[Cite as Hahn v. Hahn, 2012-Ohio-594.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96984 

LISA M. HAHN

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

WILLIAM K. HAHN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. CP-D-304819 

BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Stewart, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2012 

 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
2

Joseph G. Stafford 

Gregory J. Moore 

Stafford & Stafford Co., L.P.A. 

55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Gary S. Okin 

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A. 

60 South Park Place 

Painesville, Ohio 44077 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} William K. Hahn (“William”) appeals from the trial court’s decision, 

wherein objections filed by Lisa K. Hahn (“Lisa”), were sustained, in part, and which 

also modified the order of the magistrate issued July 19, 2010. William argues the trial 

court abused its discretion in computing the child support amount, in failing to terminate 

that child support order, in failing to order Lisa to pay child support, in calculating the 

parties’ income, and that the trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Finding no merit to this appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

{¶2} The parties were married August 15, 1987 and two children were born as 

issue of the marriage, E.W.H., (d.o.b. 12/28/93) and J.T.H., (d.o.b. 1/4/97). On May 17, 

2005, Lisa filed for divorce from William, citing incompatibility. On May 21, 2007, the 
3

trial court granted the parties a judgment entry of divorce, which provided for shared 

parenting and incorporated a shared parenting plan. The judgment entry of divorce 

required William to pay to Lisa $1,000 per month, plus a two percent processing fee for 

the support of their two children; $3,000 per month, plus a two percent processing fee, in 

spousal support for a period of five years; and health insurance for the minor children. 

{¶3} On February 26, 2009, William filed a series of motions with the trial court 

seeking the following: (1) the enforcement of the parties’ judgment entry of divorce; 

(2) the modification of the parental rights and responsibilities of the parties’ two minor 

children; (3) the modification of child support obligations; and (4) reimbursement of 

expenses relating to the children. Each of the above-filed motions contained a request 

for attorney fees, which was later withdrawn. 

{¶4} The parties were unable to come to a resolution and the matter went to trial 

before a magistrate on March 2, 2010. On March 3, 2010, the parties reached an 

agreement resolving all issues relating to William’s motion to modify parental rights and 

responsibilities. The parties agreed to modify the shared parenting plan to increase 

William’s parenting time to equal that of Lisa’s. In addition, the parties set forth 

specific details concerning which parent would receive the children on their birthdays 

and holidays. Further, the parties modified the shared parenting agreement to account 

for the minor children’s extensive involvement with competitive and recreational skiing 

for which William agreed to be responsible. 
4

{¶5} The remainder of the trial continued on March 9, 2010 and the parties filed 

closing arguments with the court. On July 19, 2010, the magistrate issued his decision. 

{¶6} The magistrate granted William’s motion to modify parental rights and 

responsibilities and incorporated the parties’ modified shared parenting agreement as 

outlined above, into the decision. 

{¶7} With respect to William’s motion to modify child support, it was alleged 

during trial by William that there did exist numerous changes in circumstances 

warranting a modification of the court’s previous child support order. He did 

demonstrate that Lisa’s income rose from $40,000 at the time of divorce to $74,067 in 

2009; that she could provide health insurance for the children for $2,727 annually, while 

his annual expense to provide health insurance was $6,060 annually; that his parenting 

time now equals that of Lisa’s and that he provides for all the expenses of the children’s 

competitive and recreational skiing, which exceeded $5,600 per year. 

{¶8} The magistrate agreed with William’s arguments and determined that 

based on the foregoing, a substantial change in circumstances existed to warrant the 

modification of the child support obligation and granted the motion to modify. The 

court determined Lisa’s 2009 income to be $74,067 in addition to $36,000 in spousal 

support for a total income of $108,586 (after the deduction of local taxes) and 

determined William’s income to be $191,393, from which he paid to Lisa $36,000 in 

spousal support, for a total income in 2009 of $151,565 (after the deduction of local 
5

taxes). The court noted that while the child support obligation of $1,020 per month for 

both children represents a significant downward derivation from that outlined in R.C. 

3119.04(B), the amount was agreed to by the parties, whose motivations at arriving at 

that amount were unknown to the court. The decision also reflected the changed 

parenting schedule, the changed health insurance abilities of the parties, and that William 

paid all costs for the children’s recreational and competitive skiing on his own. 

{¶9} With respect to the children’s skiing, it was found that the minor children’s 

standard of living certainly would have included both competitive and recreational skiing 

had the parties remained married. Lisa testified that she wanted the children to ski but 

did not want to contribute to the cost of said skiing. Consequently, the magistrate found 

that, pursuant to R.C. 3119.04(B), the annual cost of the children’s participation in skiing 

should be considered child support and that William should be given a credit for that 

expense that was $5,600 annually. That figure was compared with the child support 

guidelines, which provide for a basic combined support obligation of $21,971. The 

decision reflected no need to upwardly depart from that amount because the parties had 

agreed that all of the needs of the children were being met. According to the 

magistrate, in conjunction with the child support guidelines, William’s annual child 

support obligation equaled $5,230. When credited with the payment of the ski expenses 

in the amount of $5,600, it was determined that no further child support should be 

exchanged between the parties. 
6

{¶10} Lastly, the magistrate determined that because Lisa could provide health 

insurance for the children at a significantly discounted rate than William was able to 

provide, Lisa would be required to provide the hospitalization from that point onward. 

{¶11} William’s motion for reimbursement for the money that he spent on his 

minor children, the majority of which allowed the children to continue skiing was 

denied. The magistrate found that his willingness to exceed his legal child support 

responsibility to be laudable, but also voluntary. The parties’ shared parenting 

agreement, up until that time, did not provide for any responsibility to pay for ski 

expenses. As such, William was not entitled to further reimbursement of those funds 

already expended. 

{¶12} After listening to the testimony of the parties, the magistrate determined 

that Lisa had failed to provide certain items of personal property to which William was 

entitled pursuant to the judgment entry of divorce, found her in contempt of the court’s 

previous order, and sentenced her to 30 days in jail but provided her with the opportunity 

to purge the order of contempt. 

{¶13} On October 18, 2010, Lisa filed a series of objections to the magistrate’s 

decision, all of which related to the decision on William’s motion to modify child 

support. On December 17, 2010, William filed his response to the objections but did 

not submit any of his own objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶14} On June 6, 2011, the court issued its decision, adopting the magistrate’s 
7

decision, in part, and sustaining Lisa’s objections, in part. The court noted that the 

objections related solely to William’s motion to modify child support and adopted the 

magistrate’s findings on all other portions of the decision. The court overruled the first 

objection and determined that the change in availability of health care at such a reduced 

rate alone, constituted a substantial change in circumstances that warranted a 

modification of child support. 

{¶15} The remaining four objections to the magistrate’s decision that related to 

the manner in which the magistrate calculated the parties’ support obligations, were dealt 

with contemporaneously. The court found the magistrate’s findings regarding the income 

of the parties to be supported by the testimony and overruled those portions of the 

objections. 

{¶16} The court analyzed the magistrate’s decision regarding the child support 

obligation and determined that the magistrate’s calculations were erroneous. The 

present child support obligation was set at $1,020 per month by agreement of the parties, 

but with no explanation for the downward deviation. In his decision, the magistrate 

calculated the parties’ combined child support obligation at $21,971 annually without 

making any adjustment despite the fact that the parties’ combined income exceeded 

$150,000. The magistrate then adjusted William’s obligation downward because the 

parties had equal parenting time. This resulted in the magistrate’s calculation of 

William’s child support obligation at $5,230 per year, or $435.93 per month, per child. 
8

The magistrate next found that the children’s standard of living included skiing, the cost 

of which was approximately $5,600 per year, which was paid solely by William. The 

magistrate found that there was no agreement in the parties’ shared parenting plan or 

otherwise for payment of the annual ski-related expenses and William’s willingness to 

pay these expenses was voluntary as Lisa was not willing to contribute to that cost and 

nothing in the prior order allocated any portion of that cost to her. Despite these 

findings, the magistrate offset the entire $5,600 cost against William’s child support 

obligation, which he had already adjusted downward for equal parenting time. As stated 

above, the court found error with these calculations. 

{¶17} The trial court recalculated the parties’ child support obligations and noted 

that because the parties’ combined incomes exceeded $150,000, the court must consider 

the standard of living of the children to determine an appropriate amount of child 

support. See R.C. 3119.04. The court determined that if the marginal rate of 10.5% 

were applied to the excess income, the total combined support obligation is increased to 

$33,537, with William’s child support obligation being $21,128 annually or $1,760.67 

monthly. The court found that child support should be calculated at this amount, then 

found it appropriate to deviate downward from this amount to account for his increased 

parenting time and contributions towards the children’s skiing activities. The court 

found it to be in the children’s best interest for William’s child support obligation to be 

adjusted downward by $9,128 annually, resulting in a child support obligation of $1,000 
9

per month for both children. Thus, the court sustained Lisa’s objections, in part, and 

modified the magistrate’s order by denying William’s motion to modify child support, in 

part, and granting it, in part, only to the extent that Lisa be required to provide health 

insurance for the minor children. It is from this order that William appeals, 

raising the three assignments of error contained in the appendix to this opinion. 

{¶18} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court “erred 

and abused its discretion in calculating the child support order; and by failing to 

terminate the appellant’s spousal [child] 1

 obligation and/or by failing to order the 

Appellee to pay child support to the Appellant.” In his second assignment of error, 

William claims the trial court “erred and abused its discretion in determining the parties’ 

incomes.” 

{¶19} Appellant combines the analysis of his first and second assignments of 

error and this Court will do likewise. 

{¶20} Primarily, we note that appellant has impermissibly raised the following 

arguments: the trial court erred in its calculation of the parties’ income, and that the court 

erred in failing to order Lisa to pay child support to William. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) 

provides as follows: 

 1

Although William’s first assignment of error refers to the termination of his 

spousal support obligation, the body of his appeal refers to the termination of his 

child support obligation. As such, we can assume the inclusion of the word 

“spousal” was an error. 
10

Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on 

appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, 

whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion 

of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that 

finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). 

{¶21} From the record, it is clear that not only did appellant fail to object to the 

portions of the magistrate’s decision concerning the parties’ respective incomes and the 

order of child support, William failed to object to any portion of the magistrate’s 

decision. Accordingly, absent this court’s determination that plain error exists, he is 

now precluded from raising these arguments now on appeal. Upon careful review of 

this case, we do not find that appellant has demonstrated that this is an extremely rare 

case where exceptional circumstances exist that require application of the plain error 

doctrine. Woodworking Shop, LLC v. Shay, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-298, 

2010-Ohio-4568. Accordingly, this portion of William’s first assignment of error, and 

his second assignment of error are overruled. 

{¶22} We limit our analysis to William’s arguments that the trial court abused its 

discretion in calculating the child support obligation and in failing to terminate his child 

support obligation. 

{¶23} When reviewing matters related to child support, we apply an abuse of 

discretion standard. Walk v. Bryant, 4th Dist. No. 03CA7, 2004-Ohio-1295, 2004 WL 

540919; Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th Dist. No. 94456, 2011-Ohio-2255, 2011 WL 1849407. 

 
11

{¶24} On a plain reading of the child support statute, R.C. Chapter 3119, we 

begin by noting that the applicable provisions set forth the procedure for determining the 

appropriate child support obligations based on three distinct tiers of the parties’ annual 

aggregate gross income: (1) less than $6,600; (2) between $6,600 and $150,000; and (3) 

greater than $150,000. For the third tier, which is applicable to the instant case, the 

court determines the appropriate child support on a case-by-case basis, and is not 

required to apply the calculation worksheet. R.C. 3119.04(B). Use of the worksheet in 

this tier is directed to calculating a hypothetical child support amount that is equivalent 

to the amount an obligor would pay if the couple had an aggregate gross income of 

$150,000 or more. In this third tier, the court is bound by three requirements: (1) set the 

child support amount based on the qualitative needs and standard of living of the 

children and parents; (2) ensure that the amount set is not less than the 

$150,000-equivalent, unless awarding the $150,000- equivalent would be inappropriate 

(i.e., would be too much); and (3) if it decides the $150,000-equivalent is inappropriate 

or unjust (i.e., awards less), then journalize the justification for that decision. R.C. 

3119.04(B). See also Zeitler v. Zeitler, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008444, 2004-Ohio-5551, 

2004 WL 2348151; Kapadia. 

{¶25} Because we review the application of this statute for abuse of discretion, 

we need only find a reasonable theory for the trial court’s conduct, and conclude that the 

decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Kapadia. Thus, we 
12

review each of R.C. 3119.04(B)’s three requirements. In the present case, the trial court 

compiled the evidence and testimony and, considering the needs and standard of living, 

set an amount of child support. From the record, we can glean that the court determined 

the amount of child support at $33,537, with appellant’s child support obligation set at 

$21,128 annually, or $1,760.67 monthly. The trial court also determined the 

$150,000-equivalent to be the same as the above. However, the court found the 

$150,000-equivalent as calculated pursuant to the schedule, not just or appropriate, and 

not in the best interest of the children. The court found a reason for a downward 

deviation from application of the schedule and awarded child support in the amount of 

$1,000 per month. In downwardly deviating from the schedule amount, the court issued 

findings, crediting William with his increased parenting time as well as his contributions 

towards the children’s skiing activities. Accordingly, the court also complied with the 

third factor of R.C. 3119.04(B). 

{¶26} Notwithstanding the foregoing, appellant argues that the trial court erred 

when it recalculated the child support amount and when it failed to terminate his child 

support obligation. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it did not take into 

account the full amount he paid towards the children’s skiing activities and that the court 

failed to sufficiently explain its calculations and departure from the magistrate’s 

decision. He offers no authority, however, to this court as to why these arguments 

constitute a valid attack on the court’s calculations but for the fact that he did not agree 
13

with the amount of child support ordered by the court. We find the court’s rationale 

easy to follow and well-supported by the applicable statutory and case law. 

{¶27} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court’s child support 

determination complies with the bounds of the law and is supported by competent 

credible evidence. 

{¶28} The appellant’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶29} In his third and final assignment of error, William argues that the trial 

court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, in putting 

forth this assigned error, he fails to identify how the trial court’s decision is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant merely incorporates the remainder of his 

appellate brief as support for this assigned error, a failure that allows this court to 

disregard his argument. See App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). “If an argument exists 

that can support this assigned error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.” Cardone v. 

Cardone (May 6, 1998), 9th Dist. Nos. 18349 and 18673, 1998 WL 224934. 

{¶30} We have already determined that appellant’s arguments, as set forth in the 

remainder of his brief, are without merit. Thus, we overrule his final assignment of 

error. 

{¶31} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
14

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said lower court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, A.J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR