A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States. By Craig

Gundersen, Mara Yañez, Constanza Valdez, and Betsey Kuhn. Food Assistance and Nutrition

Research Report No. 6.



The social safety nets in Mexico and the United States rely heavily on food assistance programs to ensure food security and access to safe and nutritious foods. To achieve these general

goals, both countries’ programs are exclusively paid for out of internal funds and both target

low-income households and/or individuals. Despite those similarities, economic, cultural, and

demographic differences between the countries lead to differences in their abilities to ensure

food security and access to safe and nutritious foods. Mexico uses geographic and household

targeting to distribute benefits while the United States uses only household targeting. U.S. food

assistance programs tend to be countercyclical (as the economy expands, food assistance

expenditures decline and vice-versa). Mexican food assistance programs appear to be neither

counter- nor procyclical. Food assistance programs have little effect on the extent of poverty in

Mexico, while the opposite is true in the United States, primarily because the level of benefits

as a percentage of income is much lower in Mexico and a much higher percentage of eligible

households receive benefits from food assistance programs in the United States.

Keywords: Food assistance programs, social safety net, targeting methods, macroeconomy,

poverty, Progresa, DICONSA, FIDELIST, LICONSA, DIF, Food Stamp Program, WIC, the

National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs

	


	

The authors wish to thank Jennifer Olmsted, John Jinkins, and Linda Ghelfi for their comments

and Lindsay Mann, Tom McDonald, and Cynthia Ray for their editorial and graphic assistance.

In addition, the authors wish to thank Andros Casco Flores, Andres Rosenzweig, Mario Sosa,

John Jinkins, and Bill Coyle for their assistance throughout this research project. This report

does not necessarily reflect the policymaking beliefs or opinions of Mexico’s Secretaria de

Agricultura, Ganaderia y Desarrollo Rural.

Washington, DC 20036-5831 July 2000
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Major Food Assistance Programs in Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

LICONSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

DICONSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

DIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

FIDELIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Progresa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Major Food Assistance Programs in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Food Stamp Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,

and Children (WIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

	


	

  

Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Identification of Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

U.S. Food Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Mexico’s Food Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

A Comparison of Programs Over Three Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Effect of the Macroeconomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Food Assistance and Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Food Assistance and Food Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Food Assistance and Nutrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Effect Of Food Assistance Versus Cash On Food Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Food Assistance and Poverty Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

ii ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA
Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

Preface

Under the auspices of the Mexico Emerging Markets Program, the Economic Research Service

of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Mexican Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y

Desarrollo Rural (SAGAR) established a project to compare food assistance programs in

Mexico and the United States. While a great deal of research has been conducted analyzing

each nation’s food assistance programs, there have been no studies comparing the two countries’ food assistance programs. This absence of studies has limited the crucial insights policymakers and researchers can obtain through such comparisons. This report represents the first

published contribution to this ongoing project.
Summary

Food assistance programs are integral components of the social safety net in both Mexico and

the United States. About one in five Mexicans and one in six Americans receive benefits from

at least one federally funded food assistance program. This assistance helps ensure that people,

especially children, are food secure and have access to a safe and nutritious diet. To achieve

these general goals, both countries’ programs are internally funded, and both target benefits to

low-income households rather than to the general population. Despite those similarities, economic, cultural, and demographic differences between the countries lead to differences in their

abilities to ensure food security and access to safe and nutritious foods. Here, we compare the

countries over three dimensions – the methods used to target benefits; the effect of macroeconomic conditions on food assistance expenditures; and the effectiveness of food assistance programs in achieving their goals. 

These comparisons are particularly timely for policymakers in both countries because their

food assistance programs have undergone transformations in the past few years. In Mexico,

general food subsidies have, for the most part, disappeared and been replaced with food assistance programs explicitly designed for low-income households. As part of this change, a new

groundbreaking and innovative program, Progresa, has begun. In the United States, the structure of food assistance programs has not changed, but their role in the social safety net has

taken on new importance. Previously, cash assistance recipients could receive aid for an indefinite time period, but now time limits are placed on recipients. Food assistance programs, however, do not have such time limits and therefore will play an even larger role as people lose eligibility for cash assistance or decide not to receive cash assistance due to the time limits.

We begin with a review of the five largest food assistance programs in Mexico: Progresa

(Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación), DICONSA (Distribuidora Compañia

Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO)), FIDELIST (Fideicomiso para la

Liguidación al Subsidio de la Tortilla), LICONSA (Leche Industrializada CONASUPO), and

DIF (Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia). Five U.S. programs are also

reviewed: the Food Stamp Program, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,

Infants, and Children (WIC), the National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs, the

Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Food Distribution Program on Indian

Reservations.

In designing these programs, for a given amount of money, a country chooses methods of identifying recipients such that the intended beneficiaries receive aid while, at the same time, unintended beneficiaries do not receive aid. We show, theoretically, how a country can minimize

these problems of “undercoverage” and “leakage” and then show how Mexico and the United

States actually try to minimize these problems through the structure of benefits, the usage of

nonhousehold based information, and the avoidance of negative incentives. The primary difference between the countries is in the use of geographic targeting. In general, Mexico first

decides on particular areas to target benefits and then, within those areas, further targets lowincome households. The United States, however, targets benefits based only on low-income status and does not use any geographic information.

iv ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA
By targeting benefits, the goal of food assistance programs is to reach those most in need.

During recessions, the number of persons in need of such assistance generally increases. U.S.

food assistance programs are countercyclical. That is, as the economy expands, food assistance

expenditures decline and vice-versa. For Mexico, expenditures on the program appear to be

neither counter- nor procyclical. Mexico’s food assistance programs appear to be stable and not

influenced by changes in GDP or inflation.

An important question for evaluations of any food assistance programs is: Do these programs

improve the well-being of recipients? We first review studies showing that U.S. food assistance programs are effective in terms of alleviating food insecurity; enhancing nutritious diets;

and increasing food consumption. We then estimate how poverty rates in both countries might

be affected by the inclusion of food assistance programs. We first estimate poverty rates without food assistance and then compare these rates with those that include food assistance. In

Mexico, food assistance programs do not reduce the incidence of poverty. By contrast, U.S.

food assistance programs reduce poverty by about 10 percent. The level of benefits as a percentage of income is much lower in Mexico than in the United States, and a much higher percentage of eligible households receive benefits from food assistance programs in the United

States than in Mexico.

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ vi ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA
Introduction

Food assistance programs in Mexico and the United States

are integral components of these nations’ social safety nets.

About one in five Mexicans and one in six Americans

receive benefits from at least one federally funded food

assistance program. This assistance helps ensure that people,

especially children, are food secure and have access to a

safe and nutritious diet. These programs have been reorganized in recent years to reflect the countries’ changing

economies and policy goals.

Until recently, Mexico had universal subsidies for major

food products such as corn tortillas. Tortillas are a staple of

the Mexican diet, and government policy once ensured that

everyone had access to this basic food. Similar policies subsidize the price of dahl in India and baguettes in France. In

Mexico, these subsidies for the most part have disappeared

and been replaced with food assistance programs explicitly

designed for low-income households. Of particular interest

is a new food assistance program, Progresa, which incorporates numerous insights from the development economics

literature. As Progresa expands, it will replace the other

food assistance programs.

Unlike Mexico, the U.S. food assistance programs have not

undergone major changes in recent years, but their relative

importance in the social safety net has changed. The

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) transformed Federal

welfare policy. The act replaced the Aid to Families with

Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary

Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. While

AFDC was an entitlement program and matched State dollars with Federal dollars, TANF imposes time limits and

work requirements on recipients and uses Federal block

grants (based on previous AFDC spending levels) rather

than matching funds. While PRWORA made large cuts in

the Food Stamp Program (the largest U.S. food assistance

program), its status as an entitlement program was maintained for almost all Americans, thus preserving the nutritional safety net for almost the entire population. This nutritional safety net (combined with the other food assistance

programs such as the School Lunch Program and the

Special Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants,

and Children (WIC)) will become especially important during the next recession and as time limits for TANF recipients are realized.

In this report, we begin with a brief review of the five

largest food assistance programs in Mexico: Progresa

(Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación), DICONSA

(Distribuidora Compañía Nacional De Subsistencias

Populares (CONASUPO)), FIDELIST (Fideicomiso para la

Liguidación al Subsidio de la Tortilla), LICONSA (Leche

Industrializada CONASUPO), and DIF (Sistema Nacional

para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia). Five U.S. programs, chosen because of their size and/or parallels with

Mexican programs, are then reviewed: the Food Stamp

Program, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for

Women, Infants and Children (WIC), the National School

Lunch and Breakfast Programs, the Emergency Food

Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Food Distribution

Program on Indian Reservations. 

Demographic, economic, and cultural differences between

Mexico and the United States lead to different constructions

of these food assistance programs. We analyze the differences and the similarities between the programs over three

dimensions. First, we examine how beneficiaries are identified. After describing the targeting methods used in each

country, we consider how the countries construct their programs in terms of the level of benefits, the uses of nonhousehold-based information, and the avoidance of negative

incentives. Second, we analyze the response of the programs

to changing economic conditions. We show that while U.S.

food assistance programs tend to be countercyclical (that is,

as the economy expands, food assistance expenditures

decline and vice-versa), Mexican food assistance programs

appear to be neither counter- nor procyclical. Third, we

examine the effect of the programs on individuals’ wellbeing. We review the literatures in terms of the effects of

food assistance programs on food insecurity, nutrition, food

consumption, and poverty. 

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs

in Mexico and the United States

Craig Gundersen

Mara Yañez

Constanza Valdez

Betsey Kuhn1

1Craig Gundersen is an economist with the Economic Research Service of

the U.S. Dept. of Agr.; Mara Yañez is an economist at the Secretaria de

Agricultura, Ganaderia y Desarrollo Rural (SAGAR); Constanza Valdez is

an agricultural economist with the Econ. Res. Serv. of the U.S. Dept. of

Agr., and Betsey Kuhn is an economist with the Economic Research

Service of the U.S. Dept. of Agr. 
Major Food Assistance Programs 

in Mexico

The principles guiding the development of food assistance

programs in Mexico are found in the National Development

Plan 1995-2000. The objectives of the plan are to promote

equal opportunities and conditions of equality to ensure that

the population enjoys individual and social rights; to raise

the level of well-being and the quality of life; and to reduce

poverty and social exclusion. The efforts are oriented toward

the development of the productive capacity of individuals

and communities and are directed toward the regions with

the greatest development need.

The social development strategy has two approaches that are

necessarily inter-related:

1. Universal access policies concerning education, health,

social security, and housing.

2. Poverty reduction policies oriented toward the most 

vulnerable social groups and those whose living conditions prevent them from having access to the benefits of

development.

One part of the plan is the Program to Overcome Poverty

1995-2000. The program seeks to reduce the incidence of

extreme poverty in the medium term, giving priority to the

regions and the groups that need it the most. Therefore, a

series of comprehensive and complementary actions are proposed to support individuals and families during key

moments of their life cycle to break the intergenerational

transmission of poverty. To achieve this, the program is

based on three fundamental policies: development of coordinated and relevant actions to increase the capacity of individuals and families; construction of basic municipal infrastructure; and encouragement of productive activities that

increase income and employment. The goal is to integrate

these policies sufficiently for a comprehensive strategy to

overcome extreme poverty.

We now review the five largest food assistance programs in

Mexico: LICONSA, DICONSA, DIF, FIDELIST, and

Progresa. While DIF is an autonomous agency, the other

four programs are in the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social

(SEDESOL). Previously, LICONSA, DICONSA, and

FIDELIST were in the Secretaria de Agricultura (SAGAR).2

LICONSA

The oldest existing Mexican food assistance program,

LICONSA was started in 1965 to safeguard the health of

children. The LICONSA program provides milk powder and

liquid milk at subsidized prices to low-income families. In

1997, the milk program distributed 11 percent of total

domestic milk consumption, benefiting over 2 million children in rural areas and 3.4 million children in urban areas.

The distribution mechanism is through “cards” that entitle

poor children living in marginal zones3 to buy 4 liters of

milk per child/per week at discounted prices. In Mexico

City, the allowance is for 8 liters of milk. In 1998, the price

of milk for program participants was 25 percent lower than

the market price. 

Beginning in 1991, LICONSA increased its coverage to

children 12 years of age and younger in low-income families (children of up to 2 years of age can obtain infant formula). The program previously had served children 5 years

of age and younger. LICONSA distributes milk through

LICONSA agents, DICONSA stores, and private retail

shops. LICONSA also supplies milk powder to DIF. 

DICONSA

DICONSA was created in 1972 to distribute basic commodities (corn, beans, rice, sugar, corn flour), powdered

milk (in cooperation with LICONSA), and tortilla products

at subsidized prices to people living in marginal urban and

rural areas. DICONSA’s operations have grown significantly

over time. In 1976, DICONSA operated 1,500 rural stores;

by 1997, there were 23,344 DICONSA rural stores, benefiting 31.2 million consumers. Over 82 percent of total

DICONSA sales take place in rural areas, and 18 percent

occur in marginal urban areas and special programs. 

In 1995, DICONSA’s selling prices were 19 percent lower

than market prices in rural areas, and 13 percent lower in

urban areas. DICONSA also has a targeted program to

directly subsidize the price of corn tortillas through preferential prices to close to 5 million low-income consumers.

DICONSA’s programs also include the Rural Procurement

Program to supply subsidized basic commodities in rural

areas and the Urban Procurement Program (PAZPU) to supply basic commodities in the cities.

DIF

The National Scheme for the Integrated Development of the

Family (DIF) began in 1972 and was designed to increase

the nutritional intake and welfare of the poor. Currently DIF

manages five different food consumption programs: the

Food Rations Program (PRA), Food Assistance to Families

Program (PASAF), Popular Kitchens and Integral Services

Units (COPUSI), the School Breakfast Program, and the

Community Breakfast Program.

The most important, the Food Rations Program, provides

milk powder, corn tortillas, and beans to over 7.3 million

individuals, half of whom are children. The Food Assistance

to Families Program provides monthly food baskets to 1.7

million families in extreme poverty located in rural, indige2 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

2 For a historical perspective on food assistance programs in Mexico, see

Yañez-Zazueta, 1997. 3Marginal zones are defined as relatively poorer areas in Mexico.
nous, and marginal urban areas. The Popular Kitchens and

Integral Services Units Program provides an “integrated

package” of food, health, and educational services throughout the country to rural and indigenous populations; the program benefited 256,425 people in 1997. The School

Breakfast Program provides free breakfasts to school children located in the poor districts of the four largest cities,

and to elderly, destitute, and handicapped people in social

assistance centers. In 1997, the program benefited 2.6 million school children per day with 20 percent of the breakfasts distributed in Mexico City. The Community Breakfasts

Program provides free breakfasts to children under 5 years

of age and expecting and lactating mothers in rural and

indigenous areas with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. 

FIDELIST (Trust Fund for the Liquidation of

the Tortilla Subsidy)

In 1984, CONASUPO created the tortibonos food stamp

program, a targeted program to directly subsidize the price

of corn tortillas at preferential prices to low-income families

in urban areas. Until 1990, CONASUPO distributed tortibonos directly to 2.5 million families at prices below the

official consumer price ceilings (50 percent lower than the

retail price), principally through DICONSA retail stores in

low-income urban neighborhoods.

In 1990, the tortibonos program was replaced by the

Program to Subsidize the Consumption of Tortilla (Tortilla

sin Costo), to provide 2.1 million low-income households

with tortilla stamps to obtain 1 kilo of free tortillas per day

from the tortilla manufacturer. The free tortillas distributed

through this program represented 3 percent of the total

annual corn consumption in Mexico and about 50 percent of

the daily household consumption. In 1997, over 1.9 million

kilograms of tortillas were distributed. To control the volume distributed through tortibonos and the allocation of

subsidies, the program adopted the use of “smart electronic

cards” in 1992, implemented through DICONSA’s retail

stores and the Trust Fund for Tortilla Subsidy Payments

(FIDELIST). Since 1995, FIDELIST has been managed by

SEDESOL (Secretaria de Desarollo Social).

Progresa 

Progresa is the most recent food assistance program implemented by the Mexican Government. Initiated in 1997, it

links food assistance to health and education programs.

Currently benefiting over 400,000 urban and rural families

in 12 States, the goal is for full coverage of the country

within the next few years. 

Progresa has three linked components:

1. Education

The Government provides scholarships and financial support

for school supplies to encourage children to attend school.

In addition, the Government plans to increase the coverage

and improve the quality of education by training teachers

and improving school equipment.

Scholarships are granted to each child in families covered

by Progresa. The scholarships include school equipment or

the financial support to obtain them and are given every 2

months throughout the school year. The higher the grade,

the higher the amount distributed. Beginning in the first

grade of secondary school, girls receive a higher allowance

than boys. The scholarships are meant to ensure school

attendance and to reduce the incentives to seek jobs at a

young age or, in the case of girls, to do housework before

completing their basic education.

2. Health

The coverage of health services is enhanced by equipping

and training health-care providers. A basic free health services package is provided, and a nutritional supplement is

given to all pregnant women and nursing mothers and to

children less than 2 years old to decrease the number of

undernourished children. Health self-care by the families is

fostered through education and training in the areas of

health, nutrition, and hygiene.

3. Nutrition

Financial support of 110 pesos per month is granted to the

families to supplement their income. To help ensure that the

money is used for food, this money is distributed to the

female head of the household. This amount is indexed to

inflation so the purchasing power remains the same.

Through education and information, families are encouraged

to spend this money in a manner that will yield the most

improvement in nutrition and well-being. Beneficiaries must

make compulsory visits to health services, and parents must

attend health courses. 

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 
Major Food Assistance Programs

in the United States

We now review five food assistance programs in the United

States: the Food Stamp Program, WIC, the National School

Lunch and Breakfast Programs, the Emergency Food

Assistance Program (TEFAP), and the Food Distribution

Program on Indian Reservations. In contrast with Mexico,

where the food assistance programs are under SEDESOL

(roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Health

and Human Services), all U.S. food assistance programs are

funded by the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Food

assistance programs were originally established, in part, to

distribute surplus commodities and, hence, served an additional role of supporting U.S. farmers. While some food

assistance programs directly support domestic agriculture by

distributing surplus commodities (such as the TEFAP program, described below) or by stipulating that only commodities produced in the United States can be purchased

(such as the School Lunch Program), most food assistance

programs (including the largest one, the Food Stamp

Program) serve this role only indirectly. Nevertheless,

because these programs do increase food consumption, support for them among farmers and others in agriculture

remains high and increases political support for the food

assistance programs run by USDA.4

Food Stamp Program

The Food Stamp Program is by far the largest U.S. food

assistance program, serving approximately 18.2 million

individuals in 1999. Children are the primary recipients of

food stamp benefits: over half of all food stamp recipients

are children, and 60 percent of food stamp households

include children. The modern version of the program began

as a pilot project in 1961 and became a nationwide program

in 1974. This cornerstone of food assistance programs

works under the principle that everyone has a right to food

for themselves and their families and, hence, with a few

exceptions, this program is available to all citizens who

meet income and asset tests. Participants receive either

paper “coupons” or an Electronic Benefit Transfer card for

the purchase of food in authorized, privately run retail food

outlets selling food to participants and nonparticipants.

While authorized stores may also sell nonfood products,

food stamps cannot be used to purchase nonfood items such

as soap, toiletries, household paper products, prepared

foods, or medicines.5

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program

for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)

Nutritious supplemental foods, nutrition education, and

referrals to other important health and social services are

provided to low-income pregnant and postpartum women,

infants, and children up to the age of 5 through the Special

Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and

Children (WIC). About 7 million people participate in WIC

in any month: 3.8 million children, 1.9 million infants

(under age 1), and 1.7 million women. WIC was established

on a permanent basis in 1974. The types of food a woman

can purchase with WIC coupons for her own or her children’s consumption are restricted. To meet the needs of

pregnant and lactating women and their children, the foods

include iron-fortified infant formula and infant cereal, ironfortified adult cereal, fruits and vegetable juices rich in vitamin C, eggs, milk, cheese, peanut butter, and dried beans

and peas. These foods are generally high in protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A, and vitamin C, nutrients frequently

lacking in the diets of the program’s target population.

Fewer food outlets accept WIC coupons than accept food

stamps. About 46,000 merchants nationwide and some farmers markets are authorized to accept WIC coupons.

The National School Lunch 

and Breakfast Programs

The National School Lunch Program provides nutritionally

balanced, low-cost or free lunches to children in kindergarten through 12th grade. Each school day, about 26 million children receive lunches through the program. The

amount a child pays depends upon the child’s household’s

income: about 45 percent receive free meals; 10 percent

receive reduced-price meals; and 45 percent pay near-full

price. The program was started in 1946 to encourage children’s consumption of nutritious food and to provide an outlet for surplus commodities. To ensure the consumption of

nutritious foods, schools must meet Federal nutrition guidelines. Approximately 17 percent of the total dollar value of

food in school lunches comes from 60 different kinds of

foods from agricultural surplus; the rest comes from vendors

chosen by the schools. Virtually all public and nonprofit private schools (94,000) participate in the program.

The National School Breakfast program is a smaller, newer

program. Each school day, about 7 million children receive

breakfasts through the program, breakfasts designed to provide at least one-fourth of the daily recommended levels for

protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A, vitamin C, and calories.

As with school lunches, the amount a child pays depends on

household income, but a much higher percentage of participants receive free meals: 80 percent receive free meals; 5

percent receive reduced-price meals; and 15 percent pay

near-full price. The high percentage of students receiving

free meals is partly a function of the program’s larger presence in low-income schools. The program was made permanent in 1975. Like the National School Lunch Program,

breakfasts must meet nutrition requirements, but the program does not mandate specific foods to be offered. Unlike

4 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

4For more on the increase in food consumption due to food stamps and

its resultant effect on the agricultural sector, see Kuhn, et al., 1996.

5The information used in this and the following descriptions for U.S.

food assistance programs can be found in various issues of Food Review

and on the Food and Nutrition Service’s home page,

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/.
the lunch program, agricultural surpluses are not used.

About 70,000 schools participate in the program.

The Emergency Food Assistance Program

(TEFAP)

TEFAP is a Federal program that supplements the consumption of low-income households through the provision of

free, healthful foods. In the course of a year, the program

serves about 3.5 million households. In this program, food is

purchased, processed, and packaged by the USDA, shipped

to States, and then distributed to local organizations such as

food banks and soup kitchens. The types of foods distributed include canned and dried fruits, fruit juice, canned vegetables, meat, poultry, fish, rice, grits, cereal, peanut butter,

nonfat dry milk, dried egg mix, and pasta products. TEFAP

began in 1981 with the goal of reducing Federal food inventories and storage costs by assisting the needy. 

Food Distribution Program on Indian

Reservations

This program distributes foods to low-income households

living on Indian reservations and to Native American families living near reservations. About 123,000 families participate in the program in each month. This program is part of

the Food Stamp Program, designed as an alternative for

families without easy access to foodstores. Each month, a

household receives a food package weighing between 50

and 75 pounds, containing meats, vegetables, fruits, dairy

products, grains, and cereals. The USDA purchases and

ships the foods through six State agencies and 94 Indian

Tribal Organizations. These agencies distribute the food,

determine applicant eligibility, and provide nutrition education in 218 Indian communities.6

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

6There are other assistance programs in the United States for low-income

households. These include programs to help with housing (such as public

housing projects and Section 8 housing), to help with medical insurance

(Medicaid), and cash assistance programs (the largest is Temporary

Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)). These programs affect food consumption by enabling households to reallocate money from other necessities like housing and through the provision of extra money which can be

used for purchasing food.
Identification of Recipients

Countries with a limited amount of money allocated to

improving the well-being of poor residents must design

effective identification methods to ensure that benefits are

distributed in the most cost-effective manner possible while

still reaching the intended beneficiaries. The goals of food

assistance programs can be many. Most food assistance programs are designed to improve nutrition and ensure that

people have enough food to eat. These goals can lead to

other results, including a redistribution of resources to poor

households, an alleviation of the negative effects of economic downturns, and a population more aware of nutrition.

There are also many other potential goals not directly related to food consumption including political stability and the

reduction of agricultural surpluses. To compare the targeting

programs of Mexico and the United States, we begin with a

general theoretical framework that assumes one goal of food

assistance programs is to alleviate food insufficiency.

Consider a country with a fixed amount of money, T, for

nutrition programs. The country gives food assistance

through a vector of transfers, t, to all or some residents.7

The extent of food insufficiency is measured by a food sufficiency index, F(y; z) where y is a vector of food consumption levels for all households and z is a minimum food consumption level below which households are defined as malnourished. The food sufficiency index could be constructed

in a manner similar to poverty indexes (for example, the

Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke measure (1984); Sen’s poverty

index (1974)).

If the yi

’s are observed, a country faces the following minimization problem:

min F(y+t;z) subject to

where the ti’s are the elements of t. The solution to this

problem is

tp

*=t(y,z,T).

and each household, taking z and T as fixed, will receive the

transfer, tpi*=t(yi).8 This is called perfect targeting at the

household level.9

In most cases, however, perfect targeting is not possible. In

response, countries will minimize expected food insufficiency with a vector of observable variables, x, that are correlated with y. The new minimization problem is then

min E[F(y+t;z)] subject to , given f(y|x) and X

where the matrix X is the set of observations on x for all

households in the population. The general solution to this

can be represented by a functional t*:

t*=t(X, z, T),

which, for a given z and T, can be simplified to

t*=t(X).

Any household with observed characteristics, xi, will receive

the transfer ti*=t(xi). The vector t* will minimize the

expected food insufficiency level in the country.

Neither Mexico nor the United States (nor any other country

for that matter) is able to perfectly target transfers to households using the function t(yi

) and both instead use t(xi). In

choosing t(xi), countries consider the relative benefits and

costs of various plans (see Grosh, 1994, p. 7-14). These benefits and costs are measured in terms of leakage and undercoverage. Leakage occurs when transfers are received by

households that are not in need of assistance (as defined by

the goals of the program). Undercoverage occurs when

transfers are not received by the intended households. 

The benefits to targeting are relatively obvious in terms of

the theoretical structure above: for a fixed T, a country can

most effectively improve the well-being of poor households

by concentrating resources on those most in need.

Conversely, once a country decides on who should be

receiving assistance, identifying them accurately helps a

country minimize the amount of T needed to achieve its

goal.

There are four main costs to targeting.10 First, there are

administrative costs to identifying eligible households not

present with universal food subsidies (i.e. food assistance

benefits that are available to everyone without restrictions).

Second, there are costs borne by recipients in applying for a

subsidy. For example, the cost in time to negotiate the application process; the financial cost of getting to the welfare

office; and the opportunity cost of lost wages when applying

for benefits. Third, households may change their behavior in

response to the identification criteria. A household just

above the eligibility cutoff in terms of income, for example,

would qualify for the program if the earners in the house6 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

7Our theoretical framework is similar to Glewwe, 1992. Consistent with

papers in the poverty alleviation through targeted benefits literature, he

uses poverty as defined through income deficits from a poverty line.

Because the usual concern with food assistance programs is to ensure that

people have enough food to eat and are well-nourished, we examine the

alleviation of food insufficiency in this report. Other concepts such as

undernutrition could be used instead. For more on targeting of support to

low-income households, see Székely, 1997; de Walle and Nead, 1995;

Ravallion, 1989; Ravallion and Chao, 1989; and Besley and Kanbur, 1988. 8It is possible that for some households, tpi=0. In fact, for the programs

discussed below, this is the case. 9Perfect targeting at the household level does not imply perfect targeting at the individual level. There may be individuals in ineligible households in need of assistance. Even if the intended households receive the

benefits, due to intra-household allocation decisions, not everyone in the

household may receive the benefits in the intended amounts. (See

Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, for more on the implications arising from

intra-household bargaining.)

  



å £ 

  



å £ 

10Analyses of food assistance programs in Egypt (Ali and Adams,

1996) and Jamaica (Jacoby, 1997) have found that universal subsidies can

achieve similar outcomes as targeted subsidies. This can occur if, for example, the program provides “inferior foods” that nonpoor persons are less

likely to consume. Neither Mexico nor the United States uses universal

subsidies, so we do not consider the relative efficacy of universal versus

targeted programs.
hold scaled back the number of hours they worked. While

this improves the household’s welfare by increasing the

leisure time of wage earners, such households were not the

intended beneficiaries when the government established the

eligibility criteria. In response, the government is therefore

forced to spend more money than it would have otherwise

and/or cut back on the number of recipients. Fourth, when

geographical targeting is used, some nonrecipients may

move into the targeted area so as to receive benefits. This

outcome may have desirable features insofar as otherwise

poor nonrecipients are now covered, but if nonpoor households also move into the targeted area to receive benefits,

the Government may be forced to reduce the amount available to poor households and/or to increase the cost of the

program. 

A country’s choice of t(x) and T is clearly influenced by its

available resources. The United States is much wealthier

than Mexico. Based on current exchange rates, the per capita 1997 U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was $29,326,

while it was $4,298 in Mexico. Using purchasing power parity prices, the gap narrows somewhat: $29,326 versus

$7,697. The United States, therefore, if it is so inclined, has

a lot more money available for food assistance programs.

This additional income means that more sophisticated targeting methods t(x) are possible and T can be larger. This

should be noted as we now review how t(x) is chosen for the

three largest U.S. food assistance programs and for the

Mexican food assistance programs. 

U.S. Food Assistance Programs

Food Stamp Program

Households have to meet three financial criteria to qualify

for the Food Stamp Program: the gross income test, the net

income test, and the asset test. A household’s gross income

before taxes in the previous month must be at or below 130

percent of the poverty line ($1,479 per month in fiscal year

1999 for a three-person household, the most common food

stamp household). Households with disabled persons or

headed by someone over the age of 60 are exempt from this

test (although they must still pass the net income test). After

passing the gross income test, a household must have a net

monthly income at or below the poverty line. Net income is

calculated in the following manner. A standard deduction is

subtracted from a households’ gross income. Households

with earnings from the labor market deduct 20 percent of

these earnings from their gross income. Households incurring expenses for child care and/or care for disabled dependents can deduct up to some limit. A medical deduction for

expenses above $35 per month and a shelter deduction for

costs in excess of 50 percent of a household’s net income

(computed before the shelter deduction) are also used. (The

medical deduction is only available to households with

elderly or disabled members.) The shelter deduction is

capped except for elderly or disabled households. Finally,

net-income-eligible households must meet an asset test. All

net-income-eligible households with assets less than $2,000

qualify for the program ($3,000 for households headed by

someone over age 60). The value of a vehicle above $4,650

is also considered an asset unless it is used for work or for

the transportation of disabled persons. The value of a home

is not considered an asset.

Recipients of food stamps are categorically eligible for WIC

and the School Lunch and Breakfast programs, if they also

meet the other nonincome requirements of the program. As

seen in the income eligibility tests of these other programs,

the converse does not hold. 

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for

Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)

To qualify for WIC, three criteria must be met. First, individuals must fall into one of four categories: pregnant

woman, postpartum woman, infant under the age of 1, or

child between the ages of 1 and 4. Second, gross household

income in the previous month must be less than 185 percent

of the poverty line. Participants in the Food Stamp Program

or Medicaid are automatically income eligible. Third, recipients must be nutritionally “at risk.” Two major types of

nutritional risk are recognized: medically based risks (such

as anemia, underweight, maternal age, history of pregnancy

complications, and/or poor pregnancy outcomes) and dietbased risks such as an inadequate dietary pattern. This

assessment, based on Federal guidelines, is made by a

health professional, that is, a physician, nutritionist, or

nurse. 

Unlike other U.S. food assistance programs, WIC is not an

entitlement program and, therefore, funding may not be

available so that all eligible persons can receive benefits.

Once a local WIC agency has spent all its funds, rationing

occurs based on the following priority levels (in descending

order): pregnant women, breast-feeding women, and infants

determined to be at nutritional risk because of a nutritionrelated medical condition; infants up to 6 months of age

whose mothers were at nutritional risk during pregnancy;

children at nutritional risk because of a nutrition-related

medical condition; pregnant and breast-feeding women and

infants at nutritional risk because of an inadequate dietary

pattern; children at nutritional risk because of an inadequate

dietary pattern; and nonbreast-feeding, postpartum women

at nutritional risk. 

The National School Lunch Program

Any student at a school participating in the School Lunch

Program can receive free or reduced-price lunches. About

92 percent of all students have access to these meals with

near universal access in public schools. Children from

households earning less than 130 percent of the poverty line

can receive free meals; children from households earning

between 130 and 185 percent of the poverty line can receive

meals for 40 cents; and households earning more than 185

percent of the poverty line do not receive any reduction in

the cost (although even these meals are subsidized to some

extent due to the use of surplus agricultural foods).

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 
As seen in the age requirements for this program and WIC,

it is very unlikely that a child could receive benefits from

both programs. However, a family can potentially receive

benefits from both programs.

Mexico’s Food Assistance Programs

LICONSA

Children under the age of 12 who live in families with

incomes below 2 times the minimum salary (a commonly

used poverty line in Mexico) qualify for subsidized milk in

the LICONSA program. The participation of over 10,900

dairies ensures milk availability.

DICONSA

DICONSA’s target population is families with incomes of

less than 2 times the minimum salary living in rural communities of less than 2,500 inhabitants whose residents (a)

request assistance and (b) have the majority of the population with incomes below two-times the minimum wage.

Access to this program for the distribution of basic commodities is facilitated through 23,000 stores, 332 warehouses, and 3,400 vehicles for distribution and supervision.

DIF

Everyone residing in a targeted community qualifies for the

benefits of DIF. Targeting of DIF depends on an “index of

social vulnerability” composed of five components — (1)

infant mortality rates, (2) illiteracy rates, (3) malnutrition

rates, (4) the number of indigenous persons in an area, and

(5) the number of postpartum women who are unable to

breast-feed. To establish the index, DIF first uses official

statistics, then DIF agents talk with local officials to establish the statistics’ veracity. The goal is to reach the most

poverty-stricken households; so areas scoring highest on this

index are served by DIF.

FIDELIST

Families earning less than two times the minimum salary

and without a telephone or car qualify for FIDELIST. 

Progresa

The selection process of beneficiaries for Progresa is determined by income and other factors, a process clearly stated

in the program’s guidelines. A household is defined as a

group of people (related or unrelated) living in the same

house, sharing food expenses, and cooking in the same

kitchen.

The identification of beneficiaries of Progresa is carried out

in three stages. The first consists of a geographic targeting

process to determine the most marginal localities with relatively easy access to health services and schools. Second, a

census of socioeconomic information of each household in

all the selected localities is carried out to identify the beneficiaries of the program. Third, once the list of beneficiaries is

completed, it is presented to the communities in meetings to

rectify any improper inclusion or exclusion of beneficiaries. 

The geographic targeting process is based on the Indice de

Marginación. The index is based on, for any region, the percentage of illiterate population age 15 or more; the percentage of households without water services, drainage, electricity, or floors; the average number of inhabitants per room

in households; and the percentage of the population

employed in the primary sector (mainly manufacturing and

services industries). 

The second step in the targeting process is based on the

analysis of socioeconomic information of each household in

the regions selected by the Indice de Marginación.

Beneficiaries must also be considered poor. The information

obtained through the socioeconomic census of each household was designed to include measures of poverty. These

variables are household structure, individual characteristics,

occupation, income of each member of the household, government support programs received by the members of the

household, migration, health of the members of the household, physical characteristics of the house, use of the land,

and the number of farm animals.

The consolidation of the list of eligible households by locality takes place in a community meeting attended by the

female head of the household and other members of the

community. The input of the community in determining the

final list of beneficiaries is important and ensures that all

eligible households are included.

During this community meeting, the basic guidelines are

reviewed as well as the responsibilities of the beneficiaries,

such as compulsory visits to the health center and children’s

school attendance. The community is in charge of the control and surveillance of the program. The benefits of

Progresa can be suspended temporarily or permanently if

the beneficiaries do not fulfill their responsibilities. After 3

years, people may be rotated off the program to allow other

community members to participate.

The objective of targeting is to ensure that the poorest families receive the benefits. Because financial resources for

food assistance programs are insufficient to reach all households living in extreme poverty, the Government ensures

that Progresa does not overlap with other Government food

and education support; so beneficiaries of Progresa cannot

participate in other food assistance programs. This rule is

consistent with the goals of the Mexican Government. As

Progresa expands, it is going to replace the other programs.

In other words, the other programs are not going to be able

to replace beneficiaries lost to Progresa by going to other

parts of the country not served by Progresa or by changing

their eligibility criteria to include more families. Poor

households who receive no benefits from Progresa could

theoretically receive benefits from the four other programs.

The extent of overlap is unknown.

8 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA
A Comparison of Programs 

Over Three Dimensions

We now compare Mexican and U.S. food assistance programs over three dimensions related to targeting: (1) the

structure of benefits, (2) the uses of nonhousehold-based

information for targeting, and (3) the possible negative

incentives produced by the programs.

Structure of Benefits

In Mexico, once a family is deemed eligible for food assistance, its level of benefits is fixed. In the United States, the

amount of assistance a family receives for WIC, TEFAP, and

the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations is

also fixed. The benefits under the National School Lunch

and Breakfast Programs and the Food Stamp Program, however, are inversely related to income, although for the former, there are only three income categories. In terms of the

theoretical structure above, if ti(xi)* > 0, then ti(xi)* is independent of xi for the fixed-benefit programs; for the other

programs, if ti

(xi)* > 0, ti(xi)* depends on xi.

A fixed benefit level reduces the administrative cost of targeting because the only information needed is whether or

not a household is eligible. For example, Mexico has no

need to know whether a household without a car or telephone earns 1 or 1.5 times the minimum wage—in both

cases a household qualifies for FIDELIST. However, for the

U.S. Food Stamp Program, for example, greater detail is

needed to set the benefit level. While the need for greater

detail does increase the administrative costs, there are two

primary advantages to using a benefit level inversely related

to, say, income. First, the marginal benefit to a peso of assistance is, under reasonable assumptions, higher for households with incomes far below the poverty line than those

closer to the poverty line. In other words, it is a more efficient way to allocate scarce resources. Second, the disincentive effects of a variable benefit level are lower than for a

fixed benefit level. Consider an ineligible individual who,

with a small decrease in the number of hours worked, will

become eligible. If there is a fixed benefit level, a small

decrease in the number of hours worked may actually lead

to a higher total income. If there is a properly constructed

variable benefit level, however, a small decrease in the number of hours will not lead to a higher total income.

Uses of Nonhousehold-Based Information

In the theoretical framework above, we presumed that

households were the intended beneficiaries of food assistance programs, and, with the exception of DIF, programs in

both countries use at least some information at the household level to identify beneficiaries. However, in both countries, the vector x can also include information not necessarily at the household level. 

Some programs use more disaggregation to identify beneficiaries by targeting benefits to individuals within households. WIC does use the income of households to identify

eligible recipients, but it also uses information about the

women, infants, and/or children within the households who

are potential beneficiaries. For example, nutritional risk is

an eligibility criterion for the women, infants, and children.

Others in the household could be at nutritional risk, but they

are not eligible. U.S. school meal programs use household

income to decide on the cost of meals, but only school-age

children in schools are eligible for benefits. In Mexico,

Progresa’s scholarship program is for school-age children,

and its benefits are further targeted by gender with girls

receiving more benefits than boys. LICONSA targets benefits to children under the age of 12. This further disaggregation allows for more precision in reaching the intended beneficiaries. All members of households benefit insofar as

money previously spent on now-covered expenses is freed

up for other expenditures.

Unlike the United States, Mexico uses information aggregated beyond the household level to identify beneficiaries. All

food assistance programs in Mexico use some geographic

targeting. By using more aggregation, the administrative

costs of providing food assistance is decreased in at least

two ways. First, by screening out large categories of persons, the cost to certifying the eligibility of a smaller number of potential recipients is lowered. For example, Progresa

first decides on what areas are most in need of assistance

and, after this decision, individuals are targeted. This

method reduces the costs of ascertaining eligibility for the

Government. Second, the costs to providing the services

themselves are lessened. Consider the case of DICONSA,

which incurs both capital and labor costs. By restricting the

benefits to limited areas, the capital investment is diminished because the Government does not have to establish

and staff stores in all locales. The costs to families can also

be less. Suppose the Government, instead of targeting geographically, decided instead to establish the same number of

DICONSA stores distributed randomly across the country.

This alternative location strategy would lead to an increase

in travel and opportunity costs for the average poor family.

While there are advantages to geographic targeting, the primary disadvantage is the undercoverage that occurs because

needy individuals not in the targeted area will not receive

benefits. Simulations for Mexico show that if only Statelevel information is used, the undercoverage rate is 59.3 percent; if municipal information is used, it is 42.3 percent; and

if locality information is used, it is 37.3 percent (Baker and

Grosh, 1994; table 7). By no means should these be interpreted as the actual extent of undercoverage: they are based

on data from 1984; Mexico uses more than just geographic

targeting; and the simulations presume a fixed amount of

money available to poor households – but that fixed amount

of money is not based on the actual amount of money available. Thus, these simulations should be seen as only an indication of the relative effectiveness of hypothetical targeting

schemes. 

Compared with the United States, poverty in Mexico is

more concentrated in rural areas. This concentration is the

primary reason that most programs in Mexico use the

urban/rural distinction to target benefits more extensively

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 
than the United States. About 4.2 million Mexican households live in extreme poverty conditions.11 Of those poor

households, 1.7 million are in urban areas and 2.5 million in

rural areas. Because the distribution of Mexico’s population

between urban and rural areas is 73 percent in the cities and

27 percent in rural areas, poverty is much more common in

rural areas. (For more on the rural/urban poverty differential, see Kelly, 1999.) In the United States, poverty is more

evenly distributed. The poverty rate for persons outside

metro areas was 15.9 percent in 1997 versus 12.6 percent

inside metro areas (Dalaker and Naifeh, 1998). Using nongeographical distinctions one can see sharp disparities

between groups in poverty rates, however. For example, single mothers with children have a poverty rate of 31.6 percent, while married couples with children have a poverty

rate of 5.2 percent. While the United States has not targeted

food stamp benefits based on these nongeographical distinctions, it has structured access to food assistance programs

based on this information. For example, prior to PRWORA,

recipients of AFDC, a program for single parents with children, were categorically eligible for food stamps. As a consequence, they did not have the burden of establishing

income eligibility for food stamps.

The relation of the food assistance participation rate to the

poverty rate by State is one way to view the effectiveness of

a country’s targeting methods. The poverty rate and the participation rate are displayed by State for Mexico in figure

1.12 The States are in ascending order of poverty. There

appears to be very little connection between State poverty

rates and food assistance participation. For example, in

Oaxaca, a State with a poverty rate of 63 percent, only 9

percent of residents participate in at least one food assistance program. Conversely, in the Distrito Federal, a State

with a relatively low poverty rate of 28 percent, 36 percent

of residents participate in at least one food assistance program. We provide a more detailed look at the targeting

methods used in the food assistance programs in the section

on “Food Assistance and Poverty Rates” below. 

10 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA Baja California (Norte) Baja California Sur Distrito Federal Nuevo Leon Aguascalientes Sonora Sinaloa Chihuahua Quintana Roo Coahuila de Zaragosa Mexico Colima Jalisco Queretaro Morelos Tamaulipas Nayarit Guanajuato Durango Tiaxcala Ta basco Campeche San Luis Potosi Veracruz Puebla Michoacan Yucatan Hidalgo Zacatecas Guerrero Chiapas Oaxaca

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Poverty rate

Participation rate

Average State poverty rate is 43.2 percent

Average State participation rate is 19.3 percent

Source: Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda.

Figure 1

Mexican food assistance participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State

Percent

Note: See appendix A for more detail.

11Extreme poverty is defined as not having enough resources for access

to the goods contained in the official list of basic products that allows for

the adequate performance of daily activities.

12For a discussion of how the participation and poverty rates were calculated and the information source used for this analysis (Instituto

Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informita, 1997) see Gundersen and

Kelly, 1999. The participation rate is calculated as the percentage of households participating in at least one food assistance program. Appendix A 

has a table for all States in Mexico. Appendix B has a table for all the

United States.
A similar exercise for the Food Stamp Program in the

United States is in figure 2. There are two major differences

between the United States and Mexico in terms of the food

assistance/poverty relation. First, the difference in poverty

rates across States is much less in the United States, from 5

percent in New Hampshire to 18 percent in Mississippi

whereas in Mexico the range is from 21 percent in Baja

California (Norte) to 63 percent in Oaxaca. Second, while

not exact, food stamp participation rates appear to be more

correlated at the State level with poverty rates in the United

States. This closer correlation between poverty rates and

food stamp participation rates in the United States may be

due to three reasons. First, food stamps are an entitlement

program, while none of the food assistance programs in

Mexico are entitlement programs. Second, the costs to reach

some of the poorest areas in Mexico are very high due to

underdeveloped transportation systems. As a consequence,

administrators of food assistance programs may decide not

to serve such areas because the marginal costs of serving

them exceed the marginal benefits. In the United States,

transportation systems are well-developed and therefore are

not an issue. Third, Mexico has a large number of subsistence farmers, especially in very poor rural areas. While

these farmers may be in dire need of other social services,

food assistance may not be needed to the same extent as in

areas without subsistence agriculture. Food assistance

administrators may therefore decide not to serve these areas.

The number of subsistence farmers in the United States is

negligible.

Negative Incentives

A government generally hopes that the vector of characteristics, xi

, for any household i is not affected negatively by the

targeting method, t(xi); but that occasionally happens

nonetheless. Examples of changing characteristics to receive

benefits include moving to a certain area to receive benefits

(when geographic targeting is used); cutting back on the

number of hours worked (when income cutoffs are used);

and increasing family size to receive more benefits (when

family size influences the size of benefits).

In Mexico, there is no published evidence of and little concern about families that changed behavior to receive food

assistance benefits. In the United States, however, policymakers are concerned about the possible negative incentives

associated with welfare, including food stamps. The recent

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act was designed, in part, to reduce the negative incentives seen by some as the source of extended welfare stays

for portions of the population. Through the TANF program,

the entitlement nature of AFDC ended. The act limits cash

assistance benefits to 5 years total in an individual’s life

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖  New Hampshire Utah Wisconsin Nebraska Nevada Iowa North Dakota Massachusetts Colorado South Dakota Idaho Minnesota New Jersey Connecticut Wyoming Kansas Alaska Indiana Maryland Delaware Montana Virginia North Carolina Washington Oregon Rhode Island South Carolina Illinois Pennsylvania Florida Vermont California Michigan Ohio Maine Missouri Hawaii Arkansas Arizona Georgia Oklahoma New York Alabama Ten nessee Texas Kentucky New Mexico Louisiana West Virginia D.C. Mississippi

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Poverty rate

Participation rate

Percent

Figure 2

U.S. food stamp participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State

Average State poverty rate is 11.3 percent

Average State participation rate is 14.8 percent

Source: U.S. Dept. of Comm., Census, and U.S. Dept. of Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.

Note: See appendix B for more detail.
and, through the increased autonomy given to States, States

can impose even stricter requirements — as little as 2 years

of receiving assistance. States also impose various rules limiting benefit levels for additional children, thus reducing the

supposed incentives for mothers to have more children to

qualify for higher benefits. The Food Stamp Program

remains a federally funded entitlement program, however,

with time limits on receipt for only a small portion of eligible persons – able-bodied adults without dependents who do

not work or participate in an employment training program

and who do not live in an area with high unemployment

rates or in a labor surplus area.

Despite concern by policymakers, research has found that the

negative incentives associated with U.S. welfare programs

have a very small effect on the number of recipients and the

size of families. While hours of work were lower than they

would have been in absence of AFDC benefits, the disincentives to work were calculated to have led to about a 5-percent

increase in the AFDC caseload (Moffitt, 1992; p. 17).13 Over 

time, the number of single-parent households has increased.

However, despite the claims of some policymakers, this

increase cannot be attributed to the AFDC program (Moffitt,

1992; p. 29). Relatively less work has been done on the

effect of the Food Stamp Program on labor supply and/or

family size.14 Fraker and Moffitt (1988) found that elimination of the Food Stamp Program would lead to an estimated

9-percent increase in the number of hours worked by female

heads of households. A study of married couples (Hagstrom,

1996) found that increases in food stamp benefits produce

almost no change in the number of hours worked, although

they do induce higher participation levels.

Countries can also choose targeting methods that may indirectly induce positive changes in individual or household

characteristics. For example, Progresa requires medical

checkups as a condition of receipt, and WIC recipients are

strongly encouraged to seek prenatal care. The effects of

these indirect influences on recipients’ well-being is an area

in need of more research.

12 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

14On a per person basis, other food assistance programs are probably

too small to produce labor supply changes.

13A decline in hours of work is not necessarily a negative outcome:

this allows single mothers to spend more time caring for their children. In

fact, the original intent of AFDC was to ensure single mothers did not have

to work outside the home.
Effect of the Macroeconomy

By ensuring that low-income households have enough food

to eat, food assistance programs are an important component

of the social safety net in both countries. For purposes of

this report, we are concerned with two roles of the safety

net. For households that are persistently poor, even during

economic expansions, the safety net ensures them a minimum standard of living. In the United States, approximately

one in three poor households have permanent incomes that

lead to poverty in every year of a 10-year time horizon

(Rodgers and Rodgers, 1992). This “chronic poverty” is particularly high for certain segments of the population, for

example, households headed by single African-American

mothers without a high school diploma. These households

have a chronic poverty rate of close to 70 percent.15 A comparable situation appears to exist in terms of race/ethnicity

in Mexico. Areas with high concentrations of indigenous

persons have less than one-fourth the average incomes of

areas with low concentrations. The chronic nature of this

poverty is reflected in the low human capital levels as proxied for by literacy rates. In indigenous areas, 48 percent of

households are literate versus 76 percent in other areas. The

chronic nature is also reflected in the quality of residential

amenities – in indigenous areas, 16.1 percent of households

have piped water versus 62.5 percent in other areas; 48.9

percent have electricity versus 92.9 percent; and 2.2 percent

have a telephone versus 22.2 percent (Panagides, 1994, table

7.1, table 7.4, and figure 7.5). 

A second role of the social safety net is to protect families

that fall below the poverty line during economic recessions.16 During an economic recession, the average income

in a country declines. While, in theory, an increase in poverty does not necessarily occur if the relative distribution of

income in a country stays the same or becomes more

unequal, a falling average income does lead to an increase

in poverty. 

This inverse relation between poverty and the state of the

macroeconomy in the United States can also be seen in figure 3, which shows the poverty rate and the unemployment

rate (as economic growth declines, the unemployment rate

increases) from 1959 onwards. For example, during the prolonged expansion of the 1960’s, there was a steady decline

in the poverty rate, and during the recession of the early

1990’s, there was an increase in the poverty rate.17 There

has been extensive work done on the relationship between

the macroeconomy and the poverty rate. (See, for example,

Blank, 1993; Blank and Blinder, 1986; Blank and Card,

1993; and Cutler and Katz, 1991.)

Poverty rates and participation in welfare programs are generally closely related. However, poverty rates may change

without any changes in participation rates or vice-versa. For

example, a large number of eligible households do not participate in the U.S. Food Stamp Program (Cody and Trippe,

1997). In recent years, several researchers have analyzed the

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

15This study was based on data from 1977 to 1986.

16A safety net will also help a family facing a transitory income shock

unrelated to the macroeconomy. For example, a spouse’s departure (abandonment, death, divorce) from a family may lead to a temporary decline in

the family’s income. 17According to Gottschalk and Danziger, 1985, a large portion of this

decline is also due to increased transfer payments over this time period.

Percent

1959 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97

0

5

10

15

20

25

Figure 3

U.S. poverty rates and unemployment rates, 1959-98

Poverty rate

Unemployment rate

Source: U.S. Dept. of Agri., Food and Nutrition Serv.
effect of the macroeconomy on welfare caseloads in the

United States. This work has emerged, in part, to try to

answer the following question: Which has the larger effect

on the unprecedented decline in cash assistance caseloads –

various State-based welfare reform policies or the macroeconomic expansion? Some have argued that welfare reform

is a very important factor (Executive Office of the President,

1997; Blank, 1997) while others have argued that economic

growth swamps any influence of welfare reform (Ziliak,

Davis, and Connolly, 1997; Martini and Wiseman, 1997).18

This work was inspired by the dramatic caseload reductions

in cash assistance programs. An even greater decline has

occurred since 1994 in the Food Stamp Program. From a

record high of 27.5 million in 1994, the number of food

stamp recipients fell by more than 30 percent to 18.0 million

by mid-1999. A recent analysis by Figlio, Gundersen, and

Ziliak (2000) examined the relative contributions of the

macroeconomy and welfare reform to this decline by using

dynamic and static models with data from all 50 States and

the District of Columbia for fiscal years 1980 to 1998.19 In

their preferred dynamic model, the effect of the welfare

reform variables are very small compared with the effect of

the macroeconomic variables. From 1994 to 1998, approximately 35 percent of food stamp caseload change is due to

State differences in macroeconomic conditions (unemployment and employment-growth rates), while a very small

fraction is attributable to State-to-State differences in welfare reform. State-level political factors account for about 15

percent of the caseload decline. Their work implies that a

reversal of economic fortunes will likely lead to a substantial increase in food stamp cases. (Other research looking at

the effect of the macroeconomy on food stamp caseloads

include Kuhn, LeBlanc, and Gundersen, 1997; Wallace and

Blank, 1999; and Dynarski, Rangarajan, and Decker, 1991.)

These studies were primarily concerned with the determinants of caseloads. In this report, we analyze the effect of

the macroeconomy on food assistance expenditures in

Mexico and the United States. Caseload dynamics is one of

the two factors influencing changes in food assistance

expenditures. The other factor is the change in the average

benefit level. While we use econometric techniques to analyze the effect of the macroeconomy on food assistance

expenditures in United States, the lack of information about

food assistance expenditures before 1989 prevents a similar

exercise for Mexico.

Total real annual food assistance expenditures in the United

States from 1970 on is seen in figure 4 (the expenditures are

deflated by the Urban Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)).

Figure 5 shows the unemployment rate and total real food

assistance expenditures. With a few exceptions, increases in

unemployment apparently coincide with increases in food

assistance expenditures. Using models akin to those used in

Kuhn, LeBlanc, and Gundersen (1997), we then isolated the

effect of various macroeconomic forces on food assistance

expenditures. The two models we used are

and

where logFAEXP is the log of real food assistance expenditures (discounted by the Consumer Price Index - Urban

(CPI-U)); UN is the male unemployment rate; INFL is the

inflation rate; DGDP is the change in real GDP; and t is

time. We restricted our choice of variables and frequency of

observation (annual) such that comparable models to study

the effect of the macroeconomy on food assistance expenditures in Mexico were possible. 

The results are in table 1. In model 1, the health of the

macroeconomy is measured by the unemployment rate. The

combined effect of lagged and current unemployment

implies that a 1-percent increase in the unemployment rate

leads to a 9-percent increase in food assistance expenditures

after 2 years. Consistent with the work on food stamp participation, inflation is also positively associated with food

stamp expenditures. The steady increase in expenditures

seen in figure 5 is reflected in the importance of the year

variable.

14 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

   

 


  
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18Figlio and Ziliak, 1999, find that the primary difference in these conclusions is attributable to the types of models used. Once the dynamics of

caseloads is incorporated into models, the role of welfare reform is sharply

reduced relative to the macroeconomy. 19The static model is expressed as 

and the dynamic model is expressed as

where Cit is the natural log of per capita food stamp caseloads, URit is the

unemployment rate, EMPit is a measure of employment per capita, Wit is a

welfare reform indicator that equals the fraction of a year that “any

statewide AFDC waiver” is in effect, Bit is the real maximum AFDC/TANF

plus food stamp benefit for a family of three, Pit is a vector of variables

reflecting the political climate of a State, ABAWDit is the weighted percentage of a State’s population waived from work requirements for unemployed able-bodied adults without dependents, EBTit is an indicator that

equals the fraction of a year that a State’s recipients received benefits via

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Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

Million dollars

Source: U.S. Dept. of Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.

All food assistance

Food stamps

Child nutrition

WIC

Figure 4

U.S. real expenditures on all food assistance, food stamps, child nutrition, and WIC, 1970-98

Source: U.S. Dept. of Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.

Figure 5

U.S. real food assistance expenditures and the unemployment rate, 1970-98

Food assistance expenditures

Billion dollars Percent

1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98

0

10

20

30

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Unemployment rate
We use another measure of macroeconomic health, the

growth rate of GDP in model 2. Here, the effect of contemporaneous GDP growth rate is insignificant, but the previous

year’s growth rate is significant. The combined effect

implies that a 1-percent decrease in GDP growth rate leads

to a 7.2-percent increase in food assistance expenditures.

The effect of inflation is less in this model, but the strong

influence of time is still present.

The decomposition of food assistance expenditures in figure

4 shows that the time path of the various components of

total food assistance expenditures differs widely.20 To see

how the macroeconomy has different effects, we ran models

identical to models (1) and (2) for the three largest food

assistance programs.21 Except for contemporaneous unemployment’s effect on the WIC program, the Food Stamp

Program is the only one with expenditures influenced by

either unemployment or GDP growth (table 2). A 1-percent

increase in unemployment leads to an 11.3-percent increase

in food stamp expenditures, and a 1-percent decrease in

GDP growth rates leads to a 10.2-percent increase in food

stamp expenditures. The only other variable that matters for

the other programs, in either model, is the previous period’s

expenditures. The WIC program is not an entitlement program and, thus, does not have the capacity to expand during

economic downturns, and, even during economic expansions, persons are rationed from the program. Consequently,

we may not anticipate much of an influence of the macroeconomy, and the influence of current unemployment is

unexpected.

In the United States, food assistance expenditures are countercyclical (that is, increasing during economic downturns and

decreasing during expansions), but food assistance expenditures in Mexico appear to be neither counter- nor procyclical.

The general pattern of real food assistance expenditures in

Mexico from 1988 to 1998 is seen in figure 6 (the figures are

deflated by the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. CPI-U).22

From 1989 to 1993, food assistance expenditures generally

declined mainly because of the decline in DICONSA expen16 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 1—Effect of macroeconomic variables on total real food assistance expenditures in the United

States

Variables (1) (2)

(Log of) Real food assistance expenditures in year t-1 0.238 0.615

(2.572) (5.871)

Unemployment rate in year t .032

(3.090)

Unemployment rate in year t-1 .015

(2.426)

GDP growth rate in year t .0014

(.303)

GDP growth rate in year t-1 -.025

(-6.112)

Inflation in year t .022 .011

(3.347) (2.091)

Time trend .031 .019

(5.746) (3.946)

Constant -54.506 -33.054

(-5.490) (-3.639)

Adjusted R-squared .969 995

Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real food assistance expenditures. The Prais-Winsten correction for serially correlated residuals is used. T-statistics are

in parentheses. Please see the text for more details on the models.

20Total food assistance expenditures are broken into five components:

The Food Stamp Program and the Nutrition Assistance Programs in Puerto

Rico, the Northern Marianas, and, starting in 1996, American Samoa; all

these combined are denoted by food stamps.

The National School Lunch, School Breakfast, Child and Adult Care,

Summer Food Service, and Special Milk programs = child nutrition.

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and

Children (WIC) and the Commodity Supplemental Food Program = WIC.

The Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations, the Nutrition

Program for the Elderly, the Disaster Feeding Program, the Emergency

Food Assistance Program, the Food Distribution Program for Charitable

Institutions and Summer Camps, and the food donation programs to soup

kitchens and food banks = food donations.

Administrative expenses. The first three are much larger than food donations and administrative expenses, so we consider only those here.

21The only difference is that the lagged term always refers to the food

assistance expenditure category itself rather than total food assistance

expenditures.

22Most of the food assistance expenditure information is from Informe

de Gobierno, 1998. Information for years before 1988 in a comparable format is not available, however. In earlier years, all food assistance expenditures were subsumed under spending on a more general category of social

assistance programs (Informe de Gobierno, 1991).
Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

Table 2—Effect of macroeconomic variables on food assistance expenditures in the United States 

by category of expenditure

Variables Log of real food Log of real child Log of real WIC 

stamp expenditures nutrition expenditures expenditures

(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)

Log of real expenditures on 

____ in year t-1 0.167 0.389 0.594 0.605 0.722 0.843

(2.200) (6.604) (4.597) (5.776) (6.293) (8.001)

Unemployment rate in year t .056 -.0042 .118

(4.108) (-.378) (2.990)

Unemployment rate in year t-1 .044 .0081 -.0011

(2.349) (.571) (-0.251)

GDP growth rate in year t -.0024 .0092 -.025

(-.391) (1.745) (-1.184)

GDP growth rate in year t-1 -.033 -.0088 -.036

(-6.013) (-1.988) (-1.808)

Inflation in year t .029 .017 .0041 .0083 .044 .030

(3.514) (2.322) (.497) (1.236) (1.860) (1.176)

Year .038 .028 .0058 .0068 .039 .016

(6.454) (4.734) (1.204) (1.529) (1.724) (0.636)

Constant -69.274 -49.908 -8.098 -10.284 -77.203 -29.805

(-6.126) (-4.387) (-.935) (-1.256) (-1.716) (-.618)

Adjusted R-squared .976 .987 .977 .987 .901 .900

Notes: The Prais-Winsten correction for serially correlated residuals is used. T-statistics are in parentheses. The “____” in the listing of variables refers to the 

expenditures on the food assistance program displayed in the relevant column.

1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Figure 6

Real Mexican expenditures on all food assistance, DICONSA, LICONSA, FIDELIST, DI F, and Progresa,

1988-98

Million pesos

All food assistance

DICONSA

LICONSA

FIDELIST DIF

Progresa

Source: Informe de Gobierno.

Note: Expenditures expressed in 1994 pesos.
ditures. From 1993 on, expenditures increased sharply due to

the introduction of Progresa in 1997. 

Figure 7 is comparable to figure 5 and shows the relationship between the Mexican economy’s health and total food

assistance expenditures. Because the unemployment rate in

Mexico is not directly comparable to the U.S. unemployment rate, we instead show the growth rate of GDP. We also

show the inflation rate in Mexico because its level and

volatility have a large influence on the Mexican economy. 

Neither the inflation rate nor the GDP growth rate appears

to have any influence on food assistance expenditures.

During times of high inflation in 1988 and 1995, food assistance expenditures were unaffected, and when GDP dropped

sharply in 1995 due to the peso devaluation in December of

1994, food assistance expenditures did not change.

Conversely, despite the high economic growth in many of

these years, expenditures did not change either. One possible explanation for this lack of influence is that Mexican

food assistance programs are primarily designed to aid those

whose depth of poverty is so great that they are unaffected

by larger economic forces and are poor for longer periods. If

this is the case, then we may not find the countercyclical

relationship found in the United States where the average

length of food stamp receipt is about 9 months (Gleason,

Schochet, and Moffitt, 1998). 

One difference between the determinants of expenditures on

food assistance programs should also be emphasized. In the

United States, the types of foods available for most food

assistance recipients are relatively unrestricted, and when

prices rise in one product, individuals (or, in the case of

school meals, school districts) can purchase lower priced

substitutes. Thus, an increase in price for any commodity

will not produce a major increase in food assistance expenditures. In Mexico, however, many of the food assistance

programs are tied to one commodity. For instance, Federal

transfers for LICONSA declined in real terms in 1997 compared with 1996. This is explained by a drop in the level of

international prices for dried milk as well as prices of the

main inputs used in production, rather than budget restrictions or domestic macroeconomic variables. However, the

decrease did not affect production and distribution of milk,

as these were maintained at the same levels as in 1996.

18 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

1988 90 92 94 96 98

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Inflation rate

Real food assistance expenditures

GDP growth rate

Figure 7

Real Mexican food assistance expenditures, inflation rate, and GDP growth rate, 1988-98

Source: Informe de Gobierno.

Note: Expenditures expressed in 1994 pesos.

114 percent 

in 1988

Billion pesos (percent)
Food Assistance and Well-Being

The goal of most food assistance programs in both countries

is to improve the nutrition of lower income households. In

addition, by freeing up money previously allocated to food

expenditures, the well-being of households over other

dimensions may improve as well. Research on the benefits

of food assistance programs in the United States, especially

in terms of the Food Stamp Program, is more extensive than

for Mexican food assistance programs. Here we review several studies that examine the effect of food assistance programs on food security, nutrition, and food consumption in

the United States with brief references to the available literature for Mexico. We conclude this section with a recalculation of poverty rates in Mexico after the inclusion of food

assistance benefits.

Food Assistance and Food Insecurity

In the United States, the “USDA food insufficiency question,” one measure of food insecurity, has been included on

numerous surveys since the early 1970’s. This question asks

respondents to describe their household’s recent food intake

by responding to the following question: “Which of these

statements best describes the food eaten in your household

in the last four months?” They may choose one of four

answers: (1) “enough of the kinds of food we want to eat”;

(2) “enough but not always the kinds of food we want to

eat”; (3) “sometimes not enough to eat”; or (4) “often not

enough to eat.” Households reporting that they sometimes or

often do not get enough to eat are considered food insufficient and are asked a further question: “In what month(s)

did your household not have enough to eat?”23

Gundersen and Oliveira (1999) examined the effect of food

stamps on food insufficiency, using the above question. Out

of eligible households, 8.5 percent of participating households were food insufficient, while 4.2 percent of nonparticipants were food insufficient. On the surface, this is surprising: participants are presumed to have more resources, in

the form of food stamps, to purchase enough food to avoid

food insufficiency. However, this breakdown does not accurately portray the effect of food stamps on food insufficiency. Households more likely to be food insufficient, with or

without food stamps, may also be the same households more

likely to enter the program. If so, there are two main consequences. First, the program is effectively targeting its benefits insofar as households most in need are receiving the

benefits. Second, the positive effects of food stamps on food

insufficiency are diminished because of adverse selection.

Gundersen and Oliveira showed that with a univariate probit

model, one finds that participation in the Food Stamp

Program is associated with substantially higher probability

of being food insufficient. However, for reasons noted

above, this finding is biased if households more likely to

receive food stamps are also more likely to be food insufficient. To account for this possible endogeneity, they used a

simultaneous equation model with two probits to estimate

simultaneously the impact of participation on the food sufficiency status of households and the impact of food insufficiency on the probability of participating in the program.

Results from this model indicate substantially different

results than if separate univariate probits are analyzed. In

particular, food stamps have no effect on food insufficiency,

and food insufficient households are no more likely to

receive food stamps than food sufficient households.

Households with some of the characteristics associated with

food insufficiency, though, are more likely to join the Food

Stamp Program, indicating that effective targeting exists

over this dimension. 

Two other studies also looked at the effect of food stamps

on food insufficiency. In a study of hunger among adult

patients receiving medical care in an urban hospital in

Minnesota, Nelson, Brown, and Lurie (1998) found that loss

of food stamps was a significant determinant of food insufficiency. In a study of households with incomes less than 200

percent of the poverty line, using monthly data over a 9-

month time horizon, Gundersen and Gruber (1999) found a

similar result for a wider sample. Food-insufficient households were almost three times as likely to have lost food

stamp benefits as food-sufficient households. Out of all

households in the sample, 5.9 percent had lost their food

stamp benefits. Food-insufficient households had a food

stamp loss rate of 14.8 percent, while food-sufficient households had a food stamp loss rate of 5.4 percent.

Food Assistance and Nutrition

There have been numerous studies of the effect of food

assistance programs on nutritional intake in the United

States. The studies we review all controlled for factors other

than food assistance participation. Those other factors

included income, self-selection into the programs (for reasons discussed above in the context of food insecurity),

location, household size, household composition (for example, single-parent household, dual-parent household), education, and age. 

Studies of nutrient intake levels, all using the CSFII data set,

have found, holding all else constant, participants had higher

nutrient intake levels than eligible nonparticipants. Devaney

and Moffitt (1991) found that the marginal propensities for

low-income households to consume nutrients out of food

stamps is higher than out of cash for each of the nutrients.24

Basiotis, Kramer-LeBlanc, and Kennedy (1998) examined

the effect of food stamps and WIC on the Healthy Eating

Index (HEI), an index of overall diet quality. They found

that above some minimum food stamp benefit level, food

stamp recipients had higher HEI scores than eligible nonreEconomic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

23Several studies have confirmed the validity of the USDA food 

sufficiency question as a measure of decreased food intake (Cristofar 

and Basiotis, 1992, and Rose and Oliveira, 1997).

24The nutrients are food energy, protein, vitamin A, vitamin C, thiamin,

riboflavin, vitamin B6, calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, and iron. They

used the 1989-90 CSFII.
cipients.25 Wilde, Ranney, and McNamara (1999) found that

food stamp use leads to statistically significantly higher

intakes of meats, added sugars, and total fats, three economically efficient sources of food energy. 

Similar results held for WIC recipients.26 Oliveira and

Gundersen (1999) considered the effect of WIC on children

ages 1 to 4. They found that, with and without controlling

for possible selection bias, WIC recipients had higher nutrient intakes for most nutrients than eligible nonrecipients.27

Wilde, Ranney, and McNamara (1999) found that, all else

equal, WIC recipients had lower intakes of added sugars.

Earlier studies using different methodologies have also

found improvements in nutrient intake among WIC recipients. A 1989 National WIC Evaluation found that children

receiving WIC had higher mean intakes of iron, vitamin C,

thiamin, niacin, and vitamin B6, without an increase in food

energy intake. This lack of an increase in food energy indicates that there was an increase in the nutrient density of the

diet (U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv., 1989). Yip

et al. (1987) showed that the WIC program was partly

responsible for the over 60 percent decline in iron deficiency anemia from 1975 to 1985. WIC also appears to increase

breast-feeding among recipients (U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and

Nutrition Serv., 1995, 1992, 1989). Other post-1980 analyses of the effect of food assistance on nutrition include

Alkin et al., 1985; Butler and Raymond, 1996; and Rose,

Habicht, and Devaney, 1997.

The only studies we are aware of in Mexico regarding the

effect of food assistance programs on nutrition are a 1980

joint study by the Instituto Nacional de Nutrición and

Harvard University about the now-defunct Mexico City milk

program and a 1992 study about the distribution of dehydrated milk through LICONSA. Both of these found little

beneficial effects of the programs. One conclusion was that

if poorer households were reached instead of the relatively

better off households, a greater effect would have been realized (Chavez et al., 1996; p. 175).

The Effect of Food Assistance Versus Cash 

on Food Consumption

There have been numerous studies comparing the relative

contribution of food stamps versus cash on the marginal

propensity to consume food (see, e.g., Fraker, Martini, and

Ohls, 1995; Levedahl, 1995; and Moffitt, 1989). Using

“cash-out experiments,” where a random sample of food

stamp recipients receive cash instead of food stamps and a

control group continues to receive food stamps, these studies found that the marginal propensity to consume food out

of food stamps was higher than out of cash. While this finding may be expected for households who would spend less

on food in the absence of food stamps than they receive in

food stamps, it is unexpected for infra-marginal households

(households spending more on food than they receive in

food stamps). These infra-marginal households constitute

about 90 percent of food stamp households. Studies have

also found this for WIC (Arcia, Crouch, and Kulka, 1990).

Food Assistance and Poverty Rates

U.S. poverty rates are calculated based on households’ pretax income. One common criticism of this method is that inkind benefits like food stamps and WIC are not included

(for example, Citro and Michael, 1995). For example, suppose the Food Stamp Program expanded (as occurred in the

early 1970’s), but there was no change in the poverty rate.

The beneficial effect of expanding food stamps would thus

not be reflected. The effectiveness of in-kind benefits in

reducing poverty can be figured by the extent to which the

poverty rate is reduced when the value of in-kind benefits is

added to cash income. Using 1997 data, the U.S. poverty

rate, as measured by the head count ratio, declined by 1.4

percentage points after food assistance and housing benefits

were included (Dalaker and Naifeh, 1998; p. xv).

Two types of measures are used to characterize poverty in

Mexico. The first type uses more direct measures of wellbeing. These direct measures are generally defined with

respect to housing quality and community services. These

measures generally do not use nutrition information, except

indirectly (for example, lack of running water may produce

higher rates of sickness, leading to higher malnutrition

rates), although they are probably highly correlated with

malnutrition measures. The Indice de Marginación is one

such measure. The second type of poverty measure uses

household income or expenditures. Common poverty lines

are defined as one minimum salary, two minimum salaries,

the minimum expenditures needed to purchase the most

basic needs, and the minimum expenditures needed to purchase a slightly larger set of basic needs. These latter two

lines are based on baskets of goods established by the

General Coordinator for the National Plan for Marginal

Zones (COPLAMAR): the Canasta Normativa Alimentaria

(CAN) and the Canasta Normativa de Satisfactores

Esenciales (CNSE) (COPLAMAR, 1985).

We analyzed how poverty rates are affected by the inclusion

of food assistance benefits.28 We do not have data on

whether any household receives food assistance benefits;

rather, we just know the percentage of people receiving benefits in every State, broken down by type of assistance. This

information is taken from the 1995 Conteo de Poblacion y

Vivienda (INEGI, 1997). From the 1994 Encuesta Nacional

20 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

28We implicitly assume that food assistance benefits do not produce any

changes in behavior among low-income households. For more on the reasons behind this assumption, see “Identification of Recipients” above.

25As opposed to other indexes that focus on nutrients, the HEI is measured almost exclusively with respect to the consumption of 10 broad categories of foods: grains, vegetables, fruit, dairy, meat, total fat, saturated fat,

cholesterol, sodium, and variety.

26In addition to positive impacts on nutrition, in comparison to non-participants, WIC participants, ceteris paribus, have longer pregnancies, fewer

premature births, a lower incidence of moderately low and very low birth

weight, fewer infant deaths, and are more likely to receive prenatal care

(U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv., 1993, 1992).

27In the nonselection bias model, the nutrients for which WIC recipients

had higher intakes than nonrecipients are iron, vitamin C, vitamin A,

vitamin B6, and folate. In the selection bias model, the nutrients are iron,

calcium, vitamin B6, and folate.
de Ingreso-Gasto de Hogares (ENIGH), though, we do have

total monetary and nonmonetary expenditure information at

the household level (INEGI, 1992). If food assistance is

received, the value of food assistance benefits per person in

a household is taken from Informe de Gobierno (1998).

Since we do not know the exact distribution of benefits, we

consider three possible distributions of benefits. 

First, we imputed the value of food assistance benefits to

households, assuming that in each State the benefits are

evenly distributed throughout the population below the

poverty line. We took the current level of benefits in each

State as reported in the CPV and assigned each poor family

an equal share of these benefits. For example, in Chiapas

where 5.68 percent of households received LICONSA and

62.39 percent of households were poor, each household was

assigned a 9.10-percent share of LICONSA benefits (62.39

percent divided by 5.68 percent).29

Second, we imputed the value of food assistance assuming

that benefits are perfectly targeted within States. Perfect targeting implies that only the poorest households receive benefits. For each State, we took the current number of beneficiaries as reported in the CPV, but assigned benefits only to

the poorest x households, where x is the number of current

beneficiaries. Each household receiving benefits was

assigned an amount for any particular benefit equal to the

percentage of households receiving the benefit times the

value of the benefit. For example, in Chiapas, the poorest

14.03 percent of households would receive benefits, and the

remaining 85.97 percent would not. 

The third scenario does not rely on the distribution of benefits by State. Instead, we assumed that benefits were perfectly targeted nationally. Nationally, 20.16 percent of households received benefits in 1995, and so benefits were

assigned to the poorest 20.16 percent of households, regardless of their State of residence. For each of the households,

the level of benefits was assigned as in scenario 2. 

We used the following general axiomatically derived poverty measure, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure, for our

analysis:

where n is the total number of households, Z is the poverty

line, q is the number of households whose expenditure falls

below the poverty line, and Yi is the expenditure of the ith

household. The parameter a is greater than or equal to zero.

When a is equal to zero, all persons below the poverty line

are equally reflected in the poverty measure. When it

approaches infinity, only the income of the household with

the lowest income is reflected.

When a is zero, this equation defines the head count index.

The head count index is simply the fraction of the population whose income falls short of the poverty line. When a is

one, the equation above defines the proportional poverty gap

(PPG). The PPG accounts for the level of income of the

poor (that is, the intensity of the poverty). The PPG weights

the head count index by the ratio of the average income

shortfall of the poor to the poverty line. When a equals two,

the equation above defines the so-called distribution sensitive index. The distribution sensitive index accounts for the

severity of poverty by giving greater weight to the income

of the poorest households.30

Table 3 displays the results for the estimation of poverty

rates using the ENIGH survey data on expenditures. The

first column lists the estimates for poverty rates based on

household expenditure per capita without the inclusion of

food assistance benefits. The poverty rates for the head

count, PPG, and distribution sensitive measures are 0.286,

0.098, and 0.047 (see equation above). Under the three scenarios described in the previous section, the poverty estimates for household expenditure per capita with the inclusion of food assistance are 0.282, 0.095, and 0.045 if benefits are distributed equally to all poor households (by State);

0.284, 0.096, and 0.045 if benefits are distributed to the

poorest households (by State); and 0.286, 0.095, and 0.044

if benefits are distributed to the poorest households in the

country. Below each of the rows with the poverty measures,

the decline in the poverty rate for each scenario is presented.

The absolute declines in poverty rates translate to the following relative declines. For scenario 1, the inclusion of

food assistance benefits implies a 1.5-percent decline in the

poverty rate for the head count measure; a 2.6-percent

decline for the poverty gap measure; and a 3.2-percent

decline for the distribution sensitive measure. For scenario

2, the relative declines are 0.6 percent, 2.0 percent, and 3.7

percent. For scenario 3, the relative declines are 0 percent,

2.8 percent, and 5.2 percent. In none of these cases is the

decline in poverty statistically significant at usual confidence intervals.31

These declines in poverty rates due to the inclusion of food

assistance benefits are substantially less than in the United

States. The decline in the poverty rate in the United States is

about 10.2 percent, although this figure includes other inkind benefits such as housing assistance (but not medical

insurance). Two primary differences between food assistance programs in the two countries may explain the smaller

effect on poverty in Mexico. First, the level of benefits as a

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

29Consistent with the discussion of benefits above, the actual amount of

LICONSA benefits assigned depends on the number of children below the

age of 12. A household with no children, for example, would not get 

benefits.

30For greater details on the data sets used, the assumptions used to

impute benefits, the methods of calculating levels of benefits, the poverty

measures, and an analysis broken down by food assistance program, see

Gundersen and Kelly, 1999.

31To calculate the t-statistics in tables 3 and 4, we used a technique

derived from Kakwani, 1993. The t-statisic is

di=r(v-1)+1, i=1,2 and, where di is the design effect for the ith sample, r

is the intraclass correlation coefficient, and v is the average number of

households per cluster.

 3 4

3 a

a

= æ

è

ç ö

ø

÷ æ -

è

ç ö

ø

÷ =



 





S

( )

( )  ( )  

  

  	 	 


 

 








= -

- -= + æ

è

ç

ç

ö

ø

÷

÷ = æ -

è

ç ö

ø

÷ é

ë

ê

ê

ù

û

ú = ú

 

           

 

 























 56 	

7

s s s S
percentage of income is much lower in Mexico. In the

United States, the nominal value of food stamps can be as

much as 50 percent of a household’s income (Ohls and

Beebout, 1993). In Mexico, under the assumption that a

household receives benefits from every food assistance program, the average family below the poverty line receiving

food assistance in an urban area would receive a maximum

of 3.8 percent of its total expenditures in food assistance

benefits and the average rural family would receive a maximum of 5.1 percent. 

Second, a far larger percentage of people participate in the

United States. In 1997, over 90 percent of households with

positive incomes below the poverty line participated in the

Food Stamp Program (Castner and Cody, 1999, table 4).32

Using the figures from the CPV, in Mexico less than 70 percent of the low-income population participates in a food assistance program. These differences can be ascribed to the targeting methods used in the countries – in the United States

there is no geographic targeting and any income-eligible

household can participate, while in Mexico, a person could be

income-eligible but not live in a geographically targeted area. 

For a comparison with the United States, we now consider

how poverty rates would differ in Mexico under the supposition that food assistance benefits were expanded in both

these directions; that is, if average benefits and participation

rates were both increased. We simulate three cases with

higher average benefit levels and three cases with higher

participation rates. The results are displayed in table 4. 

To simulate the effect on poverty rates of higher average

benefit levels, we assume that Mexico implements 10-, 25-,

and 50-percent increases in the benefits of each program.

With a 10-percent increase in benefits, for scenario 1, the

inclusion of food assistance benefits implies a 1.6-percent

decline in the poverty rate for the head count measure; a

2.8-percent decline for the poverty gap measure; and a 3.7-

percent decline for the distribution sensitive measure. For

scenario 2, the relative declines are 0.7 percent, 2.3 percent,

and 4.1 percent. For scenario 3, the relative declines are 0

percent, 3.1 percent, and 5.6 percent. With a 50-percent

increase in benefits, for scenario 1, the inclusion of food

assistance benefits implies a 2.3-percent decline in the

poverty rate for the head count measure; a 4.0-percent

decline for the poverty gap measure; and a 4.7-percent

decline for the distribution sensitive measure. For scenario

2, the relative declines are 0.9 percent, 3.1 percent, and 5.4

percent and for scenario 3, the relative declines are 0 percent, 4.2 percent, and 7.8 percent.33 (The preceding declines

are based on the results in table 4.)

To simulate the effect on poverty rates of an expansion in

the number of beneficiaries, we assume, as above, that

Mexico implements 10-, 25-, and 50-percent increases.

Because the scenario of assigning equal benefits to all poor

households in a State does not make sense in this context,

we only consider the cases of assigning benefits to the poorest households by State and in the country. For all scenarios

and poverty measures, the decline in poverty is smaller due

to expansion in the number of recipients than due to expansion in benefit levels. The difference can be quite stark in

the case of a 50-percent increase: for scenario 2 under the

distribution-sensitive measure, the decline is 25 percent

greater for an increase in benefit levels, and for scenario 3

under the distribution-sensitive measure, almost 40 percent

greater. These large differences are probably due to the large

number of nonpoor recipients in major population centers

such as the Distrito Federal, where 28 percent of households

22 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 3—Poverty rates with and without food assistance benefits, Mexico

Food assistance distribution scenarios

Poverty measure Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3

Equal distribution to Distribution to poorest Distribution to poorest

all poor households (by State) households (by State) households (for country)

Head count (a=0) 0.2815 0.2843 0.2860

Change in poverty rates due .0044 .0017 0

to benefits (.500) (.173) (0)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0952 .0956 .0949

Change in poverty rates due .0025 .0020 .0027

to benefits (.595) (.484) (.653)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .044 .0447 .0441

Change in poverty rates due .0015 .0017 .0024

to benefits (.617) (.693) (.976)

Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. The poverty rates without food assistance benefits for the poverty measures are 0.2860 (a=0), 0.0976 (a=1), 

and 0.0465 (a=2).

32Other food assistance programs have even higher participation rates

among poor households.

33For the head-count and poverty-gap poverty measures, the decline in

poverty is not significant at usual confidence intervals for any of these

increases, irrespective of the targeting assumptions. This is also true for 10-

and 25-percent increases for the distribution sensitive measure. With a 50-

percent increase in benefits, the decline in poverty is statistically significant

(at the 10-percent level) for the distribution sensitive measure under the

assumption that benefits are targeted to the poorest households in the 

country.
are poor but 36 percent of residents participate in at least

one food assistance program. When the number of beneficiaries increases in these areas, there is no decrease in the

poverty rates because the incomes of nonpoor households

are not reflected in these poverty measures. If Mexico is

interested in expanding its food assistance programs and the

goal is reduction of poverty, expanding the benefit level

would be much more effective than expanding the number

of beneficiaries.

We recognize that food assistance programs are not income

transfer programs, rather they are nutrition supplement programs. Insofar as the poverty rate is a proxy for the extent of

deprivation over more direct measures of well-being (such

as nutrition), this recalculation of poverty rates measures the

decrease in deprivation due to food assistance benefits. The

effects on nutrition may differ.

Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

Table 4—Simulations of changes in poverty rates in Mexico due to increases in benefit levels and number

of recipients

Food assistance distribution scenarios

Poverty measure [1] [2] [3]

Equal distribution to all Distribution to poorest Distribution to poorest 

poor households (by State) households (by State) households (for Country)

Change in poverty rates due to benefits

10-percent increase in benefit levels

Head count (a=0) 0.0047 0.0020 0

(.482) (.197) (0)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0027 .0022 .0030

(.653) (.533) (.719)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0017 .0019 .0026

(.676) (.763) (1.074)

10-percent increase in number of recipients

Head count (a=0) 0020 0

(.205) (0)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0023 .0030

(.552) (.714)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0019 .0025

(.757) (1.006)

25-percent increase in benefit levels

Head count (a=0) .0057 .0022 0

(.577) (.221) (0)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0031 .00025 .0033

(.738) (.606) (.818)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0019 .0021 .0030

(.764) (.867) (1.221)

25-percent increase in number of recipients

Head count (a=0) .0023 0

(.237) (0)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0025 .0033

(.600) (.804)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0020 .0025

(.808) (1.034)

50-percent increase in benefit levels

Head count (a=0) .0065 .0025 0

(.656) (.252) (0)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0037 .0030 .0041

(.880) (.727) (.985)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0022 .0025 .0036

(.910) (1.040) (1.467)

50-percent increase in number of recipients

Head count (a=0) .0023 .0031

(.237) (.316)

Poverty gap (a=1) .0025 .0036

(.600) (.864)

Distribution sensitive (a=2) .0020 .0026

(.808) (1.050)

Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.
Conclusion

Food assistance programs in Mexico and the United States

are in some ways quite similar. In both countries, identification methods use information about households and/or individuals; the programs are financed internally; and an

improvement in the nutritional quality of diets (especially

for children) is the primary goal of the many different programs. This similarity allows for comparisons among programs in the countries. In this report, we considered three

critical elements to any analysis of food assistance programs: the methods of targeting, the influence of macroeconomic conditions on total expenditures, and the effect of

food assistance benefits on well-being. We now consider

two examples of how insights from one country can be

applied to the food assistance programs of the other country.

While both countries identify recipients based on household

criteria, Mexico generally uses a two-stage procedure

whereby areas in need of food assistance are first identified

and then families within those areas are identified. In the

United States, regions are not used in the identification procedure. Poverty is, however, sometimes concentrated in specific geographic areas, especially in parts of the rural deep

south, Appalachia, on Indian reservations, and in some central cities. U.S. researchers could use the methods developed

by Mexican food assistance programs to more effectively

aid beneficiaries, especially when the programs have large

fixed administrative costs. This is particularly true in terms

of outreach programs and, perhaps, setting higher benefit

levels for certain areas.

The effects of food assistance programs on individuals’

well-being can be measured in the United States because

surveys include relevant questions about food assistance

receipt, food insecurity status, and food intakes.

Unfortunately, information on food assistance receipt disaggregated to the household level is not available for Mexico,

although it is available at more aggregated levels. Also,

information on food insecurity status and food intakes in

Mexico is available neither at the household level nor at

more aggregated levels.34 Because sound theoretical frameworks and econometric methods are well-developed, the

inclusion of such questions would enable thorough studies

of the effects of food assistance benefits in Mexico.

24 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

34Surveys in Mexico do ask extensive questions about housing quality

and the availability of services such as electricity and running water.
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Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 
28 ❖ A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States Economic Research Service/USDA

Mexican food assistance participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State

State Share who are poor Share receiving food assistance 

 Percent

Baja California (Norte) 20.5 5.2

Baja California Sur 27.4 18.2

Distrito Federal 27.5 36.1

Nuevo Leon 27.5 18.3

Aguascalientes 31.1 21.8

Sonora 31.1 12.6

Sinaloa 31.3 10.6

Chihuahua 32.7 10.9

Quintana Roo 33.3 19.4

Coahuila de Zaragoza 33.5 19.1

Mexico 33.7 32.2

Colima 34.5 22.6

Jalisco 34.9 13.7

Queretaro 39.1 15.3

Morelos 40.3 23.0

Tamaulipas 41.9 21.5

Nayarit 44.4 25.9

Guanajuato 45.6 13.3

Durango 46.7 28.4

Tlaxcala 51.3 27.8

Tabasco 51.6 15.3

Campeche 51.6 23.8

San Luis Potosi 51.7 20.5

Veracruz 54.6 10.4

Puebla 54.8 12.0

Michoacan 55.5 17.8

Yucatan 56.8 22.3

Hidalgo 57.1 25.8

Zacatecas 57.5 25.4

Guerrero 59.0 24.3

Chiapas 62.4 14.0

Oaxaca 62.9 9.5

Source: Conteo de Población y Vivienda.

Appendix table A
Economic Research Service/USDA A Comparison of Food Assistance Programs in Mexico and the United States ❖ 

Appendix Table B

U.S. food stamp participation rates and poverty rates, 1995, by State

State Share who are poor Share receiving food stamps

 Percent

New Hampshire 4.9 6.9

Utah 5.8 8.3

Wisconsin 6.1 8.5

Nebraska 6.3 9.9

Nevada 6.3 10.1

Iowa 6.3 10.5

North Dakota 6.4 12.2

Massachusetts 6.4 11.1

Colorado 6.5 9.2

South Dakota 6.7 14.2

Idaho 6.7 13.7

Minnesota 6.7 9.5

New Jersey 6.8 8.8

Connecticut 6.9 10.0

Wyoming 6.9 12.5

Kansas 7.1 10.5

Alaska 7.6 8.0

Indiana 7.6 8.6

Maryland 7.8 9.6

Delaware 7.8 9.5

Montana 8.1 16.0

Virginia 8.2 11.7

North Carolina 8.3 12.1

Washington 8.6 11.2

Oregon 8.9 11.5

Rhode Island 9.2 11.5

South Carolina 9.6 15.4

Illinois 9.6 11.9

Pennsylvania 9.6 11.7

Florida 9.6 14.9

Vermont 9.8 10.7

California 10.0 16.7

Michigan 10.0 11.2

Ohio 10.0 11.7

Maine 10.4 10.9

Missouri 10.5 10.2

Hawaii 10.6 12.1

Arkansas 10.8 17.2

Arizona 10.8 17.9

Georgia 11.1 13.8

Oklahoma 11.2 15.8

New York 11.9 16.6

Alabama 12.0 16.6

Tennessee 12.2 15.2

Texas 13.1 16.9

Kentucky 13.3 15.9

New Mexico 14.0 24.0

Louisiana 16.0 18.8

West Virginia 16.5 17.2

D.C. 17.1 22.7

Mississippi 17.5 20.2

Source: U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bur., and the U.S. Dept. Agr., Food and Nutrition Serv.