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H.R. 2356, THE WMD PREVENTION AND 

PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2011 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, 

AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 23, 2011 

Serial No. 112–32 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California, Chairman 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

COLEY C. O’BRIEN, Staff Director 

ALAN CARROLL, Subcommittee Clerk 

CHRIS SCHEPIS, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida, Chairman 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

CURTIS BROWN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies ............................................... 1 

The Honorable Yvette D. Clark, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications ................................................................ 3 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

PANEL II 

Senator Jim Talent, Vice Chairman, WMD Center: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Joint Prepared Statement of Senator Jim Talent and Senator Bob Graham .................................................................................................................... 16 

Dr. Robert P. Kadlec, Former Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Mr. Richard H. Berdnik, Sheriff, Passaic County, New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

(1) 

H.R. 2356, THE WMD PREVENTION AND 

PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2011 

Thursday, June 23, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY

TECHNOLOGIES, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren 

[Chairman of the Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies subcommittee] presiding. 

Present from the Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and 

Security Technologies subcommittee: Representatives Lungren, 

Meehan, Clarke of New York, and Richardson. 

Present from the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications subcommittee: Bilirakis, Marino, Farenthold, Richardson, and Clarke of Michigan. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The joint hearing of the Committee on Homeland 

Security’s Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come to 

order. 

Subcommittees are meeting today for a legislative hearing on the 

bill entitled the ‘‘WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011,’’ 

and I would recognize myself for an opening statement. 

It is now 21⁄2 years since the Commission on the Prevention of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism issued 

its report entitled, ‘‘World at Risk.’’ Congress had asked the commission to recommend ways to prevent proliferation of WMDs and 

their use in acts of terrorism. 

Commissioners provided their guidance, and we are close to enacting their recommendations and eliminating the remaining gaps 

in our preparedness posture. The prediction of the commission that 

it is more likely than not that there will be a weapon of mass destruction used somewhere on Earth by a terrorist group before the 

end of the year 2013, is a startling reminder of the danger that we 

face as a Nation. 

Weapons of mass destruction create a risk of catastrophic consequence, but they are of low probability. In such circumstances, 

perhaps it is not surprising that complacency and inactivity are our 
2 

biggest vulnerabilities. We cannot forget that we have already 

faced biological terrorism on our soil. 

Al-Qaeda is a dedicated and, in their minds, religiously inspired 

enemy who would use weapons of mass destruction to attack the 

United States whenever the opportunity presents itself. According 

to recent reports, Iran may be as close to 2 months away from producing a viable nuclear weapon. 

We cannot allow the emergence of a nuclear Iran, and we must 

continue our non-proliferation efforts to prevent that possibility. 

Our intelligence agencies continue to warn of these threats. 

For instance, in 2009, then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said the following: ‘‘The on-going efforts of nation-states 

to develop and/or acquire dangerous weapons and delivery systems 

in the Middle East and elsewhere constitute another major threat 

to the safety of our Nation, our deployed troops, and our allies. 

‘‘The threat from the proliferation of materials and technologies 

that can contribute to both existing and prospective biological and 

chemical weapons programs also is real.’’ 

The WMD Commission is measuring our Government efforts to 

protect the Nation from WMD terrorism. We have seen excellent 

progress in certain areas, such as laying groundwork for improved 

security of biological laboratories, developing a National strategy 

for bioforensic, and strengthening our non-proliferation regime. 

However, the Government did receive a failing grade on its efforts to enhance the Nation’s capabilities for rapid response to biological attacks. I believe the legislation that is the subject of this 

hearing—that is the one that Congress and our Chairman, Peter 

King, and Congressman Pascrell have developed—addresses the 

need for a rapid response, and we look forward to hearing the witnesses thoughts on that. 

Importantly, we cannot forget Congress’ own shortcomings. The 

WMD Commission gave Congress a failing grade for not reforming 

its Congressional oversight to better address our homeland security 

needs. That is a continuing problem. For any of those who have 

been involved in that, we know that sometimes old notions of jurisdiction seem to overwhelm the current and continuing need for us 

to reorganize ourselves so that we can better address our homeland 

security needs. 

It is true, homeland security is a cross-cutting, cross-committee 

enterprise, and we should not allow historical and outdated committee barriers to stand in the way of passing needed legislation. 

Finally, I would like to thank my colleague, Chairman Bilirakis, 

for his work to identify some of the remaining capability gaps that 

we face with respect to developing medical countermeasures, delivering them to the populations that need them, and ensuring that 

DHS is doing its part to help us prevent and prepare for threats 

to our health security. 

I welcome our witnesses this morning. We look forward to learning your views on what remains to be done and how Congress may 

be helpful in these efforts, and I believe that the Ranking Member 

of my subcommittee is detained. She will be here shortly, and at 

that time, would ask her to make a statement. 

So at this point in time, I would recognize the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Commu-
3 

nications, gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for any statement 

that he may have. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it very 

much. I am pleased the subcommittees are meeting today to consider the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011 authored 

by the representative, of course, from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, 

and Chairman King. 

This bill seeks to address the findings of the WMD Commission’s 

report, ‘‘World at Risk,’’ and enhance Federal WMD prevention and 

preparedness efforts. A number of hearings in the subcommittee on 

Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications have 

helped to inform this legislation. 

The subcommittee has held hearings on the mission and activities of Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs 

and hearings on the research, development, acquisition, distribution, and dispensing of vital medical countermeasures for chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear emergencies. 

I am pleased that this bill includes legislation I introduced, 

which authorizes the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems Program. MMRS has been very successful in helping jurisdictions 

across the country enhance their abilities to prepare for and respond to mass casualty incidents resulting from terrorist attacks 

and natural disasters. 

MMRS has been used to support the integration of public health, 

emergency management, and emergency response, and to strengthen medical surge capacity, CBRN decontamination, and mass 

triage capabilities. The capacity gained under the program is particularly important due to the threat of biological terrorism facing 

the United States. 

This legislation requires the development of the National Medical 

Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to provide guidance to States 

and localities on the variety of options for dispensing medical countermeasures. As I noted, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications held a hearing on the 

distribution and dispensing of medical countermeasures earlier this 

year. We heard from a coalition of emergency response providers 

that the Federal Government has not sufficiently included them in 

efforts to address dispensing needs. 

We must ensure that emergency response providers are provided 

with necessary vaccines and antibiotics so they are protected in the 

event of a CBRN attack. 

I am pleased that the bill requires the consideration of the needs 

of emergency response providers in the development of the dispensing strategy. 

In this difficult economic climate, I am pleased to see that this 

bill includes provisions that seek to eliminate redundant and inefficient programs. The bill’s requirement of a comprehensive crosscutting biodefense budget analysis will increase transparency, ensure coordination among all Federal departments and agencies 

with a biodefense mission, and eliminate redundancies. 

The bill also eliminates the underperforming National Biosurveillance Integration Center. The goal of NBIC was to fuse many inputs of the biosurveillance data to provide early detection of an 

event of National significance, such as anthrax outbreak. 
4 

While effective National biosurveillance capability is an important component of preparedness and response, NBIC has not fulfilled its statutory mandates due in part to the lack of cooperation 

from other Federal agencies, and we have limited evidence that 

this situation will improve. 

This bill rightfully realizes that continuing to fund NBIC under 

the current operating scheme would be money wasted and calls on 

White House leadership to develop a new plan to implement a program that works effectively and efficiently. 

This bill is a bipartisan effort that has benefitted from input 

from a variety of experts in the field. I look forward to receiving 

additional feedback at today’s hearing on ways we might further 

improve the bill and our Nation’s ability to prevent and prepare for 

a WMD attack. 

With that, I thank the witnesses for being here, and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Before I recognize the Ranking Member of your 

subcommittee, I just want to say I mean no disrespect to the witnesses when I take my coat off. I just am a Californian, and I can 

get used to heat. I have never been able to get used to this humidity. 

So, with that, I would recognize the Ranking Minority Member 

of the Subcommittee of Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson, 

for any statement she may have. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Good morning. I thank both Chairman Lungren and Mr. Bilirakis for convening this hearing on the bipartisan 

WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011. 

I would like to thank our witnesses and particularly our colleague. It is always a pleasure when we have a fellow colleague 

come before us and share their expertise. Clearly, Mr. Pascrell, you 

are an expert in this area, and we respect all of the work that you 

have done. 

Today’s hearing and the release of the WMD Act is timely given 

the host of threats that we continue to face. As the WMD Commission found in its December 2008 report, America needs to move 

more aggressively to address our vulnerability to a bioterror attack. 

As an original co-sponsor of this particular act, I am proud to 

take up this bipartisan legislation that addresses this vital WMD 

issue from prevention to recovery. 

I also want to applaud Mr. Lungren and Mr. Bilirakis for pulling 

us together in this bipartisan effort and bi-committee effort. We 

don’t do this, I don’t think, often enough, and I really applaud your 

leadership in pulling this together. 

This bill addresses the unique issues and promotes improving 

our countermeasures development and dispensing mechanisms. 

One of the key provisions in this bill includes ensuring that we empower our citizens by providing WMD preparedness guidance and 

early warning systems. 

An area of particular importance to me is ensuring that we consider the needs of all of our vulnerable populations, and this is 

something Mr. Bilirakis and I have spoken about and look forward 

to working on future legislation on. 
5 

Vulnerable populations would be including children, the elderly, 

and people with disabilities. This bill addresses these areas by recognizing the importance and the role of State and local government 

and our first responders who will be sharing with us today. 

We must act now prior to any attack to ensure that our personnel, our plans, our equipment, and other resources are in place 

to effectively respond. The WMD Act ensures that first responders 

are supported through training, exercise participation, intelligence 

information, grant funding, and the inclusion in the preparedness 

planning process. 

As a representative of the 37th Congressional District in California, I understand the critical importance of preparedness for a 

potential terror attack utilizing chemical, nuclear, biological, or radiological weapons. 

It is time for us to act and to close these gaps now that exist and 

provide the resources needed to ensure that we are resilient and 

able to secure our homeland. I am proud to support this legislation, 

and I thank Congressman Pascrell, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Lungren, Chairman Bilirakis for all of 

your leadership. 

Again, I thank you for being here today, and I look forward to 

your testimony. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Richardson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER LAURA RICHARDSON

JUNE 23, 2011 

Good morning. I thank both Chairmen Lundgren and Bilirakis for convening this 

hearing on the bipartisan WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee today and 

express this committee’s deep appreciation for your service to our country. 

Today’s hearing and the release of the WMD Act is timely, given the host of 

threats we continue to face. 

As the WMD Commission found in its December 2008 report, America needs to 

move more aggressively to address our vulnerability to a bioterror attack. 

As an original co-sponsor of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act, I am 

proud to take up this bipartisan legislation that addresses vital WMD issues from 

prevention to recovery. 

The recent disaster in Japan provides us with a greater understanding of the 

unique public health issues we must address as a Nation. 

This bill addresses these unique issues and promotes improving our countermeasure development and dispensing mechanisms. 

One of the key provisions in this bill includes ensuring we empower citizens by 

providing WMD preparedness guidance and early warning systems. 

Our diverse communities require we consider the needs of all individuals and 

have inclusive policies. 

An area of particular importance to me is ensuring that we consider the needs 

of vulnerable populations, including children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. 

This bill addresses these areas by recognizing the important role of State and 

local first responders in the planning process. 

The first responder community is an essential partner in our WMD preparedness 

efforts. 

They are on the frontline in our efforts to deter an attack; and they will be there 

first to help affected citizens. 

Therefore, Congress should provide our first responders with the resources they 

need in order for them to meet the wide-ranging needs associated with responding 

to a WMD terror attack. 

We must act now, prior to an attack to ensure that the personnel, plans, equipment, and other resources are in place to effectively respond. 
6 

The WMD Act ensures first responders are supported through training, exercise 

participation, intelligence information, grant funding, and inclusion in the preparedness planning process. 

I am proud that this committee is working together to move this bill forward and 

address these concerns. 

As the representative of the 37th district of California, I understand the critical 

importance of preparedness for a potential terror attack utilizing chemical, nuclear, 

biological, or radiological weapons. 

There are four nuclear reactors located in my State, with two of them located 

within 50 miles from my district. 

If these nuclear facilities ever became compromised, the issues that we raise 

today would have a direct impact on the outcome of such a situation. 

It is time for us to act and close the gaps that exist and provide the resources 

needed to ensure we are resilient and able to secure the homeland. 

I am proud to support this legislation and thank Congressman Pascrell, Chairman 

King, and Ranking Member Thompson for their leadership. 

Again, I thank you all for being here today and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady for her comments. Other 

Members of both subcommittees are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 23, 2011 

Thank you Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis for holding this hearing. 

I also want to thank our witnesses for appearing to testify on our efforts to 

counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. 

The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism—‘‘the 

WMD Commission’’—produced a report entitled ‘‘World at Risk’’ in 2008. 

In that report, they told us that they believed that a terrorist attack would occur 

somewhere in the world by 2013, and that it was more likely to be an act of biological terrorism. 

Further, during the 111th Congress, this committee heard testimony from Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, then the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission. 

They testified that the Government’s progress toward implementing their 13 recommendations was slow and went as far as giving it a grade of ‘‘F’’ in these two 

areas: 

• ‘‘failure to enhance the Nation’s capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties’’; and 

• for a lack of progress on reforming Congressional oversight ‘‘to better address 

intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century National security 

missions.’’ 

In a bipartisan response last fall, this committee voted favorably to report H.R. 

5498—the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010 to the House. 

H.R. 5498 was a comprehensive bill that addressed the major actions recommended by the WMD Commission. 

The bill included a range of provisions related to prevention, deterrence, detection, 

preparedness, response, and recovery. 

As a Nation, we have been fortunate that a WMD attack has not come to fruition 

in the United States. 

But we must move forward with closing the coordination and resource gaps identified by the WMD Commission. 

Today, I am glad to report that this committee is once again working in a bipartisan fashion in order to enhance the Government’s capability to counter the pressing WMD threat. 

This bill will reintroduce many of H.R. 5498 major initiatives related to homeland 

security, intelligence, public health, and foreign affairs matters. 

Therefore, I look forward to working with Mr. Pascrell, Mr. King, and our Members to once again push this legislation through the committee. 

As we move closer to the 10th anniversary of 9/11, we are reminded of the consequences of fragmented security policies and inadequate resources. 

This bill provides a framework for biodefense that is inclusive and recognizes the 

important role of first responders. 
7 

A potential WMD attack requires that we refashion policy and ensure that our 

first responders have the resources needed to be effective. 

Investments in emergency communications, planning, and response equipment 

saves lives. 

The first responder grant program’s importance to WMD preparedness should not 

be understated and must be provided at adequate levels. 

I hope our conversation today provides an opportunity to understand the role and 

needs of first responders related to WMD preparedness. 

This bill ensures first responders have the committed and collaborative Federal 

partner needed to address the unique issues of a potential WMD attack. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses, and I yield back. 

We are pleased to have two panels of witnesses before us today 

on this important topic. 

The first panel is entirely taken up by the gentleman from New 

Jersey. Congressman Bill Pascrell is a distinguished Member of the 

House of Representatives, former Member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on which he served in the 108th through the 

111th Congress. He is authored legislation that is the subject of today’s hearing along with Chairman King in both the 111th and 

112th Congresses. Our hope is that we might actually move this 

one this year. 

Per an agreement between the Majority and Minority of both 

subcommittees, Congressman Pascrell will be extended Congressional privilege—be able to sit and will not be answering questions 

from the Members. 

We look forward to his testimony on the bill, and he is now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PASCRELL, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is an honor to 

be here. 

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, who just came into 

the room, thank you. Chairman Bilirakis and Ranking Member 

Richardson for holding this joint subcommittee hearing. 

I know that this committee particularly appreciates the fact of 

trying to coordinate situations since there are four or five other 

major committees that have to deal with this legislation, and we 

are going to try to address that bureaucratic nightmare, which is 

in my throat and in Mr. Chairman Lungren’s throat. How we do 

that, I don’t know. 

I want to recognize both Chairman King and Chairman Thompson. Chairman King and I worked diligently on this, as you well 

know, had bipartisan support. The last session, unfortunately, we 

did not get this bill, because we could not get cooperation beyond 

this committee. That is where it stood. 

I also want to thank the committee for inviting Sheriff Berdnik 

from my county, Passaic County, he sits right behind me. He will 

be testifying in the next panel along with two distinguished other 

individuals who have contributed so much to what you all agree is 

the most serious threat to the United States of America. 

I know that the sheriff will be able to provide you very valuable 

insights into the role his Department plays in preparing and responding to a terrorist attack. 
8 

The folks on the ground, the boots on the ground are the first 

to respond, not the Federal Government, in a catastrophic situation, and that is why he is here to testify. 

I want to discuss the WMD Preparedness and Prevention Act of 

2011, which Chairman King and I have introduced. We will introduce tomorrow the actual bill. I am proud of all the work that went 

into the legislation. I am especially proud that it is bipartisan, and 

I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that the staff has been very, very 

helpful. 

We had another meeting yesterday in which they just were terrific. They understand the issue. They are sensitive to the bureaucratic situation which we face, and we were trying to get some 

ideas on how we are going to have an end-run and get this thing 

done. Because while we all say, you know, this is important and 

significant, we haven’t figured out the strategy of getting through 

and getting it passed. 

But I understand leadership wants this. So I hope, with your 

great influence, Mr. Chairman, it will get done. 

Last year, Chairman King and I came together to craft this legislation based upon the WMD Commission’s report, ‘‘World at Risk.’’ 

Just as we need to read the 9/11 Report, we need to read ‘‘World 

at Risk.’’ It is a tremendous document put out by former Senator 

Talent and former Senator Graham of Florida. 

I think this is must-reading for all of us who want to protect this 

country. They gave us a report. We had some real sobering findings 

when we read it. We had to go back and read it again to make sure 

that we were reading what we were reading. 

The finding that under our current readiness, this attack as you 

referred to just a few moments ago, Mr. Chairman, is likely to 

occur before 2013 or by 2013. It gave us pause, all of us—gave us 

a sense of urgency. Urgency is a tough thing to deal with in Congress, regardless of who is in charge. 

Today, even after the death of Osama bin Laden, we know that 

terror groups like al-Qaeda are still out there probing and plotting 

attacks against Americans. They continue to be committed to obtaining nuclear and biological weapons, regardless of where they 

come from. 

Both Mr. King and myself being Members of the New York-New 

Jersey region are too familiar with the devastation and the tragedy 

that surrounds an attack with a weapon of mass destruction. Sheriff Berdnik was a 9/11 first responder himself. 

We have to do everything in our power to ensure that nothing 

like 9/11 ever happens on our soil. The thought of a WMD attack 

anywhere in our region is too horrific for words. We realize that. 

Using the commission’s report as a guide, Chairman King and I 

first introduced this legislation in 2010 with the support and endorsement of the commissioners. 

While our bill passed this committee, it unfortunately was never 

considered in the entire House. This is unacceptable, Mr. Chairman. As you said—quoting you. As the WMD Commission stated 

in the report, it is unacceptable that now nearly 10 years after September 11, we do not have a comprehensive, National strategy to 

counter the threat that WMD poses to our country. No one could 

put it better, Senator. 
9 

One year later, and hopefully a little wiser, there is hope. I hope 

we will swiftly consider by this committee this legislation, and that 

jurisdictional turf battles will not stop the full House and Senate 

from passing the important legislation as soon as possible. 

Prevention, preparedness, protection, response, and recovery. 

That is what this bill is all about. It contains some important new 

provisions I would like, briefly, to highlight. It addresses the findings from the Government Accountability Office on the state of our 

biodefense enterprise and creates an entirely new top-down approach centered at the White House. 

This includes establishing a new special assistant to the President for biodefense who will be responsible for crafting a Federal 

biodefense plan and putting together a yearly cross-cutting biodefense budget, which will help streamline cross-agency efforts and 

improve efficiency. 

It includes a new provision that would allow the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services to make surplus vaccines with short 

shelf lives from our strategic National stockpile to our State and 

local first responders. 

As we all know, our police and firefighters are on the front lines 

of our homeland security, and if there is a biological attack, they 

will be the first ones on the scene. Ensuring that they are vaccinated will not only prevent them from harm but better enable 

them to assist others and other victims and perform their jobs. 

Passage of the legislation is not a silver bullet that will fully immunize us from the threats that a weapon of mass destruction 

poses to our country. Our first responders still lack a Nation-wide 

interoperable communications network. 

We have talked about it on this committee. We have had bipartisan support on this committee, and we still don’t have it. It is not 

the fault of this committee. It is the fault of others in leadership, 

regardless of which party is in charge, of getting this through and 

seeing the significance of supporting and protecting the American 

people. 

Funding for our various homeland security State and local grant 

programs that help at-risk areas prepare and secure sensitive infrastructure are under severe funding constraints. We know that, 

but we must not back off what our responsibilities are. 

As the original Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, 

created in the wake of those attacks, and representing a district 

that lost 40 souls in the attacks, these issues are near and dear to 

my heart as they are to you. 

The committee, Congress as a whole, and the Executive branch 

must be committed to doing everything in our power to ensuring 

that something like this never happens again. We do know, Mr. 

Chairman, that when everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. 

So I count on your diligence and your forthrightness and your 

perseverance to get this thing through. Whatever I can do and 

whatever Peter can do, as another Chairman, we are at your beck 

and call. 

I thank the committee and thanks for listening. 

[The statement of Mr. Pascrell follows:] 
10 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PASCRELL, JR. 

Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, Chairman Bilirakis, 

and Ranking Member Richardson, and thank you for holding this important joint 

subcommittee hearing and for your invitation to testify this morning. I want to recognize the Chairman and Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. King and Mr. 

Thompson, for their friendship and leadership on the committee and their stewardship of its important work. 

I also want to thank the committee for inviting Sheriff Richard Berdnik of Passaic 

County, New Jersey, to testify before you today on the subsequent panel. Passaic 

County is a part of the Jersey City/Newark Urban Area Security Initiative, one of 

the six Tier I regions considered at greatest risk of a terrorist attack. I know that 

the sheriff will be able to provide you all valuable insights into the role that his 

Department plays in preparing for and responding to a terrorist attack, and the effectiveness of the Federal Government’s State and local partnership efforts. 

I am here this morning to discuss the WMD Preparedness and Prevention Act of 

2011, which I, along with Chairman King, will be introducing tomorrow. I am proud 

of all the work that went into this legislation, and I am especially proud that it is 

bipartisan. Democrats and Republicans may not always agree on every issue, but 

I think there is broad consensus on this committee, from Members of both parties, 

that the safety and security of our country is our highest priority. 

Last year, Chairman King and I came together to craft legislation after the release of the WMD Commission’s report: ‘‘World at Risk.’’ Under the leadership of 

Senator Bob Graham and Senator Jim Talent, that report gave us some very sobering findings. I am happy to see my former Small Business Committee Chairman, 

Senator Talent, here today. Particularly, their finding that under our current readiness, a WMD attack is ‘‘likely’’ to occur by 2013, gave us all pause and really gave 

us a sense of urgency that action was needed. 

Today, even after the death of Osama bin Laden, we know that terror groups like 

al-Qaeda are still out there plotting attacks against Americans, and that they continue to be committed to obtaining nuclear and biological weapons. The Commission 

gave the country particularly low marks for bioterrorism preparedness and our 

country’s oversight of laboratories working with some of the most dangerous diseases. 

Both Mr. King and myself, being Members from the New York/New Jersey region, 

are all too familiar with the devastation and tragedy that surrounds an attack with 

a weapon of mass destruction. Sheriff Berdnik was a 9/11 first responder himself. 

We must do everything in our power to ensure that nothing like 9/11 ever happens 

on our soil again. The thought of a WMD attack anywhere in our region is too horrific for words. 

Using the WMD Commission’s report as a guide, Chairman King and I first introduced this legislation back in 2010, with the support and endorsement of the Commissioners. While our bill passed this committee, it was, unfortunately, not considered by the entire House of Representatives. This, to me, is unacceptable. 

As the WMD Commission stated in their report, it is unacceptable that now nearly 10 years after September 11, we do not have a comprehensive National strategy 

to counter the threat that WMD poses to our country. One year later, and hopefully 

a little wiser, we are reintroducing this bill. I hope it will be swiftly considered by 

this committee, and that jurisdictional turf battles will not stop the full House and 

Senate from passing this important legislation as soon as possible. 

This year’s legislation retains the comprehensive approach to securing our country 

against weapons of mass destruction: Prevention and Preparedness, Protection, Response, and Recovery. The updated bill recognizes some of the progress that has 

been made by the administration over the last year, particularly in laboratory biosecurity, and also contains some important new provisions that I would like to highlight. 

Importantly, the bill addresses findings from the Government Accountability Office on the state of our biodefense enterprise and creates an entirely new, top-down 

approach centered at the White House. This includes establishing a new Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense who will be responsible for crafting a Federal 

biodefense plan, and putting together a yearly cross-cutting biodefense budget, 

which will help streamline cross-agency efforts and improve efficiency. 

The bill also includes a new provision that will allow the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services to make surplus vaccines with short shelf lives from our Strategic 

National stockpile to our State and local first responders. As we all know, our cops 

and firefighters are on the front lines of our homeland security, and if there is a 

biological attack, they will be the first ones on the scene. Ensuring that they are 

vaccinated will not only prevent them from harm, but better enable them to assist 
11 

other victims and perform their jobs in the response. All across the bill, language 

has been streamlined to better integrate our State and local first responders and 

to encourage their participation. 

Passage of the legislation is not a silver bullet that will fully immunize us from 

the threats that a weapon of mass destruction poses to our country. For example, 

our first responders still lack a Nation-wide interoperable communications network, 

one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and an essential component of 

any response. Chairman King has introduced legislation that I strongly support to 

establish this network and I hope that Congress considers and passes it soon. 

Additionally, funding for our various homeland security State and Local grant 

programs that help at-risk areas prepare and secure sensitive infrastructure, are 

under severe funding constraints. Grant programs for our Cops and Firefighters to 

purchase equipment and ensure they have adequate personnel are slated for cuts. 

We must find the funding in the Federal budget to ensure that these programs are 

fully funded, and that we have the resources we need to protect our country. 

In the years since the attacks on 9/11 we have all said, on a bipartisan basis, that 

our homeland security strategy must be proactive and not simply reactive. As an 

original Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, created in the wake of 

these attacks, and representing a district that lost 40 souls in the attacks, these 

issues are near and dear to my heart. The committee, Congress as a whole, and the 

Executive branch must be committed to doing everything in our power to ensuring 

that something like this never happens again. Passing this bill into law will go a 

long way towards establishing a comprehensive protection and response plan to a 

WMD attack, and it must be enacted as soon as possible. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, very much. 

Thank you, Congressman Pascrell, for your testimony and your 

leadership on this issue along with the Chairman of our full committee, Mr. King. 

We will excuse you. We won’t subject you to questions, and we 

will move on to Panel II. Thank you very, very much. 

We are, of course, joined by the Ranking Member of our subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke. If 

you have a statement to make at this time, we would be happy to 

receive it. Meanwhile, we excuse Mr. Pascrell and invite the next 

panel to come forward. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To Chairman Lungren and Chairman Bilirakis, to Ranking Member Richardson, and to my colleague present, good morning. You 

know, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman 

Lungren, Chairman Bilirakis, and my fellow Ranking Member, Ms. 

Richardson it is important for the safety of our country to come together today in this joint hearing and to discuss the legislation of 

our colleague and former committee Member, Congressman Pascrell. 

His hard work on a very complex issue has resulted in legislation 

that many of us can and will support. Thank you for calling this 

hearing. 

The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011 is an example of what we can achieve when we pull together instead of pulling apart. It is an example of what can be accomplished when we 

draw circles of interest instead of boxes of exclusion. 

Those of us who represent high-density populations of the Northeast are acutely aware of our shared vulnerability, how a single 

weapon of mass destruction can devastate huge populations and 

render infrastructure that serves millions of our citizens unusable. 

Coming from Brooklyn, New York, having been in New York City 

during the 9/11 attack, this hits home for me, profoundly. 
12 

I am proud that this committee, who passed this bill in the 110th 

Congress with Members from all walks of life and political persuasion, can take the findings of experts and colleagues as we have received from the commission on the prevention of weapons of mass 

destruction, proliferation, and terrorism, and use that kind of factfinding and recommendations to pass legislation, with truly bipartisan support. 

Senator Bob Graham of Florida and Senator Talent, who are 

with us today, chaired the commission and gave selflessly to this 

effort, devoting time and, most importantly, their intellect toward 

a comprehensive look at gigantic challenges posed by the thought 

of indiscriminate use of weapons of mass destruction on innocent 

civilians. 

I think the work they accomplished is something we are all 

proud of, but I am not here to paint a rosy picture. The scenarios 

before us are sometimes hard to grasp, especially extraordinarily 

complex ones involving chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear 

threat. 

The effect on our citizens are unimaginable, but it is the difficult 

job of these subcommittees to imagine these events and figure out 

a way to protect our citizens. Of particular interest to those of us 

from the Northeast are programs built around the Securing Our 

Cities initiative, the unified effort among Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut to defend against the threat of a radiological or nuclear device. 

DHS, the New York City Police Department, the Port Authority 

of New York and New Jersey, and officials from three States and 

91 localities are involved in that partnership. 

The more law enforcement officials who have the ability to detect 

and are on the lookout for nuclear radiological material and are in 

touch with health officials monitoring biological and disease incidents in and around New York City, the better chance law enforcement has to prevent a successful attack. 

I expect that we are going to hear some on-the-ground testimony 

today from the sheriff from Passaic County, because he is charged 

with carrying out the day-to-day preparation and response plans 

for the kind of horrific event we contemplate in these scenarios. 

We must find ways to fund our front line of defense against the 

kind of horrendous events we planned for and not how we can 

greatly or arbitrarily reduce the resources we need to protect our 

families. 

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke of New York follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER YVETTE D. CLARKE

JUNE 23, 2011 

Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Lungren, and Chairman Bilirakis, and my fellow Ranking Member Richardson, it’s important for the 

safety of our country to come together today in this joint hearing to discuss the legislation of our colleague and former committee Member, Congressman Pascrell. His 

hard work on a very complex issue has resulted in legislation that many of us can 

support. Thank you for calling this hearing. 

The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011 is an example of what we 

can achieve when we pull together, instead of constantly pulling apart. It’s an exam-
13 

ple of what can be accomplished when we draw circles of interest instead of boxes 

of exclusion. 

Those of us who represent the high-density populations of the Northeast are 

acutely aware of our shared vulnerability, how a single weapon of mass destruction 

can devastate huge populations, and render infrastructure, that serves millions of 

our citizens, unusable. 

I’m proud that this committee, who passed this bill in the 110th Congress, with 

Members from all walks of life and political persuasions, can take the findings of 

experts and colleagues, as we have received from the Commission on the Prevention 

of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, and use that kind of 

fact-finding and recommendations to pass legislation with truly bi-partisan support. 

Senator Bob Graham of Florida and Senator Talent, who is with us today, chaired 

the Commission and gave selflessly to this effort, devoting time and most importantly their intellects, toward a comprehensive look at gigantic challenges posed by 

the thought of indiscriminate use of a weapon of mass destruction on innocent civilians. I think the work they accomplished is something we are all proud of. 

But I’m not here to paint a rosy picture, the scenarios before us are sometimes 

hard to grasp, especially extraordinarily complex ones involving chemical, biological, 

radiation, and nuclear threats, and their affects on our citizens are unimaginable. 

But it is the difficult job of these subcommittees to imagine these events, and figure 

out a way to protect our citizens. 

Of particular interest to those of us from the Northeast are programs built around 

the Securing our Cities Initiative, the unified effort among Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut to defend against the 

threat of a radiological or nuclear device. DHS, the New York Police Department, 

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and officials from three States and 

91 localities are involved in this partnership. 

The more law enforcement officials who have the ability to detect and are on the 

lookout for nuclear and radiological material, and are in touch with health officials 

monitoring biological and disease incidents in and around New York City, the better 

chance law enforcement has to prevent a successful attack. 

I expect we are going to hear some on-the-ground testimony today from the sheriff 

from Passaic County, because he is charged with carrying out the day-to-day preparation and response plans for the kind of horrific events we contemplate in these 

scenarios. 

We must find ways to fund our front line of defense against the kind of horrendous events we plan for, and not how we can glibly and arbitrarily reduce the resources we need to protect our families. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady for her statements. 

Once again, all Members are reminded they may submit comments for the record. 

Now we have an opportunity to hear from our second panel. 

Three distinguished gentlemen. The first is Senator Jim Talent, 

who is vice president of the WMD Center and a distinguished fellow at Heritage Foundation where he specialized in military readiness issues. 

From May 2008 to February 2010, Senator Talent served as vice 

chairman of the Congressionally-authorized Commission on the 

Prevention of the Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and 

Terrorism, and the report that they gave us, which I note is outlined in red, which usually indicates urgency—and the fact that 

your report card is in blue is no indication that it is less urgent 

or that consistency is less necessary, and I want to thank you for 

your contribution to us in that regard—elected by citizens in Missouri, you served 4 years in the U.S. Senate and 8 years in the 

House of Representatives. So we welcome you back. 

Dr. Robert Kadlec served 26 years as an officer and physician of 

the United States Air Force where he held senior positions in the 

Executive and Legislative branches. Until January 2009, Dr. 

Kadlec served as special assistant to the President and senior director for biodefense policy on the Homeland Security Council. 
14 

While with the Homeland Security Council, Dr. Kadlec drafted 

the National biodefense policy for the 21st Century, which did become the Homeland Security Presidential Policy Directive 10. He 

was also staff director of the Senate Subcommittee for Bioterrorism 

and Public Health. 

Richard Berdnik is the sheriff of Passaic County, New Jersey, 

the position he has held since the beginning of 2011. Prior to this 

position, he led a distinguished 28-year career in law enforcement 

for the City of Clifton, New Jersey. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. 

While with the City of Clifton Police Department, he led a team 

of officers in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and we do 

thank you for your past service as well as your continuing service. 

The three of you will be invited to testify in the order in which 

you were introduced. We would ask you to try and keep your comments to around 5 minutes. We have your prepared written statements. They will be made fully a part of the record, and after you 

have completed your testimony, we will have a round of questions. 

So, Senator Talent, we would recognize you first. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM TALENT, VICE CHAIRMAN, WMD 

CENTER 

Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both Chairmen and both Ranking Members, and to the whole committee—the 

subcommittee and the committee—for consistently acting with an 

urgency that we at the WMD Center thinks is justified by this 

threat. 

Former Senator Bob Graham is the chairman of that center. I 

am the vice chairman. Senator Graham could not be here today, 

but he joins me in my comments, and I would ask that you would 

submit the full comments in the record. I will just cover a couple 

of points. One of them, and you covered pretty well in your opening 

statement—in fact, several of the leaders of the committee did—the 

history of the WMD Commission. 

We were created by you all and the other body as a follow-on to 

the 9/11 Commission in an attempt to answer the question the 

9/11 Commission asked, which is, you know, what happens if the, 

you know, worst people get the world’s worst weapon? 

Bob and I were appointed as the chairman and vice chairman of 

that. We work together in the Senate—been a real pleasure working with him on that—the nine of us on that committee—it was 

thoroughly bipartisan—our report was unanimous. 

We didn’t go into that with any bias in favor of looking in particular at the biothreat. As a matter of fact, I didn’t know that 

much about it. I was more familiar with the nuclear threat. But 

after almost a year of deliberations, you know, we looked at all the 

material that you all look at at a regular basis. 

We interviewed witnesses, traveled all over the world, and did 

reach the conclusion which you recited in your opening statement 

that the danger of a WMD attack somewhere in the world is growing, that it will reach a probability—become more likely than not— 

by 2013, by which we meant, it is just a short-term threat; it is not 

a long. I mean, it is not something that is 20 years down the road. 

It is now. 
15 

In our judgment, it is more likely to be a bioattack than anything 

else. We base that both on direct intelligence and on the fact that 

a biological weapon is easier than a nuclear weapon to develop. It 

is easier to deploy, and it is easier to stockpile. 

It doesn’t mean that a nuclear threat is beyond their capability. 

It just means that the bioweapon is easier, and everything that we 

have seen since then has reinforced our view, both of the threat 

and of the fact that we have to pay particular attention to the biothreat. 

Chairman and I were talking before the hearing, and it is my 

opinion that the cyber threat and the biothreat are the two biggest. 

We should try and prepare for all of them, but they are the two 

biggest. 

Our conclusion is—regarding the threat—was affirmed in every 

particularity by the then-Director of National Intelligence within a 

few weeks after we made it. 

After we issued the first report with recommendations, as the 

Chairman mentioned, we were asked by the leadership of Congress 

to go back and to review the Government’s success or failure of 

progress in implementing our recommendations. Bob and I both 

said that we would do it, but we made clear to the Speaker, the 

Minority Leader, and the Majority Leader of the Senate that if we 

gave our assessment, we were gonna say what we thought. If they 

didn’t want that, they shouldn’t reconstitute the commission. 

Well, they did want it, and we gave our assessment. While there 

was progress in certain areas, we did give a failing grade to the 

Government’s preparation for a bioattack. As you know, Mr. Chairman, preparation is hugely important here, not only because, you 

know, we can limit the loss of life and damage should an attack 

occur, but because if you prepare well enough, a biothreat is no 

longer a weapon of mass destruction. 

It is a terrible weapon and it can kill people, but if it doesn’t 

have a big enough impact, it is not a weapon of mass destruction 

and, therefore, it is much less likely that it will be used. So preparation in this context, unlike the nuclear context, is deterrence. 

This is a point that Senator Graham and I have made on numerous 

occasions. 

We have turned the WMD Center into a nonprofit, which is the 

same thing that happened with the 9/11 Commission. I am not 

going to go into great lengths, but we are preparing a really stemto-stern new report card, or evaluation, of the Government’s efforts. 

Lynne Kidder, who is the president of the WMD Center is with 

us today, is leading a team of people. We have pulled together experts from all across the Government and nonprofit world to look 

at the whole chain of resilience. 

First thing they are doing is identifying what are the metrics of 

success. You know, what does progress mean in this context? Then 

they are going to measure how we are doing against those metrics. 

That report is going to come out. That assessment is gonna come 

out this fall, and we think it will give you all the best assessment, 

you know, stem-to-stern, end-to-end strategic assessment of our resiliency chain that you have ever had. 

I can’t think of a committee that has done more to try and solve 

this problem and achieve progress. I don’t have much time. I do 
16 

want to say that we are very grateful for Mr. Pascrell and Mr. King 

and all of you for the WMD Bill. It addresses a number of key 

areas. 

Just, very briefly, the National Biodefense Plan is very important. The reforms in biosurveillance and detection, hugely important. We do a lot of detection, a lot of surveillance, but it is not 

integrated enough; it is not efficient enough, and it is not real-time 

enough. 

The reality is that we cannot have confidence today that we will 

know an attack has occurred within the period of time we need to 

know to do something about it. Just go look back at H1N1. Anytime the President called up the Center for Disease Control and 

asked them how many people were sick from that disease, the reality is, they couldn’t tell him. They didn’t know. 

We had months to prepare for that. We are not gonna have 

months to prepare for this. The first responder guidance, hugely 

important. The sheriff will probably talk about that. Real solid 

thinking in the bill about environmental cleanup and what the 

standards are; how clean is clean. We have not worked on that, 

and we don’t have adequate guidelines for first responders. 

I will just conclude by saying this, and I thought of it because 

of what my good friend, Bill Pascrell, said about priorities—that if 

everything is a priority, nothing is. Absolutely correct. Well if 

something is a priority, it means that you are willing to sacrifice 

other things—even other good things—if you have to in order to get 

it, right? I mean, my 15-year-old is a big basketball player, and it 

is a priority for her, which means she sacrifices other extracurricular things she could be doing to practice basketball. Okay? 

If this is a priority that we think is justified by the threat, and 

nobody has denied that this—at any hearing like this—that this 

threat is as bad as we think it is. Well, it means you have to sacrifice other things. Maybe you sacrifice your jurisdictional turf. 

Maybe the FDA is just gonna have to figure out a way to approve 

these drugs quicker, even though it would like to use its traditional 

standards, maybe it has got to do some solid thinking. Maybe it 

means, even in an era of very difficult budgets, that in areas where 

we need extra funding, you know, we find it, because it is a priority. 

So I think the Congressman from New Jersey had it exactly 

right, and I am grateful for the opportunity to be here. Sorry I 

went on a little too long. 

[The statement of Mr. Talent follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM TALENT AND SENATOR BOB GRAHAM

JUNE 23, 2011 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I am speaking today as the vice chairman of the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, better known as the WMD 

Center. Even though former Senator Bob Graham (D–FL), the chairman of the 

WMD Center could not be here today, please consider this our joint statement. 

The WMD Center is a not-for-profit research and educational organization that 

Senator Graham and I founded, along with Colonel Randy Larsen, USAF (Ret), at 

the conclusion of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (WMD Commission) in 2010. 
17 

WMD COMMISSION

In early 2008, the Commission was tasked by Congress to assess the risk of WMD 

terrorism and to recommend steps to prevent a successful WMD attack on the 

United States. During its tenure, the WMD Commission interviewed hundreds of experts and reviewed thousands of pages of research and testimony. Each commissioner quickly realized that the United States was facing a growing threat of biological terrorism—a conclusion that was unexpected for many. We learned that the 

lethality of a sophisticated biological weapon could rival the lethality of a Hiroshima-sized bomb, and that the development and delivery of such a bioweapon 

would require far less money and technical expertise than a nuclear weapon. 

In the commission report, World at Risk, we stated that terrorists are more likely 

to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. In the late fall of 

2008, we concluded that unless we act urgently and decisively, it was more likely 

than not that terrorists would use a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the 

world by the end of 2013. On December 2, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence publicly agreed with this assessment in a speech at Harvard University. 

In an unprecedented act, Congress extended the authorization of the WMD Commission and assigned it a new task: To communicate its assessment, explain the evidence behind it, and to work with Congress and the administration to enact the 

Commission’s recommendations. In other words, we were charged with encouraging 

Congress and the administration to take decisive action to prevent such an act of 

mass lethality from taking place on American soil, and should such an attack occur, 

to limit its consequences. 

In 2009, we worked closely with Congress and the administration to focus on the 

threat of bioterrorism. As our second year of work drew to a close, we released a 

report card that assessed progress on a wide range of WMD issues; however, the 

grade that garnered the most attention in the January 2010 report was the failing 

grade for America’s preparedness to respond to a biological attack. 

THE WMD CENTER AND ITS BIO-RESPONSE REPORT CARD

We founded the WMD Center to serve as an honest broker between Government 

and the American public to ensure individual, community, and National progress in 

strengthening the Nation’s capabilities to respond to biological threats. Our first 

major research project, scheduled for completion in mid-October, is a report card focused solely on America’s capability to respond to a large-scale biological event, 

whether man-made or naturally-occurring. 

Lynne Kidder, the President of the WMD Center, is leading a highly qualified 

team of experts in this study. During Phase I, our project’s board of advisors were 

charged with designing the metrics for evaluating bio-response capabilities. Advisors 

include a former Deputy Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the 

former Chief Counsel at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the former 

Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense (in the Clinton and Bush Administrations), the Founding President of the Albert B. Sabin Vaccine Institute, the Director of Disaster Medicine at the American Medical Association, and the Director 

of RAND Health. (A complete list of advisors is available at www.wmdcenter.org). 

In Phase II of our study, a separate, independent team of subject matter experts 

will collect data and provide analysis in each of seven categories: 

• Detection and situational awareness; 

• Diagnosis and attribution; 

• Communicating actionable information; 

• Medical countermeasures (development and production of vaccines and therapeutics); 

• Distributing/dispensing medical countermeasures; 

• Medical treatment and response; 

• Environmental remediation. 

In order to ensure rigorous review and diverse perspectives, this second team includes experienced practitioners and thought leaders from academia, leading think 

tanks, former Government officials, and private sector organizations that specialize 

in biodefense. These experts will provide their analyses and insights to the WMD 

Center Board of Directors, who will ultimately determine final grades, recommendations, and report content. 

Our report card will be released in mid-October. It will consist of three parts: A 

review of the threat, an assessment of America’s current capabilities to effectively 

respond to act of bioterrorism, and recommendations that will set us on the course 

to reach our goal: Removing bioterrorism from the category of WMD. While we will 

never be able to remove nuclear weapons from the category of WMD, it is within 

our power to remove bioterrorism from the category. 
18 

Given the ubiquity of select agents readily found in nature and the rapid advances in biotechnology that allow non-state actors the capability to produce sophisticated bioweapons, a major part of our biodefense strategy must be based on building a level of preparedness that will effectively remove bioweapons from the category of WMD. An attack would still cause casualties, but it would not be of a magnitude that would change the course of history. 

This is a realistic and achievable goal. 

WMD BILL

The WMD Center is not in the business of assigning grades to specific pieces of 

legislation; however, if we were in that business, this carefully-crafted, comprehensive bill would receive high marks. If all articles within this legislation were to become law, it would represent progress for America’s biodefense capabilities. 

We do understand the challenges of moving this legislation through the various 

committees and subcommittees that will claim oversight responsibility. It should be 

noted that the 9/11 Commission warned of the Byzantine jurisdictional assignment 

of Congressional oversight of homeland security. In January 2010, the WMD Commission gave Congress a failing grade for the lack of response to its recommendation: ‘‘reform Congressional oversight to better address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st Century National security missions’’. 

The WMD Center fully supports many of the provisions of the bipartisan bill 

you’ve introduced today. In particular, we support your call for the re-establishment 

of the position previously called, Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense. 

We are also pleased with other provisions that are consistent with WMD Commission recommendations, including requirements for: 

• A National biodefense plan; 

• A National bio-surveillance strategy; 

• A comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis; 

• A National intelligence strategy for countering biological threats; 

• Improvements in how the Government communicates the threat of bioterrorism; 

• Improved detection capabilities; 

• First responder guidance on WMD; 

• Guidelines on environmental cleanup and restoration. 

THE ROAD AHEAD

While we enthusiastically support this legislation, we also must ask, is it enough? 

This legislation will help move the Nation toward the WMD Center’s goal of removing bioterrorism from the category of WMD, but it will not get us all the way there. 

We will not reach this goal during the tenure of the 112th Congress, but rather, 

it will require a long-term commitment. We must ensure that the legislation and 

policies we enact today and each year forward lead us toward that goal. 

It is difficult to envision improvement without appropriate leadership and organizational structure. The 2008 report of the Project on National Security Reform, 

Forging a New Shield, examined the ‘‘uneven performance of the Federal Government’’ during several post-cold war National security scenarios, from 9/11 to 

Katrina. The report concludes: 

‘‘It is facile to blame all these regrettable outcomes on particular leaders and their 

policy choices. Leadership and judgment matter, to be sure, but as this Report demonstrates, no leader, no matter how strategically farsighted and talented as a manager, could have handled these issues without being hampered by the weaknesses 

of the current system.’’ 

While the WMD Center fully supports your call to re-establish the position of Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, we understand that doing so will not 

fix all the deficiencies in leadership and organizational structure for America’s biodefense enterprise. These will be among the most important issues we consider in 

the assessment and recommendations of our report card. 

We are fortunate to have the experience and wisdom of 2 dozen of America’s top 

biodefense and public health experts assisting our project, but we are also considering the findings of recent reports by the National Biological Science Board, the 

National Academies, the Defense Science Board, and others. 

Senator Graham and I look forward to providing you our assessments and recommendations in October. While I can’t provide specific details today, I can predict 

that some of the recommendations will require neither authorization nor appropriations, and yet will provide significant improvements in capabilities. Other recommendations will require Congressional authorization, and we know that will be 

challenging given multiple committees with jurisdiction. Some recommendations will 
19 

require more funding—a huge challenge in this fiscal environment. We will talk 

about partnerships between the public and private sectors, and while that has been 

a great bumper sticker for the post 9/11 era, it has proven far more challenging to 

implement. 

MULTIPLE BENEFITS

The good news is that many of our recommendations will have multiple benefits 

for our families and local communities, whether or not they experience a large-scale 

bioterrorist attack. Improvements in the rapid diagnosis of disease, the capability 

to quickly produce safe and effective vaccines and therapeutics, and increased surge 

capacity in our medical care systems will benefit us all—for we know with certainty 

that Mother Nature will present biological threats. These no-regret initiatives will 

be a great legacy for our children and grandchildren, and will also help keep America at the leading edge of the biotech revolution. 

THE GROWING THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM

Removing bioterrorism from the category of WMD will neither be quick nor easy, 

but it is vital to both America’s economic and National security. I would remind you 

that bin Laden had a background in construction. It shouldn’t be surprising that 

he chose to attack buildings in America, because he understood what damage could 

be wrought by flying fully-fueled, wide-body airplanes into those structures. AlQaeda’s new leader is just as determined to attack America. His formal training was 

in medicine and infectious disease—one more reason we worry about bioterrorism. 

But this is not just about al-Qaeda. 

If the FBI is correct in its assertion that Dr. Bruce Ivins was the sole perpetrator 

of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, then a single individual with no training or experience in weaponizing pathogens, and using equipment readily available for purchase on the internet, was capable of producing high-quality, dry-powdered anthrax. 

The only difference between producing enough material for several envelopes and 

enough material to attack a city is just a matter of a few months’ production work 

in a laboratory, rather than the few hours of late night work cited by the FBI investigation. 

The bottom line on the feasibility of bioterrorism is quite clear. Today, terrorists 

have ready access to pathogens, the capability to weaponize them, and the means 

to effectively dispense a biological weapon. There is no question on intent. 

REMOVING BIOTERRORISM FROM THE CATEGORY OF WMD

It is well within the capacity of our Nation to address this threat. The issue here 

is less a question of resources or knowledge than it is one of leadership and purpose. 

Our Nation must recognize that the danger of a bioattack against the American 

homeland is a high-priority threat. 

At the explicit request of the leaders of Congress, the WMD Commission recommended the steps necessary to defend the Nation against that threat. The WMD 

Center report card will offer even more specific recommendations this fall. The question is the same as when the WMD Commission issued its first report in December 

2008: Will our leaders take bold actions commensurate with the seriousness of this 

threat? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No, no, no. Thank you, very much. You don’t have 

to tell the gentleman from New Jersey he has it exactly right, but 

we appreciate that. 

Mr. TALENT. I go back long enough for them to—he knows I 

haven’t always said that about everything he believes. But I think 

he is correct on this one. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Dr. Kadlec. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. KADLEC, FORMER SPECIAL 

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR BIODEFENSE 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Representative Clarke, and the Members of the committee. I just 

want to say what a privilege it is today to meet before you as a 

private citizen having served 26 years in the military as a colonel, 
20 

I haven’t worn that title very often, and this is one of the occasions. 

Thank you. 

I come here, really, to explain, or at least to talk about one part 

of your bill, and that is the biodefense enterprise. Having served 

as one of the three special assistants to the President for biodefense during the Bush administration, it was really our principle 

responsibility to ensure that the Federal Government worked as 

one in all domestic preparedness efforts for deliberate biological attacks and natural pandemics. 

My job was literally to keep the eye on the biodefense ball 

24/7. I certainly welcome this opportunity to come to you today, 

and certainly acknowledge the bill that is before you from Mr. Pascrell and Mr. King, and just basically say that there are going to 

be parts of the bill—unfortunately not all the parts of the bill—that 

I can specifically speak to today, but at least highlight those that 

will make a significant difference in our biopreparedness status 

today. 

I have the unenviable position 30 June 2008 to actually have to 

tell President Bush and members of the senior staff that after 8 

years of intense effort, numerous numbers of political or policy documents and directives—$50 billion, approximately, in funding, that 

if we experienced a moderate to large scale anthrax attack in any 

major metropolitan area today, than in 2008, that it would probably result in catastrophic loss of life, and potentially loss of use 

of that city for many months, maybe years. 

So, it is with that—and again, to acknowledge the role of the 

WMD commission, who have really played an integral part in keeping the eye on the ball as we have moved forward—is to note that, 

unfortunately, I was the last special assistant to the President for 

biodefense policy. 

By the way, this is not the first time it happened. Because during the transition from the Clinton to Bush administration, that 

position was also eliminated. It was during the Clinton administration that it was first created in 1998, and a fellow by the name of 

Admiral Ken Bernard held that position. In doing so, he basically 

began what would be the precursors of the Homeland Security 

Council and the domestic preparedness efforts. 

But again, this is not a partisan issue. It is just a matter of perspective, and I am afraid it represents the perspective that, somehow, we have not fully integrated the bio problem as part of our 

National security priorities, to your point, sir. 

That, I think, in some ways, the fact that there is not a position 

now in the White House with that title, certainly doesn’t prevent 

progress. In fact, I would like to highlight some progress that has 

been made. First and foremost, there have been a couple of new 

Presidential directives that build on the ones that were originally 

issued by President Bush—one in National preparedness, PPD No. 

8—as well as a couple of Executive Orders that deal with medical 

countermeasure distribution as well as biosecurity. 

I just have to say that also that the Obama administration effectively managed the H1N1 pandemic, and fortunately, it was a particularly not virulent one. But the point is that the special assistant’s role is not one that is really seen in emergencies, but really 
21 

in the mundane, day-to-day events in the White House and are 

manifest in other ways. 

I will point those out. First of all, if you see how the biodefense 

portfolio is being managed today, it is not being seen as a National 

security priority. If you look how OMB has classified these programs, they are not subject to the same consideration that National 

security or homeland security is given, but actually has other 

health care programs. I think it reflects the lack of priority. 

The other way that, again, the role of the special assistant plays 

in a senior political appointee—whether it is a special assistant or 

not—it basically plays in this thing is to basically educate, advocate, and coordinate, not only across interagency, but across the 

White House. 

So, unfortunately, today, we have seen very effective communications, plans, programs subject to the nuclear threat that is out 

there today, but we haven’t seen similar efforts for the biological 

problem. So we have had no Prague speech, we have had no biological summit on this issue. 

So, with that, I think one of the effective tools that you have introduced into your bill is this idea of a National biodefense plan. 

So, in some ways, I think it does demand that we have—and, by 

the way, one does not exist today, so it is necessary. The other 

thing is, because of extremely valuable forcing function that basically we have experienced before, particularly the preparations 

around the influenza pandemics. So that is one area. 

The other area is, really, the cross-cutting budget proposal that 

you have. It is a mystery, not only to senior members of the policy 

community in the White House, but also to some members of 

OMB—what are we spending in certain areas in the biodefense 

portfolio? 

Areas like basic medical research and other areas, and some of 

the areas are very under represented, and Senator Talent mentioned the issue about environmental clean-up, an area that deserves particular mention. 

I would just like to mention, because of time, quickly two other 

areas. One is in your bill and one maybe you should consider including in your bill, and that one is, particularly around the vaccination or pre-vaccination of first responders. 

We know that in some ways we have a safe and effective vaccine. 

We have surplus supplies in the strategic National stockpile that 

are at risk of basically going bad. Quite frankly, we should utilize 

those as we do for our front-line soldiers. To realize that when they 

go to places like Iraq, Afghanistan, or South Korea, that we afford 

them the best protection. It is just odd to me that our first responders don’t deserve that in the major metropolitan areas that are at 

risk. 

The last group that I mentioned—and, again, it really does relate 

to the first responder community—is our emergency medical service community. 

Somewhat under-represented and under-appreciated, and just 

because of their nature and the fact that they really are—the small 

office in the Department of Transportation, they are really not eligible for a lot of the programs that we really would consider being 
22 

front-line in this area, and that is subject to grants to either first 

responders or hospital preparedness grants. 

Somehow, we need to recognize them as a critical force multiplier 

that, quite frankly, to date has not been optimized and utilized in 

a way that could significantly bolster our capabilities to respond to 

these events. We know they are going to be there, and for some 

reason, we really haven’t maximized their capabilities in that area. 

Simply, in closing, I would just like to say thank you. Fortunately, we have not experienced the biological attack on our homeland since the events of 9/11. I pray that we don’t, but I think the 

reality is here, as Senator Talent has mentioned, that preparedness 

is deterrence. Because there is really no other means to either prevent necessarily or necessarily preempt these kind of attacks in the 

future. 

Thank you, very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Dr. Kadlec follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. KADLEC

JUNE 23, 2011 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I am speaking today as a private citizen having had the privilege and opportunity to be one of the three individuals who 

served as the Special Assistant and Senior Director for Biodefense Policy during 

President George W. Bush’s administration. Retired Admiral (Dr.) Kenneth Bernard 

was the first and Dr. Rajeev Venkayya was the second. Dr. Bernard had the singular privilege of being the Special Advisor to the President’s National Security on 

the National Security Council during the second term of President Clinton’s administration. All three of us had the principle responsibility to ensure that the Federal 

Government worked as one in its domestic preparedness efforts for deliberate biological attacks and natural pandemics. 

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today and to share some of my 

experiences and insights during my tenure. I would like to spend the preponderance 

of my time to comment on the Title I of your draft bill entitled ‘‘The National Biodefense Enterprise.’’ 

First, I would like to acknowledge and compliment you Mr. Chairman, Members 

of your committee and staff on this bill. It represents another important step forward that the Nation should take to better prepare for an uncertain future. The recent announcement of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri as the replacement to Osama bin 

Laden, by all accounts a less than mediocre leader at best but one who has and likely still aspires to attack the United States with anthrax. 

I would also like to take the opportunity to acknowledge the important contributions made by Senators Graham and Talent in the course of their leadership of the 

WMD Commission. I applaud their continued leadership and commitment in establishing the WMD Center and look forward to their evaluation of our bioterrorism 

preparedness efforts this fall. 

If there is a theme to my opening remarks, it is about leadership. This committee 

has demonstrated it with this and other hearings and the draft bill that seeks to 

improve our Nation’s preparedness. Two former Senators have displayed it with 

their successive reports and their commitment to produce a preparedness report 

card. And hopefully the Zawahiri tenure as leader will not only be short-lived, literally and figuratively, but be the last leader for al-Qaeda. 

Regretfully, I was a last too. I was the last White House Special Assistant fully 

devoted to addressing the biodefense challenge. The position I held was eliminated 

during the transition from President Bush to Obama. This is not the first time a 

position of this type was eliminated. During the transition from President Bill Clinton to George W. Bush, the position that Admiral Ken Bernard held was eliminated 

from the National Security Council. I am convinced that the decision to eliminate 

a senior political White House position devoted to heath security was not a partisan 

decision. It was reversed following the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax letter mailings. 

It does however, reflect that we have not quite yet achieved the maturity in our National security thinking to embrace the notion that certain health security issues 

rise to the level of being a first order National security priority. It also clearly demonstrates that today, the threat of a biological Hiroshima is not viewed with the 
23 

same concern and urgency as the potential for nuclear one. But if you believe Senators Graham and Talent, it may be the catastrophe more likely to happen. 

Of the number of issues addressed in your bill, there is no more important one 

than the issue of leadership. The individual whose day-in/day-out responsibility is 

to think about this problem and ensure that the U.S. Government is taking all necessary steps to either prevent a bioterrorist attack from happening; and if one 

should, making sure all the resources available can be mobilized quickly enough to 

mitigate needless morbidity and mortality. I have stated before that second only to 

defending the U.S. Constitution, protecting and saving American lives is the sacred 

duty of all those who serve in Government. 

It is certainly disappointing that despite the dangers cited by Senators Graham 

and Talent, no senior political White House official currently has the title or the sole 

duty to address the problem posed by biological weapons. To the credit of the 

Obama administration when confronted by the H1N1 pandemic, they were able to 

mobilize a number of career civil service and military detailees that helped guide 

the administration through the early days and weeks of that event. Those individuals from the Departments of Veteran Affairs (VA), Defense (DoD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS) performed magnificently and 

were appropriately recognized for their contributions. The current Deputy Homeland 

Security Advisor under John Brennan has demonstrated a deep understanding and 

personal commitment to the biodefense problem and has worked it tirelessly but 

frankly is only human and has a number of other important issues to manage dayto-day. 

The real value of a senior political advisee for biodefense is not realized during 

an emergency. His or her contributions are made in small yet significant ways that 

are not likely apparent to outsiders. It is chairing meetings to update biodefense 

strategies, review plans, and resolve gaps or disputes among Federal departments 

and agencies. It is attending internal White House meetings concerning budgets, ensuring that key elements of the President’s biodefense priorities are recognized and 

preserved. I have one anecdote to share from my tenure. While I was meeting with 

the senior political appointee who oversaw of the U.S. Government spending for civilian biodefense in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Health Programs 

office, I learned that he did not have a security clearance to read the periodic intelligence reports or attend briefings where classified information about the subject 

was discussed. Biodefense was only a very small part of his enormous responsibilities and budgets for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. But it is the one part 

of his portfolio that had to do with National security and he had no insight into 

the threats he was responsible to mitigate. I helped him justify the need for a security clearance so he could hear and understand the nature of the bioterrorism 

threat. To the point, I served as the issue advocate within the White House. I was 

senior enough to be invited to the important meetings that detailees don’t normally 

attend and I could raise the issue or a stink about the issue if I felt the President’s 

agenda or interests were somehow being marginalized. I saw my role to educate, 

advocate, and coordinate among the White House offices as well as the Federal 

interagency. My job was keeping my eye on the biodefense ‘‘ball’’ 24/7. Without such 

person, it is likely the issue will not necessarily be routinely discussed or considered. 

Therefore, it is appropriate for Congress to request the administration to request 

a National Biodefense Plan. Between the Bush and Obama administrations there 

have been a number of well-considered and -crafted policies pertaining to biodefense. If policies would solve the problem, we would be more than half-way there. 

But the devil is in the details. In 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Decision 

(HSPD) 10 roughly outlined a number of steps that Federal departments and agencies should take. However those actions should be reviewed and refreshed. The good 

news is that there has been progress across biodefense domain, but I do not believe, 

nor does anyone who has followed this issue believe; we have done enough and are 

prepared. The excellent National Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan serves 

as a useful model to look to for a future National Biodefense Plan. 

I certainly endorse the need for better visibility across the biodefense investments 

that are being made in related programs across the Federal Government. We have 

invested over $50 billion dollars and there are legitimate questions as to whether 

we spent too much in certain areas or overlooked others. Getting better insight into 

how we spending these dollars, particularly in light of the severe Federal deficit we 

are facing, is not only prudent but an imperative. Any money that we can save can 

surely be put toward a gap that exists in our current efforts. One area that deserves 

special attention in such an analysis is whether we are adequately resourcing efforts 

to remediate and recover from a biological attack. In the course of natural evolution 

of considering our preparedness and response to such an event, we have appro-
24 

priately initially focused on the life-saving measures that must be taken. I am 

afraid not enough consideration has been given to the cost of clean-up. As witnessed 

during the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, cleaning a couple of buildings cost over a 

billion dollars. The cost of cleaning a city or subway system following a large-scale 

anthrax release is mind-boggling. It is not clear that we know the costs of environmental cleanup or even how to do it. 

I would like to make special mention about the provision in your bill devoted to 

biosurveillance. I can not think of any one issue that we as a Federal Government 

have worked harder on than biosurveillance. It is critical element in our biodefense 

strategy: To warn of an impending pandemic, or detect a biological attack and guide 

our responses to both. I admit that we have not achieved our objective of collecting 

human, animal, and environmental health data, analyzing and sharing it with all 

the responsible stakeholders at the local, State, and Federal level. To say it is still 

a ‘‘work in progress’’ is an understatement. While there are a number of 

Department- and sector-specific biosurveillance strategies, there is yet no comprehensive plan to knit them together into a National plan. I am heartened to know 

that there is now a Department of Defense detailee working on the White House 

National Security Staff whose full-time duty is addressing the biosurveillance issue. 

I think the draft bill’s provision asking a National Biosurveillance Implementation 

Plan is needed and frankly overdue. Hopefully, the process to develop a plan will 

resolve the issues surrounding the National Biosurveillance Integration Center 

(NBIC) at DHS. Originally conceived to take all-source surveillance information concerning humans, animals, plants, and environment and develop a common operating 

picture or situational awareness that is shared with all Federal, State, and local 

stakeholders; it has not yet met this objective. The concern I have is ‘‘throwing the 

baby out with the bath water’’ that by doing away with NBIC, we fail to preserve 

the essential function it was created to perform. 

There are several other provisions included in your draft bill that deserve mention 

and support. Related to biosurveillance and specifically within your committee’s jurisdiction is biodetection. Having been involved with the creation of the BioWatch 

Program now managed by the Office of Health Affairs in the Department of Homeland Security, I have watched with some concern about the receding tide of support 

and investment of this program. The current capabilities of the BioWatch system 

today in terms of timeliness and coverage are not optimal by any means. This was 

recognized when the program was conceived and deployed. The initial system, however, has served two incredibly important functions. First, it became a test bed for 

gaining experience and confidence in domestic environmental detection and improved local laboratory capabilities. There have been a number of environmental 

positives that demonstrate the sensitivity of the laboratory analyses. With that experience, the system and the protocols supporting it have been refined over time. 

Second, it has enlisted the public health, medical, and emergency management to 

work together to consider the challenge and opportunities to recognize a potentially 

devastating public health event. This evolution has not come easily. It has resulted 

from the dedication of DHS, CDC, and EPA civil servants working side-by-side with 

their State and local counterparts. Environmental detection alone is not sufficient 

to address the risks from biological attacks, clinical diagnosis, and laboratory confirmatory testing are critical adjuncts. I hope that as further time passes, the need 

to improve clinical laboratory diagnostics is viewed as a compliment rather than a 

competitor to the requirement for near-real-time environmental detection. 

I also want to mention and endorse the committee’s view on pre-event vaccination, 

particularly with the currently available FDA approved anthrax vaccine. There is 

little dispute within the intelligence community that the greatest concern today is 

the risk from an anthrax attack. The Department of Defense has judged the risk 

so serious that military personnel are immunized against anthrax before deploying 

to Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Korea. It would seem similarly prudent to consider 

offering the same vaccine to domestic Federal, State, and local responders who may 

be at increased risk of exposure based on their occupation and the major metropolitan area they live. It is generally the judgment of those who have considered the 

likely evolution of a large-scale anthrax attack that time is of the essence. It would 

be extraordinarily beneficial to have confidence that critical responders such as police, fire, health care, and yes even postal workers, who we may need to count on 

to save the lives of others would be afforded the same protection afforded to our 

troops. 

I would like to point out that there should be an additional provision in your bill 

that is not in the draft that I reviewed for this hearing. One of the most undervalued and appreciated group of first responders that I know of, besides U.S. postal 

workers, are our emergency medical service (EMS) workers. They are the critical 

link between the incident where the attack, disaster, or accident happened and the 
25 

medical system. They suffer in the Federal grant programs, depending on their jurisdiction, being neither fish nor fowl: Not recognized as being a traditional police 

or fire first responder. They are also not necessarily included for funding in the hospital preparedness grant programs. I would suggest to you that considering how 

best to optimize this group of ‘‘force multipliers’’ is not only overdue but essential 

in any legislation you consider. 

Finally, I would like to close by simply saying that so far, the United States has 

not experienced the true nature a biological attack. According to President Obama’s 

Presidential Policy Directive 2, a single unmitigated biological attack could place at 

risk potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths and cost the Nation over a trillion 

dollars. The letter attacks experienced in 2001 were just a small indication about 

the potential power of these weapons. I believe we, as a Government, do a bad job 

predicting the next disaster. The National security challenges we face are unpredictable and require a robustness and flexibility in capabilities that we have yet attained. I see your bill as helping build that capacity and resilience and look forward 

to supporting your efforts in the future. Thank you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, very much, Dr. Kadlec, and thank you 

for your service in the military. I am reminded that 67 years ago, 

this month, my father was a medical officer in the United States 

Army marching across Normandy. 

Although he only served a few years, when he passed away, we 

honored him by indicating that on his tombstone, which is one of 

the things he wanted. So I thank you for your service to our country in all your capacities. 

Sheriff? Again, thank you for your service, particularly as one of 

those who responded to the ghastly attack that took place on 9/11, 

and thank you for your continued service and, we await your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. BERDNIK, SHERIFF, PASSAIC 

COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 

Sheriff BERDNIK. I thank the subcommittees for the meeting here 

today and the opportunity to appear before this joint panel. 

I would like to commend Chairman King and, of course, my Congressman, Bill Pascrell, for their leadership on this issue and their 

sponsorship of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011. 

I have seen Congressman Pascrell’s continued leadership on this 

issue, and I personally want to thank you and commend you for 

your efforts. On January 1, 2011, I had the privilege of becoming 

the sheriff of Passaic County. 

Passaic County is a jurisdiction of approximately a half a million 

people, encompassing 185 square miles just outside the city of New 

York. It is actually northern New Jersey. Prior to becoming the 

sheriff, I was a detective/lieutenant with the Clifton Police Department for almost 30 years and served as a SWAT team commander. 

It was during that time with the Clifton Police Department that 

I became a first responder to the World Trade Center on September 

11, 2001. In addition to being one of the worst days in our Nation’s 

history, I saw first-hand the deficiencies that our emergency responders face. 

That day, thousands of brave law enforcement officers and emergency responders were called into service and showed great courage 

and commitment to our country. Unfortunately, there were many 

obstacles to overcome. We did not have the proper equipment, 

training, and the ability to communicate during this horrific event. 

As the years have gone by, some of those issues have been addressed but many have not been completely mitigated. It is almost 
26 

10 years ago. The issues I observed, they still plague us and our 

local public safety agencies today. 

The passage of this bill is essential to our Nation. Nationally, it 

is important that our Government has a system in place for preventing and working through a WMD incident. It is equally important that public safety, in general, has a system to address these 

issues and resources to protect our citizens. 

In New Jersey alone, the Home Security grants are slated to be 

reduced by 50 percent this fiscal year. That is not only shortsighted, but a dangerous public policy decision. In Passaic County, 

the sheriff’s officers benefit greatly from funding through the 

Urban Area Security Initiative, and if the sheriff’s office deploys 

certified CBRN, HAZMAT, bomb squad, SWAT teams as defined by 

NIMS. 

The ability to train and equip these teams properly is a direct 

result of the funding provided UASI. These proposed reductions in 

funding will be devastating. They will cripple the ability of these 

teams to respond in times of emergency. I understand that members of this panel share my concerns. 

In fact, recently, I just read an article in the Government Security News where Representative Bennie Thompson, the Ranking 

Member of the Homeland Security Committee, expressed these 

exact sentiments. Additionally, the sheriff’s officers and the Department supports the county health agencies in bioterrorism and provides CBRN detection and security for points of distribution. 

Funding is needed to test and evaluate these PODs to ensure 

their efficiency and effectiveness and the delivery of vaccines and 

medication during emergencies. We must also ensure that first responders are equipped with the latest technology available to support their mission. 

Unfortunately, deficiencies in communication are still on-going; 

still much of a problem in much of the State of New Jersey. With 

the current trend moving toward shared dispatch services, it is important to ensure that funding to enhance interoperable communications is provided. Initiatives like SafeCom are consistent with 

fulfilling with the objectives of the National Emergency Communications Plan. 

As demonstrated in the 9/11 attacks and other National disasters, the inability for first responders to effectively communicate 

with each other led to a substantial loss of life. Funding must be 

allocated to purchase additional frequencies in the D Block spectrum. This will enable deployment of the Nation-wide broadband 

network for first responders. 

Finally, there is no universal means to quickly and efficiently notify the public impending emergencies. There exists a patchwork of 

communication systems where agencies currently deploy their own 

methods to notify their respective citizens and responders. Currently, no comprehensive technology exists to broadcast a message 

to all the residents of Passaic County. 

This needs to be corrected, and the only way to mitigate this 

dangerous situation is through the availability of Federal funding. 

This initiative will allow for the deployment of a universal emergency alert system. The introduction of this bill moves our Nation 
27 

to establish a dialogue to ensure we are safe from any future attacks. 

The legislation helps address deficiencies in agency planning coordination and training that our Nation so badly needs to address. 

Though these issues cannot be solved with money alone, our Nation 

needs to put the appropriate resources toward this problem. 

Again, I would like to thank the committee, its Chairman, Congressman Pascrell, for the opportunity to speak before you today. 

As a law enforcement professional, I am proud to be part of this 

panel. I feel that our collective experience can assist in crafting the 

appropriate public policy to make our Nation safer from a potential 

weapon of mass destruction attack. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity, and I look forward to addressing any of your concerns. 

[The statement of Sheriff Berdnik follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. BERDNIK

I would to thank the Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the Chairs, 

and Members of the subcommittees meeting here today for the opportunity to appear in front of this joint panel. 

I want to commend Chairman King and my Congressman Bill Pascrell for their 

leadership in this issue and their sponsorship of WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2011. I have seen Congressman Pascrell’s continued leadership on this issue and I personally want to thank and commend his efforts. 

On January 1, 2011, I had the privilege of becoming the Sheriff of Passaic County. 

Passaic County is a jurisdiction of a half million people, encompassing 185 square 

miles outside of the City of New York in Northern New Jersey. Prior to becoming 

Sheriff, I was a Detective Lieutenant with the Clifton Police Department for almost 

30 years and served as the SWAT Team Commander. During my tenure with the 

Clifton Police Department I became a first responder to the World Trade Center on 

September 11, 2001. In addition to being one of the worst days in our Nation’s history, I saw first-hand the deficiencies that our emergency responders faced. That 

day thousands of brave law enforcement officers and emergency responders were 

called into service and showed great courage and commitment to our country. 

Unfortunately, there were many obstacles to overcome. We did not have the proper equipment, training, and the ability to communicate during this horrific event. 

As the years have gone by, some of those issues have been addressed, but many 

have not been completely mitigated. It is amazing that almost 10 years ago, the 

issues I observed then still plague local public safety agencies. 

The passage of this bill is essential for our Nation. Nationally it is important that 

our Government has a system in place for preventing and working through a WMD 

incident. It is equally important that public safety in general has a system to address these issues and resources to protect our citizens. 

In New Jersey alone, the Homeland Security grants are slated to be reduced by 

50 percent this fiscal year. That is not only short-sighted, but a dangerous public 

policy decision. In Passaic County, the Sheriff’s Office benefits greatly from the 

funding provided through the Urban Areas Security Initiative. The Sheriff’s Office 

deploys certified CBRNE/HAZMAT, Bomb Squad, and SWAT Teams as defined by 

NIMS (National Incident Management System). The ability to train and equip these 

teams properly is a direct result of the funding provided by UASI. These proposed 

reductions in funding will be devastating. They will cripple the ability of these 

teams to respond in times of emergency. I understand that members of this panel 

share my concerns. In fact, just recently I read an article in Government Security 

News where Representative Bennie Thompson, the Ranking Member of the Homeland Security Committee, expressed these exact sentiments. 

Additionally, the Sheriff’s Office supports the county health agencies in bioterrorism and provides CBRNE detection and security for Points of Distribution. Funding is needed to test and evaluate these PODs to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of vaccines and medication during emergencies. We must 

also ensure that first responders are equipped with the latest technology available 

to support this mission. 

Unfortunately deficiencies in communication are still an on-going problem in 

much of the State of New Jersey. With the current trend moving toward shared dis-
28 

patch services it is important to ensure that funding to enhance interoperable communications is provided. Initiatives like SAFECOM are consistent with fulfilling the 

objectives of the National Emergency Communications Plan. As demonstrated in the 

9/11 attacks and other National disasters, the inability for first responders to effectively communicate with each other, led to substantial loss of life. Funding must be 

allocated to purchase additional frequencies in the D-Block spectrum. This will enable the deployment of the Nation-wide broadband network for first responders. 

Finally, there is no universal means to quickly and efficiently notify the public 

of impending emergencies. There exists a patchwork of communication systems 

where agencies currently deploy their own methods to notify their respective citizens and responders. Currently no comprehensive technology exists to broadcast a 

message to all of the residents of Passaic County. This needs to be corrected and 

the only way to mitigate this dangerous situation is through the availability of Federal funding. This initiative will allow for the deployment of a universal emergency 

alert system. 

The introduction of this bill moves our Nation to establish a dialogue to ensure 

we are safe from any future attacks. This legislation helps address deficiencies in 

agency planning, coordination, and training that our Nation so badly needs to address. Though these issues cannot be solved with money alone, our Nation needs 

to put the appropriate resources toward the problem. 

Again, I want to thank the committee, its Chairman and Congressman Pascrell 

for the opportunity to speak here today. As a law enforcement professional, I am 

proud to be part of this panel and I feel that our collective experience can assist 

in crafting the appropriate public policy to make our Nation safer from a potential 

weapon of mass destruction attack. 

Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to addressing any concerns that 

the committee might have. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, very much, sheriff. We will now have 

a round of questions, and I will begin with 5 minutes of questions 

on my time. 

Dr. Kadlec, we always have this problem of being prepared and 

utilizing our resources properly, and you have heard some of the 

testimony about a difficult budget circumstance we have. You mentioned that the reports you had to give to the President with respect to our vulnerability with an anthrax attack. Golly, I think it 

was over 5 years ago that HHS indicated that we needed to move 

towards the next generation of anthrax vaccines. 

As I understand it, we are still in the first generation, which was 

developed in 1960s? 

Dr. KADLEC. Fifties. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Fifties? There have been some articles I have seen 

that have criticized the cost involved, and you know, when you are 

dealing with vaccine, and so forth—where are we, from your view, 

in terms of a next generation anthrax vaccine, No. 1. 

No. 2, are we doing as effective a job in utilizing our resources 

in terms of purchasing the vaccines that are available. If not, is 

there an alternative? We always talk about competition being one 

way to bring costs down. That is sometimes a strange concept when 

you are dealing with vaccines that are stockpiled. 

How do we answer that question? Where do you think we are on 

that? 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, when I was in Government, we were 5 years 

away, and as we are today, we are 5 years away. So I think the 

practical reality is it has taken longer than anybody anticipated to 

develop a new generation or next generation of anthrax vaccine. 

There are technical challenges that have to do with the science 

that have not been resolved with that. 

Subject to the issue of, you know, do we need one or should we 

have one, I think one of the concerns—and it has more to do about 
29 

resilience than it has to do anything about a particular product is 

being—relying on a single source for a product. Particularly where 

that—is a National security measure or capability, then you would 

like to somehow have some built-in redundancy. 

So I think the idea of competition here is not only who may get 

there first. It is the idea that we have to ensure that we have potentially two sources of this. There are a variety of ways of doing 

it. Essentially a single manufacturer can have two locations manufacturing of this product or whatever. 

But, you know, not to get into those particulars, I think the reality is is that in some ways, we are still a ways away. We do have 

the benefit of a product right now that is FDA-approved. It has 

been in several million individuals, mostly military personnel. So 

it seems appropriate to consider that we can use a product we already have in ways that we haven’t used it yet, particularly with 

the first responder community. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is that a matter of—— 

Dr. KADLEC. No, sir, I don’t think so. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. 

Senator? What is it that is not happening that must happen to 

ensure the sustainment of a long-term commitment to this issue? 

In other words, you have talked to us about the two things that 

you think are the greatest vulnerabilities. What are our self-imposed liabilities? What are we not doing that we need to do? What 

would be the front-burner achievements you would ask us to attempt? 

Mr. TALENT. Well, I don’t want to anticipate the assessment that 

is coming out in October from the WMD Center too much. I would 

say we clearly have issues with the stockpile. I mean, we have not 

stockpiled the range of countermeasures that we need despite the 

fact that this has been an area where there has been a rather considerable degree of funding. 

Bob just talked about—you asked about anthrax, Congressman 

Richardson raised the issue of children. Well, one of the things we 

are going to study is whether the countermeasures—whether we 

are considering the special needs of children who may be victims 

of this and developing the countermeasures, because children can’t 

always take the same things that adults are taking. 

That is clearly an area—we have done almost nothing on the 

whole clean-up issue, and if we are hit with anthrax, that may be 

the biggest long-term issue, and we have no idea now what standards should be followed. 

We have a lot of detection and surveillance out there, but we 

have not integrated it enough. We don’t have enough real-time. So 

these are all areas. Then I would just say more broadly, getting the 

Congress and the administration beyond certain groups like this 

committee to understand the urgency of this and understand what 

that means in terms of decision making, which is what Mr. Pascrell 

talked about, what I talked about. 

This is going to be with us for a while. If you think of the 

world—and I think this is how we are to think about it—it is a 

number of networks, you know, financial, communications, transportation, and in societies like ours, the livelihood of our people 
30 

and the quality of life depends on their ability to participate in 

those networks. 

Everybody aspires to be in a society where everybody can participate. In—elements around the world, Mr. Chairman. Right now, it 

is, yes, the very extreme branch of Islam, but it could be anybody. 

They understand that using asymmetric weapons is a way to hit 

societies like ours. 

So this is going to be an issue that is going to be with us for a 

long time, and as a Government, we have to adjust to that and act 

appropriately. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, very much, for your comments. Just 

reminded me of something Dr. Kadlec said when he was talking 

about the necessity of having a biodefense adviser to the President. 

Part of it is just accessibility to the President and his top people. 

I mean, if you have got somebody that is in your network, it is 

more likely you might pay attention to them. We all are victims of 

and products of our environment, and if I pass you in the hall, or 

when I go to—we used to call it the EEOB, now I guess it is the 

Eisenhower Building—if I pass you in the hallway or see you, I 

might be reminded to ask you a question and pay attention to it. 

At this time, I would recognize the Ranking Member of our subcommittee, Ms. Clarke for any questions that she might have in 

her 5 minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank our panel for their very enlightened testimony here 

this morning. I have a particular interest in white powder incidents. 

As I have said, I am from New York City, and there seem to be 

repetitive events that take place from time-to-time in New York 

City. Last year, in fact, we had white powder letters sent to foreign 

embassies and consulates in New York City. 

The FBI had briefed me on the status of their investigation at 

the time, but I would like to ask if anyone on the panel has any 

particular knowledge of these events, and do you think that our intelligence efforts performed well or informed that particular investigation or other white powder events in the United States or 

around the world, in general? 

Sheriff BERDNIK. As a first responder speaking on the level of 

sheriff, within Passaic County we have had white powder incidents, 

and again, the ability to investigate them is there. The important 

thing is actually working with, not only Federal, State, and local 

agencies, but we have been successful in tracking these incidents, 

and the fact that we are working with the Federal authorities is 

definitely beneficial to us. 

Mr. TALENT. We need a National intelligence strategy for dealing 

with the biothreat, and we don’t have it. It is broader than just this 

incident. Now, I think the FBI has really stepped up in the course 

of the last few years in terms of what it does domestically. 

But the broader intelligence community, I am concerned, hasn’t. 

You all ought to, you know, I am sure you get those briefings regularly anyway, but there are materials in there that will tell you 

that they are not as conscious, that this is a very serious threat 

as they ought to be. 
31 

So I am concerned on the intel. I don’t have specific knowledge 

of how the FBI has handled these incidents though, ma’am. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. It is of concern simply because, you 

know, oftentimes these white powders are sent into, like, the heart 

of the city. Once they reach their destination, you know, now you 

are dealing with mitigating a potential threat—— 

Mr. TALENT. Absolutely. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York [continuing]. As opposed to preventing 

it. 

As you know, there are those who believe that the nuclear threat 

to be greater than the biological threat, and it is apparent to me 

that part of the belief is based on a lesser quantity of intelligence 

regarding the biological threat and the different challenges associated with even collecting information on the biological threat in the 

first place. 

Do you believe this to be the case as well? 

Dr. KADLEC. I do. During my time at the White House, clearly, 

if you look at the volume of material, there is certainly disparity. 

I think in some ways, that disparity reflects the challenges, quite 

frankly, to get good intelligence. 

I mean, I recall the WMD Commission, sir, before yours that 

looked at the events in Iraq and basically highlighted the fact that 

the difficulty of collecting that kind of information because of the— 

nature and the ambiguity that is inherent in all that. 

But also is the stigma that basically said that based on their 

view, at that time, which I believe was 2005 and 2006, is that in 

some ways, you know, they knew we would know less about the biological threat 5 years hence than they did then. So I think there 

is a real challenge there. 

I would just highlight to you that I believe it was in the 2010 

Intelligence Authorization Bill there was actually a call to have a 

report from the DNI on this particular area, the biological collection issue. So, I don’t know where that is in its evolution, but clearly I think it has been a matter of concern by Congress and rightfully so. 

Mr. TALENT. If I could just—— 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Sure, quickly. 

Mr. TALENT. The old leader of al-Qaeda, who has met his just 

desserts, his background was in construction. I don’t think it is any 

accident that the plan he developed involved, you know, attacking 

a building. 

The new leader of al-Qaeda’s background is in medicine and infectious diseases, and I do believe that the intelligence community 

as a whole has never just really accepted the urgency of this threat 

as they have in the nuclear area, and I think you are right to be 

concerned. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. I am sorry, sheriff, did you want to 

add anything? 

Sheriff BERDNIK. Just, again, the fact is from the perspective of 

a county, when we have these white powder incidents—again, in 

our situations, it causes a lot of pandemonium, a lot of hysteria. 

It causes the evacuations of buildings. It causes an area to be contained, and from that perspective, not just from the fact that it is 
32 

a chemical threat, but the fact that it does cause a public threat 

from the hysteria that it causes. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, very much, gentlemen for 

your feedback, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Gentleman from Florida, Chairman of the other 

subcommittee is recognized for 5 minutes or more. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 

much. 

Senator Talent, in your report you described Pakistan as an 

intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorism. Since the death of 

bin Laden, our relationship with Pakistan has been in a state of 

flux. How is this affecting our ability to work with the Pakistani 

government to secure nuclear materials in Pakistan and defeat terrorist safe havens? 

Do you think the fact that the bin Laden was found in their 

country so close to their military training academy—has it opened 

their eyes to the terrorist threat and given them a greater sense 

of urgency to secure nuclear and biological materials? 

Mr. TALENT. I will speak as, you know, Jim Talent, private citizen here, because the WMD Center doesn’t—we are not taking a 

view on that. We said in the report that it was the epicenter of our 

concerns—Pakistan was, and everybody knows it is difficult to deal 

with Pakistan, in part, because it is difficult to figure out exactly 

what is going on. 

You know, it has been my opinion that it is a government that 

has been penetrated pretty effectively, particularly in security services by elements that are hostile to us and if not friendly, at least 

open and receptive, and I think the incident with Osama bin Laden 

is some indication of that. 

Parts of the government that don’t have that view are nevertheless—they are not putting the same level of priority at going after 

these terrorist elements as we are. I mean, they are looking at 

that, I think, in the context of domestic politics and broader issues 

like their relationship with India, which makes it difficult to deal 

with them. 

At the same time, given the position that we are now in in Afghanistan and the fact that when what we are trying to do in the 

region, you have to deal with the government of Pakistan. So it is 

a situation where they have leverage. I am not going to tell you 

that I think that they’re entirely reliable; although, there certainly 

are elements of the government that have worked with us. 

Yes, the way that that mission developed, and the fact that he 

had been there that long is, in my judgment, a source of concern. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Anyone else on the panel choose to respond? Okay. 

Next question, we know from think-tank research that—this is 

for Dr. Kadlec, in particular. We know from think-tank research 

that at least a dozen Federal departments and agencies are involved in biodefense activities. 

It seems that we shouldn’t have to rely on think-tanks for this 

information. The WMD bill directs that the White House submit an 

analytical budget crosscut for its biodefense expenditures. Having 

worked in the White House, what kind of analysis do you think 

would come from this provision, and will it help get us the analysis 
33 

of redundancy and inefficiencies that we are looking for? For Dr. 

Kadlec. 

Dr. KADLEC. Thank you, sir. I would just simply say, I think we 

would probably be surprised at the number of programs that are 

identified as biodefense programs that may not be, No. 1. 

No. 2, and that could be the circumstance that they are labeled 

or they are doing something else, maybe chemical defense. So the 

thing is that there is lack of, I think, understanding how things are 

defined. 

Clearly, sometimes it is in the benefit of the Department’s budget 

to basically characterize things in one light when in actuality they 

are doing other things. So I think we will find a few of those out 

there. 

The other thing is, we will likely find that there are some 

redundancies, some that maybe should be planned redundancies 

but others that are, quite frankly, unintentional and unrecognized. 

So, there are opportunities to leverage those in terms of better programs. Again, certainly savings in that area. 

The third thing is, I believe, is that you will find that, in some 

ways, the Department’s interests and, again, we talk about the environmental issues that we—and the concerns around how well we 

are to clean up contaminated areas—that you will find that there 

are multiple departments that are doing things that are relevant 

and they don’t even know they are doing those things, meaning 

that someone else is doing something very similar. 

So they first can leverage those and the benefits of increasing 

their knowledge base, but also to collectively work on a problem cooperatively. Again, it gets back to this issue of leadership at the 

White House and being able to not only have that kind of crosscutting budget that says what is being spent and how and by 

whom, but then going the next step and saying, well, how do we 

actually leverage it? 

We actually tried that in the Bush administration subject to 

medical basic research and development. Just between the Department of Defense and NIH, and went through—and maybe there is 

a success story there. I don’t have the particulars of it, but it was 

certainly challenging, and it certainly wasn’t necessarily bringing 

two willing departments together. 

I think that is what you have to do is kind of force unnatural 

acts between departments and agencies to do the right thing. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Anyone else want respond? 

Mr. TALENT. I will, with your permission, because I don’t think 

I gave as good an answer to Chairman Lungren’s question to me 

as I should have. Because this really is, I think, the No. 1 thing 

is getting somebody in charge of the whole enterprise. 

Getting somebody who has the clout, the ear of the President, 

and the ability insofar as it is possible in our Government to get 

people to work together and that also knows everything that everybody is doing. 

I think if we don’t do that, then the other things that you are 

working on legislatively—as important as they are, are likely to fail 

in execution. So if I can amend my answer to you, Chairman Lungren, that is probably the No. 1 thing. 
34 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you for your comments. I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Since some of the other Members had to leave, we 

have time for a second round. So I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Dr. KADLEC. In your written testimony, you expressed concern 

about doing away with what is known as the National Biosurveillance and Integration Center, yet there appears to be, even in your 

own testimony, consensus that it is not doing what it should. It 

hasn’t reached its objective. 

You talk about let’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater, 

and I understand that, but what would you like to see that strategy accomplish, that is a truly interagency strategy, and how soon, 

realistically, do you think you could have a truly National and integrated biosurveillance mechanism and—well, first of all, purpose— 

goal and mechanism that affects that goal? 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, my understanding, there is active work in that 

area right now. So I would say the good news is it seems like there 

is activity, certainly in the Executive branch at the White House, 

subject to the—that is the good news. 

I am less concerned about the strategy than the plan, because I 

think the strategy is pretty straightforward, I think, in terms of 

having confidence in your ability to detect across a range of spectrums—human, animal, plant, environmental, things, agents, 

whatever that happened that you would really need to know about 

quickly and be able to disseminate that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is it a lack of knowing what the specific pieces of 

evidence should be, or is it a lack of putting up some sort of chain 

and then integrating them? For instance, if you are a first responder, you are a sheriff, you are a police department, your eyes 

and ears are everywhere compared to anybody in the Federal Government. 

Is it a lack of training for officers to know that if they see this, 

this is something that at least ought to be mentioned and somehow 

we don’t have a reporting requirement? Or is it those things do get 

reported, but they are not integrated? 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, I think it is the latter. So I would say to use 

the law enforcement analogy, I have greater confidence that information that has been collected in the field by law enforcement officials, intelligence officials are being synthesized and dissimilated 

rapidly. It is not that same way. 

I think one of the challenges, particularly in our inability to have 

a high degree of confidence of understanding what is going on out 

there. Look at a disease outbreak, and I will use Germany as an 

example with the latest E. coli outbreak. I mean, the fog and friction of war applied to outbreaks of disease and the ability to gather 

credible information and evaluate it in real time. 

So, in some ways, there is not only that, if you will, the frontend problem, be able to get to know what you don’t know rapidly, 

there is also the idea of once you know it, how do you manage it 

and how do you share it? I think there is a reluctant—and this gets 

to a bureaucratic problem as well—that, in some ways, departments and agencies with some of these responsibilities are less 

than willing to share information, particularly early on when their 
35 

confidence levels are not very high subject to the information they 

have. 

Mr. LUNGREN. How would you define biosurveillance in this context? 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, I think it would be what we would want to 

know about what is happening in humans; that it is happening not 

only through public health departments, but more importantly, 

emergency rooms and doctors’ offices, in mini clinics at Walmart 

and all the other places around and having some confidence that, 

if there are suspect cases of either some natural or deliberate 

event, that those would be hopefully recognized early. 

A critical enabler—there is a technology solution that doesn’t get 

a lot of identification, but it is point-of-care diagnostic. Being able 

to provide a physician something that is in his means to rapidly 

evaluate someone to ascertain whether they have or not have something that is of public health concern. 

Mr. LUNGREN. How do you command that? In other words, I am 

a pediatrician on my own. I see something of a certain disease, 

communicable of some sort, I know I am required to report certain 

things—— 

Dr. KADLEC. Right. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do I need to have that training when I am in med 

school, continuous training, public health edicts, or publications? 

What do you do? 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, I think all of the above. I mean, the reality 

is for, you know, practitioners—and I don’t mean to single them 

out here, but that is just the human element. But yes, you really 

do need to have a sensitive—I will use something, you know, mundane like measles as an example, where we have outbreaks of measles, not because people are not sensitive to it, it is just sometimes 

they don’t recognize it, and they are not aware of it, and they kind 

of lost that index of suspicion. 

So, in some ways, it is really sensitizing the whole system to 

these kind of events. The challenge is a lot different though if you 

have to look at food or animals or crops, because those really rely 

on very different input to the system, where the commercial sector 

has a huge role in it and, quite frankly, is also somewhat reluctant 

to share that kind of information, because you can imagine, you 

know, bad news about a product can certainly impact sales as it 

often does. 

So there is some, you know, it is not easy to say homogenously, 

you know, how do you build this? I think part of it is building a 

trusting place where NBIC was supposed to be where people believe that you could share information and that information would 

be handled responsibly and disseminated to people who need to 

know when they needed to know it. 

That is something that, quite frankly, has not happened with 

NBIC. 

Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I am very hopeful. Bob 

Graham and I, along with Colonel Larsen and Lynne Kidder are 

very hopeful that our report is going to help you with respect to 

this sort of thing. 

We are going to have a piece on the threat, a piece on the assessment, and then a piece on recommendations. I know it is very dif-
36 

ficult. You can’t do everything. So, you know, what are the priority 

things? What are the most important things? 

I think, Bob talked about point-of-care diagnostics. I think the 

current diagnostic test we have for anthrax takes 48 hours, does 

it? Well, of course, you have to respond within 48 hours. If it takes 

48 hours to find out a person has anthrax, you can’t get them the 

Cipro in time. 

So that sort of thing probably is the higher priority. Then the 

only other point—and I am going to go back to a point you made, 

and I am glad you are facing up to it, the extremely complicated 

oversight rules here in the Senate in this issue make it more difficult for agencies to develop the level of trust with this body that 

they need to act freely and make judgments. Because, as you know, 

oversight works when it is one committee or two committees. 

The Executive branch develops relationships. They know what to 

expect, what is expected of them, et cetera. Then they can feel free 

to make a judgment without fear that they are going to be hung 

by somebody they don’t even know, if you know what I mean. 

Now, on the other hand, if they are ever going to be overseen by 

two dozen different committees, it is much more difficult to get that 

kind of a relationship and much more difficult for them to know 

the discretion they have to act. So I can’t emphasize enough that 

getting that problem fixed I think is going to help across a wide 

area of issues. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, very much. 

Mr. Clarke of Michigan is recognized. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My apologies coming, I think, Senator, you are actually addressing the issue 

that I think is really critical. 

I am a new Member here. So many times, you know, also and 

a former staffer. So last 2 days, we have had critical legislation before this committee, and apparently, you know, we haven’t been 

able to get it implemented through Congress because of all these 

other committees that have jurisdiction over the issue. 

To me it has become clear, is that if we want to protect the 

American people, especially against the harms that this legislation 

and other legislation this committee has considered and passed, we 

need exclusive jurisdiction over these issues, really. 

You know, our enemy is out there plotting and they are evolving 

with their threat. We have to outmaneuver them. Our decisionmaking process has to be quicker. I mean, this is really, like, outrageous. 

So I just want to commend Chairman Lungren and Congressman 

Pascrell for recognizing that. Just along the lines of that F grade 

that you gave us in terms of oversight, could you just expand on 

that a little bit, since I missed that, because I am assuming that 

is relevant to unifying the committee jurisdiction over these homeland security issues. 

Mr. TALENT. Sure. I have always been a fan of—I think Congressional oversight adds a lot to the Executive branch work on balance. Now, we all have been part of oversight hearings or processes 

that haven’t worked very well, and I think they can add a lot to 

this. One of the reasons I think this legislation is so important, 

even though some of it could probably be done by an Executive 
37 

branch order, as the President has done with a National bioforensic 

strategy and the lab regulation and they deserve credit for that— 

is because when the Congress does something—when you all pass 

legislation, everybody in the Government sits up and takes notice. 

In the Executive branch, in a way, oddly enough, that they don’t 

necessarily is when the President says something. Because you all 

control the money. You know, it is a sign of unity across the 

branches of Government that I just think is hugely important. 

That is, you know, oversight represents that kind of influence. 

But just for common-sense reasons, it just doesn’t work if you have 

taken a subject that ought to be confined to one or two committees 

and you split it up among dozens and dozens of committees and 

subcommittees. 

Nobody is looking at the whole picture. Everybody becomes parochial. Everybody cares about their program; their little agency; 

their little slice of it, and few people care about working together. 

So an organization or a body that ought to be an integrator—the 

Congress—that ought to be encouraging unity of effort within the 

Executive branch, that ought to be overseeing to make certain that, 

you know, the money goes to the right places becomes an agent for 

the opposite of that. Either nothing is done, or it just tears the effort apart. 

That is bad enough in this body, but let me say, it is worse in 

the other body, because, you know, those struggles are worse over 

there and they also have confirmation power over there, which 

means that, you know, they can do more mischief if the oversight 

goes off the rails. 

So I think you are correct, and this is not just a Congressional 

reform thing you can write about and they will teach about in colleges and doesn’t really matter whether you do it or you don’t do 

it. I mean this is a big deal, and I think you are right to raise it. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Thank you, Senator. 

Just for the time I have left, I just want to give just the panel 

a follow-up on a specific example, and that deals with the regulation of facilities that have chemicals of interest on their premises. 

You know, yesterday we considered authorization of the CFATS, 

Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards, and for me, I represent metro Detroit that has a huge regional drinking water and 

waste water system. Well, CFATS won’t apply to those systems. I 

think it is critical, you know, to protect the American people—millions of people that could get harmed from contaminated water— 

that we have some regulatory body in the Federal Government 

whose charge is to regulate the security of waste water and drinking water systems. 

Apparently, there isn’t that type of consolidated regulatory oversight. Now, on an off-line conversation some of you mentioned it, 

there likely may not be a great bioterrorist threat to waste water 

systems, but there is a water system in my area that is totally 

open to anybody, you know, contaminating that water supply. 

So it still concerns me that, No. 1, these systems are still vulnerable to a bioterrorist attack and that, second, there is the need to 

have a single regulatory oversight by the Federal Government over 

these water and waste water systems. 
38 

Did your report, or your investigation, address any of these 

issues specifically? I yield back—— 

Mr. TALENT. I would certainly defer to either the sheriff or Dr. 

Kadlec on this, because they are more expert, but our feeling is 

that an attack would be less likely to come through a water system, because it is not as good a—from the standpoint of the 

attacker—not as good a means of disseminating the toxin or the 

germ, because it gets diluted so quickly in the water supply and 

might get filtered out. 

Now, having said that, there are all kinds of reasons why you 

don’t want a water treatment system to be, you know, unprotected. 

You know, for one thing, just the disruption of that system, if not 

through a bioattack, through some other attack would certainly disrupt that city. 

So I think your concern is justified, and I would just say that, 

as you move forward with the concept of some kind of regulation, 

do try to do it in a way that integrates with the authorities that 

are already out there so that we don’t have another one that we, 

sort of, don’t know what it is doing, and it doesn’t know what everybody else is doing. 

So this concept of trying to unify the regulatory structure is very 

important. 

Sheriff BERDNIK. If I might just add to that. The Passaic County 

Sheriff’s Department does patrol the reservoirs. We have actually 

eight sheriff’s officers assigned to that function. In addition to that, 

there is private security. 

Also, we are working in conjunction now with the prosecutor’s office through grants that they had obtained to do video monitoring 

of those sites as well. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Bilirakis recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Sheriff, we heard concerns from witnesses in one of our hearings 

on medical countermeasures dispensing that a biological attack on 

an unprepared Nation would seriously disrupt the critical infrastructure. 

How important do you think it is to have a comprehensive riskbased guidance for first responders to guide them in their preparation for a CBRN attack? 

Sheriff BERDNIK. I think it is very important. I think that every 

officer should be prepared. They should have the best education 

available to them. Again, in a time of chaos and panic, it is most 

important to have the ability to be able to communicate and network amongst each other to deal with the crisis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Let me ask you one more question. 

We are having a hearing on July 8 with regard to warnings and 

alerts. How much trouble are you having—elaborate as far as notifying your residents, your constituents—— 

Sheriff BERDNIK. Yes, we have a substantial problem. If we were 

to—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Give me some suggestions. 

Sheriff BERDNIK. Okay. If an attempt to notify all the residents 

of Passaic County, it is my understanding that through a computerized reverse 9–1–1 system, it would take 7 days to make a complete notification. 
39 

I think the way that—and, again, not being a computer expert, 

but my understanding is that through advancing the fiber optic 

lines, there would be a way of increasing those notifications at a 

much, much more rapid pace. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, very good. We will get those concerns—your 

concerns will be heard. We are going to talk to FEMA and FCC. 

So thank you, very much. Appreciate it. 

Sheriff BERDNIK. Thank you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Gentlelady from New Jersey have additional questions? 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is for you, Sheriff Berdnik. From your work in local 

government in oversight work, I am sure you have some strong 

views on the inherent challenges of moving forward from a needto-know mindset to a need-to-share mindset. 

In response to a WMD threat, what specific challenges have you 

identified that have impeded effective information sharing between 

intelligence and law enforcement personnel? How do you think 

these challenges can be met and overcome? 

Then, finally, what are some of the success stories you have regarding comprehensive cross-jurisdictional catastrophic planning? 

Sheriff BERDNIK. Okay. Well, the one thing I have to say, sharing 

information, as everyone knows, is a contemporary topic. We in the 

sheriff’s department work in conjunction with the prosecutor’s office, the Federal authorities, and most recently, are enacting the 

ability to teleconference with the City of New York. 

I think this is the way of the future. I think this is the technology that we in law enforcement need. Again, it is the ability to 

communicate with each other. The ability to share information. I 

think that if we have the funding in order to do that as well as 

communicate with radios in the event of a catastrophe or emergency, it would be paramount. 

Again, as I stated, responding to September 11—tri-State response—the unfortunate thing was we could not communicate with 

each other. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Could you just, sort of, share any of 

the success stories you have perhaps regarding comprehensive 

cross-jurisdictional catastrophic planning. I know that they are tabletop exercises that are taking place. 

There are other methodologies you talked about, the teleconferencing capabilities. Can you give us a clearer sense of some of the, 

I guess, forward-leaning activity that you have already engaged in? 

Sheriff BERDNIK. Well, being involved in a HAZMAT, we also 

have a Tier II bomb squad, and the other thing, of course, is working with the office of emergency management. 

It is working with these agencies together that were able to accomplish our goals. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Then, Senator Talent, it seems to me 

that the Government needs to know who is in possession of agents 

that are material threats to the Nation here in the United States 

and throughout the world. 

The military, of course, has long needed to make those determinations in order to protect our troops when deployed overseas. 
40 

What is your perspective on this, and how concerned should we be 

about knowing where these agents are today, for both civilian and 

military purposes? 

Mr. TALENT. Well, that is certainly a piece of the remedy is to 

know which labs are out there working on these special agent lists, 

the most toxic and the worst kind of pathogens. 

We had a section of our initial report dealing with that where we 

recommended certain changes. You all put it in your bill. The Executive branch has responded, we think, appropriately with an Executive Order unifying regulations and also moving in the direction 

of concentrating our regulatory resources on the most dangerous 

pathogens, rather than trying to oversee 80 different pathogens, for 

example, most of which are not likely to be the source of an attack, 

focus on the top six or eight. 

We think that that makes sense. So a lot of progress has been 

made. Now, we need to do more internationally. Other countries 

are nowhere near as good as we are in terms of looking at their 

labs. We also have to keep in mind one of the reasons why the biothreat is so dangerous is that life science research has proliferated. 

Of course, it is a good thing. We like life science research. It has 

proliferated to the point where it is probably impossible to prevent 

this threat by keeping an eye on everybody who is working with 

these agents. 

Because it is just too easy for any reasonably well-educated bioscientist to, you know, to isolate a deadly strain of anthrax, E. coli, 

that sort of thing. But, yes, trying to find out where these agents 

are and regulating it is a piece of it. We have made some progress 

in recently. We do need to do more internationally. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Clarke do you have any other questions? The 

gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to raise the issue that has been addressed by this panel 

earlier about the need for interoperable communications. I represent the metro Detroit border, and we share a border with Canada, but our first responders cannot easily share information with 

Canadian officials. 

I will give an example. I was down in a local community in my 

district, and local police and fire they said, you know, we had an 

incident on the Detroit River, somebody needed rescue, but we 

couldn’t really get a hold of the Coast Guard that easily because 

of our, you know, our radio equipment. Then, not only that, you 

know, that they couldn’t communicate with their Canadian counterparts. 

So these are just three issues that you could address: No. 1, how 

important is interoperable communications to battling, you know, 

WMDs? Second, is there a way to measure how much progress we 

have made nationally in really upgrading our communication systems, our radios, technology? Then, third, what is the approximate 

cost of fully integrating our communications systems among our 

first responders? 

I mean, to the degree that you have that information. If you 

don’t, that is no problem. We can talk off-line about this. 
41 

Sheriff BERDNIK. From a local perspective, again, the area of 

what seems that we are progressing towards is regionalization of 

communications. At this time, with budgets the way they are, a lot 

of the smaller towns are requesting that the sheriff’s office be involved in dispatching for them. 

So I think, again, as time goes on and this occurs, we are gaining 

the ability to communicate at a much rapid pace with the municipalities. The State also has a—it is called SPEN. It is a Special Police Emergency Network. This allows us to communicate anywhere 

within the State; however, part of the problem is the fact that it 

operates on a certain frequency. So that may require individual 

towns to have more than one radio in their car, which, again, is 

a cost factor. 

If they are not able to budget for that, then that causes a problem. We can have the system in place but what good is it if they 

don’t have the equipment to utilize it? 

Mr. TALENT. To answer your question on how important it is, I 

think it is very important, because there is a concept here. You 

know, America has these tremendous first responders, fire, police, 

emergency management, and in every case they have a culture of 

mutual cooperation, dedication, and we have seen it time and time 

again. 

Now, no matter how good a job that you all do here and the 

President does here, there is gonna be gaps in this resiliency chain. 

I mean it is just the nature of the thing. But if our first responders 

and local officials are empowered adequately, and some crisis occurs, they will figure it out on the ground and fill the gap as well 

as it can be filled. 

Part of empowering them is enabling them to communicate with 

each other. So I do think it is very important as a practical matter. 

I mean, when I was in the Congress, this was an issue. I was always told that to do it Nationally all at once would probably be 

prohibitively expensive. 

So it is good, in my mind, that they are moving to regional solutions and trying to adapt these systems over time and make them 

better. 

Mr. CLARKE of Michigan. Well, you know, what I am recommending today in a resolution is we are devoting that kind of 

money to fight terrorism—we are actually borrowing it, but we are 

spending it in military aid to Afghanistan. So I am saying let’s take 

a share of that here and give our first responders—our local police, 

local fire, local emergency medical providers the equipment and the 

resources they need to share information and to respond. 

I think that is the most effective and cost-effective way for our 

taxpayers to help protect the American people. Let’s protect our 

folks here at home. We don’t need to have even 70,000 troops in 

Afghanistan. We could draw it down to 15,000, take a share of the 

savings and redirect it here to Department of Homeland Security 

to upgrade our communication systems for our first responders Nationally. 

Second, this is a political comment—this Congress in the past 

has failed to deal effectively with the foreclosure crisis that caused 

all these property values to drop. So our local units of government 

can’t raise the money to cover these costs. We, in Congress, should 
42 

do so and redirect and reallocate the money that we are spending 

in Afghanistan to address this very issue. 

Thank you for allowing me to make that comment here. 

Mr. LUNGREN. We have concluded all of our questions. So I think 

the witnesses for your valuable testimony and for your commitment 

to our country and, particularly, your commitment to the issue that 

we have before us today. 

Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for witnesses. So we would ask if you would please respond 

to these in writing after you have received them. The hearing 

record will remain open for 10 days. 

I want to thank Members of both subcommittees for participating 

and, with that, the subcommittees stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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