient risks and rewards to the lessee to be treated

as a sale and purchase, it is instead treated like a rental contract. This kind of lease is 

called an “operating lease.” In this case, the owner of the asset retains the asset on its

balance sheet and records lease rental revenue (as well as depreciation, property taxes, 

etc.) in its income statement on a period-by-period basis. The issuer using the asset does 

not record the asset, or a related liability for the future contractual rental payments, on its 

balance sheet, but records leasing expense in its income statement, also on a period-byperiod basis. 

SFAS No. 13 specifies that a lease is a capital lease if: 

• The lease transfers ownership to the issuer (i.e., the lessee) using the asset by the

end of the lease term; or 

• The lease contains an option whereby the issuer can purchase the leased property 

at a price sufficiently lower than the expected fair value of the leased property at 

the end of the lease term; or 

• The term of the lease is equal to or greater than 75% of the estimated economic 

life of the leased property; or 

• The present value of the minimum lease payments to be made by the issuer is 

equal to or greater than 90% of the fair value of the leased property.158

While in the majority of cases the evaluation of whether these criteria have been 

met is straightforward, in certain circumstances it can be challenging, as leases 

sometimes contain contingent or variable payment requirements, optional term 

extensions, and other clauses that affect the calculations under one or more of the tests 

described above. However, such determinations are very important, as they can 

completely change the accounting for the lease. 

The identification of which agreements should be accounted for as leases, and

thus subject to the tests listed above, is also challenging in some situations. In order to 

reduce the chances of like arrangements being accounted for differently, the accounting 

guidance defines leases by their characteristics, not by their label. Thus, any contract, or 

portion of a contract, that meets the definition of a lease must be accounted for as one.159 

While most leases are indeed explicitly identified as such, some are not. 

The accounting guidance also includes extensive disclosure requirements for 

leases. These requirements vary based upon the type of lease and whether the issuer is 

the lessor or lessee. These disclosure requirements provide investors with the following

information: 

 

158In addition, lessors must also consider the following additional criteria: collectibility of the minimum 

lease payments is reasonably predictable and no important uncertainties surround the amount of

unreimbursable costs yet to be incurred by the lessor under the lease. See SFAS 13, paragraphs 7 and 8. 

159See, for example, EITF Issuer No. 01-8, Determining Whether an Arrangement Contains a Lease. 

61
• General description of the nature of leasing arrangements; 

• The nature, timing and amount of cash inflows and outflows associated with 

leases; 

• The amount of lease revenues and expenses reported in the income statement each 

period; 

• Description and amounts of leased assets by major balance sheet classification 

and related liabilities; and 

• Amounts receivable and unearned revenues under lease agreements.160 

In addition, FR 67 requires presentation of both capital and operating lease 

obligations in the contractual obligations table in MD&A. 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Leases 

A lease is a particular kind of contractual obligation. As discussed in Section 

III.G, the most significant accounting issue with respect to most contractual obligations is 

whether to record the rights and obligations inherent in the contracts as assets and 

liabilities when neither party to the contract has performed. With respect to leases, 

however, the question is really how to assess whether performance has occurred. As 

noted above, the current lease accounting standards focus on a determination as to which

party to a lease agreement has the risks and rewards of ownership of the leased asset.

This, in turn, determines whether the owner is deemed to have sold the asset and whether

the issuer using the asset is deemed to have purchased the asset. 

As a consequence of this approach, the issuer leasing the asset will either

recognize the entire leased asset on its books and a liability for all of its contractually 

required payments, or it will recognize no asset and no liability. The lease accounting 

guidance either treats the contract as if all of the performance occurs at the beginning of 

the lease, or as if none of it does. The intention is to treat those leases that are 

economically equivalent to sales as sales, and to treat other leases similar to service 

contracts. This approach, while a significant improvement from previous lease 

accounting, which rarely if ever required recognition of a capital lease, does not allow the 

balance sheet to show the fact that, in just about every lease, both parties have some

interest in the asset, as well as some interest in one or more financial receivables or 

payables.161 

The “all-or-nothing” nature of the guidance means that economically similar

arrangements may receive different accounting—if they are just to one side or the other 

of the bright line test. For example, most would agree that there is little economic 

 

160See SFAS 13, as amended for detailed lists of disclosure requirements. 

161In contrast, the model used for transfers of financial assets with continuing involvement, discussed in

Section III.B, does attempt to recognize this fact, by requiring the transferor to continue to recognize those 

components that it continues to control, while requiring it to derecognize the components it no longer 

controls. 

62
difference between a lease that commits an issuer to payments equaling 89% of an asset’s 

fair value vs. 90% of an asset’s fair value. Nonetheless, because of the bright-line nature

of the lease classification tests, this small difference in economics can completely change 

the accounting. Conversely, economically different transactions may be treated 

similarly.162 For example, most would agree that there is a significant economic

difference between a one-month lease of a building and a 10-year lease of that building. 

However, if both leases qualified for operating lease treatment, they would likely both 

have little to no effect on the balance sheet. The extensive disclosures required for leases 

do provide some information about the rights and obligations inherent in operating leases. 

Problems with the all-or-nothing character of the accounting have been magnified 

because many issuers involved in leases, taking advantage of the bright-line nature of the 

lease classification guidance, structure their lease arrangements to achieve whatever 

accounting (sales-type/capital or operating) is desired. These issuers have been aided in 

these endeavors by a large number of attorneys, lenders, investment banks, accountants, 

insurers, industry advocates, and other advisers. Indeed, lease structuring to meet various 

accounting, tax, and other goals, has become an industry unto itself in the last 30 years. 

The significant amount of structuring of leases also makes analyzing potential 

changes to the lease guidance very difficult. Indeed, the current accounting guidance, 

which is criticized by many, would likely be held in much higher regard were it being 

applied to the lease arrangements that existed when it was debated and created. Changes 

in lease terms in response to the accounting guidance have caused undue focus on the 

weaknesses of the guidance. The fact that lease structuring based on the accounting 

guidance has become so prevalent will likely mean that there will be strong resistance to

significant changes to the leasing guidance, both from preparers who have become

accustomed to designing leases that achieve various reporting goals, and from other 

parties that assist those preparers. 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

In this section, the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to leases. The Staff also extrapolates from these findings to estimate 

amounts related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

Table III(D)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting cash flows

committed under operating and capital leases. Approximately 77% of issuers in the 

sample report information about operating leases, while approximately 31% report 

information about capital leases. An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the 

approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that approximately 63% of the 

total population of issuers report operating leases, and 22% report capital leases. 

 

162See paragraph 119 of SFAC 2 which states “Greater comparability of accounting information, which 

most people agree is a worthwhile aim, is not to be attained by making unlike things look alike any more

than by making like things look different. The moral is that in seeking comparability accountants must not

disguise real differences nor create false differences.” 

63
TABLE III(D)(1): Issuers Reporting Future Cash Flows Committed under 

Operating and Capital Leases a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Lease Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Issuers Reporting Operating Leases 77 91 63 63.3 

Issuers Reporting Capital Leases 30.5 39 22 22.2 

a These data were collected from the contractual obligations table in the MD&A of the filings of issuers selected for the 

Study. b

 These categories are not mutually exclusive. 

Table III(D)(2) presents the total future cash flows committed under operating 

and capital leases, as reported in the contractual obligation table in MD&A. Assets and 

liabilities related to capital leases are recorded on issuer balance sheets, but assets and

liabilities related to operating leases are not. 

TABLE III(D)(2): Reported Future Cash Flows Committed under Operating and 

Capital Leases a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Lease Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Undiscounted cash flows committed 

under operating leases $205,971 $195,506 $10,465 $1,252,006

Undiscounted cash flows committed 

under capital leases $16,095 $15,802 $293 $45,102 

a These data were collected from the contractual obligations table in the off-balance sheet arrangements section of the 

MD&A (required by FR67) for the filings of issuers selected for the Staff Study. It is important to note that the data

include only non-cancelable leases. It is also important to note that these amounts are not discounted

The undiscounted sum of the future committed cash flows related to noncancelable operating leases for our sample issuers is approximately $206 billion. An 

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that total (undiscounted) cash flows associated with these offbalance sheet operating leases for the population may approach $1.25 trillion. 

If these lease obligations had been reported on issuer balance sheets, the related 

assets and liabilities would have been required to be recognized at their present (i.e., 

discounted) values.163 The Staff did not attempt to determine the appropriate discount 

rates that would be used to estimate these amounts. For illustrative purposes, the 

 

163However, if the present value exceeds the fair value, issuers would be required to measure the lease

obligation using the fair value of the related asset. 

64
discounted value of a series of five (ten) equal annual cash flows, using a discount rate of 

8%, would be approximately 80% (67%) of the total undiscounted cash flows. 

For comparison purposes, Table III(D)(2) also presents the total dollar amounts of 

cash flows committed under capital leases for the 200 issuers in the sample. As noted 

earlier, these leases are presented on issuer balance sheets. The undiscounted sum of the

cash flows related to capital leases for our sample issuers is approximately $16 billion. 

The Staff notes that the ratio of the total cash flows related to non-cancelable operating 

leases to capital leases is more than 12 to 1 within the sample and is estimated to be more

than 25 to 1 for the population.

E. Contingent Obligations and Guarantees 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

Issuers are often involved in situations where uncertainty exists about whether an

obligation to transfer cash or other assets has arisen and/or the amount that will be 

required to settle such obligation. Examples include: 

• Where an issuer is a defendant in a lawsuit and any payment is contingent 

upon the outcome of a settlement or an administrative or court proceeding; 

• Where an issuer provides a warranty for a product it sells and any payment is 

contingent on the number of products that actually become defective and 

qualify for benefits under the warranty; and 

• Where an issuer acts as a guarantor on a loan for another entity and any 

payment is contingent on whether the other entity defaults. 

Broadly, these kinds of situations are referred to as contingent obligations.164 The

difficult accounting question is what, if any, liability should be recognized before such

contingencies are resolved. SFAS No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, provides general 

guidance regarding the accounting for contingent obligations, although certain contingent 

obligations are specifically addressed in other standards.165 Under SFAS No. 5, 

contingent obligations are treated in one of three ways depending on the circumstances. 

In order to conclude which treatment is applicable, an initial two-fold determination is

made as to whether the loss itself is deemed “probable” to occur and whether the amount 

of the loss is estimable. 

Recognition of a liability is required if the loss is deemed “probable” and

estimable; the amount to be recognized is the most likely outcome—i.e., the individual 

loss amount with the highest probability. No liability is recognized on the balance sheet, 

but disclosures are required to inform users of the existence of the potential loss if a) the

 

164Although contingencies may represent either potential assets or liabilities, the Staff focuses here on

contingent obligations, as these tend to result in more reporting questions. 

165For example, guidance related to the accounting for insurance is provided by SFAS No. 60 and other 

standards, and guidance related to the accounting for derivatives is provided by SFAS No. 133.

65
loss is deemed “probable,” but an amount cannot be reasonably estimated, or b) the loss 

is deemed “reasonably possible,” but not “probable.” Neither recognition of a liability

nor disclosure is required if the probability of loss is deemed “remote.” 

Consider an example where an issuer is a defendant in a lawsuit. Assume the 

following three possible outcomes and related probabilities of occurrence: 

Outcome 

Probability 

(A) 

Amount to be Paid

(B) 

Probability-Weighted 

Amount to be Paid

(A x B)

Issuer is found liable 5 % $500,000 $ 25,000

Issuer settles 90 % $ 50,000 $ 45,000

Issuer wins lawsuit 5 % $ 0 $ 0

Total 100 % $70,000

Under SFAS No. 5, the loss would be deemed “probable,” given the 95%

likelihood of a loss occurring. A liability would be recognized in the amount of $50,000, 

because this amount is the most likely loss amount. 

Required disclosures under SFAS No. 5 include the nature of the contingency, the 

range of the reasonably possible losses, and the amount recognized on the balance sheet, 

if any.166 

SFAS No. 5 addresses uncertainty by using the probability of loss as a threshold 

in determining whether a liability should be recognized and for how much. In the context 

of SFAS No. 5, there appear to be some range of interpretations as to how high the 

likelihood of occurrence must be to be deemed “probable,” but by all accounts this 

likelihood is substantially higher than a 50%+ threshold that common parlance might 

assign to the term. If a liability is recognized, that liability is measured as the amount 

that constitutes the most likely outcome. 

In contrast to the SFAS No. 5 approach, some recent accounting guidance 

requires that certain obligations that include contingencies be recognized at fair value. 

Under a fair value approach, the degree of uncertainty associated with a contingent

liability is reflected in the measurement of the liability, rather than in the determination of 

whether a liability is recognized. 

Interpretation No. 45, Guarantor’s Accounting and Disclosure Requirements for

Guarantees, Including Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others, issued in 2002 in 

light of the then-recent corporate scandals and passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 

requires certain guarantees to be initially recognized on the balance sheet at fair value.167 

 

166Additional disclosures regarding loss contingencies may be required by Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 

5Y, Accounting and Disclosures Relating to Loss Contingencies, Statement of Position No. 94-6, 

Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties, and Statement of Position No. 96-1, 

Environmental Remediation Liabilities, among others. In addition, Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires 

certain descriptive information to be disclosed regarding legal proceedings. 

167In developing the fair value model, FASB indicated that, over the life of a guarantee, a guarantor takes 

the obligation to “stand ready” to honor the guarantee, and that the stand-ready obligation is not itself 

66
One method used by issuers in determining the fair value of contingent obligations is 

presented by SFAC No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in 

Accounting Measurements. This method of estimating fair value is based on probabilityweighted discounted cash flows consistent with the economic concept known as 

“expected value”. 

For example, consider a simple example in which an issuer who writes a 

guarantee covering the default on a third-party’s debt with the following three outcomes

and probabilities: 

Outcome 

Probability 

(A) 

Amount to be Paid

(B) 

Probability Weighted 

Amount to be Paid

(A x B)

Third party defaults entirely 5 % $100,000 $ 5,000 

Third party defaults on 3⁄4 of debt 10 % $ 75,000 $ 7,500 

Third party does not default 85 % $ 0 $ 0

Total 100 % $12,500

If a contingency accounted for under the SFAS No. 5 approach had the above 

potential outcomes, no liability would be recognized, since the occurrence of a loss is not 

“probable” (i.e., a loss occurs with only 15% probability). However, under the

accounting specified by Interpretation No. 45, the writer of this guarantee would 

recognize a liability of $12,500, which constitutes the fair value168 of the guarantee. 

Notably, all types of guarantees are not included in the scope of Interpretation No. 

45. Further, the requirement of Interpretation No. 45 to recognize guarantees on the 

balance sheet at fair value only applied to those issued or modified after December 31, 

2002. However, Interpretation No. 45 introduced new disclosure requirements, which 

were applicable regardless of the date of the guarantee’s issuance or modification. The 

disclosures required in the notes to the financial statements include, but are not limited to, 

the following:

169

• Nature of the guarantee; 

• Maximum potential future payments; 

• Current amount of liability on the balance sheet; and 

• Certain product warranty information, including a reconciliation of changes in 

the liability. 

The Commission’s Financial Reporting Release No. 67, mandated by section 

401(a) of the Act, also requires additional disclosures in the Off-Balance Sheet section of 

MD&A regarding certain guarantee contracts. Disclosure is required to the extent 

 contingent. The liability for the stand-ready obligation is reduced over time as the guarantee performs (that

is, as it fulfills its obligation to stand ready over the life of the contract). 

168The time value of money is ignored in this example. 

169The required disclosures are presented in paragraphs 13-16 of Interpretation No. 45. 

67
necessary to provide an understanding of the issuer’s material off-balance sheet 

arrangements as well as the material effects of those arrangements. For guarantee 

contracts these disclosures may include: 

• Nature and business purpose of the guarantee contracts; 

• Importance of the guarantee contracts to liquidity, capital resources, market 

risk or credit risk support, or other benefits; 

• The financial impact of the guarantee contracts and the issuer’s exposure to 

risk as a result of the guarantees; and 

• Known events, demands, commitments, trends or uncertainties that affect the 

availability or benefits of the guarantee contracts. 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Contingent 

Obligations and Guarantees 

In accounting for contingent liabilities, how uncertainty is taken into account will 

affect which items are reflected on the balance sheet. Although both approaches appear 

to generate information that would be useful to users of financial statements, differing 

views exist as to which treatment provides the most relevant information. 

If uncertainty is taken into account in the recognition of liabilities, as is the case

for contingencies accounted for under SFAS No. 5, the balance sheet will report those 

liabilities that are highly likely to reduce cash or other assets available for distribution to 

shareholders. In addition, the items on the balance sheet would be reported at the amount 

most likely to be paid or received. However, several issues arise from this treatment. 

First, while the SFAS No. 5 accounting results in the recording of a liability that reflects

the most likely payment, the balance sheet reflects information about only that outcome. 

Information about the other potential outcomes is ignored for the purpose of recording 

the liability. While disclosures in the notes to the financial statements might help to

provide this information, in practice those disclosures are rarely detailed enough to allow 

an investor to take into account multiple possible loss outcomes. 

Difficulties in applying the SFAS No. 5 approach also arise because that approach

requires an analysis of whether a loss is probable. Although accountants generally agree, 

in practice, on the percentage likelihood that is necessary to conclude that a loss is 

probable, determining whether the loss in a particular situation exceeds that threshold can

be subjective. In addition, it may be difficult for others to independently verify 

management’s judgments in these areas. Application issues have also arisen in regards to 

determining the most likely amount of a loss when a range of possible losses exists. If 

one amount within the range is a better estimate than any other amount, that amount 

should be recognized. If no amount is considered a better estimate than any other 

amount, the minimum amount in the range is recognized.170 In practice, zero may

arguably be the low point of the range in many cases, resulting in no liability being 

 

170FASB Interpretation No. 14, “Reasonable Estimate of the Amount of Loss”. 

68
reflected. The Staff has long believed that the application of SFAS No. 5 by issuers 

should be improved, and has commented on this numerous times in speeches and other 

venues. The needed improvements include better application of both the recognition and 

disclosure criteria of SFAS No. 5. 

Some of the difficulties in accounting for contingencies under SFAS No. 5 are not 

faced in accounting for contingencies under pronouncements in which uncertainty is 

reflected in measurement, rather than recognition, of a liability. If uncertainty is taken 

into account in measuring the contingent liability, the value reflected on the balance sheet 

represents the value the market would assign to the contingent liability in assessing the

value of the issuer; thus, information that a market participant would consider relevant is 

not ignored. However, the liability recorded in these situations may not actually 

represent a possible outcome upon ultimate resolution of the contingency.

171 

Reflecting uncertainty in the measurement of the liability also removes some of 

the pressure on the “probable” determination, and on the identification of the particular 

outcome that is most likely. In addition, this approach would rarely, if ever, omit a 

contingent obligation from the balance sheet entirely. However, if determining the 

probability of loss and the most likely amount of that loss, as required under SFAS No. 5, 

is difficult and subject to judgment, determining the probabilities of multiple potential 

outcomes, as required under Interpretation No. 45, may be even more difficult. Some

argue that a fair value approach could result in less reliable financial statements and make 

auditing those statements even more challenging. Others, however, note that the fair

value approach ensures that contingencies relevant to assessing an issuer’s value are at 

least acknowledged in a fair value approach, in contrast to the SFAS No. 5 approach, 

which could allow many of those contingencies to go entirely unrecognized. 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

In this section, the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to contingent obligations, including guarantees. The Staff also 

extrapolates from these findings to estimate amounts for the approximate population of 

active U.S. issuers. 

Table III(E)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting certain contingent 

liabilities. As indicated in the table, approximately 64% of the sample issuers report 

information about some litigation contingencies in their notes to the financial statements 

and approximately 55% report information about guarantees. Substantially fewer, 21%, 

report information about environmental contingent obligations. The Staff noted during 

its analysis of the filings that disclosures about contingent obligations vary widely in 

terms of format and location in the filing. As a result, the data for contingent obligations 

was difficult to collect in a consistent manner across issuers. 

 

171In the example used previously, the three possible outcomes are losses of zero, $75,000, and $100,000, 

yet the fair value that would be recorded is $12,500.

69
TABLE III(E)(1): Issuers Reporting Certain Contingent Obligations a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Contingent

Obligation b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%) 

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%) 

Issuers reporting legal contingent

obligations

63.5 81 46 46.3

Issuers reporting environmental 

contingent obligations

20.5 31 10 10.2

Issuers reporting guarantees 54.5 74 35 35.4 

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. b

 These categories are not mutually exclusive.

Table III(E)(2) describes the percentage of issuers reporting recognition of

liabilities on their balance sheets for certain contingent liabilities. Less than 10% of the 

sample issuers report that they have recognized any amount of liability on their balance 

sheets for any legal contingent obligation, even though approximately 64% of the sample 

issuers report general information regarding legal contingent obligations. Approximately 

23% of the sample issuers report that they have recognized a liability for guarantees, less 

than half of the 55% of issuers reporting information about the existence of guarantees. 

Before the implementation of Interpretation No. 45 in 2002, the Staff suspects that few of 

these guarantees would have been recognized as liabilities on issuer balance sheets. 

TABLE III(E)(2): Issuers Reporting Liabilities for Certain Contingent Obligations 

on their Balance Sheets a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Contingent

Obligation b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%) 

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%) 

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%) 

Issuers recognizing liabilities for legal 

contingent obligations

9.5 14 5 5.1

Issuers recognizing liabilities for 

environmental contingent obligations

10 15 5 5.1

Issuers recognizing liabilities for 

guarantees 

22.5 35 10 10.2

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. b

 These categories are not mutually exclusive.

The analysis of this topic so far has focused on the proportion of issuers reporting 

information about various types of contingent obligations. We now turn to an analysis of 

the amount of liabilities recognized on issuer balance sheets and the exposures reported 

in the notes to the financial statements. 

70
Table III(E)(3) presents reported amounts of contingent obligations recognized as

liabilities on issuer balance sheets, to the extent they are reported as such in the notes to 

the financial statements.

172 Issuers in the sample report that they had recognized

liabilities on their balance sheets of approximately $10 billion related to legal contingent 

liabilities, approximately $9 billion related to environmental contingent liabilities, and 

almost $86 billion related to liabilities related to guarantees. In each of these three 

categories, at least 98% of the total liability recognized was recognized by the large 

issuer sub-sample.173 An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the

approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that legal contingent liabilities 

reported by the total population are approximately $12 billion, environmental contingent 

liabilities are approximately $19 billion, and guarantees are approximately $124 billion. 

TABLE III(E)(3): Amounts Reported as Liabilities on Issuer Balance Sheet Related 

to Certain Contingent Obligations a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Contingent

Obligation Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions) 

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100) 

(millions) 

Random

Issuers 

(n=100) 

(millions) 

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(millions) 

Legal contingent liabilities $10,725 $10,714 $11 $11,814

Environmental contingent liabilities $9,219 $9,123 $96 $18,723

Guarantee liabilities $85,834 $85,449 $385 $123,949

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study.

As discussed earlier, SFAS No. 5 and Interpretation No. 45 require disclosures 

about exposure to “possible loss or range of loss” in the notes to financial statements.174 

Table III(E)(4) presents amounts related to these exposures reported by issuers. Issuers 

in the sample report almost $32 billion in possible exposures related to legal 

contingencies, only approximately $5 billion related to environmental contingencies, and 

approximately $4 trillion related to guarantees. An extrapolation of the findings from the 

sample to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that potential losses 

reported by the population are approximately $52 billion potential losses for legal 

contingent obligations, approximately $23 billion for environmental contingent

obligations, and more than $46 trillion for guarantees. 

 

172Many such contingencies may not be reported as a separate line item on the balance sheet. Thus, users 

of financial statements must usually rely on disclosures to indicate the magnitude of the contingent

obligations recognized. 

173This represents a disproportionate difference between the large issuer sub-sample and the random issuer

sub-sample in that the ratio of total liabilities of the random issuer sub-sample to the large issuer subsample is approximately 1:100; the difference in contingent liabilities recognized by the two groups is

1:1000. 

174See SFAS No. 5, paragraph 10. 

71
TABLE III(E)(4): Reported Exposures for Certain Contingent Obligations a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Contingent

Obligation Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions) 

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions) 

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions) 

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(millions) 

Legal contingent obligations $31,762 $31,554 $208 $52,354 

Environmental contingent

obligations

$4,604 $4,414 $190 $23,414

Guarantees $4,053,499 $3,624,389 $429,110 $46,535,389

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the filings of issuers selected for the Study.

The Staff notes that the amounts of possible losses disclosed by the sample of issuers 

are largely unrelated to the liabilities recognized by issuers as reported in Table III(E)(3). 

For the most part, issuers seem to have concluded that they need not disclose quantitative

information concerning additional potential losses related to those contingent losses 

recognized as liabilities on the balance sheet.175 The Staff further notes that in many 

cases, issuers disclose the existence of the contingent legal obligation, but recognize no 

liability and disclose no maximum loss or range of loss. 

F. Derivatives 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

A derivative is “simply a financial instrument (or even more simply, an agreement

between two people) which has a value determined by the price of something else.”176 

For example, a stock option contract derives its value, at least in part, from the price of 

the underlying stock;177 similarly, a gold futures contract derives its value from the price 

 

175For example, of the $10.328 billion in legal contingent liabilities recognized (see Table III(E)(3)), only

approximately $717 million are disclosed in conjunction with quantitative information about additional

potential losses. Indeed, approximately 97% of the $23,761 billion of potential legal contingent losses 

disclosed for the entire sample relate to instances where no liability was reported as being recognized on

the balance sheet. In some cases, where liabilities are recognized, issuers may not deem additional losses 

to meet the “reasonably possible” criteria in SFAS No. 5. 

176McDonald, Robert L., Derivatives Markets (2003), at 1. 

177A stock option may be defined as a “right to purchase or sell a stock at a specified price within a stated 

period.” Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, 5th ed. (1998). 

72
of the underlying gold;178 an interest rate swap derives its value from the underlying 

interest rates.

179

Derivatives permit issuers to mitigate and take on risk, and also to select which

risks they want to retain and manage, and which they want to shift to others willing to 

bear them. For example, a manufacturer that requires oil as an input to production is 

exposed to the risk of an oil price increase. If oil prices do increase, cost of production 

increases and the manufacturer’s profitability may suffer. Such an issuer may choose to 

contract with another party to effectively fix the price it will pay for oil at some future 

date through a “forward” contract.180 In this case, the issuer has “hedged” its exposure, 

and is protected from the negative economic effects of an adverse change in oil prices. 

Of course, locking in a price through such a forward contract also precludes any cost 

savings the issuer might have experienced from a beneficial change in oil prices. If, 

instead, the issuer wished to limit its exposure to price increases while still retaining the 

benefits of price decreases, it could enter into an option contract to purchase oil at a fixed 

price; if the price goes above the exercise price of the option, the issuer would gain upon 

exercise of the option, while if the price fell, the issuer would allow the option to expire 

while making its purchases through the spot market. Of course, entering into an option 

may be more costly than entering into a forward or futures contract. 

a. Accounting for Derivatives

The current accounting guidance for derivatives has only been in effect since 

2001.181 Prior to that, many believed that accounting standards had not kept pace with

changes in global financial markets and related financial innovations. As a result, the 

Commission, members of Congress, the General Accounting Office, and others urged the

FASB to deal with reporting problems regarding derivatives.182 During the almost 10

year period that this guidance was under development, there were several notable 

derivatives issues that captured the attention of the public, various regulators, and the 

 

178A futures contract may be defined as an “agreement to buy or sell a specific amount of a commodity or 

financial instrument at a particular price on a stipulated future date ... [where] [t]he price is established ... 

on the floor of a commodity exchange ...” Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, 5th ed. 

(1998). 

179A swap may be defined as “[a] contract calling for the exchange of payments over time. Often one 

payment is fixed in advance and the other is floating, based upon the realization of a price or interest rate.”

McDonald, Robert L., Derivatives Markets (2003), at 851.

180Such a contract promises the delivery of a certain amount of oil at a certain date in the future, for a 

certain price. 

181SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (as amended), was

originally effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999. The effective date was subsequently

delayed by SFAS No. 137, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities-Deferral of

Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 133 to fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2000, or for the year

ended December 31, 2001 for calendar year end issuers. 

182SFAS No. 133, paragraph 212.

73
accounting standard setters.183 These events influenced the deliberations that would 

ultimately address the actual accounting for derivatives. 

Financial reporting for derivatives centers around three main issues. The first is

whether derivative contracts should be recognized on issuer balance sheets. The second 

is whether changes in the value of derivative contracts should be recognized in the 

income statement. The third is how to convey the overall sensitivity of the issuer to 

changes in important variables—for example, say, oil prices for an issuer that uses large 

quantities of oil—in light of the derivative positions the issuer may have taken. 

In general SFAS No. 133 requires that derivatives be recorded as assets or 

liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value, and re-measured each period with changes in 

fair value reflected in earnings. In part, the rationale for this approach was FASB’s view 

that recognizing derivatives on the balance sheet based on measurements other than fair 

value was generally less relevant and understandable.184 For example, if historical cost 

were used to measure derivatives, many would be reported at a value of zero because no 

payment is made at the inception of the contract (e.g., most forward contracts). In 

addition, under a historical cost measurement principle, changes that may have a 

significant effect on the issuer’s value would not be reflected in its financial statements. 

While this is true for all assets and liabilities measured at historical cost, derivatives have

a potential for substantial variability in value typically exceeding that of more traditional 

assets such as plant and equipment. Other methods proposed, such as intrinsic value and 

lower of cost or market, were also considered inappropriate because they ignored 

significant items that factor into the fair value of the derivative. In the end, the FASB 

concluded that fair value was the only relevant measurement for derivatives.185 

Although the core principle in SFAS No. 133 of recording all derivatives on the 

balance sheet at fair value is simply stated, many complexities become apparent with 

further analysis. First is the issue of defining “derivative” for purposes of applying the

principle. As discussed below, the FASB started with a definition that looks to certain 

characteristics of a contract to identify derivatives. However, various exceptions were

made to this definition in order to ease implementation of the standard or to acknowledge 

that certain instruments that meet the characteristics-based definition were previously 

addressed as insurance contracts or in some other manner in the existing accounting 

guidance. In addition, the guidance includes a requirement that certain derivatives

embedded in other non-derivative financial instruments or other contracts be separated 

out or “bifurcated” from those instruments and separately recognized in issuer financial 

statements. This provision prevents an issuer from avoiding the recognition and 

 

183In particular, during 1994 there were some well-publicized incidents related to derivatives. The largest 

was the bankruptcy of Orange County, California, which was partially attributed to what was considered

the imprudent use of derivatives. In addition, there were several significant corporate losses from

derivative transactions, including losses at The Proctor and Gamble Company, MG Corp. (a unit of

Germany's Metallgesellschaft AG) and Gibson Greetings Inc. 

184SFAS No. 133, paragraphs 221 and 223. 

185Paragraph 3(b) of SFAS 133 states: “Fair value is the most relevant measure for financial instruments

and the only relevant measure for derivative instruments.” 

74
measurement requirements of SFAS No. 133 merely by embedding a derivative 

instrument in a non-derivative financial instrument or other contract.186 

b. Hedge Accounting

Many issuers utilize derivative instruments to hedge their exposure to certain 

economic risks. When a derivative is used to hedge an exposure, the value of the

derivative should have an inverse relation to the value of the exposure it is hedging. 

While the core principle under SFAS No. 133 is to recognize changes in the value of 

derivatives in the income statement, SFAS No. 133 provides for an exception to this 

principle known as “hedge accounting,” to address potential timing differences in

recognizing offsetting gains and losses. These timing differences occur in part because 

GAAP utilizes a “mixed-attribute” approach where some items are recognized at 

historical cost, others at the lower of cost or market, and still others at fair value. As a

consequence, changes in the value of a derivative may not be reflected in earnings at the 

same time as changes in the value of the hedged exposure unless hedge accounting is 

used. 

For example, consider an issuer that has a mortgage obligation with a term of 30 

years at a fixed interest rate of 9% per year. The issuer enters into a contract designed to 

have the same effect as if the fixed rate of interest in the mortgage were changed to a

variable rate of interest. The terms of the contract require the issuer to pay a variable rate

based on the current rate on U.S. Treasury securities in exchange for payments based on 

the 9% rate in the mortgage. Economically, the issuer is in approximately the same

position as if its 9% fixed-rate mortgage obligation were instead a variable rate mortgage 

obligation. Such a derivative contract is called an interest rate swap. If interest rates 

drop below 9%, the swap contract will have a positive value to the issuer; that is, it is an

asset. If interest rates rise above 9%, the swap will have a negative value to the issuer 

and is a liability. 

If changes in interest rates were recognized in the measurement of the mortgage, 

then the accounting for this would be relatively straightforward. For example, suppose 

interest rates dropped below 9%. Other things being equal, the recorded value of the 

mortgage liability would increase, but by approximately the same amount that the 

derivative asset (i.e., the swap) increases in value. Thus, the changes in fair value would 

approximately offset each other, mirroring the economics of such contracts. However,

changes in the fair value of the mortgage liability associated with changes in interest rates

are not recognized in current earnings. Instead, debt, such as the mortgage liability, is 

recognized at its historical cost. 

The FASB addressed the inconsistency resulting from recognizing the derivative 

at fair value and the instrument the derivative is designed to work with at historical cost 

by creating an exception to the general historical cost measurement for some

assets/liabilities that are hedged with derivative contracts. If an asset (liability) is 

typically measured using historical cost and its fair value is hedged with a derivative,

then the asset (liability) can be reflected on the balance sheet at its fair value for the 

 

186Paragraph 293 of SFAS No. 133. 

75
portion of the risk that is being hedged. This accounting treatment—known as a “fair 

value hedge”—results in recognizing in the income statement both the change in fair 

value of the mortgage liability (due to changes in interest rates), and the offsetting change 

in fair value of the swap. Thus, this treatment reflects both sides of the economic story in 

the financial statements. 

While fair value hedge accounting resolves certain issues caused by the mixedattribute approach, another type of hedge accounting addresses situations where the issuer 

has hedged its exposure to variability in expected future cash flows. For example, 

consider an issuer that expects to purchase oil in the future and is thus exposed to market 

variability in oil prices. The issuer enters into a forward contract to purchase oil in the

future at the current “spot” price of $25 per barrel in order to hedge this exposure. A 

subsequent increase in the price of oil to $27 would have no net economic effect on the 

issuer, because the forward contract would offset the effects of the price increase. That 

is, while the value of the oil being purchased has increased $2 per barrel, the value of the

forward contract would offset such a price increase by approximately the same

amount.187 Once the price of oil has risen above $25, the forward contract clearly 

constitutes an asset, as it entitles the issuer to buy oil at less than the current market price. 

However, the issuer’s balance sheet does not recognize an obligation (or liability) related 

to the expected future purchase of oil—the item being hedged. 

Such an accounting treatment introduces volatility into earnings that some believe 

does not represent the underlying economics of such transactions. Thus, the FASB 

developed an approach—known as a “cash flow hedge”—that allows the issuer to hold 

changes in value of derivatives (to the extent these offset changes in value of the hedged 

item) that hedge expected variability in future cash flows in a section of equity called 

“accumulated other comprehensive income” until the transaction being hedged occurs.

188 

When the future transaction that was designated as being hedged actually occurs and is

recognized in income, the amount initially recorded in equity is then also recognized in 

income to reflect the offsetting effect of the hedge. 

It is important to note that SFAS No 133 strictly limits the kinds of situations that 

qualify for hedge accounting.189 In addition, in order to qualify for hedge accounting, the 

issuer has to meet specific documentation requirements. This is to avoid an opportunity 

for an issuer, using hindsight, to freely pick the approach that presents the best results. It

is also important to note that the risks that are eligible for hedging are market-related 

risks (changes in fair value and variability in cash flows), and not accounting risks, such 

as variability in reported net income. Finally, except in very rare situations,190 the

effectiveness of the derivative at offsetting the changes in value of the hedged item must 

 

187This is an oversimplification for expository purposes. It assumes that cash wasn’t paid upon the signing 

of the contract. Also, it does not take into consideration the time value of money. 

188See SFAS No. 133, paragraph 30 for a discussion of the amounts to be deferred into accumulated other

comprehensive income in the case of cash flow hedges. 

189In addition to fair value and cash flow hedges, SFAS No. 133 provides for hedging the foreign currency

risk related to an issuer’s net investment in foreign operations. 

190See SFAS No. 133, paragraphs 65 and 68. 

76
be periodically measured, and any ineffectiveness must be recognized in the income

statement, even when the relationship does qualify for hedge accounting.191

c. Disclosures

SFAS No. 133 also provides disclosure guidance, intended to help investors and 

creditors understand what an entity is attempting to accomplish through the use of 

derivatives. These disclosures are required to facilitate the understanding of the nature of 

an entity’s derivative activities and evaluation of the success of those activities, their 

importance to the entity, and their effect on the entity’s financial statements. As a result, 

SFAS No. 133 requires numerous qualitative disclosures about an entity’s use of 

derivatives including, but not limited to:192

• Its objectives for holding or issuing derivative instruments, the context needed to

understand those objectives, and its strategies for achieving those objectives; 

• A description distinguishing between derivative instruments designated as fair 

value, cash flow, and foreign currency hedging instruments, and all other 

derivatives. The description shall also indicate the entity’s risk management

policy for each of those types of hedges, including a description of the items or

transactions for which risks are hedged. For derivative instruments not designated 

as hedging instruments, the description shall indicate the purpose of the derivative 

activity; and

• Certain quantitative information related to cash flow and foreign currency hedges. 

In addition to the SFAS No. 133 required disclosures about derivatives and 

hedging activities, Item 305 of Commission Regulation S-K requires certain additional 

disclosures about market risks and how those risks are managed, including the use of 

derivatives. In particular, Item 305 requires both quantitative and qualitative disclosures 

about each type of market risk including interest rate, foreign currency, commodity price 

and other relevant risks, such as equity price risk. In preparing the quantitative 

disclosures, the issuer can choose from three alternatives: 

• Tabular presentation of fair value information and contract terms relevant to 

determining future cash flows – categorized by expected maturity dates;

• Sensitivity analysis assessing the potential loss in future earnings, fair values or

cash flows of market sensitive instruments resulting from hypothetical changes in

various market indices; or 

 

191Ibid, paragraphs 20, 22, 26, 28 and 30. 

192See SFAS No. 133, paragraphs 44 to 47 for a complete list of the disclosure requirements for derivatives

and hedging activities. 

77
• Value at risk analysis estimating the potential loss in future earnings, fair values

or cash flows from market movements with a specified likelihood of 

occurrence.193

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Derivatives 

As can be seen from the above discussion, derivatives are, in fact, on the balance 

sheet. We include them in this Report, however, because derivatives are often an integral 

part of arrangements that are considered off-balance sheet, such as the Enron prepay 

transactions discussed in Section I.C. While many have criticized SFAS No. 133 (and its 

related interpretive guidance) for its complexity, and its “rules-based” guidance, it must 

be recognized that prior to the issuance of SFAS No. 133, many derivatives were indeed 

“off-balance sheet,” and issuers’ exposures to related risks and changes in financial 

condition was therefore entirely unreported. Furthermore, much of the complexity in 

SFAS No. 133 relates to hedge accounting, which is optional. In fact, hedge accounting 

is a modification or exception to the core principles of the standard. For the reasons

already discussed, the FASB felt that hedge accounting was an appropriate part of SFAS 

No. 133. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, as is often the case with exceptions to 

basic principles, the hedge accounting guidance is complex and relies on a substantial 

number of rules. 

There are over 850 pages of authoritative guidance on accounting for derivatives, 

generated primarily by four related accounting standards194 and over 180 implementation 

and interpretive issues. What started out with a simple principle—“Record all derivatives

at fair value”—became very rules-based through a proliferation of scope exceptions and 

extensive implementation and interpretive guidance, as preparers and auditors requested

more detailed guidance. Many issues contribute to the complexity and challenges of the 

current approach to derivative accounting, but there appear to be four primary issues: 

i.) The scope of the guidance, including the definition of and identification of a 

derivative; 

ii.) The application of hedge accounting; 

iii.)The “bifurcation” requirements for embedded derivatives; and 

iv.)The valuation methodologies used. 

In defining the scope of SFAS No. 133, the FASB avoided simply listing the 

instruments and contracts to which the standard would apply (for example, options, 

forward contracts, interest rate swaps, etc). If the scope of an accounting standard were 

defined in such a way, the definition would need to be revised regularly to deal with new 

 

193See Release Nos. 33-7386 and 34-38223 for full text of the rule.

194SFAS No. 133, as well as SFAS No. 137, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging

Activities–Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 133, SFAS No. 138, Accounting for

Certain Derivatives and Certain Hedging Activities, and SFAS No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on 

Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. 

78
instruments. Instead, SFAS No. 133 employed a characteristics-based definition195 so 

that any instrument or contract reflecting those characteristics would be covered by the 

derivatives guidance. Further, to prevent issuers from avoiding the recognition and 

measurement guidance in SFAS No. 133, the standard requires that derivatives embedded 

in non-derivative financial instruments or other contracts be “bifurcated” from the host 

instrument and separately valued.196 

Although FASB attempted to take an inclusive approach in developing SFAS No. 

133, the Board also included a number of exceptions to the standard’s definition of a

derivative. These exceptions served to exclude certain contracts that otherwise would be 

accounted for as derivatives. In some cases, the exceptions were included because other 

accounting pronouncements already covered certain instruments. For example, from an 

economic perspective, many insurance contracts are derivatives, but other guidance

197

already addressed such contracts. In addition, some contracts that would meet the 

definition of a derivative, but are deemed to be “normal purchase and sale” contracts, 

were excluded simply to be consistent with the current accounting for similar contracts 

that would not qualify as derivatives under SFAS No. 133.198 Finally, derivatives on an 

issuer’s own equity are excluded because of questions surrounding whether such 

instruments represent assets or liabilities, as opposed to equity.199 

While the scope issues present challenges, many more interpretive issues concern 

hedge accounting. The underpinnings for allowing hedge accounting, as described

previously, are not all that difficult to understand. The principal idea is to avoid 

recognizing volatility in earnings that does not represent true economic volatility.

However, because hedge accounting is optional, and results in changes in the way assets, 

 

195Those characteristics are discussed in paragraphs 6-9, and 57 of SFAS No. 133 (as amended), and in

over 20 interpretative issues addressed by the DIG (“Derivatives Implementation Group”). Those 

characteristics generally are that a derivative has: 

One or more underlyings and one or more notional amounts or payment provisions or both. Those

terms determine the amount of the settlement or settlements, and, in some cases, whether or not a

settlement is required;

No initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for 

other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market 

factors; and 

Terms that require or permit net settlement, it can readily be settled net by a means outside the 

contract, or it provides for delivery of an asset that puts the recipient in a position not substantially

different from net settlement. 

196This guidance is found in paragraphs 12-16, 60-61, and 176-200 of SFAS No. 133 (as amended) and in

36 interpretative issues addressed by the DIG. 

197See, for example, SFAS No. 60. Also note that the FASB has taken up a project to provide additional 

guidance on determining when an insurance contract that limits the amount of risk taken on by the insurer

should be accounted for as insurance, and when it should instead be accounted for as an investment by the

insured and a loan by the insurer. 

198See SFAS No. 133, paragraphs 271 and 272. 

199See SFAS No. 133, paragraph 11(a), EITF Issue No. 00-19, and SFAS No. 150. 

79
liabilities, gains, and losses are reflected in the financial statements, the FASB felt it 

necessary to limit its use to situations in which the effectiveness of the derivatives at 

offsetting the risks being hedged were demonstrable. As such, to qualify for hedge

accounting, an issuer must meet a number of requirements relating to identification of the 

hedging relationship and measurement of the effectiveness of that relationship – that is, 

measurement of the extent to which the changes in the fair value of the derivative can be 

expected to and in fact do offset changes in the value of the hedged item.

200

Although the accounting for derivatives attempts to appropriately reflect the 

economics of hedged transactions, it is nonetheless true that an issuer engaged in 

derivative transactions is economically different from an issuer that is not, all other things 

being equal. Thus, it is important for disclosures to communicate the economic risks 

involved. The disclosures required by the accounting guidance and by the Item 305 of 

Regulation S-K are meant to provide the user with information that goes beyond the 

current value of the derivatives. Although fair value may reflect an important aspect of 

the “economics” of the derivative at a point in time, it nonetheless does not provide the 

user of the financial statements with the information necessary to understand what may 

happen to the derivative in the future should conditions change. For example, a gold 

mining company that has entered into fixed price forward contracts to sell its gold has a

very different risk profile than one that has not entered into such contracts, other things 

being equal. It is important for investors to understand what risk profile the issuer has 

selected—specifically, whether or not the issuer will benefit from an increase in the price 

of gold. 

Despite the disclosures required by the accounting standards and the

Commission’s rules, there is still often a perceived lack of transparency as to an issuer’s

market risk exposures, use of derivatives and the potential impact of those derivatives. 

The Staff believes that many issuers could do a better job in the notes to the financial 

statements, MD&A, and item 305 disclosures of providing disclosures on market risk 

exposures, hedge strategies, and the results of those strategies. 

3. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

In this section the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to derivatives. The Staff also extrapolates from these findings to estimate 

amounts related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

As noted previously, instruments that meet the definition of a derivative pursuant 

to SFAS No. 133 are reported on the balance sheet at fair value. However, also as noted 

above, the scope exceptions in SFAS No. 133 allow certain arrangements having the 

economic characteristics of derivatives to remain off-balance sheet. As there are no 

required disclosures for these latter arrangements, the Staff cannot reach any conclusions 

regarding the extent of these arrangements based on public filings. 

 

200There have been many interpretive issues that address whether hedge accounting can be applied to

certain situations. Indeed, over 180 issues have been addressed to date by the DIG, many of which 

interpret the hedge accounting guidance in SFAS No. 133. The requirements further manifest themselves 

in the level of documentation necessary to maintain hedge accounting. 

80
Since derivatives subject to SFAS No. 133 are reported on the balance sheet at 

fair value, the Staff did not make it a priority to report their extent in the Study of filings

by issuers. However, as a result of conducting the Study of filings by issuers, the Staff 

notes that it is often difficult to determine the total dollar amounts that are on the balance 

sheet related to derivatives. This difficulty stems from the fact that derivatives may be

presented as separate line items on the balance sheet, or alternatively, included as a 

component of some broader category (e.g., other assets).201 This latter treatment occurs

predominantly for derivatives whose current values are not considered material to the 

balance sheet presentation. Moreover, derivatives disclosures may be presented in 

different places in an issuer’s 10-K filing. 

Table III(F)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting derivatives for 

trading and non-trading purposes. Although only approximately 10% of the sample 

issuers report derivative transactions for trading purposes, approximately 63% of the 

sample issuers report using derivatives for non-trading purposes. Note fully 95% of the 

large issuer sub-sample report derivatives for non-trading (i.e., hedging) purposes. An 

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that approximately 3% of the population of issuers report that they 

use derivatives for trading purposes, while more than 30% report the use of derivatives 

for non-trading purposes. 

 

TABLE III(F)(1): Issuers Reporting Purpose of Using Derivatives a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Purpose b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

(%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

(%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(%)

For trading purposes 10.5 18 3 3.1 

For non-trading purposes 62.5 95 30 30.6 

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements and the market risk disclosures in the filings of 

issuers selected for the Study. b These categories are not mutually exclusive.

Table III(F)(2) describes the percentage of issuers reporting the use of different

types of derivative instruments. The largest percentages of issuers report the use of 

forwards and swaps, while few report using credit derivatives and combinations of 

derivatives. Again, these results are largely driven by the large issuer sub-sample. 

 

201SFAS No. 133 does not require separate disclosure of the fair value of derivatives in the notes to the

financial statements. Accordingly, many issuers do not provide this information, and the Staff noted that 

the disclosures by those who do may appear in many different places in the notes. 

81
TABLE III(F)(2): Issuers Reporting Types of Derivative Instruments Used a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Derivative 

Instrument b Full Sample 

(n=200) 

(%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100) 

(%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100) 

(%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Options 25.5 47 4 4.4 

Futures 15 25 5 5.2

Forwards 39 66 12 12.5

Swaps 48 78 18 18.6

Credit derivatives 5.5 10 1 1.1 

Combinations 4.5 8 1 1.1

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements and the market risk disclosures in the filings of 

issuers selected for the Study. b These categories are not mutually exclusive.

It is important to note, however, that even though the fair value of certain 

derivatives is on the balance sheet, the risks inherent in these instruments are not, and can 

not be, adequately presented on the balance sheet. Although it is true that the balance

sheet is also unable to capture the risks associated with owning, say, equipment, or 

inventory, for the most part, investors understand the risks and rewards of such 

“ownership” arrangements. The difference between these more familiar arrangements

and derivatives is the latter’s potential volatility, the low level of investment that may be 

required, and the flexibility available in structuring the agreements. As a consequence, 

supplemental disclosures are even more important for derivatives in understanding risk. 

Thus, the Staff believed it was important in evaluating balance sheet transparency to

examine the disclosures related to derivatives in the Study of filings by issuers. 

As described in Section III(F)(1)(c), disclosures about derivatives are presented in 

the notes to the financial statements and in a section of the filing that reports on the 

issuer’s exposure to market risks. The information in the notes to the financial statements 

includes both qualitative and quantitative information about the issuer’s involvement with 

derivatives. The issuer is required to report qualitative information about, among other 

things, “its objectives for holding or issuing those instruments, the context needed to 

understand those objectives, and its strategies for achieving those objectives.”202 The

issuer is also required to report quantitative information, but most of this information 

relates to hedge accounting, such as the amount of gain or loss temporarily deferred in 

accumulated other comprehensive income (a component of shareholders’ equity), and the 

amount of any ineffectiveness recognized in the income statement, resulting from the 

hedging arrangements. 

Table III(F)(3) describes the percentage of issuers reporting the use of certain

forms of hedge accounting. Approximately 46% of the sample issuers report using cash 

flow hedges and 42% report using fair value hedges. However, as these results are 

 

202SFAS No. 133, paragraph 44.

82
largely driven by the large issuer sub-sample. An extrapolation of the findings from the

sample to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that only 

approximately 17% of the population reports the use of cash flow hedges and 

approximately 8% report the use of fair value hedges. 

TABLE III(F)(3): Issuers Reporting Use of Hedge Accounting a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Accounting 

Hedge b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(%)

Issuers reporting cash flow hedges 45.5 75 16 16.6 

Issuers reporting fair value hedges 42 77 7 7.7 

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements and the market risk disclosures in the filings of 

issuers selected for the Study. b These categories are not mutually exclusive.

As noted above, issuers are required to disclose information about market risks in 

their filings; these issuers may or may not use derivatives to hedge such market risks. 

These disclosures are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. The qualitative

information includes disclosures regarding the issuer’s primary market risk exposures, 

how those risks are managed, and actual or expected material changes in the issuer’s

exposures. The quantitative information is intended to provide investors with 

information to assess the potential impact of market risks on the issuer. 

Table III(F)(4) describes the percentage of issuers reporting different types of 

market risks. A total of 60% of the sample issuers report some type of exposure to 

market risk. Note that the largest number of issuers report interest rate risk and currency 

price risk—almost 50% and 43%, respectively—while fewer issuers report commodity 

price risk or equity price risk. In the large issuer sub-sample, 82% of the issuers report 

exposure to interest rate risk and 76% report currency price risk; but in the random issuer 

sub-sample only 17% of issuers report interest rate risk and only 9% report currency price 

risk. 

83
TABLE III(F)(4): Issuers Reporting Market Risks a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Market 

Risk b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Any market risk 60 91 29 29.6 

Commodity price risk 15 24 6 6.2 

Interest rate risk 49.5 82 17 17.6 

Currency price risk 42.5 76 9 9.7 

Equity price risk 15.5 31 0 0c

a These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements and the market risk disclosures in the filings of 

issuers selected for the Study. b These categories are not mutually exclusive. c

 Less than 1% 

The Staff notes that one barrier to achieving transparency is that the disclosures 

related to market risk are usually organized by type of market risk (e.g., commodity price 

risk, interest rate risk, etc.), but the SFAS No. 133 disclosures in the notes to the financial 

statements are usually organized by type of accounting hedge (e.g., cash flow hedges, fair

value hedges, etc.). Thus, it may be difficult for issuers and investors to effectively

integrate the disclosures.

Further, there is no one generally accepted method for characterizing and

communicating information about risk. As a result, Commission rules allow issuers to 

choose among three types of quantitative disclosures. Issuers may simply disclose the 

terms of any outstanding derivative contracts in a tabular format, including information 

about fair values and contract terms relevant to determining future cash flows, 

categorized by expected maturity dates. Alternatively, issuers may disclose sensitivity 

analysis assessing the potential for loss (e.g., in terms of net income) resulting from 

hypothetical changes in various market factors (e.g., oil prices). Issuers may also present 

the results of a value-at-risk (“VaR”) analysis, which quantifies the potential loss in fair

values, earnings or cash flows, from market movements with a selected likelihood of 

occurrence. 

Table III(F)(5) describes the percentage of issuers using different types of 

disclosures in reporting market risks. As noted above, 60% of sample issuers report some

type of exposure to market risk (see Table III(F)(4)). More than half of this group (i.e., 

more than half of those disclosing information about market risks) present sensitivity

analysis in their disclosures; 12% present value-at-risk disclosures and another 9%

present tabular disclosures.203 As a result, comparing the risk disclosures across issuers 

can be difficult, due to lack of comparability. As is the case with regard to the earlier 

results, these percentages are driven by the predominance of derivative use in the large 

issuer sub-sample. 

 

203Issuers may use different methods to disclose information about different market risks. 

84
TABLE III(F)(5): Issuers Reporting Risk Disclosures for Non-trading Derivatives a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of Risk 

Disclosure b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Tabular 9 14 4 4.1

Sensitivity analysis 32 52 12 12.4

Value-at-risk 12 21 3 3.2

a These data were collected from the market risk disclosures in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. b These categories are not mutually exclusive.

However, even if two issuers use the same type of disclosure about derivatives, 

direct comparisons between issuers still may not be possible. Consider two issuers that 

both use sensitivity analysis to communicate information about their risk exposure to

interest rate risk. These disclosures require that an issuer estimate the change in some 

component of issuer value (the numerator) as a result of a change in some component of 

market risk (the denominator). One issuer may report the change in net income (this

particular issuer’s choice of numerator) as a result of a 1% increase in LIBOR rates (this 

issuer’s choice of denominator). Another issuer may report the change in a different 

numerator as a result of a change in a different denominator. Both of these disclosures 

may meet the requirements set up by the Commission, but investors may not be able to 

effectively compare these two issuers based upon public filings. 

As an example, Table III(F)(6) reports the numerators and denominators for the

sensitivity analyses related to interest rate risk for a set of pharmaceutical issuers (i.e., 

SIC=2834). The disclosures identified in this table are for illustrative purposes only and 

are not highlighted as being in any way insufficient or inconsistent with the disclosure 

requirements under Item 305 of Regulation S-K, but were simply selected to show the 

range of potential disclosures under Item 305 and the resulting difficulty of comparing 

the disclosures of different companies. 

85
TABLE III(F)(6) Empirical Findings Regarding Comparability of Sensitivity 

Analysis Disclosures Related to Interest Rate Risk for Pharmaceutical Industry 

(SIC=2834) a,b

Numerator Denominator

Company A b Cash flows, income, or market 

values 

100 basis point change in interest

rates 

Company B b 

Financial position, results of

operations, or cash flows 

10% change in interest rate 

structure 

Company C 

Fair value of derivative and other 

interest rate sensitive instruments 

10 basis point change in interest 

rates 

Company D Fair value of debt and investments 

1 basis point change in interest

rates 

Company E 

Net income related to financial 

instruments 

10% adverse change in interest

rates 

Company F 

Fair value of outstanding long term

debt outstanding 10% decrease in interest rates 

Company G Fair value of outstanding debt 1% point increase in interest rates 

a These data were collected from the market risk disclosures in the filings of issuers selected for the Study. c The sensitivity is reported to be immaterial for these issuers.

Overall, based on information available in public filings, not only is it difficult to 

ascertain the magnitude of the fair values of derivatives that are reported on the balance

sheet, it is also difficult to ascertain the extent of the underlying market risk exposures, as 

well as the effects of derivative transactions intended to hedge these risks. Although the 

tradeoff between comparability and representational faithfulness presents significant 

challenges, the Staff believes improvements can and should be made to enhance the 

transparency of reporting issuer activities related to derivatives and risk management. 

The Staff notes the FASB’s recently announced project to consider enhancing the 

existing disclosure requirements of SFAS No. 133. The FASB has stated that it will also 

consider whether to expand the scope of any disclosure enhancements to include financial 

instruments outside the scope of SFAS No. 133. 

G. Other Contractual Obligations 

1. Nature of Arrangements and Financial Reporting

Requirements 

Issuers are involved in any number of contractual obligations, including debt 

obligations, retirement obligations, compensation agreements, leases, guarantees, 

derivatives, and obligations to purchase goods and services. In many cases, liabilities are 

recognized on the balance sheet at the inception of the contract, because one party has 

performed. For example, if an issuer borrows money, it recognizes a liability upon 

receipt of the funds. In other cases, liabilities are recognized as time passes, as in the 

case of interest related to the borrowed funds. In still other cases, contractual obligations 

remain off the balance sheet. Examples of these obligations may include operating 

86
leases, portions of obligations related to retirement plans, certain guarantees, and certain 

derivatives, all of which have been discussed above. Although the discussion generally 

applies to other types of contractual obligations, this section will primarily focus on one 

major class of contractual obligations that remain off issuer balance sheets—purchase 

obligations.204 

A purchase obligation could be as simple as a standard one-time purchase order. 

Alternatively, the purchase obligation may be attributable to the purchase of goods or 

services to be delivered over an extended period of time. Generally, the accounting 

question is whether or not a party to a contract should reflect the rights and obligations 

inherent in the contract upon signing the contract, and, if so, in what way. 

Consider a contract to purchase one million units of inventory per year for the 

next three years.205 Upon signing the contract, the purchaser could record an asset (e.g., 

“Inventory Receivable”) and a liability (e.g., “Purchase Obligation”). The seller could 

also record an asset for the cash to be received and a liability reflecting its obligation to

deliver the inventory. However, at this point in time, nothing has been delivered and no 

payment has been made. Nonetheless, one could argue that, even though no performance 

has occurred, the issuers have many of the same risks and rewards as if the exchange had 

already been completed, and thus should recognize the related assets and liabilities. 

Under this view, it could be argued that binding contracts give rise to assets and liabilities 

in advance of any performance under the contract. 

The contrary view is that assets and liabilities should only be recognized to the 

extent performance has occurred—that is, to the extent that one or both parties have 

carried out the actions (duties) agreed to in the contract, such as delivering or paying for

the goods. Under this view, until some amount of performance has occurred on a 

contract, the buyer does not have an asset for the goods or services to be received nor a 

liability (i.e., a present obligation) to pay for them, and the seller does not have a 

recognizable asset for the right to collect the contractual payments. Thus, no asset or 

liability would be recorded until some performance has occurred. For example, if the

purchaser of the inventory paid for it in advance, the purchaser’s obligation to pay would 

be considered performed, and the purchaser would at that time record an asset to 

recognize its right to receive inventory. 

The latter view underlies the more common financial reporting treatment. Thus, 

signing a contract for the sale/purchase of goods generally does not result in the

recognition of an asset or liability by either party. However, there are exceptions to this 

general treatment. Two of the major exceptions are addressed in separate sections of this

 

204The Staff does not address loan commitments, lines of credit, and other similar arrangements in the

Study, due to their specialized industry-specific nature and the fact that these obligations to provide funding

under certain terms and conditions themselves constitute a financial service, which is arguably more similar

to an obligation to sell than an obligation to purchase. 

205The motivation to enter into such contractual commitments is straightforward. An issuer that uses 

certain raw materials in its production may wish to secure its supply of those materials—and possibly the 

price, as well—by entering into long-term purchase contracts. The provider of raw materials may also

benefit from knowing how much to produce. 

87
report: leases and derivatives. In yet other cases, while the assets and liabilities related to 

an unperformed contract are not separately recognized, losses embedded in those 

contracts are recognized. This so called “loss contract” accounting is required when an 

issuer has committed to purchase inventory at prices that ensure a loss on resale of that

inventory,206 and when a long-term construction contract is expected to result in a loss.207

In January 2002, the Commission released FR-61, “Commission Statement about 

Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of

Operations,” which described the views of the Commission regarding certain disclosures

that should be considered by issuers, including disclosures about contractual obligations 

and commercial commitments. This guidance was updated in the 2003 revision by the 

Commission of Item 303(A)(4) of Regulation S-K. Item 303(A)(4) requires disclosures 

about certain off-balance sheet arrangements, including certain contractual obligations. 

Specifically, these new rules require tabular disclosure in MD&A of contractual 

obligations, including open purchase orders, that will result in future cash payments. 

This disclosure is intended to provide financial statement users with information about

unrecognized (as well as recognized) obligations. While the disclosures do not provide

information about the related assets to be received as a result of those cash payments, the 

disclosures are an attempt to portray contractual obligations broadly. 

2. Off-Balance Sheet Issues in Accounting for Contractual 

Obligations

Conceptually, the accounting for unperformed contractual obligations could be 

done in a variety of ways. For example, all contractual rights and obligations could be 

recognized as assets and liabilities.208 This would recognize the fact that once an entity 

enters into a firm contract to buy or sell something, the entity is generally subject to many 

of the same risks and rewards as if the transaction had already been completed. For 

example, once an issuer has entered into a firm fixed-price contract to purchase 

inventory, future declines in the value of that inventory affect the issuer. Similarly, once

an issuer has agreed to sell inventory for a particular price, future decreases in the value 

of that inventory do not affect the issuer. 

However, to the extent neither party to a contract has performed, each party’s

rights and obligations are, at least implicitly, contingent upon the other party’s. As such, 

some assert the rights and obligations in the contract do not qualify as assets and 

liabilities because they do not result from past transactions. Others believe that, because

the rights and obligations are contingent upon one another, they should be accounted for

only as a group—that is, the “unit of account” would be the contract as a whole, rather 

than the assets and liabilities individually. In this analysis, the assets and liabilities would

be offset against one another. Assuming the contract represents an exchange of equal 

 

206See ARB 43, Chapter 4, Statement 10. 

207See SOP 81-1, paragraphs 85-89.

208The CFA Institute (formerly AIMR) has called upon standard setters to treat all executory contracts with 

terms greater than one year as assets and liabilities. See Financial Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond, 

AIMR (1993), page 86. 

88
values, the values of the assets and liabilities would likely net to zero, thus effectively 

resulting in no impact on the balance sheet. 

Although standard-setters have almost invariably determined that such 

unperformed contracts should not result in the recording of assets and liabilities, the basis 

for these decisions is not always stated.209 For example, as mentioned above, losses on

certain contractual commitments, such as inventory purchases and construction contracts, 

are required to be recognized before performance occurs. Conceptually, the loss in these 

contracts might be viewed as akin to an asset impairment loss, even though the rights in 

these contracts have not previously been reported as assets. 

Another potentially confusing aspect of accounting for loss contracts is that the 

accounting is applied far beyond the situations specifically addressed in the accounting 

guidance. Although this guidance specifically applies to very narrow classes of 

transactions, issuers and auditors have often applied it by analogy to other unperformed 

contractual obligations. These analogies have been applied sporadically, meaning that 

losses inherent in some unperformed contracts are recorded, while others are not. This 

diversity led the EITF to consider two issues related to losses on unperformed contracts. 

Neither, however, resulted in a consensus.210

3. Empirical Findings from Filings by Issuers 

In this section the Staff presents empirical findings from the Study of filings by

issuers related to purchase obligations, a subset of contractual obligations. Other major 

categories of contractual obligations, such as leases, guarantees, and derivatives, have 

been addressed in other sections of this Report. The Staff also extrapolates from these 

findings to estimate amounts for the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

Table III(G)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting purchase obligations.

Approximately 54% of issuers in the sample report cash flows committed under purchase 

obligations. An extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate 

population of active U.S. issuers suggests that approximately 30% of the total population 

of issuers report cash flows committed under purchase obligations. 

 

209Neither the FASB’s actual, or proposed, Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts clarifies, one way

or the other, whether recognition of contractual commitments fits within the current conceptual framework. 

By commissioning a research report on Recognition of Contractual Rights and Obligations, the FASB gave

some recognition, in 1980, to the need to consider the conceptual framework in relation to executory

contracts. That research report was written by Yuji Ijiri, Recognition of Contractual Rights and Obligations

(Stamford, CT: FASB, December, 1980). 

210See EITF 99-14 and EITF 00-26. 

89
TABLE III(G)(1): Issuers Reporting Future Cash Flows Committed under 

Purchase Obligations a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Issuers Reporting Purchase 

Obligations 54 78 30 30.5 

a These data were collected from the contractual obligations table in the MD&A of the filings of issuers selected for the 

Study. 

Table III(G)(2) presents the total future cash flows committed under purchase 

obligations for the 200 issuers in the sample, which are not recorded on the balance 

sheets of issuer. The undiscounted sum of the future committed cash flows related to 

purchase obligations for our sample of issuers is approximately $434 billion. An 

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that the total (undiscounted) cash flows associated with purchase 

commitments reported by the population is approximately $725 billion. 

TABLE III(G)(2): Reported Future Cash Flows Committed under Purchase 

Commitments a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100)

(millions)

Total undiscounted cash flows $433,661 $430,713 $2,948 $725,513

a These data were collected from the contractual obligations table in the off-balance sheet arrangements section of the 

MD&A (required by FR67) for the filings of issuers selected for the Staff Study. It is important to note that these 

amounts are not discounted.

Issuers reported other types of contractual obligations in the Contractual 

Commitments table in MD&A. In many cases, it is obvious whether the commitment in 

question is, indeed, on the issuer’s balance sheet (e.g., debt). However, in some cases, 

the Staff notes that whether the item is on or off the balance sheet remains unclear. 

90
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON CERTAIN POST-SARBANESOXLEY IMPROVEMENTS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING ON 

OFF-BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS 

A. Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities 

 1. Discussion 

After the downfall of Enron, attention became focused on special purpose entities,

a vehicle frequently used by Enron as a means to get assets and liabilities off the balance

sheet. In response to the attention on previous SPE accounting,211 the FASB developed a

new accounting interpretation that targets what are now referred to as variable interest 

entities (“VIEs”). FASB Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest 

Entities—an interpretation of ARB No. 51, was issued in January 2003, with a revision—

Interpretation No. 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 

2003)—an interpretation of ARB No. 51—issued in December 2003.

212 

Variable interest entities include SPEs and can be generally described as entities 

in which the equity investment at risk does not provide its holders with the characteristics

of a controlling financial interest or is not sufficient for the entity to finance its activities

without additional subordinated financial support.213 These characteristics are meant to

identify arrangements in which control of the entity would not be achieved through 

voting stock ownership, but through some other method. 

FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) requires consolidation of a variable interest entity

by a party that has a majority of the risks and rewards (i.e., greater than 50%) associated

with the entity. Interpretation No. 46(R) also establishes a methodology for determining 

which party associated with a VIE should consolidate the VIE. Essentially, the 

requirement is that the party exposed to a majority of the variations in the outcome of the 

performance of a VIE, both positive and negative, should consolidate the VIE, because 

such exposure is likely to be indicative of control. Interpretation No. 46(R) refers to 

such a party as the primary beneficiary of the VIE. 

An issuer’s involvement with a VIE can manifest itself in debt instruments, 

guarantees, service contracts, written put options, total return swaps, etc. These 

arrangements with a VIE can put the issuer in a position akin to an equity holder in that 

the issuer bears the same risks and rewards of the VIE as an equity holder would. For 

example, consider an issuer that owns 50% of the voting stock of another entity and is the 

sole guarantor of debt of the entity. Before Interpretation No. 46(R), such an issuer may 

 

211See EITF Topic D-14, Transactions involving Special-Purpose Entities; EITF 96-21, Implementation

Issues in Accounting for Leasing Transactions involving Special-Purpose Entities; EITF 90-15, Impact of 

Nonsubstantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in Leasing Transactions. 

212As has been the convention in the rest of this document, the Staff will generally refer to the revised

version of the interpretation (i.e., Interpretation No. 46(R)). However, there are some cases in this section 

that require reference to the original version of the interpretation (i.e., Interpretation No. 46). 

213See Interpretation No. 46(R), paragraph D2.

91
not have been required to consolidate the other entity based upon voting control. 

However, subsequent to the promulgation of Interpretation No. 46(R), if this same entity 

is deemed to be a VIE, then the issuer would likely be required to consolidate, due to the 

issuer’s additional risk of loss from the outstanding guarantee. 

In anticipation of the implementation of Interpretation No. 46 and Interpretation 

No. 46(R), a number of entities restructured arrangements with potential VIEs such that 

they would not require consolidation. Disclosures of such restructurings were noted in

the sample companies. The Staff also is aware anecdotally that many arrangements with 

potential VIEs were restructured such that the entity either would not be considered a 

VIE or such that no party would be required to consolidate the VIE. The effect of such 

changes is difficult to measure. However, in some cases, it appears that the changes 

made involved substantive changes to the economics of the variable interests or to the 

decision-making capabilities of the investors, while in other cases, the changes may have 

been less substantive. 

Although Interpretation No. 46(R) constitutes an improvement over the 

previously existing consolidation guidance, a number of interpretive questions remain.

Many users of Interpretation No. 46R find it theoretically and practically challenging to

apply. Currently, the FASB is considering ways to resolve an issue originally discussed 

by the EITF in issue 04-07, Determining Whether an Interest Is a Variable Interest in a

Potential Variable Interest Entity. A consensus on this EITF issue may change how some

issuers apply Interpretation No. 46(R). 

The Staff has noted that Interpretation No. 46(R) has resulted in a number of nonSPE type entities being consolidated such as joint ventures and jointly owned entities 

such as LLCs. However, it is unclear to the Staff whether Interpretation No. 46(R) has

significantly increased the number of SPE entities that are consolidated. In part, this may 

be a result of practice being ahead of the standard setters, effectively restructuring

arrangements in advance of the effective date of standards in order to achieve desired 

financial reporting results. Even so, if the changes made to SPEs in order to avoid 

consolidation do indeed represent substantive changes, such that the issuers in question

no longer control the SPE, Interpretation No. 46(R) will have improved financial 

reporting even if there is not a significant increase in the frequency of consolidation of 

SPEs. The Staff believes more time is needed to fully evaluate the effects of 

Interpretation No. 46(R). 

 2. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

This section summarizes the empirical findings from the Study of filings by 

issuers related to VIEs. The Staff also extrapolates from these findings to estimate

amounts related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

The Staff examined the disclosures related to Interpretation No. 46 and 

Interpretation No. 46(R) in the annual 10-K filings used for the remainder of the Study. 

However, as of that point in time, many of the sample issuers had not yet fully adopted 

Interpretation No. 46(R), so the available data was primarily limited to disclosures about

92
the expected impact of adopting Interpretation No. 46(R).214 In light of these limitations, 

the Staff supplemented the data by collecting additional information regarding issuers’ 

implementations of Interpretation No. 46(R) from selected quarterly 10-Q filings. 

Table IV(A)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting different levels of

actual or anticipated effects of implementing Interpretation No. 46 (and to some extent, 

of Interpretation No. 46(R)) as of the date of our sample issuers’ annual 10-K or 10KSB 

filings. 

Table IV(A)(1): Anticipated Effects of Adoption of Interpretation No. 46 Presented 

in Annual 10-K Filings a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Issuers with no Interpretation No. 46

disclosures 

18.5 7 30 29.8 

Issuers reporting no VIEs b 13 6 20 19.9 

Issuers reporting no material VIEs b 8.5 11 6 6.0 

Issuers reporting that the effect of

adopting Interpretation No. 46 was not 

material or not expected to be material

38 48c 28 28.2 

Issuers reporting no statement about 

materiality for any VIEs 12 14 10 10.0 

Issuers reporting they are still 

evaluating for some VIEs 6.5 7 6 6.0 

Issuers reporting that the impact of

adopting Interpretation No. 46(R) was 

material or was expected to be 

material for any VIEs 

3.5 7 0 0.0d

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the 10-K filings of issuers selected for the

Study. In some cases, issuers had fully or partially implemented Interpretation No. 46(R) as well. b

 Issuers included in this category are not counted in the categories below, even though some of these issuers also stated

that the effects were not material. c

 Approximately 16% of the issuers in this group reported the existence of VIEs other than those for which they

considered impact of Interpretation No. 46(R) to be immaterial, but these issuers did not make any statement about

materiality for these other VIEs. d

 Less than 0.5%. 

 

214As of the 10-K filing dates for the sample, most issuers had either not adopted or had only partially

adopted Interpretation No. 46(R), because Interpretation No. 46(R) replaced Interpretation No. 46, but only 

after the effective date of Interpretation No. 46. The effective date for Interpretation No. 46(R) was after

the balance sheet date for most 10-K filings in the sample. In addition, public small business issuers (i.e., 

issuers that file a 10KSB) were not required to adopt Interpretation No. 46(R) until 9 months after other 

public issuers. 

93
The information gathered for this table mainly relies on disclosures under Staff 

Accounting Bulletin No. 74, Disclosure of the impact that recently issued accounting 

standards will have on the financial statements of the registrant when adopted in a future 

period (“SAB 74”). As can be seen, less than 4% of the sample issuers reported that the

impact of the interpretations either was material or was expected to be material, and all of

these issuers were members of the large issuer sub-sample. An extrapolation of the 

findings from the sample to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests 

that less than 1% of the issuers in the population would expect the effect of the 

interpretations to be material. 

In addition, as mentioned above, the Staff believes that some arrangements with 

potential VIEs were restructured such that the entity would not be consolidated under 

Interpretation No. 46 or 46(R). In fact, seven issuers in the large issuer sub-sample made 

reference in their filings to restructurings that occurred in anticipation of or coincident

with the implementation of Interpretation No. 46 and 46(R). 

The Staff supplemented its analysis of the annual 10-K filings by collecting 

additional information about the application of Interpretation No. 46 and 46(R) from 

selected quarterly 10-Q filings, which is presented in Tables IV(A)(2) and IV(A)(3).215 

Table IV(A)(2) describes the percentage of issuers reporting adoption of 

Interpretation No. 46(R) and the percentage of issuers that are affected. Approximately 

77% of the sample issuers report that they have adopted Interpretation No. 46(R).216 

Approximately 12% of the sample issuers report in their quarterly 10-Qs that they have 

no VIEs, which is a similar proportion of those who reported no VIEs in their SAB 74 

disclosures (i.e., 13%). Issuers reporting the existence of VIEs in their quarterly 10-Qs 

amounted to approximately 32%. Finally, approximately 23% of the sample issuers 

report the existence of VIEs that are consolidated. 

 

215The Staff selected the quarterly 10-Q filing for each issuer in the sample for the period in which 

Interpretation No. 46(R) should have been fully adopted. Public small business issuers (i.e., issuers that file 

a 10KSB) were not required to adopt Interpretation No. 46(R) until 9 months after other public issuers. As 

a result, the Staff cannot comment on the effects of Interpretation No. 46(R) for many of the issuers in this 

category. 

216Some sample issuers may not have reported adoption if they had no arrangements that were in the scope

of Interpretation No. 46(R) and thus concluded that no disclosure was necessary. 

94
Table IV(A)(2): Effects of Adoption of Interpretation No. 46(R) Presented in 

Quarterly 10-Q Filings a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Issuers Reporting Full Adoption of

Interpretation No. 46(R)b 76.5 88 65c 65 

Issuers Reporting No VIEs 11.5 5 18 17.9 

Issuers Reporting Existence of 

VIEs a 32 50 14 14.4 

Issuers Reporting VIEs that are 

Consolidated b 22.5 39 6 6.3 

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the 10-Q filings of issuers selected for the

Study. b

 In many cases, filings did not clearly indicate whether the consolidations occurred as a result of adopting 

Interpretation No. 46(R). c

 Includes 8 of the 26 small business issuers in the sample.

The findings for the sub-samples present a different picture. Only 5% of the large 

issuer sub-sample report that they have no VIEs, compared to 18% of the random issuer 

sub-sample. Approximately 50% of the large issuer sub-sample reports the existence of

VIEs, and 39% of this sub-sample reports consolidating at least some of these VIEs. In 

contrast, only 14% of the random issuer sub-sample report the existence of VIEs, and 

only 6% report any consolidation. 

Table IV(A)(3) presents the reported amounts of assets and liabilities consolidated 

under Interpretation No. 46(R). The sample issuers consolidated approximately $208 

billion in assets and almost $170 billion in liabilities, the vast majority of which reflects 

consolidations in the large issuer sub-sample. These assets and liabilities represent 

approximately 2% of the total assets and 2% of the total liabilities for the sample (as

shown in Table II(A)(2)), and are proportionate for each of the sub-samples. An 

extrapolation of the findings from the sample to the approximate population of active 

U.S. issuers suggests that VIEs with approximately $516 billion in assets and $444 

billion in liabilities are consolidated by the population. 

95
TABLE IV(A)(3): Reported Amounts Related to Consolidated Assets and 

Liabilities of Variable Interest Entities a

Sub-Samples 

Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (millions)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

 (millions)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

(millions)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(millions)

VIEs Consolidated by Issuers: 

Assets $208,312 $205,206 $3,106 $515,806

Liabilities $169,706 $166,938 $2,768 $443,738

a

 These data were collected from the notes to the financial statements in the 10-K and 10-Q filings of issuers selected

for the Study. In most cases, filings did not clearly indicate whether the consolidations occurred as a result of adopting 

Interpretation No. 46(R). 

B. Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about OffBalance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual 

Obligations 

 1. Discussion 

As directed by Section 401(a) of the Act, the Commission adopted amendments to

its rules to require each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed with the 

Commission to disclose “all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements,

obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with 

unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material current or future effect 

on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations, liquidity,

capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of revenues or 

expenses.”217 The rule requires an issuer to provide an explanation of its off-balance 

sheet arrangements in a separately captioned subsection of the Management's Discussion 

and Analysis section of the issuer’s disclosure documents. It also requires issuers (other 

than small business issuers) to provide an overview of certain known contractual 

obligations in a tabular format. 

FR 67 requires disclosure for any contractual arrangement to which an 

unconsolidated entity is a party, and under which a registrant has: 

• Any obligation under certain guarantee contracts; 

• A retained or contingent interest in assets transferred to an unconsolidated entity; 

• Any obligation under certain derivative instruments; or 

• Any obligation under a variable interest held by the issuer in an unconsolidated 

entity.218

 

217Final Rule: Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements 

and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Release No. 34-47264, also codified in FR 67

218See FR 67 for a more detailed description of these categories. 

96
Disclosure is required to the extent necessary to provide an understanding of the 

issuer’s material off-balance sheet arrangements as well as the material effects of those 

arrangements on financial condition, changes in financial condition, revenues or 

expenses, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures or capital resources. As the 

Commission noted in the release accompanying the final rule, management has the 

responsibility to identify and address the key variables and other qualitative and 

quantitative factors that are peculiar to, and necessary for, an understanding and 

evaluation of the issuer. More specifically, to the extent necessary for an understanding 

of the issuer’s off-balance sheet arrangements, an issuer must provide the following four

items: 

• The nature and business purpose of the issuer’s off-balance sheet arrangements; 

• The importance of the off-balance sheet arrangements to the issuer for liquidity,

capital resources, market risk or credit risk support or other benefits; 

• The financial impact of the arrangements on the issuer (e.g., revenues, expenses, 

cash flows or securities issued) and the issuer’s exposure to risk as a result of the 

arrangements (e.g., retained interests or contingent liabilities); and 

• Known events, demands, commitments, trends or uncertainties that affect the 

availability or benefits to the issuer of material off-balance sheet arrangements. 

 2. Empirical Findings from Study of Filings by Issuers 

This section summarizes the empirical findings of the Staff Study of filings by 

issuers related to off-balance sheet arrangements reported in the section of MD&A, as 

required by FR 67. The Staff also extrapolates from these findings to estimate amounts 

related to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers. 

Table IV(B)(1) describes the percentage of issuers reporting different types of 

arrangements in the off-balance sheet section of MD&A. Approximately 23% of issuers

report information about guarantees in the off-balance sheet section of their MD&A. 

Only approximately 8% report information about variable interests held in 

unconsolidated VIEs. Approximately 13% also report information about retained 

interests in financial assets transferred to an unconsolidated entity. Even fewer issuers—

approximately 1% of the sample—report the existence of the derivatives required to be 

disclosed under FR 67 (e.g., equity-linked derivatives). 

97
TABLE IV(B)(1): Issuers Reporting Arrangements in MD&A Off-Balance Sheet

Section a

Sub-Samples 

Categorized by Type of

Arrangement b Full Sample 

(n=200)

 (%)

Large 

Issuers 

(n=100)

(%)

Random

Issuers 

(n=100)

(%)

Estimate for 

Population 

(N=10,100) 

(%)

Variable Interest Entities 7.5 14 1 1.1

Retained Interests 13 25 1 1.2 

Guarantees 22.5 39 6 6.3

Equity-linked Derivatives 1 2 0 0c

a

 These data were collected from the section on off-balance sheet arrangements in the MD&A of the filings of issuers 

selected for the Study. b These categories are not mutually exclusive. c

 Less than 0.5%. 

In many cases, the Staff notes that a greater proportion of issuers report OBS 

arrangements in the notes to the financial statements, as compared to the off-balance 

sheet section of the MD&A. For example, more than twice as many issuers report 

information on guarantees in the notes to the financial statements as in the off-balance

sheet section. One possible explanation for this is that FR 67 requires disclosures for

only a subset of the guarantees encompassed by the disclosure requirements under 

Interpretation No. 45.219 Specifically, FR 67 only requires disclosures for the types of 

guarantees that are required to be recognized as liabilities on the balance sheet under

Interpretation No. 45, while Interpretation No. 45 also requires disclosures for certain 

arrangements, such as product warranties, that are not required to be recognized on the 

balance sheet. 

Nevertheless, it appears that issuers may not have identified all of the off-balance 

sheet arrangements that are required to be discussed in the OBS section of MD&A. 

Further, the Staff believes—based in part on the difficulties faced in gathering the data 

necessary for the Study and Report—that the quality of the issuer disclosures provided in 

the off-balance sheet section of MD&A can and should be improved. To some extent, 

this is not surprising, given that this was the first year for such disclosures. The Staff 

expects to focus on these areas in its reviews of issuer filings. 

V. Initiatives to Improve Financial Reporting Transparency 

This Report has presented analyses and discussion on various types of 

transactions and arrangements that may give rise to questions regarding the content of the 

balance sheet. The Staff does not, however, view these issues as totally separable from

certain other issues that arise in financial reporting. In the course of the Staff’s day-today work, which includes working with issuers on accounting questions as well as

overseeing the work of the FASB in the development of accounting standards, the Staff 

often develops views as to how financial reporting might be improved. While that 

 

219Recall that Interpretation No. 45 governs disclosures in the footnotes. 

98
cumulative knowledge informs this Report, the work to produce this Report has also 

reinforced some of the Staff’s prior views on several broad goals that it believes are key 

to raising the level of quality of financial reporting. We present these items below. 

Readers will note that the goals do not speak to particular improvements in 

accounting standards. While we do provide specific recommendations related to 

accounting standards in Section VI, it is the broad goals that we believe should guide the 

work of the standard-setters, and, more importantly, that should be in the minds of 

preparers, auditors, regulators, and others who affect financial reporting. The Staff 

believes that discussions on improvements in financial reporting too often focus 

inappropriately and singularly on standard-setting activities. The Staff believes that 

improvement will best be achieved when all parties in the financial reporting process are

working towards the same goals. Indeed, the Staff believes that significant improvement 

in the transparency of the balance sheet and of financial reporting in general is possible 

without any changes in standards. 

A. Eliminate (or at least Reduce) Accounting-Motivated Structured 

Transactions 

As noted in the introduction to this Report, we have not limited the scope of our

consideration of off-balance sheet transactions to only those transactions that involve 

deliberate manipulation on the part of the issuer. Nonetheless, it is true that most of the

scandals that provided a catalyst to the passage of the Act did indeed involve transactions

that were structured so as to present information in a manner inconsistent with the 

underlying economics. In fact, deliberate attempts to work around the intent of the 

standards have contributed to many of the largest financial reporting failures. These

attempts normally involve transactions that are structured in an attempt to achieve 

accounting results that do not mirror the economics of the transaction. With regard to 

certain of Enron’s structured transactions, Neal Batson concluded that: 

broad concepts have given way to rules-based, bright-line tests under 

which the financial accounting for a transaction often depends on the 

form of the transaction rather than its economic substance. In fact, in 

many cases the very purpose of designing a structured finance

transaction to comply with the literal GAAP rules is to report the 

transaction in accordance with its form rather than its economic 

substance.220

In addition, transparency and the degree to which accounting and disclosure 

standards achieve their goals can be greatly diminished by the use of structuring, even 

when that structuring appears to comply with the standards. Examples of this abound in 

financial reporting, and touch on several of the topics that are addressed in this Report. 

Leasing is a prime example of this. The guidance that currently exists was developed 

with regard to the transactions that were commonplace at the time that guidance was 

issued. And, indeed, it might have produced results that would have reflected the 

 

220See Second Interim Batson Report, pages 51 and 52. 

99
economics of those transactions, if not for the fact that lease transactions changed in 

response to the guidance. Interpretation No. 46(R), which addresses the consolidation of 

variable interest entities (including SPEs), could well suffer a similar fate. In some cases,

securitizations and derivatives have been used in accounting-motivated transactions. 

When we refer to accounting-motivated structured transactions, we are speaking

of those transactions that are structured in an attempt to achieve reporting results that are

not consistent with the economics of the transaction, and thereby impair the transparency 

of financial reports.221 Further, we include not only those transactions that would not 

have been undertaken but for the perceived “benefits” of the resultant financial reporting, 

but also those that adopt a more complex form than would otherwise be the case, in order 

to achieve an accounting result. For example, an issuer might contemplate a secured 

borrowing transaction because it needs capital—a true business purpose. However, if

that issuer transfers the assets to an SPE, which then borrows the funds and transfers 

them to the issuer in a transaction that keeps the debt off the balance sheet while exposing 

the issuer to virtually the identical risks and rewards as if the simple secured borrowing

had been undertaken, the Staff considers the transaction to be accounting-motivated. 

It is tempting to blame the use of accounting-motivated transactions on 

accounting standards that can be exploited. However, while the fact that accounting 

standards may be vulnerable to exploitation may be thought of as representing a failure of 

the standard-setter, it is the creation and use of a structured transaction undertaken with 

purpose and intent to obfuscate, conceal and/or deceive that reduces transparency, not the 

standards themselves. Issuers, auditors, and advisors who work to implement

transactions that are structured in ways that attempt to portray the transactions differently

from their substance do not operate in the interests of investors, and may be in violation 

of the securities laws.222 Underscoring the seriousness of the problems caused by 

accounting-motivated transaction structures, the Commission has recently entered into 

settlements with several entities that engaged in the development or facilitation of 

transaction structures.223

The Staff believes that the significant use of accounting-motivated transactions

has contributed to a reduction in the transparency and credibility of financial statements. 

 

221Thus, we do not mean to include situations where, for example, an issuer increases its sales efforts at the 

end of a period to generate revenue. In that situation, the reporting of revenue would generally mirror the

economics if additional sales are generated. Such situations may, however, result in the need for 

explanatory disclosures, particularly in MD&A. 

222See Release No. 34-49695, Policy Statement: Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning

Complex Structured Finance Activities

223See Commission Press Releases SEC Charges Merrill Lynch, Four Merrill Lynch Executives with

Aiding and Abetting Enron Accounting Fraud (where Merrill Lynch simultaneously settles charges for 

permanent anti-fraud injunction and payment of $80 million in disgorgement, penalties and interest) (2003-

32); SEC Settles Enforcement Proceedings against J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup (where J.P. Morgan

Chase agrees to pay $135 million to settle Commission allegations that it helped Enron commit fraud and 

Citigroup agrees to pay $120 million to settle Commission allegations that it helped Enron and Dynegy

commit fraud) (2003-87); see also American International Group, Inc. Agrees to Pay $126 Million to Settle

Fraud Charges Arising Out of Its Offer and Sale of An Earnings Management Product (2004-163). 

100
In addition, transaction structuring has substantially contributed to the complexity of 

accounting and reporting standards in certain areas, a point we address immediately 

below. 

B. Continue Implementation of Objectives-Oriented Approach to 

Standard Setting 

In many areas of accounting, including several of the areas discussed in Section 

III, the accounting and reporting standards are complex. While complexity is not in-andof-itself a bad thing, and in some cases may be necessary, it nevertheless typically entails 

added cost. On July 25, 2003, the Commission released a Staff study on the adoption by 

the U.S. financial reporting system of a principles-based accounting system.224 The Staff 

recommended therein that FASB more consistently develop accounting standards on a 

principles-based or “objectives-oriented” basis, as defined in the study. The FASB has 

indicated that it “agrees with the recommendations” of the study.225 The results of the 

current Study of off-balance sheet arrangements have only served to reinforce the Staff’s 

previous conclusion of the importance of taking an objectives-oriented approach to 

standard setting. 

As noted in Section I above, the Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standards Study

recommended that accounting standards should be developed using an objectivesoriented approach and that such standards should have the following characteristics: 

• Clearly state the accounting objective of the standard with the objective 

incorporated in the standard; 

• Minimize the use of exceptions from the standard; 

• Avoid use of percentage tests (“bright-lines”) that allow financial engineers to 

achieve technical compliance with the standard while evading the intent of the

standard; 

• Be based on an improved and consistently applied conceptual framework; and 

• Provide sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be operationalized 

and applied on a consistent basis. 

Objectives-oriented standards would clearly establish the objectives for a class of 

transactions—and incorporate those objectives as an integral part of the standard itself. 

Under an objectives-oriented approach, preparers would be held responsible to present 

financial statements that are in accordance with the substantive accounting objectives

built into the pertinent standards. Moreover, under an objectives-oriented approach, the 

cost to investors and analysts of comprehending the standards themselves should be

lower. Indeed, ideally, an investor or analyst could obtain a reasoned conceptual 

understanding of the meaning of reported numbers by simply studying the stated 

 

224The study was conducted pursuant to the provisions of Section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See

Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standards Study. 

225FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption of a Principles-Based Accounting System, July 2004. 

101
objectives of the pertinent standards. That is, under an objectives-oriented regime, each 

standard’s stated objective assists the user in comprehending how the standard is 

constructed, how it is to be applied to a class of transactions or events, and how those 

transactions or events should be reflected in the financial statements. This intuitive 

coherence serves to enhance transparency. 

As noted in the previous study, rules-based standards “further a need and demand 

for voluminously detailed implementation guidance on the application of the standard, 

creating complexity in and uncertainty about the application of the standard.” For

example, the derivatives accounting guidance is often criticized as being excessively long 

and overly complex, but much of that guidance is devoted to determining whether an 

instrument qualifies for one of the exceptions from the definition of derivative, or one of 

the exceptions in the application of hedge accounting. Objectives-oriented standards that 

rely on a coherent and consistent conceptual framework with less bright lines and fewer 

exceptions may allow a significant reduction in complexity of the accounting guidance. 

Moreover, rules-based standards can provide a roadmap to avoidance of the 

accounting objectives inherent in the standards. Internal inconsistencies, exceptions and 

bright-line tests reward those willing to engineer their way around the intent of standards. 

This can result in financial reporting that is inconsistent and not representationally 

faithful to the underlying economic substance of transactions and events.226 For example, 

with respect to securitizations, current standards allow issuers to structure transactions to 

achieve desired accounting results—that is, either sale or borrowing treatment for the

items being securitized—for what are economically similar transactions. Other examples 

of accounting-motivated structured finance transactions are discussed throughout this 

Report. 

Again, it is tempting to look to the accounting standard-setter for progress 

towards objective oriented standards. However, while the FASB must be a driver of

greater use of objectives-oriented standards and the accompanying reduction in 

complexity of the guidance, they cannot do it alone. Other parties must also be 

committed to these goals in order to make them a reality. As noted in the previous study, 

the complexity in current standards exist in large part due to requests for guidance from

preparers and auditors, due to exceptions to basic principles that were requested by 

preparers or others in the financial reporting process, and due to concerns about litigation 

that might stem from standards that require a greater use of judgment on the part of 

management and auditors. It is important that all participants in the financial reporting 

process do their part to reduce complexity in financial reporting by being willing to apply 

(and accept) reasonable judgments. 

 

226For example, as indicated in Batson’s Second Interim Report, “Enron’s intimate knowledge and carefully

calculated application and manipulation of the GAAP rules ... provided a leading example of how abuse of 

the rules-based approach to GAAP standard setting can result in reported financial results materially

different from the underlying substance of the transactions reported.” Batson’s Second Interim Report,

Appendix B (Accounting Standards), page 12. 

102
C. Improve the Consistency and Relevance of Disclosures 

As discussed in Section II above, the basic financial statements themselves cannot 

convey all of the relevant information about an issuer’s rights, obligations, and 

transactions. Disclosures outside of the basic financial statements are necessary to

complement that information in order to enhance the decision-usefulness of financial 

reporting. In the process of conducting this Study, including the gathering of empirical 

data, the Staff observed that the quality of the information presented in some areas varies

greatly from issuer to issuer, and among topical areas. Some of these issues are 

mentioned in the subsections of Section III dealing with empirical data, as the Staff noted 

that it was not able to comprehensively compile data in certain areas. 

In addition, the Staff observed that disclosures sometimes appear haphazard, with 

the disclosures required by each rule or standard developed independent of other 

disclosures. While it was observed that disclosures made by issuers did in fact often 

provide information about the potential variability of estimates, alternate measurement 

attributes, assumptions used by management, and detail of summarized financial 

statement captions, it was not always clear why particular disclosures were included in

various situations, or, in some cases, what the purpose of the disclosures was. 

Indeed, both users and preparers in various industries have stated that they believe 

that disclosures in the area of financial instruments, among others, do not provide a 

complete or meaningful picture for investors. The Staff believes that it is important that 

issuers take the time and make the effort to prepare disclosures in a meaningful way and 

to provide sufficient disclosures to allow investors to understand the substance of the

issuer’s situation and activities.227 

 D. Improve Communication Focus in Financial Reporting 

An unfortunate effect of the large volume and complexity of financial reporting 

requirements is that many accountants, lawyers, and others seem to view the goal of 

financial reporting as achieving technical compliance with the rules without regard to 

communicating effectively to investors. As we have noted, the Staff believes the goal is

to communicate effectively to investors while complying with the rules. 

The Commission has previously noted the importance of clear communication in

financial reports. Perhaps most notable were the efforts to achieve greater use of “plain

English” in filings. The Commission issued rules in this area in 1998, noting in the 

release that:228

Full and fair disclosure is one of the cornerstones of investor protection 

under the federal securities laws. If a prospectus fails to communicate 

 

227Cf. Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 which states that “In addition to the information expressly required to be 

included in a statement or report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be 

necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made not 

misleading.” 

228See Release No. 33-7497, Plain English Disclosure (January 28, 1998) 

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information clearly, investors do not receive that basic protection...A 

major challenge facing the securities industry and its regulators is assuring 

that financial and business information reaches investors in a form they 

can read and understand. 

The plain English rules require the use of short sentences, everyday language, and 

tabular presentation of complex information, amongst other things. Despite these and 

other efforts to encourage better communication, the Staff believes that a substantial 

number of issuers continue to focus the bulk of their efforts on technical compliance with 

the rules, rather than true communication. 

While this mindset is certainly not limited to off-balance sheet issues or the types 

of transactions discussed in this Report, it does manifest itself in the volume of 

accounting motivated transaction structures and in disclosures that may provide certain 

required data, but remain insufficient to permit a true understanding of the issuer’s 

activities or position. No matter how many improvements are made to accounting 

standards, financial reporting will continue to suffer if it remains an accepted premise by 

some practitioners that efforts to avoid the intent of standards while maintaining seeming 

technical, minimal compliance with the letter of those standards are acceptable.229 

A stronger focus on communication with readers should also have the effect of 

making financial reports easier to understand and digest. Turning again to the example of

financial instrument disclosures, the Staff noted during its work on the Study and Report 

that even where significant information was available in filings, it was often spread in

several places, and there was little explanation of how the various disclosures related to 

each other or to the amounts reported in the financial statements. 

If all participants in the process came at financial reporting with a view of 

complying with the objectives of the guidance and clearly and transparently 

communicating material information to investors, significant improvements would occur 

even if none of the other recommendations in this Report were to be adopted. 

Conversely, the focus on seeming technical compliance results in a tendency to only 

make improvements when new rules or standards require those improvements. This 

burdens the standard-setters with the responsibility for driving all improvements, and 

investors with the responsibility for deciphering reports that are not written clearly. 

Changing this situation will not be a short-term proposition. However, 

opportunities to improve exist, and most of the opportunities depend on the actions and 

intentions of issuers. The Commission and the Staff will continue to attempt to assist.

For example, recent Commission rules that require auditors to make audit committees 

aware of situations where management has chosen a less preferable method of accounting 

may help preparers and auditors identify opportunities to improve.230 The recent 

 

229Notably, proof of compliance with GAAP does not imply that an issuer or auditor acted in good faith and

that the “facts as certified were not materially false or misleading.” See U.S. v. Simon 425 F.2d 796. 

230Release No. 33-8183, Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence;

Section 210.2-07 Communication with audit committees 

104
interpretive release on MD&A information also provides various suggestions to improve 

the quality and transparency of these disclosures.231 

The Staff is also exploring the ways that technology can help to provide

information to investors that is easier to use and understand, and that increases the ability 

to make comparisons across companies. Among other things, the Commission is 

implementing a voluntary program to allow issuers to file certain information using

XBRL, which may facilitate the analysis of financial information by users.232 It is hoped 

that preparers and users will take advantage of this program to identify the most useful

information to provide in this format, including information relating to the arrangements 

discussed in this Report. The Staff will continue to explore ways to encourage better and

more useful disclosures. However, efforts in this area will have a much greater chance of 

success with the commitment of preparers to communicate with investors in the most

effective ways possible.

VI. Recommendations Related to Accounting Standards 

The recommendations below represent suggestions for changes in accounting and 

reporting standards that we believe have the greatest potential to result in improved 

transparency. It is important to note that all of the standards that currently exist were

actively debated and discussed when they were set, and were subject to an open and 

deliberative process. The Staff believes that this process has worked well, and is the 

appropriate process by which improvements to the existing standards should be 

considered and developed. Furthermore, by including these recommendations, the Staff 

does not mean to suggest the primary responsibility for improvements in reporting rests 

solely with the FASB. Rather, the recommendations are meant in part to make clear to

readers of this Report the kinds of changes which would likely flow from attempts by the 

FASB to help achieve the goals discussed in Section V. In each case, the

recommendations speak directly to issues of transparency the Staff identified during its

work in preparing this Report. 

A. Standards on Accounting for Leases 

Lease accounting has been identified repeatedly as an area that should be 

reexamined by the FASB.233 The current “all or nothing” lease accounting guidance is

not designed to reflect the wide continuum of lease arrangements that are used, and 

 

231Release Nos. 33-8350; 34-48960 Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s 

Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations FR 72. 

232Release Nos. 33-8529, 34-51129, 25-27944, 39-2432, IC-26747 XBRL Voluntary Financial Reporting

Program on the EDGAR System 

233See, for example, AICPA’s Special Committee on Financial Reporting, Improving Business Reporting—

A Customer Focus (Dec. 1994) (discussion of users’ concerns with accounting and disclosures on long

term leases); Robert C. Lipe “Lease Accounting Research and the G4+1 Proposal” Accounting Horizons

(Sept. 2001); Dennis W. Monson “The Conceptual Framework and Accounting for Leases” Accounting 

Horizons (Sept. 2001) (Notes that “there is virtually universal agreement that SFAS No. 13 fails to achieve 

its stated objectives and needs to be reconsidered.”) 

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therefore, it cannot transparently and consistently reflect the varying economics of the 

underlying arrangements. In addition, the Staff is aware that sophisticated users, such as 

credit-rating agencies, often adjust balance sheets in their work so they can analyze 

companies as if all leases were reflected on the balance sheet. A project on lease 

accounting would be consistent with several of the goals described above in Section V. 

The lease accounting standards rely extensively on bright lines, greatly increasing 

the potential for similar arrangements to be portrayed very differently. Indeed, for a 

lessee, the accounting can flip between recording no assets and liabilities at lease 

inception to recording the entire leased asset and entire loan price with only a very small

change in economics. As discussed previously, the bright line tests have served to 

facilitate significant structuring of leases to obtain particular financial reporting goals. 

The extensive structuring further erodes the effectiveness of the standards. 

Some have suggested that lease accounting should focus on contractual cash 

inflows and outflows234 in determining the amount of assets and liabilities to record on

entities’ balance sheets. Lease accounting methods based on cash flows would generally 

require both parties in lease agreements to report their economic interests in the leased 

assets as well as assets and/or liabilities related to payments mandated by the lease 

agreement. The FASB, as part of a group of standard setters known as the G4+1,235 has 

considered, in some depth, such approaches in the past.236 The Staff believes that these

approaches, among others, remain worthy of further consideration. 

In suggesting that the FASB should undertake a project to reconsider the 

standards for accounting for leases, the Staff does not mean to suggest that such a project 

would be simple. Leases can have many different terms, including contingent rents, 

optional extensions, penalty clauses, purchase options, and others that each will require 

consideration in any project. The challenges in developing an approach that considers 

each of these terms in a conceptually consistent way are not insignificant. Furthermore, it 

is likely that a project on lease accounting would generate significant controversy; many 

issuers see leasing as an attractive form of financing asset acquisition in part because 

leases can be structured so as to avoid recording debt. For these reasons, a project on 

lease accounting would also likely take a significant amount of time as well as necessitate 

a substantial commitment of FASB staff resources. Nonetheless, the Staff believes that 

the potential benefits in terms of increased transparency of financial reporting would be

substantial enough to justify the time and effort required. 

The project to reconsider the accounting for leases may be most effective if

conducted as a joint project with the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”). 

 

234See SFAC No. 1, paragraph 37. 

235Members of the G4+1 included the Australian Accounting Standards Board, the Canadian Accounting 

Standards Board, the International Accounting Standards Committee, the New Zealand Accounting

Standards Review Board, the New Zealand Financial Reporting Standards Board, the United Kingdom

Accounting Standards Board and the United States Financial Accounting Standards Board. 

236See Financial Accounting Series Special Report: Accounting for Leases: A New Approach, July 1996 

and Financial Accounting Series Special Report: Leases: Implementation of a New Approach, February 

2000. 

106
The IASB’s standards are widely used outside of the United States. In an area as

pervasive as leasing, it would be beneficial to have similar accounting standards be used 

around the world to the greatest extent possible. 

B. Standards on Accounting for Defined-Benefit Retirement 

Arrangements 

The accounting for defined-benefit retirement arrangements provides a good 

example of a situation in which different accounting is achieved solely due to the form of

arrangement used. An issuer could meet its pension obligations by paying them out as 

they become due, and funding those payments from assets held by the issuer. If it did so, 

the assets would be accounted for like any other assets held by the issuer, and the 

obligation would be estimated and accrued like any other long-term compensation 

arrangements. As discussed above, most U.S. companies choose instead to fund their 

retirement arrangements by setting up separate entities for their pension plans and 

funding those plans. Although the company generally has almost the same risks and 

rewards and much of the same level of control over the assets and obligations whether

they are in a separate plan or not, the accounting changes completely if a plan is used. 

The FASB itself questioned whether the accounting guidance that addresses definedbenefit pension plans is sufficiently transparent, as pointed out in SFAS No. 87: 

The Board believes that it would be conceptually appropriate and 

preferable to recognize a net pension liability or asset measured as the

difference between the projected benefit obligation and plan assets, either

with no delay in recognition of gains and losses, or perhaps with gains and 

losses reported currently in comprehensive income but not in earnings. 

The Staff believes that a project that would reconsider the accounting for definedbenefit pension plans is warranted.

The Staff believes that such an effort would further several of the initiatives

discussed previously in Section V. First, the accounting for defined-benefit pension plans 

deviates from the accounting required for other business and compensation arrangements,

even when the economics are similar. While issues such as how to most appropriately 

measure the pension obligation and report pension items in the income statement should 

be considered, the Staff believes that work on the accounting for defined-benefit plans 

should also focus on those areas that are inconsistent with the accounting for similar 

items in other areas, including: 

• Consolidation—Given the fact that the plan sponsor generally controls and is 

subject to the vast majority of the risks and rewards of the pension plan, there 

is not an obvious conceptual reason why the plan should not be consolidated, 

especially since other trusts used to fund liabilities typically are consolidated. 

In addition, the consolidation exemption results in a very different financial 

statement presentation based on whether a separate entity is used to manage

the retirement benefits. While separate plans are common in the U.S. because 

of employment and tax laws, laws in other jurisdictions vary, again raising the 

possibility of different accounting for similar transactions. 

107
• Deferral of Actuarial Gains and Losses—It is not clear why changes in 

estimates related to retirement obligations should not be treated in the balance 

sheet the same way as changes in estimates related to other obligations. 

Changes in estimated amounts to be paid on obligations other than retirement

obligations almost invariably are recognized immediately as an adjustment to 

the recorded liability, while such changes are permitted to be deferred and 

recognized over time when they relate to defined-benefit pension plans. 

• Valuation of Assets—The guidance for valuing assets of retirement plans and 

recognizing related gains and losses is not consistent with the guidance that 

applies to other entities. As the sponsor of a defined-benefit plan is affected 

by the gains and losses on pension plan assets in almost the same way as it is

affected by gains and losses on other investments, this distinction appears 

questionable.237

The Staff also believes that the complex series of smoothing mechanisms, and the 

disclosures to explain them, render financial statements more difficult to understand and 

reduce transparency. SFAS No. 87 does require certain disclosures that help explain the 

effect of SFAS No. 87’s many netting and smoothing provisions. In this case, however, 

the disclosures seem designed to compensate for less than desirable accounting. A recent 

FASB project revised the disclosure requirements to provide even more information.238 

While the disclosures are quite detailed, the Staff notes that it has long been accepted that 

“good disclosure doesn’t cure bad accounting.”239 The combination of the accounting 

and disclosure provisions contribute to the length and complexity of financial statements,

a common complaint among users and preparers alike. Revisions to the guidance that 

eliminate optional smoothing mechanisms would allow significant reduction in 

disclosures without a loss of important information. 

Much like the recommendation to undertake a project on lease accounting, it is 

likely that a project on pension accounting would generate significant controversy. 

Indeed, it was such controversy that caused the FASB to deviate from its preferred 

accounting when it promulgated SFAS No. 87. Nevertheless, the Staff believes that a 

project on pension accounting should be undertaken when resources permit. Like lease 

 

237This does not necessarily suggest that all assets of retirement plans should be recorded at fair value, as 

this is not always the treatment that applies outside of retirement plans. See SFAS No. 115 and APB No.

18. 

238See Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 132 (revised 2003): Employers’ Disclosures about 

Pension and Other Postretirement Benefits—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 87, 88, and 106 

(issued 12/2003). According to the FASB, the “Statement was developed in response to concerns

expressed by users of financial statements about their need for more information about pension plan assets, 

obligations, benefit payments, contributions, and net benefit cost.” See FASB Summary of Statement No.

132 (revised 2003) at FASB.org web site. 

239Remarks by Michael H. Sutton, Chief Accountant, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1996 Twenty-Fourth Annual National Conference on 

Current SEC Developments, December 10, 1996. 

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accounting, the Staff believes that a pension accounting project may be most effective if 

conducted as a joint project with the IASB, for similar reasons. 

C. Continue Work on Consolidation Policy 

Individual decisions relating to which entities should be reflected in the 

consolidated financial statements of an issuer—that is, decisions relating to determining 

the “reporting entity”—can create much more significant differences than individual 

decisions about how to report particular transactions. This is because the consolidation 

decision determines whether all of the assets and liabilities of another entity should be

included in the financial statements instead of one asset representing the issuer’s

investment in the other entity. As noted in Section III above, the consolidation decision 

is typically based on whether or not control exists, with the determination of control 

generally based on legal ability to control the entity. However, it is possible to

effectively control an entity without having legal control. An issuer that owns 49% of the

voting shares of an entity whose shares are otherwise widely distributed would almost 

certainly be able to set policy for that other entity, but currently would not be deemed to 

control that other entity for accounting purposes. 

The FASB previously considered replacing legal control as the trigger for 

consolidation with standards that focus on what has been called “effective control.”240 A

consolidation standard based on effective control would seek to identify characteristics of

control other than a majority voting interest, in order to ensure that all entities for which 

the issuer can direct policy and make decisions are included in the issuer’s consolidated

financial statements. 

While the FASB discontinued its broad project on effective control, 

Interpretation No. 46(R) is an attempt to deal with SPEs by creating a consolidation test 

for those entities that is meant to identify which entity has the majority of the exposure to 

variations in performance and in turn effective control. However, because that test is so 

different from the test used to determine consolidation of other entities, a new series of 

structures that straddle the lines between consolidation approaches has sprung up, and 

various structures have been designed to work around the guidance in Interpretation No. 

46(R). The Staff believes that more time should be taken to evaluate the results of 

Interpretation No. 46(R) and to allow the development of interpretive guidance that may 

assist in its application. Several projects currently being undertaken by the EITF and the 

FASB staff may provide such guidance. 

Clearly, the current consolidation guidance is complicated, despite the consistent

objective of requiring consolidation when an investor controls another entity. The Staff 

believes additional standard setting efforts related to consolidation should be focused on 

whether there are ways to achieve the objectives with less complex guidance. In 

addition, once the questions regarding Interpretation No. 46(R) have been more fully 

addressed, the FASB may also wish to consider whether it should again explore the use 

of effective, rather than legal, control to guide all consolidation decisions. Finally, 

 

240See Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement of Standards: Consolidated Financial Statements: Policy and

Procedures, (1996). 

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additional work holds the promise of promoting further convergence between of 

consolidation guidance in US GAAP and the consolidation guidance in the IASB’s 

standards. 

D. Continue to Explore the Feasibility of Reporting All 

Financial Instruments at Fair Value 

Whether financial instruments are reported at fair value or not is obviously not a

question of whether they are on or off the balance sheet. However, the Staff believes that 

the issue of whether particular financial instruments are reported at fair value is related to 

a number of the topics discussed in this Report, and is directly related to a number of the 

goals discussed in Section V. 

Questions of whether to record assets and liabilities based on their historical costs 

or their current market values (“fair value”) have long been high profile issues in the 

financial reporting world. Supporters of greater use of fair values in the balance sheet 

argue that the most useful information is that which reflects the current value of the 

issuer’s assets and obligations, as this represents the “opportunity cost” of the resources 

being used by the issuer. As previously discussed, GAAP requires a mix of historical 

costs and fair values on the balance sheet—what is often termed a “mixed-attribute 

model.” Derivative assets and liabilities are generally recorded at their fair values.

Financial assets are often reflected at fair value, although there are significant exceptions. 

Non-financial assets are generally reflected at historical cost, but are also generally

subject to an impairment test that is based in part on fair value. Both financial and nonfinancial liabilities are generally recorded based on their historical basis, with accretion

over time to their final settlement values. For certain instruments, the accounting is 

dependent upon the issuer’s intent or policy elections. In an extreme example, an issuer 

could conceivably own three of the exact same corporate debt instruments, and account 

for each in a different manner. This mixed-attribute model has developed in part because 

of concerns as to whether fair value information is reliable enough to be included in the 

balance sheet and income statement, and in part because of disagreements regarding the 

relevance of fair value information. 

The mixed-attribute model has prompted a significant amount of accountingmotivated transaction structures. For example, as noted above, some sales of financial 

assets seem motivated primarily by a desire to recognize gains that could not otherwise 

be recognized, by selling (at least for accounting purposes) receivables, available-for-sale

securities, cost method investments, or other financial assets that are not recognized at 

fair value with changes recorded in earnings. Others seem designed to change the assets’ 

form into assets with a different measurement basis in order to minimize income

statement volatility, match the measurement basis of assets with that of liabilities, or for 

other reasons. Similarly, investments in the stock of other entities are often designed to 

either achieve or avoid use of the equity method of accounting. In many of the 

accounting-motivated transactions noted above, the motivation for the transaction or the

structuring could be essentially eliminated if all financial instruments were recorded at 

fair value. 

In addition, fair value accounting for all financial instruments would reduce the 

complexity of financial reporting. Investors would not have to study the accounting

110
guidance or the choices made by management to determine what basis of accounting is 

used for particular instruments. Further, fair value hedge accounting would no longer be 

needed if all financial instruments were recorded at fair value, as the gains and losses 

would naturally offset each other to the extent the hedges were effective. This would 

eliminate the related documentation, record keeping, and other associated issues. In 

addition, fair value accounting for all financial instruments would eliminate the need to 

bifurcate and separately value derivatives embedded in financial instruments, as the 

accounting would be the same for both the host instruments and the derivative. Users of

financial statements would be spared from having to comprehend a complicated set of 

rules regarding which financial instruments are at fair value and which are at historical 

cost. 

As discussed above, fair value accounting for all financial instruments would 

appear to have benefits in terms of reduced complexity, more understandability, and less 

motivation to structure transactions to meet accounting goals. In addition, many believe 

that fair value is simply the most relevant measure for financial instruments.241 There

are, however, significant concerns with requiring fair value accounting for all financial 

instruments including: 

• Relevance—Some supporters of historical cost measurements “believe that 

amortized cost provides relevant information because it focuses on the 

decision to acquire the asset, the earning effects of that decision that will be

realized over time, and the ultimate recoverable value of the asset. Among 

other things, many argue that this is particularly valuable information in

monitoring the performance of management. They argue that fair value 

ignores those concepts and focuses instead on the effects of transactions and 

events that do not involve the enterprise, reflecting opportunity gains and 

losses, whose recognition in the financial statements is, in their view, not 

appropriate until they are realized.”

242 

• Reliability—“Opponents of fair value reporting also challenge the subjectivity 

that may be necessary in estimating fair values and question the usefulness of 

reporting fair values for securities if they are not readily marketable.”243

• Manipulability—When applied to instruments without readily available

markets, some are concerned that management may be able to use fair value 

estimates to manage earnings, inflate reported equity, or otherwise deceive 

users as to the value of the company.244

 

241For example, paragraphs 39 – 50 of SFAS No. 107 discuss the relevance of fair value information. It

states in part in paragraph 41, “Information about fair value better enables investors, creditors, and other 

users to assess the consequences of an entity’s investment and financing strategies, that is, to assess its

performance.” 

242SFAS 115, paragraph 42. 

243SFAS 115, paragraph 43. 

244As Paton and Littleton (1940, 65) write: “The process of measuring periodic income involves the 

division of the stream of costs incurred between the present and the future.” They also write: “In general, 

111
The Staff appreciates these concerns, and acknowledges, in particular, the concern 

about the potential manipulation of fair value measurements, which has been a part of 

some of the recent financial reporting scandals. However, in light of the potential 

benefits, the Staff believes that exploration of ways to eliminate the obstacles to fair

value accounting for financial instruments is warranted. 

Of course, the broad issue of the reliability of fair value measurements will 

continue to be a concern. The Staff notes, however, that it is now possible to reliably 

value many instruments that could not be reliably valued in the past. The continued 

development of financial markets should further expand the types of instruments for 

which reliable information on fair value is available. In addition, the FASB plans soon to 

issue a document that includes better guidance on fair value measurement than previously

existed.245 This should help to encourage convergence of practices in this area. 

One of the other significant obstacles to reporting financial instruments at their 

fair values in the balance sheet is their treatment in the income statement. Many believe 

that income statements become too difficult to understand if changes in the value of

reported assets and liabilities attributable to market fluctuations are combined with 

changes in assets and liabilities related to business transactions. Some believe that

holding gains and losses are simply of a different character than transactional gains and 

losses. Others believe that investing and financing activities should not be combined 

with operating activities. Still others believe that unrealized and realized gains and losses 

are different in character and should not be combined. There are also those who would 

prefer that gains and losses related to highly subjective estimates be reported separately 

from those related to measurements that are more certain. 

Indeed, the ability to differentiate changes in equity that have these various 

characteristics in different combinations could be useful to users in understanding the 

results of operations and in evaluating the company’s ability to generate cash flows in the

future. The FASB and IASB currently have a joint project on Reporting Financial 

Performance that could address this issue.246 The Staff has encouraged the two Boards to 

 the only definite facts available to represent exchange transactions objectively and to express them 

homogenously are the price-aggregates involved in the exchanges; hence such data constitute the basic

subject matter of accounting.” Paton, W. A. and A.C. Littleton, 1940, at 7, An Introduction to Corporate 

Accounting Standards, American Accounting Association, Sarasota, FL. Ijiri (1975) emphasizes that 

historical cost is consistent with accountability, because it is both hard (difficult to manipulate) and tracks 

managements’ actual decisions rather than would-be decisions tracked by fair values. (On the other hand, 

one might argue that to choose to not enter into a transaction that would serve to convert an asset into its 

fair value also constitutes a decision. To wit, a decision to incur that opportunity cost. Such a decision,

and its measurement by means of fair value, might be of interest to investors.) 

245The FASB issued an Exposure Draft of a proposed statement, Fair Value Measurements, on June 23, 

2004. The comment period ended on September 7, 2004 and on September 21, 2004, the FASB held a 

public roundtable meeting. The FASB is currently deliberating both the results of the comment letters 

received and the roundtable discussions. A final pronouncement is currently expected to be released during 

the second quarter of 2005. 

246The first meeting of the joint international group on performance reporting took place on January 13-14, 

2005. The FASB and IASB anticipate that an initial public discussion document in the form of a 

112
focus on this project, consider the various views discussed, and devise ways to report 

changes in values of assets and liabilities that are consistent and transparent and best 

facilitate appropriate analysis of reported results.247 

Another important, and related, issue is to determine whether changes in an 

issuer’s own credit risk should be reflected in the reported value of that issuer’s financial 

instruments. This possibility raises concern because the effect of an increase in the 

issuer’s credit risk would be to reduce the value of liabilities reported, resulting in an 

increase in equity (and, potentially, income). This result seems counterintuitive to many. 

The FASB has recently decided to specifically consider this issue.248 

The Staff hopes to promote further discussions regarding the use of fair value in 

the coming year. 

 E. Develop a Disclosure Framework

The disclosures in the notes to the financial statements are a critically important 

complement to the financial statements and are necessary to achieve transparency in

financial reporting. Based on this Study, as well as experience with issuer filings, the 

Staff believes that disclosures can be improved. First, as discussed above, the Staff 

believes that disclosures could be improved if issuers were to seek to achieve the goal of 

communicating with investors, rather than focusing principally on technical compliance 

with rules and regulations. 

The Staff also believes that more useful and consistent disclosure requirements 

for the notes to the financial statements could be achieved if a disclosure framework were

developed that set forth the objectives to be used in these disclosures. Currently, the 

FASB’s conceptual framework does not contain a substantial amount of guidance related 

to the notes to the financial statements. As a consequence, disclosure guidance tends to 

vary from standard to standard. A project directed at developing a framework for use in 

determining the content of notes to the financial statements might consider, for example, 

whether (and if so, when) the following goals—each of which is evident in certain

currently required disclosures—are appropriate:249

• Provide information about alternative measurement attributes; 

 Preliminary Views will be issued in late 2005. For more information about the project status see the 

Project Updates section at www.fasb.org 

247For example, the IASB has considered a matrix format income statement that includes rows organized 

into categories of: “business”, “financing”, “tax” and “discontinued operations”. The columns include:

“total,” “before re-measurements,” and “re-measurements.” International Accounting Standards Board,

2003, IASB Project Summary: Reporting Comprehensive Income.

248The FASB is currently considering adding a project to its agenda that would amend SFAS No. 133

addressing whether an issuer’s own credit risk should be considered when measuring derivative liabilities

at fair value. While this proposed project is narrow in that it relates only to derivative liabilities, the same

issue would also apply to other issuer liabilities that are measured at fair value. Accordingly, the Staff 

believes that the FASB will likely consider this issue in other projects where fair value is the measurement

attribute for the liability 

249The list is not intended to be all-inclusive. 

113
• Explain the nature and extent of uncertainty in the reported figures; 

• Allow users to recompute certain items using different assumptions than those

used by management; 

• Make it more difficult for management to engage in financial fraud; 

• Allow comparisons between issuers that have chosen different accounting 

policies; 

• Explain the sensitivity of the issuer’s results to various risks; 

• Provide detailed breakdowns of certain financial statement captions; 

• Explain the issuer’s future cash requirements; 

• Highlight the impact of unusual or non-recurring events; 

• Disaggregate the issuer’s results; 

• Explain how management’s intentions affected the reported financial position and 

results of operations; and 

• Confirm compliance with GAAP. 

Disclosure relating to financial instruments, including derivatives, in particular, 

could be improved through consistent objectives and principles. Changing the disclosure 

requirements for financial instruments would not require changes in recognition and 

measurement. Indeed, assets and liabilities could be carried on the books under the same

principles as before. Disclosures about fair values will be informative to users, even in 

cases where there is variation inherent in the valuation (so long as it is disclosed that 

there is variation in the valuation). The Staff notes that the IASB has recently

proposed/promulgated guidance in this area that could be used as a starting point for 

work in this area in the U.S.250 

In order to stimulate thought and discussion, we identify below some possibilities 

for financial instrument disclosures that arose from the Staff’s work in preparing this

Report, as well as its work reviewing filing and following the IASB’s project on financial 

instrument disclosures that is referred to above: 

• Carrying value as of balance sheet date; 

• Explanation of changes in carrying value since last balance sheet date; 

• Fair market value as of balance sheet date (include range as well as point

estimate); 

• Changes in fair market value since last balance sheet date; 

 

250See International Accounting Standards Board Exposure Draft ED 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 

July 2004. 

114
• Description of valuation methods, including what proportions were valued based 

on the different types of inputs, as well as description of significant assumptions 

(and possibly access to example/actual valuation models); 

• Related derivative positions as of balance sheet date; 

• Fair value of related derivative positions as of balance sheet date; 

• Description of income statement impact; 

• Sensitivity of fair value and income to changes in significant underlying 

variable(s) without considering related derivative positions; and 

• Sensitivity of fair value and income to changes in significant underlying 

variable(s) net of related derivative positions. 

By highlighting potential objectives for disclosures in the notes to the financial 

statements and explaining what factors might influence the decision as to which 

objectives should drive disclosure requirements in a particular standard, the addition of 

disclosure guidance to the FASB’s conceptual framework could drive more consistent 

disclosures across various accounting issues, while helping users to understand why 

certain disclosures are included in financial statements. The Staff has suggested to the 

FASB that adding disclosures to its conceptual framework would be helpful. 

Of course, insights generated by the development of such a disclosure framework 

might also lead to recommendations from the Staff regarding the Commission’s 

regulatory disclosure requirements. Indeed, some of the objectives noted above, each of 

which is evident in the disclosure requirements for notes to the financial statements in 

some areas, are also objectives of MD&A or other regulatory disclosure requirements. 

As such, the Staff would be willing to work closely with the FASB in its development of 

a disclosure framework, in order to consider whether complementary changes to the 

Commission’s disclosure requirements would generate further improvement as well as to 

ensure that disclosure is provided in the most appropriate location, whether it be in notes 

to the financial statements, MD&A or in some other location. 

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