Filed 9/14/21 In re Z.R. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Guardianship of Z.R., a Minor. 2d Civil No. B300696

(Super. Ct. No. BP168313)

(Los Angeles County)

EARL DUFFIE, SR., et al.,

 Petitioners and Respondents,

v.

C.R.,

 Objector and Appellant.

C.R. appeals from the probate court’s order granting 

permanent guardianship of her son, Z.R., to his paternal 

grandparents, Earl and Verlene Duffie.

1 C.R. contends the order 

must be vacated because: (1) the court failed to issue a written 

statement of decision, and (2) substantial evidence does not 

support the order. We affirm.

1 We use the Duffies’ first names for clarity.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

C.R. and her son, Z.R.

C.R. is a survivor of sex trafficking. She was 

abducted in 2010, when she was just 13 years old, and trafficked 

for the next three years. While trafficked, police arrested her for 

prostitution. The juvenile court ordered her to serve a term of 

probation after her arrest.

At age 17, C.R. was impregnated by a 19-year-old 

drug dealer who had been in and out of prison. C.R. needed 

stable housing during her pregnancy, which the father was 

unable to provide. The probation department assigned her to St. 

Anne’s Maternity Group Home, where she gave birth to Z.R. The 

father was incarcerated at the time, and was not involved in 

Z.R.’s life.

As a condition of her probation, C.R. had to maintain 

her placement at St. Anne’s. While there, she received various 

certificates and awards. It proved difficult for her to abide by the 

rules, however. She left without permission, left Z.R. 

unattended, had him in her room and bed, and “mishandl[ed]” or 

“rough” handled him. Eventually, C.R. agreed to let the father’s 

parents, Earl and Verlene, take custody of Z.R. while she secured 

housing and employment. The probate court later appointed Earl 

and Verlene as Z.R.’s temporary guardians.

Between May and October 2015, C.R. lived in four 

different shelters, but managed to graduate from high school. 

She also continued to visit her son. Personnel monitoring the 

visits noted C.R.’s continued “rough handling” of Z.R. and 

reported it to Earl and Verlene, who petitioned the probate court 

for permanent guardianship of Z.R. C.R. objected to the petition 

and filed a petition to terminate the temporary guardianship.
3

Trial proceedings

Trial on Earl and Verlene’s petition began in 

November 2016, lasting six days over the course of eight months. 

Violet Dawson, a probation officer who last interacted with C.R. 

and Z.R. more than 18 months before trial, testified that C.R. 

shook her son and “pound[ed] on [him].” Verlene testified that 

C.R. acted inappropriately with Z.R. by referring to him as “sexy” 

and putting her tongue in his mouth. Earl also said C.R. put her 

tongue in Z.R.’s mouth and handled him “rough[ly].”

Dee Dee Mascarenas, an expert in relationship 

attachment, child development, and trauma, testified that Z.R. 

“ha[d] had enough losses in his life” and that “it would be 

important to reduce more loss.” She said that C.R. needed the 

assistance of others to develop her parenting skills. Because 

those skills would take at least two years to develop, she 

recommended a transition plan that would incrementally 

increase C.R.’s time with her son and eventually lead to 

reunification.

During trial, the court noted that C.R. displayed a 

lack of maturity. C.R.’s emotional development was akin to that 

of a 13- or 14-year-old. The court told C.R. that she needed to 

work on her immaturity issues with a therapist.

The court also expressed concern about Z.R.’s 

stability: “[He’s] not an inanimate object that can just be moved 

around like a potted plant. All right? [He’s] not—the child’s not 

a toy.” As to C.R., the court said that it was “looking for a 

pattern of constructive accomplishment or improvement.” She 

needed to show “some sort of . . . financial stability and 

responsibility.” Whether C.R. could demonstrate that stability 

and responsibility was the factor on which the petitions hinged.
4

At the conclusion of trial, the court declined to grant 

the petition for permanent guardianship, and instead extended 

the temporary guardianship for two years. That transition period 

would give C.R. time to “turn [it] around and impress” everyone 

by progressing toward the financial stability necessary to have 

Z.R. returned to her care.

Posttrial proceedings

C.R. had several unsupervised visits with her son 

after trial. Not all were successful. Over the span of 10 months, 

Z.R. suffered five documented injuries: an allergic reaction to 

orange juice, an allergic reaction to blue dye in a cookie, two 

bruises, and a broken nose. These injuries prompted Z.R.’s 

appointed counsel to file a request to modify C.R.’s visits. The 

court granted the request and ordered supervised visits.

Two years after the conclusion of trial, C.R. requested 

that the probate court continue her transition plan and terminate 

the temporary guardianship. She also requested a statement of 

decision “laying out the factual basis for the [c]ourt’s finding that 

returning [Z.R.] to [her] care would be detrimental to him.”

At a July 2019 status hearing, C.R. reiterated her 

request for a statement of decision “regarding the basis for 

detriment” if the court were to grant Earl and Verlene’s request 

for a permanent guardianship. The court declined to do so. It

told C.R. that she had “ignored” its direction to get a job and 

create a stable environment for Z.R. And during the argument of 

Z.R.’s appointed counsel, the court told C.R. that her nonverbal 

testimony—rolling her eyes and throwing up her hands—was 

prohibited. C.R. ignored the court’s admonishment, interrupting 

counsel’s argument by exclaiming, “This is my son you’re talking 
5

about. This is my child you’re talking about. You act like I don’t 

love my kid.” The hearing ended immediately thereafter.

The court issued two minute orders after the hearing. 

In the first, the court found that, “based [on] the reading of the 

moving papers and consideration of all presented evidence,” there 

was sufficient evidence to support appointing Earl and Verlene as 

Z.R.’s guardians.

The court’s second order denied C.R.’s petition to 

terminate Earl and Verlene’s guardianship. The court viewed its 

task as “determin[ing] what [was] in the best interest of [Z.R.], 

including [his] health, safety[,] and welfare, and who [was/were] 

the more appropriate guardian(s) to facilitate that goal.” Though 

C.R. loved her son, Earl and Verlene “ha[d] provided a safe, 

stable[,] and loving home” and had provided “continuity and a 

nurturing environment.” The court was thus unwilling to restore 

[Z.R.] to his mother’s custody unless she showed that she had 

established “a steady pattern of therapy, reunification therapy, 

residence, work[,] and/or school[,] including responsible and 

mature behavior at all times with the minor, with the temporary 

guardians, [and] in the courtroom”—things she had failed to do 

over the preceding two years. In short, the court was “not 

convinced [that C.R.] appreciate[d] her responsibilities as a 

parent and [was] not taking the[] proceedings seriously.” There 

was thus clear and convincing evidence that it would be 

detrimental to remove Z.R. from Earl and Verlene’s home.

At a later status hearing, C.R. asked the court to 

clarify whether it had granted Earl and Verlene temporary or 

permanent guardianship of Z.R. The court said that it had 

granted permanent guardianship. C.R. then renewed her request 
6

for a statement of decision. The court refused because C.R. 

“didn’t ask for [the statement with] specificity under the rules.”

DISCUSSION

Statement of decision

C.R. contends the order granting permanent 

guardianship should be vacated because the court erroneously 

and prejudicially rejected her request for a statement of decision. 

We disagree.

“Upon the trial of a question of fact in a proceeding to 

determine the custody of a minor child, the [probate] court shall, 

upon the request of either party, issue a statement of the decision 

explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision.” (Fam. 

Code, § 3022.3.) A statement of decision may also be required 

after a “‘special proceeding,’” such as a child custody

determination. (In re Rose G. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 406, 418.) If 

required, the statement “shall be in writing,” and must respond 

to the “controverted issues” specified by the requesting party. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) A court’s failure to issue a properly 

requested statement requires reversal unless that failure was 

harmless—i.e., did not “‘result[] in a miscarriage of justice.’” 

(F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1102.)

Here, any error in refusing to issue a written 

statement of decision was harmless. Before granting a 

nonparent’s request for permanent guardianship of a child, a 

court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) 

“granting custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child,”

and (2) “granting custody to the nonparent is required to serve 
7

the best interest of the child.” (Fam. Code, § 3041,2 subds. (a) & 

(b); see also In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 683.) “‘[D]etriment 

to the child’ includes the harm of removal from a stable 

placement of a child with a person who has assumed, on a day-today basis, the role of [their] parent, fulfilling both the child’s 

physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and 

affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period 

of time.” (Fam. Code, § 3041, subd. (c).) It “does not require any 

finding of unfitness of the parents,” however. (Ibid.)

At the conclusion of the July 2019 status hearing, the 

court issued two minute orders. In one, the court stated that it 

had read all of the moving papers, considered all of the evidence, 

and found sufficient evidence to appoint Earl and Verlene as 

Z.R.’s guardians. In the other, the court was more specific, 

finding that Earl and Verlene “ha[d] provided a safe, stable[,] and 

loving home” for Z.R. and had provided him with “continuity and 

a nurturing environment.” C.R., in contrast, had failed to 

regularly participate in therapy, did not have a stable residence, 

and had not secured steady employment. She also failed to 

“appreciate her responsibilities as a parent” and had not taken

the custody proceedings “seriously.” To the court, this was clear 

and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to return 

Z.R. to C.R.’s care and that granting custody to Earl and Verlene 

instead would be in the child’s best interest. No more was 

required by the Family Code.

That the court made its findings in an order 

purportedly denying C.R.’s request to terminate the temporary 

2 The Legislature amended Family Code section 3041 

effective January 1, 2020. References here are to the provisions 

in effect when the probate court made its findings.
8

guardianship rather than in the order granting permanent 

guardianship of Z.R. is of no consequence. Deciding a case based 

on a mistitled order “would be to exalt form over substance,” 

something we cannot do. (Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden

Associates (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 508, 516.) Because the court 

made the required findings and explained the factual and legal 

basis for them, any error in failing to issue a statement of 

decision did not result in a miscarriage of justice. 

Permanent guardianship award

C.R. next contends there was insufficient evidence to 

support the court’s decision to award Earl and Verlene 

permanent guardianship of Z.R. We again disagree.

When tasked with “reviewing a finding that a fact 

has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question 

before [us] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it 

highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996.) “[I]n making this assessment 

[we] view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may 

have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in 

the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the 

evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.) But it is immaterial whether we would 

have drawn those same inferences (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 792, 811-812); our job is not to reweigh evidence or 

reevaluate witness credibility (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 

294, 314).

Substantial evidence supports the decision to grant 

Earl and Verlene permanent guardianship of Z.R. As set forth 

above, before granting the guardianship request the court had to 
9

find that granting custody to C.R. would be detrimental to Z.R. 

and that granting custody to Earl and Verlene instead would be 

in Z.R.’s best interest. The evidence supports these findings. For 

example, several witnesses testified that C.R. was too rough or 

“inappropriate” when she interacted with her son. C.R.’s own 

expert testified that it was “important” to reduce the amount of 

loss in Z.R.’s life. She also said that C.R. needed time to develop 

better parenting skills.

Two years after trial, C.R. had yet to develop those 

skills. Z.R. suffered several injuries while in her care, which led 

to the reinstatement of supervised visits. C.R. did not have a 

stable job or secure housing. She had not participated in 

sufficient services, and failed to “appreciate her responsibilities 

as a parent.” She also failed to take the guardianship 

proceedings “seriously” and displayed immaturity by rolling her 

eyes at the court, throwing up her hands, and interrupting 

arguments. Earl and Verlene, in contrast, had cared for Z.R. for 

nearly his entire life, providing him with a “safe, stable[,] and 

loving home” and giving him “continuity and a nurturing 

environment.” Based on the evidence, a reasonable factfinder 

could have found it highly probable that disrupting that 

environment would be detrimental to Z.R., and maintaining it 

would be in his best interest. Substantial evidence thus supports 

the court’s order granting Earl and Verlene’s request for 

permanent guardianship.
10

DISPOSITION

The probate court’s order granting Earl and Verlene 

Duffie’s request for permanent guardianship of Z.R., entered July 

16, 2019, is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Elizabeth A. Lippitt, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Mayer Brown, Donald M. Falk, Sarah E. Balkissoon; 

Family Violence Appellate Project, Shuray Ghorishi, Arati Vasan, 

Jennafer Dorfman Wagner and Erin Smith for Objector and 

Appellant. 

Levin Simes Abrams, Angela J. Nehmens and Brian 

J. Perkins for Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking, 

Freedom Network USA, and HEAL Trafficking as Amici Curiae 

on behalf of Objector and Appellant. 

Mariam E. Hanna for Petitioners and Respondents.