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i 

71–449 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–78] 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN 

RUSSIA AND CHINA: UNDERSTANDING 

IMPACTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 14, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, October 14, 2011, Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Russia and 

China: Understanding Impacts to the United States ....................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, October 14, 2011 ......................................................................................... 23 

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2011 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIA AND CHINA: 

UNDERSTANDING IMPACTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 4 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Fisher, Richard D., Jr., Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy 

Center .................................................................................................................... 7 

Lewis, Dr. Jeffrey, Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 9 

Schneider, Dr. Mark B., Senior Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy ... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fisher, Richard D., Jr. ..................................................................................... 48 

Lewis, Dr. Jeffrey ............................................................................................. 73 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 31 

Schneider, Dr. Mark B. .................................................................................... 33 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from General Chilton and Admiral Mullen ........................................ 85 

Executive Summary from Study Commissioned by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency .......................................................................................... 86 

Excerpt Concerning Underground Tunnels from Department of Defense 

2011 Report on China ................................................................................... 87 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 96 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 91 

(1) 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIA AND 

CHINA: UNDERSTANDING IMPACTS TO THE UNITED 

STATES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Friday, October 14, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:38 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on ‘‘Nuclear Weapons 

Modernization in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the 

United States.’’ 

This hearing is very timely because we are currently faced with 

a highly uncertain future regarding our own nuclear deterrent 

modernization program. Despite commitments from many key leaders, that modernization of our nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery 

systems, and supporting infrastructure is critically needed. 

We are on the verge of halting our modernization program before 

it even begins. The fiscal year 2012 Energy and Water appropriation bills currently in Congress would make dramatic cuts to nuclear modernization funding levels that were agreed to last year by 

the President and Senate during consideration on the New START 

[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty. 

In that context, it is important to understand if and how other 

countries, especially China and Russia, are modernizing their nuclear forces and how that modernization should impact our decisions here in the United States. 

To help us explore these issues, we have before us several distinguished non-governmental experts on nuclear weapons program 

strategies and forces in China and Russia. 

They are Dr. Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst, National Institute 

for Public Policy; Mr. Richard Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center; and Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, 

Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. 

Thank you all for joining us today. We appreciate you sharing 

your insights with us. Based upon your written statements, you all 
2 

seem to be in agreement that Russia and China are modernizing 

their nuclear forces. 

Dr. Schneider, you point out that ‘‘Russia is modernizing every 

leg of its nuclear triad with new, more advanced systems,’’ including new ballistic missile submarines, new heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] carrying up to 15 warheads each, new 

shorter-range ballistic missiles, and new low-yield warheads. 

You highlight a series of disturbing statements by senior Russian 

officials regarding how Russia has come to put increased emphasis 

on nuclear weapons in military planning, including a possible intention to use nuclear weapons first in an attempt to end regionalor even local-level conventional wars. 

Dr. Schneider, you also reference information that Russia may 

possibly be violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. If 

true, this is deeply disturbing. I hope you will discuss this in the 

summary of your remarks. 

Mr. Fisher, you point out that China is steadily increasing the 

numbers and capabilities of the ballistic missiles it deploys and is 

upgrading older ICBMs to newer, more advanced systems. China 

also appears to be actively working to develop a submarine-based 

nuclear deterrent force, something it has never had. 

Your testimony also highlights reports of a very large tunnel system China has constructed. A recent unclassified Department of 

Defense report says that this network of tunnels could be in excess 

of 5,000 kilometers and is used to transport nuclear weapons and 

forces. 

An unclassified study commissioned by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and conducted by Dr. Phillip Karber out of Georgetown, is about to be released, which goes into even greater detail 

on this worrying development. 

As we strive to make our nuclear forces more transparent, China 

is building this underground tunnel system to make its nuclear 

forces even more opaque. 

Dr. Lewis, from your prepared statement, it appears that while 

you agree with your fellow witnesses that China and Russia are 

modernizing, you likely don’t agree with them on what the implications of that modernization are for the United States and for our 

decisionmaking. 

But you do caution that some of the modernization efforts in 

China and Russia could lead to instability in a crisis. In particular, 

I would appreciate if in your opening statement you would touch 

on the stability implications of deployment of a heavy, multiplewarhead, fixed silo-based ICBM in Russia as well as China’s nuclear force concept of operations—which requires arming their delivery systems in a crisis. 

With all of this modernization going on in Russia and China— 

and every other nuclear power—our own nuclear modernization 

program may never get past the ‘‘plan’’ stage. 

Last December, President Obama and the Senate agreed to robust funding for nuclear modernization efforts. In letters to the 

Senate, President Obama agreed to modernize the strategic triad 

of delivery systems and accelerate key infrastructure products at 

NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] labs and plants. 
3 

The President also said, ‘‘I recognize that nuclear modernization 

requires investment for the long-term, in addition to this one-year 

budget increase. That is my commitment to the Congress—that my 

Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as 

long as I am President.’’ 

The President came through on this pledge in his budget request, 

and then the House supported full funding for NNSA in fiscal year 

2012 Budget Act and the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. But now, that commitment is falling apart and 

stalling. The fiscal year 2012 Energy and Water appropriations 

bills would cut NNSA funding by up to 10 percent for the budget 

request and the current continuing resolution returns NNSA to 1.5 

percent less than fiscal year 2011 levels. 

In the House, 65 Members signed on to a letter—one that contains gross inaccuracies about the cost of sustaining and modernizing our stockpile—calling for over $200 billion in cuts of nuclear 

weapons funding over 10 years. 

Considering that the budget for sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear weapons complex and nuclear forces is on the 

order of $220 billion over the next 10 years, the cuts proposed in 

this letter would amount to unilateral disarmament. I was disappointed to see that so many of my colleagues signed on to such 

an irrational proposal. 

But I am thankful that all of my majority colleagues on this subcommittee are standing firm for the need for modernization. We recently sent a letter to four key Senate appropriators, asking them 

to stand by a written commitment the Senators had previously 

made to the President last December, in which they each pledged 

their ‘‘support for ratification of the New START Treaty and full 

funding for the modernization of nuclear weapons arsenal.’’ 

No less an authority than the Secretary of Defense supports fully 

funding NNSA’s nuclear modernization efforts. Just yesterday in 

testimony before our committee, Secretary Panetta said he ‘‘certainly would oppose any reductions with regards to the funding for 

nuclear [modernization].’’ This is a strong statement of support 

from a Secretary who is under intense pressure to cut defense 

spending. 

Secretary Panetta also said at yesterday’s hearing, ‘‘With regard 

to reducing our nuclear arena, I think that this is an area where 

I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally; we ought to do that 

on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others to make 

sure that we are all walking the same path.’’ 

I couldn’t agree more. That is why one of the New START Implementation Act provisions contained in the House-passed fiscal year 

2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] link would ensure that we don’t unilaterally reduce, and that any further reductions occur in conjunction with a formal treaty or an act of Congress. 

Today, we are going to examine nuclear modernization efforts in 

Russia and China. We need to understand what these countries are 

doing, in contrast to what we are doing. Our nuclear modernization 

plans is just that. It is just a plan. 

We are only beginning to embark on it. Meanwhile, these other 

countries continue to advance the capability and reliability of their 
4 

nuclear forces. We need to understand the potential long-term consequences of watching as Russia and China modernize their nuclear arsenal—while we sit back and simply maintain our existing 

aging nuclear forces. 

With that, let me turn to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for 

her opening statement and appreciate her. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join Chairman Turner in welcoming Dr. Schneider, Mr. Fisher, and Dr. Lewis to this 

hearing about the modernization of Russia and China’s nuclear 

weapons programs and the impact that it would have, and does 

have, on our nuclear policy and our posture. 

This is an issue, of course, of big interest to the subcommittee 

and this hearing is, I think, very useful as a follow-on to the classified briefings that our subcommittee has recently received on nuclear weapons programs earlier this summer. 

We have been working very hard to get everybody up to speed 

on this committee in an effort to, I think, have as unified a voice 

as we can about the security and issues that we have here on this 

committee. 

I think this is a very valuable opportunity for us to get a better 

understanding of where we believe modernization efforts, what direction they are going for both of these countries, the different 

models that are being used to maintain nuclear weapons, how 

these nuclear weapons, the modernization plans, add to the capability of Russia and China vis-a-vis our capabilities; whether they 

add to the deterrence in the sense of, if you have weapons does 

that deter others from using them and therefore nobody is using 

them or whether the fact that they are modernizing—how that impacts our own arsenal and what types of modernization efforts we 

might consider, considering that both the United States and Russia 

have over 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world’s arsenal. 

Given those efforts, we want to do what is the best progress in 

making the changes that we need for our nuclear weapons policy. 

And in this context I would love to hear your views, particularly 

on how we can most effectively decrease the risk that nuclear 

weapons might be employed as a result of accidental or unauthorized launch. That is one of my biggest worries with respect to 

China and Russia. Do they have the capability to keep everything 

in check, even in chaotic times? 

On whether multilateral measures, such as the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty, would help them for nuclear weapons modernization, and what must be done to preserve and to strengthen our 

strategic stability vis-a-vis what is going on with Russia and 

China? 

So I thank you for your expertise and our subcommittee looks 

forward to hearing from you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
5 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The subcommittee has received written statements from each of 

the witnesses, and without objection, these statements will be 

made part of the record. 

And now, we will turn to our witnesses and ask each to summarize their written statement in about 5 minutes. We will then proceed with Member questions. 

We will start with Dr. Schneider. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MARK B. SCHNEIDER, SENIOR ANALYST, 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority 

Member Sanchez, and distinguished members of this committee, 

for inviting me to testify. I think this is a very important topic, nuclear deterrence. And the success of nuclear deterrence is absolutely critical. 

I believe that there is a great deal of similarity between Russia 

and China in terms of the modernization programs and the role of 

nuclear weapons and their strategy. There is very little similarity 

between their views and our views on nuclear weapons, and I think 

that creates a very dangerous situation, particularly if we make 

unilateral cuts in our capabilities. 

The Russians and the Chinese are modernizing every element of 

their strategic triad. There is no debate about that at all. You have 

the older programs which were begun in the 1990s that have now 

reached fruition, that they are either being deployed or just about 

to be deployed. That’s the SS–27 and the Bulava-30 SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] with a new Borei class submarine. 

In 2011, the Russians announced a major increase in nuclear delivery vehicle capabilities that involves four new or modified 

ICBMs and SLBMs. The most threatening is the new heavy ICBM, 

which is basically a cold war relic, and the main mission being 

counterforce attacks against the U.S. ICBM force. 

The general trend in their capabilities has been going to larger 

numbers of MIRV [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] weapons, the 10 to 15 you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, on the 

new heavy. And you know, numbers like 12, 10, 6 on various other 

missiles. That is a major shift in their policy. 

The Chinese are deploying right now two new ICBMs, DF–31 

and DF–31A. They are building a new missile submarine, a new 

ballistic missile, and an improved bomber. The Chinese are much 

more secretive about their plans than the Russians are, and we 

have very incomplete information in many respects on that. 

But certainly there is evidence, particularly in the Asian press 

that they—and there is some confirmation of this in the Pentagon 

report on Chinese military power—that they are going to MIRV 

their ICBM and developing a new MIRV ICBM, referred to as DF– 

41 in the Asian press. And there are reports in the Asian press of 

one, possibly two, MIRV SLBMs. So we are seeing a major increase 

in capability. 
6 

Both Russia and China are increasing. They have announced 

they are actually increasing the number of their nuclear weapons. 

In the case of Russia that is to build up to the New START levels, 

which they are currently below in terms of accountable warheads 

by 2018. However, since New START only counts one weapon per 

bomber, they could be as much as 800 warheads above the New 

START limits. They have the countable number. 

The Russians and Chinese are developing new types of nuclear 

weapons. There is no dispute. There is no serious dispute about the 

case of Russians. Senior military leaders have actually said this on 

numerous occasions that, as Mr. Chairman Turner stated, they are 

developing low collateral damage and precision low-yield nuclear 

weapons. There are multiple sources of information on that. 

And there are reports that both are engaged in very low-yield nuclear testing. And that makes sense in light of the modernization 

program. Russia has literally thousands of nuclear weapons. The 

Obama administration has acknowledged that they have 10 times 

the number of weapons that we do. 

It is not only the numbers, it is the diversity of the weapons. 

They have capabilities to attack a wide variety of targets that we 

simply do not have the ability to attack, because of the unilateral 

reductions in our—well, not unilateral—reductions in our capability over the last 10 or 15 years. 

Mr. Chairman, the reports of the new prohibited ground launch 

cruise missile are actually pretty common in the Russian press. 

They are concerned in the sense that they could be recreating what 

was supposedly eliminated with the—actually was, I believe, at the 

time—the Zero Option INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] 

Treaty. 

I debated whether to put this into the statement, because I didn’t 

want to distract attention from the broader aspects of the Russian 

programs. This is, I think, a very important thing. There are a 

large number of reports. It comes from people all over the political 

spectrum and in the Russian Federation. 

And I think in light of the number of reports and the nature of 

the people who are making these reports, the journalists and the 

arms control experts, I would take this very seriously. And I think 

it ought to be looked at on a serious basis. 

The Russian and Chinese have different—notionally different— 

nuclear doctrines. I think there is more similarity between China 

and Russia than the notional announced doctrines, in the sense I 

do not believe the Chinese ‘‘no first use’’ policy is real. If you take 

a very close look at it, it doesn’t commit them to anything because 

we were the first to use nuclear weapons to end World War II. 

And there are still reports in the Japanese press, the Kyodo 

News Agency, says they have obtained classified Chinese documents which talked about adjusting the nuclear use threshold and 

engaging in preemptive nuclear strikes in a conventional war. 

Russians are very overtly in that direction. This has been stated 

at the highest level, and in their published military doctrine they 

reserve the right to use nuclear weapons, not only in response to 

nuclear attack or a chemical or biological attack, but in conventional warfare under certain conditions. 
7 

This is very disturbing, because they literally characterize the 

first use of nuclear weapons as de-escalation of the conflict. That 

is literally amazing. I mean, I cannot imagine anybody really believing that, but that is what they say. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Schneider, I need you to conclude so we can 

move to the other witnesses and then get to questions. If you could 

take just a few moments to conclude your statement? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Okay, I will try to go very fast. 

The Russians exercise all the time in nuclear escalation scenarios 

in local warfare, and they also do major announced strategic nuclear exercises. I believe a lot of this is political intimidation. The 

Russians have engaged in numerous types of nuclear threats, including 15, approximately, high-level nuclear targeting threats. 

They fly bombers into air defense identification zones of the U.S., 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Japan. The most 

recent one was on Wednesday of this week, where they precipitated 

defensive reactions by three NATO air forces. I regard that as beyond the pale. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Dr. Schneider. As we ask questions, 

perhaps you can embellish with the remainder of your statement. 

Mr. Fisher. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. FISHER, JR., SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER 

Mr. FISHER. Thank you. Today, to assist this committee’s deliberations on one of the most vexing challenges to the security of the 

United States: how to assess the future strategic nuclear capabilities of the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Liberation Army, 

and how to plan for the U.S. strategic capabilities that will ensure 

deterrence of PRC [People’s Republic of China] nuclear aggression 

and coercion against the United States, its friends and allies. 

Just as one citizen speaking for myself, I would like to thank the 

chairman and the members of this committee for taking the time 

to explore these issues you have listed for today’s hearing, as they 

will have a direct bearing on decisions for which there may be little 

margin for error and will require the steady leadership of this committee. 

I am aware that your deliberations are now taking place in what 

could quickly become a dire budgetary environment, which has already caused deep bipartisan concern, to include many members of 

this committee, and as seen by the warnings over the last several 

days by Secretary of Defense Panetta. 

There has been speculation in the press of cutbacks in strategic 

systems. However, standing on my nearly two decades of research 

on China’s general military trends, and focusing as well on its strategic modernization, I would add my voice of concern to those who 

are also raising concern about the potential cuts in our strategic capabilities that could follow from these widely reported budgetary 

reductions. 

By way of summarizing my written testimony for which I have 

submitted for the record, I would like to offer five main points 

about China’s nuclear and military modernization. 
8 

First, at this time in our relationship with the PRC, and perhaps 

as long as the Chinese Communist Party remains in power, it is 

not the time to be reducing American nuclear and conventional deterrent capabilities, especially in Asia. 

As the PRC leadership perceives weakness in the United States, 

it will be emboldened to take risks. The PRC has a history of engaging in optional wars, especially if it can change its strategic environment at very little cost. We have seen this in Vietnam, Korea, 

against India. 

And it is worth noting that the next leader of the PRC, Xi 

Jinping, for a time worked for a very high office in the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Central Military Commission while Deng 

Xiaoping was conducting a very successful war against Vietnam in 

1979. He saw how to take risks militarily. 

From the Korean Peninsula to the Taiwan Strait, East China 

Sea, South China Sea, its support for nuclear and missile technology proliferation, its threatening behavior in the commons of 

cyberspace, space, the United States finds itself in some degree of 

confrontation with China, and sometimes rather alone. 

And while we can point to many positive actions and indications 

from the PRC, I do not believe that these include agreement on 

what levels of military transparency can lead to confidence, especially confidence regarding nuclear forces. The PRC in recent years 

has rejected real discussions with the United States that might 

lead to nuclear stability. But it is also not clear that China’s potential demands to agree to nuclear stability would be acceptable to 

the United States. 

My second point is that it would be necessary to hold up what 

is accepted knowledge, what we think we know about PRC nuclear 

policies and strategies, to a much longer history of Chinese strategies that venerate deception. Will the PRC always have a small 

force focused on the needs of retaliation? The doubts that have already been raised about China’s ‘‘no first use’’ policy. I would agree 

with that. 

And for a military that is now building toward global power projection capabilities—naval, air, airmobile army forces—what is to 

say that China will always be satisfied with a smallish nuclear 

force for just retaliation? 

My third point would be that it is important to understand the 

breadth and direction of the PLA’s nuclear modernization as we try 

to understand their policies and their build-up. This question takes 

up most of my prepared testimony. At the top of my concerns 

would be how quickly will the PLA start to deploy new ICBMs and 

SLBMs with multiple warheads? 

There is a new large mobile ICBM for which we have had public 

imagery since 2007, but for which the Pentagon has not yet publicly identified. My sources suggest that this ICBM could carry up 

to 10 warheads. There is a potential for outfitting older DF–5 

ICBMs and perhaps future versions of the DF–31 and JL–2. 

A second concern would be growth in the PLA’s regional missile 

forces. Reports earlier this year indicate that they are now developing a new 4,000-kilometer IRBM [intermediate range ballistic 

missile] that could be ready by 2015 to supplement the DF–31 or 
9 

DF–21 MRBM [medium range ballistic missile]. And we have seen 

phenomenal growth in the number of land attack cruise missiles. 

My third concern would be to monitor the PLA’s progress in developing an eventual national missile defense capability and expanded space warfare capabilities. 

And my fourth point would be that one crucial difference between the challenges of deterring Russia and deterring the PRC 

pertains to the degree that China has abetted the nuclear capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, helped them to become a network of proliferation. 

And these countries with their known relationships to terrorist 

organizations appear to be moving toward an age that may include 

nuclear terrorism. How does the United States—the United States, 

in my opinion, has failed to arrest China’s support for this network. 

We may in the not-too-distant future be paying a very heavy price. 

And this leads to my fourth and final point, and I will conclude. 

Looking toward the future of the American nuclear deterrent posturing capability, looking into this decade and beyond, the deterrence challenge from the PRC is not just limited to the PRC per 

se, but should also include a network of dictatorships who either 

currently or imminently could have nuclear systems abetted by 

China. 

How do we convince the Chinese not just to stop abetting this 

network, but to help us roll it back? All of this points to me for a 

requirement for grave caution, especially as this committee considers very important questions about funding and preserving a nuclear deterrent capability that must be preserved. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fisher can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Dr. Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY LEWIS, DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA 

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, JAMES MARTIN CENTER 

FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE 

OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. LEWIS. Thank you. Well, it should go without saying that it 

is an honor to be here before you today. The place I would like to 

start is by noting that no country has used a nuclear weapon in 

anger since the end of the Second World War, and that our overriding interest is in continuing this norm against nuclear use. 

With the end of the cold war, I think today the principal danger 

is not a surprise attack or a bolt from the blue by Russia or China. 

Rather, the most plausible route to nuclear use is now an accident, 

an unauthorized use or miscalculation in a crisis. It is in the 

United States interest that we drive these risks as low as possible 

while maintaining our nuclear deterrent. 

It is sometimes said that the United States is the only country 

that is not modernizing its nuclear arsenal. I would submit that 

this is not true. In some cases phrases like nuclear modernization 

confuse the modernization of bombers, missiles, and submarines 

with the design of new nuclear warheads or new bombs. 

All states with nuclear weapons, including the United States, are 

replacing or modernizing delivery vehicles. The U.S. triad of stra-
10 

tegic forces, ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic 

missiles and bombers, I believe remains the most professional, 

most capable, and best funded strategic force in the world. 

There are no countries producing ‘‘new’’ nuclear warheads today, 

although the United States, Russia, and China continue to manufacture nuclear warheads that were designed and tested before 

each signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996. 

Like the United States, both Russia and China are conducting 

subcritical experiments at their former nuclear test sites to support 

ongoing stockpile stewardship. Preparations for subcritical tasks 

are very difficult to distinguish from very low-yield ‘‘hydronuclear 

tests.’’ Russia and China could not, however, develop new nuclear 

weapons with yields that I would consider militarily significant 

without conducting tests large enough to be readily detected. 

Overall, I believe the United States is the best equipped of the 

three states to maintain its stockpile of nuclear weapons under the 

current moratorium on explosive nuclear testing. There is no one 

in the United States today who I believe would seriously propose 

swapping our nuclear stockpile and our triad of delivery vehicles 

for those of either Russia or China. 

It will not surprise you that I disagree with many of the assertions made about the details of Russia and China’s programs today, 

but those details are not what is fundamentally important given 

the numbers that we are looking at right now. There are no foreseeable scenarios under which either country could initiate the use 

of nuclear weapons against the United States, our forces abroad, or 

allies without suffering overwhelming destruction that would outweigh any possible gains. 

Deterrence against nuclear attack from Russia and China today, 

I believe, is incredibly strong. There are however, however remote, 

plausible scenarios that may result in the use of one or more Russian or Chinese nuclear weapons. These are non-deliberate scenarios. 

The most pressing task for the United States is to ensure that 

our nuclear forces, policies, and postures can provide for stable deterrence during a serious crisis with either country. Russian leaders dating to the Soviet era have been deeply concerned about their 

ability to command their nuclear forces during a crisis, and have 

long feared a decapitating strike by the United States. 

However unreasonable, such fears seem to have outlasted the 

cold war. The most well-known case involved a false alarm in 1995 

when Russian officials momentarily mistook a Norwegian sounding 

rocket for an American attack. 

Whether such fears are reasonable or not, they explain a series 

of, I find, otherwise puzzling Russian behaviors. The Soviet Union 

constructed a system called Perimeter, which is sometimes called 

the ‘‘Dead Hand,’’ that would ensure Soviet nuclear forces could retaliate in the event that their leadership had been killed. 

The Russian Federation expressed a very strange concern about 

the possibility that U.S. missile defense interceptors in Poland 

might be fitted with nuclear weapons and used like a Pershing II 

in the cold war. Russian officials also insisted in the New START 

negotiations on a provision prohibiting parties from placing offense 
11 

missiles in missile defense silos. They also insisted on a higher 

number of warheads, but a lower number of delivery vehicles. 

Although Russian officials do not say so directly, I think these 

otherwise puzzling actions reveal a continuing worry about their 

ability to command their nuclear forces in a crisis. Some of the actions that they may take to ensure their ability to retaliate may 

be deeply dangerous. 

With China, the challenge is somewhat different. Chinese leaders 

appear to keep their limited number of nuclear weapons in a state 

of ‘‘no-alert,’’ with the warheads stored separately. In a serious crisis, according to some training materials for Chinese officers, Beijing intends to place these forces on alert as a signal to American 

policymakers to signal their resolve. 

As Beijing deploys new mobile missiles, this may mean sending 

those missiles out into the field and flushing ballistic missile submarines into the ocean. It is not clear to me how an American 

President might respond to such a signal, especially if the crisis 

were a serious one. And I would just note that the recent history 

of the U.S.-China crisis management is not encouraging in this regard. 

I will just simply close by noting that these challenges require 

not more deterrence, but continued attention from the United 

States to ensure that our overwhelming capacity to deter Russia 

and China is both effective and stable. My 5 minutes are up, so let 

me give you the time you need to find out what you want to know. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lewis can be found in the Appendix on page 73.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you so much. Dr. Schneider, I want to return 

to the topic in which you were leaving off in your opening statement. And I am going to ask you to elaborate on the disturbing 

statements that you were referencing that were made by senior 

Russian officials about their nuclear forces and how their nuclear 

employment policies are changing, and how should we view these 

statements in conjunction with Russia’s nuclear weapons modernization efforts? 

As you were stating, Russia’s military doctrine appears to be putting increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons as a means to deter, 

prevent and, disturbingly, as you stated, de-escalate conflicts, 

which as you said makes no sense even in conflicts at the regional 

or local level. Some Russian officials have even talked about using 

nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner in a conventional conflict. 

I would like you to discuss, then, the nexus between what you 

were identifying. What are the implications of this for the U.S. and 

the allies as we provide extended deterrent assurances? What does 

it mean for our policies? What does it mean that we should be looking to for capabilities? I know many of our NATO partners believe 

that Russia’s shift in policies are compensating for deficiencies in 

its conventional forces. 

And I am pleased to note that in all of your statements, every 

one of you, in indicating that, you know, we have not had a nuclear 

conflict, a nuclear conflict being unlikely when we have a strong 

deterrent. I mean that is really the whole aspect of the crux of the 
12 

hearing is that, you know, we understand that nuclear conflict is 

unlikely if there is strong deterrent. 

So we have to evaluate what are the effects on our deterrent, 

how can it possibly be weakened, what others are doing, how does 

it affect the equation of the effectiveness of our deterrent? Your 

statements about what is occurring, both in Russia policies and 

monetization, affects our policies, and I would like you to speak to 

that for a moment, please, Dr. Schneider. 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

The Russian military doctrine and one of the, I think, the most 

dangerous aspects of it is that it was developed by Vladimir Putin 

when he was cabinet secretary, or actually NSC [National Security 

Council], the equivalent to the NSC secretary. 

It involves on its face first use of nuclear weapons, in effect, preemptive use, in a variety of circumstances that we don’t believe any 

Western political leader or any Member of Congress would consider 

using nuclear weapons in local wars, things that are relatively inconsequential. 

Yet, Russian nuclear doctrine does that. That was revealed by 

the current secretary of their national security council, Mr. 

Patrushev, actually several times in 2009. The actual doctrine, as 

he described it, goes beyond the published version in 2000 or the 

revised version that was put out in 2010. 

My concern about Russian nuclear doctrine is not that they are 

going to wake up one day and launch a nuclear first strike at us. 

It is that they see nuclear forces and nuclear threats as a way of 

achieving political clout that they cannot achieve otherwise because 

their economy is basically a basket case. They have one-tenth of 

our gross national product. They are not a superpower in any sense 

other than they have a massive nuclear capability. 

They have made threats directly relating to U.S. military action 

before. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, they 

staged a major nuclear exercise in the Indian Ocean, overt nuclear 

exercise, where they launch not only nuclear-capable, exclusively 

nuclear-armed, cruise missiles. Russian press, for example, reported a simulated attack, a nuclear attack on Diego Garcia. They 

announced a cruise missile attacks, nuclear-capable cruise missile 

attacks on an aircraft carrier. And there aren’t too many aircraft 

carriers in the Indian Ocean other than, at that time, American 

aircraft carriers. 

So this is the linkage of what the Russians are doing and their 

view of their own sort of great power status, which really can’t be 

supported by the Russian economy, I think, is dangerous. I am 

afraid that, under some circumstances, they could box themselves 

into a corner, and they consistently oppose many U.S. policies. 

They consistently threaten the use of force. Matter of fact, during 

the week that they invaded Georgia, they made a nuclear threat, 

explicitly nuclear threat, against Poland. 

I think this is a very dangerous thing, because the Russian military leaders are hearing from their most senior officials that it is 

safe and sensible to talk about nuclear strikes in minor conflicts. 

And there are a number of Russian journalists, by the way, who 

agree with what I am saying right now; although, overall, there is 

very strong support for nuclear weapons in Russia. 
13 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Fisher, I am going to ask you to help us understand. Now that we have looked at the basis, China and Russia are 

modernizing. Our modernization program is just a plan. It is one 

that needs funding in order to be executed. We have a letter from 

General Chilton and Admiral Mullen that, you know, clearly states 

the United States is the only nuclear weapons state not currently 

modernizing its nuclear capabilities and supporting infrastructure, 

which we will include in the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. TURNER. There are risks associated with that. In a prior 

hearing, I used the example that, you know, I have a 1964 Cadillac. I love it. I love to drive it. I would not want to rely on it. You 

know, I have modernized my transportation equipment, and we 

similarly have this concern of, we are relying on an aging infrastructure at a time when we see those that we want deter are modernizing. 

Could you please describe to me, what are some of the risks associated with Russia and China continuing to do the research developing and deploying new nuclear weapons capabilities while we sit 

back and simply maintain our existing and aging nuclear weapons? 

And you know, this is obviously a very helpful perspective as we 

look to the current process of the fiscal year 2012 funding. 

Mr. Fisher. 

Mr. FISHER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Concern number one would be that, as we enter or consider follow-on reductions in our numbers of nuclear warheads that we 

could, probably in this decade or certainly shortly within the next 

decade, cross a line in which China’s rising number of delivered deployed warheads could not—perhaps not cross ours in number, but 

rise to a point that when you add the onset of ballistic missile defenses and expanded space warfare capabilities, would undermine 

in a very significant way our ability to deter Chinese aggression, 

especially on their periphery in Northeast Asia, on the Taiwan 

Strait. 

Secondly, I am concerned with decisions that we have already 

taken. The decision to retire the tactical nuclear-armed Tomahawk 

cruise missile, essentially our only secure deterrent delivery vehicle 

is—that decision taken with very little fanfare or argument, to me, 

was taken in short consideration of the degree to which Chinese 

conventional anti-aircraft missiles and its modernizing air force is 

able to increasingly threaten our tactical nuclear—airborne tactical 

nuclear delivery that we appear to have decided to rely on. 

My concern is compounded by China’s propensity to take tactical 

and strategic advantage when it presents itself and to strike with 

very little warning. The examples of Mao’s attack during the Korean War; the ability of the Chinese leadership to lull the Indian 

leadership and then attack them; the ability to have attacked Vietnam in 1979, when Vietnam was basically isolated, and there 

were—deep military losses, but Deng Xiaoping was able to change 

the strategic environment in Asia to his favor. 

My concern is that even a small drawdown in an American capability could result in some degree of Chinese temptation that we 
14 

should be working to avoid. Just this past year, or early September, we discovered from recovered Libyan government documents how China was considering selling $200 million in arms to 

Moammar Gadhafi. What was the process that caused the Chinese 

to even consider this, which, to the surprise of many, they even admitted later, after those documents were released? 

Was it because the United States deliberately decided to take a 

backseat in the coalition to support the Libyan rebels? For whatever reasons, that contributed to that decision, good or bad. There 

was this potential that we would have paid a real price in the 

terms of a Chinese attempt to extend the regime of Moammar 

Gadhafi. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Fisher, I appreciate your answer then in summation is that deterrence is an equation of which imbalance has 

risk, and I appreciate that. 

Dr. Lewis, in your written statement, you say there are no foreseeable scenarios under which either country could initiate the use 

of nuclear weapons against the United States, our forces abroad or 

our allies without suffering overwhelming destruction that would 

outweigh any possible gains. Deterrence against deliberate nuclear 

attack from Russia and China today is extremely strong. 

I appreciate that statement because it recognizes really what the 

goals and objectives of this committee has been with respect to the 

issue of deterrence, and that is, you know, deterrence is something 

that is not an inherent capability. It is something that arises out 

of investment and research. Deterrent capability of today can decay 

and age, capabilities can be outdated and threats or needs change. 

And in that change, you had—in an article that you had written 

in The Diplomat on September 23, my understanding is that you 

advocate modifying our existing B83 nuclear bomb, giving it an 

earth-penetrating capability, and therefore enabling it to hold at 

risk deeply buried underground facilities. Your article, I believe, 

suggests that the capability may be needed to deter North Korea’s 

Kim Jong Il, who is building lots of underground facilities. 

In the article, you are essentially putting forth the prospect of an 

existing bomb having a new capability. So when we look at modernization, we can look at modernization of having existing capabilities conducting a different mission. Your article, I believe, says 

that the B61–11 earth penetrator is ill-suited for certain North Korean underground targets that we need to hold at risk, and so we 

need the new capability perhaps by the B83. 

This proposition is, in effect, modifying existing warheads giving 

the new capabilities—is, in effect, a modernization process, and I 

would like for you to comment on—because obviously, one of the 

things that we look at in that deterrence process is in modernization is what are our new capabilities that we need and how do we 

look at modifying so that we might be able to achieve them. 

Dr. LEWIS. Let me start by saying I am in no way theological 

about these things. If there is a gap in deterrence, I would support 

filling it. And if things are unnecessary, then I would not support 

funding them. 

In this particular case, this would be a modification of an existing weapon need and existing requirement. And so what was proposed was for Sandia National Laboratories to do a sled test that 
15 

would indicate whether or not this was a capability that would be 

feasible or not. 

I believe it is entirely consistent with the policy outlined in the 

Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and if the sled 

test suggested that would work, that would be fine. 

We envisioned that primarily as a North Korea-directed issue because there are apparently some targets in North Korea that may 

be difficult to hold at risk. But I think that in another context— 

for example, with Russia and China—such a capability would be of 

relatively little value given the kinds of numbers and forces. 

Yes, we wrote that. It is designed to deal with a very specific 

problem in North Korea. I am not sure that that would help us 

much with the problems that I see with China and Russia, where 

I think deterrence is so robust that I am much more concerned 

about how things may go awry in a crisis. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, my final question, and then I will be turning 

to my ranking member, and if that doesn’t work, would, as you just 

identified the evolving risks associated with then what needs to be 

an evolving deterrent, permit us to build a purpose-built weapon 

that would address that if there is not an ability to modify our existing inventories? 

Dr. LEWIS. Well, I don’t want to speak for my co-author, but we 

agreed that the deterrent benefit one would get from something 

like this would be quite small. We just had a very simpleminded 

view. If there is a target, we should calculate the hardness and 

have something to hold it at risk. 

But we set two red lines for ourselves. One red line was that we 

should not violate the policy against new nuclear weapons as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and I believe we have 

stayed within that; and the second is that we would not proceed 

to explosive testing because I think in either case, the deterrent 

benefit, although real, would probably be in those two instances 

outweighed by the negative diplomatic cost of doing so. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lewis, it is my understanding that when we look at a capability, we look at the 

weapon itself and then we look at the delivery system or the conjunction of the two. 

So when I look at modernization, at least when I think of it, I 

think of modernizing both systems. Can you speak to whether 

you—I mean, you alluded earlier in your statement that the modernization of our submarine systems or the modernization of our 

other methods of deploying, that we continually modernize that. 

Do you think that is enough or do you think we should be doing 

the type of modernizing that China and Russia are doing in some 

cases, and maybe doing even more behind a black curtain, let us 

say? 

Dr. LEWIS. Well, let me start by saying I look at the problem in 

exactly the same way that you do. I would not want the United 

States to pursue the modernization path that the Chinese and the 

Russians have had. If we look at the way that they handle their 

nuclear weapons, in Russia you see this very clearly. 

Russian nuclear weapons are manufactured with the expectation 

that they will last a very short period of time and so they must be 
16 

continually remanufactured which is, I think, not the ideal way to 

do this; whereas U.S. nuclear weapons were made with incredible 

resiliency and are capable of being life-extended. 

And so if I have these two paths in front of me, I would certainly 

prefer the way the United States does it. And as I said in my statement, I would not swap the forces. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And I would ask this of all of you, starting with 

Mr. Lewis and then going down the line—it seems to me that if 

China or Russia were to make a quantum leap, if you will, in their 

nuclear capability aside from the delivery system, that we would 

somehow have to know about it because they would have to test 

it. Otherwise, I would assume—what little I know of physics, which 

I have many years of it by the way—but I would assume that they 

would just have to test it somehow, and that there is no way to 

hide that. 

Is that a false assumption? In what way could they be modernizing the actual weapon and not have us realize it or see it or hear 

it, et cetera? 

Dr. LEWIS. Yes, ma’am. You are not incorrect at all. I included 

in my testimony a chart prepared by the National Academy of 

Sciences that—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, I saw of that. 

Dr. LEWIS [continuing]. With the purposes of testing at various 

yields and I think that it is quite clear that neither Russia nor 

China, if they were to conduct tests that they could conceal, would 

be able to use those tests for anything that I think would be balance-altering, you know? 

If you look at the examples, there are things, like, one-point safety tests which, although I don’t want the Russians and the Chinese 

testing, I suppose if they are doing it for safety, that is certainly 

better than the alternative. 

What fundamentally we have is, I think, a situation where all 

three states to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 

China in particular is very constrained in its ability to put multiple 

warheads on its newest missiles without testing. 

And so I have been a very strong supporter of ratifying that treaty, which I know was an issue before the Senate, but I just believe 

it is strongly in the United States interest to keep Russia and 

China from being able to test nuclear weapons since I believe that 

under the current moratorium we have a significant advantage 

over them and our ability to maintain and whether you call it modernize or modify our existing stockpile. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Fisher, what do you think? 

Mr. FISHER. Congresswoman, my suggestion would be that, in regards to China especially, that it is as paramount to have all of our 

ears and eyes open. If there is a way to mask or divert attention 

from a nuclear test event, I would expect the Chinese to engage in 

that practice whether it be somehow modifying the sound waves 

that emerge from a test so that it would not appear to be the same 

kind of vibration that a nuclear explosion would yield. 

I agree with Jeffrey that in terms of missile testing, especially 

for multiple warheads or advanced warheads, that would be something that we could observe for as long as we had the satellites to 

observe those tests. 
17 

But I think we should also consider that a Chinese standard for 

modernizing a warhead may not be what we would require and 

that it is at least conceivable that a degree of advanced computer 

simulation may suffice in some cases for modification of warheads 

that we might prefer to test. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Fisher. Doctor. 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I disagree in terms of the impact of 

the nuclear testing constraints on the ability of Russia to modernize its forces. 

There is a very substantial literature ranging from high-level 

Russian governmental officials who have stated they were introducing new nuclear weapons. There is a very extensive press coverage of this which goes in more detail than the government officials do on exactly what they are doing in nuclear weapons modernization. 

There are declassified CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] reports 

that are available on the Internet, fortunately highly redacted, but 

they clearly indicate the Russians are developing new low-yield nuclear weapons. 

There is some fairly extensive reporting in the Russian press of 

the conduct of hydronuclear tests. Unfortunately, the atomic energy 

ministry does not share Mr. Lewis’ view of the value of very lowyield testing, and I quoted that in my prepared statement. They 

think that it is very important to weapons development. 

In addition to that, there is evidence, at least some—and including a report of the House Intelligence Committee of about 10 years 

ago—the Chinese may be testing nuclear weapons at very low 

yields. 

I take these reports with a great deal of credibility because, 

again, you can get on the Internet and you can look at the declassified intelligence, mainly CIA reports. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But, Doctor, I am really getting to the—I understand what you are saying and I don’t doubt anything you say. 

What I am asking is—I mean, here are people, CIA people, et 

cetera, who are saying we have seen it, we hear it, it is there, they 

are doing it or what have you. Whether it is in the mainstream of 

belief or not is different, but there is somebody spotting what is 

going on. 

So my question is if they were going to make a fundamental difference to their weapon which would exceed our capabilities, would 

not somebody think they saw, think they heard it, think they felt 

it? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Not necessarily, no. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Not necessarily? Do you think they could—is that 

because it is theoretical and they would build it anyway and they 

wouldn’t test it or is that because they could test it and they could 

alter so much of the test that none of us could see or hear or feel 

it? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. There are serious limitations on our ability to detect nuclear tests. The debate on how high a yield you can go without detection is at least 1 to 2 kilotons with decoupling, and if you 

test in salt mines it may be up to 10 kilotons. 

Even sub-kiloton nuclear tests—and I would suggest the committee review the JASON—not only the National Intelligence Esti-
18 

mates that was done last year, but even on an unclassified basis, 

the JASON Report of 1995 where they talked about being able to 

do partial boosting at half-kiloton yield and extrapolate that to full 

boosted yield. 

That would allow you to develop dramatically new nuclear highperformance nuclear weapons. And I believe you can go way above 

a half-kiloton with little risk of detection if you do decoupling or 

you test in salt mines. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me just one 

more question of our—I have so many, and I am just really trying 

to get some pearls of wisdom out of these guys. 

What drives and what constrains current Chinese and Russian 

nuclear weapons modernization efforts? 

Dr. LEWIS. I believe that the Chinese nuclear program is driven 

by a very straight desire to have the same technological capabilities, though not the same numbers, as Russia and the United 

States. So they will try to have at least 1 of whatever we might 

have 1,000 of. And I think further that both Russia and China, although this will sound very strange, do fundamentally fear the 

United States would use nuclear weapons first. 

And I have spent a lot of time trying to explain to Chinese and 

Russian experts what a crazy view that is. But I think that that 

is the only thing that explains both Russia’s very strange reliance 

on this Perimeter system, and the Chinese plan to put forces in the 

field as a kind of signal. So technology, and I suppose to some extent, fear. 

Mr. FISHER. Congresswoman, my view is that nuclear weapons 

as well as broader range military modernization we are seeing in 

the PRC stems from the ultimate desire to pursue regime survival. 

In 1989—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Fisher, regime survival or rule of the world? 

Mr. FISHER. All of this is designed to promote the survival of the 

Chinese Communist Party-led dictatorship. This is the ultimate 

goal that the PLA serves for the Communist Party. And the nuclear weapons modernization is pursued first and foremost with 

that goal in mind. 

In my opinion it will proceed apace, a larger, broader, conventional modernization that is designed to increasingly advance and 

defend the interests of the Chinese leadership as they seek to defend interests in Asia, beyond the Asian periphery, and then globally into the next decade. 

And in my opinion, the size and pace of nuclear modernization 

will be related to the degree to other aspects of China’s broader 

conventional modernization. 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I think in the case of Russia, nuclear 

weapons are very much a part its self-image as a great power. 

They have very little claim to anything else. That has been very 

explicitly stated by then-President Putin, of course future-President 

Putin, and then-Defense Minister Serdyukov. He is now a deputy 

prime minister and heads up the industrial part of their military 

complex. 

In the case of China, I think nuclear weapons are very much part 

of their striving to obtain superpower status. You don’t increase 

your defense budget by double digits for decades, which they have 
19 

done in the past and apparently to do so in the future, without 

having certain ambitions, you know, concerning the use of military 

force. 

And I think nuclear weapons are a part of that. I expect a very 

large increase in Chinese nuclear weapons capability over the next 

two decades. It is going to be slow, but it is going to be steady, and 

in the end it is going to be very big. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. None of you mentioned constraints. But I will just 

leave that. Maybe you can think about that and—— 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I just want to make one comment as a result of the testimony 

we have been receiving. During design, the expected life cycle of 

our weapons was somewhere between 10 and 15 years, it is my understanding. And the average age currently of our weapons is 26 

years. So I think that that helps highlight the discussion that we 

are having here of the issue of the need for modernization of exceeding the expected design life cycle. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Excuse me. Thank you all for being here. This is a really important discussion. Before I begin my questions, I would like to introduce into the record the executive summary from a study commissioned by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It is a comprehensive open-source assessment of the Chinese underground tunnel 

system. 

The full study is due to be released soon, but at the request of 

this subcommittee a preview of the executive subcommittee has 

been provided. And I ask that the executive summary be made a 

part of the record. 

Mr. TURNER. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 86.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. And additionally, the Department of Defense’s 

2011 report on the Chinese military discusses the troubling development of the Chinese underground complex of tunnels. And I ask 

that, too, be made a part of the record. 

Okay, thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Dr. Schneider, in its 2011 annual report on military developments in China just entered into the record, the DOD 

[Department of Defense] says that China has constructed and continues to expand a complex of underground tunnels, perhaps over 

5,000 kilometers in length, to enable its nuclear forces to transport 

nuclear weapons undetected and to launch from a large number of 

locations. 

What are the implications of this tunnel complex to the United 

States and our allies? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. It is almost mind-boggling. I knew they use what 

we call hardened deeply buried tunnel facilities to protect their 

strategic forces. But until recently I had no idea it was remotely 

that extensive. It has enormous implications in terms of their view 
20 

toward nuclear warfare, the survivability of their systems and their 

leadership in the event of war. 

It is virtually impossible to target anything remotely like that, 

irrespective of how many nuclear weapons you have. And that is 

a concern when you put it in the light of some of the more fanatical 

statements that have been made over the years by Chinese generals about the, you know, nuclear warfare. 

Including, you know, statements going back to the Mao era, and 

actually reiterated as recently as 2005 in Beijing about losing a few 

hundred million people being relatively insignificant, we will survive, and that sort of that stuff. 

That is really crazy stuff. And you got to deter these guys. I very 

strongly support Mr. Lewis’ suggestion of modifying the B83 into 

an earth or rock penetrator. That is a very important capability to 

have, not only for North Korea, but for Russia and China as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And does this large underground complex make 

verifying the size and structure of China’s nuclear forces more difficult? And if so, is this a very destabilizing factor? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Well, yes. I mean, it certainly makes it far more 

difficult. The Chinese are using mobile ICBMs, which are inherently very difficult to verify. For example, when we went into the 

INF treaty with Russia, the Reagan administration said there was 

a dispute of several hundred missiles on how many intermediate 

range missiles the Russians actually had. And these are the type 

of mobilized—well, in that case mobile IRBM. But the difference 

between an ICBM and an IRBM is just a few meters in canister 

length. So basically, it is the same sort of thing. 

We know a lot less about China overall than we know about the 

Russians in nuclear capability, if for no other reason that the Russians talk about it all the time, where the Chinese are fairly secretive. I think you can find deliberate leaks by the PLA in Hong 

Kong press. I think they are using that as a mechanism of debating 

some issues that they can’t openly debate in China. But I suspect 

we are going to see a very large increase in Chinese capability, including extensive MIRVing. 

That is alluded to in the case of the—you know, the possibility 

of that—in the case of the ICBM force in the latest version of the 

Pentagon report on Chinese military power. They are talking, I 

think, very clearly about the VF–21 program, which I believe Mr. 

Fisher mentioned previously, has the potential for 10 warheads. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And with the tunnel complex, they could be increasing the size of their stockpile with us not even knowing it? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, obviously; quite frankly, yes. They have the 

resources, they have got the technology. As a matter of fact, yesterday I found a very interesting statement by Yuri Solomonov, who 

is the chief Russian ICBM solid fuel designer. He once headed up 

their design bureau, MITT [Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology]. 

And he said they were 15 years behind the Russians in missile 

technology. Now, 15 years ago this is post-cold war and they were 

introducing the SS–27. That is a very significant statement on his 

part. And he said he expected them to come up to 5 to 10 years 

behind the Russians. That is a very significant development. 
21 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Fisher, the Obama administration has made unilateral declarations that there are certain conditions under which nuclear 

arms would not be used, conditions that had not been so limited 

previously. 

Have the Russians or the Chinese made any reciprocal limiting 

declarations in response to the Obama concessions? 

Mr. FISHER. Not that I am aware of, sir. The Chinese, who I am 

most familiar with—they have a long history of statements about 

their ‘‘no first use’’ policy, and how that is understood. And, in 

turn, doubted because of conflicting Chinese statements especially 

over the last two decades. But I am not aware of any specific Chinese statement in response to the Obama statement, other than 

a—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Or Russian? 

Mr. FISHER. No. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And with the passage of New START, did the Chinese react in any way? For instance, have they decelerated any of 

their modernization efforts? 

Mr. FISHER. Not to my knowledge, sir. I think that it continues 

apace. We may see the emergence of a Chinese triad within this 

decade. A new continental range bomber, multiple MIRVed missiles, perhaps a follow-on class of SSBN after the Type 094, not to 

mention missile defense advances, advances in new IRBMs and in 

space warfare capabilities. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, to me the power of example is very limited 

for those who are relying on that. And for Dr. Lewis, what is the 

view of China and Russia to each other as a potential nuclear adversary? And are any of their forces or defenses dedicated to the 

other country? 

Dr. LEWIS. Yes. Yes, they are quite worried and, one might even 

say, paranoid about one another. A significant percentage of the 

things that the Chinese have done when it comes to modernizing 

their forces seem to be Soviet and then Russia oriented. So for example, they spent considerable time making sure that their ICBMs, 

which we often think of as being pointed at us, were capable of 

penetrating the Moscow ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system. There 

is a very significant fear there that makes it very complicated as 

we try to engage with both countries. 

I will say one other thing, which is the Russians in particular are 

quite taken with this tunneling argument. And it just goes to illustrate I think the depth of the mutual hostility because I and a colleague have been looking into the tunneling issue. And it is very 

interesting. One of the questions we had was where would all the 

plutonium for the warheads have come from? Because they only 

have the two production reactors. 

And it turns out one of the citations, which is in Chinese, is a 

teenage girl’s blog, which is in and of itself a repetition of an 

English language Usenet discussion from the mid 1990s where a 

guy posting anonymously because he didn’t want his wife to know 

what he was doing just was making up some numbers. I think the 

fact that I hear these numbers repeated by Russian experts really 

just demonstrates the depth of paranoia on both sides. 
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Mr. LAMBORN. And lastly, Mr. Fisher, would you like to comment 

on the Chinese tunnel complex issue? 

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, I share the concern of my colleagues 

very much. The existence of this vast tunnel network to me raises 

the immediate question of, ‘‘Do we really know how many missiles 

do the Chinese have today?’’ The normally accepted number that 

goes into the annual Pentagon PLA reports of 20 DF–5s strikes me 

as unrealistic given not only the existence of this tunnel complex 

where they can be hidden, but also the fact that production of this 

missile can easily be facilitated by existing space launch vehicle 

production lines. And that these production lines have been churning away since the 1980s. I put into my written testimony an illustration of what I believe are dismantled DF–5 fuselages on horizontal trolleys within one of these tunnel complexes. The image 

was released in 2006 by the Chinese. And it to me just illustrates 

this question very clearly. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Well thank you. I want to thank each of our witnesses today. As you know, this is part of our overall effort to get 

a grasp of not only the countries that we are looking at for our deterrence, but also looking at their modernization programs as it affects our policies. This will be followed by classified briefings for 

this committee where we can take some of the open source information and correlate to what is known by our intelligence gathering. 

So thank you for being here, and we greatly appreciate your efforts 

and diligence on this issue. 

[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 14, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 14, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Your opening statement mentions open source evidence that Russia 

may be in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Please explain 

the evidence for this, and what the implications of this should be for the United 

States going forward. 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Under the INF Treaty, ground-launched cruise missiles with a 

range of 500-km to 5,500-km are prohibited. To violate the INF Treaty, a ground 

launched cruise missile would merely need to have the range potential to fly to such 

a range. A ballistic missile would have to demonstrate a range between 500 and 

5,500-km. 

There are a substantial number of Russian press reports that state that the R– 

500, a ground launched cruise missile first tested by Russia in 2007 and associated 

with the nuclear capable Iskander missile system, has a range between 1,000 and 

3,000-km. Two of these reports say that the R–500 is actually a derivative of the 

Soviet cruise missile eliminated by the INF Treaty. One of the reports says that the 

R–500 missile exceeded 500-km in its first flight test. Another suggests there is also 

a second prohibited missile. The journals that published these reports are well 

known (including four in an official government news agency), and the authors are 

well known military reporters and arms control experts. These individuals range 

from pro-regime to anti-regime. It is also clear that these reports are not multiple 

publications treating a single story because they widely separated in time and in 

some detail. 

One well known Russian journalist reports that Russian surface-to-air missiles 

and missile defense interceptors have a secondary surface-to-surface (SAMs) nuclear 

attack role. The INF Treaty has an exception for air and missile defense interceptors that are used solely for this purpose. It does not permit SAMs to have a dual 

role. 

Since these missiles would be classified as ballistic missiles under the Treaty, it 

requires testing to a prohibited range to violate the Treaty. 

It is clear that the Moscow ABM, if the report is true, violated the INF Treaty 

from its entry-into-force and the S–500 air/missile defense would violate the Treaty 

when it is fully tested. Whether the S–300 and S–400 surface to air missiles violate 

the INF Treaty would depend upon their testing history. 

These are very serious issues. If these reports are true, Putin’s Russia has returned to the worst arms control behavior of the Soviet Union. Violating the ‘‘zero 

option’’ arms control treaty sends a clear message about the danger of the pursuit 

of ‘‘nuclear zero.’’ If these reports are true, this is an issue that literally must be 

resolved by Russian resumption of Treaty compliance. If this does not happen, I believe the U.S. should withdraw from the INF Treaty. 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned that Russia is developing low-yield, precision nuclear 

weapons. These would appear to be a ‘‘new’’ nuclear weapon for the Russia arsenal. 

Does Russia have any policy against developing ‘‘new’’ nuclear weapons? What are 

the implications to the U.S. and our allies if Russia continues developing these new 

nuclear weapons capabilities while the U.S. simply maintains its current, aging nuclear weapons? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Russian leaders openly and repeatedly say Russia is developing 

and deploying new nuclear weapons, and this is reported in the Russian press in 

more detail. Former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov characterized them as ‘‘unique’’ 

which may be a reference to their low collateral damage designs. There are two declassified, if highly redacted, CIA reports on the subject of Russian development of 

low yield nuclear weapons. In the words of then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 

‘‘China and Russia have embarked on an ambitious path to design and field new 

weapons.’’ 

Russian development efforts, combined with hydronuclear testing, places us at a 

great disadvantage. As then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed in 2008, 

‘‘At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce 

existing stockpiles, because eventually we won’t have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have. Currently, the United States is the only declared 
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nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability 

to produce a new nuclear warhead . . . To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we 

can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization 

program.’’ We have done neither. 

We cannot replicate old tested designs exactly. As we correct problems in our 

stockpile, we are making changes. As Secretary Gates said in 2008, ‘‘With every adjustment, we move farther away from the original design that was successfully tested when the weapon was first fielded. Add to this that no weapons in our arsenal 

have been tested since 1992. So the information on which we base our annual certification of stockpile grows increasingly dated and incomplete.’’ We are rapidly losing experienced designers due to aging and retirements. There is a potential of a 

major asymmetry in weapons reliability developing due to Russian hydronuclear 

testing and recent design experience. 

Rebuilding our nuclear weapons infrastructure is critically important, but we 

must recognize that this alone does not mean our life extended nuclear weapons will 

actually work. If our primaries do not develop sufficient yield, the weapons will be 

duds. 

The combination of the enormous asymmetry in modernization of our delivery systems and the risk of loss of deterrent reliability due to lack of testing must increase 

concerns among our allies, particularly in Eastern Europe, who feel threatened by 

Russia and have been subject to direct nuclear targeting threats. The asymmetry 

in low yield and low collateral damage weapons may also increase the risk of Russian use of such weapons in a crisis. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you believe that the nature, effectiveness, and credibility of our 

extended deterrent relationships with allies are affected by nuclear weapons and delivery system modernization efforts in Russia and China when compared with our 

own here in the United States? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. Some of our allies are very concerned about the Russian and 

Chinese threat. Others are concerned about Iranian and North Korean nuclear capabilities. They will become increasingly concerned as their capabilities increase and 

the modernization asymmetry grows. To characterize the minimal changes we are 

making in our delivery systems as ‘‘modernization’’ is not realistic when we are not 

generally enhancing military capabilities which are potential adversaries are doing 

all the time. Irrespective of how reluctant our allies are to develop their own nuclear 

deterrent capabilities, I believe at some point they will be tempted to develop nuclear weapons due to limitations in our deterrent, extended deterrent and damage 

limiting potential. 

We do not have the right types of nuclear weapons for effective extended deterrence and current policy precludes any changes in our posture. Our deterrent force 

is aging and ‘‘modernization’’ efforts are generally not increasing our military potential. Our potential enemies are not doing the same. To quote then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, ‘‘Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power 

that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a 

new nuclear warhead.’’ 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Lewis said in his opening remarks that in his opinion, ‘‘Russia 

and China could not, however, develop new nuclear weapons with yields that I 

would consider militarily significant without conducting tests large enough to be 

readily detected.’’ Do you agree that Russia and China cannot conduct militarily significant nuclear weapons tests without being detected? What, if anything, do open 

sources indicate China and Russia are doing in the nuclear testing arena? Are they 

complying with the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? What are the implications of this to the U.S. and our allies? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. No. There is extensive evidence that both Russia and China are 

deploying new and improved nuclear weapons. Their leaders say this. In 2005, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, ‘‘New types of nuclear weapons are already emerging in Russia.’’ Colonel General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, then-chief of the 

Defense Ministry’s 12th Main Directorate which handles Russian nuclear weapons, 

said Russia is deploying ‘‘new nuclear weapon complexes . . . . that possess improved specifications and performance characteristics . . .’’ (Emphasis 

added). In April 1999, then-Security Council Secretary Vladimir Putin said that the 

three Presidential decrees signed by Yeltsin ‘‘concern the development of the whole 

nuclear weapons complex and the endorsement of the concept of the development 

and use of strategic nuclear weapons.’’ (Emphasis added). Nikol Voloshin, a senior official of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, revealed in June 2001 that work was 

nearing completion on a warhead for the Topol-M (SS–27), while ‘‘At the same time 

modernization is proceeding on the other warheads.’’ The SS–27 warhead is clearly 

a new design because as Colonel-General Nikolay Solovtsov and Lieutenant General 
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Vitaliy Linnik, Head of Armament and Deputy Commander of Strategic Missile 

Troops both have stated, the SS–27 warhead has an ‘‘enhanced-yield charge’’ or ‘‘an 

increased yield.’’ To increase the yield of a thermonuclear weapon it is necessary to 

redesign the secondary. Ivanov stated that the SS–27/RS–24 MIRV warhead was a 

‘‘new warhead’’ and that it is the same warhead being used on the Bulava 30. In 

September 2003, Lev Ryabev, Deputy Atomic Energy Minister, stated that young 

Russian scientists are ‘‘doing real things’’ with the goal of ‘‘keeping and improving 

of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.’’ 

A declassified August 2000 CIA Intelligence Memorandum concluded that, ‘‘Judging from Russian writing since 1995 and Moscow’s evolving nuclear doctrine, new 

roles are emerging for very-low yield weapons—including weapons for tailored radiation outputs.’’ On April 29, 1999, President Yeltsin reportedly ordered Russian development of precision low yield nuclear weapons that could be used for strategic 

or tactical nuclear strikes. 

There are multiple Russian press reports which say Russia now has a new strategic nuclear warhead in the 100-kiloton/100-kilogram range. Some of these and 

other reports say their best Cold War design was 110–130-kilogram and yielded 50– 

75 kilotons. The reports of 100-kg warheads are consistent with the throw-weight 

and nuclear warhead numbers per missile declared for the new Bulava 30 SLBM 

under the START Treaty. Two Russian generals have said that Russia increased the 

yield of the SS–27 single warhead. The numerous Russian press reports that both 

the SS–27/RS–24 and the Bulava 30 will carry 10 warheads would require further 

improvement of Russian yield-to-weight ratios in small and light warheads. I have 

traced the report about the SS–27/RS–24 10 warhead capability back to a statement 

by the Russian Defense Ministry. 

Russian nuclear weapons development has not been limited only to increasing 

yield-to-weight ratios. In November 1997, Viktor Mikhaylov, then-Atomic Energy 

Minister, stated that Russia was working on a weapon ‘‘which penetrate[s] the 

ground before exploding. I must say that our developments here are at the highest 

level . . . . Right now we are standing firm.’’ In December 2002, he stated that, 

‘‘The scientists are developing a nuclear ‘scalpel’ capable of ‘surgically removing’ and 

destroying very localized targets. The low-yield warhead will be surrounded with a 

superhardened casing which makes it possible to penetrate 30–40 meters into rock 

and destroy a buried target—for example, a troop command and control point or a 

nuclear munitions storage facility.’’ 

There are Russian press reports that say Russia is conducting hydronuclear testing. The Russian press reported that President Yeltsin’s April 29, 1999, decree on 

nuclear weapons approved ‘‘hydronuclear field experiments.’’ Recent Russian press 

accounts indicate that hydronuclear testing actually began in 1994. In November 

2010, Alexei Fenenko of the Russian National Academy of Scientists wrote that over 

the past 15 years, ‘‘significant progress’’ was made in hydronuclear testing. 

Hydronuclear tests that are designed to produce measurable nuclear yields are inconsistent with a zero-yield CTBT or zero-yield moratorium Russia claims to be observing. It is very interesting that then-First Deputy Minister for Nuclear Energy 

Viktor Mikhaylov, on April 29, 1999, wrote about the importance of hydronuclear 

testing to maintaining the nuclear arsenal. He stated: ‘‘No state will be able to create nuclear weapons for the first time based solely on hydronuclear experiments 

. . . But developed traditional nuclear powers can use hydronuclear experiments to 

perform tasks of improving reliability of their nuclear arsenal and effectively steward its operation. All countries indirectly gain here inasmuch as the risk of nuclear 

accidents is lowered. Determining the limits of ‘authorized activity’ is no simple 

process and only professionals can direct it correctly.’’ In July 2001, Mikhaylov said 

that, ‘‘The fact is that the developed, traditional nuclear powers, using hydronuclear 

experiments, can perform the task of improving reliability of the nuclear arsenal 

and effectively track its operation while reducing the risk of possible accident.’’ 

These official statements clearly suggest that Russia was conducting hydronuclear 

explosions and that Mikhaylov wanted to keep this activity under the complete control of the Nuclear Energy Ministry for obvious reasons. Why else should Mikhaylov 

be talking about the importance of hydronuclear testing when it was prohibited by 

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the testing moratorium Russia was claiming to observe? Such disregard for political commitments and legal obligations would 

be consistent with past Soviet behavior and the Russian actions documented in the 

Department of State’s August 2005 report on adherence to arms control agreements, 

which recorded a continuing pattern of Russian treaty violations. Such tests would 

be useful for the development of new nuclear weapons. 

Numerous declassified, but unfortunately heavily redacted, Clinton administration 

CIA intelligence reports discussed possible Russian nuclear testing and whether it 

was related to the development of new warheads. One declassified CIA report con-
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cluded that ‘‘hydronuclear (low-yield) experiments . . . are far more useful for Russian weapons development’’ than subcritical tests. At a minimum, these reports indicate that the CIA took this possibility very seriously. 

As stated in my prepared statement, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has 

said that hydronuclear testing improves both the reliability and safety of nuclear 

weapons. It also revealed that the Soviet Union had conducted 89 atmospheric 

hydronuclear tests until 1989. I do not believe we can assume that hydronuclear 

tests are the only thing that the Russians are now doing simply because that is 

what is reported in the Russian press. The verification threshold of the CTBT is 

high enough to permit testing of sufficient yield to develop new strategic as well as 

new tactical nuclear weapons. 

Any covert Russian nuclear testing significantly increases the threat to the U.S. 

and our allies. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you believe a potential U.S. minimum deterrence posture, whereby we maintain a small number of nuclear warheads and threaten retaliation 

against enemy cities if attacked, is credible? Why or why not? How would such a 

posture by the U.S. affect our extended deterrent and efforts to prevent proliferation 

of nuclear weapons? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. No. As then-Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe told the 

Senate Armed Services Committee in 2000, we do not target cities. Even if we 

changed our policy, I don’t believe that massively disproportionate threats are an 

effective deterrent since we are likely to be self deterred from such action and our 

adversaries know this. 

Allied governments that are worried about their security will be concerned about 

minimum deterrence because it minimizes deterrent credibility, maximizes collateral damage and minimizes damage limiting capability. It is impossible to substitute 

effectively conventional capability for nuclear deterrence because of the vulnerability 

of conventional weapons to nuclear EMP and their extremely inadequate capability 

against hard and deeply buried facilities. As Margaret Thatcher once observed, 

every town in France has a monument to the failure of conventional deterrence. 

Mr. TURNER. The Obama Administration is currently conducting a 90-day ‘‘NPR 

Implementation Study,’’ which will likely result in changes to U.S. nuclear weapon 

employment guidance. According to senior administration officials, including President Obama’s National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, it could also set the stage 

for unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. How would unilateral U.S. reductions or changes to the employment guidance be perceived by leaders in Russia and 

China? Do you believe we have sufficiently certain information on the nuclear forces 

and policies of China and Russia to enable unilateral U.S. reductions or major shifts 

in employment policy without undue risk? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I think Russia and China would interpret minimum deterrence 

as enhancing the value of their nuclear capabilities. I suspect we would see even 

more nuclear threats from Russia and China. Russia would clearly have nuclear superiority and China would have an easier option to achieve it. While there are always limitations in our intelligence about Russia and China, I think their basic attitudes toward nuclear weapons are clear and minimum deterrence would translate 

into minimum security for the U.S. and our allies. 

Mr. TURNER. The open-source information available on Chinese nuclear forces, 

strategy, and production is extremely limited. China claims this deliberate ‘‘opaqueness’’ and the associated uncertainty is needed to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of their so-called ‘‘minimum deterrence’’ force. Our forces are reasonably 

transparent, particularly with President Obama’s decision to release numbers on the 

size of our nuclear stockpile and data exchanges related to the New START Treaty. 

a. What is your assessment of China’s deliberate policy of opaqueness on its nuclear 

forces? b. If we continue making further reductions on the ‘‘path to global zero’’, at 

what point does China’s opaqueness reach a critical line, where we cannot continue 

to reduce our forces without unacceptable risk? c. What are—or should be—the impacts of this opaqueness on the nuclear strategies of the U.S. and other countries? 

Mr. FISHER. China has been fairly consistent and consistently hypocritical. China 

bewails the nuclear weapons excesses of the United States and Russia but refuses 

to take even initial steps toward transparency for its nuclear forces that could set 

the stage for subsequent dialogue that could lead to stability. China’s consistent effort to put the burden on others to reduce their nuclear weapons certainly raises 

suspicions about what they are doing for their own nuclear capability. Given China’s 

potential to arm new DF–5 versions and the ‘‘DF–41’’ ICBMs with multiple warheads, it is even more important that the U.S. not reduce its nuclear arsenal to pursue some ideological ‘‘path to global zero’’ that China does not show any sign of 

agreeing with. Reductions already made by the Administration are unwise given 
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China’s potential to increase its nuclear arsenal and further U.S. reductions would 

only compound this error. 

Mr. TURNER. China says that it maintains a minimum deterrence posture designed to deter nuclear attacks on its homeland. But China is also known to be 

seeking military capabilities to expand its sphere of security influence beyond its 

borders. Do you believe China will retain a minimum deterrence posture towards 

its nuclear weapons as it seeks a greater security role beyond its shores? Under 

what circumstances might it seek to move toward a more aggressive deterrence posture with higher numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and higher alert 

levels? 

Mr. FISHER. I believe that it is plausible to expect that as China seeks a globally 

capable conventional military force, it will also seek a much larger ‘‘world class’’ nuclear force. China will build greater numbers of large ICBMs and new SSBNs to 

deter the U.S., Russia and India. China will quietly welcome further U.S. nuclear 

reductions as that will reduce the difference to U.S. force levels, adding its ability 

to deter Washington from defending its interests. I would suggest that a Chinese 

force of 500 defended warheads would significantly undermine the U.S. extended 

nuclear deterrent in the minds of our Asian allies. China’s nuclear forces will increase further should Japan, South Korea, Vietnam or Australia decide to pursue 

a nuclear deterrent. 

In addition, the United States needs to devise its own public definition about what 

comprises a ‘‘minimum’’ nuclear deterrent. China may have ideas that 200 to 300 

warheads could still constitute a ‘‘minimum’’ deterrent compared to the nuclear 

forces of Russia and the United States. But it is not clear that Japan, South Korea, 

Australia, Vietnam and Taiwan, all states with the potential to pursue their own 

nuclear deterrent, will also view such Chinese warhead numbers as a ‘‘minimum’’ 

level. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you believe that the nature, effectiveness, and credibility of our 

extended deterrent relationships with allies are affected by nuclear weapons and delivery system modernization efforts in Russia and China when compared with our 

own here in the United States? 

Mr. FISHER. Today, based on what is known about China’s nuclear forces, U.S. 

extended nuclear deterrence is credible, but not as credible as when U.S. naval 

forces had access to secure submarine launched nuclear LACMs. North Korea’s reported development of a mobile ICBM to complement their mobile IRBMs only increases the need for a U.S. secondary or tactical nuclear deterrent in Asia. With the 

retirement of the TLAM–N and the decision to rely on aircraft delivered tactical nuclear weapons, this element of the U.S. deterrent is now vulnerable to North Korea’s 

and China’s expansive air defenses. Furthermore, if forced to use ICBMs or SLBMs 

to counter a North Korean long range missile strike, the U.S. increases the risk that 

China or Russia will misinterpret the U.S. move and potentially launch their own 

nuclear missiles. In addition, should the PRC succeed in increasing its warhead levels to 500, and a BMD system to defend them, that would significantly undermine 

the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent in the minds of Allied leaders 

in Asia. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Lewis said in his opening remarks that in his opinion, ‘‘Russia 

and China could not, however, develop new nuclear weapons with yields that I 

would consider militarily significant without conducting tests large enough to be 

readily detected.’’ Do you agree that Russia and China cannot conduct militarily significant nuclear weapons tests without being detected? What, if anything, do open 

sources indicate China and Russia are doing in the nuclear testing arena? Are they 

complying with the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? What are the implications of this to the U.S. and our allies? 

Mr. FISHER. I believe that measures being taken by the U.S. to use advanced computer techniques to help verify or even design new nuclear weapons are also techniques being sought by Russia and China. As for China, we know little about what 

passes for sufficient nuclear testing. China may accept a lesser degree of testing for 

a new weapon design. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you believe a potential U.S. minimum deterrence posture, whereby we maintain a small number of nuclear warheads and threaten retaliation 

against enemy cities if attacked, is credible? Why or why not? How would such a 

posture by the U.S. affect our extended deterrent and efforts to prevent proliferation 

of nuclear weapons? 

Mr. FISHER. I do not believe the U.S. has the option both to pursue realistic ‘‘minimum deterrence posture’’ and to preserve its security and freedom. It can have one, 

but not the other. China would take a U.S. decision to pursue a minimum nuclear 

deterrent posture as a license to invade Taiwan, enforce its territorial claims in the 

East China Sea and impose military control over the South China Sea. Such a U.S. 
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decision would also pitch China into an even higher paced general military buildup 

in order to accelerate its quest for global military dominance to displace the United 

States. After doing so China would then seek a series of confrontations with Washington to develop a system for American subordination to China’s dictat. 

Mr. TURNER. The Obama Administration is currently conducting a 90-day ‘‘NPR 

Implementation Study,’’ which will likely result in changes to U.S. nuclear weapon 

employment guidance. According to senior administration officials, including President Obama’s National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, it could also set the stage 

for unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. How would unilateral U.S. reductions or changes to the employment guidance be perceived by leaders in Russia and 

China? Do you believe we have sufficiently certain information on the nuclear forces 

and policies of China and Russia to enable unilateral U.S. reductions or major shifts 

in employment policy without undue risk? 

Mr. FISHER. I do not believe that the U.S. has sufficient information about China’s 

nuclear forces to take the decision to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions. To pursue new unilateral U.S. warhead reductions without verifiable data on China’s nuclear order of battle, its nuclear modernization plans, its real nuclear doctrine, its 

plans for missile defenses and its plans for outer space warfare, would severely 

damage American national security. 

According to open reports, a new study by Dr. Phil Karber of Georgetown University on China’s expansive, possible 5,000km long network of tunnels, undermines 

confidence in the open reporting by the Department of Defense about China’s current nuclear missile numbers. While this report does not suggest an actual new estimate, the sheer size of the tunnel network devoted to hiding China’s nuclear missile 

arsenal strongly suggests Chinese missile numbers may handily exceed open DoD 

estimates. Until such a time that China decides to provide verifiable assurance that 

its missile numbers are close to open U.S. estimates, the United States should not 

be considering further unilateral reductions in U.S. warhead numbers. 

Mr. TURNER. Russian leaders have been talking about deploying by 2018 a new, 

heavy, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that will carry multiple 

independently targetable re-entry vehicles (i.e., it will be ‘‘MIRV’d’’). Some experts 

indicate this system would greatly detract from crisis stability, because its fixed location makes it vulnerable and Russian leaders would face a very short ‘‘use-it-orlose-it’’ decision timeframe. Why is Russia contemplating deploying this system? 

What are the benefits to Russia? What, if anything, should be the U.S. response if 

Russia deploys this system? How should this decision by Russia impact U.S. decisions about our nuclear force structure and policy? 

Dr. LEWIS. Among Russian defense entities, there appears to be a debate about 

the need for new liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. The process leading to the award 

of a contract appears to reflect internal politics among Russia’s design bureaus more 

than any specific strategic rationale. As such, the long-term commitment of the Russian leadership to a new liquid-fueled Heavy ICBM remains uncertain. 

New Russian Heavy ICBMs, if based in vulnerable fixed sites, may undermine 

strategic stability by exacerbating Russian fears about the survivability of their 

forces during a crisis with the United States. The United States should seek to prevent or curtail deployment of such missiles through arms control negotiations. 

That said, the main Russian concern appears to be the vulnerability of its leadership and command and control system to a ‘‘decapitating’’ first-strike that denies 

Russia the ability to retaliate against a nuclear attack. Managing fear in Moscow 

about the viability of its command and control system remains, in my view, the 

most important path to enhancing strategic stability. The United States should continue to invest in command, control and communications capabilities to maximize 

a U.S. President’s decision-time in a crisis, as well as continue to engage Russian 

leaders on measures to reassure them that the United States does not seek a decapitating first strike against the Russian Federation. The United States has never 

sought such a capability and it is not in our interest for Russian leaders to be confused about that fact. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Should U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons be tied to Russian or Chinese modernization? Why/why not? How does the effectiveness of Russia 

and China’s nuclear deterrent compare to ours? And given what we know of the different models for maintaining nuclear weapons, would you trade our nuclear weapons for China’s or Russia’s? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, although we should also modernize to deal with rogue state 

threats in the most effective manner. As then-Secretary Gates stated in 2008, 
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‘‘There is no way to ignore efforts by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran 

to develop and deploy nuclear weapons or Russian or Chinese strategic modernization programs.’’ 

Russia already has nuclear superiority due to its 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. As former Under Secretary of Defense Ambassador Robert Joseph 

put it, we are now ‘‘Second to One.’’ There is no way we can freeze the capability 

of our strategic missiles at the technical level we achieved between 1970 and 1990 

without the Russians pulling ahead (which seems already to have happened) in 

most areas, with the exception of perhaps SSBN quietness and stealth levels. 

Even without U.S. unilateral cuts, I believe China will gradually reduce the gap 

in numbers and technology and eventually pull ahead, if we stand still. There are 

many reports in the Asian press of Chinese plans to MIRV their new strategic missiles extensively, although no time frame is given. Despite inferior technology, 

China now has extensive regional missile capability with near precision accuracy. 

This Chinese advantage is going to grow simply because they are introducing new 

and improved missiles and we are doing nothing to improve accuracy. The Chinese, 

according to Aviation Week, are developing a 4,000-km range ballistic missile with 

a nuclear capability. 

Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces would not be suitable for the U.S. 

We cannot operate mobile ICBMs, build extensive tunnel facilities because of their 

cost, live under their standards of safety or match their manpower commitments. 

It would be useful for the U.S. to have elements of their tactical and theater nuclear 

capability, but it would have to be an American version of their capability built to 

our standards. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What role, benefits and risks are there for further nuclear arms 

control measures given Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization efforts 

and plans? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Arms control can only have a positive security impact if it is complied with. The Soviet Union/Russia has a poor compliance record. The lower we go 

in nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of cheating and the consequences of cheating. New START, with its degraded verification regime, is not a good basis for additional arms control. We need the restoration of a slightly modified START telemetry 

regime and the restoration of continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production. 

The New START warhead counting regime needs major surgery so that we can accurately count deployed warheads. 

Despite its arms control rhetoric, I see little indication that the Obama administration is pressing Russia on future arms control, which Russia does not want. Indeed, according to Sergey Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of the Moscow World Economics and Politics at the National Research University-Higher School of Economics, ‘‘For the time being, in order not to lose what has been achieved, the White 

House . . . refrained from pushing for the beginning of negotiations on reducing 

nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, in which Russia is many times 

superior in terms of numbers. This is why Moscow does not want these negotiations.’’ Press reports concerning high level meetings in 2011 talk almost completely 

about the Russian missile defense agenda. Obama administration statements concerning future negotiations about tactical nuclear weapons do not talk about negotiations any time soon. Nor are they talking about fixing the problems with START. 

They generally talk about ‘‘transparency’’ rather than ‘‘verification.’’ One statement 

by NSC Arms Control Coordinator Dr. Gary Samore sounds like they are thinking 

about transparency rather than limits on tactical nuclear weapons. 

Statements by administration officials about unilateral reductions make no sense 

if the administration plans near term arms control negotiations concerning its announced agenda—further reductions in strategic nuclear forces and limits on tactical 

nuclear and non-deployed nuclear weapons of all types. Moreover, there is an obvious disconnect between this agenda and the lack of limitations in New START on 

non-deployed mobile ICBMs which is one of the main cheating threats. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What impact would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 

have on stemming nuclear weapons modernization, particularly for China? And 

what are Russia and China’s positions on the CTBT? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. The CTBT is not impacting Russia or China, both of which are 

extensively modernizing their nuclear forces. There are reports that both Russia and 

China are engaging in hydronuclear testing. 

In the 1990s, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, in a report in which thenAtomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov personally participated in drafting, said 

that Soviet hydronuclear tests ‘‘played an important role in the analysis of the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.’’ (Emphasis added). 

The detection threshold for decoupled nuclear tests and tests conducted in salt 

mines is too high to prevent covert testing that can allow the development of new 
98 

advanced nuclear weapons. I would recommend that the Committee review the recent NIE on the CTBT and compare it in detail to the comparable assessments 

made in the NIE written during the Clinton administration. I would also recommend that the Committee obtain classified briefings from the National Laboratories concerning what is possible at various testing yields for nuclear weapons development. 

A 2002 National Academy of Sciences report concluded that, with a fully functional International Monitoring System, ‘‘an underground nuclear explosion cannot 

be confidently hidden if its yield is larger than 1 or 2- kt.’’ It said that cavity decoupling had achieved a signal-reduction factor of 70 in a 400-ton yield. A January 2001 

study by Dr. William Leith of the U.S. Geological Survey concluded that, ‘‘In thick 

salt deposits and domes, it is feasible to construct cavities of sufficient volume and 

dimensions for full decoupling of an underground nuclear explosion larger than 10 

kt . . . . Above 10 kt, the resulting seismic event . . . might be detected, and located by the fully-functioning CTBT International Monitoring System (the southern 

hemisphere, this threshold will be higher) . . . . [S]uitably thick salt deposits are 

present in many naturally-seismic regions that are also areas of nuclear proliferation concern (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Syria, China, Russia) . . .’’ Dr. Leith also concluded 

that: ‘‘At yields less than about 1 kt, any country desiring to decrease the seismic 

signal from a small underground nuclear explosion can do so by detonation in a 

deep, moderate-size, elongated cavity mined in high-strength, low porosity rock (e.g., 

granite) or, if available, in salt. The construction of such a cavity is not limited by 

the available mining technology, based on numerous examples of underground construction at depth, worldwide . . . . With careful site selection, the decoupled event 

would not be large enough to be detected seismically, for broad areas of most countries.’’ 

CTBT verification involves monitoring more than known test sites. A September 

2001 study by Vitaly V. Adushkin and William Leith reported that the Soviet Union 

conducted 117 nuclear tests outside of nuclear weapons test sites. In 1999 Principal 

Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov revealed that nuclear tests had 

been conducted in 16 areas of the U.S.S.R. Indeed in one of these tests, ‘‘Soviet scientists set off a nuclear blast in 1979 next to a Ukrainian coal mine, then sent thousands of miners back to the shaft a day later without telling them,’’ and that Soviet 

‘‘officials had disguised the incident by staging a civil defense drill and evacuating 

the town’s 8,000 residents, most of whom were miners.’’ While Russia could not do 

this today in an inhabited area, Siberia is a very large place and largely unpopulated. 

Dr. Paul C. Robinson, then-Director of the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), in 

1999 Congressional testimony on the CTBT stated that he was ‘‘concerned by the 

erroneous claims’’ that the CTBT ‘‘prohibits the United States or any other nation 

from deploying new nuclear weapon designs or adapting existing nuclear explosives 

for new warheads.’’ The main failure mechanism in a thermonuclear weapon is the 

primary, which if it delivers inadequate yield, will result in a dud. Covert nuclear 

testing undetectable under the CTBT can be used to develop and certify new primaries. Even the pro-CTBT 1995 JASON report concluded that: 

For the U.S. stockpile, testing under a 500 ton yield limit would allow studies 

of boost gas ignition and initial burn, which is a critical step in achieving full 

primary design yield. The primary argument that we heard in support of the 

importance of such testing by the U.S. is the following: the evidence in several 

cases and theoretical analyses indicate that results of a sub-kiloton (∼500 tons) 

test of a given primary that achieves boost gas ignition and initial burn can be 

extrapolated to give some confidence in the yield of an identical primary with 

full boosting. Therefore, if a modified or remanufactured primary is introduced 

into the stockpile in the future to correct some aging problem, such tests on the 

modified system would add to confidence that the performance of the new primary is still adequate. 

Much higher yield tests than 500-tons yield can be conducted without detection 

with decoupling, testing outside of known test sites or in SALT mines. There is also 

the possibility of covert tests conducted at sea to hide the nationality of the test or 

in deep space. These higher tests would have still greater implications for weapons 

development. 

In October 1999 The New York Times reported that, ‘‘In a new assessment of its 

capabilities, the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that it cannot monitor 

low-level nuclear tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty . . .’’ Senator Richard Lugar (R–IN) concluded 

that, ‘‘I have little confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions will 

dissuade other nations from nuclear testing.’’ During the 1999 CTBT debate, then- 
99 

Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) Director Dr. Paul Robinson stated that, ‘‘unfortunately, compliance with a strict zero-yield requirement is unverifiable’’ and, ‘‘If the 

United States scrupulously restricts itself to zero yield while other nations may conduct experiments up to the threshold of international delectability, we will be at an 

intolerable disadvantage.’’ 

Russia and China support the CTBT. If they are covertly testing as press reports 

say, it gives them a substantial advantage. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding the Chinese and Russian current and planned modernization efforts, should the U.S. change its current nuclear posture and policy, including numbers and targeting? Why, why not? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I believe we must modernize each leg of the TRIAD. I would accelerate efforts to develop the new nuclear cruise missile because of the defense penetration and sustainment problems with the existing ALCM. I believe that some B– 

61s should be given glide bomb capability to better counter advanced defenses. We 

need to start work on new large solid rocket motors in order not to lose design capability and be able to replace our ICBM force in 2030. I would also look at ways to 

upgrade our missile accuracy at modest cost. Creating a sub-strategic capability for 

our Minuteman ICBM and Trident II, similar to the U.K. sub-strategic Trident capability, is possible at extremely low or zero cost if done as part of a life extension 

program. 

I would not make any unilateral cuts in our nuclear capability. Cuts will increase 

the prospect of China deciding to match us in numbers and make the implication 

of the Russian nuclear advantage worse. Indeed, if we are going to attempt to 

achieve a new arms control agreement with Russia, this is the worst possible thing 

to do from the standpoint of negotiating leverage. Russia will see unilateral nuclear 

cuts as enhancing its leverage concerning nuclear threats and they will have no incentive to agree to limits on tactical nuclear weapons. 

I would not change existing targeting guidance just for arms control purposes. 

Changes that make sense on their own merits are a different issue. I do not support 

targeting cities simply because it takes fewer nuclear weapons to destroy them than 

our existing targeting strategy. I believe targeting cities for the purpose of killing 

civilians is morally bankrupt and inconsistent with humanitarian international law. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What drives and constrains current Chinese and Russian nuclear 

weapons modernization efforts? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Russia sees nuclear weapons as central to its security because of 

conventional weakness, the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons and it is the 

only basis for claiming that Russia is a great power. I am concerned that Russia 

views nuclear threats as a means of preventing NATO actions like Allied Force in 

Yugoslavia. It is clear that Putin would have reacted very differently to Libya. During his first presidency, Putin did not have nuclear superiority. He now has it. I 

am concerned about how he may use it. 

The main constraining force on Russia is lack of an economy that can support Soviet style strategic forces. The main constraining force on China is inferior technology. 

I believe that China sees nuclear weapons as part of its overall deterrence and 

warfighting capability. This is dangerous because of Chinese claims concerning Taiwan and China’s declared willingness to pay ‘‘any price’’ to prevent Taiwanese ‘‘independence.’’ This is the only international confrontation involving nuclear weapons 

where a nation claims sovereignty over the entire territory of another nation. The 

‘‘one China’’ rhetoric aside, China does not control Taiwan and can only do so by 

military force or the threat of military force. China is increasing its military budget 

more each year than the entire Taiwanese military budget. U.S. arms sales policy 

toward Taiwan, particularly our unwillingness to sell the F–16, is making war more 

likely. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How much insight do we have into China’s nuclear program and 

what can be done to increase Chinese transparency about its nuclear program? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Not as much as we would like. China is very secretive and practices a great deal of deception. 

The principal Chinese nuclear weapons organization, the Chinese Academy of 

Engineering’s Institute of Physics, employs 8,500 professional technical staff members. Yu Min, described by Xinhua as the ‘‘architect of the country’s first H-bomb,’’ 

claims that China’s key nuclear capabilities are ‘‘on a par with the United States 

and the former Soviet Union.’’ Xue Bencheng, one of the most important scientists 

involved in the development of China’s neutron bomb, stated that the July 1996 

Chinese nuclear test was ‘‘a great spanning leap’’ because it solved the problem of 

nuclear weapons miniaturization. 

According to Vyacheslav Baskakov and Aleksandr Gorshkov, Russian military 

journalists: ‘‘Specifically, it [China] will succeed in making the shift from its current 
100 

megaton-class nuclear ordinance to a level of hundreds and tens of kilotons, thereby 

increasing the effectiveness of available forces and weapons, flexibility of use in various circumstances and combat situations on both a strategic and tactical level. For 

example, it is believed that the yield of the strategic nuclear warheads with which 

Chinese ICBM’s are now equipped will decrease from 1–4 megatons to 250–650 kilotons each. The yield of tactical and operational-tactical nuclear warheads, according 

to expert assessments, will total from 90–100 kilotons each.’’ 

There are convincing reports that this recent progress has not been entirely indigenous. ‘‘For example, the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 

Military Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, generally known 

as the Cox Committee, concluded that: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 

stolen classified information on all of the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and several of the associated reentry vehicles. These thefts are 

the result of an intelligence collection program spanning two decades, and continuing to the present. The PRC intelligence collection program included espionage, 

review of unclassified publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from 

the Department of Energy’s national weapons laboratories.’’ 

A number of heavily redacted CIA intelligence reports on China’s nuclear weapons 

testing have been declassified and made public. They include details that suggest 

a broad interest in developing nuclear weapons for tactical platforms, modernizing 

and replacing older warhead technologies. One of them states that, ‘‘A nuclear test 

at Lop Nor in 1990 may be related to development of a warhead for a Chinese shortrange ballistic missile.’’ The National Intelligence Daily (NID) in 1993 stated that 

accelerated Chinese testing expected by 1996 may also be related to ‘‘tactical systems to be developed in the future.’’ In September 1995, the NID reported that, 

‘‘China could be seeking to confirm the reliability of a nuclear artillery shell designed in advance of a nuclear test ban’’ in order to defend against Russian invasion 

or an amphibious landing. The device may have been a gun assembled uranium device. The Chinese nuclear tests in 1993 were driven ‘‘by its need to modernize its 

nuclear force, built largely using 1960 and 1970 technology.’’ The NID in 1993 stated that China planned seven nuclear tests, including ‘‘testing for new SLBM and 

ICBMs warheads, by 1996 . . .’’ In June 1994, the NID assessed that China was 

developing new nuclear weapons that ‘‘may use more advanced concepts such as 

aspherical primaries and possibly a type of IHE [Insensitive High Explosive].’’ In 

1995, the NID judged that Chinese testing was also aimed at developing ‘‘a cruise 

missile warhead and may involve safety upgrades to existing systems.’’ A Chinese 

nuclear test planned for 1994 was aimed at ‘‘the completion of warhead development 

for new intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles and the development of technologies to enhance confidence in warheads for an enduring stockpile 

under a nuclear test ban.’’ 

China will not voluntarily agree to transparency measures. Despite its propaganda efforts on nuclear weapons, it has avoided arms control and transparency. 

Only intense pressure on China has any chance to change this. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Has China ever sought parity with the U.S. and Russia? Why? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. During the Cold War, China did not have the economic or the 

technical capability to challenge the U.S. or Russia and made no effort to do so. 

Since the end of the Cold War, China has made a major effort to expand the quantity and quality of its nuclear forces. China can only approach current U.S. levels 

if it develops advanced delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads. To challenge us, 

China will need MIRV warheads. According to the most recent Pentagon report on 

Chinese military power, the PRC may be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, ‘‘possibly’’ capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable warhead (MIRV). This 

is apparently the missile that is referred to as the DF–41 in the Asian press. Jane’s 

reports it may carry up to 9–10 warheads. There are reports in the Asian press that 

China plans to heavily MIRV its SLBMs—as many as 576 warheads on six submarines, although no time frame is reported. While the Pentagon report on China 

does not provide unclassified projections of future Chinese nuclear capability, the 

Republican Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee in the Committee report 

on New START estimated that the Chinese nuclear force would grow to 500–1,000 

weapons in the next decade. In addition to strategic systems, China has a variety 

of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Aviation Week reports that 

China has announced that its new 4,000-km range ballistic missile will be nuclear 

capable. 

I believe we will see a gradual buildup of Chinese nuclear weapons over the next 

two decades with the ultimate objective of matching the U.S. in nuclear weapons 

as well as in all military capabilities. They have the economic capability to do this 

and our policy is making it easier. 
101 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What does China’s no first-use and alert posture maintaining nuclear warheads separated from the delivery vehicles tell us about their nuclear policy? Does this matter? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. I do not believe China’s ‘‘no first use’’ policy is real. A careful look 

at the Chinese wording of China’s ‘‘no first use’’ policy reveals that it commits them 

to nothing. As former U.S. military attache ́ to China, Colonel (ret.) Larry Wortzel 

has pointed out, ‘‘The U.S. has already used nuclear weapons against Japan in August 1945 . . . [thus] if China launched a surprise nuclear attack tomorrow, it 

would still not be the first nation to use nuclear weapons.’’ The Pentagon report on 

the Chinese military warns that ‘‘there is some ambiguity’’ over the conditions 

under which China’s No First Use policy would apply, ‘‘including whether strikes 

on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude 

bursts would constitute a first use.’’ I believe this is understated. 

The Japanese Kyodo News Agency revealed that it obtained classified Chinese documents which say that China ‘‘will adjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons . . .’’ China’s 

U.N. Arms Control Ambassador once said that ‘‘no first use’’ does not apply to Taiwan. Chinese nuclear doctrine has evolved toward ‘‘active defense,’’ which has a nuclear warfighting component. 

If ‘‘no first use’’ is really Chinese government policy, how does one explain the fact 

that over the last decade there have been repeated threats from the Chinese military of first use against the United States over the Taiwan issue? According to 

Andrei Chang, founder and editor of the Kanwa Defense Review, a Canada-based 

publication that specializes in following Chinese military developments reports that 

‘‘after 1996 China has a number of times attempted to impose nuclear deterrence 

against the U.S. and Taiwan, both strategically and tactically.’’ Perhaps the most 

famous recent such threat was made in 1996 by Lt. General Xion Guangkai, then 

a deputy chief of the General Staff. The general made an implied threat to destroy 

Los Angeles in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. He was also quoted as saying 

that to prevent Taiwanese independence, ‘‘China was prepared to sacrifice millions 

of people, even entire cities in a nuclear exchange.’’ 

Writing in 2000, academic Ellis Joffe noted that, ‘‘A Chinese military publication 

was more blunt. The United States, it said, will not sacrifice 200 million Americans 

for 20 million Taiwanese . . .’’ He added, ‘‘They will acknowledge it [the Chinese 

victory] and withdraw.’’ Another Chinese military journal reportedly said that China 

had made preparations to ‘‘fight a nuclear war with the United States.’’ In February 

2000, then-Colonel Zhu Chenghu, then-Deputy Chief of the Strategic Research Institute of Chinese National Defense University, stated that, ‘‘China has the capability 

to launch a nuclear attack against the United States. If the United States tried to 

interfere in our dispute with Taiwan, it would suffer a powerful blow as a result.’’ 

In July 2005, Zhu Chenghu, now a Major General and a Dean of the National Defense University, at a meeting for reporters sponsored by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, threatened the destruction of several hundred U.S. cities if the United States 

used conventional weapons against China in response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. In an August 2007 interview with Chinese Major General Cai Yuqiu, Vice 

Principal of Nanjing Army Command College, published in Ta Kung Pao, an internet version of a PRC-owned daily newspaper, reported that, ‘‘Cai Yuqiu said that 

he really appreciated the four sentence fight principle by Mao Zedong, i.e., we will 

not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. As to whether we will use nuclear weapons first, the above principle can also 

be followed. If we have been repeatedly ‘attacked,’ then there should not be a limit 

for our counter-attack.’’ 

When China announced its ‘‘no first use doctrine’’ in 1964, it simultaneously faced 

tens-of-thousands of nuclear weapons (with little hope of reducing the disparity to 

even one hundred-to-one within the foreseeable future) and movement toward a crisis relationship with the Soviet Union. The situation is completely different today. 

Writing in January 2005, Colonel Wen Shang-hsien of the Taiwanese military reported that after the year 2000 the PRC adopted a nuclear doctrine that allowed 

for a ‘‘a preemptive strike strategy,’’ under which the PRC would use ‘‘its tactical 

nuclear weapons in regional wars if necessary.’’ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does the development of a Russian mobile heavy mobile ICBM 

affect strategic stability and our deterrent? And what role might U.S. policy and 

posture play in Russia’s decision to develop a heavy ICBM with MIRV capability? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM which the Russian press 

says will carry 10 heavy or15 medium sized nuclear warheads. It is not a mobile 

ICBM but rather will be based in substantially upgraded silos, protected by active 

defenses and GPS jamming, according to Russian press reports. 
102 

Russia is developing the new heavy ICBM for the same reasons it did in the Cold 

War. The obvious target of the missile is the U.S. ICBM force. Russia’s upgraded 

ICBM silos will be more survivable than existing Russian ICBM silos. However, the 

silos will be unlikely to be as survivable as the new Russian SS–27 mobile ICBMs. 

It a very important piece of evidence that Russia is planning for a nuclear 

warfighting capability against the U.S. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you believe Russia will seek to build back up to New START 

levels if the number of their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles fall below New 

START levels in the next few years? 

Dr. SCHNEIDER. Russia was below the New START deployed warhead and delivery 

vehicle limits on the day New START entered into force, according to Russia’s first 

New START data declaration. During the New START Treaty’s ratification, Russian 

defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov stated three times that Russia was already 

below the New START limits on both deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles and intended to build up to them. He said: ‘‘We will meet every parameter established by the treaty before 2028, while the warhead limits will be met by 2018.’’ 

Russia’s first New START data update declaration, published by the State Department in October 2011, said that they have moved from below the New START warhead limits to above them, an overall increase of 29 warheads. 

I believe Russia will make every effort to keep the number of its nuclear warheads as high as possible. I do not believe Russian forces will ever decline to 1,550 

operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons as they were counted in the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Even ITAR–TASS admits that they can stay several hundred 

weapons above the New START limit because of the bomber weapons counting rule 

which counts a bomber as carrying only one warhead. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Should U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons be tied to Russian or Chinese modernization? Why/why not? How does the effectiveness of Russia 

and China’s nuclear deterrent compare to ours? And given what we know of the different models for maintaining nuclear weapons, would you trade our nuclear weapons for China’s or Russia’s? 

Mr. FISHER. Inasmuch as both Russia and China have opted to deploy heavy mobile ICBMs to increase their survivability, I believe it is necessary for the United 

States to increase the survivability of its land based ICBM force beyond reliance on 

hardened silos. Given the near certainty that China and Russia are going to deploy 

new heavy ICBMs with multiple warheads, it is imperative for the United States 

to develop a similar new heavy, mobile ICBM. I would not trade U.S. weapons for 

those of China or Russia but I do believe that the U.S. can develop and should develop a superior heavy mobile ICBM with adequate local active protection systems. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What role, benefits and risks are there for further nuclear arms 

control measures given Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization efforts 

and plans? 

Mr. FISHER. Any further U.S. reductions in its nuclear arsenal would be most unwise without a verifiable understanding of China’s current nuclear order of battle, 

its plans for nuclear modernization, its real nuclear doctrine, its plans for missile 

defenses and its plans for outer space warfare. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What impact would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 

have on stemming nuclear weapons modernization, particularly for China? And 

what are Russia and China’s positions on the CTBT? 

Mr. FISHER. It is my assessment that for any Chinese adherence to a CTBT to 

be credible that the U.S. would have to insist on access to known and future discovered Chinese nuclear testing facilities. But as I believe that such access will not be 

granted by China, I therefore have little confidence that a CTBT would inhibit China’s nuclear modernization. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding the Chinese and Russian current and planned modernization efforts, should the U.S. change its current nuclear posture and policy, including numbers and targeting? Why, why not? 

Mr. FISHER. Given what I know about China’s potential nuclear modernization 

plans, its potential plans for missile defenses and for outer space warfare, I would 

suggest the following: 1) There be no further reductions in U.S. nuclear warhead 

numbers, SSBN deployment rates or targeting policies; 2) The U.S. should have the 

ability to increase its warhead numbers very quickly if China’s nuclear warhead 

count exceeds 300; 3) The U.S. should develop a new heavy mobile MIRV ICBM 

with active point defenses like rail guns to increase their survivability; 4) The U.S. 

should develop a new SSBN to succeed the Ohio class; 5) The U.S. should develop 

active military space combat capabilities to deter China’s use of similar capabilities 

that it is developing. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What drives and constrains current Chinese and Russian nuclear 

weapons modernization efforts? 
103 

Mr. FISHER. China’s nuclear modernization and buildup is driven by its desire to 

become the preeminent global military power during this century. This ambition is 

constrained by the amount of resources that China can devote to this goal without 

increasing domestic stability threats to the continuation of the Communist Party 

dictatorship. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How much insight do we have into China’s nuclear program and 

what can be done to increase Chinese transparency about its nuclear program? 

Mr. FISHER. The United States, as well as the rest of the World, has a fundamentally insufficient understanding of China’s nuclear weapons program, both for the 

purposes of pursuing a path to strategic stability with China, and in comparison to 

the transparency permitted by the United States and Russia. Furthermore, we do 

not have sufficient understanding regarding China’s direct and indirect roles in assisting the nuclear weapons capabilities of North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and China’s 

possible understanding and/or relationship to proxies of these countries, like 

Hezbollah, that could be used to deliver rogue-state nuclear weapons. Until China 

decides that far greater transparency about its own nuclear program, or about those 

nuclear programs that is has assisted, is in its national security interest, very little 

can be done save to redouble U.S. espionage and intelligence operations targeting 

China’s nuclear weapons sector. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Has China ever sought parity with the U.S. and Russia? Why? 

Mr. FISHER. China is waiting for the right time to seek nuclear superiority over 

the United States. China is well on its way to achieving superiority in conventional 

weapons over the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. The numbers of aircraft 

carriers, amphibious projection ships, combat aircraft, and large transport aircraft 

that I estimate that China is seeking by the 2020s, would require a massive shift 

in U.S. forces to deter a potential conflict—given a likely continuation of global U.S. 

military commitments. In nuclear weapons, China does not have to achieve ‘‘parity’’ 

in order to upend the nuclear balance. A PLA force of 500 defended nuclear warheads would deeply undermine Asian allied confidence in the extended U.S. nuclear 

deterrent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What does China’s no first-use and alert posture maintaining nuclear warheads separated from the delivery vehicles tell us about their nuclear policy? Does this matter? 

Mr. FISHER. It is not clear to me that modern tube-launched and stored ICBMs 

and SLBMs are deployed without their nuclear warheads. Constantly unlocking 

complex seals on these large tubes, needed to sustain ‘‘cold launch’’ gas pressures, 

augers against China keeping its warheads ‘‘de-mated’’ from their DF–21, DF–31, 

DF–31A and future ‘‘DF–41’’ ICBMs. This is also, of course, impossible to sustain 

for SLBMs at sea. Keeping these newer mobile ICBMs deployed with warheads also 

reduces their response time, both for offensive and defensive contingencies. Unless 

this Committee has access to information that the PLA does ‘‘de-mate’’ all of its 

modern solid fueled tube-launched nuclear missiles, then I would advise that the 

U.S. not credit China with a ‘‘relaxed’’ nuclear posture suggested by this question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does the development of a Russian mobile heavy mobile ICBM 

affect strategic stability and our deterrent? And what role might U.S. policy and 

posture play in Russia’s decision to develop a heavy ICBM with MIRV capability? 

Mr. FISHER. I am much more concerned about China’s development of a new large 

mobile ICBM that most likely will be MIRV equipped. Given China’s willingness to 

release limited imagery regarding this new missile, I also find it very unfortunate 

that the U.S. government has not revealed more data concerning this missile. The 

development of this missile could have far more profound effect on U.S. nuclear deterrent requirements because China’s far greater effort to remain untransparent 

about this program. I would urge this Committee to in turn urge the Administration 

to provide the American people with a far more complete warning about this new 

missile, to the degree that source protection permits. As previously stated, I believe 

the advent of new Russian and Chinese large mobile MIRVed ICBMs places great 

pressure on the U.S. to develop its own new modern mobile ICBM that can also be 

paired with active defenses. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you believe Russia will seek to build back up to New START 

levels if the number of their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles fall below New 

START levels in the next few years? 

Mr. FISHER. I do not have a sufficient understanding of Russia’s nuclear plans to 

give a useful answer. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Should U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons be tied to Russian or Chinese modernization? Why/why not? How does the effectiveness of Russia 

and China’s nuclear deterrent compare to ours? And given what we know of the different models for maintaining nuclear weapons, would you trade our nuclear weapons for China’s or Russia’s? [Question #15, for cross-reference—ed.] 
104 

Dr. LEWIS. The overall balance of deterrence is not sensitive, in my judgment, to 

the technical details of opposing nuclear forces—particularly not at current levels 

in excess of 1,000 deployed nuclear warheads, many of which are deployed on submarines that are virtually invulnerable today. 

The United States should seek to maintain a secure and credible option to respond to a nuclear attack against the United States, our forces abroad and our allies 

and partners. Beyond a basic requirement that forces be survivable in large enough 

numbers to hold at risk those targets judged necessary for deterrence, small technical advantages in nuclear forces confer no political or strategic advantage. Most 

measures relating to nuclear weapons policy, forces and posture are about reassuring ourselves that we have done enough as good stewards of our strategic forces. 

These measures have little or no impact on calculations in Moscow or Beijing. 

Although the overall balance among all three forces is very robust, I would not 

trade nuclear forces with any other country. Russian leaders appear deeply concerned about the survivability of their nuclear forces, a situation that I believe no 

U.S. President could accept. Chinese leaders appear willing to accept levels of numerical inferiority that would compromise current approaches to extending deterrence to U.S. allies and partners. Moreover, the United States retains a more agile 

and capable industrial base than either country. [Answer to question #15, for crossreference—ed.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What role, benefits and risks are there for further nuclear arms 

control measures given Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization efforts 

and plans? 

Dr. LEWIS. During the Cold War, a bipartisan consensus existed on the need to 

drive the Soviet Union toward a more stabilizing nuclear weapons posture that did 

not rely heavily on early use to maintain survivability. Today, we lack a consensus 

about why further arms control measures are necessary beyond a reasonable assumption that the collapse of this process, along with its verification and transparency measures, would undermine strategic stability and U.S. security. 

Russian leaders, as I noted in my testimony, are deeply concerned about their 

ability to command their nuclear forces during a crisis and fear a ‘‘decapitating’’ 

first strike by the United States. The United States should place particular emphasis on measures that reduce Russian fears about the viability of their command and 

control structure. Long-standing efforts by the Clinton, Bush and now Obama Administrations to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center (now Joint Data Fusion 

Center) to share early warning data with Moscow is one example of a measure that 

might contribute to stability. The United States might also negotiate an agreement 

with Moscow to not place nuclear weapons on missile defense interceptors. (The 

FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the expenditure of any funds 

on the research, testing or development of nuclear-armed missile defenses.) 

China is currently in the process of adding new solid-fueled ballistic missiles to 

its strategic forces. In a serious crisis, according to some training materials for Chinese officers, they intend to place these forces on alert to signal their resolve. As 

new mobile missiles have become available, this may mean sending road-mobile 

missiles out into the field and flushing ballistic missile submarines (which are not 

yet armed with operational ballistic missiles) into the ocean. The United States and 

China need urgently to begin strategic stability consultations now, rather than during a serious political or military crisis. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What impact would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 

have on stemming nuclear weapons modernization, particularly for China? And 

what are Russia and China’s positions on the CTBT? 

Dr. LEWIS. If China were to ratify and observe the terms of the CTBT, China 

would probably be unable to develop new nuclear warhead designs small enough to 

permit placement of multiple warheads on China’s new solid-fueled ballistic missiles. This would constrain the size of China’s strategic forces, greatly reducing the 

potential threat to the U.S. and its allies in the region. 

Russia has ratified the CTBT. Russia maintains that it is complying with the 

CTBT, conducting only so-called subcritical nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya, similar 

to those conducted by the United States at the Nevada Test site. 

Chinese officials privately indicate that they will ratify the CTBT after the United 

States does. Chinese officials do not publicly describe stockpile stewardship activities, but almost certainly are conducting subcritical tests at the Lop Nor test site. 

The United States would likely be able to detect tests above a few hundred tons 

at either the Novaya Zemlya or Lop Nor test sites, ruling out most nuclear tests. 

The current test moratorium ‘‘locks in’’ the current Russian practice of remanufacturing nuclear weapons as a basis stockpile stewardship measure and significantly 

constrains the ability of both Russia and China to modernize their existing nuclear 

weapons designs. 
105 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Understanding the Chinese and Russian current and planned modernization efforts, should the U.S. change its current nuclear posture and policy, including numbers and targeting? Why, why not? 

Dr. LEWIS. Today, nuclear weapons play a smaller role in U.S. and allied security 

than at any time since the end of the Second World War. Our challenge is to align 

our nuclear weapons policies, forces and posture with this limited role. Neither Russia nor China are modernizing their forces in a way that could, at this time, threaten what is an extraordinarily robust balance of terror. 

The overall balance of deterrence is sufficiently strong that the United States 

could further reduce the number of nuclear weapons, further relax certain readiness 

requirements, and further ‘‘scrub’’ existing target sets with no risk to national security. The United States should consider such changes to the extent that they may 

yield cost savings in the current budgetary environment or enhance strategic stability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What drives and constrains current Chinese and Russian nuclear 

weapons modernization efforts? 

Dr. LEWIS. Russian leaders continue to value maintaining a relatively large nuclear arsenal, both as a deterrent against the United States and a hedge against 

the growing military capability of China. Russian leaders also appear acutely concerned about the vulnerability of their forces, particularly their ability to command 

those forces in a crisis. 

China is continuing on the modernization path established in the mid-1980s, replacing existing liquid-fueled ballistic missiles with solid-fueled ballistic missiles. 

China may also modestly expand the total number of warheads capable of reaching 

the United States, although large increases in nuclear forces do not appear underway. (At the same time, China is rapidly increasing the number of conventionallyarmed ballistic and cruise missiles.) China is not currently developing new nuclear 

warhead designs. China’s modernization appears driven by a national commitment 

to acquire the same types of capabilities, albeit in smaller numbers, as those possessed by the United States and Russia. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In your opinion, what can China or Russia gain by performing subkiloton testing? How would this impact their modernization efforts? How would 

these tests, especially by Russia, impact U.S. deterrent capability? 

Dr. LEWIS. I know of no evidence that either Russia or China are conducting socalled hydronuclear tests (which produce a small nuclear yield and would be prohibited under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) as opposed to sub-critical 

tests similar to those conducted by the United States (which do not produce a nuclear yield and would not be prohibited under the CTBT). 

Neither Russia nor China would be able to develop new thermonuclear warhead 

designs of yields above 1–2 kilotons with only sub-kiloton testing. China, in particular, would face difficulty in developing warheads that would allow it to place 

multiple warheads on a mobile missiles. 

Overall, clandestine sub-kiloton testing would pose little threat to the overall deterrent balance—although the United States should not ignore evidence of willfull 

treaty violations if they should occur. On the other hand, the United States should 

be careful not to make hasty accusations that later turn out to be false. For example, the Clinton Administration demarched Russia for conducting a clandestine nuclear test in August 1997 that later turned out to be an earthquake. 

The United States should seek additional test-site transparency measures, principally with Russia, as part of a concerted effort to secure ratification in the United 

States Senate and bring the CTBT into force. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How much insight do we have into China’s nuclear program and 

what can be done to increase Chinese transparency about its nuclear program? 

Dr. LEWIS. The United States intelligence community appears to have reasonably 

detailed information about Chinese fissile material production, ballistic and cruise 

missile development and force structure (bases, brigades, etc.). Declassified U.S. intelligence estimates that China maintains a total stockpile of approximately 200– 

300 nuclear weapons deployed on ballistic missiles are almost certainly accurate to 

within an order of magnitude. China has hundreds, not thousands, of nuclear weapons. 

Moreover, the growing openness of Chinese society has led to an explosion of information that can assist in tracking the evolution of Chinese strategic forces. 

Today, the greatest challenge is in sorting the enormous ‘‘noise’’ produced by the a 

cacophony of Chinese bloggers, hyper-patriots, military buffs and so on who often 

recycle inaccurate or distorted Western information as their own analysis. 

Recent reports that China has more than 3,000 nuclear weapons, which appear 

to be based largely on an anonymous internet posting, demonstrate the potential 

pitfalls in this new era of transparency. 
106 

An important goal of strategic stability consultations should be specific measures 

to enhance transparency relating to China’s force structure and modernization programs. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Has China ever sought parity with the U.S. and Russia? Why? 

Dr. LEWIS. No, Chinese leaders have never sought numerical parity in nuclear 

weapons or delivery vehicles with either U.S. or Russian strategic forces. 

Chinese leaders view technological milestones, not force levels, as the important 

feature in the nuclear balance, which they regard as extraordinarily robust. Chinese 

leaders would prefer, for example, to have a smaller number of modern missiles and 

warheads than an equivalent number of inferior strategic forces. 

This reflects a ‘‘possession’’ mentality where Chinese leaders view seek the same 

capabilities as other nuclear-weapons states, even if they chose to deploy only small 

numbers or, in the case of enhanced radiation warheads, none at all. Similarly, this 

emphasis on matching the capabilities of other powers is evident in Chinese efforts 

to develop a ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ system similar to the U.S. missile defense programs. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What does China’s no first-use and alert posture maintaining nuclear warheads separated from the delivery vehicles tell us about their nuclear policy? Does this matter? 

Dr. LEWIS. China maintains a very unusual nuclear posture—it maintains a small 

nuclear force based largely on land-based ballistic missiles kept off alert and with 

the most restrictive employment guidance (a ‘‘no first use’’ policy). Chinese military 

textbooks and exercises suggest that Chinese leaders plan to ‘‘ride out’’ a nuclear 

attack before ordering a retaliatory strike. 

There are bureaucratic, historical and cultural reasons for this unusual decision. 

The simplest explanation is that, unlike Western policymakers, Chinese leaders believe deterrence is not difficult to achieve or maintain. As a result, Chinese leaders 

have endured a level of vulnerability that neither Washington nor Moscow would 

accept. 

Many American analysts have difficulty accepting that China would willingly 

choose such a deterrent. They deny that Chinese leaders really have a ‘‘no first use’’ 

policy or argue that there must be thousands more nuclear weapons hidden somewhere. In fact, Chinese leaders simply think differently about nuclear weapons than 

their American counterparts. 

Radically different Chinese and American views about nuclear weapons complicate strategic dialogue between officials from the two countries and, in a crisis, 

might undermine strategic stability by reinforcing mutual suspicions. Although 

leaders from both countries generally acknowledge the need for strategic dialogue 

and have attempted to establish various fora, the overall level of communication and 

understanding between the two remains dangerously inadequate. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does the development of a Russian mobile heavy mobile ICBM 

affect strategic stability and our deterrent? And what role might U.S. policy and 

posture play in Russia’s decision to develop a heavy ICBM with MIRV capability? 

Dr. LEWIS. See Question 15 [answer at top of page 104]. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you believe Russia will seek to build back up to New START 

levels if the number of their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles fall below New 

START levels in the next few years? 

Dr. LEWIS. Russia will be able to maintain the full number of treaty-permitted 

delivery vehicles under the New START Treaty, unless it retains large numbers of 

obsolete and vulnerable systems. A reasonable projection for modern delivery vehicles in the coming years is approximately 500. 

Russia will, on the other hand, attempt to maintain the full 1550 deployed nuclear warheads. Russia’s decision to continue the extensive use of multiple warheads 

on ballistic missiles may undermine strategic stability. 

As a result, the New START Treaty made important progress in driving Russia 

toward a more stabilizing force posture, but additional agreements would be necessary to further reduce the dangers to the United States. In particular, the United 

States should seek to resurrect the ban on multiple warheads for land-based ballistic missiles that was lost with the START II Treaty, even at the cost of further 

reductions in the number of treaty-accountable delivery vehicles. 

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