area handbook series 

Cuba 

a country study 
Cuba 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 

Library of Congress 

Edited by 

Rex A. Hudson 

Research Completed 

April 2001 
On the cover: La Iglesia de San Francisco de Asis (Church of 

San Francisco) and the plaza fountain in La Habana Vieja 

(Old Havana), 1997 

Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 

Fourth Edition, First Printing, 2002. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Cuba: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Rex A Hudson - 4th ed. 

p. cm. - (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA pam; 

550-152) 

"Research completed April 2001." 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 


ISBN 0-8444-1045-4 (hc : alk. paper) 


1. Cuba. I. Hudson, Rex A, 1947- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam; 550-152 

F1758.C94875 2002 

972.91-dc21 

2002018893 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

DAPam 550-152 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 


Washington, D.C. 20402 

Foreword 

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages ofthis 

book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 

national security systems and institutions, and examining the 

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 

shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written 

by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors 

seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, 

striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular 

attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 

their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and 

extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 

political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 

not be construed as an expression of an official United States 

government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Robert L. Worden 

Chief 

Federal Research Division 

Library of Congress 

Washington, DC 20540-4840 

E-mail: frds@loc.gov 

"," 

III 

Acknowledgments 

This fourth edition of Cuba: A Country Study supersedes the 

1987 edition edited by James D. Rudolph. The authors 

acknowledge any general background information that the 

1987 edition may have provided for the present volume, which 

is a completely new edition. 

Enrique J. Lopez is gratefully acknowledged for providing 

the section on telecommunications in chapter three. The book 

editor would also like to thank the chapter authors for reviewing and commenting on various chapters of this volume. Their 

shared expertise contributed greatly to its overall quality. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of 

the United States government and international organizations, 

including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as 

scholars affiliated with universities or other institutions, who 

offered their time, special knowledge, or research facilities and 

materials to provide information and perspective. None of 

these individuals is, however, in any way responsible for the 

work or points of view of the authors. 

The book editor would also like to thank members of the 

Federal Research Division who contributed directly to the 

preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials, served as 

liaison with the sponsoring agency, provided numerous substantive and technical contributions, and prepared the index; 

Marilyn L. Majeska, who provided substantive editing and managed editing and production; Janie L. Gilchrist, who did the 

word processing and prepared the camera-ready copy; and 

Stephen C. Cranton, who provided automation and typesetting 

support. 

The firm of Maryland Mapping and Graphics prepared the 

book's maps and charts based on the book editor's drafts, as 

well as the photographs and illustrations for the cover and 

chapter title pages. 

Finally, the book editor acknowledges the generosity of the 

individuals and the United States Government, diplomatic, 

and international agencies and organizations who allowed 

their photographs to be used in this study. 

v 

Contents 

Page 

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UI 

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. v 


Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XUI 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations. . . . . . xv 


Table B. Chronology ofImportant Events........... XXI 


Country Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. xxxi 

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. xlvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 


Jaime Suchlicki 

THE EARLYYEARS, 1492-1520 ........................ 6 


Sugar, Prosperity, and Unrest in the Nineteenth 


Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 


The Indigenous Peoples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 


Spanish Conquest and Colonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 


THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1520-1898 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 


Administration and Economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 


Life and Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 


The British Occupation, 1762-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 


Century..................................... 18 


TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, 1868-1902. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 


The Ten Years' War, 1868-78. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 


1895-1902. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 


United States Involvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 


THE REPUBLIC, 1902-59 ............................. 34 


The Platt Amendment Years, 1902-34. . . . . . . . . . . . 34 


An Attempt at Revolution, 1933-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 


The Failure of Reformism, 1944-52. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 


Background to Revolution, 1952-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 


THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1959­ ................... 64 


Fidel Castro Takes Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 


VII 
Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 


The Unchanging Revolution, 1980-89. . . . . . . . . . . . 79 


PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN THE POST-SOVIET 


ERA.............................................. 85 


Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment. . . . . . . . . 89 


Sergio Diaz-Briquets 

PHYSICAL AND NATURAL SETTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 


Principal Geographic Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 


Topography and Drainage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 


Climate and Precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 


ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 100 


Economic Policy and Regulatory Environment. . .. 101 


Land Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 102 


Agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 103 


Water Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 105 


Forestry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 107 


Mining........................................ 108 


Urban and Industrial Pollution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 108 


Environmental Consequences of the Special 


Period, 1990-2000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 109 


DEMOGRAPHy....................................... 110 


Population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 110 


Demographic Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 113 


Migration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117 


RACIAL COMPOSITION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117 


PREREVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY ........................ 120 


SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION. . . . .. 122 


MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIALIZATION. . . . . . . .. 124 


Committee for the Defense of the Revolution . . . .. 125 


Women's and Youth Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 126 


Other Mass Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 127 


The Military. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 128 


The Family Institution .......................... 129 


RELIGION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 131 


The Roman Catholic Church. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 132 


Mro-Christian Rites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 134 


Other Religions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 135 


Religion in the Special Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 136 


Vlll 
Social Consequences of the Papal Visit of 


January 1998 ................................. 137 


HEALTH 

Remittances and Closer Bonds with the Emigre 


............................................. 138 


EDUCATION ......................................... 144 


SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SPECIAL PERIOD. . .. 149 


Health and Education ........................... 149 


The Social Safety Net. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 151 


Employment Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 151 


Community ................................ " 152 


Tourism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 152 


OUTLOOK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 154 


Chapter 3. The Economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 157 


Jorge Perez-Lopez 

PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 161 


Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 161 


The Economic Crisis of the 1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 163 


Economic Reforms .............................. 166 


STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179 


Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179 


Key Economic Sectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 180 


Labor .......................................... 200 


The Second Economy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 205 


FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 207 


Background, 1960-90 ........................... 207 


Foreign Trade and Finance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 211 


Investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 218 


ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 221 


Chapter 4. Government and Politics ................. 225 


Jorge I. Dominguez 

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ......................... 229 


The Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 230 


National Assembly of People's Power. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 231 


Council of State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 235 


Council of Ministers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 237 


Courts ......................................... 238 


Provincial and Local Government ................ 240 


National and Local Elections ..................... 243 


COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA. ........................ 245 


IX 
Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 245 


Political Bureau and Central Committee. . . . . . . . .. 249 


Party Organization, Membership, and Role ....... 254 


MASS ORGANIZATIONS .............................. 256 


CML ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 259 


Religion and the State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 259 


Nongovernmental Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 263 


Human Rights and Opposition Groups. . . . . . . . . .. 265 


MASS MEDIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 267 


POLITICAL PROCESSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 268 


Emerging Political Leaders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 268 


Political Aspects of the Security and Military 


Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 270 


The Widening of Public Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 271 


FOREIGN RELATIONS ............................... , 274 


OUTLOOK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 279 


Chapter 5. National Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 283 


Phyllis Greene Walker 

BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED 


FORCES, 1959-91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 287 


Institutional Consolidation in the 1960s. . . . . . . . . .. 287 


CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND TREATY 


THE UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION AT GUAN-


The Era of "Internationalism," 1970-91 . . . . . . . . . .. 291 


MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES.. 295 


Organizational Changes of 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 295 


Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s. .. 298 


THE MILITARY IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY. . . .. 301 


OBLIGATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 304 


TANAMO BAY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 308 


THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 310 


Doctrine of the War ofAll the People. . . . . . . . . . . .. 312 


Territorial Troops Militia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 312 


Civil Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 314 


Revolutionary Army...................... ....... 315 


Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force.. 319 


Revolutionary Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 320 


Conscription and Personnel Resources . . . . . . . . . .. 322 


Professional Training and Education . . . . . . . . . . . .. 325 


Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 328 


x 
Relations with Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 333 


Relations with Other Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 334 


MINISTRYOF INTERIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 335 


Leadership and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 335 


SpecialTroops.................................. 337 


Border Guard Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 338 


National Revolutionary Police. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 340 


Intelligence Directorate ......................... 341 


CRIME AND PUNISHMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 344 


General Crime Trends........................... 344 


Drug Trafficking and Narcotics-Related Problems.. 346 


The Problem of Illegal Emigration and Refugee 


Smuggling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 350 


Human Rights and Political Prisoners. . . . . . . . . . . .. 353 


Penal System ......................... . . . . . . . . .. 356 


OUTLOOK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 362 


Appendix. Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 365 


Bibliography. ........................................ 391 


Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 425 


Index................................................ 439 


Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 451 


List of Figures 

1 Administrative Units, 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. xlvi 


2 Topography and Drainage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 96 


5 Minerals, Natural Gas, Petroleum, and Thermal 


8 Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba 


3 Population Distribution by Age-Group and Sex ....... 116 


4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1995....... 166 


Resources, 1996. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 188 


6 Transportation System, 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 194 


7 Central Administrative Structure, 200l. .............. 232 


(Partido Comunista de Cuba-PCC), 200l. . . . . . . .. 250 


9 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 330 


10 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1999 ................... 331 


xi 

Preface 

Like its predecessor, published in 1987, this study is an 

attempt to examine objectively and concisely the dominant historical, social, environmental, economic, governmental, political, and national security aspects of contemporary Cuba. The 

views expressed are those of the authors and should not be 

construed as representing the views of the United States Government. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book and 

list sources thought by the chapter authors to be particularly 

helpful to the reader. Brief comments on sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. 

To the extent possible, place-names follow the system adopted 

by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN). Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is 

provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements 

(see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. 

The body of the text generally reflects information available 

as ofApril 2001. The introduction, in addition to providing historical perspective on Cuba's hemispheric relations, discusses 

significant events that occurred between the completion of 

research and mid-2002. The Country Profile generally reflects 

information contained in the chapters. Statistics contained in 

the tables or figures reflect the most current data available at 

the time. 

Although there are many variations, Spanish surnames most 

often consist of two parts: a patrilineal name followed by a 

matrilineal name. In the instance of President Fidel Castro 

Ruz, Castro is his father's name, and Ruz is his mother's 

maiden name. In nonformal use, Cubans very often drop the 

matrilineal name. Thus, after the first mention the president is 

referred to simply as Castro. (His brother is referred to as Raul 

Castro on second mention in order to avoid confusion.) 

Some literature on Cuba refers to the Cuban Revolution as 

the guerrilla struggle that culminated in the fall of Fulgencio 

Batista y Zaldivar during the last days of 1958 and the first days 

of 1959. In this book, the Cuban Revolution refers to a historical process that began on January 1, 1959, and continues into 

the present. This definition, as well as the practice of uppercasXlll 
ing "Revolution" in this context, conforms with official Cuban 

government practice and with much scholarly literature. 

Whenever possible, names, abbreviations, and acronyms of 

organizations or terms conform to official Cuban government 

use, as indicated in sources such as the Havana telephone 

directory, and official United States Government use, as compiled by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). 

For example, although the plural form of Committees for the 

Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) generally refers to the thousands of block CDRs, the national committee that heads these 

CDRs is listed officially in Cuban and United States Government reference sources as the Committee for the Defense of 

the Revolution (Comite de Defensa la la Revoluci6n-CDR). 

Thus, the singular of the abbreviation is used to distinguish the 

national committee from the block CDRs. 

XIV 
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term 

AlC 

AlDS 

AlE 

ALADI 

ANAP 

ANPP 

AT&T 

BCC 

BFI 

BNC 

BRR 

Cadeca 

Caricom 

Caritas 

CCDRN 

CCPDH 

CDA 

CDR 

CEA 

CEATM 

CEB 

CEPAL 

CETSS 

ClEM 

CIGB 

Cimex 

CIPS 

CIS 

CMEA (see Comecon) 

CNN 

Agrupaci6n Independiente de Color (Independent Colored 

Association) 

acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student Left Wing) 

Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n (Latin American 

Integration Association) 

Asociaci6n Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos (National 

Association of Small Farmers) 

Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular (National Assembly of 

People's Power) 

American Telephone and Telegraph Company 

Banco Central de Cuba (Cuban Central Bank) 

Banco Financiero Internacional (International Financial 

Bank) 

Banco Nacional de Cuba (Cuban National Bank) 

Brigadas de Respuesta Rapida (Rapid Response Brigades) 

Casas de Cambio (Exchange Houses) 

Caribbean Community and Common Market 

Catholic Relief Services 

Comit!' Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos y Reconciliaci6n 

Nacional (Cuban Committee for Human Rights and 

National Reconciliation) 

Comit!' Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos (Cuban Committee 

for Human Rights) 

Cuban Democracy Act 

Comit!' de Defensa de la Revoluci6n (Committee for the 

Defense of the Revolution) 

Centro de Estudios sobre Am!'rica (Center for American 

Studies) 

Comit!' Estatal de Abastecimiento T!'cnico-Material (State 

Committee for Technical and Material Supply) 

Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base (Ecclesiastical Base Communities) 

Comisi6n Economica para America Latina 

Comit!' Estatal de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (State Committee on Labor and Social Security) 

Centro de Investigaciones de la Economia Mundial (Center 

for the Study of the World Economy) 

Centro de Ingenieria Gen!'tica y Biotecnologia (Center for 

Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology) 

Compania Importadora-Exportadora (Import-Export Company) 

Centro de Investigaciones Psicol6gicas y Sociol6gicas (Center 

for Psychological and Sociological Research) 

Commonwealth of Independent States 

Cable News Network 

xv 
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term 

Comarna 

Comecon 

CPA 

CTC 

Cnbalse 

Cubana 

Cubanacan 

DA 

DAAFAR 

DCI 

DCI 

DCPI 

DEP 

DEU 

DGG 

DGI 

DGSP 

DGTE 

DI 

DI 

OPEl 

DPNR 

DRI 

DSE 

DT 

ECAM 

ECLAC 

Comision Nacional para la Proteccion del Medio Ambiente y 

la Conservacion de los Recursos Naturales (National Commission for Environmental Protection and Conservation of 

Natural Resources) 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

Cooperativas de Produccion Agropecuaria (Agricultural-Livestock Cooperatives) 

Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (Cuban Workers Federation) 

Empresa para Prestacion de Servicios al Cuerpo Diplomatico 

(Diplomatic Corps Service Company) 

Empresa Consolidada Cubana de Aviacion (Consolidated 

Cuban Aviation Company) 

Corporacion de Turismo y Comercio Internacional (International Tourism and Trade Corporation) 

Departamento America (America Department) 

Defensa An tiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force) 

Direccion de Cedula de Identidad (Directorate for Identity 

Cards) 

Direccion de Contra Inteligencia (Directorate of Counterintelligence) 

Direccion de Cuadros, Personal y Instruccion (Directorate of 

Cadres, Personnel, and Instruction) 

Direccion de Establecimientos Penales (Directorate of Penitentiary Establishments) 

Directorio Estudiantil Universitario (University Students 

Directorate) 

Direccion General de Guardafronteras (General Directorate 

of Border Guards) 

Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Intelligence 

Directorate) 

Direccion General de Seguridad Personal (General Directorate of Personal Security) 

Direccion General de Tropas Especiales (General Directorate 

of Special Troops) 

Direccion de Informacion (Information Directorate) 

Direccion de Inteligencia(Directorate ofIntelligence) 

Departamento de Prevencion y Extincion de Incendios 

(Directorate for the Prevention and Extinction of Fires) 

Direccion de la Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National 

Revolutionary Police) 

Direccion de Relaciones Internacionales (International Relations Directorate) 

Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (Department of State 

Security) 

Direccion Tecnica (Technical Directorate) 

Escuela de Cadetes Interarmas General Antonio Maceo (General Antonio Maceo Joint-Service School) 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 

xvi 
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term 

EEC 

EJT 

ELN 

EMCC 

EMPA 

ETA 

ETECSA 

EU 

FAR 

FARC 

FEEM 

FEU 

FY 

FMC 

FNLA 

FSB 

FSLN 

FTAA 

GATT 

GDP 

GNB 

GNP 

GONGO 

GSP 

GTP 

HN 

IAEA 

IDI 

IISS 

ITM 

Juceplan 

KGB 

LAFTA 

LCC 

European Economic Community 


Ejercito Jnvenil de Trabajo (Youth Labor Army) 


Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional (National Liberation Army) 


Escuelas Militares Camilo Cienfuegos (Camilo Cienfuegos 


Military Schools) 

Escuela Militar de Pilotos de Aviaci6n (Aviation Pilots Military 

School) 

Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) 

Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. (Telecommunications Company of Cuba) 

European Union 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed 

Forces) 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 

Federaci6n de Estudiantes de la Enseiianza Media (Federation of Secondary School Students) 

Federaci6n Estudiantil Universitaria (Federation ofUniversity 

Students) 

fiscal year 

Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas (Federation ofCuban 

Women) 

Frente Nacional de Liberta~ao de Angola (National Front for 

the Liberation ofAngola) 

Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) 

Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n National (Sandinista 

National Liberation Front) 

Free Trade Area of the Americas 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

gross domestic product 

Grupo Nueva Banca (New Banking Group) 

gross national product 

government-operated nongovernmental organization 

global social product 

Guerra de Todo el Pueblo (War ofAll the People) 

human immunodeficiency virus 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Instituto de la Demanda Interna (Domestic Consumer 

Demand Institute) 

International Institute for Strategic Studies 

Instituto Tecnico Militar (Military Technical Institute) 

Junta Central de Planificaci6n (Central Planning Board) 

Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee for State 

Security) 

Latin American Free Trade Association 

Laboratorio Central de Criminologia (Central Laboratory of 

Criminology) 

xvii 
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term 

MCR 

MGR 

MINFAR 

MNR 

MPLA 

MPS 

MTT 

NAFTA 

NATO 

NGO 

NPT 

OAS 

OCES 

ONE 

OPJM 

PCC 

PLA 

PNR 

PPC 

PPC Orthodox 

PRC 

PRC 

PRC Authentic 

PRI 

PSP 

PUND 

SA 

SELA 

SIGINT 

SMA 

SMO 

SNA 

SNTAF 

SPE 

Movimiento Civico Revolucionario (Civic Resistance Movement) 

Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Navy) 

Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Ministry 

of the Revolutionary Armed Forces) 

Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias (National Revolutionary 

Militias) 

Movimento Popular de Liberta~ao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola) 

Material Product System 

Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (Territorial Troops Militia) 

North American Free Trade Agreement 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

nongovernmental organization 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

Organization of American States 

Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States 

Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas (National Statistical Office) 

Organizaci6n de PionerosJose Marti (Organization ofJose 

Marti Pioneers) 

Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba) 

Chinese Popular Liberation Army 

Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary 

Police) 

Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Cuban People's Party) 

Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) (Cuban People's 

Party) (Orthodox) 

People's Republic of China 

Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party) 

Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autentico) (Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) 

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) 

Partido Socialista Popular (People's Socialist Party) 

Partido de Unidad Nacional Democratico (Democratic 

National Unity Party) 

soeiedades an6nimas (quasi-private companies) 

Sistema Econ6mica Latino Americana (Latin American Economic System) 

signals intelligence 

Servicio Militar Activo (Active Military Service) 

Servicio Militar Obligatorio (Obligatory Military Sef\~ce) 

System of National Accounts 

Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y Forestales 

(National Trade Union ofAgricultural and Forestry Workers) 

Sistema de Perfeccionarniento Empresarial (System for Managerial Improvement) 

XVlll 
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term 

SUPV Sistema Unificado de Prevencion y Vigilancia (Unified Prevention and Vigilance System) 

TGF Tropas Guardafronteras (Border Guard Troops) 

TSP Tribunal Supremo Popular (Supreme Court of Cuba) 

UBPC Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa (Basic Units of 

Cooperative Production) 

UJC Union de Jovenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communists) 

UMAP Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion (Military Units 

in Support of Production) 

UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights 

UNDP United Nations Development Programme 

Uneca Union de Empresas de Construccion del Caribe (Union of 

Caribbean Construction Enterprises) 

UNlTA Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola 

(National Union for the Total Independence ofAngola) 

URC Union Revolucionaria Comunista (Communist Revolutionary 

Union) 

USTEC United States-Cuba Trade and Economic Council 

xix 

Table B. Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

PREHISTORY 

c. 1000 B.C.-c. 1000 A.D. 

c. 800-c. 1450 

FIFTEENTH CENTURY 

October 27, 1492 

SIXTEENTH CENTURY 

1508 

1511-24 

1515 

1519 

1522-33 

1523--24 

1538 

1553 

1555 

1592 

1595 

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 

1607 

1628 

1662 

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 

1715 

August 17, 1917 

1723 

1728 

1733 

1748 

Ciboney Indians migrate to central-western Cuba. 

Successive migrations ofArawak Indians (sub-Taino and 

Taino) largely displace Ciboney. 

Christopher Columbus discovers and explores Cuba. 

Sebastian de Ocampo circumnavigates and explores the island. 

Diego Velazquez de Cuellar conquers the Indians and establishes various settlements, including Baracoa, the first settlement, established in 1512. 

Santiago de Cuba is established as the Cuban capital. 

San Cristobal de Habana is relocated from its original site on 

the Gulf of Batabano on the south coast to its present location on the north coast. 

The last major indigenous peoples' uprising is suppressed. 

Blacks are brought from Mrica to work the mines and fields. 

La Habana (hereafter Havana) becomes the seat of government. 

Santiago de Cuba is selected formally as the capital of the 

island. 

The governor's seat moves from Santiago de Cuba to Havana. 

French pirate Jacques de Sores captures and burns part of 

Havana. 

Philip II declares Havana to be a city. 

Cattle raisers install sugar mills on their lands and begin sugar 

production. 

Havana is formally established as the capital of Cuba, and the 

island is organized into two governing regions. 

Dutch pirate Piet Heyn captures the Spanish fleet off the 

northern coast of Cuba. 

The English capture and ransack Santiago de Cuba. 

Political administration is centralized following the Bourbons' 

assumption of power in Spain. 

Bourbon reforms begin to be introduced into Cuba. 

More than 500 armed vegueros (tobacco farmers) march into 

Havana to protest the Spanish tobacco monopoly. 

The first Cuban printing press is established. 

The University of Havana (Real y Pontificia Universidad de 

San Jeronimo de La Habana) is founded. 

Havana assumes jurisdiction over all Cuban administrative 

units. 

Havana is established as a bishopric. 

xxi 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

1762 

1763 

1789 

1790 

1791 

1792 

1793 

NINETEENTH CENTURY 

1808 

1809 

1812 

1814 

1817 

1818 

December 2, 1823 

1828-30 

1830s 

1837 

1844 

1848 

1854 

1865 

October 10, 1868 

April 10, 1869 

February 11, 1878 

March 15, 1878 

May 1878 

The English capture and occupy Havana and the western half 

of the island. Havana becomes an open port. 

Havana is traded back to Spain for Florida under the Treaty of 

Paris, which ends the Seven Years' War. 

Cuba is divided into two ecclesiastical jurisdictions, one in Santiago and the other in Havana. Free slave trade is authorized by royal decree. 

Cuba's first newspaper is established. 


Haitian sugar and coffee planters flee to Cuba. 


The Economic Society of Friends of Cuba (La Sociedad 


Econ6mica de Amigos del Pais) is founded. 

Cuba's first public library is established. 

ThomasJefferson attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain. 

Joaquin Infante organizes the first independence conspiracy. 

Jose Antonio Aponte organizes a conspiracy ofslaves and free 

blacks. 

Ferdinand is restored to the Spanish throne. 

England and Spain sign a treaty proclaiming the end oflegal 

slave trade effective 1820. 

A Spanish royal decree opens Cuban ports to free international trade. 

The United States issues the Monroe Doctrine. 

The Aguila Negra (Black Eagle) Conspiracy is organized. 

Spain imposes harsher authoritarian controls. 

The first railroad in Latin America commences operation in 

Cuba, linking Havana with Bejucal and Giiines. 

A slave conspiracy, called La Escalera (the ladder) because suspects are tied to ladders and whipped, is suppressed. 

PresidentJames Polk attempts to purchase Cuba. 

The United States issues the Ostend Manifesto, calling for the 

purchase of Cuba. 

The Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), Cuba's first political 

party, is organized. 

The Grito de Yara begins the Ten Years' War between Cuba 

and Spain. 

Rebels fighting Spain hold a Constituent Assembly in Gua;­

maro, where they adopt Cuba's first constitution and elect 

Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as their president. 

The Pact ofZanj6n, signed with Spain, ends the Ten Years' War 

but does not win independence for Cuba. The country is 

organized into six provinces: Pinar del Rio, La Habana, 

Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de 

Cuba. 

The Protest ofBaragua: General Antonio Maceo rejects the 

Pact of Zanj6n and calls for the abolition ofslavery. 

The Ten Years' War officially ends, after the remaining Cuban 

forces surrender. 

XXll 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

1879-80 

October 7, 1886 

1892 

May 19,1895 

December 7, 1896 

February 15, 1898 

April 25, 1898 

December 10, 1898 

January 1, 1899 

1WENTIETH CENTURY 

June 21, 1901 

Republican Period 

May 20,1902 

May 22,1903 

July 2,1903 

1904 

August 1906 

1906--09 

1908 

1912 

1912 

April 7, 1917 

1917 

1920 

1920 

La Guerra Chiquita (The Little War), a short-lived rebellion 

against Spairi, takes place. 

Spain abolishes slavery in Cuba. 

Jose Marti forms the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano--PRC) in Tampa, Florida. 

Cuba's foremost hero, poet, and visionary, Jose Marti, is killed 

on the battlefield at Dos Rios in eastern Cuba. 

Antonio Maceo, one of the most successful guerrilla leaders, is 

killed at the Battle of Punta Brava in western Cuba. 

The battleship U.S.S. Maine, anchored in Havana Harbor, 

blows up and sinks, killing 260 officers and crew. 

The United States declares war on Spain, beginning the Spanish-American War (1898). 

The United States and Spain sign the Treaty of Paris, ending 

the Spanish-American War and granting Cuba its independence. 

The United States occupies Cuba militarily, installing General 

John R. Brooke as the first United States military governor. 

The Cuban constitution is drafted, incorporating the United 

States-imposed Platt Amendment, which gives the United 

States the right to intervene in Cuba. 

The United States military occupation ends when the republic 

is proclaimed and Tomas Estrada Palma (president, 1902­

06) is sworn in as Cuba's first elected president. 

Cuba and the United States sign the Permanent Treaty, which 

incorporates the Platt Amendment. 

The follow-up United States-Cuban Treaty is signed, whereby 

Cuba agrees to lease the United States military bases in the 

port cities ofGuantanamo and Bahia Honda for an indefinite period. 

Cuba holds its first elections for national Congress. 

The August War (Guerrita de Agosto), a Liberal Party (Partido 

Liberal) uprising set off by Estrada Palma's fraudulent election, hastens United States intervention. 

The second United States intervention takes place, with 

Charles Magoon serving as governor of the island. 

Liberal Party candidate Jose Miguel Gomez (president, 1909­

13) wins election to a four-year term. 

A short-lived racial uprising, led by the Independent Colored 

Association (Agrupacion Independiente de Color), 

prompts the dispatch of United States Marines to Cuba. 

Conservative Mario Garcia Menocal (president, 1913-21) is 

elected to a four-year term. 

Cuba declares war on Germany. 

The Liberal Party leads a short-lived uprising in Oriente and 

Camagiiey. 

The sugar boom collapses. 

Liberal Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso (president, 1921-25) wins election to a four-year term as president. 

xxiii 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

February 1923 

1924 

August 16, 1925 

1927 

1930 

1931 

1933 

August 12,1933 

September 4, 1933 

January 1934 

May 29, 1934 

1934 

December 11, 1935 

May 1936 

December 1936 

1939 

1938 

1939 

1940 

December 9, 1941 

1943 

United States representative General Enoch Crowder is sent to 

Cuba to "reform" the political process. 

Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-33) is elected to 

his first four-year presidential term. 

The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de CubaPCC) is founded in Havana. 

The anti-Machado University Students Directorate (Directorio 

Estudiantil Universitario) is founded. 

The clandestine ABC organization is established. 

Carlos Mendieta and former President Garcia Menocal organize a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio. 

Machado's army crushes the expedition from the United States 

led by Carlos Hevia and Sergio Carb6. 

The United States becomes involved in mediating between 

Machado and various groups seeking to overthrow his government. 

The army ousts Machado; Carlos Manuel de Cespedes y Quesada (president, 1933) becomes provisional president. 

The Revolt of the Sergeants, led by Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar 

(president, 1940-44, 1952-59), hastens the fall of Cespedes. 

Dr. Ram6n Grau San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48) 

becomes president of a revolutionary government. 

Colonel Batista overthrows Grau's regime and appoints Colonel Carlos Mendieta (president, 1934-35) as provisional 

president. 

The United States abrogates the Platt Amendment by signing 

the Treaty ofRelations between Cuba and the United 

States. 

The Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) (Partido Revolucionario Cubano--PRC) (Autentico) is organized. 

A general strike forces the resignation of President Mendieta, 

who is replaced byJose A. Barnet y Vinageras (president, 

1935-36). 

Miguel Mariano G6mez y Arias (president, 1936) is "elected" 

president. 

Federico Laredo Bru (president, 1936-40) becomes president 

for a four-year term. 

Grau San Martin is elected president of the Constitutional 

Assembly. 

The PCC is recognized as a legal political party. 

The Workers' National Federation (Confederaci6n Nacional 

Obrera), created in 1925, is reorganized into the Cuban 

Workers Federation (Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de 

Cuba-CTC). 

A progressive constitution is drafted. General Batista is elected 

president for a four-year term. 

Cuba declares war on the Axis powers. 

General Batista legalizes the PCC and established diplomatic 

relations with the Soviet Union, which is allied to the 

United States. 

XXIV 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

1944 

1947 

1948 

1951 

March 10, 1952 

April 1952 

1953 

July 26, 1953 

November I, 1954 

May 15, 1955 

December 2, 1956 

March 13, 1957 

1957 

1958 

Revolutionary Period 

January 1,1959 

January 7, 1959 

January 1959 

May 17, 1959 

February 1960 

May 7,1960 

The PCC changes its party name to Popular Socialist Party 

(Partido Socialista Popular-PSP). 

Grau San Martin is elected president. 

Eduardo Chibas forms the Orthodox branch of the Cuban 

People's Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano-PPC) Orthodox (Ortodoxo). 

Carlos Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52) is elected president. 

Chibas commits suicide. 

Batista seizes power through a military coup. 

Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union are broken. 

Resistance is organized and led primarily by Autenticos and 

university students. 

Fidel Castro Ruz launches the ill-fated Moncada Barracks 

attack. 

Batista is "reelected" president for a four-year term. 

Fidel Castro is released from prison and departs for the United 

States. 

Casu·o's eighty-three-member Gramna expedition lands in Oriente Province. 

Members of the Directorate (Directorio) and the Autenticos 

attack the Presidential Palace unsuccessfully. 

Police kill Directorio leaderJose Antonio Echeverria. 

Castro consolidates his guerrilla operations in the Sierra Maestra. 

The Castro-organized general strike collapses. 

A military offensive against the guerrillas fails. 

The United States gradually withdraws support for the Batista 

regime, suspending arms shipments to it on March 14. 

A rigged election produces the victory of Batista's candidate, 

Andres Rivero Aguero. 

Increased demoralization and corruption lead to the gradual 

collapse of Cuba's armed forces. 

Batista and his close associates escape to the Dominican 

Republic. 

Fidel Castro assumes command and begins consolidation of 

power. 

The United States recognizes the Castro government. 

Trials and executions offormer Batista regime officials begin. 

The first Agrarian Reform Law is promulgated, expropriating 

farmlands of more than 404 hectares and forbidding foreign land ownership. 

Castro becomes prime minister and replaces Manuel Urrutia 

Lleo with his hand-picked candidate, Oswaldo Dortic6s 

Torrado. 

The Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificaci6nJuceplan) is created to plan and direct the economy. 

Cuban-Soviet diplomatic relations resume. 

1959 

xxv 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

October 19,1960 

January 3,1961 

April 17-19, 1961 

December 2, 1961 

January 31, 1962 

October 14, 1962 

October 22-November 20, 

1962 

November 21,1962 

November 6,1965 

November 2,1966 

August 1967 

October 9, 1967 

1975 

October 1975 

February 24,1976 

April 1977 

April 27, 1977 

September 1977 

January 1978 

August 30, 1979 

April 1980 

April 19, 1982 

The United States declares an embargo on trade with Cuba, 

except for medical supplies and most foodstuffs. 

The United States breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

Cuban forces defeat the United States·sponsored Bay of Pigs 

invasion. 

Castro declares himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. 

Cuba is expelled from the Organization ofAmerican States 

(OAS-see Glossary). 

The Cuban Missile Crisis begins when United States reconnaissance aircraft photograph Soviet construction of intermediate-range missile sites in Cuba. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis brings the United States and the 

Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear conflict. 

PresidentJohn F. Kennedy ends the quarantine measures 

against Cuba. 

The Freedom Flights Program begins, allowing 250,000 

Cubans to come to the United States by 1971. 

The Cuban Adjustment Act allows 123,000 Cubans to apply for 

permanent residence in the United States. 

Mter a one-year suspension, flights resume to take United 

States citizens out of Cuba 

Ernesto "Che" Guevara is executed in Bolivia. 

The United States reports the presence of Cuban soldiers and 

advisers in Angola to support the Marxist group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento 

Popular de Liberta~ii.o de Angola-MPLA) . 

Cuba begins deployment of 35,000 combat troops to support 

the Marxist regime in Angola. 

Cuba's new socialist constitution is promulgated, making Castro head of government as president of the Council of Ministers, commander of the armed forces, and first secretary 

of the PCC. The PCC is institutionalized within the formal 

governmental structure. 

Cuba undertakes internationalist military assistance to several 

African countries. 

Cuba and the United States sign agreements on fishing rights 

and maritime borders. 

Cuba and the United States open interests sections in each 

other's capitals. 

Cuba begins deployment of 20,000 troops to Ethiopia. 

The United States Senate announces discovery of a Soviet 

"combat brigade" of 3,000 troops in Cuba. 

About 10,000 Cuban refugees seeking asylum enter the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, starting a mass exodus of Cubans 

to Peru and the United States. Castro allows 125,000 

Cubans to leave for the United States in the Mariel Boatlift. 

The United States bans travel to Cuba by United States citizens 

and allows the 1977 fishing accord to lapse. 

XXVI 
1983 

Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

July 31,1984 

December 14, 1984 

May 20,1985 

1985 

October 4, 1985 

1986 

May 18,1986 

July 1, 1986 

1987 

November 19, 1987 

United States Assistant Secretary ofState Thomas O. Enders 

meets with the head ofthe Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, to request that Cuba take 

back thousands of Cubans (who came to the United States 

via the 1980 Mariel Boatlift) because of their criminal conduct in Cuba. 

Cuba informs the United States it is willing to discuss the 

return of some Cubans who came to the United States illegally in 1980, but only as part of overall negotiations on 

"normalizing of migration" between the two countries. 

Cuban and United States officials start discussions in New York 

about immigration issues, including the possible return of 

1,000 Cuban refugees (Marielitos) from the 1980 Marie! 

Boatlift. 

Cuba and the United States conclude a migration pact under 

which Cuba agrees to accept the return of Marielitos. 

Radio Marti begins broadcast news and information from the 

United States to Cuba. 

Twenty-three Cuban Marielitos are returned to Havana. These 

are the first of more than 2,700 unwanted Cubans the 

United States wishes to return as part of an agreement with 

Fide! Castro's government. 

Havana suspends all immigration proceedings between Cuba 

and the United States in response to the start-up ofVoice of 

America's Radio Marti. Cuban-Americans are prohibited 

from visiting Cuba. 

President Reagan bans trave! to the United States by Cuban 

government or PCC officials or their representatives, as well 

as most students, scholars, and artists. 

The United States and Cuba agree to negotiate the revival of 

the 1984 immigration agreement that enabled the United 

States to deport several thousand Cubans with histories of 

crime or mental illness who had arrived in the United States 

as part of the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. Talks collapse when 

the United States refuses to recognize Cuba's right to broadcast over an AM frequency in the United States to match 

Radio Marti transmissions. 

Cuba allows seventy political prisoners, many of whom had 

been in prison for more than twenty years, to leave the 

country and fly to Miami. 

Farmers' markets (legal since 1980) are banned. 

Cuba suspends service on its convertible currency (see Glossary) debt. 

Private home ownership is banned. 

Cuba agrees to release 348 political prisoners at request of 

Roman Catholic Church in the United States. 

The Cuban government, in a policy reversal, agrees to restore 

an immigration pact with the United States by which 2,600 

Cubans, whose criminal records make them ineligible for 

United States residence, are to be deported from the 

United States and up to 27,000 Cubans are to be allowed to 

emigrate to the United States each year. 

xxvii 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

March 1988 

April 21, 1988 

1989 

1990 

March 23, 1990 

1991 

September 1, 1991 

1992 

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (see Glossary) 

unanimously agrees to accept an unexpected invitation 

from Havana [0 investigate human rights in Cuba. Even 

though UN specialists encounter harsh penal systems in 

Cuban prisons, they find no evidence to support United 

States charges of torture and executions. The official UN 

investigation concludes that abuses have declined. 

John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New York, meets with 

Fidel Castro in Havana. It is the first visit by a Roman Catholic cardinal to Cuba since 1959. 

The UN issues a report on the human rights situation in Cuba, 

suggesting that although there have been big improvements 

in church-state relations and treatment of political prisoners, basic political liberties are still widely denied. 

Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a highly decorated 

war hero, is arrested on corruption charges; American officials say the action suggests dissension at the highest levels 

of the Cuban military; Cuba's Transportation Minister, Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, a friend of Ochoa's, is also relieved 

of his duties; Ochoa is accused of being involved in illicit 

sales in Angola. 

Minister ofInterior General Jose Abrantes Fernandez is 

replaced as the top security officer following official charges 

that high military officers in Cuba are involved in drug trafficking. The Ministry ofInterior is reorganized. 

Cuba announces that a firing squad has executed four Cuban 

Army officers convicted by court martial of conspiring to 

ship tons of cocaine and marijuana to the United States. 

The four include Ochoa Sanchez, 

The Castro regime announces a series of austerity measures, 

the "special period in peacetime" (hereafter Special 

Period-see Glossary). 

TV Marti, an anti-Castro, United States-taxpayer-funded station, is launched, but the signal is jammed by the Cuban 

government. 

Switzerland, which sponsors United States diplomats in 

Havana, offers to sponsor the Cuban Interests Section in 

Washington to ensure that both countries have diplomatic 

representation in each other's capital. 

The deteriorating economic situation in Cuba prompts a large 

increase in the number of Cubans seeking [0 leave their 

country. 

Cuba announces the lifting of restrictions on travel abroad; 

anyone aged twenty or over is to be allowed [0 leave and visit 

other countries, provided that the host nation gives them a 

visa. 

The Fourth Party Congress is held and resolves [0 allow members of religious groups to join the party. 

In order to remove a major obstacle to increased United States 

economic aid to the Soviet Union, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev declares that he will withdraw Soviet troops from 

Cuba and end the US$2-billion-a-year trade subSidy that 

Moscow gives Havana. 

The government of President Castro steps up efforts to crush 

internal opposition. 

xxviii 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

August 14, 1993 

1994 

August 1994 

September 9, 1994 

late September 1994 

1994 

December 1994 

May 2,1995 

February 24, 1996 

November 19, 1996 

February 12, 1997 

January 11,1998 

January 21-25,1998 

In a rare exception to the economic blockade of Cuba, the 

Bush administration grants permission to the American 

Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) to expand 

telephone services between Cuba and the United States; 

Cuba rejects AT&Ts proposal. 

Russia and Cuba agree to the withdrawal of a former Soviet 

infantry brigade that has been on the island since the 

Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 

Cuba and Russia sign trade accords for new ties based on 

mutual benefits; Cuba is to trade sugar for Russian oil at 

world market prices. 

Cuba ends the ban on the use of dollars. 

The Clinton administration ends the United States' open-door 

policy toward Cuban refugees, who will be detained for an 

indefinite period after they arrive in the United States. 

Following Castro's declaration of an open migration policy, a 

new boat-lift begins. The United States stops refugees 

aboard rafts and boats off the Florida coast and begins 

detaining them at its Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. 

Cuba and the United States reach agreement under which 

Cuba pledges to stop citizens from fleeing in small boats 

and the United States promises to accept at least 20,000 

Cuban immigrants a year. 

Farmers' markets are reinstated. 

The flood of Cuban refugees ends as the Cuban government 

implements terms of agreement reached with the United 

States aimed at halting the exodus. 

The Clinton administration gives United States telecommunications companies permission to establish direct telephone 

links with Cuba. 

Cuba establishes a new currency, the convertible peso (see 

Glossary). 

Cuba and the United States issue ajoint communique reaffirming their commitment to promote safe, legal, and 

orderly migration. Under this accord, Cubans interdicted at 

sea or who enter the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station illegally are returned to Cuba provided that they do not have 

any concerns about possible official Cuban retaliation. 

Cuban Air Force MiG jet fighters shoot down two small 

unarmed aircraft belonging to Brothers to the Rescue, a 

Miami-based Cuban exile group, in international waters, 

killing four persons. 

Pope John Paul II receives Fidel Castro at the Vatican and 

accepts an invitation to visit Cuba. 

The White House approves licenses for ten press organizations 

interested in establishing bureaus in Havana; Cuba 

approves only the Cable News Network (CNN). 

National and provincial parliamentary elections are held. 

Pope John Paul II visits Cuba. 

XXiX 
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events 

Period Description 

February 25, 1999 Cuba suspends about 80 percent of its telephone links to the 

United States in retaliation for the withholding by five 

United States telecommunication firms of US$19 million in 

payments owed to the Telecommunications Company of 

Cuba (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A.­

ETECSA). 

November 25,1999 A five-year-old Cuban boy, Elian Gonzalez, is rescued in the 

Straits of Florida. 

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 

March 2000 Tough new legislation aimed at combating political dissent and 

protecting the Cuban economy becomes effective. DecreeLaw 88, the Law for the Protection of the National Independence and Economy of Cuba, provides a penalty of up to 

twenty years' imprisonment for a series of offenses, including providing information to the United States government; 

owning, distributing, or reproducing material produced by 

the United States government or any other foreign entity; 

and collaborating, by any means, with foreign radio, television, press, or other foreign media, for the purpose of destabilizing the country and destroying the socialist state. 

June 28, 2000 Elian Gonzalez, accompanied by his father, returns to Cuba 

after an intense seven-month legal and political battle over 

the child's custody. 

March 21-24, 2001 A conference ofAmerican and Cuban scholars, entitled "Bay 

of Pigs: Forty Years After," is held in Havana, and many 

declassified United States and Cuban documents on the 

invasion are released. 

April 12-15, 2001 Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin pays a state visit to Cuba. 

June 12,2001 United States Secretary ofState Colin L. Powell says that China 

had delivered arms to Cuba. 

July 14, 2001 United States President George W. Bush confirms support for 

tougher economic and travel sanctions against Cuba. 

xxx 
Country Profile 

Country 

Official Name: Republic of Cuba (Republica de Cuba). 

Short Name: Cuba. 

Term for Citizen(s): Cuban(s). 

Capital: La Habana (hereafter, Havana). 

Independence: May 20, 1902 (from Spain on December 10, 

1898, but administered by United States from 1898 to 1902). 

xxxi 
Geography 

Location: Caribbean island south of Florida between Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean at geographic coordinates 

21°30'N,800 00'W. 

Size: Slightly smaller than Pennsylvania. Square kilometers: 

110,860, including Isla de Cuba (104,945 square kilometers), 

Isla de la Juventud (2,200 square kilometers), and adjacent 

keys (3,715 square kilometers). 

Length of Coastline: 5,746 kilometers. 

Maritime Claims: As signatory to Law of the Sea Treaty, Cuba 

claims twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea and 200-nautical-mile 

exclusive economic zone. 

Topography: Plains cover about two-thirds of land surface, 

three principal mountain ranges the rest. Tallest peak, Pico 

Real del Turquino, at 1,974 meters, is in Sierra Maestra 

mountain chain. About 60 percent of total land area (11 

million hectares) used for agriculture. About 12 percent 

(800,000 hectares) of agricultural land highly productive deep 

and permeable soils; 22 percent marginal for agriculture. Of 

remaining noncultivated land, 21 percent (or 2,311,000 

hectares) pasture or fallow, and 25.7 percent (or 2,831,600 

hectares) forested. Human settlements account for 6.3 percent 

(or 694,000 hectares) . 

Principal Rivers: Most important hydrographic basins: Cauto, 

Zaza, and Sagua la Grande. Average length of major rivers: 

ninety-three kilometers. Cuba's longest river: 370-kilometer 

Cauto, flowing from eastern mountains to southern coast. 

Climate: Tropical, warm, and humid. Annual mean temperatures average 25° Celsius (C). Havana's average annual rainfall: 

1,146.1 millimeters; days with rain: ninety-six. Average monthly 

temperatures in Havana range from 27° C inJuly and August to 

22° C in January and February; average temperature: 24.5° C. 

Relative humidity: 79 percent. Island averages 1,400 millimeters of rainfall a year, although annual amount varies greatly 

from year to year. Two well-established dry and rainy seasons: 

xxxii 
monthly rainfall averages between thirty-two and ninety-nine 

millimeters during dry season, from December to April; 

between 200 and 260 millimeters during rainy season, from 

May through November. Hurricane season: July to November; 

months of most frequent storms: September and October. 

Society 

Population: Total population (1999): 11,106,000 people. July 

2001 estimate: 11,184,023. Net estimated migration rate 

(2000): -1.52 migrant(s) per 1,000 population. Illicit emigration continuing problem. Estimated 3,800 Cubans took to 

Florida Straits in 1999, 40 percent of whom (1,520) were 

interdicted by United States Coast Guard. Population density 

(1998): 100.3 inhabitants per square kilometer. Annual 

population growth rates in late 1990s less than 0.5 percent a 

year, down from 0.67 in 1995. Estimated population growth 

rate (2000): 0.39 percent. Population projection (2010): 

11,516,000. Relatively high current median age (30.2 years) 

projected to increase further (to 38.7 years) by 2010. Country 

primarily urban, with 78 percent of population residing in 

cities and towns; 22 percent rural. Largest city: Havana, with 

2.2 million inhabitants (1996). Estimated birth rate (2000): 

12.68 births per 1,000 population. Estimated life expectancy at 

birth (for both sexes combined, 2000): 76.21 years (73.84 for 

males and 78.73 for females) . 

Ethnic Groups: According to 1981 Cuban census, 66 percent of 

population is "white" and 34.0 percent "nonwhite," latter 

including black (12.0 percent), mulatto or mestizo (21.9 

percent), and Asian (0.1 percent). Since 1959 Revolution, 

nonwhite share of population has increased significantly. 

Percent of population classified as white declined from 73 

percent in 1953 to 66 percent in 1981, whereas share of 

mulattos rose from 14 percent to 22 percent (black percentage 

remained almost same) . 

Official Language: Spanish (Espanol). 

Education and Literacy: Adult literacy rate (people age fifteen 

and older who can read and write) in 1995: 95.7 percent 

XXXlll 
(males: 96.2 percent; females, 95.3 percent). In late 1990s, 

Cuba had eighteen teachers per 1,000 population; and 12,223 

schools, including 9,481 primary schools, 1,891 secondary 

schools, and thirty-two higher education institutions. In 1995­

96 academic year, student enrollment in primary, secondary, 

and higher education was, respectively, 933,000, 639,000, and 

111,000. 

Health: Estimated infant mortality rate (2000): 7.51. Total 

fertility rate (1996): 1.54 children born per woman. Estimated 

total fertility rate (2000): 1.6. Major causes of death per 

100,000 population (1996): heart disease, 206; malignant 

neoplasms (cancers), 37; cerebrovascular disease, 72; infectious and parasitic diseases, 53; accidents, 51; influenza and 

pneumonia, 40. Health personnel total 339,943, including 

62,624 physicians and dentists, of whom 28,855, or 46 percent, 

are family doctors (1997). Total also includes 81,333 nurses 

and more than 56,342 mid-level technicians. Ratio of population to physicians (1997): 214, one of world's lowest, down 

from 1,393 in 1970. Physicians train in twenty-three medical 

schools, ten of which are located in Havana, and four dentistry 

schools. Health infrastructure includes 283 hospitals, 440 

Polyclinics, 161 medical posts, 220 maternity homes, 168 dental 

clinics, and other facilities (1997). Forty-eight hospitals in 

Havana, and sixty-four in rural areas. Other facilities: 196 

nursing homes for elderly (sixty-three of which provide only 

day services) and twenty-seven homes for disabled. Total 

number of hospital beds, including military hospitals (1997): 

66,195; social assistance beds: at least 14,201. Only 2,155 cases 

diagnosed as human immunodeficiency virus (HN) positive, 

811 of which were known to have developed into full-blown 

acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) (1999). 

Religion: No official religion. Nearly 90 percent of population 

nominally Roman Catholic in prerevolutionary Cuba, but 

number of practicing Roman Catholics probably less than 10 

percent. Estimated half of all Cubans agnostic, slightly more 

than 40 percent Christian; less than 2 percent practiced MroCuban religions. Limited membership in other religions, 

including Judaism. Religiosity estimates may be considerably 

higher, however, if due credit is given to the cultural relevance 

xxxiv 
of informal religions, particularly of syncretic Mro-Cuban rites, 

which historically were minimized. 

Economy 

Overview: State-controlled economy. Some reforms implemented in 1990s. Central control complicated by existence of 

informal, mostly dollar economy. Compared with 1990, living 

standards for average Cuban without dollars remain at 

depressed level. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): During 1989-93, GDP 

declined by 35 percent because of lost Soviet aid and domestic 

inefficiencies. GDP grew by 0.7 percent in 1994, 2.5 percent in 

1995, 7.8 percent in 1996,2.5 percent in 1997, and 1.2 percent 

in 1998. Cumulative GDP growth rate over 1993-98 period was 

about 16 percent, compared with contraction of 35 percent 

between 1989 and 1993. GDP growth rate in 2000: 5.6 percent. 

Per Capita GDP and Minimum Wage: Average monthly 

earnings of Cuban workers in main economic sectors, in pesos 

per month (for value of peso, see Glossary), from highest to 

lowest (1989): culture and arts, 223; science and technology, 

217; transportation, 211; administration, 201; construction, 

201; public health, social security, and tourism, 195; education, 

191; finance and insurance, 190; agriculture, 186; industry, 

186; forestry, 184; communications, 176; community and 

personal services, 164; and commerce, 163. Within industrial 

sector, average monthly earnings ranged from 237 pesos per 

month for workers in electricity production and distribution to 

141 pesos per month for workers in apparel industry. 

Inflation: In early 1990s, Cuba had very high levels of 

suppressed inflation (expressed through physical shortages 

and rampant black markets). 

Employment and Unemployment: Self-employment in more 

than 100 occupations, primarily those related to transportation, home repair, and personal services, became legal in 

September 1993, and number of authorized occupations 

expanded to 140 in July 1995. Making such employment legal 

allowed approximately 208,000 workers to engage in selfxxxv 
employment, fewer than 5 percent of economically active 

population of 4.5 million workers. By March 1996, number had 

fallen to 160,000, as result of new taxes introduced that year. 

Restrictions on self-employment remain quite severe. Statesector employment in 1989 was roughly 4.1 million workers, of 

whom 3.5 million were civilian employees and 600,000 were 

classified as other state employees. During 1990s state-sector 

employment fell sharply, reflecting severe dislocations suffered 

by state enterprises and sharp reductions in size of armed 

forces. By 1996 overall state employment was roughly 3.2 

million workers, 22 percent lower than in 1989. State civilian 

employment was 24 percent lower in 1997 than in 1990. From 

1989 to 1996, nonstate-sector employment, particularly in 

agricultural sector, increased more than four-fold, from about 

230,000 in 1989 to more than 1 million in 1996, absorbing 

large portion ofworkers shed by state sector. 

Agriculture: Liberalized agricultural markets introduced in 

October 1994. In 1997 Cuba had 6,686,700 hectares of 

agricultural land, of which 3,701,400 hectares were cultivated. 

In 1997 state directly controlled 24.4 percent of agricultural 

land; nonstate sector controlled 75.6 percent. Besides sugarcane, which accounted for 48 percent of cultivated land in 

1997, state enterprises specialize in production of rice, citrus, 

coffee, and tobacco, as well as livestock, and market their 

output. Sugar production fell from 8.1 million tons in 1989 to 

3.2 million tons in 1998. 

Mining: Metal commodities produced in Cuba include 

chromite, cobalt, copper, crude steel, and nickel. Other 

nonfuel industrial mineral products include cement, gypsum, 

lime, ammonia, salt, silica sand, and sulfur. World's eighth 

leading producer of nickel in 1998, but produces only about 4 

percent of world's total nickel mine production. Nickel most 

important metal to Cuban economy and export sector. Ministry of Basic Industry responsible for mineral and petroleum 

sectors. 

Industry: In 1986 Cuba's manufacturing sector consisted of827 

enterprises of widely varying sizes, employing 726,000 workers. 

Industries with largest number of enterprises were nonxxxvi 
electrical machinery (150 enterprises), sugar (148), and 

foodstuffs (145). Majority of largest manufacturing plants 

(those employing more than 4,000 workers) were part of sugar 

industry; other industries having plants with more than 4,000 

workers were textiles (three), mining and nonferrous metallurgy (one), apparel (one), fishing (one), and beverages and 

tobacco (one). In addition to sugar and nickel mining 

industries, significant contributors to national product in 1989 

included beverages and tobacco, foodstuffs, nonelectrical 

machinery, chemical products, electricity generation, and 

construction materials. 

Energy: Poorly endowed with energy resources, Cuba relies on 

imports to meet energy requirements. Coal not found in 

commercial quantities; hydroelectric resources limited by lowvolume rivers; and oil and natural gas deposits inadequate to 

meet demand. Biomass (in form of bagasse) an important 

energy source for sugar industry. In 1988 Cuba met 70 percent 

of energy requirements with liquid fuels (crude oil, light oil 

products, and heavy oil products), about 29 percent with 

biomass, and remaining 1 percent with other energy sources 

such as coal, coke, and hydroelectricity. Domestically produced 

oil amounted to nearly 1.7 million tons in 1998. Combined 

electric-generation capacity in 1997: 4.33 gigawatt hours. Real 

generating capacity may be only 1,200 megawatts. Electricity 

production in 1998: 15.274 billion kilowatt hours. Electricity 

consumption in 1998: 14.205 billion kilowatt hours. 

Services: In 1995 services included trade (hotels and restaurants); electricity, gas, and water; community, personal, and 

social services; finance (including business and real estate); 

and transport (including communications and warehousing). 

Trade Balance: Cuba ran deficit in services trade in 1989-91 

but has recorded surpluses in every year beginning in 1992. 

During 1993-95, surpluses were quite sizable, averaging 

around US$250 million. Income generated by tourism rose by 

535 percent between 1990 and 1997; it first exceeded US$l 

billion mark in 1995, reached nearly US$1.4 billion in 1996, 

and exceeded US$1.5 billion in 1997. Tourism surpassed nickel 

to become second largest source of revenue in 1991 and 

xxxvii 
overtook sugar exports in 1994. 

Imports: Over 1989-93 period, merchandise imports fell from 

8.1 billion pesos to slightly more than 2.0 billion pesos, or by 75 

percent. By 1998 they had risen to 4.2 billion pesos. 

Exports: Exports, like imports, began to recover in 1994, rising 

to about 1.3 billion pesos that year and 1.9 billion pesos in 

1996, falling to 1.8 billion pesos in 1997 and 1.4 billion pesos in 

1998. Principal export destinations in 1999: Russia, accounting 

for about 25 percent of exports; Netherlands, 23 percent; 

Canada, 16 percent. 

Balance of Payments: Unpaid debt and accrued service payments resulting from Cuba's suspension of payment on convertible currency effective July 1, 1986, amounted to nearly 

US$6.1 billion in 1987, US$6.5 billion in 1988, and US$6.2 

billion in 1989. Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 

billion in 1993 to more than US$l1.2 billion at the end of 

1998. 

Budget Deficit: Budget deficit fell to pre-crisis level of -1.6 

billion pesos in 1994, -766 million pesos in 1995, -569 million 

pesos in 1996, -459 million pesos in 1997, and -560 million 

pesos in 1998. Budget deficit as share of CDP was 39.5 percent 

in 1993, 12.6 percent in 1994,5.8 percent in 1995, 4.0 percent 

in 1996, 3.1 percent in 1997, and 3.8 percent in 1998. 

External Debt: Cuba's overall debt to Soviet Union and Eastern 

Europe in 1989 estimated at nearly US$27 billion (using 

official exchange rate of 1 ruble=US$1.58) and at US$30.2 

billion in 1990 (using official exchange rate of 1 ruble= 

US$1. 78). Because value of ruble vis-a-vis United States dollar 

fell sharply in 1990s, so did value of Cuban debt in United 

States dollar terms. Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 

billion in 1993 to about US$9.1 billion in 1994, US$10.5 billion 

in 1995, and US$l1.2 billion in 1998. 

Official Exchange Rate: Value of peso dropped precipitously in 

1990s as Cuban citizens expressed very strong preference for 

holding United States dollars to obtain goods and services not 

available through centrally planned first economy. In mid-1994 

XXXVlll 
peso reached probably its lowest point when it was exchanged 

at about 150 pesos for one United States dollar. In second half 

of 1990s, unofficial exchange rate fluctuated in range of twenty 

to twenty-two pesos for one United States dollar. By January 

2001, peso valued at twenty-two to dollar. 

Foreign Investment: By end of 1998, 345 joint ventures had 

been created. Foreign investment for 1985-95 period totaled 

about US$2.1 billion. 

Fiscal Year (FY): Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Air and maritime transportation services provide access to 

almost every location in Cuba. Infrastructure of ports, airports, 

and warehouses supports extensive foreign trade. 

Roads: Estimated 60,858 kilometers of highways, including 

29,4820 kilometers of paved roads and 31,038 kilometers of 

unpaved roads. Main highway: Central Highway, mostly twolane highway running for 1,200 kilometers from Pinar del Rio 

in west to Santiago de Cuba in east. Multilane National 

Expressway being constructed, with 650 kilometers, from Pinar 

del Rio in west to near Sancti Spiritus in east, completed. 

Railroads: Standard-gauge railroads, 4,807 kilometers. Railroad 

transportation neglected since 1959 in favor of truck transport. 

Poorly maintained railroad system consists of one main axis 

running length of island, connecting all of major urban 

centers, economic zones, and ports, either directly or through 

branches. About one-third of railroads carry both passengers 

and freight, with rest dedicated to transport of sugarcane. 

Central railroad line under major reconstruction since late 

1970s; equipment last updated with diesel locomotives 

manufactured in former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 

Service has been reduced since early 1990s, and fuel shortages 

and frequent equipment breakdowns have made system largely 

unreliable. 

Ports: Most important of eleven main ports capable of 

handling general export and import cargoes: Antilla, Cienxxxix 
fuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, and Santiago de 

Cuba. Only major deep-water ports: bays of Cienfuegos, 

Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, and Santiago de 

Cuba. Havana by far most important port. In addition, eight 

bulk sugar loading terminals, one supertanker terminal at 

Matanzas, and several other smaller import facilities, as well as 

specialized port facilities for fishing fleet. Number one in sugar 

export, port of Cienfuegos capable of handling one-third of 

Cuba's sugar production through its bulk sugar terminal. Its 

pier for handling oil and oil bypro ducts allows berthing of 

ships up to 50,000 tons. Guantanamo Bay, leased by United 

States for naval base, separated from rest of Cuba by twentynine-kilometer boundary. 

Pipelines: In late 1980s, Cuba completed an oil import facility 

at port of Matanzas and a pipeline linking it with new refinery 

built in Cienfuegos. 

Air Transport and Airports: Ten of seventeen civilian airports 

handle international flights, with nine linked to nine largest 

tourist resorts. Main international airports include Camagiiey, 

Ciego de Avila, Cienfuegos, Havana, Matanzas, Santiago de 

Cuba, and Varadero. Main national airports that handle 

primarily domestic flights: Baracoa, Bayamo, Cayo Largo, 

Guantanamo, Holguin, Manzanillo, Moa, Nicaro, Nueva 

Gerona, and Santa Clara. Cuba's flag carrier: Consolidated 

Cuban Aviation Company (Empresa Consolidada Cubana de 

Aviaci6n-Cubana). Of estimated 170 airports in 1999, seventyseven paved and ninety-three unpaved. 

Telecommunications: Domestic telephone countrywide trunk 

system coaxial cable; Havana and Isla de laJuventud have fiberoptic distribution. Country has two microwave radio relay 

installations (United States-built installation is old, with 

capacity of 960 channels; Soviet-built installation is newer, with 

capacity of 1,920 channels). Both analog and digital mobile 

cellular service established. Telephone density very low: 4.5 to 

5.5 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Number of main 

telephone lines in use in 1995: 353,000. Existing lines and 

systems not suitable for speed, bandwidth, and applications of 

modern telecommunications. Number of mobile cellular 

xl 
telephones in use in 1995: 1,939. About 70,000 new telephone 

lines being installed per year, with emphasis on public telephones throughout Cuba. International telephone system uses 

satellite earth station Intelsat. Telecommunications Company 

of Cuba, S.A. (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, 

S.A.-ETECSA) is the state-owned telecommunications company. Principal foreign investor: STET, Italy's largest telecommunications concern. 

Government and Politics 

Administrative Subdivisions: Fourteen provinces (provincias) 

listed from west to east: Pinar del Rio, La Habana, Ciudad de 

La Habana, Matanzas, Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, Sancti Spiritus, 

Ciego de Avila, Camagiiey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguin, 

Santiago de Cuba, and Guant:anamo. Special Municipality 

(municipio especial): Isla de laJuventud (Isle of Youth). Number 

of municipalities in national territory: 169. 

Government: Communist state with one party, Communist 

Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba-PCC). Current 

government of Fidel Castro Ruz in power since January 1, 

1959. Castro president (chief of state and head of government) 

since December 2, 1976. As chief of state, Castro president of 

thirty-one-member Council of State and thirty-nine-member 

Council of Ministers. Cuba's most important executive 

institution: seven-member Executive Committee of Council of 

Ministers. Six vice presidents of Council of State among Cuba's 

most important politicians. Fidel Castro's formally designated 

successor: General ofArmy Raul Castro Ruz, first vice president 

of Council of State and Council of Ministers and minister of 

Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR). Provincial government consists offourteen provincial assemblies, each headed by an Executive Committee, each 

with president and at least seventy-five members. Municipal 

government consists of 169 municipal assemblies, each headed 

by a president, who heads one of 169 executive committees. 

Legislature: Under 1992 constitution, all formal legislative 

powers (including powers of amending constitution) vested in 

601-member unicameral National Assembly of People's Power 

xli 
(Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular-ANPP; hereafter, 

National Assembly). National Assembly meets only two or three 

times annually for two or three days. National Assembly elects 

Council of State to make all decisions on behalf of National 

Assembly when latter not in session (most of time). 

Judiciary: Minister ofJustice administers all courts, which are 

all subordinate to National Assembly and Council of State and 

lack independence. Office of State Prosecutor (Fiscalia 

General de la Republica), overseeing all law enforcement, also 

subordinate to National Assembly and Council of State. 

Members of five-chamber Supreme Court of Cuba (Tribunal 

Supremo Popular-TSP) nominated for terms by minister of 

justice and confirmed by National Assembly, except for TSP's 

president and vice president (nominated by president of 

Council of State) and military chamber members (nominated 

jointly by ministers ofjustice and FAR). Each province has fourchamber provincial courts exercising jurisdiction over most 

types of crimes. Each municipality has municipal courts 

handling minor crimes. 

Electoral System: National Assembly seats elected directly from 

slates approved by special candidacy commissions; members 

serve five-year terms. National elections last held January 11, 

1998, when single official slate received 89.7 percent of vote 

and 601 seats; only 5 percent of voters voided their ballots or 

voted blank. In 1998 National Assembly elections, overall 

results slightly more favorable to government than in 1993, 

reflecting trend toward economic stabilization and recovery 

during intervening years. Results also more favorable to 

government in La Habana Province, where single slate 

received 88.4 percent of votes cast and percentage of null or 

blank ballots fell to 7 percent. Next elections to be held in 

2003. 

Politics: Under 1992 Electoral Law, Cuba has multi-candidate 

single-party elections with no effective campaigning at municipal level and entirely uncompetitive rules but some campaigning at provincial and national levels. At all levels, political 

regime sharply constrains freedom of political association. 

Cubans not free to associate in political party other than Comxlii 
munist Party of Cuba (PCC) to contest elections. Candidates 

running for office in different provinces and municipalities on 

official slate cannot associate into formally constituted 

"factions." Public authorities and PCC retain right to shape 

associational patterns at all levels. To be elected, candidate 

must receive more than half of valid votes cast. No candidate 

failed to be elected in 1993 and 1998 national elections. 

Political Party: PCC remains only party, still Marxist-Leninist, 

but now also follower of Jose Marti. Political Bureau party's 

leading decision-making institution and Cuba's most important 

decision-making entity. Party congresses govern PCC by 

adopting party's statutes and its programs, and choosing 

membership of Central Committee and Political Bureau. Party 

congresses meet approximately every five years, Central Committee Plenum at least once a year, and Political Bureau once a 

week. Party membership 800,000 members by time of Fifth 

Party Congress in 1997. 

Mass Media: Principal daily newspaper: Granma, official organ 

ofPCC. Official organ of Union of Young Communists (Union 

de Jovenes Comunistas-UJC): Juventud Rebelde, weekly. Longstanding newsmagazine: Bohemia. Television remains principal 

source of communication for entertainment and news, 

although costs of production for television led government to 

reduce number of channels and of hours of transmission in 

1990s. Number of television broadcast stations in 1997: fiftyeight. Number of televisions in 1997: 2.64 million. Radio 

became one of Cuba's more dynamic mass mediums in 1990s. 

Number of radio broadcast stations in 1998: AM 169, FM fiftyfive, shortwave, one. Number ofradios in 1997: 3.9 million. 

Foreign Relations: Collapse of Soviet Union and communist 

governments of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90 left 

Cuba with no international allies. During 1990s, Cuban 

economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe 

plummeted. Cuban economic relations with Russia focused 

principally on barter trade, at market prices, exchanging sugar 

for petroleum. Consistent with its general policy on nonservicing of any debts, Cuba refused to service its large accumulated international debt to Russian Federation. Russian 

xliii 
ground troops, stationed in Cuba since 1962 Cuban Missile 

Crisis, departed in 1992. Cuban relations with China recovered 

only gradually from the sharp bilateral split that had become 

manifest in 1966. With collapse of European communism, 

however, political relations warmed more quickly between 

these two remaining communist governments. Between 1989 

and 1991, Cuba repatriated its overseas troops from all 

countries to which they had been deployed. In 1992 it 

announced that it had stopped providing military support to 

revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in 

other countries. Traditional tension in United States relations 

with Castro regime continued through 1990s, aggravated by 

Cuba's encouragement of unauthorized emigration to United 

States in 1994, unilateral United States efforts to tighten 

economic embargo against Cuba, Cuba's human rights violations, and, in 1999-2000, dispute over custody of Cuban boy 

rescued off coast of Florida. Cuban policy has been most 

effective within Anglophone Caribbean. Admitted to Caribbean Tourism Organisation in 1992, Cuba in 1994 became 

founding member ofAssociation of Caribbean States. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Total active armed forces members in 2000: 

58,000. Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) includes ground 

forces, Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria-MGR), and Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air 

Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea RevolucionariaDAAFAR). Army, including conscripts and ready reserves, 

totals 45,000; MGR, 3,000; DAAFAR, 10,000. Army reserves: 

39,000. Ready reserves serve forty-five days per year to fill out 

active and reserve units. 

Military Service: Two years compulsory military service for 

young men beginning at age seventeen (registration at age 

sixteen); women volunteers serve three years. 

Paramilitary Forces: Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de 

Trabajo-EJT): 65,000. Civil Defense (Defensa Civil): 50,000. 

Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas TerritorialesMTT): 1 million. State Security: 20,000, including Ministry of 

xliv 
Interior's Special Troops (Tropas Especiales). Border Guard 

Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras-TGF): 6,500. 

Defense Relations: Has long maintained contacts with armed 

forces of many developing world nations, including those in 

Latin America, as well as with Canada and Western Europe. 

International contacts broadened in 1990s. Ties with Chinese 

Popular Liberation Army (PLA) most important relationship 

with foreign military service to develop since Soviet Union's 

demise. 

Defense Budget: Figures vary. According to the International 

Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 1999-2000, 

defense expenditures amounted to estimated US$720 million 

in 1997 and estimated US$750 million in 1999, and defense 

budget in 1999 amounted to only P650 million, or US$31 

million. Military expenditures approximately 4 percent of GDP 

(1995), according to the World Factbook 2000, or 1.6 percent, 

according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Military expenditures 

2.2 percent of Gross National Product (GNP-see Glossary) 

(1995), or 2.3 percent (1997), according to World Military 

Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998. 

Military Units: Army divided into three Regional Commands: 

Western (most important), Central, and Eastern, each with 

three army corps. Army units include four or five armed 

brigades, nine mechanized infantry brigades (three mechanized infantry, one armored, one artillery, and one air defense 

artillery regiment), one airborne brigade, fourteen reserve 

brigades, and one border brigade. Navy has four operational 

flotillas. Cubanas headquarters of Western Naval District, 

Holguin of Eastern Naval District. Naval bases at Cienfuegos, 

Cabanas, Havana, Mariel, Punta Movida, and Nicaro. 

Foreign Forces: As of 1999, United States: 1,080 personnel 

stationed in Guantanamo (United States Navy: 590; United 

States Marines: 490). Russia: 810 personnel (signals intelligence); military advisers: an estimated ten military personnel. 

xlv 
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84 S. 

UNITED STATES' , 

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24 

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Provinces 

1. Camaguey 

2. Ciego de Avila 

3. Cienfuegos 

4. Ciudad de La Habana 

5. Granma 

6. Guantanamo 

7. Holguin 

8. La Habana 

9. Las Tunas 

10. Matanzas 

11. Plnardel RIo 

12. Sancti Spiritus 

13. Santiago de Cuba 

14. Villa Clara 

Special Municipality 

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Figure 1. Administrative Units, 1999 
Introduction 

THE WORLD'S SEVENTH LARGEST island, with a total land 

surface of 110,860 square kilometer§ (about the size ofPennsylvania), the independent republic of Cuba is the largest and 

westernmost island in the West Indies, lying less than 150 kilometers south of Key West, Florida. Despite being an island 

country, it is, in terms of population (more than 11.1 million in 

2001), the ninth largest country in Latin America and the sixtyseventh largest in the world, according to the United States 

Bureau of the Census. 

Cuba's strategic location at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico between North America, the Caribbean, and Central America has played an important part in its history since 

Christopher Columbus discovered the island in 1492. The 

Spaniards first used Cuba as an operational base for the conquest of Mexico; Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula lies only about 

150 kilometers to the west of the island. During almost four 

centuries of Spanish rule, the Spaniards also used the island's 

natural harbors as ports for treasure-laden ships sailing 

between the New World and Spain. Spain imposed oppressive 

trade restrictions on its Cuban colony, however, until forced to 

reevaluate its policy after Britain occupied Havana in 1762-63 

and lifted the restraints on commerce. 

Cuba has been of strategic interest to the United States at 

least since 1808, when President Thomas Jefferson called it 

"the key to the Gulf of Mexico." It was suddenly transformed in 

that century from an unimportant "ever-faithful isle" of Spain 

into the world's major sugar producer, attracting United States 

economic interests. Liberated from Spain by the United States 

in the Spanish-American War (1898), Cuba came under the 

tutelage of a new power. The United States granted the island 

independence and a degree of self-rule in 1902 but kept it 

dependent as a result of economic involvement and successive 

military interventions, as authorized by the Platt Amendment 

(see Glossary) of 1901. The corrupt and brutal dictatorship of 

Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar (president, 1940-44, 1952-59), 

during which there were 20,000 political killings, ended with its 

overthrow on January 1, 1959, by a popularly supported guerrilla force led by Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ), who has 

xlvii 
presided over his own brand of communist dictatorship ever 

since. 

In addition to being separated from its northern neighbor 

by the Florida Straits, Cuba has been isolated socially, economically, politically, and diplomatically from the world's leading 

democracy for more than four decades by an embargo originally imposed by the United States in 1960 for Cold War reasons. Only one other country has been under embargo longer 

than Cuba, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

(more commonly known as North Korea), which the United 

States began embargoing in 1950. 

This fourth edition of Cuba: A Country Study would be incomplete without a discussion of the embargo, which the Cubans 

have always called the blockade (el bloqueo), and of Cuba's diplomatic strategy to counter it. The embargo has had a significant impact on numerous aspects of the island country, 

including the history of the Castro regime, the health of the 

population, the economy, foreign policy and relations, and the 

armed forces. Moreover, Cuba in the new millennium cannot 

be adequately understood without taking into account the 

embargo and the reality that the island nation is no longer isolated in the world, that it has become gradually integrated into 

the world system, and that it has been undergoing significant 

social and economic changes since the end of the Cold War. 

For these reasons, and also because American public opinion 

has become increasingly critical of the embargo, this introduction assesses the overall effectiveness of the sanctions during 

the 1960-2001 period; summarizes Cuba's efforts to use diplomacy, "internationalism" (see Glossary), and trade relations in 

the Western Hemisphere to counter it; and shows how the evolution of international opinion toward Cuba has evolved in 

response to the embargo. 

Since the end of the Cold War, Cuba's diplomatic efforts to 

counter the embargo have resulted in very significant progress 

toward the reintegration of the once-pariah island nation into 

the Caribbean and Latin American communities and the world 

in general, with the main exception of the United States. As a 

result of this development, the United States' embargo ofCuba 

has become paradoxical. According to embargo critics, it 

would be in the United States' national interest to have Cuba 

fully integrated into the world community rather than isolated 

and unconcerned with international opinion regarding the 

issue. The record shows that when Cuba was relatively isolated 

xlviii 
during the Cold War it lashed out by engaging in foreign 

adventurism and overt domestic repression. As Cuba has 

become more a part of the world community since the end of 

the Cold War, diplomatic concerns have increasingly constrained the Castro regime from engaging in foreign subversive 

activities and domestic repression. Although the regime lacks 

the funding to engage in foreign adventurism in any case, it no 

longer can risk jeopardizing its hard-won diplomatic relations 

by exporting revolution on even a small scale. Nor can it risk 

jeopardizing its economically vital tourism industry by repressing Cuban citizens in full view of thousands offoreign tourists. 

Because the objective of the embargo is to keep Cuba isolated, the existing situation limits the enormous potential 

American social, economic, and political influences that scholars seem to agree could accelerate the process of change in 

Cuba. Scholars also seem to agree that change in Cuba comes 

only from outside the country. For this reason, the issue of how 

the United States can best promote change in Cuba is likely to 

need further consideration. By keeping United States influence out of Cuba and thereby allowing the Cuban regime to 

maintain itself in power, the embargo has, according to this 

argument, served as a sort of reverse Berlin Wall. 

Less than a year before the real Berlin Wall began to be 

erected on August 13 (coincidentally Fidel Castro's birthday), 

1961, Washington began to build its invisible barrier around 

the island nation in retaliation against the Castro regime's 

nationalization of all United States businesses and property. 

On January 22, 1962, the Organization of American States 

(OAS-see Glossary), meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, 

reluctantly voted by a two-thirds majority to expel Cuba from 

the OAS because the island nation had "voluntarily" placed 

itself outside the inter-American system. Only fourteen of the 

twenty-one members voted for the resolution, with Argentina, 

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico abstaining. 

Cuba's foreign policy subsequently became more radical. 

The embargo, the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion ofApril 1961, 

and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 set the confrontational tone for Cuba-United States relations for the rest of the 

twentieth century. Historian Jaime Suchlicki is critical of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy for allegedly being confused and indecisive about the Bay of Pigs invasion and for being apologetic 

about the outcome. Had Kennedy lived, however, Cuba-United 

States relations might well have taken a turn for the better, a 

xlix 
development that would have been anathema to the CubanAmerican community at that time. Kennedy reportedly had 

second thoughts about the embargo, just as he had regrets 

about the Bay of Pigs fiasco. On November 17, 1963, he met 

with FrenchjournalistJean Daniel and asked him to tell Castro 

that the United States was now ready to negotiate normal relations and to drop the embargo. According to Kennedy's press 

secretary, Pierre Salinger, "If Kennedy had lived, I am confident that he would have negotiated that agreement and 

dropped the embargo because he was very concerned with the 

role the Soviet Union was playing in Cuba and Latin Amer­ .

lca .... " 

The OAS adopted the United States-imposed embargo on 

July 26, 1964, as a result of Castro's policy of supporting "armed 

struggle" (the old Cuban euphemism for terrorism and insurgency) in selective Latin American countries. Within two 

months, every Latin American country except Mexico had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the island nation 

became a pariah state. In 1967, at the time of Ernesto "Che" 

Guevara's fatal guerrilla foray in Bolivia, Cuba had diplomatic 

relations with only one country in Latin America-Mexico. 

In the early 1970s, Cuba's rapprochement with Latin America and the Caribbean in the form of "internationalist" assistance, especially medical aid, began to improve the 

revolutionary nation's regional image, with diplomatic results 

that began to erode the embargo. Increasingly, Cuba gave precedence to bilateral relations, such as those between Cuba and 

Mexico, that enhanced the island's diplomatic and trade security over support for revolutionary movements. Diplomatic 

relations were revived with various Caribbean and South American nations. 

By 1975 Havana had restored diplomatic relations with ten 

of Latin America's twenty-two nations. The OAS, impressed by 

Cuba's overt goodwill efforts and Castro's diplomatic and trade 

overtures but apparently downplaying his continuing covert 

support for revolution, lifted its twelve-year-old diplomatic and 

economic sanctions on the island nation on July 29, 1975, with 

the approval of sixteen countries, including the United States. 

On August 21, 1975, the administration of PresidentJimmy 

Carter eased the trade embargo in order to allow United States 

subsidiaries in third countries to trade with Cuba. 

With hopes of a rapprochement, Cuba and the United States 

agreed on May 30, 1977, to establish interests sections in each 
other's countries, beginning September 1. During 1978, however, Cuba's military involvement in Angola's civil conflict 

dashed any hope that the United States gesture to liberalize the 

embargo would lead to normalization of bilateral relations. 

Prospects for improved relations between Havana and Washington further dimmed during 1978-79, as Cuba expanded its 

military involvement in Mrica and increased its support for revolutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean. 

At the start of the 1980s, several events disrupted Cuba's normalization campaign and contributed to the downturn in 

Cuba's relations with Latin America. The downturn began with 

Castro's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion ofMghanistan. 

Second, Cuba's handling of refugee incidents involving the 

Peruvian and Venezuelan embassies in Havana was inept and 

led to the 1980 Mariel Boat-Lift and the flight of more than 

100,000 refugees. Castro's attempt to use the Mariel Boat-Lift 

to force the United States to discuss normalization of relations 

further exacerbated the situation. In addition, Castro reverted 

to virulent revolutionary rhetoric and continued support for 

armed struggle, particularly in Central America, Colombia, 

and Chile. These actions led the administration of President 

Ronald Reagan to make new efforts to isolate Cuba. 

In 1980-81 Cuba suffered major diplomatic setbacks. Its 

relations were suspended, downgraded, or otherwise damaged 

with Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela because of Cuban subversive activities or breaches of diplomatic protocol, and Colombia and Costa Rica broke relations with Havana over Cuba's 

renewed emphasis on armed struggle. Cuba's involvement in 

Grenada in 1981 created considerable tension in the Eastern 

Caribbean and led two other countries-Jamaica and St. 

Lucia-to break relations. Upon taking office as prime minister ofJamaica thatJanuary, Edward Seaga expelled the 500 

Cubans working on the island and declared the Cuban ambassador persona non grata. By late 1981, Cuba had become so 

ostracized that even longtime friend Mexico failed to invite 

Castro to the North-South Conference held in Mexico that 

October, despite his position as leader of the Nonaligned 

Movement (see Glossary). 

The Malvinas/Falkland Islands War between Argentina and 

Britain in 1982 provided Cuba the opportunity that it needed 

to break out of its self-created diplomatic isolation and proved 

to be a watershed in Cuba's relations with Latin America. Cuba 

improved its standing in South America and specifically its relaIi 
tions with Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela by joining 

them in siding with the right-wing military regime in Argentina. The Cuban government overlooked its ideological differences with the Argentine junta in large part because trade 

relations with Argentina gave Cuba another conduit for circumventing the embargo; Argentina soon surpassed Mexico as 

Cuba's largest regional trading partner. 

Cuba's relations with the Eastern Caribbean, however, 

reached a nadir in 1983. The joint United States/Eastern 

Caribbean intervention in Grenada on October 25 put an 

abrupt end to Cuban activities in Grenada. The only members 

of the thirteen-member Caribbean Community and Common 

Market (Caricom-see Glossary) to retain relations with Cuba 

were Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, neither of which supported the joint United States/Eastern Caribbean military 

action against Grenada. 

By the mid-1980s, as a result of Havana's new overtures to 

Latin America, Cuba was again enjoying a rapprochement of 

sorts with the region. Fortunately for Castro, the demise of 

right-wing authoritarian regimes and the transition to democratic government in several South American nations in the 

1980s improved his prospects for courting the region in the 

wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War and for normalizing relations with more countries. 

Cuba also had become more integrated into Latin American 

multilateral organizations, such as the Latin American Parliament and the Latin American Integration Association (see 

Glossary), the successor to the Latin American Free Trade 

Association (see Glossary). Havana finally bowed to Latin 

American pressure to support the Central American peace process in 1985 by belatedly endorsing the proposals initiated by 

the Contadora Support Group (see Glossary), which called for 

the removal of all foreign forces from Central America. 

At the same time that Cuba began emerging from its diplomatic isolation in the mid-1980s, Castro overestimated his selfappointed role in Latin America as revolutionary statesman. 

His attempt to fill a regional leadership vacuum by rallying 

Latin American and other developing world nations around his 

proposals for a debtors' cartel, a repudiation of Latin America's 

US$360-billion foreign debt, and a "new world economic 

order" was a failure. Although he succeeded in persuading 

Peru's President Alan Garda Perez to suspend his country's 

debt payments, Castro's grandstanding elicited mainly skeptiIii 
cism in Latin America and the broader arenas of the developingworld. 

In 1986 the Reagan administration renewed attempts to isolate Cuba in the Americas by further tightening the embargo. 

Cuba was able to continue reducing its diplomatic isolation, 

however, by using its "internationalist" workers to provide medical, educational, construction, and other assistance to numerous countries. Although, until the early 1990s, Cuba's 

"internationalist" support to a number of politically unstable 

countries in the developing world also included military, guerrilla, and security support, the small-scale Cuban aid to nations 

where Havana sought to cultivate relations created goodwill 

that led to the resumption of relations with numerous countries. Contrary to assertions that Cuba provided "internationalist" assistance only to "ideologically compatible" countries in 

the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba aided several right-wing regimes, 

such as Peru in June 1970, Nicaragua in December 1972, Honduras in September 1974, and the Dominican Republic in 

1987. 

In November 1987, as a result of the goodwill created by 

Cuba's "internationalist" aid and its diplomatic overtures in the 

Latin American region, the presidents of eight Latin American 

countries-Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, 

Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (the so-called Group of Eightsee Glossary)-agreed at a meeting in Acapulco that Cuba 

should be invited to rejoin regional organizations, including 

the OAS. The Group of Eight's proposal was the first direct 

regional challenge to United States policy toward Cuba. 

Despite the calls for reintegration of Cuba into the Latin 

American community, most countries in the region remained 

wary of the communist island state, and antagonism between 

Cuba and the United States was greater in 1987-88 than at any 

time in the previous ten years. The Castro regime voiced support for Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez's Esquipulas II accord for peace in Central America in 1987, but the 

sincerity of Havana's support of the peace process came under 

question when the plan began to stagnate in late 1988. 

Tension between Cuba and the Soviet Union increased in 

1989, and Cuba's economic slide began. Castro formally welcomed Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev during his official visit to Cuba in March, but Cuba's special relationship with 

the collapsing Soviet Union was already all but over. Castro 

liii 
reportedly had defied Gorbachev's advice that Cuba should get 

on track to political pluralism and a free market. 

During the Cold War, the international community and news 

media bestowed on Cuba and Castro greatly exaggerated global significance as minor global actors. But as Havana's onceclose ideological allies in the former Soviet bloc distanced 

themselves from the Castro government in 1989-90, this 

inflated aura of importance declined markedly. 

In 1989 skepticism about the Castro regime began increasing in the Americas as a result of the televised Havana trials of 

several Ministry of Interior officials and Division General 

Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez, hitherto a national hero, on 

trumped-up charges of drug trafficking. The summary executions of Ochoa and three other pro-reform officers inJuly 1989 

shocked democratic leaders in Latin America, Spain, and elsewhere. By lauding the installation in September 1989 of the de 

facto, short-term president of Panama, Castro also earned bad 

publicity for flouting Latin American and world criticism of the 

lack of a democratic system in Panama. 

In an attempt to counter the fallout from the Ochoa affair 

and to improve his country's regional standing, Castro again 

made overtures suggesting his willingness for closer relations 

with Latin America, which he described publicly as Cuba's 

"common fatherland" and "common future." In October 1989, 

the Group of Eight, absent Panama, added its voice to those 

calling for Cuba's reincorporation into the OAS. Castro, who 

throughout the 1960s had referred to the OAS contemptuously 

as the "ministry of colonies," announced Cuba's willingness to 

rejoin the organization, ifformally invited. 

Reaching out diplomatically became more urgent for the 

island nation as its estrangement from its one-time allies in the 

former Soviet bloc became increasingly apparent during 1990. 

In that pivotal year, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 

whose Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comeconsee Glossary) trade bloc accounted for as much as 85 percent 

of Cuba's trade during the 1980s, significantly reduced their 

ties to Cuba. The Soviet Union also substantially reduced its 

financial support, and Cuba found itself no longer an indispensable Soviet ally. The Soviet Union now regarded it as a 

drain on its diminishing resources and of questionable value as 

a Soviet proxy in conflicts in the developing world that were no 

longer ofinterest to Moscow. 

liv 
As a result of Nicaragua's presidential election in December 

1989, Cuba lost a key regional ally. Subsequently, the Castro 

government, as the only Marxist-Leninist regime in a region of 

democratically elected governments, increasingly stood out in 

1990 as an anachronism. Although the OAS nevertheless voted 

that year to admit Cuba as a member, the United States vetoed 

the OAS vote. 

In order to survive the loss of its longtime Soviet benefactor 

and to improve its standing in the world, Cuba put a higher priority in the 1990s on continuing to reintegrate itself into the 

Latin American community of nations (including the Caribbean region), on expanding its relations globally, and on developing its tourist industry. Cuba also began actively seeking to 

cultivate alternative relationships, not only with m~or developing world nations, particularly China, but also with wealthy capitalist countries, such asJapan. 

Regionally, Cuba focused its efforts on the Eastern Caribbean. By 1990 Cuba had begun new diplomatic initiatives to 

improve its relations with Caricom and to obtain observer status on a number of Caricom standing committees, including 

health and education. Caricom's decision in 1990 to promote 

cooperative projects with Cuba facilitated Cuba's rapprochement with the English-speaking Caribbean. 

By 1990 Latin America and Cuba's status in the region had 

also changed significantly. The democratically elected governments that had replaced military regimes in the region had 

opened diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba (often simply 

to demonstrate their independence of United States policy) 

and had admitted it into more inter-American organizations. 

In addition, Cuba appeared to have sharply curbed its support 

for armed struggle in South America and the Caribbean, 

although it continued to support the insurgency in El Salvador. 

As Cuba pursued its foreign policy of expanding diplomatic 

relations, it continued its traditional domestic policy of repression. In defiance of the March 5, 1990, vote by the United 

Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva calling for 

continued scrutiny of human rights in Cuba, the Castro regime 

began to crack down on the nascent human rights movement 

that had flowered since 1989. By April 1990, while communist 

rule was collapsing in Eastern Europe, the regime had crushed 

the Cuban human rights movement led by dissident Gustavo 

Arcos Bergnes, president of the Havana-based Cuban CommitIv 
tee for Human Rights (Comite Cubano Pro Derechos 

Humanos-CCPDH). 

A short time later, beginning on July 9, 1990, the Castro government damaged relations with Italy and Switzerland, as well 

as with traditional friends and important trading partners, such 

as Czechoslovakia, Mexico, and Spain (Cuba's principal Western creditor), by interfering with attempts by a few dozen 

Cuban asylum seekers to obtain sanctuary in the embassies or 

diplomatic residences of these nations in Havana. But despite 

these setbacks, Cuba was elected on October 18, 1990, for the 

first time since 1956, to a seat on the United Nations Security 

Council as one of the ten nonpermanent members. Cuba won 

the votes of all Latin American and Caribbean nations, as well 

as the largest number of votes cast for any of the aspirants to 

vacant seats (146 votes out of a possible 156). 

In the wake of the democratic tidal wave that swept away 

Cuba's allies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989­

91, Castro defiantly maintained that Cuba's "socialist" system 

was unique and would remain unaffected by the sudden 

demise of East European socialism and the rise of democratic 

reformism. While the Castro government pursued a policy of 

fostering foreign relations with most countries, it simultaneously sought to keep the Cuban population from being contaminated ideologically, not only by the democratic revolution 

that had overpowered his former communist allies but also by 

other outside influences, such as democracy in the Americas, 

globalization, and capitalism. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost 

(openness) was anathema to Castro, who openly sided with 

hard-line conservative Soviet leaders. In the early 1990s, Castro 

continued to insulate Cuba to a considerable extent from the 

political and ideological repercussions of the events in the 

communist bloc, aided by the nation's geographical distance 

from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the 

embargo-imposed isolation from the United States, and the 

government's highly effective repressive apparatus. 

In 1991, as the full weight of the embargo finally began to be 

felt in Cuba, Castro faced one of the most critical years of his 

rule since the Bay of Pigs invasion thirty years earlier. Cuba's 

severe economic crisis and mounting international pressure on 

the Castro regime to democratize generated some overly optimistic predictions that 1991 would likely be Castro's last year in 

power. 

lvi 
On May 24, 1991, in the wake ofthe Cold War's end, the Castro regime completed withdrawing its military troops from 

Africa and began focusing on implementing the policy, 

adopted in 1989, of opening its economy and attracting foreign investment. To that end, Havana sharply shifted its efforts 

from building its Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR) to developing an international 

tourism industry and expanding international relations. The 

new emphasis on tourism was in response to the country's precipitous economic deterioration resulting not only from the 

cutoff of Soviet aid and the breakup of economic and trade 

relations with East European countries and the Soviet Union, 

but also from Castro's unwillingness to radically restructure the 

economy to introduce free markets and private ownership. The 

continuation of the embargo, for its part, exacerbated the 

country's economic collapse. 

Cuba's participation in the First Ibero-American Summit of 

civilian heads of state of nineteen Latin American nations and 

of Spain and Portugal held onJuly 18-19, 1991, in Guadalajara, 

Mexico, prompted Havana's rapprochement with Chile, 

Colombia, and other countries. Leaders in the region urged 

Castro to quicken the pace of reform in Cuba in return for 

closer relations and possible reincorporation into the OAS. On 

August 2, 1991, the Latin American Parliament voted 154 to 

twenty-seven, with thirty abstentions, for a resolution asking for 

an end to the embargo of Cuba. Cuba continued to make diplomatic advances in Latin America and the Eastern Caribbean 

during 1992. 

Spurning the worldwide appeal to lift the embargo, the 

United States, in the apparent belief that the collapse of the 

post-Soviet Castro regime was imminent, intensified its 

embargo on October 15,1992, with the passage of Representative Robert G. Torricelli's Cuban Democracy Act (see Glossary). This legislation, which President George Bush signed 

into law on October 23, tightens restrictions on humanitarian 

aid, specifically food, medicine, and medical supplies. In addition to prohibiting American subsidiaries in third countries 

from trading with Cuba, the Act prohibits any vessel that had 

engaged in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days from 

entering into the United States to load or unload freight. 

The Cuban Democracy Act outraged the international community. Many countries claimed that the Act violated both 

international law and United Nations resolutions that food and 

lvii 
medicine cannot be used as weapons in international conflicts. 

Britain and Canada immediately barred United States subsidiaries located in their countries from complying with its provisions. On November 24, fifty-nine members of the United 

Nations General Assembly voted against the United States in 

favor of a resolution proposed by Cuba demanding that the law 

and the trade embargo be terminated. Only Israel and, by mistake, Romania, voted with the United States in opposing the 

measure. The European Union (EU-see Glossary), Canada, 

Argentina, Mexico, and Japan were particularly incensed over 

the Cuban Democracy Act. 

Cuba again did well on the diplomatic front in 1993-94. At 

the Third Ibero-American Summit, held in Salvador, Brazil, on 

July 15-16, 1993, the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Portugal called for an end to the United States trade embargo of 

Cuba. On November 3, the United Nations General Assembly 

voted by eighty-eight to four (Albania, Israel, Paraguay, and the 

United States), with fifty-seven abstentions, to condemn the 

embargo. In 1994 the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Portugal became increasingly critical of the embargo and called 

for the United States to ease its stance. At the twenty-fourth 

General Assembly of the OAS in Brazil in early June, the foreign ministers of most OAS members called for the end of the 

embargo and the readmission of Cuba to the OAS. At the 

Ibero-American Summit meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia, 

onJune 14, the leaders of nineteen Latin American nations 

and of Spain and Portugal approved a communique calling for 

the elimination of the unilateral United States economic and 

trade boycotts of Cuba and readmission of Cuba to the OAS. 

Three months later, on September 10, 1994, the fourteenmember Rio Group (see Glossary) also called for incorporating Cuba fully into regional bodies and lifting the embargo of 

Cuba. In addition, the Rio Group urged "peaceful transition 

toward a democratic and pluralist system in Cuba." On October 

26, the United Nations General Assembly again voted overwhelmingly to demand an end to the embargo against Cuba, 

with 101 in favor, two opposed (the United States and Israel), 

and forty-eight abstaining. In contrast to international opinion, 

in 1994 only 35 percent of Americans favored ending the 

embargo, while 51 percent opposed ending it, according to a 

September 1994 Time/Cable News Network (CNN) poll. 

Throughout his regime, Castro has invoked the threat of 

United States military invasion of Cuba as justification for mililviii 
tarizing the island, and he has blamed the embargo for the 

hardships and privations caused by his own social, economic, 

and political policies. An independent countrywide survey conducted in Cuba in late 1994 and designed by the Miami Herald 

and CID/Gallup, the Costa Rican affiliate of the Princeton, 

New Jersey-based Gallup, found that the great majority (62 percent) of Cubans blamed the United States economic sanctions, 

rather than Cuba's political system, for economic difficulties. 

On March 22, 1995, conservative members of the United 

States Congress, seeing no reason to change the status quo, 

proposed to tighten the embargo even more through passage 

of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (see Glossary; more commonly known as the Helms-Burton legislation). 

This legislation proposed augmenting the embargo extraterritorially by punishing foreign companies that do business with 

Cuba. Meeting in Quito, Ecuador, on May 22-23, the foreign 

ministers of the Rio Group unanimously condemned the bill. 

The bill's adoption by the Congress in October 1995 prompted 

the leaders of Latin American countries, Spain, and Portugal, 

all attending the Ibero-American Summit in Bariloche, Argentina, at the time, to issue a strong condemnation of United 

States policy toward Cuba. Shortly thereafter, on November 2, 

one hundred and seventeen members of the United Nations 

General Assembly voted to condemn the embargo; only the 

United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan voted in favor of it. 

In retaliation for the shooting down by two Cuban MiG-29 

fighter jets of two civilian planes piloted by four members of a 

Cuban exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, over international 

waters, within sight of Key West, on February 24, 1996, the 

United States Senate approved the conference report to the 

Helms-Burton legislation by a vote ofseventy-four to twenty-two 

on March 5. Canada, Russia, the EU, and the fourteen-member 

Caricom strongly condemned the bill. Despite the international furor aroused by the bill, President William Jefferson 

Clinton signed the Helms-Burton legislation into law on March 

12, thereby halting a series of liberalizing measures toward 

Cuba. The new law did no.t deter foreign companies from 

entering into joint ventures with Cuban state companies. Moreover, every six months for the remainder of his administration, 

President Clinton waived Title III, which would have allowed 

United States citizens to sue foreign companies for conducting 

business on confiscated American property in Cuba. 

lix 
The Helms-Burton Act intensified international outrage 

over the embargo. On August 26, 1996, thirty-four members of 

the OAS passed a resolution declaring that the Helms-Burton 

Act "does not conform to international law." That October 28, 

the EU approved legislation forbidding compliance with the 

Helms-Burton Act. On November 12, the United Nations General Assembly voted by 138 to three (United States, Israel, and 

Uzbekistan) to condemn the embargo. (For the first time, all 

fifteen EU countries voted yes.) On November 28, Canada's 

Parliament passed legislation penalizing companies for obeying the Helms-Burton Act. 

The Castro regime's repressive policies, however, continued 

to limit international solidarity with the island nation. For 

example, in May 1996 Cuba's failure to enact political reforms 

and economic liberalization led the EU to suspend discussions 

with Havana on an economic cooperation agreement. At the 

annual Ibero-American Summit, held in Santiago, Chile, on 

November 10-11,1996, Latin American leaders pressed Castro 

to make democratic changes on the island, while they 

denounced moves by the United States to isolate Cuba. On 

December 2, the EU further conditioned improvement in 

political and economic relations with Cuba and developmental 

assistance on progress in human rights and fundamental democratic reforms in Cuba. 

Cuba responded to the Helms-Burton Act by adopting a law 

in January 1997 that penalizes United States citizens who seek 

restitution of their expropriated properties under the HelmsBurton law. More significantly, the United States was also subjected to retaliatory legislation from its trade partners, and in 

1997 the United Nations General Assembly voted 143 to three 

against the embargo of Cuba. Individual countries flouted the 

embargo. For example, in August 1997 France announced a 

trade agreement with Cuba. 

During his visit to Cuba on January 21-25,1998, Pope John 

Paul II criticized the embargo several times. The papal visit had 

a beneficial effect on Cuba's international image. Responding 

to the pope's call for the world to open up to Cuba and Cuba to 

open up to the world, numerous celebrities and senior officials 

and leaders of foreign governments visited Havana during the 

year. Several countries, including Guatemala, the Dominican 

Republic, and Spain, restored diplomatic relations with Cuba 

as a result of the papal visit. 

Ix 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the papal visit, the Castro government released many of its 1,320 political prisoners, leaving 

between 350 and 400 in prison. In April 1998, the United 

Nations Commission on Human Rights, for the first time in several years, voted down a United States-backed resolution condemning Cuba. 

Acknowledging the impact of the pope's visit to Cuba, President Clinton, on March 20, 1998, eased controls on licensing 

procedures of direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba, on 

resuming cash remittances up to US$300 per quarter for the 

support of close relatives in Cuba, and on developing procedures for streamlining and expediting licenses for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to 

Cuba. President Clinton also agreed to work on a bipartisan 

basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban people. Havana, however, subsequently announced that it would 

refuse all direct American humanitarian aid as long as the 

United States maintained the embargo on Cuba. 

Underscoring the mounting isolation of the United States 

on the Cuba embargo issue, the United Nations General 

Assembly on October 14, 1998, again passed a resolution calling for an end to the embargo. An overwhelming majority (157 

votes, with twelve abstentions) pitted the United States and, 

symbolically at least, Israel against most of the world. 

Despite the worldwide criticism of the embargo, onJanuary 

5, 1999, President Clinton declined the recommendation of 

twenty-four United States senators requesting that he establish 

a National Bipartisan Commission to review United States policy toward Cuba. At the same time, the president announced 

five minor changes in the embargo: broadening cash remittances, expanding direct passenger charter flights from New 

York and Los Angeles to Cuba, reestablishing direct mail service to Cuba, authorizing the sale of food and agricultural 

inputs to independent entities in Cuba, and expanding 

exchanges among academics, athletes, and scientists. 

American public support for the embargo began to show 

signs of cracking. A Gallup poll released on May 24, 1999, 

showed that, in contrast to the 1994 Time/CNN poll, only 42 

percent of those polled supported the embargo, while 51 percent favored ending it. The poll also found that 71 percent of 

Americans supported reestablishing diplomatic relations with 

Cuba. 

lxi 
On November 9, 1999, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 155 in favor to two against (the United States 

and Israel), again adopted a resolution on the need to end the 

embargo of Cuba. Nevertheless, the island nation's poor 

human rights record continued to keep many countries at 

arm's length. Staunch traditional allies such as Canada and 

Mexico had tended to overlook the Castro government's 

human rights record, but that attitude began to change in the 

late 1990s, especially after Havana put a harsh new law on dissent into effect in February 1999. The legislation, which provides a maximum prison sentence of twenty years, includes 

penalties against unauthorized contacts with the United States 

and the import or supply of "subversive" materials, including 

texts on democracy, by news agencies and journalists. That 

March a court used the new antisedition law in sentencing four 

dissidents to prison terms of up to five years, despite Canadian 

Prime MinisterJean Chretien's personal request to Castro in a 

meeting in Havana in April 1998 for their freedom. Beginning 

in April 1999, relations between Cuba and Canada-the largest 

foreign investor in Cuba and Cuba's second-largest trade partner, behind Spain-cooled over the Castro regime's continued 

crackdowns on dissident journalists and human rights activists. 

Canada had already halted its unsuccessful campaign to restore 

Cuba's membership in the OAS. 

In general, human rights issues seemed not to interfere 

greatly with Cuba's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. At the Ibero-American Summit held in Havana in 

November 1999, Mexico's President Ernesto Zedillo did what 

no Mexican leader had done before, when he made an implicit 

call for greater democracy in Cuba, but Cuban-Mexican relations remained unchanged. Nor were human rights a factor in 

Cuba's strong relations with Venezuela. These relations greatly 

strengthened after Hugo Chavez Frias, a leftist military officer 

and populist, was inaugurated as president in February 1999, 

an event attended by Castro. Nor did human rights issues prevent Paraguay, South America's only hold-out, from reestablishing full diplomatic relations with the island nation on 

November 8,1999. 

By providing small-scale "internationalist" aid, Cuba has continued to reap diplomatic dividends. In 1998 Cuba reportedly 

had 2,759 "internationalist" technical workers, professionals, 

and specialists in eighty-six countries. In late December 1998, 

in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Central 

lxii 
America during the October 27 to November 1 period, Cuba 

dispatched about 600 medical doctors to aid the affected populations of Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the 

immediate aftermath of the flooding and mud slides that devastated a large area ofVenezuela in December 1999, Cuba sent 

more than 400 health-care personnel to assist in the recovery 

efforts. In August 2000, Cuba aided El Salvador in combating 

an outbreak of dengue fever. 

Despite Cuba's continuing condition as an embargoed 

nation, the only major country that Cuba was isolated from in 

2001-01 was the United States, and the only Latin American 

countries still without diplomatic relations with Havana were El 

Salvador and Honduras. Relations between Cuba and the 

United States were still limited to Interests Sections in each 

other's capitals. 

As a result of Havana's diplomatic and "internationalist" initiatives and the global propaganda value to Cuba of the United 

States embargo, the island nation today no longer stands alone 

in the court of world opinion. Growing international resentment of the embargo appears to have spurred many countries 

to open relations with Cuba. By 2000 Cuba's public renunciation of its longtime support for armed struggle and revolutionary military "internationalism" in the early 1990s and its 

diplomatic initiatives during the decade had allowed the island 

nation to upgrade its international standing, in the form of 

diplomatic relations with 172 members of the 187-member 

United Nations. With the important exception of the United 

States, Cuba was no longer seen as a rogue state but as a diplomatically accepted member of the world community. 

In Latin America and the Caribbean, Havana had succeeded 

in reestablishing relations with twenty-nine countries and in 

improving relations with others, such as El Salvador and Honduras. Havana has twenty-three accredited missions in the 

region, and twenty-one Latin American and Caribbean countries have diplomatic posts in Havana. The Castro regime's diplomatic comeback in Latin America may be a far more 

significant Cuban achievement in the region than Cuba's shortlived revolutionary victories in Grenada and Nicaragua. 

Viewed as a David against Goliath, Cuba is now seen internationally as a victim of a United States isolation strategy widely 

regarded as punitive and counterproductive, and, because it 

supposedly ignores the Cuban reality, as irrational. With 

increasingly large majorities, the United Nations General 

lxiii 
Assembly has voted overwhelmingly every year since 1992 for 

resolutions condemning the unilateral economic sanctions. 

Only Israel has regularly stood with the United States in opposing United Nations resolutions condemning the embargo since 

1992. Israel, however, is an active trading partner of Cuba, as 

well as a major investor, even though it lacks diplomatic relations with Havana. 

The embargo is widely seen as having helped to keep the 

Castro regime in power by preventing Cubans from being 

influenced by new ideas about human rights, economics, and 

democracy, and by giving Castro a scapegoat on which to blame 

Cuba's economic problems. Many Cubans reportedly believe 

that his regime would not last a year if the embargo were lifted. 

Just as President Reagan's decision to let American students 

travel to Eastern Europe helped to bring down the Berlin Wall 

on November 7, 1989, the Castro regime, according to 

embargo critics, would be unlikely to withstand the ideological 

and socioeconomic impact of millions of United States visitors. 

Cuban-American visitors alone have had a profound impact on 

Cuban society. As sociologist Sergio Diaz-Briquets points out 

herein, "Many observers feel that the 1980 Mariel outflow was a 

direct result of family visits as many disaffected Cubans were 

deeply influenced by contacts with Cuban-American visitors 

and the perceptions of their experience abroad." 

Despite Cuba's geographical proximity, United States citizens, unlike those of most other countries, have not been free 

to visit their island neighbor. United States law restricts travel 

to Cuba to all but a few American and foreign government officials traveling on official business (including representatives of 

international organizations of which the United States is a 

member), journalists regularly employed by a news-reporting 

organization, and Cuban-Americans, who are accorded the special right to make a once-a-year visit to family relatives. The 

United States ban on travel to Cuba was lifted on March 18, 

1977, but it was reimposed on April 19, 1982, and has remained 

in effect since then. 

The legal restrictions notwithstanding, as many as 154,000 

United States residents, including about 124,000 Cuban-Americans and 30,000 others, such asjournalists, humanitarian workers, and academics, reportedly visited Cuba legally during 

2000. Estimates of United States citizens, including CubanAmericans, who visited the island nation illegally in 2000 range 

from 22,000 to 80,000. Despite these numbers, Cuba remains 

lxiv 
largely terra incognita for its northern neighbor as a result of 

the embargo. It is not surprising, therefore, that, according to a 

February 1-4,2001, poll by Gallup, 68 percent of Americans 

had an unfavorable opinion ofCuba, while only 27 percent had 

a favorable opinion. 

The Castro government, however, has not helped its case 

with its poor human rights record, which has included sharp 

restrictions on basic rights, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement. Indeed, there has been a pattern of crackdowns following United States initiatives to ease 

the embargo, as if Castro were signaling that his government 

would prefer not to have the embargo lifted just yet. 

Human rights issues relating to Cuba also continued to be of 

concern to several democratic governments in the Americas in 

2000 and 2001. In late April 2000, Argentina and Chile voted 

"yes" in favor of a United Nations Commission on Human 

Rights vote censuring Cuba for its human rights record, while 

Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador abstained. The final vote was 

twenty-one in favor, eighteen against, and fourteen abstaining. 

In 2000-01, once-close relations between Cuba and Mexico 

and Spain appeared to be on a somewhat more formal footing 

because of the Castro government's continued hard line 

regarding human rights issues. At the Ibero-American Summit 

held in Panama on November 17-18, 2000, Castro criticized 

Mexico and Spain for supporting an EI Salvador-proposed resolution against terrorism because it did not mention Cuba's 

complaints of Cuban-American-sponsored terrorism perpetrated in Cuba. (Throughout the 1990s, Cuban-American 

exiles boasted of paramilitary raids into Cuba, including a 

series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997.) Cuba's refusal to 

sign the resolution strained ties with Spain. 

Two weeks later, on December 1, 2000, Castro attended the 

presidential inauguration of Mexico's President-elect Vicente 

Fox. With Fox's inauguration, relations between Cuba and 

Mexico began on a new footing as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional-PRI), which 

had ruled Mexico for seven decades and which historically was 

friendly to Cuba, relinquished the presidency to the opposition. Nevertheless, in 2001 Mexico's economic and commercial 

relations with Cuba continued, and bilateral relations 

remained friendly and cooperative. 

Cuba's human rights record notwithstanding, international 

disapproval of the embargo has continued to increase. The 

lxv 
continuation of the embargo has remained a significant irritant in the relations of Latin America and United States allies 

with Washington. The embargo has remained widely criticized 

internationally as a relic of the Cold War that lost its justification when Cuba ceased being a satellite of the former Soviet 

Union. It is also widely viewed as having been highly ineffective 

in achieving its main foreign policy goals, and as having failed 

to oust the Castro government and to keep Cuba from gradually reestablishing cultural, diplomatic, economic, and other 

ties with Latin America and the rest of the world. 

In 2000 and 2001, there was no lack of support in Washington for continuing the embargo of Cuba. The embargo lobby 

continued to argue that economic sanctions should not be 

lifted until Castro allows free elections and open markets, 

releases all political prisoners, and restores civilliberties-conditions that were not made when the embargo was first 

imposed. Embargo proponents continued to argue that United 

States economic ties to Cuba would only boost the Castro 

regime politically and economically and not benefit the Cuban 

people. They continued to argue that sustained sanctions can 

work. Despite the annual Cuban-American visits to Cuba that 

are a major source of financial support for the Cuban economy 

in the form of remittances, Cuban-American activists in South 

Florida have continued to express outrage that American tourists have been visiting Cuba illegally and spending money 

there. 

The forty years of embargo have been costly for Cuba. 

According to a Cuban complaint lodged with the United 

Nations General Assembly in October 1998, the United States' 

trade embargo on Cuba had cost the Caribbean island US$60 

billion in lost revenues, severely undermining the country's 

economy. In April 2000, Cuba's public health minister told the 

Group of Seventy-Seven (see Glossary) Summit in Havana that 

the embargo had cost Cuba's health sector more than US$2 billion. Cuba also announced in April that the embargo had cost 

the country's world-renowned cigar industry US$l.l billion in 

lost revenues. 

Despite its economic losses from the embargo, Cuba has 

been able to circumvent it since 1991 by finding trading partners among the former socialist nations and among marketeconomy countries. Cuba's top four trading partners in 1999 

were Spain, Canada, China, and Venezuela, in that order. In 

2000 Venezuela, as a result mainly of crude oil and refined 

lxvi 
product exports to Cuba,jumped to the top spot, with Spain 

following at a close second, according to Cuba's Central Bank. 

The pro-embargo lobby has found its stance under increasing scrutiny in the new millennium. The story of six-year-old 

Elian Gonzalez, the ship-wreck survivor who lost his mother at 

sea and was cared for by relatives in Miami's Little Havana, put 

Cuba back in the news in early 2000 and created a widespread 

perception that Cuban-Americans in Miami were extremist. 

The backlash prompted lawmakers to reexamine United States 

policy toward Cuba. 

Mter four decades ofstatus quo in relations between Havana 

and Washington, the embargo was widely regarded in the 

United States as an archaic policy. Increasingly, the American 

public and lawmakers questioned whether a United States policy that was initially formulated and adopted at the height of 

the Cold War could still be relevant in the post-Cold War era. 

United States public opinion favored a reassessment by Washington of the 1960s-era policy framework of the embargo. A 

May 2000 Gallup poll showed that 48 percent of Americans 

favored ending the embargo, as opposed to 42 percent in favor 

of maintaining it. The same poll, perhaps influenced by the 

Elian controversy, found that 57 percent of Americans favored 

renewing diplomatic relations with Cuba (a 14 percent decline, 

however, since the May 1999 poll), while only 36 percent 

opposed resuming ties. 

Embargo critics include those advocating an approach that 

calls for engaging Cuba in dialogue while lifting some United 

States sanctions that they believe hurt the Cuban people. Others call for lifting the embargo completely and restoring all 

relations. They argue that the embargo continues to provide 

Castro with a pretext not only for keeping Cuban society militarized (through mass militias) and under the tight control of 

the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de CubaPCC), but also for exploiting United States-Cuban hostilities. 

Like the long-standing Platt Amendment authorizing United 

States military intervention in Cuba from 1901 until its abrogation in 1934 and the leasing "in perpetuity" of the Guantanamo 

naval base in 1903 and, since 1934, for less than US$4,000 in 

annual rent, the embargo has long turned public sentiment in 

Cuba as well as international opinion against the United States. 

Lifting the embargo and restoring relations, critics argue, 

would be more likely to lead to a peaceful transition to democracy rather than violent civil conflict. Advocates of a policy 

lxvii 
change toward Cuba also point to the international consensus 

against the embargo, the suffering that it has caused the Cuban 

people, and lost opportunities to United States businesses 

interested in competing with Canadian and European companies operating in Cuba. Moreover, it is argued that lifting the 

embargo would not necessarily help the regime but instead 

would deprive Castro of one of his most important propaganda 

weapons. 

On May 25,2000, a proposed measure to permit the export 

of food, medicine, and medical products to Cuba marked a significant shift in Congress and reflected a growing impatience 

with the embargo's failure. In particular, business interests, 

including American farmers, alarmed that international competitors had been making major sales to countries under unilateral United States sanctions, were joining traditional 

opponents of the embargo. As a result of a growing desire by 

American farmers and business people to trade with Cuba, by 

2000 the once-powerful but still influential embargo lobby had 

been reduced to the vocal right wing of the Cuban-American 

community in Florida, its allies in Congress, and other conservatives. Nevertheless, a Florida International University poll 

released in October 2000 found that, although only 25.8 percent of Cuban-Americans felt that the embargo had worked 

well, 64.2 percent of the Cuban-American population 

expressed strong support for its continuation. 

The new congressional proposal of May 25,2000, seemed to 

herald a gradual easing of the embargo, but its actual helpfulness to Cuba appeared to be minimal at best because of the 

conditions attached to it. For example, the proposal disallowed 

bartering, purchase of any Cuban goods by United States companies, or extension of any public or private credit to cashstrapped Cuba from the United States to finance purchases. In 

addition, under the Cuban Democracy Act, ships visiting Cuba 

would still be banned from docking at a United States port during the following six months. 

Despite the prospects raised by the proposed exemption, a 

Cuban-American congressional representative from Florida 

forced removal of the trade provision from the agricultural 

spending bill on grounds that it was an unacceptable attachment to a spending bill. Furthermore, a House-approved measure that would have dropped enforcement of United States 

restrictions on travel to Cuba by Americans was replaced by a 

provision that codified the ban on American tourism to the 

lxviii 
island. Moreover, on June 20, 2000, the Senate voted, by fiftynine to forty-one, to again defeat the proposed creation of a 

National Bipartisan Commission to study the effectiveness of 

the economic embargo of Cuba. 

On November 9,2000, the international community reiterated its contrary stance when the United Nations General 

Assembly passed, with 167 votes in favor, a nonbinding, Cubadrafted resolution urging Washington to lift the embargo as 

soon as possible and all countries to refuse to comply with it. 

Only the United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands voted 

against it, while four other countries abstained. 

On March 10,2001, Caricom went on record against Cuba's 

isolation from the integrational process linked with the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) zone. In an 

official statement, Caricom said that any policy ofisolation and 

expulsion is counterproductive in the post-Cold War era. 

The United States' tattered diplomatic prestige became evident with its ouster from the fifty-four-nation Commission on 

Human Rights on May 3, 2001. The unprecedented action 

reportedly reflected a growing frustration with America's allegedly noncooperative actions and attitudes toward international 

organizations and treaties, as well as its votes involving the Palestinians and countries like China, Cuba, and Iran. On May 19, 

President Bush specifically linked the Commission's vote on 

Cuba with the subsequent loss of the United States' seat. 

Despite the favorable votes in the United Nations and other 

multinational fora over the embargo issue, Cuba's pariah status 

in organizations or pacts involving the United States continued. Cuba was the only country in the Americas to be excluded 

from the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, Canada, on 

April 20-22, 2001, when the agreement was approved, because 

only democratic countries are eligible to participate in the proposedFTAA. 

Although its economic system survived the 1990s, the island 

nation underwent significant social and economic changes 

during the decade as the economy geared toward dollar-based 

tourism, dollar remittances, and foreign investment. Political 

scientistJorge I. Dominguez observes herein that since the 

1990s Cuba has been undergoing a gradual social and political 

transition of a still undetermined nature. He explains that a 

proto-civil society has grown as a consequence of government 

reforms (such as greater religious freedom), as many Cubans 

become largely independent of the state for their livelihood, 

lxix 
and as younger, more dynamic, well-educated, and pragmatic 

leaders emerge in key institutions. Sergio Diaz-Briquets 

explains that the greater religious freedom "will inevitably contribute to the undermining of the ideological, social, political, 

and economic power of the Cuban totalitarian state." He adds 

that tourism and the dollarization of the domestic economy 

"will further accelerate a process of social change." And he 

points out that the presence of so many foreign visitors limits 

the regime's ability to suppress civil and political dissent. 

In the first quarter of 2001, the Castro regime, apparently 

more confident from having surmounted the country's economic depression of the 1990s and angry over international 

criticism of its human rights practices, returned to the mass 

protests, hard-line rhetoric, and confrontational diplomacy 

that had characterized the island nation during the decades of 

the Cold War. Instead of consumer ads, billboards displayed 

the old "Socialism or Death" signs. The resurgence of the hard 

line has been attributed to the divisive effect of the regime's 

1993 decision to allow the circulation of dollars and the 

regime's concern that discontent could get out of control 

unless redirected away from regime policies and toward the 

United States. 

Legalization of dollars made it possible for taxi drivers, hotel 

workers, and other Cubans, including prostitutes, associated 

with the tourism industry and getting tipped or paid in dollars 

to earn far more than professionals, such as government officials, military officers, doctors, scientists, and university professors. Since dollars became legal, resentment has grown 

between those with access to dollars and those without. Cubans 

receiving remittances from relatives in the United States have 

also contributed to the growing inequalities. 

Many Cubans reportedly also greatly resent the system of 

tourism apartheid that prevents Cubans from getting near 

tourist resorts for foreigners or entering hotels for foreign 

tourists (unless they are employees), that reserves first-class 

medical facilities for foreigners and high Cuban officials, and 

that compels many young Cuban women to prostitute themselves for dollars. 

Ifits frequent, government-sponsored, anti-United States rallies held in Havana's open-air structure called the protest 

drome (protestodromo) are any indication, the regime appears to 

be fearful that this seething resentment could get out of control and, instead of being directed against the United States 

lxx 
embargo and government, develop into mass protests against 

the Castro regime. In this regard, the embargo appears to serve 

the Castro regime well as a scapegoat and as a mechanism for 

bottling up growing resentment, at least for the short term. 

Mounting popular resentment may have the potential for 

unraveling the Castro regime and is reminiscent of the social 

discontent that erupted in the 1959 Revolution. 

On July 14, 2001, President Bush announced plans to 

strengthen the embargo by enforcing limits on cash payments 

that Cuban-Americans may send to their relatives on the island 

and by preventing American tourists from visiting Cuba. On 

July 16, however, in an unexpected setback for the Cuban exile 

lobby and its Congressional allies, President Bush announced 

that he would continue the Clinton administration policy of 

waiving Title III of the Helms-Burton Act for six months at a 

time. On July 25, for the second successive year, the House 

voted, by 240 to 186, to approve a measure that would effectively lift the ban on most travel to Cuba, but the measure again 

died in the Senate. 

Embargo critics believe that the politically charged embargo 

has long narrowed the perceptual lens through which United 

States policymakers view the prospects for effecting a peaceful 

transition to democracy in Cuba. For example, a related argument against the embargo is that, in the absence of relations 

between Cuba and the United States, Washington lacks the 

ability to influence the direction of the generational transition 

of Cuba's social, economic, and political system, or even the 

military, still dominated by aging generals of the generation of 

Fidel and Raul Castro. According to this argument, whether 

post-Castro Cuba remains under a regime headed by the 

uncharismatic General of the Army Raul Castro Ruz, the first 

vice president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers 

and minister of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed 

Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-MINFAR), or 

instead somehow undergoes a gradual transition to democracy, 

the lifting of the embargo would allow Cuba to accelerate a 

process of change that the United States could influence for 

the better. 

Additional groundwork for Raul Castro's eventual succession 

as chief ofstate reportedly was made as a result of a reorganization of the FAR High Command in January 2001. Five generals-two FAR vice ministers and the commanders of the 

eastern, central, and western armies-were promoted to the 

lxxi 
rank of army corps general (general de cuerpa de ejercita). Until 

then, Minister of Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra was the sole 

individual holding that rank. 

Few Cubans reportedly believe that the Cuban Revolution 

will outlast Fidel Castro. According to Professor Jorge 

Dominguez, younger, more competent, and more urbane civilian members of the political elite who are more attuned to economic and political experimentation include Carlos Lage 

Davila, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of 

Ministers; and Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, president of the 

National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 

Poder Popular). Although one of these civilian leaders might 

make a more credible figurehead president in a post-Fidel Castro transitional government than Raul Castro, it appears 

unlikely that there will be any transition from communism to 

democracy in Cuba until the Cuban population is allowed to 

elect a president in a free and fair election. 

Moreover, there are two important aspects of civil-military 

relations in Cuba that should be taken into account in any 

assessment of post-Fidel Castro Cuba. First, the military is well 

regarded by the Cuban population and is considered by many 

observers to be the most powerful institutional actor in the 

political system. Second, although it seems unlikely that the 

Cuban elites and the population in general would back a 

regime headed by Raul Castro, a long-time ideological hardline military man who lacks political charisma and any international stature, he will likely succeed his brother, as long as he 

retains the support of the military. 

In assessing the prospects for change in Cuba's relatively 

closed society, the impact of the information revolution is also 

an important consideration. The Cuban government's efforts 

to expand Cuba's ties with the nations of the world and its 

reported plans to create an information technology (IT) business on the island make its long-standing policy of trying to 

control the population's access to information increasingly 

untenable. Cuban authorities have long stifled Cuba's IT development. Because the Internet poses a serious threat to the 

Cuban government's information monopoly, Internet access is 

allowed only to businesses, foreigners, and about 40,000 officials of state entities. According to reports by foreign news 

media, Internet access in Cuba is forbidden to the average citizen. The Castro government denied these reports in early 

lxxii 
March 2000, however, claiming that access to the Internet is 

limited only for technological and financial reasons. 

As the leaks in its information monopoly proliferate, the 

regime is likely to find its policy of keeping the population isolated from the global revolution in IT to be a hopeless and 

highly counterproductive task. Despite the obstacles, a growing 

number of younger Cubans, ignoring official Internet prohibitions, have been able to purchase computers on the black market and to find a way to tap into official Internet links without 

permission. Cuba reportedly began to open a dozen cyber-cafes 

around Havana in 2001, but the US$5 per hour Internet access 

charge is likely to limit use of these facilities mainly to tourists 

and the relatively few Cubans who are paid in dollars. 

Although this general review of the embargo issue suggests 

that the arguments in favor of lifting the embargo seem to 

greatly outweigh those against it, the matter is complicated by 

the Castro regime's unceasing hostility toward America and the 

regime's potential or actual military, intelligence, and terrorist 

threats to United States national security interests. In regard to 

the potential military threat, an unclassified United States 

Department of Defense report entitled "The Cuban Threat to 

U.S. National Security" concluded that the Cuban Armed 

Forces posed "a negligible conventional threat" to the United 

States or surrounding countries by the late 1990s. Although the 

greatly downsized and financially strapped Cuban Armed 

Forces may not pose a significant conventional threat, the 

report failed to take into account an Armageddon-type crisis, 

such as a scenario in which the regime were about to be overthrown. In that situation, the Castro brothers could order 

some unanticipated terrorist attack against the United States, 

possibly using MiGs. Furthermore, the Cuban military is highly 

defensive, with much of its equipment hidden in a vast system 

of caves and tunnels. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Cuba in December 2000 raised the specter of a new alliance between Havana 

and Moscow, but reportedly was mostly symbolic rather than a 

signal of a resumption of once-close relations between Cuba 

and the former Soviet Union. Rather than resume Russia's subsidizing of Cuba, Putin reportedly was more interested in getting the Castro government to repay Cuba's multibillion-dollar 

debt to Russia, as well as making an opening for large Russian 

companies that might be interested in investing on the island. 

Putin's visit reportedly failed to achieve a breakthrough in relalxxiii 
tions, a significant trade deal, or even an agreement by Castro 

to repay the debt. 

President Putin's visit did, however, reportedly result in the 

signing by the Russian and Cuban defense ministers of a military and technical plan that calls for the parties to develop 

cooperation in such spheres as military personnel training, 

modernization of armaments, and military equipment. The 

agreement specifically concerns repair and modernization of 

Cuban planes made in the former Soviet Union. To that end, a 

Cuban military delegation headed by Army Corps General 

Julio Casas Regueiro, deputy minister of the FAR, visited Moscow in late April 200l. 

Cuba's anti-United States intelligence activities have also 

apparently impeded reestablishment of diplomatic relations 

with the United States. While the Castro regime has overtly 

pursued a diplomatic strategy to win acceptance in the international community, it has a well-publicized record of using its 

diplomatic posts, including the United Nations, for intelligence activities against the United States and its North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. 

The Cuban intelligence threat was also manifested in 2001 

by cases of proven or alleged espionage by Cuban citizens residing in the United States. On June 8, 2001, a federal jury in 

Miami, concluding a six-month trial, convicted five Cuban 

agents of espionage against the United States. Five other 

indicted members of the spy ring, which was revealed in September 1998, pleaded guilty in exchange for cooperation and 

received lighter sentences. The leader of the ring, Gerardo 

Hernandez, the only one charged and convicted in a murder 

conspiracy in the death of the four Brothers to the Rescue 

members whose planes were shot down on February 24, 1996, 

received a sentence of life imprisonment. Four others were 

able to flee to Cuba and avoid prosecution. Reflecting the antiUnited States hostility of the Castro regime, Granma International, the English version of Cuba's official newspaper, on June 

24,2001, headlined the actions of the Cuban spies as "a heroic 

behavior in the entrails of the monster," a slogan that also 

appeared on a large poster behind Fidel Castro's podium when 

he addressed a crowd of 60,000 in Havana on June 23, along 

with photos of the five indicted Cubans, and on the T-shirts of 

many Cubans at weekly rallies in Havana. In addition, on September 22, 2001, the Washington Post reported the arrest by 

agents of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 

lxxiv 
(FBI) of a senior intelligence analyst for Cuban affairs, on 

charges of spying for the Castro regime. 

Since 1964 Cuba's intelligence threat to the United States 

and NATO has been symbolized by the Russian-operated Lourdes electronic eavesdropping site, which has targeted the 

United States. On October 17, 2001, however, President Putin, 

reversing his earlier stance, announced that Russia will close 

the Lourdes facility in order to save the annual rental fee of 

US$200 million, which Castro had refused to cancel as partial 

payment for Cuban debts to Moscow. The Castro government 

angrily denounced Putin's decision. 

Cuba's potential terrorist threat needs to be put in some 

context. According to ProfessorJaime Suchlicki, one of the 

"major themes" of Cuba's international relations by the 1990s 

included continuous support of "movements of national liberation in Asia, Mrica, the Middle East, and Latin America." By 

the early 1990s, the regime appeared to have largely ceased 

active support of revolutionary groups in the absence of subsidies and other support that it had received from the former 

Soviet Union. According to Professor Dominguez, Cuba 

announced in 1992 "that it had stopped providing military support to revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in other countries." By most accounts, Cuba has 

promoted tourism, trade, and diplomacy instead of terrorism 

and revolutionary military internationalism since the early 

1990s. 

Nevertheless, the regime has reportedly continued ties with 

a number of international terrorist groups, and it has 

remained on the United States Department of State's list of 

nations sponsoring terrorism. According to the Department's 

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, published in April 2001, the 

island country continued to provide safehaven to members of 

several terrorist groups, as well as to several United States terrorist fugitives. Active terrorist groups with members taking refuge in Cuba include the Basque Fatherland and Freedom 

(Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna-ETA) and Colombia's National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional-ELN) and 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC). 

Cuba also has continued to maintain ties to other state sponsors of international terrorism, according to the report. In 

addition, in May 1998 then Secretary of Defense William 

Cohen testified in Congress that Cuba possesses advanced biolxxv 
technology and is capable of mass-producing agents for biological warfare. The Castro regime also reportedly poses a 

cyberterrorism threat to the United States infrastructure, 

according to Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency. During the public part of a hearing of the 

United States Senate Intelligence Committee on February 7, 

2001, Admiral Wilson was widely reported to have told the 

committee, in response to a question concerning Cuba's capability for cyber warfare, that the FAR could start an "information warfare or computer network attack" that could "disrupt 

our military." 

If Cuba is, as alleged by the Department of State report, 

secretly supporting international terrorism, the Castro regime 

could be seen by the United States as posing an unacceptable 

potential threat to vital United States national security interests 

in the post September 11, 2001, world. If Fidel Castro was willing to risk nuclear war between the former Soviet Union and 

the United States in October 1962, some have argued that he 

could become desperate enough to help Islamic terrorists use 

biological weapons against the United States. In the spring of 

2001, Fidel Castro toured Iran, Libya, and Syria, and was 

quoted as telling Iranian university students that "Iran and 

Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its 

knees." Like other nations on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, Cuba could find itself coming under increasing United 

States pressure to demonstrate that it deserves to be removed 

from the list by discontinuing to provide safehaven or other 

support to members of active terrorist groups. 

A lack of Cuban cooperation in the antiterrorism war could 

impede progress toward reestablishing diplomatic relations 

with the United States. In his speech of September 22, 2001, 

Fidel Castro was unsparing in attacking the United States and 

its intention to wage a war in Afghanistan, contending that 

United States "fanaticism" was stronger than that of the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks. Moreover, Cuba 

was the only nation that failed to condemn terrorism at the 

United Nations General Assembly session on November 16, 

2001. Instead, the Cuban foreign minister, Felipe Perez Roque, 

used the forum to launch a propaganda attack against the 

United States. Echoing the propaganda of Osama bin Laden 

and the Taliban, he denounced the United States for waging 

an "ineffective, unjustifiable bombing campaign" in Afghanilxxvi 
stan, which "has targeted children, the civilian population, and 

the International Red Cross hospitals and facilities as enemies." 

Prior to the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States on 

September 11, 2001, many observers believed that the Castro 

regime would be able to maintain itself in power and continue 

to blame the island's socioeconomic problems on the embargo 

as long as the status quo, Cold War situation between Cuba and 

America prevailed. Major setbacks to the Cuban economy during the year, however, had, by late 2001, compelled the Cuban 

government to reiterate its readiness for normal relations with 

the United States. Tourism to the island, a critical source of 

dollars, fell sharply following the September 11 terrorist 

attacks. Another critical source of dollars, remittances from 

exiles in Miami, also declined sharply because of the post-September 11 economic downturn in the United States. President 

Putin's abrupt decision to close Russia's Lourdes listening post 

constituted another major loss of revenue. And on November 

4, Hurricane Michelle, the island's worst storm in five decades, 

severely damaged crops that Cuba needed for export and 

domestic consumption. Creating a crack in the embargo, the 

aftermath of the storm prompted the first trade accords 

between Cuba and the United States in four decades, allowing 

four American companies to sell Cuba about US$20 million 

worth of wheat, corn, and other foodstuffs. Whether the trade 

deal heralds a thaw in relations remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, post-September 11 world sympathy for Cuba's 

financial plight and condemnation of the blockade remained 

unchanged, despite strong United Nations support for the 

United States-led war against terrorism. This fact was evident 

when the United Nations General Assembly again voted overwhelmingly on November 27 for an end to the United States 

trade embargo against Cuba. As in 2000, the vote was 167 to 

three (United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands). At a 

time when vital national security interests of the United States 

were under threat by international terrorism, maintaining the 

status quo between Cuba and the United States no longer 

seemed feasible to many Americans. Thus, it remained a compelling argument, that, if Cuba were opened to unchecked 

United States influences through the lifting of the embargo, 

the Castro regime would be unlikely to keep the socioeconomic impact ofAmerican trade and millions of United States 

visitors, the IT revolution, and the forces of economic globalization from sweeping his communist system into the same 

lxxvii 
dustbin of history now occupied by the former Soviet Union 

and its East European allies. 

December 14, 2001 

* * * 

In the first half of 2002, it appeared that Castro himself was 

increasingly becoming a major liability in his own decades-long 

diplomatic offensive in Latin America. With his mind-set stuck 

in the Cold War and in his "untouchable" communist system of 

rule, Castro had succeeded in alienating even his long-time 

allies in the region. Despite having diplomatic relations with 

most countries and worldwide support for the lifting of the 

United States embargo, Cuba remained ostracized from the 

United States, and this ostracism adversely affected Cuba's relations with other countries, most notably Mexico. 

As Mexico's relations with the United States and the global 

economy grew closer, President Vicente Fox distanced himself 

from Castro during the first half of the year, and Mexico's fourdecades-old policy of neutrality toward Cuban human rights 

issues began to unravel. President Fox ended a good-will visit to 

Cuba on February 4 by meeting with several of the Cuban government's most prominent opponents and calling on the Castro government to pursue democratic reforms and increase 

human rights protections. Fox's visit and Castro's subsequent 

brief appearance at the United Nations development summit 

meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, in March set the stage for Castro's diplomatic debacle with President Fox a few weeks later. 

At the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting 

on April 19, Castro was especially piqued by Mexico's vote censuring Cuba. He called it a "despicable betrayal" because it 

allowed the measure to narrowly prevail by twenty-three to 

twenty-one votes. In apparent retaliation, Castro seriously damaged Cuban-Mexican relations by publicizing a humiliating 

tape recording that he had made of a private telephone conversation with Fox in which the Mexican president had tried to 

persuade Castro to cancel or cut short his attendance at the 

Monterrey summit the previous month in order not to "complicate" Mexican-United States relations. The audiotape was 

highly embarrassing to Fox because he had stated publicly that 

lxxviii 
he did not ask Castro to cut short his attendance at the meeting. 

For Cuba's annual May 1 commemoration, Castro continued 

his bitter campaign against his former Latin American allies by 

ordering several million Cubans to rally in the center of 

Havana to express condemnation of the "treasonous sycophants"-otherwise known as the democratic governments of 

Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and 

Uruguay. These countries had joined in supporting a resolution critical ofCuba at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting on April 19. 

Meanwhile, United States policy toward Cuba under the 

administration of President George W. Bush appeared reminiscent of the 1980s. President Bush committed his administration to a continuation of the traditional Cold War policy 

toward Cuba. Bush's call for Castro to open his country's political and economic system was part of the "Initiative for a New 

Cuba" launched as a result of a review that began in January. 

Bush said that he would veto further measures on trade with 

Cuba and on lifting the ban that empowers the United States 

Department of the Treasury to fine Americans traveling to 

Cuba. 

In the annual publication entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism-200l, released by the United States Department of State's 

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on May 21, 

2002, Cuba remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, 

despite signing all twelve United Nations counterterrorism 

conventions and the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism 

at the 2001 summit. Although the report did not mention anything about Cuba's biological weapons capabilities, in the 

March:June period of 2002 United States military and Department of State officials made conflicting statements as to 

whether Cuba possessed biological weapons. On March 19, 

Carl W. Ford, Jr., assistant secretary for intelligence and 

research of the Department of State, stated in testimony to the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, "Cuba has at least a 

limited developmental offensive biological warfare research 

and development effort." On May 6, a week before former 

PresidentJimmy Carter's five-day visit to Cuba on May 12-17, 

Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton made a similar statement to a meeting of the conservative Heritage Foundation, 

indicating that Cuba is developing biological weapons and has 

"at least a limited offensive biological research and developlxxix 
ment effort" in germ warfare. Later that month, however, in 

response to Bolton's allegation that Cuba is developing biological weapons, Major General Gary Speer, acting commander in 

chief of the United States Southern Command, stated that he 

had seen no evidence that Cuba is producing biological weapons from its biomedical research program. 

Mter being effusively welcomed by Castro, Carter began his 

historic visit to Cuba with a promise from Castro that he could 

visit any of the island's biotechnology research centers. Not 

being in Cuba on an arms-inspection mission, however, Carter 

toured only the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y BiotecnologiaCIGB) in Havana, a facility visited by thousands of foreign scientists, including 400 Americans in 2001. 

Carter was the most prominent American political figure to 

visit Cuba in forty-three years of communist rule. As Cuban 

human rights advocates had hoped, his visit lent support to 

their campaign for greater political and economic freedom. By 

the time that he arrived in Cuba on May 12, dissident activists 

had openly collected 11,020 valid signatures on a petition calling for a national referendum to institute civil rights, the right 

to own and operate private businesses, electoral reform, and an 

amnesty for all political prisoners. Article 88 of the 1976 constitution allows any citizen who collects the signatures of at least 

10,000 registered voters to petition the National Assembly for a 

referendum on any subject. The three-year-Iong petition drive 

was known as the Varela Project, after Felix Varela, a nineteenth-century Roman Catholic priest, philosopher, and 

Cuban independence activist. Although the petition was 

rejected when its creator, Oswaldo Paya, a dissident engineer, 

delivered it to the National Assembly on May 10, the Varela 

Project was the biggest peaceful challenge to date to the Cuban 

government. Despite being unsuccessful in its reform objectives, the Varela Project united more than 140 of Cuba's dissident groups in a single campaign and marked a historic victory 

over opposition divisiveness and apathy, as well as intimidation 

by the authorities. 

As he had done for Pope John Paul II's visit in 1998, Castro 

accorded Carter the unprecedented privilege of having the 

country's news media broadcast the entire text of the former 

president's address to the Cuban people. In addition, the official newspaper, Granma, published Carter's entire speech in its 

May 16 issue, except for his comments about democracy. "Our 

lxxx 
two nations have been trapped in a destructive state of belligerence for forty-two years," Carter said in his twenty-minute 

address, which he delivered in Spanish. "And it is time for us to 

change our relationship and the way we think and talk about 

each other." Carter called on Castro to allow a national referendum to bring about broad reforms in political rights. He also 

praised the Varela Project and castigated Cuba's socialist system 

for denying basic freedoms. 

As Cuban officials had hoped, Carter called in his speech for 

easing sanctions against the island nation. The next day, forty 

members of the United States Congress (half Democrats and 

half Republicans) called for unrestricted American travel and 

increased trade with Cuba. The continuation of the traditional 

policy toward Cuba was becoming increasingly unpopular in 

Congress, where a majority in the House and Senate reportedly 

favored lifting the travel ban. Nevertheless, a few days later 

President Bush announced that he would tighten sanctions. In 

a policy speech at the White House on May 20, Bush conditioned any easing of this policy on Cuba's adoption of democratic reforms, such as holding democratic elections; giving 

opposition parties the freedom to organize and speak, thereby 

allowing non-communist candidates to participate in the 2003 

legislative elections; freeing all political prisoners; and allowing 

the development ofindependent trade unions. 

President Bush's announced intention to expand a program 

to provide assistance to internal Cuban dissidents through 

American religious and nongovernmental organizations met 

with a cold reception among Cuban dissidents. A number of 

them reiterated their belief that aid offered by the United 

States government would compromise their efforts. Carter 

strongly warned against the proposed aid program and confirmed that the Cuban dissidents he met unanimously oppose 

the United States embargo on food and medicine and favor 

more interchange with Americans. 

Having rejected the reform demands made by opposition 

figures and President Bush, Castro onJune 12 launched a petition drive for a constitutional amendment to declare Cuba's 

socialist system "irrevocable." He defiantly staged a massive 

march through downtown Havana, while other marches were 

held in cities, towns, and villages throughout the island nation. 

Castro ordered the country's eligible voting population over 

sixteen years of age-totaling between 7 and 8 million of 

Cuba's 11 million population-to show their solidarity by signlxxxi 
ing a petition in favor of the proposed constitutional amendment. Castro's claim that 99.7 percent of registered voters 

signed his petition was reflective of the autocratic nature of his 

regime and suggested that the results were most likely rigged. 

Moreover, the fact that Castro felt compelled to go to such an 

extent to ratifY his system of government seemed indicative of 

how worrisome the Varela Project andJimmy Carter's visit must 

have been as a challenge to his rule. Just as the papal visit had 

resulted in a significant opening of religious freedom in Cuba, 

Carter's visit may have had a similarly profound impact on the 

human rights movement in Cuba. 

Although the influx of dollars had created a vibrant underground economy, the country's economic outlook remained 

bleak in the first half of 2002, as tourism remained down and 

the sugar and nickel industries experienced continuing low 

prices. In June the government was preparing to close about 

half of the country's 156 decrepit sugar mills. The resulting dismissal of thousands of Cuban sugar workers was expected to 

add to the climate of tension on the island. Cuba's overall 

terms of trade were not expected to improve until sugar and 

nickel prices reversed their decline. Cuba also lost a third of its 

daily oil supply when Venezuela stopped shipping its inexpensive oil to Cuba in April 2002, forcing the island nation to 

spend millions of dollars more than planned on the world market. The negative economic trends could be reversed somewhat by a recovery in agriculture, remittances, and tourism, but 

the Castro regime's ratification of its "irrevocable" communist 

system of government effectively sentenced the country to continual suffering without any real prospect for change. The 

domestic opposition remained weak, but the population 

seemed be waiting for the moment when the maximum leader 

would pass from the scene, and the country could begin a longawaited transition to democracy. 

July 22, 2002 Rex Hudson 

lxxxii 
Chapter 1. Historical Setting 

Statue ofnational hero Carlos Manuel de Cespedes in Arms Plaza (La Plaza 

de Armas), Havana, 1997 

Courtesy Mark P Sullivan 
THE HISTORY OF CUBA began with the arrival of Christopher Columbus in 1492 and the subsequent invasion of the 

island by the Spaniards. Although aboriginal groups inhabited 

the island, they were soon eliminated or died as a result of diseases or the shock of conquest. As a result, the impact of indigenous groups on subsequent Cuban society was limited, and 

Spanish culture, institutions, language, and religion prevailed 

in Cuba. Colonial society developed slowly, with pastoral pursuits and agriculture serving as the basis of the economy. For 

the first three centuries after the conquest, the island remained 

only a neglected stopping point for the Spanish fleet that visited the New World and returned to Spain with the mineral 

wealth of continental America. 

Cuba awakened dramatically in the nineteenth century. The 

growth of the United States as an independent nation, the collapse of Haiti as a sugar-producing colony, Spanish protective 

policies, and the ingenuity of Cuba's Creole business class all 

converged to produce a sugar revolution on the island. In a 

scant few years, Cuba was transformed from a sleepy, unimportant island into the major sugar producer in the world. Slaves 

arrived in increasing numbers. Large estates squeezed out 

smaller ones. Sugar supplanted tobacco, agriculture, and cattle 

as the main occupation. Prosperity replaced poverty. Spain's 

attention replaced neglect. These factors, mainly prosperity 

and Spain's involvement, delayed a move toward independence 

in the early nineteenth century. While most of Latin America 

was breaking with Spain, Cuba remained "the ever-faithful 

island." 

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, all this began to 

change. Creole rivalry with Spaniards for the governing of the 

island, increased Spanish despotism and taxation, and the 

growth of Cuban nationalism all produced a prolonged and 

bloody war. By 1898 the United States, concerned about its economic interests on the island and its strategic interest in a 

future Panama Canal and aroused by an alarmist "yellow" press, 

focused its attention on Cuba. The emergence of the United 

States as the victorious power in the Spanish-American War 

(1898) ensured the expulsion of Spain, United States supremacy in the Caribbean, and tutelage over Cuban affairs. 

3 
Cuba: A Country Study 

In 1902 Cuba launched into nationhood with fewer problems than most Latin American nations. Prosperity increased 

during the early years. Militarism seemed curtailed. Social tensions were not profound. Yet corruption, violence, and political irresponsibility grew. Successive United States interventions 

and economic involvement weakened the growth of Cuban 

nationality and made Cuba more dependent on its northern 

neighbor. 

The 1930s saw a major attempt at revolution. Prompted by a 

cruel dictatorship, the economic hardships of the world 

depression, and the growing control of their economy by Spaniards and North Americans, a group of Cubans led by students 

and intellectuals sought radical reforms and a profound transformation of Cuban society. In January 1934, after the overthrow of the regime of Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 

1925-33) and the short-lived first presidency of Ram6n Grau 

San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48), they were catapulted into power. Their revolution failed, however. The rise of 

militarism, the opposition of the United States, and divisions 

among Cuban political elites and within the revolutionary 

ranks returned the island to less turbulent times. Fulgencio 

Batista y Zaldivar (president, 1940-44; dictator, 1952-59) and 

the military emerged as the arbiters of Cuba's politics, first 

through de facto ruling and finally with the election of Batista 

to the presidency in 1940. 

The end ofWorld War II and the end of this early Batista era 

brought to power the inheritors of the 1933 revolution. With 

the election in 1944 of Grau San Martin and, four years later, 

his successor, Carlos Pdo Socarras (president, 1948-52), an era 

of democratic government, respect for human rights, and 

accelerated prosperity ensued. Yet political violence and corruption increased. Many saw these Autentico administrations, 

that is, administrations belonging to the Cuban Revolutionary 

Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano-PRC), more commonly known as the Authentic Party (Partido Autentico), as 

having failed to live up to the ideals of the revolution. Others 

still supported the Autenticos and hoped for new leadership 

that could correct the vices of the past. A few conspired to take 

power by force. 

Batista's coup d'etat on March 10, 1952, had a profound 

effect. It led to doubts and disillusionment about the ability of 

the Cubans to govern themselves. It began a brutal dictatorship 

that resulted in the polarization of society, civil war, the over4 
Historical Setting 

throw of the dictatorship, the destruction of the military and 

most other Cuban institutions, and the rise of a long totalitarian system led by a charismatic, anti-United States caudillo (see 

Glossary). Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) seized power 

on January 1,1959, as the result of his successful guerrilla campaign against the Batista regime. 

In power for four decades, Fidei Castro converted Cuba into 

a Marxist-Leninist society with no individual freedoms or private property and with a Soviet-style centrally planned economy (see Glossary) run by a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy 

that has stifled innovation, productivity, and efficiency. Despite 

massive Soviet aid, the Cubans sank to unprecedented levels of 

poverty, aggravated further by the collapse of communism in 

the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

Cuba's alliance with the Soviets provided a protective 

umbrella that propelled Fidel Castro onto the international 

scene. Cuba's support of anti-United States guerrilla and terrorist groups, military intervention in Mrica, and unrestricted 

Soviet weapons delivery to Cuba made Castro an important 

international player. Cuba's role in bringing to power a Marxist 

regime in Angola in 1975 and in supporting the Sandinista 

overthrow of the dictatorship of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza 

Debay1e in July 1979 perhaps stand out as Castro's most significant accomplishments in foreign policy. In the 1980s, the 

United States expulsion of the Cubans from Grenada, the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the peace 

accords in Central America, including El Salvador, showed the 

limits of Cuba's "internationalism" and influence. 

The collapse of communism in the early 1990s had a profound effect on Cuba. Without Soviet support, internationalism decreased significantly, and Cuba found itself in a major 

economic crisis. Minor adjustments, such as more liberalized 

foreign investment laws and the opening of private, but highly 

regulated small businesses and agricultural stands, were introduced. Yet the regime continued to cling to an outdated Marxist and caudillista (see Glossary) system, refusing to open the 

political process or the economy. Castro remained one of the 

last unyielding communist bulwarks bent on remaining in 

power and perpetuating his dynastic vision of a communist 

Cuba, led by his anointed successor, his brother General Raul 

Castro Ruz, first vice president of the Council of State. 

5 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The Early Years, 1492-1520 

The Indigenous Peoples 

Knowledge about the early inhabitants of Cuba is sketchy. 

The people who inhabited the island at the time of Columbus's 

landing, estimated at about 60,000, had no written language. 

Most of them, although peaceful, were annihilated, absorbed, 

or died out as a result of the shock of conquest. Whatever information is available comes primarily from the writings of early 

explorers and from later archaeological discoveries and studies 

of village sites, burial places, and so forth. These sources indicate that at least three cultures-the Guanahatabey, the 

Ciboney, and the Taino-swept through the island before the 

arrival of the Spaniards. 

The first of these, the Guanahatabey, was the oldest culture 

on the island. It was a shell culture, characterized by its use of 

shell gouge and spoon as its principal artifacts. The Guanahatabey might have come from the south of the United States, 

for their artifacts display certain similarities with those of some 

early inhabitants of Florida. Yet some archaeologists and 

anthropologists are more inclined to accept the theory that the 

Guanahatabey migrated from South America through the 

chain of islands in the West Indies until finally settling in Cuba. 

By the time of the Spanish arrival, they had retreated to the 

most western part of Cuba. 

The Guanahatabey built no houses and lived mostly in caves. 

They were fruit pickers and food gatherers and did little fishing or hunting. They seem to have relied on mollusks as their 

principal foodstuff. Their civilization apparently was in decline 

by the time the Europeans arrived. 

The second culture, the Ciboney, was part of the larger 

South American Arawak group. The Ciboney inhabited western Cuba and the southwestern peninsula of Hispaniola. It is 

generally agreed that the Ciboney, as well as the more 

advanced Taino, the other Arawak group found in Cuba, originated in South America and had island-hopped along the West 

Indies. 

The Ciboney were a Stone Age culture and were more 

advanced than the Guanahatabey. They were highly skilled collectors, hunters, and fishermen and inhabited towns, usually 

near rivers or the sea. Some lived in caves while others had 

begun to inhabit primitive dwellings called bajareques or barbacoas. The Ciboney practiced some form of elementary agricul6 
Historical Setting 

ture, and their diet included turtles, fish, birds, and mollusks. 

Two of the more typical artifacts they developed included a 

stone digger (gladiolito) and a ball (esJerolito), both symbols of 

authority or high social status; they were also considered magical objects. The Ciboney fell prey to the more advanced Taino 

and became their servants, or nabories. Bartolome de Las Casas, 

an early chronicler known as the "protector of the Indians," 

described the Ciboney as "a most simple and gentle kind of 

people who were held like savages." 

The Taino was the second and more advanced Arawak group 

to enter the island. The Taino people occupied the central and 

eastern parts of Cuba, as well as most of Hispaniola, Jamaica, 

and Puerto Rico. The Taino made extensive use of pottery and 

stone artifacts that are reminiscent of Old World neolithic artifacts. The short, olive-skinned Taino people subjected their 

children to artificial cranium changes by binding the frontal or 

occipital regions of their heads during early childhood; hence, 

their faces and particularly foreheads were unusually wide. 

They preferred high and fertile terrain close to sources offresh 

water and lived in small villages in round houses with conical 

roofs made up of bamboo and thatched palm called caneyes or 

rectangular ones called bohios. 

The Taino developed a rather advanced economic system 

based on agriculture with commonly cultivated fields. The cultivation and preparation of yuca (manioc), a sturdy tuber, 

played a significant role in their society. Mter the yuca, which 

has a period of growth longer than a year, had been harvested, 

the Taino grated it, drained it ofits poisonousjuice, and baked 

it into unleavened bread called cassava, which the Spaniards 

labeled "bread of the earth." This bread was both nutritious 

and tasty and kept for several months, even in humid weather. 

Tobacco, cotton, corn, and white and sweet potato were also 

an important part of the Taino economy. Tobacco was used for 

smoking as well as for religious ceremonies and for curing the 

ill. Mter the Spanish occupation, tobacco became an important item for export. Cotton was mostly used for hammocks, 

bags, and fishing nets. Both the manufacture of textiles and the 

making of pottery items were tasks performed by women, while 

men engaged in hunting, fishing, or agriculture. The Taino 

also developed a number of wooden artifacts, such as powerful 

canoes, which gave them great mobility by water. 

Society was organized along distinct class lines. At the top 

was the chief, or cacique, who managed all the affairs of the 

7 
Cuba: A Country Study 

community and ruled over a specific territory. The line of 

inheritance to become a cacique was not direct; the eldest son of 

the cacique's eldest sister became chief when the former cacique 

died. If the cacique did not have any sisters, then his eldest son 

would inherit the post. The caciques were aided by the nitainos, 

a group of advisors who supervised communal work and seem 

to have been in charge of various sectors of the population. 

Aware of the nitainos' importance in controlling the labor supply, the Spaniards used them later on as overseers on their 

plantations. Next to the nitainos was the medicine man, or 

behique. The lower class was composed of the nabories, who did 

most of the work of the village. 

The Taino believed in a supreme invisible being, and their 

religion was dominated by a series of gods represented by idols. 

Ancestor worship was common, and the Taino carved special 

idols resembling their ancestors. The souls of the dead were 

thought to reside in a nearby island and to return at night to 

hunt the living. 

In terms of economic development, social organization, 

technological advances, and art, the native peoples of Cuba 

were far inferior to the more advanced civilizations of the 

mainland, such as the Maya and AZtec of Mexico or the Inca of 

Peru. The Ciboney and Taino left only a mild imprint on 

Cuba's later culture; the Guanahatabey left almost none. There 

was little mingling of races between Spaniards and Indians. A 

new society, first of Spaniards and then of Spaniards and 

blacks, supplanted the indigenous society. New institutions, 

new values, and a new culture replaced the old ones. Some 

Indian words, foods, and habits, as well as agricultural techniques, however, were retained by later generations. Retained 

also was the bohio, the typical and picturesque dwelling of many 

Cuban farmers, which still can be seen today and remains perhaps the most visible legacy of the native society. 

For the most part, however, the Cuban native peoples' contribution to the development of a Cuban nationality must be 

considered minor. Nevertheless, for generations after the conquest, Native American warriors such as Batuey, who fought 

the Spanish conquest in eastern Cuba, were glorified in the 

pages of Cuban history books and raised to the status of folk 

heroes. They represented for Cuban children a symbol of 

native resistance against the oppressive Spanish conquistador. 

The Indians' innocence and kindness were contrasted with the 

cruelty of the Spanish invaders. But for those present-day 

8 
Historical Setting 

Cubans in search of the roots of a uniquely Cuban national 

identity, this Indian heritage was not enough of a foundation. 

Unlike for the Mexicans, the glory of the Aztec past was not 

there for the Cubans to turn to. Instead, Cuban writers in 

search of the roots of Cuban nationality would later look to 

Spanish or Negro contributions and try to find in them the 

missing link with the past, but with little luck. The Spanish heritage was dismissed as part of the rejection of colonialism, and 

Negro contributions were never totally recognized, particularly 

by white Cuban society. 

Spanish Conquest and Colonization 

In the early sixteenth century, following Christopher Columbus's discovery of the island in 1492, the Spanish crown 

became increasingly intrigued with the possibility of finding 

gold in Cuba. Spanish officials, desirous of increasing their 

labor supply as well as exploring possible new sources of 

wealth, also began to look toward Cuba. Columbus's son, Diego 

Columbus, who had been appointed governor of the Indies in 

1508 and lived in Hispaniola, was particularly interested in 

extending the territory under his control. As a preliminary 

step toward colonization, Nicolas de Ovando (governor of Hispaniola, 1502-9) sent an expedition headed by Sebastian de 

Ocampo that circumnavigated Cuba in 1508; he brought back 

tales of wealth and a more detailed picture of the island's fine 

terrain and harbors. 

Finding a conquistador who combined military skill, administrative talent, and loyalty to the crown as well as to Diego 

Columbus himself was no easy task. The choice finally fell on 

Diego Velazquez de Cuellar (governor of Hispaniola, 1511­

21), Ovando's lieutenant and one of the wealthiest Spaniards 

in Hispaniola. Although not as heroic or daring as later conquistadors such as Francisco Pizarro, conqueror of Peru, or as 

cunning as Hernan Cortes, conqueror of Mexico, Velazquez 

had achieved a reputation for courage and sagacity because of 

his role in subduing Indian caciques in Hispaniola. 

From the start, Velazquez faced an outraged and hostile 

Indian population. Led by Hatuey, a fugitive Indian chieftain 

from Hispaniola, the natives of eastern Cuba resolved to resist 

the Spanish onslaught. It was a futile gesture, for the peaceful 

Tainos lacked the military skills and weapons to face the better 

armed and trained Spaniards. Spanish horses and hounds, 

both unknown in Cuba, played a decisive role in terrorizing the 

9 
Cuba: A Country Study 

indigenous peoples, who soon surrendered or fled into the 

mountains to escape the wrath of the conquistadors. Hatuey 

himself was captured, tried as a heretic and a rebel, and 

burned at the stake. 

Velazquez set out to pacifY the country and end the abuses 

against the Indians. He induced groups of Indians to lay down 

their weapons and work near the several new towns that he 

established throughout the island. Among these were Baracoa, 

Bayamo, Trinidad, Sancti Spiritus, La Habana (hereafter, 

Havana), Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. 

In this task, Velasquez was decisively aided by the work of 

Bartolome de Las Casas. The Dominican friar preceded the 

Spaniards into native villages on many occasions and succeeded in convincing the indigenous peoples to cooperate with 

the conquistadors. Las Casas, however, was horrified by the 

massacre of the natives and became an outspoken critic of the 

conquest of Cuba. He wrote extensively condemning the Spaniards' cruelty and claiming that the Indians were rational and 

free and therefore entitled to retain their lands. 

To strengthen his own power and gain supporters both in 

Cuba and in Spain, Velazquez began to grant encomiendas (see 

Glossary), or contracts, whereby large landowners (encomenderos-see Glossary), who were favored conquistadors, supposedly agreed to provide protection and religious instruction to 

Indians in return for their labor. The crown used the 

encomienda concept as a political instrument to consolidate its 

control over the indigenous population. Many encomenderos, 

however, interested only in exploiting the resources of the 

island, disregarded their moral, religious, and legal obligations 

to the Indians. A conflict soon developed between the crown 

and the Spanish settlers over the control and utilization of the 

labor by the exploitative encomenderos, and also over the crown's 

stated objective to Christianize the natives and the crown's own 

economic motivations. In the reality of the New World, the sixteenth-century Christian ideal of converting souls was many 

times sacrificed for a profit. Christianization was reduced to 

mass baptism; and despite the crown's insistence that Indians 

were not slaves, many were bought and sold as chattels. 

The Colonial Period, 1520-1898 

Administration and Economy 

As soon as the conquest was completed and the Indians sub10 
A view ojEl Castillo del M

Jrom El Ca

jugated, the crown began int

tional apparatus necessary to 

the highest representative o

Cuba with almost complete a

ical, and judicial affairs. The 

to the audiencia (see Glossary

roy in New Spain, the highe

In practice, however, he exer

after the wealth of Mexico 

crown's interests away from C

Nominally responsible for 

of revenues and all financia

these functions to several ro

Glossary) appointed directly 

government remained in Bar

Velazquez. In 1515 it was tran

1538 to Havana because of H

excellent port. In 1607 Hava

capital of Cuba, and the islan
rural areas. 

As royal government becam

entrenched in Cuba, the powers 

were progressively curtailed. By 

few responsible citizens wante

government. Those who did we

sonal well-being than in the af

Spaniards, or peninsulares (see 

lars), who bought their offices s

ments and enriched themselves 

Creoles (criollos) , Spaniards born 

the Spanish bureaucracy in ord

pate in other opportunities co

looked to local government as o

employment in which they cou

ever attained a position of imp

chy of the island. As the bure

period, a latent hostility develo

Creoles-a hostility that erupted 

ing the wars for independence i

In the early years, cabildo mem

an existence until such time as 

for them to migrate to better lan

would bring them instant wealth 

12 
Historical Setting 

Those who expected to enrich themselves from Cuba's mineral 

resources were greatly disappointed. The island did not enjoy 

the large deposits of gold and other minerals that were later 

found in Mexico and South America. Gold found in the river 

banks did not represent any great wealth, although washing the 

gold did require a large labor supply as well as costly equipment. A handful of Spanish entrepreneurs controlled the business and used Indians as a labor supply. The crown was also 

involved from the earliest times in controlling mining operations. The Spanish monarchs took one-fifth of all production as 

a tax for the right of mining, especially when Indians in an 

encomienda arrangement did the mining. 

Foodstuffs also were an important part of the economy. The 

Indian agricultural practices were taken over by the Spaniards, 

who continued to grow some of the native foodstuffs, particularly yuca. New crops and new grains from the Old World were 

also brought to the island. Sugarcane, which had been grown 

by the Spaniards in the Canary Islands, was also a part of the 

island's economy. As early as 1523, the crown instructed the 

Contracting House (Casa de Contrataci6n-see Glossary) to 

lend money to settlers in Cuba to help finance the construction 

of a sugar mill. Other similar loans were made in later years, 

but it was not until the eighteenth century and particularly the 

nineteenth century that sugar assumed any importance. Lacking large amounts of capital, an adequate labor supply, and 

official encouragement, the sugar industry remained overshadowed in importance by the more lucrative and important business connected with the cattle industry and its derivative 

products. 

Cattle-raising became one of the most prosperous businesses, especially in the seventeenth century. Although the 

activity called for daring horsemanship, it required no sustained effort, for Cuba's abundant pasture lands facilitated 

breeding. The cattle were let loose on Cuba's savannas, where 

they multiplied rapidly. They were used as a means of transportation as well as for feeding purposes. Salted meat became an 

important item sold to the Spanish ships that called at Cuba's 

ports. Perhaps the chief value of cattle lay in the hides. In the 

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as demand for leather 

grew in Europe, cattle hides became Cuba's chief export, yielding considerable profit. 

Tobacco also made some modest gains, particularly in the 

seventeenth century. Because it was not too bulky and com13 
Cuba: A Country Study 

manded high prices in Europe, tobacco was a favorite item for 

smuggling. By the eighteenth century, it became an important 

export item to the French. Throughout this period, the 

tobacco business remained in private hands. But under the 

administration of Charles III (1759-88), it was converted into a 

government monopoly. The crown advanced money to the 

growers, who sold their crops to the government at a fixed 

price. In the early nineteenth century, the value of tobacco as 

an export began to decline. By then the price of land had 

increased tremendously, partly as a result of the growth of 

sugar estates. Tobacco growers found themselves either 

squeezed out of their lands or selling them to the sugar capitalists. The crown's emphasis on coffee and sugar growing was 

also detrimental to the tobacco industry. In desperate need of 

capital, the Spanish monarchs encouraged the more lucrative 

sugar business as a source of revenue. 

The economy was oriented toward importing the bare necessities, with little or no provision for domestic manufacturing. 

Spain followed a thoroughly mercantilist economic policy, 

encouraging Cuba's dependence on outside sources of supply 

for its needs and looking at the island as a producer of raw 

materials to satisfy the needs of the mother country. 

Life and Society 

In the early years, Cuba became the source of support for 

the conquest of nearby lands. It was from the island that 

Hernan Cortes's expedition sailed in 1519 to conquer the 

Aztec Empire. The conquest of Mexico meant temporary prosperity and great euphoria, but it also meant the decline of 

Cuba's importance. The days of boom soon gave way to years of 

bust. Farmers and adventurers all left the island in search of El 

Dorado in Mexico, orjoined the ill-fated expedition of Panfilo 

de Narvaez of 1527 and Hernando de Soto in 1539 to conquer 

Florida. Exodus of population, decline offood production, and 

economic misery afflicted the island. Estates were abandoned 

by their owners and bought cheaply by less adventurous Peninsulars, humble folks willing to produce for the passing ships 

and live a modest existence. 

For the next two centuries, Spain focused most of its attention on the continental colonies from which it obtained muchneeded mineral wealth. A complex and at times cumbersome 

political and defense system developed to ensure the uninterrupted flow of this wealth. Cuba was relegated to a mere stop14 
Historical Setting 

ping point for passing ships. It remained valuable only because 

of its strategic location as the gateway to the New World, not 

because ofits products. 

Cuba's population diminished continuously throughout this 

period. The indigenous peoples continued to die out and 

there was little new influx of Spanish immigrants. An economy 

of scarcity and a hot, sickness-ridden tropical climate offered 

little incentive for new immigration. Those who did come to 

Cuba were mostly Spanish officials, soldiers, and members of 

the clergy; there were also many transient migrants on their 

way to Mexico or South America. By 1544 Cuba had a population of fewer than 7,000, composed of 660 Spaniards, some 

5,000 native Americans, and 800 black slaves. 

This early society was characterized by little social mobility as 

well as lack of interest in the arts or in education. Creoles were 

less educated and seemed less interested in a formal education 

than were their ancestors. Living in small towns, surrounded by 

an unknown and at times hostile environment, fearful of 

Indian or later of black rebellion, or of foreign attacks, most 

had little time for cultural activities and were mainly concerned 

with the daily problems of existence. Brutality, opportunism, 

corruption, and smuggling characterized this society. Violence 

and lack of observance of the law flourished as the struggle for 

survival became harsher. Whatever education existed was 

offered within the Roman Catholic Church. 

Protected by the power of the state, the church grew in numbers and influence. By the mid-seventeenth century, there were 

about 200 friars and priests and about 100 nuns on the island. 

Churches were built in every new city, and church wealth 

increased through the continuous acquisition oflands donated 

to the church and through the collection of rents, as well as of 

the special tax called diezmo. With wealth came not only prestige and influence, but also the loss of the church's early missionary zeal. The priesthood began identifying with the 

wealthier classes to the neglect of Indians and blacks and 

became a conservative institution interested in preserving the 

status quo. 

The uninterrupted arrival of blacks throughout the colonial 

period decisively influenced this developing society. Mrican slavery existed in Spain, and the first slaves had come to Cuba 

with the early conquistadors. Later they were brought in 

greater numbers to pan for gold; they replaced the weaker 

indigenous groups. The importation of black slaves was costly, 

15 
Cuba: A Country Study 

however. As gold reserves became exhausted, there was little 

need for a large and expensive labor supply, and so their 

importation slowed down. Not until the full-scale development 

of the sugar industry was there again a significant need for 

manpower. Thousands of black slaves entered Cuba in the 

nineteenth century, and by 1825 the black population had surpassed the white one. 

The condition of the slaves, although not unbearable, was 

poor. Blacks were much more valuable than the Indians and 

seemed to have received better treatment. Yet Spanish officials 

complained to the crown that the blacks were given little food 

or clothing and that they were subjected to abusive corporal 

punishment, forcing many to escape into Cuba's mountains. 

These runaway slaves, called cimarrones, were a constant concern to the Spaniards because by their example they encouraged other slaves to escape captivity and to rebel. As early as 

1538, black slaves rioted and looted Havana, while French privateers were attacking the city from the sea. 

Although most blacks worked in rural areas, some performed a variety ofjobs in the cities. A considerable number 

labored in artisan industries, in construction, in the wharves, 

and in domestic service. Some were able to obtain their own 

earnings and thus liberate themselves or pay the price of their 

manumission. Others were freed after they had performed services their master was willing to reward. The number of slaves 

decreased continuously until reaching the low figure of 38,879, 

out of a total population of 171,620 in 1774. 

The opportunities for slaves to become free contributed to 

the development of a uniquely Cuban society. Spanish law, the 

Roman Catholic religion, the economic condition of the 

island, and the Spanish attitude toward blacks all contributed 

to aid their integration into Cuban society. While the black 

population in the British sugar-producing colonies in the 

Caribbean lived under the tight political control of a small, 

exploiting minority of overseers and government officials, 

blacks in Cuba coexisted with the rest of the population and 

lived mainly by farming and cattle grazing. Prior to the eighteenth century, the island avoided the plantation system with 

its concomitant large-scale capital investment, latifundios 

(large estates), and docile black slave labor force. Instead, society developed with little outside interference. Cuba thus began 

to find its own identity in a society that combined racial bal16 
Historical Setting 

ance, small-scale agriculture, arid folk-Catholicism within a 

Spanish framework. 

The British Occupation, 1762-63 

Of all the wars that ravaged the Caribbean, one in particular, 

the Seven Years War (1756-63), had a profound effect on 

Cuba. At first only France and Britain were at war, but soon 

Spain came in on the French side. Motivated by dynastic connections with France, by grievances against Britain and its colonies in the New World, especially in Central America, and by an 

awareness that if France lost the war Britain would be supreme 

in the Caribbean, Spain cast its lot with the French. Spain's 

entrance into the war proved disastrous because Spain lacked 

the naval power to confront the British or to prevent them 

from capturing Spanish possessions. In August 1762, the British destroyed a large Spanish naval force and captured Manila 

and Havana, only to trade the latter back to Spain for Florida 

in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. 

Several factors converged in the late eighteenth century to 

bring Cuba out of its isolation and into the mainstream of 

world affairs and to give the sugar industry the boost it needed. 

These developments included the relaxation of Spanish trade 

restrictions, the emergence of the important and nearby 

United States market for Cuban products, and the devastation 

of Haiti's sugar and coffee estates following the rebellion of 

that country's slaves in the 1790s. But it was the British capture 

and occupation of Havana that really shocked Cuban society 

out ofits lethargic sleep. 

During the brief eleven months of British occupation, the 

oppressive Spanish trade restrictions were lifted, and Havana 

was thrown open to trade with Britain and particularly with the 

North American colonies. More than 700 merchant ships visited the port during those months, more than the number that 

had visited Havana in the preceding decade. British capital, as 

well as large numbers of low-priced slaves, entered the island, 

boosting sugar production. For the most part, Britain maintained Spanish administrative institutions, although an attempt 

was made to reform the judicial system by ending some of the 

existing privileges and streamlining judicial practices. 

The impact of the occupation was long-range. It made the 

Cubans aware of the benefits of trading with the British and 

particularly with a close and growing market like the United 

States. The large quantities of British goods that entered the 

17 
Cuba: A Country Study 

island gave the Cubans a tastt': for those products and increased 

their demands for freer trade. Similarly, the occupation 

focused the attention of North American entrepreneurs on 

Cuba's economic potential as an area for investment, a source 

of raw materials, and a market for British and North American 

products. Finally, Spain was forced to reexamine its policies 

toward Cuba. The island was no longer the stopping point of 

the fleets, but a bone of contention among European powers, 

one important enough to have merited a British effort at conquest. Spain had to look at its Caribbean possession and try to 

satisfy, or at least placate, the demands and aspirations of her 

tropical subjects. 

The British occupation had given the island the initial economic boost it needed. When the slave uprisings and the 

destruction of properties took place in Haiti, Cuba was ready to 

become the sugar bowl of the Caribbean and soon replaced 

Haiti as the supplier of European sugar. Cuban planters 

pleaded with the Spanish crown for the easing of trade relations and for the free importation of slaves. Spain acceded to 

these pleadings in 1791. 

In the years that followed, the sugar industry grew substantially. Annual production rose from 14,000 tons in 1790 to 

more than 34,000 tons in 1805, and the number of sugar mills 

grew to 478, more than twice as many as had existed prior to 

the British capture of Havana. Sugar also benefited from the 

close commercial relations that developed between Cuba and 

the United States. The wars of the French Revolution isolated 

Spain from her colonies, thus helping the growth of trade 

between Cuba and the United States. By the turn of the century, Cuba enjoyed substantial trade with the United States, 

and when Cuban ports were thrown open to free trade with all 

nations in 1818, commercial relations between the two grew 

even closer. 

Sugar, Prosperity, and Unrest in the Nineteenth Century 

Throughout the nineteenth century, sugar as well as coffee 

became increasingly important in the Cuban economy. Large 

cattle estates were subdivided and sold to enterprising Spaniards for sugar or coffee cultivation. Aware of the profit possibilities, the Spanish crown encouraged and aided the 

subdivisions of land. Prior to this time, much suitable land was 

often part of large estates, the owners of which could neither 

divide nor sell the land because it had been granted to them 

18 
Historical Setting 

for use, not ownership. The crown agreed in 1819 to consider 

landowners all those who could prove they had been on the 

land for the past forty years. This measure facilitated the breakdown of large estates, contributed to the growth of the sugar 

industry, and benefited a new class of proprietors. These new 

landowners could sell their land at a profit, become sugar producers themselves, or lease their land to other less fortunate 

and smaller planters, who did not receive title to a piece ofreal 

estate. In 1827 Cuba had 1,000 sugar mills, 2,067 coffee estates, 

and 5,534 tobacco farms. By 1860 it is estimated that there were 

about 2,000 sugar mills, the greatest number in Cuban history. 

A prosperous and large class of rural proprietors who based 

their prosperity on the cultivation of sugar and tobacco had 

emerged. 

Despite its rapid growth, the sugar industry's development 

was not without serious problems and setbacks. Overproduction, fluctuations in price, competition from the British islands 

in the Caribbean, and the appearance of a dreaded competitor, 

beet sugar, in the second decade of the century depressed the 

sugar market and slowed down Cuba's sugar boom. These 

problems were further complicated by the British-imposed 

legal suppression of the slave trade in 1821. This action 

deprived the island of a continuous source of labor. Moreover, 

Cuba lacked an appropriate network ofinternal transportation 

that could facilitate movement of sugar to the mills and the 

ports of embarkation. 

In the 1840s, however, two events renewed the acceleration 

of the sugar industry. Coffee, which had come to occupy an 

important position in the island's economy, was seriously 

affected by a fall in prices that almost ruined coffee planters. 

Capital and labor fled from coffee into sugar, and much land 

was shifted to the growing of cane. The second event was the 

introduction of the railroad. Cane could now be brought from 

remote areas to the mills and then to the ports for shipment. 

What started out as a relatively small business grew into a powerful, capitalistic enterprise based on large landholding, slave 

labor, and mass production. 

In the early decades of the century, most Cubans seemed 

content with their status. The new aristocracy of wealth that 

had developed around the sugar industry enjoyed its recently 

acquired wealth and feared that a repetition in Cuba of the 

continental wars would upset the social order upon which its 

prosperity depended. This "plantocracy" was willing to tolerate 

19 
Cuba: A Country Study 

a limited number of political and economic reforms, so long as 

the status quo was not endangered. The status quo meant the 

presence of a foreign power to protect their position against 

the possibility of a black rebellion similar to the one in Haiti. 

By the 1840s, there was real concern about preserving 

Cuba's colonial status. Still fearful of a slave rebellion, or even 

an actual end to slavery forced on a weak Spain by Britain, the 

plantocracy looked toward the United States for a possible permanent relationship. Painfully aware of the problems in the 

British Caribbean since the abolition of slavery and its impact 

on sugar production, the property owners saw in the United 

States, particularly in the southern states, a slave-owning society 

similar to Cuba's own plantation economy. A series of slave 

revolts in Cuba in the early 1840s increased apprehension and 

the desire for a permanent relationship with the United States. 

United States interest in Cuba and in its strategic location 

grew, particularly after the war with Mexico and the acquisition 

of California. In the 1840s and 1850s, PresidentsJames K. Polk, 

Franklin Pierce, andJames Buchanan attempted unsuccessfully 

to purchase Cuba from Spain. In 1854 three United States ministers to Europe signed a secret report, later known as the 

Ostend Manifesto (see Glossary), which called for the United 

States purchase of Cuba or, if this failed, the forceful wresting 

of the island from Spain. 

The Ostend Manifesto was the high watermark of United 

States interest in acquiring Cuba peacefully in the 1850s. Other 

efforts, however, proved bolder. During the administrations of 

Zachary Taylor (president, 1849-50) and Millard Fillmore 

(president, 1850-53), pro-slavery elements were discouraged 

by the lack of official support. Some turned to filibustering 

expeditions, hoping that they might lead to the overthrow of 

Spanish power on the island. The principal filibusterer was 

Narciso L6pez, a Venezuelan-born Spanish general. He lived in 

Cuba and became involved in a conspiracy and various expeditions to the island in an attempt to annex Cuba to the United 

States. 

The failure ofL6pez's expeditions and his death in 1851 and 

the United States Civil War ended, at least temporarily, the 

clamor for annexation. The abolition of slavery in the United 

States deprived Cuban slaveholders of the reason for wanting 

to tie themselves permanently to their northern neighbor. 

Abraham Lincoln's coming to power also had a significant 

effect on the Cuban policy of the United States, for Lincoln 

20 
Historical Setting 

and his advisers were willing, as long as Spain remained nonaggressive, to allow Cuba to stay under Spanish control. The 

expansionist attempts of the 1840s and 1850s thus gave way to 

the less aggressive era of the 1860s. The proponents of the 

acquisition of Cuba were not defeated, however, only silenced. 

What their brethren were unable to achieve in mid-century, the 

expansionists of the 1890s accomplished at the turn of the century when the United States occupied Cuba during the Spanish-American War and later exerted considerable political and 

economic influence over the affairs of the island. 

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, 

Cuba continued to prosper. The progressive changes known as 

the Bourbon Reforms (see Glossary), initiated throughout 

Latin America by Charles III (King of Spain, 1759-88), quickened economic and political activities and started a complete 

transformation ofCuban society. Population increased, agricultural production and profits expanded, and contacts with various Spanish ports as well as with the rest of Europe became 

closer, leading to the introduction of new ideas into the colony. 

The old order began to decay. To the forefront of Cuban society came a new and active class of Creole hacendados (hacienda 

owners) and entrepreneurs, who based their prosperity on 

sugar, coffee, land speculation, and the slave trade. 

It was only natural that members of this group would make 

their point of view felt concerning economic and social matters. As the century progressed and their power increased, they 

began questioning Spanish mercantilist policies. Their primary 

focus concerned their immediate economic interests. Yet at a 

time when Europe was undergoing profound intellectual 

changes resulting partly from the Enlightenment (see Glossary), their questioning of Spain's economic policies naturally 

led to the growth of a more critical attitude on the part of many 

Creole writers and intellectuals on the island. The desire for 

economic reforms was later translated into a desire for political 

and even social change. Intellectual activity flourished so 

intensely during the century that the period has come to be 

known as Cuba's Golden Century. 

Many of the attitudes of prominent Creoles were influenced 

by ties with the international community and particularly by 

Spain's inability to satisfy the island's economic needs. It finally 

became clear that Spanish policy had little to offer in exchange 

for increased taxation, ineffective administration, and the 

exclusion of Creoles from responsible positions in govern21 
Cuba: A Country Study 

ment. The Cubans turned away from any hopes of reform and 

toward independence. 

With the annexation movement faltering and the possibility 

ofindependence still remote, some Cubans turned to attempts 

at reform within the Spanish empire. Reformism (reformismo) , a 

movement that had existed in Cuba since the beginning of the 

nineteenth century for the purpose of reforming Spanish institutions in Cuba, took new impetus in mid-century, partly as a 

result of the failure of a number of conspiracies aimed at expelling Spanish power and because of black uprisings against slavery on the island. Spain also seemed at the time to be 

following a more conciliatory policy toward Cuba. 

In 1865 the reform movement was strong enough to organize the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), the first such 

political party to exist on the island. The party was not a cohesive political organization. Some of its members had been previously involved with the annexation movement, and a few still 

flirted with the idea. Others wanted some form of political 

autonomy for Cuba within the Spanish empire. Still others 

called for the island's representation in the Cortes (see Glossary). A few felt that reformism could be a step that would 

eventually lead to complete independence. In general, the 

party advocated equal rights for Cubans and Peninsulars, limitation on the powers of the captain-general, and greater political freedom on the island. It also supported freer trade and 

gradual abolition of slavery, and called for an increase of white 

immigrants into Cuba. The slave trade was partially curtailed in 

1865, and the Spanish governor issued a law abolishing slavery 

in Cuba on November 5, 1879. Itwas not until October 7, 1886, 

however, that a royal decree completely abolished slavery in 

Cuba. 

The activities of the Reformists soon met with strong opposition from a group of Peninsulars, who formed the Unconditional Spanish Party (Partido Incondicional Espanol). Trying 

to prevent any economic or political change, especially if it 

affected their interests, the Peninsulars used their newspaper, 

the Diario de la Marina, to attack the reformers. They cautioned 

that any concessions from Spain could only strengthen the Creoles, weakening continuous Spanish control over Cuba. 

The work of the Reformists and their clash with the Peninsulars had an impact on Spain. Following the successful movement for independence in Santo Domingo against Spanish 

rule in 1865, and at a time when Spain was experiencing 

22 
Historical Setting 

renewed economic and political difficulties, the Spanish monarchy felt it would be best to moderate its policy toward Cuba. 

It therefore called for the election of a reform commission that 

would discuss changes to be introduced on the island. 

The Information Board (Junta de Informacion) (1866-67), 

as the Reform Commission came to be known, was composed 

of twelve elected Creole reformers and four Peninsulars, 

reflecting Cubans' desire for reform. To appease the fears of 

the conservative elements within Cuba and to prevent the election of radical reformers, the Spanish government instructed 

the Cuban municipalities to set high property qualifications for 

voting. Yet to everyone's surprise, the reformers won a major 

victory in the elections. Of the sixteen Cuban commissioners, 

twelve were Creole reformers. The results of this election 

clearly indicated the Cubans' desire for reform, rather than a 

widespread Cuban desire for independence. It seems that a significant proportion of the white Creole population of the 

island still hoped, as late as the 1860s, for a modification of 

Spanish policy and the introduction of reforms that would permit them to continue within the Spanish empire. 

Yet the hope for change was short-lived. The Spanish government, which had come to power as the Reform Commission 

began deliberations several months earlier, had decided to let 

the commission meet, but had no intention of implementing 

its recommendations. In early 1867, the government not only 

disbanded the Information Board and dismissed all of its recommendations, but also imposed new and irritating taxes. Furthermore, Spain sent to Cuba Francisco Lersundi (captaingeneral, 1867-69), a reactionary captain-general who prohibited public meetings and tightly censured reformist literature. 

The failure of the Information Board in particular and of 

reformism in general gave new impetus to the independence 

movement. Aware that Spain would not permit any significant 

changes and that the island's destiny as well as their own would 

best be served by an independent Cuba, Creoles began preparing for complete separation from Spain. 

Toward Independence, 1868-1902 

The Ten Years I War, 1868-78 

Although remaining in the Spanish fold, the "ever-faithful" 

island, as Cuba became known, grew away from the crown. The 

interests and views of the Creoles and Peninsulars increasingly 

23 
Cuba: A Country Study 

clashed. Reconciliation seemed difficult; those who clamored 

for violence became more numerous, and, finally, war broke 

out. The wars for independence that followed lasted more than 

thirty years, from 1868 until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, followed by the intervention of the United States in 

1898. The wars were Cuba's belated reaction to the fight for 

independence waged throughout most of Latin America during the first quarter of the century. 

This is not to say that Cubans made no attempts to separate 

from Spain in the first part of the century. As early as 1809, at a 

time of turmoil and rebellion against Spanish power in Latin 

America, several Cubans conspired to gain independence for 

Cuba. Lacking widespread popular support, however, the early 

attempts at independence were weakened by several factors. 

Among these were the growth of the sugar industry and of 

wealth in general, the fear of a black rebellion, and the 

increased sentiment in favor of annexation by the United 

States. Then, too, a number of Spanish royalists and troops settled in Cuba following their defeat in Latin America. Cuba 

became a heavily fortified garrison, the last significant bastion 

of Spanish power in the New World. 

The international picture also was not favorable to the 

Cuban cause for independence. Fearful of European expansion into the New World and particularly of British and French 

designs on Cuba, the United States was quick to issue the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which warned in part that the nation 

would not tolerate the transfer of New World colonies from 

one European power to another. The United States seemed to 

have preferred Cuba under a weak Spain than under a mighty 

Britain. If anyone else were to have Cuba, some United States 

politicians and business interests reasoned, it would be its 

neighbor to the north. 

The reasons for the war that broke out in 1868 in Cuba were 

many and complex. Throughout the nineteenth century, Spain 

had experienced increasing political instability, with liberal and 

reactionary governments alternating in power. Spanish policy 

changes were particularly reflected in the colony under the 

rule of such arbitrary and ruthless captain-generals as Miguel 

Tac6n (1834-38) and Francisco Lersundi (1867-69), the latter 

sharing power with more moderate and understanding officials, such as Domingo Dulce and General Francisco Serrano. 

The clash between Spanish economic measures and the 

desires of the Creole sugar slavocracy also contributed to the 

24 
Historical Setting 

mounting tension. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 

planters had grown into a powerful and vocal group that could 

control or at least decisively influence the internal politics of 

the island. The planters now found themselves saddled with an 

imperial power whose protectionist policies were challenging 

their status by attempting to curtail their prerogatives and 

reduce their mounting importance. Naturally, they were not 

about to relinquish their position without a fight. 

Throughout the century, the Cubans had also progressively 

developed a separate and distinct identity. Although many 

thought of Cuba as another province of Spain and demanded 

equal rights and representation, others longed for an independent nation. Writers, painters, and poets, by looking inward to 

portray themes of their homeland, helped to develop the roots 

oftheir nationality. Through their works, they fostered not only 

a pride in being Cuban and a love for Cuban subjects but also a 

sort of shame over the fact that the island remained a Spanish 

colony. While Spanish America, with the exception of Puerto 

Rico, had successfully overthrown Spanish power, Cuba was still 

clinging to its colonial ties. 

The war broke out in 1868. It was organized and directed by 

radical Creole landowners in Oriente Province together with a 

group of lawyers and professionals. The peasants did the bulk 

of the fighting, however, with blacks joining the rebel ranks. 

The leadership of the movement was in the hands of the son of 

a wealthy landowner from Oriente Province, Carlos Manuel de 

Cespedes y Quesada. 

Cespedes and his group were determined to strike a blow at 

Spanish control of Cuba. When they learned that the Spanish 

authorities had discovered their conspiratorial activities, the 

conspirators were forced to act. On October 10,1868, Cespedes 

issued the historic call to rebellion, the "Grito de Yani," from 

his plantation, La Demajagua, proclaiming Cuba's independence. He soon freed his slaves, incorporated them into his disorganized and ill-armed force, and made public a manifesto 

explaining the causes of the revolt. Issued by the newly organized Revolutionary Junta of Cuba Qunta Revolucionaria de 

Cuba), the manifesto stated that the revolt was prompted by 

Spain's arbitrary government, excessive taxation, corruption, 

exclusion of Cubans from government employment, and deprivation of political and religious liberty, particularly the rights of 

assembly and petition. It called for complete independence 

25 
Cuba: A Country Study 

from Spain, for the establishment of a republic with universal 

suffrage, and for the indemnified emancipation ofslaves. 

The manifesto was followed by the organization of a provisional government, with Cespedes acting as commander in 

chief of the army and head of the government. Cespedes's 

almost absolute power as well as his failure to decree the immediate abolition of slavery soon caused opposition within the 

revolutionary ranks. Facing mounting pressure, Cespedes conceded some of his power and called for a constitutional conven tion to establish a more democratic provisional 

government. 

The war centered in eastern Cuba. Cespedes decreed the 

destruction of cane fields and approved the revolutionary practice of urging the slaves to revolt and to join the mambises, as 

the Cuban rebels were then called. Numerous skirmishes took 

place, but Cuban forces were unable to obtain a decisive victory 

against the Spanish army. Simultaneously, Cespedes made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain United States recognition 

of Cuban belligerency. 

While Cespedes retained civilian leadership, the military 

aspects of the war were under the leadership of the Dominican 

Maximo Gomez. Unhappy with the treatment Dominicans had 

received from Spain during Spanish occupation of his own 

country (1861-65), and horrified by the exploitation of the 

black slaves, Gomez started to conspire with the Cuban revolutionaries and joined Cespedes after the Grito de Yara. His experience in military strategy was invaluable to the revolutionary 

cause, and he was soon promoted to the rank of general and 

later to commander of Oriente Province. A master of guerrilla 

warfare, Gomez alternated training the Cubans in that type of 

struggle with commanding his forces in numerous battles. 

Antonio Maceo, a mulatto leader, supported Gomez's plans 

and actions. Under Gomez's direction, Maceo had developed 

into one of the most daring fighters of the Cuban army. Showing extraordinary leadership and tactical capabilities, Maceo 

won respect and admiration from his men, as well as fear and 

scorn from the Spanish troops. He kept tight discipline in his 

encampment, constantly planning and organizing future battles. Maceo enjoyed outsmarting and outmaneuvering the 

Spanish generals, and on successive occasions he inflicted 

heavy losses on them. Maceo's incursions into the eastern sugar 

zones not only helped to disrupt the sugar harvest but more 

26 
Historical Setting 

importantly led to the freedom of the slaves, who soon joined 

the ranks of the Cuban army. 

By 1872 Maceo had achieved the rank of general. His prominent position among revolutionary leaders soon gave rise to 

intrigue and suspicion. Conservative elements that supported 

the war effort began to fear the possibility of the establishment 

of a black republic with Maceo at its head. The example of 

Haiti still loomed in the minds of many. Dissension in the revolutionary ranks and fears of the blacks slowed down the revolutionary effort. 

The war dragged on, with neither the Cubans nor the Spaniards able to win a decisive victory. Finally, on February 11, 

1878, the Pact of Zanj6n ended the Ten Years' War. Most of the 

generals of the Cuban army accepted the pact; Maceo, however, refused to capitulate and continued to fight with his now 

depleted army. On March 15, 1878, he held a historic meeting, 

known as the "Protest of Baragwi," with the head of the Spanish forces, Marshal Arsenio Martinez Campos, requesting independence for Cuba and complete abolition of slavery. When 

these conditions were rejected, he again resumed fighting. 

It was, however, a futile effort. Years of bloodshed and war 

had left the Cuban forces exhausted. Aid from exiles 

decreased, and Maceo now faced the bulk of the Spanish forces 

alone. Realizing the hopeless situation, he left for Jamaica. 

From there he traveled to New York to raise money and weapons necessary to continue fighting. He soon joined the activities of Major General Calixto Garcia, then organizing a new 

rebellion. This uprising in 1879-80, known as the Little War 

(La Guerra Chiquita) , was also to end in disaster. Maceo was 

kept in exile for fear of antagonizing the conservative elements 

in Cuba, and Garcia was captured soon after he landed on the 

island. Exhausted and disillusioned after the long, bitter struggle and faced with a powerful and determined Spain, the 

Cubans were in no mood to join this new and ill-prepared 

attempt. 

Mter more than ten years of strife, the Cubans were unable 

to overthrow Spanish power on the island. The reasons for this 

failure are to be found partially in internal dissension, regionalism, and petty jealousies among the leaders, and partially in 

lack of internal organization and external support, which 

resulted in chronic shortages ofsupplies and ammunition. The 

odds against the Cubans were also almost insurmountable. 

They were fighting well-disciplined, well-organized, and well27 
Cuba: A Country Study 

equipped forces augmented steadily by reinforcements from 

Spain. The Spaniards also controlled the seas, preventing the 

smuggling of reinforcements and weapons from abroad. The 

Cubans were thus forced to carryon guerrilla operations in the 

hope of demoralizing the Spanish army or creating an international situation favorable to their cause. 

The protracted war had a profound effect on Cubans. Many 

Creoles fought in parts of the island they had never even seen 

before. Gradually, regionalism collapsed and a common cause 

emerged; the little homeland (patria chica), with its stress on 

local loyalties, gave way to the fatherland. The war also forced 

many to take sides on issues, thus accelerating the process of 

popular participation and integration. Finally, the war provided numerous symbols that became part of Cuba's historical 

heritage. The national anthem and flag as well as the national 

weapon, the machete, came out of this war. In particular, the 

dedication of the mambises, who abandoned position and comfort to fight Spanish power, became for future generations an 

example of unselfish sacrifice for the fatherland. 

The impact of the war was particularly felt in the economic 

realm. The destruction caused by the fighting did away with 

the fortunes of many Cuban families. Although the struggle 

was concentrated in eastern Cuba and many sugar plantations 

escaped the ravages of war, the continuous development of a 

landed slavocracy in Cuba suffered a severe blow. Numerous 

participants and sympathizers with the Cuban cause lost their 

properties. Most Peninsulars sided with Spain, and many 

estates passed from Creole to loyalist hands. Because they had 

backed the Spanish cause, some Creole loyalists also profited 

from the losses of their brethren. The growth and power of the 

Creole propertied class was to be further undermined in 1886 

with the abolition of slavery. 

With the first major attempt at independence having ended 

in partial disaster, many Cubans turned to autonomismo (autonomy movement). The movement, which advocated autonomous rule for Cuba under the Spanish monarchy, differed little 

from reformism. Autonomismo had its origins in the first half of 

the century but lost momentum during the periods of annexation and reformism. Now, after the end of the Ten Years' War, 

it coalesced into the Autonomous Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Autonomista). The founders of the party, former annexationists and reformists, called for a system of local selfgovernment patterned on the British colonial model and 

28 
Historical Setting 

requested numerous economic and political reforms, but 

within the Spanish empire. 

It soon became clear, however, that Spain still intended no 

radical changes in its policies. By 1892 the much promised and 

awaited reforms were not forthcoming. Disillusionment and 

frustration began to take hold of those who still hoped for a 

continuous association with Spain. The party warned that 

unless Spain stopped its policy of repression and persecution, 

another rebellion would be inevitable. While the stage was 

being set for the decisive effort at independence, however, the 

forces that advocated independence were still racked by schism 

and indecision. The enthusiasm and prestige of the military 

leaders of the Ten Years' War were not sufficient to coordinate 

and direct the independence effort against Spain. This leadership vacuum came to be filled by a young poet and revolutionary, Jose Marti. 

Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 1895-1902 

Jose Marti realized very early that independence from Spain 

was the only solution for Cuba and that this could only be 

achieved through a quick war that would at the same time prevent United States intervention in Cuba. His fear of a military 

dictatorship after independence led in 1884 to a break with 

Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo, who were at the time 

engaged in conspiratorial activities. He withdrew from the 

movement temporarily, but by 1887 the three men were working together, with Marti assuming political leadership. In 1892 

he formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano-PRC) in the United States and directed his 

efforts toward organizing a new war against Spain. 

Marti's pilgrimage through the Americas in the 1880s and 

early 1890s helped to unite and organize the Cubans, and with 

Gomez and Maceo he worked tirelessly toward the realization 

of Cuban independence. So well had they organized the antiSpanish forces that their order for the uprising on February 24, 

1895, assured the ultimate expulsion of Spain from the island. 

The war, however, was not the quick and decisive struggle that 

Marti had sought. It took his life on May 19, 1895, dragged on 

for three more years, and eventually prompted the United 

States intervention (1899-1902) that he had feared. 

After Marti's death, the leadership of the war fell to Gomez 

and Maceo, who were now ready to implement their plan to 

invade the western provinces. In repeated attacks, they under29 
Cuba: A Country Study 

mined and defeated the Spanish troops and carried the war to 

the sugar heart of the island. FromJanuary to March of 1896, 

Maceo waged a bitter but successful campaign against larger 

Spanish forces in the provinces of Pinar del Rio and La Habana 

(see fig. 1). By mid-1896 the Spanish troops were in retreat, 

and the Cubans seemed victorious throughout the island. 

Then came a change in the Spanish command: the more conciliatory Marshal Arsenio Martinez Campos was replaced by 

General Valeriano Weyler, a tough and harsh disciplinarian. 

Weyler's policy of concentrating the rural population in garrisoned towns and increasing the number of Spanish troops 

allowed the Spaniards to regain the initiative after Maceo's 

death on December 7, 1896, in a minor battle. Yet they were 

unable to defeat the Cuban rebels or even to engage them in a 

major battle. G6mez retreated to the eastern provinces and 

from there carried on guerrilla operations. He rejected any 

compromise with Spain. In January 1898, when the Spanish 

monarchy introduced a plan that would have made Cuba a selfgoverning province within the Spanish empire, G6mez categorically opposed the plan. 

United States Involvement 

In April 1898, the United States declared war on Spain. The 

reasons for United States involvement were many. A growing 

and energetic nation, the United States was looking for new 

markets for its budding industrial establishment. United States 

investments in Cuba were now threatened by the devastating 

war carried on by the Cubans. National security also demanded 

the control of the Central American isthmus and of its maritime approaches. A strong navy as well as naval bases would be 

essential to protect the future Panama Canal. The rich Spanish 

colony, located 145 kilometers from the Florida coast and dominating the sea-lanes to the isthmus, was a growing haven for 

investors and the dream ofevery expansionist in the United 

States. It now seemed ripe to fall into the hands ofits northern 

neighbor. 

Throughout the century, United States interest had wavered. 

Early on, United States policy makers supported a Cuba under 

a weak Spain rather than in the hands of other European powers. In mid-century, annexation became a temporary hope, 

only to be ended by the United States Civil War. In the 1870s 

and 1880s, United States investments grew in Cuba as a result 

of the war. Taking advantage of the bankruptcy of many Span30 
Jose Marti 


Courtesy Organization of 


American States 


ish and Cuban enterprises, United States capital acquired sugar 

estates and mining interests. 'When the expansion of European 

beet sugar production closed this market for Cuban sugar, the 

United States became the largest and most important buyer of 

the island's crop. The depressed world price of raw sugar 

ruined many Cuban producers and facilitated United States 

economic penetration. The McKinley Tariff of 1890, which 

placed raw sugar on the free list, led to an increase in CubanAmerican trade and especially to the expansion of sugar production. Although by 1895 control of the economy was still 

largely in the hands of the Spaniards, United States capital and 

influence, particularly in the sugar industry, were dominant. 

31 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The ingredients for United States involvement were all 

present in 1898. All that was needed was the proper national 

mood and a good excuse to step in. The first was easily 

achieved. The United States wanted intervention. Aroused by 

stories of Spanish cruelty blown out of proportion by irresponsible "yellow journalists" and by a neW sense of Anglo-Saxon 

"racial" responsibility toward the "inferior" people of the Latin 

world, large sectors of public opinion clamored for United 

States involvement and pressured President William McKinley 

to intervene. The excuse was provided by the explosion of the 

United States battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana's harbor early 

in 1898. 

The Spanish-American War was short, decisive, and popular. 

Such defenders of manifest destiny as Alfred T. Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge seemed vindicated 

by an easy and relatively inexpensive war. United States business interests saw new commercial and investment opportunities as a result of the capture of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 

Philippines. United States strategic interests were also assured 

by the final expulsion of Spain from the New World in 1899 

and the emergence of the United States as the dominant Caribbean power. 

The defenders of imperialism, however, were not unchallenged. In the United States Congress, Senator Henry M. 

Teller won approval for the Teller Resolution, which pledged 

the United States to support an independent Cuba. Roman 

Catholic and labor leaders criticized the United States and 

called for the granting of complete independence to Cuba. 

Similarly, Cuban leaders complained that Cuba was not a part 

of the Treaty of Paris (1898), which ended the Spanish-American War, that their soldiers had been excluded from the cities 

by the United States Army, and that despite innumerable sacrifices independence still loomed more as a hope than a reality. 

Although Spain relinquished Cuba under the Treaty of Paris, 

Manuel Sanguily, a staunch defender of Cuba's sovereignty, 

denounced the fact that the most reactionary Spanish elements had been permitted to remain on the island and retain 

their possessions. 

Those who criticized United States policies, however, were 

voices crying in the wilderness. This was the finest hour for 

United States expansionists, and they were not about to give up 

Cuba completely. It was not until 1902, after two years of 

United States occupation of the island, that the United States 

32 
Historical Setting 

granted Cuba nominal independence, and only after Congress 

had defined the future relations ofthe United States and Cuba. 

On February 25, 1901, Senator Orville H. Platt introduced in 

Congress the Platt Amendment (see Glossary), which stipulated the right ofthe United States to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs and to lease a naval base in Cuba. The bill became 

law on March 2. 

On June 12, 1901, a constitutional convention met in 

Havana to draft a constitution. On June 21, by a majority of 

one, it adopted the Platt Amendment as an annex to the 

Cuban constitution of 1901. The constitution also provided for 

universal suffrage, separation of church and state, a popularly 

elected but all-powerful president, and a weakened Senate and 

Chamber of Deputies. 

Despite the opposition that it generated, the occupation did 

have a number of beneficial and generally supported results. 

The United States faced a difficult task indeed in governing 

Cuba. Famine and disease were rampant. Industrial and agricultural production were at a standstill. The treasury was 

empty. The Cuban revolutionary army was idle and impatient. 

With no experience in colonial affairs, the United States tackled the job. The military governors, Generals John Brooke 

(1899) and Leonard Wood (1899-1902), supported by a variety 

of Cuban secretaries, were the supreme authority, and under 

them were other United States generals in charge of every 

province. These were soon replaced by Cuban governors. A 

method offood distribution was established that proved effective. A system of rural guards, initiated earlier by General 

Leonard Wood in Oriente, was soon extended to all the provinces, providing employment to many soldiers after the Cuban 

army was disbanded. 

The Wood administration gave particular attention to health 

and education. It built hospitals, improved sanitation and 

health conditions, and eradicated yellow fever, primarily 

through the work of the Cuban scientist CarlosJ. Finlay, who 

discovered the mosquito vector of yellow fever. The Wood 

administration established a public school system and modernized the university. Wood also reorganized the judicial system, 

provided it with buildings and other facilities, and placed the 

judges on salary for the first time. In 1899 Wood proclaimed an 

electoral law that gave the franchise to adult males who were literate, owned property, or had served in the revolutionary 

army. Elections for municipal offices were held in June 1900, 

33 
Cuba: A Country Study 

and in September, thirty-one delegates, mostly followers or representatives of the revolutionary army, were elected to the Constitutional Convention that drafted the constitution of 1901. 

On May 20, 1902, the occupation ended. On that day, General Wood turned over the presidency to Tomas Estrada Palma 

(president, 1902-06), first elected president of the new republic and former successor to Marti as head of the PRe. It was a 

day of national happiness, as the Cubans plunged into a new 

era of political freedom and republican government. Optimism, however, was tempered by the shadow of the United 

States hanging over the new nation. Looking into the future, a 

few Cubans warned that the immediate task was to resist foreign encroachments. Many still remembered Marti's prophetic 

words: "Once the United States is in Cuba, who will get it out?" 

The Republic, 1902-59 

The Platt Amendment Years, 1902-34 

Apparently highly favorable conditions accompanied Cuba's 

emergence into independence. There were no major social or 

political problems similar to those that other Latin American 

nations had experienced after their break with Spain. There 

was no large unassimilated indigenous population, and 

although blacks represented a significant proportion of the 

total population, there was no major racial conflict. The two 

groups had learned to live together since colonial times. In 

addition, no strong regionalism or powerful church challenged 

the authority of the state. Furthermore, the liberal conservative 

feud that plagued countries like Mexico during the nineteenth 

century was nonexistent in Cuba. 

The economic situation was also favorable. The infusion of 

foreign capital, the increasing trade with the United States, and 

favorable sugar prices augured a prosperous future. Cuba and 

the United States signed a Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity in 

1903 that guaranteed a 20 percent tariff preference for Cuban 

sugar entering the United States. In return, Cuba granted certain United States products preferential treatment. The treaty 

reinforced the close commercial relations between the two 

countries, but it also made Cuba further dependent on a onecrop economy and on one all-powerful market. Under the 

terms of the May 1903 Treaty of Relations (also known as the 

Permanent Reciprocity Treaty of 1903) and the Lease Agreement ofJuly 1903, the United States also acquired rights in per34 
Historical Setting 

petuity to lease a naval coaling station at Guantanamo Bay, 

which has remained the United States Naval Station at 

Guantanamo Bay ever since. 

Despite apparently favorable conditions, Marti's vision of a 

politically and economically independent nation failed to 

materialize in the postindependence years. Whether he would 

have been able to prevent the events that followed the War for 

Independence can only be conjectured. A process of centralization extended the great sugar estates of the colonial period, 

restraining the growth of a rural middle class and creating an 

agrarian proletariat of poor whites and mulattoes. Cuba 

became more and more commercially dependent on the 

United States, and the inclusion of the Platt Amendment into 

the Cuban constitution of 1901 established United States 

supervision of political developments in Cuba. 

Another problem was Cuba's preservation of the colonial 

Spanish attitude that public office was a source of personal 

profit. Electoral fraud became a standard practice. Politics 

became the means to social advancement, a contest between 

factions for the spoils of office. Personalismo was substituted for 

principle; allegiance to a man or a group was the only way to 

ensure survival in the political arena. The Spanish legacy of 

political and administrative malpractice increased in the new 

nation too suddenly to be checked by a people lacking experience in self-government. The United States' dissolution of 

Cuba's veteran army prevented a repetition of the typical nineteenth-century Spanish-American experience. Nevertheless, 

many veterans took an active part in politics, and their influence was felt in the years following the establishment of the 

republic in 1902. 

As successor to Spain as the overseer of the island's affairs, 

the United States unwittingly perpetuated the Cubans' lack of 

political responsibility. Cubans enjoyed the assurance that the 

United States would intervene to protect them from foreign 

entanglement or to solve their domestic difficulties, but the situation only encouraged an indolent attitude toward their own 

affairs and was not conducive to responsible self-government. 

In the early decades of the republic, the Cubans developed a 

"Platt Amendment mentality," which led them to rely upon the 

United States for guidance in their political decisions. 

This civic indolence was also not conducive to the growth of 

Cuban nationalism. Although the Cubans were enclosed in a 

geographic unit and shared a common language, religion, and 

35 
Cuba: A Country Study 

background, they lacked national unity and purpose. The 

influence of the United States weakened the forces of nationalism in the early part of the century. As the century progressed, 

another force, espafiolismo, became an important factor in keeping the nation divided. When Cuba became independent, 

Spaniards were guaranteed their property rights and were 

allowed to keep commerce and retail trade largely in their own 

hands. Immigration from Spain, furthermore, increased considerably, and by 1934 there were an estimated 300,000 Spaniards on the island. This influx constantly strengthened 

Spanish traditions and customs. Many Spaniards themselves 

remained divided, retaining the ways of their own native provinces, hoping for an eventual return to Spain and thus failing 

to assimilate into the mainstream of Cuban society. 

A dangerous tendency to solve differences through violence 

also permeated the political atmosphere. In 1906 President 

Estrada Palma called for United States intervention to offset 

the so-called Little August War. Organized by Jose Miguel 

Gomez and his liberal followers, who were outraged by Estrada 

Palma's fraudulent reelection, this revolt aimed at preventing 

Estrada Palma from serving a second term in office. United 

States Marines were sent to end the conflict, initiating a new 

intervention that lasted from 1906 until 1909. 

This second intervention differed significantly from the first. 

The United States was not eager to embark on a new period of 

rule in Cuba, and the provisional governor, Charles E. 

Magoon, turned to dispensing government sinecures, or botellas, to pacify the various quarreling factions. Magoon also 

embarked on an extensive program of public works, gave 

Havana a new sewerage system, and organized a modern army. 

These accomplishments, however, were partially overshadowed 

by extravagant spending that left Cuba with a debt where there 

once had been a surplus. Magoon also drew up an organic 

body of law for the executive and the judiciary, and for provincial and municipal government. He also provided an electoral 

law, as well as laws for a civil service and for municipal taxation. 

Evidently, the United States government considered enactment 

offair legislation that would prevent civil wars to be one of the 

main purposes of the intervention. Having pacified the country and introduced this new legislative apparatus, the United 

States called for municipal and national elections. In 1908 the 

Liberals, members of the newly created Liberal Party (Partido 

Liberal), won a solid majority and elected their leader, Jose 

36 
United Stales troof)S marching in Havana, 1908 

United Stales iylarine tents in front ofthe Palacio de los CajJitanes 

Generales, the old fxtlace of the SjJanish governors, 1908 

Courtes), Organization (~f American States 

37 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Miguel G6mez (president, 1909-13), to the presidency. The 

United States seemed willing to allow the democratic process 

to follow its course, and on January 28,1909, the interventionist forces were withdrawn from the island. 

The impact of this second intervention was far-reaching in 

other, less positive ways. It removed any pretense of Cuban 

independence, strengthened the Platt Amendment mentality, 

and increased doubts about the Cubans' ability for self-government. Disillusionment took hold among many leaders, intellectuals, and writers, and this feeling was transmitted to the mass 

of the population. Cynicism and irresponsibility increased and 

so did the resort to violence to solve political differences. Even 

hitherto peaceful racial relations were affected. 

The 1908 electoral fiasco of a group of radical blacks, who 

had organized a political party called the Independent Colored 

Association (Agrupaci6n Independiente de Color-AIC), 

increased the frustration of blacks. When the Cuban Senate 

passed a law prohibiting parties along racial lines, the AIC 

staged an uprising in 1912. The uprising alarmed Washington, 

which landed United States Marines in several parts of the 

island, over the protests of PresidentJose Miguel G6mez. Trying to avert another full-fledged intervention, G6mez moved 

swiftly and harshly. Government forces captured and executed 

most of the leaders and crushed the rebellion. The AlC collapsed soon after. It was to be the last time that a revolt along 

strictly racial lines would develop in Cuba. 

The tendency to resort to violence was displayed in two 

other instances at this time. In 1912 veterans of the War for 

Independence demanded the ouster of pro-Spanish elements 

from bureaucratic positions and threatened to take up arms 

against the government of President G6mez. When the United 

States expressed "grave concern" over these events, the veterans rapidly renounced their violent tactics. The second incident occurred again in 1917. This time the Liberal Party 

rebelled to protest the fraudulent reelection of Mario Garda 

Menocal (president, 1913-1921). Led by former President 

G6mez, the rebels took control of Oriente and Camaguey provinces. But Menocal, supported by a warning from the United 

States that it would not recognize a government that came to 

power by unconstitutional means, moved troops into the areas 

controlled by the rebels and captured G6mez. The rebellion 

soon died out, and, although its leaders were arrested, they 

were later pardoned. 

38 
Historical Setting 

As a result of the economic downturn of the 1920s, various 

groups protested Cuba's economic dependence on the United 

States. In 1920, after a sharp drop in the price of sugar created 

a severe economic crisis, Cuba was subjected to financial chaos 

and social misery. The crisis accelerated the desire for change 

and led to a questioning of the existing order of society among 

intellectuals and writers and also among other groups that 

were barred from becoming productive members of society. 

This economic crisis led in particular to a resurgence of economic nationalism. Several groups demanded protective legislation for Cuban interests and questioned the close economic 

ties between the United States and Cuba. The Platt Amendment as well as the repeated interventions of the United States 

government in Cuba's internal affairs came under attack. AntiUnited States feeling, xenophobia, and retrieval of the national 

wealth became the main themes of this blossoming nationalism. As the decade progressed, however, its scope was widened 

to include a call for social justice and for an end to political 

corruption and economic dependence on a single crop. 

Liberal Alfredo Zayas y Alonso (president, 1921-24), as corrupt as his administration was, managed to take advantage of 

this nationalism to reassert Cuba's sovereignty vis-a.-vis the 

United States and its special envoy, Enoch Crowder. Although 

his administration was overshadowed by graft and mismanagement, Zayas retrieved Cuba's credit, averted intervention, and 

through later negotiations secured definite title to the Isla de 

Pinos (now Isla de laJuventud) off the southern coast of Cuba 

after a two-decade delay imposed by the Platt Amendment. 

The inability of Cuban society to absorb all university graduates accentuated the feelings offrustration in a generation that 

found itself with little opportunity to apply its acquired knowledge. In 1922 university students in Havana created the Federation of University Students (Federaci6n Estudiantil 

Universitaria-FEU), occupied university buildings, and organized short-lived student strikes. The students obtained a series 

of academic and administrative reforms, larger government 

subsidies, and the establishment of a University Reform Commission composed of professors, students, and alumni. 

The university reform movement, which had started as a crusade for academic reform, developed political overtones in 

1928 when students began protesting the decision of President 

Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-29, 1929-33) to 

remain in power for another term. Claiming that his economic 

39 
Cuba: A Country Study 

program could not be completed within his four-year term and 

that only he could carry it out, Machado announced his decision to reelect himself. In April 1928, a packed constitutional 

convention granted Machado a new six-year period of power 

without reelection and abolished the vice presidency. In 

November, through a fake election in which he was the only 

candidate, Machado was given a new term, to run from May 20, 

1929, to May 20, 1935. 

Whereas a similar attempt by Estrada Palma to remain in 

power had resulted in rebellion, Machado's decision at first 

brought about only a wave of national indignation against the 

invalidation of suffrage. The regime still enjoyed the support of 

the business and conservative sectors of society. Increased revenues had brought prosperity, and Machado's improved administration, especially in the field of public works, had gained him 

a strong following. The Cuban armed forces, organized two 

decades earlier during G6mez's administration, also strongly 

backed the regime. Machado had successfully won over the military through bribes and threats and had purged disloyal officers. He used the military in a variety of civilian posts both at 

the national and local levels, thus increasingly militarizing society. The few officers who were discontented with Machado's 

reelection seemed powerless and ineffective to oppose the 

regime. In the midst of growing domestic and international 

problems, the United States looked with indifference at events 

in Cuba and seemed unwilling to become involved in Cuban 

affairs as long as the Machado administration maintained 

order and stability and a friendly posture toward Washington. 

Machado, furthermore, prevented the growth of political 

opposition by winning control of the Conservative Party 

(Partido Conservador) and aligning it both with his own Liberal Party and with the small Popular Party (Partido Popular). 

Through bribes and threats, Machado was able to subordinate 

Congress and the judiciary to the executive's will. 

Machado's decision to extend his presidency met with stern 

student opposition, resulting in riots and demonstrations in 

several towns throughout the island. Machado took immediate 

measures to prevent further opposition from that quarter. He 

temporarily closed the university, dissolved the FEU, and abolished the University Reform Commission. He also tightened 

political control. Several Spanish and European labor leaders 

were expelled from the country as undesirable aliens. Antigovernment newspapers were closed down, and the military took 

40 
Historical Setting 

an increasingly growing role in surveilling and policing the 

population. Machado warned sternly that he would keep order 

and peace at any cost. 

These measures, however, failed to control the students completely. In mid-1927, a small but active group organized the 

University Students Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil Universitario-DEU; hereafter, Directorio) to oppose the regime. The 

Directorio issued a manifesto defending the right of university 

students to discuss politics and attacking Machado's reelection 

attempts. When students demonstrated in front of the university, Machado rapidly retaliated. Following his orders, the University Council, composed of faculty and administrative 

officials, formed disciplinary tribunals and expelled most of 

the Directorio leaders from the university. 

A clash with police that left Rafael Trejo, a student leader, 

dead was the turning point in the struggle against the regime. 

From that time on, many Cubans viewed the courageous student generation that battled Machado's police with admiration 

and respect. For some, the "generation of 1930," as these students were later known in Cuban history, seemed irresponsible 

and undisciplined, but for others it became the best exponent 

of disinterested idealism. Embattled by the first shock waves of 

the world depression and oppressed by an increasingly ruthless 

dictator, many Cubans, especially those among the less privileged sectors of society, turned in hope toward these young 

people. They placed their faith in a generation that, although 

inexperienced and immature, seemed incorruptible and willing to bring morality to Cuba's public life. 

While the principal leaders of the Directorio were in jail in 

1931, a small group formed a splinter organization, the Student Left Wing (Ala Izquierda Estudiantil-AIE). The AlE, 

however, became merely a tool of the Communist Party of 

Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba-PCC). The party, founded 

in 1925 and led in the early 1930s by Ruben Martinez Villena, a 

popular poet and intellectual, directed the organization's activities and used it to influence the student movement. Throughout most of his regime, the communists opposed Machado and 

advocated, as the only correct strategy to overthrow his government, the mobilization of the proletariat, culminating in a general strike. The PCC opposition, however, was ineffectual. 

The DEU and the AlE were not the only groups opposing 

Machado. The Nationalist Union (Union Nacionalista), 

headed by a War of Independence colonel, Carlos Mendieta, 

41 
Cuba: A Country Study 

also condemned the regime in newspapers and in public demonstrations. In 1931 Mendieta and Menocal, the former president, organized a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio 

Province. That same year, a group led by engineer Carlos Hevia 

and journalist Sergio Carb6 equipped an expedition in the 

United States and landed in Oriente Province, only to be 

crushed by Machado's army. In New York, representatives of 

several anti-Machado organizations united and formed a revolutionaryjunta. 

Most prominent, perhaps, of these anti-Machado groups was 

the ABC, a clandestine extremist organization composed of 

intellectuals, students, and the middle sectors of society, established in 1930. Led by several Cuban intellectuals who were 

Harvard graduates, the ABC undermined Machado's position 

through sabotage and terrorist actions, and in December 1932 

published a manifesto in Havana criticizing the underlying 

structure of Cuban society and outlining a detailed program of 

economic and political reforms. Although the means to 

achieve its political and economic program were not clear, the 

ABC called for the elimination oflarge landholdings, nationalization of public services, limitations on land acquisitions by 

United States companies, and producers' cooperatives, as well 

as political liberty and social justice. 

Such was the existing condition on the island when the 

United States, attempting to find a peaceful solution to Cuba's 

political situation, sent Ambassador Benjamin Sumner Welles 

in 1933 to act as mediator between government and opposition. By then, United States interests in Cuba had grown significantly. Investment was concentrated in land and in the sugar 

industry, but also extended into transportation, natural 

resources, utilities, and the banking system. World War I had 

accelerated this trend, making Cuba more and more dependent on its neighbor to the North. As economic dependence 

increased, so did political dependence. A new crop of Cuban 

businessmen, technocrats, and, naturally, politicians had developed who identified with their counterparts in the United 

States and sought political guidance from Washington and Wall 

Street. This "Platt Amendment complex" permeated large sectors of Cuban society, with the exception, perhaps, of some 

writers, intellectuals, and students who saw a danger in the 

close relationship for the development of a Cuban nationality 

and identified the patria with the workers, the poor, and the 

blacks. Their ranks were small, however, and economic pros42 
Historical Setting 

perity drowned their voices. The fear of, or the desire for, 

United States involvement in Cuban affairs was the dominating 

theme, and many Cubans were willing to use the threat of or 

even actual intervention by the United States to further their 

narrow political and economic objectives. 

Most political factions and leaders supported Sumner 

Welles's mediation, with the exception of the radicals and the 

Conservative followers offormer President Menocal, the Directorio, and a few Cuban leaders. The Directorio strongly 

opposed the United States' action. The leaders of the "generation of 1930" saw themselves as representatives of the national 

will and heirs to Marti's legacy (see Jose Marti and the War for 

Independence, 1895-1902, this. ch.); their mission was to carry 

on the revolution that "the United States had frustrated in 

1898." Finding inspiration and guidance in Marti's teaching 

and his vision of a just society in a politically and economically 

independent nation, they opposed United States supervision of 

Cuban affairs and the humiliating Platt Amendment. 

Sumner Welles's mediation efforts culminated in a general 

strike, in dissension within the armed forces, and in several 

small army revolts that forced Machado to resign and leave the 

country on August 12, 1933. This general strike deepened the 

schism between the PCC and the anti-Machado groups. 

Although the party had played an important role in promoting 

the strike, it reversed itselfjust prior to Machado's fall and 

issued a back-to-work order, fearing that the general strike 

might provoke United States intervention or the establishment 

of a pro-United States government. The failure to support the 

anti-Machado struggle discredited the PCC, especially among 

the students. From that time on, the party, alienated from progressive and revolutionary forces within the country, found it 

easier to reach agreements and work with traditional conservative political parties and governments, even with military presidents. 

Sumner Welles and the army appointed Carlos Manuel de 

Cespedes to succeed Machado. The son of Cuba's first president during the rebellion against Spain in the 1860s and a prestigious although uninspiring figure, Cespedes soon received 

United States support and the backing of most anti-Machado 

groups. He annulled Machado's constitutional amendments of 

1928, restored the 1901 constitution, and prepared to bring 

the country back to normalcy. 

43 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Returning Cuba to normalcy seemed an almost impossible 

task amid the worldwide chaos of the early 1930s. The deepening economic depression had worsened the people's misery, 

and Machado's overthrow had released a wave of uncontrolled 

anger and anxiety. Looting and disorder were widespread in 

Havana, where armed bands sought out and executed 

Machado's henchmen. In rural areas, discontented peasants 

took over sugar mills and threatened wealthy landowners. 

Although the appointment of Cespedes as president did not 

end the crisis, it reduced political tensions and the level of 

armed conflict. 

An Attempt at Revolution, 1933-34 

Machado's overthrow marked the beginning of an era of 

reform. The revolutionary wave that swept away the dictatorship had begun to acquire the characteristics of a major revolution. Although it lacked a defined ideology, this revolution was 

clearly aimed at transforming all phases of national life. The 

leaders of the "generation of 1930" were the best exponents of 

this reformist zeal. Espousing the usual anti-United States and 

nonintervention communist propaganda and advocating measures ofsocial and economic significance for the less privileged 

sectors of society, the students monopolized the rhetoric of revolution. Cespedes's refusal to abrogate the 1901 constitution, 

which was regarded as too closely modeled after the United 

States Constitution and ill-adapted to Cuba's cultural milieu, 

created a crisis. The Directorio, furthermore, linked Cespedes 

to the deposed dictator, pointing to his serving in Machado's 

first cabinet and living abroad as a diplomat. 

In September 1933, the unrest in Cuba's political picture 

again came to a head. Unhappy with both a proposed reduction in pay and an order restricting their promotions, the lower 

echelons of the army, led by Sergeant-Stenographer Fulgencio 

Batista y Zaldivar, invited the Directorio to meet with them at 

Camp Columbia in Havana on September 4. Batista's contact 

with Directorio leaders dated back to the anti-Machado struggle, when he had served as stenographer during some of the 

students' trials. By the time the students arrived at Camp 

Columbia, army discipline had collapsed. Sergeants were in 

command and had arrested numerous army officers. Mter consulting with Batista and the army, the Directorio agreed to 

Cespedes's overthrow and named five men to form a pentarchy 

(a five-member civilian executive commission) to head a provi44 
Havana:s' !Iluseum ofthe Revolution (ivluseo de la Revoiuci(5n), 

formerZv the Presidential Palace (El Palacio Presidencial), home 

ofPresident Fulgencio Batista until 1959 

sional gO\'ernmenL That same night, Cespedes handed over 

the presidency to the five-member commission, which formally 

took possession of the Presidential Palace, 

September 4, 1933, was a turning point in Cuba's history. It 

marked the army's entrance as an organized force into the running of government and Batista's emergence as self-appointed 

chief of the armed forces and the arbiter of Cuba's destiny for 

years to come, On that date, the students and the military, two 

armed groups accustomed to violence, united to rule Cuba, 

The marriage, however, was short-lived. A contest for supremacy soon began between the students and the military Very few 

expected the students to win. 

The pentarchy's inability to rule the country became evident 

at once, The group lacked not only the support of the various 

political parties and groups, but also the support of the United 

States. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, surprised and confused by events on the island, refused to recognize the five-member government and rushed naval vessels to 

Cuban waters. vVhen one member of the pentarchy promoted 

4S 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Sergeant Batista to the rank of colonel without the required 

approval of the other four, another member resigned and the 

regime collapsed. In a meeting with Batista and the army on 

September 10, 1933, the Directorio appointed a university 

physiology professor, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin (president, 

1933-34,1944-48), as provisional president. 

The new president had no political experience to qualify 

him for the job at such a crucial time. He had won the admiration of the students when in 1928 he allowed the expelled 

Directorio leaders to read their manifesto to his class. At a time 

when other professors refused the students' request, Grau's gesture gained for him a following at the university. While he was 

in jail in 1931, Grau and students met again and cemented 

their relationship. When the pentarchy collapsed, their old 

professor was the students' first choice. A witty and intelligent 

man, Grau projected a controversial image. He appeared indecisive and powerless, yet he was actually cunning and determined. 

With Grau, the "generation of 1930" was catapulted into 

power. The students held Cuba's destiny in their hands. It was a 

unique spectacle indeed. Amidst thunder from the left and the 

right, and opposition from most political parties and personalities, the Directorio held daily meetings to shape governmental 

policy. 

The Directorio leaders advocated several reforms. Now that 

Machado had been overthrown, they wanted to wipe out all vestiges of his regime, including corrupt, pro-Machado army officers, politicians, office holders, and university professors. They 

called for a complete reorganization of Cuba's economic structure, including revision of the foreign debt, tax reforms, and a 

national banking and currency system removing Cuba from 

monetary and financial dependence on the United States. 

Aware that the Platt Amendment allowed for continuous 

United States interference, they sought its removal. The students also demanded agrarian reform and eventual nationalization of the sugar and mining industries. Finally, they wanted 

an autonomous university, sheltered from political interference. 

Grau's regime was the high-water mark of the revolutionary 

process and of the intense nationalism of the generation of 

1930. Nationalist sentiment rather than radical doctrines dominated the regime's consideration of economic questions. The 

government was pro-labor and opposed the predominance of 

46 
Historical Setting 

foreign capital. Soon after coming to power, Grau abrogated 

the 1901 constitution, promulgated provisional statutes to govern Cuba, and called for a constitutional convention with elections subsequently set for April 1, 1934. He also demanded the 

abrogation of the Platt Amendment, which was subsequently 

abrogated on May 29, 1934. Taking immediate action to eliminate Machado's followers from government positions, Grau 

appointed commissioners to "purge" government offices. 

Because the dictatorship had utilized the machinery of the old 

political parties, Grau issued a decree dissolving them. The government also complied with one of the oldest demands of the 

university reform movement by granting the University of 

Havana autonomy from government control. 

With the island facing a mounting wave of strikes and social 

unrest, Grau implemented a popular and reformist program. 

On September 20, he issued a decree establishing a maximum 

working day of eight hours. On November 7, the government 

issued a decree on labor organization that sought to Cubanize 

the labor movement and restrict communist and Spanish influences by limiting the role offoreign leaders. It required Cuban 

citizenship of all union officials, and all labor organizations 

were ordered to register with the Ministry of Labor. On the following day, Grau signed the Nationalization of Labor Decree, 

popularly known as the "50 Percent Law." This law required 

that at least half the total working force of all industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprises be composed of native 

Cubans (except for managers and technicians, who could not 

be supplanted by natives), and that half the total payroll be 

allotted to Cubans. Although these two decrees gained much 

labor support for the government and diminished communist 

influence in the unions, they also alienated the many Spaniards and other foreign minority groups living on the island. 

Grau's measures also aroused United States hostility. The 

United States viewed the unrest in Cuba with much concern. 

The overthrow of the United States-backed Cespedes regime 

was undoubtedly a defeat for President Roosevelt's policy 

toward Cuba in general and for Ambassador Sumner Welles's 

mediation efforts in particular. Grau's seizure of two United 

States-owned sugar mills that had been closed down because of 

labor troubles, and his temporary takeover of the Cuban Electric Company because of rate disputes and additional labor 

problems, increased Washington's apprehension. 

47 
Cuba: A Counll)' Stud), 

The United States refusal to recognize Grau complicated the 

many problems facing him because Cuban political leaders 

considered United States recognition as a key factor for the 

existence of any Cuban government. The United States policy 

condemning the Grau regime encouraged opposition groups 

and rebellious purged army officers. Opposition was strongest 

from the communists, the displaced army officers, and the 

ABC. Student leader Eduardo (Eddie) Chibas bitterly complained that although the Directorio had never used terrorism 

against the ABC-backed Cespedes regime, the ABC used it to 

combat Grau's government. The ABC seemed unhappy over 

their inability to obtain a share of power and feared that the 

consolidation of the Grau regime might exclude them from 

future political participation. 

Inner conflict in the government contributed to its instability. A faction led by student leader and Minister of Interior 

Antonio Guiteras advocated a continuation of the program of 

social reform. Strongly nationalistic and sincerely motivated, 

Guiteras initiated much of the regime's legislation, and many 

considered him the real brains behind Grall. Another faction, 

which was controlled by Batista and the army, wanted a conservative program that would bring about United States recognition. Grau seemed to have been caught in the middle of these 

conflicting forces. On November 6, 1933, the Directorio, feeling that its mandate had expired, declared itself dissolved, 

announcing, however, that its members would continue to support President Grau. 

By January 1934, it became evident that the regime would 

soon collapse. Student support was rapidly waning, the military 

conspired to take power, and Washington refused to recognize 

a regime that threatened its vested interests in Cuba. In addition, industrial and commercial leaders opposed Grau's legislation. Fearing that the government's program would attract 

labor support, the communists violently attacked Grau. A 

national teachers' strike for better wages further aggravated the 

already unstable situation. On January 14, Army Chief Fulgencio Batista forced President Grau to resign. Two days later, 

Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta as Cuba's provisional president. Within five days after Mendieta's accession to power, the 

United States recognized Cuba's new government. 

To the United States and to its ambassadors in Cuba-Sumner Welles and his successor, Jefferson Caffrey-Batista represented order and progress under friendly rule. Welles had 

48 
Historical ,Setting 

been persistently hostile to Grau, distrusting his personality as 

well as his ideas and programs. He was fearful of the social and 

economic revolution that Grau was attempting to enact and 

the damage this might cause to United States interests in Cuba. 

Both Welles and Caffrey looked to Batista as the one leader 

capable of maintaining order while guaranteeing a friendly 

posture to the United States and its corporate interests in 

Cuba. 

The Failure of Reformism, 1944-52 

Despite its short duration, the revolutionary process of 1933 

had a profound impact on subsequent Cuban developments 

and events. It gave university students a taste of power, catapulted them into the mainstream of politics, and created an 

awareness among the students and the population at large of 

the need, as well as the possibility, for rapid and drastic change. 

It also weakened foreign domination of the economy and 

opened new opportunities for several national sectors hitherto 

prevented from obtaining a bigger share of the national wealth 

because of Spanish and North American presence and control. 

Furthermore, the state's involvement in the management of 

the economy was accelerated, and new impetus given to the 

rise of organized labor. But the failure of the revolution also 

convinced many that it would be almost impossible to bring 

profound structural changes to Cuba while the country 

remained friendly toward the United States. For the more radical elements emerging out of the 1933 process, it became clear 

that only an anti-United States revolution that would destroy 

the Batista military could be successful in Cuba. 

In the years following Grau's overthrow, the "generation of 

1930" experienced the harsh facts ofCuba's power politics. The 

students thought that Machado's overthrow would signal the 

beginning of a new era of morality and change. They learned 

differently. Dominated by the army, Cuba's political life 

returned to the corruption and old ways of the past. To govern 

Cuba, Batista chose as allies many of the old politicians 

expelled from power with Machado. Opportunistic and 

unscrupulous individuals assumed important government positions, corruption continued, repression and terrorism flourished. The years of struggle and suffering seemed in vain. 

Students felt disillusioned and frustrated. Most abandoned 

their earlier idealism and found comfort in professional and 

business ventures. Some departed for foreign lands, never to 

49 
Cuba: A Country Study 

return. Others accepted radical ideologies such as communism 

or fascism. Several broke with their past and shared in the 

spoils of office. Desiring to continue fighting for their frustrated revolution, many joined the Cuban Revolutionary Party 

(PRC) , which was organized in February 1934. 

Taking their name from Marti's PRC of 1892, this group, also 

known as the Authentic Party, became the repository of revolutionary virtue. Former Directorio leaders joined the new party, 

and Grau, then living in exile in Mexico, was appointed president. The party's program called for economic and political 

nationalism, social justice, and civil liberties and emphasized 

the right of Cubans to share more fully in the country's economic resources. Although the party was silent on the question 

of peaceful or forceful methods of achieving power, Grau 

seemed at first to favor peaceful opposition to Mendieta and 

Batista. 

In the years that followed, Batista and the army all but domiluted Cuba's political life. Until 1940, when he officially 

assumed the chief-executive office, securing his election 

through a coalition of political parties that included the communists, Batista maintained tight political control, ruling 

through puppet presidents. In addition to Mendieta, these 

included Jose A. Barnet y Vinageras (president, 1935-36), 

Miguel Mariano Gomez y Arias (president, 1936), and Federico 

Laredo Bru (president, 1936-40). Desiring to win popular support and to rival the autenticos (members of the Authentic 

Party), Batista imitated his Mexican counterpart, General 

Lazaro Cardenas (president, 1934-40), by sponsoring an 

impressive body of welfare legislation. Public administration, 

health, sanitation, education, and public works improved. 

Workers were allowed to unionize and organize the Cuban 

Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba-CTC). 

Legislation to provide pensions, insurance, limited working 

hours, and minimum wages largely satisfied the workers' 

demands. 

Batista also made a serious effort to bring education and better living conditions to the countryside. Under his ambitious 

"civic-rural" program, numerous schools were built. Where 

teachers were lacking, he sent army personnel to fill their 

places. The Civic-Military Institute, which he established, provided for the housing and education of the orphans ofworkers, 

soldiers, and peasants. In 1936 he issued the Sugar Coordination Law, which protected the tenants of small sugar planta50 
A view o/the 

C

tions against eviction. Alt

continued the practice of 

marked for these projects, 

attempt to improve the he

rural population. 

In the late 1930s, Batista c

stitution. With elections for a 

a new president in sight, po

Grau himself, aware that v

power, returned from exile a

thus legitimizing the Batista

When the convention co

Grau was chosen president 

from both right and left, wo

Grau competing for popul
Cuba: A Country Study 

former President Menocal signed a political pact that left 

oppositionist groups in a minority position in the assembly, 

Grau resigned. Nevertheless, there was an unusual degree of 

cooperation among the various political groups, and the constitution was completed and proclaimed that same year. 

The constitution was in many respects the embodiment of 

the aspirations of the "generation of 1930." The president was 

to serve only one term of four years, although he might be 

reelected after eight years out of office. Many civil liberties and 

social welfare provisions were defined at great length. The state 

was to playa strong role in economic and social development. 

Workers were guaranteed paid vacations, minimum wages, and 

job tenure. Cuban nationals were to be favored over foreigners 

in the establishment of new industries. The University of 

Havana's autonomy received constitutional sanction in Article 

53. The convention thus fulfilled one of the oldest demands of 

the students. 

Batista was the first president elected under the new constitution. Supported by a coalition of political parties and by the 

communists, he defeated his old rival Grau. His administration 

coincided with World War II, during which Cuba collaborated 

closely with the United States, declaring war on the Axis powers 

in 1941. The United States, in turn, increased aid and trade 

relations with Cuba. It granted Batista credits for agricultural 

development and for public works in Havana. Batista allowed 

for the establishment of a variety of United States military facilities on Cuban territory, and in early 1941 he concluded a 

sugar deal with the United States authorizing the sale of the 

whole harvest at $.0265 per pound. Many Cubans complained 

that the low price represented an excessive sacrifice for 

Cubans. This burden, combined with a series of war taxes that 

Batista had earlier imposed and shortages of finished goods 

and some food, caused much unhappiness among the population. 

Although Batista enjoyed wartime powers, his administration 

was short of dictatorial. He enjoyed the backing of the propertied classes, and he cultivated labor support. He also catered to 

the left, allowing the communists complete freedom of operation. Mter Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the 

Cuban communists ended their denunciation of the United 

States as an imperialist power and began defending President 

Roosevelt as a "great statesman" and the war against Germany 

as a 'Just war." In 1944 the communists changed the name of 

52 
Historical Setting 

their party from Communist Revolutionary Union (Uni6n Revolucionaria Comunista-URC) to the People's Socialist Party 

(Partido Socialista Popular-PSP) and issued a mild political 

program that called for racial equality and women's rights. The 

program failed, however, to attack the United States or even to 

request agrarian reform or large-scale nationalization of foreign properties in Cuba. 

At the end of World War II, as Grau and the autenticos came 

to power, the organized use of violence took on an unprecedented dimension. The relative calm of the war years suddenly 

ended, giving way to a violent and materialistic era. Urban violence reappeared, now with tragic proportions. Although part 

of the generation that emerged out of World War II retained a 

redemptionist fanaticism and a desire to fulfill the aspirations 

of "the frustrated revolution," a still larger part evidenced an 

insatiable appetite for power and wealth, and a determination 

to obtain both regardless of obstacles. Violence-prone refugees 

of the Spanish Civil War also extended their activism and rivalries to Cuba. 

Elected to the presidency in 1944, Grau followed a conciliatory policy toward these groups and permitted their proliferation, in many instances placing their leaders on government 

payrolls. Fearing the power of these gangs and their troublemaking capabilities if employed against the government, Grau 

allowed them almost complete freedom of action. This situation continued under the presidency of Grau's protege, Carlos 

Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52). Elected in 1948, the 

former Directorio leader also avoided confronting his old 

friends and continued his predecessor's mild policies. 

A system of nepotism, favoritism, and gangsterism predominated. Despite numerous accomplishments that included 

respect for human rights, freedom of the press, and a democratic climate, the autenticos failed to provide the country with 

an honest government or to diversify Cuba's one-crop economy. The reformist zeal evident during Grau's first administration had diminished considerably in the intervening decade. 

Grau himself seemed softened after years of exile and frustration. He faced, furthermore, determined opposition in Congress and from conservative elements that had joined his party. 

Not only Grau, but many of the old student leaders of the "generation of 1930," shared in the spoils of office. When confronted with the reality of Cuban politics, their early idealism 

and reformism gave way to materialism and opportunism. 

53 
Cuba: A Country Study 

For many, the autenticos had failed to fulfill the aspirations of 

the anti-Machado revolution, especially in the area of administrative honesty. Perhaps the Cubans expected too much too 

soon. The people still remembered the rapid reforms implemented during Grau's first administration and expected their 

continuation. 

Grau's failure to bring honesty and order to Cuba's public 

life and the presidential aspirations of Eduardo Chibas, an 

autentico congressman, produced a rift in the party. In 1947 

Chibas and other autentico leaders formed the Cuban People's 

Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano-PPC), Orthodox (Ortodoxo) branch, also known as the Orthodox Party (Partido 

Ortodoxo). Led by Chibas, a former student leader of the generation of 1930, the PPC became the repository of the ideals of 

the "frustrated revolution" and the refuge of a new generation 

determined to transform those ideals into reality. 

By 1950 the ortodoxos (PPC members) had become a formidable political force. Although the party lacked a well-defined 

platform, its nationalistic program of economic independence, 

political liberty, social justice, and honest government, and its 

insistence upon remaining free from political pacts, had won 

for it a considerable following, especially among University of 

Havana students. With the slogan "verguenza contra dinero" 

(honor versus money), Chibas, now an elected senator, 

pounded on the consciences of the Cubans in his Sunday radio 

programs and sought to awaken their minds to the corruption 

of the autentico administrations. Chibas monopolized the rhetoric of revolution, becoming the exponent of the frustrated old 

generation and the leader of a new generation bent on bringing morality and honesty to Cuban public life. It was he more 

than anyone else who, with his constant exhortations, calls for 

reform, and attacks on Cuba's political leadership, paved the 

way for the Revolution that followed. 

One of those captivated by the Chibas mystique was Fidel 

Castro Ruz. As a student at the Jesuit Belen High School in 

Havana in the early 1940s, Castro fell under the particular 

influence of two of his teachers, who were admirers of Franco's 

Spain and his fascist Falangist ideology. 

While studying law at the University of Havana in the late 

1940s, Castro participated in the activities ofstudent gangs and 

associated closely with violent leaders. He soon acquired a reputation for personal ambition, forcefulness, and fine oratory. 

Yet he never became a prominent student leader. On several 

54 
Historical Setting 

occasions, he was defeated in student elections or prevented 

from winning by the nature of student politics. 

Castro, as did many Cubans, followed Chibas with enthusiasm, regarding him as the only hope Cuba had of redeeming 

its political institutions and defending its sovereignty. Yet in 

one of the most bizarre episodes of Cuban political history, 

Chibas committed suicide in August 1951, at the end of his 

radio program. Chibas's death produced a feeling ofshock and 

sadness among the masses. It also created a leadership vacuum, 

produced a rift in the Orthodox Party, and facilitated Batista's 

coup d'etat of March 10, 1952. 

By the time of Chibas's death, Cuba's political life was a sad 

spectacle. Although Carlos Pdo Socorras, elected president in 

1948, had introduced a number of reforms and gangsterism 

had diminished within the University of Havana, his administration resembled that of his predecessor. Politics came to be 

regarded by the Cuban people with disrespect. To become a 

politician was to enter into an elite, a new class apart from the 

interests of the people. The elected politicians did not owe allegiance to their constituents, not even to their nation, but only 

to themselves and their unsatisfied appetites for power and fortune. Political figures, furthermore, were the objects of popular mockery. In particular, the image of the presidency was 

ridiculed and abused. Chibas's criticism, furthermore, helped 

to undermine not only the authority of the autenticos, destroying what little prestige they still enjoyed, but also the stability of 

Cuba's already fragile political institutions. The breakdown in 

morale, respect, and values was aggravated by Batista's interruption of constitutional government in 1952. What Cubans 

believed would never happen again-the return to military 

rule-became a reality. 

Background to Revolution, 1952-59 

Convinced that he could not win the election scheduled for 

June 1952, Batista overthrew President Carlos Prfo's regime in 

a bloodless and masterfully executed coup d'etat on March 10. 

The coup was almost entirely dependent on army backing and 

caught the Cuban population, as well as Pdo and his followers, 

by surprise. Batista quickly consolidated his position by replacing dissenting army officers with his own loyal men, exiling or 

arresting key Pdo supporters, and taking temporary control 

over the mass media. Prfo himself sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy and later left the country. 

55 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The ease with which Batista took over underscored the weakness of Cuba's political institutions. The legislative branch was 

weak and permeated with corruption. Even the judiciary had 

lost prestige because of its subservient role to the executive 

branch. The ortodoxos were leaderless and had been largely 

ineffectual since Chibas's death. The autenticos' corruption and 

inability to bring profound structural changes to the Cuban 

economy had cost them a good deal ofsupport and discredited 

them in the eyes of many Cubans. The failure of this democratic reformist party was perhaps the single most important 

factor contributing to the 1952 coup and the events that followed. 

By then the importance and power of the business community had grown significantly, helped in part by the rapid economic growth experienced by the island in the 1940s. World 

War II had paralyzed sugar production in many areas of 

Europe and Asia, making possible the further expansion of 

Cuba's sugar industry. At the same time, the deterioration of 

international trade during the war years gave Cuba an extraordinary amount offoreign exchange that would otherwise have 

gone toward the purchase of agricultural and industrial import 

items. All of this served to accelerate the diversification process 

in Cuba's economic development. Domestic production flourished, and other new productive activities were established. 

This circumstance was put to good use by Cuban entrepreneurs, who began to occupy relatively important positions in 

the development of the island's economy. 

Yet despite this progress, the Cuban economy suffered from 

certain structural weaknesses that prevented any sustained 

period of rapid economic growth. Chief among these was an 

excessive concentration on sugar production and foreign 

trade, a critical dependency on one major buyer-supplier, substantial unemployment and underemployment, and inequalities between urban and rural living standards. 

Despite the apparent support of business, labor, and peasant 

groups, Batista failed to develop an active base of political backing. Political loyalties were often the result of intimidation or 

expediency and for that reason were often short-lived. Batista's 

actual political base was now narrower than in the 1930s. Even 

within the armed forces, and particularly in the middle and 

lower echelons of the officer corps, there were numerous disgruntled ortodoxo and autentico officers who engaged in conspiratorial activities against the regime. 

56 
Historical Setting 

The imposition of strict censorship by the Batista regime 

silenced all criticism. Opposition leaders were either jailed or 

exiled. Repression increased. The voices that clamored for a 

peaceful solution to the interruption of Cuba's constitutional 

process were soon drowned by voices clamoring for violence. 

Cuba again was submerged in terrorism and violence, a violence that finally culminated in a major revolution. 

Opposition developed from various sectors. Numerous ortodoxos, a faction of the Authentic Party under Grau, and most of 

Cuba's politicians peacefully opposed Batista, hoping for an 

honest election. Another faction of the autenticos, together with 

several Ortodoxo leaders, went underground and began plotting insurrectionary activities. 

The active banner ofrebellion, however, was to be carried by 

university students. Students laid aside their rivalries, directing 

all their efforts against the new regime. Militant anti-Batista student leaders emerged with effective political power, not only in 

the student community, but nationally as well. During the first 

three years of Batista's rule, student opposition was limited to 

sporadic riots, demonstrations, and protests. Although at the 

time these unorganized acts may have seemed unimportant, 

they did help awaken the minds of Cubans to the increasingly 

oppressive nature of Batista's regime and thus paved the way 

for the insurrection that followed. 

A small faction within the ortodoxos advocated violence as the 

correct tactic to combat Batista. Fidel Castro belonged to this 

group. Mter receiving his law degree from the University of 

Havana in 1950, he joined the party and was nominated to run 

as an ortodoxo candidate to the House of Representatives in the 

aborted 1952 election. Batista's coup thwarted Castro's ambitions for a parliamentary career, and Castro began organizing a 

small group of followers for his ill-fated attack on the Moncada 

military barracks in Oriente Province on July 26, 1953. 

Expecting army discipline to be low, Castro and his group 

planned a surprise attack to capture the Moncada barracks. 

The attack would coincide with a vigorous publicity campaign 

projecting the movement as an ortodoxo uprising supported by 

pro-ortodoxo army officers. Castro hoped for sufficient confusion to paralyze the army and thus prevent it from reacting 

against the rebels. Batista would then be forced to resign, and 

the ortodoxos would be catapulted into power with Castro as the 

party's undisputed leader. In reality, the party was not con57 
Cuba: A Country Study 

sulted, and its leaders were informed of Castro's plans only the 

day before the Moncada assault. 

Castro's Moncada attack ended in disaster. The garrison's 

discipline was not relaxed, and the army fought back the 

attack. Some of the attackers failed even to enter the military 

barracks. Those who did were massacred. Castro himself 

escaped to the mountains, only to be captured and sentenced 

to prison. 

In "History Will Absolve Me," his speech before the tribunal 

that sentenced him, Castro outlined his political program. He 

associated his movement with the ideals of Marti and Chiba.s 

and called for reforms that were within the mainstream of 

Cuba's political tradition. At no time during his struggle 

against Batista did Castro outline a program that departed 

from Cuba's political tradition. Although the most radical elements of the revolutionary leadership thought that Cuba 

needed major economic changes that would cure the ills of 

monoculture, unemployment and underemployment, and 

dependence, most of the oppositionist leaders to Batista 

wanted political changes. None of these groups offered a program along Marxist lines. The great majority of the Cuban people who supported the anti-Batista struggle were hoping for a 

return to the constitution of 1940, honesty in government, and 

an end to violence. 

Cuba's small communist party, the PSP (People's Socialist 

Party), also opposed Batista, but through peaceful means. 

Since the 1930s, when it supported the Machado dictatorship, 

the party had lost prestige and membership and was a weak, 

ineffectual contender in the political process. Now, as a result 

of the international situation, particularly the pressure of the 

United States, the communists were unable to arrive at a 

modus vivendi with Batista. Not until very late in the antiBatista struggle did the communists join the revolutionary 

forces, and even then their participation contributed little to 

the final overthrow of the regime. 

The mock election of November 1954, from which Batista, 

running unopposed, emerged victorious, placed Cuba at a dangerous crossroads. The opposition wanted a new election, 

while Batista insisted on remaining in power until his new term 

expired in 1958. Government officials and oppositionist leaders met throughout 1955 in an attempt to find a compromise. 

The failure to reach an agreement forced the Cuban people 

58 
Historical Setting 

reluctantly onto a road leading to civil war, chaos, and revolution. 

The students reacted violently to the failure of political 

groups to find a peaceful solution. At the end of 1955, a series 

of riots shocked the country. On November 27, the FEU organized a ceremony to honor the memory of eight students shot 

by Spanish authorities in 1871. Rioting quickly spread to 

Havana. On April 21, a group of university students stoned a 

TV station where a government-sponsored youth program was 

being televised. Several participants were wounded. A police 

cordon was thrown around the grounds of the University of 

Havana, and, on the pretext of searching for hidden arms, government forces entered the university, demolishing the rector's 

office and destroying documents, scientific equipment, and 

furnishings. Batista replied to the moral indignation of university authorities and students by declaring that the autonomy of 

the university was limited to educational, administrative, and 

internal affairs; when subversive political elements were 

entrenched within the university, the government must enforce 

law and order. 

Instead of seeking to discourage rebellion and demonstrations, particularly from university students, by moderation, the 

regime encouraged it by meeting terrorism with a counterterrorism that defeated its own ends. No better method could 

have been devised to increase the bitterness and opposition of 

the people. Each murder produced another martyr and new 

adherents to the struggle against Batista. By the end of 1955, 

the leaders of the FEU realized that the efforts of nonpartisan 

organizations to reconcile government and opposition were 

futile. They proposed the creation of an insurrectionary movement to lead the struggle against Batista. When the FEU proposal found little response among the electorally oriented 

politicians, the students formed their own clandestine organization-the Revolutionary Directorate. 

While student riots and demonstrations were going on, 

other Cubans not connected with student activities were plotting to unseat Batista. A group known as Montecristi plotted 

with army officers to overthrow the regime, but Batista uncovered the conspiracy and arrested its principal instigators in 

April 1956. That same month, another group, belonging to 

Prio's Authentic Organization (Organizaci6n Autentica), 

unsuccessfully attacked the Goicuria army barracks in Matan59 
Cuba: A Country Study 

zas Province. From jail, Fidel Castro exhorted his supporters to 

organize and to cooperate with other groups. 

In 1956 Castro was released from jail and traveled to the 

United States seeking funds for the revolutionary cause and 

organizing his followers into the Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio), an organization named after 

his ill-fated Moncada attack. In December 1956, Castro and a 

group of more than eighty young revolutionaries, including his 

brother Raul and an Argentine physician, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, left from Mexico in the small yacht Granma and landed in 

Oriente Province. There, underground commando groups had 

attacked several military installations, touching off a wave of 

sabotage throughout the province. Terrorism flared, and 

bombs exploded. Underground cells derailed trains and sabotaged power lines, blacking out entire towns. 

By the time that Fidel Castro landed on December 2, however, the uprising was well on its way to being crushed, and 

most of the leaders of Castro's Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement 

were either dead or in jail. In response to the uprising, Batista 

suspended constitutional guarantees and established tighter 

censorship of news. The dreaded military police patrolled the 

streets of Havana day and night, rounding up suspected revolutionary elements. When Castro found that his actions were not 

supported by the general public, the army, or regular opposition parties, he and about a dozen survivors found refuge in 

the Sierra Maestra mountain range and from there began waging guerrilla warfare against the regime. 

Despite the instability of the late 1930s, the fall of Machado 

had ushered in almost two decades of political freedom and 

constitutional government. The students and the Cuban people in general saw Batista's regime as only a temporary interruption of Cuba's democratic political development and as the 

consequence of Batista's own ambitions for power and Pdo's 

corrupt rule rather than a symptom of more profound national 

problems. 

The elimination of Batista's dictatorship became the panacea to cure all of Cuba's ills. This simplistic thinking served 

Fidel Castro's purposes well during his stay in the Sierra Maestra. Lacking a well-defined ideology, he proclaimed the overthrow of the regime as the nation's sole, overriding task, 

advocating only the most obvious popular reforms. 

The Revolutionary Directorate, together with several autentieo leaders, planned to overthrow the government by assassi60 
Fidel Castro flanked b

at a R
Cuba: A Country Study 

nating Batista. Student leaders reasoned that such fast, decisive 

action would cause the regime to crumble and prevent unnecessary loss of life in a possible civil war. On March 13,1957, in 

one of the boldest actions of the anti-Batista rebellion, a group 

of forty men stormed the presidential palace in the center of 

Havana and almost succeeded in killing Batista. 

Fidel Castro, from his hideout in the mountains, criticized 

the students' attack. In a taped interview shown in the United 

States in May, Castro called it "a useless waste of blood. The life 

of the dictator is of no importance. Here in the Sierra Maestra 

is where to fight." Throughout his stay in the mountains, Castro 

opposed a military coup, the assassination of Batista, or any 

other violent act by a group not directly under the control of 

his Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement. 

The defeat suffered at the presidential palace and the death 

of student leaderJose A. Echeverria, perhaps the most popular 

figure opposing Batista, during a simultaneous attack on a 

Havana radio station left the Revolutionary Directorate leaderless and disorganized. Almost a year went by before the organization recovered from the blow, and even then it never 

regained the prestige and importance that it had enjoyed prior 

to the palace assault. While the Revolutionary Directorate 

declined, Castro, unchallenged in the mountains, grew in prestige, strength, and following. He gained adherents in the cities 

and won to his side many discontented elements who, whatever 

differences they might have had with his Twenty-Sixth ofJuly 

Movement, found no other insurrectionary organization to 

join. 

Corroded by disaffection, corruption, and internal disputes, 

the army was unable to defeat the guerrillas during Batista's 

final year in power. This inability increased the guerrillas' prestige and contributed to the internal demoralization of the 

armed forces. The guerrillas had certain other advantages over 

the army. For years the peasantry in the Sierra Maestra had 

been terrified by Batista's Rural Guard (Guardia Rural), and 

they welcomed the protection and promises offered by Castro 

and his group. The knowledge of the terrain and the intelligence provided by these allies proved invaluable. In addition, 

the guerrillas operated in extremely mobile units in a vast and 

rugged terrain. The Cuban army was not trained in guerrilla 

tactics and also lacked the military leadership capable of carrying out this type of warfare against highly motivated guerrilla 

fighters. For many of the urban youth who joined Castro in the 

62 
Historical Setting 

mountains, there was a sort of mystique in being a guerrilla, 

fighting for a just cause against an oppressive regime, and living in a rural environment. Finally, the guerrillas were supported by an urban network that supplied manpower, weapons, 

money, and other necessary aid. 

Guerrilla warfare in the rural areas was accompanied by 

increased sabotage and terror in the cities. A large and loosely 

related urban resistance movement developed throughout the 

island. Underground cells of the Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement, the closely allied Civic Resistance Movement (Movimiento Civico Revolucionario-MCR), the Revolutionary 

Directorate, and the autenticos conducted bombings, sabotage, 

and kidnappings, as well as distributed propaganda. These 

actions undermined the foundations of the government and 

helped to create the atmosphere of civil war. 

This urban underground developed into the backbone of 

the anti-Batista struggle. It was the work of the urban underground more than anything else that brought about the downfall of the regime. The action of these groups provoked Batista 

and his repressive forces into such extreme retaliatory measures that the Cuban population became almost totally alienated from the regime. 

United States policy also contributed somewhat to the growing demoralization within the military. Although the United 

States had supported the Batista regime, by the fall of 1957 the 

United States government began holding up shipments of 

weapons and munitions. An arms embargo was publicly 

announced in March 1958. Although these arms shipments 

were small and from Batista's point of view not decisive in the 

struggle against Castro, they did represent a sign of continuous 

backing for his administration. Thus, when the embargo was 

declared, many Cubans saw it as a change in Washington's policy, indicating disapproval and withdrawal of support for the 

regime. United States actions were undoubtedly a strong blow 

to the declining morale of the Batista regime and of the armed 

forces in particular. 

The regime was further weakened when several institutions 

and sectors of Cuban society began a progressive withdrawal of 

their support. The church, professional and business groups, 

and the press exerted pressure on the government to allow a 

peaceful solution. At first they advocated free elections with 

absolute guarantees for all political parties, but the rigged election of November 1958, in which Batista's hand-picked candi63 
Cuba: A Country Study 

date, Andres Rivero Aguero, won the presidency for a new fouryear term, convinced many that violence was the only means of 

eliminating Batista's rule. The army's refusal at the end of 1958 

to continue fighting dealt the final blow to a crumbling 

regIme. 

The Cuban Revolution, 1959­

Fidel Castro Takes Charge 

When Batista and his closest allies escaped to the Dominican 

Republic in the early hours ofJanuary 1, 1959, power lay in the 

streets. Of the several groups that fought the Batista regime, 

the Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement had an almost undisputed 

claim to fill the vacuum left by the dictator. Castro's charisma 

and his revolutionary prestige made him, in the eyes of the 

Cuban people, the logical occupant of Batista's vacant chair; he 

was the man of the hour, the new messiah. The other insurrectionary organizations lacked the mystique, the widespread support, and the organized cadres of Castro's movement. 

Castro had unquestionable qualities of leadership. Endowed 

with an extraordinary gift of oratory and an exceptional memory, he would speak extemporaneously for hours. Like Marti 

had done years earlier, Castro lectured the Cubans on the evils 

of their society and the need for profound and rapid changes. 

The overwhelming majority of the Cubans accepted his leadership enthusiastically. The atmosphere of gloom that had prevailed during the Batista era was now converted into euphoria 

and hope for the future. Even those who had failed to participate in the anti-Batista struggle fervently joined the revolutionary ranks with a feeling of guilt for their past behavior. 

During the first few weeks in power, Castro assumed no official position except commander of the armed forces. His handpicked president, former Judge Manuel Urrutia, organized a 

government, appointing a civilian cabinet composed mainly of 

prominent anti-Batista political figures. Urrutia then proceeded to tear down Batista's governmental structure. 

It soon became clear, however, that real power lay with Fidel 

and his youthful Rebel Army officers. In public addresses, Castro announced major public policies without consultation with 

the Urrutia cabinet and complained of the slowness of 

reforms. In mid-February, Prime MinisterJose Miro Cardona 

resigned in favor of Castro, and by October Castro had forced 

Urrutia to resign and had replaced him with Oswaldo Dorticos 

64 
Four Batista men (among seventy-one executed the next day) on 

summary trial on Sunday, January 11, 1959, with Rebel Army 

membeTs in the audience 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

Torrado (president, 1959-76), an obscure lawyer and former 

communist party member. 

Fidel Castro's formal assumption of power initiated a period 

of increased radicalization. Some of Batista's more prominent 

military and civilian leaders were immediately and publicly 

brought to trial before revolutionary tribunals, and the proceedings were televised; hundreds were executed summarily. 

Faced with mounting criticism, the regime ended these public 

trials but continued them in private, while also confiscating 

property of Batista supporters or collaborators. 

On May 17, 1959, the first Agrarian Reform Law was passed. 

It required expropriation of farm lands larger than 404 hectares and forbade land ownership by foreigners. The law, 

together with a sharp reduction in urban rents, marked the 

beginning of the rapid confiscatory phase of the Revolution, 

65 
Cuba: A Country Study 

which lasted until the formal establishment of the socialist 

economy in April 1961, when Castro proclaimed that the Revolution was socialist. The revolutionary leadership aimed at agricultural diversification and industrialization, thus hoping to 

lessen dependence upon sugar. They also sought to weaken 

United States economic presence and influence in Cuba by 

confiscating foreign and domestic enterprises. Natural 

resources, utility companies, the credit system, and most large 

and medium industries fell into the hands of the government. 

As a result of these actions and the Agrarian Reform Law, the 

upper classes were wiped out, and middle-class families lost 

most of their income-producing property. Many emigrated, 

particularly to the United States, or were absorbed into the 

larger proletariat created by the Revolution. A gradual takeover of the mass communication media and the educational 

system also took place, and both became powerful tools of the 

state apparatus. In addition, the government initiated a program of low-income housing and a massive literacy campaign, 

which, according to official claims, has wiped out the 30 percent illiteracy rate that existed prior to the Revolution. 

New equal educational and employment opportunities 

offered to women had the effect of undermining the family, 

one of the most important conservers of the old order. Relations between husband and wife were undermined, and the 

family largely lost control of the children. Large numbers of 

children attended free boarding schools and saw their parents 

for only short periods of time during the year. There was, 

therefore, not only frequent separation of husband and wife 

because of the work demands of the Revolution, but also separation of parents from children (see The Family Institution, ch. 

2). The regime systematically encouraged these developments, 

perhaps aware that the only way to develop Cuba's new socialist 

man was through the destruction of culture-transmitting institutions, such as the family and the church. During the 1960s, 

the Castro government sharply curtailed the power and influence of the church (see The Roman Catholic Church, ch. 2). 

In February 1960, the regime created a Central Planning 

Board Qunta Central de Planificaci6n-Juceplan) to plan and 

direct the country's economic development. For the most part, 

the board adopted the organizational models followed by East 

European countries and transformed Cuba's private enterprise 

system into a centralized state-controlled economy. The transformation resulted in disorganization, bureaucratic chaos, inef66 
Historical Setting 

ficiency, and growing shortages. Agricultural production 

declined sharply, partly as a result of neglect and Castro's plan 

for industrialization, and by 1961 food rationing was introduced for the first time in Cuba's history. 

The growing radicalization of the regime was accompanied 

by the destruction of possible opposition and by the growth in 

influence of the PSP. Political parties were not permitted to 

function, with the exception of the communist PSP, which later 

merged with Castro's own Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement and 

adopted the party's original name, the PCC. Abetted by Castro, 

communists progressively occupied important positions in the 

government, gaining in prestige and influence. As a result, 

former Castro allies became disenchanted with the Revolution, 

believing that Castro had betrayed the ideals that he espoused 

while in the mountains. 

Evidently, Castro saw significant advantages in using the PSP. 

The party provided the trained, disciplined, and organized 

cadres that Castro's movement lacked. But more importantly, 

the party had Moscow's ear, and therefore could serve as the 

bridge for any possible Cuban-Soviet rapprochement. Castro 

knew well that as he developed an anti-American revolution 

and insisted on remaining in power, a conflict with the United 

States would ensue. Only the protective umbrella of the Soviet 

Union could defend him against possible United States pressures or attack. No other power, Castro reasoned, could or 

would confront the United States over Cuba. 

Ideologically, Fidel Castro was far from being a Marxist. 

Although strongly influenced by Falangist and fascist ideas 

while a high school student, and by Marxist ideas while at the 

University of Havana, Castro embraced none of these ideologies and was instead more a product of the Marti-Chibas tradition, although he broke with it in several fundamental respects. 

Whereas Marti and Chibas had envisioned reforms in a democratic framework in a nation politically and economically independent of the United States, they both advocated friendly 

relations with the "northern colossus." Castro did not. He had 

been anti-United States since his student days, when he distributed anti-United States propaganda in Bogota, Colombia, in 

1948. Perhaps because of his anti-North Americanism, and particularly his conviction that a major revolution with himself in 

absolute control could not be undertaken within Cuba's political framework and in harmony with the United States, Castro 

broke with the Marti-Chibas tradition. 

67 
tage and raids carried out aga

Cuban exiles operating from U

Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, an

political, social, and economic 

their Revolution in Cuba existe

ica and that revolutions woul

nent. From 1960 onward, C

representatives established con

in the area and began distributi

Cuban diplomats were expelled 

affairs of the countries to whic

sions mounted between the Un

tro's assertion of the internatio

increased, as did his involvem

Latin America. ByJuly 1960, Ca

convert "the cordillera of the A

Latin America," and money, pr

began to flow from Havana in 

the "antiimperialist" revolution. 

.. The radicalization of the Re

of relations with the United S

Soviet rapprochement. During 

Havana of Soviet Deputy Pre

68 
Cuban governm.ent officials, including Ernesto "Clle" Guevara, 


Rmil Castro, Fidel Castro, and President Osvaldo DOTtitos 


TOTmdo, lead the iVIay Day jJarade, j\I[ay 1, 1961. 


CouTteS)' National hnagel), and lVIajJjJing Agenc)" Washington 


signed a major commercial agreement with the Soviet Union. 

The agreement provided that Cuba would receive, among 

other products, Soviet oil in exchange for sugar. Formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 

May 8, ] 960. That April and May, the Cuban government 

nationalized major foreign businesses, including the transportation, banking, communications, and educational systems and 

the media. On June 28, the Castro regime confiscated United 

States-owned oil refineries without compensation. On July 26, 

Castro issued the "Declaration of Havana," claiming Cuba's 

right to export revolution and calling for Soviet support. 

Nationalization of United States- and other foreign-owned 

property in Cuba began on August 6. And on October 13, the 

Castro government expropriated most Cuban-owned businesses. In October the United States announced an embargo 

on most exports to Cuba, and when Castro restricted the staff 

of the United States embassy to eleven persons, the United 

69 
Cuba: A Country Study 

States, on January 3,1961, severed diplomatic relations and 

withdrew its ambassador. 

By then the United States had embarked on a more aggressive policy toward the Castro regime. Groups of Cuban exiles 

were being trained, under the supervision of United States officials, in Central American camps for an attack on Cuba. The 

internal situation on the island then seemed propitious for an 

attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime. Although Castro still 

counted on significant popular support, that support had progressively decreased. His own Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement 

was badly split on the issue of communism. Also, a substantial 

urban guerrilla movement existed throughout the island, composed of former Castro allies, Batista supporters, Catholic 

groups, and other elements that had been affected by the Revolution, and significant unrest was evident within the armed 

forces. 

The Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 17-19, 1961, was a tragedy 

of errors. Although the Cuban government did not know the 

date or the exact place where the exile forces would land, the 

fact that an invasion was in the offing was known both within 

and outside of Cuba. The weapons and ammunition that were 

to be used by the invading force were all placed in one ship, 

which was sunk the first day of the invasion. The site for the 

invasion was sparsely populated, surrounded by swamps, and 

offered little access to nearby mountains, where guerrilla operations could be carried out if the invasion failed. The invading 

forces could, therefore, all but discount any help from the 

nearby population. 

At the last minute, a confused and indecisive PresidentJohn 

F. Kennedy canceled some of the air raids by Cuban exiles that 

were intended to cripple Castro's air force. Perhaps trying to 

reassert his authority over the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA)-sponsored invasion, to stymie possible world reaction, or 

to appease the Soviets, Kennedy ordered no further United 

States involvement. 

The failure of the invasion and the brutal repression that followed smashed the entire Cuban underground. On the first 

day of the invasion, the regime arrested thousands of real and 

suspected oppositionists. The resistance never recovered from 

that blow. His regime strengthened and consolidated, Fidel 

Castro emerged victorious and boasted of having defeated a 

"Yankee-sponsored invasion." The disillusionment and frustration caused by the Bay of Pigs disaster among anti-Castro 

70 
Historical Setting 

forces, both inside and out of Cuba, prevented the growth of 

significant organized opposition. Meanwhile, United States 

prestige in Latin America and throughout the world sank to a 

low point. 

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States turned to 

other methods of dealing with Fidel Castro. It pursued a vigorous, although only partially successful, policy to isolate the 

Cuban regime and strangle it economically. The nation pressured its allies throughout the world to reduce their commerce 

with Cuba. In the Organization of American States (OAS-see 

Glossary), the United States forced the expulsion of Cuba by a 

slim majority in January 1962, and several countries broke diplomatic relations with the Castro regime at this time. In 1964, 

after Castro had increased subversive activities in Latin America and had moved fully into the socialist camp, the OAS voted 

to suspend trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba; except 

for Mexico, all countries that had not already done so severed 

relations. 

The single most important event accelerating Soviet military 

involvement in Cuba was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The failure of 

the United States to act decisively against Castro gave the Soviets some illusions about United States determination and interest in Cuba. The Kremlin leaders now perceived that further 

economic and even military involvement in Cuba would not 

entail any danger to the Soviet Union itself and would not seriously jeopardize United States-Soviet relations. This view was 

further reinforced by President Kennedy's apologetic attitude 

concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion and his generally weak performance during his summit meeting with Soviet Premier 

Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna inJune 1961. 

The Soviets moved swiftly. New trade and cultural agreements were signed, and increased economic and technical aid 

was sent to Cuba. By mid-1962 the Soviets had embarked on a 

dangerous gamble by surreptitiously introducing nuclear missiles and bombers into the island. Through these actions, 

Khrushchev and the Kremlin leadership hoped to alter the balance of power and force the United States to accept a settlement of the German issue. A secondary and perhaps less 

important motivation was to extend to Cuba the Soviet nuclear 

umbrella and thus protect Castro from any further hostile 

actions by the United States. 

On October 22,1962, President Kennedy publicly reacted to 

the Soviet challenge, instituting a naval blockade of the island 

71 
Cuba: A Country Study 

and demanding the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from 

Cuba. For the next several days, the world teetered on the 

brink of nuclear holocaust. 

Finally, after a hectic exchange of correspondence, Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles and bombers, and to 

allow unsupervised inspection of the removal in exchange for 

the United States' pledge not to invade Cuba. Although Castro 

refused to allow a United Nations inspection, the missiles and 

bombers were removed under United States aerial surveillance, and the crisis ended. The United States has never publicly acknowledged that it pledged not to invade Cuba, but 

subsequent United States policies indicate that a United StatesSoviet understanding was reached over Cuba that included a 

United States "hands off' policy toward the island. 

The missile crisis had a significant impact on the countries 

involved. Although it led to a thaw in United States-Soviet relations, it significantly strained Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro 

was not consulted throughout the negotiations between 

Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the unilateral Soviet withdrawal 

of the missiles and bombers wounded Castro's pride and prestige. It was a humiliating experience for the Cuban leader, who 

was relegated throughout the crisis to a mere pawn on the 

chessboard of international politics. Castro defiantly rejected 

the United States-Soviet understanding and publicly questioned Soviet willingness and determination to defend the Revolution. 

Mter the missile crisis, Fidel Castro increased contacts with 

communist China, exploiting the Sino-Soviet dispute and proclaiming his intention of remaining neutral and maintaining 

fraternal relations with all socialist states. Cuba also signed various trade and cultural agreements with Beijing, and Castro 

grew increasingly friendly toward the Chinese, praising their 

more militant revolutionary posture. He also defied the Soviets, as he joined the Chinese in refusing to sign the Nuclear 

Test Ban Treaty (1963). All of this maneuvering somewhat 

increased Castro's leverage with the Soviets and gained him 

more assistance. 

The Chinese honeymoon was short-lived, however. In 1966 

Fidel Castro blasted the Chinese for reducing rice shipments to 

Cuba below the quantities that Castro alleged had been agreed 

on between the two countries. He described Mao Tse-tung's 

ideological statements as lightweight, called for the creation of 

a "council of elders" to prevent aged leaders from "putting 

72 
A medium-range ballistic missile site in San Cristobal, Pinal' del Rio 

Province, on October 23, 1962 

The S'oviet cargo vessel Anosov, carl)'ing eight missile transporters 

with canvas-covered missiles, departs Cuba on N(rocllliJer 7, 1962. 

Courtesy National Imagery and NlajJPing Ageru)" Washington 

73 
Cuba: A Country Study 

their whims into effect when senility has taken hold of them," 

and threatened to handle Chinese diplomats the same way "we 

handle the American Embassy." By then Castro had also 

become disappointed with China's attitude toward Vietnam 

and by its propaganda efforts to sway Cubans to its side in the 

Sino-Soviet conflict. Castro's insistence on absolute control of 

the revolutionary movement in Latin America and his awareness of China's limitations in supplying Cuba's economic needs 

were further key factors in the cooling of the friendship 

between the two nations. Subsequently, relations became more 

cordial, but never reached the closeness achieved before 1966 

(see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization 

Revolutionary Adventurism 

The principal area of Soviet-Cuban conflict in the early 

1960s was Fidel Castro's revolutionary ventures in Latin America, beginning with his attempt in 1963 to subvert and overthrow the Venezuelan government and his guerrilla operations 

in Guatemala and Bolivia. Castro's attempts at revolution all 

ended in disaster, however. His failures weakened his leverage 

with the Soviets, increased Soviet influence with Cuba, and 

forced him to look inward to improve his faltering economy. 

In the early 1970s, Castro's speeches played down the notion 

of Latin American revolution; Castro had come to recognize 

that there were "different roads to power." Although not completely renouncing his original goal of exporting his own 

brand of communism, he became more selective in furnishing 

Cuban support. 

The overthrow of the Salvador Allende Gossens regime in 

Chile in September 1973, however, marked a turning point for 

the Cuban-inspired revolutionary struggle in Latin America. 

The Cuban leadership examined its strategy and tactics in the 

area and concluded that the way to power in Latin America was 

not through ballots but through bullets. Beginning in the mid1970s, Castro increased his support to select groups, particularly in Central America, providing them with propaganda 

material, training, advisers, financial help, and ultimately weapons. An acceleration of the revolutionary armed struggle in the 

area followed. 

The acceleration coincided with the United States debacle 

in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. The inability of United 

74 
Historical Setting 

States administrations to respond swiftly and decisively to conditions in Central America, as well as in other parts of the 

world, and to the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Mrica, emboldened the Cuban leader. More than 40,000 Cuban troops, supported by Soviet equipment, were transferred to Mrica in 

order to bring to power communist regimes in Angola and 

Ethiopia. 

Encouraged by Cuban-Soviet victories in Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro regime focused its attention on the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Nicaragua. Cuba, together with Panama 

and Venezuela, increased support to the Sandinista National 

Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n NacionalFSLN) , the principal guerrilla group opposing the Anastasio 

Somoza regime. In July 1979, Somoza fled and the FSLN rode 

victorious into Managua. 

The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua stands as an imposing 

monument to Cuban strategy and ambitions in the hemisphere. The overthrow of Somoza gave the Castro line its most 

important boost in two decades. It vindicated, although belatedly, Castro's ideological insistence on violence and guerrilla 

warfare as the correct strategy to attain power in Latin America. Castro's long-held belief that the political, social, and economic conditions that had produced the Revolution in Cuba 

existed or could be created in other parts of Latin America, 

and that revolution would occur throughout the continent, 

seemed at last justified. 

From that time on, the tempo of Cuban-supported violence 

accelerated in Central America. Aided by an extensive network 

of intelligence, military forces, and sophisticated propaganda 

machinery, the Cuban government increased its support to various groups in the area. In cooperation with Sandinista leaders, 

Cuba aided insurgent groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Colombia. Castro's commitment to revolutionary violence had 

been reinforced once again, showing convincingly that the 

Cuban leadership was willing to seize opportunities and take 

risks to expand its influence and power. 

Cuban-Soviet Rapprochement 

By the late 1960s, the Cuban economy was plagued by low 

productivity, mismanagement, poor planning, and shortages of 

almost every item (see Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). Structural shortcomings seemed more entrenched than ever. The 

ills of the past were still there, with renewed vengeance. Long75 
Cuba: A Country Study 

term trade agreements with the Soviets were perpetuating 

Cuba's role as a sugar producer, forcing the country to abandon indefinitely any plans for significant diversification and 

industrialization. Trade continued with one large industrialized nation, whose commercial policies reminded Castro of 

those pursued by Cuba's previous trading partner, the United 

States. Cuba's foreign debt also reached alarming proportions 

without significant improvements in the island's ability to save 

foreign exchange. The unemployment of the pre-Castro era 

gave way to a new type of unemployment in the form of poor 

labor productivity, absenteeism, and an ineffective and overstaffed bureaucracy. In response to the situation, the regime 

resorted to coercive methods to ensure a labor supply for critical agricultural tasks. The living standard ofCubans also deteriorated, as high capital accumulation was given first priority 

over consumer goods. 

In its second decade, the Cuban Revolution faced critical 

problems. Internally, mounting economic difficulties inspired 

a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation in 

the hope of stimulating productivity. One result was the 

expanded influence of the military in society, and its increasingly important role in both economic and political life. The 

party, which had remained weak and ineffective throughout 

the 1960s, was enlarged and strengthened its efforts to spread 

its influence throughout society. Meanwhile, the regime continued to pursue its aim of transforming Cuba in accordance 

with a new set of values and with the ultimate end of creating a 

new socialist citizen. Externally, the Cuban leadership 

attempted to break out of its isolation in Latin America, 

became selective in its support of revolutionary movements in 

the area, moved even closer to the Soviet Union, increased its 

influence on the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary), and 

embarked on a series of successful military interventions, primarily on the Mrican continent. 

Although past Cuban-Soviet relations had been punctuated 

by frequent instances of Castro's insubordination and attempts 

to assert his independence, in mid-1968 relations entered a 

period of close collaboration and friendliness. A turning point 

occurred in August 1968, when Castro supported the Soviet 

invasion of Czechoslovakia, a response dictated primarily by 

political and economic considerations. 

In the" early 1970s, Soviet military and economic aid 

increased substantially, arid Cuba moved closer to the Soviet 

76 
Soviet rochet-launch vehicles in the/ourth anniversary jJaracie 

in H(wana on1anuary 2, 1963 

Courtesy National Imagel)1 and JVIapping AgenGy, Washington 

Union, becoming in 1972 a member of the Council for Mutual 

Economic Assistance (CMEA; also known as Comecon-see 

Glossary). The result was greater direct Soviet influence on the 

island. During this period, Soviet technicians became extensively involved in managerial and planning activities at the 

national level. The total number of Soviet military and technical advisers increased considerably, and numerous economic 

advisers arrived. Of special significance were long-term agreements between Cuba and the Soviet Union that geared the 

Cuban economy to the Soviet economic plans. A new InterGovernmental Coordinating Committee was also established, 

giving the Kremlin considerable leverage over Cuban developments. 

Institutionalization 

In an attempt to increase economic efficiency and in line 

with Soviet objectives, the PCC was expanded and strengthened in the 1970s. The aim was greater party conformity to the 

needs of a socialist society, with principal emphasis on a higher 

77 
Cuba: A Country Study 

level of ideological training and the acquisition of specialized 

knowledge by party members. 

During the early period, the party remained small, disorganized, and relegated to a secondary position vis-a-vis the military. It lacked a clear and defined role. Internal leadership and 

coordination remained poor, and meetings were few and of 

questionable value. Evidently, Castro saw little need for a welldeveloped party structure, which would have reduced or at 

least rivaled his style of personalista (personalism-see Glossary) 

leadership. Conflict between old-guard communists and 

Fidelistas also created tension and prevented the development 

of a strong organization. Competition from the military or the 

bureaucracy took the best talents away from the party. These 

cadres saw better opportunities for advancement in those other 

sectors than in a party riddled with factionalism and not 

warmly supported by the lider maximo (maximum leader). 

The decade of the 1970s was one of expansion and consolidation for the party. During the first half of the decade, membership expanded from some 55,000 in 1969 to 202,807 at the 

time of the First Party Congress in 1975. During the second 

half, the rapid rate of expansion slowed down somewhat. By 

the time of the Second Party Congress in 1980, there were 

fewer than 400,000 members and candidates. At the Third 

Party Congress (1986), Castro disclosed that full members and 

candidates numbered 482,000. 

The First Party Congress was a watershed in legitimizing the 

position of the party as the guiding and controlling force in 

society. It reassured the Soviet Union of Cuba's loyalty and 

friendship, extolling the Soviets' continuous military and economic aid to the Cuban Revolution, and rehabilitated oldguard communists, some of whom had been mistrusted and 

persecuted by the Castroites. The Congress also expanded the 

party's Central Committee from ninety-one to 112 members, 

increased the Political Bureau from eight to thirteen members, 

and maintained the Secretariat at eleven members, with Fidel 

Castro and Raul Castro as first and second secretaries, respectively. 

In his report to the Congress in 1975, Fidel Castro attempted 

to reconcile the adoption of Soviet-style institutions on the 

island with a renewed emphasis on nationalism and on the historical roots of the Cuban Revolution. He emphasized that 

Cuban socialism was the culmination of a struggle against 

Spanish colonialism and United States neocolonial involve78 
Historical Setting 

ment in Cuban affairs. With total disregard for Marti's ideas, 

Castro linked the Cuban independence leader with Lenin in 

order to justify Cuba's move into the communist camp. The 

Congress adopted a Five-Year Plan, calling for closer economic 

integration with the Soviet Union and an economic system 

modeled on other socialist states. The approval of the party's 

platform stressing "Marxist-Leninist principles and the leading 

role of the party" was further evidence of the impact of Sovietstyle orthodoxy on the island. 

Of paramount importance was the adoption of Cuba's first 

socialist constitution, which was approved by a 97.7 percent 

majority in a popular referendum in early 1976. Modeled on 

other communist constitutions, the Cuban document recognizes the party as "the highest leading force in state and society" and defines the function of mass organizations, such as the 

Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comite de 

Defensa de la Revoluci6n-CDR) and the Federation ofCuban 

Women (Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas-FMC). It divided 

the island into fourteen new provinces instead of the six old 

ones. 

The Unchanging Revolution, 1980-89 

In the early 1980s, the Cuban Revolution reached a critical 

stage in its development. Persistent structural and managerial 

problems in the economy, low prices for Cuba's export products, and an inability to break away from economic dependence on the Soviet bloc forced a reexamination of basic goals. 

Because production in most key sectors had fallen short of 

expected targets, emphasis was placed on increased planning 

with more modest goals. The regime adopted Soviet economic 

methods, decreased emphasis on moral incentives, and 

attempted to create more efficient economic organizations. In 

the process, the Cubans suffered more austerity, with greater 

rationing offood and consumer goods, and, therefore, harder 

times. Life became increasingly more difficult: people faced 

long lines to obtain the most basic goods, the public transportation system was collapsing, and the education and health systems were deteriorating rapidly. In desperation, many Cubans 

fled the country, preferring to risk dying in the Straits of Florida on flimsy rafts rather than live in Castro's Cuba. 

The establishment of a Soviet-type, centrally planned economy burdened Cuba with a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy 

that stifled innovation, productivity, and efficiency. The island 

79 
Cuba: A Country Study 

continued its heavy reliance on sugar for development of the 

domestic economy and for foreign trade, and made little 

attempt to achieve agricultural diversification or industrialization. At the same time, Cuba relied on the Soviets for massive 

infusions of aid to meet minimal investment and consumption 

needs and depended almost entirely on Soviet oil exports for 

energy requirements. 

Popular expectations of rapid economic improvement were 

replaced by pessimism. There were signs of decreasing enthusiasm among Cuba's labor force and increasing signs of weariness with constant revolutionary exhortations. Underemployment was rampant, and labor productivity was at a low 

point. Absenteeism from the job place became common. 

Cubans stole from state enterprises and fed an already growing 

black market for food and goods. Graft and corruption became 

widespread as Cuban citizens rejected socialist morality and 

laws and struggled to survive on a daily basis. 

Yet this is only one side of the picture. It is in the nature of 

totalitarian regimes that the key question relates not to economics per se, but rather to the effects of economic factors 

upon the levers of political and social control. In an effort to 

increase productivity and forestall any further decline in revolutionary momentum, the regime increased the militarization 

and regimentation of society and institutionalized its rule by 

expanding the role and influence of the party throughout society. This progressive institutionalization contributed to the further stabilization of the system, while reducing its vulnerability 

to threats of external subversion and internal revolt. From an 

institutional standpoint, the regime appeared equipped to 

withstand the difficult years ahead. Fidel Castro was still dominant. He remained "the Revolution" and "the maximum 

leader." The evidence seemed to indicate that significant segments of the Cuban people continued to be attracted by his 

personalized style of government. Some regarded him as a protection against the state structures, resembling a traveling 

ombudsman ready to change or challenge policies of which he 

was the author. His lengthy speeches before huge throngs 

served both as a pedagogical device and as an instantaneous 

plebiscite. Despite some friction within the military after the 

United States invasion of Grenada in 1983 embarrassed the 

Cubans, Castro maintained absolute control of his government, with no other public figure in a position to challenge his 

undisputed authority. 

80 
Historical Setting 

The political elite's values, policy goals, and organizational 

interests were driven to reinforce Fidel Castro's political inclinations and policy preferences. The hard foreign policy objectives of this group were maintaining Cuba's independence 

from, and opposition to, the United States; actively supporting 

revolutionary movements in Latin America; promoting 

national liberation and socialism in the developing world; 

acquiring influence and supportive allies among the developing world states; and securing maximum military, economic, 

and political commitments from the Soviet Union. 

In foreign affairs, the Cuban Revolution achieved significant 

successes. In the late 1970s, Fidel Castro emerged as the leader 

of the Nonaligned Movement. There he espoused four important themes for the future that became the cornerstone of 

Cuba's policy toward the developing world: support for violent 

revolutions; anticolonialism; an end to white supremacy in 

Mrica; and reduction of dependency on Western economies. 

These policies coincided with Soviet objectives and produced a 

convergence of Soviet and Cuban actions in the developing 

world. Castro's willingness to commit his Soviet-equipped, welltrained armed forces on the Mrican continent gained for Cuba 

much respect and admiration, but also created some fear 

among Mrican leaders. 

The Cuban leadership saw its support for revolution as an 

integral and critical part of Cuba's foreign policy. Helping leftist insurgents throughout the world was a revolutionary commitment, ensuring that these allies would come to Cuba's aid in 

times of need. But more important, worldwide revolution 

directed against the United States, the principal enemy of the 

Cuban Revolution, was used to divert United States attention 

and resources, and perhaps to restrain its policies and actions 

against the island. The ultimate goal was to ensure the survival 

of the Cuban Revolution and its leadership, the most important objective of Cuba's foreign policy. 

Armed struggle was fundamental to Fidel Castro's mystique 

as well as to the image that he projected onto the larger world 

stage, where he was determined to playa prominent role. 

Other revolutionary leaders might shed, in time, doctrinaire 

excesses in favor of the pragmatic pursuit of comfortable rule. 

Yet there is truly nothing in Castro's personal makeup to suggest that he would forsake the global floodlights and renounce 

his "internationalist" commitments. 

81 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Perhaps the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the establishment, albeit temporarily, of a Marxist regime in Grenada 

were Cuba's most important revolutionary achievements in the 

Western hemisphere. Although the overthrow of the Somoza 

regime in Nicaragua was as much the result of internal opposition as of external aid, Cuba claimed a joint effort with Venezuela and Panama in bringing down the Somoza dynasty. For 

Cuba, Nicaragua exemplified the vindication of the Cuban 

line, which had been emphasizing for years the need for violence and particularly guerrilla warfare to attain power in Latin 

America. 

The Sandinista victory gave new life to revolutionary violence in Central America, much of it supported by Cuba. Yet 

Cuba's support for insurgent groups in the area, particularly in 

El Salvador and Guatemala, was channeled increasingly 

through Nicaragua. Using Nicaragua or other third countries 

facilitated the flow of weapons, propaganda, and aid, while 

making the task of detection and resistance that much harder. 

Cuba also denied supporting revolutionary groups, thus weakening United States credibility and influence, while at the same 

time facilitating relations with more conservative governments 

in Latin America. Castro's willingness to come to the aid of the 

Argentine military regime during the Falklands War (1982) 

was a further indication of Cuba's pragmatic and opportunistic 

foreign policy. Throughout these maneuvers in Cuba's foreign 

policy, Castro remained closely tied to the Soviet Union. 

Although there were frictions between Castro and the Kremlin, 

the latter's influence and presence in Cuba were far more 

extensive than ever before. At the same time, solidarity with the 

Soviet Union remained a vital element of Cuba's foreign policy. 

Cuba's policies and actions in the international arena operated 

in the larger framework of Soviet objectives. Castro continued 

to pursue his own policies only as long as they did not clash 

with those of the Soviets. 

Uncomfortable as he felt in the embrace ofthe Russian bear, 

Castro's options were limited. Although relations with China 

improved from their nadir in 1967, the Chinese seemed unable 

or unwilling to take Cuba on as an expensive client. Beijing 

decried Castro's support of Moscow's policies as "revisionist," 

and the Chinese still remembered his denunciations of Mao in 

the late 1960s with bitterness and anger. 

Increased commercial ties with Canada, Western Europe, 

and Japan beckoned as a healthy development from Cuba's 

82 
Historical Setting 

standpoint. Yet the ability of these countries to absorb the 

island's sugar exports was limited, and Havana had scant cash 

reserves with which to purchase European andJapanese goods. 

Cuba's heavy economic commitment to the Soviet Union and 

the East European countries was an additional deterrent to a 

broadening of its trading partners, and United States pressures 

on Western allies tended to limit their willingness to trade with 

Cuba. 

To be sure, all of this could have enhanced the desire of the 

Castro regime to reduce its reliance on the Soviet Union and to 

reach some accommodation with the United States. Rapprochement with the United States could have led to a loosening of the embargo and even access to an important 

neighboring market, if the United States were willing to buy 

Cuban sugar. It could have bolstered Cuba's immediate security 

position and provided Castro with leverage in his dealings with 

the Soviet Union. United States recognition would have meant 

an important psychological victory for Castro. In Latin America, it would have been interpreted as a defeat for "Yankee 

imperialism" and as an acceptance of the Castro regime as a 

permanent, albeit irritating, phenomenon in the Caribbean. 

Cuban moves toward accommodation with the United States 

would have posed some major problems for the Kremlin. The 

Soviets were not averse to some amelioration in Cuban-United 

States tensions, especially if the result was to reduce Cuba's 

heavy demands for Soviet aid. The Kremlin was fearful, however, that ties with the West could foster a desire for increasing 

independence by other Soviet bloc members and lead to progressive internal liberalization, as the results of the West German efforts to establish diplomatic and trade relations with 

Eastern Europe showed. Although Cuba was not as critical to 

the Soviet Union as was Eastern Europe, a resumption of 

Cuba's relations with the United States and a significant weakening in Soviet-Cuban ties would have been seen as leading to 

the eventual subverting of the Revolution and the renunciation 

of membership in the "socialist camp." Moscow viewed Cuba's 

possible defection as a blow to its prestige and as damaging to 

the Soviet power posture vis-a.-vis the United States. 

Rapprochement with the United States would also have been 

fraught with danger and uncertainties for the Cuban leadership. It would have required a loosening of Cuba's military ties 

with the Soviet Union, the abandonment of visible support for 

violent revolutions in Latin America, and the withdrawal of 

83 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Cuban troops from Mrica and other parts of the world. These 

were conditions that Castro was not willing to accept. He perceived them as an attempt by the United States to isolate Cuba 

and strengthen anti-Castro forces within Cuba, thus posing a 

threat to the stability of his regime. Castro, therefore, was not 

able or willing to offer meaningful concessions that would be 

indispensable for United States-Cuban rapprochement. Negotiations proceeded, however, and ad hoc agreements were 

struck on some issues such as skyjacking and the Mariel 

Boatlift, which brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United 

States in 1980. 

Cuban-Soviet relations, for their part, also were beset with 

serious irritants. Moscow's claim to leadership of the "socialist 

bloc" and its interference in Cuba's internal affairs have 

clashed with the forces of Cuban nationalism. Given Castro's 

personality and past policies, his suspicion, if not dislike, of the 

Soviets, and his desire to playa leading role in world affairs, he 

remained an unstable and unpredictable Soviet ally. Yet in the 

1980s, Castro had no choice but to follow the Soviet lead, while 

attempting to emerge from his isolation in Latin America and 

improve Cuba's faltering economy. 

By the 1990s, Cuba's international relations revolved around 

seven main goals: the survival of the Castro Revolution; the 

internationalization of Castro's personal prestige and charisma, with a resulting increase in power and influence; the 

maintenance, until the collapse of communism, of a close alliance with the Soviet Union and its interests throughout the 

world; the preservation of an anti-United States posture in an 

attempt to weaken United States power and influence worldwide; the acquisition of influence and supportive allies among 

developing world states; the development of a "new international economic order"; and the continuous support of "movements of national liberation" in Asia, Mrica, the Middle East, 

and Latin America. The image of a nonaligned Cuba was 

repeatedly tarnished, however, by Castro's close partnership 

with the Soviets. His stature suffered as a result of his failure to 

condemn the Soviet invasion ofMghanistan in December 1979 

and to rally Latin American leaders to repudiate their foreign 

debt. 

The Cuban government has helped a broad range of "progressive forces," terrorist groups, and religious fanatics opposing the United States. Since the 1970s, however, the regime has 

been increasingly willing, despite its Marxist rhetoric, to estab84 
Historical Setting 

lish ties with conservative Latin American states. Clearly, ideology is not the sole factor shaping Cuba's external behavior. 

Cuban interest in developing such relations has been motivated by a desire to foster Cuban and, in the past, Soviet objectives, and to undermine United States interests in the area. 

Despite perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (political 

opening) in the Soviet Union and differences with Mikhail 

Gorbachev, Castro remained a close Soviet ally until the end of 

communism in 1991. Since the late 1960s, the relations 

between Havana and Moscow had taken the form of a progressively closer alliance. The incorporation ofCuba into the Soviet 

camp was evident not only in economic terms (Cuba was a 

member ofComecon and was heavily dependent on Soviet economic and military aid and trade) but also was clearly manifested in its model of government and its international 

behavior. Undoubtedly, Cuba was subservient in most cases to 

Soviet interests, but Havana had considerable leverage with 

Moscow, as well as some freedom to act and react in external 

affairs (especially in the Caribbean and Latin America in general) . 

Problems and Prospects in the Post-Soviet Era 

In the 1990s, Castro faced some of the old problems that had 

plagued the Cuban Revolution in the past, as well as new and 

critical challenges. Internally, there was growing evidence of 

disillusionment with the party's and Castro's exhortations. 

Absenteeism and youth apathy were increasing. Castro seemed 

to be losing the battle to create a new generation devoted to 

the party and to the Revolution. Despite more than forty years 

of education and indoctrination, the new socialist man was 

nowhere to be found. The loss of this generation represented, 

perhaps, the greatest challenge for the continuity of the Revolution. 

Economically, the Revolution was extremely weak. Persistent 

structural problems, low prices for Cuba's export products, and 

the inability to obtain aid from the Soviet Union forced yet 

another reexamination of basic goals. The deepening economic crisis, aggravated by the collapse of communism not 

only in the Soviet Union, but also in Eastern Europe, produced 

a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation, in 

the hope of stimulating productivity. Rejecting perestroika and 

glasnost, Castro returned to the failed path of the past, insisting that the Cubans should work harder, sacrifice more, and 

85 
Cuba: A Country Study 

expect less in the years ahead. Among the populace, pessimism 

and cynicism replaced revolutionary fervor. 

Mild overtures from Castro toward the United States and 

Cuba's deepening economic crisis encouraged those in the 

United States who believed it was time for a rapprochement 

with Cuba. In 1989 Castro tried and executed three high-ranking officers of the Ministry of Interior and Division General 

Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, former commander of Cuban troops 

in Mrica, accusing them of drug trafficking. The execution 

seemed more connected with the elimination of a potential 

rival than with drugs. Denying his or his brother's involvement 

with drugs, Castro called on the United States for cooperation 

in fighting the drug trade. As he had in the past, Castro was 

willing to negotiate and to cooperate with the United States on 

specific issues. 

Mired in economic crisis and without the support of his 

former benefactor, Castro braced for the difficult times ahead. 

Yet he was unwilling to budge and change the Marxist course 

he had set for his Revolution four decades earlier. 

Fearful that economic change could lead to political 

change, he rejected both. He remained committed to the cornerstones of his policies-a command economy, violent revolution, anti-North Americanism, "internationalism," and 

personal rule. Although his support for violent revolution and 

"internationalism"z was quite limited, Castro was unwilling to 

modifY or abandon the five cornerstones of his policies. 

* * * 

The study of Cuban history from colonial times to the 

present has produced a wealth of scholarly works both in Cuba 

and abroad. Multivolume histories and general histories of the 

island include Charles E. Chapman's A History of the Cuban 

Republic, Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez et alia's Historia de la naci6n 

cubana, Willis F.Johnson's The History of Cuba, Wyatt MacGaffey 

and Clifford R. Barnett's Cuba, Levi Marrero's Cuba, Louis A. 

Perez's Cuba, Fernando Portuondo del Prado's Historia de Cuba, 

Jaime Suchlicki's Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, and Hugh Thomas's Cuba: The Pursuit ofFreedom. 

The era of Spanish domination has produced an extensive 

and varied literature, including Gerardo Brown Castillo's Cuba 

colonial, Jose M. Carbonell y Rivero's eighteen-volume Evoluci6n 

de la cultura cubana, Richard B. Gray's Jose Marti: Cuban Patriot, 

86 
Historical Setting 

Pedro Jose Guitera's Historia de la Isla de Cuba, Kenneth T. 

Kiple's Blacks in Colonial Cuba, Allan]. Kuethe's Cuba, 1753­

1815, Manuel Moreno Fraginals's The Sugarmill, Medardo Vitier's Las ideas en Cuba, and Irene A. Wright's The Early History of 

Cuba, 1492-1586. The institution of slavery and the role of 

blacks in Cuba have been revisited in numerous studies, especially since the Castro Revolution, in such works as Arthur F. 

Corwin's Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 

and Franklin W. Knight's Slave Society in Cuba During the Nineteenth Century. 

The independence struggle and United States intervention 

are controversial subjects and have produced a vast literature. 

Since the Revolution, numerous studies have been published 

in Cuba highlighting the role of certain leaders in the wars, 

particularly Antonio Maceo, a mulatto general, and Marti, the 

father of Cuban independence. The Jose Marti National 

Library's Anuario del Centro de Estudios Martianos is the best 

guide to the extensive literature on Marti. Other useful sources 

include Jose Franco's three-volume Antonio Maceo, Herminio 

Portell-Vila's Historia de la Guerra de Cuba y los Estados Unidos contra Espana, Julius Pratt's Expansionists of 1898, and Miguel A. 

Varona Guerrero's La Guerra de Independencia de Cuba. 

The prerevolutionary period that lasted from 1902 until 

1959 produced an incisive and critical literature that examined 

the problems of nationhood and the development of the new 

nation. A few of the useful books include Luis E. Aguilar's 

Cuba, 1933: Prologue to Revolution; Raymond L. Buell's Problems 

of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs; Russel 

H. Fitzgibbon's Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935; Ramiro 

Guerra y Sanchez,Jose M. Cabrera,Juan]. Remos, and Emeterio S. Santovenia's Historia de la naci6n cubana; Allan Reed Millett's The Politics ofIntervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 

1906-1909; Lowry Nelson's Rural Cuba; Louis A. Perez's Army 

Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958; Robert F. Smith's Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba; Suchlicki's University 

Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968; Francis Adams 

Truslow's A Report on Cuba; and Medardo Vitier's Las ideas en 

Cuba. 

The Cuban Revolution generated a vast literature that 

focused originally on the causes of the Revolution, the nature 

of the leadership, and United States policy. Later on, studies 

addressed the nature of Castroism, Castro's alliance with the 

Soviets, Castro's internationalism, and the failings of Cuba's 

87 
Cuba: A Country Study 

economic model. A few of the useful books include those by 

Juan M. del Aguila's Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution; James G. 

Blight's and David A. Welch's On the Brink: Americans and Soviets 

Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis; Jorge 1. Dominguez's Cuba: 

Order and Revolution; Theodore Draper's Castroism: Theory and 

Practice; Raymond W. Duncan's The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence; Richard R. Fagen's The Transformation ofPolitical Culture in Cuba; Pamela Falk's Cuban Foreign Policy; Carlos 

Franqui's Diary of the Cuban Revolution; Georgie Anne Geyer's 

Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story ofFidel Castro; Edward Gonzalez's Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma; Maurice Halperin's The Rise and Decline ofFidel Castro; Cuban Communism, 

edited by Irving L. Horowitz and Suchlicki; HaynesJohnson's 

The Bay ofPigs; Revolutionary Change in Cuba, edited by Carmelo 

Mesa-Lago; Carlos Alberto Montaner's Fidel Castro and the 

Cuban Revolution; Andres Oppenheimer's Castro's Final Hour, 

Thomas G. Paterson's Contesting Castro; Marifeli Perez-Stable's 

The Cuban Revolution; Elizabeth Stone's Women and the Cuban 

Revolution; three volumes edited by Suchlicki: Cuba, Castro, and 

Revolution, Cuba in a Changing World, and The Cuban Military 

Under Castro; Szulc's Fidel: A Critical Portrait, and Peter Wyden's 

Bay ofPigs: The Untold Story. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

88 
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 
A view ofthe smoke-covered Havana skyline and the seaside highway (el 

Malecan), 1996 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 
CUBA CONFRONTS DAUNTING social issues in its fifth 

decade of socialist rule, despite having a fairly well-educated 

and healthy population and low fertility and mortality rates. 

Many of the widely praised social achievements of the 1970s 

and 1980s-in health, education, and social security-are no 

longer sustainable given the absence of Soviet subsidies and 

the poor performance of the economy. The health sector, 

severely battered by the economic crisis of the "special period 

in peacetime" (periodo especial en tiempo de paz; hereafter Special 

Period-see Glossary), and with some indicators suggesting 

worsening standards, lacks even the most elementary medical 

inputs and no longer delivers the services Cubans had come to 

expect. It is also burdened by a bloated staff of physicians, 

nurses, and other health personnel far too numerous for the 

country's needs. Similar difficulties are plaguing the education 

sector, where even pencils and notebooks are scarce. Cuba has 

far more teachers than it can use productively, its educational 

infrastructure is crumbling, and its study programs are poorly 

attuned to the needs of a country urgently needing to restructure its economy and become integrated into the world economy (see Performance of the Economy, ch. 3). 

To make matters worse, the financial resources needed to 

maintain the generous safety net developed since Fidel Castro 

Ruz (president, 1976- ) seized power in 1959 are simply not 

available. Pensions for early retirement and extensive unemployment programs-crucial national entitlements-are taxing 

the country's finances, while providing only miserly benefits. A 

rapidly aging population is adding to the onerous cost of these 

programs. Regardless of developments in the economy, low 

birth rates ensure that problems associated with the elderly 

population will intensify as the number of working-age Cubans 

relative to the elderly continues to decline. On the positive 

side, Cuba can count on a relatively well-trained work force and 

the fact that the number of children relative to the working-age 

population continues to decline further. (The relative decline 

in the number of children counterbalances the increasing 

dependency ratio as the proportion of elderly in the total population rises.) Under the proper economic incentives system, 

Cuban workers have the potential to become highly productive. 

91 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Cuba must also address worrisome environmental trends. 

Concern is most warranted in the agricultural sector, where 

widespread adoption of capital-intensive (see Glossary) methods, such as chemical inputs and mechanization; grandiose but 

often poorly conceived infrastructure development plans, such 

as dams and irrigation projects; and central planning (see Glossary) may have compromised the sustainable use of some of 

the country's soils. Cuba, however, is one of the few developing 

countries that has managed to reverse a long-term deforestation trend, although this achievement may now be threatened 

by the country's current inability to import lumber and cooking fuels. 

Because of the Special Period, economic and social initiatives have been implemented that are reversing a long-term 

commitment to maintaining the national income distribution 

within a narrow band. The free circulation of the dollar, the 

assigning of priority to foreign tourism, and policies designed 

to increase emigrant remittances are having a regressive effect 

on income distribution. Not all Cubans have ready access to 

dollars; most of those who do either have family members 

residing abroad or are employed in, or derive some benefit 

from, the tourism sector. Because relatively few black Cubans 

have emigrated, this particular social group suffers the brunt of 

the perverse income-distribution effects of remittances. So do 

those Cuban families, who, regardless of race, have no immediate relatives abroad, or whose wage earners are employed in 

state enterprises or in social sectors, such as health, in which 

the government has proscribed self-employment. The increasing number of visits by emigrants further contributes to the 

growing income differential trend and serves to highlight 

social disparities. In response to these conditions, social ills less 

visible in Cuba before the Special Period-such as prostitution, 

begging, and property and violent crimes-are on the rise. 

Mass organizations, although still a dominant feature of 

social life in Cuba, have lost much of their influence because of 

general apathy and disillusionment with Cuba's state of affairs. 

A religious revival is underway; many Cubans seem to want to 

fill a spiritual void. Participating in religious ceremonies, an 

activity no longer stigmatized, has become an important social 

safety valve inasmuch as doing so permits citizens to show discontent without fear of government retribution. Pope John 

Paul II's visit in January 1998 gave added legitimacy to religion 

92 
The Society and Its Environment 

as a valid component of Cuban life (see Religion and the State, 

ch.4). 

Physical and Natural Setting 

Principal Geographic Features 

The Cuban archipelago-two main islands plus 3,715 small 

and large keys and inlets-has a total land surface of 110,860 

square kilometers. It is nine times as large as Jamaica and 

twelve times the size of Puerto Rico. The westernmost of the 

Greater Antilles island chain, the Cuban archipelago is strategically located in the Atlantic Ocean, just below the Tropic of 

Cancer at geographic coordinates 21°30'N, 800 00'W, safeguarding the entrances to the Gulf of Mexico to the west and the 

Caribbean Sea to the south. Cuba lies seventy-seven kilometers 

west of Haiti, 140 kilometers north ofJamaica, 150 kilometers 

south of Key West, and 210 kilometers east of Mexico's Yucatan 

Peninsula. 

Cuba proper is a long and elongated island that accounts for 

94.67 percent of the country's land area, or 104,945 square 

kilometers. The island is 1,250 kilometers in length from east 

to west and averages about 100 kilometers in width. Isla de la 

Juventud (formerly Isla de Pinos), the second largest land 

mass, located southwest of Cuba in the Golfo de Bataban6, has 

an area of 2,200 square kilometers, or 1.98 percent of the country's total. The remaining keys and inlets cover 3.35 percent of 

the national territory, or 3,715 square kilometers. The small 

keys and inlets are primarily clustered in five subarchipelagos, 

two of which are off the northern coast. The ArchipieIago de 

los Colorados (with about sixty keys and inlets) is off Pinar del 

Rio Province; and the ArchipieIago de Sabana and the Archipielago de Camagiiey (with about 400 keys and inlets) run 

along the northern center of the island. The most important 

archipelagos on the southern coast are the ArchipieIago de los 

Canarreos, which encompasses Isla de laJuventud and 300 

other keys and inlets; the Banco de 10sJardines andJardinillos 

keys, off the Zapata Swamp in central Cuba; and in eastern 

Cuba, in the Golfo de Guacanayabo, the Archipielago de los 

Jardines de la Reina. 

The Cuban coastline measures 5,746 kilometers. The north 

coast accounts for 3,209 kilometers, while the coastline of Isla 

de laJuventud has a length of 327 kilometers. Hundreds of 

kilometers of sandy beaches dot the Cuban archipelago, many 

93 
Cuba: A Country Study 

still in their natural state. Fossilized coral formations occupy 

about half of Cuba's coastline, while living coral reefs are found 

in adjacent waters-often extending for hundreds of kilometers. The coral reef along Cuba's northern coast is second in 

length in the world only to Australia's Great Barrier Reef. 

Many of Cuba's more than 200 bays, which have narrow 

entrances but ample inner areas, make some of the world's best 

harbors. Several of the country's many harbors, some with deep 

channels and horseshoe shapes, offer excellent protection 

from the fury of the seas. The most important harbors on the 

northern coast-from west to east-are Bahia Honda in Pinar 

del Rio Province; Bahia de Cabanas, Bahia del Mariel, and 

Bahia de La Habana in La Habana Province; Bahia de Matanzas in Matanzas Province; Bahia de Nuevitas in Camagiiey Province; Bahia de Puerto Padre in Las Tunas Province; and Puerto 

Gibara and Bahia de Nipe in Holguin Province. Major harbors 

on the southern coast-from east to west-are located at Bahia 

de Santiago in Santiago de Cuba Province and Cienfuegos in 

Cienfuegos Province. The only major deep-water ports are the 

bays of Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, 

and Santiago de Cuba. Although relatively small, Havana Bay 

(Bahia de La Habana) is the country's most heavily used harbor (see Transportation, ch. 3). 

Topography and Drainage 

Although it has three principal mountain ranges, the Cuban 

landscape is dominated by plains that cover approximately twothirds of the land surface and are, on average, 100 meters 

above sea level. The mountainous zones are isolated and separated by the extensive plains and flatlands. The elevation of the 

ranges is modest even by Caribbean standards. Only in eastern 

Cuba, in the provinces of Guant:anamo, Santiago de Cuba, and 

Granma, do mountain peaks exceed 1,200 meters above sea 

level. Several mountain ranges are found there, including the 

Sierra Maestra (along the southern coast), famous for harboring Fidel Castro and his guerrillas between December 1956 and 

January 1959 (see Background to Revolution, 1952-59, ch. 1). 

Cuba's tallest peak, the Pico Real del Turquino, at 1,974 

meters, is in the Sierra Maestra mountain chain (see fig. 2). 

Other important mountain chains in the northern section of 

this region are the Sierra de Nipe, Sierra de Nicaro, Sierra de 

Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toa. In central Cuba, to the south of 

the provinces of Cienfuegos and Sancti Spiritus, is the Sierra de 

94 
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Figure 2. TOj)ograj)hy and Drainage 
The Society and Its Environment 

Escambray chain. The tallest mountain in this chain, in the 

Sierra de Trinidad, is the Pico Sanjuan (also known as Pico La 

Cuca), at 1,156 meters. The third mountain range is in Pinar 

del Rio Province in western Cuba. With a modest elevation, the 

Cordillera de Guaniguanico includes the Sierra de los Organos 

and the Sierra del Rosario. The Pan de Guajaib6n, at 692 

meters, is the highest peak in this region. 

In between these mountain ranges are flatlands and coastal 

plains, many rich in clay. Some of Cuba's richest soils are found 

in the central provinces, whereas some of the poorest are in the 

eastern regions of the country, as well as in portions of Pinar 

del Rio, the westernmost province. Poor drainage is a serious 

problem in about 37 percent (or 4 million hectares) of the 

country's territory, with about 1 million hectares suffering 

from some degree of salinization. The latter problem is more 

severe in coastal areas exposed to seawater intrusions. According to a soil-quality typology developed with Soviet assistance, 

ofthe 6.6 million hectares (or 60.6 percent of the national land 

surface) of agricultural soils, approximately 12 percent (some 

800,000 hectares) consists of highly productive deep and permeable soils. A further 2.3 million hectares (35 percent) are 

lightly waterlogged soils, which can become productive if adequately drained. The productive potential of the remaining 

agricultural land is modest, with approximately 22 percent 

deemed to be marginal for agriculture. Many of the latter soils 

are easily ~roded and prone to salinization. 

In 1996, according to official Cuban statistics, 6,614,500 

hectares, or 60 percent of the total land area (11 million hectares), were used for agriculture, whether under permanent 

crops (2,767,100 hectares) or temporary crops (994.5 million 

hectares). Of the remaining noncultivated land, 21 percent (or 

2,311,000 hectares) was inpastures or fallow, and 25.7 percent 

(or 2,831,600 hectares) was forested. Human settlements 

accounted for 6.3 percent (or 694,000 hectares). Approximately 537,000 hectares, or 4.9 percent of the land surface, 

were classified as "unusable." 

Cuba has 632 hydrographic basins measuring more than five 

square kilometers, the most important being the Cauto, Zaza, 

and Sagua la Grande. Although the country has numerous rivers and streams, they tend to be short because of Cuba's narrow 

and elongated shape. The beds of many watercourses dry out 

for months at a time, except during the rainy season. Most rivers run from the central spine of the island to either the north97 
Cuba: A Country Study 

ern or the southern coast. The average length of the country's 

major rivers is ninety-three kilometers. The Cauto, which flows 

from the eastern mountains to the southern coast, is the country's longest, at 370 kilometers. Also among Cuba's longest rivers are several Cauto tributaries, including the Saldo (126 

kilometers), the Contramestre (ninety-six kilometers), the 

Bayamo (eighty-nine kilometers), and the Cautillo (eighty-four 

kilometers). Mter the Cauto, the next two longest rivers are in 

central Cuba. The Sagua la Grande, with a northerly flow and a 

length of 163 kilometers, is the country's second longest, followed by the southern-flowing Zaza (155 kilometers). The 

Almendares, the best-known watercourse in the capital city of 

Havana (La Habana; hereafter, Havana), is only fifty-two kilometers long. 

Natural lagoons and other still-water bodies are small and 

few in number. Laguna de la Leche (6,700 hectares) and 

Laguna de Barbacoa (1,900 hectares) are the most prominent 

saltwater lagoons; the two most important freshwater lakes are 

the Ariguanabo and Laguna del Tesoro, each with a surface 

area of approximately 900 hectares. Since the 1960s, a considerable number of man-made reservoirs (embalses) have been 

built; they numbered nearly 200 large dams and SOO minidams 

by the early 1990s. Natural and artificial water bodies account 

for about 3 percent of the country's land surface, or some 

330,000 hectares. 

Climate and Precipitation 

Cuba's tropical climate is warm and humid. Annual mean 

temperatures vary within a narrow range of 24°C to 27°C, but 

average 25°C. Annual monthly mean temperatures in different 

regions of the country fluctuate between 4.SoC and 6.SoC.January, the coldest month, has an average temperature of 22.5°C, 

and August, the warmest month, has an average temperature 

of 27.SoC. Average monthly temperatures in Havana range 

from 27°C in July and August to 22°C in January and February; 

the annual average is 24.5"C. Fluctuations in regional temperatures are primarily determined by elevation, although the 

Caribbean Sea's moderating influence is also an important factor. The maximum temperature ever recorded was 40°C. At the 

other extreme, temperatures as low as 1°C to 2°C have been 

noted on the country's highest mountain peak. During the dry 

season, temperatures moderate somewhat, especially in the 

west, as alternate cold and warm fronts dominated by the 

98 
The Rio Yumurl, Guantana

Courtesy National Imagery 

Courtesy Danielle Hayes, Unite
Cuba: A Country Study 

arrival of dry Arctic masses descend on Cuba and collide with 

warm southern winds. The average relative humidity is 81 percent. 

On average, Cuba receives about 1,400 millimeters of rainfall a year, although the amount of rainfall from year to year 

can vary greatly. Two well-established dry and rainy seasons 

characterize Cuba's climate. During the dry season, from 

December to April, the country receives, on average, between 

thirty-two and ninety-nine millimeters of rainfall a month. 

Because of the alternating pattern of cold and warm fronts, 

Cuba is prone to receive considerable amounts of rainfall even 

during the dry season. 

The rainy season runs from May through November, during 

which the amount of rainfall increases to between 200 and 260 

millimeters per month. Annual and seasonal variations in rainfall amount are influenced by the frequency and severity of 

hurricanes. Because ofits tropical location, Cuba is hit periodically by different kinds of storms, especially hurricanes, some 

with winds of more than 200 kilometers an hour and heavy 

rains of up to 300 millimeters in a twenty-four-hour period. 

Hurricane season lasts from July to November. September and 

October are the months of the most frequent storms. 

Throughout the island, precipitation levels increase from 

the coast to inland locations because the volume of precipitation is influenced by elevation. As a general rule, the drier 

areas are on the southern coast. The Moa-Toa-Baracoa region 

in northeastern Cuba receives the most rainfall (an annual 

average of 3,000 millimeters), whereas the least amount of rain 

falls in the semidesert cactus-scrub belt of Guantanamo Province (600 millimeters), a region on the southern coast just 

below this mountain range. 

Environmental Trends 

Cuba's environmental record over the last forty years is 

mixed. The country has avoided some ecological calamities, 

such as beach erosion, that have left deep scars in other Caribbean and Central American neighboring countries, while managing to partially reverse others, such as deforestation. There is 

mounting evidence, however, that some of the economic development policies pursued under socialist rule, mostly when the 

country was the recipient of Soviet subsidies, may have exacerbated certain environmental problems, most of all in agriculture. Agricultural development was predicated on the large100 
The Society and Its Environment 

scale use of mechanical and chemical inputs that, when poorly 

managed, particularly in tropical countries, can damage natural ecosystems. The widespread use of fuel-inefficient vehicles 

and industrial equipment imported from the former socialist 

world and excessive reliance on subsidized, cheap imported 

fuel also has had adverse environmental consequences. 

Economic Policy and Regulatory Environment 

Until recently, the regulatory framework for environmental 

protection in Cuba, as in most other countries, was weak and 

poorly articulated. Although some environmental regulations 

had been implemented before the socialist revolution, they 

were largely ignored and seldom enforced. In most respects, 

this situation did not change appreciably after 1959, although 

the 1976 constitution, amended in 1992, incorporates the modern notion of sustainable development (see Glossary) and 

makes explicit the right of the state and its citizens to protect 

the environment. Cuba enacted a comprehensive environmental law (Law 33) in 1981. 

Decree-Law 118 was adopted in 1990. It allowed various 

agencies to establish a system to protect the environment 

called the National Commission for Environmental Protection 

and Conservation of Natural Resources (Comisi6n Nacional 

para la Protecci6n del Medio Ambiente y la Conservaci6n de 

los Recursos Naturales-Comarna). The system was chartered 

initially in 1977. Led by a scientific council composed ofrepresentatives of numerous national ministries and agencies, 

Comarna was empowered to chart environmental policies, 

study the causes of water and agricultural pollution, and assist 

with the development of plans to protect the environment and 

conserve natural resources. The agency was also tasked with 

reviewing the development plans of other government agencies and with suggesting measures to minimize adverse environmental impacts. Comarna, however, reportedly was dissolved in 

1994 and its functions transferred to the new Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment. 

In 1994, in the midst of a major economic crisis and following the 1992 Earth Summit (Eco-92) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 

a new Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment 

was created as part of a major reorganization of the national 

administrative apparatus. Its tasks include ensuring compliance 

with environmental law, conducting environmental impact 

assessments, making recommendations based on the assess101 
Cuba: A Country Study 

ment findings, assisting with the further development of a body 

of national environmental legislation, and forging closer links 

between scientific knowledge and environmental management. Cuba's current policy of making tourism a principal 

engine of national economic growth has given urgency to these 

tasks. 

In July 1997, a new environmental law approved by the 

National Assembly supplanted Decree-Law 118. A year later, 

the Forestry Law (Law 85) was approved. The intent of this law 

is to promote the sustainable development and effective protection of forest resources. In addition, Cuba has ratified most 

international environmental conventions. Enforcement of 

environmental laws has not kept pace, however, with the regulatory framework. The problem largely lies with the broad 

nature of regulations, the weakness of regulatory institutions, 

and the inability of these institutions to enforce their authority 

over other economic sectors that had been expected to regulate themselves and had been granted much discretion within 

the dictates of a command economy. The underlying but faulty 

ideological assumption is that in a socialist economy (devoid of 

the profit motive) state agents would by definition protect the 

environment. A highly centralized and regimented economic 

decision-making approach has also been a leading cause of 

Cuba's environmental deterioration over the last several 

decades. 

Land Use 

Socialist policies substantially altered land-use patterns in 

Cuba. The most notable change was an expansion in cultivated 

land at the expense of pastures, and a sizable increase in the 

amount of forested land. The former was achieved by bringing 

under the plow formerly nonagricultural land that prior to 

1959 had been held in reserve by large sugar mills or because it 

was agriculturally marginal. Forest growth was achieved 

through an aggressive reforestation program. Urban land use 

changed as well through policies designed to slow down the 

demographic growth of Havana and promote the growth of 

secondary cities and towns. Another factor was the creation of 

approximately 335 new towns in agricultural regions. 

The establishment of new rural communities was associated 

with the implementation of an agricultural development 

model dependent on the establishment of large-scale state 

farms and agricultural cooperatives. The new communities 

102 
The Society and Its Environment 

were to facilitate capital-intensive agriculture by concentrating 

dispersed rural populations, thus allowing the unimpeded use 

of agricultural tractors and combines in large and contiguous 

fields. They also facilitated the provision of social and educational services to families living in close proximity to each 

other. Incentives and disincentives were used to encourage 

small private landowners to settle in these communities. Those 

willing to cede their farms to the state and relocate to these 

communities had access to modern housing and social services; those refusing to do so were provided with only limited 

access to agricultural inputs. In some instances during the 

1960s, peasants were forcibly relocated to new communities to 

deny a base of support to armed guerrilla bands opposing the 

government (the best known instance is that of the Escambray 

mountain population relocated to Pinar del Rio Province in 

western Cuba). By 1987 Cuba was one of the socialist countries 

with the highest concentration of agricultural land in state 

farms (73 percent) and collective farms (12.5 percent), with 

the former averaging 14,260 hectares, or seven times larger 

than the average prerevolutionary latifundio (see Glossary). 

The agricultural land concentration trend began to be 

reversed in the early 1990s, when, in an attempt to cope with 

the economic consequences of the Special Period, policies 

were implemented to provide more economic incentives to the 

peasantry to increase agricultural production, but, thus far, 

with only limited success. A new type of agricultural cooperative was introduced, the Basic Units of Cooperative Production 

(Unidades Basicas de Producci6n Cooperativa-UBPC; see 

Agricultural Cooperatives, ch. 3). Members of these cooperatives do not own the land. Instead, they are granted use of the 

soil for indefinite time periods and limited control over what 

they produce, although the UBPCs continue to be tightly regulated by the state. By 1994, 2,643 UBPCs, occupying 3 million 

hectares, had been established throughout Cuba. With an average size of 1,133 hectares, they were eleven times smaller than 

former state farms. Other measures introduced to increase 

agricultural production have also contributed to the reversal in 

land concentration. For example, several thousand families 

have been provided with small individual farms to produce 

tobacco, coffee, and dairy products. 

Agriculture 

Between 1945 (the date of the last and only prerevolutionary 

103 
Cuba: A Country Study 

agricultural census) and 1989, the country's agricultural land 

area increased by 1.3 million hectares, from 2 million to 3.3 

million hectares. Two-thirds of the additional cultivated land 

was devoted to sugarcane; the amount of land planted with 

other priority crops, such as citrus and rice, also rose significantly. The emphasis on sugar production (and citrus) was consistent with Cuba's assigned role within the Council for Mutual 

Economic Assistance (Comecon-see Glossary), the socialist 

trading bloc, as primarily a producer of agricultural commodities. In turn, these commodities were exchanged for other agricultural and industrial supplies, as well as oil and other fuels, in 

commercial terms highly advantageous to Cuba. According to 

Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, the actual amount of agricultural 

land being used by tenancy totaled 6,614,600 hectares in 1997. 

In 1999, the term "desertification" began to be used for the 

first time in official circles to refer to the deterioration of soils 

in several regions of the country. In southern Pinar del Rio 

Province, independent sources (that is, nongovernmental) 

have alleged that desertification (caused by erosion and salinization) is expanding by 11 kilometers a year. AJanuary 2000 

report by Agencia Ambiental Cubana, a leading independent 

environmental group, whose leader, Eudel Cepero Varela, went 

into exile in 1999, describes the deterioration of Cuban soils as 

an "environmental catastrophe." 

As a result of excessive use of Soviet agricultural inputs, inadequate management of irrigation, costly improvements of soils 

ill-suited for agriculture, and poor soil conservation practices 

within the context of a command economy, the environmental 

situation in Cuba's agricultural sector appears to have deteriorated. Several soil degradation problems have attracted considerable attention. These include soil compaction (as a result of 

excessive use of heavy farm equipment) in many areas, salinization in others, and a plethora of other problems. Although not 

yet fully documented, there is evidence suggesting that in some 

regions of the country soils are chemically contaminated 

because of poorly regulated pesticide use. In the early 1990s, 

according to official figures, 4.2 million hectares were eroded 

to one degree or another, 1.6 million hectares had been damaged by compaction, 780,000 hectares were affected by salinization, 2.7 million hectares were poorly drained, and the 

productive potential of 1.1 million hectares had been reduced 

by acidification. The Cauto basin, which covers 301,700 hectares and is inhabited by about half a million people, has suf104 
The Society and Its Environment 

fered serious ecological damage, partly as a result of some of 

these agricultural practices and partly as a result of deforestation. 

As Cuba became a principal supplier of agricultural commodities to the Soviet bloc, it became increasingly reliant on 

food imports from the former socialist countries. Cuba has had 

difficulties in feeding its population since the 1960s, despite 

major agricultural investments. Food supplies, as well as most 

other consumer goods, have been tightly rationed for decades, 

although the most vulnerable social groups, such as children, 

pregnant women, and the elderly, are eligible for special allocations. The end of European socialism and Soviet subsidies 

made evident the extent to which Cuba had become dependent on subsidized food imports to feed its population. Without guaranteed export markets and subsidized inputs, 

agricultural production collapsed. In 1995 the country managed to produce only 3.3 million tons of sugar, 60 percent less 

than in 1990, the peak production year since 1970 (see Agriculture, ch. 3). The 1998 harvest was even smaller; Cuba managed 

to produce only 3.2 million tons of sugar during 1998. The 

trend was reversed in 1999 and 2000, when 3.8 and 4.1 million 

tons, respectively, were produced. Between 1989 and 1993, beef 

and milk production, as well as the output of eggs and poultry, 

also fell dramatically, as feed grain imports declined by 72 percent. Equally significant declines, often exceeding 60 percent, 

occurred in the production of rice, citrus, and fruits. Nutritional standards suffered accordingly. 

In an attempt to arrest the declining agricultural production 

trend, the government has revived traditional agricultural practices neglected for decades. These practices include substituting beasts of burden for mechanized agricultural equipment, 

increasing reliance on organic fertilizers and biological pest 

controls, and assigning additional land to the production of 

food crops. The attempt to become more food self-sufficient 

also relies on shifting surplus urban labor to the countryside, 

encouraging city and town dwellers to plant urban gardens and 

raise pigs and chickens for home consumption, and reauthorizing peasant markets (allowed briefly during the 1980s, but outlawed in 1986). The success of these polices has been limited, 

with no end in sight for food-supply and nutrition problems. 

Water Policies 

By the 1980s, ambitious agricultural development plans and 
Cuba: A Country Study 

population growth had led to a major increase in water 

demand. In response, the socialist government, with extensive 

Soviet technical and financial assistance, embarked on a major 

water-resources development program, which included construction of numerous dams and more extensive utilization of 

the country's underground water stores. As a result of the dam 

construction program of the microbrigades (see Glossary), the 

country's stored water capacity increased from 48 million cubic 

meters in 1959 to 7 billion cubic meters in 1987, or by a factor 

of 150. The increase in capacity was accompanied by the development of a large-scale irrigation infrastructure that in 1989 

included 500 kilometers of master distribution channels, fifty 

electric pumping stations, irrigation channels to serve more 

than 1 million hectares of agricultural land, and other facilities. The dam construction program has continued despite the 

economic difficulties of the Special Period. 

By 1989, some 900,000 hectares, or 13.3 percent of the agricultural land, was irrigated, a considerable increase over the 

amount of land irrigated in prerevolutionary Cuba (estimated 

at 160,000 hectares in 1958). Efforts to increase the irrigated 

land area were unfortunately not accompanied by corresponding measures to increase the drainage infrastructure, a development linked, as in other countries, with the salinization of 

some of the country's soils. By 2001 the number of hectares 

irrigated had likely declined as a result of the abandonment of 

marginal agricultural land, the dearth ofinvestment resources, 

and poor maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. 

The increase in water demand came in response to policy 

initiatives that mandated either providing secondary cities and 

newly created urban communities in the countryside with 

water-distribution systems, or improving their existing system. 

The upkeep of the aging water infrastructure of metropolitan 

Havana was, meanwhile, largely neglected. In 1992, according 

to official statistics, 83 percent of the urban population and 78 

percent of the rural population were provided with drinking 

water. The number of sewerage lines and other sanitary services also increased rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s as efforts 

were made to promote the development of urban areas beyond 

Havana (by 1992, 100 percent and 39 percent of the urban and 

rural population, respectively, were served). There has been, 

however, a rapid deterioration of water-distribution systems in 

both rural and urban sectors as a result of poor infrastructure 

maintenance. The waste of much water has been attributed to 

106 
The Society and Its Environment 

poor record keeping and the policy of not charging users 

according to consumption. State enterprises did not begin to 

pay for water consumption in order to promote conservation 

and efficient resource use until the 1980s. And the government 

did not introduce water meters and urban residential consumption charges until the early 1990s. 

The dam construction program, with its associated natural 

water flow disruptions and excessive aquifer water withdrawal 

rates, has been linked with salinization of coastal aquifers and 

sea-water intrusions. These problems are reported to be most 

acute along Cuba's southwestern coast, where inland sea water 

intrudes as much as two to fifteen kilometers. In 1985 the government began to address this problem by building a 100-kilometer underground dike to prevent sea-water intrusions and 

trap fresh water inland. The South Dike (Dique Sur), which, if 

completed, will run from Majana in western La Habana Province to Bataban6 in the south-central part of the province, has 

a width of seven meters and is between two and four meters 

deep. It is not known yet whether or not the dike will accomplish its objectives, although concern has been expressed about 

potentially severe adverse environmental consequences. 

Forestry 

Cuba and Costa Rica are the only two Caribbean Basin countries to have achieved the rare accomplishment of reversing a 

long-term deforestation trend. In 1992, according to official 

figures, 18.2 percent of Cuba's national territory (approximately 2 million hectares) was forested, as compared with 14 

percent in 1959. Two-thirds of the forested areas are set aside 

as protected areas, and one-third is used for harvesting timber. 

The increase in forest cover was achieved through a reforestation program, whereby more than 2.5 billion trees were 

planted between 1960 and 1990; by better management of timber harvesting; and by the expansion of the country's national 

park system. Article 10 of the 1959 Reforestation Law created 

nine new national parks (Cienaga de Lanier, Cuchillas de Toa, 

Esca~bray, Gran Piedra, Guanacabibes, Laguna del Tesoro, 

Los Organos, Sierra de Cubitas, and Sierra Maestra). Cuba also 

has the Sierra de Cristal National Park, as well as a number of 

municipal parks. In support of the reforestation and forestmanagement strategy, Cuba managed to train an important 

cadre offorestry professionals during the last several decades. 

The availability of these professional foresters was crucial in 

107 
Cuba: A Country Study 

overcoming early meager results and mistakes, such as excessive reliance on a few, poorly adapted tree species. There is limited evidence from accounts in the official press suggesting that 

forest resources may be under increasing pressure because of a 

shortage of cooking fuels and because more and more domestic lumber is being used to build a rapidly growing tourism 

infrastructure. 

Mining 

Strip-mining has caused major environmental damage in the 

Sierra de Nipe mountain range of northeastern Cuba, where 

the country's most abundant nickel reserves are found. With 

close to 20 percent of the world's exploitable nickel resources, 

Cuba has been an important producer since the 1940s. The 

United States government, as part of its World War II effort, 

developed the processing plant at Nicaro. Construction of a 

second nickel processing plant began in Moa Bay in 1953, but 

it did not become operational until 1961. Two other plants 

were built in the 1970s at Punta Gorda and Las Camariocas. 

The environmental damage arising from strip-mining and compounded by inadequate reclamation efforts is further aggravated by the discharge of processing by-products into bodies of 

water (12,000 cubic meters a day oflight and heavy metals) and 

the atmosphere, inasmuch as processing plants also release vast 

amounts of sulphur compounds into the air (see Mining, ch. 

3). 

Urban and Industrial Pollution 

Sugar mills are highly polluting because they release liquid 

waste products-such as molasses, filter mud, and bagasse composts, that is, composted stalks and leaves of sugarcane-into 

streams and rivers and can severely damage coastal ecosystems. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, with Cuba's emphasis on increasing sugar production, the volume of these discharges rose. As a 

result, there have been reports of collapsed fisheries, destroyed 

clam beds, and contaminated shrimp farms. Some corrective 

measures, such as monitoring discharge rates, have been discussed, but with unknown results. 

Other major sources of air pollution are fuel-inefficient 

industrial plants, in particular cement plants, and transportation equipment acquired from the former socialist bloc. Of six 

cement plants operating in Cuba in the late 1980s, the two that 

relied on the least environmentally friendly dry manufacturing 

108 
The Society and Its Environment 

process-at Mariel and Artemisa-were heavy air and water 

polluters. Other heavy polluters are the country's two largest 

fertilizer production plants, located in Cienfuegos and Nuevitas, and several chemical and metalworking plants in Havana 

and other large cities. In addition, Cuba's old Soviet-designed 

vehicles lack pollution-control devices, and thus release significant amounts of air contaminants. 

Inadequate and poorly maintained sewerage systems are also 

a problem and are responsible for the extensive pollution of 

many streams and harbors. Havana Bay, for example, is notorious for its contamination: the United Nations Development 

Programme (UNDP-see Glossary) designated Havana Bay as 

one of the ten most polluted harbors in the world. Pollutants 

tend to accumulate in Havana Bay because of its shape, which 

prevents water from circulating rapidly in and out of the bay. 

The lack of circulation is a serious problem because 300 tons of 

organic matter and forty tons of oil and oil products flow each 

day into the bay, which is relatively shallow and only 3.7 kilometers in length by 4.6 kilometers in width. 

Environmental Consequences of the Special Period, 1990­

2000 

The end of Soviet subsidies and of a preferential trade relationship with the former socialist bloc that ushered in the Special Period had profound consequences for Cuba's 

environmental situation. As a result of the ensuing deep economic contraction, environmentally damaging agricultural 

practices had to be curtailed, and industrial pollution declined. 

The Special Period's austerity measures and the economic slowdown adversely affected every economic sector. Without guaranteed overseas markets and foreign inputs bartered for Cuban 

goods or supplied on credit, agricultural production plummeted. Between 1980 and 1992, fertilizer imports declined by 

80 percent and those of herbicides by 62 percent. The contraction in fuel imports was equally severe, declining by 53 percent. 

Machinery imports, including spare parts, were reduced to a 

minimum. Under these conditions, the input-intensive agricultural model was largely replaced and/or complementedaccording to agricultural priorities, crops, and so forth-by traditional practices, such as the use of beasts of burden, hand 

harvesting, and the application of agricultural byproducts, 

such as organic fertilizers. To the extent that the inputs used in 

capital-intensive agriculture had adverse environmental 

109 
Cuba: A Country Study 

impacts, these impacts were reduced by the unavailability of 

those inputs. The same occurred in the urban industrial and 

transportation sectors where as of the end of 2000 heavily polluting factories were idle and thousands of bicycles had 

replaced fuel-inefficient Hungarian buses and Soviet trucks. 

On the negative side, the Special Period's emergency economic program rests on the accelerated development of several priority sectors. Foremost is tourism, a sector that had 

been largely neglected by the international tourist trade prior 

to 1990. Cuba is currently embarked on an all-out effort to 

increase the number of hotel beds and tourist resorts to accommodate a growing number of visitors. In 1996 more than 1 million foreign tourists visited Cuba, as compared with 340,000 in 

1990 (see table 10, Appendix). About 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 1999. Crash infrastructure development programs 

were instituted in previously undisturbed coastal regions and 

offshore keys and inlets. In some of these resort areas, particularly in Cuba's northern coast, such as the area around Varadero and the northern keys of Ciego de Avila Province, 

environmental preservation standards appear to have been 

neglected. Other priority sectors, such as oil exploration and 

mining, are also potentially threatening to the environment. 

Several large oil multinationals have been granted exploration 

rights, so far with limited success. Much of the effort has been 

geared to offshore drilling, often in areas adjacent to national 

tourist resort areas, such as Varadero. Increases in oil output 

have been achieved, but mostly of sulfur-rich heavy oils that are 

being used in lieu of imports oflighter oils to fuel the country's 

electric plants. The heavy oils, when burnt, emit large quantities of air pollutants. In the Moa Bay region, pollution levels 

have increased in tandem with nickel production. 

Demography 

Population 

In 2000 Cuba had 11.2 million people. Annual population 

growth rates in the late 1990s were low-less than 0.4 percent a 

year, down from 0.67 in 1995-and projected to decline further by the twenty-first century (see table 2, Appendix). Population size is likely to stabilize or to actually begin to contract by 

the early years of the twenty-first century, given the country's 

low growth rate and continued emigration. Current demographic projections assume that population size is unlikely to 

110 
Bicycle tr

A 

Courtesy National Imag
Cuba: A Country Study 

reach 12 million people. According to the United Nations' lowvariant projection, Cuba's population will peak at about 1l.5 

million people by about the year 2015 and begin to decline in 

absolute size thereafter. 

With a population density of 101 inhabitants per square kilometer in 2000, the country is primarily urban, with 78 percent 

of the population residing in cities and towns. By far the largest 

city is Havana; it had 2,204,333 inhabitants in 1996. The second 

largest city is Santiago de Cuba, which had 405,000 inhabitants 

in 1989. T:le four next largest cities, with their 1989 populations, are Camagiiey (283,000), Holguin (228,000), 

Guantanamo (200,000), and Santa Clara (194,000). Cities and 

towns dot the national landscape. An agglomeration of as few 

as 500 people is defined as urban, as long as it meets several 

minimum requirements, such as having a public electric-power 

network, paved roads, and so forth. 

Cuba's demographic trajectory has been distinctive and, in 

many regards, different from that of other Latin American and 

Caribbean countries. The demographic transition (to low birth 

and death rates) began earlier and is more advanced than in 

most countries in the region. Further, international migration 

has played a major role in the country's demographic history. 

Cuba's indigenous population was decimated during the first 

centuries of colonial domination by epidemics and forced 

labor, or was largely absorbed through mestizaje (see Glossary) 

into the general population. In the nineteenth century, more 

than 560,000 African slaves reached Cuban shores, as did 

120,000 Chinese indentured workers, a few hundred Mexicanorigin contract workers, hundreds of thousands of Spanish 

immigrants, and other Spanish and European settlers seeking 

safehaven in the last (together with Puerto Rico) and "most 

faithful" Spanish colony in the Western Hemisphere. European 

settlers included Spaniards from the former Spanish colonies 

in South America and French planters from Haiti. 

Another major immigration surge followed during the first 

three decades of the twentieth century, when some 700,000 

people settled in Cuba, most of Spanish and other European 

origins. This episode also included sizable immigration flows 

from Haiti and Jamaica, as well as smaller ones from Mexico, 

the Dominican Republic, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries. 

112 
The Society and Its Environment 

Demographic Transition 

Cuba began its demographic transition (a gradual shift from 

high to low birth and death rates) in the late nineteenth century, well before other Caribbean countries began theirs. 

Cuba's mortality started to decline as a result of the basic public 

health and sanitary measures, such as mosquito eradication, 

that began to be implemented during the United States occupation following the end of the Spanish-American War (1895­

98), when the country had 1.6 million people. As a result of 

these measures, the incidence and severity of many infectious 

diseases-such as yellow fever, malaria, and smallpox-were 

reduced significantly. A Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Juan Finlay, was the first to hypothesize in 1881 that yellow fever was 

transmitted by the aedes aegypti mosquito; his theory helped 

physicians throughout the world to conquer this tropical disease. Over the next several decades, mortality rates declined 

further as a result of the continued application of public health 

measures, economic growth, and the introduction of medical 

measures since the 1930s. By 1960 life expectancy at birth (for 

both sexes combined) had reached sixty-four years. 

Fertility rates began to decline in the 1920s. Factors likely to 

have influenced the fertility decline were the country's relatively early modernization, the large influx of European immigrants, and perhaps most of all a severe economic depression. 

The latter was caused by a sharp contraction in demand for 

sugar in international markets that preceded and was later 

magnified by the Great Depression of the 1930s. By 1958 the 

Cuban birth rate stood at twenty-six births per 1,000, with the 

average woman having 3.6 children during her reproductive 

lifetime. This fertility level is comparable with that of Canada 

and the United States at the time, and lower than' in several 

European countries. In Latin America, only Argentina and 

Uruguay had attained comparable fertility levels by the midtwentieth century. 

Life expectancy at birth (for both sexes combined) in 2000 

was seventy-five years (seventy-four for males and seventy-seven 

for females). The infant mortality rate had declined to 6.5 

infant deaths per 1,000 live births, placing Cuba among the 

twenty-five countries in the world with the lowest rate in this 

health indicator. Some of the mortality improvements 

responded to public health policies instituted in Cuba since 

1959, such as egalitarian access to heath care services, emphasis 

on primary health care, and the widespread application of 

113 
Cuba: A Country Study 

medical and public health advances. An additional three indicators in 1997 were at their lowest historical levels: under fiveyear-olds' mortality (9.3 per 1,000 live births), maternal mortality (2.2 per 10,000), and low weight at birth (6.9 per 100). The 

trend toward a reduction in infant mortality actually started 

well before 1959. Similar developments in public health led to 

comparable trends in other countries that shared Cuba's general mortality profile in the early 1960s (for example, Costa 

Rica, Chile, and jamaica) , as well as in countries with far less 

favorable mortality indices (for example, Mexico and Colombia) at the time. For a number ofreasons, Cuba's achievements 

have drawn far more attention than those of these countries. 

The post-1959 fertility trend was first characterized by an 

abrupt increase during the 1960s, with the birth rate rising 

from twenty-six births per 1,000 in 1958, to thirty-six in 1963, 

followed by a rapid decline in the early 1970s. In 1999 the birth 

rate stood at 12.5 births per thousand population, the lowest in 

the Western Hemisphere except for Barbados and Canada. 

Between 1970 and 1978, the total fertility rate declined by 

nearly half, from 3.7 to l.9 children. The latter level is below 

that needed in the long term to assure the continued replacement of the population through natural increase (the difference between the birth and death rate), or approximately 2.1 

births per woman at Cuba's current mortality level. In the 

1990s, the total fertility rate declined even further, dropping, 

according to a press report in Granma, the official newspaper, 

to below 1.5 in 1999. Fertility fluctuations have been associated 

with numerous factors related to changing socioeconomic conditions in Cuba, including increased female educational attainment and labor force participation rates. Other important 

considerations are contraceptive availability and induced abortion. Cuba's abortion rate (abortions per 1,000 women fifteen 

to forty-four years of age) in 1989 was 56.5, a rate exceeded 

only by former socialist bloc countries, and twice as high as in 

the United States. About seven abortions per ten deliveries 

were practiced in Cuba in 1995. In 1995,2.6 percent ofwomen 

of reproductive age reported an abortion, representing some 

80,000 cases. The continued fertility decline during the 1990s 

may be in response to difficult economic conditions, including 

shortages of basic necessities. Only about two dozen, mostly 

developed countries in the world-including Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain-in the late 1990s had 

total fertility rates at or below Cuba's. 

114 
The Society and Its Environment 

Since 1959 emigration has been a primary determinant of 

Cuba's demographic evolution and its relatively slow population growth rate. Approximately 800,000 persons emigrated 

from Cuba between 1959 and 1980, primarily for political reasons or their unhappiness with socioeconomic conditions. 

Three emigration waves dominated this period. Some 215,000 

people, mostly drawn from the country's economic and professional elite, left between 1959 and 1962-the period of the 

most dramatic political and economic changes. A second emigration surge followed during the "freedom flights" of 1966­

73, when 344,000 people departed. The third largest outflow 

and the biggest in a single year was in 1980, as 125,000 Cubans 

went to the United States through the Mariel Boatlift and others found their way to other countries. Mter a decade of only 

modest emigration, the number of people leaving the country 

began to increase again in the early 1990s. Many departed the 

country illegally in makeshift rafts. Another 50,000 tried to 

leave during the 1990-94 period, but were prevented from 

doing so by Cuban authorities, according to Fidel Castro. The 

rafter (balsero) outflow came to an end when the United States 

and Cuba entered into a migration accord in 1994. Under the 

United States-Cuba Migration Agreement, the United States 

assigned to Cuba a minimum quota of 20,000 legal permanent 

residence permits a year and modified the practice of granting 

preferential treatment to Cuban migrants. Cubans currently 

intercepted by the United States Coast Guard at sea (those 

referred to as "wet feet") are repatriated, while those who manage to reach United States soil (those referred to as "dry feet") 

are allowed to take advantage of the Cuban Adjustment Act 

and remain in the United States. Because of renewed immigration, the number of people of Cuban birth residing in the 

United States increased from 737,000 in 1990 to 913,000 in 

1997 (net of deaths). 

Fluctuations in fertility and emigration have contributed to 

the evolution of an irregular and deeply indented age-sex population pyramid (see fig. 3). The aging of the 1960s baby 

boomers is apparent, as is their childbearing during the 1980s. 

Also of note is the much smaller size of the 1990s birth cohort. 

The country's current median age (thirty-three years) is relatively high and projected to increase further (to thirty-nine 

years) by the year 2010 (comparable United States figures are 

thirty-four and thirty-seven). In contrast, in 1995 the median 

age for Latin America and the Caribbean was twenty-four, ris115 
Cuba: A Country Study 

AGE-GROUP 

80 and over 

75-79 

70-74 

65-69 

60-64 

55-59 

50-54 

45-49 

40-44 

35-39 

30-34 

25-29 

20-24 

15-19 

10-14 

Total Population in 2000 = 11.2 million 

5-9 

0-4 

600 

/ 

MALES FEMALES 

/ // 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

400 200 o 200 400 600 

POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 

Source: Based on information from Oficina Nacional de Estadfsticas, Centro de 

Estudios de Poblaci6n y Desarrollo. Estzulios y datos sobre la JJOblacion cubana, 

Havana, May 1997, Table 2, IX; Department of Economic anc! Social Affairs, 

Population Division, The Sex and Age Distribution ofthe World Populations: The 

1996 Revision, New York, 1997,307; anc! information from the United States 

Bureau of the Census. 

Figure 3. Population Distribution by Age-Group and Sex 

ing to twenty-seven years by 2010. A high and rising median age 

translates into a relatively old age structure. Whereas in 2000, 

9.6 percent of the Cuban population was sixty-five years of age 

or older, by 2010 this figure will increase to 12.5 percent, a 

value comparable with that projected for the United States and 

much higher than for Latin America and the Caribbean as a 

whole. By the end of 2000, 1.5 million Cuban citizens, or 13 

percent of Cuba's approximately 11 million people (mid-2000 

figures), were sixty years old or older. By 2010 Cuba will have 

more than 2 million citizens over sixty, a figure that will represent 18 percent of the total projected population. 

116 
The Society and Its Environment 

Migration 

Aside from emigration and continued fertility decline, 

another important demographic development during the 

1990s was the resurgence of internal migration from rural 

areas and smaller cities to Havana and, to a lesser extent, to 

other large cities (see table 3, Appendix). This resurgence 

marks a departure from earlier trends because a major objective of urban policies over the last four decades has been containing Havana's demographic growth. During this period, 

infrastructural investments in the city were reduced and redirected to other parts of the country. As economic conditions 

worsened and living conditions were perceived to be better in 

Havana than in other parts of the country, internal migrants 

began to move to the capital. Between 1993 and 1996, 100,000 

migrants settled in Havana. The migrants have compounded 

problems in a city already suffering from a crumbling infrastructure and a severe housing shortage. This situation 

prompted the authorities in May 1997 to issue Decree 217, 

requiring that prospective migrants to Havana must first secure 

a resident's permit from the municipal authorities, a measure 

intended to manage the city's growth. Resumption of largescale emigration, a process that has always disproportionately 

involved Havana residents, should help ease demographic pressures on the city. 

Racial Composition 

The 1981 Cuban census, following practices akin to those 

used in United States censuses, classified 66 percent of the population as "white" and 34.0 percent as "nonwhite," the latter 

including black (12.0 percent), mulatto or mestizo (21.9 percent), and Asian (0.1 percent) (see table 4, Appendix). The 

reliability ofthese figures, like those from earlier twentieth-century censuses, has been called into question; most analysts have 

concluded that the nonwhite share of the population is much 

higher than suggested by the censuses. 

There is no broad consensus, however, regarding the "true" 

race distribution, although there is demographic evidence suggesting that since the 1959 Revolution the nonwhite share of 

the population has increased significantly. The socialist government has handled the race statistics issue very gingerly. This 

development, as in other countries with ethnic, religious, or 

racial cleavages, is not entirely surprising given the country's 

117 
Cuba: A Country Study 

troubled history of slavery and race relations. Race data collected during the 1970 census were never released, and even 

those available from the 1981 census are very limited. Several 

explanations have been offered for the unwillingness of the 

government to make these statistics public. One interpretation 

is that by not releasing the race statistics the revolutionary 

authorities have attempted to minimize racial distinctions formerly permeating Cuban society. The Revolution presumably 

did away with all racial distinctions. A more skeptical explanation is that by withholding the data, the socialist government 

can conceal remaining socioeconomic race differentials avowedly eradicated under the more equitable social and economic 

policies pursued over several decades. Yet a third and more 

cynical explanation is that by not releasing the data, the government withholds from a still racist white population the fact 

that since the Revolution Cuba has become a majority nonwhite country. 

Some analysts have noted that Cuban censuses have always 

inflated, for a variety of reasons, the share of the "white" population, while underestimating that of others-blacks and mulattos in particular. The broader and most generally accepted 

reason is that in a historically stratified society ofAfrican-origin 

black slaves and dominant Spanish-origin whites, being 

regarded as "white" conferred privileges and opportunities 

denied to "nonwhites." Also, as in other countries (for example, in the Caribbean, Brazil, and the United States) cultural 

mores that evolved over centuries of slavery gave rise to racist 

attitudes that assign more positive valuations to notions of 

"whiteness" as opposed to "blackness." "Passing" from one race 

to another (for example, from black to mulatto, mulatto to 

white, or Asian to white) can occur because the designation of 

race, while primarily dependent on physical attributes, also 

involves cultural, social, and economic yardsticks. In the Cuban 

and Caribbean context, contrary to the situation in other societies (for example, the United States), being regarded as 

"white" does not necessarily preclude some degree of racial 

intermingling, something that has been occurring in the country for centuries. 

The issue of population distribution by race categories is 

made even more complex when consideration is given to how 

the race of any given individual is determined (and by whom). 

While enumerators in the 1931 and 1943 censuses asked 

respondents to assign themselves a race category, in the 1953 

118 
The Society and Its Environment 

and 1981 censuses enumerators determined the race of 

respondents on the basis of their observations. Between 1943 

and 1953, the shift from self-reports to enumerator designations may have contributed to declines of 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively, in the mulatto and white populations, with a 

corresponding 3 percent increase in the number of those classified as black. 

These shifts suggest that enumerators were more prone to 

classify individuals as nonwhite than were the respondents 

themselves. Enumerators in 1981, the year of the most recent 

census, assigned racial categories according to the "concept 

commonly understood by the population, although [the categories] may not necessarily reflect races or colors" (when in 

doubt, the enumerators were also instructed to ask respondents about the racial categories to which those not present in 

the households during the count belonged). 

In general, however, the evolution of the population's race 

distribution tracks well with known demographic trends, 

including immigration and emigration, although other factors 

(for example, differential completeness of enumeration by 

race, emigration rates by race, fluctuations in fertility by race, 

and infant mortality rates by race) may cloud these trends. For 

example, between 1899 and 1931, when Cuba received hundreds of thousands of Spanish immigrants, the share of the 

population classified as white increased from 67 percent to 72 

percent. Between 1931 and 1943, in contrast, when Cuban 

authorities deported thousands of Haitian and jamaican immigrant workers, the black and mulatto share declined from 27 

percent to 25 percent. Race distribution changes between 1953 

(the year of the last population census before the 1959 Revolution) and 1981 are particularly consistent with well-established 

fertility, nuptiality, and emigration trends. The percent of the 

population classified as white declined from 73 percent in 1953 

to 66 percent in 1981, whereas the share of mulattos rose from 

14 percent to 22 percent (while the black percentage remained 

almost the same). 

The dominance of white emigration from Cuba since 1959, 

particularly during the first fifteen years after the Revolution, is 

well established; some estimates suggest that more than 90 percent of those leaving socialist Cuba during this period were 

white. Later emigration has included a more representative 

cross-section of Cuba's racial composition, but the vast majority 

of the emigrants continue to be classified as white. Thus, emi11Q 
Cuba: A Country Study 

gration alone accounts for a major share of the decline in the 

white population between 1953 and 1981. Perhaps an even 

more important factor explaining the growth of the nonwhite 

population is differential fertility. At the time of the Revolution, nonwhite Cubans had birth rates considerably higher 

than white Cubans. Further, higher proportions of the former 

were concentrated in the provinces with the highest fertility 

rates (primarily in easternmost Cuba), whereas most white emigrants were from Ciudad de La Habana Province, the country's 

region with the lowest fertility. In addition, during the last four 

decades and partly because of more equitable social, educational, and employment policies, social barriers to cross-race 

sexual and marital unions have weakened, thus leading to an 

increase in the number of interracial births, another factor 

behind the increase in the mulatto population. 

According to figures from the 1981 census, the provinces 

with the highest percentages of whites are Sancti Spiritus (84 

percent of the populati9n classified as white), Villa Clara (82 

percent), and Ciego de Avila (81 percent), all in central Cuba, 

plus La Habana Province (82 percent), the province that surrounds the country's capital. Guantanamo (74 percent nonwhite), Santiago de Cuba (70 percent), and Granma (57 

percent), in eastern Cuba, are the country's provinces with the 

highest nonwhite percentages, followed by the capital, Ciudad 

de La Habana Province (37 percent). 

In summary, there is consensus in the academic literature 

that censuses in Cuba have generally overestimated the share 

of the population classified as "white," while underestimating 

the percent of the nonwhite population, specifically its mulatto 

component. It is also generally accepted that since 1959 the 

share of the Cuban population classified as white has declined 

for several demographic reasons, namely differential fertility, 

selective emigration, and an increase in the number of interracial births. The actual extent of the bias is as difficult to establish as it is to define unambiguous criteria with which to define 

the concept of "race," although some observers claim that 

Cuba has become primarily a nonwhite country. 

Prerevolutionary Society 

Since 1959 there has been scholarly debate regarding the 

nature of prerevolutionary Cuban society. The conclusion 

reached by a majority of analysts is that by developing-country 

standards, Cuba was fairly modernized; others assume that the 

120 
The Society and Its Environment 

country was mired in social and economic backwardness. The 

first view has more merit, although in some respects Cuba was a 

dichotomous society: an undetermined minority of the population enjoyed high living standards, but most were poor and 

some quite poor. Estimates of prerevolutionary income distribution validate this assessment. The richest 40 percent of the 

population received close to 80 percent of total income, and 

the poorest 40 percent only 10 percent. Urban Cuba, particularly Havana, was home to the elite and most of the country's 

social and cultural amenities. Consumption patterns for the 

country's middle and upper classes were deeply influenced by 

United States geographic proximity and cultural practices. 

Prerevolutionary Cuba's urban educational levels were well 

above national norms. According to the 1953 population census, the last before the Revolution, one out of every four 

Cubans above age ten (24 percent) could not read and write. 

In La Habana Province, site of the capital city, in contrast only 

9 percent were illiterate, whereas in Oriente, the country's 

most educationally backward province, the figure was 35 percent. The better educational institutions, including the 

nation's leading university, were also in Havana. 

Comparable patterns characterized other demographic and 

social indicators. Access to health and sanitary facilities, as well 

as to other social amenities, was determined by degree of 

urbanization. Regional variations were also present; the country's central provinces were generally more developed than the 

provinces ofPinar del Rio and Oriente, at both extremes of the 

country. In urban areas, according to 1953 census data, 42 percent of dwellings had toilets (86 percent in urban La Habana 

Province), as compared with 8 percent in rural areas. The same 

could be said about the regional distribution of physicians and 

medical facilities. Nutritional standards were generally adequate: in the mid-1950s, the typical Cuban consumed, according to a national survey, more calories (2,740 calories) than 

daily requirements (2,460 calories). Many rural children, however, suffered from infantile protein malnutrition and avitaminosis, although the incidence of anemia among school-age 

children was modest. 

The hierarchical nature of prerevolutionary Cuban society 

was profoundly affected by the cyclical nature of economic 

activity and by the pervasive legacy of slavery. The annual economic cycle was dominated by the sugar harvest (la zafra) , 

which coincided with the coffee harvest and the peak period of 

121 
Cuba: A Country Study 

foreign tourist arrivals (late December through March). Unemployment, a pervasive problem in prerevolutionary Cuba, normally fluctuated in unison with the seasonal cycle, from a low 

of 10 percent during the early months of the year, to more than 

20 percent during the summer months. High levels of urbanization and the limited prevalence of subsistence agriculture 

meant that many of the country's poorest families derived their 

annual income solely from seasonal agricultural wage labor. 

Blacks and mulattos were disproportionately represented 

among the chronically unemployed. 

Social Mobility and Income Distribution 

Profound transformations of Cuba's social and income distribution structures accompanied Fidel Castro's Revolution. 

The country's old elite abruptly lost its privileged position as 

members of a younger generation assumed political power and 

began to institute radical social and economic policies, ranging 

from agrarian reform, beginning with the promulgation of the 

first Law of Agrarian Reform on May 17, 1959, to the eventual 

elimination of most forms of private property. Large-scale emigration of formerly privileged social classes accompanied the 

transformation of Cuban society. Their departure, together 

with the nationalization of private property, the growth of the 

state bureaucracy, the country's militarization, the gradual 

implementation of populist policies, such as crash rural development programs to reduce unemployment, and a rapidly 

expanding educational system, completely reshaped Cuba's 

social structure. In its place emerged an egalitarian and austere 

society with a state-dominated economy. Prior income and salary differentials were reduced substantially by state ownership, 

the almost complete elimination of private employment (other 

than for a limited number of small farmers), narrow salary 

scales, and a full employment policy. 

By the early 1970s, income differentials had been reduced 

substantially. According to one estimate, the national income 

flowing to the richest 40 percent of the population had 

declined to 60 percent, increasing to 20 percent for the bottom 

40 percent. Abject poverty was eliminated, thanks to guaranteed employment, a comprehensive social safety net (universal 

disability, as well as pension and survivor coverage), and free 

access to education and health services. Low average levels of 

material consumption remained a concern; access to nonessential and "luxury" (by revolutionary Cuba's standards) items 

122 
A street vendor selling ChUTroS (fritters) in Havana, 1999 

Courtesy Mana M. Alonso 

continued to be determined largely by political affiliation and 

real or apparent ideological fervor, as in other communist societies. Members of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido 

Comunista de Cuba-PCC), "vanguard" workers, and participants in "internationalist" missions (internationalism-see 

Glossary) were rewarded through the preferential allocation of 

housing and consumer goods. 

Within the strictures of a socialist state, educational attainment became the most significant path to social mobility, aside 

from ideological commitment. The elimination of social and 

regional differentials in access to educational opportunities 

played a vital role in this respect, as average educational 

achievemen t levels increased rapidly between the 1960s and 

the 1980s. The number of secondary school and university 

graduates mushroomed, the former increasing from 76,961 in 

the 1975-76 academic year to 317,598 in 1988-89, and the latter from 5,894 in 1975-76 to 33,199 in 1988-89 (see Education, 

this ch.). Equal educational and employment opportunities 

were extended to women, a development that also engendered 

social mobility by reducing traditional gender-based labor 

123 
Cuba: A Country Study 

force barriers. The same approach was used to help erode race 

discrimination. Race and gender discrimination, however, like 

homophobia, continues to linger in Cuban culture, although 

discriminatory practices are legally banned. On the negative 

side, access to technical and professional education is severely 

restricted for those who do not share the socialist ideology, are 

overtly homosexual, or, until recently, for those who were willing to profess religious beliefs in an officially atheistic state. 

Mass Organizations and Socialization 

Mass organizations have served important social functions in 

Cuba since the early 1960s. As in former communist states such 

as the Soviet Union, mass organizations have been used to 

inculcate socialist values and to mobilize the population in support of the state. Mass organizations have also been entrusted 

with security, educational, and public health functions. 

Although in principle voluntary in nature-except for military 

service-mass organization membership since the 1960s has 

been a prerequisite for full participation in the country's political, economic, and social life. Nonmembership is viewed as 

deviant and leads to ostracism by signifying either a refusal to 

accept or actual opposition to the prevailing political and 

social order. Those refusing to join mass organizations pay a 

dear price by being prevented from pursuing higher education 

or engaging in certain occupations, as well as by forfeiting 

material rewards. Given their enormous membership (in some 

instances in the millions), it is far from simple to determine 

what motivates individuals to join mass organizations. Social, 

political, and educational pressures are a major factor. Membership may be motivated as much by conviction as by the 

desire to avoid the penalties inherent in failing to join. 

Article 7 of the 1976 constitution recognizes, protects, and 

promotes the establishment of mass organizations. In practice, 

however, Article 61 severely curtails the actions of the various 

mass organizations by stating explicitly that "none of the freedoms that are recognized for citizens may be exercised contrary to what is established in the constitution and the law, or 

contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism 

and communism. Violation of this principle is punishable by 

law." 

Among the better known and largest Cuban mass organizations are the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution 

(Comite de Defensa de la Revoluci6n-CDR), Federation of 

124 
The Society and Its Environment 

Cuban Women (Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas-FMC), 

Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores de 

Cuba-CTC), National Association of Small Farmers (Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos-ANAP), Youth 

Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de Trabajo-EJT), and Union of 

Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas-UJC). 

There are also several student organizations, such as the Federation of University Students (Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria-FEU) and the Federation of Secondary School Students 

(Federacion de Estudiantes de la Ensenanza Media-FEEM). 

Some of these organizations, however, were actually established before the Revolution. For example, the CTC and the 

FEU were autonomous trade and student organizations, with 

their own political agendas. Although the FEU actively 

opposed the Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar dictatorship (1940­

44, 1952-59), the CTC leadership connived with it. Under 

socialist rule, these historical organizations were transformed 

and became agents ofsocial and political control. 

During the 1990s, some of the mass organizations were redefined in name by being labeled as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), despite their official origins and orientation. 

This redefinition arose from the government's desire to 

replace some former Soviet subsidies with Western financing in 

order to conduct activities, such as self-employment training, 

generally sponsored by NGOs in other countries. Among the 

mass organizations currently labeled as NGOs are the FMC and 

ANAP. 

Committee for the Defense of the Revolution 

The best-known Cuban mass organization, the Committee 

for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), was established on 

September 28, 1960. A CDR unit was set up on each square 

block throughout all urban areas, and equivalent counterparts 

were located in rural areas. By 1985 there were an estimated 

6.1 million members of CDRs, or about 80 percent of Cuba's 

adult population. Using a pyramidal organization, the CDRs 

continue to operate at the city-block level and are jurisdictionally connected to the smallest administrative units of the 

National Revolutionary Police (Policia Nacional Revolucionaria-PNR). 

Originally established to "defend the Revolution" by preventing counterrevolutionary activities and monitoring neighborhood developments, the mission of the CDRs gradually 

125 
Cuba: A Country Study 

expanded. By the late 1960s, aside from their monitoring mission, the CDRs had a major impact on the average citizen's life 

through their functions of revolutionary socialization and 

social control. The block-to-block CDRs are ubiquitous. They 

mobilize the population and ensure that the citizens under 

their purview attend mass rallies and participate in government-sponsored "voluntary" activities, such as the collection of 

bottles and other recyclable materials, blood donation drives, 

or educational programs. Neighborhood CDRs maintain 

detailed records on a person's whereabouts, family and work 

history, involvement in political activities, and overall revolutionary moral character. They also assist in ensuring compliance with compulsory military service. CDR approval must be 

obtained when requesting a change of residence; the CDRs are 

charged with registering the family food ration card when people move from one retail distribution location to another. CDR 

endorsements are also required for students applying for membership in the UJC (Union of Young Communists) or seeking 

university admission. In the late 1990s, however, participation 

in CDRs was much more perfunctory than in the past. 

Women's and Youth Organizations 

Another well-known Cuban mass organization, founded on 

August 23, 1960, is the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC). 

The FMC's founder, Vilma Espfn Guillois, a Rebel Army coordinator during the 1950s and the wife ofVice President Raul Castro Ruz, has been its only president. Espin noted that the FMC 

was established to facilitate the entry of women into the labor 

force and to help them become educationally, politically, and 

socially involved with the Revolution. The FMC has been active 

in efforts to combat illiteracy, in projects to improve educational and labor market skills of poorly educated and peasant 

women, and in programs to reduce family burdens of working 

women, such as the establishment of day-care centers. By the 

mid-1970s, 80 percent of Cuban women fourteen years of age 

and older, or about 2.3 million women, were FMC members 

(jederadas) . 

Several foreign observers have noted that although the FMC 

has made major contributions to raising the educational and 

labor market skills of Cuban women, it did so through a different prism than women's organizations in developed Western 

countries. Whereas the women's movement in these developed 

countries has sought to drastically modify traditional female 

126 
The Society and Its Environment 

role perceptions, most roles assigned to Cuban women under 

socialism follow traditional gender attitudes. This is not to say 

that gender roles have not changed, but that changes have 

occurred from a "feminine" rather than from a "feminist" perspective. 

The FMC, although nonvigilant in nature, has been instrumental in increasing female participation in neighborhood 

CDRs and other mass organizations, and in mobilizing its members in support of government initiatives. Many of Cuba's public health and educational initiatives have relied on the 

mobilization of FMC human resources. FMC members have 

supported mass vaccination campaigns, promoted maternalchild health educational programs sponsored by the national 

health ministry, and participated in numerous adult education 

programs. The FMC has also assisted with the task of integrating women into the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas 

Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR). The FMC, however, has 

come to be seen in many respects as a bureaucratized and 

unrepresentative entity. 

The government relies on youth and student mass organizations to instill socialist and collective values. The process begins 

at FMC day-care centers called Children's Clubs (Circulos 

Infantiles) and continues as children join the Pioneers Union, 

that is, the Organization ofJose Marti Pioneers (Organizaci6n 

de PionerosJose Marti-OPJM), which was established in April 

1961. All children in Cuba belong to the OPJM. In hisJuly 1983 

speech, Fidel Castro noted that "many Pioneers must be 

trained to become cadres or combatants of the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces, or of the militia .... " As they advance through 

the educational system, youth socialization continues through 

the Federation of Secondary School Students (FEEM) and the 

Federation of University Students (FEU). Youth political education culminates in the Union ofYoung Communists (UJC) , a 

selective organization with membership in the hundreds of 

thousands, rather than the millions. 

Other Mass Organizations 

Most workers belong to the Cuban Workers Federation 

(CTC). As in other socialist countries, the CTC is not an independent organization representing the interests of the workers. 

Rather, it is a transmission belt for government and party commands to workers. CTC functions have varied over time but 

have included providing a forum for leadership and workers' 

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Cuba: A Country Study 

dialogues, garnering worker support to accomplish production 

goals, enforcing labor discipline, and managing the distribution of material and other rewards. At local assembly meetings, 

production issues and matters related to labor discipline are 

reviewed, and government policies discussed. During the Special Period, for instance, assembly meetings across the nation 

were convened to discuss emergency measures being introduced to cope with the economic crisis and related labor 

adjustment policies. These policies included reallocating workers from one work site to another, closing numerous production facilities, and implementing transitory financial 

compensation mechanisms for dislocated workers. Another 

important function of the CTC is maintaining individual 

worker file records detailing an individual's labor history, 

including skills, training, voluntary labor, absences, merits, and 

demerits (partly based on work discipline and political criteria). The CTC also supports government efforts regarding voluntary labor and mass mobilizations. 

The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), created 

in May 1961, was established with the goal of integrating small 

farmers into the revolutionary process and convincing them to 

voluntarily join collective farms. Small farmers were provided 

with such incentives as centrally located modern housing, electricity, schools, and medical services, as well as mechanized 

equipment and other agricultural inputs, if they agreed to farm 

their fields collectively. By the mid-1980s, collective farms numbered close to 1,500 and were, by Cuban standards, relatively 

autonomous and productive. During the Special Period, a new 

form of agricultural cooperative was created as former state 

farm employees were granted land in usufruct. Members of the 

latter group, called Basic Units of Cooperative Production 

(UBPCs-see Agricultural Cooperatives, ch. 3), however, are 

not ANAP members but rather are affiliated with a CTC workers' union, the National Trade Union of Agricultural and Forestry Workers (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y 

Forestales-SNTAF). 

The Military 

Military service, of course, has also acted as a socialization 

agent since mandatory male military service began in 1963. 

Under the 1973 Law of Compulsory Military Service, draftees 

receive a heavy dose of ideological instruction. Other military 

institutional mechanisms that are used to attempt to socialize 

128 
The Society and Its Environment 

male youths not deemed fit for regular service-whether for 

ideological orientation, social attitudes, or poor academic 

preparation-have included the notorious Military Units in 

Support of Production (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producci6n-UMAPs). The intent of the UMAPs' forced labor 

camps, while they were operational in the 1963-65 period, was 

to punish and modify the behavior of "antisocial" individuals, 

including religious believers and homosexuals. In more recent 

years, many draftees have been made to serve in the EJT 

(Youth Labor Army). These militarized but poorly trained 

units perform primarily economic tasks, such as sugarcane harvesting and construction work. 

The Family Institution 

The saga of EWin Gonzalez (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4) 

and the intense emotions it generated within the Cuban-American community can be explained when placed within the context of the major changes that the family institution has 

experienced in Cuba over the last four decades. These 

changes, which in part reflect global forces that have influenced family structures in most countries, were also influenced 

by political and social developments arising from the ideological underpinnings of the 1959 Revolution and some of the policies pursued by the Castro government. Some of the leading 

trends involved in this historical evolution were changing 

female roles; a more intrusive state agenda in the upbringing 

and education of children; ideological cleavages that fractured 

the Cuban nation, and within it, many ofits families; and largescale, permanent emigration that over time contributed to the 

corrosion offamily bonds. 

The global revolution in women's roles, arising from commonly recognized major changes in educational, labor force, 

and reproductive functions, has been echoed in Cuban society. 

It has been manifested, as in other countries, by higher levels 

of female educational attainment and labor force participation. Extensive use of contraception and induced abortion 

have led to low childbearing and high divorce rates. High 

divorce rates have contributed to the weakening of traditional 

family bonds. Men and women have opted to exit unsatisfactory marital relations, thereby giving rise to less permanent and 

more unstable family arrangements, which, in turn, have led to 

an increase in the number of children residing with only one 

biological parent, blended families, and so forth. 

129 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The Castro regime's Marxist orientation accentuated this 

trend by assigning a prominent political role to educationalsome may say, indoctrination-policies that directly and indirectly weaken parental rights over child-rearing practices by 

imposing the ideological views of a monolithic and all-powerful 

state. Article 3 of the Code of the Child and Youth (Law No. 16 

ofJune 28, 1978), states, for example, that "The communist 

formation of the young generation is a valued aspiration of the 

state, the family, the teachers, the political organizations, and 

the mass organizations that act in order to foster in the youth 

the ideological values of communism." Article 8 goes even further as it reads that the society and the state "work for the efficient protection of youth against all influences contrary to 

their communist formation." Implied in these articles is the 

overriding power of the state upon universally recognized 

parental rights to choose for their children the values and type 

of education they wish. Further contributing to the weakening 

of parental oversight is the requirement that most children 

eleven years of age and over provide thirty to forty-five days of 

"voluntary" farm labor during their school vacations and the 

separation of students from their families while enrolled and 

residing at boarding schools (see Education, this ch.). 

Another factor that in many instances severely contributed 

to the weakening of the Cuban family was the deep political 

cleavage that accompanied the revolutionary process, particularly during the 1960s, as Cuban families fractured along ideological lines. As members of many families were imprisoned or 

chose what eventually became a permanent exile option, others enthusiastically embraced the revolutionary banner. These 

divisions within families left deep scars that were accentuated 

by permanent emigration-and for many years, by the government prohibition against emigre family visits-and an informal 

yet not so subtle government policy of discouraging party militants and government sympathizers from maintaining family 

contacts with their relatives abroad. These policies only began 

to be eased under PresidentJimmy Carter's administration, 

when family visits on a significant scale were first authorized. In 

fact, many observers feel that the 1980 Mariel Boatlift was a 

direct result of family visits as many disaffected Cubans were 

deeply influenced by contacts with Cuban-American visitors 

and the perceptions of their experiences abroad. 

Visits by Cuban-Americans became more numerous during 

the 1990s. Several developments contributed to the growing 

130 
The Society and Its Environment 

number of visitors, not least of which was the Cuban government's decision to ease, if not encourage, family contacts. This 

policy, to some extent forced on the government by the economic difficulties associated with the Special Period, was partly 

intended to facilitate the transfer of emigrants' financial 

resources to their Cuban families. Foreign remittances had 

become an important source of foreign exchange. The generosity of the Cuban-American community and the resilience of 

family bonds were also at play because in response to the economic crisis and often despite long years without any contact, 

remittances had begun to flow. Family visits followed shortly 

thereafter. Also contributing to the rise in the number of visitors was the resurgence of large-scale emigration following the 

rafter (balsero) outflow of the early 1990s, and regularized legal 

emigration following the 1994 United States-Cuba Migration 

accord. Many of the most recent emigrants have close relatives 

in Cuba, and their antagonism to the Havana regime is more 

muted. Thus they are less reticent about periodically visiting 

the island nation. The United States government has contributed, as well, to the more frequent family contacts by issuing 

more temporary visas, particularly to the elderly, for Cubans to 

visit their relatives here. 

Despite increasing family ties, it is rare indeed today, as it has 

been for the last four decades, for a recent or long-time Cuban 

emigrant to resettle in the country of birth. On a permanent 

basis, families are reunited only abroad. Not even the elderly 

retire in their home country, as so often happens with emigrant communities from other national origins. 

Religion 

Cuba is usually characterized as a country in which religion 

is not a powerful social force. Such views are based on estimates 

of membership in formal religious institutions and on assessments of the impact of institutionalized religion in Cuban history, both before and after the 1959 Revolution. Although 

nearly 90 percent of the population was nominally Roman 

Catholic in prerevolutionary Cuba, the number of practicing 

Roman Catholics was probably less than 10 percent. Other estimates suggest that about half of all Cubans were agnostic, that 

slightly more than 40 percent were Christian, and that less than 

2 percent practiced Mro-Cuban religions. Membership in 

other religions, including Judaism, was limited. Religiosity estimates may be considerably higher, however, if due credit is 

131 
Cuba: A Country Study 

given to the cultural relevance of informal religions, particularly of syncretic Mro-Cuban rites (including espiritismo and 

santeria), which historically were minimized. Another issue to 

consider is the resurgence of the Roman Catholic Church and 

many Protestant denominations in the 1990s, a development 

perhaps explained by the government's more tolerant attitude 

and the despair gripping many Cubans. Open expression of 

religious faith, further, offers one of the few relatively safe 

channels of expressing dissatisfaction with the government's 

policies. 

The Roman Catholic Church 

Several historical factors contributed to the relative weakness 

of the Roman Catholic Church in prerevolutionary Cuba. The 

church had long been viewed as conservative and as serving 

the country's political elite. During the country's wars of independence (1868-78 and 1895-98) in the late nineteenth century, the church was aligned with Spain, the colonial power. 

The church's local hierarchy and most priests were Spanish; 

many chose to return to the Iberian peninsula following the 

colonial army's defeat in the Spanish-American War (1895-98). 

Mter independence, the church gradually regained some ofits 

prestige and influence through its educational and charitable 

deeds, and by ministering to hundreds of thousands of Spanish 

immigrants who settled in Cuba during the first three decades 

of the century. By the late 1950s, however, only about a third of 

all Roman Catholic priests and nuns were Cuban-born; the 

church was still relying heavily on Spanish-born priests and 

nuns, as well as other foreign missionaries. The church was 

present mostly in urban areas, where it enrolled more than 

60,000 students in 212 schools and managed hospitals and 

orphanages. The schools, among the finest in the country, 

were run by various orders-such as the Jesuits, Christian 

Brothers, Dominicans, and Ursuline Sisters-and catered primarily to the educational needs of the country's middle and 

upper classes. The church also ran Villanueva University (Universidad de Villanueva). Although most Cubans were baptized, 

few, even in the cities, attended mass regularly. The church was 

notably absent from rural Cuba, where only a handful of priests 

were assigned and few peasants ever went to church. 

Church-state relations deteriorated rapidly in the early 1960s 

because of the radicalization of Fidel Castro's government and 

its growing alignment with the Soviet Union, and also because 

132 
The Belen Church and Convent in Old Havana 

Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations 

Development Programme 

of historical antagonisms between the Roman Catholic Church 

and communism. Even though many Roman Catholics 

remained sympathetic to the goals of the Revolution, increasing emigration by the upper and middle classes and the departure of many priests and nuns eroded the church's base of 

support. Following the failed United States-sponsored Bay of 

Pigs invasion in April 1961 and growing social tensions, the 

government nationalized all private schools, including churchaffiliated schools. The government's absolute control of the 

mass media and its decision to erase religious holidays from the 

national calendar also curtailed the power of the church. 

Shortly thereafter, in September 1961, the government 

deported 130 priests, bringing the total number left in the 

country to about 200, from about 800 three years earlier. Many 

of the more than 2,000 nuns in the country in 1960 departed as 

well. Cuba officially became an atheistic state in 1962. 

The next decades saw a gradual easing of tensions between 

the government and the Roman Catholic Church. Several fac133 
Cuba: A Country Study 

tors accounted for the rapprochement. Rome and the national 

hierarchy came to terms with the strength of the socialist government and accepted that pastoral functions had to be conducted within the new sociopolitical context. In 1969 Cuban 

bishops also denounced the United States economic embargo 

against Cuba. Underlying currents behind these developments 

were the flowering of liberation theology (see Glossary) in 

Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s and a growing awareness 

of doctrinal affinity in some social goals between Christianity 

and socialism. By the mid-1980s, government/church cooperation was evident in some respects, such as the upkeep of 

churches and church training of selected social services government personnel. 

In practice, however, and until the 1980s, those openly professing a religious faith had to continue to contend with social 

and political penalties. Whereas Article 54 of the 1976 constitution provides for freedom of religion, those professing their 

faith publicly were effectively discriminated against. Believers 

were barred from membership in Cuba's elite organizations, 

such as the UJC and the PCC, and thus prevented from gaining 

access to university education and high-level government positions. Other restrictions, such as the inability to hold meetings 

in public places or to evangelize through the mass media, continued as barriers to the church's activities through the 1980s. 

Although official attitudes had become less restrictive by 2000, 

the government continues to tightly regulate public displays of 

faith. 

Afro-Christian Rites 

Mro-Christian rites, deeply ingrained in Cuba's cultural 

ethos, are one of the leading vehicles through which many 

Cubans of all races, but primarily black and mulatto, manifest 

religious faith. An important Mrican cultural legacy, the MroCuban religions constitute a syncretism between Roman Catholic and Mrican beliefs that evolved over time as slaves pretended to accept a faith being forced on them by slaveholders. 

Combining elements of several religious traditions, the MroCuban rites, like similar rites in Brazil and other former slaveholding societies,juxtapose Roman Catholic saints with Mrican 

deities. Mrican deities are known by their Mrican as well as by 

their Roman Catholic names and are depicted as they would be 

in the Roman Catholic Church tradition. For example, the Virgin Mary, in one of its Afro-Cuban versions, is known as 

134 
The Society and Its Environment 

Obatala. This superficiality in appearance conceals the 

strength of underlying Mrican beliefs and rituals, while not 

masking the syncretic relationship between the two religious 

traditions. 

Mro-Cuban religions, while informal and poorly institutionalized, are divided into three main rites (reglas) , all ofWestMrican origin. The Lucumi rite, or santeria (see Glossary) of 

Yoruba origin, is widely practiced in Nigeria. Of Bantu origin, 

the Congo rite arose along the Congo River all the way to the 

Kalahari Desert. The third rite, practiced by the male Abakua 

society, and also of Nigerian origin, is best known by the name 

given to its followers, Naiiigos. These rites combine monotheistic and polytheistic elements, mysterious and supernatural 

powers associated with living organisms and nonliving natural 

objects, the belief that spirits reside in these organisms and natural objects, and complex rituals. The rites also assign important roles to magic, music, and dance. Espiritismo, a less 

Mricanized practice, implies the ability to communicate with 

the dead, often through a chosen few who possess the ability to 

do so. 

Tension has always existed between the Roman Catholic 

Church and Mro-Cuban rites, partly because the former recognizes the popular strength of the latter, and also because of the 

church's inability to come to terms with many features of MroCuban religions unacceptable to Rome. Thus, there has always 

been ambivalence, the church embracing the Mro-Cuban 

faithful entering a church to pray, yet maintaining considerable distance between the formal church hierarchy and the 

very informal Afro-Cuban priestly class. A tribute to the 

strength of Mro-Cuban rites in the national culture is the relative tolerance shown toward these rites by the socialist government, a predisposition enhanced by the lower-class origins of 

most adherents to these religious beliefs. 

Other Religions 

The Protestant Church had a very limited presence in Cuba 

until the early years of the twentieth century. This situation 

changed during the United States' first Cuban occupation 

(1898-1902) , when several denominations-Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Methodists, and Presbyteriansestablished footholds in the country with the financial support 

of United States-based mother churches. As did the Roman 

Catholic Church, Protestant churches emphasized education 

135 
Cuba: A Country Study 

and limited evangelization activities to urban areas. In the Revolution's early days, there were as many as 100,000 Protestants 

grouped in forty denominations. The government, however, 

nationalized the Protestant schools, and many Protestants emigrated because of disagreement with the Revolution. 

Gradually, Protestant denominations, as had the Roman 

Catholic Church, sought to come to terms with the new political status quo. Because they were less structured, the Protestant 

denominations were regarded by the government as effective 

counterbalances to the more organized Roman Catholic 

Church. Nevertheless, some denominations, for example,Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists, that have opposed 

such socialist dictates as pledging allegiance to national symbols have been at times harshly persecuted. 

AlthoughJews were barred from settling in the Spanish colonial empire, their presence in Cuba dates to the days of the 

island's discovery and the arrival ofJews who were nominally 

Roman Catholic. The prerevolutionary Cuban colony was 

diverse in origin and included both Sephardic and Ashkenazic 

Jews. The Jewish population peaked in 1959, when it reached 

about 15,000. Between the 1920s and 1940s, Cuba was an 

important transit point for Jews seeking permanent settlement 

in the United States. MostJews left after the Revolution; in 

1990 only about 300 Jewish families remained. Buddhist and 

Muslim influence in Cuba is very slight. Few traces remain 

today of the legacies of the thousands of Chinese and Arab 

emigrants to Cuba. The former arrived mostly as indentured 

workers during the late nineteenth century, and the latter as 

independent migrants during the first three decades of the 

twentieth century. 

Religion in the Special Period 

Church/state relations have continued to improve during 

the Special Period. The ban barring religious believers from 

membership in the PCC was lifted in 1991, and in 1992 the 

constitution was amended to make Cuba a secular rather than 

an atheistic state. The church's reception of these measures was 

guarded but generally positive. The 1990s saw a notable 

increase in church attendance, and the church continued to 

seek additional freedoms from the government. 

The difficult church-government dialogue has highlighted 

common points of view, for example, condemnation of the 

United States economic embargo, but has been punctuated by 

136 
The Society and Its Environment 

open disagreements. During his visit to Cuba in January 1998, 

Pope John Paul II articulated some of these disagreements. 

Cuba's bishops have also expressed their views in pastoral letters. In one pastoral letter in particular, issued on September 8, 

1993, and entitled "El amor todo 10 espera" ("Love Hopes All 

Things"), the bishops called for national reconciliation among 

all Cubans, including those abroad, and openly called into 

question Cuba's one-party system (see Religion and the State, 

ch.4). 

Despite these tensions, the government has been allowing 

more public religious ceremonies. It has also granted in principle entry permits to several hundred foreign priests and nuns 

and has allowed the church to expand its humanitarian services, such as direct distribution of foreign donations of medications. In addition, by inviting the pope to visit, the 

government tacitly recognized the Roman Catholic Church's 

importance as an independent national institution. The PCGs 

Political Bureau made a major gesture when it announced in 

Granma on December 1, 1998, that henceforth December 25 

would be considered a national holiday "for Christians and 

non-Christians, believers and nonbelievers." 

The more positive official attitude toward religion has benefitted Protestant churches, too, inasmuch as they have been 

allowed to expand their humanitarian activities in response to 

the country's economic crisis. Mro-Cuban rites are also being 

practiced more openly. Some observers have suggested that the 

government is encouraging public displays of these beliefs to 

enhance the country's international tourist appeal. Selective 

repression of religious acts deemed to be contrary to official 

interests continues, however, as does the occasional criticism by 

the official press of some sectors of the Roman Catholic 

Church. In addition, in May 1995, eighty-six Pentecostal 

churches were closed in Camagiiey Province. Five years later, 

Granma accused some members of the Church hierarchy of 

"conspiracy" following the celebration of several public events 

that were cosponsored by the Religious Civic Training Center 

(Centro de Formaci6n Civico Religiosa) of Pinar del Rio, a lay 

religious organization, and visitors from a Polish official delegation. 

Social Consequences of the Papal Visit of January 1998 

During hisJanuary 1998 trip to Cuba, the details of which 

had been carefully negotiated between Rome and Havana, 

137 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Pope John Paul II celebrated four large-scale open masses in 

the cities of Camagiiey, Havana, Santa Clara, and Santiago de 

Cuba. These masses, attended by hundreds of thousands and 

broadcast on national television, were the first large-scale public events since the early days of the Revolution that were not 

officially organized. Although the open-air masses were a welcome departure from totalitarian control, it is not clear what 

long-term consequences will follow from the pope's visit. 

Massive outward professions of religious faith in a Cuba confronting economic and ideological difficulties suggest several 

interpretations. The official interpretation is that the massive 

outpouring arose out of curiosity and its encouragement by the 

authorities. A second and more plausible interpretation is that 

Cubans saw the pope's visit as an opportunity to safely demonstrate unhappiness without fear of government retribution. A 

complementary interpretation is that Cuba is experiencing a 

renaissance of religious faith as many Cubans seek spiritual 

alternatives to fill the ideological void left by the collapse of 

Marxism-Leninism. Finally, in Cuba's economy of scarcity, organized religion has become an increasingly important source of 

hard-to-get products, such as food and medications. The 

Roman Catholic Church has been a distributor of foreign food 

and medical donations, for example. Thus, the popular outpouring may signal that Cubans are beginning to consider 

alternatives to the socialist state, and that religion may offer a 

path through which desired changes can be achieved. The 

greater freedom and economic clout of the Roman Catholic 

Church and other religious institutions, together with the 

pope's visit, will inevitably contribute to the undermining of 

the ideological, social, political, and economic power of the 

Cuban totalitarian state. So will embracing December 25 as a 

national holiday, although public religious manifestations continue to be highly regimented by the authorities. 

Health 

Revolutionary Cuba is proud of and constantly proclaims its 

achievements in the health sector. These claims are validated 

by the government's release of copious volumes of statistical 

data with some regularity (such as the Anuario Estadistico of the 

Ministry of Public Health) and by its calling attention to the 

success of domestic programs designed to reduce infectious 

diseases, promote maternal and child health, and develOp a 

modern biotechnology industry. Cuba is also proud of the 

138 
Health workers at the health unitfor Battalion 2721 in SanJose 

de las Lajas, La H abana Province, 1998 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agent:)', Washington 

"internationalist" public health assistance programs that it 

launched in Mrica and other developing regions (often in support of Soviet-assisted internationalist ventures, as in Angola 

and Nicaragua), the many foreign physicians it has trained at 

home, and the medical services it offers in Havana hospitals to 

fee-paying foreign patients. In 2000 the latter service was 

expanded when Cuba began to offer medical services to 

selected patients from Venezuela in exchange for oil under an 

agreement negotiated between President Fidel Castro and 

President Hugo Chavez Frias. These achievements are partially 

rooted in the relatively advanced medical system inherited by 

the socialist government and in the priority accorded by the 

authorities to the health sector since the earliest days of the 

Revolution. In fact, since 1978 President Castro has often 

boasted about his intent to make Cuba a world "medical 

power" capable of challenging the United States in many public health areas. 

139 
Cuba: A Country Study 

In prerevolutionary Cuba, public hospitals, private physicians, and mutualist welfare associations provided medical services. The latter, the equivalent ofmodern-day prepaid medical 

plans, were established in Cuba by Spanish immigrants, 

although the mutualist model was later adopted by labor 

unions, professional groups, and private medical practitioners. 

By 1958 mutualist associations served about half of Havana's 

population, as well as 350,000 members in other cities of the 

country. Although relatively extensive by developing country 

standards of the 1950s, the national health network was primarily urban-based. It consisted of thirty hospitals and dispensaries administered by the Ministry of Health and Social 

Assistance plus fourteen other hospitals and sixty dispensaries 

managed by autonomous public entities, such as the National 

Tuberculosis Council (Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis). The 

primacy of the country's capital was reflected in the national 

distribution of hospital beds: 62 percent of all hospital beds 

were in La Habana Province in 1958. Access to health care for 

the poorest segments of the population, particularly in the 

countryside, and for blacks and mulattos was mostly limited to 

public facilities. 

Redressing these inequities in health care access was at the 

heart of the populist agenda of the Revolution. The early public health reforms were based on four pillars: increasing 

emphasis on preventive medicine, improving overall sanitary 

standards, addressing the nutritional needs of disadvantaged 

social groups, and increasing reliance on public health education. Another important component was expanding the 

national health and hospital infrastructure and equalizing 

access to health care facilities throughout the country, most of 

all in rural areas. Rural medical facilities, capable of providing 

only the most essential services, began to be built in the early 

1960s. Fifty-six rural hospitals and numerous rural medical 

posts were operating by 1975. At the same time, the government aggressively began to expand training programs for physicians and other health personnel needed to staff these 

facilities. Physician training became a priority inasmuch as 

approximately half of the prerevolutionary stock of medical 

doctors, dissatisfied with the radicalization of the Revolution, 

emigrated. By the late 1960s, the private practice of medicine 

had largely been banned; only a few older physicians were still 

being allowed to see private patients. 

140 
The Society and Its Environment 

The Ministry of Public Health administers a hierarchical and 

regional system of public health facilities and hospitals, 

whereby the most routine needs of patients are attended to at 

the local level; referrals are made to increasingly specialized 

facilities as the need arises. Each province has a hierarchical 

structure of medical facilities capable of providing all types of 

care, except for the most specialized and costly. The latter are 

available only in selected Havana hospitals. Municipalities 

within each province are divided into basic health units, or 

health areas, which act as service areas for polyclinics (policlinicos) or the traditional basic primary health care facilities. These 

units provide preventive and curative services in internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, and dentistry, as 

well as elementary sanitary and psychological services. The 

next three levels-municipal, provincial, and national-are 

responsible for increasingly specialized hospital and other services. 

The polyclinics began to be supplemented by "family doctors" in 1984. The intent of the Family Doctor Program is to 

monitor the health of all Cubans by assigning physician-nurse 

teams to groups of 120 to 150 families. These teams playa 

frontline preventive-medicine role and intervene the moment 

an incipient medical condition is identified. Each family group, 

ranging in size from 600 to 700 individuals, is provided with 

locally based medical dispensaries equipped to provide essential preventive services. To be familiar with the communities 

they serve, physician-nurse teams and their families must reside 

there, often in apartments built at or in close proximity to the 

dispensaries. The health teams must also provide health and 

nutrition education, as well as organize adult exercise classes. 

Family Doctor teams must be available at all times, pay home 

calls to patients unable to visit dispensaries, and provide services to the elderly and chronically ill. Family doctors must also 

monitor patient treatment and serve as patients' advocates 

when hospitalizations are required. In 1993 about half of the 

Family Doctor teams were deployed in urban areas. 

In 1997 Cuba had 339,943 health personnel, including 

62,624 physicians and dentists, of which 28,855, or 46 percent, 

were family doctors. The total also included 81,333 nurses and 

more than 56,342 mid-level technicians. The ratio of population to physicians in 1997 was 214, one of the lowest in the 

world, down from 1,393 in 1970. In a May 1998 speech, Fidel 

Castro noted that Cuba has a doctor for every 176 inhabitants. 

141 
Cuba: A Country Study 

As a point of comparison, Cuba has physician-to-population 

ratios 2.5 and two times higher than Canada and the United 

States, respectively, two of the countries that spend the most in 

health care costs. In contrast, the Cuban nurses to physicians 

ratio of 1.3 is about two-thirds lower than in these two countries. 

Physicians are trained in twenty-three medical schools, ten of 

which are located in Havana, and four dentistry schools. The 

1993 graduating class consisted of 4,780 doctors, with an additional 20,801 students enrolled that year in medical school. 

Interestingly, the 4,781 students in the sixth (and last) year of 

medical training was nearly double the number (2,608) 

enrolled in the first year. The dramatic enrollment decline 

indicates that the educational authorities are concerned about 

a physician surplus created by medical school admission policies (which became more selective in the 1990s), declining 

population growth, and lessened demand for Cuban "internationalist" physicians since the end of the Cold War. The number of medical graduates drastically declined in 1996, when 

they totaled only 3,418, a decline of 28.5 percent in relation to 

1993. 

The health infrastructure in 1997 included 283 hospitals, 

440 Polyclinics, 161 medical posts, 220 maternity homes, 168 

dental clinics, and other facilities. Forty-eight hospitals are in 

Havana, and sixty-four are in rural areas. Other facilities 

included 196 nursing homes for the elderly (sixty-three of 

which provide only day services) and twenty-seven homes for 

the disabled. The total number of hospital beds in 1997, 

including military hospitals, reached 66,195, up from 51,244 in 

1975. The number of social assistance beds has been doubled 

since 1975 to at least 14,20l. 

Cuba's contemporary health profile resembles that of developed nations. Most causes of death are degenerative in nature, 

for example, cancer and diseases of the heart and cardiovascular system. Infectious diseases account for only a small share of 

all deaths. The general outlines of this mortality pattern preceded the Revolution, however; by the 1950s, cardiovascular 

diseases and cancer already were the leading causes of death. 

In 1996 the five leading causes of death were diseases of the 

heart (with a death rate of 206 deaths per 100,000 population), 

malignant tumors (137 deaths per 100,000 population), cerebrovascular disease (72 deaths per 100,000 population), accidents (51 deaths per 100,000 population), and influenza and 

142 
The Society and Its Environment 

pneumonia (40 deaths per 100,000 population). Deaths from 

these five causes accounted for 70.1 percent of all deaths in 

1996. The death rate from infectious and parasitic diseases was 

low (53 deaths per 100,000 population), representing only 7.4 

percent of all deaths. 

The first individuals identified as human immunodeficiency 

virus (HIV)-positive were found in Cuba in 1986. Through an 

aggressive prevention program that has included close monitoring of cases, large-scale screening, and extensive education 

programs as well as the controversial practice of isolating 

infected patients by forcibly interning them in sanatoriums, the 

health authorities succeeded in minimizing the number of 

cases. By 1999 only 2,155 cases had been diagnosed as HIV positive, 811 of which were known to have developed full-blown 

acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Some of the 

most controversial practices of the National AIDS Program 

have been somewhat relaxed; for example, patients considered 

to pose low risks of infecting others are being allowed to 

receive treatment on an outpatient basis. At the close of 1995, 

about a fourth of HIV-positive cases were enrolled in the outpatient program. Vigilance continues to be strict because there is 

concern that, with the combination of a rising tide of foreign 

tourists and the reappearance of prostitution, the disease is 

becoming more widespread. 

As part of its overall health development strategy, and in 

keeping with Fidel Castro's wishes of making Cuba a world 

medical power, major investments have been made since the 

early 1980s to develop a national biotechnology industry. In 

addition to acquiring foreign technology, the government has 

devoted much attention to training abroad the Cuban scientists currently staffing the Center for Genetic Engineering and 

Biotechnology (Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotecnologia-CIGB) and other research facilities. Cuba has produced some biotechnology health products for domestic use 

and exported small quantities to developing countries and the 

former socialist world. Inadequate marketing capabilities and 

quality-control problems hamper Cuba's ability to sell biotechnology products abroad, but attempts along these lines continue to be made through joint-venture agreements with firms 

from Canada and other countries. Some observers have voiced 

concerns that the major biotechnology investments are also 

related to a desire to develop the capacity to produce biological 

weapons. 

143 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Despite the country's emphasis on preventive medicine, 

Cuba's public health approach was and continues to be hospital- and physician-intensive. This public-health approach places 

a heavy financial burden on the nation not only by being physician-intensive but also by emphasizing other costly medical 

inputs. These include obtaining the latest medical equipment 

and consistently exceeding internationally recommended medical norms as regards, for example, the number of recommended prenatal visits and the constant monitoring of healthy 

people by family doctors. Cuba was able to bear these excessive 

costs as long as its economy was cushioned by Soviet subsidies. 

Without subsidies, the unsustainable character of the national 

public health approach became apparent: equipment and 

medicine shortages currently hamper the effectiveness of the 

Cuban health system (see Social Consequences of the Special 

Period, this ch.). These high costs explain why many other 

developing countries were unwilling to emulate Cuba's public 

health model, despite its many well-publicized achievements 

during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1990s, the provision of 

quality health care services deteriorated to such an extent that 

commonly prescribed medications were often not available and 

patients, when hospitalized, were often asked to bring their 

own bed sheets, towels, and other personal supplies. The government has even been forced to accept medical donations 

from abroad that are distributed through the Roman Catholic 

Church and other charities. In addition, Cubans residing 

abroad provide an unknown, but very substantial, number of 

the medications consumed. 

Education 

Another priority of Cuba's revolutionary leadership was education. As a result, the country's educational profile was quantitatively transformed. Although Cuba was a relatively welleducated country by developing country standards in the 

1950s, many shortcomings confronted the sector. Among these 

were limited educational opportunities. Access to formal 

schooling depended on one's social class, urban residence, and 

race. Data from the 1953 census reveal that nearly one of every 

four Cubans ten years of age and older was illiterate. Only half 

of primary school-age children and only one in ten of secondary school-age children attended school. The country's public 

universities enrolled 20,000 students, but relatively few pursued 

careers in fields relevant to the country's development, such as 

144 
The Society and Its Environment 

agriculture and engineering. Despite much concern about the 

nation's education situation, the general sense was that standards were deteriorating and not enough was being done to 

improve the country's educational system. An extensive network of private schools made up for some public-sector deficiencies. In 1958 Cuba had 1,300 secular and religious private 

schools and four private universities. 

The educational reforms begun in 1959 were designed to 

make educational opportunities more accessible and to 

increase the literacy rate. Between 1959 and 1961, at least 1,100 

new schools were built. Crash programs to train new teachers 

were initiated. Volunteers in the 1961 literacy campaign taught 

1 million students, with varying success. On July 6,1961, the 

government promulgated the Law on the Nationalization of 

Education, by which all private education was nationalized, and 

all schools were placed under the Ministry of Education. 

Since 1959 the increase in the number of teachers and 

school enrollments has been dramatic. Primary school enrollments rose from 811,000 to 1.7 million between the 1958-59 

and 1970-71 academic years. A few years later, secondary 

school enrollments reflected primary school attendance gains, 

increasing from 88,000 students in 1958-59 to 1.2 million students in 1985-86. University enrollments rose just as markedly, 

from 26,000 in 1965-66 to 269,000 in 1985-86, when they 

peaked. Vocational and adult education programs were also 

expanded. Most previous regional educational differentials 

were erased, although school attainment rates were still somewhat higher in urban than in rural areas. By the late 1980s, 

more than three-quarters of the population had at least completed primary education, and 20 percent had some technical 

training. In 1995 Cuba reported an adult literacy rate of 95.7 

percent. By the late 1990s, there were eighteen teachers per 

1,000 population, and the country had 12,223 schools, including 9,481 primary schools, 1,891 secondary schools, and thirtytwo higher education institutions. These achievements must be 

placed in the context of similar policies pursued in other countries that had comparable successes during the second half of 

the twentieth century. Literacy rates in countries like Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay are at levels similar to that of Cuba. 

Cuba has developed a comprehensive national educational 

system that includes the Children's Clubs and preprimary education, primary education schools (first to sixth grades), and 

145 
Cuba: A Country Study 

secondary education (seventh to ninth grades). Mter basic secondary education, students are tracked into preuniversity education (tenth to twelfth grades) or vocational/technical 

training. Secondary education includes, as well, the training of 

kindergarten, preprimary, primary, and secondary education 

teachers. Adult education programs are available for peasants 

at the primary (Educaci6n Obrera Campesina), secondary 

(Secundaria Obrera Campesina), and university (Facultad 

Obrera Campesina) levels. Adults can also attend language 

schools. Students thirteen to sixteen years of age with poor 

scholastic records can enroll in remedial schools providing 

vocational training. Schools also cater to the needs of handicapped children and young adults. At the apex of the educational system are thirty-five centers for higher education under 

the aegis of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher 

Education, and other government entities, including the military. 

In the 1995-96 academic year, student enrollment in primary, secondary, and higher education was, respectively, 

933,000, 639,000, and 111,000. Declines in primary and secondary school enrollments in 1995-96, as compared with earlier years, such as the 1970s, resulted from a contraction in the 

number of school-age children because of low birth rates. University enrollment declines, on the other hand, were caused by 

deliberate state policies formulated in the 1990s to reduce the 

number of university graduates, to the benefit of vocational 

training. This policy was guided by the conclusion that Cuba 

had a surplus of university graduates but lacked a sufficient 

supply of trained technicians, especially in the agricultural sector. In the mid-1990s, 60 percent of students completing primary education were enrolled in vocational and technical 

training, while the remaining 40 percent were channeled into 

pre-university schools, in effect reversing the previous distribution ofstudents. 

One of the most commented on features of Cuban education is its emphasis on combining work and study. The objective of this practice, begun in the 1960s, was to create a "new 

man" with strong work habits. The practice was also designed 

to erase social distinctions between physical and intellectual 

work, as well as between urban and rural lifestyles. Through 

the Schools in the Countryside (Escuelas al Campo) and, since 

the 1970s, the Basic Secondary Schools in the Countryside 

(Escuelas Secundarias Basicas en el Campo) programs, many 

146 
The Society and Its Environment 

Cuban children have attended coeducational boarding schools 

that combine formal schooling with agricultural, industrial, or 

manufacturing work. By working, the students presumably help 

finance their own education. Another important objective of 

the work-study program is the ideological preparation of the 

nation's youth. While separated from their parents and living 

in boarding schools, they are exposed to socialist ideological 

messages. In the 1989-90 academic year, of the 728,000 students enrolled in basic secondary and preuniversity education, 

27 percent and 63 percent, respectively, were attending schools 

in the countryside. Parents have objected to the schools-in-thecountryside concept, alleging, among other things, that such 

schools adversely affect the parent-child relationship, that parents have difficulty visiting their offspring, and that the schools 

provide poor living conditions. By isolating children from their 

parents for long periods of time, the state obviously gains the 

upper hand in its attempt to inculcate political and other values that may be at odds with parental preferences, a practice 

that has been commonplace in totalitarian societies. This concern was at the heart of the Cuban-American community's 

objection to the return of Elian Gonzalez to Cuba. 

Ideological criteria have had a very important role in educational policies, particularly regarding university enrollments. In 

order to enroll, university applicants not only must submit preuniversity transcripts and provide evidence of passing an 

entrance examination, but also must pass a test designed to 

evaluate the applicant's ideological commitment to revolutionary principles. Representatives from one of the country's mass 

organizations must also submit a report vouching for the applicant's ideological standing. Admission to academic fields considered politically and ideologically sensitive, such as political 

science and economics, is dependent on ideological criteria. 

Such screening is not applied so consistently to fields such as 

the natural sciences, however. Before the late 1980s, professing 

a religious belief disqualified an applicant from admission. 

At all levels of the educational system, the ideological content offormal education is considerable. In recent years, this 

content has been revised in response to changes in political 

and economic circumstances. For example, since the collapse 

of the Soviet Union the teaching of Marxist philosophy and 

economics has been downplayed. The emphasis is now placed 

on Cuba's historical nationalistic roots and the teaching ofmarket economics and modern managerial principles. Educational 

147 
Cuba: A Country Study 

content in the social and political realms, however, largely continues to reflect the Revolution's ideological perspectives to the 

exclusion of all others. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba hosted large numbers of 

international students (at all school levels) from Mrican and 

Latin American countries closely aligned with Cuba during the 

Cold War. Many of the students on scholarships financed by the 

Cuban government-mostly from Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua-were boarded in schools in 

the countryside established for them on Isla de laJuventud. 

National student groups were kept together in schools assigned 

to them, where they were instructed by Cuban teachers, 

although teachers from the students' own countries taught language, history, and cultural studies. These programs were obviously loaded with a heavy ideological content. As many as 

22,000 foreign students attended Cuban schools in 1986. With 

the end of the Cold War and Cuba's financial crisis of the 

1990s, most of the foreign-student programs were phased out, 

although Cuba still provides university training to foreign students. In the 1989-90 academic year, more than 4,000 foreign 

students were enrolled in Cuban universities, while more than 

6,000 Cubans attended Soviet and East European universities. 

In 1999 Cuba announced that it would considerably expand 

physician training for foreigners in the country through the 

establishment in Havana of the Latin American Medical University (Universidad Latinoamericana de Medicina); the university was to have an initial enrollment of 1,000 scholarship 

students from Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The 

impetus for the establishment of this medical education institution, at a time when Cuba could hardly afford it, was the emergency caused in Central America by Hurricane Mitch in late 

1998. During the recovery, Cuba provided emergency medical 

brigades to the countries in need, in addition to offering medical educational opportunities to aspiring physicians from these 

and other countries. Aside from being a generous humanitarian gesture, the assistance gave Cuba an opportunity to gain 

influence with these countries as it sought closer political and 

economic ties with formerly hostile neighbors. The geographical reach of the new medical training institution has been further expanded and now enrolls students from many other 

countries. To allay concern about ideological indoctrination, 

the Cuban government has even stated its willingness to minimize discussions of political perspectives at this university. The 

148 
As many as 300 passengers crowd into Havana '.I' large-capacity 

public buses called camelos (camels). 

Courtesy lvlaria iV1. Alonso 

quality of the medical education being imparted at the facility, 

however, is questionable given that many of the admitted students have deficient backgrounds and need remedial crash 

courses on basic sciences and other disciplines. In private, 

many Cubans question the reasonableness of this initiative at a 

time when Cuba faces so many unmet domestic economic 

needs. 

Social Consequences of the Special Period 

In social terms, the consequences of the Special Period have 

been monumental. Severe problems have crippled the formerly vaunted Cuban health and educational systems. Massive 

labor force realignment measures offer convincing testimony 

of Cuba's extreme reliance on Soviet subsidies and how ineffectively they were utilized. Because of the economic crisis, social 

ills presumably eradicated in the 1960s, such as prostitution, 

have reemerged. Explosive growth in foreign tourism and emigrant remittances are inexorably altering Cuba's socialist social 

fabric. 

Health and Education 

Health and education, the social sectors much praised for 

149 
Cuba: A Country Study 

their achievements under Fidel Castro's rule, have been 

severely affected by the economic austerity of the Special 

Period. Cuban hospitals and other public health facilities are 

experiencing chronic and severe shortages of medicines and 

other basic supplies. The government has authorized Catholic 

Relief Services (Caritas), which is the Roman Catholic 

Church's humanitarian arm, and other religious and humanitarian organizations to import and distribute medical donations because they cannot be found in governmen t 

pharmacies. Food shortages have been blamed for serious 

nutritional problems. Daily caloric and protein intake declined 

drastically after 1990. Vitamin B-12 deficits among Cubans also 

led to a serious outbreak of optic neuropathy that was responsible for the temporary blindness of 50,000 people in 1991-93; 

the outbreak was arrested by the emergency nationwide distribution of vitamin supplements. In addition, the proportion of 

newborns with low birth weights began to rise in the early 

1990s, as did the number of underweight pregnant women. 

Mortality rates have also risen among elderly nursing-home residents. 

As domestic health care standards deteriorated, Cuba was 

promoting medical services for paying foreign patients at the 

country's leading medical institutions. This practice has led to 

charges that the medical needs of Cuban patients are being 

sacrificed ("medical apartheid") for the benefit of foreigners. 

The government responds that the foreign currency earned by 

treating foreign patients benefits all Cubans because the earnings are used to buy medical supplies abroad. That health standards have not deteriorated even further is thanks to the 

importance accorded the sector and the extensive health care 

infrastructure, including medical personnel, developed in earlier decades. 

Since the onset of the Special Period in the early 1990s, the 

educational system, like other sectors of the economy, has suffered from severe funding cutbacks. Thousands of teachers are 

reported to have left their posts for employment in other better-paying sectors, such as tourism, where dollars can be 

earned. This trend has led to expressions of alarm over a likely 

and growing teacher shortage. However, the number of teachers trained in Cuba is so large and the decline in the number of 

students (because of declining birth rates) so significant, that 

this concern seems groundless. Although no schools have been 

shut down, schools are poorly maintained, and educational 

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The Society and Its Environment 

supplies are scarce. In addition, some educational facilities 

have been abandoned or converted to other uses because of 

the declining number of students. The government has also 

taken steps to reduce university enrollments. 

The Social Safety Net 

The extensive and generous social safety net developed by 

socialist Cuba is currently incapable of providing the protection for which it was designed: government financial resources 

have contracted dramatically. Left to its own domestic 

resources, Cuba can no longer afford to extend extremely liberal social and economic benefits. These include, aside from 

full employment, generous social entitlements, such as early 

retirement (at age sixty for men, and fifty-five for women) and 

a broad array of partially or wholly subsidized social services, 

such as meals in government-owned cafeterias and public 

transportation. An extreme example of such entitlements was 

described by the Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba-CTC) in 1996, when it announced that 38 

percent of all workers managed to obtain a disability certificate 

in 1995 entitling them to retire and receive a pension. Many of 

these "retirees" are known to then engage in informal sector 

economic activities or to seek employment in state enterprises 

other than the one from which they retired. Demographic 

trends further aggravate the erosion of the safety net. As was 

indicated earlier, Cuba's population is aging rapidly, and as the 

number of elderly increases, the demands placed on the social 

safety net grow apace. 

Employment Policies 

Cuba's employment situation is at the crux of the economic 

crisis. According to United Nations Economic Commission for 

Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC-see Glossary) estimates, in 1996 Cuba had an equivalent unemployment rate 

(combined unemployment and underemployment (see Glossary) rates) of 34 percent, which translates into the need to create 1 million new jobs. The government has responded to the 

crisis by expanding unemployment benefits, shifting urban 

labor to the countryside, and reassigning and re-training surplus workers. Because the government lacks sufficient financial 

resources, these adjustment mechanisms have been unable to 

prevent a brutal contraction in real income for the average 

Cuban worker (see Labor, ch. 3). 

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Cuba: A Country Study 

Remittances and Closer Bonds with the Emigre Community 

The economic crisis has intensified and in many cases 

reawakened family bonds severed by decades of emigration. 

The emigre community has responded generously to the plea 

for assistance received from relatives in Cuba, even when families had not been in contact for many years. Cuban families 

abroad are remitting hundreds of millions of dollars (up to 

US$500 million annually, although ECLAC claims the figure 

may be as high as US$800 million) in assistance, including food 

and medicines. To facilitate the inflow of remittances, previous 

restrictive measures imposed by the Cuban government have 

been lifted. These measures extend to the easing of visa procedures as a means to encourage emigrant visits. Among the most 

decisive measure was the 1993 decision to decriminalize the 

holding of United States dollars and to authorize the free circulation of United States currency. 

Closer ties between Cubans at home and abroad have important social implications. They chip away at the ideological and 

political cleavages separating Cuban families, and thereby lead 

to the questioning of the official stigmatization of those who 

left for ideological or material reasons. Second, and perhaps 

most important, remittance inflows have substantially modified 

the country's pattern of income distribution and granted a 

measure of economic freedom to families formerly totally 

dependent on the state. The latter fact has curbed the power of 

the state, particularly given the fact that a few dollars are the 

peso equivalent of the average monthly salary. The regressive 

effects of remittances are substantial given that not all families 

have access to them. Families without close relatives abroad are 

excluded, including those belonging to social categories 

underrepresented in the emigration stream, such as Cubans of 

Mrican descent (see Attracting Foreign Investment and Remittances, ch. 3). 

Tourism 

In response to government policies to promote international tourism, millions of foreign tourists have traveled to 

Cuba since the early 1990s. If current trends persist, the annual 

number offoreign tourists visiting Cuba will rise to as many as 2 

million annually-more than 1.6 million tourists visited in 

1999-by the beginning of the twenty-first century, as compared with 270,000 in 1989 (see Tourism, ch. 3). This develop152 
The Society and Its Environment 

ment, together with the dollarization of the domestic economy, 

will further accelerate a process of social change in a country 

that up to the late 1980s was largely, although not completely, 

isolated from outside influences. This impact is already evident 

in numerous ways. 

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of foreign tourists has 

led to charges of "tourism apartheid," or the discrimination to 

which Cubans without dollars are subjected by not being able 

to pay for services available only in tourist facilities, such as 

hotels and nightclubs. Like foreign remittances, tourism also 

contributes to increases in income differentials. Workers in the 

foreign tourist sector have access to dollars (in tips and other 

compensation) and other goods not available to workers in 

other economic sectors. Foreign tourists, through their lifestyles and behaviors, such as consumerism, provide alternative 

role models at variance with those of socialism. They also provide a conduit for news from the outside world. The culture of 

service in the tourism sector, essential if the industry is to prosper, to some extent is inimical to egalitarian socialist principles. 

With hundreds of thousands offoreign visitors present, it is no 

longer wise for the government to openly suppress social and 

political dissent. Tourism, by contributing to a more relaxed 

social environment, will force the government, albeit reluctantly, to tolerate alternative behaviors that challenge conformist socialist norms. 

Tourism and the poverty associated with the economic crisis 

have contributed to the resurgence of several social ills that 

had presumably been eradicated under socialism. Prostitution 

is endemic, particularly in tourist areas, and until recently the 

government has been unable or unwilling to stop it, despite 

some high-visibility attempts to do so. Many prostitutes are 

young, well-educated women (and men) who practice the 

ancient trade to feed families or purchase expensive (by Cuban 

standards) and coveted foreign goods in dollar-only stores. Sexually suggestive advertisements in Europe and South America 

lure tourists seeking amorous adventures while enjoying affordable vacation packages. In early 1999, the authorities took drastic measures to remove prostitutes from the streets of Havana 

and from important tourist resorts. The measures included the 

institutionalization of repeat offenders, forcing young prostitutes from the interior of the country to return to their places 

of origin, and reeducation plans. To what extent these policies 

will be effective, however, remains to be seen because the eco153 
Cuba: A Country Study 

nomic conditions behind prostitution have not changed, nor 

are they likely to change in the near future. 

Petty crime, as well as a rising trend of violent crime, much 

of it targeting foreign visitors, is a cause of concern (see Crime 

and Punishment, ch. 5). Drug use is on the increase as well, 

although its incidence is still low. The allegiance of the people 

to the socialist state is gravely compromised by these developments. They are indicative of the implosion of the implicit cradle-to-grave social bargain promised and delivered by the oncesubsidized socialist government. 

Outlook 

Any reasonable observer must forecast that profound social 

changes are in store for Cuba. Four decades of social engineering designed to create a society populated by men and women 

schooled in Marxist-Leninist principles and committed to 

internationalist solidarity were rattled by the disintegration of 

the communist world. The austere social environment created 

by the Revolution, including many of its social welfare institutions, managed to function relatively well as long as Cuba's inefficient economy was sheltered from outside shocks, and costly 

health, education, and safety-net programs could be sustained 

with external financial transfers. In this context, the educational system and highly structured mass organizations conveyed ideological messages whose credibility was enhanced by 

socialist Cuba's ability to construct an equitable, if totalitarian, 

society. These social achievements had an important symbolic 

value in legitimizing socialist Cuba's policies, even providing a 

veneer ofjustification for its totalitarian excesses. Repressing 

competing worldviews, whether in the political, economic, 

social, or religious realms, was feasible in a totalitarian state 

that controlled practically all aspects of the country's life. Outside influences were contained in a Cuba only partially open to 

the outside world; the permanent exile option, often employed 

on a massive scale, was used to rid the country of those citizens 

most unhappy with government policies. 

The context is vastly different today. Whether the leadership 

wants it or not, Cuba must open to the world. Foreign values 

and influences are coming into Cuba in the form of international tourism; with the tourists come the demonstration 

effects of consumer societies and a growing appetite for material well-being, as well as more tolerant social and political attitudes. As this happens and as the distribution of income 

154 
The Society and Its Environment 

becomes more unequal, socioeconomic differentials can only 

increase and alternative ideological viewpoints become more 

widespread. Past ideological messages are as irrelevant today as 

they are impractical. The socialist government is no longer 

able to deliver on its social-compact promises of equity and universal access to quality social services. It is difficult to predict 

the long-term consequences of these developments. The 

Cuban people show many signs of restlessness, ideological 

exhaustion, and the search for viable individual alternatives. 

The only thing certain is that social relations and Cuba's social 

fabric in the early twenty-first century will be vastly different 

from those dreamed of and partially achieved by the revolutionary leadership in the 1970s and 1980s. 

* * * 

The literature on Cuba is vast and growing, in Spanish as 

well as in English and other languages. Much of it touches on 

the country's social history and contemporary social conditions 

up to the early 1990s. Among the most comprehensive and 

authoritative references is the journal Cuban Studies/Estudios 

Cubanos, published since 1970 by the University of Pittsburgh 

Press. Also replete with information is Cuba in Transition (available on the Internet at http://www.ascecuba.org) , the proceedings of the annual meeting of the Association for the 

Study of the Cuban Economy, published since 1991. Aside from 

books on specific topics published by university and academic 

presses, edited collections (with varying ideological tinges) are 

available. They focus on different facets of Cuban affairs, dating back to the 1960s, and cover developments since the early 

1990s. Of particular note are the ten editions of Cuban Communism, a comprehensive compilation of essays culled from many 

sources and edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. 

Many of the excellent studies conducted over the years 

about Cuba's social situation do not capture the reality of the 

country since the early 1990s given the drastic changes that 

have occurred. But important sources that could be consulted 

on the evolution of different facets of social life in Cuba 

include Juan Clark's Mito y realidad, Julie Feinsilver's Healing the 

Masses, and Julie Marie Bunck's Fidel Castro and the Questfor a 

Revolutionary Culture in Cuba. One noted source dealing with 

contemporary Cuba, but with a major emphasis on economics, 

is La economia cubana: Reformas estructurales y desempeiio en los 

1.~.~ 
Cuba: A Country Study 

noventa, a study sponsored by the Economic Commission for 

Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and published in 

1997 by the Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica in Mexico City. 

Among major American newspapers, the most extensive 

Cuban coverage is provided by the Miami Herald, in particular 

by its Spanish-language version, El Nuevo Herald. Excellent but 

more sporadic coverage can also be found in other major 

national newspapers, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, both (like the Miami Herald and other newspapers) 

accessible through the Internet. Internet readers have at their 

reach a wealth of additional information on Cuba that can be 

located in various Web pages and associated links. Selected web 

pages range from those of Florida-produced Cuba Free Press and 

Cuba Press, which offer accounts of daily life provided by independent, and often persecuted, journalists in Cuba, to Englishlanguage versions of official Cuban newspapers, such as the 

daily Granma, Cuba's most important newspaper, and the 

weekly Granma International [Havana]. Equally important 

sources of news on Cuba are the various international news 

agencies, such as the Associated Press and Cuba's own official 

news agency, Prensa Latina. These news agencies can also be 

accessed through the Internet. (For further information and 

complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

156 
Chapter 3. The Economy 
Havana's main train station, 1999 

Courtesy Maria M. Alonso 
NEARLY FOUR DECADES SINCE the triumph of the Revolution of 1959, the Cuban economy remains based on agriculture, notwithstanding the rhetoric of Cuba's government. 

Sugar remains the mainstay of the economy, the largest 

employer, and the main generator of net export revenues (see 

Key Economic Sectors, this ch.). The tourism industry grew 

rapidly in the 1990s, however, spurred by foreign investment in 

the form ofjoint ventures. By the late 1990s, gross revenue generated by tourism had surpassed that earned by sugar. Net revenues generated by tourism are only about one-third of gross 

revenue, however, reflecting the high import content of activities of this industry. 

Cuba remains nominally a centrally planned economy (see 

Glossary), and the Cuban government controls the bulk of the 

productive resources of the nation. By the 1980s, however, 

some economic activities for private gain existed. Such activities included agriculture (private farmers owned a small portion of the island's agricultural land) ; the sale of some personal 

services; and, for a period in the early 1980s, farmers' markets 

and artisan markets. In addition, black market (see Glossary) 

operations were illegally conducted outside of state control. 

Other illegal activities with economic consequences included 

unauthorized use of government resources and corruption. 

During the 1990s, Cuba faced perhaps its most serious economic crisis of the twentieth century. The crisis was triggered 

by the breakup of economic and trade relations with East European countries and the Soviet Union as these countries abandoned socialism and began their transition to market 

economies. The results have been devastating for Cuba and for 

the Cuban people: a contraction in national product of onethird to one-half between 1989 and 1993, a fall in exports by 79 

percent and imports by 75 percent, a tripling of the budget deficit, and sharp declines in the standard ofliving of the population. The economic crisis of the 1990s, and the austerity 

measures put in place to try to overcome it, are referred to by 

the Cuban government as the "special period in peacetime" 

(periodo especial en tiempo de paz; hereafter Special Period-see 

Glossary) . 

In the summer of 1993, faced with a badly deteriorating economic picture, the Cuban government began to take steps to 

159 
Cuba: A Country Study 

liberalize certain areas of the economy, attract foreign investment by offering tax holidays and other incentives to foreign 

investors, and attain some measure of macroeconomic stabilization. The pace of reforms slowed down in 1995, although the 

National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 

Poder Popular-ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly) passed a 

tax code and Foreign Investment Decree-Law 77 that year. Law 

77 clarifies the concept of private property and provides a legal 

basis for transferring state property to joint ventures established with foreign partners. Law 77 also authorizes 100 percent foreign ownership of investments, simplifies the screening 

offoreign investment, and explicitly allows foreign investment 

in real estate. 

In 1996 the National Assembly passed legislation to create 

free-trade zones and in 1997 a bill to reform the banking system. Far from being a well-articulated set of reforms to liberalize the Cuban economy and make it more efficient and 

productive, the reforms were opportunistic measures to ease 

the economic crisis and maintain the Cuban government and 

the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de CubaPCC) in political control. Modest positive economic growth 

during 1994-98 arrested the economic deterioration experienced over the first half of the 1990s, but did not result in a significant improvement in the standard of living of the 

population. 

Several of the reform measures implemented in the 1990s 

stimulated economic activity outside of the control of the state. 

These reform measures included the decriminalization of the 

holding and use of foreign currencies, the breakup of state 

farms and their reinstitution as cooperatives, the authorization 

of self-employment, the reestablishment of agricultural and 

artisan markets, the decentralization of foreign trade, and the 

creation of semiautonomous corporations. By 1998 about onequarter of the Cuban labor force was engaged in activities outside of the state sector, compared with about 5 percent in 1989. 

Attraction of foreign investment was one of the bright spots 

of the Cuban economy in the 1990s, although the levels of 

incoming investment were very small in comparison with the 

foreign support that was lost as a result of the change in economic and trade relations with the former Soviet Union and 

the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The impact on investment of the Helms-Burton Act (see Glossary), adopted by the 

United States in 1996, is difficult to ascertain given the secrecy 

160 
The Economy 

with which the Cuban government deals with foreign investment information. 

Cuba has had great difficulties in borrowing funds in international markets since it suspended service on its convertible 

currency (see Glossary) on July 1, 1986. As a result, the island 

has had to rely on short-term loans at very high interest rates. 

At the end of 1998, Cuba's convertible currency debt 

amounted to more than US$11.2 billion. In addition, Cuba has 

a substantial debt with the former Soviet Union (this debt has 

been assumed by Russia) and with East European nations 

denominated in rubles. Very little is known about the magnitude of this debt or the exchange rate at which it is to be converted to either pesos or dollars for purposes of repayment. 

In the second half of the 1990s, foreign remittances-the 

funds that Cuban individuals and families receive from relatives and friends living abroad-became the lifeline of the 

external sector of the Cuban economy. The Cuban government adopted policies that facilitate the use of remittances by 

Cuban citizens and encourage relatives and friends abroad to 

increase remittance levels. These policies include permitting 

Cuban citizens to hold foreign currencies, establish stores 

where such currencies can be used, and set up a system of 

exchange houses to facilitate conversion into domestic currency. According to Cuban official sources, foreign remittances 

amounted to 820 million pesos in 1998 (for value of the pesosee Glossary) . 

Performance of the Economy 

Background 

Buffered by economic assistance from the Soviet Union and 

other socialist countries, the Cuban economy showed positive 

economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. According to official 

statistics, the global social product (GSP-see Glossary), a 

broad, Soviet-style measure of the economy under Cuba's Material Product System (MPS-see Glossary), grew at an average 

annual rate of 7.5 percent during the first half of the 1970s and 

3.5 percent during the second half. In 1972 Cuba became a 

member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 

(CMEA; also known as Comecon-see Glossary), the organization that promoted and guided trade and economic cooperation among the socialist countries. In that same year, Cuba and 

the Soviet Union formalized a system of preferential prices1 fll 
Cuba: A Country Study 

that is, higher than world market prices-for Cuban sugar 

exports that would result in very large price subsidies for the 

island throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 

In the first half of the 1980s, socialist Cuba recorded its 

strongest economic performance, with GSP growing at an average annual rate of 7.2 percent. Economic growth slowed during the second half of the 1980s, when GSP growth rates of 1.2 

percent in 1986, -3.9 percent in 1987, 2.2 percent in 1988, and 

1.1 percent in 1989 were recorded. During this period, Cuba 

was engaged in the "rectification process of errors and negative 

tendencies" (proceso de rectificaci6n de errores y tendencias negativas-see Glossary) and began to face a tightening of its economic relations with the Soviet Union under former president 

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of economic and governmental 

reform (perestroika). 

In late September 1990, Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) 

announced that the country had entered a Special Period. He 

likened the economic situation-sharply reduced levels of 

imports of fuel, food, raw materials, machinery, and spare 

parts-to what would have ensued from the imposition of an 

air and naval blockade in a war situation. Surviving this Special 

Period would require emergency measures similar to those 

called for in a war setting. Indeed, in the 1990s Cuba has faced 

its most serious economic crisis in the twentieth century. 

The events that triggered Cuba's economic crisis are 

undoubtedly related to the shift in trade and economic relations with the former socialist countries that began in 1989 as 

these economic partners abandoned central planning and 

began their transition toward market economies. In the late 

1980s, East European countries and the former Soviet Union 

purchased 85 percent of Cuba's exports, provided a like share 

of imports, and were the main source of the island's development financing. The disappearance of the socialist regimes in 

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and these countries' demand that henceforth trade relations be conducted 

using convertible currencies and following normal commercial 

practices, meant that the economic support that the socialist 

community had given Cuba for nearly three decades vanished 

almost overnight. 

External sector shocks triggered the economic crisis of the 

1990s, but they alone are not responsible for its occurrence, 

severity, or length. The underlying causes of the crisis are the 

well-known inefficiencies of centrally planned economies, com1fi2 
The Economy 

pounded by distortions created by massive inflows of resources 

from the socialist bloc and the leadership's refusal to undertake the necessary political and economic reforms. 

The Economic Crisis of the 1990s 

Official information on the performance of the Cuban economy during the 1990s remains scanty. The official statistical 

yearbook, Anuario estadistico, which was published annually during the 1970s and 1980s, ceased publication with the issue for 

1989 and did not appear again until the issue for 1996, under 

the auspices of the newly formed National Statistical Office 

(Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas-ONE). Beginning in August 

1995, the Cuban National Bank (Banco Nacional de CubaBNC) and its successor, the Cuban Central Bank (Banco Central de Cuba-BCC), have published annual reports on the 

performance of the Cuban economy that include some statistical information. The national product statistics in the BNC, 

BCC, and ONE reports follow the System of National Accounts 

(SNA-see Glossary), a different methodology than was used 

by socialist Cuba through the early 1990s, thereby making longterm comparisons impossible. 

In mid-1997, the Economic Commission for Latin America 

and the Caribbean (ECLAC-see Glossary) of the United 

Nations released a comprehensive study of the Cuban economy 

prepared with the cooperation of the Cuban government. A 

statistical annex to this report-reportedly based on information provided by Cuban government statistical agencies-provides economic data not published directly by the Cuban 

authorities. Using information contained in the BNC, BCC, 

ONE, and ECLAC reports, analysts may be able to gauge the 

depth and breadth of the economic crisis of the 1990s. 

National Product 

Mter falling freely since 1989-by 3 percent in 1990, 11 percent in 1991, 12 percent in 1992, and 15 percent in 1993-the 

Cuban economy apparently hit bottom around mid-1994. The 

gross domestic product (GDP-see Glossary) at constant prices 

of 1981 was about 12.8 billion pesos in 1993,35 percent lower 

than in 1989 (see Table 5, Appendix). 

According to official statistics, the GDP grew by 0.7 percent 

in 1994,2.5 percent in 1995,7.8 percent in 1996, 2.5 percent in 

1997, and 1.2 percent in 1998. As had been the practice in the 

1990s, Cuba has not provided detailed statistics to support 

163 
Cuba: A Country Study 

reported growth rates. Experts on the Cuban economy have 

raised fundamental questions about the reliability of Cuban 

economic statistics for 1996 and, by extension, about those for 

other years and more broadly about the Cuban system of 

national accounts. If the official statistics are taken at face 

value, the cumulative CDP growth rate over the 1993-98 

period is about 16 percent, compared with a contraction of 35 

percent between 1989 and 1993. 

Foreign Trade 

Cuban merchandise exports in 1993 amounted to less than 

l.2 billion pesos, 79 percent lower than the nearly 5.4 billion 

pesos recorded in 1989 (see Foreign Economic Relations, this 

ch.; table 6, Appendix). Over the same period, merchandise 

imports fell from 8.1 billion pesos to slightly more than 2.0 billion pesos, or by 75 percent. Exports began to recover in 1994, 

rising to about l.3 billion pesos in 1994, l.5 billion pesos in 

1995, and l.9 billion pesos in 1996, then falling to l.8 billion 

pesos in 1997 and 1.4 billion pesos in 1998. Meanwhile, 

imports were 2.0 billion pesos in 1994, 2.9 billion pesos in 

1995,3.6 billion pesos in 1996, 4.0 billion pesos in 1997, and 

4.2 billion pesos in 1998. In 1998 exports and imports were still 

substantially lower than in 1989, by 73 percent and 49 percent, 

respectively. 

State Budget 

During the crisis, the nation's budget deficit nearly tripled, 

deteriorating from 1.4 billion pesos in 1989 to nearly 5.1 billion 

pesos in 1993 (see table 7, Appendix). In 1993 the budget deficit amounted to more than 30 percent ofthe CDP. Shortages of 

consumer products in the state distribution system, coupled 

with low (officially set) prices for basic consumption goods, the 

lack of a tax system, and government policies of continuing to 

pay a portion (60 percent) of salaries to idle workers, led to a 

sharp rise of monetary balances in the hands of the population. These balances grew from about 4 billion pesos in 1989 to 

1l.4 billion pesos in 1993. 

The government's budget deficit fell to the pre-crisis level of 

-l.6 billion pesos in 1994, -766 million pesos in 1995, -570 million pesos in 1996, -459 million pesos in 1997, and -560 million 

pesos in 1998. Meanwhile, monetary balances in the hands of 

the population declined to 9.9 billion pesos in 1994 and 9.3 bil164 
The Economy 

lion pesos in 1995, but rose again in 1996 to 9.5 billion pesos 

and reached 9.7 billion pesos in 1998. 

Performance ofEconomic Sectars 

The economic crisis affected nearly all sectors of the economy. As discussed above, GDP fell by 35 percent during 1989­

93, according to official statistics. However, the performance of 

several key sectors of the economy was significantly worse: output of the construction sector fell by 71.4 percent, agriculture 

by 51.9 percent, transportation by 45.8 percent, commerce by 

43.0 percent, and manufacturing by 36.5 percent. The downturn of the construction industry was attributed to a sharp contraction in domestic investment and shortages of construction 

materials; nonsugar agriculture was adversely affected by the 

lack of imported inputs-for example, fertilizers, pesticides, 

and spare parts for machinery-and of manpower to cultivate 

the land and harvest crops. Sugar production, still the mainstay 

of the economy and the most significant source of export revenue in the early 1990s, fell from 7.3 million tons in 1989 to 4.1 

million tons in 1993, or by 43.8 percent, contributing to the 

decline in the output of the manufacturing sector. Nickel production declined by 35.2 percent. By 1995, however, the manufacturing sector had increased its share of GDP by 2 percent, to 

27 percent (see fig. 4). 

Two bright spots for the Cuban economy during the gloomy 

1989-93 period were the oil and tourism industries. Domestic 

oil production for the first time exceeded 1 million tons in 

1993. Between 1989 and 1993, the number of international 

tourists visiting the island jumped from 300,000 to 546,000 persons, and gross income from tourism increased more than 

fourfold (from 166 to 720 million pesos) . 

Population consumption of food, consumer durables (see 

Glossary), and nondurables, such as vegetables, dropped 

sharply in the early 1990s, with rationing reinstated for a wide 

range of staple food, personal hygiene, and clothing items. 

Moreover, monthly rationing allowances were trimmed back so 

that the typical household could satisfy only about two weeks of 

its consumption needs through the rationing system. The cutbacks forced most consumers to turn to more expensive alternatives-especially the very active black market-and affected, 

in particular, consumption levels of pensioners. Electricity 

shortages and blackouts became commonplace, and public 

transportation was cut back sharply. The availability and quality 

165 
Cuba: A Country Study 

FY 1995 - GDP 13,184.5 million pesos (at 1981 prices) 

TRANSPORT 

(INCLUDING 

COMMUNICATIONS AND 

CONSTRUCTION 

FINANCE SERVICES WAREHOUSING) 

(INCLUDING BUSINESS 5.7% TRADE (INCLUDING 

AND REAL ESTATE) HOTELS AND 

3.7% RESTAURANTS) 

22.6% 

COMMUNITY, 

PERSONAL, ---­
 3.1%
 AND SOCIAL ­ MINING AND SERVICES 

QUARRYING 26.9% 

1.2% 

AGRICULTURE, 


FISHING, FORESTRY, MANUFACTURING 


AND HUNTING 27.0% 


ELECTRICITY, 6.9% GAS, AND WATER 

2.9% 

Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Infanne economico 1995, 

Havana, August 1995, Appendix A. 

Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1995 

of public health and education services, two of the most lauded 

accomplishments of Fidel Castro's government, also declined 

severely. 

Economic Reforms 

Far from an articulated and comprehensive blueprint to 

transform the economic system into a market-oriented one, the 

reform measures taken to date represent a survival strategymodest, opportunistic measures that seek to allow the government and the PCC to cope with the economic crisis and remain 

in power. In the summer of 1993, Cuba took steps to liberalize 

certain areas of the domestic economy and to attract foreign 

166 
The Economy 

resources. A second set of initiatives, including stabilization 

measures, was implemented in May 1994 together with a sweeping law, Decree-Law 149, against "improper enrichment." 

In mid-1995, however, Fidel Castro vowed not to abandon 

Cuba's socialist principles and Marxist-Leninist convictions. 

Subsequently, the pace of change slowed down as the government postponed implementation of enterprise-restructuring 

measures that would inevitably have resulted in the shutdown 

ofinefficient plants and increased unemployment. 

In March 1996, Raul Castro Ruz, the minister of defense and 

vice president, strongly criticized some of the economic 

changes that had been implemented. He lashed out at foreign 

influences associated with the international tourism industry 

and the wealth acquired by individuals engaged in legal forms 

of self-employment, and called for renewed ideological vigor in 

defense of communism. Raul Castro's broadside squelched an 

incipient domestic dialogue on reforms centered on the work 

ofseveral Cuban economists. 

Stabilizing the Economy 

Cuba's macroeconomic situation in the early 1990s was dismal. The country had a very large government budget deficit, 

very high levels of repressed inflation (manifested through 

physical shortages and rampant black markets), and large cash 

balances in the hands of the population. To address these 

problems, Cuba took a number of actions to introduce fiscal 

discipline, including reducing government expenditures, 

increasing revenues, and reforming the tax system. 

Meeting in early May 1994, the National Assembly adopted a 

resolution calling for strict discipline in the implementation of 

the budget law and for reductions in expenditures and 

increases in revenues at all levels of government. On the 

expenditures side, the National Assembly directed the executive to take concrete steps to reduce subsidies to loss-making 

enterprises, stimulate personal savings, increase revenue collection through increases in prices of nonessential goods and 

some services, and develop a comprehensive tax system that 

would be equitable, foster production and work effort, and 

raise sufficient revenue to balance the state budget. A reorganization of the central state administration reduced the number 

of entities from fifty to thirty-two, eliminating altogether 984 

organizational units, such as departments, sections, and directorates, and reducing personnel and administrative expenses. 

167 
Cuba: A Country Study 

On the revenue side, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers decreed increases in the prices of cigarettes and 

alcoholic beverages, gasoline, electricity, and public transportation, and in the rates for sending mail and telegrams; eliminated subsidies to workplace cafeterias; and imposed a charge 

for services formerly provided free, such as school lunches, 

some medications, and attendance at sports and cultural 

events. Assessing fees on self-employed workers is a new source 

of government revenue. 

The results of the implementation of austerity measures in 

1994-95 were sharp reductions in the budget deficit and in the 

amount of currency in circulation. All areas of government 

expenditure were subject to cuts, particularly subsidies to 

enterprises. The budget deficit in 1994 was 1.6 billion pesos, 50 

percent lower than the projected deficit of 3.2 billion pesos. 

For 1995 the budget deficit was anticipated at 1 billion pesos, 

but the actual deficit was 766 million pesos, and it was 570 million pesos in 1996,459 million pesos in 1997, and 560 million 

pesos in 1998. The budget deficit as a share of GDP was 39.5 

percent in 1993, 12.6 percent in 1994, 5.8 percent in 1995,4.0 

percent in 1996, 3.1 percent in 1997, and 3.8 percent in 1998. 

Currency in circulation fell from 11.0 billion pesos at the 

end of 1993 to 9.9 billion pesos at the end of 1994, or by 10 percent, as a result of increased savings and price increases. Cash 

holdings were 9.5 billion pesos in 1995,9.4 billion pesos in 

1997, and 9.7 billion pesos in 1998. 

In August 1994, the National Assembly approved a new and 

very broad tax code, to be implemented gradually beginning in 

October 1994. The new system levies taxes on the income of 

enterprises, including joint ventures with foreign investors, as 

well as on the value of assets owned; earned income; sales; consumption of products, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, 

domestic electric appliances, and other luxury goods; public 

services, such as electricity, water and sewer, telephone, telegrams, transportation, restaurants, and lodging; real estate 

holdings; gasoline- or draft animal-powered transportation 

vehicles; transfer of property, including inheritances; public 

documents issued; payrolls; and use of natural resources. The 

law also provides for employer contributions to social security, 

user fees on roads (tolls) and airport services, and charges for 

advertising of products or services. Implementation of the law 

has been gradual, with personal income taxes, user fees on air168 
A pedicab and its driver in Havana 

A knife sharpener plying his trade on a Havana street 

Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 

port services, and charges on advertising becoming effective in 

October 1994 and the rest since 1995. 

Stimulating Production 

Cuba took some tentative steps to liberalize selected sectors 

of the economy to stimulate production. The most significant 

such steps were those related to the liberalization of selfemployment, agricultural production and sales, and the decentralization of foreign trade. Concern about the possibility that 

economic liberalization measures would bring about the 

enrichment of some individuals prompted the adoption, in 

March 1994, of Decree-Law 149 (effective that May) to facilitate the prosecution of"profiteers." 

In September 1993, the Cuban government authorized selfemployment in more than 100 occupations, primarily those 

related to transportation, home repair, and personal services. 

It took this long overdue measure in order to legitimize a 

booming black market for personal services and handicraft 

production and to absorb the large number of workers unemployed and underemployed because of the idling of their workplaces. 

169 
Cuba: A Country Study 

However, under Decree-Law 186, restrictions on self-employment remain quite severe. Professionals with a university 

degree cannot become self-employed in the occupation for 

which they were trained; moreover, physicians, dentists, teachers, professors, and researchers are not allowed to engage in 

self-employment because education and public health services 

continue to be supplied by the state. Even with regard to the 

occupations where self-employment is allowed, restrictions 

apply: the self-employed have to request a license, cannot hire 

others, have to pay fees and taxes to the government, and are 

limited on how they sell the goods or service they produce. In 

October 1993, the state expanded the list of occupations amenable to self-employment by twenty occupations. InJune 1995, 

it designated additional occupations for self-employment, 

bringing the number of authorized occupations to 140; in July 

1995, the Ministry of Labor authorized university graduates to 

become self-employed, provided the occupations they performed differed from those for which they were trained-for 

example, an engineer could be self-employed as a messenger 

or a taxi driver. 

Shortly after self-employment was authorized, there was an 

explosion of home restaurants-commonly called paladares 

(see Glossary)-set up pursuant to the provisions of the law 

that authorized self-employment related to food preparation. 

Most of the home restaurants were modest operations and provided relatively simple staple foods, but some were fancy and 

charged high prices. The government first banned home restaurants, arguing that they were inconsistent with the authorized forms of self-employment, but in 1995 it reversed course 

and explicitly authorized them, provided they sat twelve or 

fewer customers and complied with a stiff schedule of monthly 

fees. At the end of 1995, approximately 208,000 workers had 

been authorized to engage in self-employment, less than 5 percent of the economically active population of 4.5 million workers and about one-fifth of the estimated 1 million workers who 

would be subject to dismissals in an overall rationalization of 

state enterprises. 

New fees and taxes-pursuant to the 1994 tax code-began 

to be charged to the self-employed effective February 1, 1996. 

Fees paid by self-employed taxi drivers jumped from 100 to 400 

pesos per month, manicurists from 60 to 100 pesos, hair dressers from 90 to 200 pesos, and paladares charging prices in 

domestic currency (pesos) to 800 pesos per month. The new 

170 
The Economy 

progressive income tax system levied taxes of 10 percent on 

annual incomes up to 2,400 pesos and 50 percent on annual 

incomes exceeding 60,000 pesos. By January 1998, the number 

of self-employed had fallen to about 160,000, from about 

209,000 in March 1996, and reportedly has continued to fall. 

In September 1993, the Council of State approved breaking 

up state farms into a new form of agricultural cooperatives, the 

Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades Basicas de 

Producci6n Cooperativa-UBPC). The UBPCs have the use of 

the land they work for an indefinite period of time, own the 

output they produce, have the ability to sell their output to the 

state through the state procurement system or through other 

means, have the authority to contract and pay for the technical 

and material resources they use, have their own bank accounts 

and buy necessary inputs on credit, and are able to elect their 

own management, which must report to its members periodically. The UBPCs also have to pay taxes. The rationale for the 

policy change was that the shift from state farms to cooperatives would give workers greater incentives to increase production with the least expenditure of material resources. 

In essence, the UBPCs operate as production cooperatives 

within each state farm, breaking up the larger estates and creating smaller units that compete with one another. Workers of 

former state farms shift from being wage workers in the employ 

of the state to being cooperative members, with their earnings 

connected to the profitability of their units. Cooperatives are 

able, within some constraints, to make decisions regarding how 

they use their land. They are permitted to set aside some land 

for growing agricultural products and raise livestock to meet 

their own consumption needs. 

In early May 1994, the Council of State adopted a broad statute that would allow confiscation of assets and income of individuals who had obtained them through "improper 

enrichment" (enriquecimiento indebido). This law grants the government sweeping powers to confiscate cash, goods, and assets 

of individuals found guilty of "profiteering" and provides for 

retroactive application of sanctions against this offense. Seizures ordered by the Office of the National Prosecutor in 

"improper enrichment" cases are not appealable. 

In late September 1994, Cuba authorized agricultural markets (agros-see Glossary), locations at which producers of 

selected agricultural products can sell a portion of their output 

at prices set by demand and supply. Before an agricultural pro171 
Cuba: A Country Study 

ducer-private farmer, cooperative member, or even state 

enterprise-can sell his or her output in the new markets, sales 

obligations to the state procurement system (acopio--see Glossary) must be met. Participants in the agricultural markets 

would also have to pay a fee to participate and a tax on sales 

conducted. In most respects, the agricultural markets authorized in September 1994 are similar to the farmers' free markets (mercados libres campesinos) that were in operation during 

1980-86 and scuttled during rectification. 

In October 1994, following on the establishment of agricultural markets, the Cuban government announced that it would 

also allow the free sale of a wide range of consumer products 

through a network of artisan and manufactured products markets. The new markets could be used by artisans to sell handicrafts and also by the government to dispose of inventories of 

manufactured goods and surplus products made by state enterprises. These markets resemble very closely the artisan markets 

that were in operation during 1980-86 and eliminated during 

rectification. 

Prior to the 1990s, Cuban foreign trade was a state monopoly, based on Article 18 of the socialist constitution of 1976, 

which decrees that "foreign trade is the exclusive function of 

the state." Cuban foreign trade institutions mirrored those of 

the Soviet Union and East European socialist nations: exports 

were conducted by specialized enterprises of the Ministry of 

Foreign Trade; imports were primarily the responsibility of the 

State Committee for Technical and Material Supply (Comite 

Estatal de Abastecimiento Tecnico-Material-CEATM). 

Among the reforms to the constitution implemented in 1992 

was a reformulation of Article 18 that eliminated the state 

monopoly over the conduct of foreign trade, and shifted the 

role of the state to directing and controlling foreign trade. 

Cuba has created various foreign trade corporations that operate largely independently of the state. Examples are Acemex, 

S.A., a private shipping company registered in Liechtenstein; 

Diplomatic Corps Service Company (Empresa para Prestaci6n 

de Servicios al Cuerpo Diplomatico-Cubalse), which imports 

consumer goods for the diplomatic corps and foreign technicians residing in Cuba and exports beverages, tobacco, leather 

goods, and foodstuffs; Havana Tourism Company (Havanatur); 

International Tourism and Trade Corporation (Corporaci6n 

de Turismo y Comercio Internacional-Cubanacan), a tourist 

agency; the military-owned tourism company Gaviota; the Pan172 
An artisan maThet on Cathedm

Plaza (La Plaza de la Catedml) i

Havana, 199

The Agricultuml MaThet (Mercad

Agropecuario) in Havana, 199

Courtesy MaTh P. Sulliva
Cuba: A Country Study 

ama-based Import-Export Company (Compania ImportadoraExportadora-Cimex); Union of Caribbean Construction 

Enterprises (Union de Empresas de Construccion del CaribeUneca); and International Financial Bank (Banco Financiero 

Internacional-BFI), a commercial bank that promotes Cuban 

exports and banking relations. Cuba has also experimented 

with the establishment of quasi-private companies called 

sociedades anonimas (S.A.), stock companies controlled by government loyalists. Cuba's sociedades anonimas have considerable 

autonomy from the state. Many organizations that produce 

goods and services are also permitted to import and export, 

with many working on the basis of self-financing arrangements 

using convertible currency. 

The slight economic recovery registered in 1994 was reportedly fed by sharp growth in the manufacturing sector (7.6 percent) and in the electricity industry (4.4 percent). Cuba 

reported a growth rate of 2.5 percent for 1995, 7.8 percent for 

1996,2.5 percent for 1997, and l.2 percent for 1998. Unfortunately, the requisite data and information on methodology to 

confirm aggregate growth trends are not available. Data on 

detailed physical output data, product prices adjusted for inflation, and the relative importance of each product within a sector and within the economy at large are also not available. The 

fragmentary data that are available raise some questions. For 

example, the recovery of the manufacturing sector suggested 

by the official statistics is incongruent with the poor performance of the sugar industry, a principal component of that sector. With the exception of nickel-where foreign investment 

has played a key role-manufactured products showed output 

in 1998 below the level reached in 1989. 

Agricultural production continued to decline despite the 

breakup of state farms and creation of the UBPCs. By the end 

of 1994, the state had distributed the bulk of agricultural land 

to the UBPCs, retaining only 25 percent. Unable to obtain necessary inputs, the UBPCs struggled to adjust to their new independent status after being part of large enterprises and 

accustomed to extensive use of mechanization, fertilizers, and 

pesticides; most of the 1,500 sugarcane UBPCs were unprofitable in 1994. 

Overall, the agricultural sector has continued to perform 

poorly. By 1997 production of tubers, plantains, corn, and 

beans had reached or exceeded 1989 levels, but other agricultural products, such as vegetables, rice, citrus, other fruits, 

174 
The Economy 

tobacco, eggs, and milk were still below the level reached in 

1989 (see table 8, Appendix). 

The agricultural markets reportedly got off to a good start, 

quickly increasing the amount and variety of produce available 

to the public, although at very high prices. According to a 1998 

Cuban survey, the origin of produce sold through the farmers' 

free markets was as follows: private farmers, 60 percent of 

meats and 50 percent of all other products; state sector, 39 percent and 51 percent, respectively; and cooperatives (including 

the UBPCs), 0.2 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. Prices in 

farmers' markets continue to be very high and unaffordable to 

the average Cuban consumer. The average monthly salary of 

workers in the state sector was 203 pesos in 1998 and 1997, and 

200 pesos in 1996. Meanwhile, prices in agricultural markets in 

La Habana (hereafter, Havana) in August 1998 were 4.50 pesos 

for a pound of rice, 10 to 12 pesos for a pound of beans, 2 

pesos for one egg, and 23 to 25 pesos for a pound of pork. 

Attracting Foreign Investment and Remittances 

To ease severe external-sector pressures, Cuba has taken a 

number ofsteps to reform its foreign sector. Cuba's main interest has been to attract foreign resources-primarily in the form 

of remittances and foreign investment-that can help reactivate its economy. 

In the summer of 1993, Cuba decriminalized the holding 

and use of convertible currency (mostly United States dollars) 

by Cuban citizens. The government also created special stores 

at which Cuban citizens holding convertible currencies can 

shop and obtain items that are not available to Cubans holding 

pesos. In addition, the government liberalized travel to the 

island by relatives and friends of Cuban citizens. The intent of 

the measures was to stimulate convertible currency remittances 

to Cuban citizens from family and friends living abroad, mostly 

in the United States, and to reduce the importance of a very 

active convertible currency black market. 

Other complementary steps have been taken to accommodate the needs of citizens holding convertible currencies. In 

September 1995, the BNC for the first time began to accept 

from the population deposits denominated in convertible currency and offered to pay interest on such savings also in convertible currency. And in mid-October 1995, the government 

created Exchange Houses (Casas de Cambio-Cadeca), at 
Cuba: A Country Study 

which Cuban citizens can buy and sell foreign currencies at 

rates close to those prevailing in the black market. 

In December 1994, Cuba announced the creation of a new 

currency, the convertible peso (peso convertible--see Glossary), 

that would gradually replace the United States dollar and other 

foreign currencies within the island. The convertible peso, valued at par with the United States dollar, would eventually be 

the currency used in the tourism sector and in outlets authorized since mid-1993 to sell goods for foreign currencies. 

Incentive payments to workers of certain key industries that 

generate hard currency-for example, tourism, oil extraction 

and tobacco-are now made in convertible pesos rather than 

in foreign currencies, as had been the practice. 

Cuba first passed legislation allowing foreign investment on 

the island-mostly in the form ofjoint ventures-in February 

1982. This innovation generated very little interest among 

Western investors until the 1990s, when Cuba began an aggressive campaign to attract foreign capital. In 1992 the National 

Assembly passed a number of amendments to the 1976 constitution clarifying the concept of private property and providing 

a legal basis for transferring state property to joint ventures 

with foreign partners. 

One of the areas in which Cuba has been particularly active 

in seeking foreign investment has been mining. In December 

1994, the National Assembly passed a new Mining Law, which 

became effective in January 1995, aimed at encouraging foreign investment in exploration and production of oil and minerals. In the 1990s, mining has received a boost from foreign 

joint ventures, primarily with Canadian investors (see Mining, 

this ch.). 

To institutionalize the "irreversibility" of the opening to foreign investment, in September 1995 the National Assembly 

adopted Foreign Investment Law 77, which codifies the de 

facto rules under which joint ventures had been operating and 

introduces some changes to the legal framework for foreign 

investment. The law guarantees that investors in Cuba will be 

protected from expropriation, except for "public utility or 

social interest"; will be able to sell shares of investment to the 

state or to a third party, depending on the initial agreement; 

and will be able to fully transfer profits abroad. The new law for 

the first time permits lOO-percent foreign ownership of investments, up from the 49 percent allowed by the earlier statute. 

Similarly, the new law simplifies the screening offoreign invest176 
The Economy 

ment practiced by Cuba, explicitly allows foreign investments 

in real estate, and authorizes the establishment of free-trade 

zones. However, the 1995 Foreign Investment Law does not 

change regulations that ban joint ventures from directly hiring 

Cuban citizens as employees. Such hiring continues to be carried out by an entity of the Cuban government with power to 

select, hire, and fire employees, powers that individual joint 

ventures do not have. 

Complementing the September 1995 Foreign Investment 

Law, the Council of State passed legislation inJune 1996 creating export-processing zones, that is, free-trade zones and industrial parks (zonas francas y parques industriales). Investors settling 

in the free-trade zones are subject to a special and more beneficial regime regarding customs, banking, taxes, labor, migration, public order, and foreign trade. Specifically, investments 

in free-trade zones are exempt from tariffs (see Glossary) and 

other levies on imports and are also exempt from taxes for a 

twelve-year period. Regulations establishing an official registry 

of export-processing zone operators and investors and issuing 

special customs regulations applicable to foreign investments 

locating in the zones were issued in October 1996. 

Since 1960, when the private banks were nationalized, the 

BNC has operated as both a central bank (see Glossary) and a 

commercial bank, arranging short- and long-term credits, 

financing investments and operations with other countries, 

and acting as a clearing and payments center. Under a centrally 

planned system, the BNC's main function was financing the 

implementation of the national economic plan as reflected in 

the national budget. In 1984 the BFI was created to operate 

solely with convertible currencies and to support the activities 

offoreign investors. 

In response to the perception by foreign investors that the 

financial sector was not sufficiently developed, Cuba has taken 

a number of steps to allow more choice. In 1994 Cuba granted 

a license to ING Bank of Holland to operate on the island, the 

first foreign bank to be so permitted since 1960. In 1995 similar 

licenses were issued to the General Society of France (Societe 

Generale de France) and to the Sabadell Bank (Banco 

Sabadell) of Spain. Other foreign banks have also been allowed 

to establish representative offices in Cuba. Moreover, in order 

to expand the number offinancial services available to foreign 

investors and semiautonomous enterprises, the BNC created 

the New Banking Group (Grupo Nueva Banca-GNB), a hold177 
Cuba: A Country Study 

ing company, to supervise the operations of Cuba's reformed 

financial sector. The network of new financial institutions 

under the GNB's supervision includes, in addition to the 

already mentioned Cadeca and BFI, the Agro-Industrial and 

Commercial Bank (Banco Agro-Industrial y Comercial), which 

provides commercial banking services to farmers and cooperatives; the International Bank of Commerce (Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A.-BICSA), a merchant bank that, like the 

BFI, provides trade finance to Cuban institutions and arranges 

financing transactions with overseas lenders; the Investment 

Bank (Banco de Inversiones), which provides medium- and 

long-term development finance; the Metropolitan Bank 

(Banco Metropolitano), which caters to diplomats and other 

private customers; the National Financier (Financiera Nacional-FINSA), an export-import bank that provides short-term 

finance for Cuban enterprises; and the People's Savings Bank 

(Banco Popular de Ahorro) , which provides retail banking. 

In May 1997, the Council of State finally passed longexpected legislation to reform the banking system. Decree-Law 

172 established the BCC (Cuban Central Bank) as an autonomous and independent entity and assigned to it the traditional 

central banking functions. The BNC, which, as mentioned 

above, had performed central and commercial banking functions since 1960, continued to operate, but its role was relegated to commercial banking. Decree-Law 173, also passed in 

May 1997, set out the legal framework for registration and 

operation of commercial banks and financial institutions 

under the supervision of the BCC. 

As a result of its dollarization policies, Cuba de facto 

adopted a dual currency system that has introduced severe inequalities on the island. Citizens with access to foreign currency 

(dollars)-because they receive remittances from family or 

friends abroad, tips in the tourism sector, or bonuses paid by 

the government in hard currency to stimulate production of 

exportables-have access to goods and services not available to 

those citizens without it. In the second half of the 1990s, remittances became a very significant source of foreign currency to 

Cuba (see Foreign Economic Relations, this ch.). 

According to government officials, 231 joint ventures had 

been created as of the end of May 1995. By the end of 1998, the 

number ofjoint ventures had increased to 345. There are no 

reliable statistics on the amount offoreign investment that has 

actually flowed into the Cuban economy. Cuban government 

178 
The Economy 

officials have used the figure of about US$2.1 billion for the 

1985-95 period, a figure that may overstate actual investment. 

Although small when compared with the volume of resources 

that flowed into Cuba from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, incoming foreign investment has had a salutary 

effect on the island's economy: it has eased somewhat Cuba's 

very severe shortage of international financing, provided 

access to new technology, financed imports of raw materials 

and equipment that have kept workers at their jobs, and created markets for exports that otherwise would not have been 

available to domestic entities. 

Structure of the Economy 

Background 

Since the early 1960s, Cuba's official economy has been 

organized along the lines of the socialist, centrally planned 

model. In addition to central economic planning, some of the 

elements of this model, common to the former Soviet Union 

and other centrally planned economies, are as follows: government control over the bulk of the economic resources of the 

country, especially major industries, foreign trade, banking, 

and usually commerce and land; and state regulation and subordination of a highly circumscribed private sector. 

With the collapse of economic and commercial relations 

with the former Soviet Union and East European socialist 

countries, application of the central planning model in Cuba 

began to break down. Institutions created to support central 

planning and economic and trade relations with socialist countries, such as the Central Planning Board Qunta Central de 

Planificaci6n-Juceplan), became obsolete and began to 

undergo a process of transformation and adjustment to the 

new economic reality. Additional space has been created for 

the nonstate sector through the expansion of the number of 

occupations suitable for self-employment, the conversion of 

state farms into cooperatives, and the reinstatement offarmers' 

markets. 

At a rhetorical level, economic policies pursued by Cuba's 

socialist government have supported industrialization and 

diversification of the economy away from sugar. The reality is 

that Cuba continues to be primarily an agricultural country, 

and sugar remains the mainstay of the economy, its largest 

employer, and primary net generator of export revenue. 

179 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Cuba's specialization in sugar and other basic commodities was 

formalized through its participation in the CMEA (Council for 

Mutual Economic Assistance), within which the island was 

assigned the role ofsupplier of raw materials to other members 

of that organization. 

In the 1990s, Cuba focused its efforts on reviving its sugar 

industry, increasing nonsugar agricultural production, and 

stimulating development of its tourism and biotechnology 

industries. The record so far has been mixed, with the sugar 

industry continuing to perform poorly and food production 

also lagging behind. The tourism industry has been the focus 

of a significant number ofjoint ventures with foreign enterprises and has become a major contributor to economic activity, particularly the generation of convertible currency. 

Key Economic Sectors 

Agriculture 

In 1997 Cuba had 6,686,700 heCtares of agricultural land, of 

which 3,701,400 hectares were cultivated. However, the cultivated land suffers from various degrees ofsoil degradation (see 

Topography and Drainage, ch. 2). In 1997 the state directly 

controlled 24.4 percent of the agricultural land and the nonstate sector, 75.6 percent. The nonstate sector includes the 

newly formed UBPCs, the former state farms converted to 

cooperatives. The UBPCs alone accounted for 47.0 percent of 

cultivated land. In addition to sugarcane, state enterprises and 

UBPCs specialize in the production of rice, citrus, coffee, and 

tobacco, as well as livestock. In addition to UBPCs, nonstate 

actors include Agricultural-Livestock Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Producci6n Agropecuaria-CPA), Credit and Services 

Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Creditos y Servicios-CCS), and 

individual farmers. 

A large portion of the nation's industrial capacity and agricultural lands are devoted to sugar production. During the 

1975-87 period, the sugar industry was the largest recipient of 

investment resources, averaging about 20 percent of manufacturing investment. Similarly, investments in sugar agriculture 

took about one-third of overall agricultural investment during 

this same period. 

By the mid-1990s, Cuba's sugar industrial complex comprised 156 sugar mills; seventeen refineries; more than fifty 

plants producing derivatives, such as pulp and paper made 

180 
A frrtilefarrning valle)' near Havana 

Courtesy Suzanne Petrie 

Sugarcane wm}{CiS in Carnagiiry Province 

Courte,I)' DanieUe Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 

181 
Cuba: A Country Study 

from bagasse (that is, stalks and leaves that remain after sugarcane is ground for sugar production), bagasse boards, ethanol, 

rum, yeast, and wax; electric-power generation plants; mechanical shops that produce parts for the sugar industrial facilities 

and manage their maintenance; an extensive internal transportation network; and eight export shipping terminals capable of 

handling sugar in bulk. Although many of the sugar mills date 

from the 1920s, most of them have been thoroughly overhauled. 

A large sugar industry such as Cuba's requires prodigious 

volumes of cane as inputs into the industrial process. Assuming 

an industrial yield of 11 percent-roughly the average yield 

obtained in Cuba in 1950-80-means that the agricultural sector must deliver 100 tons of sugarcane to mills to produce 

eleven tons of raw sugar. The timely delivery of such large 

amounts of sugarcane to mills requires very close coordination 

between agricultural and industrial sectors: the sugarcane must 

both be ground at a time when its sucrose content is highest 

and enter the mills in a steady flow to avoid costly (in terms of 

energy consumption) shutdowns. 

Socialist Cuba has experimented with different forms of 

organization to manage the sugar process. Three of these organizational methods have included totally separate agricultural 

and industrial enterprises controlled by different ministries, 

joint management of agricultural and industrial activities 

under a single Ministry of the Sugar Industry, and agroindustrial complexes, where both sets of activities are coordinated by 

one management team. However, these organizational changes 

have not been able to resolve the agricultural bottlenecks that 

have plagued the Cuban sugar industry. 

In 1989 nearly 2.0 million hectares were devoted to sugarcane cultivation, with the state sector accounting for more than 

1.9 million hectares and the nonstate sector for less than 

100,000 hectares. That is, 53 percent of cultivated land in that 

year was devoted to sugarcane production. It is also clear from 

the above data that sugarcane production was skewed toward 

the state sector, with the nonstate sector controlling less than 5 

percent of sugarcane lands. In 1997, 1.8 million hectares, or 48 

percent of cultivated land, was devoted to sugarcane production. 

Implementation of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law and subsequent confiscatory laws with respect to the sugar industry 

resulted in the expropriation of large amounts of land con182 
The Economy 

trolled by sugar mills. These lands were first organized as cooperatives and in 1962 converted into state farms. In state farms, 

agricultural workers were essentially wage earners, with no 

involvement in management decisions. Sugarcane state farms 

were unwieldy and notorious for their low productivity and failure to meet production targets. In part to try to improve their 

management and performance, state farms were broken up 

and converted into smaller UBPCs in September 1993. 

Cuba has made significant gains in harvesting its sugarcane 

crop through mechanical means. Cutting and loading sugarcane by hand is exhausting and dangerous work. Cuba's socialist government has made a sustained effort to mechanize these 

tasks and has been largely successful, thereby freeing a significant number of workers to participate in other economic activities. By the end of the 1980s, about 70 percent of harvested 

sugarcane was cut by mechanical harvesters, and almost 100 

percent was loaded mechanically (generally using front loaders). Although mechanization of the harvest has eliminated 

the problem of shortages of cane cutters, it has created new 

problems, such as increased extraneous matter entering sugar 

mills (which lowers yield and often results in equipment breakdowns) and higher demand for fuel and spare parts for the 

equipment. 

Consistent with its plan to expand sugar production to about 

11 million tons per year by 1990 and 13 to 14 million tons per 

year by 2000, in the 1980s Cuba began to build new sugargrinding capacity. At least seven new mills (of a planned fifteen) were built, each capable of producing about 100,000 tons 

of sugar in a 150-day zajra (harvest). However, production fell 

behind schedule during the late 1980s, averaging about 7.5 

million tons per annum during 1985-89. Then the crisis of the 

1990s took a heavier toll on the industry. At first, production 

fell gradually, from 8.1 million tons in 1989 to 8.0 in 1990, 7.6 

in 1991, and 7.0 in 1992, but then fell precipitously to 4.1 in 

1993, 3.9 in 1994, and 3.3 in 1995 (the lowest output in fifty 

years). Production recovered somewhat in 1996, when 4.4 million tons were produced, but slumped again to 4.2 million tons 

in 1997 and 3.2 million tons in 1998 (see table 9, Appendix). 

In addition to sugarcane, Cuba produces a broad range of 

other agricultural products, among them roots and tubers, vegetables, grains, beans, citrus, plantain and bananas, tropical 

fruits, coffee, tobacco, livestock, and forest products. No statistics on the relative importance of each of these products (in 

183 
Cuba: A Country Study 

terms of value) within the nonsugar agricultural sector are 

available. Other important segments of the nonsugar agriculture sector in terms of land area devoted to cultivation in 1997 

are rice (6.1 percent of total area); pastures (9.9 percent); coffee (3.8 percent); beans, bananas, and plantains (3.3 percent); 

and citrus (2.5 percent). Most of the output of the nonsugar 

agricultural sector is consumed domestically, but some products-for example, tobacco and citrus-are significant generators of export revenue. 

The cattle-raising industry, seriously affected by the collapse 

of trade with the former Soviet bloc, has suffered from prolonged neglect. Its problems began after 1959 when government experts, relying on genetics and artificial insemination, 

introduced a radical change into the composition of the herd, 

which previously consisted primarily of Cebu and Criollo 

breeds. The new breeds produce more milk but are less resistant to the tropical climate and require greater attention and 

expenditures. By the beginning of the 1970s, the national herd 

declined by one-quarter, and by 1997 there were only 0.42 head 

of cattle per capita, close to the lowest figure on record in the 

twentieth century. 

Cuba's agriculture relies heavily on the use of imported 

inputs and of mechanized equipment. Shortages of imported 

fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, fuels, and spare parts for 

equipment have taken a heavy toll on agricultural production. 

Nonsugar producers have been seriously affected. Output of 

key agricultural products was lower in 1993 than in 1989: 

tubers by 17 percent, vegetables by 36 percent, grains by 61 

percent, beans by 38 percent, citrus by 22 percent, eggs by 46 

percent, and milk by 66 percent. At the same time that production slumped, sharp reductions in food imports gave rise to 

severe food shortages. The government responded by instituting an ambitious food production program that had as its 

objective securing increases in the output of staple foods and 

becoming self-sufficient in food production. Although the food 

program has failed to achieve most of its objectives, by 1997 

food production had improved in nearly all categories over 

1993, although production levels of many commodities 

remained below levels in 1989. To increase the domestic rice 

yield, the government in 1996, for the first time in decades, 

began to encourage the planting of small rice pads (known 

officially as "popular rice") by individual farms. This practice, 

184 
The Economy 

which was widespread before 1959, was almost eradicated in 

subsequent years. 

In accordance with the national acopio procurement system 

instituted in 1962 and covering all agricultural products, nonstate producers are required to sell certain volumes of their 

output to the state. Statistics on the contribution by nonstate 

producers to acopio in 1980 provide insights into the range of 

agricultural commodities produced in the nonstate sector. 

Thus, the latter producers contributed 6.5 percent of the rice, 

57.9 percent of the papayas, and 87.7 percent of the green peppers procured by the state, suggesting that the nonstate sector 

specialized in fruits and vegetables. The breakup of state farms 

and the creation of the UBPCs in September 1993 have 

expanded considerably the role of the nonstate agricultural 

sector. By 1997 the 1,567 UBPCs controlled 3 million hectares 

of land (37 percent of Cuba's state and private land not dedicated to sugarcane) and employed almost 122,000 workers, 

114,000 of whom are members and the rest contracted laborers. 

Manufacturing 

In 1986, the most recent year for which these data are available, Cuba's manufacturing sector consisted of 827 enterprises, 

employing 726,000 workers. The size of the enterprises varied 

significantly, with twenty-six having more than 4,000 workers 

each, nineteen between 3,001 and 4,000 workers, ninety-three 

between 2,001 and 3,000 workers, 190 between 1,001 and 2,000 

workers, and 499 up to 1,000 workers. Industries with the largest number of enterprises manufactured nonelectrical machinery (150 enterprises), sugar (148 enterprises), and foodstuffs 

(145 enterprises). The majority (nineteen out of twenty-six) of 

the largest manufacturing plants, that is, those employing 

more than 4,000 workers, were part of the sugar industry; other 

industries having plants with more than 4,000 workers were 

textiles (three), mining and nonferrous metallurgy (one), 

apparel (one), fishing (one), and beverages and tobacco 

(one). 

In addition to the sugar and nickel mining industries, the 

most significant contributors to national product in 1989 

within the manufacturing sector were the following industries: 

beverages and tobacco, foodstuffs, nonelectrical machinery, 

chemical, electricity generation, and construction materials. 

Enterprises producing beverages and foodstuffs are under the 

185 
Cuba: A Country Study 

control of the Ministry of Foodstuffs Industry. Among the most 

important products of this industry are dairy products, processed meats and fruits, beverages and liquors (including rum 

and beer), and bakery products. The nonelectrical machinery 

industry produces a range of outputs, from transportation 

equipment for the railroads to consumer products such as 

metal pots and pans; however, it is also heavily geared to supplying and servicing the sugar industry, including producing 

Soviet-designed KTP mechanical harvesters and equipment for 

sugar mills. The chemical industry specializes in the production offertilizers and rubber and plastic products. Cement production dominates the construction materials industry. 

During the economic crisis, the manufacturing sector was 

affected severely. Over the 1989-93 period, production fell as 

follows: steel, down 69 percent; cotton yarn, 85 percent; textiles, 77 percent; pasta, 75 percent; lard, 99 percent; powdered 

milk, 75 percent; cement, 74 percent; crushed stone, 85 percent; and cement blocks, 74 percent. Although production of 

most manufactured products improved in the second half of 

the 1990s, production levels in 1998 of key manufactured products were below 1989 levels, with the exception of nickel, oxygen gas, canned meats, and soft drinks. 

Mining 

Metal commodities produced in Cuba include chromite, 

cobalt, copper, crude steel, and nickel (see fig. 5). Other nonfuel industrial mineral products include cement, gypsum, lime, 

ammonia, salt, silica sand, and sulfur. Nickel is the most important metal to the Cuban economy and the export sector. In 

1998 Cuba was the eighth leading producer of nickel in the 

world, producing about 4 percent of total primary nickel production. Cuba's nickel reserves, among the largest in the world, 

are concentrated in the northeastern region of the country, 

around the town of Moa in Holguin Province, and consist primarily of laterites in which nickel is mixed with other metals 

such as iron, chrome, and cobalt. The Moa-Baracoa massif is 

not only the site of the country'~ largest reserves of nickel and 

cobalt, but also of considerable deposits of chromite. 

In the 1990s, Cuba's nickel-processing industry consisted of 

three plants: the Comandante Rene Ramos Latour plant, 

located in Nicaro, which began operations in 1943 and produces nickel oxide; the Comandante Pedro Soto Alba plant, 

located in Moa Bay, which began operations in 1959 and pro186 
50 

Cari66ean Sea 

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LasTunas~ 

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.; 

J,j 

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THE \ .....,_ 

BAHAMAS 

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® 	 National capital 

Populated place • 

Natural gas pipeline 

• 

Planned natural 

gas pipeline 

Tanker terminal 

100 Kilometers 

50 100 Miles 

Cayman 

Islands 

(U.K.) 

~.AMA.· .• ·.ICAX>;.•

~:.;® 

Key to Minerals 

<$) Cement V Kaolin Petroleum 

<iii Chromium 0 Lead Qtz Quartz crystals 

Co Cobalt ~ Magnesium ., Thermal electric power plant 

(Megawatts unknown) ;if Copper, mine output .. Manganese 


[§QQJ Thermal electric power plant 
 Ii Fertilizer Iill Natural gas (power generation rn Megawatts) @ Gold Ni Nickel A Zeolite 

Iron ore 'Nuclear power plant .~ 

Zn Zinc • 

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NOTE-Underlined symbol indicates processing plant. 


Source: Based on information from Orlando D. Martino. Alinrml Indllstries o/IJltin 1\1I11,ri[([. 'Washington: 1998, 

48-9; /11([jor Pi/idines aIthe Warld [London], 62, No.3, March 1995. 

Figure 5. iVlineraL~, Natural Gas, Petroleum, and Thermal Resources, 1996 
The Economy 

duces nickel and cobalt sulfides; and the Comandante Ernesto 

"Che" Guevara plant, located in Punta Gorda, which began 

operations in 1988 and produces nickel oxide. Construction of 

a fourth plant at Las Camariocas, which was being carried out 

with financial assistance from the CMEA countries, has been 

suspended un til new forms of foreign financing are found. 

As a result of the economic crisis of the 1990s, nickel production fell steadily from approximately 47,000 tons (mineral content) in 1989 to approximately 27,000 tons (mineral content) 

in 1994, or by 43 percent, mainly because of maintenance 

problems and energy shortages. Production bounced back in 

1995, when nearly 43,000 tons (mineral content) were produced. A significant factor in the recovery of the nickel industry has been influxes of capital and technology and export 

markets provided by foreign investors. In 1994 Sherritt International, a Canadian company, entered into a fifty-fifty joint venture arrangement with Cuba's General Nickel Company 

(Compania General del Niquel). The joint venture agreement 

included mineral concessions; the operation of the nickel-production facility Comandante Pedro Soto Alba at Moa Bay and a 

nickel refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, Canada, owned 

by Sherritt; and ajoint enterprise to market the products produced by the joint venture. Other reported foreign investments 

in the nickel industry include a credit from a Dutch bank to 

modernize facilities and an agreement between the Western 

Mining Company of Australia and the Cuban Commercial 

Caribbean Nickel Company to assess and develop mineral 

deposits in the Pinares de Mayari area. 

Joint ventures with foreign investors have also been active in 

exploration and production of copper, silver, gold, and other 

minerals. Cuba's state mining agency, Geominera, has entered 

into joint venture agreements with a number of Canadian companies: Joutel Resources Limited, Republic Goldfields, Miramar Mining Corporation, Caribgold Resources, Homer 

Goldmines, and Macdonald Mines Exploration. Cuba has 

granted concessions to the foreign companies to explore for 

silver, gold, and copper in specific areas of the country. The 

joint ventures have also taken over the exploitation of existing 

mining operations, injecting capital to purchase equipment 

and fund operating expenses. 

189 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Energy 

Cuba has traditionally relied on imports to meet its energy 

requirements. The island is not well endowed with energy 

resources: coal is not found in commercial quantities; hydroelectric resources are limited by rivers that have low heads, 

carry relatively small quantities of water, and are subject to 

uneven flow during the year; and oil and natural gas deposits 

discovered to date are woefully inadequate to meet demand. 

Biomass (in the form of bagasse) is an important energy source 

for the sugar industry. However, the use of bagasse by the economy at large is constrained by its bulkiness, its low caloric value, 

and its demand by the sugar industry and several factories, 

which use bagasse as a raw material for producing building and 

consumer products. In 1988 Cuba met 70 percent of its energy 

requirements with liquid fuels (crude oil, light oil products, 

and heavy oil products), about 29 percent with biomass, and 

the remaining 1 percent with other energy sources such as 

coal, coke, and hydroelectricity. 

In the 1990s, Cuba relied on oil to generate more than 80 

percent of its electricity. Cuba's electricity generation industry 

had a combined generation capacity of 4.33 gigawatt hours in 

1997 and 15.274 billion kilowatt hours in 1998. With the exception of several small hydroelectric plants with a combined 

capacity of 55.4 megawatt hours, the remaining power plants 

were fueled with oil, oil products, and natural gas. Cuba's electricity consumption in 1998 totaled 14.205 billion kilowatt 

hours. 

Cuba began an ambitious nuclear power program in the 

early 1980s, with the objective of meeting up to one-fifth of 

electricity demand through nuclear power. The first nuclear 

reactor, being built with technology and financial assistance 

from the Soviet Union atJuragua, on Cuba's southern coast, 

has been delayed because of lack of financial resources, and it 

is now questionable whether the project will ever be completed. 

Oil has been produced in Cuba commercially since 1915, 

but domestic production has traditionally provided only a 

small fraction of consumption. Domestic oil production's share 

of apparent consumption (domestic production plus imports 

minus exports) has been estimated at about 1 to 3 percent in 

the 1960s and 1970s and 6 to 9 percent in the 1980s. Despite 

this increase, domestically produced oil still accounted for less 

than one-fifth of the depressed oil consumption level of about 

190 
The Economy 

5 million tons in the first half of the 1990s. Apparent consumption of oil and oil products was in the range of 10 to 12 million 

tons per annum in the late 1980s. Domestically produced oil 

(mostly heavy crude) rose from 0.67 million tons in 1990 to 

nearly 1.7 million tons by 1998. 

Oil exploration (onshore and offshore) and production 

have been a priority in the 1990s, mainly through partnerships 

with foreign companies. In 1994 at least eleven foreign companies were involved in oil exploration and production in Cuban 

territory, both on land and offshore; eleven others were working in oil production services. Firms from Britain, France, Canada, Germany, and Sweden were operating eighteen of thirtythree oil fields in the nation. Almost 90 percent of Cuba's still 

limited oil production is concentrated in an extensive line of 

coastal territory running north of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and in the area between Sancti Spiritus and Ciego de 

Avila provinces. 

As a result of the 1992 reorganization of Cuba's petroleum 

industry, a new state enterprise, Cubapetroleum (Cubapetr6­

leo-Cupet), was established, under the Ministry of Basic 

Industries, with responsibility for the entire petroleum sector: 

exploration, drilling, and refining and distribution. Another 

entity, Commercial Cupet (Comercial Cupet), is in charge of 

negotiating with foreign companies. 

Production partnership agreements appear to be risk contracts, where the foreign entity typically undertakes the investment risk and shares the oil that may be produced with the 

domestic partner. As a result offoreign participation, oil production has been one of the few economic activities not 

severely affected by the economic crisis. Crude oil production 

dipped from around 700,000 tons in 1989-90 to 527,000 tons 

in 1991, but recovered to 882,000 tons in 1992 and for the first 

time exceeded 1 million tons in 1994, when 1,107,600 tons 

were produced. Oil production was roughly 1.5 million tons in 

1995-97 and 1.7 million tons in 1998. 

The Soviet Union was Cuba's primary source of energy (primarilyoil and oil products) imports from 1960 to 1990. Domestic energy demand rose rapidly through the end of the 1980s, 

with imports from the Soviet Union increasing as well. In the 

1960s, Cuba imported 4 to 6 million tons of Soviet oil and oil 

products per annum; in 1985-88 Cuban oil imports exceeded 

13 million tons per annum. Not all of the imported Soviet oil 

was consumed domestically. During the 1980s, Cuba reex­
Cuba: A Country Study 

ported significant quantities of Soviet oil to the world market 

to generate convertible currencies; as many as 3.6 to 3.7 million tons of Soviet oil were reexported in 1985-86. 

Oil imports from the Soviet Union were disrupted beginning in 1990. In August 1990, the Cuban government 

announced the imposition of mandatory energy conservation 

measures to address a 2-million-ton shortfall in Soviet deliveries 

of oil and oil products. The shift in pricing of Soviet (and subsequently Russian) oil exports to convertible currency forced 

Cuba to cut imports drastically. It is estimated that Cuba's oil 

and oil products imports in the second half of the 1990s are in 

the range of 5 to 7 million tons per annum; even with higher 

domestic oil output, domestic production was about 20 percent 

of apparent consumption. 

Cuba relies on three refineries-located in Cabaiguan, 

Havana, and Santiago de Cuba-to process domestic and 

imported crude oil into a range of derivatives demanded by 

Cuban industries, agriculture, the transportation sector, and 

consumers. A fourth refinery, at Cienfuegos, with a capacity of 

3 million tons of crude per year, is still only partially completed. The others date from the 1950s and were expropriated 

in 1960 from the international oil companies (Esso, Texaco, 

and Royal-Dutch Shell) that operated on the island prior to the 

revolutionary takeover of 1959. In the late 1980s, Cuba completed an oil import facility at the port of Matanzas and a pipeline linking it with the new Cienfuegos refinery. 

Transportation 

A relatively small and densely populated country that relies 

heavily on foreign trade, Cuba has a well-developed transportation infrastructure. By 1997 Cuba had an estimated 60,858 kilometers of highways, including 29,820 kilometers of paved roads 

and 31,038 kilometers of unpaved roads. The country's railroads total 4,807 kilometers of standard gauge. The highways, 

railroads, and air and maritime transportation services provide 

access to almost every location on the island (see fig. 6). Cuba 

also has an infrastructure of ports, airports, and warehouses to 

support extensive foreign trade. 

For many years, the main highway was the Central Highway, 

mostly a two-lane highway running for 1,200 kilometers from 

Pinar del Rio in the west to Santiago de Cuba in the east. In the 

late 1970s, construction began on a new eight-lane National 

Expressway (commonly known as "Ocho Vias," or Eight 

192 
The Economy 

Lanes), which now reportedly runs the length of Cuba, from 

Pinar del Rio in the west to Santiago de Cuba in the east. Private ownership of vehicles is very low. Passenger transportation 

within the island depends heavily on public buses and trucks. 

Cuba's stock of passenger cars and commercial vehicles in 1988 

was 241,300 units, of which 208,400 (86.4 percent) were commercial vehicles. In 1985 Cuba had thirty-eight motor vehicles 

per 1,000 population, a rate much lower than for developed 

countries (United States, 717; Canada, 567; Australia, 532; Germany, 451) and also for the more highly developed Latin 

American countries (Argentina, 175; Brazil, 88; Chile, 73; Mexico, 94; Uruguay, 117; Venezuela, 117). 

Land transportation has been severely affected by the economic crisis. Lack of spare parts for the bus and truck fleet has 

reduced significantly the number of vehicles in operation. 

(Hungary and the former Soviet Union scrapped production 

of some of these vehicles and spare parts.) Moreover, fuel 

shortages have forced cutbacks in the number of routes and 

their frequency. Transportation bottlenecks have affected labor 

productivity because workers are unable to get to their jobs on 

time or have to spend an inordinately long period of time in 

reporting to theirjobs. 

Railroad transportation has been neglected since 1959 in 

favor of truck transport, despite being much more energy efficient than truck transport, particularly in transporting sugarcane. Cuba's poorly maintained railroad system consists of one 

main axis running the length of the island, connecting all of 

the major urban centers, economic zones, and ports, either 

directly or through branches. A bit more than one-third of the 

railroads carry both passengers and freight, with the rest dedicated to the transport of sugarcane. A major reconstruction of 

the central railroad line began in the late 1970s; equipment 

was updated with diesel locomotives manufactured in the 

Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Railroad transportation has 

also been affected by shortages offuel and spare parts during 

the Special Period; the four daily trips from Havana to Santiago 

de Cuba have been reduced to one a day, and frequent equipment breakdowns have made the system largely unreliable. 

Cuba has eleven main ports capable of handling general 

export and import cargoes. The most important of these are 

Antilla, Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, and 

Santiago de Cuba (see Principal Geographic Features, ch. 2). 

The major deep-water ports are the bays of Cienfuegos, 

193 
<D Boundary representation ~ not necessarily aUlhoritativo 

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Railroad 

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UNITED STATES'/' ,,­ ,",,~,,*. d'- , &c. .,;\0" 'I(i 0\ StrOl " ,.. ,., 

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THE 

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Figure 6. TransjJortation System, 1999 
The Economy 

Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, and Santiago de 

Cuba. 

Havana is by far the most important port. In addition, Cuba 

has eight bulk sugar loading terminals, one supertanker terminal at Matanzas, and several other smaller import facilities, as 

well as specialized port facilities for the fishing fleet. Number 

one in sugar export, the port of Cienfuegos is capable of handling one-third of Cuba's sugar production through its bulk 

sugar terminal. Its pier for handling oil and oil byproducts 

allows the berthing of ships up to 50,000 tons. 

In part because of the fast-growing tourism industry, Cuba 

has made considerable investments in upgrading and expanding its airport infrastructure. Ten of the seventeen civilian airports can now handle international flights, and nine of them 

are linked to the nine largest tourist resorts. Of Cuba's 170 airports in 1999, seventy-seven were paved and ninety-three 

unpaved. Cuba's main international airports include 

Camagiiey, Ciego de Avila, Cienfuegos, Havana, Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, and Varadero. In May 1997, Cuba began a 

US$70 million, seven-month modernization project at its two 

most important airports, those in Havana and Varadero, as a 

result of an agreement between the Cuban Airport Services 

Enterprise (Empresa Cubana de Aeropuertos S.A.-ECASA) 

and the British company, Airport Planning Development 

(APD). Inaugurated in mid-1998, the Jose Marti International 

Airport's new terminal expands the Havana airport's capacity 

to 3 million people per year. The main national airports that 

handle primarily domestic flights include Baracoa, Bayamo, 

Cayo Largo, Guantanamo, Holguin, Manzanillo, Moa, Nicaro, 

Nueva Gerona, and Santa Clara. The Consolidated Cuban Aviation Company (Empresa Consolidada Cubana de Aviaci6nCubana), Cuba's flag carrier, moves 45 percent ofinternational 

tourism into Cuba and manages all seventeen civilian airports. 

Telecommunications 

Cuba's telecommunications infrastructure improved in the 

late 1990s as a result of government efforts to increase the 

availability of telephones throughout the island and the participation of foreign investors. Telephone density remains low by 

global standards, approximately between 4.5 and 5.5 telephones per 100 inhabitants, and is below the telephone density 

of neighboring Caribbean countries. Approximately 45 per195 
Cuba: A Country Study 

cent of Cuba's telephone lines serve residents within Havana's 

metropolitan area. 

The island's national infrastructure supports national and 

international telecommunications services utilizing wired and 

wireless facilities. The majority of the infrastructure dates to 

the period before the 1959 revolution and uses technology that 

has surpassed its life cycle multiple times. Newer facilities were 

installed during the 1990s with the assistance of foreign telecommunications services partners. 

Cuba's first private investment participation in the telecommunications industry began in 1991, when ajoint venture was 

formed between Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, 

S.A. (ETECSA), the state-owned telecommunications company, 

and Telefonos Internacionales de Mexico, S.A. (TIMSA), creating Telefonos Celulares de Cuba, S.A, (Cubacel). Cubacel 

became a provider of cellular telephone service within the city 

of Havana and the tourist corridor connecting Havana and 

Varadero. In 1998 a Canadian company, Sherritt International 

Corporation, acquired 37 percent of Cubacel for US$38.2 million. This acquisition gave Sherritt twenty-year rights for the 

800 Megahertz (MHz) bands for provisioning of analog and 

digital telecommunications services. The target industry sectors are tourism, diplomatic corps, joint ventures, and government; most of the current 5,500 to 7,000 subscribers come 

from these sectors. A second wireless cellular system is 

planned. 

In June 1994, Cuba announced a joint venture between 

ETECSA and Crupo Domos Internacional, a holding group 

based in Monterey, Mexico, wherein Crupo Domos would own 

49 percent of the island's telephone infrastructure. Planned 

investments of approximately US$700 million by Crupo Domos 

in the development and upgrade of the telephone infrastructure ran aground because of the group's financial difficulties 

associated with Mexico's economic recession of 1995. Domos 

subsequently sold its participation in the joint venture to Italy's 

largest telecommunications concern, STET International 

Netherlands N.v. In 1997 the United States approved a private 

agreement between STET and the International Telephone 

and Telegraph (ITT) company, the owner of Cuba's telephone 

system prior to the revolution, wherein STET agreed to pay 

approximately US$25 million to ITT for the right to use its telephone system and avoid sanctions under the Helms-Burton 

Act. 

196 
The Economy 

Estimates of required investment for upgrading Cuba's 

national infrastructure range from US$900 million for the 

national telephone infrastructure to approximately US$2.5 billion for upgrading the full complement of voice, data, and 

video communications infrastructure. These estimates support 

a plan to increase the national telephone density from its 

present levels to approximately eleven per 100 inhabitants, 

while increasing the density to fifteen per 100 inhabitants in 

the city of Havana. To attain a density of nine per 100 by the 

year 2004 would require the installation of approximately 

100,000 telephones per year. New telephone line installation 

has been programmed at approximately 70,000 per year, with 

an increased emphasis on the installation of public telephones 

throughout the island. An additional 8,000 coin- and cardoperated public telephones (CCOPT) were planned for installation during 2000, with a planned deployment of an additional 52,000 public telephones by the year 2004. 

The bulk of the conversion to digital facilities by 2000 

occurred within the city of Havana consistent with the plan to 

increase telephone density in areas that promise a higher 

return on investment. As part of the infrastructure improvement effort, approximately 11,200 lines were assigned for 

award by municipal governments to residential users. 

Future development and deployment of Cuba's telecommunications infrastructure will be limited by per capita disposable 

income. The latter is a primary factor that has slowed the 

deployment of telephone service into the population mainstream. CCOPTs have served to fill this economic void. United 

States foreign policy is having and will have an impact on the 

development and growth rate of Cuba's telecommunications 

infrastructure because foreign investors have been careful not 

to violate United States law. 

Cuba receives hard-currency revenue from its international 

long-distance services. Approximately 70 percent of Cuba's 

international calls are made to or from the United States, connecting the island to the large Cuban-American community living in the United States. Annual revenue from United StatesCuba long-distance services ranges from US$50 million to 

US$70 million for Cuba and approximately US$60 million to 

US$80 million for United States-based carriers that provide 

such service. 

Cuba's government has realized the importance of the development of a telecommunications infrastructure in support of 

197 
Cuba: A Country Study 

its economic development efforts and has prioritized the development oflimited high bandwidth facilities, including Internet 

access for the diplomatic corps, joint ventures, and the government, education, tourism and financial sectors. Although limited, this development has allowed sectors such as banking to 

provide and support basic services such as automatic teller 

machines (ATMs). Chinese interests have created an additional 

force within the telecommunications industry, including the 

manufacture of telecommunications hardware for internal use 

and export. Cuba's telecommunications system naturally also 

includes television and radio. In 1997 Cuba had fifty-eight television broadcast stations and 2.64 million televisions. Cuban 

radio became a more dynamic mass medium in the late 1990s. 

The number of radio broadcast stations in 1998 totaled 169 

AM, fifty-five FM, and one shortwave. The country had 3.9 million radios in 1997. 

Tourism 

Mter shunning international tourism in the 1960s on the 

grounds that it represented foreign exploitation and behavior 

that was inconsistent with a socialist society, Cuba created the 

National Institute ofTourism (Instituto Nacional de TurismoIntur) in the mid-1970s and began to encourage international 

tourism. In the 1980s, international tourism was recognized as 

a potentially important source of revenue for the island, but it 

became apparent that after more than two decades of neglect, 

the tourism infrastructure had deteriorated to the point that 

Cuba was incapable of competing with other tourist destinations. Cuba created two semiautonomous corporations-Cubanacan in 1987 and Grupo Gaviota in 1989-to enlist foreign 

participation in the international tourism industry. The 

emphasis has been on building a physical infrastructure for the 

industry and improving the quality of services so as to be able 

to compete in the international tourism market. 

Tourism is the sector of the economy that first began to 

attract foreign investment, with the first joint venture established in 1988. Particularly active injoint venturing in the tourism industry have been investors from Canada, Germany, 

Mexico, the Netherlands, and Spain. In many instances, the 

joint ventures are actually closer to management contracts: the 

foreign partner assumes management of a tourism facility, 

obtaining a flow of tourists from its home market, and ensuring 

198 
A performer at the Tropican

nightclub in Havana, 199

Courtesy Maria M. Alons

The neocolonial Hot

Nacional, Havana's mo

opulent hotel, overlooks th

Port ofHavana

Courtesy Phillips Bourn
Cuba: A Country Study 

that the quality of the tourism services meets international 

standards. 

The Cuban tourism industry has thrived in the 1990s. This 

growth is reflected in the increasing capacity to accommodate 

tourists; the stock of hotel rooms increased from about 32,000 

in 1991 to about 41,000 in 1997 (see table 10, Appendix). 

Meanwhile, the stock of hotel rooms suitable for international 

tourism more than doubled between 1990 and 1996, from 

12,900 to 26,900 rooms, evidence that new construction is 

aimed at the international tourism market and that some of 

the stock of hotel rooms have been upgraded to meet higher 

international standards. 

The number of foreign visitors nearly tripled, going from 

340,000 in 1990 to nearly 1.2 million in 1997. Gross revenue 

from international tourism in 1997 has been estimated at 1,543 

million pesos. About a third is estimated to be net revenue. 

With regard to efficiency indicators, the occupancy rate of 

hotel rooms overall was nearly 70 percent in 1991; it fell to 

about 60 percent in subsequent years. For hotel rooms suitable 

for international tourism, the occupancy rate increased from 

about 40 percent in the early 1990s to more than 50 percent in 

1995-96. However, the average length ofstay offoreign visitors 

declined from 8.7 days in 1990-91 to 7.3 days in 1996. 

Income per visitor per day increased steadily over the 1990­

96 period, from US$82.50 in 1990 to US$187.80 in 1996. 

According to an industry expert, Cuba continues to be 

regarded as an inexpensive "package" destination, reflecting 

the initial tourism strategy of quickly penetrating source markets by offering low, all-inclusive packages. Moreover, the ability to increase prices is hindered by the lack of quality of 

products and services in other associated industries: food and 

beverage operations, retail facilities, recreation and entertainment activities, and other tourism infrastructure. 

Labor 

The 1981 population census, the last such census conducted 

on the island, revealed that 52.3 percent of the population fifteen years of age and over was economically active (that is, 

employed or looking for work, excluding retirees, students, 

those unable to work, and persons who were primarily homemakers). With respect to gender, 71.5 percent of males and 

32.8 percent offemales fifteen years of age and over were economically active. 

200 
The Economy 

Labor statistics published by the Cuban government 

through the 1980s were scanty and tended to focus on employment in the state sector. This emphasis on state-sector employment reflected both the very small role of the nonstate sector 

in the economy and the full employment policy of the government. Cuban economistJose Luis Rodriguez has estimated that 

in 1988 the Cuban state controlled all of the industrial, construction, retail trade, wholesale and foreign trade, banking, 

and education sectors, almost all of the transportation sector, 

and 92 percent of the agricultural sector. The full employment 

policy pursued by the government resulted in bloated payrolls 

of state enterprises, very low open unemployment rates-for 

example, a reported l.3 percent in the 1970 census of population and 3.4 percent in the 1981 census-but very high rates of 

underemployment (see Glossary). 

Since 1962, wages of Cuban workers have been set on the 

basis of a uniform, nationwide wage scale for various categories 

ofjobs. Prior to a wage reform carried out in 1981 to stem the 

flight of workers from the agricultural sector, average earnings 

of agricultural workers were substantially below those of other 

sectors of the economy. They were, for example, about 20 percent below the overall average for all workers in 1975 and 14 

percent in 1980. Mter 1981 the gap between wages of agricultural and nonagricultural workers was closed. By 1988-89, average monthly earnings of agricultural workers were at, or near, 

the average for workers in the productive sphere and higher 

than the average earnings of workers in certain sectors within 

the productive sphere, such as commerce and communications. 

In 1989 average monthly earnings of Cuban workers in each 

of the main economic sectors, in pesos per month, were culture and arts, 223; science and technology, 217; transportation, 

211; administration, 201; construction, 201; public health, 

social security and tourism, 195; education, 191; finance and 

insurance, 190; agriculture, 186; industry, 186; forestry, 184; 

communications, 176; community and personal services, 164; 

and commerce, 163. Within the industrial sector, average 

monthly earnings ranged from 237 pesos per month for workers in electricity production and distribution to 141 pesos per 

month for workers in the apparel industry. 

Statistics released by Cuba to ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) permit an examination of the labor market in the 1990s. In 1989, the year just 

201 
Cuba: A Country Study 

prior to the beginning of the economic crisis, 92.1 percent of 

the economically active population was reported as being 

employed and 7.9 percent as unemployed. Of those employed, 

80.1 percent held jobs as state civilian employees, 13.8 percent 

held other state jobs, and 5.3 percent held nonstate jobs, such 

as cooperative members, private farmers, and self-employed or 

salaried workers. With regard to the unemployed, four-fifths 

had lost their jobs and were seeking a new one, while one-fifth 

were new entrants into the labor force seeking a first job. 

During the 1990s, the economically active population actually declined, from 4.7 million persons in 1989 to 4.5 million 

persons in 1995, recovering to 4.6 million in 1996 (see table 11, 

Appendix). The decline in the economically active population 

is attributable to several factors, among them declining fertility, 

the shift of some persons from the formal to the informal economy, early retirement, and emigration. Employment also fell 

during the 1990s; in 1996 total employment was nearly 3 percent below the corresponding level in 1989. 

State-sector employment in 1989 was roughly 4.1 million 

workers, of whom 3.5 million were civilian employees and 

600,000 were classified as other state employees. During the 

1990s, state-sector employment fell sharply, reflecting the 

severe dislocations suffered by state enterprises and sharp 

reductions in the size of the armed forces. By 1996 overall state 

employment was roughly 3.2 million workers, 22 percent lower 

than in 1989. State civilian employment was 24 percent lower 

in 1997 than in 1990; particularly significant were reductions in 

state employment in agriculture and related activities (77 percent) because of the creation of UBPCs and in manufacturing 

(18 percent) (see table 12, Appendix). 

The sharp reductions in economic activity of the 1990s are 

not reflected in the open unemployment statistics because of 

explicit government policies to shield workers from the impact 

of the economic crisis and the rapid growth of employment in 

the nonstate sector. However, severe reductions in imports of 

fuels, raw materials, and spare parts have significantly reduced 

economic activity and labor demand. In September 1990, for 

example, President Castro announced that several recently 

completed investments would remain idle, among them a 

nickel production plant and an oil refinery, and that an existing nickel-producing plant would cease to operate because of 

lack of fuel. In mid-October 1990, the Ministry of Light Industry reported that 321 factories under its control were operating 

202 
The Economy 

at the rate of twenty-four hours per week and that twenty-six 

others had been shut down altogether. In 1992 the State Committee on Labor and Social Security (Comite Estatal de Trabajo 

y Seguridad Social-CETSS) reported that 155,000 workers 

had lost their jobs as a result of the lack of imported inputs. 

Finally, in May 1993 about 60 percent of Cuba's factories were 

reportedly idle because ofshortages offuels, raw materials, and 

spare parts. Yet the number of workers who had lost their jobs 

and were seeking new employment peaked at nearly 300,000 

workers in 1989 and fell to fewer than 215,000 workers in 

1992-93. 

The Fourth Congress of the PCC, held in October 1991, 

addressed the problem of worker dislocations and adopted 

new rules as part of its resolution on economic development. 

The document assures a basic income for every family or 

worker and maintains the right of each citizen to work. In 

those cases where it is not possible to keep someone working, 

the worker will retain the right to the post and will receive a 

percentage of his or her salary, according to current legislation." 

InJuly 1990, in anticipation of the worst in economic dislocations, the CETSS adopted rules to facilitate the transfer of 

dislocated workers (trabajadores disponibles) from one workplace 

to another. The rules identified agriculture as the employer of 

last resort, that is, a sector of the economy that could absorb 

additional workers from other sectors. The rules also retained 

the existing system of payments to dislocated workers, which 

ranged from one month to a maximum of one year depending 

on the length of service in the job (payments for a full year 

were available only to workers with job tenure ofmore than ten 

years) and calculated on the basis of a declining wage replacement formula of 100 percent for the first month, 70 percent 

for the second month, and 50 percent for subsequent months. 

In November 1990, as the economic situation deteriorated 

and it became increasingly clear that the nature and depth of 

the dislocations could not be addressed by shifting workers 

from one workplace to another, the CETSS issued new rules to 

deal with the problem of redundant or surplus workers (trabajadores sobrantes). The new rules made it easier to reassign workers to other workplaces or occupations and modified the 

compensation system to recognize the long-term duration of 

the dislocations. Thus, time limits on payment of compensation were removed, and the wage replacement percentages 

203 
Cuba: A Country Study 

were readjusted to 100 percent for the first month and 60 percent for each subsequent month. While receiving these benefits, workers maintained an association with their workplaceseven if their workplaces were shut down-and therefore were 

not considered unemployed. 

At the same time that state-sector employment was shrinking, employment in the nonstate sector was growing at a very 

fast pace: nonstate-sector employment increased more than 

four-fold, from about 230,000 in 1989 to more than 1 million in 

1996, absorbing a large portion of workers shed by the state 

sector. It should be noted, however, that the growth of employment in the nonstate sector does not uniformly represent net 

job creation because structural shifts have occurred that affect 

the distribution of employment between the state and nonstate 

sectors. The most significant shift is with regard to the agricultural sector, where the creation of the UBPCs added approximately 240,000 workers to the nonstate sector in 1994; these 

workers were formerly employees of state farms and were 

counted as employees of the state sector. Similarly, it is not 

clear that increases in the category of "salaried workers" actually represent new job creation because they may reflect the 

shift of some state enterprises to joint ventures with foreign 

investors or to sociedades anonimas (stock companies) operating 

outside of the state sector. 

The only available statistics regarding the distribution of 

employment by economic activity are for employees of the state 

civilian sector. Although these statistics were a good proxy for 

overall employment during the time period when the state controlled the bulk of economic activities, they are less so now 

because of structural changes that have occurred, and therefore must be examined with much caution. 

In 1990 the manufacturing sector accounted for about 19 

percent of state civilian employment, while the percentage for 

the agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing sectors totaled 22 

percent. Other significant economic activities in terms of 

employment were commerce, restaurants, and hotels (12 percent); and construction (nearly 9 percent). Employment in 

manufacturing, construction, commerce, restaurants, and 

hotels declined during the 1990s, consistent with reports that 

these areas of economic activity were particularly hard hit by 

shortages ofimports. 

Employment in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 

rose in the early 1990s, consistent with information suggesting 

204 
A 1950s-era North American automobile (una maquina) 

still in use in Havana, 1997 

Courtesy }\I1ark P. Sullivan 

that workers dislocated from manufacturing, construction, and 

other activities were being reassigned to agricultural activities. 

The sharp drop in agricultural employment in 1994 did not 

necessarily reflect a reversal of this trend but rather the shift of 

a large number of state workers to the nonstate sector upon the 

creation of the UBPCs. 

The Second Economy 

The term second economy originates from the literature on 

centrally planned economies. It has been used by scholars to 

comprise economic activities outside the first, official, or 

planned economy. Certain characteristics of centrally planned 

economies-overwhelming government ownership of the 

means of production, tautness or rigidity of central plans, and 

suppressed inflation-account for both the quantitative importance of the first economy and the pervasiveness of activities 

outside of it. 

Cuba's first economy consists of economic activities under 

the control of the socialist state and subject to the central plan. 

Through the late 1980s, although the Cuban state controlled 

205 
Cuba: A Country Study 

nearly all economic activities on the island, some economic 

activities for private gain were permitted to exist alongside the 

planned state economy. These second economy activities 

included agriculture, where private farmers controlled a portion of the land; the sale of certain personal services; and, for a 

period during the early 1980s, farmers' markets and artisan 

markets. Other economic activities outside of state control 

were those conducted illegally, such as black-market operations 

and unauthorized use of government resources. 

There are no readily available measures or estimates of the 

magnitude of Cuba's second economy. However, an examination of official statistics on overall agricultural output, civilian 

employment, and the structure ofthe population's income suggests that private, legal economic activity in the 1980s probably 

accounted for about 6 percent of GSP (global social product), 

employed about 230,000 workers, or about 5 percent of civilian 

employment, and accounted for 5 to 6 percent of the population's income. It is even more difficult to estimate the value of 

illegal economic activities because participants in illegal economic activities place a high premium on the anonymity of 

their actions and deal almost exclusively with cash transactions 

in order to avoid audit trails that could reveal their activities. 

As the bottom fell out of the first economy during the early 

1990s, the second economy expanded to fill the gap. According to the Domestic Consumer Demand Institute (Instituto de 

la Demanda Interna-IDI), the value of black-market transactions rose from 17 percent of retail sales in 1990 to more than 

60 percent in 1992 as money supply expanded and the availability of goods and services through the state distribution system contracted. Illegal forms of self-employment reportedly 

also increased during the early 1990s. 

Several of the policy initiatives pursued in the 1990s have 

stimulated the second economy. These initiatives include the 

creation of the UBPCs, authorization of self-employment, stimulation ofjoint ventures with foreign investors, creation of agricultural and artisan markets, decriminalization of the use of 

convertible currencies, establishment of government-operated 

foreign currency Exchange Houses, decentralization offoreign 

trade activities, and formation of semiautonomous corporations. That the economic policies to overcome the economic 

crisis are centered on second-economy activities is a tacit 

admission that the first economy is no longer viable in an economic environment in which there are no trade subsidies or 

206 
The Economy 

economic assistance from the former Soviet Union and Eastern 

Europe. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

Background, 1960-90 

Beginning in the early 1960s, and through around 1990, 

Cuba's external sector was segmented into two parts: economic 

relations with the socialist world, conducted within the framework of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), 

and economic relations with market economies, mainly West 

European nations, Canada, Japan, and some key developing 

countries. Economic relations with the socialist countries were 

by far the more significant quantitatively; relations with market 

economies, although quantitatively small, were strategically significant, however, because they afforded Cuba the possibility to 

import goods and services and obtain technology not available 

from the socialist nations. 

Relatians with Socialist Countries 

Cuba's economic relations with the Soviet Union and socialist countries were based on a web of bilateral agreements covering merchandise trade, payments, credits, and technical 

assistance. During the 1961-69 period alone, Cuba concluded 

more than 400 bilateral agreements with socialist countries. To 

coordinate the burgeoning economic and scientific-technical 

assistance relationship, several government-to-government 

commissions were established in the 1960s and 1970s with the 

German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (in 1964), Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (1965), Hungary (1966), Romania 

(1967), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 

Korea) (1968), Poland (1969), and the Soviet Union (1970). 

Economic relations with socialist countries deepened after 

1972, when Cuba became a member of the CMEA. 

The bulk of Cuba's trade with socialist countries was conducted through bilateral balancing agreements-tantamount 

to barter arrangements-in which individual transactions were 

made and accounts settled, using either the currency of one of 

the partner countries or "transferable rubles." The latter was 

an artificial currency whose sole role was to serve as the unit of 

account in transactions among socialist countries. Because neither the currencies of socialist countries nor the "transferable 

ruble" could be freely converted or exchanged into "hard" cur207 
Cuba: A Country Study 

rencies-for example, the United States dollar, Deutsche mark, 

and Japanese yen-to purchase goods and services in international markets, socialist nations made efforts to balance trade 

bilaterally each year. To the extent that trade was not balanced 

annually, the gap was covered by "soft" (transferable ruble) 

credits. 

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union began to purchase Cuban 

sugar at prices that were fixed for several years (typically, five 

years). Because world market prices for sugar fluctuatedsometimes exceeding, but more often falling below the contracted price-the arrangement tended to favor Cuba. In 

December 1972, Cuba and the Soviet Union signed two agreements that formalized a system of preferential, that is, higher 

than world market, prices for Cuban nickel and sugar exports. 

The price of nickel was set for five-year intervals, but it was 

raised whenever the world market price exceeded this threshold by a substantial margin. In 1981-84, for example, Cuba 

greatly benefitted from Soviet concessionary prices for nickel 

imports, which were more than twice the world market price. 

In the aftermath of very high world market prices for sugar 

in 1974 and 1975, the contract price for Cuban sugar exports 

to the Soviet Union and other CMEA nations was renegotiated 

and adjusted upward. In 1975 Cuba and the Soviet Union 

agreed to a mechanism whereby sugar export prices were 

adjusted annually, above a very high base price, in proportion 

to changes in the prices of a basket of commodities Cuba 

imported from the Soviet Union. As a result of this indexing 

arrangement, henceforth the price of Cuban sugar exports to 

the Soviet Union consistently exceeded the world market price 

by a considerable margin. Cuba also negotiated agreements 

with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 

Poland, and Romania, all of which granted preferential prices 

to Cuban sugar exports. In addition, Cuba benefitted in the 

1960s, 1970s, and the first half of the 1980s from pricing 

arrangements in intra-CMEA trade that held the price of oil 

below the world market price. 

The Soviet Union became revolutionary Cuba's almost sole 

supplier of oil and oil products in 1960, on the heels of the 

Cuban government's takeover of the refineries operated by 

Western multinational oil companies. The price of Soviet oil 

exports, like the prices of other basic commodities traded by 

socialist countries among themselves, was fixed for a five-year 

period, purportedly to avoid fluctuations in capitalist world 

208 
The Economy 

markets. Because of this arrangement, Cuba was spared the 

shock associated with the quadrupling of world oil market 

prices that occurred in 1973 and additional price increases in 

1974. In 1975, however, the Soviet Union began to adjust prices 

of oil exports to its CMEA allies annually, based on a moving 

average of world market prices in the previous five years. 

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, as world oil market 

prices rose, Cuba benefitted from this arrangement. But as 

world oil market prices fell in the mid-1980s, the arrangement 

worked to Cuba's disadvantage, with the island paying prices in 

the late 1980s for Soviet oil that were above the world market 

price. Over the entire 1960-90 period, however, the oil price 

supply arrangements with the Soviet Union resulted in net 

gains for Cuba. 

From 1962 to 1974, Cuba's merchandise trade turnoverthe sum of merchandise exports and imports-averaged 24 

percent of GSP; in 1985-89 it averaged 50 percent, evidencing 

greater openness of the economy and the greater influence of 

trade. Since the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and the other 

socialist countries had accounted for the bulk of Cuba's trade, 

far outstripping trade with capitalist countries and with developing countries. Over the 1983-89 period, the socialist country 

members of the CMEA (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union) 

absorbed 82.9 percent of Cuba's exports and accounted for 

82.7 percent of Cuba's imports; other socialist countries (Albania, China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia) 

accounted for 3.9 percent of exports and 3.1 percent of 

imports; capitalist countries were responsible for 9.3 percent of 

exports and 9.9 percent of imports; and developing countries 

accounted for 6.8 percent of exports and 6.5 percent of 

imports. 

Merchandise trade deficits set records in the 1980s, as Cuba's 

imports rose at a much faster rate than exports. The deficit 

rose from 660 million pesos in 1980 to 2.0 billion in 1985; in 

1989 the deficit recorded an all-time record high when it 

reached more than 2.7 billion pesos. The percentage of the 

overall trade deficit incurred with the Soviet Union rose 

steadily in the second half of the 1980s, from about 50 percent 

in 1984-85 to more than 80 percent in 1988-89. These huge 

deficits in bilateral trade were routinely financed through 

transferable ruble credits underwritten by the Soviet Union. 

209 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The large trade deficits with the Soviet Union are the more 

remarkable given the very favorable terms of trade (see Glossary) for Cuba's main exports (sugar and nickel) and imports 

(oil). The socialist practice offixing commodity prices for multiyear periods (typically the five-year period covered by a plan) 

eliminated the world market commodity price fluctuations. 

They also resulted in transfers from one country to the other 

(nonrepayable subsidies) whenever intra-CMEA prices 

diverged from world market prices. 

Another oil trade arrangement between Cuba and the Soviet 

Union that benefitted Cuba was the latter country's ability to 

reexport Soviet oil to buyers willing to pay with convertible currency. In 1977 Cuba reexported more than 900,000 tons of oil 

obtained from the Soviet Union; the volume of reexported oil 

rose to 2 million tons in 1982 and peaked at 3.7 million tons in 

1986. The significance of these exports for the Cuban economy 

should not be underestimated. In 1986 and 1987, oil reexports 

overtook sugar as Cuba's most significant convertible currency 

export earner, contributing 30 and 27 percent, respectively, of 

convertible currency earnings in those two years. 

Economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago has estimated the magnitude 

of Soviet nonrepayable price subsidies to Cuba related to sugar, 

nickel, and oil trade on the basis of differences between the 

prices paid (in the case ofsugar and nickel) or charged (in the 

case of oil) by the Soviet Union and world market prices. His 

estimates put overall Soviet nonrepayable price subsidies over 

the 1960-90 period at 39.4 billion pesos, of which 28.5 percent 

were granted during 1976-80,40.0 percent during 1981-85, 

and 25.7 percent during 1986-90. 

Relations with Capitalist Countries 

Meanwhile, Cuban trade with developed market economies 

and with many developing countries was conducted following 

common commercial practices and using convertible currencies. Cuba earned convertible currencies through sale of its 

exports (especially sugar) and used such earnings to finance 

imports from convertible currency areas. On occasion, Western 

governments, financial institutions, or suppliers provided convertible currency credits to Cuba to finance imports; these 

interest-bearing credits were repayable in convertible currencies subject to a predetermined schedule. Because of currency 

inconvertibility, Cuba could not apply surpluses in trade with 

210 
The Economy 

the socialist countries to offset deficits with developed market 

economies or to service debt with these nations. 

In conclusion, Cuba's external accounts were segmented 

into nonconvertible or soft currency accounts that covered 

most of the country's commercial and financial relations with 

the socialist nations, and convertible currency accounts that 

applied to economic relations with the rest of the world. The 

nonconvertible currency accounts dominated: over the 1978­

85 period, for example, Cuba sold 76 percent ofits exports and 

purchased 83 percent ofits imports using these currencies. 

Even after the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had 

begun to disappear, Cuba continued to argue for maintaining 

the CMEA and the preferential relations it had enjoyed with 

socialist countries. At the January 1990 meeting of the CMEA, 

the Soviet Union proposed that, effective January 1,1991, 

trade among member countries be conducted on the basis of 

market prices and convertible currencies. The Cuban representative took issue with the proposal, arguing that it would 

restore the "production anarchy" associated with markets and 

result in unfair terms of trade for developing countries within 

the CMEA (Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam), and calling for a 

continuation of preferential treatment for these countries. Not 

only were Cuba's arguments ignored, but a few months later 

the CMEA was dissolved. The CMEA's dissolution forced Cuba 

to adjust in a very short period of time to commercial relations 

based on world market prices and convertible currencies and 

eliminated the dichotomy in external sector accounts between 

nonconvertible and convertible currency accounts. 

Foreign Trade and Finance 

Currency 

The official Cuban currency is the peso (for value of the 

peso-see Glossary). From 1914 to 1971, the peso was 

exchanged at par with the United States dollar, but since 1961 

the Cuban currency has not been freely exchanged in international markets. The peso was linked to the pound sterling for 

trade purposes beginning in 1961. With the floating of the 

United States dollar in 1971, the value of the peso appreciated 

vis-a.-vis the United States dollar through its link with the 

pound. The link with the pound was reportedly severed in 1974 

by Cuban monetary authorities; beginning in 1976, the peso 

was placed on a controlled float, its value determined on the 

211 
Cuba: A Country Study 

basis of the value of a basket of currencies that accounted for 

the bulk of Cuba's international transactions. 

It is widely accepted that the official exchange rate of the 

peso vis-a.-vis the United States dollar vastly overstates the purchasing power of the peso, but the precise extent of overvaluation has been difficult to establish. Pick's Currency Yearbook 

reported black-market Cuban peso exchange rates resulting 

from unauthorized dealings of foreign currency banknotes 

and/or unlicensed transfers abroad in the range of six to ten 

pesos for one United States dollar in 1970-72, about nine pesos 

for one United States dollar in 1973-76, and ten to fifteen 

pesos for one United States dollar in 1977-79. In the 1980s, the 

black-market rate was reported to be four to eight pesos for 

one United States dollar. 

The value of the peso dropped precipitously in the 1990s as 

Cuban citizens expressed a very strong preference for holding 

United States dollars to obtain goods and services that were not 

available through the centrally planned first economy. In mid1994 the peso reached probably its lowest point when it was 

exchanged at about 150 pesos for one United States dollar. In 

the second half of the 1990s, the unofficial exchange rate fluctuated in the range of twenty to twenty-two pesos for one 

United States dollar (twenty-two in 2000). 

Cuban official statistics are invariably reported on the basis 

of domestic currency, that is, pesos. Given the large disparity 

between the official and unofficial exchange rate, it is difficult 

to determine which exchange rate to use to convert Cuban 

pesos data to a convertible currency, such as the United States 

dollar, for international comparisons and other purposes. 

Thus, much caution must be exercised in using statistics 

regarding the foreign sector that may have been converted to 

United States dollars or some other convertible currency. 

Merchandise Trade 

Cuban merchandise exports in 1993 amounted to slightly 

more than 1.1 billion pesos, 79 percent lower than the 5.4 billion recorded in 1989. Over the same period, merchandise 

imports fell from 8.1 billion to slightly more than 2.0 billion 

pesos, or by 75 percent. In 1994 exports recovered slightly, 

increasing by about 17 percent to about 1.3 billion, while 

imports fell by about 1 percent. In 1996 exports peaked at 

nearly 1.9 billion pesos, falling to 1.8 billion in 1997 and 1.4 bil212 
The Economy 

lion in 1998. Meanwhile, imports grew steadily, to 4.1 billion 

pesos in 1997 and 4.2 billion in 1998. 

Prior to the changes in international economic relations 

that occurred in the 1990s, Cuba routinely ran a very large 

merchandise trade deficit, financed mainly by bilateral credits 

from the Soviet Union. The disappearance of the Soviet Union 

as a source of trade financing meant that Cuba had to reduce 

its imports drastically to bring them closer to exports. Lacking 

financing from the former Soviet Union, Cuba saw its trade 

deficit fall sharply in 1992, to 535 million pesos, but grow thereafter to about 950 million pesos in 1993, 970 million pesos in 

1994, 1.5 billion pesos in 1995, 1.8 billion pesos in 1996, 2.2 billion pesos in 1997, and nearly 2.8 billion pesos in 1998. The 

1998 trade deficit was five-fold its level in 1992. 

Russia occupied first place among destinations of Cuban 

merchandise exports in 1997, taking about 17 percent of 

Cuba's exports. Other top destinations of Cuban exports in 

1997 (in descending order) were Canada, Spain, Egypt, China, 

Japan, Iran, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Dominican Republic, 

and the United Kingdom. 

Spain was Cuba's largest supplier of merchandise imports in 

1997, providing 12 percent ofimports. Other significant suppliers of merchandise imports to Cuba in 1997 (in descending 

order) were Venezuela, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Canada, 

France, China, Italy, and Vietnam. 

With regard to the composition of merchandise exports, 

sugar and related products remain the most significant 

exports. Sugar and related products accounted for more than 

50 percent of the value of Cuban merchandise exports in the 

first half of the 1990s, falling below this mark for the first time 

in 1997 (47 percent). According to statistics of the International Sugar Organization, Russia remained the top importer 

of Cuban sugar, accounting for 41 percent of the quantity of 

exports in 1997, with Egypt, China, Iran, andJapan also significant purchasers of Cuban sugar. Products of the mining industry, especially nickel, were the second most significant category 

of merchandise exports. Canada and the Netherlands purchased almost all such exports. 

Fuels continue to be Cuba's most significant merchandise 

import, accounting for 33 to 35 percent of the total value of 

imports in the early 1990s and about 25 percent in 1997. Russia 

continues to be a principal supplier of Cuba's fuels, but Latin 

American countries-Venezuela, Mexico, and the Netherlands 

213 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Antilles-also provided significant amounts of fuels during 

some years in the 1990s. The Cuban leadership slashed imports 

of machinery, semifinished goods, raw materials, and consumer goods to be able to finance imports of fuels and foods: 

in 1993, imports of machinery amounted to 13 percent of their 

level in 1989, raw materials 15 percent, consumer goods 22 percent, and semifinished goods 26 percent. In 1995-97, imports 

in all four of these categories rose, contributing to the significant expansion of the merchandise trade deficit that occurred 

between 1994 and 1997. 

Development Assistance 

Socialist countries were the source of nearly all of the development finance received by revolutionary Cuba. No systematic 

data exist on development assistance to Cuba, but scattered 

information suggests that aid was substantial. Originating primarily from the Soviet Union, the aid covered a wide range of 

economic activities and took mostly the form of loans repayable at very low interest rates. 

According to Cuban sources, during the 1981-85 period the 

Soviet Union provided the island with 1.8 billion rubles in 

development assistance (mostly loans), while East European 

socialist countries granted about 1 billion rubles and the 

CMEA another 1 billion rubles in multilateral assistance. Up 

through 1986, the Soviet Union had assisted Cuba in completing 360 development projects, and 289 others were in progress. 

Enterprises built with Soviet assistance were responsible for 15 

percent of gross industrial output, 100 percent of the nation's 

output of steel plates, 90 percent of its steel products, 50 percent of mixed fertilizers, 70 percent of nitrogen fertilizers, 70 

percent of electricity, 50 percent of products of the metalworking industry, 100 percent of the repair of Soviet vehicles, and 

65 percent of textiles. 

Economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago has estimated that the Soviet 

Union provided resources to Cuba amounting to more than 

US$65 billion during the 1960-90 period; about 67 percent of 

this total was extended in the 1980s. Approximately 40 percent 

of the flow of resources (about US$25.7 billion) took the form 

of repayable loans-credits to finance trade deficits (27 percent) and development credits (13 percent). As indicated 

above, about 60 percent (US$39.4 billion) was in the form of 

nonrepayable price subsidies. 

214 
The Economy 

Debt 

Cuba has not officially released information on its debt with 

the former Soviet Union and East European socialist countries. 

According to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the then-Soviet prime 

minister, Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union on November 1, 

1989, amounted to 15.49 billion transferable rubles; Cuba was 

the largest debtor country to the Soviet Union, accounting for 

18.1 percent of outstanding debt. Cuba reportedly also had 

outstanding debt of more than 1 billion rubles with Bulgaria, 

Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and a debt of 2 billion East German marks with East Germany in 1989. 

Mesa-Lago has estimated Cuba's overall debt to the Soviet 

Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 at nearly US$27 billion 

(using the official exchange rate of one ruble equals US$1.S8) 

and at US$30.2 billion in 1990 (using the official exchange rate 

of one ruble equals US$I. 78). Because the value of the ruble 

vis-a.-vis the United States dollar fell sharply in the 1990s, so has 

the value of the Cuban debt in United States dollar terms. No 

information is available on the currency in which the Cuban 

debt to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is to be 

valued or to be repaid. 

In 1969 Cuba's convertible currency debt was small, amounting to US$291 million; it grew rapidly in the 1970s, reaching 

more than US$1.3 billion in 1975 and nearly US$3.3 billion in 

1979 as Cuba borrowed heavily from commercial banks flush 

with "petrodollars" and official lenders willing to back sales of 

machinery and equipment to the island. In 1982 a sharp reduction in short-term loans and deposits prompted Cuba to seek to 

reschedule its convertible currency debt due in 1982-85. Cuba 

succeeded in getting some short-term relief, but a sharp deterioration in the balance of payments (see Glossary) in 1985 led 

to Cuba's decision to suspend payment on convertible currency 

effective July 1, 1986. The unpaid debt and accrued service 

payments amounted to nearly US$6.1 billion in 1987, US$6.5 

billion in 1988, and US$6.2 billion in 1989. 

Cuba suspended service on its convertible currency debt 

effective July 1, 1986. Although this action had a favorable 

impact on the balance of payments because service payments 

were avoided, it seriously impaired Cuba's ability to turn to foreign markets to obtain new long-term credits. As a result, since 

the mid-1980s Cuba has had to rely primarily on short-term 

debt at very high interest rates. Loans amounted to US$473 

million in 1995. Convertible currency capital flows into the 

215 
Cuba: A Country Study 

island during the 1960-90 period consisted primarily of loans 

from private and public institutions and supplier credits as 

Cuba effectively banned foreign investment. 

Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 billion in 1993 to 

about US$9.1 billion in 1994, US$10.5 billion in 1995, and 

US$1l.2 billion in 1998 (see table 13, Appendix). The fact that 

the outstanding debt grew does not mean that Cuba actually 

obtained fresh loans: the year-to-year value of the outstanding 

debt is affected by several factors, among them the accumulation of unpaid interest and relative changes in the value of currencies in which the debt was contracted. 

Balance ofPayments 

Socialist Cuba began to publish balance of payments statistics in the 1990s. During the 1980s, Cuba did publish balance 

of payments statistics for its convertible currency accounts, in a 

series of reports that were issued beginning in 1982 by the BN e 

(Cuban National Bank) to support renegotiation of the convertible currency debt held by Western creditors. These partial 

balance of payments statistics are of very limited value because 

convertible currency transactions accounted for only a small 

share of overall economic activity in Cuba during the 1980s. 

The lack of comprehensive balance of payments statistics 

means that there are no data on important components of the 

external sector, such as overall.trade in services, transfers, and 

capital flows. 

The shift in Cuban external economic relations in the 1990s 

to the use of convertible currencies did away with the dichotomy in external accounts, eliminating the soft currency 

accounts. The BNC and its successor, the BCe, have published 

balance of payments statistics (in pesos, at the official rate of 

one peso equals US$l) for 1993-98 purporting to cover the 

totality of external economic relations (see table 14, Appendix). 

Cuba ran surpluses in services trade every year during the 

1993-98 period; the surpluses were quite sizable, particularly 

after 1994. The favorable balance in the services export 

account presumably reflects the performance of the international tourism industry. As discussed above, foreign investment 

has played an important role in the development of this industry. 

Income generated by tourism rose by 535 percent between 

1990 and 1997; it first exceeded the US$l billion mark in 1995 

216 
Taxis and buses waitingJor tourists in downtown Havana 

Courtesy Suzanne Petrie 

and reached more than US$1.5 billion in 1997. Tourism surpassed nickel to become the second largest source of revenue 

in 1991 and overtook sugar exports in 1994. It should be noted, 

however, that these income figures refer to gross income and 

include the value of imported goods and services consumed by 

visitors; the foreign exchange cost of capital investment; payments that leave Cuba in the form of profits, interest payments, 

royalties, management fees, payments to foreign travel agents 

and so on; the cost of advertising and promoting travel to 

Cuba; the overseas cost of training service personnel; and aviation receipts from its airlines and airport fees. 

A better measure of tourism's contribution to the balance of 

payments would be net receipts, that is, gross receipts minus 

the associated convertible-currency imports and other expenditures. For the Cuban tourism industry, net receipts are a fraction of gross income: in the range of 30 to 38 percent, 

according to studies conducted by the Ministry of Tourism, 

and about 33 percent according to Fran<;:oise Simon, an expert 

in international tourism. Reports on the performance of the 

Cuban tourism industry often do not distinguish between gross 

217 
Cuba: A Country Study 

and net receipts, with Cuban officials tending to report only 

gross receipts, which are, of course, larger. 

Transfers 

In the balance of payments methodology, transfers are flows 

of resources from one economy to another for which there is 

no quid pro quo. Transfers could be official-for example, foreign grants or aid in kind for which no repayment is 

required-or private remittances from persons who have emigrated to relatives or friends who have remained at home. 

According to ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), net transfers were negative in 1989-90, 

meaning that resources actually flowed out of the Cuban economy in those two years in the form of transfers; they turned 

positive beginning in 1991, however, and boomed thereafter. 

According to Cuban official statistics, transfers were US$263 

million in 1993, US$646 million in 1995, and US$820 million 

in 1998. Transfers have been Cuba's most significant source of 

convertible currency since 1996, exceeding gross revenue from 

sugar or nickel and net revenues from tourism. 

According to ECLAC, transfers received by Cuba are predominantly private and take the form of cash remittances from 

residents of the United States to persons in Cuba. The primary 

motivation for private remittances to Cuba appears to be the 

desire on the part of emigrants to ease the economic hardships 

being experienced by relatives and friends on the island during 

the Special Period. The ECLAC private remittance estimates 

should be used with caution, as they seem to be derived as a 

residual from the balance of payments rather than through 

direct measurement. 

Investment 

Balance of payments statistics report that direct investment 

on the island amounted to US$54 million in 1993, US$563 million in 1994, US$4.7 million in 1995, US$82 million in 1996, 

US$442 million in 1997, and US$207 million in 1998. These 

statistics are significant for at least two reasons: First, they are 

the first official statistics on actual investment flows reported by 

the Cuban government. And second, they suggest lower investment flows than had been reported by Cuban officials and are 

found in Cuban investment promotional literature. 

Cuban officials have cited the threat of possible action by the 

United States government against potential or actual investors 

218 
The Economy 

as justification for the secrecy with which they treat investment 

data. The rationale behind the policy of "minimum reporting," 

as articulated by Vice President Carlos Lage Davila, is "the pressure which everyone who comes to invest in Cuba is subjected 

to by the United States." Although this may be so, it is also possible that the lack of transparency in reporting foreign investment information may be a deliberate act to influence the 

investment climate by giving the impression that larger investments have occurred, or are under negotiation, than is actually 

the case. 

Cuban officials have reported flows of foreign investment 

that appear too optimistic in the light of other information and 

the balance of payments data mentioned above. For example, 

in October 1991,julio Garcia Oliveras, chairman of the Cuban 

Chamber of Commerce, reported that negotiations were ongoing with investors representing investments of US$1.2 billion. 

Carlos Lage stated in November 1994 that by the end of 1994 

joint ventures would have provided Cuba with US$1.5 billion in 

investment. By the end of 1995, according to official sources, 

foreign investment had reached more than US$2.1 billion. 

Official estimates of foreign investment probably overstate 

actual equity capital flows into the island for several reasons. 

First, multiyear disbursements may be involved. Second, some 

investments may be contingent on performance. Third, some 

investments may take the form of assets rather than fresh 

investments. Fourth, some of the investments may be management contracts, production partnership agreements (particularly in mining and oil exploration), or debt-equity swaps, 

where funds invested are minimal. And fifth, others may actually be supplier contracts rather than equity investments. At 

best, the figures reported by Cuban government officials might 

represent the intentions of foreign investors, but they significantly overstate actual capital that has flowed onto the island. 

Thus, according to the United States-Cuba Trade and Economic Council (see Glossary), investments amounting to 

nearly US$6.1 billion had been "announced" through March 

1999. However, the volume "committed or delivered" was a 

more modest US$I.8 billion, or 29.5 percent of the announced 

amount. 

Although legislation authorizing the creation ofjoint ventures was enacted in 1982, only three joint ventures were established during the 1982-90 period (see table 15, Appendix). 

Foreign investment activity increased in 1992-94, with thirty219 
Cuba: A Country Study 

three joint ventures established in 1992, sixty in 1993, and seventy-four in 1994, but slowed in 1995, when thirty-one joint 

ventures were created. In all, Cuban government statistics indicate that 212 joint ventures with foreign investors had been 

established through the end of 1995; Spanish investors were 

responsible for the largest number ofjoint ventures (fortyseven, or 22 percent) followed by Canada (twenty-six, or 12 

percent), Italy (seventeen, or 8 percent), and France and Mexico (thirteen, or 6 percent each). The largest concentration of 

joint ventures was in the industrial sector (fifty-six, or 26 percent), followed by tourism (thirty-four, or 16 percent), mining 

(twenty-eight, or 13 percent), and the oil sector (twenty-five, or 

12 percent) (see table 16, Appendix). 

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 

(the Helms-Burton Act), enacted by the United States in 1996, 

gives United States citizens who hold valid claims a right of 

action in United States courts against those who knowingly 

"traffic" in their confiscated Cuban properties. Title IV allows 

the exclusion of these violators of United States property 

claims and their immediate families from the United States. 

Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (see Glossary) have 

vigorously protested the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, 

claiming that it impinges on their sovereignty and that its extra­

. territorial reach is inconsistent with international obligations 

of the World Trade Organization (WTO-see Glossary) and 

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA-see 

Glossary). 

According to Ibrahim Ferradaz, the then minister of foreign 

investment and economic cooperation, 260 joint ventures with 

foreign capital had been established on the island by the end 

of 1996 in thirty-four sectors of the economy. This number 

showed an increase of forty-eight joint ventures or 23 percent 

over the 212joint ventures at the end of 1995. During the first 

half of 1997, according to Ferradaz, more joint venture deals 

were consummated than during a like period in 1996, and 140 

new projects were under active consideration. Ferradaz stated 

that the impact of the Helms-Burton Act on foreign investment 

in Cuba was "difficult to estimate," noting that some foreign 

investors had "become fearful [of Helms-Burton] and called 

off their projects." More recent data indicates that there were 

345 joint ventures by the end of 1998. The main sources offoreign capital, as measured by the number ofjoint ventures, were 

Spain (seventy joint ventures), Canada (sixty-six), Italy (fifty220 

The Economy 

two), the United Kingdom (fifteen) and France (fourteen). 

The main recipients of foreign investment, again as measured 

by the number ofjoint ventures, were mining, oil and heavy 

industry (eighty-eightjoint ventures), tourism (fifty-eight), 

light industry (thirty), food processing (twenty-four) and agriculture (seventeen). 

Cuba's first two export processing zones, created pursuant to 

Decree-Law 165 of 1996, opened in May 1997 in Berroa and 

Wajay, near the city of Havana. These zones were followed by 

another export processing zone in the port of Mariel. 

Economic Outlook 

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the prospects for the 

economy of socialist Cuba appear bleak. Although the economic free fall experienced at the beginning of the decade has 

been arrested since about 1994, there is no end in sight for the 

Special Period. Growth rates recorded since then have been 

quite modest and do not come close to offsetting the large 

drop in economic activity. At the current rates of growth, it will 

take more than ten years for the Cuban economy to return to 

1989 levels. 

The foreign sector, critical to the performance of the Cuban 

economy, has improved its performance during the second 

half of the 1990s, but the level of foreign resources attracted 

into the country is still very small in comparison with the subsidies and financial assistance from the Soviet Union and other 

socialist countries to which Cuba had grown accustomed. Cuba 

has very limited access to foreign financial markets, and it is 

not a member of the international financial institutions that 

could assist it in overcoming balance of payments difficulties. 

Cuba has played but a marginal role in the process of economic integration of the Western Hemisphere, a situation that 

is not likely to change until Cuba and the United States normalize diplomatic and economic relations. Foreign investment 

is having a positive impact on the economy; in addition to providing foreign resources, it also transfers technology and provides additional markets for Cuban exports. However, its 

magnitude is too small to overcome the scarcity of foreign 

exchange. In the next few years, the external sector is likely to 

perform as it has since the mid-1990s, providing just enough 

foreign resources to allow the economy to continue to operate 

at very low levels of capacity and efficiency. 

221 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The process of economic reforms that began in 1993 slowed 

down after the economy reached bottom and began to recover 

in 1994. Since then, there have been no significant policy 

departures. Critical reforms, such as the liberalization of 

prices, enterprise reform, privatization, and the creation of factor markets, have been put on hold indefinitely because the 

government fears that their implementation would weaken its 

political stranglehold on the Cuban nation. Unless Cuba sheds 

its statist model entirely, adopts a free-market economy consistent with the principles of the international trading system, and 

changes its political system to allow some space for alternatives 

outside of the PCC, the economy is likely to continue to stagnate, to the detriment of the standard of living of the Cuban 

people. 

* * * 

Detailed information on the performance of the Cuban 

economy in the 1990s is limited and often inconsistent. In the 

late 1990s, Cuba published the first statistical yearbooks since 

1989, the Estadistico, 1996 and Anuario estadistico, 1997. These 

two volumes begin to fill the statistical gap since Anuario 

estadistico de Cuba 1989, which contains statistical information 

through 1989 (1988 in some instances). Reports by the 

National Bank of Cuba (BNC) and its successor the Cuban 

Central Bank (BCC) released since the mid-1990s-Economic 

Report 1994 and Informe economico 1997-contain some useful 

data. In 1997 the United Nations' ECLAC published a massive 

volume titled La economia cubana: Reformas estructurales y desempeno en los noventa with nearly seventy tables prepared from 

information made available by the BNC, the Ministry of 

Finance and Prices, the ONE (National Statistical Office), and 

other instrumentalities of the Cuban government. Since the 

early 1990s, the United States Central Intelligence Agency has 

been preparing estimates of Cuban merchandise foreign trade 

based on information from Cuba's trading partners; its latest 

issue, Cuba: Handbook of Trade Statistics, 1998 is the best source 

of information on Cuban foreign trade. 

The most solid analysis of Cuba's economic policies and 

reforms during the 1990s is Carmelo Mesa-Lago's Are Economic 

Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? A Cuban perspective on 

economic reforms, including reform proposals that the Cuban 

government has been unwilling to undertake, is Cuba: La 

222 
The Economy 

restructuracion de la economia: Una contribucion al debate byJulio 

Carranza Valdes, Luis Gutierrez Urdaneta, and Pedro Monreal 

Gonzalez. Another important source of analysis on the Cuban 

economy is the proceedings series of the Association for the 

Study of the Cuban Economy titled Cuba in Transition, which 

have appeared annually beginning in 1990 (for the series, see 

http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/index.html). 

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

223 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 

The National Capitol (El Capitolio Nacional), the seat ofgovernment until 

1959, now houses the Cuban Academy ofSciences (Academia de Ciencias de 

Cuba) and the National Library ofScience and Technology (Biblioteca Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia). 

Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 
SUDDENLY, DRAMATICALLY, ALMOST unexpectedly, the 

Cold War came to an end in Europe, and the world changed. 

Communist governments tumbled throughout Central and 

Eastern Europe in 1989, and, by the end of 1991, the Soviet 

Union itself collapsed. Constitutional governments, increasingly democratic, emerged in the 1990s in much of Central 

and Eastern Europe. 

For Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) and his associates 

in the Cuban government and the Communist Party of Cuba 

(Partido Comunista de Cuba-PCC), these results were a catastrophe. As a result of a trade protocol signed in Moscow in late 

December 1990, Soviet economic subsidies to Cuba ended as of 

January 1, 1991. Bilateral trade between Cuba and the Soviet 

Union would henceforth be conducted at world market prices. 

Whereas in the past Cuba had dealt with only sixty-two Soviet 

agencies and enterprises, the trade protocol abolished the central management of trade relations and required Cuba to 

develop commercial relations with some 25,000 Soviet firms. 

The Russian government, successor to the Soviet Union, 

retained similar policies: trade with Cuba would be conducted 

on a commercial basis presuming no "special relationship" 

between Russia and Cuba. Stunned and inexperienced, Cuban 

government officials at first had great difficulty coping with 

these changes. And, bereft of economic subsidies, Cuba's economy collapsed (see The Economic Crisis of the 1990s, ch. 3). 

Cuba also lost the political and military protection provided 

by the Soviet Union that it had enjoyed since 1960. Cuban leaders, consequently, felt nakedly vulnerable facing the United 

States. The United States government, for its part, increased its 

pressure on the Cuban government in the 1990s to force it to 

change or, preferably, to fall. 

Cuba was unable to pay on its own for the costs of its worldwide activist foreign policy. Absent Soviet backing, the Cuban 

government risked United States retaliation for overseas militaryexpeditions. Consequently, Cuban foreign policy retreated 

across the board. In September 1989, Cuba completed the 

repatriation of its troops from Ethiopia. In March 1990, all 

Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua were brought home. In 

May 1991, Cuba's last troops were repatriated from Angola. 

Also in 1990 and 1991, Cuba brought back its troops and mili227 
Cuba: A Country Study 

tary advisers from various other countries. Cuba's global military deployments ended nearly instantaneously as the Cold 

War was winding down in Europe and as Cuba was rapidly losing Soviet political, economic, and military backing. Cuba had 

become once again only a Caribbean island archipelago-no 

longer an aspirant to major-power status astride the world 

stage. 

Born bristling in radicalism, Cuban state socialism changed 

in the 1990s. In 1960 the government expropriated all foreign 

firms. In 1989 it launched a campaign to attract private foreign 

direct investment once again (see Economic Reforms, ch. 3). 

In May 1990, President Castro inaugurated the first of many 

foreign-owned hotels on Cuba's premier tourist beach at Varadero. He announced that Cuba would henceforth seek foreign 

investment to develop its economy. These policies would soon 

be endorsed by the PCGs executive organ, the Political Bureau 

(Bur6 Politico). These changes had implications well beyond 

their economic significance. In reversing the regime's founding policies, President Castro and his comrades signaled that 

they could no longer govern Cuba as they had and as they 

would still prefer. Other modest market-oriented economic 

policy reforms further communicated to the population the 

state's retreat from orthodox bureaucratic socialism (see Economic Reforms, ch. 3). Cuban leaders were compelled to 

change by a world suddenly averse to their brand of bureaucratic socialism. 

The capacity of the Cuban state weakened at home as well. 

This weakening was in part a consequence of the leadership's 

unexpected inability to govern as had been their practice. Citizens who witnessed Fidel Castro's reluctant retreat from the 

policies he still cherished and had long implemented felt newly 

free to begin to take their lives into their own hands. An illegal 

economy or black market (see Glossary) boomed in Cuba in 

the early 1990s (see The Second Economy, ch. 3). The government could no longer prevent it, nor could it assure an acceptable standard of living to the population. The grip of the state 

loosened gradually in various aspects of social life. Religious 

activity revived (see Religion in the Special Period, 1990-97, 

ch. 2), and intellectual life became more independent in some 

respects. Human rights and political opposition activists undertook bolder actions, and their groups became more likely to 

endure. 

228 
Government and Politics 

The story ofCuban politics in the 1990s, therefore, has three 

principal strands. First, government and PCC leaders have 

sought to retain enough political support to continue to govern, adapting policies, streamlining organizations, and replacing personnel to make their survival more likely. Particularly 

significant have been a major replacement of the political leadership just below the very top of the regime and a substantial 

downsizing of the armed forces (see Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, ch. 5). Second, a slow political transition has gotten underway, unloved by the rulers but 

constructed by Cuban citizens who, step by step, have edged 

away from the control that the state and the PCC had held over 

Cuban life for the preceding decades. Third, internationally, 

the Cuban government has designed a strategy to resist United 

States pressures and to fashion a new network of international 

relations for the only surviving communist regime outside East 

Asia. Cuban leaders have gained support in Europe, Latin 

America, the Middle East, Canada, and East Asia from governments that object to United States attempts to force them to 

follow United States policy toward Cuba. This "negative" international coalition in opposition to United States policy is a key 

to the Cuban regime's capacity to survive seemingly against all 

odds years after the Soviet Union crashed. 

Institutional Structure 

Cuba features a formidable array of state, government, and 

partisan entities. Some have endured for nearly forty years, and 

all have lasted for at least two decades. And yet, in the 1990s as 

in earlier decades, these formal institutions manifest only one 

of the two "faces of power" in Cuba. Officeholders in state, government, and PCC organs and in the mass organizations often 

have less power than it would seem from a description of their 

formal rights and duties. 

The other "face of power" in Cuba is intensely personal. It 

derives its clout from the Revolution in the 1950s and from 

"revolutionary accomplishments" in the years that followed. A 

key feature of these "accomplishments" is that they appeared to 

require heroic deeds and leaders who succeeded in reaching 

an impossible dream. Fidel Castro epitomizes this source of 

power. His towering role in Cuban politics at times has allowed 

him to override institutional rules and constraints to veto some 

policies and enact others. Other men (and some, but not very 

many, women) have also acquired significant public standing as 

229 
Cuba: A Country Study 

a result of their heroic deeds over the years, but most of them 

died during the revolution of the 1950s and in the 1960s. Fidel 

Castro's capacity to make policies happen, or to stop their 

implementation, and his unmatched capacity to pick and 

choose officials to whom he delegates extraordinary powers 

shape the capacity of these institutions to function. 

The Constitution 

The Fourth Congress of the PCC met in October 1991 to 

review the debris from the collapse of the communist world in 

Europe and its impact on Cuba. One of its decisions was to 

revise Cuba's constitution of 1976. The leadership closely controlled the process of constitutional revision, and PCC and 

National Assembly committees carried out the task. Although 

the text was open to discussion by Cubans through the country's official mass organizations and other means, no plebiscite 

was held to approve the substantially revised text. The PCC and 

the National Assembly approved the new constitutional text in 

July 1992. 

The new constitution signaled Cuba's changed circumstances and, especially, a more tolerant approach to certain differences within society. Unlike the old constitution, the text of 

the new constitution makes no reference to the Soviet Union, a 

country that had ceased to exist. The normative chapters of the 

constitution seek to embrace all Cubans, notjust those ideologically committed to Marxism-Leninism. Its preamble and opening chapters invoke the mantle of nationalism in an attempt to 

cover all Cubans. The new Article 1 (unlike its predecessor) 

refers to Jose Marti and affirms that the socialist state seeks to 

serve all and the good of alL The PCC remains enshrined in 

Article 5 as the single party, still Marxist-Leninist, but now also 

a follower ofJose Marti. Whereas the old Article 54 proclaimed 

that the state based its actions on and advocated a "scientific 

materialist conception of the universe," while also guaranteeing freedom of conscience and worship, the new Article 55 

omits all reference to scientific materialism and simply seeks to 

guarantee freedom of religion. In these and other symbolically 

significant ways, the 1992 constitution seeks to include all 

Cubans ready to pledge their allegiance and otherwise 

attempts to marginalize none. 

The 1992 constitution retroactively legitimizes the changed 

property regime inaugurated with the search to lure foreign 

investment that started in 1989 and was made public in 1990. 

230 
Government and Politics 

The 1976 constitution had authorized only state property, 

except for what individuals were authorized to own directly. 

The 1992 constitution limits state ownership to the "fundamental" means of production (Article 14). Article 15 goes further, 

however. It opens by seemingly prohibiting the privatization of 

most enterprises and other forms of economic activities, but it 

goes on to authorize the privatization of every property, provided such transfer of ownership is approved by the Executive 

Committee (Comite Ejecutivo) of the Council of Ministers 

(Consejo de Ministros). 

The ideological and property regime shifts of the 1992 constitution made the political regime more inclusive and, especially, more toleran t of religious belief, behavior, and 

organizations. They signaled as well a much greater emphasis 

in public discourse on Cuban nationalism rather than on the 

canonical texts of Marxism, Leninism, socialism, or communism. The changes in the property regime, of course, accelerated the process of private foreign direct investment. 

The 1992 constitution remains deeply authoritarian, however. The PCC remains the only legal political party. The bill of 

rights is as riddled with exceptions as it was in the 1976 constitution. The new Article 53 is identical to its predecessor in recognizing freedom of expression, but only so long as it 

conforms to the "goals of a socialist society." All mass media 

must remain in state hands. And the article also enables the 

government to further regulate whatever residual freedoms 

remain. Other articles recognize the privacy of the home and 

of personal correspondence, unless, of course, the law states 

otherwise. Finally, Article 62 (like its predecessor) prohibits the 

use of any of these freedoms "against the existence and purposes of the socialist state." Indeed, in one important respect 

the 1992 constitution is more authoritarian than its predecessor. The new Article 67 empowers the president of the Council 

ofState (Fidel Castro) on his own authority to declare a state of 

emergency and to modify the exercise of rights or the obligations embedded in the constitution. 

National Assembly of People's Power 

The 1992 constitution also institutes some modest changes 

in the design of the organs of the state (see fig. 7). The 1992 

constitution, like its predecessor, vests all formal legislative 

powers (including the powers of amending the constitution) in 

the National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional 

231 
Cuba: A Country Study 

AGRICULTURE 

AUDITING AND CONTROL 

BASIC INDUSTRY 

COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

CONSTRUCTION 

CULTURE 

DOMESTIC TRADE 

ECONOMY AND PLANNING 

EDUCATION 

FINANCE AND PRICES 

FISHING INDUSTRY 

FOOD INDUSTRY 

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 

ECONOMIC COOPERATION 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 

FOREIGN TRADE 

HIGHER EDUCATION 

INTERIOR 

IRON, STEEL, AND MACHINE INDUSTRY 

JUSTICE 

LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY 

LIGHT INDUSTRY 

PUBLIC HEALTH 

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES 

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENVIRONMENT 

SUGAR INDUSTRY 

TOURISM 

TRANSPORTATION 

Source: Based on information from Roberto Segre, Mario Coyula, andJoseph L. 

Scarpaci, Havana: Two Faces ofthe Antillean Metropolis, New York: 1997, 178; and 

Jorge I. Dominguez. 

Figure 7. Central Administrative Structure, 2001 

232 
Government and Politics 

del Poder Popular-ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly). The 

National Assembly has the formal powers, among others, to 

declare war in the event of military aggression; make peace; 

enact or modify legislation; approve the budget and the 

national economic plan; elect the members of the Council of 

State (Consejo de Estado), including its president; and elect 

the members of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo Popular). (The Supreme Court cannotjudge the constitutionality of 

National Assembly decisions.) National Assembly leaders also 

generally oversee the rule-making activities and electoral processes of the provincial assemblies and municipal assemblies. 

Despite all of its functions, the National Assembly is not a 

powerful institution. For the most part, it ratifies decisions 

made prior to its meetings; it typically votes unanimously or 

nearly unanimously to endorse government bills. Deputies 

have other full-time jobs, and the National Assembly characteristically meets only twice a year, three times at most. Each time 

it usually meets for two or three days. Founded in 1976, the 

National Assembly became, in the 1990s, simultaneously marginally less institutionalized but also more effective. Institutionalization declined because officials at times failed to observe 

their own rules. For example, National Assembly elections 

should have been held in 1991 but were postponed until February 1993 in order to defer the electoral process well past the 

shock ofthe collapse ofthe Soviet Union and other communist 

regimes. And, at times in the 1990s, National Assembly sessions 

were canceled or deferred arbitrarily instead of meeting at 

their normal times. 

The National Assembly became more effective, however, 

under the leadership of Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, who 

became its president in March 1993. Alarcon reinvigorated the 

National Assembly'S working commissions, which aid the 

National Assembly and the Council of State in carrying out 

their functions. Alarcon urged the commissions to audit the 

operation of state agencies, ask questions, and write reports. 

The National Assembly'S debate in its standing commissions 

has at times forced the executive branch to amend, reconsider, 

or delay the submission of bills for formal approval. Among the 

most vigorously debated bills was the Law on Foreign Investment, finally approved after much delay and several drafts in 

September 1995. Alarcon has also urged deputies to remain in 

closer touch with the voters and to campaign actively for office 

as ifthey were contested. In these respects, the National Assem233 
Cuba: A Country Study 

bly's political efficacy has risen, and so has Alarcon's political 

star. 

National Assembly deputies are elected for five-year terms. 

In 1998 the new National Assembly had 601 members. The 

1992 constitution mandates that the deputies be elected 

directly by the people, in contrast to the previous system, in 

which the provincial assemblies elected the deputies. However, 

the Electoral Law of 1992 requires that the number of candidates equal the number of posts to be filled. The old Electoral 

Law required that a provincial assembly (Asamblea Provincial) 

be given a choice of nominees somewhat larger than the number of posts to be filled. Thus, the change in national electoral 

procedures had the appearance of democratization while 

embodying a reduction in effective choice. The election of 

deputies through the provincial assemblies had fostered some 

competition within the elite; the 1992 changes reduced the 

level of open political contestation. 

Candidates for National Assembly deputy, candidates for 

membership in the Council of State, and candidates for 

National Assembly president, vice president, and secretary 

originate with a National Commission for Candidacies. This 

commission is constituted of appointees designated by the officially sponsored mass organizations. These mass organizations 

are the Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores 

de Cuba-CTC), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas-FMC), the Committee for the 

Defense of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion-CDR), the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequeiios-ANAP), the Federation of University Students, and the Federation of Secondary School Students (Federacion de Estudiantes de la 

Enseiianza Media-FEEM) (see Mass Organizations, this ch.). 

The CTC representative chairs the commission. The commission, which consults various national, provincial, and municipal leaders, proposes a list of precandidates (with a number of 

precandidates equal to no fewer than twice the number to be 

elected) to a similarly constituted commission at the municipal 

level. The latter commission formally nominates the candidates 

for deputy. Those nominated for candidacy are almost certain 

to be elected because the final list of candidates equals the 

number of posts to be filled. 

Mter the 1993 national elections, reelected incumbents constituted only 17 percent of the new National Assembly. This fig234 
Government and Politics 

ure was not the result of voter discontent (all the incumbents 

who stood for reelection were reelected), but of a prior elite 

decision not to renominate most incumbents. In contrast, after 

the 1998 national elections, reelected incumbents constituted 

35 percent of the new National Assembly. (Average age in the 

National Assembly rose from forty-three to forty-five from one 

election to the next.) In general, this pattern of sweeping personnel change in the early 1990s but somewhat greater continuity in the late 1990s reflected the top leadership's greater 

confidence that it had removed the "dead wood" and identified 

a good political team to ensure the continuation of the political regime. A similar pattern would be evident in the composition of the PCC's Central Committee (Comite Central) (see 

Political Bureau and Central Committee, this ch.). 

The proportion offemale members of the National Assembly rose from 23 to 28 percent from the 1993 to the 1998 elections. In addition, 78 percent of the deputies were university 

graduates in 1998 (versus 75 percent in 1993). The number of 

deputies on active duty in the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR) or in the Ministry of 

Interior remained the same (thirty-five deputies). The number 

of high PCC officials dropped substantially, however, from 24 

percent to 11 percent in part as a result of the downsizing of 

the PCC's Central Committee in 1997. 

Council of State 

The Council of State is elected by the National Assembly and 

is empowered to make all decisions on behalf of the National 

Assembly when the latter is not in session, which is most of the 

time. Among other powers, the Council of State can appoint 

and remove ministers, ambassadors, and other high officials, 

issue decrees with the force oflaw, declare war or make peace, 

ratify treaties, and suspend or revoke the decisions by all provincial or local governments. In effect, the Council of State, not 

the National Assembly, is the routine, constitutionally authoritative collective decision maker. 

The president of the Council of State, who under the constitution is also president of the Council of Ministers, is the chief 

ofstate. These functions had been performed by different individuals before the adoption of the 1976 constitution, as had 

been the norm in communist countries. Since 1976, these posts 

have been held by Fidel Castro, who, in taking on these func235 
Cuba: A Country Study 

tions, adopted a pattern of presidentialism familiar to Latin 

Americans. 

The six vice presidents of the Council of State are among 

Cuba's most important politicians. The first vice president is 

General of the Army Raul Castro Ruz, minister of the FAR and 

Fidel Castro's formally designated successor. The other vice 

presidents are Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida 

Bosque, who has long played a role in maintaining discipline 

and morale in the military and the PCC; Army Corps General 

Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of interior and decorated 

hero of the republic of Cuba for his role in Cuba's wars in 

Africa; Carlos Lage Davila, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers and, in effect, chief operating 

officer for the Cuban economy;Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, 

long-time secretary of organization of the PCC's Central Committee; and Esteban Lazo Hernandez, first secretary of the PCC 

in Havana City Province (Ciudad de La Habana Province) . 

The Council of State has thirty-one members, including its 

president, vice presidents, and secretary, all of whom were 

reelected in 1998. Its membership had been relatively stable 

from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. Six leaders-the Castro 

brothers, Almeida, Armando Hart Davalos, Machado, and 

Pedro Miret Prieto-have been members of the Council of 

State since its establishment in 1977 and were reelected again 

in 1998. In 1998, however, there was a major overhaul of the 

council's membership, the only top leadership organ to be 

reorganized so thoroughly in the late 1990s. Only seventeen of 

the thirty-one members of the 1993 Council of State were 

reelected in 1998; only two of the departing fourteen members 

had died. On balance, there were three fewer ministers in the 

1998 Council of State, two fewer generals, and none of the 

three members of the old council without significant political 

responsibilities. However, three local government officials 

joined the Council, as did two intellectuals. Some of the rotation was intended to retain the representation of a political 

role that had passed from one individual to another. By tradition, the heads of the most important mass organizations 

belong to the Council of State. The number of women in the 

Council of State was the same in 1993 and in 1998: five women, 

one more than in the first Council of State chosen in 1976. 

There are six Afro-Cubans in the 1998 Council of State (the 

non-white share ofCuba's population was one-third in the 1981 

census). In general, the slight changes in membership led away 

236 
Fidel Castro Ruz in the early 

1980s 

Courtesy Ministry ofForeign 

Relations 

from those with administrative responsibilities and toward 

those with political responsibilities, paying little attention to 

concerns for gender or racial representation. 

Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive and administrative organ. The constitution empowers it to issue regulations to administer laws and decrees and to authorize 

exceptions to state ownership of the means of production. It 

responds to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. 

Ministers are formally chosen by the National Assembly on the 

recommendation of the president of the Council of State, but 

they can be changed as well by the Council of State, on its president's recommendation. 

Ministers are replaced one by one, or in small numbers. 

There has never been a wholesale replacement of the Council 

of Ministers; there is no provision for such National Assembly 

action in the constitution. In the 1990s, the National Assembly 

began to ask for more information from ministers about the 

work of their agencies, but ministers are, in practice, principally responsible to the Executive Committee of the Council of 

Ministers and to President Castro. On April 21,1994, the 

Cuban government adopted a drastic reorganization and simplification of its administrative structure, reducing the number 

of ministries to twenty-seven and abolishing, combining, or 

237 
Cuba: A Country Study 

downsizing another sixteen major agencies of the national government. In 2000, the Council of Ministers included a president (Fidel Castro), a first vice president (Raul Castro), a 

secretary (Carlos Lage) , four vice presidents, a minister of government, twenty-six ministers, the president of the central 

bank, and the directors offour cabinet-level institutes. 

Courts 

The Supreme Court of Cuba is organized into five chambers: 

criminal, civil and administrative, labor, state security, and military. The members of the Supreme Court are nominated by the 

minister ofjustice and confirmed by the National Assembly, 

with two exceptions. First, the Supreme Court's president and 

vice president are nominated by the president of the Council 

of State (Fidel Castro); second, the members of the military 

chamber are nominated jointly by the ministers ofjustice and 

the FAR (the latter minister is Raul Castro). The minister of 

justice exercises administrative control over all the courts, 

including the Supreme Court; the Ministry ofJustice thus has 

full authority over budget, payroll, and personnel. 

The Supreme Court and all the courts are subordinate to 

the National Assembly and the Council of State (Article 121). 

The Supreme Court has no authority to declare a law unconstitutional. The courts are formally much less independent, 

therefore, than in other political systems. Judges are appointed 

for a term, not for life, and they can be removed from office if 

proper cause is shown. As a result of these measures, the courts 

show considerable deference to executive authority and are 

marked by political timidity. 

There are also provincial courts in each province. These 

courts have four chambers, the same as for the Supreme Court 

except for the military chamber. The provincial courts exercise 

jurisdiction over crimes for which punishment will not exceed 

eight years; thus, about three-quarters of all crimes fall within 

its realm. 

There are municipal courts in each municipality. They serve 

as trial courts at the lowest level, and they have jurisdiction over 

minor crimes that typically carry a penalty ofimprisonment for 

less than one year or small fines. They are also the courts of 

first instance in civil and labor cases. Municipal courts are not 

divided into chambers, but trials are always held before a panel 

of three judges. 

238 
Government and Politics 

All of Cuba's courts have both professional and lay judges. 

Each of the chambers of the Supreme Court, for example, has 

professional and lay judges, as is also the case at the provincial 

and municipal levels. The reliance on layjudges reflects a political judgment that decisions in courts belong to the people, 

and that ordinary citizens with relatively little training are 

appropriate judges nonetheless. (In United States jurisprudence, the role ofjuries bears some resemblance to this Cuban 

procedure.) Professional judges are selected through a competitive examination administered by the Ministry ofJustice. 

About half of Cuba's judges are members of the PCC, with a 

higher proportion of PCC members in the Supreme Court. 

The role of the Cuban courts is quite similar to that in other 

countries. The courts are key institutions in law enforcement. 

In Cuba they also seek to educate the population about their 

rights and obligations. The Supreme Court, as an appellate 

court, is responsible for ensuring uniformity in the application 

of law throughout the country; the Supreme Court revokes 

lower-court decisions that are contrary to law or precedent. 

Cuban courts are unusual in one respect: they are very harsh 

in their treatment of the political opposition. Cubans can be 

jailed for speaking ill of their rulers or for organizing groups to 

contest political power. The number of political prisoners has 

declined from the very high levels of the 1960s, but it remains 

characteristically in the hundreds. In the 1990s, the Cuban government often released some political prisoners at the request 

of visiting foreign dignitaries. For example, in 1998, many 

political and common prisoners were released on the occasion 

of Pope John Paul II's visit to Cuba thatJanuary. Nonetheless, 

the existing rules to protect "state security" make it probable 

that the overall number of political prisoners remains the 

same: some are freed, but others are arrested. 

The Office of the State Prosecutor (Fiscalia General de la 

Republica) is subordinate to the National Assembly, which formally elects the prosecutor (Fiscal General de la Republica), 

and the Council of State. The prosecutor has wide latitude to 

review the past conduct and prospective actions of all organs of 

state power. The prosecutor has specific oversight over all law 

enforcement, with a rank equal to a Supreme Court justice. 

The prosecutor is directly responsible for cases of treason or 

corruption. 

239 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Provincial and Local Government 

Cuba has fourteen provinces. From west to east, they are: 

Pinar del Rio, La Habana, Ciudad de La Habana, Matanzas, 

Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, Sancti Spiritus, Ciego de Avila, 

Camagiiey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguin, Santiago de Cuba, 

and Guantanamo. The Isla de laJuventud (Isle of Youth) , the 

Cuban archipelago's second-largest island, is a special municipality. The entire national territory is subdivided into 169 

municipalities. 

Each province is formally governed by a provincial assembly 

and each municipality by a municipal assembly (Asamblea 

Municipal). The respective assemblies elect municipal committees. The president of a provincial assembly's provincial committee functions as a provincial governor; the president of a 

municipal assembly's municipal committee functions as mayor. 

Provincial assembly delegates serve for five years; municipal 

assembly delegates serve for two and one-half years. Provincial 

assemblies must have no fewer than seventy-five members, 

although some are larger because of a province's greater population. 

The Provincial Commission for Candidacies, constituted in 

the same manner as the National Commission, proposes precandidates for provincial assembly delegates to the Municipal 

Commission for Candidacies. The list of precandidates equals 

no fewer than twice the number of posts to be filled. The 

Municipal Commission formally nominates the candidates for 

delegates. As at the national level, the number of candidates 

for provincial delegate equals the number of seats to be filled. 

Voters have no choice among candidates for provincial delegates, just as they have no choice among candidates in the vote 

for national deputies. (The Provincial Commission also nominates the candidates for provincial assembly president, vice 

president, and secretary.) 

The Municipal Commission for Candidacies is constituted in 

the same way as its national and provincial counterparts. Formally, it nominates candidates for municipal assembly president and vice president. The Municipal Commission also 

formally sorts out the precandidacies for provincial delegate 

and national deputy, and presents the respective lists to the 

municipal assembly for final nomination. As a practical matter, 

the political process that leads to these nominations is controlled carefully from national headquarters. Nonetheless, 

because the number of precandidates is twice the number of 

240 
Restored and unrestored hornes 

in Old Havana 

Courtesy Suzanne Petrie 

A cobblestone side street in Old 

Havana 

Courtesy Suzanne Petrie 

~ll 
Cuba: A Country Study 

eventual nominations and posts, there is some significant competition among insiders for these symbolically important posts. 

The elections for municipal assembly are different, however. 

Nominations come from assemblies of neighbors held at the 

precinct level. For each post, there must be at least two candidates, and there may be more. To be elected, a candidate must 

receive more than half the valid votes cast. Because of multiple 

candidacies, runoff elections between the top two contenders 

from the first round are common in many municipalities. In 

the municipal elections in spring 2000, for example, 5.7 percent of these municipal posts were filled in the second round. 

Overall, approximately half of the incumbent municipal assembly members were reelected in these elections. 

Research by Cuban scholars shows that many voters are often 

unaware whether candidates for municipal assembly delegate 

are members of the PCC. Membership in the PCC serves typically neither as an asset nor as a liability in local elections, 

although, in fact, most elected officials are party members. The 

main motivations for voters are whether local candidates have a 

reputation for honesty, good neighborliness, and humane sensibilities. Cubans vote for their friends and neighbors for local 

office in ways not unlike voters do in United States local elections. Thus, it is noteworthy that many of these are, indeed, 

PCC members; the party members seem to be held in high 

regard even if the PCC as an institution is not an object of popular affection. 

Municipal governments provide social services and run 

retail trade enterprises, as well as restaurants and cafeterias, at 

the local level. They also build residential housing. They have 

no control over provincial and national enterprises that have 

offices or subsidiaries in the municipality, but they can at times 

develop collaborative relations with the larger state firms for 

the benefit of the community. Through their relations with 

local governments, large national state enterprises, in effect, 

have local "charitable" activities that are somewhat similar to 

the practices oflarge firms in other countries. 

The main limitation on the scope of municipal government 

is the principle of double subordination. That is, local firms 

and agencies supposedly owned and operated by the municipality must still meet the standards for quality of performance 

and personnel set at the national level. In practice, this principle has greatly limited the municipality's actual discretionary 

242 
Government and Politics 

powers; there are few significant policies they can change on 

their own. 

In 1988 the government authorized the creation of People's 

Councils (Consejos Populares) to expedite the administration 

of services at the local level. There are several People's Councils within each municipality. Each People's Council includes 

the municipal delegates elected within a given territory as well 

as representatives from the mass organizations and state institutions operating within that locality. People's Councils became, 

in effect, one more layer in Cuba's administrative structure; 

they did not materially change the efficacy of the delivery of 

services or the quality of political representation. 

Cuba's provinces face significant problems in carrying out 

their tasks. From 1986 to 1996, the percentage of nationwide 

budget expenditures disbursed at the provincial and municipal 

levels fell from 35 percent to 27 percent. For the most part, this 

drop was accounted for by the collapse of subnational government entrepreneurial and investment expenditures, while local 

governments attempted to sustain their funding of basic services. In 1996 every provincial governmen t ran a deficit 

(although Havana's budget was nearly balanced). The size of 

the deficit of the provincial governments of Ciego de Avila, Las 

Tunas, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio, Sancti Spiritus, Santiago de 

Cuba, and Villa Clara was equal to more than half of the revenues of these provinces. The size of the deficit of the provincial 

governments of Granma and Guantanamo was larger than the 

revenues of these provinces. 

National and local Elections 

Elections for the National Assembly are held in multimember districts. Voters have three choices: they can vote for the 

single official slate; they can vote for some of the candidates on 

the official slate (but never for opposition party candidates); or 

they can cast a blank ballot. To be elected, a candidate has to 

receive more than half of the valid votes cast. No candidate 

failed to be elected in the 1993 and 1998 National Assembly 

elections. The government, the PCC, and the mass organizations campaign vigorously to increase voting turnout, and, in 

particular, they urge citizens to vote for the entire single official 

slate. Thus, one measure of lawful dissent is the percentage of 

Cubans who vote for something other than the single slate (see 

Table 17, Appendix). 

243 
Cuba: A Country Study 

In the 1998 National Assembly elections, the overall results 

were slightly more favorable to the government than in 1993, 

reflecting the trend toward economic stabilization and recovery during the intervening years. In 1998,89.7 percent of the 

voters cast their ballots for the single slate, and only 5 percent 

of the voters voided their ballots or voted blank. The results 

were also more favorable to the government in La Habana 

Province, where the single slate received 88.4 percent of the 

votes cast and the percentage of null or blank ballots fell to 7 

percent. These results necessarily imply, however, that the single slate performed less well in some of the other provinces. 

Comparative inter-provincial data, available for the 1993 

National Assembly election and the 1997 and 2000 municipal 

elections, show a fairly consistent geographic distribution of 

dissent (see Table 18, Appendix). Voiding one's ballot or voting 

blank are the only two means of expressing displeasure with 

the political system at the municipal level, so the percentage of 

voters who choose them is somewhat larger than in national 

elections. At the National Assembly level, there is the additional option of not voting for the entire official slate. In all 

three elections, the largest proportion of dissenters was found 

in the western provinces (Pinar del Rio, Ciudad de La Habana, 

La Habana, Matanzas, Villa Clara, and the special municipality 

ofIsla de laJuventud, or Isle of Youth). And in all three elections, the smallest proportion of dissenters was evident in four 

eastern provinces: Las Tunas, Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and 

Guantinamo. The overall trend toward a decline in voting null 

or blank was evident in both National Assembly and municipal 

elections in the 1990s. 

Cuba's Electoral Law of 1992 treated national, provincial, 

and municipal elections differently with regard to campaigning. Up until 1992, there was no campaigning at all for any 

post. At the municipal level, the "campaign" was limited to the 

posting of the photographs and biographies of the candidates 

in public places. These biographies were prepared and posted 

by the public authorities and could include derogatory comments about the candidates. At the provincial and national levels, provincial delegates and national deputies were chosen by 

the municipal assemblies. Their names were made known only 

after they were so chosen. 

The 1992 Electoral Law did not change the procedures for 

municipal elections. For provincial and national elections, as 

already noted, one change enacted in 1992 was direct popular 

244 
Government and Politics 

election-a change rendered nearly meaningless because there 

was no choice among candidates in the 1993 and 1998 

National Assembly and provincial assembly elections. 

Another change was the posting of photographs and biographies of provincial and national candidates in public places 

and encouraging candidates to meet voters and answer questions. Thus, since 1992, the Electoral Law has featured multicandidate single-party elections with no effective campaigning 

at the municipal level and entirely uncompetitive rules but 

some campaigning at the provincial and national levels. 

At all levels, the political regime sharply constrained the 

freedom of political association. Cubans were not free to associate in a political party other than the PCC to contest elections. 

Candidates for office in different provinces and municipalities 

on the official slate could not even associate into formally constituted "factions." The public authorities and the PCC 

retained the right to shape associational patterns at all levels. 

Communist Party of Cuba 

Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses 

In October 1991, the Fourth Congress of the PCC met to 

assess the wreckage of international communism. The Soviet 

Union was on the verge of disintegration, and the Soviet Communist Party was rapidly losing its hold on power. The Fourth 

Congress declared that the collapse of the Soviet Union and 

the communist regimes ofEurope was a "political disaster" that 

stemmed from avoidable mistakes, which the PCC would avoid. 

One consequence, according to the Fourth Congress, was the 

establishment of a "unipolar world" in which United States military power reigned. And one manifestation of that power was 

the Gulf War on Iraq, which was designed to intimidate any 

government daring to differ with the United States. 

Thus, the Fourth Congress took heart that Cuba had been 

invited to the first Summit of Iberoamerican heads of government, held in Guadalajara, Mexico, months earlier, and hoped 

that Latin American countries would join to advance their 

common interests. It hailed the world's remaining communist 

governments, all of them in East Asia. But it reached out generally to governments everywhere in search of support. It underlined the repatriation of Cuban troops from Mrican soil and 

Cuba's disposition to work within the United Nations system. It 

clearly sought to avoid needless trouble. 

245 
Cuba: A Country Study 

At home, the Fourth Congress affirmed its conviction that 

Marxism-Leninism remained its guide to the future, but it 

noted-for the first time in the history of these documentsthat this ideology "should not be applied dogmatically." Moreover, the PCC would apply these principles taking into account 

Cuba's new circumstances. The Fourth Congress recognized 

that "the world has changed. Today the enemies of the people 

feel stronger than ever." But it stated its conviction that a 

greater strength is the "will to independence, freedom, and 

development of every people. The duty of every revolutionary 

continues to be to make the Revolution, and to defend it." 

Thus, the Fourth Congress proclaimed that it would make no 

concessions, for concessions are the path to ruin. Defiant still, 

Fidel Castro's government was not ready to fold. 

And yet, the Fourth Congress understood that it had to 

adjust to the changed international circumstances. One adjustment has already been mentioned: the full repatriation of 

Cuban troops, mainly from Mrica but also from other countries, which was completed by the time the Fourth Congress 

met. A more regime-changing adjustment was the reorientation of economic policy. The Fourth Congress set its own priority clearly: "The supreme objective [is] to save the Homeland, 

the Revolution, and Socialism." The Fourth Congress endorsed 

the continued use of traditional instruments, such as mass 

mobilizations, to produce food or address other tasks; these 

measures had typically been inefficient in their use ofresources 

and often ineffective in terms ofreaching their objectives, however. 

In Cuba's newly dire circumstances, the Fourth Congress 

understood that it had to authorize changes in economic policy. It endorsed the development of an international tourism 

industry as a new engine of growth that, by the late 1990s, had 

become a crucial earner of foreign exchange (see Key Economic Sectors, ch. 3). The Fourth Congress authorized a slight 

liberalization of self-employment, especially in services, even 

though clear preference was expressed for centralization of 

ownership, management, and planning; such liberalization of 

self-employment would be implemented two years later. 

More dramatically, the Fourth Congress authorized retroactively a new policy on foreign direct investment. In so doing, 

the Fourth Congress departed from a foundational decision at 

the origins ofrevolutionary rule in Cuba, namely, the expropriation of all foreign firms. The Fourth Congress affirmed that 

246 
Government and Politics 

foreign investment should be notjust tolerated but "promoted" 

and that considerable flexibility should govern its terms of 

entry. 

An important social and political change had also been 

authorized by the PCC's Political Bureau prior to the Fourth 

Congress and simply ratified by it. In the "Call to the Fourth 

Congress," the party pledged "sincere communication with ... 

members ofvarious religious denominations who share our life 

and endorse our program ... although some aspects of their 

ideology may differ from ours." At the Fourth Congress, PCC 

Statutes were changed to permit religious believers to join its 

ranks provided they otherwise supported the party's program. 

Despite these significant changes, the main thrust of the 

Fourth Party Congress was to resist widespread political 

change. In December 1991, Carlos Aldana Escalante, PCC secretary for ideology and for international relations and Fidel 

Castro's principal political agent in the late 1980s and early 

1990s, addressed the National Assembly. Aldana had been the 

only top PCC leader who had ever implied in public that he 

thought well of "reform communism" in Central and Eastern 

Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Aldana rectified his 

views. He denounced those who still advocated the implementation in Cuba ofreforms akin to those blamed for the collapse 

of communist regimes in Europe. Despite his adoption of this 

harder line, Aldana, too, was dismissed from office for various 

reasons in September 1992. 

In October 1997, the Fifth Congress of the PCC convened, 

to the general relief of its members. They had survived. Their 

political regime had endured. Cuba had succeeded in resisting 

the sharper onslaught of United States policies during the 

1990s. The Cuban economy had nosedived in the early years of 

the decade as a consequence of the ending of Soviet subsidies 

and the disruption of Cuban international trade, but the economy's decline had stopped in 1994, and a modest economic 

recovery had begun. Cuba was the only extant communist 

regime outside East Asia. The forecasts of many in Washington 

and Miami that the Cuban regime would tumble like other 

communist regimes had proved off the mark. From the perspective of the leadership of the PCC, Cuba's survival was a 

stunning triumph. 

Nonetheless, there was a cloud hovering over the party. Fidel 

Castro had disappeared from public view during the preceding 

summer months. Now he looked gaunt, having lost much 

247 
Cuba: A Country Study 

weight in the interim. As if seeking to reassure the 1,500 delegates to the Fifth Congress that he was still in fine shape, Castro 

spoke for six hours and forty minutes. He recalled the difficult 

days of the early 1990s and detailed the significance of their 

success in overcoming those problems. The PCC, he believed, 

had made "acceptable concessions" in its preferred policies in 

order to survive. As he had said so many times during the early 

1990s, Castro emphasized that he did not like the policies that 

he and the government and the party had been compelled to 

authorize, in particular the large-scale development of the 

tourism industry and the welcome to foreign investment. But 

these policies were necessary to obtain capital, technology, and 

access to markets, and they had already proven successful, he 

said. 

Castro noted new sources of concern. Market-oriented policies had generated new inequalities. Crime had increased. And 

some of the newly preferred strategies for development, such 

as Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades Basicas de 

Producci6n Cooperativa-UBPC), which are semi-private agricultural cooperatives, were not working well. But he praised 

the party's resourcefulness in overcoming the "setbacks, bitterness, and deceptions" associated with the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. The PCC had rallied to the defense of the regime, said 

Castro, and it had prevailed. 

The principal debate at the Fifth Congress centered on the 

new economic policy of the 1990s. Successful though it had 

been in rescuing the Cuban economy from further catastrophes, it was very different from the preferences of many Fifth 

Congress delegates for a centralized command economy. Vice 

President Carlos Lage, the political architect of the economic 

reforms, admitted that prices in those food markets and restaurants where demand and supply were allowed to play freely 

were often well above the purchasing power of Cuban workers. 

But he resisted suggestions for renewed state intervention in 

these markets, arguing instead for further incentives to 

increase production. Lage warned that renewed statism would 

stimulate criminality and the black market. Lage also resisted a 

generalized salary increase; the nation could not afford it. He 

preached the virtues of efficiency, balanced budgets, and control of inflation. Fortunately for Lage, he was publicly backed 

by Fidel Castro. Castro acknowledged the problems and reiterated his dislike of these "painful remedies," but argued that 

current economic policies were sound. 

248 
Government and Politics 

The Fifth Congress's resolution on the economy reflected 

the prevailing balance of power. The Fifth Congress took note 

that the United States should be expected to continue its "economic war" on Cuba. Consequently, Cuba would continue to 

face an adverse international economic and financial environment. Therefore, the "key objective of economic policy is efficiency," provided, to be sure, that all of the changes already 

adopted or about to be introduced "would always be directed 

to preserve the socialist essence of the Revolution." 

The Fifth Congress stood firm on political changes. Perhaps 

its aversion to change is best summarized in the title of the 

political resolution approved by the Fifth Congress: "The Party 

of Unity, Democracy, and the Human Rights That We Defend." 

The closing phrase of the title implied that there were some 

human rights that this party chose not to defend. 

Political Bureau and Central Committee 

Political Bureau 

The PCC's Political Bureau is the party's leading decisionmaking institution, and Cuba's most important decision-making entity (see fig. 8). The Political Bureau meets regularly to 

discuss the nation's key issues. Membership on the Political 

Bureau best identifies Cuba's most powerful leaders. Political 

Bureau members typically have responsibilities in other 

spheres of public life as heads of key provinces, military commands, mass organizations, or major PCC posts. Three leaders 

have led the Political Bureau since 1965-Fidel Castro, first secretary of the PCC; Raul Castro, second secretary of the party; 

and Juan Almeida, chief of the party's disciplinary commission. 

From 1965 through 1980, no member was ever dropped 

from the Political Bureau, although its membership expanded 

from eight in 1965 to thirteen in 1975 and sixteen in 1980. By 

the time of the Third Party Congress (1986), death and voluntary and involuntary retirements had led to a six-member 

reduction (37 percent) from the Political Bureau's 1980 membership; meanwhile, four new members joined the bureau in 

1986, leaving its membership at fourteen members. 

The Fourth Party Congress (1991) witnessed the most dramatic change in membership in the Political Bureau since its 

founding. The Congress wanted to promote a younger and 

more dynamic leadership. Six of the members (43 percent) left 

the bureau during the Congress. Because the Political Bureau's 

249 
Cuba: A Count1y Study 

POLITICAL BUREAU 

(24 members) 

First Secretary: Fidel Castro Ruz 

Second Secretary: General Raul Castro Ruz 

I 

PARTY CONGRESS CENTRAL COMMITIEE (1,500 members; meets ----~ (150 members) every five to six years) 

I 

I 

PROVINCIAL COMMITIEES 

(14 committees, 14 first secretaries) 

I 

MUNICIPAL COMMITIEES 

(169 committees, 169 first secretaries) 

I 

I PARTY CELLS I 

Directs, controls, or supervises 

Elects, appoints, or nominates 

Source: Based on information from Jorge 1. Dominguez; and Raimundo Lopez, 

"Prela Report on pee Membership, Percentages," October 8,1997. 

Figure 8. 	Organization of the Communist Party ofCuba (Partido 

Comunista de Cuba-PCC), 2001 

size had expanded to twenty-five members, seventeen of its 

1991 members (68 percent) were new-unprecedented since 

the party's founding in 1965. The Fifth Party Congress (1997) 

dropped nine members (36 percent) of the Political Bureau 

and added only eight new members, Thus, the Fifth Party Congress's Political Bureau (twenty-four members) suffered from 

less volatility than had its predecessor, as would be expected 

from a leadership that felt more politically secure. 

250 
Government and Politics 

By the conclusion of the Fifth Congress, only the Castro 

brothers and Almeida had served continuously on the Political 

Bureau since 1965, and onlyJose Ram6n Machado, party organization secretary, had been a member since 1975. The next 

two longest-serving members, both since 1986, were Army 

Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of interior, 

and Esteban Lazo, who had served at various times as party provincial secretary in Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, and Ciudad de 

La Habana Province. 

In sum, only six of the twenty-four members of the 1997 

Political Bureau had been members of Cuba's top decisionmaking organ before the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 

Cuba's top leadership, therefore, has already undergone an 

important transition at the levelsjust below the Castro brothers 

and their closest associates. Most Political Bureau members in 

the 1990s are themselves the product of a transition that took 

place under the communist political system. They do not count 

on Soviet subsidies. They do not count on external military 

support. They do not expect to be engaged in military or other 

foreign expeditions. They are much readier to experiment at 

home with various economic policy changes. They are younger. 

The median birth year of the 1997 Political Bureau was 1943; 

six were born after the assault on the Moncada barracks onJuly 

26, 1953. They expect to have a political future in Cuba regardless of the name of the nation's president or the form of its 

political regime. The transition among Cuba's political elite is 

already underway. 

In 1991 three women belonged to the twenty-five-member 

Political Bureau; that number dropped to two in 1997. In 1991 

four military officers on active duty belonged to the Political 

Bureau; that number rose to five in 1997. In 1991 five of the 

provincial first secretaries belonged to the Political Bureau; 

that number rose to six in 1997. The post of provincial first secretary is perhaps Cuba's most challenging position, for all subnational responsibilities fall on the persons occupying these 

posts. Not surprisingly, three of the five provincial first secretaries from 1991 were dropped from the Political Bureau to be 

replaced by others. In the judgment of their superiors, the dismissed first secretaries were poor managers. 

In contrast to previous decades, in 1991 Carlos Lage, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, 

was the only civilian minister on the Political Bureau. The PCC 

leadership clearly understood that its problem in 1991 was emi251 
Cuba: A Country Study 

nently political: how to survive the collapse of European communism and retain the support, or at least the forbearance, of 

the Cuban people. By 1997 three of the Political Bureau members first chosen at the previous party congress had switched 

jobs to become government ministers: Alfredo Jordan Morales, 

minister of agriculture; Abel Prieto Jimenez, minister of culture; and Roberto Robaina Gonzalez, minister of foreign relations. They were joined by Marcos Portal Leon, minister of 

basic industries. Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro 

became minister of the sugar industry, although he remained 

formally on active military duty. In 1997, with six out of twentyfour Political Bureau members serving also as members of the 

cabinet (along with FAR Minister General Raul Castro, Interior 

Minister Army Corps General Abelardo Colome, and President 

Fidel Castro), the PCC leadership signaled a higher priority for 

improving the tasks of governance and in particular the economy's performance. 

Central Committee 

The PCC's Central Committee, a much larger group than 

the Political Bureau, is made up of many key leaders from 

intermediate levels of responsibility. The Central Committee 

met infrequently in the late 1960s; for the most part, it convened only in times of crisis. The committee met more regularly in the 1970s and 1980s; the original party statutes called 

for a meeting of the Central Committee Plenum approximately 

every six months to enable the Central Committee to have an 

impact on major decisions. The party statutes in place since the 

1997 party congress stipulate a plenum meeting at least once a 

year. 

The history of membership on the Central Committee 

resembles that of the Political Bureau. The 1975 First Party 

Congress reelected 77 percent of the 100 founding members of 

the 1965 Central Committee. The 1980 Second Party Congress 

reelected 79 percent of the 1975 full members still active in 

1980; the size of the committee had expanded to 148 in 1980. 

The 1986 Third Party Congress reelected 61 percent. The 

lower rate of continuity in 1986 parallels what was happening 

at the Political Bureau. The size of the Central Committee 

remained stable at 146. 

In 1991 the Fourth Party Congress removed half of the members of the old Central Committee, and it expanded the size of 

the new Central Committee to 225. Consequently, only 32 per252 
Government and Politics 

cent of the new Central Committee members had served on 

the previous committee. Not only was the rate of continuity the 

lowest since the Central Committee had been founded, but the 

proportion of newcomers was the highest since the PCC's 

founding. 

The Fifth Party Congress stabilized membership on the Central Committee just as it had done for the Political Bureau. The 

expansion of the size of the Central Committee in 1991 had 

been a temporary experiment that the Fifth Party Congress 

reversed in 1997. The size of the Central Committee shrank to 

150 members, and 56 percent of the members of the 1991 Central Committee were dismissed. The 1997 Central Committee's 

veterans from 1991 constituted, however, two-thirds of the 

membership of the new Central Committee, and accordingly 

the new body was far more experienced than its predecessor. 

The oversized and inexperienced Central Committee in 

place between 1991 and 1997 was the least important Central 

Committee since the late 1960s. Then, as in most of the 1990s, 

the Central Committee met rarely-in the 1990s less often than 

expected from the party statutes. Moreover, although the party 

statutes mandate a PCC congress every five yeats, the Fourth 

Party Congress met nearly six years after its predecessor. The 

Fifth Congress met a full year late. In general, the Central 

Committee's excessive size, inexperience, and infrequency of 

meetings in the 1990s marked a process of party de-institutionalization that the Fifth Congress sought to reverse, hence the 

reduction in size and the renewed premium on experience. 

One result of these processes, however, was to install and sustain a Central Committee that was younger than its predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s. The PoIitical Bureau and the 

Central Committee finished the century with a young and 

energetic leadership, steeled in Cuba's troubled life in the 

1990s, ready for political competition with any challenger. 

The Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Party Congress 

has an additional characteristic: 36 percent of its members 

have posts only in the PCC and its youth wing, the Union of 

Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas-UJC). 

This Central Committee is full of municipal party first secretaries, not just first secretaries at the level of provinces or on the 

staff of national party headquarters. This Central Committee 

represents the party elite better than its predecessors. It is 

rrlUch less a mere assembly of those who have performed meritorious service in various spheres of life. It is no longer broadly 

253 
Cuba: A Country Study 

representative of Cuban society and institutions. Its members 

seek to rule. 

Party Organization, Membership, and Role 

Formally, the PCC is governed by its party congresses. These 

adopt the party's statutes and its programs, and choose the 

membership of the Central Committee and Political Bureau. 

Party congresses are to meet every five years, the Central Committee Plenum every year, and the Political Bureau once a 

week. In practice, as already noted, the Political Bureau is the 

party's most important entity and the only one whose actual 

power corresponds to the formal organization. 

Party structure was simplified in the 1990s. The post of 

"alternate" for various posts (including Political Bureau and 

Central Committee member) was eliminated. The party Secretariat is no longer a separate body but simply the party's staff at 

various levels. The party's subnational organization matches 

the number of provinces and municipalities. The most rapidly 

replaced significant party post is that of provincial secretary; 

thatjob requires mediation between the demands of the center 

and the localities and is difficult to perform. 

The PCC is a party of selection. Not everyone who wishes to 

belong to the party has the right to join it, although all party 

members must seek to be a member. Party members are chosen 

through a complex process. First, all candidates for party membership must be chosen as "exemplary workers" at assemblies 

held at their workplace. Then, a party commission in charge of 

membership scrutinizes each candidacy and is empowered to 

reject arty and all. A variant on this procedure is through membership in the UJC, the party's youth wing. Ordinarily, the party 

hopes that UJC members will, in due course, also be chosen as 

exemplary workers, but the party commissions can bypass such 

procedures. 

Concerned that party membership might drop in Cuba in 

the 1990s as it had in formerly communist Europe in the late 

1980s, the Fourth Party Congress liberalized membership procedures in two ways. First, it eliminated all discrimination 

against religious believers; the party no longer required a person to be an atheist or an agnostic to qualify for membership. 

Second, the probation time for young UJC members to be eligible for party membership was cut from three to two years. As a 

result, in the 1990s party membership grew on average some 

46,000 persons per year, compared with an annual member254 
Havana Headquarters ofthe Union of Young Communists (Union 

deJovenes Comunistas-UJC), 1997 

Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 

ship growth of only about 27,000 persons in the 1980s. Party 

membership grew to 800,000 members by the time of the Fifth 

Party Congress in 1997 out of a population of about eleven million people. In 1997 about 30 percent of the members had 

joined during the 1990s. Workers constituted about one-third 

of the entire party membership. Another half-million belonged 

to the UJc. 

The PCC's manner of filling public offices differs from how 

political parties elsewhere in the world go about this pursuit. 

Elected public offices wield relatively modest power in Cuba. 

The National Assembly meets infrequently and has limited 

powers. Provincial and municipal assemblies have limited 

resources to carryon with their tasks. Although the pec 

screens who is elected to these offices, it focuses its attention 

on appointed offices that wield significant power. The pec 

commission at the appropriate level must clear and endorse 

every officeholder for such posts prior to appointment. Heads 

of central government agencies, state enterprises, hospitals, 

military commands, and so forth must all be cleared and 

255 
Cuba: A Country Study 

endorsed. This type of control is the party's principal source of 

power. 

PCC officials, especially at the subnationallevel, also play key 

roles as problem solvers and coordinators. When difficulties 

arise in a province or a municipality, the party first secretary is 

often the only person well positioned to appeal through the 

party hierarchy for additional support or resources from 

Havana. The party first secretary in the provinces and the 

municipalities functions also as an arbiter in disputes that may 

arise in various spheres of life. More controversially, the party 

municipal or provincial secretary often assumes the responsibility of breaking a national policy directive on the grounds 

that local conditions are not propitious. This last role implies 

that party provincial and municipal secretaries are, in some 

instances, high risk-takers, but it also explains why provincial 

first secretaries are vulnerable to dismissal. 

The PCC organs are loci for discussion and debate over 

national, sectoral, provincial, or municipal policies. Although 

the Central Committee had become less representative of 

Cuban society by the late 1990s, PCC cells (the party's lowest 

units) and various assemblies often congregate leaders from 

various spheres of life effectively. These fora provide opportunities to clear the air in a heated dispute and to review, understand, and influence decisions issued from on high. 

The party generally orients policies at various levels and with 

varying degrees of specificity. In contrast to previous decades, 

in the 1990s the party's national staff became smaller, and party 

officials were instructed to interfere less in the routine running 

of government agencies, state enterprises, and social service 

entities. The party in the 1990s retained its key tasks, as outlined above, but withdrew in many cases from becoming a substitute policy executor. This behavior was consistent with 

turning the party into, and using it, as a political machine. 

Mass Organizations 

Three of Cuba's principal mass organizations were founded 

shordy after revolutionary victory, between late 1959 and 1961. 

The Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) groups women members, as might be expected. The National Association of Small 

Farmers (ANAP) brings together smallholders regardless of 

their crops of specialization. Following the 1963 agrarian 

reform, many such private smallholders remained. Some cultivated plots on their own or with their families; others did so as 

256 
Government and Politics 

members of cooperatives. All belonged to the ANAP. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) were established in every neighborhood to uncover plots against the 

government. "Revolutionary vigilance" was their main task. 

The CDRs were also responsible for rooting out common crime 

and, from time to time, collaborated in such activities as mass 

vaccination campaigns, garbage recycling, park clean-ups, and 

the like. 

The fourth mass organization is much older: the Cuban 

Workers Federation (CTC) was founded in the 1930s. The CTC 

groups all Cubans who are gainfully employed. It is organized 

into federations according to sectors of economic activity, not 

according to professional categories or trades. The CTC has a 

presence in every work center, and it and the ANAP often substitute for government agencies in dispute resolution. 

From the 1960s to the 1980s, these mass organizations were 

means by which the government and the PCC implemented 

policies and monitored the population. The moment of highest recognition of their role came at the Second Party Congress 

in 1980, when all four heads of the mass organizations became 

alternate members of the party's Political Bureau. 

By the 1980s, however, the capacities of the mass organizations had begun to weaken. Consider the ANAP. One ofthe top 

national objectives in the rural sector was to promote Agricultural-Livestock Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Producci6n 

Agropecuaria-CPAs); the national leadership thought it more 

rational for smallholders to pool their resources. CPA membership jumped from 9,103 in 1978 to 82,611 in 1983, but by 1990 

membership had dropped to 62,130. The number of hectares 

in CPAs peaked in 1986; after this high point, the organizations 

lost nearly a fifth of their pooled land. 

A generalized weakening of the capacity of the various mass 

organizations became evident in the late 1980s. PCC leaders, 

worried that these longstanding means of control were breaking down, took decisive action in the early 1990s by replacing 

the leaders of three mass organizations. Thus, Orlando Lugo 

Fonte replaced Jose Ramirez Cruz, the longtime ANAP president; Juan Contino replaced Armando Acosta Cordero, the 

longtime national coordinator of the CDRs; and Pedro Ross 

Leal replaced the longtime CTC secretary-general, Roberto 

Veiga Menendez. Lugo Fonte and Contino joined the PCC 

Central Committee in 1991; Ross Leal was elevated to the Political Bureau that same year. 

257 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Vilma Espin founded the FMC and has remained its only 

president. She is Raul Castro's wife, Fidel's sister-in-law. Espin 

was promoted to alternate member of the Political Bureau in 

1980 and to full Political Bureau membership in 1986. In 1991 

she became a member of the Central Committee but remained 

as FMC president. 

Notwithstanding these attempts to reinvigorate the mass 

organizations, primarily through new leadership, the FMC, the 

CDRs, and the ANAP remain weaker than in decades past in 

terms of representing and mobilizing the population. The 

eDRs hit bottom in the early 1990s; in the mid-1990s, they 

responded to their reduced capacity by concentrating on some 

strategic tasks where they are still capable of delivering important support for the political regime. For example, the eDRs 

came to play an important role in Cuba's electoral process in 

the 1990s. (As the 1990s closed, the CDRs counted 7.5 million 

people on their membership rolls.) During the 1998 National 

Assembly elections, the CDRs campaigned steadily and massively on behalf of a vote for the single official slate; they combated both blank voting and the process of voting selectively 

for some but not all candidates on the official ballot. On election day, the CDRs visited some homes repeatedly to ensure the 

highest possible turnout. The CDRs were literally an arm of the 

pce working to achieve the desired electoral results. 

The CTC, in contrast, found a new, albeit still limited, role in 

the 1990s: defending the interests of workers in some respects 

and questioning some of the recommendations of government 

technocrats. In this latter stance, the CTe differed from its 

prior role ofjust helping the government implement its objectives. In the 1990s, labor unions, for example, delayed legislation that would have forced recalcitrant workers to relocate to 

other jobs. As a result, Cuban state firms remained overstaffed 

and inefficient, but the government was spared from political 

protest and overt unemployment remained relatively low. 

Unions also resisted stricter sanctions against labor absenteeism (thus making it easier for workers to moonlight as selfemployed), and fought off linking wages to productivity. The 

CTC also spoke out in late 1993 when the government adopted 

some of its most far-reaching economic reforms and, spurred 

by Finance Minister]ose Luis Rodriguez Garcia, the government's leading technocrat, began to consider whether to 

impose taxes on self-employed and salaried workers. The CTC 

opposed the imposition of taxes on the payrolls of salaried 

258 
Government and Politics 

workers and supported a nationwide discussion of the proposed measures in "workers' parliaments" during the first half 

of 1994. In the end, taxes were imposed on self-employed but 

not on salaried workers (see Tax Reform, ch. 3). 

The changes that took place in the 1990s increased the 

CTC's autonomy from the state and imbued it with some claims 

to represent the interests of state workers. This new political 

role, of course, came at the expense of delaying or impeding 

economic reform, but it no doubt made the CTC more important. During this period, the CDRs, on the other hand, became 

even more closely connected to the PCC's partisan interests. 

The ANAP and the FMC have yet to find an effective new role. 

Civil Organizations 

Religion and the State 

The Cuban state is secular, according to the constitution. In 

fact, in the 1960s government policy was designed to weaken 

the Roman Catholic Church and other forms of organized religious behavior, while respecting "freedom of religion" at its 

narrowest level: Cubans remained free to worship. Active 

churchgoers and their children, however, risked being discriminated against when applying to selective schools and the university and when seeking promotions in the workplace. The 

PCC was formally atheist until 1991, and membership in the 

party was often a prerequisite for jobs carrying significant 

responsibilities. Therefore, the Cuban leadership's decision to 

drop atheism as a formal requirement for party membership in 

1991 and, more generally, in the 1990s to discontinue the 

active campaigns against organized religion were significant 

decisions with broad impact. 

In fact, Cuba witnessed a religious revival in many faiths in 

the 1990s. The revival began from a fairly low baseline. A large 

survey (N=3105, with N meaning the size of the random poll 

sample) conducted in the early 1990s by Cuba's Center for Psychological and Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Psicol6gicas y SocioI6gicas-CIPS) showed that 65 

percent of respondents believed in the possibility of magical 

cures while 43 percent thought well of burial ceremonies. But 

only 17 percent approved of baptisms, only 6 percent attended 

religious services, and only 2 percent admitted to belonging to 

a religious grouping. In 1997 a Cuban government survey 

showed that more than four-fifths of Cubans believed in some259 
Cuba: A Country Study 

thing transcendent, while 15 percent admitted to belonging to 

a religious grouping. 

Although its social base of support remains modest, the 

Roman Catholic Church is Cuba's most hierarchically organized community offaith (see Roman Catholic Church, ch. 2). 

The rebuilding of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba began 

in the mid-1980s in preparation for the 1986 Roman Catholic 

Congress, the first to be held since 1959. Congress participants 

reviewed the situation of the church in Cuba, through history 

and in the present. They formulated broad recommendations 

for pastoral action and provided the first sustained critique of 

aspects of Cuban government policy. The final document 

issued by the Congress complained of discrimination in job 

promotions suffered by Roman Catholics, criticized official 

atheism, and called attention to "moral deficiencies" in contemporary Cuba, including "duplicity, mendacity, fraud." 

In the early 1990s, Roman Catholic bishops criticized the 

government and party policies more sharply. The bishops 

issued their pastoral letter, "Love Hopes All Things," on September 8, 1993, the feast of Our Lady of Charity of Cobre, 

Cuba's patroness, and coincidentally the grimmest moment in 

Cuba's sharp economic collapse of the early 1990s.The bishops 

developed several controversial themes that would resurface 

during the pope's visit in January 1998. In 1993 the bishops 

claimed the right to speak to all Cubans, including politicians. 

"We bishops of Cuba," they added, "reject any kind of measure 

that in order to punish the Cuban government serves to aggravate the problems of our people," specifically mentioning the 

United States embargo and other sanctions on Cuba. The bishops criticized official practice "that leads to identifYing terms 

that cannot be made synonymous, such as homeland and socialism . .. Cuban and revolutionary." They chided the authorities 

for limiting freedoms, for "excessive surveillance by the state 

security agencies that even extends into the strictly private life 

of individuals." They lamented the "high number of prisoners 

being held," including those "being punished for economic or 

political reasons ...." 

In November 1996, President Fidel Castro visited Pope John 

Paul II at the Vatican and invited him to visit Cuba. The Roman 

Catholic bishops had first invited the pope in 1989, and informal discussions had been underway since earlier in the 1980s, 

but the Cuban government had delayed issuing its own invitation. In preparation for the papal visit that took place in Janu260 
On the occasion oftheJune 29, 1997, open-air mass held in 

Havana, the first in almost four decades, a sign advertises 

the upcomingJanuary 1998 visit ofPopeJohn Paul II. 

Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 

ary 1998, the first ever to Cuba by a pope, church and state 

negotiated extensively. The Cuban government agreed to permit outdoor masses, not limiting them just to the period of the 

pope's visit, and authorized religious processions outside 

church buildings. In addition, in December 1997, Christmas 

Day became an official holiday for the first time since 1969. 

The Cuban mass media covered some of the preparation for 

the pope's visit, and during the visit radio and television broadcast all public events live. CardinalJaime Ortega, archbishop of 

Havana, was given a half-hour of free television time shortly 

before the pope's visit to explain the meaning and significance 

of the forthcoming events. The government also allowed thousands of international pilgrims, including Cuban-Americans, to 

visit Cuba for the duration of the visit, and allowed the church 

to import paper and other materials to publish necessary information. 

Because the pope's visit took place well after a process of 

social and religious change had begun, his visit may have a 

longer-lasting impact on Cuban society and politics than if it 

261 
Cuba: A Country Study 

had taken place without such prior changes. Thus, the papal 

visit may be a catalyst or an accelerator offurther changes. The 

Roman Catholic church in Cuba has begun to behave like its 

brethren in former communist countries or in former Latin 

American dictatorships. Some parishes sponsor book or film 

clubs, or other groups to discuss issues of common concern, 

not just exclusively religious issues. Several dioceses also publish magazines that cover a wide array of topics, not just those 

of religious significance. For example, the Havana archdiocesan magazine Palabra Nueva often publishes articles that assess 

and criticize government economic policy. Vitral, the magazine 

of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, has been the boldest in challenging aspects of government policy. 

It is difficult to assess the relative size of Cuba's various communities offaith. Nonetheless, both before the Revolution and 

in the 1990s it is likely that the largest such community is heir 

to Cuba's Mro-Cuban religious traditions. Santeria, regla de palo, 

spiritualism, and other forms of Mro-Cuban religiosity command significant popular allegiance, probably more than 

Roman Catholicism. The already mentioned large survey from 

the early 1990s, for example, suggests strong support for beliefs 

and practices often associated with Mro-Cuban practices. 

According to the survey, more Cubans believed in the worth of 

consulting a babalao (an Mro-Cuban religious leader) than a 

priest. In the western provinces, Roman Catholic Church attendance once a month reached 20 percent by late 1994, but, even 

after the pope's visit in 1998, consistent weekly church attendance nationwide was only about 3 percent, although the proportion was much higher in Havana than in eastern Cuba. 

During the 1990s, evangelical Protestantism reportedly grew 

rapidly in Cuba, as was the case elsewhere in Latin America and 

in former communist Europe. More traditional forms of Protestantism did not grow much, however. To the extent that religious belief and behavior remained a form of distancing 

oneself from the government and the PCC, then the fact that 

other forms of religiosity grew faster than mainstream Protestantism could be explained in political terms: Cubans were 

unwilling to join those communities of faith perceived as too 

close to the political regime, and some Protestant pastors from 

mainline Protestant faiths had agreed to serve on the government's single official slate for National Assembly elections. 

Cuba also has a small Jewish community but no resident 

rabbi, although one or two are in training and rabbis from the 

262 
Government and Politics 

United States visit Cuba for services on holy days. The Jewish 

community has also grown, as older and younger Jews have 

sought to explore their religious tradition. (Some Jews, however, have used this reactivation of their community links as a 

means to emigrate to Israel. If they are active members of a 

Temple, Jews have found it more likely that Israel will accept 

them as immigrants and that the Cuban government will permit their emigration.) 

Nongovernmental Organizations 

Cuba's most important nonreligious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are often government operated nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs). This is the case for two 

reasons. The nature and extent of government and PCC control over Cuban society and political life have been very extensive. The principal forms of societal organization, for example, 

have been the mass organizations, already discussed. By the 

late 1970s and thereafter, however, the government and party 

found it useful to establish organizations with a greater margin 

of autonomy. In the 1990s, one additional motivation was that 

GONGOs could more readily obtain international assistance 

from NGOs in Western Europe and Canada. 

There are many examples of GONGOs. They include sports 

clubs; environmental organizations; a Cuban variant of a 

national rifle association; professional associations of lawyers, 

economists, engineers, and so forth; as well as many intellectual and scientific organizations, including think tanks. The 

think tanks focused on political, economic, and social analysis, 

were founded directly by the PCC, and followed its guidelines 

fairly closely through the 1980s. The Center for the Study of 

the World Economy (Centro de Investigaciones de la 

Economia Mundial-CIEM), for example, conducted research 

principally on the Soviet Union and East European communist 

countries until their collapse, but also on the Cuban economy. 

The director and deputy director of the ClEM, Oswaldo Martinez and Jose Luis Rodriguez, respectively, successively held 

the post ofminister of economy in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, 

more than one-half of the publications produced by the CIPS 

(Center for Psychological and Sociological Research) were classified for the use of government and party officials, not for 

wider academic circulation. 

In the mid-1990s, the most notable GONGO was the Center 

for American Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre America263 
Cuba: A Country Study 

CEA). Founded in the late 1970s by the PCC to generate information and analysis about the United States, Canada, and 

Latin America, the CEA, by the early 1990s, was strikingly independent in the development of its work while remaining well 

connected to some high-ranking government and party officials. Central Committee members and staff, National Assembly leaders and staff, and ministers of government solicited the 

work of CEA staff and at times attended CEA workshops and 

conferences. 

In the early 1990s, CEA economists working on Cuba distinguished themselves by the originality of their thought and their 

willingness to venture past the officially established canon for 

discussion of economic policy. One CEA-produced book, Cuba: 

La restructuraci6n de la economia, una propuesta para el debate, provides a searching diagnosis and critique of Cuba's economic 

circumstances and proposes economic policies different from 

those the government was then pursuing. The CEA economists 

wished to accelerate the use of market incentives and instruments, although still within a socialist framework. The CEA 

sociologists and political scientists had also been working on 

domestic Cuban politics and society. In the spring of 1994, they 

held a conference to assess the quality of Cuban democracy. In 

that conference and in the resulting book that was published in 

1995, some foreign authors were included as well. The publication of these two CEA books, however, alarmed some within 

the leadership. 

In March 1996, Raul Castro, minister of the FAR, read a 

wide-ranging report on behalf of the Political Bureau to the 

Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee. One part of the text 

sharply criticized the CEA, accusing its academics of parroting 

the line of United States scholars on Cuba and, more generally, 

of serving United States interests and undermining revolutionary ideology. There followed an investigation led by Jose 

Ramon Balaguer Cabrera, party secretary for ideology. The 

terms of the investigation resembled a witch hunt. The CEA 

senior staff held together, however, insisting that they were 

good revolutionaries and good communists. (The United 

States government from time to time had denied CEA academics visas to enter the United States precisely for these reasons.) 

Although they "confessed" to minor issues (for example, something could have been done better), they held firm in defense 

of their substantive ideas and professions of loyalty. In the end, 

although they had to leave the CEA (the institution became a 

264 
A view ofHavana from Fort Spain (Fortaleza La Espana) 

Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 

pale shadow of its former self), each of the senior academics at 

first found employment that, for the most part, permitted the 

continuation of much of their academic research. None was 

immediately expelled from the PCC. The survival of the CEA 

academics depended greatly on the expression of international 

support by scholars and governments in many countries that 

had come to value CEA researchers. 

NGOs, no matter what their origin might have been, create 

spaces between state and society, between ruling party and private citizens. Such an occurrence has been an aspect of the 

Cuban experience in the 1990s. The CEA case is instructive 

because the CEA was able to resist more effectively than would 

have been the case in Cuba in previous decades. 

Human Rights and Opposition Groups 

It is not news that the Cuban government harasses or jails 

human rights activists and groups as well as the political opposition. The news in the 1990s was that the government was no 

longer succeeding in its repression. Since the defeat and 

destruction of violent counterrevolutionary forces in the mid1960s, the government has not feared violent opposition. But, 

beginning slowly and haltingly in the late 1970s and gathering 

265 
Cuba: A Country Study 

steam in the 1980s, a human rights movement finally blossomed in Cuba in the 1990s. 

In the 1990s, when the government jailed human rights 

activists or opposition political leaders or destroyed some of 

their organizations, others, hitherto unknown, replaced them. 

Thus, the work of these groups has continued even if the faces 

and names of the people and organizations have changed. 

A high-water mark for human rights groups was reached in 

1995-96. On October 10, 1995 (the anniversary of the beginning of Cuba's first war of independence), an organization 

called the Cuban Council (Concilio Cubano) was founded. 

The Concilio was an attempt by some 140 small, unofficial 

opposition groups to coalesce around a minimal program. The 

Concilio's aims were a general amnesty for all political prisoners, full respect for the present constitution and fundamental 

laws, a call on the Cuban government to fulfill its obligations to 

respect human rights under the United Nations Charter, a 

demand for freedom of economic organization, and a call for 

free and direct elections on the basis of the pluralist nature of 

society. 

In November 1995, the Concilio reaffirmed its commitment 

to use only peaceful means to achieve its aims. In short, the 

Concilio respected the country's constitution and legal framework while demanding changes within them. In December the 

Concilio formally asked the government for permission to hold 

a large gathering on February 24, 1996 (the anniversary of the 

beginning of Cuba's last war of independence). On February 

15, however, the government launched a wave of repression 

against Concilio leaders and members; the next day it banned 

the gathering. The Concilio's principal leader and national delegate, Leonel Morej6n, served a prison term for his role in the 

organization; several others were jailed as well. 

The Concilio Cubano episode was noteworthy because it was 

the largest and most ambitious attempt to consolidate human 

rights and opposition groups. Throughout the 1990s, the 

repression of human rights and opposition activity and the 

rebirth in due course were a recurring pattern. In the late 

1990s, human tights and opposition activists founded new 

groups, some ofwhich created new, smaller coalitions. The government again resorted to repression, and the activists and 

oppositionists rebounded as well. 

As in decades past, in the 1990s the government responded 

to opposition efforts by forcing some activists into exile and 

266 
Government and Politics 

sometimes, in effect, deporting them. One means of assuring 

political stability since 1959 has been the government's export 

of its opposition. Many Concilio Cubano leaders and members 

went into exile after the 1996 crackdown, for example. The 

government often releases political prisoners only on the condition that they emigrate. 

Mass Media 

In the 1990s, as in decades past, the state owned and operated all mass media, except for publications of the Roman 

Catholic Church. Because of the high cost of importing newsprint, in the early 1990s the government sharply cut back on 

the publication of newspapers and magazines. Many journals 

and magazines were shut down; the circulation of newspapers 

was cut back. 

The principal daily newspaper is Granma, official organ of 

the PCC. Granma reads like a collection of press releases. It 

often publishes the full texts of official speeches and is generally devoid of editorial or substantive variety. In the late 1990s, 

it resumed occasional publication of abbreviated "letters to the 

editor" along with responses to them, thereby providing a 

glimpse of how official Cuba addresses popular questions. 

Juventud Rebelde is the official organ of the UJC (Communist 

Youth Union). In the 1990s, it changed from a daily to a weekly. 

It is likely to feature opinion pieces that provide a slightly wider 

range of political and social commentary. Bohemia is a newsmagazine of long standing that at times presents investigative 

reporting of problems that government leaders wish to bring to 

light. 

By the end of the 1950s, Cuba had an impressive nationwide 

network of television broadcast companies and television sets. 

Fidel Castro employed television extensively in 1959 and thereafter to communicate his vision and his policies to the Cuban 

people. The Cuban Revolution was the first revolution whose 

leaders made extensive use of television. In the 1990s, however, 

the costs of production for television led the government to 

reduce the number of channels and of hours of transmission. 

Nonetheless, television remains the principal source of communication for entertainment and news. 

In the 1990s, however, radio, a lower-cost alternative to print 

or television media, became the more dynamic mass medium. 

Moreover, the Cuban government's response to the United 

States-sponsored Radio Marti Program led to wider freedom of 

267 
Cuba: A Country Study 

programming for radio. Consequently, Cuban radio engages in 

investigative reporting ofvarious misdeeds, ranging from stores 

that do not open when they should or that sell shoddy merchandise, to incidents of crime and corruption. Live talk shows 

urge listeners to call in with their questions and complaints. 

Some radio programs broadcast internationally popular music, 

instead of the establishment revolutionary or "solidarity" music 

favored by official Cuba. In 1993, for example, Radio Taino was 

revamped to broadcast with the characteristics of commercialstyle radio. It featured contemporary Cuban and international 

Latin dance music, and it carried advertising from foreign 

firms operating in Cuba. 

In the 1990s, the Roman Catholic Church was allowed to 

accept donations to import materials and equipment to publish the texts necessary for the liturgy and to publish magazines 

ofsubstantial circulation. As already mentioned, several archdioceses publish magazines and other limited-circulation publications. The most important one, Palabra Nueva, sponsored by 

the Archdiocese of Havana, features articles on religious 

themes, but it has also published regularly on economics and 

social issues, at times diverging significantly and critically from 

government policies. 

Political Processes 

Emerging Political leaders 

Cuba's political processes at the start of the twenty-first century were more complex than in decades past. President Fidel 

Castro remained at the pinnacle of power. Although aging (he 

was born in 1926) and less healthy than in prior years, his 

energy and talents remained extraordinary. He could still 

deliver multi-hour speeches with few notes; and he still kept 

the hours of a night owl, insisting on seeing foreign leaders at 

midnight or thereafter when the latter were exhausted and he 

was in his prime. Castro is still thoughtful, eloquent, inspiring, 

decisive, and charming. He is also ruthless, brutal, intolerant, 

egomaniacal, and manipulative. These and other traits make 

him a politician who is revered and feared, admired and 

loathed, but whom none take lightly. 

Fidel's slightly younger brother Raul Castro (born in 1931), 

the FAR minister, is the designated successor. Raul Castro lacks 

the more attractive qualities of his brother's public personality, 

but he has inspired respect and loyalty among subordinates for 

268 
A view ofdowntown Havana (Old Havana), including the 

National Capitol (Capitolio Nacional), 1996 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

his painstaking and effective construction of Cuba's armed 

forces. Although no longer a formidable force, the FAR won 

the wars that it fought twice in Angola against South Mrican 

invasions (1975-76, 1987-88) and once on Ethiopian soil 

against Somalia's invasion (1977-78). 

Other important political leaders will most likely continue to 

playa role in Cuba's future politics. PCC Organization Secretary Jose Ramon Machado was a winner in the composition of 

the Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Party Congress and 

positioned himself well for the future. Army Corps General 

Abelardo Colome, "Hero of the Republic of Cuba" for his combat service in overseas wars, rose through a professional career 

in the army and in the late 1980s became in terior minister. 

National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon revitalized 

Cuba's parliament and, to some degree, political life by reaching out to a wider number of loyal "revolutionary" Cubans who 

were not necessarily PCC cadres. Alarcon has remained the 

government's chief of relations with the United States. Esteban 

Lazo Hernandez is the party's expert on subnational government, having served as first party secretary in more provinces 

(including La Habana) than anyone else. Lazo (born in 1944) 

269 
Cuba: A Country Study 

is the Mro-Cuban who best combines relative youth and significant experience at the top of the leadership. Carlos Lage, vice 

president of the Council of State, heads the economic cabinet 

and, backed by Minister of Economy and Planning Jose Luis 

Rodriguez Garda, was the political architect of Cuba's economic reforms of the 1990s. Younger than these others, Lage 

portrays on national television and in person an image of quiet 

competence and candor. Also playing political roles wider than 

their ministerial portfolios imply are Culture Minister Abel Prieto, Division General and Sugar Industry Minister Ulises 

Rosales del Toro, and Basic Industries Minister Marcos Portal. 

Portal in particular was the champion of more efficient administrators in state enterprises. 

In the 1990s, unlike the 1960s, Cuba had no clearly identifiable "factions" within the party, but it has witnessed varying currents of opinion. These combine and overlap. In general, PCC 

cadres and Secretary Machado tend to oppose most economic, 

political, and religious reforms. Leading military and internal 

security officers in contrast, favor various market reforms. FAR 

Minister Raul Castro, for example, took the lead in 1994 to 

advocate market reforms in agriculture, contrary to what had 

been Fidel Castro's position. The Ministry of Interior, too, 

favors economic reforms to decriminalize activities that would 

otherwise occur illegally; ministry officials believe that they 

have tougher enemies to fight than parents seeking milk for 

their children. Vice President Lage and National Assembly 

President Alarcon, among others, have been more willing than 

other national leaders to support the various economic and 

political experiments that took place in the 1990s. 

Political Aspects of the Security and Military Forces 

Cuban state security remains effective in many ways. In the 

summer of 1994, it controlled and suffocated with a professional use of force a large riot that took place in downtown 

Havana, as thousands of Cubans protested the use of force 

against those seeking to emigrate without prior lawful authorization. Cuban leaders quietly pointed out that the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China used massive 

force in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989 to put down protests. The Cuban military was not called in to put down this 

riot, however, because internal security forces handled the incident effectively, with restrained use of force. Internal security 

270 
Government and Politics 

forces also effectively suppressed illegal job actions and 

attempted strikes at various moments in the 1990s. 

Politically, several factors are noteworthy about the FAR. 

Most Cuban military officers are also PCC members. In the 

1990s, military officers on active duty constituted a consistent 

fifth of the membership of the party's Political Bureau. Two of 

the key members of the Political Bureau were Generals Raul 

Castro and Abelardo Colome. And, after the 1997 Fifth Party 

Congress, the military represented 17 percent of the membership of the party's Central Committee, continuing a slide evident over the decades but retaining significant clout (see also 

The Military in the Government and Party, ch. 5). 

In the 1990s, the FAR became a pale shadow of its former 

self, as regards combat readiness and effectiveness. Cuba 

stopped receiving weaponry free of charge from the Soviet 

Union at the beginning of the decade, and it could not afford 

to import sufficient new equipment or even spare parts. As a 

result, the FAR had to reduce the frequency and scope of its 

military exercises. Its size shrank greatly, downsizing to not 

more than 65,000 regular troops. From 1989 to 1997, the size 

of the military and internal security budget (in pesos) was cut 

by 45 percent. The leadership's downsizing of the FAR was a 

major political and budgetary contribution to any future government of Cuba. 

To facilitate the demobilization of personnel and to supplement the meager peso-denominated pensions, the government 

created semi-private companies (they operate as private companies, but the state is the sole shareholder) to employ former 

officers. The military-run tourist firm Gaviota is one example; 

many ofits taxi drivers, former military officers, are paid in dollars by tourists. However, military officers on active duty are 

prohibited from moonlighting and discouraged from receiving 

funds from their overseas relatives. As a result, the standard of 

living of military officers dropped appreciably relative to o"ther 

Cubans who enjoyed lawful access to self-employment or to dollar remittances. Some officers moonlighted, nonetheless, and 

in so doing broke the law they were sworn to uphold. 

The Widening of Public Space 

The most notable change in elite political processes in the 

1990s was that some disputes could no longer be resolved just 

in private as had hitherto been quite common. In the 1990s, 

some disputes became quite public. The new Foreign Invest271 
Cuba: A Country Study 

ment Law 77 of 1995 was vigorously debated and its approval 

consequently delayed. Another publicly debated case, that 

relating to the imposition of payroll taxes, was the first instance 

in which an economic initiative advocated by the leadership 

was defeated. Fidel Castro's need to explain and defend publicly his invitation to Pope John Paul II both at the Fifth Party 

Congress and in the days prior to the pope's arrival was yet 

another example. 

The widening of public space was most closely associated, 

however, with the weakening of the government's control. The 

boom of illegal markets in the 1990s, discussed in previous 

chapters, is the best example ofweakened control. The government had been an intrusive micromanager of economic life, 

shaping the work place and earnings decisions and outcomes 

for every Cuban. In the 1990s, that changed. Lawfully or not, 

many Cubans took hold of their economic lives and became 

largely independent of the state for their livelihood. Given the 

context of past decades, this was a major political change, not 

just an economic change. 

Moreover, President Fidel Castro repeatedly made it clear 

that he detested authorizing the limited market-oriented policies that he felt compelled to authorize in the 1990s to ensure 

his government's survival. For Cubans long-accustomed to a 

ruler who had governed with vast discretion, this, too, was a 

stunning political change. Fidel Castro could no longer govern 

his way. 

Human rights and opposition activists understood this new 

modest but nonetheless real opening. Each of them might suffer repression, abuse, or imprisonment, but they were newly 

confident that others would pick up their fallen standard to 

continue to press for wider spaces for democratic liberties. 

Cuba's government could no longer prevail even in the one 

area that had always mattered the most, namely, the capacity to 

eliminate all organized opposition. 

The academics associated with the Center for American 

Studies (CEA) did not consider themselves dissidents or oppositionists but loyal PCC members; nonetheless, the party leadership came down hard on them. And yet, these academics 

resisted, as well, in ways unlike in the past. They did not break 

ranks. They did not betray each other. And, to a surprising 

degree, they succeeded in continuing at least some aspects of 

their academic work. 

272 
Government and Politics 

"Do not be afraid," said Pope John Paul II during his visit to 

Cuba in January 1998. Posters with the pope's photograph, 

plastered all over the country, reiterated this fundamental message. Cubans took the pope's message to heart in their participation in the events associated with his visit. The pope's 

pilgrimage to Cuba, as already noted, was likely to have some 

lasting impact because it rode the crest of a wave of renewed 

interest in religiosity. 

The political attitudes of Cubans also changed. In the spring 

of 1990, Cuba's newsmagazine Bohemia conducted a nationwide 

public opinion poll (N=957). Asked about municipal government, more than 40 percent of respondents failed to express 

trust in the delegate elected from their district; nearly 60 percent believed that improvements needed to be made in Cuba's 

local government structures and procedures. In the spring of 

1990, the PCC also sponsored a nationwide survey. Only 20 percent of respondents said that the food supply was good, and 

only 10 percent said that the quality of transportation was 

good. Having thus reported criticism on certain matters, the 

poll was believable when it reported that 77 percent of respondents thought that health services were good and 83 percent 

believed in the efficacy of the country's schooling. Cubans 

were, therefore, unhappy with the capacity of their government institutions and leaders to represent and serve many of 

their interests, but they continued to be impressed by performance in education and health care. This legacy of at least partial public support was crucial for regime survival at its moment 

of greatest peril, when so many Cubans had come to feel free 

to express their severe unhappiness even to PCC pollsters. 

In late 1994, an affiliate of the Gallup Poll conducted a large 

survey in Cuba's western provinces. A large proportion of 

respondents had no difficulty reporting complaints. Only a 

quarter of Cubans believed that their needs for food were fully 

met, although half believed their health care needs were being 

met and nearly three-quarters were satisfied with Cuba's education programs. Only one in ten Cubans called themselves 

"communists" although half thought of themselves as "revolutionaries"; a quarter said that they were not supporters of the 

regime. Half of those surveyed were interested in setting up 

small businesses, if the government were to authorize them. 

More Cubans supported the value of equality than the value of 

freedom. 

273 
Cuba: A Country Study 

These views suggest that Cubans had absorbed-and supported-a number of socialist values but that many also disagreed significantly with the government and were not afraid 

to voice those disagreements to pollsters. Support for the PCC 

was quite low even though, as noted before, many individual 

party members were highly regarded by their neighbors. 

Cuban politics changed slowly but decisively in the 1990s. 

Political leaders could not and did not govern as had been 

their custom. They were forced to authorize some changes and 

permit others, even when they disapproved of them. Cubans 

began to act through the market, legally or not, and chose to 

explore new political, religious, and intellectual alternatives. 

The PCC and government leaders, in turn, had enacted 

important changes on their own to shape Cuba's present and 

future. The leadership was substantially overhauled in the early 

1990s. New, younger people were appointed to significant 

posts. The armed forces were downsized sharply. Mter a period 

of decline and deinstitutionalization early in the 1990s, the government took some steps to strengthen and rearticulate regime 

institutions as the decade closed. The regime'S leaders and 

institutions, however, had changed in perceptible ways even if 

their purpose continued to be the retention of power. 

Cuba in the 1990s was in the throes of a political transition, 

although its end point was uncertain. This "transition to somewhere" did not imply a transition to a liberal democratic 

regime as had occurred elsewhere in Latin America or in much 

of the former communist world. It was associated with more 

open spaces for a private and public life autonomous from government and party power, and with rules that enabled market 

processes to operate. Whether Cuba's transition would evolve 

toward democratization remained unclear as the decade 

reached a close. 

Foreign Relations 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist 

governments of Central and Eastern Europe, Cuba was bereft 

of international allies. Its trade, investments, military support, 

and political relations had been disproportionately concentrated and dependent on governments that no longer existed. 

As 1990 opened, the Soviet Union required that all bilateral 

trade be conducted at international market prices by whatever 

private or state enterprises engaged in pertinent activities. No 

274 
The North East Gate, Marine Barracks, Ground Defense Force, 

U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 1993 

longer would bilateral trade be mandated and carried out by 

the central government in Moscow. 

During the 1990s, Cuban economic relations with Central 

and Eastern Europe plummeted. Cuban economic relations 

with Russia focused principally on barter trade, at market 

prices, exchanging sugar for petroleum (see The Economic 

Crisis of the 1990s, ch. 3). Cuba refused to service its large 

accumulated international debt to the Russian Federation, but 

that was no different from its general policy on nonservicing of 

any debts. Russian ground troops, who had been stationed in 

Cuba since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, also departed in 

1992. 

Russia and Cuba retained two somewhat more complicated 

relationships. The Russian government paid rent to Cuba for 

the use of electronic eavesdropping facilities set up south of 

Havana at Lourdes (see Relations with Russia, ch. 5) at the 

height of the Cold War. And Russia and Cuba continued to 

negotiate over the fate of the nearly completed but mothballed 

nuclear power plant near Cienfuegos in south central Cuba. 

The investment costs of completing the nuclear power plant, 

however, were beyond the capacities of both governments. 

275 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Cuba accepted international inspection of these facilities by 

the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Cuban relations with China recovered only gradually from 

the sharp bilateral split that had become manifest in 1966. 

With the collapse of European communism, however, political 

relations warmed more quickly between these two remaining 

communist governments. The Cuban government sought to 

learn fast and well the magic secrets of China's creation of market Leninism. Economic relations between the two countries 

remained basically what they had been, however: significant for 

Cuba, modest for China, and conducted at international market prices. Sino-Cuban military relations are modest in scope. 

Between 1989 and 1991, Cuba repatriated its overseas troops 

from all countries to which they had been deployed. In 1992 it 

announced that it had stopped providing military support to 

revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in 

other countries. 

The international dimensions of the Cuban government's 

strategy for survival required the active cultivation of foreign 

investment and, therefore, of better political relations with 

market-economy countries. To resist the increased United 

States economic and political pressures on Cuba, Fidel Castro's 

government needed to find some international support. 

United States actions led to some sympathy for Cuba. In 

October 1992, the United States Congress enacted the Cuban 

Democracy Act (see Glossary), whose principal sponsor was 

Representative Robert G. Torricelli. The new law prohibited 

United States subsidiaries in third countries from trading with 

Cuba. Other governments deemed it an extraterritorial secondary boycott in violation of the rules under the General 

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT-see Glossary). In 

March 1996, the United States Congress enacted the Cuban 

Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (also known as the 

Helms-Burton Act), sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms and 

Representative Dan Burton. However, invoking procedures in 

the law itself, President William Jefferson Clinton suspended 

the enforcement of the act's key feature, Title III, which authorizes United States citizens and firms to sue in United States 

courts those firms from other countries that "traffic" with 

Cuba. The law is broadly written to affect most foreign investment in Cuba as well as trade. 

These laws provoked strong opposition from Canada, the 

European Union (EU-see Glossary), the Caribbean, and 

276 
Government and Politics 

Latin American countries, among others. The EU, Canada, 

Argentina, and Mexico enacted blocking legislation to prevent 

their firms from complying with these United States laws and to 

protect them if they were sued in United States courts. At the 

annual Iberoamerican summits of heads ofstate, opposition to 

these United States policies rose markedly. Although the 

Iberoamerican summits endorsed democracy and human 

rights strongly, President Fidel Castro was welcomed at each of 

these events, and his government's authoritarian practices were 

never explicitly criticized. 

Within days of the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, 

in November 1992, for the first time ever Cuba gained overwhelming support in the United Nations General Assembly for 

a resolution condemning United States policies toward Cuba. 

The enactment of the Helms-Burton Act further tilted the vote 

in the General Assembly against the United States. In 1992 the 

vote was fifty-nine in favor of Cuba's resolution; three nations, 

including the United States, voted against the motion; and seventy-one abstained. In November 1997, 143 countries voted to 

condemn United States policy, three voted against, and only 

seventeen abstained. United States policy served Cuba's purposes well. (In separate motions, however, the General Assembly repeatedly criticized the Cuban government's violations of 

human rights.) 

Cuban policy was most effective within the Anglophone 

Caribbean. Cuba was admitted to the Caribbean Tourism Organization in 1992, and in 1994 became a founding member of 

the Association of Caribbean States (see Glossary) led by the 

Anglophone Caribbean. Caribbean countries became among 

the most vocal opponents of United States policy toward Cuba. 

In September 1993, the European Parliament (see Glossary) 

condemned the Cuban Democracy Act, and in September 1994 

it called upon Cuba to enact democratic reforms. Also in 1993, 

the European Commission (see Glossary) created for the first 

time a humanitarian aid program for Cuba, although Cuba 

remained the only Latin American country with which the EU 

had not concluded a formal cooperation agreement. In 

response to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, European 

governments challenged the United States and refused to 

accept its imposition on European firms. 

The government of Canada, along with those of various 

Caribbean countries, went the farthest in opposing United 

States policies. Canada strengthened its legislation to block the 

277 
Cuba: A Country Study 

impact of United States law on Canadian firms, established a 

program of official development assistance in addition to 

humanitarian aid, and financed the business activities of Canadian firms with Cuba. It facilitated the work of Canadian NGOs 

in Cuba. And in 1998, Canada's Prime MinisterJean Chretien 

visited Havana. 

Cuban relations with the United States featured three key 

events in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the riot in Havana in 

the summer of 1994, the Cuban government lifted all requirements for an exit permit to emigrate and encouraged unauthorized emigration by boat or raft to the United States. Tens of 

thousands of Cubans took to the seas. Many were seized by 

United States Coast Guard and Navy ships and held for months 

at the United States base at Guantanamo Bay. Eventually, the 

United States and Cuba reached agreements in September 

1994 and May 1995 to end the crisis. The United States 

accepted almost all Cubans who had emigrated illegally in 

1994, although a few criminals were excluded and returned to 

Cuba, which accepted them. The United States promised to 

accept no fewer than 20,000 legal immigrants per year for the 

indefinite future. The United States also undertook to intercept on the high seas and return to Cuba those seeking to 

enter the United States illegally and without a credible claim to 

refugee status; this policy has been enforced. Cuba agreed to 

accept those whom the United States had intercepted and not 

to discriminate against them. It also agreed to reimpose its barriers on unlawful exit. 

The next significant episode occurred on February 24, 1996, 

when at least one, perhaps three, unarmed civilian aircraft 

piloted by Cuban-American members of a group called Brothers to the Rescue flew into Cuban airspace. (On a prior trip, 

Brothers to the Rescue airplanes had dropped antigovernment 

leaflets over Havana.) As they were fleeing the pursuit of 

Cuban Air Force jets, two of the planes were shot down over 

international waters. This Cuban action, condemned by the 

International Civil Aviation Association, triggered the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act. 

In November 1999, a five-year-old boy, Elian Gonzalez, was 

rescued in the Straits of Florida, hanging on a raft after his 

mother had drowned. At first, the United States Immigration 

and Naturalization Service allowed his great-uncle to obtain 

provisional custody. Soon, however, the boy's father, Juan 

Miguel Gonzalez, claimed custody, requesting the boy's return 

278 
Government and Politics 

to Cuba. An intense seven-month legal and political battle 

developed over the child's custody, engaging both national governments, various local governments in southern Florida as 

well as state and Federal courts, including the Supreme Court. 

Consistent with their new migration relations, the United 

States and Cuban governments assumed similar positions on 

the issue and ultimately prevailed: Elian Gonzalez, accompanied by his father, returned to Cuba in June 2000. In the 

United States, the political battle over Elian was fierce; in Cuba, 

the government used the incident to mobilize nationalist support. In the end, the Cuban American community's insistence 

that the boy should remain in the United States, and not with 

his father in Cuba, received little support. The Elian Gonzalez 

case may have begun a re-thinking of United States policy 

toward Cuba. 

During the 1990s, the United States and Cuba also constructed modest confidence-building measures to prevent accidental war and minimize the likelihood of accidents. These 

included frequent contact between the two countries' coast 

guards to enforce the migration agreements and carry out 

search-and-rescue operations. Regular procedures for contact 

were also established between both sides at the Guantanamo 

base. In anticipation of potential trouble, both governments 

inform each other in great detail and, to the extent possible, 

coordinate their actions. 

Outlook 

As the twenty-first century began, Cuba's communist leadership believed that it had survived the collapse of the Soviet 

Union and the European communist world. It had overcome 

increased United States sanctions on Cuba. And it had 

stemmed the economy's decline. Cuban leaders were conscious 

that popular support had dipped seriously, but they believed 

that they retained enough support, and wider tolerance, from 

their people to rebuild the political bases of the regime and to 

live through the next and perhaps most decisive crisis: Fidel 

Castro's death. Although Castro remained firmly in charge, his 

health had begun to fail and, for the first time since 1959, 

regime loyalists began to contemplate seriously a Cuba without 

Fidel. 

Much has already changed in Cuba in anticipation of that 

future. Cuba's political institutions from the mid-1960s to the 

mid-1980s had been marked by very slow rotation of personnel. 

279 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The circulation of elites accelerated dramatically in the early 

1990s and then stabilized somewhat later in the decade. Most 

members of the party's Political Bureau in place in 2000 had 

joined the bureau after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In 

effect, a much younger, more dynamic set of leaders was in 

place, ready for the regime's future battles for political survival. 

The armed forces had also changed. In particular, the forces 

were downsized, a move that reduced the political burden on 

future governments to do more downsizing. 

Cuba's political institutions, however, were weaker, more 

brittle, and enjoyed much less political support than in the 

past. The National Assembly, despite its partial revitalization in 

the 1990s, remained a toothless institution. The PCC's members were well regarded by their fellow citizens, but the party as 

such was not. The PCC as an institution weakened also in the 

early to mid-1990s, although an attempt was made to reinvigorate it in time for the Fifth Party Congress. The strengthening 

of the PCC in 1997 may have set the basis for a future "renewed 

communist" party, as in Poland, Lithuania, or Hungary in the 

mid-1990s. ' 

Ordinary Cubans were ready for change and were already 

seizing the reins of the future. They sought and found jobs on 

their own. A growing number discovered the value of religion 

to their lives. Some courageous onesjoined human rights and 

opposition groups, and did not desist despite repression. Intellectuals were more willing to challenge the government and 

the party. And even Fidel Castro grudgingly and publicly confessed that he could no longer pursue the policies he preferred 

most. 

The future ofCuba lies also in part with the United States. It 

will be made easier or more difficult by United States government policies regarding the claims of American citizens and 

firms seeking compensation for the property expropriated in 

1959 and 1960. And it will also be greatly affected by the generosity or the revenge of returning Cuban-Americans. 

Cuba is an island archipelago, battered by hurricanes, natural and political. There is absolute certainty that real as well as 

metaphorical hurricanes will strike it in the years to come. The 

only doubt is when and with what force. 

* * * 


280 
Government and Politics 

Much of the literature on Cuban government and politics in 

the 1990s was polemical or speculative, that is, it denounced 

the Cuban political regime and imagined a post-Castro future. 

As a result, there is less careful analytical and empirical work 

on Cuba in the 1990s than there is for previous times. Most of 

the material for this chapter had to be constructed from primary sources. Various books do, however, ably place the early 

1990s within the broader sweep of Cuban politics since 1959. 

Among them are Irving Louis Horowitz's Cuban Communism, 

Carollee Bengelsdorfs The Problem ofDemocracy in Cuba, Marifeli 

Perez-Stable's The Cuban Revolution, and Susan Eckstein's Back 

from the Future. Perhaps the single most comprehensive analytical and empirical work about Cuban politics and economics in 

the 1990s remains unpublished, however. It is Cuba in Transition, sponsored by the Cuban Research Institute of Florida 

International University (for the series, see http:/I 

www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/index.html). The 

journal Cuban Studies continues to provide valuable articles, 

book reviews, and bibliographies. 

The good news is that significant social scientific work has 

been published in Cuba in the 1990s. Until 1996, Cuba's leading scholarly institution for political analysis was the Center for 

American Studies (CEA). The works of then-CEA scholars, 

such asJulio Carranza, Haroldo Dilla, Rafael Hernandez, and 

Pedro Monreal, among others, contributed much to the understanding ofCuba in the 1990s. So, too, did the center'sjournal, 

Cuadernos de Nuestra America. Important work was also produced, although infrequently published, at the Center for Psychological and Sociological Research (CIPS) and at various 

research centers within the University of Havana. Cuba's premier social science publication is Temas, edited by Rafael 

Hernandez. 

Indispensable primary sources remain the daily newspaper 

Granma, the weekly newsmagazine Bohemia, and the panoply of 

journals published, sometimesjust occasionally, by Cuba's universities and think tanks. The official legal gazette is the Gaceta 

Ojicial de la Republica. The official Cuban government web site 

(http://www.cubaweb.cu) is also informative and useful. (For 

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

281 

Chapter 5. National Security 
The marble obelisk and statue at theJose Marti Memorial (Monumento aJose 

Marti) in the center ofRevolution Plaza (La Plaza de la Revoluci6n), formerly 

Republic Plaza (La Plaza de la Republica), 1997 

Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE 1990s, Cuba's Revolutionary Armed 

Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR) was a shadow 

of its former self. The decline of the Cuban military institution 

during the 1990s was in stark contrast to the FAR's position in 

the mid-1980s, when it was one of the largest and most formidable militaries in the Latin American region, if not in the 

entire developing world. 

The pre-1990 development of the military institution owed 

much to Soviet aid, a benefit from the Cuban leadership's close 

ties with the former Soviet Union that dated to the early years 

of the Revolution. These ties made possible not only the FAR's 

intensive professionalization, which was deepened in the early 

1970s, but also the extension several years later of Cuban military involvement to other developing world nations. By the 

time that Cuba's military "internationalism" (see Glossary) in 

Mrica ended in 1991, 300,000 FAR personnel had served as 

trainers, advisers, and combatants. Throughout the 1970s and 

1980s, the most promising young Cuban officers were trained 

at the Soviet Union's top military schools; foreign assistance 

worth millions of dollars was channeled each year to help support the Cuban institution; and the FAR's inventory was replete 

with many of the Soviet Union's most sophisticated, state-ofthe-art weapons and equipment. 

By the early 1990s, the erosion of the FAR's image as one of 

the premier military institutions of the developing world was 

already underway. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and 

the deepening of the island's economic crisis, the Cuban military found itself confronted with some of the most serious challenges in the history of the institution. By 1989, with the 

demise of the East European bloc imminent, the Cuban military leadership was already making plans to "go it alone" without the help they had long received. As the era of Cuba's 

military "internationalism" drew to a close, the combat troops 

once deployed abroad and hailed as heroes returned home 

only to be tasked to menial agricultural labor. In the difficult 

years that followed, the size of the armed forces was halved, the 

term of military service shortened, and the defense budget 

reduced sharply. On top of these cuts, much of the FAR's 

equipment-from its supersonic jet fighters to its aging main 

285 
Cuba: A Country Study 

battle tanks-was put into storage because of the continuing 

shortages of fuel and spare parts. 

By the mid-1990s, there were signs that the FAR was successfully defining a new course. The post-Cold War thaw made possible the establishment of closer ties with fellow military 

officers in Latin America and Europe, which helped somewhat 

to mitigate the institution's isolation. Even more significant 

were the reforms introduced on the island that provided an 

opening for the FAR to assume a more prominent role in the 

economy. This provided the military the opportunity to serve 

as an exemplary model for the rest of the nation, as suggested 

by the "experiments" with the System for Managerial Improvement (Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial-SPE) that 

were first conducted within the FAR's production enterprises. 

Of no small import, this economic involvement was also motivated by the FAR's interest in economic survival, which was 

facilitated by the expansion of the military-linked Gaviota 

Tourism Group, S.A., in the burgeoning tourism industry. 

Toward the close of the decade, although a United States 

Department of Defense study affirmed that the weakened FAR 

no longer posed a serious threat, it appeared equally unlikely 

that the military institution, still professional and staunchly 

supportive of the regime, might wither away. 

The latter half of the 1990s heralded a period of new and 

different security-related concerns for the Cuban leadership. 

These concerns-stimulated, in part, by the dynamic set underway by the economic reforms carried out only years beforeled to a higher profile for the police forces of the Ministry of 

Interior. In an effort to stem the growth of common crime, the 

regular police found themselves the beneficiaries of increased 

budgets, new equipment, and training programs, occasionally 

carried out with modest assistance from European police 

authorities. At the same time, the political police-as the members of the Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security 

are often called-were tasked to monitor and do what was necessary to rein in the increasingly bold activities of dissidents 

and members of the nascent independent press. One serious 

crackdown, which began in earnest in late 1998, brought 

changes in the Penal Code that codified new offenses and 

established harsher sentences for many crimes already on the 

books. The crackdown included the issuance of harsher sentences for what foreign observers might recognize as offenses 

286 
National Security 

that were political in nature, as well as the more frequent application of the death penalty. 

Cuba's security environment of the 1990s thus appeared 

quite different from what it did in the 1980s. In some respects, 

it resembled more the difficult years of the 1960s than either of 

the two succeeding decades. With the collapse of the Eastern 

bloc, the Cuban government's focus was redirected from ambitious military efforts to bolster socialist allies abroad to efforts 

simply to maintain domestic order and the regime's own socialist foundation. Despite continuing economic problems in the 

final years of the decade, the FAR appeared to be adapting to 

its new position and economic role. As well, the deterrent measures aimed at halting the surge in common crime appeared to 

be achieving some success. At the same time, however, there 

were few indications that the regime's harsher treatment for 

political offenders had led dissidents and independentjournalists to cease efforts to press for changes. 

At the close of the twentieth century, various aspects of 

Cuban internal security had clearly been challenged, whether 

directly or indirectly, as a result of the crisis of the past decade. 

Yet despite the frequent forecasts of impending collapse that 

were heard throughout the 1990s, the Cuban regime maintained its stability. This was made possible in part by the continuing loyalty and support of the security forces under the 

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-MINFAR). Moreover, the 

regime appeared ready to take on the new security challenges 

that were sure to arise in the coming years. 

Background of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 

1959-91 

Institutional Consolidation in the 1960s 

One of the greatest challenges faced by the revolutionary 

government when it assumed power in January 1959 was that 

of organizing a new military. Fidel Castro Ruz, who initially had 

no formal role in the civilian government, was recognized as 

the commander in chief of the armed forces. In turn, the 

troops of the Rebel Army formed the core of the new military, 

and the Rebel Army's top field commanders became the new 

institution's leaders. However, the issue remained as to what to 

do with the remnants of Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar's (president, 1940-44; dictator, 1952-59) old armed forces and with 

2R7 

Cuba: A Country Study 

the poorly prepared peasants who had joined the Rebel Army's 

ranks during the final phases of the struggle in 1958. 

Batista had left behind a 40,000-man military consisting of 

35,000 members of the army and 5,000 members of the naval 

and air forces, including several thousand new recruits. The 

armed forces also had received new equipment from the 

United States shortly before the cutoff of aid to the regime. 

With Batista gone, the armed forces fell into complete disarray. 

Many officers quickly fled the island upon learning of Batista's 

departure, and members of army units throughout the country 

refused to continue fighting, with some abandoning their 

posts. Although the victorious rebels initially professed plans to 

unite the two armies into a single large force, the difficulties in 

building a new military organization composed of both guerrillas and their former enemies may have been recognized. In the 

months that followed the rebels' arrival in Havana, very few of 

the old military's officers who remained in Cuba were kept on 

active duty, and thousands were dismissed peremptorily. Hundreds of others were accused of war crimes, court martialed, 

and publicly executed in fulfillment of what Fidel Castro 

termed "revolutionary justice." 

The MINFAR was created on October 16, 1959, to replace 

the Batista-era Ministry of Defense. Headed by Raul Castro, the 

MINFAR quickly became the dominant organization in the 

new government. At first, the new MINFAR's leaders planned 

to have a military of 15,000 to 25,000 well-trained troops, whose 

hierarchy would be built around the few hundred individuals 

who had been the Rebel Army's leaders, were hardened combatants, and were known for their loyalty to Fidel and Raul Castro. This aim was never fully realized, however, because, despite 

their low level of professionalism, it was seen as politically 

unwise to dismiss the many who had joined the rebels in the 

latter days of the revolutionary struggle. Organized in October 

1959, the FAR numbered 40,000 troops and officers by early 

1961, making it comparable in size to Batista's old military. The 

FAR was supported by the National Revolutionary Militias 

(Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias-MNR), a civilian organization formed in October 1959. 

Although maintaining a large force posed a problem, the 

FAR proved useful in helping the regime counter two threats 

that developed in the early 1960s. The first was the internal 

security problem posed by the activities of the counterrevolutionaries, who opposed the new government and Fidel Castro 

288 
Cuban soldiers wearing Soviet helmets and armed with Czech-made 

automatic rifles stand guard outside the US. Naval Base at 

Guantanamo in September 1962. 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

and were roaming the countryside in central Cuba. The Castro 

government's campaign against the counterrevolutionaries, 

known as the "fight against bandits" (lucha contra bandidos) , 

began in 1960 and continued until victory was declared five 

years later. Working together in coordinated operations to 

defeat the antigovernment rebels were members of at least four 

organizations-the military, the Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del 

Estado-DSE), the MNR, and the Committee for the Defense 

of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa de la Revoluci6nCDR). By the end of 1964, 500 soldiers had died in the campaign, and a total of 3,500 counterrevolutionaries had been 

killed or captured. 

The United States Government's efforts to bring about the 

regime's overthrow perhaps posed a more serious threat. On 

April 17, 1961, the first major United States-sponsored military 

289 
Cuba: A Country Study 

action against the Castro government was carried out with the 

landing of an army of Cuban exiles organized by the United 

States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on Playa Gir6n in the 

Bay of Pigs on the south-central Cuban coast. This ostensibly 

covert invasion, which came only fourteen weeks after Washington had broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba, presented the first real test of the ability of the regime's security 

forces, including the militia and the FAR's newly organized air 

force, to repel external aggression. About 300 of the invaders 

were killed outright, and 1,179 others were captured and held 

for twenty-two months. The exile force's ready defeat turned 

into a propaganda victory for the FAR and the regime. The following year, initiation of the United States-sponsored Operation Mongoose, which was aimed at sparking a popular revolt, 

obliged the FAR to continue to maintain a high state of readiness. This readiness continued until the declarations of victory 

in 1965, at which time the Cuban leadership turned its attention to developing the armed forces' professional capabilities 

(see Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization, ch. 

1). 

This effort began with steps taken in early 1963, when the 

MNR was disbanded. Also at that time, the armed forces' ranks 

were trimmed, and several professional military schools were 

opened to improve the training and competency of the senior 

officer corps as well as of the various service arms. In addition, 

the universal conscription system known as Obligatory Military 

Service (Servicio Militar Obligatorio-SMO) was instituted so 

that draftees completing their three-year term of service might 

help fill the scaled-down military's manpower requirements. In 

1965 the military budget, which had been reduced along with 

the manpower cuts, was increased. But the truly capping 

achievement during this period was the delivery of state-of-theart MiG-21 supersonic fighters, which lent the FAR the prestige of being the first military in Latin America to have such 

advanced aircraft. 

Despite the Soviet contributions to the Cuban arsenal during the first half of the 1960s, tensions in Soviet-Cuban relations persisted over Cuban efforts to "export the Revolution" to 

other developing countries (at a time when the Soviets were 

pursuing "peaceful coexistence" with the West). Mter the capture and execution by Bolivian army troops of Ernesto "Che" 

Guevara in October 1967, the regime's radical ardor was tempered. One of the Revolution's heroes, Guevara had left Cuba 

290 
National Security 

in a vain attempt to fulfill his revolutionary theory by sparking 

a peasant-led insurgency in that distant nation. 

With Cuba's decision to return to the Soviet fold, the FAR's 

professional development was intensified, a move that set the 

course that the institution would follow for the next two 

decades. In mid-1969, in one of the first outward signs that the 

rapprochement would likely extend to the FAR, a Soviet naval 

squadron entered Caribbean waters on a flag-showing visit to 

Cuba. Such visits by the Soviet Navy continued on at least an 

annual basis well into the 1980s. 

The Era of "Internationalism/' 1970-91 

Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the FAR enjoyed a 

reputation as one of the developing world's preeminent military institutions, and its troops participated in various international combat missions. This reputation and foreign 

involvement were made possible in part as a result of the extensive Soviet military assistance that the FAR began receiving during the early 1970s. By the end of that decade, "internationalist 

service," as the foreign military duty was known, had become 

an important part of the institution's professional identity and 

was counted among the FAR's official missions. 

The Soviet role in Cuba during the first half of the 1970s was 

aimed at developing the FAR's professional training and capabilities as well as Cuban military installations that the Soviets 

could use. The latter included Soviet construction of a deepwater submarine support facility at Cienfuegos on Cuba's 

southern coast. The construction of this militarily significant 

facility prompted a minor crisis in United States-Soviet relations in 1970. According to a former Soviet diplomat, the 

Cubans had agreed to the facility'S construction in exchange 

for the promise of modern Soviet fighter aircraft. There were 

also efforts to model the FAR's development on that of the 

Soviet military, an aim that included routinely sending FAR 

officers for training at Soviet military schools. In keeping with 

this emphasis on training, the Youth Labor Army (Ejercito 

Juvenil de Trabajo-FJT) was created in 1973. As a result, thousands of enlisted troops and officers were relieved of their duty 

to work in agriculture and construction in order that they 

might dedicate themselves to their professional development. 

During this period, military ranks and insignia were also 

revised to resemble more closely the Soviet style. In addition, 

the size of the FAR was cut by half between 1970 and 1974, 

291 
Cuba: A Country Study 

bringing it to 100,000. An attempt was made to improve the 

combat readiness of these forces through constant training and 

exercises. 

This professionalization helped to prepare the FAR for its 

extensive international involvement in Mrica, which began 

with the surreptitious dispatch of Cuba's elite Special Troops 

(Tropas Especiales) to the newly independent nation ofAngola 

in 1975 (see Special Troops, this ch.). Although made possible 

by Soviet aid, this extension of the FAR's international role was 

principally a reflection of the Cuban regime's abiding interest 

in providing political and military support to allies abroad. 

During the early 1960s, Che Guevara had traveled throughout 

Mrica in hopes of building a support network between Mrican 

nationalists and Cuban revolutionaries. In October 1963, in the 

first international action in which FAR troops took part, 686 

soldiers, including a battalion of 400 tank troops (tanquistas) , 

were deployed to Algeria to aid in its border war with Morocco 

and remained there for six months. Elsewhere in Mrica during 

the 1960s, small numbers of Cuban military personnel were 

reportedly involved in guerrilla fighting in territory encompassing Congo (present-day Zaire), Tanzania, and Guinea-Bissau. Within the Western Hemisphere as well, the regime also 

sought to provide aid and military training to members of leftist guerrilla movements and to organize insurgencies where 

such groups were lacking. In early 1973, Cuban advisers, eventually numbering 600 and 700 personnel, were sent to South 

Yemen to train its military and their guerrilla allies who were 

fighting in the Dhofari rebellion. In October and November 

1973, with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Cuba's deployment of an 800-man tank brigade to fight for Syria against 

Israel heralded the more prominent foreign role that the FAR 

would shortly assume. 

On the heels of the Special Troops' arrival in Angola, the 

first large-scale commitment of Cuban combat personnel 

abroad came in late 1975 when tens of thousands of forces 

arrived to fight in the civil war on the side of the ruling Popular 

Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular 

de Liberta~ao de Angola-MPLA), then under the leadership 

of Agostinho Neto. For the next sixteen years, Cuban troop 

strength in Angola varied according to the ebbs and flows in 

the prolonged conflict. The FAR's air and ground forces, 

equipped by the Soviets, were pitted at different times against 

personnel ofthe South Mrican Defence Force; the rebels fight292 
National Security 

ing for the National Union for the Total Independence of 

Angola (Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de 

Angola-UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi; and members of a 

lesser known rebel group, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertar;:ao de AngolaFNLA), which, despite United States covert funding, soon fell 

apart. In mid-1976, 33,000 to 36,000 FAR combat troops began 

to be deployed in Angola during one of the early peaks in the 

fighting; as many as 80 percent were thought to be activated 

reserve troops. 

When fighting intensified again in the late 1980s, the Cuban 

deployment in Angola grew to 50,000 personnel. The Battle of 

Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988 was the final major clash in 

which Cuban forces participated. It was hailed by the Cuban 

leadership as the great victory that paved the way for negotiations to end the war and Cuba's withdrawal from the conflict. 

These negotiations led to the signing of the United Statesmediated Tripartite Agreement by representatives of Angola, 

South Mrica, and Cuba in December 1988. In addition, to providing for an end to the Angolan war and Namibian independence, the agreement set a timetable for the phased withdrawal 

of Cuban forces over a thirty-month period. In May 1991, the 

last combat troops returned home to Cuba, two months ahead 

ofschedule. 

The second major theater to which Cuban troops were 

deployed was in eastern Mrica, where several thousand combat 

personnel were sent in early 1978 to aid Ethiopia in its war with 

Somalia. During the peak of the fighting that year, 12,000 FAR 

troops were involved in the conflict. Following Somalia's decision to end hostilities, the number of Cuban combatants in 

Ethiopia was reduced to 5,000 personnel, and this number 

remained relatively constant for most of the next decade. At 

the time of the decision to withdraw Cuban forces from Ethiopia in 1989, the Cuban contingent numbered 3,000 personnel. 

Toward the end of the 1980s, because of economic difficulties at home as well as the shifting international environment, 

Soviet support for the Cubans' continuing involvement abroad 

was beginning to wane. Nevertheless, the FAR clearly had benefitted greatly from the considerable Soviet aid it had received 

over the past years. At the conclusion of the 1980s, the Cuban 

military was one of the largest in the Western Hemisphere, 

with an estimated 180,500 personnel, of whom more than 

three-fourths were ground troops. The FAR was also one of the 

293 
Cuba: A Country Study 

best-equipped armed forces in the Latin American region, if 

not the entire developing world, counting in its inventory 

more than 100 MiG fighterjets (including new MiG-29s, which 

were then being delivered), several submarines, more than 

1,000 main battle tanks, and an array of missiles and other 

armaments. FAR personnel also remained beneficiaries of the 

extensive Soviet training program, with the most upwardly 

mobile officers sent either to Moscow's M.V. Frunze Military 

Academy or the K.E. Voroshilov General StaffAcademy. Others 

received technical training, often in Eastern Europe, to operate and maintain the sophisticated equipment that the FAR 

had received. 

The United States military's intervention in Grenada in late 

October 1983 ended Cuban activities on that island nation. 

Mter the takeover of Grenada's government by the MarxistLeninist New Jewel Movement in 1979, Cuban military advisers 

and labor brigades were brought in to help build an international airport capable of landing large military transports. 

Mter only brief skirmishes with the Cubans, the 13,000 United 

States troops accepted the surrender of the fifty Cuban military 

advisers to Grenada's then-collapsing regime and of the 

approximately 600 armed construction workers. 

The Grenada intervention was the last incident in the twentieth century in which armed United States and Cuban personnel directly confronted each other. In 1990, following the electoral defeat of Nicaragua's Sandinista government, the Cuban 

military advisers who had been active there since 1979 and who 

had once numbered several thousand were sent home. FAR 

advisers who were involved in training missions in various other 

developing world nations also returned home, including the 

1,500 personnel who were withdrawn from Congo in 1991. 

As of the end of 1991, with all Cuban troops at home, the 

FAR's "internationalist" mission was effectively over. The members of the military who served abroad had gained valuable 

combat experience. In addition, the institution's inventory of 

materiel was expanded by the equipment and weapons that the 

troops brought back with them. Overall, the FAR's prestige was 

enhanced as a result of its "internationalist" role, in which the 

Cuban forces were generally considered to have acquitted 

themselves well. Both this "internationalist" experience and the 

ethos of professionalism instilled over the past two decades 

were important in the FAR's development as an institution, one 

that might be capable of managing the changes that it would 

294 
National Security 

have to embrace during the course of the 1990s (see Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s, this ch.). 

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

Organizational Changes of 1989 

Toward the end of the 1980s, the political and economic 

changes already taking place at home and abroad had begun to 

place strains on the Cuban military institution. The withdrawal 

of troops from Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere marked the 

beginning of the end for the FAR's "internationalist" mission 

and obliged the institution's leadership to seriously consider 

what the future might hold for the armed forces. At the same 

time, the military's domestic economic role and interest in economic involvement were also beginning to change, largely as a 

result of decisions implemented following the 1986 Third Party 

Congress, when several select FAR enterprises were authorized 

to initiate experiments in allowing plant managers greater 

autonomy in decision-making as a means to spur efficiency and 

productivity. Only two years later, with the collapse of the eastern bloc regimes already imminent, the leadership announced 

its decision, with seeming abruptness, to commit Cuban military troops, including many returning combat veterans, to agricultural production in order to help ensure the country's 

continuing food supply during the difficult times it saw ahead. 

By mid-1989, the changes then taking place on the island 

and abroad had already likely resulted in a shared sense among 

the Cuban leadership that a crisis might be at hand. The shakeup of Cuba's security apparatus later that same year, together 

with the events that preceded it, seemed to confirm this. As a 

result of the shake-up, the prestige of the Ministry of Interior 

was diminished and its capabilities weakened as many career 

intelligence officers were forced out of the institution and 

replaced by military personnel. The events surrounding this 

shake-up, in which Army Corps General Abelardo Colome 

Ibarra, the FAR's ranking officer under Raul Castro, was 

installed as minister of interior, has continued to be debated 

among scholars who follow Cuban security issues. Because of 

the secrecy related to these changes in the security apparatus, it 

remains one of the least understood actions undertaken by the 

regime (see Ministry of Interior, this ch.). 

The most important reason for this lack of understanding is 

linked to what has become popularly known as the Ochoa 

295 
Cuba: A Country Study 

affair, named after Division General Arnaldo T. Ochoa 

Sanchez. Although it involved the detention and trial of a number of ranking officers of the country's security forces, nearly 

all of them Ministry of Interior personnel, it was named the 

Ochoa affair because it began with the court martial and execution of Ochoa, along with three other officers. Ochoa was a 

widely respected FAR officer who was not only popular among 

his men but, as the recipient of the MINFAR's highest decoration, a Hero of the Republic. At the time, the Ochoa affair 

raised widespread speculation about support within the military for the regime, given Fidel Castro's resistance to implementing any political or economic reforms similar to those 

then being carried out in the Soviet Union under President 

Mikhail Gorbachev and recurring rumors that Ochoa was 

somehow involved in plotting against the leadership. It also 

raised questions yet to be answered concerning the regime's 

underlying motives in singling out Ochoa for punishment and 

in joining his case with that made against the Ministry ofInteriorofficials implicated. 

InJune 1989, six months after his return from a tour of duty 

as the commander of Cuba's "internationalist" forces in 

Angola, General Ochoa was slated to take over as the chief of 

the Western Army, the most important of the FAR's three territorial commands (see The Revolutionary Armed Forces, this 

ch.). Instead, on June 13, the well-regarded general was 

arrested and charged with "serious acts of corruption and illegal use of economic resources." Within weeks, a Military Honor 

Tribunal, composed of forty-seven fellow general officers, was 

convened. The Honor Tribunal stripped Ochoa of his rank 

and honors, recommended that he be tried for high treason, 

and expressed its support for the application of the "full 

weight" of the law against him, if convicted, by a Special Military Tribunal. 

The court martial by the Special Tribunal began onJune 30, 

1989. In addition to Ochoa, the government identified three 

other officers, each also stripped ofrank, as the key players in a 

wide conspiracy of self-enrichment that included trafficking in 

drugs, diamonds, and other contraband, and money laundering. Another ten individuals, who had backgrounds in either 

the Ministry ofInterior or the MINFAR, were tried on related 

charges at the court martial, but were convicted of lesser 

crimes. Many foreign observers at the time described the hastily convened Special Tribunal, the proceedings of which were 

296 
The Ministry ofthe 


Revolutionary Armed Forces 


building at Revolution Plaza 


(Plaza de la Revolucion), 


October 1991 


Courtesy National Imagery and 


Mapping Agency, Washington 


broadcast on state television, as a "show trial" that was reminiscent of the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. In July, following 

the Council of State's review and approval of the sentences 

handed down, the four former officers were executed by firing 

squad. 

Well beyond the proceedings that were known formally as 

Case Number 1 of 1989, the Ochoa affair continued to have 

repercussions within the state's security apparatus. Only shortly 

before the court martial began, the government announced 

that the minister of interior, Division General Jose Abran tes 

Fernandez, a man who had long been responsible for Fidel 

Castro's personal guard and was counted among his most 

trusted aides, had been removed from office for failing to discover the illegal activities that were carried out by the soon-tobe convicted officials under his charge. Abrantes was immediately replaced as minister by General Colome Ibarra. 

Through the ensuing month, a succession of MINFAR officers were appointed to fill the vacated posts of the top Ministry 

of Interior officials who resigned. Then, on July 30, Abrantes 

and a number of those who had worked closely under him 

were arrested. The crimes with which they were charged 

included negligence, illegal use of government resources, corruption and/or toleration of corruption by others, and the 

manipulation and concealment of information of interest to 

the government. On August 24, a second Special Military Tri297 
Cuba: A Country Study 

bunal was convened for Case Number 2 of 1989, to consider 

the charges against Abrantes and six other former Ministry of 

Interior officials. At the conclusion of this secret court martial, 

Abrantes, who was then in his late fifties, was sentenced to 

twenty years in prison, where he died ofa heart attack in January 1991. The other former officials were given prison terms 

ranging from five to fifteen years. 

By the end of 1989, with Abrantes gone and a trusted career 

FAR officer in his place, hundreds of Ministry of Interior officials, including many who had spent their entire careers in the 

organization, had been retired, dismissed, or otherwise 

replaced by FAR officers. These new Ministry of Interior personnel, according to some analysts, often had little training or 

background in intelligence matters, and as a result, the institution's effectiveness was thought to have suffered during the 

1990s. In 2001 Colome Ibarra remained head ofthe Ministry of 

Interior. 

Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s 

The decade of the 1990s brought important political and 

economic changes for the FAR that were associated with the 

end of the armed forces' "internationalist" mission and the 

break-up of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc. These 

changes presented formidable challenges for the Cuban military, perhaps the most critical of which was simply continuing 

to maintain the FAR as a professional military institution 

despite a serious lack of resources. During the course of the 

decade, the FAR leadership's responses to the continuing challenges led the military to become more involved in national 

life and to assume a more prominent role as a domestic economic actor. This shift appeared to be driven both by the FAR's 

financial need, given the institution's efforts to become "selffinancing" as its share of the national budget was pared, and by 

the regime's prevailing concern about being able to maintain 

domestic order should a security crisis develop. 

Well before Fidel Castro's September 1990 declaration of 

the "special period in peacetime" (periodo especial en tiempo de 

paz; hereafter Special Period-see Glossary), the FAR had 

already begun efforts to cut spending and otherwise help minimize the impact of what it saw as an impending crisis. Troops 

returning from "internationalist" service were sent to work in 

agriculture in order to help boost the national food supply; still 

others were discharged from active duty, often placed on inac298 
National Security 

tive reserve and left to fend for themselves, despite the promise 

that they would have jobs to return to after completing their 

foreign military duty. Within the FAR, meetings were routinely 

convened among service personnel in order to brainstorm on 

ways to conserve fuel and make do with fewer expenditures. 

Paramount among the military leadership's planning efforts at 

that time was the formulation of contingency plans for what 

was known as the "zero option," which was to be implemented 

if all foreign aid and supplies were cut off. 

Changing Ties with the Former Soviet Union 

By mid-1991, less than a year after Cuba's formal declaration 

of its economic crisis, the Soviet commitment to the island 

under President Mikhail Gorbachev had already clearly weakened. However, even in the face of the Castro regime's adamant refusal to implement any Soviet-style reforms, the longstanding ties between the FAR and the conservative-leaning 

Soviet Armed Forces might have suggested some slight hope 

for continuing close military-to-military relations, despite tensions between the two countries' political leaders. There 

appeared some basis for this hope: United States Department 

of State estimates of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, 

although said by some scholars to be inflated amounts, had 

reached US$1.5 billion in 1990, which turned out to be the 

final year of Soviet aid to the island. In addition, in early 1990, 

the first six of what was expected to be a squadron of thirty-six 

state-of-the art MiG-29 jet fighters had arrived on the island. 

The failed coup attempt against President Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991 and Cuba's resounding silence after the 

fact marked an irreversible shift in relations between the two 

countries. In September Gorbachev announced plans to withdraw the Soviet military's "special training brigade," which had 

been based on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

According to Fidel Castro, this decision was announced without the courtesy of informing him beforehand. The Soviet 

training brigade, more formally known as an independent 

motorized infantry brigade, numbered only 2,800 troops in 

1991, but it had once had an estimated 20,000 troops. Despite a 

drawdown in personnel that had already taken place, the brigade was considered in Cuba, as well as abroad, as one of the 

enduring symbols of the Soviet Union's commitment to the 

regime. The announcement of its formal withdrawal appeared 

to confirm that it would not be possible for the FAR's ties with 

299 
Cuba: A Country Study 

their Soviet counterparts to remain close. In September 1992, 

months after the formation of the new Commonwealth of 

Independent States (CIS), the Cubans reluctantly agreed to 

the Russians' schedule for the departure of the brigade's last 

troops. In 1993, as the Cuban economy bottomed out, the final 

brigade members departed the island. 

The Military's Economic Role 

Since the beginning of the economic crisis in the early 

1990s, the military has become increasingly involved in the 

nation's economy. Such involvement was officially denoted as a 

new responsibility for the MINFAR in early 1991, when Fidel 

Castro declared, "[O]ne of the Armed Forces' missions at this 

time is to help the economy." The military's interest in this economic involvement has been spurred as much by concerns 

over the loss of the military aid and training once provided by 

the Soviet Union as by the weakness of the civilian economy, 

which has forced reduced government spending on the armed 

forces and the inception of the MINFAR's efforts to "selffinance" a portion of its budget. In addition, this involvement 

has helped the military avoid further reductions in personnel 

that might otherwise have been necessary. Toward the end of 

the 1990s, some reports estimated that the MINFAR had managed to provide for as much as 80 percent ofits spending needs 

through self-financing. 

The MINFAR's efforts to achieve heightened efficiency and 

productivity through management innovations in its enterprises, known as the SPE (System for Managerial Improvement), can be traced to policies embraced as early as 1987. The 

severity of the economic crisis, however, spurred the military to 

become more extensively involved in agricultural production. 

During the most difficult years of the economic crisis in the 

early 1990s, the military's troops, often having just returned 

from "internationalist" duty, were routinely deployed in the 

fields in intensive efforts to boost crop yields, and its trucks 

were used to help farmers transport their goods to the newly 

opened farmers' markets. The participation of MINFAR troops 

in the annual sugar harvest (zaJra) and in planting or picking 

other crops was not unprecedented; however, it did mark the 

first time in twenty years that regular troops had been assigned 

to such tasks. During this period, the military is generally considered to have achieved self-sufficiency in terms ofits ability to 

300 
National Security 

feed its troops, and surplus produce from the military farms 

(granjas) was sold to bring in additional revenue. 

Perhaps the most important facet of the military's economic 

involvement came about after the government's 1990 decision 

to legalize joint investment ventures, when the military became 

a dominant partner in the state tourism company known as the 

Gaviota Tourism Group, S.A. Gaviota was originally formed in 

1988 in order to provide support for vacations by Cuban and 

Soviet military personnel on the island. In its new incarnation, 

Gaviota has teamed with such foreign partners as Spain's Sol 

Melia and Tryp hotel chains and France's Club Med in order to 

bring in significant hard-currency earnings for the MINFAR. 

Gaviota has been active in both the management and the 

administration of the tourism projects funded by foreign capital, which include four- and five-star hotels and resorts located 

in prime tourism spots, such as Varadero. It has also established 

subsidiary operations, such as AeroGaviota, which operates 

domestically to fly tourists to their vacation destinations. 

Although the exact connection between Gaviota and the 

armed forces hierarchy has not yet been publicly clarified, it is 

widely acknowledged that, since the early 1990s, the firm has 

been routinely used as a source of employment for loyal officers who are formally retired from active duty. Some direction 

is provided through the MINFAR's Vice Ministry for Economic 

Mfairs, which in the late 1990s was headed by a Politburo member, Division GeneralJulio Casas Regueiro, the former commander of the Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air 

Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea RevolucionariaDAAFAR). 

The Military in the Government and Party 

From almost the beginning of the Revolution, the Cuban 

military has played a prominent role in both the government 

of the nation and, since its founding in 1965, the Communist 

Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba-PCC). The most 

notable aspects of this role are the key leadership duties of 

Fidel and Raul Castro, who exercise overlapping national 

authority as heads of the government, the military, and the 

PCC. Other senior military officials may also be found in positions of authority and influence elsewhere within the regime, 

particularly within the cabinet and in the top councils of the 

PCC. Their most significant single unifying trait continues to 

301 
Cuba: A Country Study 

be their record of loyalty to the Castros, often dating back to 

the era of the guerrilla struggle. 

The military's influence within the national government can 

be most clearly seen in the composition of the Council of Ministers (Consejo de Ministros). In addition to Fidel and Raul 

Castro, five other men with military backgrounds were members of the Council of Ministers in the late 1990s. These 

included General Colome Ibarra, the minister of interior; Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, the FAR's former Chief of 

General Staff, who was appointed minister of the sugar industry in late 1997; Brigade General Silvano Colas Sanchez, the 

minister of communications; Captain (Capitan de Navio) 

Orlando Felipe Rodrig~ez Romay, the minister of the fishing 

industry; and Colonel Alvaro Perez Morales, the minister of 

transportation. In addition, another prominent military official in the government is retired Brigade GeneralJuan Escalona Reguera, the Attorney General of the Republic (Fiscal 

General de la Republica). Although not a member of the 

Council of Ministers, Escalona, as attorney general, serves as 

the country's top law enforcement official and sits on the Governing Council of the Supreme People's Tribunal, the Cuban 

state's top judicial body. 

The MINFAR has been under Raul Castro's leadership since 

its organization in 1959. By the time of the shake-up in 1989, 

however, the Ministry of Interior had been led by three different individuals, who, although members of the guerrillas' 

Rebel Army, did not necessarily build careers within the FAR. 

Since 1989 the Ministry of Interior has been led by a FAR 

officer (see Organizational Changes of 1989, this ch.). In addition to the other ministerial posts now held by military officials, 

the ministries of communications and transportation have previously been headed by military officers, a record that suggests 

not only the military's expertise in logistics but also that the 

leadership likely considers these to be important resources to 

control in the event of a security crisis. Similarly, some analysts 

believed that Rosales's appointment as minister of the sugar 

industry signaled the military's expanded influence in domestic economic affairs. It should also be noted, however, that 

Rosales's ministerial post has previously been held by a military 

man, most recently in the early 1980s. Escalona's appointment 

as attorney general, a post he has held during the 1990s, is 

somewhat unusual despite the general's legal background, as 

none of his predecessors were known to be military officials. It 

302 
SS-N2 STYX missile on parade in Havana, December 2, 1986 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

may be explained by his prominent role in 1989 as the lead 

prosecutor in the Ochoa affair. 

The military also wields considerable influence within the 

top echelons of the PCC. Yet, throughout the 1990s, a consistent decline in the number of officers elected to the PCC's 

Central Committee took place. In 1981, following the PCC's 

Second Congress, officers, all with commissioned ranks, were 

elected to just over a quarter of the Committee's 225 seats. By 

contrast, after the Fourth Congress in 1991, their representation in the Central Committee had declined by half. 

At the same time, the FAR has retained its dominance within 

the Political Bureau (Politburo), the PCC's top decision-making organ. After the 1997 Party Congress, although the overall 

size of the Politburo was cut by one member, an additional military officer was named, which brought to seven the number of 

officials in the twenty-four-member body. They included Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro, General of the Army Raul Castro, Army Corps General Colome Ibarra, and Division Generals 

Julio Casas Regueiro, Leopoldo Cintra Frias, Rosales del Toro, 

and the more recently appointed Ramon Espinosa Martin. 

Given the hierarchical nature of the Cuban regime, the mili303 
Cuba: A Country :study 

tary's continuing domination at this top level within the Party 

suggests that its declining representation on the Central Committee may not be a matter that greatly concerns the military 

institution and its leadership. 

Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations 

Cuba's 1976 constitution, as amended in July 1992, establishes in Article 43 the right of all Cubans to ascend to any rank 

in the country's security forces, "according to their merits and 

capabilities." In turn, as described in Article 134, the members 

of the armed forces and of other security forces also have the 

same right to vote and to be elected to office as do other citizens. In Article 65, the "defense of the socialist homeland" is 

recognized as "the greatest honor and the supreme duty of 

every Cuban citizen." As stipulated in this article, military service is to be regulated by law. Treason is recognized as "the 

gravest of all crimes," with the person committing it to be "subject to the most severe sanctions." These sanctions, although 

not specified in the constitution, might include capital punishment or life imprisonment (see Penal System, this ch.). 

The articles guaranteeing Cuban citizens the right to serve 

in the security forces and setting the primacy of defense as a citizen's duty have remained unchanged since 1976. However, the 

1992 reforms created a new Chapter 8 in the constitution, composed of a single article, that was added to address provisions 

for a state of emergency. In that chapter, Article 67 sets out the 

right of the president of the Council of State to declare a state 

of emergency in case of developments or imminent developments-whether "natural disasters or catastrophes or other circumstances"-which may affect "domestic order, the security of 

the country or the stability of the State." This state of emergency may be applied to all the republic or a part ofit, and the 

president is authorized to mobilize the population while the 

state of emergency is in effect. Article 67 also states that the 

manner in which the state of emergency is declared, its 

enforcement, and its termination are to be regulated by law. 

Similarly, although still to be subject to law, Article 67 stipulates 

that the exercise of "the rights and fundamental duties recognized by the constitution" during normal times "must be regulated differently" while the state of emergency is in force. 

In complementing the authority granted the president of 

the Council of State to declare a state of emergency, the 

National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 

304 
National Security 

Poder Popular-ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly), Cuba's 

national legislature, formally bears constitutional responsibility 

to "declare a state of war in case of military aggression and to 

approve peace treaties." However, as the National Assembly 

meets in regular session only briefly each year, Article 89 establishes that the Council of State, a body elected by the National 

Assembly, has the right to represent it between sessions or, 

according to Article 90, to convene extraordinary sessions. 

Among other provisions, Article 90 further explicitly assigns 

the Council of State the right "to decree a general mobilization 

when required for national defense, to declare war in case of 

aggression, or to approve peace treaties when the Assembly is 

in recess and cannot be convened with the necessary security 

and urgency." 

According to Article 93, the president of the Council of 

State, the office held by Fidel Castro that establishes him as 

chief of the Cuban state and government, has expansive 

responsibilities in terms of the security forces and national 

defense. The Council's president serves as the supreme commander of the country's security forces, which include the 

FAR's troops as well as the forces under the immediate supervision of the Ministry ofInterior, and is authorized to determine 

their general organization. As noted above, the president also 

has the authority to declare a state of emergency in situations 

addressed by Article 67 of the constitution, and as soon as circumstances permit, to give an accounting of that declaration to 

the National Assembly or, if the legislature cannot be convened, to the Council of State. Further, the president of the 

Council of State also presides over the National Defense Council (Consejo de Defensa Nacional), the body established to 

oversee the defense planning and coordination system adopted 

in the 1980s. In addition, Article 94 establishes that in case of 

"the absence, sickness, or death of the president of the Council 

of State," authority is delegated to the first vice president of the 

Council of State, an office held by Raul Castro. 

As the nation's supreme executive and administrative body, 

the Council of Ministers, whose president is also Fidel Castro, is 

also invested by the constitution with security-related responsibilities. As enumerated under Article 98, these responsibilities 

include "providing for national defense, the maintenance of 

domestic order and security, the protection of citizens' rights, 

and the protection oflives and property in the event of natural 

disaster." To support these responsibilities, among others, the 

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Cuba: A Country Study 

Council of Ministers is charged with formulating the national 

budget and, following its approval by the National Assembly, its 

oversight. All government ministers, including the heads of the 

MINFAR and of the Ministry of Interior, are members of the 

Council of Ministers. Further, because Raul Castro serves as the 

first vice president of the Council of State, he would remain a 

member of the Council of Ministers even if he no longer 

served as the MINFAR's chief. 

Lastly, Article 101 addresses the role of the National Defense 

Council. This body is charged with the responsibility to direct 

the country during "conditions of a state ofwar, during the war, 

the general mobilization, and the state of emergency." It is 

required to maintain its readiness to assume responsibility for 

any of these duties at any time. As noted above, the National 

Defense Council's president is the president of the Council of 

State-again, Fidel Castro. According to Article 101, the Council's organization and functions are to be regulated by law. 

Related to this, Article 119 elaborates the responsibilities of the 

Provincial Defense Councils, the Municipal Defense Councils, 

and the neighborhood-based Defense Zones, which within 

their respective territories mirror those assigned to the 

National Council. In accordance with the law, the National 

Council is charged with determining these bodies' organization and functions. The specific execution of their duties during a crisis, however, is to be defined by the nation's general 

defense plan and the role and responsibility assigned each 

body by one of the country's three regional military councils, 

which cover geographic territories that correspond to the areas 

under each of the MINFAR's three regional army commands. 

In terms of Cuba's security-related treaty obligations, Fidel 

Castro's government has been reluctant to enter into multilateral and bilateral pacts that might limit the scope of its actions 

either domestically or in the international arena. This stance is 

underscored in Article 11 of the 1992 constitution, which states 

that "The Republic of Cuba repudiates and considers illegal 

and null the treaties, pacts, or concessions that were signed in 

conditions of inequality or that disregard or diminish its sovereignty and territorial integrity." 

In March 1960, shortly after the victory of the Revolution, 

Cuba withdrew from the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (more commonly known as the Rio Treatysee Glossary), which provides for collective hemispheric 

defense against external aggressors. In August 1960, months 

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before diplomatic relations with the United States were broken 

off, Cuba terminated its participation in the United States 

Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which provided military 

aid and had been endorsed by Batista in 1952. Cuba's participation in the Organization of American States (OAS-see Glossary) was formally suspended on January 31, 1962, after the 

member states determined that the Marxist-Leninist ideology 

of the Castro government was "incompatible with the interests 

of the hemisphere." Consequently, Cuba does not have a representative on the Inter-American Defense Board, nor are its military personnel eligible to attend the Inter-American Defense 

College, located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. 

Until recently, Cuba also resisted entering into any agreements aimed at controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. It 

remains the only country in the hemisphere that has not 

joined the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 

which a former Cuban United Nations ambassador said would 

require Cuba to give up "its inalienable right to defend itself 

using weapons of any kind." Nevertheless, in March 1995, Cuba 

did finally sign the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 

Weapons in Latin America, more commonly known as the 

Treaty of Tlatelolco (see Glossary), which, like the NPT, establishes a commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Cuba also 

reached an agreement with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) in May 1980 with respect to implementing safeguards and allowing inspections at its nuclear power facilities 

then under construction (and now abandoned) atJuragua, 

near Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. 

Despite its avowals, the Castro government has shown an 

inclination to join other pacts related to the conduct ofwarfare 

and the treatment ofits victims. InJune 1966, Cuba ratified the 

1925 Geneva Protocol that prohibits the wartime use of poisonous gases or bacteriological agents. It also has ratified the four 

international agreements of the 1949 Geneva Convention for 

the protection of war victims. In 1976 the Cuban government 

ratified the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons Convention. Cuba has refused to sign the 1997 Ottawa 

Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 

Destruction, however, largely because of the use of these 

devices throughout the Cuban side of the no-man's-land that 

separates the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay 

from the rest of the mainland. 

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Cuba: A Country Study 

The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay 

The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo consists of a 

seventy-three-kilometer area (including land and water), four 

kilometers wide, located east of the Sierra Maestra in Cuba's 

southeastern Guantanamo Province. United States Marines 

first landed at this site during the Spanish-American War in 

1898. The United States leased the territory in 1903 as a coaling station for United States naval vessels transiting the Caribbean. 

A 1934 treaty with the United States replaced the 1901 Platt 

Amendment (see Glossary), which had authorized United 

States military intervention in Cuba. Several of the principal 

provisions of both treaties were identical, however. For example, the 1934 treaty also grants a lease to the Guantanamo 

Naval Station area "in perpetuity" and free maritime access to 

the land through Guantanamo Bay. In exchange, the United 

States agreed to continue to pay the Cuban government an 

annual rent of $2,000, an amount tied to the gold standard that 

was equivalent in the late 1990s to just over US$4,000. The 

main difference was that under the 1934 treaty the United 

States agreed to forego the discretionary right to intervene in 

Cuba's domestic affairs. The United States also agreed in both 

1901 and 1934 to terminate the lease by the joint consent of 

both governments. 

In terms of its strategic role, Guantanamo serves as a supply 

and logistics base for the United States Navy's Atlantic Fleet. 

Although the base's strategic value to the United States has 

declined over the years, it would still likely be a platform for 

operations in the event of war or natural disaster in the Caribbean or Latin America. For more mundane purposes, the 

United States Navy uses the base for exercises and maneuvers, 

the maintenance of United States naval vessels, and the monitoring of Cuban airspace. From time to time, it has also been 

used to temporarily house refugees, including 34,000 Haitian 

refugees in 1991 and many of the 30,000 Cubans who 

attempted to leave the island during the balsero (rafter) crisis in 

the summer of 1994. During 1999, the base was briefly considered as a possible temporary shelter for the estimated 20,000 

Kosovo refugees left homeless as a result of the war. Although it 

serves as a permanent "home" to approximately 1,080 United 

States military personnel and possibly about 2,500 American 

civilian personnel, as well as 300 foreign nationals, the base is 

believed to be capable of providing temporary housing for up 

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to 50,000. Since the 1960s, it has been self-sufficient in terms of 

its water supply and electrical needs. In the late 1990s, approximately 1,000 United States Navy personnel and 640 United 

States Marines were stationed at Guantanamo. The number of 

American personnel stationed there is expected to continue to 

decline over the foreseeable future as a result of ongoing 

efforts to pare military expenditures. 

The base, described by Fidel Castro as a "dagger plunged 

into the heart of Cuban soil," has remained a point of tension 

in bilateral relations. As a sign of its defiance of the United 

States' right to use the territory, Castro's government has 

refused the funds paid annually by the United States Department of the Navy over the past decades under the terms of the 

lease. Beginning in 1961, after President Dwight D. Eisenhower 

broke diplomatic relations with the Castro government, Cuban 

and United States military troops began patrolling opposite 

sides of a twenty-eight-kilometer barb-wire-fenced stretch of the 

perimeter that separates the base from Cuban territory, and 

watchtowers were constructed on both sides. Since then the 

base has remained separated from the rest of the island by 

barbed-wire fencing and a no-man's-land filled with antipersonnel and antitank mines that are designed as much to keep 

Cubans out of the base as to keep the American personnel 

there isolated. Since the onset of Cuba's economic crisis in the 

early 1990s, tourists on the Cuban side of the perimeter have 

been able to pay for visits to some of the look-out points used 

by the FAR's Border Brigade (Brigada de la Frontera) to monitor the base's activities. 

Despite Cuba's continuing adamant demand for the departure of American troops from Cuban territory, the tensions 

between Cuba and the United States over the base have been 

reduced in recent years, especially since the bilateral Migratory 

Accords were signed in August 1994 and May 1995 and the 

final Cuban refugees left the base. The accords establish that 

Washington grant 20,000 visas a year to Cubans who wish to 

reside in the United States and that Cubans picked up at sea be 

returned to Cuba, with no reprisals by Cuba. The last time that 

shots were fired by troops stationed on either side of the perimeter was in December 1989. In 1996 the United States began 

removing antipersonnel mines from its side of the no-man'sland that separates the base from the rest of the island; the task 

was completed in 1999. These mines were replaced by motion 

and sound detectors to warn of any incursion onto the base. 

309 
Cuba: A Country Study 

The Cubans, on the other hand, have not made public any 

plans to begin de-mining their side of the 1 OO-kilometer perimeter. Rather, the Cuban government maintains that these 

mines are needed for defensive purposes, and will be removed 

only after the United States gives up its base on Cuba's national 

territory. Thirteen American soldiers and five Cubans have 

been killed by the mines since their installation. Between 

50,000 and 70,000 mines were placed in the no-man's-land 

between Cuba and the Guantanamo base beginning in 1961. 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces 

By the end of the twentieth century, the profile of the FAR 

had changed significantly from that of only a decade before. 

The change was brought about largely as a result of a change in 

the armed forces' missions: the abandonment of military 

"internationalism" and the embrace of a new domestic economic role; the loss of the extensive financial assistance and 

training support for the military that was once provided by the 

Soviet Union; and the continuation of the island's economic 

crisis, also a product of the loss of Soviet support. As a consequence of these changes, the FAR has had to make do with far 

fewer resources, both in terms of getting by on a reduced budget and with reduced manpower, yet all the while attempting to 

maintain itself as a professional military organization. 

In the late 1990s, the FAR was composed of three major 

armed services, as it had been for the past four decades: the 

Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario), the aforementioned DAAFAR (Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air 

Force), and the Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria-MGR). Of these, the army, as the historical successor 

to the guerrillas' Rebel Army, is generally recognized as the 

main force; not until 1972 were separate commands established for the DAAFAR and the MGR. All three services are 

under the authority of the MINFAR's General Staff. At the end 

of 2000, the chief of the MINFAR's General Staff continued to 

be Division General Alvaro Lopez Miera, also MINFAR vice 

minister. Lopez Miera assumed the General Staff post in late 

1998 on succeeding Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, 

who, at that time, had only recently been promoted from the 

rank of brigade general (see Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms, 

this ch.). As General Staff chief, Lopez Miera also serves as the 

commander of the Revolutionary Army. The DAAFAR was 

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commanded by Division General Ruben Martinez Puentes, and 

the MGR, by Vice Admiral Pedro Miguel Perez Betancourt. 

During the course of the 1990s, the FAR's manpower was 

reduced by more than half from what had been an estimated 

180,500 active-duty troops in 1990. This reduction, with the 

most severe cuts having been carried out between 1993 and 

1995, was the result of efforts to trim expenditures as well as 

adjust to a greatly reduced need for military manpower following the end of the "internationalist" mission. According to the 

London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies 

(IISS), the FAR was composed of 65,000 personnel in 2000. 

This number included an estimated 45,000 members of the 

Revolutionary Army, 10,000 of the DAAFAR, and 5,000 of the 

MGR. The ratio of Cuba's army in proportion to the island's 

population dropped from twenty-nine soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in 1987 to only five soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in 

1997, based on data compiled by the Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute. This ratio was comparable on a per 

capita basis to that found in such countries as Colombia, 

Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador. Moreover, the FAR's present 

force strength is even lower than it was prior to the adoption of 

the military's "internationalist" mission in the mid-1970s, a 

period when its manpower needs were roughly comparable yet 

its budget was subsidized by Soviet aid. At that time, the FAR 

was able to maintain an active-duty force strength of 120,000 

troops and officers. 

These regular military forces under the FAR's command, 

which include conscripts and activated reservists, are supported by yet other organizations that are assigned duties 

related to defense and the maintenance of internal order. Of 

these, the EJT (Youth Labor Army) and the Territorial Troops 

Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales-MTT) are the most 

important. The members of the EJT are primarily engaged in 

agriculture and military construction projects. The MTT consists of civilian volunteers who are trained and led by the members of the regular military. A Civil Defense (Defensa Civil) 

force, also made up of civilians and led by military officers, 

rounds out the nation's defense organization (see Territorial 

Troops Militia; Civil Defense, this ch.). 

The FAR's two main missions in the late 1990s consisted of 

providing for the island's external defense and the maintenance ofinternal order. These have remained the FAR's principal missions since the beginning of the Revolution. In 1976 the 

311 
Cuba: A Country Study 

FAR's "internationalist" mission was added, which provided a 

basis for the military's deployment of troops to foreign combat. 

However, after the return home of the last "internationalist" 

forces in 1991, the sixteen-year "internationalist" mission was 

replaced with a new charge for the military to help the ailing 

economy. During the course of the 1990s, this newest mission 

led to the FAR's expanded activities in the economic sphere 

that extend from the military's role in agricultural production, 

to manufacturing, and even to providing services for the burgeoning tourism industry. 

Doctrine of the War of All the People 

The military doctrine that guides the FAR in the execution 

of its traditional defense-related missions is known as the War 

ofAll the People (Guerra de Todo el Pueblo-GTP). This doctrine has been in force since the early 1980s, around the time 

that the MTT was established. The GTP centers on the key role 

assigned to the Cuban population in helping defend the island 

in the event of an attack. Its objective is to deter such an attack 

by so raising the costs for an invader, in terms of the casualties 

inflicted, that the action is deemed unacceptable. The doctrine 

is built around the defense-related duties assigned to the members of the MTT, who would be armed in order to support the 

regular armed forces. Under this doctrine, the country's entire 

population has been organized into defense zones, which exist 

at the local and provincial level and which are presided over by 

the National Defense Council. In the event of a crisis, the local 

defense zones and the militia would be mobilized and their 

command taken over by the armed forces. In the Cubans' 

defensive strategy, the regular military is conceived of as only a 

"professional vanguard" of the mobilized citizenry, and any 

ensuing struggle would be waged by means of conventional 

warfare as well as unconventional or guerrilla warfare. The 

regime's ability to rely on an armed population for the island's 

defense, at least rhetorically, has helped to compensate slightly 

for the loss of capabilities, especially in terms of diminished 

manpower, that the FAR has suffered since the early 1990s. 

Territorial Troops Militia 

The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales-MTT), a body composed exclusively of civilian volunteers, was established on May 1, 1980, and placed under the 

command of the MINF AR. Its creation is recognized as having 

312 
A fire station in Old Havana, 1999 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

marked the beginning of Cuba's official embrace of the military doctrine of the War of All the People, which has remained 

in force since then. Like the MNR (National Revolutionary 

Militia) of the early 1960s, the MTT's formation reinforced the 

notion of the popular will to defend the Revolution. 

Most members of the MTT are women, the elderly, or retirees. Male teenagers who are too young or have not yet been 

called for military service are also eligible to join the MTT, as 

are men who are not obligated to serve as reservists. The MTT 

expanded from 500,000 members in 1982 to l.2 million by 

mid-1984. The size of the force has remained at about 1 million, despite the economic crisis. 

The MTT's mission during a crisis would be to fight alongside, and provide replacements for, the personnel of the regular armed force; to help protect such strategic infrastructure as 

bridges, highways, and railroads; and to carry out any other 

measures that might be needed to immobilize, wear down, or 

ultimately destroy the enemy. By the beginning of the 1980s, 

MTT members were extensively involved in the construction of 

tunnels throughout the island, which would be used as shelter 

for the population in the event of an attack. As a result of 

Cuba's continuing economic difficulties during the 1990s, the 

time that MTT members have spent in training and preparing 

for their various defense-related activities has been reduced. 

The reduction includes a decrease in the time that MTT mem313 
Cuba: A Country Study 

bers have spent in carrying out joint exercises and maneuvers 

with regular FAR troops. . 

The MTT is supported through the MINFAR's budget as well 

as through "voluntary" donations made by citizens. Most of 

these donations come from workplace contributions, which are 

paid through weekly deductions from workers' salaries. According to the MINFAR, between 1981 and 1995, the expenses 

incurred for the MTT's training averaged approximately 35 

million Cuban pesos (for value of peso, see Glossary) per year. 

During this same period, popular contributions toward the 

force averaged about 30 million pesos per year. Just over half of 

the training expenditures went toward the purchase of study 

supplies and other training materials; just over one-third were 

dedicated for the purchase of weapons, communication equipment, uniforms, and spare parts. Other organizations also set 

annual funding goals with respect to their own MTT contributions. Among such organizations were the CDR (Committee 

for the Defense of the Revolution), the Federation of Cuban 

Women (Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas-FMC), the 

National Association of Small Farmers (Asociaci6n Nacional de 

Agricultores Pequenos-ANAP), and even the Organization of 

Jose Marti Pioneers (Organizaci6n de PionerosJose MartiOPJM). 

According to reforms for allocating MTT funds made in the 

system in 1995, the funds collected for the MTT are no longer 

sent to a central government account but remain within each 

municipality to support local MTT activities. Despite the country's economic hardships, the amount of funds collected 

through popular contributions to the MTT continued to 

increase after the beginning of the Special Period in the early 

1990s. As of 1995, the MINFAR was paying only 14 percent of 

the MTT's total expenditures. 

Civil Defense 

Civil Defense was organized in 1966, following the disbandment of the Popular Defense Force, which was the immediate 

successor to the MNR (National Revolutionary Militias), after 

the MNR's dissolution in 1963. The mission of the civilianbased Civil Defense, which falls under the command of the 

MINFAR, is, in some respects, similar to that of the MTT, as the 

militia's modern incarnation. During a national crisis or wartime, Civil Defense members would be responsible for helping 

provide for local defense and rear-area security. 

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National Security 

Civil Defense's more routine duties, however, are to aid the 

civilian population and help protect economic resources in the 

event of a peacetime disaster. In practice this has most often 

meant that the force has been active in helping safeguard the 

population and property, including livestock, when the island 

has been threatened or hit by hurricanes or affected by other 

natural disasters, such as droughts or earthquakes. In 1999 

Civil Defense had an estimated 50,000 members, including 

both men and women. Members are often PCC members or 

local government officials and are active in their local defense 

zones. Civil Defense units are often organized at schools as well 

as at workplaces. 

Revolutionary Army 

In 1999 the Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario) 

represented approximately 70 percent of Cuba's regular military manpower. According to the IISS, the Army's estimated 

45,000 troops included 39,000 members of the Ready Reserves 

who were completing the forty-five days of annual active-duty 

service necessary for maintaining their status, as well as conscripts who were fulfilling their military service requirement. 

These personnel were under the command of one of three territorial armies, which are under the authority of the FAR's General Staff. These commands roughly divide the island into 

thirds, corresponding with territory under either the Western, 

Central, or Eastern Armies. Since 1993 the commands have 

been unified, with the units of the DAAFAR and MGR having 

been brought under the operational control of the territorial 

army chiefs. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Isla de laJuventud Military Region-which was established in 1962 and in the 

1980s was an independent command, with a single infantry 

division-had been brought under the authority of the Western Army. 

The Western Army, organized in 1970, is the largest of the 

three territorial commands, and is generally considered the 

most strategically important because its troops are responsible 

for the defense of the nation's capital as well as Cuba's most 

important military installations. In addition to the Isla de la 

Juventud, the territory under the Western Army includes the 

provinces of Pinar del Rio, La Habana, and Ciudad de La 

Habana, where its headquarters is shared with the MINFAR. 

The Western Army is also thought to be subdivided into three 

army corps-the Havana Eastern Corps, the Havana Western 

315 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Corps, and the Pinar del Rio Corps-plus the Isla de la Juventud Military Region. Since 1989 the Western Army has been led 

by Division General Leopoldo "Polo" Cintra Frias, a Politburo 

member, former commander of Cuban forces in Angola, and 

Hero of the Republic. Each of the provinces under the Western 

Army's command has its own general staff. This organizational 

pattern at the provincial level is replicated in the Central and 

Eastern Armies. 

The Central Army was established in April 1961, only thirteen days before the Bay of Pigs landing at Playa Giron in the 

province of Matanzas. In addition to Matanzas, the provinces 

under the Central Army's command include Cienfuegos, Santa 

Clara, and Sancti Spiritus. Its headquarters is in Santa Clara, 

the capital ofVilla Clara Province. The Central Army is further 

subdivided into three army corps, consisting of the Matanzas 

Corps, the Central Corps (which has command over troops stationed in Villa Clara, Ci~nfuegos, and Sancti Spiritus provinces), and the Ciego de Avila Corps. In 1999 the chief of the 

Central Army was Division GeneralJoaquin Quintas Sola, who 

has held that post since 1984. 

The Eastern Army, established in April 1961, held command 

over personnel stationed in the provinces of Camagiiey, Las 

Tunas, Holguin, Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guancinamo 

from its headquarters in Santiago de Cuba. In 1999 the chief of 

the Eastern Army was Division General Ramon Espinosa Martin, who has held that command for the past fifteen years. The 

Eastern Army is also organized into three army corps, consisting of the Camagiiey, the Northern, and the Southern Army 

Corps. The Northern Army Corps had authority over troops in 

the provinces of Las Tunas and Holguin. The Southern Army 

Corps had command over units deployed in the provinces of 

Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guancinamo. Also under the 

Eastern Army's command is the elite Border Brigade (Brigada 

de la Frontera), which maintains watch over the United States 

Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay (see The United States Naval 

Station at Guancinamo Bay, this ch.). 

The IISS reported in 1999 that the army's troop formations 

consisted of four to five armored brigades; nine mechanized 

infantry brigades; an airborne brigade; fourteen reserve brigades; and the Border Brigade. In addition, there is an air 

defense artillery regiment and a surface-to-air missile brigade. 

Each of the three territorial armies is believed to be assigned at 

least one armored brigade-usually attached to the army's 

316 
A Cuban army colonel inspect

A front-side view ofa BMP-

Battalion 2721 in 

Courtesy National Image
Cuba: A Country Study 

headquarters-as well as a mechanized infantry brigade. As 

well, it is known that the Border Brigade in Guantanamo and at 

least one ground artillery regiment (attached to a mechanized 

infantry brigade), based in Las Tunas, are under the Eastern 

Army's command. Unfortunately, there is relatively little public 

information available with respect to the organization of the 

ground forces within the three armies, let alone the equipment 

that pertains to each of these commands (see table 19, Major 

Army Equipment, 1999, Appendix). Nevertheless, the Western 

Army is known to have the greatest priority for the FAR leadership, and is also likely to be assigned the most personnel and 

the most equipment; this would be followed, according to 

defense priorities, by the Eastern Army, and, lastly, by the Central Army. 

Assessing the situation of Cuba's ground forces has been further complicated by the leadership's decision to put into storage three-fourths of the FAR's equipment. The mothballing of 

so much of the military's equipment began with the onset of 

the economic crisis in the early 1990s, and was prompted by 

the lack of spare and replacement parts for the Soviet-era materiel as well as the shortage of the hard currency needed to pay 

for the fuel for training and exercises. Much of this equipment 

is stored in tunnels and caves throughout the island, but it is 

not thought to be withstanding well the island's tropical environment. Especially vulnerable are the equipment and weaponry that rely on more sophisticated technology. According to 

the United States Department of Defense's 1998 report entitled, "The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security," the mothballed materiel would not be available for defense on short 

notice. The same report also concludes that, owing to severely 

reduced training, the ground forces' overall state of readiness 

is low and notes that the FAR generally is not capable of mounting effective operations above the battalion level. 

The Cuban military has long maintained its own secret base 

for intercepting electronic communications. Operated by the 

FAR's Electronic Warfare Battalion, this smaller, relatively 

unknown base is located at El Wajay, 14.5 kilometers southwest 

of Havana, near the Russian operation at Lourdes. Although 

not as powerful as the Russian facility, the Cuban military's signals intelligence (SIGINT) facility is thought to be capable of 

monitoring telephone and radio signals at least as far away as 

Florida. The Electronic Warfare Battalion reportedly has the 

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equipment necessary to jam United States communications, 

but is not thought to have used it for this end. 

Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force 

The Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force 

(Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria-DAAFAR) 

traces its origins to the single aircraft that constituted the guerrillas' Rebel Air Force in April 1958. It was established as a 

branch of service separate from the Revolutionary Army, with 

its own command structure, in April 1972, a change that was 

likely influenced by the then ongoing efforts by the Soviet 

Union to help professionalize Cuba's armed forces. The DAAFAR's responsibilities encompass providing for the nation's air 

defense as well as tactical and airlift support for the FAR's 

ground forces. According to the IISS, in 1999 the DAAFAR had 

10,000 personnel, including conscripts, and represented 15 

percent of total regular military manpower. 

The DAAFAR's territorial commands parallel those of the 

three territorial armies and consist of the Western, Central, 

and Eastern Air Force brigades. In addition, the DAAFAR also 

maintains Air Defense Artillery and Missile Forces. Although 

their locations are not publicly disclosed, it is reasonable to surmise that they are stationed in a position to defend the capital 

of Havana. The major air installations under the command of 

the Western Air Force Brigade include bases at San Julian in 

Pinar del Rio Province and San Antonio de los Banos, as well as 

the Baracoa Air Base and the Jose MartI International Airport 

in La Habana Province. Under the Central Brigade are air 

bases at Giiines, Matanzas; Cienfuegos, Cienfuegos; Santa 

Clara, Villa Clara; and Sancti SpIritus, Sancti SpIritus. The 

Western Brigade maintains its key installations at the provincial 

capitals of Camagiiey, Holguin, and Santiago de Cuba in the 

respective provinces of Camagiiey, Holguin, and Santiago de 

Cuba. Of all these, the base at San Antonio de los Banos is considered to be the military'S most important airport. It is the 

only airport that, as of the early 1990s, had three airstrips, one 

ofwhich was 4,000 meters in length. 

The operational readiness and effectiveness of the DAAFAR 

have been severely compromised by the economic crisis and 

the loss of Soviet aid. Although Cuba is formally acknowledged 

as having one of the better equipped air forces in Latin America, consisting of several hundred combat aircraft and armed 

helicopters, the reality is that, by the late 1990s, a significant 

319 
Cuba: A Country Study 

part of the fleet was no longer deemed operational (see table 

20, Appendix). To become more self-sufficient, the DAAFAR's . 

Research and Development Center is also seeking to build its 

own aircraft, such as the AC-001 multi-use "Comas" planes that 

were first produced at the Yuri Gargarin Military Industrial 

Enterprise in 1992. 

The United States Department of Defense estimated in 1998 

that fewer than two dozen of the DAAFAR's MiGs remain operational. Despite the access to spare parts established by an 

accord with the Russians as rent for the signals intelligence 

facility at Lourdes, which is located south of Havana in La 

Habana Province, the DAAFAR's state of readiness is expected 

to continue to worsen. The mothballed equipment continues 

to deteriorate, and pilot training and flight hours, which are 

essential for flying the more sophisticated MiGs in the Cuban 

inventory, remain limited because of the cost offuel. 

Revolutionary Navy 

The Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria-MGR), which has always been the smallest and least prestigious of the FAR's three armed services since its establishment 

in August 1963, is the service that has been most severely 

affected by the economic crisis. As of late 2000, it barely managed as an independent force. The MGR's formal mission has 

traditionally been to provide for shore-based coastal defense as 

well as to conduct offshore naval operations. By the end of the 

1990s, however, the MGR had no major ships that were still seaworthy and no longer was considered to be a blue-water navy. It 

remained capable only of patrolling Cuba's territorial waters, 

and even that responsibility was shared with the Ministry of 

Interior's Border Guard Troops (Tropas GuardafronterasTGF). 

In 1999 the IISS estimated that the MGR was composed of 

5,000 personnel, which represented just over 7.5 percent of 

total regular military manpower. Of these 5,000 personnel, an 

estimated 3,000 were conscripts. Another 550 were members of 

the Naval Infantry, a battalion-size force that was created in the 

late 1970s. This force, which was assigned to coastal defense, 

gave the MGR a limited ground combat capability. Although 

the MGR has no reserve force, it would presumably be supplemented by members of the Cuban Merchant Marine in the 

event of a crisis. Naval aviation is a function of the DAAFAR. 

320 
National Security 

The MGR's headquarters is located in Havana. Its operational commands are divided in accordance with the three territorial armies, each of which holds ultimate authority over the 

MGR's forces within its geographic boundaries. The MGR's 

western headquarters is believed to be at Cabanas, located 

approximately 48.4 kilometers west of Ciudad de La Habana 

Province on the coast in Pinar del Rio Province; and its eastern 

headquarters, at Holguin, an inland city in the province of the 

same name. The location of the central headquarters-or even 

if the headquarters is still maintained, given the cutbacks-is 

unclear. During the 1990s, the MGR's principal installations 

were said to include facilities at the Bahia de Cienfuegos, Cienfuegos; the Bahia de Cabanas, Pinar del Rio; the Bahia de 

Mariel, Havana; the Bahia de La Habana, Ciudad de La 

Habana; the Bahia de Matanzas, Matanzas; the Bahia de Nuevitas, Camaguey; and the Bahia de Nipe, Holguin. With the 

exception of that at the Bahia de Cienfuegos, all of these bases 

were located along the northern coast. Some of the installations may have been closed as a result of the continuing cutbacks that were carried out during the course of the 1990s. The 

naval academy was one of the installations closed. Located just 

west of Ciudad de La Habana Province on the northern coast 

at Punta Santa Ana, the MGR's principal training school was 

converted into a hospital in the 1990s. 

As recently as a decade ago, the MGR counted in its inventory three submarines, which had been delivered by the Soviets 

between 1979 and 1984, and two frigates, the last of which was 

also received in 1984. It was one of the few countries in the 

region to have such an ocean-going fleet (see table 21, Appendix). But by the end of the 1990s, none of these vessels 

remained in operation, and only just over a dozen of the 

MGR's remaining surface vessels were held to be combat capable. The fast-attack boats that are equipped with Styx (SS-N2B) surface-to-surface antiship missiles provide the MGR with a 

continuing, yet weak, antisurface warfare capability. The MGR's 

shore-based naval infantry reportedly is armed with approximately fifty Samlet (SSC-2B) and two Styx (SSC-3) surface-tosurface missiles. According to the United States Naval Institute, 

auxiliary ships that remained in operation as late as 1998 

included a replenishment oiler, an intelligence collector, a 

cargo ship, and several hydrographic survey vessels. 

321 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Conscription and Personnel Resources 

Until 1991, Cuban men were required to perform three 

years of compulsory military service under the SMO (Obligatory Military Service) system. The three-year obligation had 

been in force since the first Law of Military Service was promulgated in November 1963. In August 1991, however, the Active 

Military Service (Servicio Militar Activo-SMA) requirement 

was reduced to two years, beginning at age sixteen, under the 

General Military Service Law (Ley de Servicio Militar General-SMG), formerly the SMO. Young Cubans usually are not 

called to service until age seventeen. 

The compulsory service duty reflects the interest of the military and Cuban leadership in having a large proportion of the 

island's population prepared to contribute to the defense of 

the Revolution. By the end of the 1990s, 1. 7 million young 

Cuban men had completed their SMA requirement as conscripts. Since the onset of the economic crisis, Cuban youth 

carrying out such compulsory military service continue to play 

an important role in the military. Although now at reduced 

numbers because of overall cutbacks in military manpower, 

they have become most important in providing a source of 

cheap labor for the MINFAR's efforts to become a self-sustaining institution. 

In terms of overall personnel resources, in 1999 a total of 

6.08 million Cubans between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine 

were considered to be "available" for military service, according to the Central Intelligence Agency's WorldFactbook. Of this 

total, only 3.76 million Cubans, or just under two-thirds, were 

judged to be "fit" for military service. In this latter category, 1.9 

million of the Cubans were males and l.86 million were 

females. 

The fulfillment of SMA for conscripts entails their assignment to one of the services of the regular armed forces, to the 

65,000-member E]T (Youth Labor Army), or to the Ministry of 

Interior. Cuban males between the ages of sixteen and fifty are 

required to perform a minimum of two years' service as an 

active-duty member of one of the country's security forces, a 

member of the military reserves, or in some combination of 

both forms of service. Young men are required to register 

locally for the draft after reaching their sixteenth birthday, and 

are then issued a certificate that shows they have registered. 

According to population statistics, just under 75,000 young 

Cuban males were becoming eligible for conscription each 

322 
The barracks at B

A view of the sleejJing 

Courles)l National Ima
Cuba: A Country Study 

year during the late 1990s. Induction calls are held twice a year, 

with the youth to be inducted selected by lottery. Young men 

between the ages of sixteen and twenty-eight who have not 

been called for Active Military Service are known as prerecruits 

(prereclutados). During the late 1980s, new draftees received six 

to eight months of basic training before being formally 

inducted into the armed forces. It is likely that the extent and 

nature of the training given draftees in the 1990s were limited 

as a result of the economic crisis. 

Since the end of the FAR's "internationalist" mission, during 

which tens of thousands of draftees were sent to fight abroad, 

the military's need for conscripted manpower has fallen markedly. The decreased need was likely one of the considerations 

behind the 1991 decision to reduce the SMA term from three 

to two years, a move that brought the Cuban system more 

closely in line with the military service requirements maintained by other Latin American countries. The official explanation for the reduction was that the overall educational level of 

draftees had so improved over the years that they now needed 

less training. This explanation does not appear to be wholly 

without merit, given that since 1987, graduates of preuniversity 

programs who are drafted are required to perform only one 

year ofservice. In addition, the military maintains policies that 

reflect an interest in supporting the educational accomplishments ofits draftees, as reflected in a provision known as Order 

18. According to this order, youth who were initially not admitted to a university but who distinguish themselves during their 

term of service are given a second opportunity to pursue their 

higher education. By the end of 1998, 14,000 graduates of 

Cuban universities had been beneficiaries of this program. 

Cuban women are not subject to conscription. Mter turning 

sixteen years of age, however, they are eligible to enlist in the 

armed forces under the program known as Voluntary Female 

Military Service (Servicio Militar Voluntario Feminimo), which 

was established in 1986. (Women served in the FAR well before 

that date, however.) Their applications for enlistment are coordinated by the FMC (Federation of Cuban Women), the mass 

organization that has long been headed by Vilma Espin, Raul 

Castro's wife. During the 1980s, new female volunteers were 

accepted twice a year and signed up for two-year tours of duty, 

in contrast to the five-year commitment that was then required 

of male enlistees. Those who did not reenlist upon completion 

of their tour of duty automatically became members of the 

324 
National Security 

FAR's reserve forces; they were eligible to remain active in the 

reserve until reaching forty years of age. 

Women who enlist in the FAR are formally eligible to ascend 

within the ranks of the armed forces, yet they are believed to 

face limited opportunities for the advanced military education 

that might qualify them for such promotions. At the pre-university level, women were reported to be subject to meeting more 

restrictive entrance requirements than male applicants. At the 

more advanced levels of military education, it was believed that 

the only professional program open to women was that offered 

by the Military Technical Institute (Instituto Tecnico MilitarITM). The prevalence of traditional attitudes regarding sex 

roles also appeared as an impediment to women's career 

advancement within the armed forces. Between 1986 and early 

1999, more than 18,000 young women had volunteered for military service. 

Men who have completed their Active Military Service automatically pass to the ranks of the reserves, where they are 

expected to continue to train annually until reaching age fifty. 

Reservists are divided into various groups, according to their 

state of readiness and training. The members of the Ready 

Reserves are assigned to army units, serve on active duty for at 

least forty-five days each year, and could reportedly be mobilized on a few hours' notice. In 1999 these reserve forces numbered approximately 39,000 troops. The next tier consists of 

men who have completed at least one year of Active Military 

Service and could be mobilized on a few days' notice. The final 

group consists of those who either have not completed a year 

of active service or who were deemed unfit for duty, whether 

for reasons ascribable to their physical condition or political 

unreliability. Members of this last group appear to be "reservists" only in name, and reportedly are not required to undergo 

regular military training. 

Professional Training and Education 

Cuba's system of military training and education has been 

developed over the decades to support the specialized needs of 

a highly professional military force. These schools and training 

centers are under the authority of a separate directorate within 

the MINFAR. This directorate is dedicated exclusively to overseeing the education system and reports to the FAR General 

Staff. During the late 1970s, as a result of efforts to improve 

educational standards, the upper-level military educational 

325 
Cuba: A Country Study 

institutions were granted university status. The extent to which 

these schools, their admission standards, and their curricula 

were affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s and by the 

downsizing of the armed forces is unclear. 

The preparation of potential future members of the armed 

forces may be seen as beginning with the Camilo Cienfuegos 

Military Schools (Escuelas Militares Camilo CienfuegosEMCC), which are open to youth (both males and females) 

between the ages of eleven and seventeen. The first Camilo 

Cienfuegos school was opened in Matanzas in 1966. By the 

1980s, eleven such schools had been established and were 

located throughout the island. Each was under the authority of 

a particular branch of military service, with the army controlling seven of the schools. They offered a five-year course of 

study that was considered comparable to a preuniversity education. Yet in addition to the general curriculum that paralleled 

that offered by civilian schools, the Camilitos-as the school's 

students are known-were also given introductory classes on 

military tactics, the handling of light weapons, topography, 

chemical defense, and engineering. The students were also 

expected to adhere to military discipline and participate in 

drills. Most students gained admission either through their 

own participation in PCC-related youth organizationsnamely, the OPJM (Organization ofJose Marti Pioneers) or the 

Union ofYoung Communists (Union de Jovenes ComunistasUJC)-or through their parents' membership in the FAR or 

PCC. The graduates of the EMCC were believed to be given 

preference in admission to the MINFAR's more advanced 

schools and training programs. The extent to which these 

schools and their curricula were affected by the economic crisis 

of the 1990s remained unclear at the time ofwriting. 

Beyond this level, each branch of the armed forces has, until 

recently, operated its own schools and service academies. The 

exception is the MGR, whose naval academy at Punta Santa 

Ana, near Havana, was closed in the 1990s and converted into a 

hospital. The DAAFAR's Aviation Pilots Military School 

(Escuela Militar de Pilotos de Aviacion-EMPA) is located at 

the San Julian airbase in western Pinar del Rio Province. During the 1980s, the DAAFAR also operated its own technical 

school, the DAAFAR Technical School (Escuela Tecnica de la 

DAAFAR). The Ministry of Interior also operates separate 

schools for training its personnel. 

326 
National Security 

The General Antonio Maceo Joint-Service School (Escuela 

de Cadetes Interarmas General Antonio Maceo-ECAM) has 

traditionally been the Army's service academy. This school, 

located at Ceiba del Agua, a short distance southeast of the capital, was first opened in 1963. By the 1980s, admission requirements had been stiffened to stipulate that entrants must have a 

minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between the ages 

of fifteen and twenty-one. ECAM's three- and four-year programs ofstudy emphasize the preparation and training of tactical and technical command officers; the curriculum is 

designed for members of armored and mechanized infantry 

units and for engineering and logistics personnel. 

The Major Camilo Cienfuegos Revolutionary Armed Forces 

Artillery School (Escuela de Artilleria de las FAR Comandante 

Camilo Cienfuegos) was founded in 1963 and is located at La 

Cabana Fortress in Havana harbor. It provides advanced training for field and antiaircraft artillery officers, who upon completion of their studies are awarded a degree in either science 

or engineering. Those admitted to the school's engineering 

program, which is a five-year course of study, are required to 

have graduated from a preuniversity preparatory school, technical institute, or high school, and must be between the ages of 

seventeen and twenty-one. A four-year program, with similar 

admission requirements, is offered that focuses on preparing 

future officers who will command field and antiaircraft artillery, reconnaissance, and radio-technical units. 

The Military Technical Institute (ITM) , founded in 1966 

and located in Havana, offers the most advanced technical 

training programs available to MINFAR personnel. Unlike the 

other academies, the ITM is open to women. It offers enrollment in either four- or five-year training programs. Those 

admitted to the more stringent five-year program must be graduates of a preuniversity preparatory school and be between the 

ages of seventeen and twenty-one. The five-year program provides for instruction in field artillery, infantry, weapons, tanks, 

and transport; those graduating from the program become 

qualified mechanical engineers. The two four-year programs 

offer training for electromechanical and mechanical technicians. The admission requirements for the four-year courses of 

study are slightly less stringent than for the five-year program. 

So long as an applicant has a minimum tenth-grade education 

and is between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, he or she is 

eligible for admission. As with the other schools and courses of 

327 
Cuba: A Country Study 

study already discussed, the demonstration of political loyalty 

was considered a relevant factor in determining an applicant's 

qualifications. 

The MINFAR's senior service school is the General Maximo 

G6mez Revolutionary Armed Forces Academy (Academia de 

las FAR General Maximo G6mez), which was founded in July 

1963 and is located in western La Habana Province. This 

school provides training for middle-to upper-ranking MINFAR 

officers. During the 1980s, attendance at the school became a 

requisite for those hoping to be assigned to the General Staff. 

The school's curriculum is roughly comparable to that offered 

at advanced officer training schools in the United States, such 

as the United States Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or the United States Army 

War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

During the 1990s, the most advanced institution for military 

education was the National Defense College. This recently 

established college, which was modeled on Canada's senior 

officer school, offers a curriculum that is roughly comparable 

to that of the United States' National Defense University at Fort 

McNair in Washington, D.C. Its primary focus, as reflected in 

the curriculum, is on strategic security issues. Although organized mainly for the benefit of senior military professionals, 

some civilians-most ofwhom are government functionariesalso are invited to attend the courses. The faculty of the college 

includes military officials as well as civilian professors. During 

the 1990s, a period when the military became increasingly 

involved in the national economy and was often identified as 

an advocate for further reforms in that arena, the college's faculty members included civilian economists, some ofwhom also 

favored economic reforms in line with those envisioned by the 

MINFAR's leaders. 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 

Since 1976 the MINFAR's system of military ranks has been 

basically patterned after that used by most Western armed 

forces (see fig. 9; 10). Prior to that time, the system ofranks was 

far from conventional, a factor that complicated relations with 

the Soviet military, which pressed Cuba to carry out such 

changes as part of its professionalization. In about 1998, a 

minor revision to the FAR's rank insignia was made when chevrons were reintroduced to replace the stars on the insignia of 

junior officers. Two decades earlier, in 1978, the stars had 

328 
National Security 

replaced the chevrons. Another minor change, also made in 

1978, was the creation of a new rank, adding the warran t 

officer class for all three services. 

The lack of conventionality in the MINFAR's system of ranks 

may be traced to the earliest days of the Revolution, and may 

be understood as a gesture that reflected the rebels' egalitarian 

nature. Following the victory of the Revolution in 1959, this 

unconventionality continued, and the only military ranks recognized were those inherited from the Rebel Army. They consisted of lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major 

(comandante). At that time, three dozen men-nearly all of 

them Rebel Army veterans-held the rank of comandante, 

including Fidel Castro (even though he was clearly recognized 

as the others' superior). 

Between 1959 and 1973, no sweeping overhauls were carried 

out, but new ranks were gradually introduced. In late 1959, the 

rank of second lieutenant was the first addition to the military 

echelons. Between 1963 and 1973, other new ranks were 

added, including brigade commander, division commander, 

corps commander, army commander, and commander-inchief. First-class officers included the ranks offirst commander, 

commander, and major; and junior officers, the ranks of first 

and second lieutenant and first and second captain. 

In November 1976, Law No. 1315 created the system of 

ranks that remained basically unchanged for the next twentyodd years. These ranks are held by personnel assigned to the 

FAR and by personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Personnel assigned to the Revolutionary Army, the DAAFAR, and the 

Ministry of Interior may have similar rank titles, differentiated 

only by their uniforms and insignia colors. Fidel Castro holds 

the rank of commander in chief; his brother, MINFAR Minister 

Raul Castro, as army general (general de ejircito), is the secondranking officer in the hierarchy of the armed forces. Minister 

of Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra, as army corps general 

(general de cuerpo de ejircito) , is the third-ranking officer. 

The vice ministerial slots within the MINFAR as well as the 

commands of the FAR's general staff and of its three territorial 

armies are filled by officers having the rank of division general 

(general de division). The remaining rank at the general officer 

level is that of brigade general (general de brigada). 

First-class officer ranks are composed of, in descending 

order, colonel (coronel), lieutenant colonel (teniente coronel), and 

major (mayor); junior officers' ranks include captain (caPitan), 

329 
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Figure 9. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1999 
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...... Figure 10. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1999 
Cuba: A Country Study 

first lieutenant (primer teniente), lieutenant (teniente), and second 

lieutenant (subteniente). The noncommissioned ranks of warrant officers and enlisted personnel include, in descending 

order, senior warrant officer (primer subojicial) and warrant 

officer (subojicial), master sergeant (sargento de primera), sergeant first class (sargento de segunda), sergeant (sargento de tercera), private first class (soldado de primera), and private (soldado). 

Establishing comparability for the highest ranks of MGR personnel remains somewhat difficult inasmuch as the Cuban 

rank of almirante (admiral) is the equivalent of the United 

States rank of vice admiral. The MGR rank of vice almirante 

(vice admiral) is comparable to the United States rank of rear 

admiral, upper half. A contra almirante (rear admiral), in turn, 

is comparable to the United States rank of rear admiral, lower 

half (the rank formerly known in the United States Navy as 

commodore). First-class officers include, in descending order, 

the ranks of ship captain (capitan de navio), frigate captain 

(capitan de fragata) , and corvette captain (capitan de corbeta), 

which correspond to the United States ranks of captain, commander, and lieutenant commander, respectively. Junior officers include, in descending order, the ranks of ship lieutenant 

(teniente de navio), which is comparable to the rank oflieutenant 

in the United States Navy, as well as frigate lieutenant (teniente 

de fragata) and corvette lieutenant (teniente de corbeta), which are 

both considered comparable to the single rank of lieutenant 

junior grade in the United States Navy. The rank of ensign 

(alferez) is comparable for both the United States Navy and the 

MGR. 

In terms of noncommissioned personnel in the MGR, the 

most senior rank is that of first sergeant major (primer subojicial), which is comparable to a United States Navy master chief 

petty officer. Confusingly, however, an MGR sergeant major 

(subojicial) corresponds to two United States ranks, senior chief 

petty officer and chief petty officer. The ranks of sergeant are 

divided into three classes: A first sergeant (sargento de primera) 

and second sergeant (sargento de segunda) correspond directly 

to the ranks of petty officer, first and second class, respectively. 

The MGR rank of third sergeant (sargento de tercera) corresponds to the two United States Navy ranks of petty officer, 

third class, and seaman. The ranks of seaman, first class (marinero de primera) and seaman (marinero) in the MGR correspond 

to the United States Navy ranks of seaman apprentice and seaman recruit, respeCtively. 

332. 
National Security 

With respect to uniforms, the olive-drab fatigues made 

famous by Castro continue to be the standard field uniform for 

the FAR's ground and air forces. Other uniforms issued to FAR 

personnel include various styles of service, parade, and ceremonial parade uniforms. The parade uniforms of the Revolutionary Army are olive-drab; those of the DAAFAR are blue; 

and those of the MGR are either blue-black, for winter, or 

white, for summer. Notwithstanding changes that might be 

ordered by commanders, summer uniforms are generally worn 

from mid-March through mid-November. In addition, special 

uniforms are also issued. For the ground forces, they include 

paratrooper, chemical warfare, and tanker uniforms. For the 

DAAFAR, special pilot uniforms include an antigravity uniform 

and a pressurized uniform. 

Relations with Russia 

Following the departure of the last Russian troops in 1993, 

the SIGINT facility at Lourdes remained one of the only practical vestiges (apart from the extensive Soviet-origin materiel in 

the FAR's inventory) of the once-close security relationship 

between Cuba and the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it 

provided a reason for continuing regular interaction between 

the leaders of the two countries on issues related to security 

concerns through the remainder of the 1990s. During this 

period, the Lourdes facility was maintained and staffed by Russian intelligence personnel of the Federal Security Service 

(Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti-FSB), a successor entity 

to the Soviet-era Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti-KGB). An estimated 810 Russian 

military personnel were in Cuba in 1999. 

Under the first bilateral agreement pertaining to Lourdes 

that was reached in 1993, it was agreed that the facility would 

remain in operation and that "rent" would be paid in the form 

of spare parts for the FAR. At that time, the Russians agreed to 

pay Cuba for the next twenty years for both the Lourdes operation and for a since-closed submarine support facility at Cienfuegos on the southern Cuban coast, but the amount of the 

rent was not set. In March 1995, the agreement finalizing the 

terms for remuneration for Lourdes was signed in Moscow by 

FAR First Vice Minister Division GeneralJulio Casas Regueiro. 

It provided for an annual rent in the range of US$200 million, 

much ofwhich would be in the form of bartered military materials. Although the Russians, owing to their own domestic prob333 
Cuba: A Country Study 

lems, had difficulties in providing the Cubans with the 

bartered goods during the first years that followed the agreement's signing, the supply problems were thought to have been 

resolved by the end of the 1990s. 

According to the Russians, the "listening post" is used to 

monitor compliance with international arms-control agreements. Yet notwithstanding its likely utility in this regard, the 

Lourdes facility also is capable of intercepting and monitoring 

communications along the eastern coast of the United States as 

well as the circum-Caribbean region. Although the Cubans do 

not have access to the "raw" intelligence data obtained by the 

Russians, they are routinely provided intelligence summaries 

on issues that are thought to affect their interests. 

Relations with Other Armed Forces 

The onset of the economic crisis, the end of military "internationalism," and the loss of Soviet support appeared to bring 

about a heightened awareness within the Cuban armed forces 

with respect to the institution's potential isolation. As a result, 

the Cuban military's efforts to build contacts with foreign militaries were stepped up during the 1990s. In terms of other 

countries' receptivity, the Cuban military's efforts were aided by 

the end of the Cold War and Fidel Castro's 1992 declaration 

that Cuba would no longer support revolutionary movements 

abroad. 

The Cuban military has long maintained contacts with the 

armed forces of developing world nations that are considered 

nonaligned or, at least, not ideologically hostile toward the Castro regime. The changed situation of the 1990s, however, 

helped open the way for broader international contacts. The 

Cuban interest in reducing the FAR's ideological isolation in 

the post-Cold War era spurred its efforts to increase cooperation and regular contacts with other militaries in the Latin 

American region. By mid-decade, these efforts appeared to 

have been somewhat successful. In 1996 Cuba served as host of 

the biennial meeting of Ibero-American Military Academies, a 

gathering whose participants included military officials from 

Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. In this new environment, the Cuban military has also 

sought to build ties and expand cooperation with militaries in 

Canada and Western Europe. Among the latter group of countries with whose militaries the Cubans have been most publicly 

engaged are Britain, France, and, most significantly, Spain, 

334 
National Security 

which in 1996 announced its decision to become the first European Union (EU-see Glossary) nation to assign a permanent 

military attache to Havana. The contacts with these European 

countries have included hosting visits of students from their 

military schools as well as conducting discussions on mutual 

concerns and exploring areas of possible future cooperation. 

Despite the importance of Cuba's renewed military ties with 

Latin America and Europe, perhaps the most important tie 

with a foreign military service to develop since the Soviet 

Union's demise has been the FAR's relationship with the Chinese Popular Liberation Army (PLA). On various occasions 

during the 1990s, FAR leaders have traveled to the People's 

Republic of China (PRC) to meet with military officials; and 

those officials, in turn, have reciprocated in visiting the island. 

In February 1999, the Chinese defense minister and a delegation of military officials paid a three-day visit to Cuba. The 

FAR's interest in these contacts is believed to stem from the 

desire to have a powerful ally. In addition, the MINFAR leadership's view-and, in particular, Minister Raul Castro's viewthat elements of the Chinese model of economic reform may 

be relevant for Cuba also likely contributed to the interest in 

broadening ties with their military colleagues, who during the 

1990s had a prominent role in the Chinese economy. The PLA, 

at the same time, may be recognized to have a geostrategic 

interest with respect to its Cuban ally in the Caribbean, an 

interest that has raised some concerns in the United States. In 

late 1999, for example, Cuban officials were obliged to deny a 

report published by a Miami newspaper that the PRC had 

established a military communications facility on the island. 

Ministry of Interior 

leadership and Organization 

The Ministry of Interior was created in June 1961 and 

charged with maintaining Cuba's internal security, with responsibilities ranging from counterintelligence to firefighting. 

Between that time and 1989, the Ministry of Interior was often 

pitted against the MINFAR in the bureaucratic competition for 

primacy in ensuring national security. In contrast to the MINFAR, which since its organization has remained under the sole 

authority of Raul Castro, the Ministry ofInterior has been variously headed by Ramiro Valdes Menendez, a Rebel Army veteran and the founder of the ministry, and by Sergio del Valle 

335 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Jimenez, also a longtime revolutionary supporter. Perhaps 

owing to his background as a physician, del Valle launched 

rehabilitation programs and efforts to curtail torture. In the 

years immediately preceding the trial involving Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, the ministry's head was its former first vice 

minister, Division GeneralJose Abrantes Fernandez, who was a 

close associate of Valdes, a trusted aide to Fidel Castro, and 

who had also played a key role in the organization of Cuba's 

intelligence community, beginning in the early 1960s (see 

Organizational Changes of 1989, this ch.) . 

Following the events of mid-1989 that were associated with 

the Ochoa affair, Abrantes was sentenced to jail. The post of 

minister of interior was then assigned to the second-ranking 

officer in the FAR, Army Corps General Abelardo Colome 

Ibarra, a close associate of Raul Castro. During the ensuing 

months, the top layers of leadership of the ministry's various 

directorates were purged and their officials replaced by men 

who had a background as loyal officers in the FAR. By the late 

1990s, a few reports suggested that some of the once-purged 

Ministry of Interior officials, mainly those who had had backgrounds in intelligence, were being invited back on a selective 

basis. Nevertheless, some analysts maintained that even a 

decade later the ministry had still not recovered from the 

shake-up that followed the Ochoa affair. As of 1999, Colome 

Ibarra continued to head the ministry and served as its representative on the Council of Ministers (see The Military in the 

Government and the Party, this ch.). 

At the time of the shake-up, the Ministry of Interior was 

organized with six vice ministries, each of which was in turn 

responsible for various directorates and departments. Despite 

some name changes, this basic structure is thought to have 

remained intact since 1989. The most important of the vice 

ministries is that of the first vice minister. The first vice minister 

has authority over a number of key directorates and departments, including the General Directorate of Personal Security 

(Direcci6n General de Seguridad Personal-DGSP), which is 

responsible for safeguarding the life of the Cuban leader; the 

General Directorate of Special Troops (Direcci6n General de 

Tropas Especiales-DGTE); the General Directorate of Border 

Guards (Direcci6n General de Guardafronteras-DGG); the 

Technical Directorate; and the directorates of immigration, 

control, codes (sometimes referred to as the Eighth Director336 
National Security 

ate), and weapons. The Central Laboratory of Criminology is 

also under the first vice minister's jurisdiction. 

The remaining five vice ministries have more specific 

responsibilities. They include the Vice Ministry of Counterintelligence, which is responsible for the Directorate of Counterintelligence (Direcci6n de Contra Inteligencia); the Vice 

Ministry of Intelligence, which oversees the Directorate of 

Intelligence (Direcci6n de Inteligencia-DI); and the Vice 

Ministry of Political Mfairs, which reportedly is jointly subordinate to the head of the PCC Central Committee's national 

security commission, as well as to the minister of interior. The 

Vice Ministry of Internal Order has authority over the following directorates: National Revolutionary Police, Penitentiary 

Establishments, Prevention and Extinction of Fires, and Identity Cards. Lastly, the Vice Ministry of the Economy is responsible for overseeing the ministry's administrative functions, 

including planning, budgeting, and exercising inventory control over motor vehicles and warehouses. 

Other ministry subdivisions that are organizationally independent of the vice ministries include the directorates of Cadres, Personnel, and Instruction; Information; and 

International Relations. The ministry's Secretariat, a body 

established in the 1980s and which maintains the central 

archives, is thought to still be responsible for overseeing the 

aforementioned directorates. In addition to the personnel who 

may be stationed abroad, the ministry also maintains delegations in each provincial capital that work closely with the local 

PCC in helping to carry out the charges of the sundry directorates and departments. 

Special Troops 

The Special Troops (Tropas Especiales) are considered the 

elite of Cuba's security forces. Under the nominal authority of 

the first vice minister of the Ministry of Interior, they are 

thought to receive their orders directly from Fidel Castro. 

Established in the mid-1960s, the Special Troops consist of two 

battalions made up of an estimated 1,200 highly trained and 

politically reliable personnel. Despite the economic crisis of 

the 1990s, the Special Troops are considered to remain capable 

of executing selected military and internal security missions. 

The Special Troops' mission is to serve as a highly mobile 

shock force that can provide protection for high-ranking officials, conduct special military operations, and help support 

337 
Cuba: A Country Study 

other special security requirements that the leadership might 

have. During the 1980s, several foreign advisers, all of whom 

were from Vietnam, were brought in to aid with the Special 

Troops' training, especially in survival techniques; in turn the 

Special Troops are also known to have provided training to 

selected foreign forces. Roughly comparable to the United 

States Green Berets or the spetznaz of the former Soviet Union, 

the Special Troops are trained to operate as commando-style 

units. Most members of the force are both parachute- and 

scuba-qualified and trained in the martial arts for hand-to-hand 

combat. In terms of their publicly known operations, members 

of the Special Troops were the surreptitious "advance" forces 

sent by Fidel Castro to Angola in 1975, whose arrival there 

prior to Angolan independence preceded the formal beginning of Cuba's military involvement in that Mrican conflict. 

Few details are available with respect to the deployment of 

these forces throughout the island. Most personnel belonging 

to the Special Troops are believed to be stationed in or near 

Havana, although at least one unit was reportedly stationed 

near the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo. 

Border Guard Troops 

The Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras-TGF) 

are under the authority of the Ministry of Interior's Directorate 

of Border Guards, an entity that falls under the jurisdiction of 

the first vice minister. In 1999 the TGF had an estimated 6,500 

personnel, as compared with an estimated 3,500 in the late 

1980s. The TGF was originally established under the Ministry 

of Interior in March 1963 as the Department of Coastal and 

Port Vigilance. During the counterrevolutionary campaign of 

the 1960s known as the "fight against bandits," the members of 

this force engaged in the maritime-oriented "fight against 

pirates." Their principal mission remains coastal surveillance. 

Correspondingly, they are charged with helping ensure the 

security of the country's borders, both in preventing unauthorized incursions into Cuban territory and in preventing unauthorized departures by Cubans attempting to leave the island. 

Although responsible primarily for patrolling Cuba's inland 

waterways, shores, and coastal waters, their members would be 

the first line of defense against any external invading force. Up 

until the significant weakening of Cuba's naval forces during 

the 1990s, it was expected that the TGF's forces would fall 

under the operational command of the MGR during a national 

338 
A Soviet-built Cuban Foxtrot-cl

New Cuban jmtrol boats at th

Courte.'.), National Image
Cuba: A Country Study 

security crisis. According to a 1996 report, the TGF is thought 

to have at least one antisubmarine unit. The TGF is equipped 

with twenty Soviet-era Zhuk patrol craft as well as various fast 

launches and utility boats. TGF forces also regularly use motorcycles for helping patrol the shoreline as well as canines for 

tracking. 

At the time of the 1994 balsero crisis, the TGF was widely condemned for its role in the sinking of the tugboat 13 de marzo, 

which was carrying Cubans seeking to leave the island illegally. 

As a result of the TGF's ramming and fire-hosing of the vessel, 

forty-one of the boat's seventy-two passengers drowned, deaths 

that included women and twenty-three children. Because of 

the international outcry that the incident provoked, the leadership instructed the TGF to no longer use force in preventing 

such departures. . 

During the late 1990s, by contrast, no reports emerged that 

cited significant brutality on the part of the TGF. Rather, in 

helping Cuba comply with the terms of the May 1995 immigration accord signed with the United States, members of the TGF 

are routinely in contact with their counterparts in the United 

States Coast Guard. Their main role is to cooperate in the repatriation ofCuban emigres who are intercepted at sea by United 

States Coast Guard personnel. 

National Revolutionary Police 

The National Revolutionary Police (Polida Nacional Revolucionaria-PNR) fall under the authority of the Vice Ministry of 

Internal Order. As Cuba's primary uniformed law enforcement 

body, they are responsible for handling routine criminal and 

law enforcement matters and are also occasionally called on by 

other security forces to help with what are deemed to be political matters. The force was established on January 5, 1959, only 

days after the victory of the Revolution, and in the mid-1980s 

numbered 10,000. It is unclear how the size of the force may 

have been affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s. 

The regime's increased concern over the growing crime 

problem on the island prompted greater attention to the PNR's 

professional development during the late 1990s. As a result, the 

PNR received improved training, was assigned new French Citroen cruisers to replace the old Soviet-era Ladas, and also was 

provided new, more modern communications equipment. During this period, the presence of the uniformed PNR officers on 

the street was also increased, especially with respect to the 

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National Security 

patrols, often accompanied by canines, assigned to areas frequented by foreign tourists. According to Cuban officials, the 

increases in security-related government expenditures in 1999 

were largely attributable to the attention dedicated to beefing 

up the country's police forces. 

During the late 1990s, numerous reports by human rights 

groups also stated that PNR officers routinely assisted the nonuniformed personnel of the DSE in matters related to the activities of Cuban dissidents. On occasion, political detainees have 

been taken to PNR precinct stations, where they have been 

held briefly before being released or transferred to other facilities associated with the DSE. The PNR's forces have also been 

criticized for failing to act to break up the so-called spontaneous demonstrations that often erupted outside the home of dissidents and others considered to be antagonistic toward the 

regime, such as members of the small yet vocal independent 

press. The participants in these demonstrations, which are 

known as acts ofrepudiation (actos de repudio), are usually members of the officially sanctioned Rapid Response Brigades 

(Brigadas de Respuesta Ripida-BRR) or of the local CDRs. 

The BRR, composed of civilian volunteers, were initially organized in mid-1991 to deal with possible problems that could 

develop in relation to Cuba's hosting of the Pan-American 

Games in the midst of the then new economic crisis (see 

Human Rights and Political Prisoners, this ch.). 

In addition, to assist the regular police in their increased 

responsibilities in light of Cuba's tourism boom of the 1990s, a 

new black-bereted force known as the Special Brigade (Brigada 

Especial) was created in 1998. The main role of the Special Brigade has been preventive, often in helping identify and arrest 

the hustlers and pimps who prey on foreign tourists. The force 

members have also worked closely with the PNR in coordinating the neighborhood-based, anticrime groups under the Unified Prevention and Vigilance System (Sistema Unificado de 

Prevenci6n y Vigilancia-SUPV). The SUPV was conceived 

during the early 1990s and placed under the PNR's supervision 

as part of the effort to stem the surge in economic-related 

crime that accompanied the onset of the crisis and at the same 

time improve vigilance in relation to "antisocial" behavior. 

Intelligence Directorate 

The key organization responsible for Cuba's foreign intelligence is the Intelligence Directorate (Direcci6n de Inteligen341 
Cuba: A Country Study 

cia). Before its name was changed in 1989, this body was long 

known as the General Intelligence Directorate (Direcci6n 

General de Inteligencia-DGI). Prior to the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, the DGI was closely aligned with and organized 

along the lines of the former Soviet Union's KGB, from which 

it also received training. During the Soviet era, foreign intelligence gained by either organization was occasionally shared. 

The United States and the resident Cuban exile community 

in this country have been the two principal foci of the Intelligence Directorate's collection and analytical efforts. The collection activities include the infiltration of exile organizations, 

an effort that is relatively easy given the common language and 

culture and the large numbers of exiles resident in the United 

States. Following the February 1996 downing of two aircraft 

piloted by members of the exile organization Brothers to the 

Rescue, it became known that one of the group's pilots who did 

not fly that day,Juan Pablo Roque, had infiltrated the organization on behalf of the Cuban government. Shortly after the aircraft were shot down, Roque disappeared from his home in 

Florida and resurfaced in Havana. Other United States-based 

groups and paramilitary organizations reportedly targeted by 

the Intelligence Directorate include the Democracy Movement, the Alpha 66, the Democratic National Unity Party 

(Partido de Unidad Nacional Democratico-PUND), and even 

the Latin American Chamber of Commerce. 

Cuban intelligence operatives are believed to have been 

somewhat less successful in other United States penetration 

efforts. On various occasions, members of the Cuban Interests 

Section in Washington, D.C., have been identified as intelligence agents, declared persona non grata, and sent home. In 

September 1998, an extensive effort to penetrate the United 

States government was revealed, when ten Cubans residing in 

Florida were arrested for espionage. Related to these arrests, in 

December 1998, three Cuban diplomats from Cuba's United 

Nations mission were ordered to leave the United States 

because of their ties to the ten individuals. The Miami spy ring 

was the largest single group of Cubans charged with spying by 

the United States since the Castro government came to power. 

According to the United States Federal Bureau ofInvestigation 

(FBI), the ten arrested were tasked with spying on military 

installations in Florida, including the Boca Chica Naval Air Station, the United States Southern Command, and MacDill Air 

Force Base. 

342 
National Security 

With respect to the Intelligence Directorate's interests, this 

shift to military targets was deemed by some observers to 

reflect a new Cuban intelligence concern, namely its interest in 

regaining access to the kind of strategic information on the 

United States military that had once been provided by the 

Soviet Union. However, the directorate is also active elsewhere 

in the world, where its operatives are often tasked to collect 

intelligence related to investments in the island or other business-related endeavors. Still, even beyond North America, the 

Cubans have demonstrated a continuing interest in militaryrelated targets, as was suggested by the revelation in early 1999 

that the directorate had infiltrated Spanish military intelligence. At the time, Intelligence Directorate agents were 

thought to be seeking details regarding Spain's participation in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as 

information pertaining to investments in Cuba's tourism industry. Spain's capital, Madrid, is believed to serve as the "home 

base" for the directorate's agents assigned to Europe. 

By the end of the 1990s, the Intelligence Directorate 

appeared to be stepping up its overseas activities, apparently 

having recovered from the shake-up in 1989, when, as occurred 

in the other bureaucratic entities under the Ministry of Interior's authority, a large number of the directorate's long-time 

personnel were fired or retired, and were replaced with military personnel. This extensive changeover in personnel was 

believed to have negatively affected Cuban intelligence during 

most of the 1990s, given that scores of operatives with many 

years of experience were peremptorily dismissed. During the 

mid-1990s, in an effort to recoup its capabilities, the directorate was reported to have asked some of these career intelligence officers to return to active service. The directorate 

remained dominated by military personnel, however. 

In the late 1990s, the Intelligence Directorate reportedly 

had six divisions, or bureaus, which were divided into two categories of roughly equal size, consisting of operational divisions 

and support divisions. The operational divisions include the 

Political-Economic Intelligence Division, which is subdivided 

into regional sections, including a separate one for North 

America; the Military Intelligence Division, and the External 

Counterintelligence Division, which is tasked with penetrating 

foreign intelligence services and the surveillance of exiles. The 

support divisions include the Technical Division, the Information Division, and the Preparation Division. The first is respon343 
Cuba: A Country Study 

sible for the production of false documents, maintenance of 

the communications systems that support clandestine operations, and the development of clandestine message capabilities. 

The Ministry of Interior's Intelligence Directorate maintains a 

radio listening and transmitting post on the island that is used 

primarily to maintain contact with its operatives abroad. The 

information and preparation divisions assist in matters related 

to intelligence analysis. During the 1970s and 1980s, the operatives of the America Department (Departamento AmericaDA), an entity formally under the PCC's jurisdiction, worked 

closely with the DGI (as the Intelligence Directorate was then 

known) in managing covert activities and support for national 

liberation movements throughout the world. 

Crime and Punishment 

General Crime/Trends 

By the end of the 1990s, the growing national crime problem 

had become a focal point for the regime. During the early 

1990s, economic crimes-often committed by average citizens 

trying to resolver; or make do, during the most difficult years of 

the crisis-became the focus of official attention. By the end of 

the 1990s, however, the types of crimes being committed, as 

well as those committing them, had changed, prompting 

heightened concerns. These concerns stemmed from what was 

recognized as a sudden, alarming increase in violent crime, 

including armed robbery and murder, that occurred in 1998. 

In late 1998, a special section in one of the nation's leading 

weekly newspapers,Juventud Rebelde, identified crime as "one of 

the great new challenges" facing the regime and said that it 

even was emerging as a threat to the socialist system. In a major 

speech made inJanuary 1999 to the country's National Revolutionary Police (PNR), Fidel Castro called for urgent measures 

to preserve law and order. These measures included changes to 

the country's Penal Code, with the addition of new crimes as 

well as increasing sentences for a number of offenses. 

Throughout most of the Revolution, Cuba has traditionally 

had low rates of violence and juvenile delinquency, and has 

been counted among the nations in Latin America that could 

boast of having "safe streets." During the 1990s, however, this 

situation appeared to be changing. Many Cuban citizens 

responded to the increasing incidence of crime by installing 

bars on the windows and balconies of their homes in order to 

344 
National Security 

keep intruders out; others reportedly turned to attack dogs 

and alarm systems. The government maintains that the 

increase in crime is "temporary" and blames it on the difficulties caused by the longstanding United States embargo. The 

cause, however, is generally acknowledged to be linked with the 

long economic crisis, the dollarization of the economy, and the 

many changes associated with the growth of the tourism industryon the island during the 1990s. Apart from the incidence of 

violent crime, the general trends in crime reflected a rise in all 

kinds of theft during the late 1990s, whether break-ins, car 

theft, or livestock theft. Lastly, the theft, usually by employees, 

of goods and manufacturing materials from state-run industries for sale in dollars on the black market remained a problem that interfered with the government's efforts to achieve 

greater productivity. 

In addition to theft, prostitution has increased since the 

legalization of dollars in 1992 and the growth of the tourism 

industry on the island during the decade, as Cubans have 

turned to this profession as a way to earn hard currency. 

Although prostitution itself is not recognized as a criminal 

offense, it is viewed as morally reprehensible, and Cuban 

authorities have instituted periodic campaigns against it. Those 

who profit from prostitution, whether pimps or those who rent 

rooms used by the prostitutes, are subject to prosecution and 

several years' imprisonment. During the 1998 campaign, police 

patrols in areas frequented by foreigners, such as Varadero 

Beach and the Cuban Keys, were stepped up in efforts to discourage the prostitutes' open solicitation of tourists; yet some 

reports indicated that the prostitutes were often able to bribe 

the officers to look the other way. 

The government has been anxious to keep the increase in 

crime from negatively affecting the tourism industry, one of 

the primary sources of the nation's hard currency earnings. 

(One of the incidents that may have contributed to the suddenly heightened official concern in late 1998 was the fatal 

shooting of two Italian tourists during a robbery.) As a result, 

the government has attempted to increase police training, 

patrols, and manpower, and to put other resources at the disposal of the police (see National Revolutionary Police, this 

ch.). In this last regard, a special new police force, the aforementioned Special Brigade, was created in 1998 to deter crime 

in tourist areas. Cuban authorities have also called on the population for assistance in the anticrime campaign. At the Fifth 

345 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Congress of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 

(CDRs) in September 1998, CDR members-whose political 

fervor was generally thought to have diminished as the daily 

difficulties of economic life increased in the 1990s-were 

assigned a new role in helping improve anticriminal vigilance 

in their neighborhoods. As part of this vigilance program, 

which is coordinated by the PNR, joint patrols by neighborhood residents and police were increased in Cuba's urban 

areas. 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics-Related Problems 

During the late 1990s, the issue of drug trafficking became a 

heightened concern for Cuban officials. During this period, 

the island had become an important transshipment point for 

illicit drugs destined for sale either in Europe or, most often, 

the United States. With increasing frequency, Cuba was being 

used for airdrops of South American-produced drugs, usually 

cocaine, bundles of which were then retrieved and carried by 

fast launches to the United States. Cuba's ability to prevent the 

traffickers' operations is limited by its own strategic inability to 

fully monitor national airspace, particularly the skies over central Cuba, the air corridor most often favored by the traffickers. 

Similarly, severe resource shortages have hampered the ability 

of the Ministry of Interior's Border Guard Troops, which are 

assigned to patrol the island's coastal waters, to interdict shipments, and to apprehend traffickers at sea. 

Cuban authorities appear to have had mixed success in their 

interdiction efforts. By the end of 1999, the use of Cuban airspace by traffickers was believed to be on the decline, the reason for which may have been their relatively easier access to the 

skies over the neighboring island of Hispaniola. Still, Cuban 

officials reported that in 1999 they seized two tons of cocaine 

that had washed up on the country's north shore. This cocaine, 

part of failed airdrops at sea, was intended to be picked up by 

the small speedboats, known colloquially as "go-fasts," that 

ferry the drugs to the United States. Some analysts maintain 

that the unconfiscated drugs that have washed ashore have 

been the source of the island's nascent domestic drug problem. 

Cuban authorities also have achieved some success in apprehending individuals who tried to smuggle drugs through one 

of the island's eleven international airports. Foreigners apprehended for attempted drug smuggling have included Canadian, Jamaican, and British nationals, among others. During 

346 
National Security 

1998 alone, a Ministry ofInterior report stated that arrests and 

seizures had doubled over the previous year. Cuban authorities 

arrested 1,216 individuals for possession and trafficking and 

seized a total of 106 kilos of cocaine and eighty kilos of marijuana. 

Despite Cuba's efforts, a notable drug seizure made in 

Colombia in December 1998 suggested a possible new aspect to 

the island's strategic role in the international narcotics trade. 

That seizure was of 7.2 tons of cocaine found packed in shipping containers aboard a vessel bound for Cuba that had an 

ultimate destination in Spain. It raised the possibility that the 

maritime transit of containerized cargo was a new tactic in trafficking via Cuba because, as one police official observed, it was 

unlikely that so large a shipment would have been sent along 

an untested route. Following the broad negative publicity that 

the incident generated, President Fidel Castro announced in 

January 1999 that international traffickers apprehended and 

convicted by Cuban authorities would be subject to the death 

penalty. 

Within the Cuban government, the Ministry of Interior and 

the Ministry ofJustice are the two principal entities charged 

with antinarcotics responsibilities. As a reflection of Cuba's 

concern over what is perceived as a growing problem, the minister ofjustice, Roberto Diaz Sotolongo, also served as the head 

of the country's National Drug Commission (Comisi6n Nacional de Drogas). Within the Ministry of Interior, the National 

Antidrug Division, which in 1999 was led by Colonel Oliverio 

Montalvo, is responsible for coordinating the antinarcotics 

efforts of its personnel, which include the police, the Border 

Guard Troops, and Customs authorities. Also, in recognition of 

this relatively new national problem and its extension well 

beyond national borders, Cuba has signed pacts with twentyfive foreign governments in an effort to combat international 

narcotics trafficking and the associated money laundering that 

often accompanies it. Included are pacts with Spain, Britain, 

and even Colombia. Training assistance provided by European 

governments includes helping the Cubans improve their investigative and ship-searching techniques as well as their airport 

control measures. 

Cuban officials have also sought to increase cooperation on 

antinarcotics issues with the United States, in particular with 

the United States Coast Guard. These have included efforts to 

establish and maintain routine communications and contacts 

347 
Cuba: A Country Study 

between the Coast Guard and their counterparts in the Border 

Guard Troops, particularly among lower-ranking officials and 

on a "case-by-case" basis (see Border Guard Troops, this ch.). In 

one of the most notable cases involving successful cooperation 

between Cuba and the United States to deter drug trafficking, 

the United States informed the Cuban government in late 1996 

of a suspicious disabled freighter, the Limerick, which had 

drifted into Cuban waters. The Cubans searched the vessel and 

found six tons of cocaine. Cuban officials later testified at the 

United States trial in which the traffickers were convicted. 

Despite official concern with narcotics trafficking, Cuban 

government authorities officially maintained that the domestic 

consumption of drugs had not become a broad social problem 

by the end of the 1990s, but they did acknowledge a trend 

toward growing use. It was also recognized that drug use had 

increased, in particular in areas frequented by foreign tourists, 

suggesting that the tourists themselves either were bringing 

illicit drugs to the island or were a target market for Cubans 

selling the drugs. 

The use of illegal drugs has been discouraged in Cuba since 

the very beginning of the Revolution, when under Order 6, 

which was issued by Fidel Castro while still a guerrilla in the 

Sierra Maestra, the use and consumption of marijuana was prohibited. Despite the paucity of statistical data on the subject, 

drug consumption within the Cuban population, especially by 

youth, is believed to have increased markedly during the late 

1990s. Frequently, unretrieved drug shipments that accidentally wash ashore are recovered by Cubans, who often choose to 

sell the drugs and may save some for their own use. The 

Cubans have favored a community-based, educational 

approach in addressing this potential problem, as spelled out 

in their Integrated Drug Prevention Plan. According to a fine 

line drawn by the Penal Code, drug consumption itself is not a 

crime, but possession is. An individual with a record of illegal 

drug consumption or identified as exhibiting behavior that 

suggests drug use may be subject to "preventive detention." 

Despite the Cuban government's belief that the country is 

not a target market for such common illegal narcotics as 

cocaine, marijuana, or heroin, it does acknowledge that Cuba 

is one of the largest illegal markets in the hemisphere for the 

pharmaceutical tranquilizer known as meprobamate, which is 

medically prescribed to relieve anxiety, tension, and muscle 

spasms. In terms of the classification of illicit drugs, Cuba 

348 
National Security 

adheres to the schedule elaborated by the U.N.'s Vienna Commission. The government officially supports international 

efforts to fight narcotics trafficking. For example, Cuba's minister ofjustice represented Cuba at the mid-1998 U.N. Anti-Drug 

Summit in New York. 

Yet notwithstanding present efforts to build cooperation in 

this area, the issue ofillicit narcotics remains a somewhat sensitive subject for the Cuban government, a number ofwhose officials have in the past been accused of engaging in international 

drug trafficking. During the 1989 trial of Division General 

Arnaldo Ochoa, one of the key charges that government prosecutors highlighted as having threatened the Revolution was the 

defendants' involvement and contacts with Carlos Lehder 

Rivas, the one-time head of Colombia's Medellin Cartel, with 

whom the defendants were said to have discussed collaboration. Some critics of the Castro government maintain that the 

regime's own concern over being exposed for participating in 

the international drug trade prompted it at that time to convict 

and "sacrifice" several of its leading security officers in order to 

save itself. 

Allegedly, Cuba's interest in facilitating international drug 

trafficking can be dated to the late 1970s, when the government first realized that it could gain by providing safe haven 

and other support for the major drug cartels and independent 

traffickers that operated in and around the Caribbean. In addition, in supporting the introduction of illicit drugs into the 

United States, the regime enjoyed an insidious side benefit: the 

ability to "corrupt" the country from within by promoting drug 

use. Some of the money obtained was thought to have been 

used to finance revolutionary activities in Central and South 

America as well as to help support the sending ofCuban troops 

to Mrica. According to one former Cuban intelligence officer, 

these operations were initially managed through what was 

known as Department "Z" of the Ministry of Interior's Special 

Troops Directorate. They were later transferred to Department 

"MC," which was under the Ministry of Interior's Vice Ministry 

ofInformation. (The initials "MC" are said to stand for moneda 

convertible (convertible currency), and the generation of 

moneda convertible was the main purpose of that department.) 

The heyday of Cuba's covert role in the international drug 

trade was presumably between 1979 and 1989. At this point, 

only six weeks before Ochoa's arrest in June 1989, it became 

known that two traffickers who were in the custody of United 

349 
Cuba: A Country Study 

States authorities in Miami were preparing to provide details 

on Cuba's role in narcotics trafficking and to testify against 

regime authorities for their involvement. Earlier, in November 

1982, four Cuban government officials, including Admiral 

Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado, then the chief of the Revolutionary Navy, were indicted by a United States grand jury for allowing Cuba to be used as a drug transshipment point by foreign 

traffickers. United States prosecutors' plans in 1993 to indict 

MINFAR chief Raul Castro along with several top Ministry of 

Interior officials for their role in facilitating the transit of 

Colombian cocaine to the United States market over a ten-year 

period were never carried out. Many of the critics who have 

cited the Cuban government's role in narcotics trafficking 

argue that the leadership continues to be deeply involved in 

trafficking and money laundering. Despite the successful limited cooperation involved in the 1996 Limerick case and the fact 

that no Cuban authorities have ever been detained based on 

the indictments handed down, this alleged record of long-time 

involvement in international narcotics trafficking left some 

United States officials reluctant in the late 1990s to engage in 

more extensive cooperation with the Cubans in this area. As of 

the late 1990s, however, United States intelligence had never 

publicly revealed any evidence that high-level Cuban government officials are engaged in drug trafficking. 

The Problem of Illegal Emigration and Refugee Smuggling 

By the end of the 1990s, illegal emigration and alien smuggling had become a growing problem for the regime. Given 

that Cubans are not free to leave the country without government-provided exit visas, illegal emigration- has long plagued 

the regime, yet it has also provided a political "relief valve" in 

that those most dissatisfied with their situation on the island 

have left. Nevertheless, the incidence of alien smuggling-in 

which professional smugglers are paid to help Cubans surreptitiously leave the country-is a relatively new and growing phenomenon. By 1999 United States authorities believed that the 

majority of the Cubans arriving illegally had been brought in 

by smugglers. This developing problem was in part spurred by 

the terms of the 1995 immigration accord, which provides that 

most Cuban refugees who make it to United States soil are not 

turned away from this country but that those intercepted at sea 

by the United States Coast Guard are picked up and repatriated to Cuba. This accord reflected a change in United States 

350 
National Security 

policy inasmuch as for decades the United States had welcomed all Cubans. In turn, under the accords, the Cuban 

regime agreed that it would attempt to stem the uncontrolled 

flow of Cubans illegally departing the island, as had occurred 

on various occasions in the past. Two such incidents were the 

Marie! Boatlift ofl980, in which 125,000 Cubans left the island, 

and the 1994 balsero crisis, when 30,000 Cubans attempted to 

leave the island on rafts. 

Since 1994, thousands of Cubans have attempted to leave 

the island, often on their own, setting off on makeshift rafts or 

other unseaworthy vessels. During good weather, the number 

ofCubans attempting to make the trip across the shark-infested 

Straits of Florida to United States soil generally increases. From 

January to July 1999 alone, the United States Coast Guard 

reported that it had apprehended at sea 1,039 Cubans, whowith the Coast Guard working in coordination with Cuba's Border Guard Troops-were returned to the island. This figure 

reflects a significant increase over prior years, given that from 

May 1995 toJuly 1999, a total of2,195 Cubans were reported to 

hav~ been intercepted at sea and repatriated. By contrast, the 

United States Border Patrol, which assumes jurisdiction once 

the Cubans reach United States soil, reported that between 

October 1998 andJuly 1999, 1,943 Cubans had made it to Florida, thus enabling them to seek permanent resident status in 

the United States. Based on the physical condition of those 

arriving and the absence of vessels or other likely means of 

transport, the Border Patrol estimated that 80 percent had 

been ferried to the United States by smugglers. The number of 

those who have perished at sea in attempting to make the 145­

kilometer trip to the shores of Florida, however, is unknown 

and perhaps incalculable. In one of the more noted cases to 

come to public attention in the late 1990s, a six-year-old boy, 

Elia.n Gonzalez, was found clinging to a tire's inner tube and 

rescued by fis~ermen in November 1999; he was the sole survivor of a raft sinking in which his mother perished. 

There is little debate that the 1994 balsero crisis, which came 

as Cuba's economic decline was near its worst, so raised concerns on the part of both the United States and Cuban governments that it paved the way for the new agreement on 

immigration. Yet the unintended consequence appears to have 

been that the agreement, which also set up a lottery system for 

the granting to Cubans of only 20,000 United States visas annually, raised the stakes for leaving the island to the point that 

351 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Cubans became more willing to pay a smuggler for assistance. 

In most cases, the smugglers are paid by the Cubans' relatives 

who reside in the United States and wish to help their family 

members join them. Occasionally, Cubans are not transported 

directly from the island, but must first travel to the Bahamas 

where they are picked up by the smugglers whose networks 

operate from there. During the late 1990s, the professional 

smugglers' fees reportedly ranged from a low ofUS$l,OOO to as 

much as US$8,000 or US$10,000 per person; they often make 

their trips using fast boats that can outrun the United States 

Coast Guard's vessels. According to one estimate, a single boatload that might carry two dozen Cubans could bring the smugglers more than US$200,000 per trip. 

Alien smuggling stands as a criminal offense in both the 

United States and Cuba. Although smugglers apprehended by 

United States authorities have long been subject to prosecution, not until the late 1990s did Cuba begin instituting laws 

that were specifically targeted against the smuggling ofits citizens. According to United States regulations aimed at deterring these smugglers' activities, the United States Coast Guard 

requires that boats up to 45.5 meters in length obtain a United 

States permit to travel to Cuba from a Florida port. If it is 

found that a boat intercepted by the Coast Guard has made a 

trip without permission, the Coast Guard can seize the vessel 

and subject those aboard to prosecution. For those convicted 

of smuggling by United States courts, sentences might range 

from five to ten years' imprisonment. 

In early 1999, in light of this growing problem, Cuba 

announced its intent to crack down on those involved in smuggling. In a widely publicized anticrime speech to the PNR in 

January, Fidel Castro urged that smugglers who are apprehended and convicted be "at least" imprisoned for life (cadena 

perpetua) (see Penal System, this ch.). In July 1999, in a more 

direct attempt to deter Cubans from leaving, Decree-Law 194 

also established a 500 to 10,000 peso fine (payable in hard currency for foreigners) for those who buy, transport, or repair 

vessels without first gaining official approval. Despite Cuba's 

efforts to crack down on this crime, alien smuggling remains 

very lucrative; its continuation suggests the smugglers may 

deem their possible apprehension and prosecution by Cuban 

authorities to be unlikely and worth the risk. As ofJuly 1999, 

Cuba was holding thirty United States residents arrested for 

352 
National Security 

alien smuggling, twenty-six of whom it had offered to send 

back to the United States for trial. 

Human Rights and Political Prisoners 

Cuba is widely recognized as being among the nations of the 

world whose governments have a poor human rights record. 

This general assessment is offered by entities as diverse as the 

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United 

States Department of State, Amnesty International, Human 

Rights Watch, and Freedom House. The Cuban leadership 

does not accept this assessment; rather, it maintains that any 

definition of "human rights" should consider a government's 

efforts to provide for such basic needs of its citizens as food, 

health care, and education. In this respect, the regime deems it 

has fared well. Notwithstanding this view of its own performance, Cuban authorities routinely interfere with the citizens' 

exercise of political and civil rights to the extent that Canada 

and member states of the EU have sought to use their diplomatic and economic ties, most often in vain, to sway the regime 

toward improving its human rights record. 

The nature of Cuba's political system, which follows a totalitarian model according to which the PCC remains the sole 

legal political party, appears at the core of the issue. Unlike the 

situation in many countries identified as having poor human 

rights records, the incidence of politically related "disappearances" of individuals has not been reported as problematic in 

Cuba. However, since almost the beginning of the Revolution, 

the government has not tolerated active opposition, albeit nonviolent, by any who challenge its leadership and political program. In recognizing such activity as counterrevolutionary, the 

leadership has developed a sophisticated system to deal with 

such opposition, often using the Ministry of Interior for support. As a result, those recognized as challenging the regime 

have for decades been subject to harassment, loss of employment, or even imprisonment, and many have sought exile in 

the United States or other countries, rather than continue to 

face oppressive political conditions (see Human Rights and 

Opposition Groups, ch. 4). 

According to the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and 

National Reconcilation (Comite Cubano Pro Derechos 

Humanos y Reconciliaci6n Nacional-CCDRN), Cuban jails 

held 344 political prisoners inJuly 1999. This Cuba-based organization-headed by Elizardo Sanchez, himself a former politi353 
Cuba: A Country Study 

cal prisoner-is generally recognized by those abroad as being 

a reliable source of information about both the number of 

political prisoners and internal political conditions. Because 

the government refuses to release statistics relating to how 

many Cubans are imprisoned for political crimes, the CCDRN's 

estimates are based largely on information confirmed through 

interviews with the detainees' families. Reports by some human 

rights advocates in Cuba suggest that many of these detainees 

are young men who have been imprisoned for their refusal to 

carry out their obligatory military service. According to the 

CCDRN, the number of individuals arrested and imprisoned 

for political offenses began to increase after 1997. This trend 

continued through the balance of the decade, in contrast to 

the decline in arrests and detentions that occurred for several 

years in a row during the early years of the economic crisis. 

The watershed event that marked this minor shift in the 

regime's tolerance of political activism and dissent was the 

detention of four prominent citizens, leaders of what was 

known as the Internal Dissidents' Working Group (Grupo de 

Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna), in what became one of the 

most noted human rights-related cases of the 1990s. These 

individuals were arrested in mid:July 1997, only weeks after 

signing and circulating a document entitled "The Homeland Is 

for All" ("La Patria es de todos") just prior to the convening of 

the PCC's Fifth Congress in October 1997. This document 

offered an analysis of the Cuban economic crisis that discouraged foreign investment, discussed the problem of human 

rights, and proposed reforms to the constitution that would 

end the PCC's monopoly on power. They were accused of inciting sedition and "other acts against the security of the state." 

Despite the international concern provoked by the detention 

of these four respected professionals and the request for their 

release by many foreign dignitaries, including Pope John Paul 

II, the regime ignored the pleas and held the four without trial 

for nearly two years. They were not formally charged with any 

crimes until September 1998, after they had spent more than a 

year in prison. In March 1999, they were finally tried behind 

closed doors, convicted, and given prison sentences ranging 

from three-and-one-half to five years. However, only one 

remained in prison as of early 200l. 

Individuals who have been considered by human rights 

groups to be political prisoners have occasionally been released 

in response to requests by foreign officials. The Cuban govern354 
National Security 

ment has done this as a means to generate goodwill and, in 

demonstrating its presumed responsiveness to foreign concerns, has used the occasional releases as a tactic to gain political advantages in its foreign relations. The largest group 

released during the 1990s consisted of approximately 300 

detainees, about half of whom were considered to be political 

prisoners, who were freed in response to the clemency appeal 

made by Pope John Paul II during hisJanuary 1998 visit to the 

island. According to human rights monitors, many of those 

released in response to the papal request were at or nearing 

the end of their sentences. Shortly thereafter, in late November 

1998, in response to a request made to Fidel Castro by the 

Spanish foreign minister, who had traveled to the island in 

preparation for King Juan Carlos' upcoming trip, two more 

prisoners were released. The men, one of whom had already 

served nearly half of his fourteen-year term, had been convicted of disseminating "enemy propaganda." According to 

Cuban officials, they were pardoned for "humanitarian reasons," and released to foreign exile in Spain. Frequently, political prisoners who are released from detention before 

completion of their sentences are required to accept exile 

abroad as a condition for their release. 

These recent instances of the detention of dissidents and 

occasional prisoner releases in response to outsiders' requests 

also reflect the regime'S methods during the decades preceding the 1990s. In 1979, for example, 3,600 political prisoners 

were released from detention as a result of negotiations 

between the Cuban and United States governments. Many of 

those released in 1979 remained on the island for a number of 

years because of migration-related problems that arose after 

the 1980 Mariel exodus. In mid-1984, twenty-seven political 

detainees, along with twenty-two United States citizens who 

were serving prison sentences in Cuba, were released and 

granted entry to this country following the intervention of the 

Reverend Jesse Jackson. In late 1984, under an immigration 

accord reached between Cuba and the United States, the 

United States agreed to accept during the following year up to 

20,000 Cuban emigres, a figure that included former political 

detainees still residing on the island. 

In dealing with its imprisoned dissidents, the Cuban government routinely seeks to obtain the prisoners' participation in 

reeducation and rehabilitation efforts as part of the terms of 

their confinement. Those convicted of politically related 

355 
Cuba: A Country Study 

offenses are required to perform wage labor and participate in 

other prison-sponsored activities. Frequently, however, political 

prisoners are known to refuse to join in, an act of disobedience 

that may be interpreted as a sign of continuing defiance. These 

prisoners, who usually also refuse to wear prison uniforms (as 

they maintain they are not common criminals), are known as 

plantados (literally, the planted ones). Human rights monitors 

report that plantados are often accorded the harshest treatment 

by prison officials. This treatment may include the denial of 

contact with visitors or fellow prisoners and of basic privileges 

and needs, such as medical treatment, or the restriction of 

already meager food rations. Further, depending on the situation, political prisoners are reported to often be intentionally 

placed in cells with prisoners convicted of violent crimes or 

held for long periods in solitary confinement, or sealed cells 

(celdas tapiadas). A 1985 report issued by the American Association for the Advancement of Science noted that such tactics are 

generally recognized to be methods of physical and psychological torture. In May 1995, Cuba ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but by the end of the 

decade it had not yet established criminal penalties for acts of 

torture. 

Penal System 

The revisions in the Penal Code carried out during the 

1990s suggested the regime's intent to toughen its stance on 

crime and tighten political control by recognizing as criminal 

some offenses that could be deemed to be basically political in 

nature. These revisions stood in contrast to the trend evident 

during the preceding decade, when changes in the code carried out between roughly 1979 and 1988 deleted some acts previously considered criminal and reduced the length of 

sentence for a number of common crimes. The revisions of the 

1990s appeared to be prompted by a variety of new pressures 

generated in relation to the economic crisis, including those 

associated with the dollarization of the economy, the legalization of foreign investment, and the growth of tourism. They 

may also be seen as the regime's response to security-related 

concerns spurred by the efforts of dissidents and the nascent 

independent press to expand and deepen their contacts with 

foreign sympathizers, especially those in the United States. 

356 
National Security 

As a result, during the latter half of the 1990s, a number of 

existing code provisions were being enforced more vigorously 

while new provisions were established in what the regime recognized an the ongoing effort to "adequately respond to the 

present situation." Specifically, in early 1999, three new crimes 

were recognized and incorporated in the code. They were the 

crimes of money laundering (lavado de dinero) , of trafficking in 

humans (trafteo de personas), and of the sale and trafficking of 

minors (venta y trafteo de men ores) . Crimes in Cuba are broadly 

categorized as either felonies or misdemeanors, for which anyone aged sixteen or above may be convicted. Felony crimes 

may carry either a potential sentence of greater than one year's 

imprisonment or a fine above a threshold of 300 euotas, a variable unit that is loosely linked with the Cuban peso. Misdemeanor crimes carry either a potential sentence of less than 

one year or a fine under or at the 300-cuota threshold. Crimes 

categorized as felony offenses consist of murder, rape, and robbery. Other crimes, including assault, death or injury by vehicle, burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, arson, and drug trafficking, 

may variously be classified as felonies or misdemeanors 

depending on the severity of the offense. 

According to the Penal Code, acts that are recognized to be 

offenses against socialist organization are also subject to criminal prosecution. These crimes have become the focus of 

heightened state scrutiny during the 1990s, especially in light 

of the exigencies related to the economic crisis. They include 

the misuse of employment in a state enterprise for illegal personal gain (malversaci6n) , obtaining money or property illegally 

channeled from a state economic venture (receptaci6n), trading 

in foreign currency (traftco de divisas) , slaughter and distribution oflivestock outside the socialist distribution system (sacrificio ilegal) , and attempting to leave the country without 

complying with formal emigration requirements (salida ilegal). 

Of the existing code provisions that were more vigorously 

enforced during the late 1990s, many were targeted against 

individuals who were deemed hostile to the regime. Among 

these offenses are included contempt for authority (desacato) , 

dangerousness (peligrosidad) , defamation, resisting authority, 

association to commit criminal acts (asociaci6n para delinquir) , 

and a vaguely defined, catch-all category of other acts against 

state security (otros actos contra la seguridad del estado). 

Under some of these provisions, it was recognized that the 

commission of what might normally be considered a criminal 

357 
Cuba: A Country Study 

act was not necessarily a prerequisite for arrest. The offense of 

dangerousness, for example, is recognized under the code as 

the "special inclination of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist 

norms." Thus, as defined, the code allows for arrests to be 

made on a preventive basis. According to critics of the current 

human rights situation on the island, such arrests-which may 

call for up to several years' imprisonment if an individual is 

convicted-have reportedly resulted in the detention of thousands of Cubans. Lastly, the new Law for the Protection of the 

National Independence and Economy of Cuba, enacted in February 1999 and sometimes referred to simply as Law 88, 

appeared specifically directed against dissidents and independentjournalists. Law 88 identifies a broad range of activities as 

undermining state security, with sanctions of up to twenty years' 

imprisonment established for contacts or collaboration with 

the United States or other foreign media aimed at destabilizing 

the country or destroying the socialist state. 

According to Cuba's Law of Penal Procedures, once an 

arrest is made police are required to file formal charges within 

the next ninety-six hours and to provide those detained with 

access to a lawyer within seven days. Between the arrest and the 

filing of formal charges, in what is known as the preparatory 

phase (jase preparatoria) , the police, possibly in conjunction 

with the government prosecutor (fiscal), gather the witnesses 

and evidence considered necessary to demonstrate that a 

crime has been committed. Police and other security officers 

are permitted to exercise their discretion in stopping, detaining, and interrogating probable offenders, who during such a 

period are often not provided access to counsel. The individuals detained may then be released without charges. According 

to the Law of Penal Procedures, those suspected of having committed an offense may be held no more than twenty-four hours 

before their case must be submitted to an investigator. Human 

rights monitors report that such methods are frequently used 

to intimidate political dissidents. In addition, as occurred with 

the members of the aforementioned Working Group, individuals may sometimes be held for long periods without formal 

charges being filed. 

According to the Cuban constitution, the state reserves the 

right to deny the civil rights of anyone who actively opposes the 

"decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." The state 

invokes this right to justify its detention of some individuals, 

358 
National Security 

even though doing so stands in violation of the penal procedures law. Once a determination is made that a crime has been 

committed, the prosecutor issues a bill of indictment (conclusiones provisionales) that details the charges and circumstances 

surrounding the crime. The case is then sent to trial, with a 

copy of the criminal indictment being provided to the defense 

attorney, if one has been identified. Lawyer collectives (bufetes 

colectivos), whose members charge fees set by the state, exist to 

provide the accused with legal counsel. All criminal cases are 

required to be adjudicated; no provisions exist for plea bargaining. Pretrial incarceration (prisi6n provisional) is permitted 

for those charged with serious felony offenses, those charged 

with multiple crimes, or those who are deemed likely to flee 

prosecution. The determination regarding the need for such 

incarceration in relation to any specific case is made by the 

court offirst instance. 

Penal Code 

The Penal Code delineates the range of sentences that 

might be handed down. They include probation, public chastisement (amonestacion), fines, correctional labor without confinement, correctional labor with confinement to the worksite, 

incarceration, and execution. A conviction for first-degree 

murder, for example, might warrant a sentence in the range of 

fifteen to twenty years' imprisonment. The maximum prison 

term is twenty to thirty years. During the crackdown on crime 

initiated at the end of the 1990s, Cuban leader Fidel Castro 

called for harsher sentences for a number of other crimes, 

including drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and robbery; life 

sentences were also to be recommended for repeat offenders. 

Unlike many countries in the region, Cuba does carry out 

capital punishment, as it has since the beginning of the Revolution. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, death sentences were 

not handed down as frequently as during the first twenty years 

of the Revolution. However, by the end of the 1990s, this trend 

appeared to be reversing. Under the Penal Code, the death 

penalty has traditionally been reserved for particularly heinous 

offenses, or exceptional cases (casos excepcionales), whether represented by crimes against individuals or against state security. 

In 1999 the Penal Code recognized 112 different types of 

offenses for which capital punishment could potentially be 

applied, two-thirds of which involved crimes against state security. As a result of revisions in the Penal Code that became 

359 
Cuba: A Country Study 

effective in March 1999, the death penalty was established as a 

possible punishment for convictions of drug-trafficking, corruption of minors, and armed robbery. The mode of execution 

in Cuba is by firing squad. Persons either under twenty years of 

age or pregnant at the time of the crime or at sentencing cannot be condemned to death. Cuban law stipulates that all death 

sentences are automatically appealed to the Supreme Court 

and subject to review by the Council of State, which has the 

authority to commute the sentences to life imprisonment. 

Although on occasion executions have been carried out within 

weeks after ajudgment is rendered, the appeal and review process can sometimes continue for months. 

It is believed that eleven individuals were executed in Cuba 

between 1989 and the end of 1997. Included in this group were 

the four MINFAR and Ministry of Interior officers who were 

put to death in 1989. A trend toward more frequent application of the death penalty was apparent during the final years of 

the 1990s. Based on data released by Amnesty International, 

although no executions were carried out during 1997, "at least" 

five individuals were executed during 1998. Then, during 1999 

alone, "at least" thirteen Cubans were executed, and nine others were under sentence. Among the individuals sentenced to 

death in 1999 were two Cubans convicted for the murder of 

four foreign tourists. In addition, two Salvadoran nationals, 

tried in entirely separate cases, were convicted of terrorism and 

sentenced to death for a string of hotel bombings carried out 

in 1997, in one of which a foreign tourist was killed. According 

to the prosecutors, both Salvadorans were acting on behalf of 

anti-Castro exiles in an effort to sabotage Cuba's tourism industry. As of the close of 1999, the sentences had not been carried 

out. 

Penal Institutions 

Cuba's prison system falls under the authority of the Ministry 

of Interior's Directorate of Penitentiary Establishments. In 

1998 there were 294 prisons and correctional work camps 

located throughout the island. These prisons included forty 

maximum security facilities, thirty minimum security prisons, 

and more than 200 work camps or farms (granjas) where those 

convicted of less serious offenses might complete their sentences. Of the prisons, nineteen were reported to be "closed," 

meaning that the detainees are not allowed contact with outsiders. In addition to these facilities, police stations, offices of the 

360 
National Security 

Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security, and even 

the headquarters of the Ministry ofInterior at Villa Marista are 

often used as prisons. The Ministry of Interior supervises the 

administration of these various places of confinement, and provides guards, work camp and farm overseers, and other stafffor 

the facilities. 

Cuba in the late 1990s was believed to have one of the highest per capita confinement ratios in all of Latin America and 

the Caribbean. In 1996 one estimate placed the island's prison 

population at between 100,000 and 200,000 prisoners of all categories. This number stood in marked contrast to a 1990 estimate that indicated a prison population of only 19,000. 

Although the Cuban government reportedly maintains a computerized database to keep track of its prison population, it 

does not release or allow any public access to statistics regarding it. In addition to those serving time for their convictions, 

large numbers of pretrial detainees are also held in the prisons, 

many of whom, according to human rights critics, may be confined six to nine months or longer before being brought to 

trial. Darker-skinned Cubans are reportedly overrepresented in 

Cuba's prisons. Separate penal establishments are maintained 

for women; delinquent youth under sixteen years of age might 

be sent to school-like facilities. Conjugal visits with spouses are 

formally permitted once every two months, yet might occur 

more or less frequently, based on a prisoner's conduct. 

In the late 1990s, the conditions for prisoners at many of the 

island's facilities were generally considered to be substandard, 

unhealthy, and not in compliance with the United Nations' 

Standard Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Problems frequently noted by those knowledgeable of prison conditions included inadequate food, overcrowding, inadequate or 

denied medical attention, and forced participation in "re-education" programs for all detainees. In tacit recognition of these 

oft-cited problems, the Cuban government made some efforts 

during the late 1990s to improve the state of confinement. In 

May 1997, the Ministry ofInterior promulgated several new 

regulations designed to achieve this end. Further revisions in 

the Penal Code in early 1999 explicitly prohibited the use of 

corporal punishment by guards and other security officials 

against detainees. However, the code set no penalties for violating that provision. 

361 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Outlook 

The Cuban military in 2001 is a very different institution 

from what it was when the regime first came to power. At least 

three distinct generations have been through the institution 

since the Revolution, from the veterans of the guerrilla war to 

the young professional technicians of the present generation. 

Recognizing the different formative experiences of these individuals is as important as considering how their varied backgrounds may relate to the effectiveness of political control. The 

officers who are now prepared to move into positions of leadership in the institution have spent their careers as military professionals. Their perspective on the future of the Cuban 

military institution is likely to be quite different from that of 

the guerrilla leaders who led the Revolution in the late 1950s. 

And the mechanisms necessary to ensure their continuing subordination to political authority may be quite different as well. 

* * * 

The study of the Cuban military and national security is seriously hampered by the lack of publicly available information. 

The Cuban government rarely makes public any details regarding the status of its security forces and related security concerns; rather, it tends to view efforts to obtain and relate such 

information, whether by private Cuban or foreign citizens, as 

inimical to the interests of the Revolution. Consequently, of the 

information garnered, most is gathered by United States or foreign government authorities and obtained in such a manner 

that leads it to be classified. Despite these difficulties, the careful monitoring of the press and other open-source documents 

and reports can often yield fragmentary details that help fill 

out the picture. Defectors are also an often valuable source, 

particularly when the details they provide help to corroborate 

other information. 

The PCC's official daily newspaper, Granma, is the single best 

source to consult. Within the United States, the Miami Herald 

and its Spanish-language counterpart, El Nuevo Herald, have the 

most regular coverage of Cuban affairs, and offer the best 

chance for finding information related to Cuban military and 

security affairs. Digital versions of these newspapers can be 

found on the Internet (Miami Herald at http://www.herald.com; El Nuevo Herald at http://www.elherald.com) . The 

362 
National Security 

Cuban Armed Forces Review (http://www.cubapolidata.com/ 

cafr/ cafr.html) is a private website containing military-related 

details and photographs compiled from other public sources. 

Lastly, an excellent resource for general information is the 

Cuba Today e-mail list operated by political scientist Nelson 

Valdes at the University of New Mexico. This list tracks daily 

media coverage related to Cuba and often includes reporting 

on security-related concerns. 

Studies by academics also have contributed to an improved 

understanding of the FAR and its role in national life. Among 

the important authors of such studies are Domingo Amuchastegui, Jorge I. Dominguez, Edward Gonzalez, and Jaime 

Suchlicki. Rafael Fermoselle's comprehensive study, The Evolution of the Cuban Military, and the biographies of the officers 

provided in his Cuban Leadership after Castro should also be 

noted. The text, Cuban Communism, now in its ninth edition 

and whose primary editor throughout the years has been Irving Louis Horowitz, has regularly included a section on the military composed of previously published articles. Lastly, 

mention must be made of the important 1996 volume that profiles the prominent members of the FAR. Cuban journalist Luis 

Baez's Secretos de generales: Desclasificado, a collection of his interviews with the officers, provides not only insights into the lives 

and career paths of the military's top officials but also the organization of the institution. 

Unfortunately, finding information on the forces under the 

Ministry of Interior is even more difficult than locating information on the FAR. The little to be found is often based on 

defectors' recollections that date to the period preceding the 

economic crisis and the ministry'S 1989 shake-up. Nevertheless, 

two good starting points to be noted are Jose Luis LlovioMenendez's Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba 

and Juan Antonio Rodriguez-Menier's Inside the Cuban Interior 

Ministry. 

For information related to human rights, penal procedures, 

and prison conditions, the best sources are the annual human 

rights reports published by the United States Department of 

State and those of the widely recognized nongovernmental 

organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights 

Watch. On the Internet, the daily reports by independent 

Cuban journalists available on the Website maintained by 

CubaNet (http://www.cubanet.org) offer unusual perspectives 

363 
Cuba: A Country Study 

on the difficulties that life on the island may pose for those 

who fail to go along with the regime. 

364 
1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Demographic Trends in Cuba, Selected Ye

3 Trends in Urban and Rural Population Cha

Years, 1970-95 

4 Enumerated Population Classified by Race, 

1899-1981 

5 Gross Domestic Product (GOP) by Econom

1989-98 

6 Cuban Foreign Merchandise Trade~ 1989-9

7 Selected Categories of the State Budget, 19

8 Selected Indicators of Production: Agricult

1993-97 

9 Selected Indicators of Production: Manufac

1993-98 

10 Tourism Industry Indicators, 1990-97 

11 Employed and Unemployed Economically A

tion, 1989-96 

12 State Civilian Employment. by Economic Se

13 Foreign Debt in Convertible Currency, 199

14 Balance of Payments, 1993-98 

15 ForeignJointVentures in Cuba, by Country 

1990-95 

16 For-eignJoint Ventures in Cuba, by Econom

1990-95 

17 Voters in National Assem.bly Elections. 1993 

18 Percentage ofNull and Blank Votes Cast in E

1997, and 2000 

19 Major Army Equipment~ 1999 

20 M~or Air Force Equipment, 1999 

21 Major Naval Equipment, 1999 

Appendix 

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors1 

When you know Multiply by To find 

Millimeters .............................. . 0.04 inches 

Centimeters ............................. . 0.39 inches 

Meters...................... , ........... . 3.3 feet 

Kilometers .............................. . 0.62 miles 

Hectares (l0,000 m?)2 .................... . 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers ........................ . 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters ............................ . 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters .................................. . 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms ............................... . 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons3 ............................. . 0.98 long tons 

l.l short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) ............... . l.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

And add 32 

I Cuba uses the metric system, but old Spanish units are also used. 

2 For area measurement, one Cuban caballeria equals 13.4 hectares or 33.16 acres. 

3 Sugar is often measured in Spanish tons of2,271 pounds, and there is a Cuban quintal of 101.4 pounds made up of 

four a1Tobas. 

367 
(,)Q 

00 

Ol 

Table 2. Demographic Trends in Cuba, Selected Years

Year Population Population D

(in squa

Size Growth Rate Median 

kilomete

(in thousands) (in percentages) Age 

3 

1950 .................. 1 ,850 n.a. 23.3 53 

1955 .................. 6,417 1.85 23.2 58 

1960 .................. 6,985 1.70 23.4 63 

1965 .................. 7,754 2.09 22.7 70 

1970 .................. 8,520 1.88 22.3 77 

1975 .................. 9,306 1.77 22.7 84 

1980 .................. 9,710 .85 24.2 88 

1985 .................. 10,615 .82 25.7 91 

1990 .................. 10,828 .99 27.8 96 

1995 .................. 10,964 .62 30.2 99 

20004 ................. 11,177 .38 33.0 101 

1 Rates refer to the quinquennium preceding the reference period. 


2 Both sexes combined. 


3 n.a.-not available. 


4 Projection. 


Source: Based on information from United Nations, World Papulation Prospects: The 1998 Revision, Ne
Appendix 

Table 3. Trends in Urban and Rural Population Change, Selected 

Years, 1970-95 

Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 

Population size (in thousands) 

TOTAL .......... 8,520 9,306 9,710 10,102 10,598 1l,041 

Urban ........... 5,122 5,962 6,605 7,237 7,927 8,560 

Rural............ 3,398 3,343 3,105 2,865 2,671 2,481 

Percent urban .... 60 64 68 72 75 78 

Quinquennial growth rates (in percent)! 

TOTAL.......... n.a.2 1.8 .85 .79 .96 .82 

Urban ........... n.a. 3.03 2.05 1.83 1.82 1.54 

Rural. ........... n.a. -.32 -1.48 -1.61 -1.40 -1.48 

1 Rates refer to the quinquennium preceding the reference period. 

2 n.a.-DO[ available. 

Source: Based on information from Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia, "America 

Latina: Proyecciones de poblaci6n urbana-rural," Boletin Demogrrifico [Santiago, Chile], 28,1995,31,35. 

Table 4. Enumerated Population Classified by Race, Selected Years, 


1899-1981 


(in percentages) 


Census Year White Black Mulatto or Mestizo Asian 

1899 ................... 66.9 14.9 17.2 1.0 

1907 ................... 69.7 13.4 16.3 0.6 

1919 ................... 72.3 11.2 16.0 0.5 

1931 ................... 72.1 11.0 16.2 0.7 

1943 ................... 74.3 9.7 15.6 0.4 

1953 ................... 72.8 12.4 14.5 0.3 

1981 ................... 66.0 12.0 21.9 0.1 

Source: Based on information from Cuban censuses provided by Sergio Diaz-Briquets. 

369 
CJO 

....:r 

0 

Table 5. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Economic Activitiy, 1989-98 (in m

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19

Gross domestic product. .............. 19,585.8 19,008.3 16,975.8 15,009.9 12,776.7 12,86

Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and 

fishing .......................... 1,924.5 1,756.3 1,334.9 1,197.1 924.9 87

Mining and quarrying ................ 123.0 91.6 81.6 105.7 96.4 9

Manufacturing industries ............. 4,886.8 4,640.2 4,199.7 3,506.5 3,103.6 3,34

Electricity, gas, and water. ............. 452.0 454.6 426.5 378.2 335.2 35

Construction ....................... 1,349.7 1,508.1 1,085.2 603.7 385.7 38

Trade, restaurants, and hotels.......... 5150.6 4,936.3 4,396.4 4,050.2 2,936.4 2,93

Transport, warehousing, and 

communications . ................. 1,352.6 1,202.3 1,058.9 9ll.6 733.3 70

Finance, real estate, and business 

services . ......................... 584.9 603.2 639.2 543.9 513.4 49

Community, social, and personal 

services.. ........................ 3,761.7 3,815.7 3,753.4 3,713.0 3,747.8 3,68

Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Economic RepMt, 1994, Havana, August 19

Anuario estadistico, 1997, Havana, 1999,82; and Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Cuba en cifras
Appendix 

Table 6. Cuban Foreign Merchandise Trade, 1989-98 

(in millions of pesos) 

Year Exports Imports Turnover Balance 

1989 ..................... 5,399.9 8,139.8 13,539.7 -2,739.9 

1990 ..................... 5,414.9 7,416.5 12,831.4 -2,001.6 

1991 ..................... 2,979.5 4,233.8 7,213.3 -1,254.3 

1992 ..................... 1,779.4 2,314.9 4,094.3 -535.5 

1993 ..................... 1,156.7 2,008.2 3,164.9 -851.5 

1994 ..................... 1,330.8 2,016.8 3,347.6 -686.0 

1995 ..................... 1,491.6 2,882.5 4,374.1 -1,390.9 

1996 ..................... 1,865.5 3,569.0 5,434.5 -1,703.5 

1997 ..................... 1,819.1 3,996.0 5,815.1 -2,176.9 

1998 ..................... 1,443.7 4,181.2 5,624.9 -2,737.5 

Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Economic Report, 1994, 

Havana, August 1995, 11; Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 

1997, Havana, 1999, 119; and Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Cuba en cifras, 

1998, Havana, 1999, 38. 

371 
(.>0 

-:r 

N) 

Table 7. Selected Categories of the State Budget, 1989-98 (i

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1

Total revenues . .................... 12,501 12,255 10,949 9,263 9,516 12

Circulation tax .................. 5,138 5,017 3,979 3,968 3,310 5

Profits ......................... 1,888 1,125 1,066 1,193 1,400 1

Contribution by state enterprises ... 850 1,465 2,026 1,309 1,516 1

Total expenditures ................. 13,904 14,213 14,714 14,132 14,567 14

Education ...................... 1,651 1,620 1,504 1,427 1,385 1

Health ......................... 905 937 925 938 1,077 1

Defense and internal order ........ 1,259 1,149 882 736 713 

Social securi ty ................... 1,039 1,164 1,226 1,348 1,452 1

Administration .................. 490 453 400 362 413 

Housing and community services ... 406 383 281 248 260 

Productive sphere " ............. 388 351 209 204 166 

Culture and arts ................. 191 201 203 178 173 

Science and technology........... 124 124 126 122 125 

Sports ......................... 116 117 125 100 104 

Welfare ........................ 101 96 88 98 94 

Subsidies to loss-making enterprises ....................... 2,654 2,975 3,882 4,889 5,434 3
Table 7. (Continued) Selected Categories ojtke State Budget, 1989-9

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199

Price subsidies ................... 673 737 554 921 735 5

Investment expenses.............. 3,060 2,886 3,625 2,356 2,038 2,6

Surplus or Deficit. .................. -1,404 -1,958 -3,765 -4,869 -5,051 -1,6

1 n.a.-not available. 

Source: Based on information from Comisi6n Econ6mica para America Latina y eJ Caribe (CEPAL), L

en los noventa, Mexico, 1997, Table A7; Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 

Estadisticas, Cuba en cifras, 1998, Havana, 1999, 35. 

(.):) 

(.):) 

--:r 
(jO 

'f 

>l>­ 

Table 8. Selected Indicators of Production: Agriculture, 1989, 1993-97 

thousands of tons, unless otherwise indic

Product 1989 1993 1994 1995 

Tubers ............................... 681.2 568.7 484.5 624.2 

Potatoes ........................... 281.7 235.2 188.3 281.6 

Sweet potatoes ...................... 194.8 130.4 133.4 151.6 

Vegetables ............................ 610.2 392.9 322.2 402.3 

Tomatoes .......................... 260.0 127.8 95.9 140.4 

Grains................................ 584.0 226.2 299.7 303.8 

Rice ............................... 536.4 176.8 226.1 222.9 

Corn .............................. 47.1 49.5 73.6 81.0 

Beans ................................ 14.1 8.8 10.8 11.5 

Plantains ............................. 291.4 400.0 360.7 400.0 

Citrus frui ts ........................... 825.7 644.5 505.0 536.5 

Other fruits ........................... 218.9 68.3 89.1 112.3 

Tobacco .............................. 41.6 19.9 17.1 25.0 

Eggs! ................................ 2,522.6 1,362.2 1,376.1 1,224.0 

Milk2 ................................ 924.1 316.7 167.6 117.7 

1 In millions of units. 


2 In millions of tons. Slate sector only. 


Source: Based on information from Consultores Asociadas, S.A., Cuba: Inversiones y negocios, 1995-1

America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), La economia cubana: Reformas estructurales y desempeiio e

Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 1997, Havana, 1999, 189-98. 
Table 9. Selected Indicators ofProduction: Manufacturing, 1

(in thousands of tons, unless otherwise indi

Product 1989 1993 1994 1995 1996 

Electricity1 .................................. 15.2 11.0 12.0 12.5 13

Steel ........... , ......................... , . 314 98 131 201 229 

Nickel plus cobalt (mineral content) ............. 46.6 30.2 26.9 42.7 53

Automotive batteries2 ......................... 360 153 164 179 149 

Automotive tires . ............................. 315 63 112 194 212 

Oxygen gas3 ................................. 21 16 20 21 21 

Complete fertilizers ........................... 899 95 136 218 242 

Cement4 .................................... 3.8 1.0 l.l 1.4 1

Crushed stone3 ............................... 12.5 1.9 2.3 2.4 2

Concrete blocks5 ............................. 103 27 32 48 49 

Cotton yarn ................................. 33 5 6 5 7 

Textiles6 ..................... , ........ , ..... 220 51 56 45 48 

Rawsugar4 .................................. 8.1 4.1 3.9 3.3 4

Rice ........................................ 249 85 75 79 141 

Wheatflour ................................. 398 215 265 268 245 

Milk ........................................ 762 328 295 269 273 

Pork........................................ 67 12 16 16 19 

Poultry ............................... , ... ,. 76 16 19 19 23 

Canned meats................................ 68 68 67 72 74 

Canned fruits and vegetables ................... 166 66 742 113 136 

(.Xl 

(,Jl 

-..J Pasta ....................................... 52 13 24 25 28 
(.)D 

--.J Table 9. (Continued) Selected Indicators ofProduction.- Manufacturi

O"l (in thousands of tons, unless otherwise indi

Product 1989 1993 1994 1995 1996 

Lard7 ...................................... . 2,077 31 46 19 23 

Vegetable oil7 ............................... . 1,923 463 661 555 577 

Powdered milk .............................. . 2.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.

Bread...................................... . 497 327 353 354 362 

Fish catch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 67 57 74 95 

Rum9 ...................................... 514 388 441 528 476 

Beer9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,333 1,304 1,201 1,330 1,504 

Soft drinks9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,391 1,511 1,721 1,941 1,938 

Cigars5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 208 186 192 194 

CigaretteslO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 12 14 13 11 

Mixed animal feed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,904 668 723 798 713 

'1989-97. 

1 In thousands of gigawatt hours. 

2 In thousands of units. 

3 In millions of cubic meters. 

4 In millions of tons. 

5 In millions of units. 

6 In millions of square meters. 

7In tons. 

8 n.a.-no[ available. 

9 In thousands of hectoliters. 

IO In billions of units. 

Source: Based on information from Consultores Asociados, S.A., Cuba: Inversiones y negocios, 1994-9

America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), La economia cubana: Reformas estructuraks y desempeiio en 

Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 1997, Havana, 1999; and Oficina Naciona
Table 10. Tourism Industry Indicators, 1990

1990 1991 1992 19

Number of visitors (thousands) ................................ 340 424 461 54

Length of average stay (days) .................................. 8.7 8.7 9.1 

Stock of hotel rooms (thousands) .............................. n.a.1 31.8 32.9 3

Stock of hotel rooms suitable for international 

tourism (thousands) ....................................... 12.9 16.6 18.7 2

Occupancy rate of hotel rooms (percent) ........................ n.a. 69.8 60.4 5

Occupancy rate of hotel rooms suitable for 

international tourism (percent) ............................. 39.7 43.0 42.0 4

Gross income (in millions of United States 

dollars) ......................................... , ........ 243.4 387.4 567.0 72

Average daily income per visitor (in United 

States dollars) ............................................ 82.5 105.3 135.6 13

I n.a.-not available. 

Source: Based on information from Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEP AL) , L

en los noventa, Mexico, 1997, Table A23; and Oficina NacionaI de Estadisticas, Anuario estadisti

(jQ 

~ 

~ 
(.)D 

00 

-J 

Table 11. Employed and Unemployed Economically Active Population, 198

1989 1990 1991 1992 

Economically active population .................. 4,728.2 4,741.6 4,736.8 4,635.3 

Employment. ................................. 4,355.8 4,393.5 4,374.3 4,523.3 

State sector ......................... 4,126.6 4,153.5 4,119.3 4,072.3 

Non-state .................................. 229.2 240.0 255.0 280.0 

Cooperatives and UBPCs2 .................. 64.6 60.0 60.0 60.0 

Private farmers ........................... 123.1 130.0 130.0 130.0 

Self-employed ............................ 25.2 30.0 40.0 60.0 

Salaried ................................. 16.3 20.0 25.0 30.0 

Unemployed population ........................ 372.4 348.1 362.5 283.0 

Dislocated from previous job .................. 299.9 276.2 291.1 212.1 

First-time job seekers ........................ 72.5 71.9 71.4 70.9 

1 Estimated. 

2 Basic Unit of Cooperative Production Unit (Unidad Basica de Producci6n Cooperativa-UBPC). 

Source: Based on information from Comisi6n Econ6mica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), L

en los noventa, Mexico, 1997, Table A28; and Oficina Nacional de Estadfsticas, Anuario estadistic
Table 12. State Civilian Employment, by Economic Sector, 1990-97 (in 

1990 1991 1992 19

State Civilian Employment .................................. 3,569.4 3,579.3 3,542.3 3,46

Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing ................... 785.3 831.0 838.1 84

Mining ................................................ 38.8 40.0 42.5 4

Manufacturing.......................................... 685.2 663.1 654.8 64

Electricity, gas, and water ................................. 40.5 40.1 42.7 4

Construction ........................................... 309.8 304.8 287.7 23

Commerce, restaurants, and hotels . ........................ 431.2 420.2 416.3 41

Transportation, warehousing, and communications ........... 232.6 229.4 215.0 19

Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services . ......... 65.2 65.5 56.5 5

Community, social, and personal services . ................... 920.8 985.2 988.7 99

Source: Based on information from Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 1997, Havana, 

(,)Q 

~ 
(jD 

00 	 

o Table 13. Foreign Debt in Convertible Currency, 1993-98 (in millions 

1993 1994 199

Total Debt. .................................................. 8,785 9,083 10,5

Official bilateral .............................................. 4,067 3,992 4,5

Intergovernmental loans .................................... 40 44 

Credits for development aid.................................. 151 164 1

Export credits with government guarantee...................... 3,855 3,784 4,3

Official multilateral ........................................... 438 503 6

Suppliers.................................................... 1,867 2,058 2,4

Financial institutions . ......................................... 2,406 2,501 2,9

Bank loans and deposits ....................................... 2,156 2,254 2,6

Medium- and long-term bilateral and consortium loans ........... 1,027 1,135 1,2

Short-term deposits......................................... 1,130 1,119 1,3

Credits for current imports ..................................... 249 248 3

Other credits ................................................ 27 29 

Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Economic Report 1994, Havana, Aug

econ6mico, 1995, Havana, May 1996, 24; and Banco Central de Cuba, InJorme econ6mico, 1998, A
Table 14. Balance ofPayments, 1993-98 (in million

1993 1994 1995 

Current Account ................................ -371.6 -260.2 -517.7 

Goods and Services............................ -370.7 -307.6 -639.1 

Goods .................................... -847.4 -971.4 -1,483.3 

Exports................................. 1,136.6 1,381.4 1,507.3 

Imports ........... , ..... , .............. 1,984.0 2,352.8 2,991.6 

Services ................................... 476.7 663.8 845.2 

Income...................................... -263.8 -422.8 -524.8 

Current Transfers ............................. 262.9 470.2 646.2 

Capital Account ................................. 356.1 262.4 596.2 

Long-term Capital. ............................ 118.4 817.4 24.2 

Direct Investment. .......................... 54.0 563.4 4.7 

Other .................................... 64.4 254.0 19.5 

Other Capital ................................ 237.7 -555.0 572.0 

Change in Reserves .............................. 15.5 -2.2 -78.5 

Note: By convention, a negative change in international reserves is a gain in such reserves. 

Source: Based on information from Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico de Cuba, 19

Estadisticas, Cuba en cifras, 1998, Havana, 1999, 36. 

(JQ 

00 

...... 
()O 

00 

N) 

Table 15. Foreignjoint ventures in Cuba, by Country of Origin, 1988, 1990-9

1988 1990 1991 1

Spain ..................................................... . 3 

Mexico ................................................... . 2 

Canada ................................................... . 

Italy ...................................................... . 

France .................................................... . 

Netherlands ............................................... . 

Tax havens ................................................ . 3 

Other Latin American countries............................... . 2 

Other countries ............................................ . 

TOTAL ................................................... . 2 11 

Source: Based on information from Consultores Asociados, S.A., Cuba: Inversiones y negocios, 1995-1996
Table 16. ForeignJoint Ventures in Cuba, llyEconomic Sector, 1988, 1990-9

1988 1990 1991 1992 

Agriculture .......................................... 

Mining ............................................. 

Oil. ................................................ 11 

Industry ............................................ 5 9 

Tourism............................................. 4 

Transportation ....................................... 

Construction and construction materials ................. 2 3 

Communications . .................................... 1 

Other .............................................. 4 

TOTAL ............................................. 2 11 33 

Source: Based on information from Consultores Asociados, S.A., Cuba: Inversiones y negocios, 1995-199

(.Xl 

00 

(.Xl 
(.A 

00 

~ 

Table 17. Voters in National Assembly Elections, 

Number ofVoters Voting for Full Official V

Province (from west to east) 

Casting Ballots Slate (percentage) 

Pinar del Rio ................................ . 510,551.0 89.5 

Ciudad de La Habana ........................ . 1,607,173.0 77.3 

La Habana ................................. . 503,211.0 82.2 

Matanzas ................................... . 476,600.0 88.0 

Cienfuegos ................................. . 281,053.0 90.8 

Villa Clara .................................. . 613,616.0 88.5 

Sancti Spiritus ............................... . 327,692.0 91.8 

Ciego de Avila............................... . 276,274.0 91.1 

Camagiiey ...........................-....... . 537,557.0 90.4 

Las Tunas ................... '" ............ . 356,172.0 96.5 

Holguin.................................... . 718,815.0 92.0 

Granma.................................... . 560,646.0 97.0 

Santiago de Cuba ............................ . 692,228.0 94.2 

Guantanamo................................ . 333,471.0 95.7 

Isla de laJuventud ........................... . 57,056.0 88.3 

TOTAL .................................... . 7,852,315.0 88.4 

(average) 

Source: Based on information compiled byJorge 1. Dominguez from Granma [Havana], March 11, 199
Appendix 

Table 18. Percentage ofNull and Blank Votes Cast in Elections, 1993, 

1997, and 2000 

1993 National 1997 Municipal 2000 Municipal Provinces Elections Elections Elections 

Pinar del Rio .................. 6.6 8.3 6.7 


Ciudad de La Habana ........... 14.7 9.9 7.9 


La Habana .................... 12.6 11.2 8.8 


Matanzas...................... 7.0 8.5 6.6 


Cienfuegos .................... 5.0 7.9 6.4 


Villa Clara ..................... 6.9 8.0 7.1 


Sancti Spiritus ................. 4.0 6.3 4.9 


Ciego de Avila ................. 4.3 5.3 4.4 


Camagiiey..................... 5.0 6.2 4.8 


Las Tunas ..................... 1.9 4.4 4.0 


Holguin ...................... 4.5 6.2 5.3 


Granma ...................... 1.4 4.0 3.4 


Santiago de Cuba............... 2.7 4.4 3.5 


Guantinamo .................. 2.0 3.9 3.4 


Isla de laJuventud .............. 5.9 5.9 5.3 


Countrywide .................. 7.0 7.2 5.9 


Source: Based on information computed by Jorge I. Dominguez from Granma 

[Havana], March 11, 1993, and April 25, 2000. 

385 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Table 19. Major Army Equipment, 199~ 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Medium battle tanks 

T-34,T-54/-55,T-62 ............. . 

Light tanks 

PT-76 .......................... . 

Reconnaissance 

BRDM-1/-2 ..................... . 

Armored infantry fighting vehicle 

BMP-1 ......................... . 

Armored personnel carrier 

BTR-40/-50/-60/-152............ . 

Towed artillery ..................... . 


76mm ZIS-3 ..................... . 


122mm M-1938, D-30............. . 


130mmM-46 .................... . 


152mm M-1937, D-l. ............. . 


Self-propelled artillery ............... . 


122mm 2S1 ...................... . 


152mm2S3...................... . 


Multiple rocket launcher ............. . 


122mm BM-21 ................... . 


140mm BM-14 ................... . 


Mortars ........................... . 


82mm M-4I/-43 ................. . 


120mm M-38/-43 ................ . 


Static defense artillery ............... . 


122mmJS-2 heavy tank ............ . 


85mm T-34 ..................... . 


Antitank guided weapon ............. . 


AT-1 Snapper. ................... . 


AT-3 Sagger .... " ............... . 


Artillery guns....................... . 

85mmD-44 ..................... . 

100mm SU-lOO selfpropelled, T-12................ . 

Air defense guns .................... . 

23mm ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 

self-propelled.................. . 

30mm M-53 (twin)/BTR-60P 

self- propelled ................. . 

37mm M-1939 ................... . 

Soviet Union 

2 n.a.

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

1,500 (including 400 T-34, 

600 T-54/-55, 400 T-62) 

A relatively small number. 

250 

400 

700 

700 

40 

300 

1,000 

n.a. 

n.a. 

n.a. 

100 SU-100 


400 ZU-23, 36 ZSU-23-4 


100 

300 

386 
Appendix 

Table 19. (Continued) Major Army Equipment, 19991 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

57mm 5-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 selfpropelled .................... . 2005-60, 25 ZSU-57-2 

85mmKS--12 .................... . 100 

100mm KS--19 .................. . 75 

Surface-to-air missile ............... . n.a. n.a. 

SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-l3/-l4/-l6 ..... 

1 Most equipment in storage and not available on short notice. 

2 n.a.-not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1999-2000, London, 1999, 

228-29; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology 

[Bonn], 24, No.1, 2000, 51. 

387 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Table 20. Major AirForce Equipment, 19991 


Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Air Force 

Fighter ground attack (two squadrons) 

MiG-23BN ............................ . 

Fighters2 (four squadrons) 


MiG-21F .............................. . 


MiG-21bis ............................. . 


MiG-23MF............................. . 


MiG-29 ............................... . 


Attack helicopters 

Mi-8 and Mi-17 

Mi-24 ................................. . 

Mi-25 ................................. . 

Antisubmarine warfare 

Mi-14 helicopters ....................... . 


Transport (four squadrons) 

An-2 .................................. . 

An-24................................. . 

An-26 ................................. . 

An-30................................. . 

An-32 ................................. . 

Yak--40 ................................ . 

11-76 (Air Force aircraft in civilian 

markings) ........................... . 

Helicopters 

Mi-8/-17.............................. . 

Training 


L--39C Albatros ......................... . 


MiG-15 ............................... . 


MiG-21U .............................. . 


MiG-23U .............................. . 


MiG-29UB............................. . 


Z-326 ................................. . 


Missiles 


Antisubmarine missiles AS--7 .............. . 


Antiaircraft missiles AA-2, AA-7, AA-8, 


AA--I0, AA-ll. ....................... . 


Surface-to-air missiles Active SA-2, SA-3 


sites . ............................... . 


Civil Airline 


Aircraft used as troop transports 


11-62 ....................... . 


Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

Soviet Union 

10 


30 


50 


20 


6 


45 


12 


35 


5 


8 


15 


1 


2 


4 


2 


40 


25 


30 


8 


4 


2 


20 


3
 n.a.

n.a. 

13 


10 


388 
Appendix 

Table 20. (Continued) Major AirForce Equipment, 19991 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Tu-154 ..................... . Soviet Union 7 

Yak-42 ..................... . Soviet Union 12 

An-30 ...................... . Soviet Union 

I Most aircraft are in storage for lack of spare parts and as a cost-saving measure. 

2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that probably only about three MiG- 29, ten MiG-23, 

and five MiG-21 bis are in operation. 

S n.a.-not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1999--2000, London, 1999, 

229; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology 

[Bonn], 24, No.1, 2000, 51. 

389 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Table 21. Major Naval Equipment, 1991J1 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Navy 

Submarines 

FoxtTOtwith 533mm and 406mm torpedo 

tube (nonoperational) ................. . Soviet Union 

Frigates 

Koni-class with two antisubmarine warfare 

rocket launchers (nonoperational) ....... . Soviet Union 2 

Patrol and coastal combatants missile craft 

Osa lIII with four SSN-2 Styx surface-tosurface missiles ... ..................... . Soviet Union 4 

Pauk II fust patrol craft with two antisubmarine warfare rocket launchers and 

four anti-submarine torpedo tubes........ . Soviet Union 

Mine countermeasures 

Sonya coastal minesweeper. ................ . Soviet Union 2 

Yevgenya inshore minesweeper .............. . Soviet Union 4 

Support and miscellaneous intelligence collection 

vessel .................................. . n.a.2 

survey ................... " ............. . n.a. 

Naval Infantry 

Artillery 

122mm M-1931/37 ...................... . n.a. n.a. 

130mm M-46............................ . n.a. n.a, 

152mm M-1937.......................... . n.a. n.a, 

Surface-to-surface missiles 

SS-C--3 systems .......................... . n.a. n.a. 

Mobile Bandera IV ....................... . n.a. n.a. 

Naval Aviation 

Ka-28s.................................... . Soviet Union 4 

Mi-4s..................................... . Soviet Union 4 

MiG-29 ................................... . Soviet Union 6 

1The Cuban Navy is no longer an operational force. 

2 n.a.-not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance. 1999-2000, London, 1999, 

229; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology 

[Bonn], 24, No. 1,2000,50. 

390 
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424 
Glossary 

acopio---Compulsory system of state agricultural procurement 

established in 1962. Nonstate agricultural producers are 

required to sell a certain percentage of their output to the 

state at fixed prices. Fulfillment of these quotas is a condition for private farmers to continue to receive access to 

agricultural services, fertilizer, and other inputs from the 

state. Output in excess of acopio quotas is used by nonstate 

producers for self-consumption, for barter or black market 

sales, or for sale in government-authorized markets (which 

were allowed during the period 1980-86 and again since 

1993). 

agros-Short for agromercados, or agricultural markets. A network offarm-produce markets opened across the island in 

1994. These markets allow vendors, rather than the state, 

to set prices for their products. The agros have helped to 

ease chronic food shortages. 

Association of Caribbean States-An association of twenty-five 

Caribbean Basin countries formed in 1994 under the 

sponsorship of the Caribbean Community and Common 

Market (Caricom-q.v.) for the purpose of promoting 

regional integration, economic cooperation, and a common approach to regional political problems. In addition 

to the fifteen members of Caricom, it includes Belize, 

Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 

Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela. Its 

creation was seen largely as a reaction to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United 

States, Canada, and Mexico, although its far smaller market raised doubts about its viability. 

audiencia-A high court ofjustice, exercising some administrative and executive functions in the colonial period. 

balance of payments-An annual statistical summary of the 

monetary value of all economic transactions between one 

country and the rest of the world, including goods, services, income on investments, and other financial matters, 

such as credits or loans. 

black market-Illegal activities related to trade in goods, services, and currencies. 

Bourbon Reforms-Throughout the eighteenth century, the 

425 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Bourbons reorganized the government structure, the economic system, and church-state relations in Latin America. 

The reforms introduced centralized government, in which 

ministries and a Council of State replaced the council system. 

cabildo-Presided over by the governor or his lieutenant and 

composed of alcaldes Uudges), regidores (councilmen), and 

other minor officials, the cabildo was the political, judicial, 

and administrative unit of each new settlement. It imposed 

local taxes, provided for local police, and maintained public buildings, jails, and roads. 

capital-intensive-A high ratio of capital to labor and other 

resources used in the production process. 

Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom)-The 

successor to the British West Indies Federation that was 

formed in 1958 and ended in 1962, Caricom officially 

came into effect on August 1, 1973, and by mid-1995 had 

fourteen member states. From its inception, Caricom has 

focused on promoting economic integration and foreign 

policy coordination among the independent member 

states. 

Casa de Contrataci6n (House ofTrade)-A colonial-era institution located in Seville, Spain, and devoted to finance, taxation, and maritime operations between Spain and 

America. 

caudillista-Dictatorial. Derived from the term caudillo (q. v.). 

caudillo-A Spanish or Latin American dictator. An adaptation 

of an Arab word meaning leader. 

central bank-Usually a government institution that is 

entrusted with control of the commercial banking system 

and with the issuance of the currency. Responsible for setting the level of credit and money supply in an economy 

and serving as the banker of last resort for other banks. 

Also has a major impact on interest rates. 

centrally planned economy-An economy where crucial economic processes are determined not by market forces but 

by an economic planning board. In a planned economy 

such as Cuba's, production and consumption goals are set 

largely in specific quantities, without regard to factors such 

as profitability and efficiency; production successes supposedly reflect the superiority of socialism, and therefore 

have high ideological and political values; and much 

importance is placed on achieving high output targets 

426 
Glossary 

within a short deadline. 

Comecon (CMEA)-See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 

consumer durables-Consumer items used for several years, 

such as automobiles, appliances, or furniture. 

Contadora Support Group-A diplomatic initiative launched 

by aJanuary 1983 meeting on Contadora Island off the 

Pacific coast of Panama, by which the "Core Four" mediator countries of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama sought to prevent through negotiations a regional 

conflagration among the Central American states of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 

The governments ofArgentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay 

formed the Contadora Support Group in 1985 in an effort 

to revitalize the faltering talks. 

convertible currency-Currencies that are freely exchanged in 

international markets and are generally acceptable as a 

medium of payment in international transactions. Examples of convertible currencies are the United States dollar, 

the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, and the 

French franc. Currencies of the socialist countries (including the peso-q. v.) were not convertible. Because their 

currencies were not convertible, transactions among the 

socialist countries relied heavily on commodity bartering. 

convertible peso-The official term for a new currency introduced in 1995. It denotes a kind of money that has no 

value outside ofCuba, but which circulates on the island as 

a parallel hard currency alongside the domestic peso. The 

value of the convertible peso is fixed at one per United 

States dollar. 

Cortes-The Spanish parliament to which Cuba was allowed to 

send representatives beginning in 1820. Mter the Ten 

Years' War (1868-78), Cubans were again represented in 

the Cortes, although with a very restrictive franchise. 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon)-An intergovernmental council headquartered in 

Moscow and established on January 25, 1949, to promote 

the development of socialist countries and to further economic cooperation among member countries. Membership included the centrally planned economies of Eastern 

Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 

Romania), the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's 

Republic, Vietnam, and Cuba. Cuba joined Comecon in 

427 
Cuba: A Country Study 

1972. The organization was abolished on January 1, 1991. 

Cuban Democracy Act (CDA)-Sponsored by Congressman 

Robert G. Torricelli (D-New Jersey). Signed into law on 

October 23, 1992, reversing the 1975 decision to allow 

third-country companies owned or controlled by United 

States firms to engage in licensed trade with Cuba. An 

exception allowed special licenses to be granted for the 

sale of medicines or medical equipment by these firms or 

their parent companies. 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton)-Enacted on March 12, 1996, mandates full enforcement of criminal penalties for those who knowingly violate 

the embargo, enables claimants on properties expropriated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959, to 

sue for compensation in United States Federal Court those 

international investors employing those properties for 

their profit, mandates the denial of United States visas to 

executives of business firms trafficking with Cuba, and prescribes United States policy during post-Castro transition. 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 

(ECLAC; more commonly known in Latin America as the 

Comisi6n Econ6mica para la America Latina y el CaribeCEPAL)-A United Nations regional economic commission established on February 25, 1948, as the Economic 

Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In 1984 ECLA 

expanded its operations and title to include the Caribbean. Main functions are to initiate and coordinate policies aimed at promoting economic development. In 

addition to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC's forty-one members include Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the 

United States. There are an additional five Caribbean associate members. 

encomenderos-Colonial grantees, usually large landowners, who 

were given rights over Native American labor and tribute 

in exchange for assuming responsibility to protect and 

Christianize these indigenous subjects. 

encomienda-A system or legal arrangement that entailed 

assigning Indian families or other inhabitants of a town to 

a Spaniard, who would extract labor and tribute from 

them while providing for their Christianization. The granting of an encomienda did not carry with it title to the land 

on which the Indians lived and labored or ownership of 

428 
Glossary 

the Indians. The crown took the position that the natives 

were "free" subjects, although they could be compelled to 

pay tribute and to work like other such subjects. Many 

encomenderos (q.v.), however, interested only in exploiting 

the resources of the island, disregarded their moral, religious, and legal obligations to the Indians, as did others 

elsewhere in the New World. 

Enlightenment-An eighteenth-century European philosophical movement influenced by the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution and the ideas ofJohn Locke and Issac 

Newton. Its basic belief was the superiority of reason as a 

guide to all knowledge and human concerns. From this 

flowed the idea of progress and a challenging of traditional Christianity. 

European Commission (EC)-The twenty-member executive 

body of the European Union (q.v.) responsible for implementing and managing EU policies and the EU's annual 

budget, among other responsibilities. 

European Parliament-The directly elected (since 1979) 

assembly of the European Union (q. v.), with limited legislative and juridical competence. It has the right ofscrutiny 

and supervision of EC executives and participates in the 

legislative and budgetary processes, advising the EC and 

reviewing all legislative proposals. 

European Union (EU)-Successor organization to the European Community, the EU was officially established on 

November 1,1993, when the Treaty on European Union 

went into effect. The goal of the EU is a closer economic 

union of its member states and the European Monetary 

Union, a greater unity in matters ofjustice and domestic 

affairs, and the development of a common foreign and 

security policy. To the members of the EC, the EU added 

Austria, Finland, and Sweden, effective January 1, 1995. 

fiscal year (FY)-Coincides with Cuban calendar year. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-A 123­

member international organization created on October 

30, 1947, to provide a continuing basis for nations to negotiate and regulate commercial policies and promote international trade on a nondiscriminatory basis. Its principal 

activity is multinational negotiation for tariff reductions. 

Its seventh and final round of negotiations, held on April 

15,1994, was the Uruguay Round (q.v.), which had the 

aim of liberalizing the world market and promoting intel429 
Cuba: A Country Study 

lectual property. GATT was subsumed by the World Trade 

Organization (q.v.) on January 1, 1995. 

global social product (GSP)-The broadest measure of an 

economy's output under the Material Product System 

(q. v.). The GSP accumulates the value of goods and "material" services produced by the economy in a given time 

frame, typically a year. The GSP differs from the gross 

domestic product (q. v.) in two main respects. First, the 

GSP tends to inflate value because it is based on gross 

value. For example, GSP includes the value of output of a 

furniture factory as well as the value of wood and other 

inputs that were used to produce the furniture. Thus, the 

GSP is subject to double-counting because the cost of 

inputs is not deducted from final output at each stage of 

the production process. Second, whereas the GDP 

includes nonproductive services, the GSP does not. 

gross domestic product (GDP)-The most commonly used 

broad measure of an economy's output under the System 

of National Accounts (q. v.). The GDP aggregates the value 

added at each stage of the production process for goods 

and services and therefore avoids double counting. In the 

1990s, Cuba reported economic performance on the basis 

of GDP growth rates, while earlier it did so on the basis of 

global social product (q. v.) growth rates. 

gross national product (GNP)-Total market value of all final 

goods (those sold to the final user) and services produced 

by an economy during a year, plus the value of any net 

changes in inventories. Measured by adding the gross 

domestic product (GDP-q.v.) , net changes in inventories, 

and the income received from abroad by residents less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP is the 

value of GNP when inflation has been taken into account. 

Group of Eight-A permanent mechanism for consultation 

and political coordination that succeeded the Contadora 

Support Group in December 1986. It consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, 

and Venezuela. It advocated democracy and a negotiated 

solution to the Central American insurgencies. Its name 

was changed in 1990 to the Rio Group (q.v.). 

Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77)-Established on June 15, 

1964, by seventy-seven developing countries that signed 

the 'Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries" 

issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations 

430 
Glossary 

Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 

Geneva. Although the membership of the G-77 has 

increased to 133 countries, the original name has been 

retained because of its historic significance. As the largest 

developing-world coalition in the UN, the G-77 provides 

the means for the developing world to articulate and promote its collective economic interests and enhance its 

joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues in the UN system and promote economic and 

technical cooperation among developing countries. 

Helms-Burton Act-See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. 

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947-See 

Rio Treaty. 

internationalism-Starting in 1959, Cuba actively engaged in 

dispatching overseas missions involving support for insurgencies, combat troops, or members of construction and 

medical brigades to support developing countries in 

Mrica, Asia, and Latin America for diplomatic, military, 

political, ideological, or other reasons. In the 1990s, Cuba 

continued to send nonmilitary internationalists abroad. In 

May 1998, Cuba had 2,759 internationalist technical workers, professionals, and specialists in eighty-six countries. 

latifundio-A large landed estate. A legacy of the Spanish 

Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, latifundia provided the foundation for the small upper class and huge 

peasant class in the New World colonies. 

Latin American Economic System (Sistema Econ6mico Latinoamericano-SELA)-A regional intergovernmental 

organization, headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela, that 

groups twenty-seven Latin American and Caribbean countries. SELA was established on October 17, 1975, by the 

Panama Convention, and currently consists of the following member countries: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, 

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 

Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 

Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 

Uruguay, and Venezuela. SELA provides a consultation 

and coordination system for consensus on joint positions 

and common strategies for the Latin American and Caribbean regions on economic issues vis-a.-vis countries, groups 

of countries, and international organizations. 

431 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)-A regional 

group founded by the Montevideo Treaty of 1960 to 

increase trade and foster development. LAFTA was 

replaced in 1980 by the Latin American Integration Association (Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6nAlADI-q.v.). 

Latin American Integration Association (Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n-ALADI)-An organization 

that was established by the Treaty of Montevideo (August 

1980) and became operational in March 1981. ALADI 

replaced the Latin American Free Trade Association 

(LAFTA-q.v.) , which had been established in 1960 with 

the aim of developing a common market in Latin America. 

LAFTA made little progress, and ALADI was created with a 

more flexible and more limited role of encouraging free 

trade but with no timetable for the institution of a common market. Members approved the Regional Tariff Preference Program in 1984 and expanded upon it in 1987 

and 1990. ALADI seeks economic cooperation among its 

eleven members-Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 

liberation theology-An activist movement led by Roman Catholic clergy who trace their inspiration to Vatican Council II 

(1965), when some church procedures were liberalized, 

and the Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellin, 

Colombia (1968), which endorsed greater direct efforts to 

improve the lot of the poor. 

Material Product System (MPS)-A national income accounting methodology used by the centrally planned economies. Cuba adopted the MPS in the early 1960s and used it 

through about 1992 to produce national product statistics. 

The MPS covers the value of output of goods and of socalled material services, which include freight transport, 

communications, and trade. In Cuban statistics, the MPS 

indicator most commonly available is the global social 

product (q. v.) . 

mestizaje-According to this ideology, the fusion of various cultural traditions (including language, religion, food, music, 

and so forth) in the Americas created a new and better 

mestizo race. This idea gained strength after the Mexican 

Revolution, and Jose Vasconcelos popularized it in his 

1925 essay "La raza c6smica" (The Cosmic Race). Also 

432 
Glossary 

refers to a process of racial amalgamation. 

microbrigade-Started in 1971, microbrigades consist of "voluntary" workers from a given workplace-such as factories, 

ministries, commerce, education-who labor full time, 

typically in construction projects, while the rest of the 

workers at the original workplace cover the tasks abandoned by their comrades. These efforts are supplemented 

on weekends, when all workers can join in "voluntary 

work" in order to increase the pace of construction. 

Nonaligned Movement (NAM)-Established on September 1, 

1961, in Belgrade, with the aim of promoting political and 

military cooperation apart from the traditional East and 

West blocs. By 1999 NAM included 112 members plus the 

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), nineteen 

observer nations and organizations, and twenty-one 

"guest" nations. NAM experienced considerable difficulty 

in establishing a unified policy on many issues in international affairs. With the end of the Cold War and the 

breakup of the Soviet Union (1991), neutralism lost much 

of its usefulness as a guiding principle in many nations' 

foreign relations. 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-A multilateral agreement negotiated by the United States, Canada, 

and Mexico setting forth agreements to lower and/or 

eliminate unfair trade barriers that affect the trade of 

goods and services among the three countries. NAFTA 

entered into force on January 1,1994. 

oficiales reales-The royal budget officers, of whom there were 

four in each Spanish colony. The oficiales reales worked very 

closely, discussing ways to increase royal revenue, with 

both the governor and the Casa de Contrataci6n (q.v.). 

Organization of American States (OAS)-Established by the 

Ninth International Conference of American States held 

in Bogota on April 30, 1948, and effective since December 

13, 1951. Has served as a major inter-American organization to promote regional peace and security as well as economic and social development in Latin America. 

Composed of thirty-five members, including most Latin 

American states and the United States and Canada. Determines common political, defense, economic, and social 

policies and provides for coordination of vadous interAmerican agencies. Responsible for implementing the 

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 

433 
Cuba: A Country Study 

Treaty-q.v.) , when any threat to the security of the region 

arises. 

Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OCES)-A 

regional body founded on June 18, 1981, by the seven 

former members of the West Indies Association (WI SA) , 

which had been created in 1966. Original members were 

Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The British Virgin Islands later became an associate 

member. Administered by a Central Secretariat located on 

the Morne, near Castries, St. Lucia, the OCES is designed 

to coordinate economic, foreign policy, and defense matters among its members and to facilitate their relations 

with various international organizations. The OCES is an 

associate institution of the Caribbean Community and 

Common Market (q.v.). 

Ostend Manifesto-A confidential dispatch in October 1854 to 

the United States Department of State from United States 

ambassadors in Europe. It suggested that if Spain refused 

to sell Cuba to the United States, the United States would 

be justified in seizing the island. Northerners claimed it 

was a plot to expand slavery, and the Manifesto was disavowed. 

paladares (singular, paladar)-The popular name given to 

home restaurants that sprang up in Cuba as a result of the 

legislation legalizing self-employment. The name originates from a chain of restaurants in a popular Brazilian 

soap opera shown on Cuban television in the late 1980s. 

peninsulares-A term widely used throughout the Spanish 

Empire to refer to individuals born in Spain who were 

residing, usually temporarily, in one of the overseas colonies. Peninsulares were usually associated with important 

officials in the colonial bureaucracy, the military, or the 

Roman Catholic Church. 

peso-The national currency, consisting of 100 centavos. 

Between 1914 and 1971, the peso was exchanged at parity 

with the United States dollar. Since the early 1960s, the 

peso has not been exchanged freely in the international 

market. The official exchange rate during the 1972-86 

period averaged 1.23 (in pesos per United States dollar) 

and since 1987 has been reported by the Cuban National 

Bank to be 1.00. Since the 1960s, there has been an active 

black market for dollars in Cuba, with the black-market 

434 
Glossary 

exchange rate fluctuating between six and fifteen pesos 

per United States dollar. In the 1990s, the value of the 

peso in the black market fell drastically. The unofficial 

exchange of the peso for the U.S. dollar has been estimated (in pesos per United States dollar) as follows: 1991, 

twenty; 1992, thirty-five; 1993, sixty;June 1994, 100; August 

1994,150; December 1994, forty-five; July 1995, thirty; September 1995, twenty-five; July 1996, twenty-one; December 

1996, twenty. In the late 1990s, the exchange rate in government-operated Casas de Cambio was twenty to twentytwo pesos for one United States dollar. 

Platt Amendment-In 1901, shortly after cessations of hostilities in the Spanish-American War, Washington Senator 

Orville Platt introduced legislation allowing the United 

States to intervene whenever it wished in order to protect 

life and property and "assure Cuban independence." The 

amendment was included in the Cuban constitution of 

1901. On May 29, 1934, it was abrogated under the Treaty 

of Relations with Cuba, which continued to permit the 

United States to lease the site of its naval base at 

Guantanamo. 

Rio 	Group-A permanent mechanism for consultation and 

political coordination that succeeded the Group of Eight 

(q.v.), formerly the Contadora Support Group, in 1990. 

The Group of Eight's predecessors had been involved in 

Central American peacekeeping negotiations. In 1993 the 

Rio Group (or Group of Rio) had twelve members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 

Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 

Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)­

A regional alliance, signed in Rio deJaneiro in 1947, that 

established a mutual security system to safeguard the Western Hemisphere from aggression from within or outside 

the zone. Signatories include the United States and twenty 

Latin American republics. In 1975 a special conference 

approved, over United States objections, a Protocol of 

Amendment to the Rio Treaty that, once ratified, would 

establish the principle of "ideological pluralism" and 

would simplify the rescinding of sanctions imposed on an 

aggressor party. 

santena-A syncretic cult, widely practiced in Cuba, in which 

Roman Catholic saints are equated with Mrican deities. Its 

main practitioners are among the poorer strata of Cuban 

435 
Cuba: A Country Study 

society, both black and white, but practitioners even 

include some of the white middle class. 

special period in peacetime (periodo especial en tiempo de paz; 

hereafter Special Period)-A government euphemism for 

an emergency "wartime" economic program launched by 

President Castro in 1990 to deal with the onset of the economic crisis. The name reflects the Cuban leadership's 

view of the escalating recession as a kind of siege economy 

without outright war. The emphasis of Special Period policies has been on austerity measures. 

sustainable development-A concept that emerged in the 

1990s, based on the premise that development must meet 

the need of the present generation without compromising 

the ability offuture generations to meet their own needs. 

System of National Accounts (SNA)-The national income 

accounting methodology used by all nations other than 

the centrally planned economies. The SNA covers the 

value of output of goods and services, including "nonmaterial" services that are excluded under the Material Product 

System (q. v.), such as education, health services, culture 

and art, housing, government administration, and 

national defense. The most commonly available SNA indicator is the gross domestic product (q. v.). Cuba began to 

publish national product statistics based on the SNA in the 

1990s. 

tariff-A tax levied by a government in accordance with its tariff schedule, usually on imported products, but sometimes 

also on exported goods. May be imposed to protect 

domestic industries from competitive imported goods 

and/or to generate revenue. Types include ad valorem, 

variable, or some combination. 

terms of trade-The ratio of a country's index of average 

export prices and average import prices. In international 

economies, the concept of "terms of trade" plays an important role in evaluating exchange relationships between 

nations. The terms of trade shift whenever a country's 

exports will buy more or fewer imports. An improvement 

in the terms of trade occurs when export prices rise relative to import prices. The terms of trade turn unfavorable 

in the event of a slump in export prices relative to import 

prices. 

Treaty of Tlatelolco-On being ratified by Cuba in April 1995, 

the treaty took effect, binding the thirty-three Latin Amer436 
Glossary 

ican and Caribbean signatory nations to the peaceful use 

of nuclear power. Under the treaty, Latin America became 

the world's first region to prohibit nuclear weapons. The 

treaty covers all of Latin America, including the Caribbean, from the Mexican border with the United States to 

Antarctica. It bans the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Each participating 

country must negotiate accords with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to facilitate verification. 

underemployment-According to the dual-labor market 

hypothesis, there are many workers in the secondary labor 

market who either already possess skills that would enable 

them to function satisfactorily within the primary market 

or who could be trained for skilled jobs at no more than 

the usual costs. Given the obstacles to entering the primary labor market, however, they are required to take up 

unskilled secondary-sector jobs and are in this sense 

underemployed. 

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)­

Primary responsibility for the promotion of human rights 

under the UN Charter rests in the General Assembly and, 

under its authority, in the Economic and Social Council 

and its subsidiary body, the UNCHR, an intergovernmental body that serves as the UN's central policy organ in the 

human rights field. The UNCHR annually establishes a 

working group to consider and make recommendations 

concerning alleged "gross violations" of human rights. The 

UNCHR and its subcommission meet annually in Geneva 

to consider a wide range of human rights issues. 

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-A thirtysix-member organization, established on November 22, 

1965, to provide technical assistance to stimulate economic and social development. 

United States-Cuba Trade and Economic Council (USTEC)­

A United States-based organization that has collaborative 

relations with the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic 

of Cuba, Cuba's ministries of Foreign Trade, Foreign 

Investment and Economic Cooperation, Tourism, Public 

Health, Metallurgy Industry, and Foreign Relations, as well 

as with the National Assembly. 

Uruguay Round-Refers to multilateral trade negotiations 

under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (q.v.) 

that began at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986 

437 
Cuba: A Country Study 

and concluded in Geneva in December 1993 with an 

agreement signed by ministers in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 

April 1994. The Uruguay Round led to the World Trade 

Organization (q. v.) . 

World Trade Organization (WTO)-An international agency 

overseeing the rules of international trade of member 

countries. It was established on January 1, 1995, as a result 

of the Uruguay Round (q. v.) to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (q. v.) dealing with trade in 

goods. The latter agreement is now part of the WTO 

agreements. The WTO has more than 130 members. 

438 
Index 

ABC, 42, 48 


abortion, 114, 129 


Abrantes Fernandez, jose, 297, 336 


acidification (ofsoil) , 104 


Acosta Cordero, Armando, 257 


acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 


(AIDS),143 


Mrica: Cuban military involvement in, 5, 


292-94, 295; withdrawal from, lvii 


Mro-Cuban religions, 131-32, 134-35, 


137,262 


Mro-Cubans, 236 


age structure, 115-16 


agrarian reform, 46, 65-66, 68, 102-103, 


122,182-83,256 


agricultural development, 52, 100-101, 


102-103 


agricultural markets, 159, 160, 171-72, 


175,206 


agriculture (see also cooperatives, agricul­


tural),67,92, 103-105, 165, 169, 174­

75,180-85,204-205 


air force. See Antiaircraft Defense and 

Revolutionary Air Force 

airports, 195 


Alarcon de Quesada, Ricardo, lxxii, 233, 


269,270 


Aldana Escalante, Carlos, 247 


Allende Gossens, Salvador, 74 


Almeida Bosque, juan, 236, 249, 251 


Almendares River, 98 


Angola: Cuban military involvement in, 


Ii,75,292-93 

Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary 

Air Force ( Defensa Antiaerea y 

Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria-DAAFAR),301,310,315,319-20 

Antilla, 193 


Arawak,6 

Archipielago de Camagiiey, 93 


Archipielago de los Canarreos, 93 


Archipielago de los Colorados, 93 


Archipielago de losjardines de la Reina, 

Archipielago de Sabana, 93 


Ariguanabo (lake), 98 


armed forces. See Revolutionary Armed 


Forces 


army. See Revolutionary Army 


artisan markets, 159, 160, 172, 206 


Association of Caribbean States, 277 


audiencia, 11, 12 


austerity measures, 79, 109, 150, 159, 168 


Authentic Organization, 59-60 


Authentic Party, 4, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 


60,63 

autonomismo, 28 


Autonomous Liberal Party, 28 


Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic 

Weapons Convention (1972),307 

Bahia de Cabanas, 94, 321 


Bahia de Cienfuegos, 321 


Bahia de La Habana (Havana Bay), 94, 


109,321 


Bahia del Mariel, 94, 321 


Bahia de Matanzas, 94, 321 


Bahia de Nipe, 94, 321 


Bahia de Nuevitas, 94, 321 


Bahia de Puerto Padre, 94 


Bahia de Santiago, 94 


Bahia Honda, 94 


Balaguer Cabrera,jose Ramon, 264 


balance of payments, 215, 216-18 


Banco de losjardines, 93 


banking system, 160, 177-78 


Baracoa, 10,319 


Barnet y Vinageras, jose, 50 


Basic Secondary Schools in the Country­


side, 146-47 


Basic Units of Cooperative Production 


(Unidades Basicas de Produccion 


Cooperativa-UBPC), 103, 128, 171, 


175,180,183,185,204,206,248 


Batabano, 107 


Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio, xlvii, 4, 44, 


45-46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55-64, 65, 


125,287-88,307 


Bay of Pigs invasion, xlix, I, lvi, 70, 71, 


93 

439 
Cuba: A Country Study 

133,290,316 258, 264, 268, 270, 271, 288, 295, 301, 

Bayamo,lO 

Bayamo River, 98 

bays, 94,193-95 

Berroa,221 

biological weapons capability, Ixxix-Ixxx 

biotechnology industry, lxxx, 138, 143­

44, 180 

birth rate, 91,113-14,120, 146, 150 

black market, 80,159, 165, 167,228,248 

blacks, 16, 34, 38, 117 , 118-19 

Bonsai, Phillip, 68 

Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras-TGF), 320, 338-40, 346, 

347-48,351 

Bourbon reforms, 21 

Brooke,john, 33 

Brothers to the Rescue, lix, lxxiv, 278 

Buchanan, james, 20 

Buddhism, 136 

budget, government, 164-65, 168 

budget deficits, 164-65, 167, 168 

Bush, George, lvii 

Bush, George W., lxxix, Ixxxi 

Cabanas, 321 

cabiido, 12 

Caffrey, jefferson, 48, 49 

Camagiiey, 112, 138, 195 

Camaguey Province, 38, 94, 137, 240, 

316,319,321 

Canada: Cuban relations with, lxii, 277­

78 

Carbo, Sergio, 42 

Cardenas, Lazaro, 50 

Caribbean Tourism Organization, 277 

Carter,jimmy, I, lxxx-lxxxi, lxxxii, 130 

Casas Regueiro, julio, lxxiv, 301, 303, 

333 

cash crops, 183-84 

Castro Ruz, Fidel, xlvii, liii, liv, lxxi, lxxii, 

lxxviii, 5, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 

63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,72,78,80, 

81,86,91,94,115,122,130,133,139, 

140, 141, 149-50, 162, 167, 202, 227, 

228, 229, 231, 235-36, 237, 238, 247­

48, 249, 251, 252, 258, 268, 270, 272, 

279, 287-89, 299, 301, 302, 303, 305, 

306,308,329,336,337,352 

Castro Ruz, Raul, lxxi, lxxii, 5, 60, 61, 68, 

69, 126, 167, 236, 238, 249, 251, 252, 

440 

302,303,306,324,329,335,336,350 

Catholic Relief Services (Caritas), 150 

Cautillo (river), 98 

Cauto (river and basin), 97-98,104-105 

Ceiba del Agua, 327 

censorship, 57 

census: in 1931, 118-19; in 1943, 118-19; 

in 1953, 118-19, 121, 144; in 1970, 

118,201; in 1981, 117, 118-19, 120, 

200,201 

census, agricultural, 103-104 

Center for American Studies (Centro de 

Estudios sobre Am€:rica-CEA), 263­

65,272 

Central America: Cuban involvement in, 

82 

Central Committee, 78, 235, 252-54, 

256,258,264,271,303-304 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 70, 

290 

centrally planned economy, 5, 66-67, 

79-80,122,159,162-63,179,205 

Central Planning Board (Junta Central 

de Planificaci6n-juceplan), 66, 179 

Cespedes, Carlos Manuel de, 43, 44-45, 

47,48 

Cespedes y Quesada, Carlos Manuel de, 

25,26 

Chamber of Deputies, 33 

Charles III, 14, 21 

Chavez Frias, Hugo, 139 

Chibas, Eduardo (Eddie), 48, 54, 55, 56, 

58,67 

Children's Clubs, 127, 146 

China: Cuban relations with, lv, 72-74, 

82,276,335 

church-state relations, 66, 132-34, 136­

38, 259-63 

Ciboney, 6, 7, 8 

Ciego de A.vila, 195 

Ciego de A.vila Province, 110, 120, 240, 

243 

Cienfuegos, 94, 193-95, 275, 291, 319, 

333 

Cienfuegos, Camilo, 61 

Cienfuegos Province, 94, 250, 316, 319, 

321 

cimarrones, 16 

Cintra Frias, Leopoldo, 303, 316 

citrus production, 104, 105, 180, 183-84 

Ciudad de La Habana Province, 120, 
Index 

236,240,243,244,251,315,321 constitution (1976), 101, 124, 134, 231 


civic-action programs, 50 


Civic-Military Institute, 50 


Civic Resistance Movement (Movimiento 


Civico Revolucionario-MCR), 63 


civil defense, 311, 314-15 


civil liberties, 52, 134, 231, 245, 353 


civil-military relations, Ixxii 


civil service, 36 


climate, 98-100 


Clinton, William Jefferson, lix, lxi, 276 


coffee production, 18, 19, 21, 121, 180, 


183-84 


Colas Sanchez, Silvano, 302 


collective farms, 103, 128 


Colome Ibarra, Abelardo, lxxii, 236, 251, 


252,269,271,295,297,302,304,329, 


336 


colonial economy, 3, 12-14, 17-20 


colonial government, 10-12,21-23 


colonial society, 3, 14-16, 21 


colonization, by Spain, xlvii, 9-16 


Columbus, Christopher, xlvii, 3, 6, 9 


Columbus, Diego, 9 


Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity 


(1903),34 


Committee for the Defense of the Revo­


lution (Comite de Defensa de la Rev­


oluci6n-CDR), 79, 124, 125-26,234, 


257,258,259,289,314,345 


Commonwealth of Independent States 


(CIS), 300 


communism, in Cuba, lxxxi, 5, 41-42, 


48,50,52,58,67,70 


communism, international: collapse of, 


5,85,147,162,227,245,274,279,285 


Communist Party of Cuba (Partido 


Comunista de Cuba-PCC), lxvii, 41, 


43,67,76,77-79,123,136,137,160, 


203,227,228,229,230,231,235,239, 


242, 243, 245-56, 257, 258, 259, 263, 


264,265,270,271,280,301,303 


Communist Revolutionary Union 


(Uni6n Revolucionaria Comunista­


URC),52-53 


compulsory military service, 128-29, 


290,322-25 


conquest, by Spain, 9-10 


Conservative Party, 40, 43 


constitution (1901),33-34,35,43,44, 


4~7 

constitution (1940), 52, 58 


constitution, revised (1992), 172,230­

31,306,358-59 


constitution, socialist, 79 


constitutional convention, 33-34, 51 


constitutional development, 51-52,101 


construction industry, 165, 204-205 


consumer goods, 164 


Contino,Juan, 257 


Contracting House, 13 


Contramestre River, 98 


cooperatives, agricultural, 102, 103, 128, 


160,171,180,183,257 


Cordillera de Guaniguanico, 97 


corruption, 35,39,49,53,55,80 


Cortes, 22 


Cortes, Hernan, 9,14 


Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 


(CMEA or Comecon), liv, 76-77,85, 


104, 161, 180, 189, 207, 208, 209, 210, 


211,214 


Council of Ministers, lxxi, 168, 231, 235, 


237-38,302,305,306,336 


Council of State, lxxi, 5, 171, 178, 231, 


233, 234, 235-37, 238, 239, 297, 304, 


305,306,360 


counternarcotics, 346-50 


counterterrorism, lxxvi, Ixxix 


coup d'etat: by Batista (1952), 4,55-56 


Creoles, 12,21,22,23-24,25,28 


crime, 154, 248, 344-53 


mofZos. See Creoles 


Crowder, Enoch, 39 


Cuban-American community (in the 


United States), I, lix, lxiv, lxvi, lxvii, 


lxviii, lxxi, 129, 130-31, 147, 152,278­

79,280,342 


Cuban Central Bank (Banco Central de 


Cuba-BCC), lxvii, 163,216 


Cuban Democracy Act, lvii-lviii, lxviii, 


276,277 


Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidar­


ity Act. See Helms-Burton Act 


Cuban Missile Crisis, xlix, 71-73, 275, 


299 


Cuban National Bank (Banco Nacional 


de Cuba-BNC), 163, 175, 177, 178, 


216 


Cuban People's Party (Partido del 


Pueblo Cubano-PPC), Orthodox 


branch. See Orthodox Party 


Cuban Revolution (1959), lxxi, 64-86, 


441 
Cuba: A Country Study 

117,118,122,129,131,133,136,140, economic reforms, lxix, 159-60, 166-79, 


148,154,159,229,301,311,344 222,228,246,248,258,270 


Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido 


Revolucionario Cubano-PRC), 4, 29, 


34,50 


Cuban Workers Federation (Central de 


Trabajadores de Cuba-CTC), 50, 


124-25,127-28,151,234,258,259 


Cuchillas de Toa, 94,107 


currenc~ 152, 160, 161, 175,210-11,212 


dams, 106, 107 


death: causes of, 142-43 


death penalty, 286-87, 359-60 


"Declaration of Havana," 69 


deforestation, 92,107 


del Valle Jimenez, Sergio, 335-36 


demographic indicators, 110-17, 119, 


121, 151 


demographic transition, 112, 113-16 


Department of State Security (Departa­


mento de Seguridad del Estado­


DSE),289 


desertification, 104 


Diaz Sotolongo, Roberto, 347 


Directorio. See University Students 


Directorate 


discrimination, 123-24 


divorce, 129 


dollar (US), 92,152 


dollarization, lxix, lxx, 152-53, 178 


Dorticos Torrado, Oswaldo, 64-65, 69 


drainage, 97-98 


drug trafficking, 86, 346-50, 360 


drug use, 154, 348-49 


Dulce, Domingo, 24 


Echeverria,Jose A., 62 


Economic Commission for Latin Amer­


ica and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 163, 


201,218 


economic dependence, xlvii, 39, 42, 56, 


66,75-76,79-80,81,83,85 


economic development, 56, 66, 214 


economic diversification, 56, 66, 76, 79­

80,179 


economic growth, 162, 163-64, 174,221 


economic performance, lxxxii, 163-66 


economic planning, 79 


economic recovery, 174 


education, 123, 144-49; adult, 145; 


enrollment, 146, 151; higher, 146; 


ideological content, 147-48, 149; 


medical, 148-49; military, 325-28; 


nationalization of, 145; preprimary, 


145-46; primary, 145-46; secondary, 


145-46; vocational, 145; work-study, 


146-47 


Eisenhower, Dwight D., 68, 309 


elections, 36, 38, 55, 58, 63, 233-35, 243­

45 


electoral fraud, 35, 36, 38, 40, 63 


electoral laws, 36, 234, 244-45 


elites: economic, 24-25, 28, 121; politi­


cal, lxxii, 4, 55,251,253,268-70,271­

72 


embargo, economic: by United States 


against Cuba, xlviii, I, lvi, lvii, lviii, lix, 


lxi, lxiii, lxiv, lxv, lxvi, lxvii, lxviii, lxix, 


lxx-lxxi, lxxiii, lxxvii, lxxxi, 63, 69-70, 


134,136-37,276-78 


emigration, 66, 79, 84, 112, 115, 119-20, 


122,130,131,152,278,350-53 


employment, 122, 151-52,201-205 


encomenderos, 10 


encomienda system, 10, 13 


energy, 190-92 


Enlightenment, 21 


environmental regulations, 101-102 


environmental trends, 92,100-110 


erosion, 104 


Escalona Reguera,Juan, 302 


espaiiolismo, 36 


Espin Guillois, Vilma, 126, 257, 324 


Espinosa Martin, Ramon, 303 


espiritismo, 132, 135 


Estrada Palma, Tomas, 34, 36, 40 


Ethiopia: Cuban military involvement in, 


75,293 


ethnicity, 117-20 


European Commission, 277 


European Parliament, 277 


European Union (EU), lviii, Ix, 276-77, 


334-35 


executions, 65, 68 


export-processing zones, 177, 221 


expor~, 159, 161-62, 164,212-14 


expropriations of properties and enterprises,65-66, 68, 69, 122,228 


442 
Index 

Falklands War, Ii, Iii, 82 


family life, 66, 129-31, 152 


family planning, ll4, 129 


Federation of Cuban Women (Fede­


racion de Mujeres Cubanas-FMC), 


79, 124-25, 126-27, 234, 256, 258, 


259,314 


Federation of Secondary School Stu­


dents (Federacion de Estudiantes de 


la Enseiianza Media-FEEM), 124-25, 


127,234 


Federation of University Students (Fede­


racion Estudiantil Universitaria­


FEU), 39, 40, 59, 124-25 


fertility rate, 91, ll3-14, ll9, 120, 127 


Fillmore, Millard, 20 


financial sector, 177-78 


Finlay, Carlos]., 33 


Five-Year Plan, 79 


food crops, 105 


food rationing, 67, 79, 105, 165 


food self-sufficiency, 105 


food shortages, 150, 184 


food subsidies, 105 


foreign aid, 161, 214 


foreign debt, 76, 161,215-16 


foreign exchange, 175-76 


foreign investment, lvii, lxix, 5,159,160­

61, 175-79, 189, 198, 218-21, 228, 


233,246-47,248,271-72 


foreign relations, xlviii, Ii, lxxv, 80-85, 


274-79 


foreign trade, lxvi, 159, 161-62, 164, 169, 


172-74,177,207-18,227 


forestry, 102, 107-108 


Fox, Vicente, lxxviii-lxxix 


free-trade zones, 160, 177 


Garcia, Calix to, 27 


General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 


(GATT),276 


"generation of 1930," 41,43,44,46,49, 


52,53 


Geneva Convention (1949), 307 


Geneva Protocol (1924), 307 


geography, xlvii, 93-98 


glasnost, lvi, 85 


Global Social Product (GSP), 161, 162, 


206 


Golden Century (Cuba's), 21 


Golfo de Batabano, 93 


Golfo de Guacanayabo, 93 


Gomez,jose Miguel, 36-38 


Gomez, Maximo, 26, 29, 30 


Gomez y Arias, Miguel Mariano, 50 


Gonzalez, Elian, lxvii, 129, 147, 278-79, 


351 


Gorbachev, Mikhail, liii-liv, lvi, 85, 162, 


299 


government system, 229-45; provincial 


and local, 240-43 


Granma, lxxx, 60 


Granma Province, 94,120,240,243,244, 


316 


Grau San Martin, Ramon, 4, 46-49, 50, 


51-52,53-54,57 


Great Depression, ll3 


Greater Antilles, 93 


Grenada: Cuban activities in, Ii, Iii, 294; 


United States military intervention in, 


Iii, 80, 294 


"Grito de Yara," 25 


gross domestic product (GDP), 163-64, 


165, 166 


Guanahatabey, 6, 8 


Guantanamo, 112 


Guanranamo Bay, 34, 308 


Guantanamo Province, 94, 100, 120, 240, 


243,244,308,316,318 


guerrilla warfare, 60-64 


Guevara, Ernesto "Che," I, 60, 68, 69, 


290-91,292 


Giiines, 319 


Guiteras, Antonio, 48 


harbors, 94 


Hatuey, 8, 9 


Havana, 10, ll, 12, 16, 17,98, II2, II7, 


121,138,193-95,197,221,319,321 


health care, 138-44, 149-50 


Helms-Burton Act, !ix, lx, lxxi, 160-61, 


220,276,277,278 


Hevia, Carlos, 42 


Hispaniola, 6, 7, 9 


Holguin, II2, 321 


Holguin Province, 94,186,240,316,319, 


321 


housing, 66, II7, 242 


human rights, lv-lvi, lx, lxi-lxii, lxv, lxix, 


lxxix, lxxx, 228, 249, 265-67, 272, 


353-56 


hurricanes, lxiii, lxxvii, 100, 148 


443 
Cuba: A Country Study 

hydroelectric power, 190 


immigration, 112, 113, 119 


imports, 159, 164,212-14 

income distribution, 121, 122-24, 152, 


153, 154-55 


indentured workers, 112 


independence: struggle for, xlvii, 22, 23­

34, 132 


Independent Colored Association 


(Agrupaci6n Independiente de 


Color-AlC), 38 


indigenous peoples, 3, 6-9, 15, 112 


indoctrination of society, by the party, 


77-78,80,85,130,146-47,148,154 


industrialization, 66, 67, 76, 79-80, 179 


infectious diseases, 113, 142 


inflation, 167 


informal sector, 151, 205-207 


Information Board, 23 


information technology, Ixxii-Ixiii 


Intelligence Directorate, 341-44 


intelligence threat, lxxiv-Jxxv 


Inter-American Defense Board, 307 


Inter-American Defense College, 307 


Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 


Assistance (the Rio Treaty), 306-307 


internal security, 270-71, 287, 342-44, 


353-56 


International Atomic Energy Agency 


(IAEA),307 


"internationalism," xlviii, I, liii, lxii, lxiii, 


5, 81-82, 86, 123, 138-39, 227-28, 


245, 246, 285, 290-91, 291-96, 310, 


334 


Internet, Ixxii-Ixxiii 


intervention in Cuba: by the United 


States, xlvii, 30-44 


invasion of Czechoslovakia: by the Soviet 


Union, 76 


irrigation, 106 


Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth), 93, 


148,240,244,316 


Isla de Pinos (Isle of Pines), 39 


Islam, 136 


Jackson,Jesse, 355 


J ardinillos keys, 93 


John Paul II (Pope), Ix, lxxx, 92-93, 


137-38, 239, 260-62, 272, 273, 354, 


355 


joint ventures, lix, 159, 160, 168, 176-77, 


178,189,196,198-200,204,206,219­

21,301 


Jordan Morales, Alfredo, 252 


Jose Marti International Airport, 195, 


319 


Juan Carlos (King), 355 


Judaism, 131, 136,262-63 


judiciary, 238-39 


Kennedy,John F., 70, 71-72 


Khrushchev, Nikita, 71, 72 


labor force, 122, 127-28, 160, 200-205, 


258 


labor, forced, 129 


labor unions, 258 


La Cabana Fortress, 327 


Lage Davila, Carlos, lxxii, 236, 238, 248; 


251-52,270 


lagoons, 98 


Laguna de Barbacoa, 98 


Laguna de la Leche, 98 


Laguna del Tesoro, 98, 107 


La Habana. See Havana 

La Habana Province, 30, 94, 107, 120, 


121,140,240,244,251,315,319,320, 


328 


lakes, 98 


landholding, 50-51, 103, 122, 185, 256­

57 


land reform, 65-66, 122, 182-83, 256 


land tenure, 103 


land use, 97, 102-103, 104, 180, 182, 184 


Laredo Bru, Federico, 50 


Las Camariocas, 108 


Las Casas, Bartolome de, 7, 10 


Las Tunas Province, 94, 240, 243, 244, 


316, 318 


latifundios, 16, 103 


Latin America: Cuban relations with, Ii, 


Iii, liii, liv, Iv, lvii, lviii, lix, Ix, lxii, lxv, 

lxix, lxxviii-lxxix, 276-77 


Latin American Medical University, 148 


Lazo Hernandez, Esteban, 236, 251, 


269-70 


Lease Agreement (1903), 34 


legislative branch. See National Assembly 


of People's Power 

444 
Index 

Lersundi, Francisco, 23, 24 


Liberal Party, 36, 38, 40 


liberation theology, 134 


life expectancy, 113 


Lincoln, Abraham, 20-21 


literacy, 66, 121, 126, 144, 145 


Little August War, 36 


Little War, 27 


livestock, 13, 105, 180, 184 


Lodge, Henry Cabot, 32 


Lopez Miera, Alvaro, 310 


Lopez, Narciso, 20 


Lourdes,lxxv,lxxvii, 275, 316,320,333­

34 


Lugo Fonte, Orlando, 257 


Maceo, Antonio, 26, 27, 29, 30 


Machado Ventura, Jose Ramon, 236, 


251,269 


Machado y Morales, Gerardo, 4, 39-40, 


41,42,43,44,46,47,49,58,60 


Magoon, Charles E., 36 


Mahan, Alfred T., 32 


Majana,107 


malnutrition, 121, 150 


mambises, 26, 28 


manifest destiny, 32 


manufacturing, 165, 174, 185-86, 204 


Mao Tse-tung, 72 


Mariel, port of, 94, 193, 221 


Marie! Boatlift, Ii, lxiv, 84, 115, 130 


Marti,Jose, 29, 31, 34, 35, 43, 58, 67, 79, 


230 


Martinez, Oswaldo, 263 


Martinez Campos, Arsenio, 27, 30 


Martinez Puentes, Ruben, 310-11 


Martinez Villena, Ruben, 41 


Marxism-Leninism, liv-1v, 5, 67, 79, 84­

85, 86, 130, 147-48, 154, 167, 230, 


231,246,307 


mass media, 198, 267-68 


mass organizations, 79, 92, 124-28, 154, 


256-59 


Matanzas, 193-95, 326 


Matanzas Province, 59-60, 94, 240, 243, 


244,251,316,319,321 


McKinley, William, 32 


McKinley Tariff (1890),31 


Mendieta, Carlos, 41-42, 48, 50 


Menocal, Mario Garcia, 38, 42, 43, 51-52 


mercantilist economic policy, 14, 21, 24­

25 


Merchant Marine, 320 


Mexico: Cuban relations with, lxv, 


lxxviii-lxxix, 277 


migration, internal, 117 


Mikoyan, Anastas, 68-69 


militarization of society, Iviii-lix, 40-41, 


45,76,80,122,128-29 


military assistance, 71, 293-94, 299-300, 


310 


military intervention in politics, 45, 48, 


50, 76 


military ranks, uniforms, and insignia, 


328-33 


Military Units in Support of Production 


(Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Pro­


duccion-UMAPS), 129 


mining, 108, 176, 186-89 


Ministry of Basic Industries, 191 


Ministry of Education, 145, 146 


Ministry of Foodstuffs Industry, 186 


Ministry of Foreign Trade, 172 


Ministry of Health and Social Assistance, 


140 


Ministry of Higher Education, 146 


Ministry ofInterior, liv, 86, 235, 286, 289, 


295, 298, 302, 306, 335-40; Border 


Guard Troops of, 338-40; Intelligence 


Directorate under, 341-44; leader­


ship and organization of, 335-37; Spe­


cial Troops of, 337-38 


Ministry ofJustice, 238, 239 


Ministry of Labor, 170 


Ministry of Light Industry, 202-203 


Ministry of Public Health, 138-39, 141 


Ministry of Science, Technology, and the 


Environment, 101-102 


Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed 


Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas 


Armadas Revolucionarias-MIN­


FAR), lxxi, 287, 295-307 


Ministry ofTourism, 217 


Miro Cardona,Jose, 64 


Moa, 186 


Moa Bay, 108, 110, 186 


Moncada military barracks: attack on, 


58,60,251 


Monroe Doctrine, 24 


Montecristi conspiracy, 59 


mortality rate, 91, 113-14, 119, 120, 150; 


infant, 113-14, 119; maternal, 114 


mountain ranges, 94-97 


445 
Cuba: A Country Study 

mulattos, 117, 119, 120, 122 


Municipal Commission for Candidacies, 


240 


municipalities, 240-43, 256 


National Assembly of People's Power 


(Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popu­


lar-ANPP), lxxii, lxxx, 160, 167, 168, 


176,230,231-35,237,238,239,243­

45,255,280,304-305 


National Association of Small Farmers 


(Asociaci6n Nacional de Agricultores 


Pequeiios-ANAP), 124-25, 128,234, 


256,257,258,259,314 


National Commission for Candidacies, 


234, 240 


National Commission for Environmental 


Protection and Conservation of Natu­


ral Resources (Comisi6n Nacional 


para la Protecci6n del Medio Ambi­


ente y la Conservaci6n de los Recursos 


Naturales-Comarna),101 


National Defense Council, 305, 306, 312 


National Drug Commission, 347 


national identity, 8-9, 16-17, 25, 28, 35­

36,39,42 


nationalism, 39, 231 


Nationalist Union, 41 


nationalization (economic), xlix, 46, 47, 


65-66,68,69,122 


national parks, 107 


National Revolutionary Militias (Mili­


cias Nacionales Revolucionarias­


MNR), 288, 289, 290 


National Revolutionary Police (Policia 


Nacional Revolucionaria-PNR), 125, 


340-41 


National Statistical Office (Oficina 


Nacional de Estadisticas-ONE), 163 


National Trade Union of Agricultural 


and Forestry Workers (Sindicato 


Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y 


Forestales-SNTAF),128 


natural gas, 190 


naval blockade, 71-72 


navy. See Revolutionary Navy 


Nicaragua: Cuban activities in, Iv, 82, 294 


Nicaro,108 


nickel production, lxxxii, 108, 165, 185, 


186-89,217 


Nonaligned Movement, Ii, 76, 81 


nongovernmen tal organ izations 


(NGOs), 125, 263-65 


North American Free Trade Agree­


ment,220 


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 


(NPT),307 


nuclear power, 190, 275 


Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), 72 


Nuevitas, 193-95 


nutrition, 105, 121, 150 


Ocampo, Sebastian de, 9 


occupation, of Cuba: by Britain, xlvii, liv, 


17-18; by the United States, 21, 32-34 


Ochoa affair, liv, 295-98, 302-303, 336, 


349-50 


Ochoa Sanchez, Arnaldo, 86, 296, 336, 


349-50 


Office of the State Prosecutor, 239 


offshore drilling, 110 


oil exploration, 110, 191 


oil imports, lxxxii, 110, 191-92, 208-209, 


213-14 


oil production, 110, 165, 190-92 


Organization of American States (OAS), 


xlix, I, liii, liv, Iv, lvii, lviii, Ix, lxii, 71, 


307 


Organization ofJose Marti Pioneers 


(Organizaci6n de Pioneros Jose 


Marti-OPJM),127,314,326 


organized labor, 49, 50, 127-28 


Oriente Province, 25, 33, 38, 42, 57, 60, 


121 


Ortega, Jaime, 261 


Orthodox Party, 54, 55, 56, 57 


Ostend Manifesto, 20 


Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition 


of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 


and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 


and on Their Destruction (1997), 307 


Ovando, Nicolas de, 9 


Pact of Zanj6n, 27 


Panama Canal, 30 


Pan de Guajaib6n, 97 


party congresses, 78, 203, 230, 245-51, 


252-56,257,303 


party control of society, 78-80, 228-29, 


271-74 


party structure, 78, 249-56 


446 
Paya, Oswaldo, Ixxx 


Penal Code, 286-87, 348, 356, 357, 359­

60 


penal system, 356-62 


peninsulares. See Peninsulars 


Peninsulars, 12,22,23-24,28 


Pentecostal churches, 137 


People's Councils, 243 


People's Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular-PSP), 52-53, 58, 67 


perestroika, 85, 162 


Perez Betancourt, Pedro Miguel, 311 


Perez Morales, Alvaro, 302 


Perez Roque, Felipe, !xxvi 


Permanent Reciprocity Treaty (1903), 


34 


personalismo, 35, 78 


peso, convertible, 176,211-12 


Pico La Cuca, 97 


Pico Real del Turquino, 94 


Pico Sanjuan, 97 


Pierce, Franklin, 20 


Pinar del Rio Province, 30, 42, 93, 94, 97, 


103, 104, 121, 240, 243, 244, 315, 319, 


321,326 


Pizarro, Francisco, 9 


plantation economy, 20 


plantation system, 16 


"plantocracy," 19-20 


Platt, Orville R., 33 


Platt Amendment, xlvii, lxvii, 33, 34-44, 


46,47,308 


"Platt Amendment complex," 42-43 


police. See National Revolutionary 


Police 


Political Bureau, 78, 137,228,235,247, 


249-52, 253, 254, 257, 258, 264, 271, 


280,303 


political dynamics, 229, 268-74, 279-80 


political opposition, lxxx, lxxxi, 239, 


265-67,272 


political participation, 245 


political parties, 67, 245 


political prisoners, lxi, 239, 353-56 


political repression, xlix, lv, lx, lxii, 57, 


67,70,239,245,353 


political violence, 36, 38, 45, 53, 57 


Polk,James K.., 20 


pollution, 108-109, 110 


Popular Party, 40 


population, 110-17; density of, Ill; size 


and growth of, xlvii, 110-11 


Index 

Portal Leon, Marcos, 252, 270 


ports, 94, 193-95 


precipitation, 98-100 


priests, 15, 132, 133 


Prieto Jimenez, Abel, 252, 270 


Prio Socarras, Carlos, 4, 53 54, 59, 60 


prison system, 360-61 


private property, 122, 160, 176, 231 


privatization, 231 


prostitution, 149, 153-54,345 


Protestants, 132, 135-36, 262 


"Protest ofBaragua," 27 


provinces, 79,240,243,256 


Provincial Commission for Candidacies, 


240 


public health,139-40, 141, 144 


public works, 36, 40, 50, 52 


Puerto Gibara, 94 


Puerto Principe, 10 


Punta Gorda, 108 


Punta Santa Ana, 326 


Putin, Vladimir, lxxiii-lxxiv, lxxv 


Quintas Sola, Joaquin, 316 


racial composition, 117-20 


racial conflict, 38 


railroads, 192, 193 


Ramirez Cruz,Jose, 257 


reforestation, 102, 107 


Reform Commission, 23 


reformism, 22, 28, 49-55 


Reformist Party, 22 


religion, 92, 131-38, 228, 259-63; free­


dom of, lxix-lxx, lxxxii, 134, 230, 231, 


259 


remittances, cash, lxi, lxvi, lxix, lxx, lxx­


vii, 92, 131, 149, 152, 153, 161, 175, 


178 


reservoirs, 98 


revolution (1933),4,44-49 


revolution (1959). See Cuban Revolution 


revolution, export of, xlix, I, 68, 69, 74­

75,81-82; 290-91 


Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas 


Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR), lvii, 


lxxi, 127, 235, 269, 270-71, 285-307, 


310-35; agricultural production by, 


295,298,300; air forces, 319-20; 


armed services of, 310; army, 315-19; 


447 
Cuba: A Country Study 

background, 287-95; economic role, 


300-301, 310; "internationalist" mis­


sions, 291-95, 310, 311-12, 324; 


involvement in the government and 


party, 301-304; manpower, 311, 322­

25; military doctrine, 312; missions, 


311-12; navy, 320-21; ranks, insignia, 


and uniforms, 328-33; relations with 


other armed forces, 334-35; relations 


with Russia, 333-34; role in public life, 


271; Soviet military assistance to, 299­

300, 310; training and education, 325­

28; women in, 324-25 


Revolutionary Army, 310, 315-19 


Revolutionary Directorate, 59, 60-62, 63 


RevolutionaryJunta of Cuba, 25 


Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra 


Revolucionaria-MGR), 310, 315, 


320-21,350 


rice production, 104, 105, 180, 184-85 


Rivero Agiiero, Andres, 63-64 


rivers, 97-98 


roads, 192-93 


Robaina Gonzalez, Roberto, 252 


Rodriguez Garcia, Jose Luis, 258, 263, 


270 


Rodriguez Romay, Orlando Felipe, 302 


Roman Catholic Church, 15, 131, 132­

34,138,144,150,259-62,268 


Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 45, 47, 52 


Roosevelt, Theodore, 32 


Rosales del Toro, Uiises, 252, 270, 302, 


303,310 


Ross Leal, Pedro, 257 


Rural Guard, 62 


Russia: Cuban relations with, lxxiii-lxxiv, 


275-76,333-34 


Sagua la Grande River, 97, 98 


Saldo River, 98 


salinization, 97,104,107 


San Antonio de los Banos, 319 


Sancti Spiritus, 10,319 


Sancti Spiritus Province, 94-97, 120, 


240,243,316,319 


Sandinistas, 5, 75, 81-82, 294 


Sanguily, Manuel, 32 


sanitation, 106, 109, 121 


San Julian, 319 


Santa Clara, 112, 138,316,319 


Santamaria Cuadrado, AIdo, 350 


sant~a, 132, 135,262 


Santiago de Cuba, 10, 11-12, 112, 138, 


193-95, 316 


Santiago de Cuba Province, 94, 120,240, 


243,244,251,316,319 


Schools in the Countryside, 146-47 


second economy, 151, 205-207 


self-employment, 160, 169-71,246,258 


Senate, 32, 38 


Serrano, Francisco, 24 


Seven Years War, 17 


sewerage systems, 106, 109 


Sierra de Cristal, 94, 107 


Sierra de Cubitas, 107 


Sierra de Escambray, 94-97, 103, 107 


Sierra de los Organos, 97, 107 


Sierra del Rosario, 97 


Sierra de Nicaro, 94 


Sierra de Nipe, 94, 108 


Sierra de Trinidad, 97 


Sierra Maestra mountain range, 60, 61, 


62,94,107,308 


slave rebellions, 16, 20 


slavery: abolition of, in Cuba, 22, 28: 


legacy of, 121 


slaves, 15-16, 18,26-27, 112, 118, 134 


slave trade, 18, 19, 21, 22 


social change, 153, 154-55 


social engineering, 154 


socialism, in Cuba, lvi, lxxxi, 65-66, 76, 


78-79, 85-86, 122, 154, 167, 228, 231, 


274 


socialization, 124-31 


social mobility, 122-24 


social security, 122, 151 


social services, 242 


social structure, 118, 120-24 


social welfare, 50, 52, 91,122,151,154 


soil compaction, 104 


soil conservation, 104 


soil contamination, 104 


soil degradation, 104, 180 


Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 5, 75, 82 


Soviet military involvement in Cuba, 71, 


293-94,299-300 


Soviet Union: Cuban relations with, liii­


liv, 67, 68-69, 71, 72, 74, 75-77, 80, 81, 


82-85,227-28,290,293-94,299-300 


Spanish-American War, xlvii, 3, 21, 24, 


32, 113, 132, 308 


Spanish heritage, 9 


Special Period, 91, 92, 103, 106, 109­

448 
1l0, 128, 131, 136-37, 149, 150, 159, 


162,221,298 


Special Troops, 292, 337-38 


standard ofliving, 76, 121, 159, 160,222, 


228 


State Committee for Technical and 


Material Supply (Comite Estatal de 


Abastecimiento Tecnico-Material­


CEATM),172 


State Committee on Labor and Social 


Security (Comite Estatal de Trabajo y 


Seguridad Social-CETSS), 203 


state farms, 102-103, 160, 171, 183, 185 


Straits of Florida, 278, 351 


Student Left Wing (Ala Izquierda Estudiantil-AIE),41 

subsidies, Soviet, lvii, lxxv, 80, 91, 100, 


105, 109, 144, 149,208,209,210,227, 


247,251 


subsistence agriculture, 122, 183--85 

Sugar Coordination Law, 50 


sugar production, lxxxii, 3, 13, 18-19, 


21,56, 104, 105, 121, 159, 165, 180­

84,217 


sugar slavocracy, 24-25, 28 


Supreme Court, 233, 238, 360 


sustainable development, 101, 102 


System for Managerial Improvement 


(Sistema de Perfeccionamiento 


Empresarial-SPE), 286, 300 


Tacon, Miguel, 24 


Taino,6,7,8,9-10 


tariffs, 177 


tax code, 168, 170-71 


Taylor, Zachary, 20 


teachers, 150 


technology transfers, 221 


telecommunications, 195-98 


Teller, Henry M., 32 


Teller Resolution, 32 


Ten Years' War, 23--29 

Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de 


Tropas Territoriales-MTT), 311, 


312-14 


terrorism threat, lxxv-lxxvi, Ixxix 

tobacco production, 3, 13-14, 19, 180, 


183, 184 


topography, 94-97 


Torricelli, Robert G., 276 


tourism, xlix, lv, lvii, lxix, lxx, lxxvii, 


Index 

lxxxii, DO, 152-53, 159, 165, 167, 180, 


198-200,217,286 


trade deficits, 209-210 


transportation, 165, 192-95 


Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 


Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 


TlateloIco), 307 


Treaty of Paris (1763), 17 


Treaty of Paris (1898), 32 


Treaty of Relations (1903), 34 


Trejo, Rafael, 41 


tribunals, revolutionary, 65, 68 


Trinidad, 10 


tropical fruit production, 183--84 


Twenty-Sixth ofJuly Movement, 60, 61, 


62,63,64,67,70 


Unconditional Spanish Party, 22 


underemployment, 80, 151 


unemployment, 76, 122, 151-52, 201­

203 


Union of Young Communists (Union de 


Jovenes Comunistas-UJC), 124-25, 


126,127,134,253,254-55,326 


United Nations Development Pro­


gramme (UNDP), lxxviii, 109 


United Nations Economic Commission 


for Latin America and the Caribbean 


(ECLAC), 151, 152 


United Nations General Assembly, lviii, 


Iix, lx, lxi, lxii, lxiii-lxiv, lxvi, lxix, 


lxxvi, lxxvii, 277 


United Nations Security Council, lvi 

United States: Cuban relations with, 


lxvii, lxxiii, lxxvi, lxxix, lxxxi, 67-70, 


83-84, 86, 227-28, 276-79, 306-307, 


308-10 


United States Border Patrol, 351 


United States Coast Guard, 115,347-48, 


350,352 


United States-Cuba Trade and Economic 


Council,219 


United States Marines, 36, 38, 308,309 


United States Naval Station at Guan­


tanamo Bay, lxvii, 33, 34-35, 278, 307, 


308-310,316 


United States Navy, 308, 309 


University Council, 41 


University of Havana, 47, 52, 54, 55, 59, 


67 


University Reform Commission, 39, 40 


449 
Cuba: A Country Study 

University Students Directorate (Direc­


torio Estudiantil Universitario­


DEU), 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 53 


urbanization, ll2, 121, 122 


Urrutia, Manuel, 64 


Valdes Menendez, Ramiro, 335-36 


Varadero, 110, 195, 228 


Varela, Felix, \xxx 


Varela Project, lxxx, lxxxi, Ixxxii 


Veiga Menendez, Roberto, 257 


Velazquez de Cuellar, Diego, 9, 10, II 


Villa Clara Province, 120, 240, 243, 244, 


316,319 


Villanueva University, 132 


wages, 201 


War of All the People (Guerra de Todo 


el Pueblo-GTP), 312, 313 


Watergate scandal, 74 


water resources, 105-107 


water use, 105-107 


Welles, Benjamin Sumner, 42, 43, 47, 


48-49 


Weyler, Valeriano, 30 


women's organizations, 126-27 


women's rights, 66, 123-24 


Wood, Leonard, 33, 34 


work-study programs, 146-47 


World Trade Agreement, 220 


World War II, 52 


yellow fever, 33 


Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de 


Trabajo-EJT), 124-25, 129, 291, 3ll 


youth organizations, 126-27 


Yucatan Peninsula, xlvii, 93 


Zayas y Alonso, Alfredo, 39 


Zaza River, 97, 98 


450 
Contributors 

Sergio Diaz-Briquets is Senior Division Director, Casals and 

Associates, Arlington, Virginia. He has written extensively 

on Cuban social and environmental issues. 

Jorge I. Dominguez is Director, Weatherhead Center for International Mfairs, and Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, 

Massachusetts. He has written extensively on Cuban political affairs and foreign relations. 

Rex A. Hudson is Senior Research Specialist in Latin American 

Mfairs with the Federal Research Division of the Library 

of Congress. His earlier research on Cuba focused on 

Cuban support for insurgency in Latin America and 

Cuban diplomatic relations in the region. 

Enrique J. Lopez is an international information technology 

consultant and President, AKL Group, Inc., Coral Cables, 

Florida. 

Jorge Perez-Lopez is Director, Office of International Economic Mfairs, Bureau of International Labor Mfairs, 

United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. He 

has written extensively on the Cuban economy. 

Jaime Suchlicki is Professor of History, Graduate School of 

International Studies, and Director, Institute for Cuban 

and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS), University of 

Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. He has written extensively 

on Cuban history. 

Phyllis Greene Walker is a Washington-area political scientist 

who has written extensively on Cuban military and security affairs. 

451 

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454