S. HRG. 112–80, PT. 5 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND 

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1253 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY 

CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 5 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAY 10, 2011 

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S. HRG. 112–80 PT. 5 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND 

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1253 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY 

CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 5 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAY 10, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MAY 10, 2011

Page 

Harrington, Anne M., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; Accompanied by John Gerrard .................................................................. 5 

Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 14 

Handelman, Kenneth B., Acting Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, Department of Defense; Accompanied by Jed Royal, Director, Office 

of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, Department of Defense .................... 24 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:55 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R. Hagan 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Portman. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Jessica L. Kingston, research 

assistant. 

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional 

staff member; John W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; 

Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, 

research assistant. 

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and Brian F. 

Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Roger Pena, assistant to 

Senator Hagan; Patrick Day, assistant to Senator Shaheen; and 

Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator HAGAN. I would like to convene the second session of the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee today. Good 

afternoon. We meet today to discuss proliferation prevention, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and threat reduction programs 

at the Departments of Defense and Energy. 

We began this hearing today in closed session to understand the 

threats these programs are designed to address, and in that session 

we learned more about why we worry about proliferation of weapVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:06 Jan 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68088.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
2 

ons of mass destruction (WMD), technology, and materials, and 

who is trying to get WMDs. 

I want to welcome our witnesses to this session. We have Ms. 

Anne Harrington, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) at the Department of Energy (DOE); Mr. Kenneth Myers 

III, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); 

and Mr. Kenneth Handelman, the Acting Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Global Strategic Affairs at the Department of Defense 

(DOD). 

As I mentioned in the closed session, there is wide agreement 

that the use of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist would be a catastrophic event. The probability that this will occur, however, is unknown, but some, such as former Senator Sam Nunn, worry that 

it’s just a matter of time—not if, but when. 

President Obama has embarked on a three-pronged effort to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear 

technology. As the President said in the Nuclear Posture Review, 

‘‘The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk 

of nuclear attack has increased.’’ 

The most immediate and extreme threat today is nuclear terrorism. Today we will discuss the efforts at DOD and DOE to 

thwart the goals of these potential nuclear terrorists and reduce 

the chances that a nuclear or radiological device is detonated in a 

U.S. city or anywhere else. 

At the end of the Cold War, DOD and DOE, at the direction of 

former Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar, established 

programs with Russia and the states of the Former Soviet Union 

to secure, dismantle, or destroy nuclear and chemical weapons and 

to secure or destroy biological weapons materials. That program, 

I’m pleased to say, has been a resounding success, with thousands 

of nuclear weapons and delivery systems destroyed, tons of nuclear 

material secured, tons of chemical weapons destroyed, and significant quantities of biological material secured. While there is still 

work left to be finished, this work is winding down. 

Today the focus is shifting to address more global threats, not 

only from nuclear and radiological threats, but also biological materials. The biological threat is very different from the nuclear threat, 

but an attack using biological material would be devastating. As a 

result, DOD is increasing its work to prevent the biological threat. 

Almost half of the cooperative threat reduction program in fiscal 

year 2012 will be dedicated to preventing a biological attack. 

We look forward to discussing with our DOD witnesses how this 

effort, particularly those new efforts in Africa and elsewhere, are 

progressing. We would also be interested in hearing from our witnesses today how the response to the threat is evolving and what 

is the next round of challenges in nonproliferation programs generally. States such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea continue 

to increase the size of their nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery 

systems. Other states, such as Iran, are still trying to hide their 

actions and expand their nuclear programs. We would be interested 

in the progress and programs such as the proliferation security initiative and export controls, which are designed to prevent the furVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:06 Jan 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68088.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
3 

ther proliferation of nuclear technology and delivery systems, primarily among state actors. 

While the United States has been a leader in threat reduction 

programs, the problem is not a U.S. problem only. As a result, 

many of the programs are designed to build capacity in regional 

partners to detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. Is the United States getting good cooperation from 

these partners? 

The two Departments seek to engage new partners, such as India 

and China, in preventing proliferation. How will these programs be 

different from the traditional programs and who will bear the cost? 

I thank each of our witnesses for being here this afternoon. I look 

forward to you answering these and many other questions and generally having a good discussion on this important topic. 

Senator Portman. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair, for this hearing 

and for our previous one, where we had the opportunity to speak 

with some of your colleagues in closed session. I’d like to join you, 

Madam Chair, in welcoming those here today and tell you thank 

you for your service and for those who serve under you, for what 

they’re doing every day to help protect us from the existential potential threat of nuclear proliferation. 

Clearly, since the Cold War our approach has had to change with 

regard to the issues you deal with every day. At that time I think 

‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’ referred to the Soviets almost exclusively in the possibility of a nuclear attack, and we had a mutually 

assured destruction approach that really has dissolved now, and 

now the threat in some respects is much more difficult because it’s 

more diffuse, and of course includes chemical and biological weapons, as well as radiological and nuclear weapons. 

Of course, it has become a lot less predictable, as we’ve seen recently with rogue nations like Iran or North Korea and so many 

non-state actors having the shared goal to develop these destructive capabilities to terrorize and maybe sometimes to coerce others. 

Although we had a great success by recently eliminating the most 

wanted terrorist in the world, there are lots of violent groups now 

without a home who are dedicated, not to a government or to a 

place, but to an ideology of extremism. So that proliferation, as the 

chair has said, would be top on our priority list today to talk about. 

With regard to the funding, let me just say that we looked at 

some of these numbers and part of what we’re doing here is building a record for the authorization bill. We do spend billions of dollars a year in securing the world’s most dangerous materials and 

keeping them out of the hands of those who wish to do us harm. 

As we’ve said, that’s extremely important. 

This has been a bipartisan effort over time and we’re all committed to countering these threats. Nonetheless, in this fiscal condition we find ourselves in we need to be sure those dollars are 

being spent most effectively. 

There is currently a discrepancy that I just want to raise in my 

opening statement and then we’ll have a chance to talk about. If 

you look at the 2012 budget request from DOE’s NNSA, it is a 

4 

$2.55 billion request and as I look here, since 2009 this means 

these programs at DOE have expanded substantially. In fact, it’s 

almost $1 billion a year, more than it was during the previous administration. So we have seen substantial increases in DOE’s programs. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised some 

concerns about the effectiveness of some of these programs and I’m 

sure you have had the opportunity to look at GAO’s report. It says 

that the 4-year global nuclear materials security initiative lacks 

specific details on implementation. As I read it, it also indicates it 

lacks measurement to be able to know whether performance is 

being met. 

It talks about the three nuclear nonproliferation programs that 

they reviewed having made different levels of progress. Only one, 

the materials protection control and accounting program, did they 

consider to have made considerable progress in securing the Russian nuclear warhead and material facilities, which is of course one 

of the major objectives. 

They thought that the materials consolidation and conversion 

and the global threat reduction initiative programs had only exhibited limited success in achieving their objectives in Russia. The report also said that, because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to working with the United States, the future 

of these programs was unclear. 

Again I think NNSA has a critical mission. The question is 

whether the increased funding is justified and what measures can 

be taken to address these concerns, assuming they are valid concerns. 

On the other hand, DTRA has had its budget decreased in the 

fiscal year 2012 request, and again this is a discrepancy I just want 

to hear more on today. Again, this decrease in DTRA funding 

comes as DTRA is being asked to do more and more and more, including hosting and conducting on-site verifications of arms control 

treaties, which is very important, particularly given the New 

START Treaty, including looking at issues that were raised in the 

U.S. Senate and in the House in that process. I understand inspections are already underway and I look forward to getting an update 

on how things are progressing there. 

In contrast to the increases for NNSA, I’m interested in hearing 

the reasoning for DTRA’s budget reduction despite these increased 

responsibilities. 

Again, Madam Chair, I thank you for having the hearing and I 

appreciate the witnesses being here today. I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Senator Portman. 

Each of you have submitted a written statement that will be included into the record and I’d like you each to keep your opening 

comments to about 5 minutes or so. Ms. Harrington, if you would 

start, then will be followed by Mr. Myers and then Mr. Handelman. 

Ms. Harrington. 

5 

STATEMENT OF ANNE M. HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN GERRARD 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman: Thank you for the opportunity to 

join you today to discuss the investments the President has requested for NNSA’s defense nuclear nonproliferation programs. I 

will abbreviate that as ‘‘DNN’’ in my remarks. 

More importantly, thank you for your continued support of the 

NNSA and the 35,000 men and women working across the enterprise to keep our country safe, protect our allies, and enhance global security. We could not do this work without strong bilateral support and engaged leadership from Congress. 

Since I have submitted a more detailed written statement, I will 

keep my remarks short. 

If I could, I’d like to start with a simple but important statement. 

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and keeping dangerous 

nuclear and radiological materials out of the hands of terrorists is 

a vital national security priority. These are without a doubt national security programs. As President Obama said in his speech 

in Prague in April 2009, the threat of a terrorist acquiring and 

using a nuclear weapon is the most immediate and extreme threat 

we face. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more dangerous threat to 

our Nation. 

That’s the danger. Here’s the good news. On any given day, we 

have some of our Nation’s most talented and hard-working people 

engaged worldwide in more than 100 countries to reduce the global 

nuclear threat. In that work, we are joined by a network of similarly committed nations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals that support and enable and 

collaborate with us on these critical efforts. I’m honored to share 

this table with two of those. 

President Obama has shown strong leadership in protecting the 

safety and security of the American people by working to reduce 

global nuclear dangers. As part of that effort, he has requested $2.5 

billion in fiscal year 2012 and $14.2 billion over the next 5 years 

to reduce the global nuclear threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the responsible application of nuclear 

technology and science. This includes stemming the risk of expertise proliferation through innovative science and technology partnerships. 

The President’s request provides the resources required to meet 

commitments secured during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. 

NNSA, along with DOD and other U.S. Government departments 

and agencies, working with countries around the world, is implementing these commitments. As partners, we are engaged in a focused and intensified international effort to lock down or remove 

vulnerable nuclear materials. We are executing an integrated, 

prioritized strategy that aligns authorities, capabilities, and resources to address global nuclear threats. 

This three-tiered strategy covers the site, country, and global levels. NNSA takes a lead role in many of the activities that meet this 

6 

goal, including removing or eliminating special nuclear material 

where possible, securing that material and providing critical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

For fiscal year 2012, our budget request includes more than $1 

billion to remove and prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear 

material around the world and enable NNSA to continue leading 

international efforts to implement more stringent standards for the 

physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities worldwide. 

The President is also seeking $890 million for fissile materials 

disposition, which supports the continued construction of the mixed 

oxide fuel fabrication facility, waste solidification building, and efforts to baseline the pit disassembly and conversion project at the 

Savannah River site in South Carolina. Not only will these facilities be used to permanently eliminate more than 34 metric tons of 

U.S. surplus weapons-grade plutonium, this will be done in a way 

that produces electricity for American consumers. Similarly, as 

part of our broader nonproliferation effort, Russia will also be disposing of 34 metric tons of its surplus weapons plutonium in a way 

that will provide energy for Russia. 

Finally, this budget request directs more than $360 million to 

support the research and development required to create new technologies for detecting nuclear proliferation or testing and for monitoring compliance with nuclear nonproliferation and arms control 

agreements. To me, this last point is key. Investing in the future 

of the scientific and technical underpinnings of our program is critical to implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda. This 

is serious business and we need the best minds in the country 

working at our national laboratories and sites to develop new tools 

that will keep the American people safe and enhance global security. Investing in a modern 21st century nuclear security enterprise 

is essential to preventing nuclear terrorism or nuclear proliferation. 

All of NNSA, including defense nuclear nonproliferation, defense 

programs, counterproliferation, and emergency response, and many 

other agencies outside NNSA, as we recently discussed, rely on the 

skills, people, and facilities of the DOE enterprise. For example, 

our nonproliferation mission to protect, remove, and eliminate 

weapon-useable material, the uranium and plutonium, depends on 

maintaining our scientific and technical capabilities in these areas. 

These infrastructure investments, such as the uranium processing 

facility and the chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility, are critical to our enterprise and deserve your support. 

Madam Chairman, these are the highlights of our budget request 

as it relates to our nuclear nonproliferation programs. We recognize 

that we are making this request at a time of acute financial stress 

for our entire Nation and that this committee has many competing 

requests. 

As we work to invest in the future and implement the President’s 

nuclear security agenda, we remain committed to improving the 

way we do business. We fully understand that we cannot come before this Congress and expect increased investments if we are not 

able to demonstrate our ability to spend those resources wisely. 

7 

I am proud to say that improving how we do business is a priority for defense nuclear nonproliferation programs and we’re seeing results. Last year our global threat reduction initiative became 

the first Federal program to receive the Project Management Institute’s coveted Distinguished Project Award. Two weeks ago, our 

MOX program was honored with an environmental stewardship 

award from the State of South Carolina. 

This committee has also voiced concerns in the past about the 

level of our uncommitted carryover funds. I can report that we 

have made continuous improvements in that area over the past 6 

years and through diligent management efforts we have reduced 

the end-of-year uncommitted carryover funds from 15.5 percent in 

2005 to 10.1 percent in 2010, while at the same time, seeing budget 

increases of 40 percent. This reduction puts the nuclear nonproliferation program well below the 13 percent threshold for uncommitted carryover funds established by DOE. 

The vision outlined in this budget request supports the full range 

of NNSA missions by investing in infrastructure, people, science, 

technology, and engineering required to fulfil our missions. I look 

forward to working with the members of the subcommittee to make 

NNSA’s vision a reality and I look forward to any questions you 

may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ANNE M. HARRINGTON

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to present the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). This budget request will enable the NNSA to meet its commitments to the American people and 

our international partners to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers around the 

world. The request also provides the science, technology, and engineering capabilities necessary to allow us to address the broader national security challenges of the 

21st century. 

While recognizing the economic challenges facing our Nation, the President has 

demonstrated through this fiscal year 2012 budget request his strong commitment 

to nonproliferation and nuclear security. This unprecedented investment in DNN’s 

mission represents a commitment to implement the President’s nuclear security 

agenda, but does so in a way that balances our highest priorities with continued 

focus on efficiency and effectiveness. 

During his speech in Prague in April 2009, the President unveiled an ambitious 

nuclear security agenda, which identified the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and keep dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists, 

as a top national security priority. Meeting this objective, however, requires international commitment and action. The success of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit 

was the first concrete demonstration of broad international commitment, resulting 

in 47 heads of state coming together and jointly endorsing global nuclear security 

objectives. Today, there is a robust international effort underway to secure the most 

vulnerable nuclear material around the world and to build on the success of the 

2010 Summit. 

NNSA’s vision is to make the world a safer place. The words are simple, but the 

challenges to realizing that vision are substantial. The Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation’s role in the NNSA mission is to leverage its technical expertise, 

creativity, and other unique capabilities and resources to confront the challenges of 

nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the 

world. Our strategy includes engaging our domestic and international partners in 

a global effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide; impeding 

the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies, information, materials and expertise; providing technical support to the President’s nonproliferation and arms control 

agenda; developing a new framework for nuclear energy that minimizes proliferation 

8 

risks; and advancing the science, technology and engineering base that supports 

DNN’s missions. 

IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT’S NUCLEAR SECURITY AGENDA

The fiscal year 2012 NNSA budget request includes $2.55 billion for Defense Nu- clear Nonproliferation for fiscal year 2012 and $14.3 billion over the next 5 years 

to reduce the global nuclear and radiological threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling nuclear and radiological material, as well as 

promoting the responsible application of nuclear technology and science. Each fiscal 

year from fiscal year 2012 until fiscal year 2016 has been analyzed for priorities to 

achieve Presidential and operational objectives. This includes stemming the risk of 

weapons-expertise proliferation through innovative science and technology partnerships. The budget request provides the resources required to continue making 

progress on the President’s international effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years, a key national security goal. 

This budget request recognizes significant accomplishments of NNSA’s nuclear 

nonproliferation programs in the past year and seeks the resources needed to continue to work toward the President’s goals. NNSA along with the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government departments and agencies, working with countries 

around the world, is implementing Prague speech commitments to a focused and intensified international effort to lock down or remove vulnerable nuclear materials. 

We are executing an integrated, prioritized strategy that aligns authorities, capabilities, and resources to address global nuclear threats. This three-tiered strategy covers the site, country and global levels. NNSA takes a lead role in many of the activities that meet this goal, including removing or eliminating special nuclear material 

when possible, securing that material when not and providing critical support to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency. 

For example, this request provides the necessary resources to support commitments secured from international partners to remove all remaining highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) from Belarus, Ukraine, and Mexico by April 2012, and to carry out 

the removal of nuclear material from other countries. It also contributes to preventing nuclear terrorism by working with Russia and other countries to secure and 

eliminate vulnerable weapons-usable material. The budget request also provides resources to work with the Department of Defense to strengthen international nuclear 

security cooperation. It will enable NNSA, working with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), to continue leading international efforts to implement more 

stringent standards for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities worldwide. 

The request of $2.55 billion is an increase of 10 percent from the fiscal year 2011 

Continuing Resolution, and an increase of 19.6 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. This 10 percent, or $230.8 million increase will support efforts to secure 

the most vulnerable nuclear materials within the President’s stated timeframe. The 

NNSA budget request remains consistent with our overall strategy to ensure that 

programs supporting the President’s commitment lead to an international effort to 

reduce nuclear dangers. 

In addition, the budget request supports the efforts of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) related to radiological material, as well as the activities of the 

International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation (INMP&C) program to 

enhance the ability of our foreign partners to detect nuclear smuggling both at fixed 

border crossings and internal checkpoints. The budget request also continues to support the Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD) U.S. plutonium disposition mission to 

include the three construction projects, as well as the U.S. uranium disposition program. 

Specifically, our $2.55 billion fiscal year 2012 request includes: 

• More than $508 million for GTRI to remove and secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material around the world in 4 years, accelerate additional 

conversions of HEU fueled research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and to provide a comprehensive approach to permanently 

deny terrorists access to nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites 

worldwide; 

• More than $890 million for the FMD program to dispose of U.S. surplus 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium by constructing a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and a Waste Solidification Building, and developing a capability to disassemble nuclear weapon pits and convert the material for use 

in MOX fuel. The fiscal year 2012 request also supports programmatic activities that are not part of the line item construction projects but are essential to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, including: MOX fuel 

9 

qualification, executing utility contracts, obtaining plutonium feedstock 

from Los Alamos National Lab in advance of a full-scale pit disassembly capability, obtaining depleted uranium oxide feedstock, storage of feed materials, and transportation. 

• Over $571 million for the INMP&C program for additional Material Protection Control & Accounting (MPC&A) upgrades and sustainability support, expansion of MPC&A cooperation with countries outside of Russia and 

the former Soviet Union, and additional deployment of radiation detection 

systems with enabling support for sustained operations to combat illicit 

trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials under the Second 

Line of Defense (SLD) program; 

• Over $417 million for the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and 

Development (R&D) program to provide the key technical support for the 

President’s arms control and nonproliferation agenda, as well as to provide 

funding for the University of California pension obligations; and 

• Nearly $162 million for the Nonproliferation and International Security 

(NIS) program to safeguard nuclear material; ensure adequate security of 

U.S.-obligated nuclear material provided to other countries and enhance 

work with partners to strengthen security globally; control the spread of 

WMD technologies, equipment, and expertise; and verify nuclear reductions 

and compliance with international regimes, treaties, and agreements. 

AN INTEGRATED EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL

Different people perceive the ‘‘threat’’ in different ways; we all have our views on 

how to make the world safer. At NNSA, we have formed our view collectively 

through discussions with our counterparts from across the U.S. Government. Working with a strong team from the National Security Staff and with the intelligence 

community, we have developed strategies and identified priorities for programmatic 

and diplomatic engagement. No matter what the risks and threats are, the most effective approach is to integrate our efforts and capitalize on our unique capabilities 

to work effectively across NNSA, within DOE and the interagency, and with our foreign partners. In that respect, the threat priorities of our international partners are 

also taken into account. 

As One-NNSA, all of NNSA’s major components work together closely. For example, the Office of Defense Programs and DNN collaborate on approaches to transparency and monitoring for treaty-related purposes; DNN and the Office of Emergency Response work together to carry out training in partner countries. This pattern of collaboration is important because our missions are so closely interrelated 

and we because share resources across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. For example, investments that sustain the stockpile will also support our full range of nuclear nonproliferation missions. In addition to the substantial support that our National Laboratories and facilities receive from Defense Programs and other parts of 

DOE, DNN also makes a major contribution to preserving and developing worldclass expertise that can support all of NNSA’s missions. We must continue to invest 

in the future. 

We also have important common ground with our colleagues in the Offices of Nuclear Energy and Environmental Management at DOE as we all develop strategies 

to address the expansion of nuclear energy and the disposition of nuclear and radiological materials in a safe and secure way. We maintain constant contact with our 

partners throughout the interagency, particularly at the Departments of Homeland 

Security, State, and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National 

Security Staff (NSS). For instance, the NSS currently leads a strong interagency 

team that meets regularly to prioritize activities and to assess risk by material type 

and country, which in turn informs how we execute our programs. As the largest 

nonproliferation account in the government, NNSA’s fiscal year 2012 budget request 

was developed with the interagency effort in mind and in the context of a well-defined scope of work within the President’s timeframe for the 4-year effort. 

But no matter how coordinated and integrated our efforts are in the United 

States, none of our efforts would be possible without the full engagement and cooperation of our foreign partners. The United States cannot control knowledge, material and technology as we did in the past. Globalization requires us to pursue partnerships based on shared nonproliferation objectives. 

NNSA is one of several U.S. agencies actively working on the President’s nonproliferation agenda, and has taken the lead in a number of areas. These capabilities are reflected in our fiscal year 2012 budget request, including: 

10 

Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material from Theft and Diversion 

NNSA is the interagency leader in making sure that nuclear material worldwide 

is secured from theft and diversion at its source. 

Through GTRI, NNSA leads U.S. efforts to convert research and test reactors 

from HEU to LEU, remove excess or unwanted weapons-usable nuclear and radiological material, and enhance the security of risk-significant quantities of nuclear 

and radiological materials in use at civilian sites around the world to help prevent 

terrorists from acquiring what they need to make a nuclear weapon or radiological 

‘‘dirty bomb.’’ Since President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech, NNSA has removed 963 kilograms of HEU and plutonium from 19 countries around the world. 

That is enough material for more than 38 nuclear weapons. Six countries have had 

all of their HEU removed since the Prague speech. In November 2010, NNSA completed a large-scale campaign to move spent fuel from Kazakhstan’s BN–350 plutonium production reactor to a secure storage facility in eastern Kazakhstan. The 

spent fuel contains 10 metric tons of HEU and three metric tons of weapons-grade 

plutonium—enough material for more than 775 nuclear weapons. NNSA plans to 

complete a number of important projects in fiscal year 2012, including the removal 

of all HEU from Ukraine, Belarus, and Mexico in cooperation with each of those 

countries. NNSA will continue efforts to remove HEU from Vietnam, Uzbekistan, 

Poland, and Hungary in 2013. In fiscal year 2012, NNSA will continue to lead U.S. 

efforts to secure or recover high-risk radiological materials, enhance security at an 

additional 158 buildings worldwide, and recover an additional 1,900 disused or unwanted radioactive sealed sources here in the United States. 

The INMP&C program has two main components. Under Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A), the program prevents nuclear terrorism by working 

in Russia and other regions of concern to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear 

weapons and weapons exploitable material. Under its SLD Program, NNSA works 

with international partners to deploy radiation detection systems at international 

crossing points, airports, and seaports, and to provide mobile systems for use at interior checkpoints to detect and deter the illicit transfer of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Training and sustainability support are also key components of 

this program. Since the President’s 2009 Prague speech, the program has completed 

MPC&A upgrades to 33 buildings containing weapons-usable material in Russia; 

initiated new upgrades at a number of Russian facilities; placed a cumulative total 

of 25 MPC&A regulations in development in Russia and other FSU countries to 

strengthen nuclear security safeguards; cooperated with the FBI to provide mobile 

detection training in four countries; deployed radiation detection systems at 162 

sites; downblended over two metric tons of HEU to LEU in Russia; and initiated 

cooperation with India and China to develop nuclear security Centers of Excellence 

to help those nations become regional centers on nuclear security culture and training. The budget request will allow INMP&C to: complete MPC&A upgrades at 3 additional buildings in Russia with weapons usable nuclear material; provide additional MPC&A upgrades at 25 Russian nuclear material sites; continue to support 

the transition of security upgrades to sustainable operations at 76 sites in Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine; complete Russian Ministry of Defense training 

centers (Ochakovo, Krasnoyarsk, Abramovo); continue Russian inspections support 

activities and training, and support for secure transportation sustainability, measurement methodologies, and protective force programs; and will downblend an additional 1 MTs of HEU. SLD plans to install detection systems in 30 foreign strategic 

transit and border sites (cumulative total of 448 of 650 planned), to complete 3 

Megaports in Cameroon, Vietnam, and Italy (for a cumulative total 48 of 100 

planned), and to deploy mobile detection systems in 8 more countries. 

In fiscal year 2012, marking one of the first major accomplishments of the 2010 

Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, NNSA led the U.S. Government and international efforts to finalize the fifth revision of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities 

(IAEA Information Circular 225). In fiscal year 2012, through the NIS Program, 

NNSA will lead U.S. and global efforts to implement INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and work 

closely with foreign partners to operationalize its recommendations. Such efforts will 

include facilitating the exchange of information on best practices for securing nuclear material in facilities and in transport. NNSA’s NIS program will continue to 

lead U.S. interagency physical protection assessment visits to other countries that 

have received U.S.-obligated nuclear material under Section 123 Agreements for 

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. In doing so, NNSA and its predecessor organizations 

will have led over 125 visits to 48 countries since 1974. Additionally, NIS will continue to engage foreign partners and multilateral organizations on nuclear security 

initiatives globally through technical projects and nuclear security training activities. 

11 

NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is working to strengthen 

the international safeguards system, a central pillar of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Safeguards ensure the timely detection of diversion of nuclear 

materials from peaceful activities. As NGSI works to advance the President’s call 

in Prague for ‘‘more resources and authority for international inspections,’’ it is simultaneously creating the next generation of dedicated nonproliferation experts, developing cutting edge technology for use by the IAEA and other safeguards organizations, and working with international partners to strengthen the implementation 

of IAEA safeguards. 

Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Smuggling 

As a complement to our facility-based physical security efforts that serve as a first 

line of defense, NNSA executes a number of programs that provide an additional 

layer of defense by detecting and preventing illicit transfers of nuclear-related material, technology and equipment. These programs help implement the President’s call 

during his April 2009 Prague speech call to build on efforts to break up nuclear 

black markets and detect and intercept dangerous materials in transit. 

Within INMP&C, the SLD Core program cooperates with foreign partners to install radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic ports in Russia, other former Soviet Union states, Eastern Europe, and other key countries, and 

provides mobile detection capability to law enforcement as well as related training 

and support. The SLD Megaports Initiative likewise cooperates internationally to 

deploy radiation detection equipment and provide related training to key strategic 

and high-volume ports. The fiscal year 2012 budget request provides for SLD installations at an additional 30 sites in Estonia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Mongolia, Croatia, and Moldova, mobile 

detection capability to 8 countries, and completion of Megaports installations and 

activities at 3 additional foreign seaports with ongoing installation activities at an 

additional 13 ports. The SLD Program will continue to provide some level of sustainability support to over 250 sites in over 40 countries. 

NNSA’s R&D program funds research to deliver nuclear detectors that are more 

sensitive, have better discrimination and are easier to deploy facilitating the discovery and identification of contraband radiation materials. The R&D program also 

delivers state-of-the-art imaging equipment that identifies chemical trails at a distance. 

Within NIS, the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) 

supports U.S. Government efforts to combat illicit trafficking of dual-use commodities required to manufacture WMD and their means of delivery. Specifically, 

INECP improves partners’ export control systems and their ability to prevent illicit 

smuggling—particularly threats posed by black market networks. Notably, INECP 

collaborates with partners to develop sustainable national training capabilities, including outreach to strategic industries to improve compliance and efforts to 

strengthen our partners’ frontline inspection and other enforcement capabilities. 

Since 2001, INECP has trained over 17,000 frontline personnel to recognize WMD 

dual-use commodities in 65 countries, 19 of which have adopted domestic programs. 

Moreover, to help governments investigate the illicit use of nuclear materials and 

deter illicit trafficking of those materials, NIS’s Confidence-Building Measures Program is advancing international cooperation in nonproliferation nuclear forensics. 

Nuclear forensics applies scientific techniques to identify unique characteristics of 

nuclear and radioactive material. Promoting cooperation among countries in nuclear 

forensics can produce investigative leads to link a seizure by one country with diversion in another, helping to better prosecute those involved. NIS’s Confidence-Building Measures Program sponsors technical collaborations to strengthening the global 

capacity for effective nuclear forensics and increase data sharing. 

Permanent nuclear material disposition 

Part of the challenge in making the world a safer place is to be ever mindful of 

the challenges associated with disposing of large quantities of Cold War nuclear 

weapons materials. Disposition not only permanently reduces the risk that these 

materials could be stolen or diverted for use by rogue nations or terrorists but it 

also allows us to reduce the number of sites where these materials are stored thereby significantly reducing the cost associated with guarding and storing the material. 

In this regard, the President is seeking $890 million for the FMD program, which 

supports continued efforts to down-blend surplus U.S. HEU as well as to continue 

construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, Waste Solidification Building, 

and efforts to disassemble nuclear weapons pits at the Savannah River Site in 

South Carolina. Not only will these facilities be used to permanently eliminate more 

than 34 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium, they will do so in a way that 

12 

produces electricity for consumers right here in the United States. Similarly, as part 

of our broader nonproliferation effort, Russia will also be disposing of 34 metric tons 

of surplus weapons plutonium in a way that will provide energy for Russia. As I 

like to say, this is the ultimate swords to plowshares program, and a key element 

of the President’s nuclear nonproliferation agenda. 

Ensuring Transparent and Verifiable Compliance 

The budget request allows NNSA to provide national leadership with continuous, 

global, real-time assurance that nuclear test agreements are respected through the 

U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System satellite payloads. DNN is leading interagency re-evaluation of system requirements and implementation to sustain needed 

capability at an affordable cost. The Nuclear Detonation Detection seismic model 

and sensor development raises confidence of policy makers about the nature, magnitude, and location of explosions that could be tests of nuclear devices. 

The budget request will also support the monitored elimination of an additional 

30 metric tons of Russian weapons-grade HEU in fiscal year 2012. This is one of 

the final steps toward completing the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement in 

2013. The Agreement has been one of NNSA’s most successful nonproliferation efforts to date and is on track to convert 500 metric tons Russian weapons-grade 

HEU, the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear weapons, into nuclear fuel used to generate 

nearly 10 percent of all U.S. electricity. 

The 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) between the United 

States and the Russian Federation has a goal of eliminating plutonium production 

for use in weapons. The Agreement has monitoring provisions to ensure that shutdown U.S. and Russian production reactors remain shutdown and that at least nine 

metric tons of Russian plutonium oxide produced from the last three operating Russian production reactors is not used in weapons. DOE is the Executive Agent for 

the PPRA, is a member of the U.S. component of the bilateral Joint Implementation 

and Compliance Commission that oversees PPRA activities, supplies technical experts for the monitoring visits in Russia, and hosts the Russian monitors at DOE 

sites during the shutdown reactor visits. 

An important PPRA milestone has been reached—the three remaining operating 

Russian plutonium production reactors recently were shut down. The two reactors 

in Seversk were shut down in 2008, and the closure of the last, at Zheleznogorsk, 

was announced at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. In accordance with 

the Agreement, those reactors will be transitioned to the established PPRA monitoring regime to ensure that they remain permanently shutdown. Of the 27 plutonium production reactors covered in the Agreement, including 14 in the United 

States and 13 in Russia, 11 have already been decommissioned to the point that 

they have been removed from monitoring and will never be used again for plutonium production. The United States and Russia will continue to monitor the remaining reactors until they are similarly decommissioned and the subject plutonium 

oxide is transitioned to another monitoring regime or is eliminated. 

Technical Support to the President’s Nonproliferation and Arms Control Agenda 

DNN provides technical expertise, drawing from NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise, as well as negotiating and policy expertise, to support the development, negotiation, and implementation of treaties and agreements, including the New START 

Treaty with Russia. While contributing to overall U.S. national security objectives, 

our focus is to meet our current and potential future treaty commitments and obligations while at the same time continuing to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Drawing upon our expertise, including work in support of past arms control and 

nonproliferation agreements, DNN is playing an essential role in technology development to address future arms control and nonproliferation challenges. This includes developing the next generation of radiation detection equipment, advanced 

tamper indication and unique identification capabilities, and methodologies to support potential future warhead and material identification and verification requirements. We are also capitalizing on the resources in place at the National Center for 

Nuclear Security in Nevada. Such resources enable us to advance and demonstrate 

capabilities to address verification, monitoring, and transparency requirements by 

increasing confidence in our ability to detect and discriminate signatures of interest 

and capabilities that address technical nuclear forensics requirements and other 

nonproliferation initiatives, as described in the Nuclear Posture Review. We work 

in close cooperation with NNSA’s Defense Programs and our U.S. Interagency counterparts to develop initiatives that accomplish U.S. objectives while minimizing any 

potential impacts across our own enterprise. 

13 

Investing in our future 

The Nuclear Science and Security Consortium builds a stable pipeline of highly 

trained nuclear nonproliferation technical expertise for the NNSA laboratory system, sponsors basic research in nuclear nonproliferation, and bridges the nuclear 

nonproliferation knowledge bases in academia and the NNSA Laboratory system. By 

ensuring DNN maintains a vital R&D program to fund cutting edge nonproliferation 

technologies in the National Lab complex, we also make an investment in human 

capital development at the labs. Challenging research opportunities and world class 

facilities enable our labs to attract and hire the best and brightest young research 

scientists, technicians, and engineers, and thereby renew the workforce for generations to come. In addition, the DNN programs engage with national laboratories and 

facilities across the DOE complex to ensure the long term capabilities and expertise 

necessary to serve all of our missions. 

International Engagement 

We are also continuing to build upon our existing partnerships with foreign colleagues and to initiate new partnerships. Our traditional defense partnership with 

the United Kingdom, for example, is decades old. Our collaboration on technologies 

and methodologies to support monitoring and verification initiatives is now in the 

beginning of its second decade, and provides an essential mechanism to evaluate 

and test approaches in alternative environments. We hope to build upon this success 

by engaging with other key allies and partners as we work toward addressing the 

range of global nuclear security challenges, including potential future arms limitations and reductions agreements. 

NNSA strives to build strong cooperative relationships with our international 

partners, both old and new. DNN’s NIS program provides training and other support to enhance the capabilities of our partners to meet the commitments they made 

at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. The pledges from Japan and the Republic of 

Korea to develop Centers of Excellence for nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation are two examples as NNSA is collaborating with both to develop nuclear security training curriculum, nuclear security test beds, and international 

workshops in nuclear security for their respective centers. The Obama administration is also working closely with strategic partners such as China and India to advance regional centers of excellence, with the overarching goal of spurring deeper 

engagement in preventing the spread of WMD-related material, technology, equipment and expertise. 

As outlined in his 2009 Cairo speech, the President has also called for a more 

comprehensive engagement with Middle East and North African countries, stressing 

science and technology partnerships focused on issues of common concern. Since 

2003, NNSA has advanced regional security cooperation through the Middle East 

Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS), formerly known as the Cooperative Monitoring Center, in Amman, Jordan. As a regional center of excellence, MESIS provides a forum for training and dialogue on regional security and proliferation concerns, including export controls, border security, and nuclear safety, security and 

safeguards. It marshals regional, U.S., and international resources to cultivate indigenous nonproliferation expertise. The Institute also facilitates workshops and 

training efforts for other NNSA and U.S. Government nonproliferation programs, 

and leverages U.S. Government and international nonproliferation efforts in the region. 

Preparing for the Threats We Don’t Know 

As threats evolve and our knowledge of the world changes, NNSA must constantly 

re-evaluate its efforts to ensure that we have the flexibility to accomplish our goals. 

This constant re-evaluation must stretch from advanced technology R&D to working 

with our international partners to prepare for unknown threats by asking them to 

consider the plausible range of adversary capabilities, strategies, and tactics—including insider and cyber capabilities—when designing security systems. In this 

way, all of DNN’s programs, along with the complementary activities of our partners 

throughout NNSA, DOE, and the rest of the U.S. Government, are forward looking 

and prepared for any eventuality. 

CONCLUSION

NNSA carefully evaluates its security needs in a fluid, uncertain, and challenging 

international landscape. In coordination with the rest of the U.S. Government, 

NNSA has charted a path forward for DNN that shows our unwavering commitment 

to our Nation’s security and enhances our formidable capabilities to address broader 

security challenges. 

14 

The NNSA is a technically-based organization with a strong nuclear heritage that 

serves as the base for our contribution to a wide range of national security solutions. 

NNSA is rooted in the management of our Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and 

the application of nuclear energy for naval propulsion. Additionally, NNSA capabilities support a broad range of U.S. and international activities that address existing 

dangers, identify and prepare for future challenges, and advise the U.S. Government 

and our international partners on nuclear security matters. 

This budget request takes DNN into the future and strengthens the capabilities 

that are themselves integral elements of our national security. The challenge is to 

retain the capabilities that continue to be essential, and to identify and develop 

those capabilities that are needed for the future. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Myers. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MYERS. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman: It is 

an honor to be here today to address the countering WMD mission 

performed by DTRA and the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) Center for Combating WMDs. I serve as director for 

both of these organizations, which are collocated at Fort Belvoir, 

VA. We work together to reduce WMD threats at their source, provide capabilities to deter, detect, interdict, and defeat them, and 

develop means for minimizing the effects and consequences of such 

attacks. We provide subject matter expertise and capabilities at the 

global, national, and battlefield levels. We conduct technology development to counter WMD threats. We also help maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

The threat is very real. The consequences of a WMD attack 

would cause mass casualties, have a crippling economic impact, 

and cause major sociological harm. As General Bob Kehler, the 

Commander of STRATCOM, recently told the full committee: ‘‘Of 

the threats we face, WMD clearly represent the greatest threat to 

the American people, particularly when they are pursued or possessed by violent extremists or state proliferators.’’ 

We have an increasingly effective national strategy for countering this threat. It harnesses expertise across the whole government and the international community. Our focus is on building 

additional and more effective barriers between the threat and the 

American people. Our team is truly a unique, agile, and dynamic 

institution. As you walk down the halls of our facilities, you will 

see nuclear physicists, microbiologists, and special forces operators 

working together to solve complex problems. 

If you spend a day with us, this is what you might experience: 

At 7:30 a.m., senior leadership assembles in our 24–7 operations 

center for briefings on ongoing activities around the world and intelligence updates. In the briefing a map is projected displaying the 

location of our teams around the world. Status updates are provided for ongoing real world exercises and testing, and a detailed 

overview of all requests for information for reachback support from 

across the entire government. 

Next door in a vault, subject matter experts of the reachback 

team are working on a request from a combatant commander for 

plume modeling analysis on a threatened chlorine attack against 

U.S. forces. At the same time, we are overseeing the Nunn-Lugar 

program’s elimination of a Typhoon-class missile submarine in 

15 

northern Russia. The submarine was armed with 20 intercontinental missiles carrying 200 nuclear warheads, each capable of destroying an American city. Today it is being dismantled piece by 

piece. 

Two thousand miles to the southeast, at the Nunn-Lugar Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Siberia, 152-millimeter artillery rounds containing VX nerve agent are being destroyed as the 

program eliminates the 2 million chemical weapons stored there. In 

the Mediterranean, our personnel are observing a proliferation security initiative exercise, where they are focused on stopping the 

potential trafficking of nuclear weapons material. 

Half a world away in the Straits of Malacca, together with the 

U.S. Navy and a Southeast Asian partner, we successfully completed the test of a new nuclear material detector developed by our 

research and development enterprise. 

At the U.S. naval submarine base at King’s Bay, Georgia, we are 

preparing for a Russian inspection under the terms of the New 

START treaty. Across the planet, an inspection team has just arrived in Russia, en route to a base in Siberia to inspect warheads 

of deployed ballistic missiles or heavy bombers. 

In the Middle East, a team is supporting a U.S. Central Command exercise to interdict a WMD shipment, while another team 

is conducting a vulnerability assessment of a critical U.S. command 

and control facility. At White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, 

personnel are preparing to oversee a live test drop of a 30,000- 

pound massive ordinance penetrator by a U.S. Air Force B–2 bomber against a tunnel facility that replicates a known underground 

target in a potentially hostile country. 

In Africa, at the request of the State Department, we are assisting a central African nation in improving the safety, security, and 

accountability of its manportable anti-aircraft missiles and other 

small arms. In East Africa, we are part of a U.S. interagency team 

discussing plans with their host counterparts for safety and security improvements at a facility where dangerous pathogens are potentially vulnerable to terrorist threats. 

Madam Chairman, Senator Portman, what I have described here 

are real examples of the practical differences made by our team on 

a daily basis. In closing, we could not do our job without your 

strong and continued support. I thank you for authorizing our full 

fiscal year 2011 budget request and hope that we will earn your 

support for the fiscal year 2012 request. 

I’d be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KENNETH A. MYERS III 

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and members of the subcommittee, 

it is an honor to be here today to address the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) mission performed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

and U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC–WMD). 

The threat posed by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is immediate, growing in scope, and evolving in its potential applications. Those who 

wish to harm us understand that the use of such weapons could result in immense 

loss of life and enduring economic, political, and social damage on a global scale. 

They have stated and demonstrated their intent to acquire and use WMD against 

us. For example, the fall 2010 issue of the magazine ‘‘Inspire . . . and Inspire the 

16 

Believers,’’ published by al Qaeda, contains the following passage: ‘‘For those 

mujahid brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry lays the greatest opportunity and responsibility. For such brothers we encourage them to develop a weapon 

of mass destruction, i.e., an effective poison with the proper method of delivery . . . 

Due to the extreme importance of moving the war with America over to the next 

stage, the state of weapons of mass destruction, we shall In Sha ̄’ Alla ̄h cover such 

topics in more detail in our upcoming issues.’’ 

The United States has a national strategy that harnesses the Counter WMD 

(CWMD) expertise and capabilities across the U.S. Government and the international community. The President has challenged us to secure vulnerable nuclear 

materials across the globe and reduce the likelihood and consequences of biological 

attacks. In addition, focused efforts by the U.S. Government and other parties to 

the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are destroying their chemical weapons. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years has better organized itself to perform the CWMD mission to include more streamlined policy development, mission 

oversight, requirements identification, WMD intelligence fusion, investment 

prioritization, planning and exercising, and CWMD mission execution. Additionally, 

DOD is working more closely with partners across the U.S. Government and overseas to counter WMD threats. 

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY MISSION

The mission of DTRA is to safeguard America and its allies from WMD (chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear weapons) and from high-yield explosives by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter these threats and mitigate their 

effects. 

DTRA is the DOD’s center of expertise for the CWMD mission and is a national 

asset in terms of its unique CWMD knowledge and capabilities. The agency’s programs and activities span the scope of the full national response: nonproliferation— 

reduction of WMD threats at their source; counterproliferation—the deterrence, 

interdiction, and defeat of WMD threats; and consequence management—the minimization of the effects of WMD attacks and the mitigation of their consequences. 

DTRA provides CWMD subject matter expertise at global, national, regional, local, 

and battlefield levels; performs CWMD-related technology development and integrates that technology with operational needs; provides planning assistance for the 

warfighters; and helps maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. 

Today, more than ever, DTRA is working closely with our DOD, interagency, and 

international partners to build more effective barriers between WMD threats and 

the American people and our allies. 

The agency has approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel located primarily in Virginia, New Mexico, and Florida, but also at 17 more locations across 

the globe. Our budget request for fiscal year 2012 is $1.487 billion and comprises 

Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $504.747 million Science and 

Technology (S&T) portion of the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

(CBDP) and serves as the funds manager for the remainder of that program’s funding, $1.021 billion. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $3 

billion. 

DTRA performs its programs in response to direction provided by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD). As the Director of DTRA, I report through Mr. Andrew 

Weber, the assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics. Because DTRA conducts CWMD-related S&T development, we also work 

in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In addition, as we are executing programs that implement DOD and national 

security policy, DTRA has a close partnership with the assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy. Our close relationship to the Intelligence Community is also vital in 

terms of assisting that community in better assessing WMD threats and, thereby, 

better informing our planning and mission support. 

DTRA is also the DOD Combat Support Agency charged with providing CWMD 

expertise and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, and the 

combatant commanders. While we serve all combatant commanders, we work most 

closely with the six Geographic Combatant Commanders, U.S. Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM), and STRATCOM. 

17 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WMD

DTRA’s roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when it provided technical 

and operational nuclear weapons effects expertise to the Military Services. This assistance was and continues to be provided to the Services and also STRATCOM. 

In late 2005, the Secretary of Defense assigned the Commander, STRATCOM, the 

responsibilities for integrating and synchronizing DOD CWMD efforts in support of 

U.S. Government objectives. The Commander, STRATCOM turned to DTRA for its 

CWMD expertise and established the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC–WMD). On 31 January 2006, the Secretary of Defense assigned 

the DTRA Director to serve in the additional capacity as the Director, SCC–WMD 

under the authority, direction, and control of the Commander, STRATCOM. The 

SCC–WMD is colocated with DTRA at the Defense Threat Reduction Center on Fort 

Belvoir to leverage the agency’s technical expertise and to provide a seamless partnership between the two organizations. 

The mission of the SCC–WMD is to synchronize planning for the counter-WMD 

mission across DOD in conjunction with the entire U.S. Government’s effort in the 

field. The SCC–WMD is responsible for establishing technical support and providing 

analysis of the global CWMD mission to the combatant commanders, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. The Center’s approximately 70 military 

and civilian personnel coordinate global CWMD operations support; plan against 

designated WMD threats; develop and maintain a global CWMD concept of operations; provide military representation to U.S. national agencies, commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related to CWMD efforts; advocate for 

CWMD capabilities; integrate theater security cooperation activities, deployments, 

and capabilities that support campaigns to combat WMD; and execute CWMD operations, as directed. 

Twice each year, the SCC–WMD hosts the Global Synchronization Conference, a 

series of planning sessions that bring together hundreds of CWMD leaders from 

across the U.S. Government and several partner nations. Participants work on specific issues in focus groups, develop desired outcomes and solution paths, and make 

meaningful progress on solution implementation between conferences. Achievements 

across recent conferences include development of a DOD-wide CWMD Campaign 

plan from a framework document to a detailed plan with goals, tasks, and performance standards that will enable us to assess CWMD mission progress; the drafting 

of health-based chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) decontamination clearance standards for unrestricted operations of U.S. Transportation Command airlifters; and an interagency biosurveillance indications and warning exercise 

that clarified for CWMD planners the roles of the intelligence and medical communities in responding to a biological event. 

The SCC–WMD also supports WMD Elimination operations undertaken in a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and disable or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities. Its Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) provides joint expertise and support in the development, 

training, and exercising of WMD Elimination related plans, operations, and forces. 

The SCC–WMD and DTRA are providing assistance to the Commander, 

STRATCOM, who was tasked to establish and maintain Standing Joint Force Headquarters for WMD Elimination as called for by the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Additionally, the Center is a key facilitator of the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI), an international effort by 98 countries to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI Support Cell assists combatant command staffs in developing, planning, and executing PSI exercises; assists OSD and the Joint Staff in 

planning and executing international PSI exercises involving other U.S. Government 

departments and agencies; and provides subject matter expertise to international 

PSI meetings and activities. 

RECENT DTRA/SCC–WMD ACCOMPLISHMENTS

I am pleased to report that DTRA and the SCC–WMD work together as a fully 

integrated team. As a team we have assisted the development of more efficient and 

effective DOD and combatant commander CWMD plans; advanced the means for assessing and exercising CWMD capabilities; shaped and advocated for CWMD requirements; and provided improved PSI planning support. 

Other recent accomplishments include: 

• DTRA successfully transitioned the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) 

to the United States Air Force. The MOP is a 30,000-pound conventional 

penetrating weapon designed to provide substantial improvements in accuVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:06 Jan 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68088.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
18 

racy and lethality over current weapons in the arsenal to defeat hardened, 

deeply buried targets. 

• DTRA responded this past year to over 1,600 ‘‘reach back’’ requests for 

CWMD expertise and WMD effects analysis from OSD, the Joint Staff, the 

combatant commanders, National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams 

(WMD–CSTs), and other DOD and interagency customers. This is an over 

four-fold increase in numbers of requests from when we began providing 

this expertise several years ago. In addition, our reach back customers are 

asking for more detailed information and analysis, and expecting faster 

turn around times. We have provided expertise and supported events ranging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Gulf Oil spill to the Super 

Bowl and the State of the Union Address. 

• Without missing a beat in executing our daily mission, we concurrently 

responded to events in Libya, supporting Operations Odyssey Dawn and 

Unified Protector, as well as the consequences of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, by supporting Operation Tomodachi. At the peak level of 

activity, over 200 DTRA and SCC–WMD personnel daily supported 33 liaisons, CWMD planners, JECE personnel, and consequence management experts deployed to the U.S. Africa Command in Germany, as well as the U.S. 

Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the U.S. Embassy in 

Tokyo. We responded to well over 500 requests for information in support 

of both operations. In addition, we recommended consequence management 

technologies for consideration by the Commanders, U.S. Pacific Command 

and USFJ. Our ability to support these events at opposite ends of the earth, 

on short notice, and on a continuing basis while still meeting other mission 

requirements demonstrates the agility and professionalism of the DTRA/ 

SCC–WMD team. 

DTRA’S NEW STRATEGIC PLAN

Many organizations within DOD and across the U.S. Government contribute in 

some way to countering WMD threats. With a fulltime focus on CWMD, DTRA provides the core of the DOD expertise for countering WMD threats. Rather than duplicating capabilities and expertise that exist elsewhere inside and outside the department, DTRA partners with these organizations, leveraging their expertise and efforts and making the full scope of our knowledge and capabilities available to them. 

As threats evolve and budgets tighten, we must deepen existing relationships and 

build new partnerships across the department and throughout the U.S. Government 

and with our friends and allies overseas. We also understand that we need to be 

more effective and efficient in how we perform our mission. Two examples of this 

are our ongoing effort with the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) on opportunities for: (a) collaborative R&D on nuclear-related threats; and (b) joint offices that will reduce required space in U.S. embassies 

or the need to rent commercial office space abroad. Both departments and the 

United States will benefit. 

The new DTRA Strategic Plan, released last November, recognizes today’s realities. It will provide for forward movement in concert with our DOD, interagency, 

and international partners; facilitate more efficient and effective mission execution; 

and underpin our fiscal year 2012 budget request. At the heart of this plan are 

three goals. 

Goal 1—Adapt to and shape the dynamic Global Security Environment 

DTRA cultivates interconnected, mutually supportive partnerships to counter 

WMD threats. We must focus on developing new and expanding existing bilateral 

and multilateral partnerships to promote broader international cooperation on nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management; support the cooperative elimination of WMD threats abroad; improve the security and accountability 

of vulnerable nuclear, biological, and chemical material globally; and improve strategic global situational awareness to respond to emerging threats. 

As the revolution in the life sciences advances enabling technologies and the ability to exploit these technologies becomes increasingly available, there is the urgent 

need to provide improved protection against naturally occurring extremely dangerous pathogens or newly created biological materials. As American troops are 

called upon to operate around the world, disease surveillance becomes an even more 

important aspect of force protection. 

Guiding these efforts is a strategy built upon our success with the Nunn-Lugar 

CTR Program, which is expanding to include new partnerships beyond the former 

Soviet Union (FSU) and greater focus on reducing the threat of biological weapons. 

19 

This innovative cooperative program for reducing WMD threats has an impressive 

history of success. In the FSU, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 7,599 nuclear warheads; and destroyed 2,367 ballistic missiles and strategic air-to-surface 

missiles, 155 strategic bombers; 32 ballistic missile submarines, and 678 silo and 

mobile missile launchers. In addition, 24 Russian nuclear weapons storage sites 

have received security upgrades as have 19 former biological weapons and health 

facilities. Four former Soviet biological weapon production facilities have been eliminated or converted. Twenty-three disease surveillance labs across the FSU have 

been built and equipped to enhance early detection of biological incidents. In addition, over 17,000 tons of chemical weapon agents and 819,000 chemical weapon 

rounds have been destroyed either in Russia or Albania. 

While Nunn-Lugar activities will continue in the FSU, the program is expanding 

to new regions and increasingly focused on cooperative efforts to reduce biological 

threats. The Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) Program is working with 

new partner countries to build capacity that improves safe and secure diagnosis of 

dangerous disease outbreaks and to gain an understanding of their indigenous 

pathogens. These Nunn-Lugar efforts will directly contribute to improved force protection for our military personnel—a top priority for the Services and the combatant 

commands as expressed by the Commander, U.S. Africa Command, in a 4 January 

2011 letter to Senator Richard Lugar, who had visited diagnostic and research laboratories in East Africa in November 2010. In this letter, General Kip Ward stated: 

‘‘Your call for the United States to work together with African partners and provide 

financial support to mitigate potential bio-terrorism threats was very timely and 

highlights a key area for intensified engagement now. I share your concern that biosecurity should be enhanced, and quickly, so that al Qaeda and other terrorist 

groups in the region are denied access to deadly pathogens that may cause largescale human suffering, death, and economic chaos.’’ 

To accomplish this, we rely on the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and, in some 

cases, existing relationships with these nations that our partners across the U.S. 

Government—including the Departments of State, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture—already possess. Our efforts simultaneously aid the regional 

strategic objectives of the combatant commands by increasing biosafety for partner 

nation populations. 

Objectives under this goal include: 

• In collaboration with the NNSA, support President Obama’s 4-year nuclear lockdown goal, both with existing partners in the FSU and with new 

partners like China and India. 

• Initiate and strengthen strategic relationships in conjunction with our 

interagency partners to explore collaborative efforts to prevent, reduce, and 

respond to WMD threats. 

• Initiate and expand CBE programs and relationships with, among others, 

Kenya, Uganda, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India to secure and consolidate 

collections of extremely dangerous pathogens and their research in the minimum number of secure laboratories and build capacity to quickly diagnose 

and report natural occurring or deliberate bio-threats. 

• In concert with the CBDP develop and expand biosurveillance technologies that encompass early detection, early information sharing, and the 

ability to make informed decisions in near-real time. 

• Develop bilateral and regional-level capacity to counter WMD proliferation through collaborative workshops, training, equipment enhancements, 

and regionally integrated counterproliferation efforts to include the International Counterproliferation Program, the Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation 

Prevention Program, and various counter-trafficking programs. 

• Support Department of State Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 

efforts to assess, reduce, and secure stockpiles of small arms and light 

weapons (SALW) worldwide. These efforts help foreign governments ensure 

that manportable air defense systems, other SALW, and related ordnance 

are properly secured and managed and that excess stockpiles are destroyed. 

DTRA performs assessments, provides technical advice, and presents best 

practices through training seminars. Although these weapons and munitions are not WMD, DTRA’s on-site weapons inspection and accountability 

expertise has been applied to reduce the proliferation risks and advice countries on how to avoid accidental explosions in their munitions depots. 

• In concert with the Department of State, develop and execute a ‘‘wholeof-government’’ supported program to build consequence management capacity with international partners. 

20 

Goal 2—Provide Counter WMD Capabilities to Meet Current Threats and Challenges 

DTRA enables warfighters and allies to counter WMD threats swiftly, effectively, 

and as far from our borders as possible. Counterproliferation and consequence management activities account for the largest part of this second goal. Related objectives 

include: 

• Expansion of near-real time technical ‘‘reach back’’ support to meet the 

increased number and sophistication of WMD related requests from a growing list of customers including OSD, the combatant commanders, and the 

WMD–CSTs. 

• Priority attention on the safety, security, and accounting of the Nation’s 

nuclear weapons under DOD’s responsibility. 

• Expanded development of WMD active and passive detection technologies 

and accelerated integration into operational concepts to measurably increase standoff detection capabilities and improve means for interdicting 

WMD on the move. 

• Improved non-nuclear means of defeating underground facilities, particularly those associated with WMD. We have particularly close partnerships 

with the Services, SOCOM, and the Intelligence Community in this area. 

• Accelerated development and transition of nuclear forensics and weapons 

effects capabilities that will increase the understanding of tomorrow’s WMD 

threat environment and ensure the survivability and operability of systems 

and key infrastructure following WMD attacks. 

• Enhanced combatant commanders’ capability to eliminate and respond to 

WMD threats and vulnerabilities, including the improvement of the combatant commanders’ ability to plan and execute CWMD responsibilities. 

• Improved WMD technical analysis efforts with particular emphasis on 

modeling, simulation, wargaming, and tool development across the WMD 

spectrum. 

• Better integrated intelligence data and WMD technical expertise to provide improved understanding of the characteristics, risks, and 

vulnerabilities of WMD threats. 

• Develop a collaborative approach to CWMD education and training better 

focused on the needs of the combatant commanders, the Military Services, 

and our interagency partners. 

• Improved capabilities to defeat WMD agents with minimal collateral 

damage. 

• Accelerated development and transition of technologies to improve the 

protection of the warfighters through passive means and decontamination. 

• In cooperation with the CBDP, develop medical technologies to protect 

the warfighter and the populace from emerging and genetically engineered 

biological threats by linking the identification of pathogens to the development of medical countermeasures and placing higher priority on vaccine development and production to counter disease pandemics. 

Goal 3—Institutionalize a ‘‘whole-of-DTRA’’ approach to enhance the agency’s mission performance 

The third goal calls for the improvement and integration of strategic planning, 

management, and business processes; improved information technology infrastructure and knowledge management; and the development of increased intellectual capital to meet the future WMD threats and provide the required CWMD expertise. 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST

I would like to thank the subcommittee for fully authorizing DTRA’s fiscal year 

2011 budget request. I request your support for our fiscal year 2012 budget request 

of $1.487 billion as follows: $432.133 million in Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide funding; $13.006 million in Procurement, Defense-wide; $533.652 million 

in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-wide funding; and 

$508.219 million for Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. I also urge your support for the request for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Science and Technology (CBDP S&T) program, which DTRA executes. These budget requests include 

efficiencies implemented as part of developing the President’s budget submission. 

Highlights of the DTRA fiscal year 2012 budget request follow. 

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING

Most DTRA Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding directly supports the 

warfighters and national missions. The requested $432.133 million would be applied 

as follows: 

21 

• $71.731 million for Nonproliferation Activities including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Open Skies missions; Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program; International Counterproliferation Program; and 

Secretary of Defense Support. 

• $147.113 million for WMD Combat Support and Operations including 

combat support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, and 

Services; operational and analytical support for nuclear weapons and WMD 

matters; direct technical support to the combatant commands for planning, 

exercises, and real-world operations; deployable subject matter expertise; 

targeting support and combat assessments; Balanced Survivability Assessments that provide mission survivability evaluations; Joint Staff Integrated 

Vulnerability Assessments to improve force protection at home and abroad; 

support to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and support 

to Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation planning and activities. 

• $25.253 million for DTRA’s support to the SCC–WMD including development and maintenance of a WMD common operating picture; synchronization of CWMD planning across DOD and with interagency partners to include the Global Synchronization Conference; access and continuity to national WMD expertise; DTRA Operations Center; and 24/7 technical reach 

back. 

• $10.093 million for the Defense Threat Reduction University that provides unique training for students from all levels of DOD, Federal and state 

agencies, and allied countries in nuclear weapons; nuclear and radiological 

incident command, control, and response; counterproliferation with emphasis on operational support; and maintenance of the DOD source of information and analysis of CWMD and nuclear knowledge. 

• $177.943 million for Core Mission Sustainment that provides for all agency mission essential functions including resource management, security and 

asset protection, information and knowledge management, and acquisition 

and logistics management. Special care was taken in preparing this request 

to ensure that much-needed information technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA’s global mission execution were funded to the fullest extent possible. 

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION FUNDING

DTRA research and development programs respond to the most pressing CWMD 

challenges including stand-off nuclear detection; modeling and simulation; support 

to Special Operations Forces; WMD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 

support to the Intelligence Community; hard target defeat; and system survivability 

against WMD effects. 

The requested $533.652 million would be applied as follows: 

• $47.737 million for Basic Research to discover and develop CWMD-related fundamental knowledge and understanding by DOD and other U.S. 

Government laboratories, industry, and academia—to include partnerships 

with foreign universities. This program manages over 200 active basic research awards on a 3- to 5-year cycle. Since 2007, DTRA has made 205 

basic research awards worth $97.2 million in 36 States, thereby funding the 

CWMD-related research projects performed by more than 500 students and 

100 post-doctoral researchers and resulting in more than 500 publications 

and 25 patents. 

• $196.954 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research including systems engineering and innovation; counter-terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; nuclear and radiological effects; WMD battle management; test 

infrastructure; and CWMD fundamental research. 

• $283.073 million for Counterproliferation Initiatives Advanced Technologies Development including systems engineering and innovation; 

counter-terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced energetics 

and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; WMD battle management; and 

target assessment technologies. 

• $5.888 million for WMD Defeat Capabilities Development and Demonstration on nuclear and radiological effects. 

22 

CBDP S&T BUDGET REQUEST

Defending the homeland and improving CBRN defense capabilities are top national and DOD priorities because it is not possible in a practical sense to distinguish between public health and warfighter protection. The CBDP is a key part of 

a comprehensive, national strategy to prevent, protect, and respond to emerging 

21st century threats posed by an ever-evolving spectrum of chemical and biological 

threats. Directed by the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the 

White House Initiative on Reinventing the Medical Countermeasures Enterprise, 

the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Defense Planning and Program 

Guidance, the CBDP supports comprehensive DOD efforts to: research, develop, and 

acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated defense against CBRN agents; better 

understand potential threats; secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent potential attacks. Although the funding for the CBDP is not part 

of the DTRA budget request, the agency does execute the S&T portion of this program, for which the department has requested $504.747 million in fiscal year 2012. 

This S&T funding provides for technology development to advance CBRN detection, decontamination, medical treatments and diagnostics, battle analysis and management, modeling and simulation, integrated early warning and medical surveillance, individual and collective protection, and medical prophylaxes. I will highlight 

four significant programs and initiatives: 

• The Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMI) will address unique 

operational medical countermeasures (MCM) requirements; establish a 

Public-Private Partnership for advanced development of MCM candidates to 

achieve Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensure, priority manufacture of FDA-licensed products, and surge production capacity to respond to 

a national emergency. This program is vital to staying ahead of WMD 

threats and I urge your strong support for it. 

• The Transformational Medical Technologies (TMT) Program represents a 

paradigm shift for biodefense through the rapid identification of known and 

unknown pathogens and the corresponding rapid discovery of effective countermeasures. The TMT has demonstrated an ‘‘end-to-end’’ capability to respond to emerging infectious diseases and genetically engineered threats. 

This highly successful effort has demonstrated abilities to: perform threat 

identification, characterization, and evaluation within 24 hours; manufacture and test materials in 72 hours; and initiate animal efficacy testing 

within 2 weeks, to be completed within 1 year. 

• Since time is the key critical factor in responding to biological threats, 

enhancing global biosurveillance capabilities is a priority for DOD. Biosurveillance activities performed by the department include research, development, and acquisition of medical diagnostics, data fusion and management, and environmental biodetection capabilities. DOD biosurveillance activities are enhanced by establishing strategic partnerships and scientific 

cooperative efforts with partner Federal departments and agencies as well 

as nations across the globe. 

• Nontraditional Agents (NTAs) are chemicals and biochemicals reportedly 

researched or developed with potential application or intent as chemical 

warfare agents, but which do not fall in the category of traditional chemical 

warfare agents or Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Materials. NTAs pose unique 

risks and challenges for our chemical defense capabilities and the NTA 

Countering Advanced Threats initiative addresses emerging and future capabilities. 

It is important to emphasize that DOD CBDP programs are conducted in partnership with, and leverage the expertise and capabilities of, departments and agencies 

across the U.S. Government. 

PROCUREMENT FUNDING

The DTRA Procurement, Defense-wide request replaces mission essential vehicles 

and equipment and procures new investment items required to perform agency missions. The fiscal year 2012 request is for $13.006 million, $0.949 million higher than 

the fiscal year 2011 estimate. As with the DTRA O&M account, special care was 

taken in preparing this request to ensure that critically essential information technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA’s global mission 

execution were funded to the fullest extent possible. 

23 

NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FUNDING

The Nunn-Lugar program’s overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat of WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise. This program has expanded its activities beyond the FSU as authorized in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. For fiscal year 2012, the 

Nunn-Lugar program has been restructured to clearly link efforts to established national security strategies, gain efficiencies among related project efforts, and enable 

and promote the expansion of the program beyond the FSU. The $508.219 million, a 3-year appropriation, requested for this program in fiscal 

year 2012 would be applied for 3 years as follows: 

• $63.221 million for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination in Russia to include 20 SS–19 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 11 SS–19 silos 

and launch control centers, 36 SS–25 ICBMs, 27 SS–25 road-mobile launchers, and 20 SS–N–18 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). This 

request is a $10.311 million less than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. In addition the funding would decommission one SS–25 ICBM regiment; complete 

the dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 

DELTA III Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) and eliminate 16 SLBM 

launchers; and complete the dismantlement of the nuclear reactor cores and 

launcher sections of one Typhoon SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers. 

• $9.804 million for Chemical Weapons Destruction technical support to the 

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia. This is 

$6.204 million more than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. To date, this effort 

has resulted in the destruction of 1,680.4 metric tons of declared chemical 

weapon agents. 

• $121.143 million for Global Nuclear Security. This is $43.136 million less 

than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. This program area renames and consolidates all activities related to nuclear warhead and weapons-grade nuclear 

material security within selected countries. These efforts provide enhanced 

physical security, including associated inventory management and security 

training support, for strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons 

and fissile materials. The program also improves security for nuclear material that meets specific criteria for enrichment and quantity and is judged 

to be vulnerable. In addition, it assists in the secure transport of nuclear 

warheads and other qualifying material to dismantlement facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition. This program also assists with the establishment of Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capabilities for nuclear security, material 

control, and inventory management that is consistent with best international practices, and installs additional security measures in Kazakhstan. 

• $259.470 million for Cooperative Biological Engagement. This is $50.436 

million more than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. This program was formerly 

titled Biological Threat Reduction. The CBE program counters the threat 

posed by pathogens (as delineated in the U.S. Select Agent List); related 

materials and expertise; and other emerging infectious disease risks. It 

helps prevent these pathogens from reaching any foreign state or non-state 

actors who may use them against the United States and its allies. The CBE 

program focuses on delivering tailored approaches that recognize and build 

upon partner countries’ indigenous capacities. The CBE program builds capacity and advocates best practices for the safe and secure handling of extremely dangerous pathogens. It supports transparent responsible research 

to understand indigenous dangerous pathogens in partnership with the 

whole of U.S. Government and international partners. These collaborative 

partnerships enhance global capacity to detect, diagnose, and mitigate biological risks of concern. These partnerships also facilitate an ability to initiate timely and effective disease control measures to contain trans-border 

global disease threats. The program is engaged with Ukraine, Georgia, 

Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, 

and Uganda. In fiscal year 2012, it will partner with Iraq, Tanzania, 

Djibouti, South Africa, and India. 

• $28.080 million for Proliferation Prevention by building partner capacity 

in Armenia and Moldova, in collaboration with counterproliferation capacity 

building programs across the U.S. Government, and expanding ongoing efforts within the FSU, to include additional land border assistance and bolstered regional training capacities in Ukraine; land border assistance in Armenia; and possible land border training and equipment assistance in 

Moldova. This is $1.919 million more than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. 

24 

Additionally, it is envisioned that this will support project assessments for 

future land border and maritime efforts that enhance CWMD command, 

control, communications, surveillance, and detection and interdiction capabilities. 

• $2.5 million for Threat Reduction Engagement opportunities in new geo- graphical areas. This is $2.500 million less than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. 

• $24.001 million for Other Assessments/Administrative Support including 

audits and examinations of provided assistance, contractor advisory and assistance services, and U.S. Embassy support in partner countries. This is 

$0.961 million more than the fiscal year 2011 estimate. 

CONCLUSION

Madam Chairman, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee, the 

DTRA/SCC–WMD team has an impressive record of reducing, deterring, defeating 

and countering WMD threats. We have strong partnerships with the combatant 

commanders, the Joint Staff, across the U.S. Government, and with allies and 

friends overseas. DTRA has made and continues to make the world safer—whether 

we are performing on-site inspections as part of the U.S. arms control treaty obligations; overseeing the destruction of FSU WMD weaponry; conducting imaginative 

and unprecedented threat reduction activities; developing new capabilities for defeating WMD in place or on the move; protecting people, systems, and infrastructure; improving CWMD planning; enabling CWMD operations; and supporting the 

U.S nuclear deterrent. 

In the years ahead we will be expanding cooperative threat reduction and engagement on a worldwide scale with new partners. We will enable the warfighters and 

our allies to more effectively and efficiently counter WMD threats by providing the 

intellectual, technical, and operational expertise that will permit far more effective 

decision making and mission execution. 

I hope that we continue to earn your trust and support. I would be pleased to 

respond to your questions. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Handelman. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH B. HANDELMAN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY JED ROYAL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Madam Chairman, Senator Portman: It’s an 

honor to testify today on DOD’s nonproliferation activities and on 

our efforts more broadly to counter the threat of WMDs. It’s a personal pleasure to be joined by Mr. Jed Royal, who is sitting behind 

me to my left, who is the Director of the Office of Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Policy. It’s Jed and his team, working with Ken 

Myers and his team, who actually make things really happen in 

the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. 

I’d like to focus my opening remarks on an area that has attracted significant attention and indeed to which you referred, 

Madam Chairman, in your opening remarks. That is DOD’s work 

in biodefense. Now let me be clear about the administration’s WMD 

priorities overall. The President has said that the greatest threat 

to the United States is a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist. However, the President has also given a similar high priority to biodefense. The December 2009 national strategy for countering biological threats highlighted the significant threat to our 

people, our coalition partners, and our forces posed by especially 

dangerous pathogens. 

Sometimes it is not so obvious why DOD should care so much 

about biodefense issues. Let me briefly highlight why we care and 

25 

very much. First, biodefense is not merely about the health of U.S. 

troops and their families. It’s about the ability of U.S. troops to 

fight and win in an environment that might be compromised by 

diseases against which we have no protection or treatment. 

Second, even if U.S. forces are prepared to fight in such an environment, our doctrine and our force structure require that we fight 

alongside coalition partners. If our partners are vulnerable to biothreats, then we can count them out of the fight right from the 

start. 

Third, biodefense is an area where we can use modest investments prior to a conflict to maximize our capabilities during a conflict. Here are some of the things that we are already doing in this 

area. To limit proliferation of especially dangerous pathogens, we’re 

working with partner countries in areas where dangerous diseases 

are endemic to improve laboratory physical security and security 

practices. 

To improve our understanding of dangerous diseases that can impact our troops, we’re expanding cooperative research projects with 

partner countries and leveraging the U.S. military’s overseas lab 

network. To improve our early warning posture, we’re pursuing a 

disease surveillance capability that will give us a heads-up about 

the origin and potency of outbreaks that could spread in our forces 

or our population. 

These are just a few examples of how DOD is trying to get ahead 

of what we believe is an underaddressed security challenge. I want 

to emphasize how closely we coordinate with our colleagues in the 

public health business without getting into their business. We have 

been careful to maintain our focus on national security and to 

avoid overlap with the efforts of established U.S. public health outreach overseas. But it is very important that DOD engage aggressively in this global biodefense effort. DOD and State are the only 

U.S. agencies with authority to develop biodefense relationships 

with partners around the globe in support of U.S. national security, 

and DOD has a special equity, given how frequently and far afield 

we deploy our military members. 

Our work in this area is still in its infancy. We have a great 

partnership with other U.S. agencies and we are learning important lessons. I want to leave you with two of those lessons as I 

wrap up. 

First, we’ve learned that, as with other WMD, threats to the 

health of our forces are best addressed at the source, in regions 

where dangerous diseases originate. 

Second, we’ve learned that, even as we carefully deconflict our 

biodefense work with activities of our public health colleagues, 

there really is no way to draw a bright line distinction between 

public health and national security. 

Madam Chairman, Senator Portman, I wanted to use my opening 

remarks to focus on DOD’s biodefense activities because this is a 

conversation that we need to expand with the committee. As biological science becomes more accessible and borders less secure, we 

believe that the bio threat will only increase, and DOD’s biodefense 

activities will increase as well. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Handelman follows:] 

26 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KENNETH B. HANDELMAN

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the subcommittee, it 

is an honor to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts. The Department is building on its legacy of counterproliferation and threat reduction work while adjusting 

activities to meet new proliferation challenges and emerging threats. I welcome the 

opportunity to discuss these developments with you today. 

It is a special honor to appear with two colleagues with whom I work very closely: 

the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Ken Myers, and the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ms. Anne Harrington. 

DTRA and the office I oversee—OSD-Policy’s Global Strategic Affairs organization—serve complementary roles in the development, execution, and oversight of the 

Department’s CWMD mission. In general terms, my office develops strategy and policy guidance, manages interagency and international relationships, and sets Department CWMD priorities. DTRA is the entity responsible for implementing the 

CWMD strategic guidance which my office has developed. DTRA accomplishes this 

mission with acquisition oversight of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical 

and Biological programs. As a practical matter, all of these DOD components execute responsibilities at all levels in close coordination with each other, and with 

combatant commanders, especially U.S. Strategic Command. 

Our missions are executed with essential support from the Department of State, 

and in cooperation with Ms. Harrington and her team at NNSA. I do not claim complete success in all we do, but it is not an exaggeration to say that the U.S. Government’s CWMD ‘‘community’’ is a successfully integrated interagency team. 

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND DOD’S STRATEGY

The threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains 

complex. The intent of states and non-state actors to acquire WMD, combined with 

the availability of sensitive materials and increased access to scientific expertise 

make WMD more accessible than ever to potential adversaries. 

President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague that overcoming 

the threat posed by WMD—especially the nexus between WMD and terrorism—requires a comprehensive approach. This is reflected in the broad strategic framework 

that guides our efforts. 

• The 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, a comprehensive approach to prevent or respond to the proliferation and use of 

biological weapons by states or non-state actors. A key part of this strategy 

is a broad effort to increase capability worldwide to conduct effective and 

timely disease surveillance and to improve capacity to counter both naturally occurring and deliberately-caused disease outbreaks through the application of targeted and proven tools for biological risk management. 

• The 2010 National Security Strategy, which outlines a comprehensive 

nonproliferation and security agenda, including reducing the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, promoting regional stability, and 

ensuring the effectiveness of our deterrent and defensive capabilities. 

• The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which devotes more attention to 

this challenge than any prior defense review, establishes ‘‘Preventing Proliferation and Countering WMD’’ and ‘‘Defending the United States and 

Supporting Civil Authorities at Home’’ among the Department’s top six priority mission areas. 

• The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which seeks to better align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities—preventing nuclear 

terrorism and proliferation while ensuring the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

In support of these efforts, DOD is aligning its CWMD programs to become more 

flexible and responsive. Here our approach is three-fold: First, we are supporting the 

administration’s broader effort to reinvigorate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to secure or eliminate WMD threats at their 

source and in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond 

to emerging threats, and to ensure our troops, along with coalition partners, can 

fight and win in an environment contaminated by chemical, biological, radiological 

or other hazards. These three lines of effort can be summed up as touchstones: leadership, partnership, and innovation. 

27 

STRENGTHENING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

This area of effort is about enhancing U.S. leadership in global non-proliferation 

forums. 

For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective vulnerability to these weapons. 

The current network of initiatives, regimes, and treaties offers important tools for 

advancing this critical agenda. The administration’s efforts to strengthen the global 

non-proliferation regime through the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are instrumental to raising barriers to WMD proliferation. In this area we are not naı ̈ve: the 

worst actual or potential proliferators won’t meet non-proliferation obligations under 

any circumstance. However, a number of nations face choices about their role in the 

world’s WMD nonproliferation ‘‘conversation’’; with strong U.S. leadership we can 

convince them from staying on the sidelines, or worse, from becoming proliferators 

themselves. 

We are actively working to strengthen the NPT—the cornerstone of the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime. The May 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed parties’ 

commitment to the Treaty and significantly achieved consensus on an Action Plan 

for future progress. This Action Plan endorsed a balanced approach to advance the 

three pillars of the regime: nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 

nuclear disarmament. DOD will continue to actively participate with State and our 

interagency colleagues in international activities to implement this Plan. The 

United States’ ‘‘negative security assurance’’ set forth in DOD’s 2010 Report of the 

Nuclear Posture Review is clear: ‘‘The United States will not use or threaten to use 

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear 

NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.’’ This assurance underscores the security benefits of adhering to, and complying fully with, the 

NPT. 

In addition, the administration is committed to ratification of the CTBT. The 

CTBT would limit countries without nuclear weapons from confidently deploying 

such weapons; it would hinder existing nuclear powers from developing new types 

of warheads. As a sign of our commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue 

to maintain our unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, and will remain 

fully engaged in development of the Treaty’s verification regime. At the same time, 

we remain committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent 

for our security and that of our allies. 

We also seek a FMCT that would ban production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. DOD continues to support discussions among technical experts in the 

U.N. Conference on Disarmament. These discussions are not a substitute for actual 

negotiations, but hopefully they will foster greater appreciation of key technical 

issues. 

Further, we are engaged actively in efforts to ensure that the upcoming Biological 

and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference strengthens the global norm 

against possession and use of biological weapons. We hope to expand membership 

in the Convention and strengthen its implementation to meet the bioweapons challenges of the 21st century. As part of this effort, DOD has taken steps to increase 

the transparency of our biological defense activities; the United States is encouraging other treaty parties to do the same. 

Finally, the administration recognizes the importance of multilateral activities 

and mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Since its creation in 2003, nearly one hundred countries have 

endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which commits signatories to 

take action individually and cooperatively, as necessary to interdict WMD related 

materials in transit to states of proliferation concern. The PSI also continues to help 

build states’ individual and collective ability to fulfill this commitment, using military exercises, table top workshops and ship-boarding training. This year we are focusing our efforts to promote key interdiction capabilities, identify resources to support these capabilities, and design strategies to proactively engage nations in the 

capacity-building process. 

Last year the U.N. Security Council imposed the toughest sanctions to date 

against Iran. As with the case of North Korea, the Security Council called on states 

to inspect suspicious cargo bound from or to Iran at airports, seaports, and on the 

high seas. This illustrated the utility of PSI and related activities to non-proliferation success. U.N. members are now obligated to block North Korean and Iranian 

transfers of WMD and related cargoes, to include missile parts, explosives, and 

other nuclear-related technology. Exercises and training provided under the PSI 

28 

help increase the international community’s collective capability to execute these activities. 

United States multilateral non-proliferation leadership was punctuated last year 

by the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, attended by 47 countries. The momentum and specific non-proliferation accomplishments generated by the Summit were 

impressive, and we are supporting the Republic of Korea as it prepares to host the 

next Nuclear Security Summit in spring 2012. 

REDUCING AND ELIMINATING THREATS

This area of effort focuses on our essential partnership with governments dealing 

with legacies of WMD on their territory, or which are interested in building the capacity to prevent WMD and related materials from crossing their borders illicitly. 

Since its inception in 1992, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

Program has worked with states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) to address nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical threats. Since 2005, CTR has evolved to 

keep pace with the changing global security environment, and that evolution has 

accelerated recently. In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determined that CTR partnerships with Iraq, India, 

China, and the countries of Africa will assist the United States in achieving longstanding nonproliferation goals, as well as sustaining long-term partnerships that 

enhance security. The Secretary’s action adds to his 2009 determination to pursue 

CTR cooperation with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This work beyond CTR’s ‘‘traditional’’ area of operations in the FSU reflects opportunities we see for expanded 

partnerships on WMD security issues. Four principles guide evolution of CTR as we 

expand geographically: integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation. 

Integration 

In the past, CTR was often the lead U.S. interlocutor with a foreign government 

on a particular project. In the future, CTR needs to build on work that other U.S. 

and international agencies have accomplished, taking care to leverage others’ success without reinventing-the-wheel. This is especially true in CTR’s expanding bioengagement. 

Responsiveness 

CTR has typically taken a very methodical approach to its activities. Should the 

need arise, we are revising procedures to in order that we can be agile enough to 

accept targets of opportunity and flexible enough to utilize CTR in new regions and 

for new projects. 

Stewardship 

We are working closely with DTRA to ensure that partner countries can join effectively in sustaining the capacity that many new CTR projects are intended to create. 

Cooperation 

CTR is about protecting U.S. interests. However, we increase our risks when our 

solutions are devised with an inside-the-Beltway perspective. We can better leverage 

partners’ local creativity to meet common goals. 

Having just described the principles governing CTR’s geographic expansion, it is 

worth highlighting two other points of principle. First, we are expanding the program beyond its traditional area of activity because we believe that a threat persists 

which CTR can help address. CTR has built important interagency relationships 

and global experience working in remote locations; this is a valuable asset we are 

redeploying in relevant, modernized ways in pursuit of U.S. interests. Second, our 

geographic expansion of CTR does not necessarily imply significantly increased 

costs. We appreciate Congress’s support last year for a substantial increase in CTR’s 

budget. We believe that step addressed a prior mismatch between CTR’s missions 

and resources. However, at this time we believe the fiscal year 2012 budget request 

and the program’s future years projected baseline is well-balanced against likely demands. DOD will do its part in the national deficit reduction effort, and we are prepared to make hard choices in the CTR program should they be necessary. 

The President has requested $508.2 million for CTR in fiscal year 2012. This figure supports a variety of counter-WMD efforts described in my testimony, within 

the context of Secretary Gates’ imperative to maximize efficiencies in the Department. DTRA and the NNSA have also presented balanced requests, well-synchronized across the CWMD community. I urge the committee’s support for these 

requests; I’d like to highlight a few of the activities these funds will support. 

CTR’s strategic nuclear systems elimination work in the FSU has largely been 

concluded; however, work continues in Russia as ballistic missiles, launchers, and 

29 

ballistic missile submarines are being dismantled in verifiable fashion. With the 

entry into force of the New START Treaty, we anticipate that the Russian Federation will request continued CTR assistance to ensure strategic systems are properly 

disposed of with no residual proliferation-sensitive components remaining. 

CTR also assists Russia with safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction 

of a portion of its nerve agent stockpile that is most vulnerable to theft or diversion. 

Russia is responsible for meeting its commitments under the Chemical Weapons 

Convention; CTR’s involvement focuses only on the most dangerous, most 

proliferable portion of the former Soviet stockpile and related infrastructure. Our 

current chemical weapons-related work in Russia involved primarily technical assistance: we are ensuring proper maintenance at the Shchuch’ye Chemical Weapons 

Destruction Facility constructed by CTR, which began eliminating chemical weapons 

in March 2009. This protects our investment, as well as the contributions of other 

donor countries. 

Through CTR’s work in Russia, DOD is contributing to the ‘‘site-level’’ approach 

of the interagency strategy for the President’s global nuclear lockdown agenda, described by my DOE colleague. CTR continues to assist Russia with transport of nuclear warheads from operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated storage sites. We are also assisting Russia with secure transport 

of spent naval fuel that is both enriched and vulnerable to a degree that gives rise 

to proliferation concern. CTR’s successful partnership with the Department of Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense to secure warhead storage 

sites also continues. Although primary activity for this effort (the so-called 

‘‘Bratislava Initiative’’) concluded some years ago, CTR is ensuring that Russia can 

sustain the modernized physical protection systems that were installed for the long 

term. This sustainment work is nearing completion, and we are working with DOE 

to transition responsibility for their sustainment to the Russian Federation. 

CTR considers each Russian request independently; not all requests for support 

are granted. We continue to believe that engagement with Russia through the CTR 

program supports U.S. nonproliferation and strategic interests. Moreover, cooperation with Russia funded through CTR has endured as a steady, open channel even 

when the success of other aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship have been inconsistent. 

We are also leveraging our nuclear security experience in the former Soviet Union 

to support the implementation of the ‘‘country-level’’ and ‘‘global-level’’ approaches 

of the global nuclear lockdown strategy. Alongside DOE and other interagency 

stakeholders, CTR is supporting a ‘‘Center of Excellence’’ for Nuclear Security in 

China, and will participate with India in the nuclear security component of its Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, both announced at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Through these Centers we hope to be able to exchange nuclear security best practices, demonstrate equipment, and contribute to national and 

regional training programs. DOD is also active in multilateral nuclear security collaborations, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, as well as 

the Nuclear Security Summit process. 

The most dynamic area of CTR activity for the foreseeable future will be biodefense. CTR’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) (formerly designated Bio-Threat Reduction Program) is pursuing four lines of effort. First, CBEP 

consolidates and secures collections of especially dangerous pathogens that might 

serve as the source for biological weapons. Second, CBEP provides laboratory safety 

enhancements and training to prevent accidental release of especially dangerous 

pathogens. Third, CBEP strengthens partner countries’ detection, diagnostic, and reporting systems with training, technology upgrades, and improvements to laboratory 

detection networks. Finally, CBEP promotes collaborative research projects to increase capacity to understand and recognize the most dangerous pathogens. Collectively, these four areas help address the growing human and animal biodefense 

challenge which we believe has heretofore lacked appropriate resources and attention from U.S. agencies with national security missions. CBEP activities are synchronized with the National Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, 

specifically, its goals of strengthening global health security, obtaining timely insight on emerging outbreaks, reducing the potential for exploitation of life sciences 

material and technology, and reinforcing norms of safe and responsible conduct. 

The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) continues to partner 

with countries of the FSU and is active in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In Georgia, we recently opened a new Central 

Reference Laboratory (CRL) and are in the process of helping it become an internationally recognized center for disease surveillance and diagnostics. A similar effort 

is underway in Kazakhstan. In Ukraine, the CBEP consolidate Ukraine’s human esVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:06 Jan 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68088.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
30 

pecially dangerous pathogens at an upgraded, secure facility, with an eye toward 

taking similar action for Ukraine’s animal especially dangerous pathogens. 

Earlier, I mentioned Secretary Gates’ approval of CTR expansion to Africa for biodefense work; and I’d like to say a bit more about why DOD views Africa as a priority for this kind of engagement. Africa is a continent that is rich in indigenous, 

naturally-occurring especially dangerous pathogens, which local scientists and 

health professionals must work with on a routine basis. Limited funding for training, infrastructure and other needs means that this work is all too often performed 

with less than ideal safety and security standards in place. Security of borders is 

also a challenge in many parts of Africa. These factors make Africa a tempting destination for both state and non-state organizations that seek biological weapons. 

The United States and its allies have had a longstanding public-health presence 

in Africa, a base of experience and familiarity that facilitates CTR’s activities on the 

continent. Potential African partner governments are both enthusiastic and creative 

about the opportunities for Nunn-Lugar CTR program activities, and we are working with them to pursue a regional approach for our cooperative engagement program that would have a lasting impact beyond traditional bilateral relationships. 

The U.S. military has important relationships in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, 

so we view our activities as directly supporting U.S. troops’ security, in addition to 

furthering larger non-proliferation goals. Our work has been aided greatly by the 

support of State Department colleagues and country teams as CTR managers build 

relationships in the program’s first major expansion outside the FSU. 

While securing WMD materials at their sources is an important component of the 

CTR program, our strategy requires a layered defense against WMD proliferation 

threats. CTR’s WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) can enhance partners’ 

ability to detect and interdict WMD ‘‘on the move’’ through provision of detection, 

surveillance, and interdiction capabilities. DTRA’s International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) complements the capital-intensive investments of the 

WMD–PPP program through its modest ‘‘train and equip’’ efforts. ICP is unique in 

its legislative authority to partner explicitly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD across the FSU, the Baltic States, and in Eastern Europe. We are currently working to determine how best to expand both border security programs to new partners. 

DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO EMERGING THREATS

This area of activity will depend for success on innovation in technology, intelligence, and planning; innovation which we will need to foster. Our attention in this 

regard has focused on re-looking the Nation’s defenses against the threat of loose 

nuclear material, plus consideration of new defenses against emerging biological 

threats. 

As President Obama said in his April 2009 Prague speech, ‘‘the threat of global 

nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. . . . Black market trade in nuclear secrets and 

nuclear materials abound. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal’’ a nuclear weapon. The President’s charge to executive agencies was to look again at 

what heretofore had been viewed as a reliable whole-of-U.S. Government response 

should we suspect a terrorist organization has obtained one or more nuclear devices. 

Faced with such a threat, we will potentially need a globally-synchronized response 

to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of nuclear weapons. This could include 

activities such as securing material at the source, intercepting material on the 

move, and increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland. 

The threat of nuclear terrorism is also closely intertwined with state challenges. 

For instance, the instability or collapse of a nuclear-armed state could quickly lead 

to proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin 

and involve multiple state and non-state actors as it moves. Our plans for these potential challenges need to be revised to reflect the ever-increasing velocity of information, new challenges and capabilities in intelligence collection, and enduring technical hurdles related to nuclear detection and forensics. 

Within DOD, we seek to synchronize a layered defense against these threats that 

includes enhanced protective posture of the homeland; better identification of likely 

proliferation pathways; and, new abilities to detect and characterize sources and 

properties threats. We can be certain that in a nuclear or other WMD crisis, all 

these activities would be occurring simultaneously, under withering media scrutiny. 

Our focus in DOD is to improve capacity among top leaders, the combatant commanders, and the providers of key expertise to coordinate efforts as a potential 

threat is tracked from remote parts of the globe. 

31 

The emerging biodefense threat lacks the signature characteristics of a ‘‘loose 

nuke,’’ but is no less dangerous. 

An important priority of the President’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats is increasing capability to conduct effective and timely disease surveillance worldwide. This will improve our capacity to respond successfully to both naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks. A 2009 report by the National Research Council noted that countries which lack the public health infrastructure necessary to detect, diagnose, and report naturally occurring disease outbreaks are substantially less able to effectively deal with a bio-terror attack. I spoke earlier of efforts of the CTR program to address the bio-surveillance shortfall. In addition, we 

have worked with the Army and Navy to restructure DOD support for its overseas 

laboratory system beginning in fiscal year 2012. These labs are DOD’s primary 

means to discover novel pathogens or characterize pathogens that are not generally 

found in the United States. Within the military medical community these labs have 

long been well-known for their intrepid work protecting U.S. military members from 

disease. The innovation we will implement in 2012 is to begin leveraging these important facilities for non-proliferation purposes, as an addition to their original clinical missions. 

Other innovations reflect an array of concerns about the changing WMD threat 

and how best to prepare our troops and coalition partners to confront it: 

• The revolution in biotechnology and the chemical industry is undermining our confidence in defenses currently protecting our forces. With 

growing access to expertise, equipment and precursors needed to produce 

new chemical or biological compounds, we sought more RDT&E funding to 

develop improved countermeasures, personal protection gear, and research 

new decontamination techniques to mitigate the effects of novel chemical 

and biological agents. 

• We have recognized a need for innovation in our military organizational 

capacity to counter WMD threats. The 2010 QDR called for a new standing 

Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination which will serve as a permanent, 

join advocate for training, exercising and refining military tactics, techniques and procedures related to WMD elimination. The Secretary designated U.S. Strategic Command as the lead, and the command is currently 

completing its mission analysis. The standing headquarters will greatly increase DOD’s capability to locate, characterize, secure, disable or destroy 

hostile WMD capabilities in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. 

• We have also made a down-payment on innovative approaches to building 

partners’ WMD defense capabilities. For fiscal year 2012, the DOD budget 

request includes a small start-up fund for ‘‘counter-WMD Cooperative Defense Initiatives.’’ These funds are dedicated for each Geographic Combatant Command to provide an initial capacity for interoperability among U.S. 

forces and regional partners, and ensure partner nations can survive an attack, eliminate further threats, and manage the humanitarian consequences of a WMD attack. This initiative is supported strongly by our 

COCOM counterparts and we look forward to reporting to Congress in future years on its progress. 

• Finally, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the new Strategic Concept adopted by Heads of State and Government at the November 

2010 Lisbon Summit reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear weapons. At the United States’ behest, the Strategic Concept directed NATO to assess how it can improve capacity to 

counter proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. DOD is working 

closely with State to assist NATO in this important effort. 

CONCLUSION

Congress has provided authorities and resources which allow DOD to address the 

WMD threat to our troops and our people. It is an evolving threat that spans traditional counter-proliferation and non-proliferation responses. Our mission is to ensure that DOD’s responses stay ahead of the threat in order that our troops and 

those of our coalition partners can fight and win in a WMD environment, and that 

our people are protected from WMD threats. We are committed to working closely 

with our interagency and international partners, and with Congress in this endeavor. 

Senator HAGAN. Thanks to all three of you. 

32 

What I’d like to do is to now take maybe 6-minute questions 

each, and then we’ll have a second round. 

Let me just mention budgets for a quick question. NNSA did not 

receive all of the funding requested in its fiscal year 2011 budget. 

What is the programmatic impact of not receiving the amount requested? What will not get done, and will not having all of the requested funding in fiscal year 2011 have an impact on the fiscal 

year 2012 funding and programs? 

Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you very much for that question. Fiscal 

year 2011 has been a management challenge. I will not mince 

words about that. The successive continuing resolutions have 

caused us to rebalance our programming on a very regular basis 

throughout the year so far. We’re very pleased and grateful that 

we’re now on solid footing for the remainder of the year. 

Through good management and creative distribution of available 

funds, we have preserved all of the critical activities that are 

scheduled under the 4-year lockdown effort. We feel confident right 

now that we will be able to meet all of the high-level presidential 

commitments that were made. So in that regard, we have been able 

to successfully preserve that piece of our programming. 

That is not to say that none of our programming was affected. 

Certainly when you simply don’t have the money certain things 

will suffer. So the radiological source recovery and security activities that we typically undertake in the United States have been cut 

back, and we have also eliminated some of the funding for the Russia piece of the fissile material disposition program. But we have 

done that without sacrifice to those programs. We will see some of 

those funds come back in future years, so it’s not that those weren’t 

important items to fund. It’s just that we had to postpone certain 

things because of budget realities this year. 

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Myers, I understand the DTRA is in a similar position. What impact will the reductions in fiscal year 2011 

have on DTRA’s mission and what won’t get done? 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you. Let me take one step back before I discuss 2011 and 2012. I think it’s important to put this in the proper 

context. DTRA was flat-lined for approximately a decade. So the 

2011 budget that was submitted by the President for DTRA represented a significant increase, approximately 17.5 percent, and we 

are very appreciative of the fact that the vast majority of those resources were provided. A small cut was made, but the vast majority 

of those were provided. 

So when you compare the 2010 to the 2011 to the 2012 budget 

request that Senator Portman suggested, you will see a spike. So 

the 2012 request is not necessarily a cut. It is not as high as the 

correction, if you will, of the 2011 budget. 

Now, I will tell you we have taken the Secretary of Defense’s 

challenge very, very seriously. We are working very hard to become 

more effective, more efficient, with the resources that we have. We 

are prioritizing. We have taken a very long, hard look at what 

we’re doing and how we’re doing it, to ensure that we’re getting 

maximum efficiency out of every effort currently underway. 

We have shut down a number of offices because we believe we 

can support them equally well from our headquarters with foreign 

33 

trips or TDY efforts or the like. We’ve also looked at a number of 

our efforts and narrowed the technological paths that we’re following in those areas. We’ve also done a complete rack-and-stack 

prioritization of all the things that we do at DTRA. 

The item that came out at the bottom was the Advanced Systems 

and Concepts Office. This is an organization that has sponsored 

dialogues and conferences and studies in the past, and we identified that as our lowest priority. That is going to be significantly cut 

back in the future. We will continue some support for those efforts 

in coordination with Policy and our friends at the NNSA. But those 

are the ways that we have identified savings, so we can continue 

to place the highest priorities in our role as a combat support agency directly to the warfighter and continue our threat reduction activities and our research and development activities as well. 

Senator HAGAN. I appreciate your comments on having to be 

more efficient and more effective, and I think every agency and 

every entity has to be doing that. So thank you. 

Ms. Harrington, every year the subcommittee hears that there 

are countries that want to participate in the Megaports program, 

but there is not enough money to fund all of these agreements. Is 

that true this year, and why is the Megaports program important? 

Are there other countries helping in the cost of Megaports oversight or the program? Does NNSA know if there has been any detection of nuclear materials that could be used in a dirty bomb or 

an improvised nuclear device? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you very much for your question. I’d 

like to ask John Gerrard, if I could, to answer your specific question about the Megaports program and countries that would like to 

participate or not. 

Also, on the detection piece of it, yes, our equipment has in fact 

detected various shipments, sometimes false alarms, sometimes 

not. But these are tracked, working in coordination with our Office 

of Emergency Response, and the recipient countries are alerted. 

The system actually works quite well. In fact, in a closed session 

we could describe perhaps more in detail, but there was a recent 

detection in fact with the contents being identified as to what the 

problem was. 

So this is an ongoing but effective program that I believe does 

deserve support, including, for example, in countries like Pakistan, 

where this is one of our active programs with them. Certainly we 

don’t want anything exported to us from Pakistan that has a surprise in it. So we are very serious about that program there. 

John. 

Mr. GERRARD. We have 100 Megaports in our baseline program 

right now to be completed by 2018. I can’t say that we have countries that are requesting assistance at the moment that we are not 

currently engaging, but if we did outreach to additional countries 

it would probably generate interest. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Senator Portman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses today for giving us some great information 

about their work and their budgets. As I said in my opening, I’d 

34 

like to talk a little about this GAO report and some of the concerns 

that were raised. 

But let me start, if I could by talking about again the fiscal situation. By the way, I have to commend you, Mr. Myers. I don’t think 

I’ve ever heard an agency head say, including in my time at the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), that a 5 percent reduction in spending was not a cut. I understand what you’re saying 

about last year’s budget, but you’re a good soldier. I wish you’d 

been working there when I was at OMB, so your agency would 

have been more understanding. 

The concern about cost-sharing and particularly sharing the 

overall cost burden associated with monitoring and securing material is a challenge. There was a summit in 2010 when there seemed 

to be a lot of global support for nonproliferation efforts. But my understanding is that very few nations have stepped up. 

Ms. Harrington, maybe you’re the best one to answer this one 

about cost-sharing. What countries do we currently have cost-sharing arrangements with and how much are they doing? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you very much. I’d like to start that, 

that cost-sharing and coordination, by pointing out to you that I 

think we have the best example of that sitting here at the table. 

Between our organization, DOD Policy, and DTRA, we have quarterly what we call bridge meetings. We have five standing working 

groups that are addressing various elements that are in common 

among our organizations. We look at everything from the strategic 

planning level to what can we be doing in specific countries together. So we really are trying to work very hard as U.S. Government agencies across the government to make our nuclear security 

work more effective. 

On your specific question about what impact has the nuclear security summit had and what assistance are other countries providing, there is a fairly detailed accounting of what different countries are putting into their commitments for the nuclear security 

summit. It’s one of those circumstances, which I’m sure you understand well, that when you get heads of state or heads of government together and they make commitments, they don’t like to look 

foolish 2 years later when they show up at the follow-up summit 

with nothing in hand. 

So we actually have seen some real movement. For example, the 

Chinese, who are working with us on a center of excellence, are 

putting many tens of millions of dollars into both the land and construction of that facility. Other nations, including The Netherlands, 

the U.K., Denmark, Norway, have over time provided I believe it’s 

either $61 or $71 million. It’s a little bit over $61 million to our 

programs. 

So that often comes in half a million or million dollar pieces, but 

it has been a very steady trend over the past years that these countries are providing additional funding directly to us. That is allowable because you gave us the authority to accept the foreign funds 

and that has in fact opened the gate to providing those additional 

funds to us. 

But we can provide you with a detailed breakout of the countries, 

the amounts, and the programs to which the funds came. 

35 

[The information on commitments was not available. The information on foreign contributions follows:] 


510etc1.eps
36 

Senator PORTMAN. I’d appreciate that, if you could give us what 

the commitments were and then where they are in terms of their 

cost-sharing obligations. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Yes. 

Senator PORTMAN. Any information you have as to the future. As 

you say, maybe some of these countries are going to come through 

before the next meeting. I assume that’s in 2012. I’d like to see 

what they’re actually doing. 

Since you mentioned China, let’s go to China. The GAO report 

said that political sensitivities in China and in India have limited 

your efforts in both countries to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, demonstration 

projects, instead of implementing these activities directly at nuclear sites. So my question would be, to the extent the American 

taxpayer is paying for the nuclear center of excellence in China, 

and my understanding is we are paying the bulk of that, and to 

the extent that China is not cooperating per the GAO report, what 

confidence do you have that there is going to be cooperation going 

forward that justifies this expense? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I’ll be happy to share this, to share the answer, with my DOD colleagues. First, I think we need to be aware 


510etc2.eps
37 

that cooperation with China is extensive in the nuclear security, 

nuclear energy, and nuclear safety areas. I was recently in China 

for a meeting of our peaceful uses of nuclear technology joint coordinating committee, and also spent time during that visit with 

China Customs going over plans for a new radiation detection 

training center that we’re developing with them. 

But we have a very deep and professional relationship with the 

Chinese in a number of nonproliferation areas. The center of excellence is simply another layer on top of that. So I would say that 

we are already working on collaboration at many levels. 

Senator PORTMAN. You disagree with the GAO analysis saying 

that this relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear practices 

and so on and training and so on is problematic, that they’re not 

moving ahead because of political sensitivities? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. That does not at all track with my discussions 

a month ago, when there was uniform enthusiasm for proceeding 

with the center of excellence and for exploring how broadly we can 

use that as a new mechanism, not just for bilateral, but also for 

regional and international activities in the nonproliferation area. 

Senator PORTMAN. Back to the first question I raised in my opening statement, when the GAO looked at two of your three programs 

and said they had only limited success in achieving their objectives 

in Russia, how do you respond to that? Do you disagree with that 

as well? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. The GAO report came out at a time when 

there was a lot of work that was midstream, and since that report 

was published a great deal has happened. For example, since the 

April 2009 Prague speech we’ve removed 963 kilograms of nuclear 

weapons-useable material from a variety of countries, 21 countries. 

We’ve eliminated all material from six countries: Romania, Libya, 

Turkey, Taiwan, Chile, and Serbia. We also were able to secure a 

number of shipments, again after the GAO report came out. There 

were multiple shipments out of Ukraine to Russia in December of 

2010 and again from Belarus. That material, with our cooperation 

with the Russians, was removed in November and December of 

2010. 

So at the point when the GAO data collection was complete for 

their report, that was one point in time. We’re in a very different 

point in time now. 

Senator PORTMAN. It might be helpful if you could give the committee that in writing, relative to the GAO analysis. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

38 


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Senator PORTMAN. One final question. Last year you testified 

that the Russians have resisted granting us access to their serial 

production plants, the plants where weapons are actually built. My 

question is, do you think these facilities are adequately secured? 

This time last year, the list you had for securing facilities in Russia 

was down to 19. What’s your number now? How much progress has 

been made, and what’s the time frame for securing the remaining 

facilities? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I’ll turn to John Gerrard for that one. 

Mr. GERRARD. With regard to the serial production enterprises, 

we are not working with those facilities, so that situation continues. 

Senator PORTMAN. You’re not working with those facilities? 

Mr. GERRARD. We are not. We haven’t been granted access to 

those facilities, so we’ve not visited them and we have very little 

information about the conduct of security operations at them. 

Senator PORTMAN. So you can’t tell us whether they’re adequately secured? 

Mr. GERRARD. No. 

Senator PORTMAN. Is Russia covering the cost of sustaining a security infrastructure at those facilities and others? 


510etc4.eps
40 

Mr. GERRARD. Yes, yes. We believe a lot of our nationally-oriented programs, like our training programs and our regulatory programs with the Russian Rosatom complex, affect the serial production enterprises. So we think we are touching them indirectly, but 

we are not on the ground at them. 

Senator PORTMAN. What are your plans for being able to access 

the serial production plants to know whether they’re being adequately secured? 

Mr. GERRARD. We have a continuing desire to dialogue with Russian officials on that subject. But there is no particular path forward right now with regard to gaining access to those facilities. 

They have assured us several times, including in writing, that they 

are doing that on their own. 

Senator PORTMAN. My time has expired. I have some questions 

about START that I hope maybe, Mr. Myers, you can get back to 

us in writing on. Again, I thank you for your hard work and your 

testimony today. 

Senator HAGAN. I think we’ll take two more quick rounds of 4 or 

5 minutes. 

Biological surveillance. Mr. Handelman and Mr. Myers, DOD is 

expanding its biological surveillance and early warning efforts. 

How are these activities coordinated with other health care-focused 

activities to ensure that there is no overlap, and why has DOD decided to do work in Africa, if you can comment on that? Are other 

countries providing funds to help with the biological surveillance 

work? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Senator, let me take those in reverse order. I 

think there were three questions. Your last point touched on this 

issue of cost-sharing. 

Senator HAGAN. Right. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. As I was listening to Secretary Harrington discuss it with Senator Portman, I wanted to chime in and make what 

I think is a really important point about these programs. These 

programs are not foreign assistance. Now, I’m not trying to be pejorative about foreign assistance. We engage in these activities because they benefit the United States interest and they’re supposed 

to be in pursuit of U.S. interests. 

Now, in a time of fiscal austerity, and certainly if you’re trying 

to build a mutual relationship that’s built on commitments and 

trust, cost-sharing is a good thing. However, I can tell you from my 

perspective, my experience with the Nunn-Lugar program, you get 

what you pay for, and when you want to meet certain milestones 

on a certain time line, sometimes you have to just go and do it. 

Now, when we were working in Russia and the other former Soviet states, that had sometimes colossal cost implications because 

we were dealing with a very heavy infrastructure and complex 

projects. As we move into Africa or other areas outside the former 

Soviet states, particularly with respect to biodefense, it’s our expectation that those cost implications are going to be less. 

Let me hesitate to say, you gave us authority for cost-sharing. 

We’re not ignoring that. I’m not trying to say that we’re just not 

going to pursue that. 

Why did we look at Africa? Well, first of all, why did we look so 

much at biodefense? You have a large part of the U.S. Government 

41 

in the nonproliferation business that’s worrying about nuclear and 

radiological issues. The vast expertise in the entire DOE, for example. As I said in my opening comments, though, there really are not 

very many U.S. agencies with authority to deal with biodefense 

issues overseas. Department of Homeland Security does a fine job 

domestically. So this really, as we looked at it, was an underaddressed area and it was something we wanted to pursue, and 

there was a huge base of experience dealing with what was known 

as Biopreparat. This is the old Soviet bioweapons complex in the 

former Soviet states. Africa is not the first time that the U.S. is addressing biosecurity. 

But when we looked outside the former Soviet states, African 

countries first were a place where the United States already has 

a significant perch or presence. Public health agencies have been 

working there for many years. Second, needless to say, highly dangerous pathogens are endemic. Africa is also a continent where borders are less secure. 

So from our perspective, if we wanted to dip a toe in the water, 

so to speak, outside the former Soviet states, this was a continent 

where we could leverage preexisting U.S. presence and also one 

where a mosaic of factors contributed to a potential threat profile. 

We are not aware of any particular terrorist organization raiding 

labs in a particular African country right now, but all the pieces 

and parts are there for that kind of threat to emerge. 

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Myers, did you have any comments on that? 

Mr. MYERS. Just two quick ones. Mr. Handelman and I had the 

opportunity to join Senator Lugar on a trip to Kenya and Uganda 

last fall, and I think the thing that became very clear to me was 

that that region of the world, that’s the birthplace for a lot of these 

pandemics and deadly diseases. I mean, they occur naturally in 

that region. 

Many of the weapons programs around the world have gone to 

East Africa to collect samples, take them back home, and begin to 

develop weapons programs. So that our goal is to keep the terrorists as far away from the weapons or the pathogens or the diseases 

as possible. In a lot of cases when you’re talking about East Africa, 

that really is one of the places that an organization could find 

those kind of diseases occurring naturally. 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Portman, Senator Portman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Just briefly on the biological side. On your 

trip, my understanding is that you found certain facilities, particularly laboratories, which were not laboratories focused on 

weaponization, but rather just focused on research facilities, much 

as we have here in this country; and that some of them were not 

as well secured as you would have hoped. What, if anything, has 

the United States done with regard to those labs and others in 

Kenya, Uganda, and other countries? 

Mr. HANDELMAN. Well, I introduced Mr. Jed Royal in my opening 

remarks. He’s made a number of trips out to those countries. 

Senator PORTMAN. Would Jed please raise his hand? Is it J-e-d? 

Mr. ROYAL. Yes, sir, J-e-d. 

Senator PORTMAN. I have a son Jed who’s in town right now. It’s 

a very prestigious name, and unusual. 

42 

Mr. HANDELMAN. I hope you claim credit for your son’s good 

works, as I do for this Jed. 

Senator PORTMAN. Yes, you’re talking him up. 

Mr. HANDELMAN. So we are in the phase where we’re building 

the relationship. We have yet to formally exchange diplomatic 

notes. One thing we’re trying to get away from is the cumbersome 

overarching sort of legal frameworks that were necessary in some 

of the former Soviet projects. We just want to get on with the work. 

The first step will be physical security. That’s easy. The harder 

parts and the longer term part of it are cooperative research programs, giving these laboratories the capability, for example, to do 

surveillance. As I alluded to in my opening statement, the hard 

part about this is we can give them a PCR machine, which is the 

thing that figures out some genetic aspects of a sample. They could 

use that for measles. I’m not going to tell you otherwise. But they 

could also use it for ebola, depending on what’s happened out in 

the countryside, assuming a sample can be brought into the laboratory. 

I will say, in some of those countries they actually have quite an 

advanced science capability already, particularly in Kenya. Our 

goal is to be able to work with them so they know to communicate 

this stuff—well, first of all do the science correctly, and then communicate it through the World Health Organization, through the 

relationships with us, in order that we have a bit of a heads up 

on whether an outbreak is naturally occurring or manmade. 

Senator HAGAN. Ms. Harrington, Mr. Myers? 

Mr. MYERS. I would just follow up with one quick point, and that 

is when we’re talking about the cooperation that we are seeking to 

engage with African partners on, we’re really talking about a different scale and scope of the cooperation that we had with states 

of the former Soviet Union. In the states of the former Soviet 

Union (FSU), we were talking about a massive infrastructure, the 

Biopreparat system that Mr. Handelman referred to earlier. It was 

a very large undertaking, a very complex undertaking. 

When we’re talking about providing the equipment that Mr. 

Handelman referred to and security and safety upgrades, we’re 

talking about a much more straightforward, much simpler, much 

less expensive process. So I really want to point out the difference 

in the scale and scope of the efforts that we have underway or had 

underway in the FSU as compared to those that we are engaging 

Kenya, Uganda, and other countries in today. 

Senator HAGAN. Ms. Harrington, Mr. Myers, and Mr. 

Handelman, thank you very much for your testimony today. The 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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