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THI S W E' L L D E F E N D

Joint Publication 3-12 (R)

Cyberspace Operations

5 February 2013
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and 

assessment of joint cyberspace operations across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and provides considerations for 

military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, 

and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of 

authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and 

prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by 

the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of 

this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing 

the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the 

accomplishment of objectives. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the US. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, 

commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and 

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI 

 Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 

 Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-12 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... v 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. I-1 

 Cyberspace ............................................................................................................... I-2 

 Integrating Cyberspace Operations .......................................................................... I-6 

 The Joint Force and Cyberspace .............................................................................. I-6 

CHAPTER II 

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 

 Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1 

 Military Operations In and Through Cyberspace ................................................... II-2 

 National Intelligence Operations In and Through Cyberspace ................................ II-5 

 Department of Defense Ordinary Business Operations 

In and Through Cyberspace .................................................................................... II-6 

 The Joint Functions and Cyberspace Operations .................................................... II-6 

CHAPTER III 

AUTHORITIES, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

 Introduction ........................................................................................................... III-1 

 Authorities ............................................................................................................ III-2 

 Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................................... III-2 

 Legal Considerations .......................................................................................... III-10 

CHAPTER IV 

PLANNING AND COORDINATION 

 Joint Operation Planning Process and Cyberspace Operations ............................ IV-1 

 Cyberspace Operations Planning Considerations .................................................. IV-1

 Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations ............................................... IV-6 

 Synchronization of Cyberspace Operations .......................................................... IV-9 

 Assessment of Cyberspace Operations ............................................................... IV-10 

 Interorganizational Considerations ..................................................................... IV-12 

 Multinational Considerations .............................................................................. IV-13 

APPENDIX 

A References ...................................................................................................... A-1 

B Administrative Instructions ............................................................................. B-1 
Table of Contents 

iv JP 3-12 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................ GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ........................................................................... GL-4 

FIGURE 

I-1 The Three Layers of Cyberspace ............................................................... I-3 

III-1 United States Code-Based Authorities ................................................... III-3 

IV-1 Cyberspace Command and Control Organizational Construct .............. IV-8 
v 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Introduces cyberspace and its integration into joint operations. 

• Explains cyberspace operations and their relationship to joint functions. 

• Covers authorities, roles, and responsibilities. 

• Discusses planning and coordination of cyberspace operations. 

Introduction 

Cyberspace operations (CO) 

are the employment of 

cyberspace capabilities where 

the primary purpose is to 

achieve objectives in or 

through cyberspace. 

Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on 

cyberspace, the global domain within the information 

environment consisting of the interdependent network of 

information technology infrastructures and resident data, 

including the Internet, telecommunications networks, 

computer systems, and embedded processors and 

controllers. Developments in cyberspace provide the 

means for the US military, its allies, and partner nations 

to gain and maintain a strategic, continuing advantage in 

the operational environment (OE), and can be leveraged 

to ensure the nation’s economic and physical security. 

Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability 

to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures 

in direct and indirect ways. These characteristics and 

conditions present a paradox within cyberspace: the 

prosperity and security of our nation have been 

significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace, yet 

these same developments have led to increased 

vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace, 

for the US in general and the joint force in particular. 

Cyberspace 

Cyberspace, while a global 

domain within the information 

environment, is one of five 

interdependent domains, the 

others being the physical 

domains of air, land, maritime, 

and space. 

Cyberspace consists of many different and often 

overlapping networks, as well as the nodes (any device or 

logical location with an Internet protocol address or other 

analogous identifier) on those networks, and the system 

data (such as routing tables) that support them. 

Cyberspace can be described in terms of three layers: 

physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona. 

The physical network layer of cyberspace is comprised 

of the geographic component and the physical network 

components. It is the medium where the data travel. The 

logical network layer consists of those elements of the 
Executive Summary 

vi JP 3-12 

network that are related to one another in a way that is 

abstracted from the physical network, i.e., the form or 

relationships are not tied to an individual, specific path, 

or node. A simple example is any Web site that is hosted 

on servers in multiple physical locations where all 

content can be accessed through a single uniform 

resource locator. The cyber-persona layer represents yet 

a higher level of abstraction of the logical network in 

cyberspace; it uses the rules that apply in the logical 

network layer to develop a digital representation of an 

individual or entity identity in cyberspace. The cyberpersona layer consists of the people actually on the 

network. 

Integrating CO 

While it is possible that some 

military objectives can be 

achieved by CO alone, CO 

capabilities should be 

considered during joint 

operation planning, integrated 

into the joint force 

commander’s plan, and 

synchronized with other 

operations during execution. 

Commanders conduct cyberspace operations (CO) to 

retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish 

the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives, deny 

freedom of action to adversaries, and enable other 

operational activities. Conflicts that may need to be 

addressed to fully integrate CO into joint operation 

planning and execution include: centralized CO planning 

for Department of Defense information network 

(DODIN) operations and defense; the JFC’s need to 

synchronize operations and fires, including CO; 

deconfliction requirements between government entities; 

partner nation relationships; and the relationships 

between CO and information operations, between CO 

and operations conducted in the physical domains, and 

the wide variety of legal issues that relate to CO. 

The Joint Force and 

Cyberspace 

The JFC faces a unique set of challenges while executing 

CO in a complex global security environment. CO are 

enabled by the DODIN. The DODIN is a global 

infrastructure of Department of Defense (DOD) systems 

carrying DOD, national security, and related intelligence 

community information and intelligence. Cyberspace 

presents the JFC with many threats ranging from nation 

states to individual actors. Perhaps the most challenging 

aspect of attributing actions in cyberspace is connecting a 

cyberspace actor (cyber-persona) or action to an actual 

individual, group, or state actor, with sufficient 

confidence and verifiability to hold them accountable. 

CO may not require physical proximity; many CO can be 

executed remotely. Moreover, the effects of CO may 

extend beyond a target, a joint operations area, or even an 

area of responsibility (AOR). 
 Executive Summary 

vii 

Cyberspace Operations 

Introduction CO are composed of the military, intelligence, and 

ordinary business operations of DOD in and through 

cyberspace. The military component of CO, which is the 

only component guided by joint doctrine, is the primary 

focus of this publication. CO enhance operational 

effectiveness and leverage various capabilities from 

physical domains to create effects, which may span 

multiple geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) 

AORs. 

Military Operations In and 

Through Cyberspace

The successful execution of CO requires the integrated 

and synchronized employment of offensive, defensive, 

and DODIN operations, underpinned by effective and 

timely operational preparation of the environment. CO 

missions are categorized as offensive cyberspace 

operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations 

(DCO), and DODIN based on their intent. OCO are 

CO intended to project power by the application of force 

in and through cyberspace. DCO are CO intended to 

defend DOD or other friendly cyberspace. DODIN 

operations are actions taken to design, build, configure, 

secure, operate, maintain, and sustain DOD 

communications systems and networks in a way that 

creates and preserves data availability, integrity, 

confidentiality, as well as user/entity authentication and 

non-repudiation. 

National Intelligence 

Operations In and Through 

Cyberspace

National level intelligence organizations, including major 

DOD agencies, conduct intelligence activities for 

national intelligence priorities. This intelligence can 

support a military commander’s planning and 

preparation. 

Department of Defense 

Ordinary Business Operations 

In and Through Cyberspace

Ordinary business operations in and through cyberspace 

are those non-warfighting capabilities and functions used 

to support and sustain DOD forces in their normal dayto-day functions, but that are not normally under the 

control of a JFC. This includes the CO of the civilianrun DOD agencies, such as the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service and the Defense Commissary 

Agency. These organizations conduct routine uses of 

cyberspace, as well as DODIN operations and some 

internal defensive measures. 

The Joint Functions and CO Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, delineates joint 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-12 

functions common to joint operations at all levels of war 

into six basic groups: command and control (C2), 

intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, 

and sustainment.

Command and Control C2 of operations in and through cyberspace encompasses 

the exercise of authority and direction by commanders 

over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment 

of their mission. 

Intelligence Intelligence collected in cyberspace may come from 

DOD and/or national-level sources and may serve 

strategic, operational, or tactical requirements. 

Fires Depending on the objective, cyberspace fires can be 

offensive or defensive, supporting or supported. Like all 

forms of power projection, fires in and through 

cyberspace should be included in the joint planning and 

execution processes from inception in order to facilitate 

synchronization and unity of effort. 

Movement and Maneuver A significant factor in maneuverability in cyberspace is 

access to the target node. Movement and maneuver in 

cyberspace can occur in all three layers: the physical 

network, logical network, and the cyber-persona layer. 

Sustainment JFCs must identify required forces and capabilities, 

critical cyberspace assets, assess risk, ensure redundancy 

(including non-cyberspace alternatives), and actively 

exercise continuity of operations plans to respond to 

outages or adversary actions that degrade or compromise 

cyberspace access or reliability. 

Protection Cyberspace capabilities requiring protection include not 

only the infrastructure (computers, cables, antennas, and 

switching and routing equipment), as well as parts of the 

EMS (e.g., datalink frequencies to include satellite 

downlink, cellular, and wireless), and the content (both 

data and applications) on which military operations rely.

Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 

Introduction Under the authorities of the Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef), DOD uses cyberspace capabilities to shape 

cyberspace and provide integrated offensive and 

defensive options. As directed by United States Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM), United States Cyber 
 Executive Summary 

ix 

Command (USCYBERCOM) synchronizes and directs 

transregional operations and, in coordination with 

combatant commands (CCMDs), Joint Staff (JS), and 

Office of Secretary of Defense, liaises with other United 

States Government (USG) departments and agencies, and 

members of the defense industrial base in conjunction 

with the Department of Homeland Security. Similarly, as 

directed, DOD will deploy necessary resources to support 

efforts of other USG departments and agencies. 

Authorities Authority for actions undertaken by the Armed Forces of 

the United States is derived from the US Constitution and 

Federal law. These authorities establish roles and 

responsibilities that provide focus for organizations to 

develop capabilities and expertise, including those for 

cyberspace. 

Roles and Responsibilities SecDef directs the military, intelligence, and ordinary 

business operations of DOD in cyberspace; and, provides 

policy guidance and authority for employment of 

assigned, attached, and supporting military forces 

conducting cyberspace missions. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ensures 

that cyberspace plans and operations are compatible with 

other military plans. 

Service Chiefs [Services] will provide CO capabilities 

for deployment/support to CCMDs as directed by 

SecDef; and, remain responsible for compliance with 

USSTRATCOM’s direction for operation and defense of 

the DODIN. 

Commander, United States Strategic Command 

(CDRUSSTRATCOM), has overall responsibility for 

DODIN operations and defense in coordination with 

CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and CCDRs. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for CO to secure, 

operate, and defend the DODIN, and to defend US 

critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions as 

directed by the President or SecDef, against any intrusion 

or attack, and does so through a subunified command, 

USCYBERCOM. 

Other Combatant Commanders operate and defend 

tactical and constructed networks within their commands; 

and, integrate CO capabilities into all military operations; 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-12 

integrate CO into plans (concept plans and operation 

plans [OPLANs]); and work closely with the joint force, 

USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM, Service components, 

and DOD agencies to create fully integrated capabilities.

Legal Considerations The legal framework applicable to CO depends on the 

nature of the activities to be conducted, such as offensive 

or defensive military operations; defense support of civil 

authorities; service provider actions; law enforcement 

and counterintelligence activities; intelligence operations; 

and defense of the homeland. Before conducting CO, 

commanders, planners, and operators must understand 

the relevant legal framework in order to comply with 

laws and policies, the application of which may be 

challenging given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace 

and the often geographic orientation of domestic and 

international law. 

Planning and Coordination 

Joint Operation Planning 

Process and CO 

Commanders integrate cyberspace capabilities at all 

levels and in all military operations. Plans should 

address how to effectively integrate cyberspace 

capabilities, counter an adversary’s use of cyberspace, 

secure mission critical networks, operate in a degraded 

environment, efficiently use limited cyberspace assets, 

and consolidate operational requirements for cyberspace 

capabilities. 

CO Planning Considerations CO planners are presented the same considerations and 

challenges that are present in planning for other joint 

capabilities and functions, as well as some unique 

considerations. Targeting, deconfliction, commander’s 

intent, political/military assessment, and collateral effects 

considerations all play into the calculations of the CO 

planner’s efforts. CO planning considerations include: 

cyberspace-related intelligence requirements, targeting, 

and DODIN operations.

Command and Control of CO Clearly established command relationships are crucial for 

ensuring timely and effective employment of forces. As 

authorized by CDRUSSTRATCOM, Commander, 

United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM) 

manages day-to-day global CO. Typically, CO require 

coordination between theater and global operations, 

creating a dynamic C2 environment. CO are integrated 

and synchronized by the supported commander into their 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

concept of operations, detailed plans and orders, and 

specific joint offensive and defensive operations. The 

GCC is generally the supported commander for CO with 

first order effects within their AOR. 

Similarly, CDRUSSTRATCOM/ CDRUSCYBERCOM 

is generally the supported commander at the global or 

transregional (across AOR boundaries) level. C2 of 

DODIN operations and DCO may require pre-determined 

and preauthorized actions based on meeting particular 

conditions and triggers, executed either manually or 

automatically if the nature of the threat requires 

instantaneous response. 

Synchronization of CO The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational 

collaboration, as well as constant vigilance upon 

initiation, to ensure that activities in cyberspace and 

throughout the OE are coordinated and deconflicted in 

advance. 

Assessment of CO Assessments in cyberspace may be unique in that the 

normal assessment cell will not typically have the 

capabilities or expertise to assess CO; CO will typically 

involve multiple commands, such as the supported JFC, 

CDRUSCYBERCOM, and possibly other functional 

supporting JFCs. Additionally, with CO typically being 

conducted as part of a larger operation, assessment of CO 

will need to be conducted in the context of supporting the 

overarching JFC objectives. 

Interorganizational 

Considerations 

Just as JFCs and their staffs must consider how the 

capabilities of other USG and nongovernmental 

organizations can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing 

military missions and broader national strategic 

objectives, JFCs should also consider the capabilities and 

priorities of interagency partners in planning and 

executing CO. Through JS and USCYBERCOM, JFCs 

should coordinate with interagency representatives 

during planning to ensure appropriate agreements exist to 

support their plans. 

Multinational Considerations CO planning, coordination, and execution items that 

must be considered when a multinational force campaign 

or OPLAN is developed include:

Through dual involvement in 

national and multinational 

security processes, US national 

 National agendas for each country of the 

multinational force may differ significantly from 

those of the US, creating potential difficulties in 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-12 

leaders integrate national and 

theater strategic CO planning 

with that of the multinational 

force whenever possible. 

determining the CO objectives. 

 Differing national standards and laws pertaining to 

sovereignty in cyberspace may affect willingness or 

the legality of their participation in certain CO. 

 Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of 

individual CO plans and orders with multinational 

partners; this may severely hamper cyberspace 

synchronization efforts. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, 

preparation, execution, and assessment of joint CO 

across the range of military operations.
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

1. Introduction 

a. This publication provides fundamental constructs and guidance to assist joint force 

commanders (JFCs), their staffs, and supporting and subordinate commanders in the 

planning, execution, and assessment of cyberspace operations (CO). CO are the employment 

of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through 

cyberspace. 

b. This publication discusses military operations in and through cyberspace; explains 

the Joint Staff (JS), combatant command (CCMD), United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), functional and 

Service component relationships and responsibilities; and establishes a framework for the 

employment of cyberspace forces and capabilities. 

c. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace, the global domain within 

the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 

technology (IT) infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications 

networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Developments in 

cyberspace provide the means for the US military, its allies, and partner nations to gain and 

maintain a strategic, continuing advantage in the operational environment (OE), and can be 

leveraged to ensure the nation’s economic and physical security. Cyberspace reaches across 

geographic and geopolitical boundaries, much of it residing outside of US control, and is 

integrated with the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce, 

governance, and national security. Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability 

to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures in direct and indirect ways. These 

characteristics and conditions present a paradox within cyberspace: the prosperity and 

security of our nation have been significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace, yet these 

same developments have led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on 

cyberspace, for the US in general and the joint force in particular. 

d. While CO can produce stand-alone tactical, operational, and strategic effects and 

achieve objectives, they must be integrated with the employment of the JFC’s other 

capabilities to create synergistic effects in support of the JFC’s plan. 

e. CO takes place in a complex environment: large parts of cyberspace are not under 

the any nations’ control; the array of state and non-state actors is extremely broad; the costs 

of entry are low; and technology proliferates rapidly and often unpredictably. Conversely, 

they should also be prepared to conduct operations under degraded cyberspace conditions. 

“Cyberspace and its associated technologies offer unprecedented opportunities to 

the US and are vital to our Nation’s security, and by extension, to all aspects of 

military operations.” 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 2011 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-12 

They should develop mitigation and recovery measures, defensive cyberspace operations 

(DCO) priorities, primary/secondary/tertiary communication means, and measures to ensure 

critical data reliability. When the staff perceives that they cannot trust data on a network, or 

segment of the network, they should stop using the network/segment. In fact, the perception 

of data unreliability may unnecessarily extend beyond the specific degraded segment. 

Therefore, it is imperative that the staff be informed of network/segment status as quickly as 

possible. 

2. Cyberspace 

a. Cyberspace, while a global domain within the information environment, is one of five 

interdependent domains, the others being the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and 

space. Much as air operations rely on air bases or ships in the land and maritime domains, 

CO rely on an interdependent network of IT infrastructures, including the Internet, 

telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers, 

and the content that flows across and through these components. CO rely on links and nodes 

that reside in the physical domains and perform functions experienced both in cyberspace 

and the physical domains. For example, network servers may reside in a land-based data 

complex or at sea aboard warships, and wireless network transmissions pass through air and 

space and even underwater. Similarly, activities in cyberspace can enable freedom of action 

for activities in the physical domains. Activities in the physical domains can create effects in 

and through cyberspace by affecting the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), or the physical 

infrastructure. The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that virtually all 

space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be 

provided via space operations. Space provides a key global connectivity option for CO. 

Conversely, CO provide a means by which space support is executed. These interrelationships are important considerations across the spectrum of CO, and particularly when 

conducting targeting in cyberspace (see Chapter IV, “Planning and Coordination”). 

b. Cyberspace consists of many different and often overlapping networks, as well as the 

nodes (any device or logical location with an internet protocol [IP] address or other 

analogous identifier) on those networks, and the system data (such as routing tables) that 

support them. Though not all nodes and networks are globally connected or accessible, 

cyberspace continues to become increasingly interconnected. Networks can be intentionally 

isolated or subdivided into enclaves using access controls, encryption, disparate protocols, or 

physical separation. With the exception of physical separation, none of these approaches 

eliminate underlying physical connectivity; instead they limit access. Achieving CO access 

may be affected by legal, sovereignty, policy, informational environment, or operational 

limitations; however, adjusting to limitations does not necessarily allow access to a target.

c. Cyberspace can be described in terms of three layers: physical network, logical 

network, and cyber-persona (Figure I-1). Each of these represents a level on which CO may 

be conducted.

(1) The physical network layer of cyberspace is comprised of the geographic 

component and the physical network components. It is the medium where the data travel. 

The geographic component is the location in land, air, sea, or space where elements of the 
 Introduction 

I-3 

network reside. While geopolitical boundaries can easily be crossed in cyberspace at a rate 

approaching the speed of light, there are still sovereignty issues tied to the physical domains. 

The physical network component is comprised of the hardware, systems software, and 

infrastructure (wired, wireless, cabled links, EMS links, satellite, and optical) that supports 

the network and the physical connectors (wires, cables, radio frequency, routers, switches, 

servers, and computers). However, the physical network layer uses logical constructs as the 

primary method of security (e.g., information assurance [IA]) and integrity (e.g., virtual 

private networks that tunnel through cyberspace). This is a primary target for signals 

intelligence (SIGINT), including computer network exploitation (CNE), measurement and 

signature intelligence, open source intelligence, and human intelligence. It is the first point 

of reference for determining jurisdiction and application of authorities. It is also the primary 

layer for geospatial intelligence, which can also contribute useful targeting data in 

cyberspace.

(2) The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network that are 

related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network, i.e., the form or 

relationships are not tied to an individual, specific path, or node. A simple example is any 

Web site that is hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where all content can be 

accessed through a single uniform resource locator (URL). For example, Defense 

Knowledge Online exists on multiple servers in multiple locations in the physical domains, 

but is represented as a single URL on the World Wide Web. A more complex example of 

the logical layer is the DOD’s Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). 

(3) The cyber-persona layer represents yet a higher level of abstraction of the 

logical network in cyberspace; it uses the rules that apply in the logical network layer to 

develop a digital representation of an individual or entity identity in cyberspace. The cyberpersona layer consists of the people actually on the network. Cyber-personas may relate 

fairly directly to an actual person or entity, incorporating some biographical or corporate 

Figure I-1. The Three Layers of Cyberspace 

The Three Layers of Cyberspace

Physical Network 

Layer

Logical Network 

Layer

Cyber-Persona 

Layer
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-12 

data, e-mail and IP address(es), Web pages, phone numbers, etc. However, one individual 

may have multiple cyber-persona, which may vary in the degree to which they are factually 

accurate. A single cyber-persona can have multiple users. Consequently, attributing 

responsibility and targeting in cyberspace is difficult. Because cyber-personas can be 

complex, with elements in many virtual locations, but normally not linked to a single 

physical location or form, significant intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are 

required for the joint forces to gain sufficient insight and situational awareness (SA) of a 

cyber-persona to enable effective targeting and creation of the JFC’s desired effect. 

d. The Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) are a globally 

interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, 

disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and 

support personnel. The DODIN includes owned and leased communications and computing 

systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other 

associated services, and national security systems. 

e. The Operational Environment. The OE is a composite of the conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the 

decisions of the commander. The continuing advancement of communications and computer 

technology has significantly reduced acquisition costs leading to the rapid proliferation of 

cyberspace capabilities, considerably complicating the OE. The OE factors affecting CO 

vary in importance according to mission. Fully understanding cyberspace and its 

relationship to the physical domains is the first step in planning military operations in 

cyberspace. 

(1) Information and communications technology (ICT) is rapidly evolving, forcing 

governments and militaries to rethink the context in which they operate. From around-theclock news to blogs, social networking, and text messaging, the rapid flow of information 

has changed the social fabric of the world. The ability of social networks in cyberspace to 

incite popular support and to spread ideology is not geographically limited, and the 

continued proliferation of ICT will have profound implications for US national security and 

that of our partners. 

(2) ICT and other advanced technologies are used by a wide range of state and nonstate actors, and represent an inexpensive way for a small and/or materially disadvantaged 

adversary to pose a significant threat to the US. The application of low-cost cyberspace 

capabilities can result in disproportionate effects against a technology-dependent nation or 

organization. This provides actors who could not otherwise effectively oppose the US using 

traditional military forces with an asymmetric alternative. Potential adversaries see these 

technology options as much cheaper alternatives to building expensive weapons, such as 

stealth fighters or aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat to US national security. 

Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) replace Global 

Information Grid (GIG) terminology, which remains in legacy Department of 

Defense (DOD) policy and doctrinal publications. Likewise, DODIN 

operations replace the previous use of DGO [DOD GIG operations]. 
 Introduction 

I-5 

Additionally, sophisticated cyberspace capabilities of organized crime or other non-state, 

extralegal organizations may benefit adversaries. This relationship to organized criminal 

elements may be for financial purposes, with the rise of illicit vendors providing malicious 

software (malware) as a service. Due to minimal barriers to entry and the potentially high 

payoff, the US can expect adversaries to resort to asymmetric means to negate US 

advantages in military capabilities. 

f. The Information Environment. The information environment is the aggregate of 

individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 

information. The information environment is broken down into the physical, informational, 

and cognitive dimensions. 

(1) The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of command 

and control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable 

individuals and organizations to conduct operations. It is the dimension where physical 

platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. The physical 

dimension includes, but is not limited to, human beings, C2 facilities, newspapers, books, 

microwave towers, computers, laptops, smart phones, tablet computers, or any other entities 

that are subject to empirical measurement. 

(2) The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is the place 

where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It is the 

dimension where the C2 of modern military forces is exercised and where the commander’s 

intent is conveyed. Actions in this dimension affect the content and flow of information. 

(3) The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds 

of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. In this dimension 

people think, perceive, visualize, understand, and decide. 

g. The Relationship Between IO and CO

(1) It is important to address the relationship between IO and CO. CO are 

concerned with using cyberspace capabilities to create effects which support operations 

across the physical domains and cyberspace. IO is more specifically concerned with the 

integrated employment of information-related capabilities during military operations, in 

concert with other lines of operation (LOOs), to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the 

decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Thus, 

cyberspace is a medium through which some information-related capabilities, such as 

military information support operations (MISO) or military deception (MILDEC), may be 

employed. However, IO also uses capabilities from the physical domains to accomplish its 

objectives. 

(2) While some CO may support IO objectives, other CO will be conducted in 

support of target objectives, or to support operations in the physical domains to achieve 

objectives. This relationship represents an evolution both in IO, transitioning from a 

collection of capabilities to a broader integrating function focused on the adversary, and in 

CO, evolving from its computer network operations roots into a way to operationally 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-12 

integrate CO within joint operations. In the past, CO have been considered a subset of IO 

and those operations incorporated in the terms of computer network operations, computer 

network attack, computer network defense, and CNE. Refer to Director of Central 

Intelligence Directive 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related 

Activities, for more information on CNE. The terminology used for the training, planning, 

and execution of military CO includes: offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), DCO, and 

DODIN operations. OCO and DCO are covered in detail in Chapter II, “Cyberspace 

Operations.” 

3. Integrating Cyberspace Operations

a. CO are conducted across the range of military operations. While it is possible that 

some military objectives can be achieved by CO alone, CO capabilities should be considered 

during joint operation planning, integrated into the JFC’s plan, and synchronized with other 

operations during execution. Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in 

cyberspace, accomplish the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom of action to adversaries, and 

enable other operational activities. 

b. The importance of CO support to all military operations is growing in tandem with 

the joint force’s increasing reliance on cyberspace, especially for C2, but also for critical 

logistics functions that often rely on non-DOD networks. However, conflicts that may need 

to be addressed to fully integrate CO into joint operation planning and execution include: 

centralized CO planning for DODIN operations and defense; the JFC’s need to synchronize 

operations and fires, including CO; deconfliction requirements between government entities; 

partner nation relationships; and the relationships between CO and IO, between CO and 

operations conducted in the physical domains, and the wide variety of legal issues that relate 

to CO. 

4. The Joint Force and Cyberspace 

a. The JFC faces a unique set of challenges while executing CO in a complex global 

security environment. CO are enabled by the DODIN. The DODIN is a global 

infrastructure of DOD systems carrying DOD, national security, and related intelligence 

community (IC) information and intelligence. 

(1) Threats. Cyberspace presents the JFC with many threats ranging from nation 

states to individual actors. 

(a) Nation State Threat. This threat is potentially the most dangerous 

because of access to resources, personnel, and time that may not be available to other actors. 

Other nations may employ cyberspace to either attack or conduct espionage against the US. 

Nation state threats involve traditional adversaries and sometimes, in the case of espionage, 

even traditional allies. Nation states may conduct operations directly or may outsource them 

to third parties to achieve their goals. 

A cyberspace capability is a device, computer program, or technique, 

including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to 

create an effect in or through cyberspace. 
 Introduction 

I-7 

(b) Transnational Actor Threat. Transnational actors are formal and 

informal organizations that are not bound by national borders. These actors use cyberspace 

to raise funds, communicate with target audiences and each other, recruit, plan operations, 

destabilize confidence in governments, and conduct direct terrorist actions within 

cyberspace. 

(c) Criminal Organization Threat. Criminal organizations may be national 

or transnational in nature. Criminal organizations steal information for their own use or, in 

turn, to sell to raise capital. They also may be used as surrogates by nation states or 

transnational actors to conduct attacks or espionage through CO. 

(d) Individual Actors or Small Group Threat. Individual actors or small 

groups of people can illegally disrupt or gain access to networks or computer systems. Their 

intentions are as varied as the number of groups and individuals. These actors gain access 

into systems to discover vulnerabilities, sometimes sharing the information with the owners; 

however, they also may have malicious intent. Political motivations often drive their 

operations, and they use cyberspace to spread their message. They may also create and then 

install malware on commercial or government systems. These actors can be exploited by 

others, such as criminal organizations or nation states, in order to execute concealed 

operations against targets in order to preserve their identity or create plausible deniability. 

(2) Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. Perhaps the most challenging 

aspect of attributing actions in cyberspace is connecting a cyberspace actor (cyber-persona) 

or action to an actual individual, group, or state actor. This effort requires significant 

analysis and collaboration with non-cyberspace agencies or organizations. The nature of 

cyberspace presents challenges to determining the origin of cyberspace threats. 

(3) Additional Challenges. CO may not require physical proximity; many CO can 

be executed remotely. Moreover, the effects of CO may extend beyond a target, a joint 

operations area (JOA), or even an area of responsibility (AOR). Because of transregional 

considerations or the requirement for high-demand, low-density resources, CO may be 

coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with centralized execution from a location outside 

the AOR of the supported commander. Another challenge facing the JFC is that the use of a 

capability may reveal its functionality and compromise future effectiveness. This has 

implications for OCO, but it also affects DCO as the same capabilities may have a role in 

both OCO and DCO. OCO and DCO are covered in detail in Chapter II, “Cyberspace 

Operations.” 

b. Cyberspace Integration/Synchronization. CO encompass more than just the 

network connections upon which the joint force relies. Cyberspace effects are created 

through the integration of cyberspace capabilities with air, land, maritime, and space 

capabilities. The boundaries within which CO are executed and the priorities and restrictions 

on its use should be identified in coordination between the JFC, non-DOD government 

departments and agencies, and national leadership. Effects in cyberspace may have the 

potential to impact intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement (LE) efforts and therefore 

will often require coordination across the interagency. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-12 

c. Private Industry. Many of DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on 

commercial assets, including Internet service providers and global supply chains, over which 

DOD has no direct authority to mitigate risk effectively. Therefore, DOD will work with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other interagency partners, and the private sector 

to improve cybersecurity. One example of such cooperation is the 2010 memorandum of 

agreement signed by DOD and DHS to align and enhance cybersecurity collaboration. The 

memorandum formalizes joint participation in program planning and improves a shared 

understanding of cybersecurity. Under this memorandum USCYBERCOM and DHS 

exchange liaison personnel. DOD supports DHS in leading interagency efforts to identify 

and mitigate cyberspace vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure. DOD has the 

lead for the defense industrial base (DIB) sector, but will continue to support the 

development of whole-of-government approaches for managing risks associated with the 

globalization of the ICT sector. The global technology supply chain affects mission critical 

aspects of the DOD enterprise and IT risks must be mitigated through strategic public-private 

sector cooperation. DOD is partnering with the DIB to increase the safeguarding of DOD 

program information residing or transiting DIB unclassified networks. To increase 

protection of DIB networks, DOD launched the DIB Cybersecurity and Information 

Assurance Program. The DOD Cyber Crime Center serves as DOD’s operational focal point 

for this voluntary cyberspace information sharing and incident reporting program. 

d. As the JFC integrates CO capabilities into joint operations, careful consideration 

must be given to some of the unique aspects of cyberspace, as well as its commonalities and 

synergies with operations in the physical domains: the relationship with IO; legal, political, 

and technical drivers and constraints; and the role of non-DOD actors in US CO. The 

employment of cyberspace capabilities and their effective integration with other military 

operations are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 

1. Introduction 

a. CO are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to 

achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. CO are composed of the military, intelligence, 

and ordinary business operations of DOD in and through cyberspace. The military 

component of CO, which is the only one guided by joint doctrine, is the focus of this 

publication. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) use CO in and through cyberspace in support 

of military objectives. 

b. Domain Overlap. CO enhance operational effectiveness and leverage various 

capabilities from physical domains to create effects, which may span multiple geographic 

combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) AORs. Some of the capabilities the JFC may employ in 

conjunction with, or to enable CO, include significant portions of electronic warfare (EW), 

EMS management, C2, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), navigation 

warfare (NAVWAR), and some space mission areas. Advancements in technology have 

created an increasingly complex OE. CO, space operations, and EW operations can be 

conducted against targets using portions of the EMS. They can be integrated with other 

information related capabilities as part of IO. CO, space operations, and EW operations are 

often conducted under specific authorities. Likewise, some information-related capabilities 

supported by CO, such as MISO, MILDEC, and special technical operations (STO), have 

their own execution approval process. The JFC and staff must be familiar with the different 

coordination requirements, and forward requests for execution as early in the planning 

process as possible in order to comply with US law and to facilitate effective and timely CO. 

To minimize overlap, the primary responsibility for CO coordination between 

USCYBERCOM and JFCs will reside with the cyberspace support element (CSE) in 

coordination with the CCMD joint cyberspace centers (JCCs). For National Guard matters, 

USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM coordinates with the Chief, National Guard Bureau. 

Refer to Chapter III, “Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities,” for specifics on CO 

authorities. Refer to respective doctrine and policy documents of supported informationrelated capabilities for specifics on their authorities. 

For more information, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, and JP 6-0, 

Joint Communications System.

“DOD [Department of Defense] will execute an active cyber [space] defense 

capability to prevent intrusions into DOD networks and systems...and is 

developing new defense operating concepts and computing architectures for its 

cyberspace operations that go beyond the current operational and technical 

paradigms. All of these components combine to form adaptive and dynamic 

defense of DOD networks and systems.”

Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, May 2011 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-12 

c. Authorities Overlap. Like other military operations conducted by the JFC or 

Service elements, CO are covered by appropriate authorities, such as military orders, 

standing or supplemental rules of engagement, DOD policy, etc. This includes military 

intelligence activities that provide ISR in cyberspace. The JFC also receives support from 

DOD intelligence agencies, such as NSA, in accordance with national and departmental 

policies and guidance. Likewise, DOD ordinary business operations in cyberspace are 

accomplished by DOD agencies following DOD policy. 

2. Military Operations In and Through Cyberspace 

a. Cyberspace Operations. The successful execution of CO requires integrated and 

synchronized offensive, defensive, and DODIN operations, underpinned by effective and 

timely operational preparation of the environment (OPE). CO missions are categorized as 

OCO, DCO, and DODIN operations based on their intent. Specific actions are discussed in 

paragraph 2.e, “Cyberspace Actions.” All CO missions are informed by timely intelligence 

and threat indicators from traditional and advanced sensors, vulnerability information from 

DOD and non-DOD sources, and accurate assessments. 

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Appendix D, “Assessment,” for more information on 

assessment and battle damage assessment (BDA).

(1) Offensive Cyberspace Operations. OCO are CO intended to project power by 

the application of force in and through cyberspace. OCO will be authorized like offensive 

operations in the physical domains, via an execute order (EXORD). OCO requires 

deconfliction in accordance with (IAW) current policies. 

(2) Defensive Cyberspace Operations. DCO are CO intended to defend DOD or 

other friendly cyberspace. Specifically, they are passive and active cyberspace defense 

operations to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, 

networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems. DCO responds to 

unauthorized activity or alerts/threat information against the DODIN, and leverages 

intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), LE, and other military capabilities as required. DCO 

includes outmaneuvering adversaries taking or about to take offensive actions against 

defended networks, or otherwise responding to internal and external cyberspace threats. 

Most DCO occurs within the defended network. Internal defensive measures include 

mission assurance actions to dynamically reestablish, re-secure, reroute, reconstitute, or 

isolate degraded or compromised local networks to ensure sufficient cyberspace access for 

JFC forces. DCO also includes actively hunting for advanced internal threats that evade 

routine security measures. However, some adversary actions can trigger DCO response 

actions (DCO-RA) necessary to defend networks, when authorized, by creating effects 

outside of the DODIN. DCO consists of those actions designed to protect friendly 

cyberspace from adversary actions. DCO may be conducted in response to attack, 

exploitation, intrusion, or effects of malware on the DODIN or other assets that DOD is 

directed to defend. DOD’s DCO mission is accomplished using a layered, adaptive, defensein-depth approach, with mutually supporting elements of digital and physical protection. A 

key characteristic of DOD’s DCO activities is a construct of active cyberspace defense. The 

Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace describes active cyberspace 
 Cyberspace Operations 

II-3 

defense as DOD’s synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and 

mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to defend networks and systems. Leveraging the full 

range of DCO, active cyberspace defense builds on traditional approaches to defending DOD 

networks and systems to address advanced persistent threats. Defense of the DODIN and 

other elements of cyberspace requires SA and automated, agile, and synchronized 

preapproved defenses. Types of DCO consist of: 

(a) Internal Defensive Measures. Internal defensive measures are those DCO 

that are conducted within the DODIN. They include actively hunting for advanced internal 

threats as well as the internal responses to these threats. Internal defensive measures respond 

to unauthorized activity or alerts/threat information within the DODIN, and leverage 

intelligence, CI, LE, and other military capabilities as required. 

(b) DCO Response Actions. DCO-RA are those deliberate, authorized 

defensive actions which are taken external to the DODIN to defeat ongoing or imminent 

threats to defend DOD cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems. DCO-RA must 

be authorized IAW the standing rules of engagement and any applicable supplemental rules 

of engagement and may rise to the level of use of force. In some cases, countermeasures are 

all that is required, but as in the physical domains, the effects of countermeasures are limited 

and will typically only degrade, not defeat, an adversary’s activities. 

1. Countermeasures. Countermeasures are that form of military science 

that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, has as its objective the impairment of 

the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. In cyberspace, countermeasures are intended 

to identify the source of a threat to the DODIN and use non- intrusive techniques to stop or 

mitigate offensive activity in cyberspace. Countermeasures extend beyond the DOD 

perimeters against a specific adversary activity. Countermeasures are nondestructive in 

nature, typically impact only malicious activity but not the associated threat systems, and are 

terminated when the threat stops. Countermeasures in cyberspace should not destroy or 

significantly impede the operations or functionality of the network they are being employed 

against, nor should they intentionally cause injury or the loss of life. Any DOD authorized 

use of countermeasures must be in compliance with US domestic law, international law, and 

applicable rules of engagement. Countermeasures require deconfliction with other USG 

departments and agencies to the maximum extent practicable. 

(3) DOD Information Network Operations. DODIN operations are actions taken 

to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain DOD communications 

systems and networks in a way that creates and preserves data availability, integrity, 

confidentiality, as well as user/entity authentication and non-repudiation. These include 

proactive actions which address the entire DODIN, including configuration control and 

patching, IA measures and user training, physical security and secure architecture design, 

operation of host-based security systems and firewalls, and encryption of data. Although 

many DODIN operations activities are regularly scheduled events, they should not be 

considered routine or unimportant, since their aggregate effect establishes the security 

framework on which all DOD missions ultimately depend. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-12 

b. Security of Non-DOD Information Networks. While DCO are generally focused 

on the DODIN, which includes all networks owned or leased by DOD, DOD relies on many 

other networks, including private sector networks, to support DOD operations. 

Responsibility for these non-DOD information networks and systems falls to the network 

owners, which include other USG departments and agencies and private sector entities. 

Since all DOD-associated networks are known targets for our adversaries, protection of these 

non-DOD information networks and systems is just as important as protection of the 

DODIN. Unfortunately, DOD cannot guarantee the level of security of non-DOD 

information networks or the robustness of the security standards governing such networks. 

The JFC’s mission risk analysis should account for this uncertainty in security of non-DOD 

networks. It is essential that planners and those supporting CO coordinate with non-DOD 

essential network owners to better secure those networks. USCYBERCOM liaises with 

other USG departments and agencies that can facilitate necessary planning. 

c. Routine Uses of Cyberspace. Most military CO are routine uses of cyberspace. 

Routine uses of cyberspace, such as operating C2 or logistics systems, sending an e-mail, 

using the Internet to complete an on-line training course, and developing a briefing or 

document, employ cyberspace capabilities and complete tasks in cyberspace, but they do not 

amount to OCO, DCO, or DODIN operations. Other than being an authorized user of the 

network, DOD members need no special authorities to conduct these activities. However, it 

is through these routine uses of cyberspace where a majority of the vulnerabilities on our 

networks are exposed to, and exploited by, our adversaries. As such, the importance of 

cultivating a culture of cyber security among all DODIN users cannot be overstated. The 

challenge is to train DODIN users to recognize the trade craft of adversaries so that routine 

cyberspace uses do not continue to represent a source of unnecessary risk to the mission. 

DODIN operations functions, particularly interagency policies and training, are critical to the 

success of all types of DOD CO. 

d. Intelligence Operations. See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to 

Military Operations, for a more complete discussion of activities that fall under intelligence 

operations. 

e. Cyberspace Actions. While the JFC’s military missions in cyberspace (OCO, DCO, 

and DODIN operations) are categorized by intent, as described above, these missions will 

require the employment of various capabilities to create specific effects in cyberspace. To 

plan for, authorize, and assess these actions, it is important the JFC and staff understand how 

they are distinguished from one another. 

(1) Cyberspace Defense. Actions normally created within DOD cyberspace for 

securing, operating, and defending the DODIN. Specific actions include protect, detect, 

characterize, counter, and mitigate. Such defensive actions are usually created by the JFC or 

Service that owns or operates the network, except in such cases where these defensive 

actions would impact the operations of networks outside the responsibility of the respective 

JFC or Service. 

(2) Cyberspace ISR. An intelligence action conducted by the JFC authorized by 

an EXORD or conducted by attached SIGNT units under temporary delegated SIGINT 
 Cyberspace Operations 

II-5 

operational tasking authority. Cyberspace ISR includes ISR activities in cyberspace 

conducted to gather intelligence that may be required to support future operations, including 

OCO or DCO. These activities synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of 

cyberspace systems, in direct support of current and future operations. Cyberspace ISR 

focuses on tactical and operational intelligence and on mapping adversary cyberspace to 

support military planning. Cyberspace ISR requires appropriate deconfliction, and 

cyberspace forces that are trained and certified to a common standard with the IC. ISR in 

cyberspace is conducted pursuant to military authorities and must be coordinated and 

deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies.

(3) Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment. OPE consists of 

the non-intelligence enabling activities conducted to plan and prepare for potential follow-on 

military operations. OPE requires cyberspace forces trained to a standard that prevents 

compromise of related IC operations. OPE in cyberspace is conducted pursuant to military 

authorities and must be coordinated and deconflicted with other USG departments and 

agencies. 

(4) Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace actions that create various direct denial 

effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) and manipulation that 

leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains. These specific 

actions are: 

(a) Deny. To degrade, disrupt, or destroy access to, operation of, or 

availability of a target by a specified level for a specified time. Denial prevents adversary 

use of resources. 

1. Degrade. To deny access (a function of amount) to, or operation of, a 

target to a level represented as a percentage of capacity. Level of degradation must be 

specified. If a specific time is required, it can be specified.

2. Disrupt. To completely but temporarily deny (a function of time) 

access to, or operation of, a target for a period of time. A desired start and stop time are 

normally specified. Disruption can be considered a special case of degradation where the 

degradation level selected is 100 percent. 

3. Destroy. To permanently, completely, and irreparably deny (time and 

amount are both maximized) access to, or operation of, a target. 

(b) Manipulate. To control or change the adversary’s information, 

information systems, and/or networks in a manner that supports the commander’s objectives. 

3. National Intelligence Operations In and Through Cyberspace 

National level intelligence organizations, including major DOD agencies, conduct 

intelligence activities for national intelligence priorities. This intelligence can support a 

military commander’s planning and preparation. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-12 

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for a more 

complete discussion of activities that fall under intelligence operations. 

4. Department of Defense Ordinary Business Operations In and Through Cyberspace 

Ordinary business operations in and through cyberspace are those non-warfighting 

capabilities and functions used to support and sustain DOD forces in their normal day-to-day 

functions, but that are not normally under the control of a JFC. This includes the CO of the 

Services and civilian-run DOD agencies, such as the Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service and the Defense Commissary Agency. These organizations conduct routine uses of 

cyberspace, as well as DODIN operations and some internal defensive measures. Since the 

conduct of DOD ordinary business operations in cyberspace is not generally guided by joint 

doctrine, they are not discussed here in detail. However, vulnerabilities that occur in DOD 

ordinary business operations processes can easily become vulnerabilities that directly impact 

the JFC’s mission. A compromise in any area of cyberspace might result in an exposure to 

other areas. 

5. The Joint Functions and Cyberspace Operations 

a. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, delineates joint functions common to joint operations at all 

levels of war into six basic groups: C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, 

protection, and sustainment. These joint functions comprise related capabilities and 

activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. 

This section presents an overview of how each of these functions applies to effective joint 

operations in and through cyberspace. 

b. Command and Control. C2 of operations in and through cyberspace encompasses 

the exercise of authority and direction by commanders over assigned and attached forces in 

the accomplishment of their mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and 

direction to the joint force. In their role to provide a communications pathway, planning and 

decision-support aids, and cyberspace related ISR, CO can provide timely access to critical 

information which can enable JFCs to make and execute decisions more rapidly than the 

adversary, giving commanders more control over the timing and tempo of operations. 

(1) CO requires unity of effort to synchronize forces toward a common objective. 

However, the dual nature of CO as simultaneously providing actions at the global level and 

at the theater or JOA level necessitates adaptations to traditional C2 structures. Joint forces 

principally employ centralized planning with decentralized execution of operations. Certain 

CO functions, particularly global defense, lend themselves to centralized execution to meet 

multiple, near-instantaneous requirements for response. However, those CO must be 

integrated and synchronized with the JFC’s regional or local CO, conducted by forces 

assigned or attached to the JFC. For these reasons, there may be times when C2 of global 

CO and of theater CO are conducted using a support command relationship under two 

separate, but mutually supporting/supported chains of command. USSTRATCOM/ 

USCYBERCOM is the supported command for global or trans-regional CO even as it 

supports one or more JFC’s operations. For specific CO, the supported/supporting command 

relationship will be established in the EXORD. A supported relationship for CO does not 
 Cyberspace Operations 

II-7 

exempt either command from coordinating response options with affected JFCs prior to 

conducting an operation. Regardless of which model is employed for any particular 

operation, unless otherwise specified in supplemental orders or directives, effective C2 for 

CO will be standardized, integrated, and synchronized IAW the 15 March 2012 Joint Staff 

Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control (C2) Concept of Operations 

(CONOPS) to ensure effective coordination of joint forces and to provide a common 

construct for JFCs to execute their mission within a global context. 

(2) Differing C2 structures can provide a unique organization and array of forces 

for the JFC. C2 of DOD forces conducting CO activities are defined by the JFC and 

enumerated in the concept of operations (CONOPS)/operation order (OPORD). 

(a) DODIN operations require centralized coordination because they have the 

potential to impact the integrity and operational readiness of the DODIN. Although 

execution will generally be decentralized, Commander, United States Strategic Command 

(CDRUSSTRATCOM) is the supported commander for CO to secure, operate, and defend 

the DODIN, and to defend US critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions. 

(b) Theater-level DODIN operations are those activities occurring within a 

theater that have the potential to impact only operations in that theater. The CCMD JCC 

should coordinate actions with the USCYBERCOM CSE located on site to ensure effects are 

constrained within authorized areas. Examples may include operations on mission networks, 

the timing of centrally directed network configuration, establishing MINIMIZE to limit 

outbound traffic flow or other prioritization of theater resources. The affected GCC is the 

supported command for theater-level DODIN operations with CDRUSSTRATCOM/ 

Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM) supporting, as 

required. 

(c) CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global CO, and may 

delegate authority where appropriate to CDRUSCYBERCOM. 

(d) C2 for Theater CO Fires and Maneuver. These CO support JFC 

objectives and the JFC is the supported commander, with USCYBERCOM supporting as 

necessary. The JFC is responsible for integrating and synchronizing CO fires with other 

fires, and may use either assigned or attached assets or supporting USCYBERCOM assets. 

JFCs coordinate their requirements with USCYBERCOM to ensure they are accounted for 

and prioritized in execution. CO maneuvers will become vital when a JFC’s capabilities are 

under attack to the degree that subsets of friendly cyberspace are degraded, compromised, or 

lost. In such operations, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is in a supporting 

role, as required. 

(3) Decision authority for most OCO and some DCO involves careful consideration 

of projected effects and geopolitical boundaries. However, some OCO and some DCO 

activities have inherent transregional effects, requiring interagency coordination to deconflict 

activities in cyberspace and assure appropriate consideration of nonmilitary factors such as 

foreign policy implications. For these reasons, OCO and some DCO require careful 

planning, in-depth intelligence support, and interagency coordination. The growing reliance 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-12 

on cyberspace around the globe requires carefully controlling OCO, requiring national level 

approval. This requires commanders to remain cognizant of changes in national cyberspace 

policy and potential impacts on operational authorities. 

(4) A common operational picture (COP) for cyberspace facilitates C2 of CO and 

real-time comprehensive SA. A cyberspace COP should include the ability to rapidly fuse, 

correlate, and display data from global network sensors to deliver a reliable picture of 

friendly, neutral, and adversary networks, including their physical locations and activities. In 

addition, the cyberspace COP should support real-time threat and event data from myriad 

sources (i.e., DOD, IC, interagency, private industry, and international partners) and improve 

commanders’ abilities to identify, monitor, characterize, track, locate, and take action in 

response to cyberspace activity as it occurs both globally for USSTRATCOM/ 

USCYBERCOM and within the AOR for the GCC. 

c. Intelligence

(1) Intelligence collected in cyberspace may come from DOD and/or national-level 

sources and may serve strategic, operational, or tactical requirements. JP 2-0, Joint 

Intelligence, covers the basics of military intelligence joint doctrine. This section addresses 

the unique challenges of military intelligence in cyberspace. Intelligence operations in 

cyberspace not associated with the JFC are covered in paragraph 3, “National Intelligence 

Operations In and Through Cyberspace.”

(2) Understanding the OE is fundamental to all joint operations. Intelligence 

support to CO utilizes the same intelligence process (i.e., intelligence operations) as in all 

other military operations: 

(a) Planning and direction, to include managing CI activities that protect 

against espionage, sabotage, and attacks against US citizens/facilities; and examining 

mission success criteria and associated metrics to assess the impact of CO and inform the 

commander’s decisions. 

(b) Collection, to include surveillance and reconnaissance. 

(c) Processing and exploitation of collected data. 

(d) Analysis of information and production of intelligence. 

(e) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with operations quality.

(f) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality. 

(3) Event Detection and Characterization. Activities in cyberspace by a 

sophisticated adversary may be difficult to detect. Unlike adversary actions in the physical 

domains which may be detected by the presence of equipment or specific activity, adversary 

actions in cyberspace may not be easily distinguishable from legitimate activity. Capabilities 

for detecting and attributing activities in cyberspace are critical for enabling effective DCO 

and OCO. Equally important, rapid assessment of DOD operations in and through 
 Cyberspace Operations 

II-9 

cyberspace facilitates necessary rapid adaptation and changes in tactics, defensive measures, 

and other available response options. 

(4) In order to minimize the effects of threats that exploit previously unknown 

vulnerabilities, joint forces should develop mitigation and recovery measures, to include 

exercising the capability to operate in a denied or compromised portion of cyberspace. 

(5) Analysis and Attribution. Due to the characteristics of the physical network, 

logical network, and cyber-persona layers in CO, attribution of adversary OCO to people, 

criminal organization, non-state actors, or even responsible nation states is difficult. 

(6) Intelligence Gain/Loss (IGL). Another concern is that CO could potentially 

compromise intelligence collection activities. An IGL assessment is required prior to 

executing a CO to the maximum extent practicable. The IGL assessment could be further 

complicated by the array of non-DOD USG and multinational partners operating in 

cyberspace. See Chapter IV, “Planning and Coordination,” for further information regarding 

targeting in CO. 

(7) Indications and Warning (I&W). Cyberspace intelligence on nation-state 

threats should include all-source analysis in order to factor in traditional political/military 

I&W. Adversary cyberspace actions will often occur outside, and often well in advance of, 

traditional adversary military activities. Additionally, cyberspace I&W may recognize 

adversary CO triggers with only a relatively short time available to respond. These factors 

make the inclusion of all-source intelligence analysis very important for the effective 

analysis of our adversaries’ intentions in cyberspace. 

d. Fires. Depending on the objective, cyberspace fires can be offensive or defensive, 

supporting or supported. Like all forms of power projection, fires in and through cyberspace 

should be included in the joint planning and execution processes from inception in order to 

facilitate synchronization and unity of effort. Fires in and through cyberspace encompass a 

number of tasks, actions, and processes, including: 

(1) Joint Targeting, Coordination, and Deconfliction. The purpose of targeting 

is to integrate and synchronize fires into joint operations. Targeting is the process of 

selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering 

operational requirements and capabilities. Integrating and synchronizing planning, 

execution, and assessment is pivotal to the success of targeting. Understanding the 

objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all actors within the OE enables the use 

of joint, interagency, and multinational means to create effects. Target development and 

selection are based on what the commander wants to achieve rather than on the available 

ways and means to achieve them. In other words, the focus should be on creating the desired 

target effects that accomplish targeting-related tasks and objectives. Deconfliction is the act 

of coordinating those targets with applicable DOD, interagency, and multinational partners. 

Therefore, cyberspace targets should be nominated, vetted, and validated within the 

established targeting process. The targeting process for CO requires close coordination 

within DOD, with interagency and multinational partners, and with key allies. Deconfliction 

of CO has both an operational and a technical component. If two USG entities have 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-12 

requirements to create effects on the same target in cyberspace, their uncoordinated actions 

could expose or interfere with the actions of one or both. Assuming both effects can be 

created independently and are sufficiently well-justified, a technical analysis will still need to 

be conducted to determine if the proposed capabilities can operate in the same target 

environment without interference or increasing the chances of unwanted detection. 

For more information on joint targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(2) Integration of Cyberspace Fires. CO capabilities, though they may be used in 

a stand-alone context, are generally most effective when integrated with other capabilities to 

create the JFC’s desired effects. Cyberspace capabilities can be used to manipulate 

adversary cyberspace targets through MILDEC, redirection, systems conditioning, etc., to 

assist with friendly mission objectives, or deny adversary functional use of cyberspace assets. 

These effects can be created at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. 

(3) Assessment. The assessment process includes measuring the appropriate 

performance and effectiveness of fires, as well as their contribution to the larger operation or 

objective. Although traditional assessment of military operations has been in terms of firstorder battle damage, ongoing and recent military operations suggest that physical damage is 

often not the most operationally or strategically important. BDA is composed of physical 

damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment, typically 

taking a three-phased approach to proceed from a micro-level examination of the damage or 

effect inflicted on a specific target, to ultimately arriving at macro-level conclusions 

regarding the functional outcomes created in the target system. Likewise, first-order effects 

of CO are often subtle, and assessment of second- and third-order effects can be difficult. 

Thus assessment of fires in and through cyberspace frequently requires significant 

intelligence capabilities and collection efforts. Prediction and assessment for CO must be 

incorporated into existing joint force staff processes to ensure that JFC objectives are met. 

e. Movement and Maneuver

(1) Movement and maneuver involves deploying forces into an operational area and 

moving within that area to gain operational advantage in support of operational objectives. 

An essential component of planning is the concept of key terrain, which is any locality or 

area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. 

These might include major lines of communications; key access points for the defense, 

observation, and launch points for the offense; or opportunities to create bottlenecks. In 

cyberspace, key terrain involves network links and nodes that are essential to a particular 

friendly or adversary capability. The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace creates another major 

consideration in CO, because it enables an adversary to establish key points of presence 

outside the physical operating area. 

(2) Another component of maneuver in cyberspace is the movement of data. In this 

context, bandwidth (wired or wireless), the available data throughput that can be physically 

accommodated by the supporting infrastructure, can be considered as roughly analogous to 

lines of communications in the physical domains. The ability to maneuver the flow of data 

from one physical line to another, for example from terrestrial cables to satellite 
 Cyberspace Operations 

II-11 

communications (SATCOM) links, is an example of maintaining freedom of maneuver in 

cyberspace. Managing the EMS within the battle space is a key component for the JFC to 

consider in developing and executing operations. 

(3) Movement and maneuver in cyberspace can occur in all three layers: the 

physical network, logical network, and the cyber-persona layer. 

f. Sustainment

(1) Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to 

maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. Services and 

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) organize, train, equip, and sustain 

forces for CO. JFCs must identify required forces and capabilities, critical cyberspace assets, 

assess risk, ensure redundancy (including non-cyberspace alternatives), and actively exercise 

continuity of operations plans to respond to outages or adversary actions that degrade or 

compromise cyberspace access or reliability. 

(2) Advancements in IT continue to develop rapidly, which in turn requires the 

Services and USSOCOM to develop, field, and sustain cyberspace capabilities adaptable to 

the rapid changing OE. For example, new wireless mobile devices may provide greater 

Internet access, an adversary might update or change operating systems, or they may 

transition to the use of virtual machines in their network architecture. Joint forces need the 

capability to rapidly incorporate new cyberspace capabilities into their arsenal. Additionally, 

the joint force may need the capability to rapidly upgrade their own networks to leverage 

new technologies. Pressure to deploy new technology must be balanced against approved 

requirements and increased risks, and implementation must be carefully orchestrated to 

prevent divergence among Service-provisioned networks that could create gaps or seams in 

DOD’s global architecture. 

(3) A key component of sustainment is the maintenance of a well-trained force. 

Most successful network intrusions and attacks can be traced to poor operator and/or 

administrator security practices. Assets deployed securely only remain secure if they are 

maintained accordingly. 

(4) Many critical legacy systems are not built to be easily modified or patched. As 

a result, many of the risks incurred across DOD are introduced via unpatched (and 

effectively unpatchable) systems on the DODIN. This risk can be mitigated through 

additional layers of network protection, which must then be sustained. Additionally some 

hardware capabilities can also deteriorate over time, requiring component, software, or 

firmware upgrades. Replacement due to wear and tear or adversary discovery/compromise 

may be necessary to ensure sensors and other forward deployed cyberspace capabilities are 

ready when needed. This can be particularly problematic when physically inaccessible 

systems (such as those deployed to remote sites or on ships) must be replaced or upgraded. 

It is vital that commanders understand the risk created by leaving such vulnerabilities in 

place, not just to their operation, but to the future success of DOD missions worldwide. 

Finally, contingency software capabilities that are not often accessed may also require 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-12 

periodic refreshing and retesting to ensure that they are still both secure and capable of 

creating the required effects despite changes in the targeted OE. 

g. Protection

(1) Protection is somewhat unique within cyberspace because adversaries can 

create multiple, cascading effects that may not be restricted by physical geography, 

civil/military boundaries, and significantly expand the area requiring protection. Cyberspace 

capabilities requiring protection include not only the infrastructure (computers, cables, 

antennas, and switching and routing equipment), as well as parts of the EMS (e.g., datalink 

frequencies to include satellite downlink, cellular, and wireless), and the content (both data 

and applications) on which military operations rely. Key to cyberspace protection is the 

positive control of the DODIN and the ability to monitor, detect, and prevent hostile traffic 

from entering and exfiltration of information. 

(2) Protection of friendly cyberspace uses a combination of defensive capabilities 

and OPSEC. Because of the speed of effects in cyberspace, automated technologies for 

securing networks, verifying approved network configurations, and discovering network 

vulnerabilities often provide a far better chance of success than their manual equivalents. 

However, the strongest encryption and most secure protocols cannot protect our networks 

from poorly trained/motivated users who do not employ proper security practices. 

Commanders should ensure personnel understand and are accountable for their roles in 

cybersecurity. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

AUTHORITIES, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

1. Introduction 

a. Under the authorities of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), DOD uses cyberspace 

capabilities to shape cyberspace and provide integrated offensive and defensive options. As 

directed by USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM synchronizes and directs transregional 

operations and, in coordination with CCMDs, JS, and Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), liaises with other USG departments and agencies, and members of DIB in 

conjunction with DHS. Similarly, as directed, DOD will deploy necessary resources to 

support efforts of other USG departments and agencies. 

b. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO) and the 

Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace provide requirements for 

national defense in cyberspace and DOD’s role in defending US national interests through 

CO. 

c. DOD’s Roles and Initiatives in Cyberspace. The NMS-CO instructs DOD to be 

prepared to support DHS, as the lead USG agency, in the following cyberspace roles: 

national incident response and support to USG departments and agencies in CI/KR 

protection. To fulfill this mission, DOD conducts military operations to defend cyberspace, 

DOD elements of CI/KR, the homeland, or other vital US interests as directed. If defense of 

a national interest is required, DOD’s national defense missions, when authorized by 

Presidential orders or standing authorities, take primacy over, and may subsume, the 

standing missions of other departments or agencies. The Department of Defense Strategy for 

Operating in Cyberspace establishes strategic initiatives that offer a roadmap for DOD to 

operate effectively in cyberspace, defend national interests, and achieve national security 

objectives. 

d. National Incident Response. In addition to DOD’s responsibility to defend the 

Nation, DOD provides defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), as directed. DOD 

coordinates with DHS and other interagency partners, as described in the National Response 

Framework. 

e. Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Protection. CI/KR consist of the 

infrastructure and assets vital to the nation’s security, governance, public health and safety, 

economy, and public confidence. IAW the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DOD is 

designated as the sector-specific agency for the DIB. DOD provides cyberspace analysis and 

forensics support via the DIB Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Program and the 

DOD Cyber Crime Center. Concurrent with its national defense and incident response 

“The US Government has the responsibility to... ensure that the United States and 

its citizens, together with the larger community of nations, can realize the full 

potential of the Information Technology revolution.” 

President Obama, 29 May 2009 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-12 

missions, DOD will also support DHS and other USG departments and agencies to ensure all 

sectors of cyberspace CI/KR are available to support national objectives. CI/KR protection 

relies on analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability identification and reduction, 

mitigation, and aiding of national recovery efforts. Defense critical infrastructure (DCI) 

refers to DOD and non-DOD assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces 

and operations worldwide that are a subset of CI&KR. GCCs have the responsibility to 

prevent the loss or degradation of the DCI within their AORs and must coordinate with the 

DOD asset owner, heads of DOD components, and defense infrastructure sector lead agents 

to fulfill this responsibility. CCDRs may act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of 

non-DOD-owned DCI only at the direction of SecDef IAW Department of Defense Directive 

(DODD) 3020.40, DOD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure. This action 

must be coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). The Director of DISA is responsible for matters 

pertaining to the identification, prioritization, and remediation of critical DODIN 

infrastructure issues, as the lead agent for the DODIN sector of the DCI. Likewise, DOD is 

responsible to support the DHS coordination of efforts to protect the DIB and the DODIN 

portion of the DIB. 

2. Authorities 

Authority for actions undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United States is derived 

from the US Constitution and Federal law. These authorities establish roles and 

responsibilities that provide focus for organizations to develop capabilities and expertise, 

including those for cyberspace. Key statutory authorities that apply to DOD include Title 10, 

United States Code (USC), Armed Forces; Title 50, USC, War and National Defense; and 

Title 32, USC, National Guard. See Figure III-1 for a summary of applicable titles of USC 

as they apply to CO. 

3. Roles and Responsibilities 

a. Secretary of Defense

(1) Direct the military, intelligence, and ordinary business operations of DOD in 

cyberspace. 

(2) Provide policy guidance and authority for employment of assigned, attached, 

and supporting military forces conducting cyberspace missions. 

(3) Coordinate with secretaries of other USG departments to establish appropriate 

representation and participation of personnel on joint interagency coordination groups 

(JIACG), working groups, task forces, etc. 

b. DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO)

(1) Serve as SecDef’s principal staff assistant for information management (IM), 

and consequently develop and issue the DOD Information Resources Management Strategic 

Plan. 
Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 

III-3 

(2) As the DODIN architect, develop, maintain, and enforce compliance with the 

DODIN architecture. Inherent in the CIO’s architecture responsibility is the responsibility to 

enforce interoperability, IA, net-centric data sharing, use of enterprise services, and DOD 

information networks program synchronization. 

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Figure III-1. United States Code-Based Authorities 

United States Code-Based Authorities

Role in Cyberspace Principal 

Organization Title Key Focus

United 

States 

Code 

(USC)

Title 6

Title 10

Title 18

Title 32

Title 40

Title 50

Domestic

Security

Armed

Forces

Crimes 

and

Criminal

Procedure

National

Guard

Public

Buildings,

Property, 

and

Works

War and

National

Defense

Homeland security

National defense

Law enforcement

National defense

and civil support

training and

operations, in the

US

Chief Information

Officer roles and

responsibilities

A broad spectrum of

military, foreign

intelligence, and

counterintelligence

activities

Department of

Homeland

Security

Department of

Defense

Department of

Justice

State Army 

National

Guard, State Air

National Guard

All Federal

departments and

agencies

Commands,

Services, and

agencies under 

the

Department of

Defense and

intelligence

community

agencies aligned

under the Office of

the Director of

National

Intelligence

Security of US cyberspace

Man, train, and equip US

forces for military

operations in cyberspace

Crime prevention,

apprehension, and

prosecution of criminals

operating in cyberspace

Domestic consequence

management (if activated

for federal service, the

National Guard is

integrated into the Title 10,

USC, )

Establish and enforce

standards for acquisition

and security of information

technologies

Secure US interests by

conducting military and

foreign intelligence

operations in cyberspace

Armed Forces
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-12 

(1) Advise the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and 

programs. 

(2) Assist SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats or hostile acts. 

(3) Translate SecDef guidance into OPORDs. 

(4) Ensure that cyberspace plans and operations are compatible with other military 

plans. 

(5) Assist CCDRs in meeting their operational requirements that have been 

approved by SecDef.

d. Service Chiefs

(1) Provide appropriate administration of and support to cyberspace forces assigned 

or attached to CCMDs. 

(2) Train and equip forces for CO for deployment/support to CCMDs as directed 

by SecDef. Services will provide CO capabilities for deployment/support to CCMDs as 

directed by SecDef. 

(3) Remain responsible for compliance with USSTRATCOM’s direction for 

operation and defense of the DODIN. 

(4) Coordinate with CDRUSSTRATCOM to prioritize cyberspace mission 

requirements and force capabilities. 

(5) Provide users of the EMS regulatory and operational guidance in the use of 

radio frequencies through the authority of Army (Army Spectrum Management Office), 

Navy (Navy and Marine Corps Spectrum Center), and Air Force (Air Force Spectrum 

Management Office). 

e. Chief, National Guard Bureau

(1) Serves as an advisor to CDRUSSTRATCOM on National Guard matters 

pertaining to the CCMD missions and support planning and coordination for such activities 

as requested by the CJCS or the CCDRs. 

(2) Serves as the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the 

National Guard between USSTRATCOM and the 50 states, the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 

f. Commander, US Strategic Command

(1) Has overall responsibility for DODIN operations and defense in coordination 

with CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and CCDRs. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for CO to 

secure, operate, and defend the DODIN, and to defend US critical cyberspace assets, 
Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 

III-5 

systems, and functions as directed by the President or SecDef, against any intrusion or 

attack, and does so through a subunified command, USCYBERCOM. At the headquarters 

level, USSTRATCOM advocates for national requirements and standards, and in 

coordination with other CCDRs, assesses and reports the operational readiness of the 

DODIN. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is responsible to establish compliance and enforce 

accountability across the department and, as required, to engage through CCMDs to build 

DOD partnering capacity with partner nations with respect to CO. 

(2) Represents the DOD SATCOM community, coordinating and orchestrating 

consolidated user positions with CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies and with 

international partners. CDRUSSTRATCOM has operational and configuration management 

authority for SATCOM on-orbit assets, control systems, and ground terminal infrastructure, 

including DOD gateways, deemed necessary for the effective and efficient operation of 

SATCOM for DOD. Directs day-to-day operations of DOD-owned and leased SATCOM 

resources, as well as international partner and non-DOD SATCOM resources used by DOD, 

to provide authorized users with global SATCOM support as operations and evolving 

requirements dictate. 

(3) Develops, coordinates, and executes SATCOM operations policies and 

procedures; constellation deployment plans; and satellite positioning, repositioning, and 

disposal plans. Assesses how these various plans impact communications support to current 

and future operations, OPORDs, operation plans (OPLANs), and concept plans 

(CONPLANs), and coordinates SATCOM actions prior to execution. 

(4) In support of Unified Command Plan-assigned missions, CDRUSSTRATCOM: 

(a) Coordinates with the IC, CCMDs, Services, agencies, and allied partners to 

facilitate development of improved cyberspace access to support planning and operations. 

(b) Provides shared SA of CO and I&W. 

(c) Provides military representation to US national agencies, US commercial 

entities, and international agencies for cyberspace matters, as directed. 

(d) Notifies the CCMDs of ongoing or developing threats and anomalies via 

appropriate means to reduce potential risks and to ensure effective integration of systems, 

networks, services, use of the EMS, and to comply with DOD-mandated configuration 

standards. 

(e) Performs analysis of threats to the DODIN, including threat analysis of 

foreign malicious activity. Changes the global information condition as warranted by threat 

assessments. 

(f) Plans for and, as directed, coordinates DCO of CI&KR. 

(g) For global events, USSTRATCOM will be the supported command. 

(5) Commander, United States Cyber Command 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-12 

(a) As USSTRATCOM’s execution arm for CO, plan, coordinate, integrate, 

synchronize, and conduct activities to: 

1. Direct the security, operations, and defense of the DODIN. 

2. Prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-spectrum military CO. 

(b) For global events, CDRUSSTRATCOM will be the supported commander. 

For theater events, CDRUSCYBERCOM may be a supporting commander. 

(c) Cyberspace Support Elements. CSEs are organized from 

USCYBERCOM forces and deployed to CCMDs for full integration into their staffs. CSEs 

resources are provided by USCYBERCOM to provide the CCMDs with joint CO planners 

and other subject matter experts on CO. These personnel facilitate development of 

cyberspace requirements and coordinate, integrate, and deconflict CO into the command’s 

planning process. 

1. The CSE provides CCMDs an interface and reachback capability to 

USCYBERCOM to synchronize cyberspace fires with the commander’s scheme of 

maneuver, develop SA, and facilitate acquiring timely threat information. 

2. USCYBERCOM retains operational control of the CSE, and the CSE is 

in direct support to the JCC. 

(e) Leverages the IC to establish and share comprehensive SA of cyberspace, 

both friendly and adversary, in support of DOD and CCDRs. 

(f) Supports CCMDs in the development of and build of the cyberspace 

portion of joint intelligence preparation of the OE and target system analysis products. 

(g) Submits target development nominations to the supported CCMD for 

inclusion into candidate target lists. 

(h) Submits a target nomination list to the supported CCMD targeting staff. 

g. Other Combatant Commanders 

(1) Operate and defend tactical and constructed networks within their commands. 

(2) Integrate CO capabilities into all military operations; integrate CO into plans 

(CONPLANs and OPLANs); and work closely with the joint force, 

USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM, Service components, and DOD agencies to create fully 

integrated capabilities. 

(3) In coordination with USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM, GCCs orchestrate the 

planning efforts for CO, designate the desired effects of CO, and determine the timing and 

tempo for CO conducted in their AORs in support of GCC missions. Functional CCDRs 

direct DODIN operations and defense consistent with functional responsibilities. 
Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 

III-7 

(4) GCCs lead, prioritize, and direct theater-specific DCO in response to 

cybersecurity events through the unified command theater network control center or 

equivalent organization. For cybersecurity events that have been categorized as “global” by 

USCYBERCOM, CCDRs, when requested through CDRUSSTRATCOM and directed by 

SecDef, will support response efforts and tasking from CDRUSSTRATCOM as the 

supported commander. 

(5) Serve as a focal point for DODIN operations with multinational partners. 

(6) Plan for the communications system support of operations that may be directed 

by SecDef and ensure the interoperability of DOD forces with non-DOD mission partners in 

terms of equipment, procedures, and standards. 

(7) Retain authority to approve or deny DOD component-initiated modifications to 

the DODIN with theater impacts. 

(8) In coordination with the DOD asset owner, heads of DOD components, and 

DOD infrastructure sector lead agents, GCCs act to prevent the loss or degradation of DODowned DCI within their AORs. For non-DOD-owned DCI, in coordination with CJCS and 

USD(P) and only at the direction of SecDef, act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation 

of DCI. 

(9) In coordination with USSTRATCOM, advocate for cyberspace capabilities and 

resources needed to support the CCDR’s missions. 

(10) Provide users of the EMS regulatory and operational guidance in the use of 

required frequencies IAW coordinated agreements between US forces and host nations. 

h. Commanders, US Pacific Command and US Northern Command. In addition to 

responsibilities in paragraph 3(g), “Other Combatant Commanders,” fulfill specific 

responsibilities related to DSCA and homeland defense with CDRUSSTRATCOM and 

others. 

i. Director, Defense Information Systems Agency

(1) Comply with USSTRATCOM’s direction for executing DODIN operations 

functions within DISA-operated portions of the DODIN. 

(2) Provide engineering, architecture, and provisioning support for integrated 

DODIN operations, including DOD information network enterprise management, DOD 

information network content management, and DODIN assurance. 

(3) Conduct DODIN operations and DCO at the global and enterprise level, as 

directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

(4) Provide shared SA of DISA-operated portions of the DODIN. 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-12 

(5) Support compliance inspections IAW Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 6510.01, Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network 

Defense (CND). 

(6) Acquires all commercial SATCOM resources (unless the DOD CIO has granted 

a waiver to the requesting organization). Supports USSTRATCOM as the Consolidated 

SATCOM System Expert for commercial SATCOM and DOD Gateways. 

(7) Plan, mitigate, and execute service restoration at the global and enterprise level, 

as directed by CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

(8) Provide and maintain a critical nodes defense plan. 

j. Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service. Provides 

SIGINT support and IA guidance and assistance to DOD components and national 

customers, pursuant to Executive Order 12333, US Intelligence Activities and National 

Security Directive 42, National Policy for the Security of National Security 

Telecommunications and Information Systems. 

k. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

(1) Provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to warfighters, 

defense planners, and defense and national security policy makers. 

(2) Provide the same all-source intelligence support to CO as for other joint 

operations, to include intelligence support to the JFC’s intelligence preparation of the OE for 

operations in cyberspace and intelligence support to targeting. 

(3) Through the DIA Office for Cyber threat Analysis: 

(a) Assess foreign military C2 processes, networks, and information 

technologies. 

(b) Provide all-source intelligence that looks beyond the current operational or 

tactical threat to warn of emerging adversary cyberspace capabilities and intent, national 

space strategy and foreign influence threats, as well as associated risks to DOD critical 

information infrastructures and national security interests. 

(4) DIA’s Office of Counterintelligence, Counterespionage Division is the DOD 

focal point for all CI cyberspace investigations and operations. The division strives to ensure 

all CI related cyberspace threats to the Services and DOD agencies are identified and 

neutralized. It supports CI operations in cyberspace to promote operational superiority over 

America’s adversaries. It provides worldwide cyberspace CI SA and coordination. 

(5) DIA is responsible for the engineering, development, implementation, and 

management of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the DODIN including 

the configuration of information, data, and communications standards for intelligence 

systems, in coordination with JS, Services, other agencies, and OSD. Included within this is 
Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities 

III-9 

the overall responsibility for the operation of Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 

System (JWICS), a strategic secure, high capacity telecommunications network serving the 

IC with voice, data, and video services. DIA establishes defense-wide intelligence priorities 

for attaining interoperability between tactical, theater, and national intelligence related 

systems and between intelligence related systems and tactical, theater, and national elements 

of the DODIN. The DIA exercises operational management of JWICS via the JWICS 

network operations center.

l. Other DOD Agencies. Similar to other DOD component responsibilities, DOD 

agencies are responsible for ensuring that their information systems environment is 

developed and maintained in a manner that is consistent with and reflective of the DODIN 

architecture and that agency-specific programs are planned, resourced, acquired, and 

implemented IAW the DOD IM support plan and defense resource priorities. Those DOD 

agencies which are also part of the IC are also subject to the policies and guidance of the IC 

CIO. DOD Cyber Crime Center’s responsibilities include: 

(1) Provides digital and multimedia forensics, cyber investigative training; 

research, development, test and evaluation; and cyberspace analysis to DODIN defense, LE, 

IC, CI, and counterterrorism agencies; 

(2) Serves as the DOD center of excellence and establishes DOD standards for 

digital and multimedia forensics; and 

(3) Serves as the operational focal point for the DIB Cybersecurity and Information 

Assurance Program’s information sharing activities performed to protect unclassified DOD 

information that transits or resides on unclassified DIB information systems and networks. 

m. Department of Homeland Security

(1) DHS has the responsibility to secure cyberspace, at the national level, by 

protecting non-DOD USG networks against cyberspace intrusions and attacks. The DOD 

ensures secure operation of the DOD portion of cyberspace and depends on other USG 

departments and agencies to secure the portions of cyberspace under their authority. 

(2) Within DHS, the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) is tasked to protect 

the USG network systems from cyberspace threats. NCSD partners with government, 

industry, and academia, as well as the international community, to make cybersecurity a 

national priority and to reinforce that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility. 

(3) The National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 23, issued on 2 January 2008, established the Comprehensive National 

Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). The CNCI formalizes a series of continuous efforts to 

further safeguard Federal systems from cyberspace threats. Under the CNCI, DHS has the 

lead in a number of areas, to include: 

(a) Establish a frontline defense to reduce current vulnerabilities and prevent 

intrusions. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-12 

(b) Defend against the full spectrum of threats by using intelligence and 

strengthening supply chain security. 

4. Legal Considerations 

a. DOD must conduct CO consistent with US domestic law, applicable international 

law, and relevant USG and DOD policies. The legal framework applicable to CO depends 

on the nature of the activities to be conducted, such as offensive or defensive military 

operations; DSCA; service provider actions; LE and CI activities; intelligence operations; 

and defense of the homeland. Before conducting CO, commanders, planners, and operators 

must understand the relevant legal framework in order to comply with laws and policies, the 

application of which may be challenging given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and the 

often geographic orientation of domestic and international law. National Guard forces in 

Title 32, USC, status and state active duty status are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act 

(PCA), and therefore may provide support without regard to the PCA. It is essential that 

commanders, planners, and operators consult with legal counsel during planning and 

execution of CO. 

b. Application of the Law of War. It is DOD policy that members of DOD comply 

with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and 

in all other military operations. The law of war is defined as that part of international law 

that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It encompasses all international law for the 

conduct of hostilities binding on the US or its individual citizens, including treaties and 

international agreements to which the US is a party, and applicable customary international 

law. The law of war rests on fundamental principles of military necessity, unnecessary 

suffering, proportionality, and distinction (discrimination), which will apply to CO. 

For more information on the law of war, see JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 

and CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

c. Lawful Military Attacks. Military attacks will be directed only at military 

targets. Only a military target is a lawful object of direct attack. By their nature, location, 

purpose, or use, military targets are those objects whose total or partial destruction, capture, 

or neutralization offers a direct and concrete military advantage. 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

PLANNING AND COORDINATION 

1. Joint Operation Planning Process and Cyberspace Operations 

a. Commanders integrate cyberspace capabilities at all levels and in all military 

operations. Plans should address how to effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities, 

counter an adversary’s use of cyberspace, secure mission critical networks, operate in a 

degraded environment, efficiently use limited cyberspace assets, and consolidate operational 

requirements for cyberspace capabilities. The JFC will typically provide initial planning 

guidance which may specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, 

authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC’s authority, and direct other actions 

as necessary. If requested by the JFC, CDRUSSTRATCOM may direct 

CDRUSCYBERCOM to provide assistance in integrating cyberspace forces, capabilities, 

and considerations into the JFC’s plans and orders. 

b. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states “Joint operation planning process (JOPP) 

provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate 

commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem 

to be solved. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and 

synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission.” CO capability considerations 

and options are integrated into JOPP, just like all other joint capabilities and functions. 

For more information on the JOPP, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

2. Cyberspace Operations Planning Considerations 

a. CO planners are presented the same considerations and challenges that are present in 

planning for other joint capabilities and functions, as well as some unique considerations. 

Targeting, deconfliction, commander’s intent, political/military assessment, and collateral 

effects considerations all play into the calculations of the CO planner’s efforts. In a similar 

fashion, all of the principles of joint operations, such as maneuver and surprise, are germane 

to CO. However, second and higher order effects in and through cyberspace can be more 

difficult to predict, necessitating more branches and sequels in plans. Further, while many 

elements of cyberspace can be mapped geographically in the physical domains, a full 

understanding of an adversary’s posture and capabilities in cyberspace involves 

understanding the underlying network infrastructure, a clear understanding of what friendly 

forces or capabilities might be targeted and how, and an understanding of applicable 

domestic, foreign, and international laws and policy. Adversaries in cyberspace may be 

“Alongside this nuclear danger is an entirely new kind of threat we have to be 

better prepared to confront – the threat of cyber[space] attacks. Cyber[space] has 

become a major concern as we face large numbers of attacks from non-state 

actors and large nations alike, and the prospect of a catastrophic disruption of 

critical infrastructure that would cripple our nation. The potential to paralyze this 

country from a cyber[space] attack is very real.” 

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, October 2011
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-12 

nation states, groups, or individuals, and the parts of cyberspace they control are not 

necessarily either within the geographic borders associated with the actor’s nationality, or 

proportional to the actor’s geopolitical influence. A criminal element, a politically motivated 

group, or even an individual may have a greater presence and capability in cyberspace than 

many nations do today. Regardless of what operational phase may be underway, it is always 

important to determine what authorities are required to execute CO. Cyberspace planners 

must account for the lead time to acquire the authorities needed to implement the desired 

cyberspace capabilities. This does not change the JFC’s planning fundamentals, but does 

emphasize the importance of coordination with interagency partners, who may have 

authorities that are different from DOD. Despite the additional considerations and 

challenges of integrating CO in JFC planning, planners can use many elements of the 

traditional processes to implement the JFC’s intent and guidance. 

b. Cyberspace-Related Intelligence Requirements (IRs). During mission analysis, 

the joint force staff identifies significant gaps in what is known about the adversary and other 

relevant aspects of the OE and formulates IRs. IRs are general or specific subjects upon 

which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence. 

Based on the command’s IRs, the intelligence staff develops more specific questions known 

as information requirements (those items of information that must be collected and processed 

to develop the intelligence required by the commander). Information requirements related to 

cyberspace may include: network infrastructures, personnel status and readiness of 

adversaries’ equipment, and unique cyberspace signature identifiers such as 

software/firmware versions, configuration files, etc. 

For additional information on IRs, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to 

Military Operations.

(1) Requests for Information (RFIs). Cyberspace planners can submit an RFI to 

generate intelligence collection efforts in support of CO support to JOPP. RFIs respond to 

customer requirements, ranging from dissemination of existing products through the 

integration or tailoring of on hand information to scheduling original production. The 

intelligence office translating the customer’s requirement and the primary intelligence 

producer determine how best to meet the customer’s needs. The information must be timely, 

accurate, and in a usable format. 

For additional information on RFIs, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to 

Military Operations.

(2) Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED) 

Architecture. The DOD’s global connectivity has enabled joint force collection managers 

to levy tasking against all-source intelligence assets and resources, and submit tasking, 

collection, and production requirements directly to the appropriate CCDR. Further, 

collection databases can be leveraged via reachback to retrieve current and historical 

products. However, much of the TCPED may occur outside the theater because the sheer 

volume of requirements for first and second phase exploitation may quickly overwhelm intheater assets. 
Planning and Coordination 

IV-3 

c. Targeting. The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires (the use of 

available weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target) into joint 

operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the 

appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. The 

overall joint targeting cycle and target development process are described in JP 3-60, Joint 

Targeting. However, three aspects of CO should be included in the JFC’s targeting 

processes: recognizing that cyberspace capabilities are a viable option for engaging 

designated joint targets; understanding that a CO option may be preferable in some cases; 

and first, second, and third order effects on joint targets may involve or affect elements of the 

DODIN. Additionally, there are some characteristics unique to cyberspace targets and 

cyberspace capabilities that are described below. 

For additional information on joint targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(1) Characteristics of Targets in Cyberspace. Every target has distinct intrinsic 

or acquired characteristics. These characteristics form the basis for target detection, location, 

identification, target value within the adversary target system, and classification for future 

surveillance, analysis, strike, and assessment. As discussed in Chapter I, “Introduction,” 

cyberspace can be viewed as consisting of three layers: physical network, logical network, 

and cyber-persona. The challenge in targeting is to identify, coordinate, and deconflict 

multiple activities occurring across multiple layers. 

(a) The physical network layer is the medium where the data travels. It 

includes wired (land and submarine cable) and wireless (radio, radio-relay, cellular, satellite) 

transmission means. It is the first point of reference for determining jurisdiction and 

application of authorities. It is also the primary layer for geospatial intelligence, which can 

also contribute useful targeting data in cyberspace. 

(b) The logical network layer constitutes an abstraction of the physical 

network layer, depicting how nodes in the physical dimension of the information 

environment logically relate to one another to form entities in cyberspace. The logical 

network layer is the first point where the connection to the physical dimension of the 

information environment is lost. 

(c) The cyber-persona layer, an individual’s or groups’ online identity(ies), 

holds important implications for joint forces in terms of positive target identification and 

affiliation, and activity attribution. Because cyber-personas can be complex, with elements 

in many virtual locations, but normally not linked to a single physical location or form, 

significant intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are required for the joint forces to 

gain sufficient insight and SA of a cyber-persona to enable effective targeting and creation of 

the JFC’s desired effects. 

(2) Characteristics of Cyberspace Capabilities. Cyberspace capabilities must 

operate and create effects within the complex and ever-changing systems in cyberspace; 

however, they are each developed with certain environmental assumptions and expectations 

about the operating conditions that will be found in the target environment. The extent to 

which the expected environmental conditions of a cyberspace target cannot be confirmed 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-12 

through intelligence sources represents an increased level of risk associated with using the 

capability. Cyberspace capabilities that have the fewest environmental dependencies and/or 

allow the operator to reconfigure the capability on-the-fly are preferred. Department of 

Defense Instruction (DODI) O-3600.03, Technical Assurance Standard (TAS) for Computer 

Network Attack (CNA) Capabilities, provides detailed requirements for technical assurance 

evaluations that document these characteristics. 

(3) Cascading and Collateral Effects. Overlaps between military, civil, 

government, private, and corporate activities on shared networks in cyberspace make the 

evaluation of probable cascading and collateral effects particularly important when planning 

for CO. Due to policy concerns, an EXORD or applicable ROE may limit CO to only those 

operations that result in no or low levels of collateral effects. A collateral effects analysis to 

meet policy limits is separate and apart from the proportionality analysis required by the law 

of war. Even if a proposed CO is permissible after a collateral effects analysis, the proposed 

CO must also be permissible under a law of war proportionality analysis. 

For more information see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(4) Target Nomination and Synchronization. Component commanders, national 

agencies, supporting commands and/or the JFC staff submit target development nominations 

to the JFC targeting staff for development and inclusion on the JFC’s joint target list (JTL). 

Once identified on the JTL, targets can be selected for engagement by organic assets (if 

within a component commander’s assigned area of operations) or nominated for action by 

other joint force components and other organizations, usually via a coordinating body (joint 

fires element [JFE] of the operations directorate of joint staff) or working group (joint 

targeting working group [JTWG]). The JFE normally holds a JTWG for prioritization of the 

nominated targets through a draft joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) and 

establishment of the “cut line.” The “cut line” simply reflects an estimate of resources 

available to take action against targets in priority order and does not guarantee that a specific 

target will be attacked. The joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) provides a seniorlevel forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future 

operations to ensure that they are synchronized and integrated. Although most targeting 

issues are worked out at the JTWG, the JTCB normally conducts final coordination of the 

JIPTL and submits it for JFC approval. The JFE also maintains the restricted target list and 

no-strike list. The no-strike list contains objects or entities that are not legal targets, while, 

the restricted target list is constrained by the JFC for other reasons characterized as protected 

from the effects of military operations under international law and/or the rules of 

engagement. 

For additional details on vetting, validation, and JTWGs, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 

and CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards. 

(5) Time-Sensitive Targeting

(a) A time-sensitive target (TST) is a target of such high priority to friendly 

forces that the JFC designates it as requiring immediate response because it poses (or will 

soon pose) a danger to friendly forces, or it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target. TSTs are 
Planning and Coordination 

IV-5 

normally executed dynamically; however, to be successful, they require considerable 

deliberate planning and preparation within the joint targeting cycle. TSTs that are engaged 

through CO require detailed joint, cross-CCMD, interagency, and likely multinational 

planning and coordination of OPE, engagement, assessment, and intelligence efforts. 

(b) The actual prosecution of a TST through cyberspace requires that 

cyberspace planners and operators coordinate with the supported commander early in the 

planning phase to ensure access to the target is available when the fleeting opportunity 

arises. In addition, JFCs should establish procedures to quickly promulgate execution orders 

for CO-engaged TSTs, which due to their unique cyberspace interagency 

deconfliction/coordination requirements may involve coordinating pre-approval for specific 

actions conducted under specific circumstances. Likewise, successful prosecution of TSTs 

requires a well-organized and well-rehearsed process for sharing sensor data and targeting 

information, identifying suitable strike assets, obtaining mission approval, and rapidly 

deconflicting weapon employment. The key for success is performing as much coordination 

and decision making as possible in advance. 

For more information on attacking TSTs, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

d. Target nomination processes remain unchanged when addressing CO and should be 

leveraged appropriately by planners. Development of target folders must include 

characteristics of the target as it relates to cyberspace. Development of this data is 

imperative to understand and characterize the cyberspace element and its relevancy. Also, 

this data allows the planner to develop and match an appropriate effect to be created against 

a particular target through cyberspace fires. 

e. DOD Information Network Operations. The US military’s reliance on cyberspace 

is well understood by our adversaries. DODIN operations underlie nearly every aspect of the 

JFC’s operations, throughout the OE, however, it is often overlooked as a planning 

consideration. JFC planning to ensure DODIN resiliency in the face of cyberspace threats is 

essential. Besides physical protection of key cyberspace infrastructure, the JFC’s primary 

defense-in-depth in cyberspace is DODIN operations which includes IA, configuration 

control and secure architectures, intrusion detection, bandwidth management/spectrum 

management, data encryption, and operating and maintaining the associated hardware 

(routers, receivers, switches, etc.). The GCC’s JCCs must coordinate and deconflict these 

activities with USSTRATCOM via the USCYBERCOM CSE, where their effects transcend 

the AOR. 

(1) Situational Awareness. Cyberspace SA is the requisite current and predictive 

knowledge of cyberspace and the OE upon which CO depend, including all factors affecting 

friendly and adversary cyberspace forces. DODIN operations activities are the foundation of 

cyberspace SA, therefore, DODIN operations are fundamental to the commander’s SA of the 

OE. A commander continually assesses the OE through a combination of staff element and 

other reporting; personal observation; intelligence, to include threat I&W; and 

representations of various activities occurring in the JOA through a COP. Sustainment of 

these communication channels, data feeds, and user interfaces is one of the key functions of 

DODIN operations. Accurate and comprehensive SA is critical for rapid decision making in 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-12 

a constantly changing OE and engaging an elusive adaptive adversary. SA of adversary CO 

relies heavily on SIGINT, but contributions can come from all sources of intelligence. SA of 

friendly cyberspace is provided today by the Services and agencies operating their portions 

of the DODIN, DISA, through the theater NETOPS centers, to the CCMD theater/global 

NETOPS control centers, USCYBERCOM Joint Operations Center, Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space’s Joint Space Operations Center, and their Service/agency 

leadership. They coordinate with each other as required to ensure operational effectiveness. 

(2) Sustainment, Remediation, and Recovery. JFC mission-essential tasks to 

support DODIN operations include: 

(a) Monitor and protect network capabilities in support of joint operations. 

(b) Prioritize network assets for defense and recovery of JFC cyberspace 

capabilities (e.g., critical systems for priority restoral, alternative paths, backups). 

(c) Assess operational impact of network disruptions and identify alternatives. 

(d) Respond to network outages/intrusions/attacks. 

(e) Dynamically reallocate network traffic to meet bandwidth and data priority 

requirements and mitigate attacks or other deleterious events. 

3. Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations 

a. Clearly established command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and 

effective employment of forces. As authorized by CDRUSSTRATCOM, 

CDRUSCYBERCOM manages day-to-day global CO. Typically, CO require coordination 

between theater and global operations, creating a dynamic C2 environment. CO are 

integrated and synchronized by the supported commander into their CONOPS, detailed plans 

and orders, and specific joint offensive and defensive operations. The GCC is generally the 

supported commander for CO with first order effects with their AOR. Similarly, 

CDRUSSTRATCOM/CDRUSCYBERCOM is generally the supported commander at the 

global or transregional (across AOR boundaries) level. C2 of DODIN operations and DCO 

may require pre-determined and preauthorized actions based on meeting particular 

conditions and triggers, executed either manually or automatically if the nature of the threat 

requires instantaneous response. The JFC and planners should understand these command 

relationships, how they are derived and employed, and when necessary, how to deconflict 

them without compromising other operations. Forces conducting CO may simultaneously 

support multiple users. This requires extensive coordination, planning, and early integration 

of requirements and capabilities. Supported and supporting commanders coordinate, as 

appropriate, the deployment and employment of forces conducting CO required to 

accomplish the assigned mission. Some CO forces may be geographically separated from a 

particular supported theater of operations. Such cases require all involved commanders to 

take extra measures to ensure the supported commander is continuously aware of the remote 

supporting forces’ operational status. 
Planning and Coordination 

IV-7 

b. Forces providing global CO capabilities may need to support multiple CCMDs nearly 

simultaneously. Reachback to these capabilities allows faster adaptation to rapidly changing 

needs. At the same time, GCCs must be able to effectively conduct theater CO in order to 

operate and defend tactical and constructed networks. They must also be able to synchronize 

cyberspace activities related to accomplishing their operational objectives. In order to do 

that, some CO capabilities supporting synchronization may need to be forward deployed. 

However, CCMDs should retain knowledge and expertise required to support effective 

reachback within the CCMD, typically through the CCMD’s JCC. 

c. The Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control (C2) Concepts of 

Operations (CONOPS) provides an interim framework (see Figure IV-1) to standardize 

cyberspace C2 mechanics and allow a more studied approach to achieve an enduring C2 

architecture that defines global, regional, and functional cyberspace operational lanes; 

enables unity of effort; and allows CCMDs to use current authorities to conduct timely 

operations. The C2 CONOPS stresses the need for partnership among all DOD 

organizations conducting operations across the three cyberspace LOOs of: DODIN 

operations, DCO, and OCO. 

(1) CCDRs should size and structure the JCC to best support mission and CCMD 

requirements. CCMDs, through their JCC, supported by the CSE coordinate CO 

requirements and capabilities throughout their planning, operations, intelligence, targeting, 

and readiness processes in order to integrate and synchronize CO with all other military 

operations. Additionally, in partnership with USSTRATCOM, the JCC engages and 

coordinates regionally with interagency and multinational partners (as necessary). The JCC 

will: 

(a) Combine inputs from USCYBERCOM with information about CCMD 

tactical and/or constructed networks to provide a regional/functional SA/COP tailored to 

CCMD requirements. 

(b) Facilitate, through USCYBERCOM, coordination and deconfliction of 

CCDR directed CO which may impact or conflict with other DOD or other USG cyberspace 

activities or operations within the AOR or DOD information networks. As early as possible 

in the planning process, provide USCYBERCOM with sufficient information about CCDR 

planned CO to enable deconfliction with USG CO. 

(2) CSEs are organized to meet individual CCMD requirements and facilitate and 

coordinate all three cyberspace LOOs. The dual function of the CSE, as a forward element 

of USCYBERCOM, provides direct support to CCMDs and enables USCYBERCOM to 

support centralized, global CO. CSEs provide reachback for support from USCYBERCOM 

and its Service components, bridging theater/tactical and global/national cyberspace forces 

and operations. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-12 

d. For a subordinate force, the specific cyberspace element to support the force 

will be determined by the establishing CCDR and the JFC in coordination with 

USCYBERCOM. 

Figure IV-1. Cyberspace Command and Control Organizational Construct 

Cyberspace Command and Control Organizational Construct

Legend

COCOM

OPCON

TACON

ADCON

supporting

direct support

ADCON administrative control

AFCY Air Forces Cyber Command

ARCY Army Cyber Command

CCDR combatant commander

CCMD combatant command

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DNC DISA network center

FLTCY Fleet Cyber Command

JCC joint cyberspace center

MAR4CY Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace 

Command

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NOSC network operations and security center

TNCC theater network coordination center

NSA National Security Agency

OPCON operational control

TACON tactical control

TNC theater network center

USCYBERCOM United States Cyberspace Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

Joint Task Force

*Representational of JCC’s relationship with DISA’s sub-element.

24th 

Air 

Force

10th 

Fleet

2nd 

Army

ARCY AFCY FLTCY MAR4CY

MAR4CY

Services

USSRATCOM

CCDR and 

Headquarters 

Staff DIA, NSA, 

NGA, etc.

Service Cyberspace 

Components

CCMD Joint 

Cyberspace 

Center

Cyberspace 

Support 

Element

Services 

NOSC

Joint Task Force

Components

TNCC*

DISA

DNC

(TNC)

USCYBERCOM

Global Steady-State

Contingency

Combat Support 

Agencies
Planning and Coordination 

IV-9 

e. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, ALLIED FORCE, and UNIFIED 

PROTECTOR highlight that the US military will likely enter into conflict as part of a joint or 

multinational force. Planning for the specific C2 elements desired by the JFC will depend on 

the type and scale of the operation, the cyberspace presence or sophistication of the 

adversary, and the types of cyberspace targets identified. Regardless of what elements are 

established, the overlaps between global and theater missions in cyberspace, and the 

constraints and restraints on personnel conducting CO necessitate close coordination 

between the CCDR, CDRUSSTRATCOM, and other allied and interagency partners for the 

effective synchronization of CO. 

4. Synchronization of Cyberspace Operations 

The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational collaboration, as well as constant 

vigilance upon initiation, to ensure that activities in cyberspace and throughout the OE are 

coordinated and deconflicted in advance. One key to this is maintaining cyberspace SA and 

assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including security 

posture, changes in configuration, or observed I&W of adversary activity. Planners and 

operators must also understand how operations within the OE may impact the JFC’s CO 

efforts, and vice versa. Fire support coordination measures are a method that the joint force 

plans and uses in the air, land, and maritime domains which facilitate the rapid engagement 

of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Deconfliction and 

coordination efforts in or through cyberspace should include similar measures: 

a. Deconfliction of the JFC’s intended OCO, their activities, and the techniques planned 

to create these effects with other commands and agencies that may have equities in the same 

area of cyberspace is required. From a technical and operational perspective, deconfliction 

requires detailed analysis of each of the capabilities whose interoperability is being 

considered, as well as that of the target environment, to ensure the desired effects are 

achieved without unintended consequences. Additionally, the timelines required for analysis 

and coordination should be considered and included in the plan. 

b. Planners should maintain awareness of the EMS and its impact on mobile devices 

and wireless networks, including cellular, wireless local area network, Global Positioning 

System, and other commercial and military uses of the EMS. CO and EA, to include 

offensive space control, must be deconflicted. Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact 

OCO utilizing the EMS. Depending upon power levels, the terrain in which they are used, 

and the nature of the system being targeted, unintended effects of EA can also occur outside 

of a local commander’s AOR just as second order effects of CO may occur outside the AOR. 

c. Minimizing vulnerabilities to the joint force caused by cyberspace applications. 

Coordinated joint force operations benefit from the use of various applications, including 

Web sites used for public affairs and strategic communication. Forward deployed forces 

also use the Internet, mobile phones, and instant messaging for logistics, morale purposes, 

and to communicate with friends and families. These DOD classified and unclassified 

networks are targeted by myriad actors, from foreign nations to malicious insiders. The 

JFC must work with DISA, the Services, and USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM as well as 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-12 

assigned forces to limit the threat to US and partner nations’ networks. Several areas of 

concern exist for the JFC: 

(1) Insider threats are one of the most significant threats to the joint force. Because 

insiders have a trusted relationship with access to the DODIN, any malicious activity can be 

much more far reaching than external entities attempting to gain access. Malicious insiders 

may exploit their access at the behest of foreign governments, terrorist groups, criminal 

elements, unscrupulous associates, or on their own initiative. Whether malicious insiders are 

committing espionage, making a political statement, or expressing personal disgruntlement, 

the consequences for DOD, and national security, can be devastating. JFCs must consider 

risk mitigation measures for this threat, such as reinforcing training of the joint force to be 

alert for suspicious insider activity. 

(2) Internet-based capabilities, including e-mail, social networking, and Web sites 

are used for both official and unofficial purposes and pose security risks that are not fully 

understood. The security risks of Internet-based capabilities are often obscured and 

mitigation of these risks is limited, due to the nongovernmental ownership of the majority of 

the supporting information systems or sites. These IA and OPSEC concerns, combined with 

bandwidth requirements of Internet applications, create an imperative for the JFC to be 

aware of and actively manage the impact of Internet-based capabilities. 

(3) Cross-domain solutions between systems classified at different levels 

complicate cryptographic and other security support considerations, and should be included 

in planning consideration. These cross-domain solutions are often required in multinational 

operations and at the tactical level. The pace of operations and increasing demand for 

information from commanders and their staffs can coerce end-users into poor security 

practices. Likewise, emergent tasking for information sharing can exert pressure on network 

managers to build ad hoc networks over existing commercial infrastructure, or connect nonDOD US and partner networks without adequate security controls. USSTRATCOM and 

USCYBERCOM will work with JFCs to develop appropriate technical solutions and detailed 

security policies to address these needs. Planners should include requirements for early 

coordination to ensure that appropriate security features are included that meet the JFCs 

needs. 

(4) CO also need to be deconflicted and synchronized with STO. Information 

related to STO and its contribution to CO can be obtained from the STO planners at CCMD 

or Service component headquarters. 

5. Assessment of Cyberspace Operations 

a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. The focus is on measuring progress toward the end state and delivering 

relevant reliable feedback into the planning process to adjust operations during execution. 

Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to 

determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment 

helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving 

objectives, or performing tasks. Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progress 
Planning and Coordination 

IV-11 

of operations and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Based on their assessment, 

commanders adjust operations to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is 

achieved. Appendix D, “Assessment,” of JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes the 

assessment process in detail. Additional assessment process information can be found in 

Appendix F, “The Assessment Process,” of JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

For more information on BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment, see JP 3-60, Joint 

Targeting, and Defense Intelligence Agency Publication DI-2820-4-03, Battle Damage 

Assessment (BDA) Quick Guide. 

(1) Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). MOEs are used to assess changes in system 

behavior, capability, or the OE. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of 

an objective, or creation of an effect. When expressed quantitatively, MOEs generally 

reflect a trend or show progress toward a measurable threshold. While MOEs may be harder 

to derive than measures of performance (MOPs) for a discrete task, they are nonetheless 

essential to effective assessment. 

(2) MOPs. MOPs are criteria for measuring task performance or accomplishment. 

MOPs are generally quantitative, and are used in most aspects of combat assessment, which 

typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine 

accomplishment of tactical tasks. 

For more information on assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 3-60, 

Joint Targeting. Each publication describes the assessment process in detail and includes an 

appendix on the subject. 

b. Assessment of CO at the Operational Level

(1) The operational level planner is concerned with the accumulation of tactical 

effects into an overall operational effect. At the operational level, objectives and desired 

effects are developed by the JFC’s staff and are used to develop tasks to subordinates. 

Subordinate staffs use the assigned tasks to develop tactical-level objectives, tasks, 

subordinate targeting objectives and effects, and plan tactical actions and MOPs/MOEs for 

those actions. Tactical actions typically must combine with other tactical actions to create 

operational level effects; however, they can have operational or strategic implications. 

Usually the summation of tactical actions in an operational theater will be used to conduct an 

operational level assessment which in turn supports the strategic level assessment (as 

required). 

(2) Operational MOPs/MOEs avoid tactical information overload by providing 

commanders a shorthand method of tracking tactical actions and maintaining SA. MOPs and 

MOEs must be clearly definable and measurable, should be selected to support and enhance 

the commander’s decision process, and guide future actions toward achieving objectives and 

end states. 

(3) CO are a recent addition in the development of operational level 

MOPs/MOEs. In some cases, activities in cyberspace alone will have operational level 

effects; for example, the use of a cyberspace attack to bring down or corrupt the adversary 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-12 

headquarters network could very well reverberate through the entire JOA. A CO option 

may be preferable in some cases. 

(4) Assessments in cyberspace may be unique in that the normal assessment cell 

will not typically have the capabilities or expertise to assess CO; CO will typically involve 

multiple commands, such as the supported JFC, CDRUSCYBERCOM, and possibly other 

functional supporting JFCs. Additionally, with CO typically being conducted as part of a 

larger operation, assessment of CO will need to be conducted in the context of supporting the 

overarching JFC objectives. Therefore, CO assessments will require close coordination 

within each staff and across multiple commands. Coordination and federation of the 

assessment efforts will often require arrangements that need to be in place prior to execution. 

c. Navigation Warfare Considerations in CO Planning. CO produces NAVWAR 

effects by assuring friendly access and/or denying enemy access to positioning, navigation, 

and timing information transmitted by global navigation satellite system (GNSS) or other 

radio navigation aid signals. Creation of global and theater NAVWAR effects is attained 

through the coordinated employment of CO, EW, and space operations. 

6. Interorganizational Considerations 

a. JFCs begin to coordinate and, when appropriate, integrate their activities with other 

agencies before and during joint operation planning. Integrating the interagency community 

effectively is vital to successful military operations, especially during theater shaping, 

stability, and transition to civil authority phases of an operation. Just as JFCs and their staffs 

must consider how the capabilities of other USG and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing military missions and broader national 

strategic objectives, JFCs should also consider the capabilities and priorities of interagency 

partners in planning and executing CO. Through JS and USCYBERCOM, JFCs should 

coordinate with interagency representatives during planning to ensure appropriate 

agreements exist to support their plans. 

b. At the national level, the National Security Council, with its policy coordination 

committees and interagency working groups, advises and assists the President on all aspects 

of national security policy. OSD and JS, in consultation with the Services and CCMDs, must 

ensure any interagency support required outside the AOR is fully coordinated to support the 

JFC’s plans and orders. While supported CCDRs are the focal points for interagency 

coordination in support of operations in their AORs, interagency coordination with 

supporting commanders is also important. At the operational level, commanders should 

consider and integrate interagency capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations that 

interagency partners can realistically commit to the effort. 

c. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team to 

promote unified action. A number of factors can complicate the coordination process, 

including the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles 

and responsibilities, procedures, and decision-making processes. The JFC must ensure that 

interagency planners clearly understand military capabilities, requirements, operational 

limitations, liaison, and legal considerations. Additionally, planners should understand the 
Planning and Coordination 

IV-13 

nature of this relationship and the types of support interagency partners can provide. In the 

absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve 

unity of effort. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission 

accomplishment. 

d. Interagency command relationships, lines of authority, and planning processes can 

vary greatly from those of DOD. Interagency management techniques often involve 

committees, steering groups, and/or interagency working groups organized along functional 

lines. During joint operations, a JIACG provides the CCDR and subordinate JFCs with an 

increased capability to coordinate with other USG departments and agencies. The JIACG is 

composed of USG civilian and military experts tailored to meet the CCDR’s specific needs 

and assigned to the CCDR’s staff. The JIACG establishes regular, timely, and collaborative 

working relationships between civilian and military operational planners providing a CCDR 

with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with USG civilian agencies and 

departments. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, and security 

cooperation planning. Additionally, they provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent 

organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary 

organizations. 

e. Planning and Coordination with Other Agencies. A supported commander is 

responsible for developing interagency coordination requirements and mechanisms for each 

OPLAN. The JFC should supply the interagency partners with the capabilities that military 

planners have determined to be required and the shared understanding of the situation and 

common activities required to achieve the objective. This enables interagency planners to 

more rigorously plan their efforts in concert with the military, to suggest other activities or 

partners that could contribute to the operation, and to better determine any support 

requirements. 

7. Multinational Considerations 

a. Collective security is a strategic goal of the US, and joint operation planning will 

frequently be accomplished within the context of operation planning for multinational 

operations. There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance or 

coalition develops its own protocols and plans. US planning for joint operations must 

accommodate and complement such protocols and plans. JFCs must also anticipate and 

incorporate planning factors such as domestic and international laws, regulations, and 

operational limitations on the use of various weapons and tactics. 

b. When working within a multinational task force, each country and Service can expect 

to be tasked by the commander with the mission(s) most suited to their particular 

capabilities. CO planning, coordination, and execution items that must be considered when a 

multinational force campaign or OPLAN is developed include: 

(1) National agendas for each country of the multinational force may differ 

significantly from those of the US, creating potential difficulties in determining the CO 

objectives. 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-12 

(2) Differing national standards and laws pertaining to sovereignty in cyberspace 

may affect willingness or the legality of their participation in certain CO. These differences 

may be reflected in policies or capabilities that are either narrower or broader than those of 

the US. 

(3) In a US-led multinational force, countries without established CO doctrine may 

need to be advised of the benefits of CO and assisted in integrating CO into the planning 

process. 

(4) Nations in a multinational force will often require approval of the CO portion of 

plans and orders from higher authority, which may significantly impede CO implementation. 

Additionally, this national-level approval requirement increases potential constraints and 

restraints upon the participating national forces, and further lengthens the time required to 

gain national approval for their participation. Commanders and planners should be 

particularly sensitive to national agendas and anticipate the additional time required for 

approval through this parallel national command structure. 

(5) Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of individual CO plans and 

orders with multinational partners; this may severely hamper cyberspace synchronization 

efforts. Therefore, the JFC’s staff should obtain approval for information sharing among 

partners, and then issue specific guidance on the release of classified US material to the 

multinational force as early as possible during planning. Likewise, once these information 

sharing restrictions are identified by each nation, policy should be established and 

mechanisms put in place for appropriate information sharing across the force. 

(6) There will often be IT hardware and software incompatibilities that may cause a 

slowdown in the sharing of information among multinational partners. Failure to bridge 

these incompatibilities may introduce seams, gaps, and vulnerabilities requiring additional 

DCO efforts. 

(7) To effectively conduct multinational operations, multinational partners require 

appropriate access to systems, services, and information. The US joint force strives to 

provide necessary and appropriate access and support at the lowest appropriate security 

classification level. Commanders involved in multinational operations can enable this shared 

access by engaging proper authorities early in the process to determine appropriate access 

levels, necessary services, and satisfactory means for expediting the process for foreign 

disclosure of appropriate intelligence information. 

c. Integration. In support of each multinational force, a hierarchy of bilateral or 

multilateral bodies is established to define objectives, develop strategies, and to coordinate 

strategic guidance for planning and executing multinational operations. The same is true for 

CO. Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national 

leaders integrate national and theater strategic CO planning with that of the multinational 

force whenever possible. Within the multinational structure, US participants ensure that 

objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. 

Within the US national structure, US participants ensure that international commitments are 

reflected in national military strategy and are adequately addressed in strategic guidance for 
Planning and Coordination 

IV-15 

joint operation planning. Planning with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs is often 

necessary, particularly if CO supports foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and 

other stability operations. Incorporating NGOs and their capabilities into the planning 

process requires the JFC and staff to balance NGOs’ information requirements with OPSEC. 

Additionally, many NGOs are hesitant to become associated with military organizations in 

any form of formal relationship, especially in the case of conducting CO, because doing so 

could compromise their status as an independent entity, restrict their freedom of movement 

and even place their members at risk in uncertain or hostile permissive environments. 

d. Multinational partners may use a different lexicon, assumptions, decision thresholds, 

and operational constraints pertaining to CO. All of these will affect coordination, 

integration, and execution and should be taken into consideration during planning. 

For more information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations; 

for more information on joint planning, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-12 

Intentionally Blank 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-12 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. Title 10, USC. 

b. Title 32, USC. 

c. Title 50, USC. 

d. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 7/3, Information Operations and 

Intelligence Community Related Activities. 

e. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 

f. Executive Order 12333, US Intelligence Activities. 

g. Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control (C2) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS). 

2. Strategy and Policy Documents 

a. Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. 

b. International Strategy for Cyberspace (May 2011). 

c. Unified Command Plan.

d. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO). 

e. National Policy Governing the Release of Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) 

Products or Associated INFOSEC Information to Foreign Governments. 

f. National Security Directive 42, National Policy for the Security of National Security 

Telecommunications and Information Systems.

g. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Policy for Department of Defense 

(DOD) Interactive Internet Activities, June 8, 2007. 

h. National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

i. Defense Strategic Guidance.
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-12 

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense Guidance 

Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Establishment of a Subordinate Unified US Cyber 

Command Under US Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations. 

4. Department of Defense 

a. DODD 3600.01, Information Operations (IO). 

b. DODD 5205.15E, DOD Forensic Enterprise.

c. DODD 5505.13E, DOD Executive Agent (EA) for the DOD Cyber Crime Center 

(DC3). 

d. DODD 8000.01, Management of the Department of Defense Information Enterprise. 

e. DODD 8500.01E, Information Assurance (IA). 

f. DODI 5205.13, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information Assurance 

(CS/IA) Activities. 

g. DODI 8410.02, NETOPS for the Global Information Grid (GIG). 

h. DODI O-3600.02, Information Operations (IO) Security Classification Guidance. 

i. DODI O-3600.03, Technical Assurance Standard (TAS) for Computer Network Attack 

(CNA) Capabilities. 

j. DODI O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense. 

k. DODD O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense. 

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSM 3122.07A, Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTO) 

Supplement to Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I 

(Planning and Procedures). 

b. CJCSM 3122.08A, IJSTO Supplement to Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System, Volume II. 

c. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces. 

d. CJCSI 3210.01B, Joint Information Operations Policy. 

e. CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards.

f. CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 
 References 

A-3 

g. CJCSI 6510.01F, Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network 

Defense (CND). 

h. CJCSM 6510.01A, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense 

(CND) Volume I (Incident Handling Program). 

6. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. 

c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

d. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

e. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

g. JP 3-07, Stability Operations. 

h. JP3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

i. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

j. JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare Operations. 

k. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations. 

l. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

m. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

n. JP 3-14, Space Operations. 

o. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

p. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

q. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

r. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

s. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

7. Service Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-12 

b. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-7-X, The United 

States Army’s Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028. 

c. Naval Warfare Publication 3-63, Volume I, Computer Network Operations. 

d. Field Manual (FM) 3-36, Electronic Warfare in Operations.

e. FM 3-09.32/MCWP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.

8. Supporting Documents 

a. CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN, Cyberspace Operations. 

b. CDRUSSTRATCOM Operational Concept for Cyberspace. 

c. CDRUSSTRATCOM Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid 

NETOPS. 

d. USSTRATCOM: US Cyber Command Implementation Plan. 

e. Trilateral Memorandum of Agreement Among the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community Regarding Computer Network Attack 

and Computer Network Exploitation Activities, 9 May 2007. 

f. Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 7/3, Information Operations and 

Intelligence Community Related Activities.
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint 

Staff operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff (J-7), Deputy Director, 

Joint and Coalition Warfighting, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View 

Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, 

usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff 

Director of Operations (J-3). 

3. Redaction 

This publication is a redacted version of JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 5 February 

2013, which is available on the classified Joint Electronic Library system. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted to: 

To: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-3 DDGO/J-7-JEDD// 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and 

Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support Division and info the lead agent and 

the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify JS J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in 

this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD 

Manual 5200.01, Vol. III, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified 

Information.
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-12 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs, 

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign 

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA 

Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community 

member, JS J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the CCMDs and Services.
GL-1 JP 3-12 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AOR area of responsibility 

BDA battle damage assessment 

C2 command and control 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCMD combatant command 

CDRUSCYBERCOM Commander, United States Cyber Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CI counterintelligence 

CI/KR critical infrastructure/key resources 

CIO chief information officer 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CNCI Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 

CNE computer network exploitation 

CO cyberspace operations 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan 

COP common operational picture 

CSE cyberspace support element 

DCI defense critical infrastructure 

DCO defensive cyberspace operations 

DCO-RA defensive cyberspace operations response actions 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIB defense industrial base 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DODIN Department of Defense information networks 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

EA electronic attack 

EMS electromagnetic spectrum 

EW electronic warfare 

EXORD execute order 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GNSS global navigation satellite system 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-12 

I&W indications and warning 

IA information assurance 

IAW in accordance with 

IC intelligence community 

ICT information and communications technology 

IGL intelligence gain/loss 

IM information management 

IO information operations 

IP internet protocol 

IR intelligence requirement 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IT information technology 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-7 operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint 

staff 

JCC joint cyberspace center 

JFC joint force commander 

JFE joint fires element 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JS the Joint Staff 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTL joint target list 

JTWG joint targeting working group 

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 

LE law enforcement 

LOO line of operation 

MILDEC military deception 

MISO military information support operations 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

NAVWAR navigation warfare 

NCSD National Cyber Security Division (DHS) 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NMS-CO National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSA/CSS National Security Agency/Central Security Service 
Glossary 

GL-3 

OCO offensive cyberspace operations 

OE operational environment 

OPE operational preparation of the environment 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PCA Posse Comitatus Act 

PPD Presidential policy directive 

RFI request for information 

SA situational awareness 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

STO special technical operations 

TCPED tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination 

TST time-sensitive target 

URL uniform resource locater 

USC United States Code 

USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USG United States Government 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 
GL-4 JP 3-12 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

computer intrusion. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

computer intrusion detection. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

computer simulation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

cyberspace. A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 

interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, 

including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 

processors and controllers. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

cyberspace superiority. The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits 

the secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, 

maritime, and space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by 

an adversary. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

defensive cyberspace operation response action. Deliberate, authorized defensive 

measures or activities taken outside of the defended network to protect and defend 

Department of Defense cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems. Also called 

DCO-RA. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

defensive cyberspace operations. Passive and active cyberspace operations intended to 

preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, 

net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems. Also called DCO. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

Department of Defense information network operations. Operations to design, build, 

configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense networks to 

create and preserve information assurance on the Department of Defense information 

networks. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

Department of Defense information networks. The globally interconnected, end-to-end 

set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, 

storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy 

makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased communications and 

computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security 

services, other associated services, and national security systems. Also called DODIN. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

information assurance. Actions that protect and defend information systems by ensuring 

availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Also called 

IA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

offensive cyberspace operations. Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the 

application of force in or through cyberspace. Also called OCO. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.)