UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JANELLE BRIDGES, individually and as 

the surviving spouse of Shane Allen 

Bridges, deceased, and as the Mother and 

Next Friend of: A.B., a minor child; B.B., a 

minor child; S.B. Jr., a minor child; A.C., a 

minor child; J.S., a minor child; J.H., a 

minor child, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellees, 

v. 

KYLE WILSON, in his individual and 

official capacity, 

 Defendant - Appellant, 

and 

MIKE REED, in his individual and official 

capacity; MAYES COUNTY, 

 Defendants. 

No. 16-5177 

(D.C. No. 4:15-CV-00126-GKF-PJC) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 4, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

The Appellees, heirs of Shane Bridges (hereinafter the “estate of Shane 

Bridges” or the “estate”), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The estate 

alleges Appellant Kyle Wilson—a deputy sheriff in Mayes County, Oklahoma—used 

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment in shooting and killing Bridges 

on January 1, 2014. Following discovery, Wilson filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The district court determined that a jury could find Bridges did not fire or 

even point a gun at Wilson. By taking this view—the version of the facts most 

favorable to the estate, the non-moving party—the district court concluded Wilson 

did not carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The 

district court subsequently denied Wilson’s summary judgment motion because there 

were genuine issues of material fact. Wilson now brings this interlocutory appeal, 

arguing that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Wilson asks us to 

resolve disputes of material fact that do not rest on discrete questions of law, we lack 

appellate jurisdiction and dismiss this appeal. 

I 

When reviewing a district court’s denial of qualified immunity at the summary 

judgment stage, we generally do not make our own factual determinations, but rely 

instead on the district court’s recitation of the facts. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 

304, 319–20 (1995). Here, the district court found the following:

This case arises from the fatal shooting of Shane 

Bridges by [Kyle Wilson, a deputy sheriff of the Mayes 

County Sheriff’s Office,] on January 1, 2014 . . . . Wilson 

received a dispatch call notifying him that there was an 

intoxicated, possibly suicidal person who was possibly 
3 

threatening harm to a child at the Bridges’s residence. 

Wilson arrived and exited his vehicle and stood by the 

front, driver’s side tire of his patrol car. Shane Bridges 

was in the front room of the house when Wilson arrived, 

and went to the door, opening and closing the door. 

Wilson fired thirteen shots in Bridges’s direction, hitting 

Bridges twice and fatally wounding him . . . . 

[V]iewing the evidentiary materials in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiffs, Wilson did not identify himself 

as law enforcement officer, order Bridges to drop a 

weapon, or give Bridges any other commands; Bridges did 

not fire a gun; and, at the time of the shooting, the distance 

between Wilson and Bridges was approximately thirty to 

thirty-five feet. 

D. Ct. Order at 1, 3–4 (record citations omitted). 

 Wilson argues for a different version of the facts on appeal, as he did in his 

summary judgment briefing before the district court. In its summary judgment order, 

the district court explained why it discounted Wilson’s version of the events. It 

stated: 

Deputy Wilson testified that after he exited his 

vehicle, Bridges opened the front door of the residence, 

stepped onto the front porch, and fired a single shot, 

although not in Wilson’s direction. Wilson testified that 

he then shouted Shane Bridges’s name, after which Shane 

turned and started firing again. Turning a gun on Wilson 

would be a hostile motion, even if Bridges did not fire. 

Although the testimony of Janelle Bridges[, Shane 

Bridges’s widow,] and Rex Dale Cowan[, a neighbor and 

first responder who lived in the home closest to the 

Bridges and heard gunshots,] addresses whether Shane 

Bridges fired a gun [and suggests Shane Bridges did not 

fire his gun], the only evidentiary material addressing 

whether Shane Bridges turned the gun in Wilson’s 

direction is Wilson’s own testimony. None of the 

evidentiary materials submitted by the parties contradicts 

Wilson’s testimony on this issue. However, “courts should 

be cautious on summary judgment to ‘ensure that the 
4 

officer is not taking advantage of the fact that the witness 

most likely to contradict his story—the person shot dead—

is unable to testify.’” [Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 

1079–80 (10th Cir. 2016)][1] (quoting Abraham v. Raso, 

183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999)). “[T]he court may not 

simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the 

police officer.” Id. at 1080 (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 

F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). The court “must also look 

at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed would tend 

to discredit the police officer’s story, and consider whether 

this evidence could convince a rational factfinder that the 

officer acted unreasonably.” Id. The court concludes a 

rational factfinder could—based on the testimony of 

Janelle Bridges and Rex Dale Cowan—conclude Wilson’s 

testimony that Bridges fired a gun was inaccurate, and 

could, accordingly, discredit Wilson’s testimony that 

Shane Bridges turned to point a gun at him. 

D. Ct. Order at 4 (record citations omitted). 

Thus, the district court determined that, viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the estate, Wilson committed a clearly established Fourth Amendment 

violation. Id. at 5. The district court then held “summary judgment is not 

appropriate because genuine issues of material fact remain, including . . . whether 

Bridges pointed or fired a gun at Wilson before Wilson shot Bridges, and thus 

whether Wilson’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable in light of the 

circumstances.” Id. at 5–6.2

 Wilson then filed this interlocutory appeal of the district 

court’s denial of qualified immunity. Vol. VIII at 1427. 

 1

 The Supreme Court subsequently vacated this opinion. See Pauly v. White, 

137 S. Ct. 548 (2017). 

2

 In addition to this § 1983 excessive force claim against Wilson in his 

individual capacity, the estate’s complaint also included a § 1983 claim against 

(continued . . .) 
5 

II 

A 

Before we can consider the merits of Wilson’s qualified immunity argument, 

we must address the threshold question of whether we have appellate jurisdiction. 

See Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

we can review “all final decisions of the district courts.” A denial of summary 

judgment is ordinarily not an appealable final order under § 1291. Roosevelt–Hennix 

v. Prickett, 717 F.3d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2013). Yet, under the collateral order 

doctrine, a state official may appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity 

at summary judgment—but only to the extent it involves abstract issues of law. See 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see also Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 

F.3d 1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2013). 

To satisfy the requirements for appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order 

doctrine, the appellant-defendant “must establish that the district court’s order (1) 

conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) resolved an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the case, and (3) is effectively unreviewable 

on appeal from a final judgment.” Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 

 

(continued . . .) 

Wilson in his official capacity, an Oklahoma Government Tort Claims Act cause of 

action against Wilson, claims against the Mayes County sheriff in his individual and 

official capacities, and municipal liability claims against Mayes County. Although 

the district court granted summary judgment on all of those claims, none of those 

claims are relevant to this appeal, as we are merely addressing Wilson’s interlocutory 

appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. 
6 

2015) (quotation omitted); see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 310. If the district court 

denied summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact, we 

lack jurisdiction because the defendant-appellant “may not appeal a district court’s 

summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial 

record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. 

Yet, even under Johnson and its progeny, a district court’s determination that 

genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment does not necessarily bar 

our exercise of appellate jurisdiction in all cases. See Henderson, 813 F.3d at 948. 

We still have jurisdiction to address the merits of the qualified immunity analysis, 

but “only if our review would [not] require second-guessing the district court’s 

determinations of evidence sufficiency.” Id. (quoting Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 

1124, 1130 (10th Cir. 2001)). That is, “[w]e may not and do not . . . second guess the 

district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency,” T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 

1209, 1213 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017), because “‘whether or not the pretrial record sets 

forth a genuine issue of fact for trial’ is not an abstract legal question, and a court of 

appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a district court’s ruling on such a matter,” 

Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black, 706 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320). 

We are left then with jurisdiction to hear cases in which “‘the defendant does 

not dispute the facts alleged by the plaintiff’ and raises only legal challenges to the 

denial of qualified immunity based on those facts.” Henderson, 813 F.3d at 948 

(quoting Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1258 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002)). By contrast, 
7 

we lack jurisdiction if the defendant-appellant’s appeal presents a revised version of 

the facts and challenges “the district court’s conclusion [that p]laintiffs presented 

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Castillo v. Day, 790 

F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2015)). 

B 

In this appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, Wilson challenges the 

district court’s version of the facts. Wilson argues the district court “went out of its 

way to ignore the undisputed fact that Shane Bridges pointed his gun toward 

Wilson,” Aplt. Op. Br. at 29, because the paths of the bullets indicate that Bridges’s 

arm may have been raised, id. at 28, and the estate allegedly has “no physical 

evidence” to contradict Wilson’s testimony that Bridges pointed a gun at him. Id. at 

29. Wilson therefore argues that “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 

the” estate still requires that we reject the district court’s findings and accept the 

assumption that Bridges “turned toward [Wilson] with a pointed firearm.” Id. at 30; 

see also Aplt. Reply Br. at 6. Wilson then argues that, under this revised view of the 

facts, he is entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established 

law which would have alerted a reasonable officer in Wilson’s position that his use of 

deadly force would violate the Fourth Amendment. Aplt. Op. Br. at 30. 

The type of factual analysis that Wilson urges us to undertake “would require 

second-guessing the district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency.” Cox, 

800 F.3d at 1242 (quotation omitted). In its summary judgment order, the district 

court concluded that “genuine issues of material fact remain” regarding whether 
8 

Bridges raised or fired a gun at Wilson. D. Ct. Order at 5–6. That is precisely the 

type of evidentiary analysis that we lack jurisdiction to address. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 

319–20. 

C 

But that conclusion does not end our review. Even if, on appeal from a denial 

of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a defendant-appellant challenges the 

district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency, we are still permitted to 

address the merits in two circumstances: (1) when the record “blatantly contradict[s]” 

the district court’s factual recitation, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), or (2) 

when the district court failed to specify the facts upon which it based the denial of 

qualified immunity, Roosevelt-Hennix, 717 F.3d at 753–54 (holding that a review of 

the district court record was appropriate because the district court merely provided a 

short statement that the case was “quintessentially a jury matter”). 

Wilson makes two arguments in support of his contention that the record 

blatantly contradicts the district court’s conclusion that a jury could find Bridges did 

not point a gun at Wilson. Aplt. Op. Br. at 30–35. We conclude that neither 

argument has merit. 

First, Wilson refers to his expert’s testimony that the paths of the two bullets 

that entered Bridges’s body indicate Bridges had his right arm raised. Id. at 32–33. 

But that testimony only provides the positioning of Bridges’s arm at the time the 

bullets entered his body. It does not establish whether Bridges was inside or outside 

of his home at the time, and thus whether Wilson could see Bridges and perceive him 
9 

as a threat. Moreover, the expert’s testimony does not indicate whether there was a 

gun in Bridges’s right hand when the bullets struck him. 

Second, Wilson argues Bridges must have been outside of his home at the time 

of the shooting—a factual dispute that the district court did not explicitly address. 

Wilson attempts to establish that Bridges was outside based on three pieces of 

evidence: (1) his expert’s testimony that the paths of the bullet holes in the Bridges’s 

front door show the door was closed throughout the shooting, (2) Janelle Bridges’s 

testimony that she heard Shane Bridges open and close the front door, id. at 177, and 

(3) Janelle Bridges’s testimony that she “stuck” her hands “out the door” to show she 

did not have a gun after she discovered her husband lying on the floor in the living 

room, Vol. II at 195. According to Wilson, this evidence conclusively establishes 

that the front door was closed during the shooting, but became ajar thereafter. 

Further, Wilson argues the only explanation for the door being open after the 

shooting is that Shane Bridges was outside when Wilson shot Bridges, forcing 

Bridges to retreat into the house and leave the door ajar behind him. 

But the evidence that Wilson cites does not directly contradict the district 

court’s factual recitation for two reasons. First, Wilson mischaracterizes Janelle 

Bridges’s testimony. She actually testified that she “heard [Shane Bridges] open the 

door[,] . . . heard him shut the door and walk back around the couch[,] and then . . . 

heard gunshots.” Id. at 177; see also id. at 185 (“He opens the door, he sees there’s a 

car, he shuts it and walks back.”). This testimony undermines Wilson’s argument 

that Shane Bridges had to be outside at the time of the shooting. Further, Janelle 
10 

Bridges’s testimony about sticking her hands out of the door was that she “ran to the 

door and . . . put [her] hands up.” Id. at 194. She did not explicitly testify about 

whether the door was open or closed at the time. This inconclusive testimony does 

not blatantly contradict the district court’s account, which did not address whether 

Shane Bridges was inside or outside during the shooting or whether the door was 

open following the shooting. 

Also, the inferences that Wilson draws from the three pieces of evidence 

ignore the estate’s evidence about the shooting. The estate’s investigator identified 

thirteen bullet holes outside of the Bridges’s house—three in Janelle Bridges’s 

vehicle, three north of the front door, two south of the front door, and five in the front 

door. Vol. VII, at 1019–38; see also Vol. VI, at 826–30. And the coroner recovered 

two bullets from Shane Bridges’s body. The estate argues that, logically, unless two 

of the bullet holes predated January 1, 2014, the bullets that entered and killed 

Bridges had to have traveled through the house or front door before hitting him. 

Thus, the estate argues there is evidence that Bridges was inside the house when he 

was shot, and not outside pointing a gun at Wilson. At the very least, the estate’s 

evidence counters the testimony that Wilson cites, and demonstrates that the record 

does not blatantly contradict the district court’s factual recitation. 

Finally, we conclude the district court sufficiently articulated its reasoning for 

finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bridges raised or 

fired a gun at Wilson. In support of its determination that a jury could find that 

Bridges never fired a shot at Wilson, the district court cited Janelle Bridges’s and 
11 

Rex Dale Cowen’s testimony that it sounded as if shots were coming from only one 

gun. And the district court noted that Wilson’s testimony was the only evidence to 

support a finding that Bridges may have raised a gun and pointed it at Wilson. Since 

a jury could discount Wilson’s credibility—in part, because there was “circumstantial 

evidence” that could discredit Wilson’s version of the events—the district court 

concluded there were genuine issues of material fact. D. Ct. Order at 4–6. The 

district court’s ruling sufficiently identified the basis for concluding that genuine 

issues of material fact remained. Cf. Roosevelt-Hennix, 717 F.3d at 753–54 (holding 

the district court’s explanation was insufficient). Thus, we need not conduct our own 

review of the record to determine whether there was support for the district court’s 

conclusion. 

III 

 Because this appeal focuses on second-guessing the district court’s ruling 

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, and because the district court’s reasoning 

was sufficiently articulated and is not blatantly contradicted by the record, we 

conclude that we lack jurisdiction and dismiss this appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge