UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4799

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

FRITZ ST. LOUIS, a/k/a Davinci,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (5:15-cr-00002-BO-1)

Submitted: June 14, 2019 Decided: August 2, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Fritz St. Louis appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised 

release and imposing a sentence of 21 months in prison. The district court found by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he violated his supervised release conditions as 

alleged in the probation officer’s amended motion for revocation. The probation officer 

calculated that his policy statement range was 18 to 24 months in prison. The district 

court sentenced St. Louis to 21 months in prison, correctly explaining that it was “the 

mid-level of his guideline.” On appeal, St. Louis argues the district court committed 

procedural error, because it “did not indicate that it computed the advisory Guideline 

range” or adequately explain why a 21-month sentence was appropriate. We affirm. 

“We will not disturb a district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside 

the statutory maximum or is otherwise ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Padgett, 

788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In determining whether a sentence 

is reasonable, we are informed by the same procedural and substantive considerations 

that guide our review of original sentences, but we strike a more deferential appellate 

posture. Id. (citations omitted). The district court retains broad discretion to impose a 

term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Id. (citations omitted). In exercising 

this discretion, the district court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the 

federal Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory factors applicable to revocation 

sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 

641 (4th Cir. 2013). A sentence within the policy statement range is “presumed 

reasonable.” Id. at 642. “‘[W]e review the district court’s sentencing procedure for 
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abuse of discretion, and must reverse if we find error, unless we can conclude that the 

error was harmless.’” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 2010)).

“A [district] court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation 

sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still ‘must 

provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Thompson, 

595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[S]ome cases require only a brief 

explanation of the sentencing judge’s conclusions, such as when a judge ‘appl[ies] the 

Guidelines to a particular case’ because the case is typical and ‘the Guidelines sentence is 

a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical 

case.’” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007)). Where a defendant “‘presents nonfrivolous reasons 

for imposing a different sentence’ the judge ‘will normally go further and explain why he 

has rejected those arguments.’” Id. at 518-19 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 357). 

When imposing a revocation sentence, the district court “must address the parties’ 

nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects those 

arguments, it must explain why in a detailed-enough manner that this Court can 

meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the revocation sentence 

imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017). “[I]n determining 

whether there has been an adequate explanation, we do not evaluate a court’s sentencing 

statements in a vacuum” but also consider “[t]he context surrounding a district court’s 

explanation.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not err or 

abuse its discretion in sentencing St. Louis to 21 months in prison. He argues that the

court “did not indicate that it computed the advisory Guideline range,” but it explicitly 

stated that its sentence of 21 months was “the mid-level of his guideline”; and St. Louis 

does not dispute that his policy statement range was in fact 18 to 24 months. We further 

conclude that the court adequately addressed his nonfrivolous arguments and sufficiently 

explained its sentencing decision. The court explained his record on supervised release 

showed that he had not changed, and his prior prison sentence did not deter him from 

continuing his criminal behavior. The court also rebutted his argument that he had made 

progress by working part-time for a moving company, noting he was still selling drugs.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED