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67–598PDF 2011

COORDINATING AFRICA POLICY ON SECURITY,

COUNTERTERRORISM, HUMANITARIAN

OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2011

Serial No. 112–100

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................................... 6

The Honorable Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ..................... 12

Ms. Sharon Cromer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development ................................................ 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement ................................. 9

The Honorable Vicki Huddleston: Prepared statement ........................................ 16

Ms. Sharon Cromer: Prepared statement .............................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 48

The Honorable Vicki Huddleston: 

Written responses to questions asked during the hearing by the Honorable 

Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and 

Human Rights ................................................................................................... 49

Written responses to questions asked for the record by the Honorable 

Rus Carnahan ................................................................................................... 60

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COORDINATING AFRICA POLICY ON SECURITY, COUNTERTERRORISM, HUMANITARIAN 

OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2255 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. And good afternoon to everybody. Sorry for the delay. We did have a series of 

votes on the House floor so we’re a little bit late, not too late, but 

a little bit. 

We are meeting today to examine how the United States’ policies 

are being coordinated in Africa from the security, counterterrorism, 

humanitarian, and development perspectives since the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command in 2008. 

For decades, despite the wave of African independence in the 

1950s through the 1970s, many American policy makers did not believe Africa held strategic importance to the United States. According to one defense analyst, ‘‘During the Cold War, the United 

States’ foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa had little to do 

with Africa.’’

After the fall of the Soviet Union many U.S. policy makers continue to consider the U.S. military’s role and responsibilities on the 

continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of Defense asserted in its U.S. security strategy for sub-Saharan Africa that ‘‘ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.’’ 

Oh, how they were wrong. 

A look at current statistics amply demonstrates that the United 

States does have a strategic and a very strong one in sub-Saharan 

Africa. Over 90 percent of U.S. trade with African nations centers 

on American imports of African oil. Imports from Africa comprise 

of nearly a quarter of all American oil imports and promises to increase as new sources of oil continue to be found throughout Africa. 

Similarly, African nations have abundant minerals on which our 

modern society depends. In recent years, the mineral coltan, largely from Africa, has enabled the development of computers, cell 

phones, and electronic devices. We would be hard pressed to construct jet aircraft, automobile catalytic converters, or iPods, withVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072611\67598 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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out the minerals found in Africa and, in some cases, almost nowhere else to be found in the world. 

Since the 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania, it has become clear that terrorism can strike the 

United States even in Africa. In fact, the presence of Africans on 

the list of planners of the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks demonstrates that terrorism in Africa is not confined to Africa itself and can reach out and strike us even in our homeland. 

In a hearing that I chaired on March 12, 1999, on U.S. embassy 

security, Admiral William Crowe, then chairman of the Accountability Review Board, said the Kenya and Tanzania bombings demonstrated the inadequacy of resources to provide security against 

terrorist attacks as demonstrated by the lack of resources devoted 

to U.S. security at U.S. posts abroad. That resulted in what we 

then called the Embassy Security Act of 1999, and I offered it. It 

became known when it was finally enacted as the Admiral Nance 

and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act of 2000. 

When I visited Sudan in 2005, government officials in Khartoum 

admitted they had harbored al-Qaeda in the past and Security 

Chief Salah Gosh bragged to me about how close his government 

was to the late Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda at one time. Clearly, we must remain vigilant concerning the existence of terrorist organizations that threaten our interests in Africa and of course, Africa’s people. 

As we have learned during our hearings on Somalia on July 7th, 

we are currently in the midst of a huge famine in the Horn of Africa as a result of severe drought that is affecting the entire eastern 

Africa region. The drought, said to be the worst in 60 years, has 

caused a severe crisis across Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya that 

threatens the livelihood of more than 12 million people. Other 

countries in and around the Horn of Africa including Djibouti, 

Sudan, South Sudan, and parts of Uganda also are affected by a 

food crisis. 

Our Government certainly now realizes the importance of Africa, 

but remnants of our policy neglect remain. One example of the previous underestimation of Africa’s significance was the division of 

American interests in Africa among three different combatant commands: The European Command, the Central Command and the 

Pacific Command. Because of their differing strategic objectives 

and goals, Africa was hardly ever a primary concern. The creation 

of the African Command or AFRICOM demonstrates the current 

awareness of the strategic importance of Africa, not only for the 

United States, but for the world in general. 

During our country’s growing engagement with the nations of Africa, our policy toward the continent has been managed by two civilian agencies, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development. It is therefore reasonable that 

AFRICOM contains a larger non-DoD civilian staff than has been 

the tradition with other combatant commands, but questions remain concerning whether an expanded military presence will overshadow the so-called soft power of diplomacy and humanitarian developmental assistance. 

DoD officials emphasize that AFRICOM remains under development. Some details regarding the command structure and footprint 

3

are still being reviewed. For example, a decision on AFRICOM’s 

final headquarters’ location has been postponed until 2012 and a 

move to the continent may not occur for several years, if at all. 

This new coordination during the past 3 years among the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department, and its implications 

for U.S. policy in Africa as a whole, will be the focus of this hearing. 

A former EUCOM commander suggested that the Africa Command, with the interagency coordination, would be the pioneer for 

a new approach that other commands might adopt later. We look 

forward to examining the challenges and the success of this approach with our very distinguished witnesses. 

I’d like to now yield such time as it may consume to my good 

friend and colleague, Don Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me 

commend you for calling this very important hearing. Today, I look 

forward to the hearing about the recent developments in AFRICOM 

and its mission to collaborate with state and USAID. I think that 

Africa has had its problems as it moved out of decolonization following World War II as it started to move for independence, but 

as that occurred, of course, the Cold War began. And countries 

then were judged on what side are you on, on the Warsaw Pact nations with the USSR or are you with democracy as we were fighting against the Iron Curtain countries. And so unfortunately, because of that, dictators were put into power not on how they govern, but where they stood. And we’ve seen people like Mobutu in 

Zaire and Santos in Angola and we can go on, so-called constructive engagement in South Africa with P. W. Botha, where we 

looked the other way because our main concern was where do you 

stand against the USSR. So unfortunately as democratization came 

about many countries felt all they had to do was to satisfy either 

the USA or the USSR and move along with brutal dictators, mostly 

military persons. 

And so we have seen the difficult transition. We did see a wave 

of democracy move through in the ’70s and ’80s and ’90s where 

countries had excellent elections and we saw the military people 

move out of the leadership of countries and democratically elected 

leaders. Of course, we know AFRICOM was first established in 

2007, made operational in 2008 to promote the U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding areas. Prior to 

AFRICOM’s creation there were, as we know, three Department of 

Defense combatant commands covering Africa, U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. 

At that time, current U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, then a Senior 

Fellow at Brookings Institute criticized the three command approach by stating that Africa had been the poor stepchild in each 

of these different commands and that it deserved full attention of 

a U.S. Command. 

Given Africa’s strategic importance and the prevalence of civil violence and the development challenges on the continent, it was felt 

that it was appropriate for the Department of Defense, State Department and USAID to have a coordinated approach to addressing 

security in the region. AFRICOM must also adhere to its stated 

4

purpose to work with African nations and African organizations to 

build regional security and crisis response capacity. 

When AFRICOM was first launched, I voiced concern regarding 

the role it would be playing and the motivation behind its creation 

and much of that came from African leaders. You may recall when 

AFRICOM was announced, General Ward, who we have so much 

respect for him as he recently retired, Four Star General, was appointed to lead AFRICOM and did visit a number of African countries to inform them about this new command. 

Unfortunately, not much previous announcement was given. 

Meetings were short and quick. Had to do one or two countries 

every other day and I think that it was handled totally poorly. And 

therefore, Africa countries wondered what is this all about? And 

secondly, our Department of Defense, in my opinion, did a very 

poor job of introducing it. African Presidents with a number of 

them wondered well, what is this new thing? Is it just because U.S. 

has interests? Is it watch the Gulf of Guinea’s oil? Is it fight alQaeda? All of these things are very positive for the United States 

of America, but well, secondly, what does it mean for us? It’s great 

for you, but what about us? 

And so I think that the debacle of the poor manner in which the 

introduction of AFRICOM to African nations was a setback. Every 

single country said thanks, but no thanks except Liberia who, as 

you know, is one of our staunchest allies. And of course, the President was looking for the AFRICOM to come to Liberia because they 

need to have additional income. I believe that was the main reason. 

So it was handled poorly and it was a setback. 

My primary concern was like I said, it was hastily created, although Department of Defense was thinking about it for a long 

time. However, they didn’t let others know. Unclear mission and 

the potential of militarizing foreign aid. And that was one of the 

other misconceptions. You had to see the General to see whether 

you were going to get aid or not. 

And as we talk about democracy all through the ’70s and ’80s 

and ’90s and said do away with the generals, they shouldn’t be in 

charge of government. They shouldn’t be the ones you go to for assistance and for jobs and we looked like we were putting a general 

in charge of what agency should get the aid or the food or should 

the children get it or the adults? So it was just poorly conceived 

in my opinion. Of course, people in the Department of Defense tell 

me I’m all wrong. The State Department said it, too. However, 

that’s just the way it is. 

So we are where we are. 

Another concern was that African nations have expressed unwillingness to house the Command with the notable exception, as I 

mentioned, of Liberia. In fact, just last month, Liberia’s President, 

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, met with me and other Members of Congress 

and stated her desire once again to have AFRICOM headquartered 

in Liberia. I’m interested as we move along about whether the operations will move to Africa, will stay in Europe, and if Liberia is 

one of the countries that would be considered. Many others also 

questioned the Bush administration’s intentions for AFRICOM and 

worried about the increased military presence and whether this 

5

was a reaction to China’s growing investment in the region and 

ways of securing Africa’s valuable natural resources. 

There is no doubt that the Department of Defense have resources 

and capabilities, that’s for sure. If used in a collaborative way with 

the Department of State, USAID, as well as African military partners, can serve as a valuable contribution to the continent. Indeed, 

there are good examples for such collaboration. For example, 

AFRICOM has utilized USAID’s conflict analysis of Southern 

Sudan to inform its planning efforts and is assisting in the interagency in determining the appropriate approach to supporting 

South Sudan’s security sector reform and conflict mitigation activities. 

In the DRC, AFRICOM collaborated with State and USAID to 

address sexual and gender-based violence issues which, as we 

know, is very prominent there. The Command used its resources to 

construct or renovate buildings where the government, the U.N. or 

local and international nongovernmental organizations delivered 

services. AFRICOM also oversaw training on preventing sexual and 

gender-based violence for the Congolese Army. 

These successful interventions and training initiatives are good 

examples of how interagency cooperation on security assistance in 

Africa can be very effective and AFRICOM has the resources to be 

a valuable player on the continent. It is important, however, that 

AFRICOM seek to maintain equal partnership and does not over 

reach its mandate and attempt to become a leader in the U.S. diplomacy and development. 

While I remain somewhat hesitant about aspects of AFRICOM 

with foreign assistance funds at a risk for significant cuts as we 

move to the next Congresses, I welcome AFRICOM as a partner to 

State and USAID since the Department of Defense is the only Department that seems to be able to not have serious cuts. 

I hope to learn about, more about the interagency coordination 

between AFRICOM, USAID, and State Department and how this 

collaboration is benefitting African citizens while also advancing 

American interests. So I certainly look forward to the testimony 

and I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Chairman, I have no comment at this time. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Once again, thank you, Chairman Smith 

and Ranking Member Payne for convening this important hearing 

to discuss AFRICOM and its role in Africa. I’d also like to thank 

our witnesses who will present testimony today. I look forward to 

hearing more about the inter-departmental collaborations and coordinations between AFRICOM and USAID. 

Throughout the hearing, I also look forward to hearing more 

about direct interaction and relationship between AFRICOM and 

African countries. I do understand, as Mr. Payne was describing, 

that many African leaders are concerned and some resistant to the 

idea of AFRICOM headquartered within the continent. And I’m interested in assessing the value of relocating AFRICOM to the continent both for Americans and Africans. 

I would appreciate some additional information about the general 

posture of African leaders and the African Union toward AFRICOM 

6

at this time. So thank you very much for the taking the time out 

today. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Ms. Buerkle. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank 

you and the ranking member, Mr. Payne, for calling this very important hearing and I look forward to hearing the testimony from 

our witnesses, this afternoon. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Buerkle. Without objection, a full biography of each of our very distinguished witnesses 

will be made a part of the record, but I will just briefly introduce 

them to the panel, beginning—although none of you are strangers—beginning with Ambassador Donald Yamamoto who has testified before us as recently as March at a hearing on the DRC and 

another hearing just a few weeks ago on Somalia. He has served 

since 2009 as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau for African Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. His prior 

assignments included serving as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from 

November 2006 to July 2009, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State in the Bureau for African Affairs from ’03 to ’06. 

We’ll then hear from Ambassador Vicki Huddleston who currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. Ambassador Huddleston began her 

public service career as a Peace Corps volunteer and has held a 

number of positions in the State Department including several in 

Africa where she served as Acting Ambassador to Ethiopia and 

Ambassador to Madagascar and Mali. Throughout her career in the 

State Department, Ambassador Huddleston has worked to advance 

democracy and to build peace. Prior to joining the DoD, she was 

a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. 

And finally we’ll hear from Sharon Cromer who is currently serving as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Africa Bureau 

for USAID, a position she has held since May 2010. Ms. Cromer 

is a Senior USAID Foreign Service Officer with more than 20 years 

of experience in the international humanitarian and development 

assistance area. Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. 

Cromer served as Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance on a temporary 

basis before assuming the position of Deputy Administrator in the 

Bureau of Management. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, if you would proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith 

and Ranking Member Payne and distinguished members of this 

committee. I extend our deep appreciation to this committee for 

this hearing on AFRICOM’s partnership with USAID and the Department of State in facing the challenges in Africa and forming 

important alliances with Africa’s leaders and people. 

AFRICOM’s role is a paradigm shift, a new way of doing business that makes sense, promotes our national strategic interests, 

and accomplishes our goals and objectives by bringing the interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072611\67598 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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agency closer as a team in the most effective and innovative manner. 

First, AFRICOM provides greater unity of command on a continent that DoD previously split between geographic combatant 

commands, a multiple, functional commands. Further, AFRICOM 

provides a command structure capable of coordinating and commanding a multitude of U.S. military components engaged in programs in Africa, enhancing DoD’s operational effectiveness in cooperation with our Embassies, Ambassadors, and USAID mission 

directors. 

In the past several years, DoD components have grown to become 

the largest non-State Department presence in several of our missions. 

Second, AFRICOM is an important partner for USAID and State, 

as we seek to tackle problems, pursue solutions and expand partnerships in Africa. General Ward, and now General Ham, do not 

merely meet with their military counterparts, but also with national leaders, civilian policy makers and play an integral part in 

how we approach Africa, how we develop policy and how we execute programs. 

Third, AFRICOM has a civilian Department of State official as 

its deputy commander, as well as other State and USAID officers 

directly integrated into its headquarter structures which improves 

coordinations between agencies which is a unique organizational 

arrangement, not commonly found in military formations. Duplicated in other commands, AFRICOM’s unique approach is directly 

relevant to Secretary Clinton’s launching of the QDDR process 

through which we are rethinking how we do business and integrate 

the interagency in achieving our common national goals and objectives. 

AFRICOM, with USAID and State are working together to address a multitude of challenges including the conflict in Libya; implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan; stabilization, piracy challenges in Somalia; addressing violence in 

Congo; development in Liberia; promoting training and infrastructure development throughout Africa and transnational challenges. 

In addition, we are directly collaborating on issues such as military professionalization, building counterterrorism capacity, disaster management, peacekeeping capacity building, humanitarian 

operations coordinated with USAID, de-mining ammunition handling training, nonproliferation of weapons and mass destruction, 

destruction of excess small arms, light weapons and ammunition, 

defense sector reform, maritime safety, a whole slew of activities 

that goes on and on. 

If there’s a downside to the level of engagement we have seen 

from AFRICOM, it is that the large number of AFRICOM’s temporary assignment personnel deployed to the continent often 

present significant logistical challenges for our U.S. missions which 

sometimes find it difficult to maintain full visibility and provide 

adequate support given their own very limited staffing levels. 

Additionally, the constant turnover of temporary military personnel working on 3 or 6 months’ rotations can cause significant 

confusion with both a country team and the host nation it carefully 

manages. Nonetheless, we will continue to work together and coVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072611\67598 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ordinate closely in order to mitigate and manage these challenges 

which are far outweighed by the positive gains that AFRICOM has 

made in the past 3 years. 

I can report to you today that cooperation between AFRICOM 

and our African partners is at an all-time high, despite the lingering wariness toward AFRICOM on the part of some African nations. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again 

for this opportunity to appear before this committee. And I submit 

a longer version for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Yamamoto follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record 

and thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador Huddleston? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICKI HUDDLESTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 

Payne, thank you, first of all, for your remarks. We very much appreciated them. And honorable members of the committee, thank 

you for the invitation to talk with you today about cooperation between the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, the State Department, and the USAID on the African continent. 

I also want to extend my thanks to my colleagues from State and 

USAID and other witnesses today. 

Since its standup in 2008, AFRICOM has brought long-needed 

integration to the security dimension of our Africa policy. Up to 

that time, DoD had partitioned Africa among three co-COMs, 

EUCOM, CENTCOM, AND PACOM. As a result, Africa did not receive the attention it needed. The lack of one command focused exclusively on the continent meant that DoD lacked a coherent, consistent approach to and an understanding of the region’s vast complexities. And both the chairman and the ranking member, mentioned that. 

One immediate and fully expected outcome of the creation of 

AFRICOM has been the expanded DoD engagement in the U.S. Africa policy making and implementation policy. This should have 

come as no surprise. Secretary Clinton has spelled out the three 

legs of national security: Diplomacy, development, and defense. 

Strong diplomacy and robust development programs have served as 

hallmarks of U.S. Africa policy for a half century since the end of 

colonialism. 

Less prominent, however, in that formulation was the third leg, 

defense. The Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and 

9/11 brought home to all of us that we could no longer afford to 

place Africa on the periphery of national security. 

Today, Africa is part of a struggle against violent extremism, notably against al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in Maghreb in 

the north and west of the African continent. Instability on the continent affects the U.S. homeland directly whether threats of terrorism, economic disruption, refugee flows or any host of other 

ways. We now all recognize the need to focus equally on the third 

D of Secretary Clinton’s formulation. 

We at the Pentagon work closely with AFRICOM and our interagency partners at the State Department and USAID to ensure 

that our nation’s goals in Africa are well defined and our activities 

are closely coordinated from planning through implementation. 

And just as an aside, I can assure you that that has been my highest priority. 

This close coordination occurs at all levels. I meet weekly via secure video link with my counterparts on the Joint Staff and with 

senior generals at AFRICOM including J2 Intelligence, J5 Strategy 

and J3 Operations and Logistics. And we meet bi-weekly with the 

State Department’s Africa Bureau to coordinate our policies in seVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072611\67598 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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curity cooperation and our activities. And I attend, along with Assistant Secretary of State and my colleague, Sharon Cromer on my 

left, a weekly meeting at the National Security Council chaired by 

the Senior Director. 

Coordination extends much deeper, however, than myself and 

senior staff. Every day action officers in my office, colonels, lieutenants, lieutenant colonels, commanders, and the civilians are on the 

phone, emailing and attending meetings on both sides of the Potomac River. Such is the frequency of these interactions that they are 

on a first-name basis with their State and USAID colleagues. 

There’s extensive cross fertilization among agencies, the concrete 

result of years of planning. I have a permanent State 

Department position on my staff and it is currently held by a veteran Foreign Service Officer. Likewise, the Regional Security Affairs Division of the Africa Bureau has two active military colonels 

on its staff. 

DoD works closely with the State Department to implement 

broad security cooperation efforts, leveraging the complementary 

authorities and funding streams available to each department. And 

this, I think, is really the heart of the matter. The State Department, under its Title 2 authority, manages security assistance programs to promote U.S. foreign policy through diplomacy by building 

professional militaries that respect international law and human 

rights. These programs include the well-known examples of Foreign 

Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, 

IMET, Regional Security Initiatives, and Peacekeeping Operations 

capacity building. DoD plays a crucial role in all those programs in 

their implementation, through our U.S. AFRICOM personnel who 

are on the continent and also through our defense attaches that are 

assigned to the Embassies that are under the authority of the 

United States Ambassadors. 

DoD’s Title 10 activities expand and complement these Title 22 

activities of the State Department, thereby furthering USG policy 

objectives set by the Department of State and the National Security Council. Title 10 programs fund exercises that give African 

militaries the opportunity to work together and often to provide assistance to their citizens. In addition, Section 1206 authority allows 

State and DoD to build counterterrorism capacity of our African 

partners. 

These Title 10 activities reflect our over-arching goals of assisting African militaries to protect and defend their borders and their 

citizens. The proposed new Global Security Contingency Fund 

would further this collaborative approach by allowing DoD and 

State to pool resources, thereby facilitating our national response 

to complex crises that require a range of military and diplomatic 

assistance. 

AFRICOM’s security sector strategy ensures that our national interests are protected from potential threats on the African continent while contributing to the stability and security for the people 

of Africa. Ranking Member Payne mentioned what is in it for the 

people of Africa. AFRICOM achieves these objectives by building 

partner nation capacity so that our partners can counter extremism 

and provide for the security of their citizens and contribute to 

peacekeeping. 

14

In the Horn of Africa, AFRICOM builds capacity of local militaries so they can effectively counter extremist threats. The State 

Department’s regional program, Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism, PREACT, provides the framework under 

which AFRICOM’s activities are carried out in the Horn of Africa. 

AFRICOM provides military trainers to the State Department’s African Contingency Operation and Training and Assistance Program, ACOTA, that trains Ugandan and Burundian contingents 

that make up the bulk of AMISON peacekeepers in Somalia. 

In West Africa, AFRICOM’s Special Forces are building the capacity of Malian and Mauritanian forces to counter al-Qaeda in the 

Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM. These efforts are conducted 

under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP, 

that the State Department is responsible for and is in coordination 

with USAID as well. AFRICOM enhances the capacity of our key 

African partners to provide a secure environment for democracy, 

governance, and development. State contractors and USAFRICOM 

trained a battalion in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 

new army of Liberia. By training professional military units that 

respect civilian control, these militaries become important contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law. AFRICOM’s exercises provide opportunities for our African partners to continue perfecting their professional abilities. 

The State Department and DoD are committed to helping African 

armed forces prevent and deter tragedies that result in humanitarian disasters. In response to congressional legislation, State, 

DoD, and USAID have developed a strategy to assist the governments and the armed forces in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, and the Central African Republic to counter the atrocities 

that are being committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

AFRICOM’s activities will improve the regional armed forces’ ability to defeat the LRA. In parallel, USAID and State are working 

with local NGOs. 

Today, we are facing a vast humanitarian crisis that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as a result of the severe drought in the 

Horn of Africa. While State and USAID are leading a significant 

humanitarian response on behalf of the U.S. Government, 

USAFRICOM has set up a task force and is prepared to assist in 

any appropriate way when requested. 

In Libya, USAFRICOM worked closely with State and USAID to 

return thousands of Egyptians stranded in Tunisia to their homes. 

This air bridge complemented AFRICOM’s leadership of 

Odyssey Dawn, a coalition of 10 nations that, in accordance with 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, stopped the advance of the Libyan Army on defenseless civilians in Benghazi, and 

put into place a no-fly zone, and a sea embargo. 

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member, for the 

opportunity to discuss interagency security cooperation efforts in 

Africa. I believe that AFRICOM’s success as a command will depend on its ability to coordinate its activities with State and 

USAID and indeed with its African partners and we have much improved, AFRICOM has much improved its initial roll-out which 

Ranking Member Payne pointed out was not as successful as we 

would have liked. 

15

Over the past 2 years as AFRICOM has matured as a Command, 

this cooperation and communication with Africa, and indeed with 

my colleagues here, has improved AFRICOM’s ability to build partner capacity, respond to the needs of the continent, and defend our 

nation’s interests. USAFRICOM is proving the wisdom of establishing a single command for Africa that can provide rapid and appropriate assistance for a continent with many challenges and 

great possibilities. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Huddleston follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Huddleston, thank you so very much for 

your testimony. 

Ms. Cromer. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON CROMER, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, 

Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to speak with you today 

about how USAID works with AFRICOM to achieve common U.S. 

foreign policy goals. I would like to also thank Ambassadors 

Yamamoto and Huddleston for their work in collaboration. We really do meet on a bi-weekly basis and we see a lot of each other. 

With the chairman’s permission, I will submit my testimony in 

full for the record, but today I will make three brief points. The 

first point is that USAID and AFRICOM engagement is mutually 

supportive of U.S. foreign policy objectives. In other words, we have 

found common ground. Today’s world is more interconnected and 

complex than ever. Instability, poverty, and disease travel with 

ease across oceans and borders. Problems abroad all too quickly become problems at home. A peaceful, healthy, and prosperous Africa 

benefits us all. 

The link between security and development is as essential in Africa as it is elsewhere. War, terrorism, and violence threaten current progress and impede potential gains in health, education, democracy and economic growth. But with improved security, African 

nations can experience sustained economic growth, better living 

conditions and improved governance. 

USAID coordination with the Department of Defense must not be 

perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather 

as contributing to broad U.S. foreign policy goals. While we retain 

the essential humanitarian and development mission of USAID, we 

have also found mutually beneficial opportunities that support the 

interests of the United States and the beneficiaries in the countries 

in which we work. 

For example, USAFRICOM had a prominent role in helping to 

stabilize Liberia following years of civil war. As a result, USAID 

has worked with the Government of Liberia to develop a long-term 

sustainable health program that is providing the essential package 

of basic health services to the Liberian people. This type of work 

is not possible amidst war and strife. The military’s logistical capabilities can be invaluable assets in providing humanitarian assistance during emergencies. Fortunately, we have not had an opportunity to call upon them in recent years on the continent. 

Likewise, USAID’s unique skills in addressing a range of essential civilian needs during both times of peace and war substantially 

and strategically benefit the foreign policy of the United States. 

Thus, USAID’s coordination with the military’s assistance programs can lead to important synergies of effort. For example, in 

some countries where USAID is providing assistance and training 

to teachers in rural schools, the Department of Defense’s humanitarian assistance teams have renovated school structures, including 

dining halls and latrines to improve hygiene and orderliness. This 

21

combined effort creates a learning environment in which improved 

reading and math skills prevail. 

The second point is that early coordination in the planning phase 

between USAID and AFRICOM has vastly improved since we established staffing structures which have been described in earlier 

testimony. This structure includes three officers who—USAID officers who work at AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as 

staff—AFRICOM staff who work in our Office of Military Affairs in 

Washington. 

Increased regular dialogue and joint planning helps us to align 

activities from the start, whereas in the past, misunderstandings 

and assumptions and lack of coordination could lead to problems in 

the implementation phase we’re now planning from the start and 

avoiding some of those challenges. 

USAID regularly engages with AFRICOM through ongoing participation in a variety of strategic visioning and planning processes 

and through regular briefings on particular countries and programs. This engagement has included an unprecedented level of 

USAID participation and development of AFRICOM’s current theater campaign plan which directs AFRICOM’s peacetime activities 

across the continent. In fact, just last week at USAID, we reviewed 

this plan with AFRICOM participants, identifying common visions 

and goals and objectives. 

Our work in Djibouti presents an example of how strategic alignment produces mutually beneficial results. Previously, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, CJTF–HOA, proposed 

projects and if USAID and the Embassy concurred, coordination 

with the Government of Djibouti would follow. Under that system, 

projects may or may not have been aligned with local development 

needs and priorities. Under the new framework, USAID works with 

the Government of Djibouti to develop a list of needed projects 

first. While CJTF–HOA, taking into account their own objectives 

and resources, can choose to contribute to any such project if it has 

the endorsement of the Ambassador. 

For example, the opening of the Guistir Clinic near the Somali 

border was the first large-scale project carried out under this 

framework. For years, USAID had been building and refurbishing 

rural health clinics in Djibouti, at carefully selected sites. CJTF–

HOA constructed the Guistir Clinic in a remote border area identified by the Government of Djibouti and USAID as a remaining gap 

in the health care system. USAID’s assistance complemented 

CJTF–HOA’s efforts by equipping and staffing the clinic which 

today provides access to health care for over 400 families. 

The third and final point is that while USAID and AFRICOM 

have notable successes working together, challenges do remain. 

AFRICOM is still relatively new and so, too, is its cooperation and 

collaboration with USAID and other U.S. Government actors. 

USAID is able to program a sizeable amount of foreign assistance 

in Africa through a relatively small number of staff members, while 

AFRICOM has a smaller budget and more available staff. 

While USAID is moving to move more resources to Africa, it is 

still difficult as Ambassador Yamamoto pointed out for us to engage fully with AFRICOM on the ground, given the fact that our 

staff are so stretched. Nonetheless, the payoffs that can result from 

22

a comprehensive whole of government approach are so important 

that the effort to coordinate is worthwhile. 

Gains made in civil military coordination need to be institutionalized to prevent stagnation and backsliding. We are committed 

to enhancing, monitoring, and evaluation so that we can learn from 

mistakes and amplify best practices. 

The central point of our relationship is clear. Security, stability, 

and peace are essential for economic growth, poverty reduction and 

for development overall. We welcome the continued dialogue to ensure the solutions for short-term objectives are consistent with our 

shared long-term goals. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cromer follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Let me just beginning the 

questioning. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, you responded to, and Ambassador Huddleston as well, the largely negative reaction that met AFRICOM 

early on. And I’m wondering how that reaction has changed, and 

if so why? Was it a matter of a false impression as to what we were 

up to? 

And if you could perhaps, Ambassador Huddleton, you as well 

answer that. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. I think it’s changed immensely and 

basically because the countries of Africa have seen AFRICOM at 

work. General Ward was an amazing diplomat for AFRICOM and 

he was all over the continent talking with Presidents as well as 

chiefs of staff of militaries and ministers of defense. General Ham 

has been absolutely the same. He is today, as we speak, in Ethiopia. And so they, themselves, have been very, very good Ambassadors. 

But what we’ve done with Africa also makes a huge difference 

because we’ve done exercises such as Natural Fire in Uganda, 

where we bring the regional militaries together and then they 

carry out an exercise with us that builds a school and provides relief in a clinic. So these are things that Africans understand. They 

can see how it’s helping their military not only to improve their 

skills, but to work with other militaries in the region. 

And then they’ve seen what’s going on, for example, the training 

of a Liberian Army battalion in Kisangani, which has now been deployed up into the region where the LRA is active and hopefully 

they’ll be able to provide some additional protection for civilians in 

that area. 

Where AFRICOM still runs into problems is on a political level, 

and in that regard, that’s because some of the larger countries in 

Africa are worried about is AFRICOM actually becoming a competing military. And this is a wonderful opportunity just to say no. 

AFRICOM is on the continent to build the capacity of professional 

militaries under civilian control. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. 

Ambassador Yamamoto? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I concur with Ambassador Huddleston. 

You know, everyone at the roll-out, everyone was talking about 

AFRICOM except AFRICOM. And until AFRICOM was able to articulate and define what AFRICOM was about, then we were able 

to engage and overcome a lot of misunderstandings. During the 

questions, we can go into greater detail. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you with regards to the constant turnover, Ambassador Yamamoto, you mentioned in your testimony, 

causing confusion for the country team and the host nation. What 

are you talking about in terms of how long is the deployment and 

what can be done to remedy that situation? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I think it would be very difficult given 

the way we deploy forces, etcetera. My son is a first lieutenant with 

the 3rd ID and he was in Iraq and he has a set time and he has 

a set mission. For us in the Africa Bureau, we have 1100 officers 

manning 53 Embassies and consultates in sub-Saharan Africa. 

31

Most of us are committed to the African continent and we’re experts in the field. 

When we were setting up Camp Lemonnier, as they were setting 

up the camp, we were very struck by the large number of different 

units, but they stayed for maybe 6 weeks or 2 months or 3 months, 

but never any longer. And I think we talked to General Franks and 

later General Abizaid to extend those assignments. And that 

helped a lot now at CJTF, we have 1-year assignments. So that is 

helping. 

But again in other parts of the continent, the assignments are 

very short and so it takes a lot of onus for the Ambassador, the 

DMCs to work with these units to identify what are our common 

goals and objectives. 

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Huddleston, is that being looked at as 

perhaps an area for reform, or are you happy with the way it is 

today? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. AFRICOM is very aware of the problem. Obviously the State Department is as well and as Ambassador 

Yamamoto said, it has improved significantly in that AFRICOM is 

now assigning for 1 year CJTF–HOA. But actually, one of the main 

problems is that AFRICOM has no assigned forces, so they rely on 

the components, they rely on the Army, they rely on the Special 

Forces, they rely on the Marines to provide them with forces to 

carry out the task on the continent. Obviously, our forces are engaged in other important tasks around the world and so they sometimes are not available for other than short periods. 

We also rely upon the National Guard. Actually, the National 

Guard of Kansas in CJTF–HOA. And of course, their families don’t 

want them to be gone for over a year, so these are some of the challenges involved in extending the period of time on the continent. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Let me ask you, you’ve testified that 

building professional militaries is a function of AFRICOM. How 

has that worked out—if you could perhaps give some examples? 

And in an area that is very close to my heart, human rights training, if you could elaborate on what kind of training we do provide 

to African militaries and with particular emphasis on trafficking in 

persons. 

As you may know, I authorized the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and in 2001, 1 year after that law went into effect, 

a Fox News reporter from Ohio walked into my office and said Congressman, you need to look at this. And he showed me a videotape 

of women who had been trafficked from Russia, Moldova, the Philippines, and indigenous South Koreans who were being abused by 

American service members. And the places of abuse were in absolute proximity to our military bases. 

We handed that over to Joseph Schmitz, who was then the IG 

for the Department of Defense. He initiated, and we asked for, a 

global assessment of U.S. complicity, wittingly or unwittingly, in 

human trafficking. And he came back very, very disturbed with a 

very compelling report looking first at Bosnia and South Korea, 

and then the rest of the world. President Bush for his part issued 

a zero tolerance policy and went even a step further and changed 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice to include prostitution as an 

actionable offense. And word went out. I read them. I talk about 

32

it to other militaries all the time and give them copies of it to see 

that America was serious about combating trafficking, that we 

want to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. 

I went to NATO, talked to those folks, and we know Kofi Annan 

did the zero tolerance policy. I think everyone is trying, at least, 

to do a good job there. General LaPorte actually testified at two 

hearings that I co-chaired along with people like John McHugh and 

Duncan Hunter, John, obviously, over at the Secretary of the 

Army. And General LaPorte had a best practices which I know has 

been further refined and made even more efficacious, but he talked 

about the importance of having on-base recreation, making sure 

that the men are aware of who it is that they are seeing at 4 

o’clock in the morning and that the woman is a slave. She cannot 

leave and if she does, she will be beaten. She will be raped again, 

and we need to be on the side of protection and not on the side of 

oppression. 

And I thought he did an outstanding job. Every time I talk to a 

military person in any country, I bring DoD information with me 

and ask them what are they doing to combat human trafficking. 

The question—to make a long story short—is that there are 10 

countries in Africa, as you know, on the Tier 3 list as egregious violators of sex trafficking. There are 13 African countries on Tier 2 

watch lists, that could easily drop into Tier 3 because of on-going 

abuse, mostly against women and children. 

The question is: Does AFRICOM train other militaries, especially 

their officer corps, on best practices, especially those that have 

been developed so magnificently by the Department of Defense so 

that they get it? The military should be on the side of protection, 

not on the side of exploitation. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Yes sir. And what I often like to point 

out is when we train, when AFRICOM trains, we train to U.S. 

standards and to international law standards on human rights and 

on respect of civilians, whether women or men. And what I’d like 

to point out particularly is when you look at Tunisia and when you 

look at Egypt, both of those militaries have significant U.S. and 

Western training. And both of those militaries, as we all know in 

this room, stood up for the people in their country. In Liberia, there 

was no training by Western or U.S. forces and we have seen what 

has happened there. 

The soldiers of AFRICOM and their components only follow the 

highest standards of conduct on the continent and they expect their 

counterparts who are training to do the same. We have Leahy vetting. as you’re aware that that’s those that we train. In addition, 

we provide DILS training and human rights training to all forces 

that we train on the continent. 

And then you ask about what does our training do, can I point 

to some good examples? I recently visited the Liberians and I was 

very impressed with their discipline and also the fact that they had 

formed an engineering battalion. An engineering battalion is working with the Bangladeshi peacekeepers to do civil military projects. 

We’d like to see more of the militaries of Africa doing civil military 

projects. 

On the more robust front, since AFRICOM trainers joined the 

ACOTA trainers for the State Department who are contract and 

33

often former military, we have been able to do COIN training 

which is counter insurgency training. And by doing that training, 

as you can see, the AMISOM forces have actually been able to gain 

area in Mogadishu and also respect better civilians who might 

come into harm’s way because they’re in the conflict area. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Ms. Cromer? 

Ms. CROMER. Yes. I’d just like to add that in 2009, AFRICOM 

was asked to identify ways to support U.S. efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and support survivors. And there, AFRICOM did oversee 

training, but they also in coordination with the Embassy and 

USAID, determined that the facilities that were supporting the 

survivors of gender-based violence was substandard and actually 

put in $1 million to help build up those facilities and otherwise 

support the survivors. So that’s another example of our coordination. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ambassador Yamamoto? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes, and just to add. It’s more than just 

DoD. And DoD does a great job. The Command and Staff College 

in Ethiopia does civil rights and human rights issues, but it’s also 

a comprehensive approach in the U.S. Government, but also the 

host nations. And we share your outrage in many of the instances 

and cases that we’ve uncovered. And we’ve worked very hard with 

these countries on TR–3 and the other 13 countries. As you and 

Congressman Payne have so eloquently articulated, we need to 

stand up and work with these countries and host nations to support the development of not only legal affairs, but also going after 

trafficking and righting those wrongs. 

As you know, our work in the Congo and other parts of Africa, 

we’ve done this to the best of our ability in an interagency process. 

Mr. SMITH. I’ll just ask you again on trafficking, could we be provided a copy of what it is, a curricular, if you will, of human rights 

training in general, but also with a particular emphasis on what 

it is that we’re trying to convey to our friends in the African militaries with regards to human trafficking. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Certainly. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Let me just ask one final question 

and that would be in the area of crises. It’s been my experience, 

and I’m one of those who believes that the military are the ultimate peacekeepers. Without that, we know what chaos results, and 

how innocent victims are killed. But very often, even in the area 

of providing immediate and very effective intervention, almost like 

a trauma surgeon in an emergency room, the military have the capacity, the airlift and really the capability to go into a situation, 

stabilize it, pass the baton then on to the NGOs and everyone else. 

I saw it provide comfort when the Kurds literally during that first 

2 to 3 weeks that I was there—5 days after the mass exodus to the 

Turkish-Iraqi border. Had it not been for Special Forces actually 

using PSYOPS to put on Meals Ready To Eat so that the MREs 

would be properly opened and eaten and immunizations, everywhere you looked you saw Kurds walking around with camouflage 

jackets which were essential to not dying because of the elements. 

They did not have cold weather clothing. 

34

So the same thing happened in Tbilisi. A week after the Russians 

went in, it was the military that came in with food, nutrition—all 

kinds of nutritional support, medicines. So the same thing in Haiti 

and in the tsunami. I was on the Abraham Lincoln briefly. We 

went to several places, Phuket, Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka, but it 

seemed to me that the entire ship—everyone on the ship—wanted 

to go on to Banda Aceh and join with the helicopter crews and everyone else in assisting. It was unbelievable, the esprit de corps 

and the sense of humanitarianism which the military does not get 

the credit that it deserves for rolling up their sleeves and jumping 

in and helping to assist people who are sick or dying or at risk. 

So my question is, you did mention, Ambassador Huddleston, 

that AFRICOM has set up task forces and is prepared to assist in 

any appropriate way when requested to do so by State or USAID 

with regards to the severe drought. Is it likely that there will be 

an East Africa task force? We know there’s 750,000 people affected, 

and Ambassador Yamamoto and his team and others all testified 

just a few weeks ago that this crisis is huge and getting worse by 

the day. Are those plans likely to be implemented any time soon? 

Can you give any indication what it might look like in terms of airlift and the like to get food to people who are starving? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you 

so much for the kind remarks about all the wonderful activities 

and rescue and humanitarian operations at the U.S. military has 

done around the world. Let me just outline this a little bit for you 

and then I’ll turn to my colleagues because they know it’s a very 

important question. 

Right now we have on our staff, as Ms. Cromer pointed out, 

USAID personnel at AFRICOM and they’re staying in close coordination. In addition, AFRICOM has developed possibilities that it 

could do, should it be required to do so. But what is going on right 

now is that the U.N. agencies, the NGOs are actually already expanding the capacity. There are seven additional refugee camps for 

feeding and distribution in Ethiopia. There are two additional 

camps that can be opened, one already opened outside of Dadaab 

in Kenya. 

So far, the rescue agencies, the international community, the 

NGOs have been able to respond to the situation in Ethiopia and 

Kenya. In Somalia, of course, as we know, that’s more complicated, 

but of course, that would be an area that AFRICOM would not be 

welcome, but again, in that area, WFP, UNICEF are already pushing to get in there, talking to even al-Shabaab to see if they cannot 

work out ways in which they can get the food and water and medical assistance that’s so desperately needed. 

So at this point, USAID, State and NSS tell us that they have 

what they need and as we’re here to talk about interagency coordination, so rest assured we’ve been attending all those IPCs and 

DCs at the National Security Council to make sure that we stay 

very much informed on what is happening and are prepared to assist should we be called upon to do so. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Would either of you like to——

Ms. CROMER. Mr. Chairman, USAID has been monitoring the situation in the Horn of Africa since the famine early warning system, which we support, alerted us to the onslaught of a potential 

35

problem last summer. And we have been prepositioning food in the 

region to address the situation. 

To date, we’re one of the largest donors in the emergency assistance, helping more than 4.6 million people. We’re working very 

closely, as Ambassador Huddleston mentioned, with the U.N. and 

other NGOs to address the crisis. The famine has been announced 

for Somalia which is an area, a region in Somalia that’s very difficult for us, and other organizations, to access. And that’s been a 

challenge. At one point this was called a traveling famine because 

of the number of Somalis that are moving out of the region into 

Ethiopia and other regions. 

But to date, we are working very closely with the U.N. and other 

donors and we are coordinating in the interagency with our colleagues in defense and if the need should arise, I’m sure we would 

have the support we need. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And you’re absolutely correct. There’s 

the short-term crisis that we need to address immediately and the 

refugee flows over 2,000 or so or 1,500 a day into Dadaab, Kenya 

and over 1,000 into Ethiopia. But in the long term, because the 

area is chronically dry, there’s not been rainfall in 2 years and very 

little in 5 years in many areas, and so how do you address a longterm problem. And those are things that we’re addressing right 

now, the interagency process at which DoD, USAID and State are 

very much involved in that and our task force is looking at how we 

can effectively address these short-term and long-term problems. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. In regard to the drought, 

there was some negotiations, I think, that initially the al-Shabaab 

would not allow for humanitarian aid. Then they changed and said 

they were saying it was over played and all that business. Well, 

now that it’s very clear as we knew all along that it was very serious. They then said yes, you can come in with food aid. 

Have they changed again? I understand there may have been 

some withdrawal from the agreement that humanitarian food and 

supplies could come in. What is the—do you know what the status 

is at this time? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. From what we understand, and it’s still 

an evolving situation, is that we still cannot get into the areas to 

deliver food. As you know, 60 percent of the people who are at risk 

are still in al-Shabaab-held territories and so feeding those areas 

is very difficult. 

What we’re seeing now is not only the flow of refugees into Ethiopia and Kenya, but also internally displaced people. Right now, 

Mogadishu, you’re seeing an equal number of people going into 

Mogadishu feeling from al-Shabaab-held territory. And so that is 

going to continue to be a problem. So what we’re doing now is looking at how we can feed the people we have at hand in the refugee 

camps and also internally displaced. Al-Shabaab area is going to be 

a much more long-term problem. 

Mr. PAYNE. What about the, as we mentioned, the Dadaab camp? 

It’s always been over crowded, but now it’s unbelievably over 

crowded. I last visited there a couple years ago, it was busting at 

the seams, so I can imagine what it is now. Are we getting food 

36

aid or working with the U.N. agencies to assist in the Dadaab 

camps? 

Ms. CROMER. Yes, we’re getting pre-positioned food and other resources to the camp, but this is a large-scale multi-donor intervention which is underway and the scope is massive. We’re prioritizing 

our aid to make sure that the most pressing needs are addressed. 

Our initial response is primarily focused on food and water. We’re 

also concerned with the spread of disease in these camps as they 

grow and hygiene becomes an issue. So we’re addressing all of 

these. 

Mr. PAYNE. There’s a mass amount of awareness growing and 

first page story on The Washington Post today and just yesterday 

we, 2 days ago, introduced Resolution 361 that certainly recognizes 

the effort that the U.S. is doing and we look, urge long-term intervention and in just 2 days we have over 50 co-sponsors just with 

it being known that it’s out there. So there’s certainly a tremendous amount of support here on Capitol Hill for what you’re doing. 

Just wonder in general, general, you said that the perception of 

AFRICOM is better now. Is it at the point where most of the countries are—I mean it’s a reality, but what is the attitude currently? 

Is it at the point where you’re comfortable that you can really move 

forward, full force in what your goals are? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. We’re quite comfortable with the situation as of right now. And as I said, it’s even getting better because 

General Ham is following in the footsteps of General Ward in making it a point to visit every country. And even countries that have 

had some hesitation about AFRICOM, have been willing to work 

with the components and do exercises and development with the 

components. 

One of the success stories is the African partnership station 

which sends U.S. vessels, Navy or Coast Guard along the coast and 

participates with Coast Guards and Navies in the coastal countries 

to do exercises and to do training. In fact, last year, and I forget 

the name of the vessel that was out there, it had seven mariners 

from various West African countries on board when we had the 

earthquake in Haiti and the vessel steamed to Haiti with the permission of the countries and that vessel with the officers from the 

West African countries provided assistance to the victims of the 

earthquake in Haiti. 

Mr. PAYNE. Are there civilian or what percentage is there? Can 

you count a percentage of civilians that are involved in AFRICOM 

other than military or is it 100 percent military at this time? I 

know that they’re working with USAID and working with State, 

but AFRICOM itself is strictly military without civilians? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. As Ambassador Yamamoto and Ms. 

Cromer mentioned, AFRICOM has a Deputy Commander. It has 

two Deputy Commanders. One of the Deputy Commanders is a 

State Department active duty officer. He’s a former Ambassador. 

AFRICOM also has a State Department officer who is the head of 

their Outreach Division which is one of the major divisions of 

AFRICOM. 

AFRICOM also has several USAID officers embedded in their 

Planning and Strategy Division to include this very excellent 

37

USAID person that is excellent on drought and humanitarian relief. 

In addition, AFRICOM hires civilians so they have a number of 

civilian advisors. So they have a significant contingent of civilians 

in the command just as part, just like at DoD, myself, we have a 

significant portion of our workforce that are civilian and that is 

also the case for AFRICOM. 

Mr. PAYNE. I had an opportunity to fly to Djibouti with General 

Ham and do think that he’s certainly an adequate replacement although General—what was his name again, who just retired? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. General Ward. 

Mr. PAYNE. Ward, yes, he’s got big feet so it’s going to be a hard 

act to follow, even though I was not supportive. But the headquarters issue, how much of an issue is that? It’s currently been 

talked about bringing it to the United States. Of course, the question of whether it should be on Africa soil, how much of a question 

is that and how is the logistics going as relates to its headquarters? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. As you know, since its inception, 

AFRICOM has been stationed in Stuttgart and at this point there 

would be significant budgetary implications if AFRICOM were to 

pull up its roots which is to some degree in Stuttgart and move. 

AFRICOM, however, is very much aware that it has a study to 

complete about where would be the most appropriate location. 

Mr. PAYNE. I think you mentioned it before, but what is the relationship with AFRICOM and AMISOM’s mission in Somalia with 

the TFG and their military operation? And actually, is the 

AFRICOM looking at Somaliland or Puntland as it deals with the 

Horn and with Somalia, in general. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Congressman. That actually gives me the opportunity to talk a little bit about Title 22 and 

Title 10. As you’re aware, AFRICOM cannot do training or equipment with its own funds which are Title 10. Therefore, any training that AFRICOM is doing in Africa is being done either with 

1206 which are combined funds or with PKO or State Department 

Title 22 funds. In other words, all training on the continent is with 

State Department funds, therefore, everything that’s done in training is authorized by the State Department. 

What we were very pleased about with AFRICOM is that State 

Department invited AFRICOM trainers, some Special Forces to 

come and train with the training that they were providing to the 

Ugandans and the Burundians because as you know, Mogadishu is 

a pretty violent place. 

Mr. PAYNE. I know. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. So some of the experience—yes, I 

guess you do know. I’m glad they missed you. 

Mr. PAYNE. I am, too. I saw President Sheik Sharif in Djibouti 

at the celebration of South Sudan and he did ask me when I was 

coming back. I told him my send-off wasn’t so hot, but I’ll take another look at it. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Yes, I imagine diplomatic security is 

not keen for you to return any time soon. 

Mr. PAYNE. They didn’t want me to go in the first place, as you 

know. 

38

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Indeed. So that’s what AFRICOM has 

done is to provide some trainers to work in parallel and with their 

ACOTA trainers to provide additional training for the Ugandans 

and Burundians that are deploying to Mogadishu. 

Mr. PAYNE. Just a final question for you, there is a proposed cut 

in our peacekeeping budget here and I wonder, you know, how the 

security assistance would trickle down to what AFRICOM is intending to do or—not AFRICOM necessarily, but as you know, the 

mission in Somalia is under the U.N. and therefore it depends on 

U.N. peacekeeping allotments. How do you see some of our, and of 

course, the new one that we’re trying to stand up in South Sudan 

on the borders around Abvei and other areas in question, South 

Coeur d’Enfant. How do you see that playing out? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Since these are our Title 22 funds, I 

am going to ask my colleague, Ambassador Yamamoto, to answer. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Just going back on PKO funding and 

others. As you know, we provide about $265 million with your approval on PKO, IMET, and FMF and of the PKO funding about 15–

20 percent of that goes to DoD to help us send assistance levels in 

training programs, etcetera for AMISON and other programs. As 

you know, in the Somalia area, we have $42 million dedicated to 

AMISON training programs equipping safety, security, etcetera. 

And so a cut or a decrease in that amount would affect, obviously, 

the operations and also stabilization efforts. 

The other issue, too, as you raise in Sudan is how do we address 

the recent deployment of 1600 troops from Ethiopia into Abyei and 

then the continuation of course, is in Darfur and also anticipated 

what do you do in the Coeur d’Enfant area to stabilize that area? 

So right now the $265 million that we had in 2010, that’s not a 

very large amount of money. So if we decrease that, then there’s 

an ability to work with DoD and host nations and other groups to 

do training, equipping and security sector reform and stabilization 

will be affected. 

Mr. PAYNE. My final question, Ms. Cromer, I think it’s great and 

it’s certainly with these various titles what you can do. I always 

felt the USAID, it would be great if they had an opportunity to 

dabble in education more, some of the physical facilities. We see 

that the Department of Defense can fix up a school, however. 

USAID can’t, you know. And of course, we’ve been concerned about 

the educational situation in Africa, as we know many of the countries now have moved to so-called universal education where there 

may be some school fees, there is kind of universal education in 

most of the countries and the girl child, as you know, as been included which is a great step in the right direction. We’re looking 

now at how can we assist in higher education which I mean secondary, of course, and higher education as Africa develops. 

I wonder how do you see the interaction between the Department 

of Defense that can do things with USAID and your restrictions. 

And there’s a second and final part and question, we’ve had some 

concern about the nutritional components of USAID’s food and—

there are two reports that have come out about—there’s not a request for additional funds, but that they look at the nutritional 

value of the—who did that? Tufts? GAO also did a report on the 

nutritional values we find that there’s some excellent recommendaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072611\67598 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tions and I would hope that you would take an opportunity to look 

at that and we would really like to talk to you about it. 

I had a resolution to say that we should do something about it 

and it ended up 21 to 21, so I didn’t win. Mr. Smith did vote with 

me on that resolution on the food, just trying to make it more nutritional. So if you could just answer those and I’ll yield back to the 

chairman. 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you, Congressman Payne. We have at 

USAID new education policy that we are trying to implement. The 

focus of the policy is on reading with understanding, primarily at 

the basic education level. This policy doesn’t necessarily prohibit 

renovating structures, but it’s with reduced funding. We find that 

we’re not able to do very much of that. So we do relish the opportunity to work with AFRICOM and identify synergies where we 

have common goals and they can help us in renovating schools. 

We do see that we as some of our education programs are diminished, due to lack of funding and a need to focus, it would be an 

opportune time to have a different dialogue with some of our African country partners about the funding they provide in their own 

development planning and programming. And taking what they do 

and trying to make it more efficient. We’re looking at working with 

some of our African partners to look at their public financial management systems, trying to streamline those systems, make them 

more transparent, make them more robust so that all of the revenues going through our country partners are used to address key 

development challenges like education. 

So if we can help those partners strengthen their own systems 

so their own resources are used more effectively, then we can see 

some achievement in education and the monies that we put into 

those sectors will go longer and for more sustained development objective. 

On nutrition and the GAO report that you mentioned, I’m not familiar with that particular report, but we can get a response to you 

on that. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I yield back my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

for this hearing and for our panelists being here and special thanks 

to Ambassador Yamamoto for your hospitality in getting to see 

your work really on the ground firsthand when we visited Ethiopia 

a few years ago. 

I want to start with really a question for all the panelists here 

today. I’m particularly interested to hear about our plans for postconflict in Libya. I certainly want to acknowledge the significant 

variations in histories and cultures and size and scope of our recent 

interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and I believe that insufficient and disjointed planning for post-conflict stabilization there set 

a poor precedent for NATO operations in Libya. 

But as different parties come together on this issue, what is 

AFRICOM doing to prepare for a post revolution in Libya? What 

role does AFRICOM have after any political resolution? And finally 

and most importantly, how is AFRICOM working with State and 

USAID on this effort? And let’s start with Ambassador Yamamoto? 

Or Ambassador Huddleston, why don’t you start? 

40

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Mr. Carnahan, the only reason I’m 

starting is because normally it would be Ambassador Yamamoto, 

but he is responsible for sub-Saharan Africa and he is not responsible for North Africa because that falls under the Middle East Division. So ironically, I’m the only spokesperson here among the 

three of us who can speak to North Africa because AFRICOM was 

formed as a command for the whole continent, except for Egypt and 

Egypt remains in the CENTOM or the Middle East Command. 

So I will have to apologize in that I’m sure that my State Department colleague, Ambassador Feldman, could do a better job of answering your question than I can, but let me give it a try. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. We’re happy to hear from you. Thank you. 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Thank you very much. Let me just go 

back for a moment to the beginning because I’d like very much to 

point out what President Obama said. President Obama said that 

we had an international mandate. We had a broad coalition. We 

had the support of the Arab League. And we had the pleas of the 

Libyan people to go into Libya. And we did and it was really quite 

an amazing thing in that the new commander of AFRICOM, General Ham, had only been in that position for less than 2 weeks. 

And AFRICOM became the leader of a coalition of 10 nations including two Arab nations that put in place the no fly zone, the sea 

embargo, and most importantly, protected 800,000 people in the 

city of Benghazi from certain deaths, certainly to many of them. 

Now that coalition has been handed over to NATO and that, too, 

has been pretty amazing and pretty unique and impressive in that 

AFRICOM began the implementation of the no fly zone and protection of civilians on March 19th and they turned over all four missions to NATO on the 31st of March, 14 days later. 

So AFRICOM is not a major player in any way now in the ongoing NATO operation. AFRICOM has retained responsibility for 

recovery, should that be necessary. So the U.S. forces that are contributing to NATO come directly from the components, most particularly from the dual-hatted Navy commander for Europe and Africa and that’s Admiral Locklear. And as you know, Canadian General Bouchard is the responsible person for NATO. 

So AFRICOM itself is not the major player it was at one time, 

but you ask what would AFRICOM do in a post-Gaddafi? Well, we 

have made it clear, as well as NATO, that we did not envision 

boots on the ground in Libya. So it would in a fairly far future 

post-Gaddafi Libya when the situation had returned to normal, 

Embassies were reestablished, that there might be something like 

a defense attache and an Office of Security Cooperation and that 

with the new democratic Libyan Government, we might have the 

opportunity then to do some training with our State Department 

colleagues and the State Department funds of a new and responsible and democratic Libyan Army. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Mr. Cromer, did you have anything 

to add? 

Ms. CROMER. Excuse me, like my State Department colleague, as 

Ambassador Huddleston said, we focus at USAID in the Africa Bureau on sub-Saharan Africa. So our operation doesn’t cover North 

Africa. 

41

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Also, I wanted to ask, getting back 

to Ms. Cromer, about Somalia with on-going drought in the Horn 

of Africa and the humanitarian crisis, the scope of which we 

haven’t seen for decades. Last week, the U.N. officially declared a 

famine in two regions of Somalia. 

Could you give me and the subcommittee an update on the response to the crisis as well as partnerships with other key organizations that you’re working with? 

Ms. CROMER. Yes. As you’ve stated, the scale and severity of the 

famine in southern Somalia represents a most serious food and security situation in the world today. And as a multi-donor response 

that’s underway, we’re prioritizing our aid to make sure that the 

most pressing needs are addressed. At this point, we are primarily 

focused on food and water and we’re, as I mentioned earlier, concerned with the spread of disease and so we’re working to expand 

our health and hygiene response. 

In Somalia, the World Food Program is considering strategies to 

counter the deteriorating food situation. They’re looking at various 

options to address the nutrition situation in southern Somalia. 

They’re doing an in-depth food, urban food and nutrition security 

assessment in 16 districts of Mogadishu. And the assessment will 

seek to measure the number of food-insecure people by district. So 

with this information, the international community, particularly 

WFP, will be guided to program their interventions in a more targeted fashion. 

The access to the most food-insecure populations is still an issue 

that’s being worked out. But it is a serious concern. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Let me ask just a few 

final questions. First, on Friday, I chaired a hearing on the Helsinki Commission on Egypt, and I know none of you deal with 

Egypt, but you’ll know why I raise it in a moment, and that is the 

barbaric practice that has gotten worse, according to our witnesses, 

that young Coptic Christian girls are being abducted and sold into 

modern-day slavery and forced marriages, again, thousands per 

year. It’s been largely ignored, if not under-appreciated by many in 

the human rights community. We had a very credible panel that 

spoke to this egregious practice. And the women are forced to become Muslim, and then they’re given to a man and then they and 

the children they bear are Muslim. 

And I’m wondering: In Egypt today, the military does control 

that government. What kind of human rights training, Ambassador 

Huddleston, I think you’re the one to speak to this when it comes 

to religious freedom, do the militaries get in terms of tolerance? We 

know that at the core of many of these conflicts it has been, including Sudan, the imposition of Sharia law, particularly with the invasion of the south of Sudan. That was a mainstay issue. It’s also 

been a problem obviously in Darfur, but especially in southern 

Sudan. 

I recently met with a Catholic bishop and an imam who couldn’t 

make the meeting, but his representative was there from Nigeria, 

who spoke how they had gone from village to village preaching a 

sense of tolerance and respect for all religions, but in this case 

those two major religions, Christianity and Islam and I’m wonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\072611\67598 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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dering if in our training on human rights if there’s a religious freedom component to emphasize with exclamation points why all of us 

need to respect the other person’s faith and that forced 

Islamization, the imposition of Sharia law or any creed is not following fundamental human rights policy. Is that something that’s 

taught? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I’m sorry to hear 

about that situation that you were explaining in Egypt. I do not 

know the particulars of all the training and all the human rights 

training that is performed by our soldiers overseas, but I can get 

you the curriculum. And I can also say that I think that what you 

will probably see is what we teach is respect for human life, respect 

for human dignity, respect for the rule of law and the constitution 

and the people of a country, all of which, in essence, means respect 

for tolerance and different religious beliefs, but I’ll be happy to get 

a transcript and provide it. 

Mr. SMITH. And if you could, if it’s not being done, if it’s something that could have been considered when the International Religious Freedom Act was passed in 1998, and I chaired all the hearings on it. It was Congressman Frank Wolf’s legislation, and there 

was profound pushback from many in the Department of State, including the White House, against that legislation, and one of the 

components that we wrote into it was the training of foreign service officers on religious freedom matters. 

And I say without any fear of contradiction that the pushback 

was profound. The Assistant Secretary for Democracy of Human 

Rights and Labor testified at our hearing saying they were against 

the bill. I’m sure they’re for tolerance, but they were against this 

legislation. So I would hope you could get back to us on that; it 

would be very helpful. 

[NOTE: 

The information referred to appears in the appendix.] 

Mr. SMITH. And finally, you cite, Ms. Cromer, in your testimony 

a 2010 assessment that shows that of the 25 countries having the 

highest instability, 22 are in Africa. And I’m wondering if there’s 

any—now 3 years into AFRICOM—if there’s been any improvement as a result of that combatant command being stood up? 

Ms. CROMER. Well, we can certainly cite Libya as a very good example of the improvement in the security situation which allows 

for improved economic growth and development in health and education. I’m sure there are other examples that we can provide, but 

again, having a professional military that respects human rights 

and respects good governance and democracy is a profound effort 

to move forward in any development situation. 

We really cannot proceed with our development interventions in 

good measure if we don’t have peace and security. So what 

AFRICOM has done on the continent to enhance the professionalism of militaries and support human rights and good governance is absolutely essential to what we do in development. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Just one last question. The fact that the LRA and 

Mr. Kony have been roaming around for 20 some years, it just 

seems to me that—not that it’s AFRICOM’s situation, but it would 

seem to me that there should be some more coordinated effort to 

43

try to bring him to the International Court of Justice. And I just 

wonder if—and Mr. Yamamoto has had a lot of history in Africa 

and certainly has known about the LRA or you Ambassador Huddleston, could give a brief synopsis of any knowledge you have of 

a concerted effort to bring Mr. Kony to justice. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And that’s a very tough issue that we 

have been addressing for years with you and other members. Right 

now, as DoD and State Department and USAID, all the interagencies is combined together to (a) support the UPDF in their operations against Kony, specifically in the CAR. They have distribution points in Obo and from there the UPDF is able to bring their 

equipment and supplies into the front lines to go after Kony’s 

troops. We have provided on average in the last quarter about $3 

million to support for supplies, fuel, rentals of equipment and helicopters to bring the supplies up to Obo and from there to transport 

them to the UPDF forces. 

We’re also working with the President Bozize ́ in CAR to look at 

training troops there to form a blocking force against Kony and 

then with other neighboring states particularly with MONUSCO 

and DRC FARDC troops and other troops as well. It’s a very tough 

fight and it’s going to continue until this is brought to conclusion. 

Mr. SMITH. Would any of you like to conclude with any final remarks? 

Yes, Ambassador Huddleston? 

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. I didn’t want to miss the opportunity 

just to say that first of all we appreciate very much that you’re 

having the hearing, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and also to 

underline the fact because the ranking member began with this 

roll-out of AFRICOM was very difficult and really it’s a great credit 

to our service men and women and to the leadership of AFRICOM 

that they’ve really turned that around because they’ve not only 

turned it around with the African governments, but they’ve turned 

it around with our colleagues, the State Department, and USAID 

as you have heard here today. 

I think AFRICOM really is making a great difference on the continent because as we all know, it begins with security. And there 

can’t be democratic governments or can’t be human rights or can’t 

be development unless there’s security. And by giving the local 

militaries the ability to provide for security for their people it 

makes all the difference. So thank you very much for this opportunity. 

Mr. SMITH. On that very encouraging note, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was concluded.] 

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