J-S54016-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.E.-M.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.A.J., FATHER

No. 748 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree March 31, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 61-ADOPT-2013

IN RE: ADOPTION OF F.N.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.A.J., FATHER

No. 749 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree March 31, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 62-ADOPT-2013

IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.M.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.A.J., FATHER

No. 750 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree March 31, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 63-ADOPT-2013
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BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 05, 2014

S.A.J. (Father) appeals from the March 31, 2014 decrees involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his three daughters, C.E.M.-J., born in July 

2005, and, F.N.J. and J.M.J., who are twins born in November 2006 (the 

Children).1 Upon careful review, we affirm. 

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows. 

The Children were born in York County, Pennsylvania, during the marriage of 

Father and J.M.D. (Mother). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 5. In May 

2008, when C.E.-M.J. was nearly three years old, and F.N.J. and J.M.J. were 

eighteen months old, Father placed the Children in the temporary custody of 

his sister, J.L.H. (Aunt), and her husband, D.P.H. (Uncle). N.T., 3/25/14, at 

11, 56, 110. At the time, Father and the Children were living in the State of 

Georgia, with Father acting as the primary caretaker of the Children because 

Mother was in the military. Id. at 56, 133. Uncle and Aunt offered to take 

the Children for “a little while,” so Father could make arrangements to 

relocate to Pennsylvania. Id. at 56. Father and Mother subsequently 

divorced, and Father relocated to Pennsylvania at a time not specified in the 

certified record before this Court. Id. at 161, 177-178. 

____________________________________________

1 By the same decrees, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the 

parental rights of the Children’s mother, J.M.D., but she did not file notices 

of appeal. 
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Aunt and Uncle filed a custody action in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, 

against Father, and, by order dated August 6, 2010, Father, then living in 

the York or Lancaster area of Pennsylvania, was granted supervised 

visitation for three and one-half hours on an alternating weekly basis.2 Id.

at 20-21, 134, 161. In October 2011, Father re-married, and thereafter he 

and his wife, L.J. (Stepmother), resided in Elkland, Tioga County, 

Pennsylvania, which is a driving distance of approximately four to four and 

one-half hours from the home of Aunt, Uncle, and the Children in 

Shippensburg, Franklin County, Pennsylvania. Id. at 132, 159, 161.

On December 20, 2013, Aunt and Uncle filed petitions for the 

involuntary termination of parental rights of Father and Mother pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). The orphans’ court held a hearing on 

March 25, 2014, during which Uncle, Aunt, Stepmother, and Father testified. 

By decrees dated March 31, 2014, the orphans’ court granted the petitions 

for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights.3 On April 30, 

2014, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors 

____________________________________________

2

Father appeared pro se in the custody action. N.T., 3/25/14, at 134. The 

custody order is not included in the certified record, and the record does not 

disclose the basis for the custody court’s decision limiting Father’s custody to 

supervised visitation. 

3 On April 10, 2014, the orphans’ court issued two amended decrees at Nos. 

61 ADOPT 2013 and 62 ADOPT 2013, respectively, to correct typographical 

errors. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 1, n.2.
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complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), (b). On May 

14, 2014, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 

513 (permitting consolidation of appeals where the same question is 

involved).

On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review.

I. Did the [orphans’] court err in determining 

[that Aunt and Uncle] presented clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

II. Did the [orphans’] court err in finding there 

was sufficient evidence that termination of Father’s 

parental rights after analysis pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b) was in the best interest of the [C]hildren?

Father’s Brief at 4.

We review the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental 

rights according to the following standard.

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of 

discretion standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does 

not result merely because the reviewing court might 

have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.
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[T]here are clear reasons for applying an 

abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, 

appellate courts are not equipped to make the factspecific determinations on a cold record, where the 

trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous 

other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist 

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose 

its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as 

the factual findings are supported by the record and 

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 

2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process 

prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the 

focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights 

are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

...

(b) Other considerations.―The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A §§ 2511(a)(1), 2511(b). 
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With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six 

months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008), citing

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

Id., quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 

1998).

This Court has emphasized that a parent does not perform his or her 

parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development 

of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, In Re Adoption of N.M.B., 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 

2005). We have explained this principle as follows.

A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, 

cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the 

development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has 

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty 

which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 
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the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act 

affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and 

not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the 

parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent 

must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more 

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his 

or her physical and emotional needs.

Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted)

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows. 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination 

of parental rights would best serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs 

and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where 

there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect 
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analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case. Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

In his first issue on appeal, Father argues that his conduct does not 

warrant termination of his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) 

because Aunt and Uncle “discouraged, obstructed and ultimately thwarted 

[his] efforts to remain a significant figure in his daughter[s’] lives.” Father’s 

Brief at 12. Father argues that the efforts he made to perform his parental 

duties were reasonable under the circumstances. Upon careful review, we 

disagree.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court articulated its factual 

findings as follows.

Father offered evidence that he had made 

repeated attempts to have telephone contact with 

the [C]hildren, often calling multiple times a day and 

leaving messages; however, his calls were not 

returned by [Aunt and Uncle]. [Aunt and Uncle] 

acknowledged not answering the telephone if the 

[C]hildren were not able to speak with Father for 

some reason (meals[sic] time, not all children home, 

etc.). Father admitted that [Aunt and Uncle] asked 

that he call ahead to schedule a time to speak with 

the [C]hildren when all of the [C]hildren would be 

available to speak with him. Father refused to do as 

[Aunt and Uncle] asked and call ahead since the 

Custody Order did not require him to do so and his 

work as an over-the-road truck driver prevented him 

from being able to establish a set time for phone 

calls. Father’s last telephone contact with the 

[C]hildren was in December of 2013 when he spoke 

with them for about 30 minutes.
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The Custody Order required Father’s time with

the [C]hildren to be supervised. Specifically, the 

Custody Order awarded Father supervised visits on 

alternate Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. until 1:30 p.m. 

at the home of Paternal Grandparents. [Aunt] 

testified that Father maintained regular visits under 

the Custody Order for a year. After that he visited 

with the [C]hildren about on[c]e a month, and then 

less frequently until he completely stopped 

contacting [Aunt and Uncle] to schedule visits. 

According to [Aunt], Father’s last visit occurred on 

June 23, 2012.

Initially, [Uncle] was willing to serve as the 

supervisor [of the visits] and did so. Father and 

[Uncle] set up times for visits via email. [Uncle] 

provided transportation to Paternal Grandparents’ 

home in the York, Pennsylvania area where the visits 

took place. However, after July 2012, [Uncle] was 

unable to continue as the supervisor because of a 

change in his employment. By that time, Paternal 

Grandparents were also not willing to provide 

supervision for Father’s visits. [Uncle] advised 

Father of his inability to continue to supervise visits 

and encouraged Father to find another supervisor. 

Father testified that he felt that he had done his 

share with respect to locating a suitable supervisor, 

and that it was up to [Uncle] to locate one by, for 

example, asking his church members. Father’s last 

visit with the [C]hildren was supervised by a family 

acquainted with Father and approved by [Aunt and 

Uncle]; unfortunately, the family sold their home and 

embarked on a mission trip to Africa. Thereafter, 

[Aunt and Uncle] refused Father’s request to permit 

Father’s then fiancée (now wife) to supervise the 

visits.

Father also informally requested additional 

time with the [C]hildren after completing the fourhour program for separated and divorcing parents 

required of individuals prior to being granted a 

divorce decree in this judicial district. Father took 

the course in December, 2010, because completion 

of a parenting class was a prerequisite under the 
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Custody Order for Father to be awarded more time

with the [C]hildren. He believed the course would 

satisfy the requirement; [Aunt and Uncle] did not 

believe the four-hour class satisfied the [custody 

c]ourt’s directive and therefore refused Father’s 

requests to expand his time. Father claims to have 

taken another course through his church, as well. 

The [custody c]ourt was never asked to examine and 

decide the issue.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 9-11. Upon review of the record, we 

conclude the testimonial evidence supports the orphans’ court’s findings.

Indeed, Father testified that, after completing the parenting class on 

December 9, 2010, Uncle and Aunt denied him increased visitation with the 

Children. Nevertheless, he did not request more visitation from the custody 

court because he could not financially afford a lawyer. N.T., 3/25/14, at 

136-137. He further testified, “I could have done it on my own, but given 

my past experience in the [custody c]ourt, without a lawyer, I didn’t want to 

go into [the custody c]ourt and lose more time with my kids....” Id. at 137. 

On cross-examination by counsel for Aunt and Uncle, Father testified with 

respect to the performance of his parental duties as follows. 

Q. So is it your belief and your testimony 

today that you have been a parent to your children 

in the six months prior to the [involuntary 

termination] petition being filed in December, 2013?

A. As best as I was allowed to be.

Q. When you say you were allowed to be, 

what did you do to try to parent your children?

A. I made phone calls to make contact with 

them and they were not returned or answered.
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Q. And it is your belief that phone calls are 

enough to parent children?

A. No.

Q. Did you contact a lawyer about changing 

the Custody Order?

A. I haven’t had the financial means to do 

so.

Q. Did you attempt contacting legal services 

to see if they could help you at a reduced or a free 

rate?

A. Other than my lawyer standing present, 

no.

Q. And that would have been you applied 

for her after you received the Petition?

A. Correct.

Q. Did you attempt to do the paperwork and 

file with the [custody c]ourt to be able to do things 

on your own to get this in front of a judge?

A. I downloaded ... many of the documents 

to do that, but because of my inexperience in law, I 

didn’t know how to go about all of it, and I was 

afraid that if I tried – and I was given advice not to 

by some of my friends that I trusted, because they 

knew of friends of theirs that had done the same 

thing and went into [custody c]ourt and lost more.

Q. But in 2013 you’re essentially saying you 

had nothing with your children, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So how could you lose more than 

nothing?
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A. That’s a good point.

Id. at 164-165. In addition, Father testified that since his last visit with the 

Children in June of 2012, he has not written any letters to the Children. Id.

at 182. According to Father’s own testimony, since the beginning of 2013, 

while he purchased gifts, he did not provide the gifts to the Children. Id. at 

153. 

On cross-examination by the guardian ad litem (GAL), Father testified 

with respect to his share of responsibility for his lack of contact with the 

Children:

A. I understand that basically that I need to 

do my part, and I think I’ve learned even through 

this part where we are right now, that legally I had 

more options, that I didn’t really know . . . that were 

available to me, apart from knocking on their door, 

which has already been told to me I’m not allowed 

near their home. So I didn’t know if I was even 

allowed in their church, places that I could have 

gone to make myself known, to make my presence 

known in my daughters’ lives, I didn’t think were an 

option to me, because I’m not even allowed in their 

home.

So I found out since this proceeding has 

started that I’m incorrect in that, that I should have 

been doing those things, and I wish I had.

Id. at 184. 

With respect to the Children’s best interests, Aunt and Uncle testified 

that they intend to adopt the Children if Father’s and Mother’s parental 

rights are terminated. Id. at 36-37, 98. Aunt testified that it is neither her 

nor Uncle’s intent to wholly exclude Father as a part of the Children’s lives. 
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Id. at 98. Aunt explained, “[w]e hope that some day we can all be at family 

events together.” Id. 

Father acknowledged that it would be detrimental to remove the 

Children from Aunt and Uncle. Id. at 177. Father testified on crossexamination by counsel for Aunt and Uncle with respect to the Children’s 

best interests, as follows.

Q. [L]ooking at it from your kids’ 

perspective, who have been ... mom and dad to 

them?

A. [Aunt and Uncle] have.

Q. And is it your position that making that 

permanent by allowing them to be adopted is not in

their best interest?

A. They have been mom and dad. If the 

Court could give me what I have always wanted, the 

least of which I’ve always wanted, is that if [Aunt] 

and [Uncle] were in the place of mom, quoteunquote, mom in the normal type of divorced 

situation, that I would get what a normal dad would 

get. That would make me happy. I think that 

moving to that would have to be slow, because of 

the fact that I haven’t had a lot of access to my kids, 

but that I think it would be best -- whether they 

adopted them or whether or not I don’t lose my 

rights, and I get that -- I think what would be best is 

that I stay involved in their life, and I think it would 

be detrimental to remove [Aunt] and [Uncle] from 

their life, as well.

Id. at 176-177. 

Based on our review, and the foregoing testimonial evidence, we 

conclude the orphans’ court did not commit an error of law or abuse its 
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discretion in determining that “Father’s efforts to overcome the difficulty he 

experienced spending time with and talking to his children and to engage in 

a meaningful father-child relationship were insufficient.” Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 5/19/14, at 11. We conclude the record demonstrates that Father 

displayed “merely a passive interest in the development” of the Children, 

which does not satisfy his parental obligation. See In re B.,N.M., supra. 

Father acknowledged yielding to the obstacles posed by Aunt and Uncle in 

maintaining communication and association with the Children. Orphans’ 

Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 11. Father has allowed Aunt and Uncle to satisfy 

the Children’s physical and emotional needs since May of 2008, and he has 

failed to exercise reasonable firmness in maintaining a parent-child 

relationship with them. Id. Therefore, upon our thorough review, we 

conclude the record supports termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). 

Father’s first issue on appeal fails.

In his second issue, Father argues the orphans’ court abused its 

discretion in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) 

because there was insufficient evidence with regard to “the current bond 

between him and the Children to determine the extent of the bond and the 

effect on the [C]hildren if the bond were to be severed.” Father’s Brief at 

20. We disagree.

With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), our 

Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment 
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of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination 

petition.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The Court further 

stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination 

must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and 

whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation 

omitted). Moreover, the Court directed that, in weighing the bond 

considerations pursuant to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking 

clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The Court observed that, 

“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail, ... 

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court noted that the GAL, 

who interviewed the Children and visited them in the home of Aunt and 

Uncle, “did not specifically interview the [C]hildren about their Father, so as 

not to cause the [C]hildren to become upset.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

5/19/14, at 18. Nevertheless, the court stated that the GAL “described all 

three children as energetic and happy. He observed the Children to show 

affection toward [Aunt and Uncle]. The GAL’s report also indicated that the 

girls are doing well in school.” Id. The GAL recommended to the orphans’ 

court that Father’s parental rights be involuntarily terminated.4 

____________________________________________

4

Likewise, the GAL filed an appellee brief with this Court in support of the 

subject decrees.
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To the extent Father argues that a bonding evaluation was necessary 

in this case, we disagree. We have long recognized that, “[i]n analyzing the 

parent-child bond, the orphans’ court is not required by statute or precedent 

to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by an expert.” In re 

K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

Similarly, we have stated that, “when conducting a bonding analysis, the 

court is not required to use expert testimony.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court found as follows.

[T]he [C]hildren do not see Father in a 

parental role. [Aunt and Uncle] have filled the roles 

of parents in the [C]hildren’s lives since May 2008. 

By way of example, the girls refer to Father as 

“Daddy Steve” by their own choice. The [C]hildren 

refer to [Uncle] as “Daddy.” ...

...

Despite not having seen their Father since July 

2012 and not having spoken with him on the 

telephone since December 2013 (and only 

sporadically prior to that), the [C]hildren are doing 

well. They have, for the most part, overcome the 

developmental delays that necessitated Early 

Childhood Intervention services. The twins have 

largely addressed the issues that necessitated 

counseling services, and C.E.-M.J.’s counseling 

sessions are held on [a] less frequent schedule now 

than they had been in the past, indicating progress. 

With the exception of some stealing behavior 

exhibited by C.E.-M.J., the [orphans’ c]ourt heard no 

evidence regarding behavior issues, educational 

issues, or emotional issues leading the [orphans’ 

c]ourt to believe that their Father’s near two-year 
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absence has caused the [C]hildren to suffer in any 

significant or measurable way.[5]

According to the credible testimony of [Aunt], 

the [C]hildren have started to combine their last 

name with [Uncle’s and Aunt’s] last name and have 

asked why their last name cannot be the same as 

[Uncle and Aunt]. C.E.-M.J. has formed the 

impression that her parents have walked out of her 

life.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 16-17. Based on our review, we 

conclude the testimonial evidence supports the orphans’ court’s findings.

Significantly, Aunt testified on cross-examination by the GAL about 

why she decided to seek counseling for the Children in March of 2012.

Q. [W]hy did you think that the [C]hildren 

needed counseling as of March 2012, rather than in 

the time period before that, when they were in your 

care? What changed?

A. What changed was that I saw more and 

more things cropping up that concerned me. I saw 

[F.N.J.]’s confusion. I saw her frustration with 

herself as a very bright, little girl when she couldn’t 

make things do exactly what she wanted them to do.

I saw some of [J.M.J.]’s insecurity 

around other people. She has a tremendous fear of 

dogs, period.

And I saw [C.E.-M.J.]’s struggles 

reflected in some of her behavior and in some of the 

things that she would say – I saw her struggles with 

I have all these people but what do they mean to my 

life. And I know she struggled with the thought that 

____________________________________________

5 Uncle testified that he and Aunt are seeking a second opinion from a 

psychologist with respect to whether C.E.-M.J. suffers from Asperger’s 

Syndrome. N.T., 3/25/14, at 79. 
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her ... biological mom and her biological dad – had 

essentially all but walked away. That was ... the 

impression that she was forming.

And we wanted to do things to help all 

three of the girls get past some of these obstacles in 

their lives.

N.T., 3/25/14, at 115-116. 

Finally, Aunt testified about the effect on the Children of terminating 

Father’s parental rights.

Q. And what about the termination[] of 

[Father]’s parental rights, how do you think that will 

affect [the Children]?

A. [] I will say this: I do not believe it will 

as adversely affect them as [Father] may think it 

will. They love him. And I think that’s wonderful. 

They don’t see him often enough or hear from him or 

get cards or letters or anything from him with any 

consistency that it would cause them damage to 

have him no longer be their biological father.

Id. at 98. 

In light of the foregoing testimonial evidence, and after thorough 

review of the certified record, we discern no error of law or abuse of 

discretion by the orphans’ court in concluding that, 

[T]he [C]hildren certainly love their father. 

However, Father’s sporadic and minimal contact with 

the [C]hildren cannot be a sound basis to maintain 

that the [C]hildren would suffer harm if Father’s 

parental rights were terminated. There is no 

evidence to suggest that a permanent severance of 

the bond between Father and the [C]hildren would 

cause the [C]hildren harm. In fact, based on the 

evidence presented, the [C]hildren’s best interests 

would be served by terminating Father’s parental 
J-S54016-14

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rights and freeing the [C]hildren for adoption by 

[Aunt and Uncle].

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/19/14, at 18-19; See In re K.K.R.-S., supra at 

535 (clarifying that, “concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent 

simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound”). Therefore, contrary to Father’s 

assertion, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the orphans’

court termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

Accordingly, Father’s final issue on appeal fails.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decrees involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Sections 

2511(a)(1) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/5/2014