J. S04033/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: L.N.D., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: B.N.M. : No. 1572 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree, September 21, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 1589-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 20, 2018

B.N.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated September 21, 

2017,1in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, granting the 

petition of Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency 

(the “Agency”) and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her 

minor, dependent child, L.N.D. (the “Child”), a female born in August of 

2015, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

 

1 While the docket reflects a docket date of September 21, 2017, and the 

decree indicates copies were sent, there is no notation on the docket that 

notice was given and that the order was entered for purposes of 

Pa.R.C.P. 236(b). See Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115 

(Pa. 1999) (holding that “an order is not appealable until it is entered on the 

docket with the required notation that appropriate notice has been given”). 

See also Pa.R.A.P. 108(a) (entry of an order is designated as “the day on 

which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the 

order has been given as required by Pa.R.C.P. 236(b)”.). While we consider 

the matter on the merits, we caution the Lancaster County Prothonotary’s 

Office as to compliance with the rules with regard to the entry of orders.
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and (8).

2, 3

 After review, we affirm, and we deny, without prejudice, counsel 

for Mother’s petition to withdraw as counsel.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and/or factual 

history as follows:

Procedural History

On March 30, 2016, the [Agency] filed a 

Petition for Temporary Custody of [Child]. A Shelter 

Care Order was entered following a hearing on 

March 31, 2016. Father failed to appear for the 

Shelter Care Hearing despite receiving notice. 

Mother appeared but waived the Shelter Care 

Hearing without admitting any allegations. Following 

a hearing on April 14, 2016, the [c]ourt adjudicated 

the child dependent and approved a child 

permanency plan with the goal of return to parents 

and a concurrent placement goal of adoption. 

Mother attended the Adjudication and Disposition 

Hearing but Father did not. On July 20, 2017, the 

Agency petitioned to terminate the parental rights of 

[Father] and [Mother] to [Child] pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). A 

hearing on the termination petition was held on 

 

2 By the same decree, the trial court additionally involuntarily terminated the 

parental rights of Child’s father, C.D. (“Father”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Father filed a separate appeal addressed by 

separate Memorandum at Superior Court Docket No. 1629 MDA 2017. 

3 At the time of Child’s birth, Mother was married to N.M. 

(“presumptive father”). Presumptive father’s parental rights were 

terminated on August 24, 2017. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 62-63, 

107; decree, 8/24/17.) Notably, paternity testing established Father’s 

paternity in June 2016. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 107.)
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September 21, 2017[

4, 5] and the [c]ourt issued a 

decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s and 

Father’s rights to [Child].[

6] Mother and Father, on 

October 13, 2017, and October 23, 2017, 

respectively, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior 

Court of Pennsylvania of the September 21, 2017 

Orphans’ Court Order terminating their parental 

rights. 

Factual History

The Agency became involved with Mother and 

Father since the birth of Child in August of 2015. 

Due to the baby’s low birth weight and signs of 

withdrawal symptoms due to morphine and other 

medications Mother was taking during her 

pregnancy, Child remained in the neonatal care unit 

several weeks following her birth. The Agency 

attempted to avoid placement of the Child but 

Mother and Father did not participate in random drug 

 

4 The Agency presented the testimony of Jonathan Gransee, Psy.D., clinical 

psychologist, who performed a psychological evaluation of Mother and a 

parenting capacity evaluation of Father; and Caitlin Hoover, Agency 

caseworker. The Agency additionally offered Exhibits P-1 through P-5, 

which, upon review, were never admitted on the record.

Notably, Mother, who was represented by counsel, was not present 

due to alleged health issues, and no evidence was presented on her behalf. 

Father, also represented by counsel, was present but did not testify or 

present any evidence on his behalf.

5 Guardian ad litem, Cynthia L. Garman, Esq., also participated in these 

proceedings. Ms. Garman argued and filed a brief in support of the 

termination of parental rights. A Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) 

was additionally appointed. The record reveals that the CASA recommended 

Child remain where placed and also favored termination of parental rights. 

(Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 110.) We observe that this report was not 

marked and admitted as part of the record.

6 While the decree only indicates termination pursuant to Subsections (a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8), the record reflects that evidence was presented with 

regard to Subsection (b) and the trial court addressed Subsection (b) both 

on the record and in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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screens and violated the safety plan. The Agency 

took custody of the Child on March 30, 201[6]. At 

the time of the termination hearing, Mother and 

Father failed to make significant progress and, 

neither parent had completed any goal on their 

reunification plans.

Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 1-2 (unpaginated).

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the [c]ourt erred in denying Mother’s 

request for a continuance of the termination of 

parental rights hearing due to her health 

issues?

II. Whether the [c]ourt erred when it terminated 

Mother’s rights?

III. Whether the [c]ourt erred in concluding that 

Mother had, by conduct continuing for more 

than six (6) months, evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the 

child and had refused or failed to perform her 

parental duties?

IV. Whether the [c]ourt erred in concluding that 

the evidence clearly and convincingly 

established that the repeated and continued 

incapacity, neglect, or refusal of Mother had 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control and subsistence 

necessary for her physical and mental wellbeing and that the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied by Mother?

V. Whether the [c]ourt erred in concluding that 

the Lancaster County Children and Youth 

Agency had met its burden in proving that 

Mother’s parental rights should be terminated 

when there was evidence that Mother had been 

actively working on and completing the goals 

on her child permanency plan?
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VI. Whether the [c]ourt erred in finding that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child?

Mother’s brief at 8-9. 

At the outset, we address Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s denial 

of counsel’s request for a continuance on her behalf at the termination 

hearing. “It is well settled that the decision to grant or deny a request for a 

continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” 

Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted). “Further a trial court’s decision to deny a request for a 

continuance will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” 

Id. As we have consistently stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error in judgment. Id. Rather, discretion is abused when “the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown 

by the evidence or the record.” Id.

In concluding that the denial of Mother’s request for a continuance was 

proper, the trial court reasoned as follows:

It was proper for the [c]ourt to deny Mother’s 

request for a continuance. Mother has had a long 

history of asking for continuances in this case. In 

the past, Mother has asked for continuances stating 

she has a medical appointment that conflicts with the 

time of the hearing when in fact there was no conflict 

in time. Mother also had a criminal hearing 

scheduled for September 18, 2017, for which she did 

not appear and a warrant was issued for her arrest. 
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Mother claims her health issues caused her mobility 

problems but she refused to attend the hearing via 

telephone. Mother has canceled appointments 

related to her objectives. In one instance, she 

stated she wanted to attend Child’s doctor 

appointments. She never rescheduled her canceled 

appointments nor did she attend Child’s 

appointments. She has failed to appear for 

scheduled drug tests. She was discharged from her 

domestic violence offenders group for missing 

five (5) sessions. Originally[,] Mother was granted 

weekly visits with Child. However, after missing 

thirty-two (32) [of] forty-five (45) visits, her visits 

decreased to bi[-]weekly. Mother missed seven (7) 

of the eleven (11) bi-weekly visits. Mother 

requested that her visits take place in the home due 

to her health problems to which [the] Agency 

requested a letter from a doctor stating that Mother 

was unable to go to the [A]gency for visits and visits 

needed to take place in her home. No letter was 

ever presented to the [A]gency. For all these stated 

reasons, it was proper for the [c]ourt to deny 

Mother’s request for a continuance.

Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 2-3 (citations omitted).

Mother, however, argues that the court’s denial of the request for a 

continuance amounted to “a deprivation of her right to testify on her own 

behalf and to participate in the proceedings.” (Mother’s brief at 15.) In so 

arguing, Mother references In re Adoption of A.N.P., 155 A.3d 56, 68 

(Pa.Super. 2017), a case where a panel of this court found that “the trial 

court violated Mother’s constitutional guarantee to due process when it 

precluded her from the opportunity to be heard.” Mother asserts as follows:

Similarly, in the instant case, the trial [c]ourt’s 

denial of counsel’s request for a continuance denied 

Mother the opportunity to participate, testify, and 

present evidence on her own behalf and it denied her 
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counsel the ability to present evidence in the form of 

Mother’s testimony. Essentially, the trial [c]ourt 

violated Mother’s constitutional guarantee to due 

process when it denied counsel’s continuance 

request because Mother was precluded from 

presenting her case to the [c]ourt. Based upon the 

above, Mother requests that the Decree and Order 

terminating her rights to her child be vacated, that 

the case be remanded for further proceedings before 

the trial [c]ourt, and that she be given the 

opportunity to present her case at subsequent 

proceedings before the [c]ourt.

Mother’s brief at 17. We disagree.

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion with regard to the 

denial of the request for a continuance, and as such, we do not disturb the 

court’s determination. We find that the factual circumstances of A.N.P. are 

distinguishable from the instant matter. In A.N.P., the mother was present 

and was excused from the courtroom during the termination proceedings by 

the court after raising illness. The court then refused to allow the mother 

re-entry and to allow the presentation of her testimony. A.N.P., 155 A.3d 

at 56-57. Here, however, Mother, who had a history of continuances, 

cancellations, and non-appearances, failed to appear. Mother e-mailed her 

counsel the morning of the termination hearing indicating medical issues and 

an appointment that morning without any supporting medical documentation 

establishing that she could not attend the hearing. (Notes of testimony, 

9/21/17 at 4-9.) Mother’s first issue is, thus, without merit.
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We next proceed to Mother’s challenge to the court’s termination of 

her parental rights. In matters involving involuntary termination of parental 

rights, our standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should 

not be reversed merely because the record would 

support a different result. Id. at 827. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts 

that often have first-hand observations of the parties 

spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 

9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis 
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of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the 

child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201, quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles 

E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). In this case, the trial court 

terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8). We have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of 

parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze 
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the court’s termination decree pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), 

which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
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We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 

(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected 

as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Instantly, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to 

Subsection (a), the trial court stated the following:
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Despite Child[’s] being in Agency custody for 

eighteen months, Mother failed to complete any of 

her plan’s objective[s]. Mother has not remained 

drug free. Mother was asked to complete a drug and 

alcohol evaluation by an Agency[-]approved drug 

and alcohol provider and was referred by the Agency 

to an approved provider on July 18, 2016. On 

July 29, 2016, Mother contacted the Agency and 

reported being admitted into a program for detox. 

Upon discharge, another appointment was set up for 

an evaluation on August 17, 2016. Mother did not 

follow through with this appointment. Mother was 

asked to complete another drug and alcohol 

evaluation to allow the Agency to provide input. 

Mother agreed to have another evaluation done but 

never followed through. Mother was admitted for 

inpatient treatment on August 29, 2016.

Mother was drug screened prior to her child 

visits. On more than one occasion, Mother tested 

positive for Opiates and Benzodiazepine for which 

she did not have a valid prescription. On numerous 

occasions, Mother refused the Agency’s request for a 

drug screen. On August 24, 2017, the [c]ourt 

ordered Mother to complete a drug screen. Mother 

refused to be screened at that time. She said she 

had an appointment but would return to the Agency 

later that day. Mother never came that day nor any 

day thereafter. The Agency contacted Mother the 

morning of September 14, 2017 to come in for a 

drug screening before the close of the day. Mother 

refused stating she had other things to do.

Mother failed to improve her mental health 

functioning. Although knowing since July 18, 2016, 

she needed to complete a psychological evaluation 

with Dr. Jonath[a]n Gransee, Mother did not have 

her evaluation until August of 2017. Dr. Gransee 

was reluctant to complete Mother’s evaluation 

because of her threatening and hostile behavior 

towards him. Dr. Gransee recommended that 

Mother participate in anger management, a drug and 

alcohol evaluation, medication management, and no 

less than twenty-six (26) weekly individual therapy 
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sessions. At the time of the hearing, Mother had 

attended only six (6) individual therapy sessions and 

was close to being discharged from therapy for poor 

attendance.

Mother failed to complete the domestic 

violence objective by not completing domestic 

violence offenders therapy. Mother was admitted to 

a twelve (12)[-]week program, however, Mother was 

discharged from the program after missing five (5) 

classes.

Mother has not remained crime free. Mother 

owes approximately twenty-four hundred dollars 

($2,400) in parking fines, has missed payments, and 

was arrested on a warrant on August 23, 2017. 

Mother also failed to resolve her drug charges. 

Mother did not appear for her court date on those 

charges and a warrant was issued for her arrest on 

January 28, 2017.

Mother has not completed her objectives of 

financial and housing stability. Mother has not 

provided Agency with proof of income despite 

claiming she receives social security and food 

stamps. Mother currently resides with her husband, 

father and her other children. Mother’s relationship 

with [her] husband is unstable and abusive. 

Mother’s nineteen (19)[-]year[-]old son also resides 

in the home. The son has been convicted of ten (10) 

felony counts of child pornography and it is not 

recommended that he be around any child more than 

two years younger than he without supervision.

Originally[,] Mother was granted weekly visits 

with Child. However, after missing thirty-two (32) 

[of] forty-five (45) visits, her visits decreased to 

bi[-]weekly in March 20, 2017. Thereafter, she 

missed seven (7) of the eleven (11) bi-weekly visits. 

Mother requested her visits take place in the home 

due to her health problems. The Agency requested a 

letter from a doctor stating that Mother was unable 

to go to the Agency for visits and that the visits 

needed to take place in her home. No letter was 
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ever presented to the Agency by Mother. The last 

visit Mother had with Child was on August 31, 

2016.[

7]

Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 5-6 (unpaginated; citations omitted).

Mother, however, argues that the court erred in determining that she 

had failed to complete any objectives established. (Mother’s brief at 27-31.) 

Mother asserts that her drug and alcohol, mental health, and domestic 

violence objectives were ongoing, not incomplete. (Id. at 27-29.) She 

further maintains that the Agency’s failure to make a referral for parenting 

prevented her completion of this objective. (Id. at 29-30.) Likewise, 

Mother argues that she completed her housing and income objectives. (Id.

at 30-31.) Lastly, as to her commitment objective, Mother contends that “it 

was unreasonable for the Agency not to grant Mother’s requests for home 

visits. Due to the Agency’s actions, Mother missed several visits with the 

child.” (Id. at 30.) Mother, therefore, maintains that “the only objective 

that was incomplete at the time of the hearing was parenting. . . ,” which, as 

indicated, she blames on the Agency. (Id. at 31.) We disagree. 

A review of the record supports the trial court’s determination of a 

basis for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). As we discern no abuse of 

discretion or error of law, we do not disturb the court’s findings. The 

evidence reveals that Mother failed to complete her established objectives 

 

7 Given that Mother’s visitation decreased to bi-weekly in March 2017, it 

would appear that this is a misstatement as to when her last visit with Child 

occurred.
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contained within her child permanency plan. Agency caseworker, 

Caitlin Hoover, recounted Mother’s objectives as: to remain free from drugs 

and the misuse of alcohol, to improve mental health functioning to the 

extent that she can care for her child, to remain free of domestic violence, to 

remain crime free, to learn and use good parenting skills, to be financially 

stable in order to provide for herself and her child, to obtain and maintain a 

home free and clear of hazards for herself and her child, and to maintain an

ongoing commitment to her child. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 64, 

69-73.) Significantly, Ms. Hoover testified that Mother failed to complete her 

objectives. (Id. at 76.) 

Further, Dr. Gransee testified as to Mother’s perceiving herself as and 

acting and reacting as a victim, which could be harmful to those around her. 

(Id. at 27-30.) Specifically, he stated that others “may develop trauma 

disorders as well.” (Id. at 29.) He further explained how Mother’s 

behaviors may in effect “continu[e] the pattern, the cycle of abuse from 

generation to generation. . . .” (Id. at 30.) Dr. Gransee opined that, 

despite Mother’s reported therapy, he was not hopeful as to her ability to 

change in the future. (Id. at 30-31.) 

As this court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 
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of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion 

that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

has caused Child to be without essential parental control or subsistence 

necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this 

situation. See id.

As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we 

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b). 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384. We, therefore, need not address any further 

subsection of Section 2511(a) and turn to whether termination was proper 

under Section 2511(b). 

As to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). 

The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In 

In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this 

Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the 

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The

“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. 
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However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s 

bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on 

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

Moreover,

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster 

parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M.,

33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are 
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in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the 

bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court 

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have 

an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail 

. . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored the 

Child’s needs and welfare, the court reasoned as follows:

The Child’s best interest is served by her 

remaining in foster care and being adopted. She has 

been in care for eighteen (18) months, since 

seven (7) months of age. The [c]ourt is convinced 

that the parents will not resolve their significant 

issues in a reasonable amount of time. Child is 

thriving in a loving and healthy home which is a 

potentially permanent resource. She has clearly 

bonded with the resource parents, and the other 

child in the home. By now, any bonding with parents 

is very limited at best. Child cannot wait for an 

indefinite period of time for the stability and care of 

a permanent family in the hope that her biological 

parents will drastically change their behavior and 

accomplish their goals. She is doing well and has 

spent more time with their current family than with 

anyone else. It is clear to this [c]ourt that the best 

interest of Child is served by terminating the rights 

of the parents and having her being adopted. The 

[CASA] and the Guardian ad litem support the 

termination of parental rights.

Trial court opinion, 11/3/17 at 7-8 (unpaginated; citations to record 

omitted).
J. S04033/18

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Mother, however, asserts error, citing a lack of evidence to support the 

court’s findings as to bonding. (Mother’s brief at 31-32.) Mother states:

[T]he [c]ourt concluded that the child has “clearly 

bonded with the resource parents, and the other 

child in the home.” However, no evidence was 

presented to support this finding. No bonding 

assessment was done and the [CASA] did not 

provide any testimony at the hearing. Additionally, 

there was no basis for the [c]ourt to conclude that 

“by now, any bonding with parents is very limited at 

best.” Based upon the above, it was error for the 

[c]ourt to conclude that terminating Mother’s 

parental rights would be in the child’s best interests.

Id. (citations to record omitted).

Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record 

supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial 

court to make a determination of Child’s needs and welfare, and as to the 

existence of a lack of a bond between Mother and Child that, if severed, 

would not have a detrimental impact on her.

While Ms. Hoover testified that Mother’s visits with Child went well 

(notes of testimony, 9/21/17 at 109-110), she confirmed that Mother missed 

a total of 39 of 56 visits with Child. (Id. at 73-75.) Moreover, Child was in 

the same pre-adoptive home since placement and was doing well and 

bonded with her resource family. (Id. at 85-86.) Ms. Hoover offered that 

Child “has developed a close relationship and attachment with her resource 
J. S04033/18

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parents and their adopted daughter. [Child] also enjoys playing with 

resource parents’ two dogs.” (Id. at 86.) As such, Ms. Hoover opined that 

it was in Child’s best interests to terminate parental rights. She stated:

The [Agency] believes that termination of parental 

rights would be in Child’s best interest so that she 

may be adopted and have a stable permanent home. 

Prolonging this child in foster care and not allowing 

her stability and permanency in her life would cause 

more harm than termination of parental rights.

Id. It was noted on the record that the CASA also recommended Child 

remain in her resource home and favored termination of parental rights. 

(Id. at 110.) 

Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Mother’s parental 

rights serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare and was proper pursuant to Section 2511(b). While Mother may 

profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the 

hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the 

custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or 

her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(citation omitted). 
J. S04033/18

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Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Lastly, court-appointed counsel for Mother additionally has filed a 

petition to withdraw as counsel. Counsel indicates that, by electronic mail 

dated January 6, 2018, Mother “no longer want[s] her involved in” and 

“discharged her from the case.” (Petition of counsel to withdraw 

appearance, 1/18/18 at ¶10.) Counsel further notes that she advised 

Mother of the filing of the within petition and availability of her file without 

response. (Id. at ¶13.) However, as there is no simultaneous entry of 

appearance of another counsel on Mother’s behalf, or suggestion thereof, we 

deny counsel’s petition without prejudice. See Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court 

Rules 1.7(b) (“Counsel who has entered an appearance before the court as 

provided in subparagraph (a) shall not be permitted to withdraw without 

filing a petition to withdraw and obtaining the court’s leave, unless . . . there 

is a simultaneous entry of appearance by other counsel that will not delay 

the litigation.”).

Decree affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel denied without 

prejudice to petition the Orphans’ Court. If the court grants the petition to 

withdraw, then it should make a determination as to whether substitute 

counsel is required for any further appellate review.
J. S04033/18

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/20/2018