SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3092-19

JAMES C. LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

SKY ZONE, LLC, SKY ZONE 

FRANCHISE GROUP, LLC,

CIRCUSTRIX HOLDINGS, LLC,

BUCKINGHAM INVESTMENT 

GROUP, INC. d/b/a SKY ZONE 

LAKEWOOD, and RPSZ 

CONSTRUCTION, LLC,

Defendants-Appellants/

Cross-Respondents,

and

FUN SPOT MANUFACTURING,

LLC, INTERNATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF TRAMPOLINE 

PARKS, INC. (Discovery Only), 

and AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR 

TESTING AND MATERIALS d/b/a

ASTM INTERNATIONAL,

(Discovery Only),

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-3092-19

Defendants. 

Submitted March 15, 2021 – Decided March 30, 2021

Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2149-19.

Chazen & Chazen, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent/cross-appellant (David K. Chazen, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

Wood Smith Henning & Berman, LLP, attorneys for 

appellants/cross-respondents (Kelly A. Waters, of 

counsel and on the briefs; Samuel G. John and Carolynn 

A. Mulder, on the briefs).

Cohen, Placitella & Roth, P.C. attorneys for amicus 

curie New Jersey Association for Justice (Jared M. 

Placitella and Christopher M. Placitella, of counsel and 

on the briefs).

PER CURIAM 

Sky Zone, LLC, Sky Zone Franchise Group, LLC, Circustrix Holdings, 

LLC, Buckingham Investment Group, Inc. (d/b/a Sky Zone Lakewood), and 

RPSZ Construction, LLC (collectively defendants), appeal from a March 30, 

2020 order denying reconsideration of a December 20, 2019 order denying their 

motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint and compel arbitration. 

The judge altered his earlier finding that the unavailability of JAMS rendered 

the agreement unenforceable but concluded that the agreement still lacked 
3

A-3092-19

mutual assent because it did not adequately explain what replaced a jury. 

Defendants generally maintain that the law only requires that plaintiff 

understand he waived a jury. 

Plaintiff cross-appeals from the March 30, 2020 order contending that the 

judge erroneously changed his mind about JAMS. Plaintiff primarily maintains 

that the agreement is unenforceable because, despite the designation that the 

arbitration would be administered by JAMS utilizing its rules, JAMS itself is an 

unavailable arbitration forum in New Jersey. Thus, plaintiff argues, there was 

no meeting of the minds. The New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ), 

participating as amici, also argues that there was no meeting of the minds.

On these motions, the parties and the judge focused on whether the 

agreement adequately explained the ramifications of a jury waiver, particularly 

addressing whether it sufficiently referenced the rights that replaced the jury. 

That made sense because, at the time, they attempted to apply our decision in 

Flanzman.

1

 But since the issuance of the orders, the Supreme Court reversed 

1

 Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 456 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018).
4

A-3092-19

our opinion,2 which directly impacts our adjudication of the issues on appeal. 3 

The parties did not make arbitrating the dispute utilizing JAMS and its rules an 

integral term to the agreement, which contained a severability clause indicating 

that if one term is unenforceable, the rest of the agreement will not be affected. 

The automatic application of the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA)

4

supplies 

the missing terms about the arbitration process, as does the Federal Arbitration 

Act (FAA),

5 which the agreement generally references.6

 We therefore reverse.

I.

Before entering the indoor trampoline facility, plaintiff was required to 

execute a six-page release agreement entitled "Participation Agreement, Release 

and Assumption of Risk" (Release Agreement). The Release Agreement 

generally required him to release the facility from liability, assume the risk of 

using the trampolines and other equipment, and waive certain rights, such as his 

2

 Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020).

3

 The parties and amici submitted supplemental briefs since the Court rendered 

its decision in Flanzman.

4

 New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36.

5

 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16.

6

 See e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 5 (providing for the appointment of an arbitrator), id. § 7 

(addressing witnesses, documents, fees, and the power to issue a summons). 
5

A-3092-19

right to a jury trial by agreeing to arbitrate covered disputes. The Release 

Agreement reads as follows:

ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES; TIME LIMIT TO 

BRING CLAIM

I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as 

set forth in this section, I am waiving my right, and the 

right(s) of the minor child(ren) above, to maintain a 

lawsuit against SZ and the other Releasees for any and 

all claims covered by this Agreement. By agreeing to 

arbitrate, I understand that I will NOT have the right to 

have my claim determined by a jury, and the minor 

child(ren) above will NOT have the right to have 

claim(s) determined by a jury. Reciprocally, SZ and the 

other Releasees waive their right to maintain a lawsuit 

against me and the minor child(ren) above for any and 

all claims covered by this Agreement, and they will not 

have the right to have their claim(s) determined by a 

jury. ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM OR 

CONTROVERSY ARISING OUT OF OR 

RELATING TO MY OR THE CHILD'S ACCESS 

TO AND/OR USE OF THE SKY ZONE PREMISES 

AND/OR ITS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THE 

DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OR 

APPLICABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT TO 

ARBITRATE, SHALL BE BROUGHT WITHIN 

ONE YEAR OF ITS ACCRUAL (i.e., the date of the 

alleged injury) FOR AN ADULT AND WITHIN 

THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

FOR A MINOR AND BE DETERMINED BY 

ARBITRATION IN THE COUNTY OF THE SKY 

ZONE FACILITY, NEW JERSEY, BEFORE ONE 

ARBITRATOR. THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE 

ADMINISTERED BY JAMS PURSUANT TO ITS 

RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED ARBITRATION RULES 

AND PROCEDURES. JUDGMENT ON THE 
6

A-3092-19

AWARD MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT 

HAVING JURISDICTION. THIS CLAUSE 

SHALL NOT PRECLUDE PARTIES FROM 

SEEKING PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN AID OF 

ARBITRATION FROM A COURT OF 

APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION. This Agreement 

shall be governed by, construed and interpreted in 

accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey, 

without regard to choice of law principles. 

Notwithstanding the provision with respect to the 

applicable substantive law, any arbitration conducted 

pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be 

governed by the [FAA] (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16). I 

understand and acknowledge that the JAMS Arbitration 

Rules to which I agree are available online for my 

review at jamsadr.com, and include JAMS 

Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures; Rule 

16.1 Expedited Procedures; and, Policy On Consumer 

Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness.

[Emphasis in original.]

It is undisputed that JAMS could not administer the arbitration proceeding. 

Consequently, that part of the agreement was unenforceable. The severance 

provision provides that

[i]f any term or provision of this Release shall be 

illegal, unenforceable, or in conflict with any law 

governing this Release[,] the validity of the remaining 

portions shall not be affected thereby. 

In entering the orders under review, and guided by our Flanzman decision, the 

judge concluded the agreement was unenforceable for lack of mutual assent 

because the parties did not fully understand what rights replaced the jury.
7

A-3092-19

II.

On appeal, defendants raise the following arguments, which we have renumbered, for our consideration:

[POINT I]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN HOLDING 

THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS 

UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 

EXPLAIN OR SUMMARIZE THE ARBITRATION 

RULES.[7]

[POINT II]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT 

THE UNAVILABILITY OF JAMS IS IMMATERIAL 

TO THE ENFORECEABILITY OF THE 

ARBITRATION PROVISION. 

A. FEDERAL LAW PROVIDES FOR 

COURT APPOINTMENT OF AN 

ARBITRATOR AND PREEMPTS ANY 

CONTRARY STATE LAW.

B. NEW JERSEY LAW PROVIDES FOR 

COURT APPOINTMENT OF AN 

ARBITRATOR.

C. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 

AT ISSUE HERE REQUIRES 

7

 We need not reach this contention because JAMS itself was unavailable to 

administer the arbitration. Whether plaintiff had the opportunity to read the 

JAMS rules, therefore, is academic: JAMS could not arbitrate the dispute 

regardless. 
8

A-3092-19

ARBITRATION EVEN IF JAMS IS 

UNAVAILABLE.

[POINT III]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN HOLDING 

THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS MUST 

SUMMARIZE OR PROVIDE A COPY OF THE 

ARBITRATION RULES.

[POINT IV]

PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO 

THE JAMS RULES LACK MERIT AND ARE 

IMMATERIAL TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 

THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE. (Not Ruled on 

Below).

A. PARTIES MAY AGREE TO LIMIT 

DISCOVERY AND OTHER 

PROCEDURES IN THEIR 

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

B. LIKE THE NEW JERSEY COURT 

RULES, THE JAMS RULES CONTAIN

APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS AND 

FLEXIBILITY.

C. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 

TO THE JAMS RULES HAD MERIT, 

THEY ARE IMMATERIAL BECAUSE 

ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE 

SEVERABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

[POINT V]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT 

THE UNAVAILABILITY OF JAMS DOES NOT 
9

A-3092-19

AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION 

CLAUSE BECAUSE JAMS IS NOT INTEGRAL TO 

THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE.

A. NEW JERSEY LAW REQUIRES 

COURT-APPOINTMENT OF AN 

ARBITRATOR EVEN THOUGH JAMS 

IS UNAVAILABLE.

B. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S POSITION 

REGARDING NEW JERSEY LAW 

WERE CORRECT, FEDERAL LAW 

WOULD PREEMPT NEW JERSEY LAW 

AND REQUIRES COURTAPPOINTMENT OF AN ARBITRATOR.

[POINT VI]

PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE ON UNREPORTED 

DECISIONS IS UNAVAILING AND 

PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER.

[POINT VII]

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE

TRUTH-IN-CONSUMER CONTRACTS, 

WARRANTY, AND NOTICE ACT IS WITHOUT 

MERIT.

[POINT VIII]

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT REGARDING NONSIGNATORIES IS WITHOUT MERIT. 

[POINT IX]
10 A-3092-19

THE ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE JAMS 

RULES HAS NO EFFECT ON THE ARBITRATION 

AGREEMENT'S VALIDITY. 

[POINT X]

THE UNAVAILABILITY OF JAMS HAS NO 

EFFECT ON THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT'S 

VALIDITY.

[POINT XI]

NJAJ IMPROPERLY RELIES ON IMMATERIAL 

AND UNSUPPORTED ARGUMENTS THAT WERE 

NOT RAISED BELOW. 

[PONT XII]

IN SKUSE,

[8] THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 

REAFFIRMED THE FAA'S EQUAL-FOOTING 

PRINCIPLE AND APPLIED GENERAL CONTRACT 

LAW.

[POINT VIII]

IN SKUSE, THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 

HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS BEAR THE BURDEN OF 

OBTAINING AND REVIEWING AVAILABLE 

INFORMATION. 

On his cross-appeal, plaintiff raises the following contentions, which we 

have re-numbered:

[POINT I]

8 Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020). 
11 A-3092-19

THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THE 

ARBITRATION PROVISION TO BE 

UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE JAMS RULES 

WERE "UNACCESSIBLE[,]" THE ARBITRATION 

PROVISION "DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE RULES[,]" 

AND "BECAUSE IT LACKS A MEETING OF THE 

MINDS.["]

[POINT II]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] HELD CORRECTLY THAT 

THE DESIGNATION OF JAMS AS THE 

EXCLUSIVE ARBITRAL FORUM AND ITS 

UNAVAILABILITY MEANT THAT THERE WAS 

NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE 

PARTIES AND THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS 

UNENFORCEABLE[;] THE [MOTION JUDGE] 

ERRED UPON RECONSIDERATION IN HOLDING 

THAT THE UNAVAILABILITY OF JAMS WAS 

NOT SO INTEGRAL TO THE ARBITRATION 

CLAUSE TO RENDER IT UNENFORCEABLE.

[POINT III]

DIVERGENT COURT OPINIONS HAVE LEFT THE 

VALIDITY OF THE SKY ZONE ARBITRATION 

CLAUSE UNSETTLED.

[POINT VI]

DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WOULD BE IMPROPER BECAUSE 

NON-SIGNATORIES TO THE AGREEMENT 

CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE.

[POINT V]
12 A-3092-19

THE SKY ZONE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 

CONTAINS MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES 

ESSENTIAL TO A CONSUMER WAIVER-OFRIGHTS NEGATING A MEETING OF THE MINDS.

[POINT VI]

SKY ZONE CLAIMS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION 

UNDER THE JAMS RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED 

PROCEDURES AND RULES ARE AN EXAMPLE 

OF INDUSTRY-WIDE CONTRACTS OF 

ADHESION.[9] 

[POINT VII] 

FLANZMAN HOLDS THAT THE NJAA PROVIDES 

A DEFAULT PROCEDURE WHEN PARTIES OMIT 

THE TERMS FOR SELECTION OF THE 

ARBITRATOR AND THE ARBITRATION 

PROCESS—BUT DISTINGUISHES THE HOLDING 

IN KLEINE WHERE THE PARTIES AGREE TO A 

SPECIFIC ARBITRATION ORGANIZATION AS AN 

ESSENTIAL TERM AND RENDER IT 

UNENFORCEABLE WHEN THE ARBITRATION 

ORGANIZATION WAS UNAVAILABLE AT THE 

TIME THE CONTRACT WAS EXECUTED—AS 

ESSENTIAL TO A CONSUMER WAIVER-OFRIGHTS AND NEGATING A MEETING OF THE 

MINDS. 

A. SKY ZONE SELECTED JAMS AS 

THE EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION 

ORGANIZATION AND KNEW OR 

9

 There is insufficient information on this record for us to adjudicate this 

contention, which was not explicitly addressed by the judge, either by way of 

findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
13 A-3092-19

SHOULD HAVE KNOWN JAMS WAS 

UNAVAILABLE. 

B. THE SKY ZONE ARBITRATION 

CLAUSE VIOLATES THE PLAIN 

LANGUAGE ACT AND THE TRUTHIN-CONSUMER CONTRACT, 

WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT. 

C. SKY ZONE'S SELECTION OF JAMS 

WAS AN ESSENTIAL/INTEGRAL 

CONTRACT TERM.

NJAJ, as amici, raise the following points, which we have re-numbered: 

[POINT I]

THERE WAS NO ASSENT BY [PLAINTIFF] TO 

WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL SO THE 

[MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT HE 

CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATION. 

A. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 

HERE FAILS TO EXPLAIN TO THE 

CONSUMER THE RAMIFICATIONS OF 

SURRENDERING HIS 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY 

TRIAL.

B. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 

FAILED TO PROVIDE AND EXPLAIN 

THE JAMS EXPEDITED ARBITRATION 

RULES, AND ITS MERE REFERENCE 

TO THOSE PROCEDURES 

PREVENTED ANY MEETING OF THE 

MINDS.
14 A-3092-19

C. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 

IS CONTRADICTORY, CONFUSING 

AND VIOLATES NEW JERSEY'S PLAIN

LANGUAGE ACT.

[POINT II]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN [HIS] DICTUM 

STATEMENT THAT [HE] COULD APPOINT AN 

ARBITRAL FORUM NOT CONTEMPLATED BY 

THE PARTIES BECAUSE THAT WOULD

INAPPROPRIATELY RE-WRITE THE PARTIES' 

AGREEMENT.

[POINT III]

THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT 

[PLAINTIFF] CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO 

ARBITRATION BECAUSE [SKY ZONE'S] 

AGREEMENT FAILS TO CLEARLY AND 

UNMISTAKABLY EXPLAIN THAT HE WAS 

SURRENDERING HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 

AND THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR DOING SO.

[POINT IV] 

THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT 

[PLAINTIFF] CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO 

ARBITRATE BECAUSE THE CONFUSING AND 

CONTRADICTORY LANGUAGE OF [SKY ZONE'S]

AGREEMENT FAILED TO ASSURE HIS MUTUAL 

ASSENT. 

[POINT V] 

FLANZMAN REQUIRES THAT ARBITRATION 

CANNOT BE COMPELLED HERE BECAUSE SKY 

ZONE LLC'S SELECTED ARBITRAL FORUM AND 
15 A-3092-19

PROCESS WAS NEVER AVAILABLE TO THE 

PARTIES AND THUS THERE WAS NO MUTUAL 

ASSENT TO ARBITRATE.

III.

We begin by addressing the judge's conclusion that the agreement was 

unenforceable for lack of mutual assent. The judge undertook a careful analysis 

of whether there existed a meeting of the minds; specifically, whether the parties 

understood what rights replaced the jury. 

The judge reached his conclusion by relying on our appellate opinion in 

Flanzman, where we quoted both Atalese v. U.S. Legal Serv. Group, L.P., 219

N.J. 430, 443-45 (2014) and NAACP of Camden Cty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt., 421 

N.J. Super. 404, 425 (App. Div. 2011), explaining that " [judges] take particular 

care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear 

mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent." Flanzman, 456 N.J. 

Super at 621. And like us, the judge cited Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445 

N.J. Super. 545, 552-53 (App. Div. 2016), where this court determined that to 

clearly understand the ramifications of waiving a jury, a party "must be able to 

understand—from clear and unambiguous language—both the rights that have 

been waived and the rights that have taken their place." Flanzman, 456 N.J. 

Super. at 622 (citing Kleine, 445 N.J. Super. at 552-53). That is because the 
16 A-3092-19

Supreme Court explained that the word "arbitration" is not self-defining. See

Kernahan v. Home Warranty Admin., 236 N.J. 308, 332-33 (2019); Morgan v. 

Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 308 (2016); Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. We 

understood "ramifications of the assent" to mean not just the rights parties gave 

up but also the rights the parties received in their place. The Supreme Court 

disagreed with our understanding and clarified that "ramifications" referred only 

to waiving a jury, rather than also understanding what replaced the jury. 

Unlike Flanzman, where the parties omitted any reference to what 

replaced the jury, the parties' agreement here incorporated that information. 

Even if they had not, the Court has since explained a general reference to the 

arbitration process governing the dispute is not a material term; failure to 

reference it does not impact enforceability; and instead, the NJAA will fill in 

the missing information. Flanzman, 244 N.J. at 136-39. The Court agreed—to 

add clarity—it would be advantageous, sound, and practical for parties to 

"designate in their agreement an arbitral organization" and "an alternative 

method of choosing an organization" should the parties' primary choice be 

unavailable. Id. at 140. By doing so, the parties would then understand what to 

expect during the arbitration. But the Court concluded the information was not 

essential to the arbitration agreement.
17 A-3092-19

The judge determined that the agreement was unenforceable for lack of 

mutual assent because what the parties had contracted for—JAMS arbitrating 

the dispute—could not occur. He found, therefore, that they did not reach a 

meeting of the minds about what replaced the jury. Applying the Court's 

decision in Flanzman, and Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147 (2020),

10

we reach a different conclusion.

IV.

We conclude the agreement meets the requirements established in Atalese, 

and therefore there exists mutual assent to arbitrate. The parties clearly 

understood the ramifications of such assent because the agreement itself 

explains that the parties have waived a jury. The unavailability of JAMS is not

fatal to the enforceability of the agreement, especially because the agreement 

contains a severability clause. And even without the severability clause, under 

Flanzman and Arafa, the NJAA will fill in the arbitration process details. 

As evidence that the parties did not make JAMS integral to the arbitration 

process, we turn to the language of the agreement that identified the NJAA and 

FAA.

10

 The orders under review were issued before the Court rendered its opinion in 

Arafa.
18 A-3092-19

This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and 

interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of 

New Jersey, without regard to choice of law principles. 

Notwithstanding the provision with respect to the 

applicable substantive law, any arbitration conducted 

pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be 

governed by the [FAA] (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16).

The parties' agreement did not make arbitration solely dependent on the 

availability of JAMS. Instead, it included a severability clause and specifically 

identified the NJAA and FAA. 

In 2002, our Legislature enacted the NJAA to advance arbitration as an 

alternative to litigation and to clarify arbitration procedures. Flanzman, 214 N.J. 

at 133-34. The NJAA is a modified version of the Uniform Act,11 which itself 

is a default statute, meaning that statutory provisions can be varied or waived 

by contract. Indeed, the NJAA is a modified default statute, as reflected by its 

legislative history. See Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 514 1 (stating

that "[t]his bill is a modified version of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 

. . . as proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 

Laws").

11

 The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, Rev. Unif. Arb. Act §§ 1-31 (2000), 

updated and modified the Uniform Arbitration Act, Unif. Arb. Act §§ 1-25 

(1955).
19 A-3092-19

In Flanzman, the automatic application of the NJAA permitted the 

appointment of an arbitrator, Flanzman, 224 N.J. at 141 (citing N.J.S.A. 

2A:23B-11(a)),

12 and provided the general framework of the arbitration process, 

ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15). As to these two points, the same is true here. 

Flanzman is not the first instance where the Supreme Court utilized the NJAA 

to fill in missing terms in arbitration agreements. In July of last year, the Court 

decided Arafa, a case in which the parties identified in their agreement the FAA 

as the governing law, then later discovered that the FAA could not control. 243 

N.J. at 166 (noting that "it is undisputed that Section 1 [of the FAA] applies" to 

Arafa, which exempts employees and independent contractors involved in 

interstate commerce from the FAA). The Court applied the NJAA and filled in 

the missing terms addressing the arbitration process. Id. at 167. In Arafa, the 

Court concluded that the NJAA applies automatically, as it does here. 

To summarize: the arbitration agreement satisfies Atalese; the provision 

that JAMS arbitrate the dispute is unenforceable because JAMS is not available; 

the severability clause renders the rest of the agreement enforceable; and the 

NJAA will fill in the missing term as to the arbitration process. We therefore 

12

 The FAA has a similar provision. See 9 U.S.C. § 5. 
20 A-3092-19

reverse and remand, directing the parties to the arbitration agreement proceed to 

arbitration.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.