ABOUT THE REPORT

This report reflects a key goal of USIP's Gender and Peace

Initiative, which seeks to inform policy through analytical and 

practitioner work. The report presents the results of qualitative

research conducted with combatants from the Mai Mai militia

in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as part

of a project by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI).

Interviews conducted at three field sites provide insight

into soldiers’ motivations and their attitudes toward sexual

violence in their group. However, soldiers’ responses also reveal

potential areas for intervention.

This research was funded through a grant from the

Open Society Institute (OSI) and was made possible through

collaboration with the Centre d’Assistance Medico-Psychosociale

(CAMPS). The author gratefully acknowledges the CAMPS

field team for their remarkable dedication and courage in

undertaking this project: Justin Kabanga, Deogratsias Bisimwa

Bulungu, and Dieudonné Bagalwa Cherubala. She would also 

like to thank the team at HHI for their continuing support

and for sharing their knowledge and expertise to help make

this project possible: Michael Vanrooyen, Jennifer Leaning,

Vincenzo Bollettino, Sasha Chriss, Gregg Greenough, and 

Margeaux Fischer.

Jocelyn Kelly is the sexual and gender-based violence research

coordinator for the HHI, where she designs and implements

research projects to examine how different groups experience

and perceive conflict in the DRC. She received her master’s in

public health from the Harvard School of Public Health.

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t United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 signals a new movement in the international community to recognize widespread sexual violence against women in conflict as a 

threat to international peace and security. 

t Research on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has predominantly focused on victims and survivors of rape. A better understanding ofthe roots of SGBV in conflict, however, 

can only be gained by examining the experiences and motivations of perpetrators.

t SGBV has been a pervasive and highly destructive feature of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Soldiers from the Mai Mai militia group, one of many 

armed groups operating in this conflict, describe a number of factors that promote sexual 

violence in the ranks of this group.

t Soldiers have a complex and sometimes contradictory relationship with civilians. Interviewees express a desire to reintegrate into civilian life and return to pre-war norms, and they 

see themselves as protectors of civilians. However, civilians are also seen as a resource that 

can be exploited for money, food, and other needs. 

t For the Mai Mai, sexual violence against women by other armed groups, particularly foreign 

groups, is seen as a motivation to fight. Nevertheless, at least some soldiers justify sexual 

violence perpetrated by members of their own group.

t Some commanders explicitly support rape by treating women as a spoil of war. Men also 

describe rape as a result of individual motives, such as the desire of a particular woman.

t The most effective interventions to address SGBV are tailored to the motivations and decision-making structures of each armed group. An understanding of militia group attitudes is 

especially important as these groups are currently being integrated into the national army.

t Mai Mai commandersshould be held responsible for the violence perpetrated by themselves 

and the men under their command. High levels of concern about contracting HIV/AIDS and 

other sexually transmitted infections pose an opportunity to discourage combatants from 

engaging in sexual violence.

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CONTENTS

Rape in War: Attemps at Understanding 3

Project Background 4

Methodological Challenges 5

Results 5

Recommendations 12
2

t The DRC government should use the integration of Mai Mai troops into the national army 

as an opportunity to retrain troops, with a focus on sensitizing soldiers about human rights 

and the need to protect civilians. Trust between civilians and the military could be built 

through regular meetings among leaders as well as effective prosecution of rape crimes. 

t The international and humanitarian communities can provide mental health counseling to 

demobilized soldiers as well as employment opportunities to assist in reintegration.

To address the issues that arise in conflict and move toward effective reconstruction, policymakers and practitioners must understand the needs, experiences, and motivations of the

different populations involved. At the heart of most conflicts are the armed combatants

themselves—often among the most difficult groupsto access, butsome ofthe most essential 

to understanding the factors driving violence. Hit by two successive wars in 1996 and 1998, 

the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) hangs in limbo between a

conflict and postconflict state. In a theater of impunity, over twenty armed groups operate 

in a shifting landscape of motivations and alliances, leaving the country, after decades of 

unrest, with some of the worst health and development indicators in the world. 

Extremely brutal forms ofsexual violence have been one of the mostsalient and destructive characteristics of the conflict. Despite international recognition of the problem, levels 

of rape in eastern DRC increased in 2009 and remain extremely high.

1 The United Nations 

estimatesthat 200,000 women and girls have been assaulted over the past twelve years.

2 In 

the first three months of 2010, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugeesreported 

that 1,244 women were sexually assaulted throughout the country. More than a third of 

these rapes occurred in North and South Kivu provinces, in the conflict-affected eastern 

region. These regional figures are comparable to the same period in 2009, revealing little 

progress in decreasing sexual violence.

3 Rapes in DRC are so common and vicious that the

United Nations undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, John Holmes, called rape 

in DRC “the worst in the world.”

4

To address these crimes against humanity, the United Nations Security Council recognized sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a threat to world peace and security by 

adopting Security Council Resolution (SRC) 1820 in June 2008. SCR 1820 condemns sexual 

violence as a tactic of war and requires that states carry out the appropriate judicial reform 

and transitional justice procedures necessary to prevent sexual violence during conflict. In 

his one-year followup report on Resolution 1820, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon noted 

the importance of analyzing the trends of sexual violence in armed conflict, calling for 

more and better data to understand the profiles and manifestations of sexual violence in 

individual settings, including the motivations of perpetrators.

5 Academic and humanitarian communities echo Ban Ki-Moon’s call and recognize that to effectively intervene, it is 

necessary to understand the conditions, motivations, and risk factorsinvolved in these acts 

of violence.

6 The extant research on SGBV has, predominantly and appropriately, focused on 

victims and survivors of rape. To better understand this complex phenomenon, however, it 

is necessary to look not only at the consequences, but also at the roots of SGBV in conflict, 

and this analysis can only be done by better understanding the experiences and motivations 

of perpetrators. 

Previous research from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) has highlighted the 

connection between armed groups and sexual violence in DRC. In a survey conducted in 

eastern DRC in 2007, over 80 percent of women interviewed reported that their attacker was 

wearing some kind of uniform. Over two-thirds said they were gang-raped, and almost half 

reported being abducted. These findings speak to the highly militarized forms of rape in 

DRC,suggesting that understandings of why SGBV occursthere are incomplete without fuller 

insight into the experiences and attitudes of combatants themselves.

7

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace,

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials,

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent,

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress.

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts,

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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This research project is among the first to document directly the role of a militia group 

in perpetrating sexual violence in DRC and to examine motives and rationalizations for 

engaging in sexual violence. Thisreport focuses on the attitudestoward violence in one DRC 

militia group, the Mai Mai. The first part of the report describes the general characteristics 

of the Mai Mai militia: the motivations of soldiers to join the group, challenges they face 

as active combatants, some of the ways socialization occurs in the group through looking 

at initiation rights and magical belief systems, and the role the command structure plays 

in soldiers’ lives. The second section examines soldiers’ attitudes toward women in general 

and female combatants in particular, then turns to the ways soldiers talk about sexual violence, both in society and within the Mai Mai. Finally, the report explores soldiers’ thoughts 

on demobilization and aspirations for the future. The concluding recommendations have 

been made to inform policymakers and practitioners on the types of interventions that 

may be most effective to mitigate violence and effectively demobilize soldiers. As Mai Mai 

forces continue to integrate into the national army—the Forces Armées de la République 

Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)—harmful behaviors and attitudesthat manifest in the Mai 

Mai have a high probability of appearing in the FARDC if they are not properly understood 

and addressed. 

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Wartime rape is probably as old as war itself. However, real attention to and study of this 

phenomenon has been undertaken seriously only in the past two decades, as international 

attention became focused on the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

8 Wartime rape can differ from other forms of sexual violence, such as intimate partner 

rape, in that it is typically used as “a weapon wielded by male soldiers of one country (or 

national, political, or cultural group) against typically unarmed female civilians of another.”9

SGBV during conflict can serve larger strategic purposes, functioning as a means of warfare 

with diverse yet predictable consequences. The strategic rape theory states that SGBV 

is a tool to subjugate populations, instill fear, curtail movement and economic activity, 

stigmatize women, undermine community and family structures, contribute to bonding of 

perpetrators through the common act of rape, and in some cases, deliberately pollute the 

bloodline of the victimized population.

10

History has shown, however, that the reality of wartime rape is unexpectedly complicated, and that the pervasiveness of sexual violence varies across and within conflicts. 

Various parties may use SGBV differently in the same dispute, and the types and prevalence 

of SGBV may change both temporally and geographically. Rape has been highly violent and 

widespread in some conflicts, such as in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and DRC, and rare in other 

conflicts, such as in Israel-Palestine and El Salvador.

11

Armed groups in DRC conflict often exhibit a unique profile or “repertoire of violence.”

Interahamwe troops during and after the war of 1998 were infamous for raping with instrumentssuch as guns and forcing people to watch as other members oftheir family were killed. 

Currently, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has established itself in northeastern 

DRC, practices both killing and mutilation of civilians to deter communities from disclosing 

LRA whereabouts.

12 A group’s repertoire of violence may change over time; it may serve the 

strategic aims of the groups or be a pattern of individual exploitation that hasreached large 

proportions. Widespread rape, however, can also be detrimental to the perpetrating groups. 

Instead of intimidating populations, rape can spur them toward anger and revenge. When 

armed groups depend on civilians for support, rape can quickly undermine their reputations 

and endanger the groups’ accessto vital resources,such asfood and shelter. A single-theory 

approach may be too blunt a tool to adequately predict profiles of violence and motivations 

SGBV is a tool to subjugate 

populations, instill fear, curtail 

movement and economic 

activity, stigmatize women, 

undermine community and

family structures, contribute to 

bonding of perpetrators through 

the common act of rape, and in 

some cases, deliberately pollute 

the bloodline of the victimized 

population.


for the perpetration of SGBV within conflict. It may be more valuable to look at a multiplicity of causes and dynamics that interact to influence soldiers’ behaviors. These can change 

over time and space, just asthey can vary from unitto unit within the same largerstructure. 

This project attempts to take a more differentiated view of the motivations and causes of 

violence by looking at a particular group within the DRC conflict.

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The Mai Mai (Swahili for “water water”) originally formed in the 1960s as part of the Mulelist 

Rebellion, when then–education minister Pierre Mulele organized youth into militias to 

revolt against Mobutu’s government.

13 Mulele used local medicine men to convince the 

young men that bullets would turn to water ifshot at Mai Mai fighters.

14 Beginning in 1993, 

many of these local militias reorganized to protect their communities from Mobutu’s army 

and the influx of foreign armed militias afterthe 1994 Rwandan genocide.

15 Mai Mai militias 

soon became a powerful force in the eastern region of DRC, with an estimated 10,000 to 

25,000 soldiers fighting with Kabila in the 1996–97 conflict. As the Mai Mai have proliferated throughout eastern DRC, fighting each other, foreign militias, and the government 

over natural resources and land, they have increasingly been implicated in the looting, rape, 

abduction, and mass displacement of civilians.

16

For this report, thirty-three Mai Mai combatants were interviewed in three rural towns 

in eastern DRC—seventeen in Kamituga, eight in Katogota, and eight in Chambucha—from 

January 2009 to February 2010. Soldiers from the first two field sites were associated with 

the subgroup Mai Mai Shikito;soldiersfrom the third field site were associated with Mai Mai 

Kifuafua. The interviews were conducted in a private location by a team of male Congolese 

social workers and psychologists. Access was negotiated through the militia’s officers and 

permission given to travel to field sites and speak with soldiers. Logistics in each field site 

were then discussed with the highest-ranking commander. The interviewees ranged in age 

from eighteen to forty-five years old; ranks ranged from private to major. All interviews 

were recorded with permission of the participants. Swahili transcriptions of the recordings 

were written and these transcripts translated into English. The translated narratives were 

analyzed to identify the salient themes emerging from the interviews. All text pertaining to 

these themes was then compiled and analyzed, and areas of convergence and disagreement 

across interviews identified. 

Asin all qualitative research, the interviewers can influence the type of information that 

emerges. The Congolese interviewers used their role as outsiders to the group to encourage 

intervieweesto feel comfortable speaking about thingsthey might not be able to talk about 

with their fellow soldiers. The interviewers’ experience working with war-affected populations was also intended to facilitate dialogue. However, soldiers might not have wanted 

to discuss sensitive or difficult topics with outsiders for fear of being judged or disclosing 

sensitive group information. The presence of a female American researcher, who traveled to 

the field site and introduced the project, also influenced responses. On one hand, soldiers 

seemed to view the presence of a foreigner as an opportunity to gain access to an international audience and to explain themselves to the rest of the world. On the other hand, 

soldiers may have said things they thought an outsider might want to hear or things that 

would portray their actions in a positive light. 

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This study does not seek to make generalizable claims about the state of mind or experiences of Mai Maisoldiersin eastern DRC. The smallsample size and qualitative nature of this 

As the Mai Mai have proliferated 

throughout eastern DRC . . .

they have increasingly been 

implicated in the looting, 

rape, abduction, and mass 

displacement of civilians.


study mean that these results cannot be taken asrepresentative ofsoldiers, or even Mai Mai 

soldiers’, experiences in the war. 

Speaking to active parties to a conflict, who have their own motivations and objectives, 

means the information gathered may be biased or amended versions of what soldiers truly 

believe. Sometimes, however, this bias itself is informative, revealing what soldiers perceive 

as important to convey to an interviewer. Working with armed actors who are currently 

within a command structure also meansthat they may tell more about the group’s goals and 

ideals than the reality of the situation. Despite these drawbacks, the results of this research 

offer some insight into the experiences and attitudes of certain Mai Mai soldiers and reveal 

a number of common themes that emerge across interviews. 

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Reasons for Joining the Mai Mai: “There Was Nothing Else for Me to Do”

Conversations with Mai Mai combatants largely revolved around the devastating consequences that years of war have had on communities throughout eastern DRC. Nearly all the 

soldiers described having a family member killed in the conflict and losing the ability to 

study or find a job. As one soldier said, “There was nothing else for me to do. I knew I had 

no other support, so I had to join the military.” 

The frequent looting and destruction of villages during the conflict resulted in a pervasive fear that foreign combatants would overrun the country. This realization, linked with 

a deeply ingrained distrust of the government and perception that the national army was 

ineffectual, pushed many men to join the Mai Mai. As one interviewee said,

We came to realize that our country had been invaded by foreign troops, and that we

needed, ourselves, to fight for our country. We have waited for government support for

so long, it did not come.

The fear of foreign invasion and the anger at the looting of DRC was so strong that some 

interviewees viewed the invading forces as an existential threat to the country itself:

They [Interahamwe]17 were killing the population, they were beating them without any

reason, and they were looting their goods and raping the population. Because of that,

we felt that we might be exterminated and so we decided to create this group to be

able to protect the population.

Another stated Mai Mai goal was to protect the country’s national resources. One interviewee highlighted the central role of natural resources in Mai Mai objectives: “The goal 

of this group is to protect natural resources that are in this part of the country. We know 

already that natural resources are what motivate the enemy to come here.” Despite their 

dedication to these stated aims, however,soldiers emphasized how difficult their lives were. 

Lack of pay was most often cited as a problem, though soldiers also spoke about the lack of 

uniforms, supplies, and health care:

It is sometimes revolting to see the conditions under which we live, but other times,

we say that we devoted ourselves to join the army in order to protect our population.

Nevertheless, these conditions are still unbearable.

Another soldier said simply, “If I were paid I would not be starving.” Soldiers emphasized that the social isolation resulting from living in the bush was extremely difficult. 

Many expressed a desire to go back to life as it existed before the war and not to be seen 

as soldiers but as members of the community once again. At the same time, civilians were 

seen as a source of income and an exploitable resource. Some interviewees described in 

the same sentence that they were there to protect people but had to steal from them to 


survive. As one respondent said, “No soldier is allowed to go to farm; his fields are the

population.” 

Initiation Rites, Magical Belief Systems, and Drugs: “So It Is Like This”

The Mai Mai group is known for its strong rituals and adherence to magical beliefs. All 

soldiers interviewed spoke of widespread use of magical-religious practices that protect 

combatants during battle and help them fight. As one soldier stated with a mix of faith 

and practicality, “We use the traditional medicine for protection and [to] help us to win the 

war—sort of.” Interviewees overwhelmingly expressed belief in magical practices, which 

included drinking a special porridge, allowing female elders to shower them with sacred 

water, using local herbs, and scarifications.

18 As one combatant explained,

[Magical beliefs] are the rule, and it is our foundation. Our biggest support is that 

witchcraft. Because when we started fighting we didn’t have any money for firearms,

so, after you got the scarifications, they would provide you with a machete or a knife,

and you’d go to war. When you killed an enemy fighter, his firearm would become your

weapon. We really believe in the witchcraft, so if you don’t go through the rituals, you 

don’t go anywhere.

Soldiers explained how they combined traditional beliefs with Christianity.

19 When one 

was asked if he felt any difficulty practicing two separate belief systems, he responded, “It 

is not a problem, I will follow both. I can’t do one and not do the other.” Another soldier 

described how he reconciled seemingly contradictory belief systems: “I say to God, ‘You are 

in Heaven, but witchcraft is down here on earth.’” Yet the responses of some soldiers suggested there is not uniform buy-in to the belief system. As one soldier stated, “I do it just 

because it is a requirement.” 

Interviewees described initiation rites that involve receiving sacred rituals. However, 

some soldiers described a much more brutal induction that literally beat the civilian out of 

new recruits:

Q: If someone wishes to join you, what can he do? 

R: That civilian must be spilt in the dust, be beaten black and blue so that he might

leave his civilian thoughts.

Q: Beat him first? How is this helpful?

R: The civilian will come out of him. You must spill him in the mud, to beat him black

and blue before he is taken care of and given his uniform as well as a gun.

Q: Will he not be trained?

R: He will be trained after receiving a uniform and a gun. You will be shown the field 

and explained things as they are. Since you have already dropped civilian thoughts

because of the flogging, you will start saying, “Ahhhh! So it is like this!” Then you will

be practicing what you have learned.

Another soldier described his first beating, saying new recruits were taken to the river, 

stripped naked, and flogged. After the beating they were “anointed” with the river mud. 

The soldier described himself as being “molded in the mud” and went on to say, “All those 

sticks that you were beaten with put into you another ideology.”

Soldiers also described widespread use of marijuana among the troops, both during 

active fighting and periods of relative peace. Smoking marijuana was cited as one way 

to overcome fear on the battlefield, especially for new soldiers. A subset of interviewees 

noted that marijuana could also be widespread in times of little fighting and even after 

demobilization. 
7

Command Structure and Following Orders

The soldiers interviewed described a well-defined command structure, with higher-ranking 

commanders working from strategic towns, such as Goma and Bukavu, and running operations from there to rural areas. Many of the soldiers considered the command structure to 

be paternalistic. Commanders were like fathers and as such had to be obeyed implicitly. 

Speaking about hissuperiors, one respondentsaid, “I am like hisson....[The higher ranking 

officer] has become like my father and my mother at the same time. If I make a mistake, it 

is normal that he punishes me and I cannot complain. I have to tell myself if I am punished, 

I deserve it.” 

However, attitudes of unquestioning obedience and implicittrust of commandersseemed 

to coexist with feelings of resentment and anger toward unfairness in the distribution of 

resources. One soldier, describing himself as “an obedient child” and his commander as the 

“father,” said: 

If [my commander] sends me somewhere, I accept. He has become my father....

And if I am looking for a written document that will allow me to go to Bunyakiri or

to Bukavu,20 after he has given me this document I will say that “Really, this father

loves me.”

However, the same interviewee went on to say that he received only one-tenth of his 

promised pay: “It is as if they eat our money. They are oppressing us.”

Although all participants described the same general command structure, they disagreed 

on whether or not orders considered morally wrong should be followed. Roughly half the 

interviewees seemed to take every order as law, while the other half were more flexible 

in their interpretations, noting that there was some leeway in obedience. One respondent 

described how trumped-up charges were often made against rich civilians to extort money 

from them.In these cases, when a soldier was ordered to do something he did not feel comfortable doing, he could pretend he did not find the person or try to warn the target ahead 

of time to leave the area. Punishment for disobedience is harsh and includes imprisonment, 

flogging, and possibly death. As one soldier noted, “I must obey, because they are orders. 

There is no way to refuse it.... Even if you do not want to, you are not given a chance to 

choose.... You go—the body—but [hesitation] the soul is not there.” 

Attitudes toward Women

When asked about the respective roles of men and women in society, soldiers described 

extremely rigid and formalized gender roles in times of both war and peace. Men were the 

protectors of the family and the decision makers, while women cooked, cleaned, raised the 

children, and undertook small commercial activities or farming to help support the family. 

Soldiers did say, however, that there was a small minority of women in the military, 

called PMF, the French acronym for female military personnel. These women seldom took 

part in active combat but did have guns and uniforms. Often, they manned checkpoints and 

roadblocks, or gathered intelligence, since they were able to travel more freely than their 

male counterparts:

In general a woman [combatant] brings us some information about what is going on,

because she isthe person who is moving around. During the war, they may let her pass,

which helps us to get information on where our enemies are. 

The rigid mind-set toward women in general seemed to translate into dismissive attitudes toward female combatants. Interviewees insisted that even if women were wearing 

uniforms, their primary role was simply to cook for the men. One interviewee, speculating 

on what could push women to join the Mai Mai, explained, “If [a woman] joins, it is due 

Attitudes of unquestioning 

obedience and implicit trust of 

commanders seemed to coexist

with feelings of resentment and 

anger toward unfairness in the 

distribution of resources.
8

to the fact of not being married” and went on to note that not being married could affect 

a woman’s sanity. These trivializing attitudes toward women, and the assumption that 

women’s main purpose in life was to care for men, underpinned the way many soldiers 

viewed sexual relations.

Sexual Violence: “Satan Walks behind You”

Soldiers defined sexual violence asforcing a woman to have sex against her will, noting that 

they had learned this definition mainly from listening to the radio. Rape for the Mai Mai 

seemed to have military origins (women as a spoil of war) as well as individual motivations 

(taking a woman because you desire her). In the first case, women were given as a reward; 

soldiers were ordered to abduct women, and these women were then “given” to soldiers, 

with higher ranking officers given precedence. As one man said, “[The commander] will have 

his [girl] brought first before he can ask me to bring mine. In that case, if you refuse, it 

becomes an open conflict.” The interviewer pressed the soldier saying:

Q: Do you really bring her?

R: That is exactly what I must do. You say: “Great chief, here is the girl you asked me

to bring to you.”

Another interviewee described how rape can be motivated individually instead of by 

military command: “Maybe I have a bandit’s thought. . . .I see a woman passing by, and I 

begin to desire her, then I come and I jump into her phoof.” 

When soldiers discussed rape or the ability to resist rape, they often invoked biblical 

imagery and depicted this type of violence as a manifestation of evil. Forces of good (God) 

and evil (Satan or the devil) were described as inhabiting the soldier and guiding decisions 

around sexual violence. When speaking about whether soldiers from his group assaulted 

women sexually, one respondent said, “To rape? Well, rape for a Mai Mai, it is Satan’s work, 

because as people walk, Satan follows behind them.... This means it [raping] may happen 

to you when you are not prepared, but all of a sudden, the Devil fools you.”

Soldiers noted that being far from their villages made them anonymous. One respondent 

described eloquently how being in his father’s village meant he was respected as an individual. However, the transient life of a combatant took away thisidentity, and people would 

only look at him as “a passing soldier.” 

Interviewees across research sites used “being ordered to rape” as a spontaneous example

of an order from a commander, suggesting this type of command may have been given to 

troops in different areas. Some interviewees noted that even if their hearts were not in it, 

they felt compelled to follow these orders: 

We are always sent by our chiefs who tell us: “Do this!” Despite your refusal, they

oblige you to do it; otherwise you will be beaten seriously. As a result, you will do it 

unwillingly. And you can even rape because of that.

When prompted about orders to rape women, even women who were much older, the 

same soldier responded:

R: Eh [yes], because we say in our career that there is order, and no discussion.

Q: So, when you are in the act of raping that woman who is like your mother, can you

not feel ashamed?

R: Well, one must be ashamed. A person like your mother! You should be ashamed. But 

in that particular case, it will be because of the military service that one can do it. But

in my view, I do not find it moral to do such acts.

Even as some interviewees described raping women, abducting them for themselves or 

their commanders, or raping for individual reasons, many interviewees denied that rape ever 


occurred in the Mai Mai and described how it was strictly forbidden by their principles. The 

reasons given for this were partly ideologically driven, since, as a homegrown militia, the 

group was ostensibly created to protect the population. When speaking about soldiers that 

do not rape, one interviewee said: 

It is only thanks to the spirit of God that is within them [that they don’t rape], also 

thanks to the love they have for the whole Congo and for the whole world because

we are able to realize that rape is the destruction for the whole population. Rape is

forbidden, since we know that we are here to protect the population.

There were also many practical reasons for soldiers not to rape. Interviewees noted that 

raping risked losing community support, upon which soldiersrelied heavily. As one interviewee said, “There are women there who grow food in their fields in the surrounding villages, 

they assist us with food.” Another described, “We have an excellent collaboration with the 

population who help us.” An interviewee discussing the risk of losing support conceptualized 

rape itself as a form of infection:

Q: In a group like Shikito or in other similar groups, what could be the consequences

for a person who rapes? 

R: If you commit rape and you are caught, you must be punished.

Q: What else besides being punished? 

R: And if you were not caught, you can get infected. 

Q: Can the whole group get infected? 

R: No.... Yes—in the sense it can get infected because if one member rapes, everyone

will be saying that the whole group of Shikito is raping. 

A number of interviewees emphasized that being perceived as rapists would poison relationships with the population, could be detrimental to the soldiers’ livelihoods, and could 

“ruin the reputation of the group.” As one man said, “For instance, if one person from the 

group decides to rape, or a fellow soldier rapes a woman, people will say that the group of 

Mai Mai is raping women. It becomes an illness for the whole group.” 

In general, soldiers from the Mai Mai Shikito group were much more likely to state that 

they did not rape and that rape “never” occurred in the group. They were also more likely to 

emphasize the positive relationship they tried to cultivate with civilians. Sometimes they 

claimed that rape “never happened any more” at all and was only a problem of the past. 

Soldiers from the Mai Mai Kifuafua group were much more likely to admit to raping and to 

talk about treating women as a spoil of war.It is extremely difficult to know whether Shikito 

simply had a better public-relations message or whether the group did in fact inflict less 

violence on civilians. Whatever the reality, the differing abilities of each group to portray 

themselves in a certain light illustrates the large role of intragroup dynamics in affecting 

responses.

In both groups, interviewees cited the risk of getting diseases as a consequence of rape. 

Sexually transmitted infections (STIs), especially HIV/AIDS, were described as an unavoidable punishment, even if one were not formally caught raping. They noted that much of the 

information about HIV and other consequences of rape were gleaned fromm radio broadcasts. One man noted, “Yes, there is a risk of getting infected, also of being punished. And 

even when you are not caught, you can get sick.” 

One soldier even described how the fear of AIDS mightstop a soldier who is aboutto rape 

a women,saying, “HIV/AIDS issomething [Mai Maisoldiers] are so much afraid of. First, you 

ask yourself, ‘Say I have sexual intercourse with this person who may have been infected 

with HIV/AIDS, what may be the result?’ Therefore, you decide not to do it, and you let the 

person go.” When asked about the impact of mass rape, men again focused on the risk of 

disease, noting that mass rape could destroy entire communities. 
10

Q: You said that there are consequences for a woman who has been raped. If six or

seven women from the same community are raped, what might be the consequences

to that entire community? 

R: The entire community might be extinguished because disease can spread to 

everyone, even to the newborns. This will make the community perish.

Some forms of sexual violence, including the use of foreign objects to penetrate women 

during rape, were seen as unacceptable, while other forms of violence were considered 

relatively common, including abduction of women and girls as well as opportunistic rape. 

In some interviews, after soldiers had spoken about the sexual violence they had witnessed 

in the military, the interviewer asked them specifically about cases of rape where foreign 

objects were used to penetrate women—a particularly horrific and brutal form of sexual 

violence that has been described by a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 

and service providers in DRC.

21 The soldiers who had described perpetrating other forms of 

sexual violence were horrified at this. As one exclaimed, “That is a crime!” 

When asked to reflect on why such violence might happen, another interviewee reflected, “I can say that such a person [who rapes women with foreign objects] is a killer, or he is 

less sane, because he has already raped the woman and has satisfied his needs. He should 

free her. They have already had their blood mixed from the [rape]. How can someone find 

it again interesting to kill or ill-treat such a partner?” Calling one’s victim a “partner” and 

normalizing some types of violence (rape) but not others (rape with instruments) illustrates 

some of the ways soldiers justify their behavior. 

One interviewee was outraged at a report that another armed group, the name of which 

he did not specify, had raped a number of girls all under the age of ten in their area of 

control. He went on to say this was an awful thing to do and expressed sympathy for the 

girls. When asked by the interviewer if he thought the attacks were meant to provoke the 

Mai Mai, he replied:

It is exactly to provoke us!... We were very annoyed that they took the young girls

with them.... They are really provoking us. I am shocked because I am looking after

somebody, but another person comes and doessuch dirty thingsto them. We are really

unhappy about that.

Demobilization

Soldiers were extremely positive about the possibility of integrating into the national army, 

seeing it as one of the goals of the Mai Mai. It was often described not as a matter of if, but 

when. Even as many soldiers viewed theirservice in the Mai Mai as a precursorto integrating 

into the national army,they noted that atthe moment, it did not matter which military they 

were associated with, as neither the Mai Mai nor the FARDC paid reliable salaries. 

Soldiers often expressed concern that the DRC government would not recognize their 

achievements upon integration. One interviewee noted, “We want the government to officially acknowledge our existence as fighters who defended this country.” Combatants also 

talked about how isolated they felt from communities and envisioned difficulty reintegrating into civilian life. Some desired to leave the military life altogether, but stated that the 

lack of jobs made this impossible. Many interviewees had tried to leave the militia at some 

point but kept coming back because they did not find viable alternatives.

Fractured Perceptions and Reconciled Realities

Previous research on rebel groups suggests that highly ideologically driven groups that 

depend heavily on civilian support often restrain their use of violence.

22 Conversely, groups 

that attract recruits who join for opportunistic instead of ideological reasons and have 

Soldiers were extremely positive 

about the possibility of

integrating into the national 

army, seeing it as one of the 

goals of the Mai Mai. 
11

access to lootable resources are more likely to engage in unrestrained violence. The Mai 

Mai appear to be an interesting mix of these two profiles. Partly ideologically driven, partly 

driven by necessity, the group idealizes civilian life while exploiting civilians. 

Soldiers seemed able to shift among diverse attitudes about rape. They sometimes 

described it as a great evil and a tool that enemy combatants use to destroy DRC; other 

times,they frankly described how rape is committed within the Mai Mai. The widespread and 

violent rape of civilians by other armed groups was cited as one of the reasons soldiers said 

they were motivated to take up arms and, at its extreme, it was considered an existential 

threat to Congolese culture. Interviewees were enthusiastic about describing themselves as 

protectors of the population, discussing how rape of civilians was a liability for the group 

on a practical level, weakening their vital support from the community. But soldiers also 

described situationsin which they stole, beat, extorted money from, and abducted the same 

civilians they were charged to protect. Rape might be personally motivated (the result of a 

soldier acting on personal desire) as well as militarily motivated (rape as a result of following 

an order or abducting a woman as a form of reward).

Elisabeth Wood makes a compelling case for analyzing sexual violence at three levels: 

the armed group, the small unit in which combatants function on a day-to-day basis, and 

the individual.

23 She notes that rape can occur for a variety of reasons at each level. Commanding officers can actively promote SGBV, tacitly accept it, or not punish it at all. In the 

case of the Mai Mai, top command seemsto promote the ideals of protecting the population 

but seems unable or unwilling to translate these principles into restraint in the field. The 

present research supports the idea that sexual violence is tolerated, if not promoted, at the 

individual and unit-command level. Differences between the Shikito and the Kifuafua groups 

support the notion that attitudes toward rape, and possibly the practice of rape itself, can 

differ significantly among units operating within the same larger structure.

In interviews with military personnel from the Congolese national army, Maria Eriksson 

Baaz and Maria Stern note that interviewees distinguish between “lust rapes” and “evil 

rapes.”24 The Mai Mai seem to make a similar distinction, as they engage in certain types of 

sexual violence but look upon others as unacceptable. Rape for personalsexual gratification 

and abducting women for commanding officers was described as relatively commonplace. 

However, other forms of sexual violence, such as rape with foreign objects and rape of the 

very young was described as “wrong,” even “evil.” Thus, soldiers may be able to convince 

themselves that they are not exploiting civilians as long as they commit only certain acts 

of violence.

A number of factors keep this group from achieving the low levels of rape exhibited by 

ideologically driven civilian-based groups in other conflicts.

25 Mai Mai soldiers describe a

process of being de-identified when they join the militia, as they leave behind traditional 

notions of right and wrong: “They beat the civilian out of you.” The command structure 

is viewed as a paternal force that must be obeyed. Rape is not depicted as a bonding 

mechanism among members of the group, as has occurred in other conflicts, such as Sierra 

Leone,

26 but as a part of a soldier’s due and a man’s right. 

The findings outlined above suggest a number of intervention points. Many soldiers 

noted that they had received messages about the risks and consequences of sexual violence 

from the radio. High levels of concern about contracting HIV/AIDS and other STIs provide 

an opportunity to discourage combatantsfrom engaging in sexual violence.Integration into 

the national army, which most interviewees viewed positively, offers an opening to train 

soldiers on human rights and the appropriate protection of civilians. However, soldiers were 

skeptical about the long-term feasibility of integration until FARDC can pay a steady salary. 

Even those who did not want to integrate into the national army were still extremely positive about leaving the Mai Mai. These soldiers expressed a desire to take up a trade, such as 

Soldiers may be able to convince 

themselves that they are not

exploiting civilians as long as 

they commit only certain acts of 

violence.
12

being a carpenter or auto mechanic, and return to civilian life. Nevertheless, this was not 

seen as a viable option until more jobs become available in the civilian sector. 

At the time of writing this report, the groups interviewed for this project were already 

integrating into the national army. Without othertraining,the same behaviors and attitudes 

that men hold as militia members will likely guide their behavior as national soldiers. The 

shocking human rights abuses that the FARDC carried out during the Kimia II operations 

in 2009 illustrate what happens when armed soldiers with no training and full impunity 

are unleashed on civilian populations. To understand how to best integrate soldiers from a 

mosaic of armed groupsinto a national army, it isimportant to understand the context from 

which they come. Approaches to addressing SGBV will be most effective if they address the 

motivations, beliefs, and decision-making structures of each group. This paper offersinsight 

into how one of these groups perceives and perpetrates sexual violence, providing specific 

intervention points based on this information.

There are a number of areas for future research. The role of women in armed groups 

deserves more investigation; it would be particularly interesting to examine whether the 

presence of female soldiers inhibits sexual violence, or the degree to which female combatants are also perpetrators. Interviews with other armed groups, particularly the Democratic 

Forcesforthe Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), could illuminate each group’s unique motivations 

and attitudes toward sexual violence. Quantitative studies that sample larger numbers of 

combatants would elucidate the links between soldiers’ perpetration of, command-structure 

attitudes toward, and motivations for sexual violence. Finally, studies that compare current 

soldiers’ responses with those of demobilized soldiers would be illuminating. Demobilized 

soldiers might be more open about their experiences with violence,since they are no longer 

part of a command structure.

3FDPNNFOEBUJPOT

To the Mai Mai and FARDC

"U UIF IJHI DPNNBOE MFWFM

t Use a multimessage approach to inhibit rape. Reinforce that a soldier’s role is to protect 

civilians and not exploit them. Underpin this message with practical measures to enforce 

a no-rape policy. 

t Hold commanders responsible for the violence perpetrated by themselves and the men 

under their command, creating a chain of accountability that links high-level command to 

the actions of individual soldiers. 

t Punish high-level commanders who perpetrate or support SGBV to send a clear message 

throughout the ranks that this type of violence will no longer be tolerated.

"U UIF TNBMMVOJU MFWFM

t Stop treating civilians in general, and women in particular, as bounties of war and exploitable resources. 

t Stop committing, condoning, and promoting sexual violence as part of combat operations.

t Engender an atmosphere of personal responsibility through strong accountability mechanisms for individual actions.

t Carry out appropriate punishments to enforce restraint of violence policies.


"U UIF JOEJWJEVBM MFWFM

t Stop distinguishing between rapesthat are acceptable and those that are not; acknowledge 

all forms of SGBV are unacceptable.

t Recognize the humanity of civilians and the devastating consequences of rape and other 

forms of SGBV on women individually and communities as a whole.

t Refuse commands that promote SGBV and violence against civilians.

To the DRC Government

t Continue the integration of Mai Mai troops into the FARDC and use this as an intervention 

point to retrain troops, with a focus on sensitizing soldiers about human rights and the 

need to protect civilians. 

t Improve civil-military cooperation to help both civilians and soldiers rebuild mutual trust. 

Regular meetings between civil and military leaders can serve as a first step in this direction.

t Undertake special trainings to ensure female combatants are treated with respect and are 

not at risk of sexual violence within the ranks.

t Provide soldiers with steady pay and effective training to give them the means to stop 

exploiting civilians and to change the mentality of soldiers as exploiters.

t Embed a human rightsspecialistinto regimentalstructuresto monitor and reinforce civilian 

protection policies and to refer abuse cases to appropriate justice mechanisms.

t Prosecute rape crimes, from the highest level of command to the lowest, to send a clear 

message this type of violence will not be tolerated. Ensure convicted rapists serve their 

entire prison sentences. 

To the Humanitarian and International Community

t Improve messaging about the risks of sexual violence that are geared toward both state 

and nonstate armed actors. Frame rape as a security issue that jeopardizes the health, 

effectiveness, and public support of armed groups. Messages can be conveyed by radio, 

which has shown good diffusion into armed groups. 

t Improve messaging around consequences of sexual violence for women and communities 

to help soldiers better understand the results of their actions.

t Create employment opportunities for demobilized soldiers to provide sustainable alternate 

means of making a living.

t Undertake community-building exercises to help civilians and demobilized soldiers integrate into the same community and provide mental health counseling and mediation 

services to both demobilized soldiers and community members. 


/PUFT

1. Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo:Massive Increase in Attacks on Civilians,” newsrelease, July 2, 2009. Available at 

http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/02/dr-congo-massive-increase-attacks-civilians (accessed May 4, 2010).

2. United Nations Population Fund, “Secretary-General Calls Attention to Scourge of Sexual Violence in DRC,” 

dispatch, March 1, 2009. Available at http://www.unfpa.org/public/News/pid/2181 (accessed May 4, 2010). 

3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Condemns Endemic Rape in DRC, Helps Survivors,” 

briefing notes, April 23, 2010. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/4bd18e7e9.html (accessed May 4, 2010).

4. Stephanie McCrummen, “Prevalence of Rape in E. Congo Described as Worst in World,” Washington Post, 

September 9, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/

AR2007090801194.html (accessed May 10, 2010).

5. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1820, S/2009/362. Available at http://

www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.htm (accessed May 10, 2010). 

6. J. Gottschall, “Explaining Wartime Rape,” Journal of Sex Research, vol. 41, no. 2 (May 2004): 129–36.

7. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Characterizing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Profiles 

of Violence, Community Responses, and Implications for the Protection of Women (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

Humanitarian Initiative and Open Society Institute, 2009). Available at http://www.hhi.harvard.edu/images/

resources/reports/final report for the open society institute - 1.pdf (accessed May 4, 2010).

8. C. Card, “Rape as a Weapon of War,” Hypatia, vol. 11, no. 4 (1996): 5–18; R. Seifert, “The Logic of Sexual Violence 

in Wars,” Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 19, no. 1–2 (1996): 35–43; C. Schiessl, “An Element of 

Genocide: Rape, Total War, and International Law in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 4, 

no. 2 (2002): 197–210.

9. J.L. Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 

10. See T. Gingerich and J. Leaning, The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan (Boston, 

MA: Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights, François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human 

Rights, Harvard School of Public Health, and Physicians for Human Rights, 2005); M. Eriksson, P. Wallensteen, 

and M. Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict, 1989–2002,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 5 (2003): 593–607; M.B. 

Olujic, “Embodiment of Terror: Gendered Violence in Peacetime and Wartime in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 

Medical Anthropology Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1 (1998): 31–50.

11. E.J. Wood, “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?” Politics and Society, vol. 37, no. 1 

(2009): 131–61.

12. International Crisis Group, LRA: A Regional Strategy beyond Killing Kony, Africa Report no. 157 (Brussels: 

International Crisis Group, 2010). Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/

uganda/157-lra-a-regional-strategy-beyond-killing-kony.aspx (accessed May 4, 2010).

13. United Nations Regional Integration Networks, “DRC: From Protection to Insurgency—History of the Mayi Mayi,” 

news release, March 16, 2006. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/03/mil060316-irin01.htm (accessed May 4, 2010).

14. International Crisis Group, North Kivu, Into the Quagmire? An Overview of the Current Crisis in North Kivu,

Africa Report No. 1 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 1998). Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/

regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/001-north-kivu-into-the-quagmire-an-overview-of-the-current-crisis.aspx 

(accessed May 4, 2010).

15. S. Smith, “Ceasefire Negotiationsin Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” Conciliation Resources website, 2005. 

Available at http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=59 (accessed on May 10, 2010).

16. Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Protect Children from Rape and Recruitment,” December 16, 2008. Available 

at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/16/dr-congo-protect-children-rape-and-recruitment (accessed May 4, 

2010).

17. Interahamwe was an extremist Hutu paramilitary organization credited with carrying out many of the killings 

during the Rwandan genocide. Members ofthis group then fled to Congo, where they perpetrated extreme human

rights abuses, including highly violent rapes of women.

18. The process of scarification involves cutting or etching patterns into the skin as a form of permanent body 

modification.

19. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is overwhelmingly Christian, with the population split roughly evenly 

between Catholicism and Protestantism.

20. Towns in the South Kivu province of DRC.

21. S. Bartels, M. VanRooyen, J. Leaning, J. Scott, and J. Kelly, “Now, the World Is Without Me”: An Investigation 

of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and 

Oxfam International, 2010).


22. J. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

23. E.J. Wood, “Variation in Sexual Violence during War,” Politics and Society, vol. 34, no. 3 (2006): 307. 

24. M. Eriksson Baaz and M. Stern, “Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces 

in the Congo (DRC),” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2 (2009): 495–518.

25. Wood, “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence.”

26. D.K. Cohen, “Explaining Sexual Violence during Civil War,” PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, 

Stanford University, 2010.
0G 3FMBUFE *OUFSFTU

t The Health Sector and Gender-Based Violence in a Time of War, by Anjalee Kohli, 

Kathleen Kuehnast, Leonard Rubenstein (Peace Brief, April 2010)

t Conflict-Business Dynamics in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Raymond Gilpin 

and Richard Downie (Special Report, November 2009)

t What Next for the Democratic Republic of Congo? by Dorina Bekoe and Michelle 

Swearingen (Peace Brief, December 2009)

t Disaster in the DRC: Responding to the Humanitarian Crisis in North Kivu by Go 

Funai and Catherine Morris (Peace Brief, December 2008)

t Healing and Reintegrating the Victims of Congo’s War by Dorina Bekoe and Christina 

Parajon (Peace Brief, July 2007)

6OJUFE 4UBUFT

*OTUJUVUF PG 1FBDF

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

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An online edition of this and related

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject (www.usip.

org/programs/centers/gender-andpeacebuilding-initiative).