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i 

71–445 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–74] 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS 

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF FORMER 

CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEES 

ON ARMED SERVICES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, October 12, 2011, The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of Former Chairmen of the 

Committees on Armed Services .......................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, October 12, 2011 ................................................................................. 37 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN 

YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE 

COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan L., Former Chairman, House Armed Services Committee .................................................................................................................... 4 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, Former Chairman, House Armed Services Committee ......... 9 

Warner, Hon. John, Former Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee ..... 12 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan L. .................................................................................. 44 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 41 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 52 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 43 

Warner, Hon. John ........................................................................................... 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. 

MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF 

FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEES ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 12, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee meets to 

receive testimony today on ‘‘The Future of National Defense and 

the U.S. Military Ten Years after 9/11: Perspectives of Former 

Chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services.’’ We are very fortunate to have with us today Senator Warner from the other body. 

You know, I remember when he was over there, they used to do 

things over there. Nice to have him back. 

Mr. WARNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you can just kind of swing by over there 

before you leave, give them a little prod? 

Mr. WARNER. Yeah. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think the last count we have over 100 bills sitting over there waiting to be addressed to start jobs and a few 

other things. 

Mr. WARNER. You are on your own. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am also really happy to see Chairman Hunter, 

who was my mentor from the day I got here, and Chairman Skelton, two guys that really worked hand in hand for many years. 

Both chaired this committee, and it is good to have them back. 

This hearing is part of our ongoing series to evaluate lessons 

learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will 

soon be making about the future of our Force. We received perspectives of former military leaders from each of the Services, as well 

as outside experts. Today we will have the opportunity to view 

these issues through the lens of the leaders of the Legislative 

Branch. 

The individuals with us today in more ways than we can possibly 

imagine led the fight here on the Hill to ensure our warfighters got 

what they needed to defend this Nation and take care of their families, especially in the months following the attacks of September 
2 

11th, when it became clear that the procurement holiday of the 

1990s had left gaps in our capabilities, the readiness was low, and 

that our Force was being stretched too thin. The chairmen of the 

Armed Services Committees ensured that not only Congress, but 

the Department of Defense and industry were doing their part to 

make it right for our Armed Forces. 

Unfortunately our successes in the Global War on Terror and in 

Iraq and Afghanistan are lulling our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Too many appear to believe 

that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget 

choices, not strategic ones; that the threats we face will be reduced 

along with funding for national security. 

I am not arguing that the military can be held exempt from fiscal 

belt-tightening. Indeed, half a trillion dollars has been cut from the 

DOD [Department of Defense] already. The military has absorbed 

about half of the deficit reduction measures enacted to date, but 

these cuts have happened in advance of the development of a new 

strategy for national defense, and without any changes to the military’s roles and missions. 

Even more concerning is that if the Joint Select Committee does 

not succeed in developing and passing another deficit-reduction 

plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. It also remains to be seen whether or not additional cuts may be proposed by the Administration, even if the 

‘‘super committee’’ [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] is 

successful. But all this talk about dollars doesn’t trans well into actual impacts on the Force and risk to our Nation. 

I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the lessons 

we learned 10 years ago and give us recommendations about how 

we might avoid repeating the same mistakes. How can we make 

sure the DOD is a good steward of the taxpayers dollar without increasing the risk to our Armed Forces? 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s pillar of American strength 

and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the 

struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation, but it is imperative 

that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt instead 

of the protector of our prosperity. With that in mind, I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today. 

I apologize, I am going have to leave for a HPSCI [House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence] briefing. Our vice chair, 

Mac Thornberry, will take the chair, and I look forward—I will return as soon as I can for the questioning and learn what we can 

from these witnesses. 

With that I yield to our ranking member on the committee, 

Adam Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and in particular it is an honor to have two of 

our former chairmen of this committee here and a great honor to 
3 

have a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 

as well. Senator Warner, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Skelton, welcome 

back. 

My formative years on this committee were spent under Mr. 

Hunter and Mr. Skelton, and I could not have had two better mentors to see how they run this committee. And it is a great testimony that you are back together to the bipartisanship of this committee that both of you upheld in fine standing, which I might also 

add Chairman McKeon has done an excellent job of as well. You 

know, we work together on this committee. We have differences, 

but I think more so than any other committee out here, we definitely see this as a bipartisan issue, try and make sure that we 

adequately provide for the national security of our Nation. It is an 

honor to serve on this committee, and I think all Members take it 

very seriously. It is great to see you both again. 

I thank the chairman for having this hearing and the series of 

hearings that we have had to discuss the future of our defense 

budget. Our country right now faces enormous challenges on the 

budget front, but we also continue to face national security threats, 

and I agree with the chairman that we cannot wish them away. We 

have had a number of successes over the course of the last decade 

in confronting Al Qaeda and dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, but those threats remain, and we have a world that is uncertain. We are uncertain of China’s intentions in Asia. Iran and 

North Korea continue to be grave threats. 

We have reason to make sure that we maintain a strong national 

security posture, and cuts will impact that. As the chairman has 

mentioned, the debt ceiling agreement that was passed in August 

has already put us on a path to cut somewhere in the neighborhood 

of $500 billion out of the defense budget over the course of the next 

10 years. The Pentagon is already planning for that. Secretary Panetta, who we will hear from I think it is tomorrow, gave a speech 

yesterday morning outlining their vision for how to implement 

those cuts. So it is not that Defense has not stepped up and offered 

reductions. It has. The question is what should those reductions be, 

and where do we go from here, what more might come at us? 

But at the same time, as I have said on this committee, we have 

to be mindful of our debt and deficit situation. The math is unrelenting. We are 40 percent out of whack on our budget. That means 

we are borrowing 40 percent of every dollar that we spend. That 

is unsustainable and devastating to the national security of this 

country. 

Now, it is my viewpoint that the debt ceiling agreement lumped 

all of that on the nonentitlement portion of the budget, of which 

defense is over half, and that the entire budget has to be part of 

the discussion. And, yes, though my colleagues to my right are sick 

of hearing me say this, revenue has to be part of the discussion as 

well. 

I think there are incredibly powerful arguments that have been 

made by the majority for the devastating impact of further cuts on 

national security. We must prevent that, but unfortunately the 

debt ceiling agreement puts us on the path to doing it unless we 

come up with something else. And again, the math is the math. 

Unless you want to cut entitlements by somewhere around a third, 
4 

you have got to put revenue on the table. I think the importance 

of our national security needs is an argument for doing that, and 

I will continue to advocate very strongly for that, in part because 

of my belief that the national security budget has already been cut 

by as much as it can be, but also in part because there are other 

discretionary programs that are important to this country: Infrastructure, education, just to name a couple. They face those devastating cuts of sequestration as well. So I hope the committee can 

come together with the idea that we need to prevent sequestration. 

As one final little bit of sequestration, which is not widely understood, it is an across-the-board cut that is required. It takes away 

any discretion on behalf of the Department of Defense. They have 

to cut every single line by the same amount, and that is one of the 

most ridiculous ways to budget I can possibly imagine. But that is 

what happens if we don’t come up with some agreement to find at 

least another $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction. 

I will also say that the way we continue to do CRs [Continuing 

Resolutions] as the way to fund it also has a more profoundly devastating impact on our ability to budget than most people realize. 

I have heard people talking about the fact that we may not be able 

to get an appropriations bill this year, so the Department of Defense will once again have to live for months and months with a 

CR. A CR is not the same as having appropriated money. It makes 

it very, very difficult to plan and very, very difficult to do an efficient job of spending taxpayers’ money. 

We need to make decisions. We need to put everything on the 

table and make a comprehensive decision for how to get the deficit 

under control long-term. No one is talking about making big, deep, 

traumatic cuts right now, this year in the middle of a recession; we 

are talking about putting a plan in place to have a reasonable 10- 

year effort to get the deficit under control, and we need do that. 

Defense is but one of many places that will be impacted in a devastating way if we don’t. 

So I look forward to the testimony of our three esteemed witnesses on their expertise and experience sorely missed from this 

committee. We look forward to getting at least a little bit of it 

today to give us some guidance on where we should go and how we 

should make the right decisions going forward. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Thank the gentleman. 

Let me add my welcome to our distinguished witnesses. Without 

objection, any written statement you would like to submit will be 

made part of the record. And with that I would yield first to Chairman Hunter for any comments he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN L. HUNTER, FORMER 

CHAIRMAN, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, and thanks to the Members of the committee for the opportunity for all of us to come back and give our 

views on where we stand today with respect to the security challenge and what the proposed budget cuts—the impact that they 

would have on security in the near term and the long term. And 
5 

it is neat to see everybody. It is great be back and wonderful to see 

old friends. It is great to see our great staff members, who have 

made this committee work so effectively. And it is always good to 

be here with John Warner, my old colleague from the Senate who 

worked across the table with us for so many years putting together 

a defense package that served the country well; and also with Ike 

Skelton, one of the truly great Americans of all time, a guy that 

I knew for my entire congressional career, and just wonderful to be 

with him. So thanks for the homecoming. It has been good. 

Now, I have got a written statement for the record, but let me 

just go straight to the point here, because I think it is important 

to have lots of time for questions if you have them. 

First, I have looked at the proposed budget cuts that will occur 

under the Joint Committee’s automatic pilot, if you will, if they 

don’t find cuts elsewhere, and, in my opinion, the automatic budget 

cuts that are proposed by the Joint Committee will badly damage 

America’s national security in the near term and in the long term. 

And let me explain why I think that is the case. 

You know, after World War II, when we had over 8 million people under arms, we, in the words of John Marshall, didn’t simply 

demobilize. General Marshall said it was a route. We stacked arms. 

A couple of years later a third-rate country with a third-rate military pushed Americans down the Korean Peninsula and almost 

pushed us into the ocean until we established a Pusan perimeter 

and pushed back, ultimately weathered the intervention of the 

Communist Chinese, and established that stalemate that prevails 

today. 

We had a drawdown after Vietnam in which, as I recall, the 

Army was called hollow. We had 50 percent of our aircraft that 

were not fully mission capable, we had lots of ships that couldn’t 

steam, and national security was in bad shape. 

We rebuilt national security in the 1980s, and in doing so, we 

stood up to the Soviet Union. In fact, I think one of the first things 

I did as a freshman on this committee was join Ike in approving 

the President’s 12.6 percent pay increase for all military personnel, 

because in 1979 you had about 1,000 petty officers a month who 

were leaving the Navy because they couldn’t feed their families on 

military pay. 

So we rebuilt national security, we brought down the Soviet 

Union, and at that point we went into a drawdown phase. And we 

went from 18 Army divisions, as Ronald Reagan walked out the 

door, to 14 Army divisions during the early years of the 1990s. We 

then went into a very devastating time in which we pulled the 

Army, for example, down to a little more than half of what it had 

been. We pulled it down from 18 divisions to 10 divisions by the 

time the Administration in 2000 walked out the door. 

We had—and I recall this as the first procurement chairman and 

ultimately full committee chairman—we did an analysis on how 

much equipment we needed to buy each year to try to fill the gaps, 

and we were funding in the late years of the 1990s about half of 

what we needed, half the equipment that we needed. So we had 

that enormous drawdown, and even though Congress restored 

about $40 billion during the late 1990s, we had that enormous 
6 

drawdown, and ultimately we came into 2000 with a vastly reduced 

military. 

Now, we rebuilt to a large degree after 9/11, spurred by 9/11, I 

might say, and we filled up some of those things that the former 

Chief of the Army called the ‘‘holes in the yard,’’ the equipment 

yard. We replenished some of that equipment. We reinvigorated 

our missile defense program. 

But at this point in this war, and I understand the American 

people are weary of war, you get weary of war, and this committee, 

I am sure, is weary of the long wars that we fought, but we won 

in Iraq. The Government in Iraq is holding, the military that we 

built from the ground up is holding, and we did that because we 

increased military end strength, we increased pay, we increased 

the people side of the defense budget, and we also put in place new 

modernization programs that are just now on the cusp of being 

fully fielded. 

At this point we are about ready to go into a historic drawdown 

if these proposed budget cuts occur that will be devastating to national security near-term and long-term. 

And, Mr. Chairman, let me know, I always hate to be cut off by 

chairmen, I have always hated that, but do let me know when I 

am close to my allotted time here. I don’t want to—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think the committee is going to extend a 

great deal of discretion to our former distinguished colleagues. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could you tell somebody 

to turn my blinking light off? 

Mr. Chairman, so let me talk about these cuts and what they do 

in the context of the world that we live in today. 

First, we are still fighting the war in Afghanistan. It is a difficult, complex war, but a winnable war. And the war against terrorism is not over. Beyond that, we have a neighbor to Iraq, which, 

having failed to intervene successfully in the Iraq war, the Americans having won the Iraq war, even though they killed a number 

of Americans with their intervention, the special groups with explosively formed projectiles, and with their intelligence aid to the 

other side, they are proceeding apace with the development of a nuclear weapon. 

Now, here is what we know about Iran in shorthand. The efforts 

by the West, by the Allies, to stop the enrichment of nuclear weapons material have failed. The path of the last 5 or 6 years is littered with failed sanctions because the meaningful sanctions have 

been invariably blunted by China and Russia. The 1,500 engineers, 

Iranian engineers, that have been trained by the Russians form 

now a permanent cadre, if you will, for the development of nuclear 

systems. 

You know, if you go to a shooting gallery, you see the big ducks 

go by first, and they are easy to hit, and then you see the small 

ducks go by, and they are tough to hit. The big ducks are almost 

all gone with respect to Iran, because the big operations that are 

visible, that you can see with overhead surveillance, that you can 

assess, that is the huge stockpiles of material that needs to be refined until it is weapons grade and can be used in a nuclear device. 

Getting to the 5 percent refinement point with the centrifuges, the 

thousands of centrifuges that Iran has in places like Natanz, it is 
7 

a big, visible operation, but it is shortly going to be over, and the 

smaller work that can be done in clandestine sites, which are very 

difficult to see with National Technical Means and very difficult to 

assess, will finish up that work. 

So the United States is nearing a moment of truth with respect 

to Iran. And the Iran has followed the model, I think, of the North 

Koreans, whom they have observed very closely, and that is to talk 

and build, and wrangle and build, and lie and build until you have 

a nuclear device. I think that is the path that they are taking. 

And, of course, the Soviet Union, having been disassembled, 

leaves a residue of a strong strategic core in Russia, which, while 

the intent is not as ambitious or as aggressive as it was in the 

past, nonetheless you have a very strong strategic array of nucleartipped systems which have to be considered by American defense 

planners. 

Now let me go to the big picture, the final picture, and, I think, 

the primary problem and defense challenge that the United States 

is going to have: China. China right now is surging its national security capability not necessarily in numbers, but in capability, the 

capability to kill Americans should we have a Taiwan Straits scenario or another scenario. 

The Chinese have focused heavily on being able to blunt the 

United States Navy should it try to intervene in a Taiwan scenario 

or something similar and, in my estimation, they don’t intend do 

that with a classic naval-on-naval engagement. They intend to use 

land-based ballistic missiles with antiship guidance systems where 

they can destroy the American fleet, or a good part of it, including 

aircraft carriers, 500, 600, 700 miles out from the Taiwan Straits. 

And if you look at the ballistic missiles that they are developing 

today with antiship capability, that is precisely the range that they 

have attributed to and built into these systems. 

The Chinese also are building a high-end, multirole fighter. They 

are building about 100 medium-range ballistic missiles a year, 

which are staged and packed in the areas that can reach Taiwan. 

In fact, if we look at all the indicia that we used to look at when 

we try to decide whether they were going to at some point hit Taiwan, a lot of those boxes have now been checked, and they have 

done those things. 

Now, the problem, the challenge with China goes not just to 

what they have, but to their ability. I am always reminded of the 

legendary statement by a Japanese admiral shortly after Pearl 

Harbor in which he told his colleagues, at some point the Americans will defeat us and overwhelm us with their industrial base. 

A great part of the American industrial base now resides in China, 

and while China isn’t churning out submarines at a high rate this 

year, even though they have turned out as many as 7 submarines 

in 2004 and 7 submarines, attack submarines, in 2005, and, as I 

understand, a fairly large number in the last 14 months, they have 

the ability to surge this big industrial base, especially their shipbuilding base, their domestic shipbuilding base, pivot that base into 

a warship-building base, and far exceed the capability of the 

United States to quickly build a fleet. 

The Chinese are also pushing very hard in very important areas, 

high-leverage areas. Along with their submarine capability, high- 
8 

end fighters, they are also working very hard in the area of electronic warfare. They want to neutralize American electronic warfare and our capabilities that are dependent on our electronic capability. They understand that, and they understand the massive leverage that they get if they develop an ability to neutralize precision weapons. They have watched the effect of precision weapons. 

They really came into their own in Iraq. In the first Gulf war, 

about 10 percent of our weapons were precision weapons. They 

knocked out about 40 percent of the targets, as I recall. About 60 

percent of our weapons were precision weapons in this last war, 

and they were devastating, obviously. We took out many of Saddam 

Hussein’s armor formations long before the Army and the Marine 

units came within range of those systems. The Chinese watched 

that, and they want to be able to neutralize precision-weapon capability. 

They also want to be able to dominate space, and for those Members of this committee or Congress who would like to keep space 

a benign environment, it is too late. The Chinese understand the 

importance of space, and they are developing systems to be able to 

control and dominate space. It was 2007, I believe, when they shot 

down one of their own target satellites and proved an incipient 

ASAT [Anti-satellite] capability. 

So China has a huge mobilization capability that will be very difficult for the United States to match because a large part of our 

industrial base now belongs to them. At the same time they have 

a lot of cash, and, for example, when they commission submarines, 

they buy Kilos. They not only produce submarines, they buy Kilo 

submarines from the Russians along with Sovremenny-class missile 

cruisers because they have ready cash, a lot of which came from 

the United States. 

I would predict, Mr. Chairman, looking at the budget that you 

have here, at a time when the Navy needs to meet these threats, 

they need to meet the missile threat to be able to keep the Navy 

from being so vulnerable that it can’t enter certain parts of the 

Western Pacific, that takes a lot of money. This budget, if these 

budget cuts of approximately $1 trillion through 2021 go through, 

the Navy will not be able to do what it takes to defend itself in an 

exposed environment. 

If you add to that the massive problems that the Navy has in 

other areas, the 288 ships that are spread very thin, the relatively 

small submarine force that we have now when a lot of Joint Chief 

studies have said we need close to 100 attack boats and we have 

got 50 or less, the Navy’s problems right now in the face of a burgeoning Chinese industrial base and military capability are immense. If we as a government make these cuts, we will deprive the 

U.S. Navy of a future in the Western Pacific where it is a dominant 

force, and where it has a strong envelope of security over those 

Navy task forces that go out and deploy in those regions. And I 

would predict that this budget starts us on a road in which China 

by 2020 will be the dominant force in the Western Pacific, if they 

want to be. If they surge their warship production, with the declining road that this puts us on with respect to naval vessels and personnel and technology, they will be the dominant force in the Western Pacific. 
9 

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman to my left, and as well as the gentleman to my right, but especially the gentleman to my left, was 

one of those Americans who—you know, the great thing about this 

committee is you find common ground, Democrats and Republicans, 

and probably nobody did more to work on ensuring that the Army 

end strength was increased than Ike Skelton. And I will leave the 

comments with respect to the people side, of what this does on the 

people side, to him and to Senator Warner. 

Let me just finish with this. Before this Government and this 

Congress votes to make these massive cuts on defense, they should 

ask this question: Has the world become a safer place? Another 

question: Is the war against terrorists over? Another question: Does 

it still make sense to shoot down incoming missiles? Because that 

is important, and these cuts will devastate the missile defense program. That is the ability to stop a fast-moving missile or a slowmoving missile from coming in and hitting either your troops in 

theater, your ships at sea, your allies, or your population here in 

the United States. Is defending against incoming missiles now a 

bad idea? Because this budget will devastate our missile defense 

program. 

And finally, what is the most important obligation that we have 

to the American people as a government? You must ask yourself 

that question. I have always thought it was to provide them with 

security. And the first thing that we should take care of, and especially in this era, is national security and then work out the rest 

of the budget exercise after we have determined what it takes to 

defend America. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. 

Chairman Skelton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, FORMER CHAIRMAN, 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members 

of the Armed Services Committee, it is a signal honor to return to 

this Chamber where I served three decades in support of our men 

and women in uniform to discuss a matter of great importance, 

whether the United States will continue to have the finest military 

force in history. 

It is a special honor to be with my long-standing friend Duncan 

Hunter and my long-standing Senate compatriot Senator Warner. 

It is a real thrill to join them today. It is especially good to see my 

successor Mrs. Hartzler carrying the Missouri mantle as we move 

forward. So thank you again for the opportunity to be with you. 

I am deeply concerned with the prospect of cuts to our defense 

budget while our sons and our daughters are still at work in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and still fighting Al Qaeda around the globe. Our 

pilots are often younger than the planes they fly. Our Navy is not 

growing even as China builds a fleet that may threaten our ability 

to preserve freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific, and yet 

significant cuts are being contemplated to our defense. In fact, the 
10 

Budget Control Act could lead to defense cuts that would be downright devastating. 

I concur with the past statements of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Panetta that the cuts to the defense budget that could occur 

under sequestration would imperil our Nation. Should sequestration cuts happen, in 10 years our country will be relegated to the 

sidelines of history. 

Congress has the sole power to raise and maintain our military 

under Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. Thus my message to 

Congress is don’t scuttle the American Armed Forces. Our military 

is the best ever. I implore Congress to pursue cuts to the defense 

budget with the utmost care. I recommend to the committee the report of ‘‘Hard Choices’’ released by the Center for a New American 

Security, where I serve on the board of advisors. This report outlines some of the significant consequences of cuts on American combat power. I echo the warnings of this report that budget cuts beyond the $480 billion already designated will endanger our national security. 

Cuts of this magnitude will jeopardize our ability to uphold our 

vital interests. Our future military must have the capability to 

deter potential aggressors and quickly and decisively defeat any direct threats. This means maintaining a strong ground force that 

can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and then transfer security 

responsibility to our Afghan partners. Yet any responsible defense 

budget must also prioritize the Navy and the Air Force. This is especially important in South and East Asia where rising powers 

such as China and India increasingly serve as fulcrums of global 

economic and political power. They can serve to bolster or challenge 

the security of global communion. 

For this reason the United States cannot degrade our naval and 

air capabilities. Cuts to the Navy and Air Force will limit our 

power projection capability, make our allies and partners question 

our commitments to them, and give China a free hand in the Western Pacific. 

The Army and Marines are also critical for this theater. The 

ground forces must support our Asian allies, improving American 

ties with those countries and discouraging China from bullying 

them. 

The new strategic situation means that in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, which had its genesis in this committee, we must 

embrace a joint vision for our future military. An interdependent 

military will more effectively protect our national interests through 

greater cooperation, thereby making more intelligent battlefield decisions. 

Already we have seen past attempts at this policy bear fruit. The 

Navy and the Air Force have made major strides through their 

evolving air-sea battle concept. Any future strategic concept must 

envision how a combined arms approach on air, sea and land will 

deter threats and defeat them if deterrence fails. 

Significant defense cuts could also endanger the vitality of our 

Services by compromising our ability to keep and train excellent officers, especially if personnel cuts degrade our officer-training institution. The strength of the U.S. military flows from the dedication 

and skill of our All-Volunteer Force. Indeed, the new defense budg-
11 

et must maintain our Nation’s security by keeping the profession 

of arms professional. 

The American military’s most important edge over our adversaries comes from the unparalleled professionalism and training of 

our men and women; however, this edge is fragile. When just over 

50 percent of service academy graduates remain in the service after 

10 years, our military loses its best and brightest. We must combat 

this by incentivizing retention of officers in the military. The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel last year recommended 

two new bonuses for high-caliber soldiers, regardless of rank, and 

reforming our up-or-out system. By completing these imperative reforms, we will significantly improve the quality of our officer corps. 

We must complement these reforms by continuing our commitment to our professional military education. In the words of Admiral James Stavridis, we will prevail by outthinking the enemy. Our 

military service academies and the ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training Corps] programs are the best in the world, yet learning must 

continue as soldiers remain in the service. Warriors matching the 

strength of a Spartan hoplite, the flexibility of a Roman legionnaire, and the brilliant tactical mind of a Hannibal or Scipio are 

commissioned every year. As we face new domains of warfare in 

space and in cyberspace, officers who understand the past and anticipate the future will be well prepared to adapt the world’s finest 

military to new ways of war. 

Deep defense cuts could endanger professional military education 

programs needed to prepare officers and enlisted personnel for this 

future. If the military hopes to adapt to the ever-changing nature 

of warfare, we must commit fully to funding professional military 

education and providing scholarships and support to those individuals pursuing higher education. Doing so will broaden the expertise 

of soldiers and prepare men and women for the threats of the future. Doing otherwise will turn our military into a profoundly moribund organization. 

Any defense budget must also not break faith with the men and 

the women and the families who comprise our All-Volunteer Force. 

We must honor the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families by 

preserving their hard-earned medical pay and retirement benefits. 

We also must ensure that we provide the resources to confront 

a lethal crisis affecting our military: suicide. In light of the rising 

suicides since 2001, especially amongst the Army and Marines who 

served so faithfully in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must continue to 

pursue innovative ways to ensure mental wellness in the armed 

services. 

I would like to conclude by emphasizing how important it is to 

get this right. It is no longer a question of if, but when the cuts 

will fall. Already the Department of Defense is looking at cuts of 

about $489 billion over the next 10 years. Our future force must 

be able to quickly defeat threats all over the world and to respond 

properly to the growing importance of Asia. Our Congress must remain vigilant that budget cuts do not irreparably damage our military forces. It must fight to preserve the education, training and 

health care that make our military the best in the world. We must 

not break faith with those who have sacrificed so much over the 

past decade. 
12 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to return to this Chamber 

and to say a word on behalf of the young men and young women 

in uniform. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 52.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, FORMER CHAIRMAN, 

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

Mr. WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am deeply 

honored to be here. I again thank the chairman and ranking member and others who have found the time to come and attend. 

My two distinguished colleagues and dear, dear friends of many 

years, we have worked together in this room and in rooms throughout the Capitol complex to resolve problems, and here we are today 

to try and give you a little advice. 

Well, my first advice is I should be brief, because I am anxious 

to respond to questions, and I defer to the excellent summary of 

the world situation given by my good friend here from California. 

And then from the heartland of America, Harry Truman’s land, Ike 

Skelton has talked about a subject I will touch on, and that is the 

All-Volunteer Force. 

I submitted a statement. It is short, it is of no great consequence. 

It is sort of a few notes from the heart, but what I felt. 

But I would like to say a personal thing. I looked around this 

morning at these portraits and reminded myself that I have been 

before this committee, this is my 41st year. I started with those 

two gentlemen over there as a youngster, Under Secretary of the 

Navy at that time, and with the exception of five short races for 

the Senate, I have been associated with Congress and working with 

the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House for 

certainly the 30 years that I finished in the Senate and the 5 years 

that I was in the Pentagon and the Navy Secretariat. 

But what I thought I would do today is first commend the staff 

and the Members for having this series of hearings. I have got to 

say to myself, why didn’t I do something like this at difficult times? 

Thanks to Bob Simmons and Katie Sendak, I read every one of the 

statements of the witnesses who preceded this here, and I learned 

quite a bit. They were beautifully prepared statements. I wish I 

had spent a little more time on my very brief statement. But nevertheless, the hearing records will be there for all to see, and I hope 

somehow you put them together, because they are a very valuable 

resource as the Congress of the United States heads towards what 

I believe will be one of the greatest achievements they have ever 

had. 

I have not lost confidence in our Congress, our Senate, our House 

to work together. Both the chairman and ranking member in their 

opening comments referred to that magical word ‘‘bipartisan.’’ The 

three of us saw it year after year with each bill that we had, and 

we never once failed to get a bill through that was bipartisan and 

signed by the sequence of Presidents. This Congress, I am confident, will achieve the same. 
13 

However, my colleagues have spoken to the draconian threat of 

the sequester procedure and the special committee and the like. 

The only prediction I make today, is that will not happen, and it 

will not happen for the reason that the Committees of the Armed 

Services and the respective Appropriations Committees on armed 

services will not let that happen, because you understand the severity of the issues as they relate to the men and women of the 

Armed Forces. 

I sat here looking at that recitation from the Congress of the 

United States—excuse me, the Constitution, reminding Congress 

and the President, which constitute the Government together with 

our judiciary, it is the Federal Government’s responsibility, national defense, no one else. It is the Federal Government. And 

these two committees, House and Senate, and the appropriators 

are the immediate ones responsible to see that this draconian chapter of a budget would not happen with $500 billion more being extracted from the Department of Defense current and outyear budgets. It must not happen. 

I want to also refer to the first thing I wanted to say in my statement was the All-Volunteer Force. I was in the Pentagon in the 

years 1969 to 1974 when the concept of that came about, and we 

recognized the need to do it. And when it passed, it was viewed 

that Congress had dumped onto the military the biggest gamble we 

had ever taken. But the military leadership at that time, and progressively since that period, have strengthened that all-voluntary 

concept. That is the very backbone of all of our defense. And every 

decision that this committee and others make in the context of this 

budget, you must keep foremost in mind the essential need to 

maintain that All-Volunteer Force. 

I was Secretary of the Navy during Vietnam. I saw the difficulties that we encountered with the draft, the American public turning against colleagues, turning against those in uniform as they 

came back from performing their duties on that frightful battlefield, which laid a heavy toll on our men and women and their families. Now, bear in mind that it is this committee and that in the 

Senate that must make sure that that doesn’t happen again. 

Since that period the Armed Forces have continually, with strong 

leadership, be it from the generals and admirals or the privates 

and sailors, grown to where today they are respected more than 

any other segment of our society. They did it by their own sweat 

of their brow, their own sacrifice, their own ability to do with what 

Congress had provided and do it brilliantly. 

Also we cannot look at this situation in the context of the United 

States alone. Our Nation stands like a beacon to the free world. We 

are viewed upon in various ways, but the record will be clear we, 

the United States, do not desire to dominate or take anyone else’s 

land or property. We are there solely to help preserve freedom for 

those who will fight with us to do so. And in that context if we 

were to face this draconian budget cut, it would send a signal, like 

the old days in the Navy that I knew, we used to flash this signal 

to maintain electronic silence. That signal would be flashed across 

the world: The United States is beginning to withdraw. That we 

cannot do. 
14 

So I say to you the cuts in defense—and I will say right now we 

have taken—that is ‘‘we’’ collectively, the Department of Defense 

under the brilliant leadership of Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, and 

I have known those two fine men and worked with them for many 

years—we have taken a significant number of those cuts. But for 

symbolic reasons and other reasons, we cannot now say, in this 

current challenge to find more, that defense is off the table. I would 

not suggest we use that phrase. I suggest we use the depth of understanding in this committee to explain to your colleagues why 

certain cuts cannot be made against the defense. Some possibly can 

be, and we will participate the defense in somewhat meeting these 

obligations that must be met to avoid that draconian $500 billion. 

But it is you, individually, singly and as a committee, that is the 

last bulwark to protect this. 

So I just conclude I remain confident in Congress. Preserve that 

All-Volunteer Force, and the Nation will survive and continue to be 

a very strong, stabilizing force. If we were not continued to be 

viewed as a strong, stabilizing force, it could well be the incentive 

for other nations to start a race of armament and a race toward 

the ultimate weapons, weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. We are the stabilizer. We must remain so in being 

true to our men and women in the Armed Forces and their families. I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warner can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. 

I would like to acknowledge the presence of another former Member, longtime stalwart on the committee, Jimmy Saxton of New 

Jersey. Happy to have you here. 

We have kind of a unique opportunity with former chairman 

Duncan Hunter and Duncan Hunter, Jr., here. I know you spent 

all night preparing questions for your dad. I will yield my time to 

Duncan at this time. 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I was hoping we could put him under oath first. I have got some questions 

about my childhood I would like to bring up right now. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and I just want to say it is great to be 

here, it is a humbling experience to be here. And to my dad, it is 

kind of sad actually. I wish you would have stayed. Your superior 

knowledge and your take on this stuff would be much appreciated 

right now. We would like to have you around in a think tank or 

something instead of out hunting elk in Idaho, in Colorado, in Wyoming and in New Mexico and whatever else you are doing. 

Mr. HUNTER. The Hunters are a big family, you know 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. They are a big family, that is true. 

I would like to ask the panel, with your experience coming pre 

or, you know, during the Cold War in the 1980s, when Dad was 

elected in 1980—Ike, I don’t know when you were elected. The 

same? 1980, 1982. 

Mr. SKELTON. 1976. 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. That is the year I was born. So coming from that experience—— 

Mr. SKELTON. You didn’t have to say that. 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. I am sorry. 
15 

Coming from that experience, just the breadth of knowledge and 

what you have seen, I would like you to kind of put these cuts in 

perspective for us. Because Presidents come and go. You gentlemen 

have been here a long time, and you have a lot of perspective. I 

would like you to just share that perspective with us. Thank you. 

Mr. SKELTON. I remember when I first came to Congress, it must 

have been 1978, I went down to Fort Bragg and was with some 

young, relatively young, troops, and comparing what I saw then, 

the caliber and the training, to what I see now at Fort Leonard 

Wood in Missouri and other Army posts and Marine bases in training, it is night and day. We then did not have a military that can 

compare to what we have today. 

Same year I went on an overnight visit on the USS Saratoga, which, of course, is now out of commission, and I met with a group 

of Missouri sailors after the dinner, roomful of them, and all of 

them were so discouraged, they were going to get out of the Navy, 

except one, who had been in some 19 years, who was going to stick 

it out another year. And the morale that I heard and witnessed 

that evening aboard that ship was, frankly, very discouraging. 

In more recent years I have spent time aboard ships, on Navy 

bases with young men, young women all across the training spectrum, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are good. They are 

well-trained, their attitude is positive, they understand duty. And 

I am convinced though it is a small group of young men and young 

women—at any one time only one half of 1 percent of Americans 

are in uniform—but I am convinced that this group of young folks 

will return and make a great difference to the future of America. 

You are one of them. And I think that you will see, though they 

are small in numbers, a growing great generation come from them, 

because they understand duty, they understand patriotism, and 

they understand what makes America work. 

That is why we can’t lose what we have today. They are the best 

I have seen. They are good. Whether it be a trainee or whether it 

be a four-star admiral, they are very, very good at what they do. 

Barbara Tuchman wrote a book, the historian, entitled, The 

March of Folly, and each chapter was about how a country made 

decisions that were contrary to their own vital interests. Should sequestration come to pass and our military be devastated, as we 

have predicted, another chapter could be added to that book. This 

is serious business. 

Mr. HUNTER. I would say to the gentleman from San Diego—— 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. Distinguished gentleman. 

Mr. HUNTER. Distinguished gentleman from San Diego. I am in 

a familiar position being grilled by you, but it is really great to answer that question because you are part of the answer. 

And, you know, when I came in in 1980, one thing that everyone 

arrives at when they come into this body, into this committee, and 

they have a relationship with lots of folks in the military, they get 

to know the military, we make trips to the bases, we meet with lots 

of them, lots of folks who have done extraordinary things, comparing that era to this era, which I think is part of your question, 

is I have always been impressed with the sameness. 

When I say ‘‘the sameness,’’ I am reminded of that book, The 

Bridges at Toko-Ri, by James Michener, when, when the hero 
16 

didn’t come back—and I forget who played him in the movie—the 

captain of the ship stood on the deck of this carrier and said, 

Where does America get such men who fly off these tiny aircraft 

carriers, go into a difficult combat situation, and then try—those 

that survive—try to find that carrier somewhere at sea? 

And then he said or he concluded with the thought that these 

people come from America’s cities and villages and towns, and 

somehow they come in with this incredible devotion to duty, and 

they preserve our country and preserve our freedom. And I have 

always thought about that, because in 1980, when I came in and 

I met these wonderful people who make the United States work, 

make the United States military work, I always remembered that 

line, because they are still coming. 

And I know Ike and I, and I am sure John, has had the same 

experience, and all of us and all of you in the committee have gone 

out into the warfighting theaters many times. When you meet 

these people, you meet people like J.A. Lamkin, the medic who alternately killed Al Qaeda and carried—performed an operation on 

his back in a firefight in—I believe it was in Baghdad, and then 

carried his wounded man down three flights of stairs, finished off 

a couple more enemy personnel, and finally successfully 

medevac’ed him; or Sergeant First Class Alwyn Cashe, who extracted his men from his Bradley who were burning, who were on 

fire after a fuel cell had exploded in an ambush, and he himself 

was burning, and continued to extract them until he couldn’t move 

anymore; and the people that we know, and, Duncan, the people 

that you know, and the great young marines that you have brought 

to our house who have this sense of duty to our country. 

And today they have something else, and that is something that 

Ike touched on and John touched on, and that is this: Many of the 

people who served in these warfighting theaters over the last 10 

years are what I would call old hands. They have done two, three, 

and four tours, and I am talking about whether the Marines, the 

Army, the ground forces, but also the Air Force and the Navy, 

these are people who know how to make the military work and 

know how to win wars, and they have a creativity, an innovative 

capability, and a genius, and we are going to lose a lot of those people. 

We are going to lose colonels like Joe L’Etoile, who took 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines into that dangerous area called the Zydon and 

turned that around, cleansed it of Al Qaeda by alternately being 

a brilliant warfighter and by getting the tribes on his side; guys 

like John Kelly, who is now the Deputy for the Secretary, who, 

when the widows of Anbar Province were destitute, got them milk 

cows so that they could have a little income, and it gave a benefit 

on both ends, and it brought the tribes closer together to us; guys 

like Paul Kennedy, who worked as a liaison here and then commanded 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, and the day after his battalion 

had killed 300 insurgents in the battle of Ramadi, he held medical 

open house in the soccer stadium in Ramadi for the old people and 

the children and started to divide the insurgency from the tribes 

of Anbar Province. 

The same type of operations, those same counterinsurgency 

geniuses are plying their trade in Afghanistan today. Those are the 
17 

old hands. Those are those colonels and lieutenant colonels who 

may never become generals, they may or may not, but they have 

the ability to win wars. They are creative, they are smart, they 

have enormous experience, and under these massive budget cuts, 

a lot of that great talent is going to be jettisoned. 

Going back to 1980, I would say, that is—I was always impressed 

first and foremost with the dedication and the capability of our people. It has never been better than it is today, and we are in danger 

right now of losing it. 

And so I would say to my son who joined the Marines, unlike my 

other son who joined the Army like me, whom I just left up at Fort 

Lewis and came back with the 4th Stryker Brigade, I had a little 

bit of that understanding the day that you quit your job and joined 

the Marines the day after 9/11 and deployed. 

So this is a massive challenge for us is to keep this talent, and 

Ike has talked about it, and John has talked about it. We are on 

the verge of losing enormous talent that will never be recovered 

once it is gone. Let us not do it. 

Mr. WARNER. The two colleagues to my left have covered beautifully, better than I could, most of your question, Mr. Hunter. 

By the way, Semper Fi. You made the right choice. Marine Corps 

structured me and laid a foundation which enabled me. I am everlastingly grateful to that and the GI [Government Issue] Bill for 

what my country did for me, and I tried in my years in Congress 

to repay that debt. 

But I am going to take a different segment of your question, and 

that is the magnificence of the warfighters they have described, but 

the warfighters have got to have in their hands the most modern, 

the most high-tech, the most advanced weapons obtainable, because we are fighting in situations where low-tech weapons are trying to be used to neuter high-tech weapons, and it has been successful, you see with the roadside bombs. No matter what amount 

of money and how hard we worked on that issue, it is still a mean, 

dirty, threatening issue, that type of ordnance. 

But this goes to the acquisition process. I came to Congress in 

1979, essentially we were all here in one block together, and I 

learned about that acquisition progress—process and how it takes 

really 10 years to develop and build and test and so forth the weaponry that the forward-deployed troops have today, and we have got 

to maintain a continuity of that modernization. 

Cuts will be made, I am certain, to the programs, but that is 

where the wisdom of this committee comes in to make sure that 

those cuts are ones that will not, 10 years from now, leave that 

force that we will have, hopefully composed of the same brilliant 

men and women of the All-Volunteer Force that we have today— 

that they will have the weapons in order to deal with the array of 

challenges. Many of those challenges we cannot foresee today that 

will face our troops. Remember, that acquisition process has to 

have continuity and stability. Cuts will have to be made in some, 

but others have allowed to go forward to equip our troops for the 

future. 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank the distinguished panel, and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
18 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask about the acquisition process, just dive down into 

that piece. You gentlemen have all had great experience with dealing with it. 

We have not had a good decade when it comes to the acquisition 

process. A fair number of programs have gone way over budget. A 

number of others have turned out not to work and had to have 

been cancelled. 

Without getting into my long-winded speech about the challenges 

here, I will just say that I think we need to be more flexible in 

terms of buying technology that is already out there and available 

and get off of so many programs of record that start us down the 

path of working forever on something that may or may not work. 

But I am curious on your thoughts when we look to sort of get 

more out of the money we have spent. I mean, you can look back 

at the last decade and easily get up to $50-, maybe even $100 billion that we all wish we had back, and given where we are at right 

now, that is truly painful. Based on your experiences, what do we 

need to do going forward to have a better acquisition procurement 

process? And I will leave it to you in terms of what order. Well, 

Senator Warner, why don’t you give us your take first, and we will 

work our way down. 

Mr. WARNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, indeed, I have had the acquisition process from both sides, 

working in the Pentagon and then coming to Congress, but I will 

have to be blunt and say the buck stops on your desk. You have 

got to exercise stronger oversight. You have got to put in place laws 

like Nunn-McCurdy and others to deter the very thing that you 

say. 

You can point fingers, you can look at tragic cases, but you cannot stifle innovation. You have got to take a measure of risk exploring new technology, some of which will fail, but at the same time 

when you do decide to go forward with a program, give it stability, 

give it continuity, but have oversight, and do not fear the threat 

to cancel that contract if the case merits it. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Let me add to John’s statement a few facts. One is that one thing 

that this committee came up with was an ability to quick-field critical systems on the battlefield, so one thing you have got to have 

is the ability to move out very quickly to push aside that—those 

stacks of massive bureaucratic regulations and all the people who 

attend those regulations and get things to the field quickly. 

We drafted a one pager, a one-page law that became law that 

was used in the war in Iraq, and I will tell you how we did it, and 

the committee did it, this committee did it. It said this: It said if 

casualties are being taken on the battlefield, the Secretary of Defense is authorized and empowered with one stroke of his signature 

to waive all acquisition regulations and simply buy what is needed, 

get it to the battlefield. 

We did that during the height of the Iraq war when we had IEDs 

[Improvised Explosive Devices] being defended against with a vast 

array, as John says, of big programs. We had the jammers, as you 

know, Adam, that go on the—150 pounds or so that go on our vehi-
19 

cles that we would use to create a protective bubble over a convoy 

so that when somebody has a remotely detonated bomb on the 

road, and he tries to detonate that with some type of a remote device, a garage door opener, a radio, et cetera, that that signal is 

jammed. 

And we said in the committee, well, how about the guys on foot? 

If a guy is walking through a courtyard in Fallujah, and somebody 

is remotely detonating a 52-artillery round on him, he can’t carry 

a 150-pound jammer on his shoulders. We said we need a small 

jammer; we need it quickly. The committee passed this law that 

was signed into law that said the Secretary can immediately move 

out a piece of equipment to the battlefield, push all acquisition regs 

aside, and simply buy it and get it to the troops. 

We built a small jammer that we called ‘‘Little Blue’’ that was 

man portable. It was about this big, weighed a couple of pounds, 

that a corporal could carry on his back on a dismounted operation. 

We got, as I recall, 10,000 of those invented and built and fielded 

in I believe it was 4 months, 3 or 4 months, and committee staff 

could correct the record if that is not the accurate time, but we did 

it very quickly. 

So you have to fast-field equipment, and there is a disconnect between the bureaucracy here that doesn’t want to let go of the acquisition process and the guys in the field. You may recall that is how 

we got the Predator. Remember, the Predator was early fielded in 

Bosnia, and the tests—some of the test bureaucracies said, wait a 

minute, we haven’t fully tested it. For example, we haven’t got the 

deicing fixed on it and several other things. The general who had 

already used it in theater said, well, I have tested it and I like it, 

send me some more. We actually flanked the acquisition system. 

And so in my estimation, we have to streamline the bureaucracy. 

I know that is easier said than done. 

When I was a freshman, Dave McCurdy and I were assigned by 

the chairman to go off, and I think he just wanted to get us out 

of his hair, but to go off and fix the procurement system in a couple 

of weeks. So we traveled around the country. One thing I do remember is we sat in front of the president of Boeing, and he said, 

let me tell you what I think is wrong with the procurement system. 

He said, I am making some planes right now for an airline. I am 

going to have them to the airline ahead of schedule under cost. He 

said, I have got one airline representative in my shop here in Seattle while we are making those planes for them. He said, I am 

also making these planes for the Air Force. I have got 222 engineers who stop my guys constantly and force them to brief them 

on what they are doing, and he said, as a result, your aircraft are 

going to be 30 percent over cost, and they are going to be delayed. 

So we are in the business of protecting the system from ourselves 

and from the Pentagon by having a labyrinth of regulations which 

very often disservice, and then when we have a scandal, we have 

the $200 hammer, for example, we lay on more regulations to fix 

that and go in exactly the wrong direction. 

So individual responsibility and, as John said, risk taking. In the 

end you need to have people—and I don’t want to use the term ‘‘bureaucrat’’ in a derogatory way, because a lot of those folks have 

some guts, have some leadership, and you have got to have some-
20 

body that says, I am willing to take a chance on that system, let 

us get it to the battlefield, and if it doesn’t work as well as it is 

supposed to, I will take the fall for that. We can’t simply be in the 

business of justifying cost. We have to also be in the business of 

getting things out the door quickly and taking a risk. That is easy 

to say, very difficult to do. 

Mr. SMITH. Those are good insights. I appreciate it. 

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you for the question. 

I refer you to what this committee did in 2009 and again in 2010 

under the leadership of Mr. Andrews and Mr. Conaway, a bipartisan panel on acquisition. In 2009, they reformed—a separate bill 

was passed regarding major weapons systems; in 2010, acquisition 

reform was passed regarding all other matters of acquisition. 

I would hope this committee could revisit those laws and see how 

they are operating. They were supposed to solve money problems 

as well as time problems, and I am convinced that they were well 

written, and the question is whether there is follow-through in this 

committee, is there follow-through on it. I urge you to take a look 

at that if that would not at least solve part of your problem. 

Mr. SMITH. Thanks once again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we are 

all awed by the experience and the expertise of the three witnesses 

today. Senator Warner set an example of professionalism and bipartisanship in his office that few have been able to reach. There 

has never been a more principled legislator, I think, sitting in that 

chair than Duncan Hunter when he chaired this committee, and 

Ike Skelton brought to the attention of Congress some of the risks 

of China before it was popular to be talking about that. So we 

thank all three of you. 

Unfortunately, I do not share the optimism and confidence that 

Senator Warner has in Congress being able to do the right thing, 

and I think the American people probably are closer to me on that. 

If we take a picture, a snapshot of where we are, that is one 

thing, but if we look at the curves, which is more of what life really 

is, we see some startling things that concern us. The first thing is 

that in 2010, for the first time in 100 years, we stopped being the 

manufacturing leader of the world. China became the manufacturing leader. Just recently we have ceded our expertise and superiority in the space program to the French, the Russians, and the 

Chinese, the first time in any of our lifetimes. And the third thing 

is, forget sequestration and forget these draconian cuts that could 

come down, just the $450 to $489 billion—and nobody knows the 

exact figure of cuts that we have already done. We were at the 

Pentagon last night, and it seems to be a conclusion that everybody 

shares that we are today the greatest military the world has ever 

known, but even without sequestration and even without these additional cuts, just the cuts we are going to make, this $450- to $480 

billion, will take us down from being the greatest military the 

world has ever known. We may still be the greatest military in the 

world, but not the greatest military the world has ever known, be-
21 

cause we are making some significant risks that we are going to 

have to undergo. 

If the three of you, with your wealth of experience and expertise, 

had to issue one warning that we could carry to our colleagues, not 

about sequestration, not about additional cuts, but about where we 

are today with the cuts we have already made, what would that 

warning be that we could take to them and say, hey, we better listen to this, and we better heed this warning? 

Mr. SKELTON. This committee probably got tired of hearing me 

say over and over again that from the time I came into Congress 

until my last year here, we had had a total of—which covered 34 

years—we had had a total of 12 military contingencies, and if you 

add to that since I have been out of Congress the participation of 

America in the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] air 

strikes in Libya, that would be a total of 13. Some of those contingencies were small, some were pretty large, and if there is one 

thing to worry about, it is the uncertainty of our national security. 

All of those 12 military contingencies save one were unexpected. 

Iraq, of course, is the one we initiated. The outcome, of course, was 

not predicted because many thought that it would be an in-and-out 

situation. You can’t tell what is around the corner. Congress is 

charged to raise and maintain the military, but the military must 

be ready for the uncertainties, and there were 12 uncertainties 

while I sat in your seat in this Chamber, and we met them, some 

of them far better than others as time went on. But you don’t want 

to have something bad happen and be unprepared for it. 

I had a roommate in law school, my first year in law school. My 

roommate had been in the Pusan Perimeter in Korea, which was, 

as you know, a low moment in our Korean war effort. We don’t 

want that to happen again, and it is the uncertainty that you must 

sell to your colleagues. Just as sure as God made little green apples, we are going to have another contingency. Let us hope it 

doesn’t happen, but it will. 

Mr. WARNER. First, may I say how proud I am of you and your 

representation of the great State of Virginia, which we are both so 

fortunate to have served. I have known you from the first time you 

started in politics, campaigned for you, and you and I campaigned 

on fiscal conservatism and a balanced budget, and you have adhered to that, and I commend you for it. 

But at the same time, we have the need today to reduce spending, and I think collectively everybody in this room agrees with 

that. It is just how we go about doing it. And I come back time and 

time again that the strength of our economy is no less important 

than the strength of our weapons systems and the ability of our 

forces to protect us. They are tied together. And so you have got 

the most awesome challenge that you have ever had in your entire 

distinguished career as a member of this committee, as a Member 

of this Congress to somehow strike that balance between what we 

can do by way of spending reductions and at the same time not 

weaken to the point where we are perceived as a Nation that is beginning to withdraw from our global responsibilities. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. A great question. I think I am tempted 

to give you my big three rather than the big one. 
22 

I think this Nation has to retrieve its industrial base. In World 

War II at Willow Run, Michigan, we turned out a bomber aircraft 

every hour to aid in that war effort. I think we did the same thing 

in San Diego. 

The industrial base is locked intricately with the national security interests of this country, and we have gutted the country. We 

have sent a great deal of our industrial base, and the tragedy of 

the exodus is this: China has taken a large part of the American 

industrial base. As a result of that, they have cash. Nations that 

make things have cash; nations that don’t make things borrow 

cash. We have discovered that. In the old days China could not afford to buy Kilo-class submarines from the Russians. They couldn’t 

afford to buy Sovremenny-class missile cruisers. They didn’t have 

any money. Today they use American dollars to buy weaponry, 

some of which is aimed at the United States. The missile cruisers 

that they bought were designed for one thing; that is, to kill American aircraft carriers. So the industrial base of China is booming, 

and it is accumulating more and more American companies, more 

transplants on a monthly basis. 

At the same time, the American industrial base diminishes, and 

with it to some degree every time one of those facilities leaves, we 

become somewhat more impoverished. We have more people who 

need the social services that are at the heart of this budget debate. 

If you look at the big picture, history may say that China accomplished two things by achieving the transplantation of the American industrial base. They allowed for the surging and mass mobilization of their own military capability with high-quality, high-capability military apparatus, and at the same time they impoverished 

the Americans to the point where we had to contract our national 

security, which is now at issue in these budget cuts that are called 

necessary. 

So if there was one message that I would give to the American 

people and to this Congress, we must retrieve our industrial base. 

It is part and parcel of our national security. It builds these systems. 

The question was asked by the gentleman from Washington Mr. 

Smith about large cost overruns, the fact that it is difficult to buy 

anything inexpensively in the defense sector. Part of that is attributable to the fact that we now have lot—we have onesies and 

twosies in this industrial base; that is, in many sectors we will 

have one company or maybe two companies that make a particular 

product, and that is it. You don’t get good prices that way, and you 

don’t get good innovation. You need competition. When you devastate your industrial base, you have less competition, and as a result you have higher prices. 

If we retrieved a large part of the industrial base of this country, 

we would have more middle-class jobs, more high-paying manufacturing jobs, and we would have less of this budget problem which 

right now is bringing this major question before us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a really special 

honor to have these three gentlemen before us today, and I thank 

them for their service to our country. And I especially want to 
23 

thank Chairman Hunter and Chairman Skelton for their 

mentorship and tutelage for many of us on this committee. It is a 

special honor in my career that I got to serve under both of you, 

and it is great to see all three of you today, especially our two 

chairmen coming back. 

My premise is that we should learn from our successes and then 

also learn from our deficiencies, and in the last couple years I can 

point to two successes in the area of procurement that I think provide role models as to what to do, not just procurement, but the 

broader strategy. 

The successful strike against bin Laden’s compound on May 1st 

in large part happened because of the bravery of the individuals involved, but you three gentlemen gave them the tools to succeed. 

You supported a reordering of our intelligence operations so we 

were able to find that needle in that haystack in a very impressive 

way. You created the opportunity to move quickly, quietly, and lethally to the place of attack. You had the technology so our guys 

in that compound, our Navy SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land] and others, could see what the enemy could not and take full advantage 

of that situation. I don’t think there is an American breathing who 

would say that whatever we invested in that effort was worth every 

penny. 

The interesting thing is we didn’t invest a whole lot in that effort 

relative to some other things. There weren’t a whole lot of cost 

overruns on those helicopters, there weren’t a whole lot of cost 

overruns on those night vision tools, and the intelligence money 

that we spent, if anything, has moderated in cost the last couple 

years because we reorganized it. So that is a success in my book. 

The second success is one that I regret that we had to work on 

together, but I am glad we did, and that is the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected] program that saved countless numbers of 

lives, and it happened because of this committee. We all heard the 

excuses and the lethargy from the bureaucratic community, how it 

was going to take years to figure out what to do, and, Chairman 

Hunter, you in particular, and Gene Taylor, who served on this 

committee at the time, supported by Chairman Skelton, just became impatient and intolerant of those explanations, and the result 

was, as you said earlier, we fielded much more successful up-armored vehicles, we did it in a hurry, and we saved a lot of people’s 

lives, a lot of people’s lives. And I think if you want to talk about 

an achievement in a legislative career, that is the best one I could 

possibly think of. 

Now, that didn’t have a whole lot of cost overruns, and it didn’t 

have 222 engineers climbing all over the people making those 

things. It happened because there was a will, and there was a 

strategy, and there was a level of attention paid to it. 

I contrast that with the deficiencies, a whole bunch of them. 

They add up to $296 billion over a 7-year period in cost overruns 

of major weapons systems, and you pick any one you want. I will 

look at the SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared System] platform as an 

example. The R&D [research and development] cost that we poured 

into the SBIRS platform has made the per-unit cost of one of those 

things five times what it was supposed to be when we started out 

the program. 
24 

Now, I would be interested in the guidance the three of you could 

give us on the direction you think we should take to have more successes like the strike against bin Laden and the MRAP success and 

fewer failures like we have had in the one that I mentioned. What 

would you suggest that the role of the committee should be in 

maximizing those successes and eliminating the deficiencies? 

Mr. HUNTER. First, to the gentleman from New Jersey, what a 

lot of fun it has been working with you, and together we on this 

committee have done some good things for the country. It is great 

to see you again. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. And great to see you continuing to work for America. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. We have got to break the pencil. You have so many 

systems that started out as $5 systems and ended up being $100 

systems because of the proclivity to change the blueprints, change 

the design, and add bells and whistles, and that is human nature. 

Military people do what they think they are supposed to do, what 

they are ordered to do, what their challenge is, and when somebody 

comes up with a new idea, something that can be added to a system, he does everything that he can to get that thing in. 

As Mr. Simmons, the staff director of the committee, used to say, 

at some point you have to break the pencil. You have got to say, 

okay, this is the design, we are going with it, we are not going to 

redesign this thing every couple of months. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

Mr. HUNTER. And I think there needs to be a major directive on 

that. I think that is a very important thing. 

Just one point, because you talked about the committee. When 

we were having a tough time getting a huge load of MRAPs out, 

that was—I believe it was in 2005, that were going to be delivered 

in December. Mr. Simmons, our staff director, went to the—this 

was up-armored Humvees. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yep. 

Mr. HUNTER. It was going to be a long run before we got the next 

load of some 10,000, as I recall. He went to the company, and they 

said—he said, what is the problem here, because Mr. Simmons was 

a CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of an aerospace company before he 

came to D.C. to be our staff director. They said, steel. They said, 

we got this, this is our steel schedule, we have to live with it. He 

said, where is the steel company? He went to the steel company, 

and they said, this is our schedule. He said, why can’t you do three 

shifts? They said, well, we would have to work with the unions. He 

said, let me talk to them. Mr. Simmons, our staff director, sat down 

with the union leadership. They said, we have got kids in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, we will run three shifts. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

Mr. HUNTER. We pulled up that shipment of up-armored 

Humvees to protect lives of our folks in Iraq, I believe, and I have 

the staff—maybe Jenness can get the exact numbers on this. As I 

recall, we advanced it from instead of getting it in December of 

2005, we got them in April of 2005. 
25 

So I would say that in the area of acquisition and trying to 

change this bureaucracy, the same things work that work on the 

battlefield: Initiative, leadership—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Focus. 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. And the willingness to take risk. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Focus. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yeah. 

Mr. WARNER. I want to pick up on a very important point that 

you made, and that is the remarkable apprehension of—eventually 

of bin Laden. It showed a lot of courage on behalf of the President 

to make that tough decision. Say what you want and criticism, it 

was an extraordinary—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WARNER [continuing]. Operation and teamwork from the 

Commander in Chief right on down. But ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], those magical three letters that you 

used, laid that foundation, and if I may recall, this threesome right 

here, about 15 years ago the unmanned system was not a very popular thing. The Air Force said, well, they will—we will lose cockpits. We have got to have so many cockpits. The three of us put 

together a law at that time, became law, a bill and it became law, 

directing the Department of Defense to accelerate, and we set 

benchmarks and time schedules on the number of programs that 

they should try and initiate to have unmanned systems, Army, 

Navy, Air Force and Marines, and they did it. 

As a matter of fact, that law, they left us in a cloud of dust in 

about 3 years and went off on their own and really achieved it. 

I got a note that I am affiliated with two companies that are in 

it, but I was a champion of ISR long before that. 

That is the type of cuts you have got to look at—when you are 

coming to grips with this awesome responsibility of the budget 

problem. Take out those areas that led to the capture of bin Laden, 

which we needed to get, and the other magnificent things we have 

done, and protect those sources so that we can have the modern 

weapons not only for the current generation, but 10 years down the 

road for the next generation of all-volunteers. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. SKELTON. I think simply you should revisit what you have 

already done, whether it be the air/land subcommittee or it be an 

extension of the panel that you and Mr. Conaway headed, see how 

those two laws are working. From the testimony and the comments 

prior to passing that out of this committee, a lot of those problems 

would be solved. And I can only refer you to what you have already 

done and what this committee has already produced. Take a look 

at it. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

I just want to say that the chairman has implemented another 

panel to follow up on the financial statement side of this, which 

Mr. Conaway is chairing, and we are diligently meeting every 

Thursday morning at 8 o’clock to make sure we get you a good 

work product. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 
26 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you all so much for joining us. Senator Warner, Chairman Hunter, Chairman Skelton, thank you so much for 

your service. You really have shown the way for us here on the 

House Armed Services Committee. 

And I wanted to begin by talking in a broad perspective about 

risk. And you all have been through a number of efforts to look at 

our defense posture, to look at defense reviews, whether it is our 

National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review. So you 

have seen how the threats have changed through the years, you 

have seen how the breadth and scope of our military has changed, 

where the challenges are. And if you look today, obviously we are 

in an extraordinarily challenging world with many different chapters that have been written, but many to be written, about what 

we do and how do we respond. And there are a lot of things we 

can do to look at the force structure and determine how do we 

change that, but as you have heard, the concern is that strategy 

should drive budgets, budgets shouldn’t drive strategies. 

Regardless of what goes on, those threats are there, they are 

real, and this country has to make sure that we are properly prepared for that. And the realm that we exist in is what are the 

risks; what are the risks in the what-if scenarios? And I really am 

focused on what happens with our Marine Corps and our Navy. 

We talk about ships, we talked about the industrial base, and we 

have had recently some great successes there with USS Nimitz in 

that class have been very successful; the USS Arleigh Burke, a very 

successful class; the USS Virginia, Senator Warner, your brainchild 

there to make sure that was put forward, a very, very successful 

program. We talk about having those assets in addition to, as you 

all spoke so eloquently about, the men and women in our military, 

the best absolutely in the world and doing a fantastic job. 

The question is this: If you could give us your estimate, based 

on some of the proposed budget scenarios that have been put out 

there about reductions, both the $450 billion existing and then the 

sequestration that could result in an additional $500 billion, what 

do you believe are the risks that this Nation faces in the future? 

And specifically with a Navy that may have less than 250 ships, 

with a Marine Corps that may lose a number of units, what is your 

estimate about the risk that we face and what this Nation would 

be looking at? 

Our challenge is to communicate not just to Members of this 

body, but to the public about what does this mean for this country 

and what are those risks. So you all have been through this process, know it intimately. I would like to get your perspective on the 

risks that this Nation faces with these budget scenarios. 

Mr. WARNER. Well, we start with the fundamental proposition 

which is eminently clear to all of us: We are an island Nation. Yes, 

this is a global community, a global economy, a global defense, but 

the fact is that we are dependent on the sea lanes of the world, 

which we call the common property of the world, observing sovereignty rights and others, but operating those sea lanes and protecting those sea lanes such that we can have our trade and the 

necessity of bringing in the raw materials and regrettably an abundance of fuel that we must have to support our economy. That is 
27 

the prime mission of the United States Navy, and we have had it 

that way for years. 

Now, people argue about fewer and fewer ships. I remember a 

600-ship Navy, 300-ship Navy. Actually when I was privileged to 

serve in the Navy Secretariat, we had close to 900 ships. Most of 

them regrettably were old World War II ships which we had to 

scrap. But the point is, don’t let the numbers tangle you up. It is 

the capacity and the ability of the ship. The ship today is far greater in its capacity and ability and its weapons systems than the destroyers of the early era, and the same with the carriers. So they 

are magnificent ships. 

We simply must keep a replacement cycle, a modernization cycle 

going, but the numbers are not the magic. The key is come back 

to the island Nation and our reliance on those sea lanes that must 

be kept open. 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Wittman, we—China is developing the ability, 

and I think their—at this point their game plan with respect to 

taking on the U.S. Navy is not to try to build a counterpart to the 

carriers and the attending ships, but to have the ability to kill 

them at long range with ballistic missiles which are launched from 

the mainland, which have a high-capability, antiship targeting system. And they are developing those systems right now, and we are 

very concerned about those. 

Offsetting that capability, that move, which we see right now, 

and we are analyzing, will require a lot of money. If we have these 

draconian cuts that are proposed, we are going to lose the ability 

to protect our carrier battle groups in those areas of the far Pacific. 

We will lose it, and I would predict that it will be gone by 2020. 

We will not be the dominant force; in fact, we will be a subservient 

force in the western Pacific. It will take an enormous investment. 

And there is several things you have to do, incidentally, with 

missile defense. You not only have to have the ability to shoot 

down those first several antiship missiles that come in, you have 

to be able to shoot down salvos of antiship missiles that come in. 

That means you need to have endurance built into your antimissile 

programs. That requires money, it requires investment, requires innovation. The Navy will not be able to meet that challenge with the 

massive cuts that we have posited. So we lose the western Pacific. 

And I think this clearly puts us on a glide slope to lose the western 

Pacific. 

We lose the space battle. We lose the competition in space, which 

is key to our military operations. All the countries in the world 

watched with interest as they saw American precision munitions 

devastate Saddam Hussein’s armored formations far ahead of our 

advancing 3rd Marines—or 1st Marine Division on the right and 

3rd Army Division on the left as we advanced up the Euphrates 

and the Tigris River plains in Iraq. They saw that; they saw that 

use of precision. 

If you knock out the satellites, those highly targeted precision 

munitions become dumb bombs and become much less effective. 

They understand that, and they have a military doctrine of going 

after a superior force by targeting a weakness and hitting it. So I 

think the space competition is part and parcel of maintaining a viable Navy. 
28 

Now, with respect to the Marines and the Army, we have—we 

are looking at scenarios that might occur at some point, and especially if China becomes expeditionary. That means it is able to 

move its forces to Africa or other places or other parts of the world 

where they want to protect an extractive industry, and they end up 

planting a military flag, and there is a confrontation. 

Putting explosives on target with electronics today has changed 

the face of warfare. As I said, precision munitions used for the first 

time in the majority in Iraq were devastating to the enemy. 

If we allow China to have that ability to knock out our precision 

capability, that is, if we lose the space contest, those marines and 

soldiers who have to in the end carry the battle to the enemy—and 

we learned in Iraq that this isn’t a push-button world. As Kip 

Yeager fought his last battle and finished it with a knife, the 

grandson of the great Chuck Yeager who broke the speed of sound, 

in a small room in Fallujah, we learned that it is not a push-button 

world. It is a world that ends up with young men fighting at close 

range, and they are marines and they are soldiers, and the investment that we have made in blunting the capability of the other 

side to kill those young men becomes very critical. So the exposure 

to land forces that would work in any of a number of scenarios in 

the western Pacific will be massive, and we will take massive casualties. 

A second way we would take casualties is this: We have very few 

bombers today. We are at an historic low point with respect to 

bomber aircraft, long-range bomber aircraft. They are very important in armor battles. Now, we didn’t have big armor battles in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, but if you have armor battles, and you need 

to have—utilize bomber strikes to neutralize the armor capability 

of the other side, all of our analyses that we have taken now say 

even with the number of bombers that we have today, if we have 

two scenarios that involve armor, we are going to have to swing the 

bombers. The Air Force calls this swinging the bombers. Swinging 

the bombers means that you take them out of one theater where 

you are fighting, which is risky, and you expose that theater, and 

you take them over to the other theater and let them make a 

strike. And when you ask the question, what does the risk translate into, in the end the briefer will tell you, increased casualties, 

because if you don’t have those bomber aircraft there to blunt that 

armored attack, you will take American casualties. 

So as our investment in protecting our ground fighting elements 

goes down, protecting them by continuing to advance the technology that protects them, like having precision missile guidance 

that allows you to knock out armored formations far ahead of your 

infantry, if we cease to have a—to keep up with other nations that 

are trying to neutralize that ability so they can get in and kill our 

soldiers and marines, then you will have a massive increase in the 

risk of death and high casualty numbers in those ranks. So that 

is a second major risk. 

Lastly, airlift, sealift, you can’t undertake the airlift and sealift 

that we need in these expeditionary roles that we have been in 

with these massive cuts. You simply can’t do it. We are down to 

a fairly historic low with respect to our airlift. You have got roughly—we have got a little more than half of the airfields available to 
29 

us around the world that we had in the 1960s. So having longrange lift and intratheater lift, very important. 

Our lift assets will go down measurably under these massive 

budget cuts. That means we won’t be able to move men and materiel into locations in a timely manner, and that means that you 

lose contests, and you lose people, and you lose ground. 

So those are several of the risks that are inherent in these proposed cuts. 

Mr. SKELTON. Your question is that of risks. Of course, we are 

aware fully of the trend in China, fully aware of what is happening 

in the Arab world, but we really don’t know where the next shoe 

will drop. 

I strongly suggest keeping a very strong intelligence network, including paying more attention to the HUMINT [human intelligence] element thereof, which was devastated a good number of 

years ago and now slowly being built up. In addition to that, you 

will need to have and to educate and to protect strategic thinkers 

within our military who will be listened to by Members of Congress 

and by the administration. 

I once asked General Robert Scales, who is a former president of 

the Army War College and a great historian, I asked him out of 

an average graduating class from the Army War College how many 

could immediately have a serious conversation with George C. Marshall, and he said two or three, but that is all right. These would 

be strategic thinkers that others have relied on—Harry Truman 

had them around him, Dwight Eisenhower had them around him— 

and you have to identify them and protect them in their career. I 

cannot emphasize that enough, because when some of them are 

identified and not shepherded into solid positions and kept in the 

military, you are losing a national asset. These are the ones who 

can say ‘‘look out for,’’ and 9 times out of 10 they are right. That 

is the best I think you can do, intelligence and strategic thinkers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. [Presiding.] I would like to recognize our colleague from San Diego, Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is a pleasure to 

sit here and listen to the pearls of wisdom from all of you, and it 

certainly was a pleasure serving with you both, Duncan, and I 

thank you very much for your leadership and your mentoring. 

I have wanted to ask some questions about oversight, but I think 

we probably have had a chance to delve into a number of those. 

Sometimes it still falls short for me, that we could do a better job. 

I think the chairman has brought to the committee a number of 

witnesses recently, and we have had a chance to look at particularly many of the costs, irrespective of the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fact that many of those costs have escalated to 

such a degree that we now are in a position where we really do 

have to pull back in many, many ways, and I wonder whether our 

role in that oversight could certainly have been sharper and more 

focused. 

If you would like to share any additional insight in that, I would 

really entertain that, and then I have a few other questions. I just 

want to be sure that we have had a chance to get all of your 

thoughts out about that. 
30 

Mr. HUNTER. First, so nice to see my colleague, and thank you 

for your long years of service on this committee. And here is what 

I would say. With respect to costs, there is no more compelling 

force than competition; that is, the threat that someone else might 

get the program. One problem with the shrinking industrial base 

is we have left in some areas one company or two companies that 

might be able to make something. As a result of that, you can jawbone them all you want. We can pull companies in that make particular especially major weapons systems, and we can beat them up 

verbally, and they go back and the costs continue to rise because 

we haven’t done anything substantive or real. 

One thing that we initiated in this committee that I thought was 

a very good thing, we established the Challenge Program. We did 

that with a law that said if you are a company in the United 

States, and you think you can make a particular product, a primary product or a component, cheaper and with better warfighting 

capability than the other guy, than the incumbent, we are going to 

let you challenge them. And you can come in and brief the Pentagon on why your product is better for the taxpayers and gives 

you more warfighting capability, or a combination of those factors, 

and if we find that to be true, we can kick out the incumbent, and 

we can put you in. There is no kick in the pants so effective for 

somebody who is going over cost than looking over his shoulder and 

seeing somebody else getting the job. 

The Pentagon hated the Challenge Program. It upset the apple 

cart, and as a result of that, they have pigeonholed it down to a 

kind of a semi-small business set-aside status. I would reinvigorate 

the Challenge Program. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah, I appreciate that, because I was going to say 

I don’t think that that is working, and what we need to have perhaps is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. It is not being utilized by the Pentagon. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Greater reporting of those kinds of programs and reinstate them. 

Mr. HUNTER. It is not being used by the Pentagon. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah, yeah. 

Mr. HUNTER. It upsets them. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And it is that partnering, I think, with the Pentagon 

so that the goals, the strategic goals, are really in sync with what 

the needs are that we can play a greater role. 

I would like to turn to personnel and my dear friend Mr. Skelton. 

You always certainly encouraged me in that area to be very, very 

mindful of the men and women who are serving, and obviously 

their families, and I think we have tried to do that. 

I can remember that a number of people would say that the military benefits were basically sucking all the, you know, oxygen out 

of the room when it came to defense systems, and that, in fact, you 

know, we needed to look at those more seriously. 

What would you say to people today who look at that? We know 

that many of those issues around health benefits are perhaps 

unsustainable, but at the same time I think we believe that we 

must do everything in our power to support the men and women 

who serve. That is going to be an important part of the discussion 
31 

as we move forward, and I am looking for some pearls of wisdom 

around that issue that we can go forward with. 

Mr. SKELTON. Well, it is not brain surgery that you need the 

highest-caliber young men and young women in uniform, whether 

they be recent graduates of basic training, or whether they be a 

lieutenant colonel leading a battalion, or whether they be a strategic thinker advising the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

I think that you should do your very, very best to keep the very 

best you have in uniform, because if you go back to what I saw in 

1978 aboard the USS Saratoga, you are going to start losing some 

conflicts, you are going to have bad things happen, and, as a result, 

recruitment, retention goes down, and you will end up with a second-class military. And even if you had the finest weapons in the 

world, you would not have the bright, able, innovative young people 

to use those weapons. 

You lose proportionally, or I should say disproportionally, ability 

when you cut the ability of your force. They are all volunteers, they 

don’t have to be there, and so many of them could make better 

money elsewhere, but they are there for patriotism, a sense of duty, 

and you want to keep them. 

I would put as many eggs as you can stand into keeping them 

happy. And there is an old saying, if Mama ain’t happy, ain’t nobody happy, and this is so true. How many of your spouses have 

said to the other spouse who is in uniform, Honey, you have been 

over there three times, let us go home. 

So my message to you today is to do the best you can in health 

care, benefits, training, education so you can keep that brain power 

in uniform. 

Mr. WARNER. I would simply add to that—and, by the way, 

thank you for—I have been sort of watching everybody. You have 

paid great attention to this and nodded your head on occasion 

when some of us have made a statement, and that is reassuring. 

But I would like to point out, and I have seen quite a span of 

the history from closing year of World War II to today, this country, its profound and deep respect for the men and women in uniform is manifested today in how well we try and care for the 

wounded and for the families who have lost their loved one as a 

combat casualty. I think we have made great strides in that direction, and at the same time as we see what we do there, there are 

young men and women standing at this moment in recruiting stations signing up to come in and be a part of this force, well knowing and full well knowing that they someday could be the casualties themselves. 

That is the magnificence of our system today, the one that we 

cannot let break, the one we cannot lose faith with those men and 

women in uniform today, nor prepare those that will come 10 years 

from now with anything less than the best of weapons. But you 

still have to deal with your budget. 

And I want to close by one—two subjects that we didn’t turn to, 

and that is the nuclear triad that gives us the nuclear deterrence 

today. It deters not only anyone from attacking us, but from others 

feeling the necessity they have got to develop their systems. That 

has to be made strong, because it is at the very heart of our ability 

as a Nation working with others to prevent the proliferation of 
32 

weapons of mass destruction, another very dangerous area. I do 

hope such cuts as this committee will have to face will not be borne 

by those very important areas of our defense. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ms. Davis. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the three chairs, it is an honor to hear you. I didn’t have the 

pleasure of serving with any of you, but you have touched upon 

subjects that are very dear to me. I represent the congressional— 

the First Congressional District of Hawaii, so you can imagine how 

important the Pacific theater is to me and what is going on, and 

one of the topics that I have been following very carefully, of 

course, is China. 

So if I can begin with Chairman Hunter, you said many things, 

and I wish I had more time, but given the time limitation, I want 

to concentrate on certain portions of it. I agree with you that we 

need to be that great industrial Nation that we were, and the 

statement made that World War II, about the fact that America is 

going to win. And I think the other comment that was made was 

that it is the sleeping giant, and it is something that everyone 

knows, yet we seem to have lost that edge, if we can call it that. 

I also was listening very carefully to your statements regarding 

how China’s navy or—may build—and we know that they are putting a lot of money in their military, but more important than that, 

your emphasis on the use of ballistic missiles on their part to take 

out our naval force. 

Trying to put all of that together, I guess my fundamental question is, so what do we do? I mean, we do know that we need to, 

I believe, keep up our research and development. That is going to 

be very critical. We need to be able to counter that, because I can’t 

see us not having a force because of the fact that we need that 

force because we are what really protects—as Senator Warner talks 

about us going back to the concept that we are an island Nation, 

so you can imagine we are an island State. So I can identify that. 

So how do we do this? How do we build up our industry, then 

also protect our naval fleet in the Pacific, which is critical, because 

we are what I believe holds the peace in the Pacific and protects 

the rest of this Nation, because that is the theater. 

So there is so many things in what all of you said, but I would 

like to understand what you think is where we go. 

And, you know, I will also tell you one of the issues we always 

face, especially in Hawaii, is how do we preserve shipbuilding, the 

Jones Act, for example, and the fact people forget it was part of the 

Merchant Marine statute, and how do we do all of that? What is 

your recommendation? 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much for that question. And congratulations on representing a wonderful part of the world in the 

United States. 

There is two aspects. Number one is how do we offset what I see 

as a coming dominance of the Western Pacific by China. And the 

second question is how do we get that industrial base back, as I 

understand it. 
33 

Let me just take the first part, that first question. There are four 

categories. The Chinese plan, the strategy, it appears to me, in 

looking at their development programs that are being developed 

and fielded right now, is heavily reliant on missiles, about 1,000 

midrange ballistic missiles now placed around the Taiwan Straits, 

approximately 100 years being developed, and extremely critical to 

our Navy’s plans right now is the antiship ballistic missile. That 

is a ballistic missile that can travel 600, 700, 800 miles with an 

antiship guidance system. Toward the end of its flight, as it comes 

in toward an aircraft carrier, it has a secondary guidance system 

that allows it to adjust and maneuver until it hits that carrier. 

An aircraft carrier has 5,000 Americans on board. The killing of 

an American aircraft carrier is devastating in any type of a scenario. You stop missiles with missile defense. Now, one thing this 

committee did, incidentally, years ago is when we started doing 

theater missile defense systems, that was systems that could shoot 

down short-range ballistic missiles, we insisted in this committee 

and wrote it in the language that they had to start fielding those 

on ships. That became the Aegis defense system that we have now 

fielded. That is the ability to shoot down what I would call moderate-speed missiles. You have to have the ability to shoot down 

fast missiles; that is, a missile that comes from a long range and 

reenters with high sped. 

There is a secondary class of missiles, and that is cruise missiles. 

And some of them are maneuverable; that is, they jink around like 

a running back running down to a goal line as they come in toward 

the ship they are intended to kill, and they are hard to shoot down. 

So having an ability to shoot down missiles, missile defense, is critical to maintaining the dominant presence in the western Pacific, 

and it is going to be expensive. As John said, you make mistakes, 

and you spend money, and you have to go back and keep at it until 

you get a system that works. It is expensive. You can’t do that 

under this budget. So missile defense is a critical aspect. 

Submarines. Submarines are the leverage system of the United 

States Navy. The submarines at times in our history have sunk 

hundreds of boats, single submarines, hundreds of cargo ships, and 

the reliance on the Pacific Rim of those sea lanes that pull in 50, 

60, 70, 80 percent of their petroleum products, including our allies, 

is a very strong one, and one that could be very much threatened 

by a submarine system. 

Our submarines are the best in the world. There are not many 

of them. We are going to go down below—even without these cuts, 

we will go below 50 attack submarines, and the smart people that 

I know, and I know John knows and Ike knows, too, in the submarine areas tell us it would be best if we had close to 100 attack 

submarines, which we used to have. We are going to go down much 

lower. Submarines are expensive. We are not going to be able to 

build the submarine fleet that we need with these cuts. So submarines is the second aspect of defending the western Pacific. 

Space. If we can be blinded successfully, the entire forward projection apparatus, the United States Navy, is devastated if we can 

be blinded in space, because so much of what we do depends on a 

space apparatus. You have to be able to do two things: One, defend 

the assets that you have got that are sending those signals and 
34 

making your equipment and your weapons operate; and the other 

is to take out the other guys’s stuff so when his missile is coming 

in on your aircraft carrier, you can turn off his missile and make 

it go down. So having a strong position in space, winning the space 

competition is a key to the western Pacific and, I might say, lots 

of other military operations. That is the third one. 

The fourth one is having an enduring strike program; that is, the 

ability to shoot and shoot and shoot again, meaning we have to 

have our own capability to launch ship-to-ship missiles, ship-toshore missiles, and be able to maintain that and, incidentally, 

maintain those defenses that I talked about for long periods of 

time, not just to handle one or two missiles, but salvos of missiles. 

That is very expensive, being able to put that infrastructure in 

place that allows a carrier battle group to defend itself for days 

against sporadic missile attacks, very expensive and something 

that is going to require more development. 

Those are four areas that are necessary in the western Pacific. 

And lastly, the industrial base, I think we have got to bring it 

back. We see more and more American companies going to China, 

taking huge pieces of our employment and our technology with 

them, because they feel they have to. I think we should put tariffs 

on Chinese goods, fairly strong tariffs in the national interest, so 

that Americans over here—so that when a businessman sits at his 

table, and he is told that he can jettison his American workers who 

are getting $22 an hour in return for folks that will work for $22 

a day, roughly one-tenth of the labor cost, he says, there are other 

considerations. The only thing that is real is the tariff, meaning it 

is going to cost money to bring those products to the people that 

pull the train, which is the American consumer. 

We also need to punish this manipulation of the yuan, of their 

currency, which gives them an advantage, and the VAT [valueadded tax] tax, meaning if this microphone costs $100 and is made 

in China, when it goes down to the docks to be sent to the United 

States to be sold to you, the Chinese Government rebates all the 

tax money, 17 percent VAT. That takes the cost down from $100 

to $83. If you make this microphone for $110 here and send it 

there, the Chinese Government gives you a $17 penalty when you 

get to the docks. That means yours just went—they both started 

at $100. Yours went to $117 when the consumer gets it, theirs 

went to $83. You have a 34-point advantage before the opening 

kickoff in this football game called international trade competition. 

That is bad business. We should change that. We should retrieve 

the American industrial base, and with it we will retrieve a part 

of our defense capability which we have lost, which is the ability 

to mobilize, and to build things quickly and effectively that we use 

for national security. 

Mr. WARNER. Mr. Hunter has covered quite well the question you 

have asked. I just wish to note that I am privileged to be a part 

of the group that is trying to work to build the museums at Ford 

Island and restore the tower as a constant reminder of how Hawaii 

is at the very basic, pivotal spot of our defense system, as it was 

then on that fateful day, as it is now. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I must ask the courtesy 

of the chair to excuse this humble Senator. I leave it in good hands, 
35 

and it has been a memorable hearing for me to join here once again 

and with this distinguished committee. I predict that you will resolve this issue, Members of Congress, and it will be looked upon 

as one of your finest hours. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We appreciate that. 

Mr. SKELTON. I appreciate your question, but Mr. Hunter has 

discussed it far better than I. When I look up at the portrait of my 

old friend Bob Stump, and I recall walking around on Ford Island 

with him and how he was telling me what happened here and what 

happened there, and the ramp that the PBYs [Navy patrol seaplanes] came up on, and this was during the war. And I hope whatever you do there, and I am very much supportive, will be a tribute 

to the Bob Stumps in this world for the efforts that they did in the 

moment of American greatness. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much for the plug for Ford Island. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gentlemen, thank you so much. Thanks for your 

service to our Nation. Thanks for coming in today and providing 

your reflection. As I said, your experience there and seeing where 

this Nation has been and letting us know where it needs to go, especially in these tough times from a budgeting standpoint, is critical. So again, thanks much for taking the time today, thanks for 

your service to our Nation, and we look forward to continued conversations about where we go in the days and months to come. 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing us to be 

here. And especially it is so wonderful for being here with Ike Skelton, who is always the corporate history of this committee and 

largely of our military history of this last—the last 100 years or so. 

Ike Skelton could always apply a lesson that was learned in history 

to a present problem, a wonderful gift and one that served us well. 

And let me tell you, thank you for letting me get grilled, lightly 

grilled, by that Member of Congress from California, Duncan 

Hunter. And I have got to tell you, I am as proud of him as I am 

my Army son, but it was good to be able to have the new, improved 

Duncan Hunter ask those questions. Thanks a lot. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, we are glad to have him, and I am glad to 

have him as my seatmate. He is carrying on the Hunter tradition 

and legacy here very well, so—— 

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. It has been a real thrill, 

particularly being with my old friend and compatriot, Duncan 

Hunter. We had a lot of fun together, and actually I think we did 

a few good things. We hope that Congress today can meet its challenges, as we had different ones, but we felt we met them and provided for as the Constitution requires. Thank you for having us. It 

is good to be back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. We appreciate 

that. Thanks again for the perspective that you bring. Your viewpoints on Goldwater-Nichols, the idea of jointness and where we 

can go there to really have a multiplying effect on our Force, I 

think, is very, very important for all of us to realize. You know, as 

you have watched that effort grow, it is going to be a critical 
36 

part of our future. 

So, gentlemen, thank you both. We look forward to continued 

conversations with where we go as a Nation. Thank you, and God 

bless you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

(41) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of 

Former Chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services 

October 12, 2011 

This hearing is part of our ongoing series to evaluate lessons 

learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will 

soon be making about the future of our force. We have received 

perspectives of former military leaders from each of the Services, 

as well as outside experts. Today we will have the opportunity to 

view these issues through the lens of the leaders of the legislative 

branch. The individuals with us today, in more ways than we can 

possibly imagine, led the fight here on the Hill to ensure our 

warfighters got what they needed to defend this Nation and take 

care of their families. Especially in the months following the attacks of September 11th, when it became clear that the procurement holiday of the 1990s had left gaps in our capabilities, that 

readiness was low, and that our force was being stretched too thin, 

the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees ensured that not 

only Congress, but the Department of Defense and industry, were 

doing their part to make it right for our Armed Forces. 

Unfortunately, our successes in the global war on terror, and in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, are lulling our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Too many appear to believe 

that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget 

choices, not strategic ones—that the threats we face will be reduced, along with funding for national security. 

I am not arguing that the military can be held exempt from fiscal 

belt-tightening. Indeed, half a trillion dollars has been cut from 

DOD already—the military has absorbed about half of the deficit 

reduction measures enacted to date. But these cuts have happened 

in advance of the development of a new strategy for national defense and without any changes to the military’s roles and missions. 

Even more concerning is that if the Joint Select Committee does 

not succeed in developing and passing another deficit reduction 

plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. It also remains to be seen whether or not additional cuts may be proposed by the Administration, even if the 

‘‘super committee’’ is successful. 
42 

But all this talk about dollars doesn’t translate well into actual 

impacts on the force and risk to our Nation. I hope our witnesses 

today can help us understand the lessons we learned 10 years ago 

and give us recommendations about how we might avoid repeating 

the same mistakes. How can we make sure DOD is a good steward 

of the taxpayers’ dollar, without increasing the risk to our Armed 

Forces? 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s pillar of American strength 

and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the 

struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation. But it is imperative 

that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt, instead 

of the protector of our prosperity. With that in mind, I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today. 
43 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of 

Former Chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services 

October 12, 2011 

I wish to join the chairman, and I am sure, all my colleagues 

here today, in thanking our witnesses for appearing here today. 

Collectively, you served more years than you probably want to 

think about—writing the defense budget and overseeing defense 

spending. I am glad we will continue to benefit from that experience here today. 

Our country faces a budget dilemma—we don’t collect enough 

revenue to cover our expenditures. Currently, we must borrow 

about 40 cents for every dollar the Federal Government spends. 

This problem must be addressed in two ends—spending will have 

to come down, and we’re going to have to generate new revenues. 

Like many, if not most, of our members here, I share the view 

that large, immediate cuts to the defense budget would have substantially negative impacts on the ability of the U.S. military to 

carry out its missions. I am also deeply concerned about cuts to all 

non-entitlement spending, which bore the brunt of the recent deficit deal. If the ‘‘super committee’’ fails to reach a deal, then cuts 

through sequestration will only impose deeper and more dangerous 

cuts to our military and non-entitlement spending such as infrastructure, education and homeland security. 

I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national security 

strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current mission sets we 

ask the military to undertake and come up with a strategy that requires less funding. We on this committee like to say that strategy 

should not be driven by arbitrary budget numbers, but by the same 

token not considering the level of available resources when developing a strategy is irresponsible. We can, I believe, spend smarter 

and not just more. 

It is also important that we address the revenue side of our 

budget problem. In order to avoid drastic cuts to our military and 

other important programs, revenue streams must be enhanced. 

We have to make some serious choices. Our problems must be 

looked at in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about not 

cutting large amounts of funding from the defense budget, something else has to give. Large, immediate, across-the-board cuts to 

the defense budget, which would occur under sequestration, would 

do serious damage to our national security. In order to avoid large 

cuts to the defense budget, we’re going to have to stop repeating 

ideological talking points and address our budget problems comprehensively, through smarter spending and increased revenue. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And 

thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today. 
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