About the Report

This report originated from both the belief that civil 

society must be involved if a lasting solution to the Darfur 

conflict is to be found and the recognition that, outside 

specialized sectors, little is known about Darfur civil society. 

In defining the categories of civil society in the Darfur context, 

the report explores civil society’s role in the greater peace 

process, examines mediators’ efforts to harness civil society to 

date, and argues that civil society could be extremely useful 

to the peacemaking process, but only if its representatives to 

the process are carefully selected and properly involved in the 

process. The United States Institute of Peace worked closely 

with the authors in the conception of this report. 

Theodore Murphy, a mediation specialist working for the Centre 

for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, Switzerland, speaks 

fluent Darfuri Arabic, and over the last six years has worked 

on Darfur in humanitarian, political analysis, and mediation 

capacities. In 2007, he was seconded to the African Union–

United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) as expert 

adviser, and he attended both the Doha 1 and 

Doha 2 civil society conferences on Darfur. Jérôme Tubiana 

is an independent researcher specializing in Darfur and Chad, 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 249 September 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Theodore Murphy and Jérôme Tubiana

Civil Society in Darfur

The Missing Peace

Summary

•	 The present track-one rebel-government process is insufficient to bring peace to Darfur. 

Giving civil society a central role in the peace process is a necessity, not a luxury. 

•	 Civil society is a loosely defined concept, but for the purposes of peacemaking in Darfur, 

it can serve specific practical purposes. Engaging with civil society offers mediators the 

chance to engage with actors who wield real power and influence in Darfur but who are 

not government officials or rebels. 

•	 Civil society can contribute to the Darfur peace process by (1) generating momentum for 

the process and positively pressuring the existing track-one process and actors to engage, 

(2) ensuring popular “buy-in” and legitimacy for any eventual agreement, and (3) providing 

substantive input on and even directly negotiating certain issues. 

•	 Although the tendency has been to focus on the substantive issues of the peace process, 

only with proper civil society representation will truly inclusive consultations take place and 

will the Darfur population see the process as a credible and legitimate one. 

•	 Civil society has a unique role to play in some of the biggest issues to be resolved in Darfur. Land, return, compensation, justice, reconciliation, and security are all issues requiring 

consensus and discussion among the affected communities.

•	 Certain civil society blocs are particularly essential to the success of the peace process. 

Civil society talks provide a vehicle for involving the key communities of the displaced Fur 

(both major victims of the conflict and supporters of the rebellion) and the Abbala (camelherding) Arabs, who contributed to the government’s proxy militias but whose interests are 

not necessarily represented by Khartoum.

•	 Developing the civil society track is a long-term process. It should remain linked to the 

government-rebel negotiations but not driven solely by deadlines linked to developments 

in these negotiations. Once assembled into a political vehicle, the civil society track can 

play multiple roles at various stages of the peace process, ranging from direct negotiations to postagreement implementation. As such, getting the civil society process right is 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

A Brief History of Civil Society in Darfur since 2003 2

Between Government and Rebels: What Role for

Darfur Civil Society? 6

The Composition of Darfur Civil Society 9

The Selection Dilemma 13

Conclusions and Recommendations 17

Continued on page 2
2

more important than rushing to meet artificial deadlines driven by the government-rebel 

negotiations. 

•	 After the first Doha civil society conference, organizing the civil society track of the peace 

process became the responsibility of the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur 

(UNAMID). Donors should do what is necessary to ensure that UNAMID has the resources 

and capacity to undertake this complex and important task. 

•	 The work of various international actors on the civil society track must be well-coordinated. 

A close and effective working relationship among the Joint Mediation and Support Team, 

the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan, and UNAMID 

is vital. 

Introduction

Until recently, the peace process in Darfur has focused on an elite dialogue between the 

Sudanese government and rebel movements. The idea has been that these parties would 

agree to a classic power- and wealth-sharing deal, and local reconciliation initiatives 

and development projects would help tidy up the remaining difficult issues. Although 

international diplomats have publicly lamented the absence of a broader range of Darfuri 

stakeholders in the peace process, many privately regard their inclusion as infeasible. The 

deterioration of many of the rebel movements since the process began and the refusal by 

one of the most important groups to even come to the table has exposed the fallacy of this 

view. Indeed, the absence of viable track-one actors in Darfur—and the presence of tracktwo actors with genuine influence—demands a rethink of the process.

Little more than lip service has been paid to civil society involvement in the peace 

process by most donors and diplomats since Darfur hit the headlines in 2003. To its credit, 

however, the African Union–United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) for Darfur began to bring together various civil society peace efforts, such as those initiated by 

Sudanese individuals and local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

and since mid-2009 (following plans developed in 2008) has been running the primary civil 

society track parallel to the government-rebel track.

While the participation of civil society is crucial, the design and management of this 

process presents dauntingly complex questions. First, how can civil society in Darfur be 

defined? Second, how should participants be selected and who should manage this selection 

process? Third, what should civil society’s precise function be in the overall process and how 

should it relate to the government-rebel negotiations? By reviewing civil society’s place in 

Darfur and examining the dilemmas involved in the current civil society process, this report 

explores answers to these questions.

A Brief History of Civil Society in Darfur since 2003

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which in 2005 halted two decades of war in 

Southern Sudan, was signed only by the two main armed parties—the government and the 

rebels of the mostly southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)—with 

“extremely limited” civil society involvement.1 Designed even before the CPA was signed, 

the Darfur peace process was based on a similar government-rebel framework, although it 

was already evident that other armed parties, in particular the Arab communities armed by 

the government as part of its counterinsurgency strategy, were not fully represented in the 

process. All suggestions to include “civil society” members were dismissed by the armed 

parties, in particular Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction leader Minni Arku Minnawi, with 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 

where he has worked as a consultant for various 

organizations, including the United States Agency for 

International Development. As a consultant to the 

JMST, he participated in consultations among Darfuri 

refugees in Chad and attended Doha 2. He also acted 

as an expert in Darfur civil society consultations held by 

Concordis International in the United Kingdom in 2008. 

He holds a doctorate in African studies. 

Continued from page 1
3

the common argument that “those without guns don’t have power.” 

This view was shared by many on the mediation team as well as in the international 

community more broadly, and it continued to be the predominant view after the Darfur 

Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in Abuja in May 2006. By 2007, however, as rebel groups 

fragmented and it became clear that the DPA was a failure, many commentators began to 

assert that working with civil society could offer an alternative to dealing with fragmented 

and obstinate rebels. Opinions on the subject both among the rebel movements and those 

in the international community have remained divided, with some continuing to advocate 

a pure track-one approach.

Ironically, it was during the early stages of the conflict in 2003–04, when civil society was largely excluded from the negotiation process, that civil society was at its most 

dynamic. One of the main initiatives in 2004 was the foundation of the Darfur Forum for 

Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence, better known by its Arabic name Minbar Darfur. Its 

leading founder and first chairman was Ibrahim Suleiman, a retired general who had served 

as minister of defense and, between 2001 and 2003, as governor of North Darfur. Suleiman 

was known to have been in favor of negotiations with the rebels until they attacked El 

Fasher airport in April 2003, after which he was dismissed as governor and the government 

changed its approach toward violent counterinsurgency.2 Although Suleiman remained a 

National Congress Party (NCP) member, he managed to include in the forum Darfuris from 

all political parties and ethnic groups. Even though the forum was dominated by Khartoumbased elites, this diversity made Minbar Darfur an ideal organization for the international 

community to support. International support, however, made it more visible and subject to 

external interference as well as internal divisions.

In 2004 and 2005, members of Minbar Darfur and traditional leaders from various Darfur 

tribes participated in several meetings in Libya that succeeded in challenging the distrust 

that many rebels had of the Darfuri elite, particularly the traditional leaders whom they 

viewed as government stooges. The government, concerned by this rapprochement, created a rival organization, the Forum for Peace and Development, headed by another retired 

general and former governor of South Darfur, Adam Hamid Musa. An Arab from the Abbala 

(camel-herding) Zeyadiya tribe, General Adam Hamid is seen, in contrast to the “dove” Ibrahim Suleiman, as a “hawk” and as one of the leading inspirers of the government’s Janjaweed 

militia strategy. The two retired NCP generals thus played out their disagreement on the 

government’s counterinsurgency strategy within the civil society arena. Eventually, however, 

Minbar Darfur collapsed due to its own internal conflicts. Its members, many from different 

political strands within the Umma Party, were unable to overcome the divisions dictated by 

their various political affiliations.

The possibility of having influence as a civil society activist independent of a political 

party or rebel movement all but vanished during this period. Civil society was sidelined at 

the DPA talks, and as a prominent Darfuri intellectual writes, the refusal of the government 

to give seats to civil society representatives in Darfur’s three legislative assemblies as part 

of the DPA “meant that the Darfuri elites who were not aligned with either party [government or SLA-Minni Minnawi]—notably the group headed by General Ibrahim Suleiman—

were entirely shut out from representation in Darfur’s interim structures.”3

After the failure of further government-rebel talks in Sirte, Libya, in October and November 2007, Darfur’s civil society, including Minbar Darfur members, suddenly became relevant 

once more. Three notable initiatives were held outside of Sudan in 2008: one by the Max 

Planck Institute in Heidelberg, Germany; one by the United Kingdom–based Concordis 

International; and one by the Switzerland-based Darfur Relief and Documentation Center, 

which held meetings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Participants were mostly diaspora and 

Khartoum-based intellectuals dominated by members of the Minbar Darfur (most of whom 
4

were Umma Party members) and overlapped across these different initiatives. They were 

ethnically diverse, however, and a significant number of the participants seemed to express 

positions specific to their tribe rather than to their political party. For others, political 

affiliations seemed equally important to tribal ones. Despite the divisions, these meetings 

showed the ability of the participants to reach consensus on major issues, such as land, 

coexistence, and security.4

Although these initiatives produced strong declarations, follow-up was uneven. Political, 

ethnic, and personal rivalries among Darfuri participants as well as competition between 

the international organizations involved made attempts to unite the various initiatives 

through a larger conference difficult, with some of the participants competing to get international support in order to reinforce their influence.

In 2009, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, an NGO founded by Sudanese billionaire Mohamed 

Fathi Ibrahim to support good governance in Africa, revived briefly the idea of uniting these 

competing initiatives. It planned to organize a conference in Addis Ababa for more than 

three hundred delegates from Darfur civil society, including at least one hundred women. It 

used a very broad view of “civil society,” one that included the diaspora and all Sudanese 

political parties, including the NCP. But this was not enough to prevent the government 

from raising obstacles that finally obliged the foundation to cancel the conference.5 Some 

believed that the interest regarding the Darfur lobbies in the United States and Europe may 

have been a factor in Khartoum’s hostility.

The Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Group, a relatively small-scale initiative of exchange 

among Darfuri intellectuals chaired by Prof. Al-Tayeb Haj Ateya of Khartoum University, has 

continued to meet since its establishment in 2008 and has issued a document that contains 

“Draft Proposals for Consideration in a Future Darfur Peace Agreement.” The document has 

strong similarities to the Doha Declaration (discussed later in this report), notably in its 

proposal to restore the “native administration” and the traditional land-tenure system under 

the supervision of a council of elders. But it is less conciliatory with the government on 

the issue of justice, claiming in particular that “there can be no sustainable peace in Darfur 

without bringing to justice the most senior persons responsible for grave acts of violence.” 

In proposing a mix of solutions for addressing questions of justice, the Heidelberg group 

recommends the use of the International Criminal Court (which is not mentioned in the 

Doha Declaration), traditional courts, and transitional-justice mechanisms, as well as the 

hybrid courts proposed by the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), discussed 

later in this report.6

In parallel to the civil society meetings held abroad, official initiatives were being 

pursued within Sudan. The purpose of these initiatives was to show more sensitivity to the 

government’s concerns in carrying out its work. In addition to lower-level locally managed 

initiatives, the official international lead on civil society fell to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue 

and Consultation (DDDC), a body established by the DPA.7 The DDDC held consultations with 

civil society in Darfur, but after the DPA agreement failed and in the absence of a new peace 

process, it lacked a political conduit into which it could feed results. In 2009, the DDDC 

organized several rounds of civil society consultation aimed at establishing consensus on 

“common-ground” issues—including land and natural resources, administration and democracy, identity, recovery and development, reconciliation, and security. These activities were 

pursuant to its original mandate under the DPA and fed into the work of the emerging JMSTled Doha civil society initiative and the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur.8

As the official lead on mediation in Darfur, the JMST established a civil society track in 

addition to the government-rebel negotiations in Doha. Its first achievement was an “inaugural” civil society conference (Doha 1) that gathered some 170 delegates in Doha, Qatar, 

November 16–19, 2009. It was by no means perfect. Many of those who attended, as well 

The Heidelberg group 

recommends the use of 

the International Criminal 

Court, traditional courts, and 

transitional-justice mechanisms, 

as well as the hybrid courts 

proposed by the African Union 

High-Level Panel on Darfur.
5

as many of those who refused to attend or had not been invited, criticized the fact that 

a number of delegates had been chosen by the government. Even so, those “government 

people” were unable to prevent others, in particular, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) 

and the youth, from speaking freely. As a result, the conference’s final declaration, known 

as the Doha Declaration, was surprisingly strong. Even among those who were not happy 

with the selection process, many acknowledged the quality of the declaration. For their part, 

government officials seemed less content with it.9

An earlier and shorter “final declaration” issued by the conference insisted in particular 

on the importance of civil society, “which represents the broad base and the silent majority 

of the Darfuri community. . . . Negligence of the civil society role in the peace process is one 

of the factors that led to failure of the previous peace resolutions as negotiations were only 

confined between the [government] and the armed movements.”10 The Doha Declaration, 

meanwhile, demanded the restoration of a powerful and depoliticized native administration 

of the traditional land system; the return of IDPs to their original land and the evacuation 

of settlers; the promotion of major development projects, in particular the long-promised 

road from Khartoum to El Fasher; and increased education, notably, the reintroduction of 

boarding schools, which are particularly important for the nomads. The declaration omitted 

neither the difficult issue of justice, dealing with it in terms acceptable to all sides, nor 

the importance of commemorating the victims of the war “for future generations and the 

invigoration of their memories.”11 As with previous initiatives, there was uncertainty on 

the follow-up. The “temporary follow-up committee” of forty people (ten from each of the 

three Darfur states and ten from the Darfur community in Khartoum) that was chosen was 

considered illegitimate by some of the participants.

In July 2010, a second civil society conference (Doha 2) gathered some 340 participants 

in Doha. Progress was made in that refugees in Chad were represented there, as were a few 

IDP participants from previously abstaining blocs. But on issues of substance, little new 

ground was covered in the resulting declaration; an exception being the focus on the issue 

of the Darfur region. Discussion here centered on the difficult issue of the reunification of 

the three Darfur states into one region. Although a large majority seemed in favor of this, 

consensus could not be reached. When the point was nevertheless included in the final 

declaration, it provoked a protest by the Abbala Arab participants, who also disagreed over 

wording that referenced “newcomers” and “Janjaweed.”

In February–March 2010, primary responsibility for the civil society track had passed 

from the JMST to the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), revising JMST’s 

role to that of an adviser. As JMST’s role receded on the civil society track, that of the 

African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan ascended.12 The AUHIP, 

having throughout the previous year jockeyed to be the lead in Darfur mediation, appeared 

by June–July 2010 to have secured enough support for the mediation to be transitioned to 

its auspices. The AUHIP’s mediation plans, in particular, supporting a “domestication of the 

peace process”—that is, relocating it to Sudan—feature civil society as a major component. 

This move may lead to greater influence on civil society by the political parties, including 

the NCP. Those among civil society who are refugees in Chad or among the diaspora will 

need to be included through alternative means. Both the AUHIP’s political process and the 

Doha process depend on cooperation with UNAMID to carry out activities on the ground 

in Darfur. 
6

Between Government and Rebels: What Role for Darfur Civil 

Society? 

Influence of the Government on Civil Society

To be considered part of civil society, organizations and individuals must theoretically be 

autonomous from the state. However, as Nelson Kasfir states, “the ubiquity and importance 

of patronage for maintaining African governments raises serious questions about the ability 

of civil society organizations to maintain their autonomy from the state.”13

This is true in Sudan and particularly in Darfur, where the government has often created 

its own civil society organizations (CSOs) in an effort to increase its control at the grassroots 

level. According to one United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, “A conspicuous 

feature of present Sudanese CSOs is the blurred dividing lines between governmental and 

non-governmental organizations as processes of political manipulation are quite visible and 

apparent.”14

Traditional leaders, too, who comprise one of the main categories of Darfur civil society, 

have been government clients since colonial times when the British made them a tool of 

their system of indirect rule, under the name native administration (idara ahliya). A part 

of the Darfuri educated elite is also suspected of being pro-NCP, as many supported its 

forerunner, the National Islamic Front regime, believing that the Islamists would give equal 

treatment to all Sudanese Muslims. 

Beyond the government’s links to various civil society figures and organizations, the 

government also involved itself directly in civil society processes: either by organizing its 

own or seeking to provide input into the formulation of international-led efforts. 

In October 2008, the government launched its own civil society conference, the Sudan 

People’s Initiative, which gathered those parts of civil society considered acceptable by the 

government and was chaired in Khartoum by the NCP’s vice president, Nafi Ali Nafi. IDPs 

were notably absent from the conference.15

Concerning the government’s influence on the international processes, a main criticism 

of the Doha civil society conference in November 2009 was the alleged presence of many 

government participants. One blogger quoted an anonymous UNAMID worker as saying that 

“civil society representatives were selected ‘in consultation with the government.’16 Others 

criticized UNAMID Civil Affairs, which was in charge of the selection process in Darfur, for 

allowing the governor of North Darfur to withdraw and add participants to both Doha 1 and 

2.17 JMST claims to be unaware of any withdrawal and argues that to allow the conference 

to happen, JMST had to show the lists to the government, so that “the government didn’t 

block anybody from coming to Doha” (in the event some were actually prevented from 

traveling). JMST also notes that it “agreed to include people” in the Doha 1 list, at the suggestion, directly or through intermediaries, of various intellectuals and politicians, some of 

whom are believed to be close to the government. One of those was General Abdallah Ali 

Safi Al-Nur, an ex-governor of North Darfur believed to be one of the leading inspirers of the 

violent counterinsurgency of 2003–04 and a member of the government delegation in Doha, 

who “really begged the mediation to [include] some of his people” but who was apparently 

not satisfied by the representation of his Abbala Arab kin.18 Including these controversial 

figures was not just a sop to the government. On the contrary, the JMST, rightly held that 

involving even controversial people, especially representatives of the Arab communities 

that form the bulk of the so-called Janjaweed, is a necessary component toward creating an 

inclusive civil society approach.

Having the government represented, through affiliated Darfuris or otherwise, is not just 

a concession to its sovereignty, but a necessary aspect of the civil society process. Some 

NCP-linked individuals also represent local constituencies in Darfur; their government affiliHaving the government 

represented, through affiliated 

Darfuris or otherwise, is not just 

a concession to its sovereignty, 

but a necessary aspect of the 

civil society process. 
7

ation does not preclude this. Using this line of reasonsing, many NCP members attending the 

Doha conferences, particularly the traditional leaders, did not always necessarily maintain 

the official government positions; many of them preferred to speak primarily on behalf of 

their communities.

Influence of the Darfur Rebels on Civil Society

In the early stages of the conflict, the rebel groups generally rejected civil society, seeing 

it as either progovernment or unsuitable to include in negotiations. After Abuja, however, 

their approach changed and the rebel groups started trying, like the government, to extend 

their influence by creating their own civil society representatives. Both the government 

and the movements—the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Liberation and 

Justice Movement (LJM)—invited civil society delegates to Doha, but to the track-one 

negotiations rather than the track-two talks. The two main rebel groups—JEM and the 

SLA faction of Abdelwahid Mohamed Ahmed Nur (SLA-AW)—opposed the separate Doha 

civil society conferences. It was speculated that JEM took this line because it wanted to 

maintain its monopoly of representation of Darfuris, while SLA-AW’s position was consistent 

with its strategy of refusing engagement until preconditions had been met, a strategy it 

had employed since the 2006 Abuja talks. However, the various civil society meetings have 

shown that on the main issues of the conflict, civil society positions are much closer to 

those of the rebels than to those of the government. 

Support for JEM and SLA-AW remains very strong in the camps, both in Darfur and in 

Chad.19 Rebel movements have attempted to build on this popularity by creating or supporting certain spokesmen for the displaced. In February 2009, JEM formed its own union 

of refugees, picking representatives in all twelve Chadian camps. Its chairman, Dr. Mustafa 

Mahamat Ali, himself part of the Zaghawa diaspora in London, and several refugees went 

to Doha in April 2010 to participate in track-one negotiations. According to JEM chairman 

Khalil Ibrahim, “when we go for peace talks, we want to be sure we’re representing all people 

in Darfur. . . . [and that] the agreement will be accepted by the people, that we can sell 

them the agreement.”20

Similarly, Abdelwahid manages to maintain power and influence in the Darfur camps, 

particularly among the Fur IDPs living in camps close to Nyala, including, most notably, 

Kalma, but also Kas, Zalingei, El Fasher, and Kebkabiya. The architecture of this system of 

control dates back to the early days of the Darfur conflict. In 2001, the Darfur Liberation 

Front—later to become the SLA—formed a student union called the United Popular Front 

(UPF), some members of which were trained by the SPLA. In 2006, more than a hundred 

UPF members were sent to Darfur IDP camps, where they have since been accused of intimidating—and sometimes killing—those who do not follow the line of the Fur rebel leader. 

The consequences of this influence in the camps is clear: IDP leaders refused to participate 

in the Doha conferences—some out of conviction, but many for fear of retribution by these 

cadres. However, following the more recent Doha 2 meeting of civil society, there has been 

some signs of a loosening of control, most notably in the Kalma camp. The ramifications of 

this precedent-setting divergence from the party line are still being played out at the time 

of this report’s writing.

Beyond the IDP camps, rebels use traditional leaders as another important aspect of civil 

society. Traditional leaders of all ranks have been recruited to form a native administration 

in the rebel areas, in the refugee camps in Chad, and sometimes in the negotiations themselves. The blurred line between rebel groups and civil society has also been aggravated by 

the repeated attempts of some members of the educated elite, particularly in the diaspora, 

to become leaders of rebel groups. For example, Tijani Sese, a Darfur governor in the 1980s 

The various civil society 

meetings have shown that on 

the main issues of the conflict, 

civil society positions are 

much closer to those of the 

rebels than to those of the 

government. 
8

and diaspora intellectual, transformed himself from civil society figure to rebel leader when 

in February 2010 he became the chairman of the LJM, a new coalition composed of various 

small SLA and JEM splinters. Sese’s name was initially proposed by General Ibrahim Suleiman, 

together with other close members of his Minbar, as well as by Libya, which has been trying 

to reunite some factions. With little strength in the field, the new group has been labeled 

by Khalil Ibrahim as a “civil society group armed with water pistols.”

Sese’s sudden metamorphosis into a rebel leader has provoked mistrust over his intentions and spurred some Darfuris to suspect the designs of the international community. 

Some refer to Sese as “Little Hamid Karzai” due to the particularly apparent U.S. support he 

enjoys, and there are various reports of international mediators, in both Darfur and Doha, 

“encouraging” IDPs and refugees to support LJM.21 JEM in particular accused the JMST and 

UNAMID of encouraging IDPs to support “a specific Darfur figure,” namely Sese, who, seemingly is encouraging this perception that the international community’s civil society efforts 

were aimed at building his base. Sese addressed the civil society participants in Doha 2 as 

“our supporters.”22

Role for Civil Society in the Darfur Peace Process

A spectrum of views exists on the role of civil society in the Darfur peace process. In the 

minimalist interpretation, civil society represents “the people” whose presence in the eaves 

of the negotiation bestows legitimacy on the result. Though only an observer, civil society 

is expected to act as the conscience of the process, actively encouraging the parties to 

look beyond narrow self-interest and work with goodwill toward compromise. In terms of 

legitimacy, many take the lesson from the failure of the Abuja agreement that civil society’s 

presence at the negotiations can decrease the likelihood of any future agreement’s rejection 

on the ground. If it is part of the process, civil society can help “sell” its result. 

Others propose a slightly more active role, with civil society helping ensure that the core 

issues of the conflict are addressed. In this more robust interpretation, civil society still acts 

as observer, but it is mandated to contribute issues to be included in the negotiations. 

In the maximalist interpretation, civil society serves two functions: it fills the gap 

created by rejectionists, pressuring them to join for fear of marginalization and becoming 

irrelevant, and negotiates directly on certain issues. In its first function, civil society stands 

for those actively opposed to the peace process. Given Abdelwahid’s refusal to come to the 

table, a civil society process that reaches a critical mass of popular support and brings in 

some of his Fur constituency may eclipse Abdelwahid’s claim to speak for large swathes of 

Darfur. The effect of this process may result in pressure on Abdelwahid to engage or, in his 

continued absence, allow representatives of this critical mass to speak on behalf of Abdelwahid’s presumed constituency. 

The need to fill the gap left by absent track-one parties leads to the most expansive and 

maximalist interpretation of civil society’s role, or its second function—negotiating substantively on the issues. Fundamental to this approach is the view that the Darfur conflict 

is more than a clash between the armed movements and government. Most Darfuris seem 

to place primary importance on the interconnected issues of land, return, and security, 

which means addressing, among other things, the disarmament of the Janjaweed. Accepting that this militia will not be adequately represented by their perceived sponsor—the 

government—dictates that a negotiated settlement is required that directly involves this 

community. 

Not all civil society actors would bear the same influence in this negotiating role. Representatives of the key Fur ethnic group, and as yet absent representatives of the Janjaweed, 

should be engaged as principals in this kind of dialogue. This is not to say the negotiation 

Most Darfuris seem to place 

primary importance on the 

interconnected issues of 

land, return, and security, 

which means addressing the 

disarmament of the Janjaweed.
9

should be solely between these two groups, because the issues affect all of Darfur’s ethnic 

communities. But without the credible participation of these two critical blocs, substantive 

progress toward a resolution will be impossible. 

Within the various JMST-assigned civil society groups, and in Darfur more broadly, there 

are disagreements on what the extent of civil society’s role should be. While the Doha Declaration favored a minimalist approach, calling on civil society to be “a principal partner” in 

negotiations, the question of civil society’s role was not clearly defined during Doha 1 and 

remained controversial among participants themselves. Some returned from Qatar with the 

idea that they were observers, while others saw themselves as full negotiators.23

The Composition of Darfur Civil Society

For the purpose of the Doha meetings, the JMST divided civil society into six categories: 

CSOs, traditional leaders, IDPs and refugees, women, youth, and nomads. In reality these 

categories often overlap—a civil society actor can easily fit into multiple categories simultaneously. Closer examination of these categories demonstrates the challenges in categorizing civil society, the importance of selecting participants based on a sound understanding 

of local dynamics, and the dangers in rushing this process.

Civil Society Organizations

For international actors, CSOs can seem an obvious place to start when trying to identify 

civil society voices. In Darfur, CSOs tend to reflect existing power structures. More than 

groups of individuals with various ethnic and political backgrounds, they are often linked to 

a strong leader and his (generally ethnic) following. 

A 2009 UNDP study estimated the number of CSOs in Darfur at no less than 241, with 

an additional roughly 230 Darfur-related CSOs based in Khartoum.24 Those figures take into 

account only the CSOs registered by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) and exclude 

trade unions and professional associations, cultural groups, faith-based organizations, and 

sport associations.25

Tribal affiliation most dominantly delineates the identity of Darfur CSOs.26 Every Darfur 

tribe has its own NGO, but these rarely work effectively across tribal lines. For example, 

those active in intertribal reconciliation rarely cooperate with organizations linked with 

other tribes, posing a fundamental challenge to prospects for success. 

CSOs tend to overrepresent educated elites. Predominantly urban-based, these have limited 

contact with their rural constituencies. This is even truer of Khartoum-based organizations.27

CSOs also tend toward politicization, falling roughly into categories of progovernment 

or antigovernment, the latter being a mixture of CSOs sympathetic to the rebels or to other 

opposition political parties. Some are very blatantly in the progovernment category, like 

NGOs linked to prominent NCP members such as General Safi Al-Nur or Zaghawa presidential 

adviser Hasan Borgu, while others are led by opposition politicians, in particular from the 

Umma Party. Local CSOs, especially the most newly registered ones, are generally suspected 

of being pro-NCP.28

Given this complex web of affiliations, the engagement of CSOs in the civil society 

process must be based on a strong understanding of how these organizations fit with local 

political and ethnic dynamics. Aware of the prevalence of the NCP’s influence with many 

CSOs, the JMST has not envisaged a leading role for CSOs in the civil society process. 
10

Traditional Leaders

Darfur’s traditional leadership—dynastic in nature and often based on tribal and family 

interests—is inconsistent with the common perception of civil society. However, it is “the 

earliest form of civil society institution” in Darfur,29 and it still has links with and influence 

on all the other, more modern categories of civil society.

Darfur’s traditional authority structure historically represented tribal power. The conflict 

has fundamentally altered this structure. The government has removed traditional leaders 

who were critical of its strategy and appointed new ones. The armed movements, including 

the Arab militia, absorbed or replaced many of the traditional authorities as the de facto 

local authority in many areas. The present war has also separated many traditional leaders 

from their people in the camps or countryside, often displaced to government-controlled 

towns. Beyond the clear NCP affiliation of some leaders—largely a pragmatic necessity 

based on the need to mobilize resources from the central authority—this patronage is 

often the main reason why the native administration is considered biased toward the government. 

Those who did not join the armed movements, or move to government-controlled areas, 

ended up in IDP camps. There they found their influence reduced by new authority structures that prioritized different skills, such as the ability to negotiate with international 

aid agencies, or by the presence of the armed movements and their independent power 

structures in the camps. Those who joined the armed movements based in their former 

territories continue to retain influence, though it is limited by the more powerful sway of 

the rebel leadership. 

The more modern components of civil society, such as the educated elite, youth, and 

IDPs, generally portray the native administration as archaic, linked to the central government, and detached from the population. Nevertheless, the various civil society consultations that have taken place have generally insisted on the restoration of the power of 

traditional leaders, including on important issues such as land and security. The Doha 

Declaration stressed the need to “restore the role of leaders of the Native Administration at 

all levels including inside IDP Camps.”

Beyond their controversial political affiliations, traditional leaders have played and can 

continue to play an important role in the civil society track of the peace process. Traditional 

leaders can reach consensus among themselves and the rest of the civil society because they 

are often the only ones with real experience with traditional reconciliation mechanisms and 

issues such as land.30

To date, only paramount traditional leaders living in government-controlled areas have 

been represented in the civil society track of the peace process—although the main leaders 

from North and West Darfur were absent from Doha 2. Some of those living in rebel areas or 

in refugee camps in Chad were invited by the rebels to attend track-one negotiations, but 

they could possibly play a more constructive role as part of the track-two process, along with 

fellow traditional leaders from the government areas. 

IDPs and Refugees

The displaced are drawn predominantly from certain tribes—namely, the Fur, Zaghawa, and 

Masalit—and constitute a core constituency of the rebel movements. Their representatives 

are largely from new power structures that have replaced the traditional authorities. Since 

the camps no longer fall exclusively under the structures of traditional authority, government, or armed movements, they represent a distinct pillar of civil society that is tribally 

defined and influential. 

Traditional leaders can reach 

consensus among themselves 

and the rest of the civil society 

because they are often the 

only ones with real experience 

with traditional reconciliation 

mechanisms.
11

Some of the camps established political structures supporting the armed movements, in 

particular, SLA-AW. These popular wings of the armed resistance have dealt predominantly 

with civilian issues, such as acting as interlocutors with humanitarian agencies, but also 

serve military functions, such as recruiting and fundraising. The allegiance of particular 

camps to rebel movements, and the degree of control, varies according to their location 

and ethnic composition. 

These links have made the IDP leadership a crucial though challenging target for involvement in the peace process. When some rebel leaders rejected the peace process, bringing 

affiliated IDP representatives into the negotiations became a means of pressuring the rebel 

leadership to participate and also compensating for their absence. In the case of SLA-AW, 

the movement’s strength was seen as nearly totally dependent on this popular support. 

Some within mediation circles believed that bypassing the leadership and connecting 

directly to the base would serve as an effective way to circumvent the rejectionists. 

Results were mixed. In the words of one JMST official interviewed by this study’s authors 

in April 2010, “Inclusion of the IDPs [in mediation] is a big failure.” Though IDPs from Darfur did attend, the abstentionist IDP leaders from the pro-SLA-AW camps refused to attend 

Doha 1. But more recently there has been positive movement. For the first time, Doha 2 

saw ten IDPs from the Kalma camp travel to Doha (though the delegation did not include 

the most prominent camp leaders). This progress was not universal nor without cost. At the 

end of July 2010, upon the delegation’s return to Darfur, serious clashes between pro-Doha 

and anti-Doha (or pro-AW) IDPs ensued in Kalma, as well as in Hamidiya camp near Zalingei. 

The fact that some of the Kalma IDPs who went to Doha were actually rebel dissidents from 

SLA-AW who had taken refuge in Kalma after being kicked out of Jebel Marra in January 

2010 indicates that those clashes might also have been a continuation, inside the camp, of 

the inter-SLA struggle that took place in Jebel Marra in early 2010. The government’s ensuing ultimatum to UNAMID to deliver six IDP leaders accused of being involved in the Kalma 

clashes, all of whom were anti-Doha and pro-AW, is another challenge to UNAMID’s neutrality.31 The eventual success or failure of bringing on board the pro-SLA-AW IDPs remains to 

be seen as civil society efforts continue. 

The displaced population seems trapped between the idea that it has to avoid disloyalty 

to the rebel movements to get a better peace agreement and the feeling that it is not 

fully represented by the movements. Although objective data for the IDPs are unavailable, 

data collected from refugees in Chad indicate this tension. Despite widespread support for 

the rebel groups, 96 percent of the refugees feel “that their individual interests were not 

represented in past peace negotiations.”32 The refugees in Chad had not been included in 

the peace process until JMST organized consultations there in March and April 2010. Fifteen 

refugee delegates from five different camps attended Doha 2.

Women and Youth

Creating specific categories for women and youth speaks to a debatable Western belief that 

these voices are generally more progressive, and thus more committed to peace, and that 

these categories are necessarily the primary victims of the conflict.

This predilection for advancing women and youth as peacemakers challenges established 

traditional Darfuri reconciliation mechanisms—and the possibility of transferring them 

into the civil society arena. The most accepted of those mechanisms—judiya—has as 

main actors old men bearing the title of ajawid, an Arabic term that is often translated as 

”elders.”33 Faced with this traditional underrepresentation of women and youth in Darfur, as 

in other parts of Africa, the international community pushes for affirmative action. 

This predilection for 

advancing women and youth 

as peacemakers challenges 

established traditional Darfuri 

reconciliation mechanisms—and 

the possibility of transferring 

them into the civil society 

arena.
12

In IDP and refugee camps, women’s issues have become the domain of sheikha. These 

female leaders have become the privileged interlocutors of the humanitarian community, 

but it is unclear to what degree they can play a specific role in the peace process, beyond 

raising gender issues.

Trying to address women’s underrepresentation and to find influential women, various 

international organizations have shown a specific interest for the hakkama, women war singers who commemorate past victories and encourage fighters for upcoming battles. All ethnic 

groups have their singers, but the Arab hakkama are particularly famous for their presence 

during battles, mounted either on horses or camels. As early as the 1990s, government 

programs attempted to reorient the hakkama toward “peace singing.” Today, notably in IDP 

camps, some NGOs encourage women singers to promote new messages, for instance in favor 

of hygiene, while others involved in peacebuilding have proposed that influential singers 

be included in civil society meetings. Finding a more peace-oriented role for the hakkama 

will not be easy, however. Not only does this constitute a break with their established social 

role, but it is also debatable whether their songs express their own views or merely reflect 

the sentiments of their community or its male leaders. 

The “modern” part of Darfur civil society also includes educated women, including many 

who work for CSOs. These women are close to the male elite—most had access to education because they belong to big, influential families or are daughters of traditional leaders 

or intellectuals. Many are also government functionaries, making the woman category, as 

well as the youth category, relatively open to government interference. Among the main 

government-backed civil society organizations are the Sudanese Women General Union, the 

Sudanese Youth National Union, and the Sudanese Students General Union.34

The youth category is also subject to tensions between the international community 

and the traditional Darfuri understanding of youth. International actors seeking to engage 

civil society generally view this category as representing a generation that has come of age 

during the war and is alienated from the old social structures in Darfur. Youth are seen to 

encompass better-educated individuals who neither fall into the intellectual category, nor 

the IDP or traditional leadership strata. 

This is only partly true. Male youths (shebab in Arabic), as men of fighting age, are 

naturally mobilized as fighters in times of war—in the past into traditional militias or “selfdefense groups” or, in contemporary Darfur, into rebel groups or government militias. In the 

camps, IDPs recreated this traditional structure by choosing youth leaders who were often 

very close to the rebels, if not their representatives.

Thus, while it has been hoped that their voices would be progressive, in practice they 

can prove to be among the most radical. Their positions are often hard-line, sometimes more 

influenced by ideology than pragmatism. Lacking experience of prewar Darfur, they are also 

less informed about the preexisting social and legal agreements governing relations among 

tribes in Darfur, leading their views to be disconnected from the practicalities of key issues, 

such as land, security, and return. 

Intellectuals

Darfuri intellectuals are generally seen as important because of their potential to contribute 

constructive ideas toward the peace process, and have played a prominent role in various civil 

society peacebuilding initiatives. As many observers have noted, neither the rebels nor the 

government thought in detail about the core issues of security, return, and land. In general, 

the educated Darfuri elite have been viewed with some hostility by both the government and 

rebels and largely left out of past negotiations. However, keen to participate in the peace 

process, they have brought with them knowledge and ideas on managing a future Darfur.35
13

The category of intellectuals overlaps with the other defined categories of Darfur civil 

society, particularly with CSOs where many educated Darfuris earn their living. Some traditional leaders can also be placed in this category, as many intellectuals belong to the 

families of tribal chiefs, who are able to send their children to school in larger numbers than 

their “subjects.” 

Despite many attributes that would enable intellectuals to play a leading role in peace 

efforts, the main problem with placing educated elites at the center of civil society efforts 

are that they are somewhat divorced from the grassroots level. For some years they had 

met, despite tribal divisions, in what was seen as a vanguard for the type of intercommunal 

dialogue required for a future solution in Darfur. But the majority of intellectuals are part 

of the internal diaspora based in Khartoum or are part of the Darfur diaspora living in the 

Gulf, Europe, and the United States. Having sat out the conflict, they are generally viewed 

cautiously by those remaining behind in Darfur. These intellectuals advanced ideas marked 

by their more developed discussions across tribal lines, but these ideas went far beyond the 

comfort level of the more directly affected communities in Darfur in terms of reconciliation. 

Articulate, often English-speaking, and easily accessible in Khartoum, the intellectuals and 

their ideas became the main interface for the international community. 

The gap between the rarefied Khartoum circles and those within Darfur began to 

emerge for all to see during the Doha process. The Khartoum group advanced themselves 

and their ideas ahead of the pace of discussions budding in Darfur, which led to a serious 

rift at Doha 1 between the three delegations from Darfur and the large delegation of Darfuri intellectuals based in Khartoum. Most of the Khartoum delegates, having participated 

in past civil society meetings abroad, often without delegates from Darfur, were keen to 

play the same role as they had in those past meetings—that is, as full participants. But 

the Darfur delegates forced them to remain as facilitators and experts, the roles that had 

been allocated to them by the mediation. 

This tension was aggravated by the competition for supremacy on the civil society track 

between the JMST, which was closer to the Khartoum delegation, and UNAMID, which was in 

charge of the selection process in Darfur. Consequences of this divide were felt well after the 

conference, when the presence of Khartoum members in the follow-up committee was questioned.36 At Doha 2, UNAMID had invited only eleven Khartoum delegates. JMST meanwhile 

invited all those who had been present at Doha 1, but many of the Khartoum delegates, 

notably members of the Doha 1 follow-up committee, boycotted Doha 2.

In the end, it became clear that the civil society leaders whom the international community had placed stock in—the Khartoum-based intellectuals—did not have the support 

required for them to exercise a leadership role. While it is clear that intellectuals can contribute important knowledge and vision to a process, their lack of grassroots links means that it 

is necessary to be cautious about giving them too central a role in future meetings. 

The Selection Dilemma

Elected or Selected?

Darfuris have continually demonstrated that the question of representation is of primary 

importance. The rejection of the Abuja peace agreement is cited by many as proof of this, 

where the majority of Darfuris rejected the agreement not on the basis of its content but 

on the basis of who signed on and who did not. Equally for the civil society process, should 

a critical mass of Darfuris become convinced that the representatives selected in the civil 

society process are unacceptable, its results would likely be fatally damaged before they 

could be taken forward. Conversely, if the participation of certain communities and their 
14

representatives could be secured to an acceptable degree, this could form a critical mass. 

The important question is, who has influence in Darfur society? Despite the long-established presence of the international community in Darfur, this remains largely unknown. 

With no fixed criteria and an imperfect understanding of who was sought, the international 

community had to venture into untrodden territory as it developed the civil society track 

in the lead-up to Doha. 

Seen as essential for the purposes of pressuring and circumventing rejectionists among 

the rebel movements—namely, Abdelwahid—are the Fur IDPs who form their constituency. 

Similarly, failure to bring in the Arab populations, especially their armed elements, would 

negate the possibility of civil society negotiating meaningfully on the essential issues of 

land, security, and return. 

However, integrating the Fur IDPs is complicated by the challenge of overcoming the 

opposition of their political leadership. Bringing in the Arab communities is a sensitive 

subject as far as the Sudanese government is concerned, and it is further complicated by a 

lack of mapping and contacts. 

Within the camps, the process of selection has been simplified by letting camp residents 

self select. While this proved to be a way forward, taking such a hands-off approach holds 

risks. Given that the camp power structures often replace the traditional leadership structure, empowering the camp leadership to decide its representatives further entrenches this 

shift. Furthermore, this approach can marginalize ethnic minority groups within camps. The 

dominant camp ethnicity can choose not to include any representatives of the minority 

ethnicity. 

Outside the more organized camp structures, selection has been less about having representatives chosen by influential communities—such as the Fur IDPs—than about securing 

the participation of influential individuals themselves. UNAMID criticized the JMST’s first 

lists for Doha 1 as being undemocratic and opted for self-selection during consultations for 

Doha 2. There was no secret vote, however, and it has been argued that the presence of local 

authorities during the consultations easily allowed them to mobilize NCP members and influence the selection. UNAMID was also criticized by civil society members for drawing lots to 

select delegates, notably in North Darfur for Doha 1 and South Darfur for Doha 2.37 As fair 

Darfur-wide elections to select civil society delegates do not seem realistic, selection has 

to remain the work of international actors, who will need detailed mapping to understand 

the power dynamics and political tendencies within influential groups. 

Strategic Targets

Civil society members, especially the educated, are often reluctant to mention their ethnicity and prefer to be presented as being from North, South, or West Darfur, or simply as 

Darfuri. However, most know the ethnic origin of the other members. It is also important 

for the international community to have an idea of ethnic balance and to target certain 

strategic communities. Chief among these are the Fur, which constitute the main ethnic 

group in Darfur and the majority of the IDPs, and the Abbala, which constitute the bulk of 

the government militias. According to one JMST official, “Success will have to be judged by 

the inclusion of Arabs and IDPs,” as well as the Zaghawa, who played a key role in facilitating rebel support from Chad and in providing numerous rebel leaders and fighters. As one 

Chadian Zaghawa official in charge of the Darfur file points out, “The Fur say that without 

them there would be no Darfur, the Zaghawa say that without them there would have been 

no rebellion, and the Arabs say that without them there will be no peace.”38

Within the camps, the process of 

selection has been simplified by 

letting camp residents 

self select. 
15

Solving the Fur dilemma. The Fur have been well represented in most civil society meetings: 

at Doha 1 they constituted more than 23 percent of the participants, and at Doha 2 they 

probably accounted for an even larger percentage.39 Although they were well represented 

among CSOs and traditional leaders, they were not among the IDPs, as the main Fur camps 

refused to participate in the process. Indeed, a large gap exists between the elite, who live 

mostly in government-held towns, and the rural population, who are largely displaced in the 

camps. Although Abdelwahid is in exile in France and his fighters have not been very active 

in the field, many Fur, in particular those in the camps, still recognize him as their leader. 

For years, his popularity has paralyzed the Fur elite, whose members, afraid of losing their 

traditional constituencies, rarely dare to challenge Abdelwahid’s authority, despite pressure 

by the international community to do so.

Since Abuja, the international community has employed three different approaches at 

various times in order to solve the Fur dilemma: convincing Abdelwahid to join the peace 

process; convincing Fur IDPs to join the civil society track against Abdelwahid’s wishes; and 

replacing Abdelwahid with another Fur rebel leader. The two first approaches have failed, 

while the third has foundered for lack of a charismatic Fur figure who would be accepted 

by both Fur IDPs and fighters in the field. Throughout 2009, U.S. special envoy General 

Scott Gration sought to bypass Abdelwahid’s abstention from the peace process through 

direct engagement with Abdelwahid’s field forces. Working directly with SLA-AW field commanders and Fur members of civil society critical of Abdelwahid’s position, General Gration 

encouraged them to desert Abdelwahid and to reunite under Tijani Sese’s leadership. What 

resulted initially was a further splintering of SLM-AW groups, though some of these splinters 

coalesced in a tenuous coalition headed by Tijani Sese. As of this writing, Sese’s coalition 

has achieved no greater cohesion. Indeed, the international community’s wish for a Fur civil 

society that challenges Abdelwahid and ensures the acceptance of an agreement by IDPs 

faces serious obstacles—namely, the unpopularity of the Fur elite in the IDP camps and 

the Fur rebel areas and the fear among the Fur that breaking away from Abdelwahid would 

weaken the rebellion and divide it into splinter groups rather than unite it behind a new 

leader. 

This tension is played out in the reluctance of SLA-AW dissidents to join Tijani Sese’s 

LJM. Commanders have strongly criticized the choice of a civil society figure instead of a 

field leader to chair the new movement. Although its international backers see Sese as a 

respected Fur intellectual, his rebel group had no Fur faction among its components until 

Ahmad Abdeshafi—himself viewed by many Fur as an exiled politician—joined its ranks in 

April 2010. Sese risks facing the same stigma attached to the diaspora elite by those in the 

field. In addition, the Fur hold mixed views on his record as governor of Darfur during the 

Fur-Arab war of 1987–89.

The international community is aware of these handicaps. But given its difficulties in 

reaching Fur IDPs, it hopes Sese will be able to establish direct contacts with them and 

maybe include IDP representatives in his negotiation team, so as to better sell a peace 

agreement to the camps. No doubt this strategy will be opposed by SLA-AW and JEM, as well 

as by members of civil society who had placed their hopes in an inclusive track-two process. 

For both the LJM rebels and their international backers, as well as for civil society’s unity, 

such a strategy is a very risky bet. 

Getting the Janjaweed on board. The emergence of nomads as a category at Doha 1 reflects 

the fact that, in the humanitarian community in Darfur, the term nomads has become a 

label for the Arabs, particularly the Abbala Arabs. The idea behind this nomad component is 

to include those Abbala communities that served as a recruitment pool for the Janjaweed. 

Engaging them has not been easy. Although the more neutral Baggara (cattle-herding) Arabs 
16

of South Darfur were well represented in both Doha 1 and 2, notably by their paramount 

traditional leaders, only ten to fifteen Abbala delegates were present. 

One difficulty is that both the government and rebels claim to represent the Abbala. 

In Abuja, they were supposedly represented by the government, but left with the impression that the government was ready to abandon them on important issues, including those 

related to disarmament, land, and justice. This triggered a growing autonomization of the 

Abbala militias and communities, and the multiplication of local negotiations between them 

and the rebel groups, following which some ex-Janjaweed joined either SLA-AW or JEM. Both 

movements also held direct negotiations with major militia leaders, such as Musa Hilal and 

Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, “Hemmeti.”40 This yielded mixed results, partially due to the 

government’s success in enticing dissident Janjaweed leaders away from the rebels with new 

promises of support, but also due to the mismanagement of the issue by the rebels, who 

were unable to inculcate these erstwhile enemies convincingly into their movements. Even 

Abbala leaders in the rebel movements acknowledge that the rebels cannot fully represent 

their communities.41

As the Abbala’s demands have not been fully represented during the track-one negotiations, despite their being a major actor in the conflict, integrating them in the civil society 

track may be the only option. If militia leaders cannot be included, traditional leaders can 

be, as can intellectuals from the Abbala’s small but growing educated elite. 

Exactly which traditional leaders, intellectuals, and elites to include is more controversial. Some tribes are perceived as having been less involved in the Janjaweed than others. 

For instance, the Mahariya, an Arab tribe, are usually more accepted by the non-Arabs than 

Musa Hilal’s Mahamid. Khartoum-based Abbala politicians such as Generals Adam Hamid 

Musa and Hisein Abdallah Jibril, considered to be fully progovernment, are widely rejected 

by both non-Arab civil society members as well as Abbala leaders based in Darfur.42

Potential Abbala representatives could be divided into three broad categories. The first 

would comprise local leaders, in particular, traditional leaders who are generally accepted 

by non-Arab civil society. The second category would comprise those who left the government and participated in local dialogue with both rebels and non-Arab communities. They 

could play an important role in enlarging those local initiatives toward a Darfur consensus 

on major issues. The third and most controversial category would comprise the Abbala’s 

“big players,” many of whom had been involved in recruiting militias and whose standing is 

questionable, both among the government and their cadres on the ground. 

Although individuals in this latter category were generally rewarded with government 

positions, they do not necessarily believe that their tribal and personal interests are well 

represented by the government and are keen to participate directly in the peace process. 

Moreover, they could easily act as spoilers if they are not integrated in some way. Some of 

them might be easier to integrate in track-one negotiations, and others in track two, either 

directly or through representatives. For instance, one of Musa Hilal’s sons attended Doha 1. 

The selection of such individuals needs to navigate possible opposition from government, 

rebels, and non-Arab civil society, as well as tribal and individual competition among Abbala 

leaders themselves. For instance, powerful militia leader Hemmeti was not pleased with the 

presence of Abdallah Mustafa Abu Noba in Doha, his rival for the leadership of the Abbala 

Mahariya in South Darfur.43

Nevertheless, many Arab participants in the Doha conferences viewed them as a positive 

step. “Two years ago, if people like Abu Noba would have come to such a meeting, the others 

would have fought,” noted a Baggara Arab intellectual. “It did not happen. It’s a major step 

towards reconciliation.”44
17

Remembering the Zaghawa. The underrepresentation of Fur IDPs and Abbala Arabs in the process has been widely acknowledged, if not solved. The need to include Zaghawa civil society 

has had far less consideration from mediators. It is estimated that the Zaghawa accounted 

for 8 percent of participants at the Doha conferences. However, many important members of 

the Zaghawa elite were missing, and the fifteen or so Zaghawa leaders and intellectuals who 

did attend are widely considered to be progovernment and to have little influence among 

their grassroots constituencies. 

The Zaghawa are generally considered to be sufficiently represented in the peace process 

by their rebel groups—JEM and various SLA and JEM splinters. However, Zaghawa refugees 

in Chad are almost unanimous in their belief that their interests were not represented in 

previous peace negotiations.45

The two scenarios for progress in the peace process, in the minds of most diplomats, 

would leave little space for Zaghawa civil society. The first scenario—the possibility of an 

agreement between the government and JEM—would be an elite power-sharing deal that 

would be worryingly similar to the Abuja agreement. A second scenario—a deal built on 

an alliance between the Fur and the Arab components of Darfur civil society—would also 

risk overlooking Zaghawa concerns. Both scenarios would risk giving a platform to existing 

anti-Zaghawa feelings among most Darfur communities, which are fearful of what they see 

as the Zaghawa’s political and economic ambitions.46

Conclusions and Recommendations

The importance of civil society’s role in peacebuilding in Darfur is clear. It has the potential 

to bring excluded ethnic groups into the process, to address social and political issues on 

which the rebels are not well placed to negotiate, and to generate much needed momentum 

in what has been a long and difficult process. Civil society as a player in the peace process 

can no longer be treated as an afterthought. Although integrating it into a larger peace 

process is a challenge, it is increasingly clear that this is no longer optional—peace cannot 

be brought without it. 

Some continue to see civil society as essentially an add-on to the government-rebel 

negotiation. The more recent investment in the track-two process that led to the Doha 

Declaration only came about due to mediators’ frustration with the lack of progress in the 

track-one talks. Even so, track-two risks receiving less priority once more if there seems to 

be a chance of progress in the rebel-government negotiations. 

This strategy of advancing the government-rebel talks and then inserting civil society 

only at the last minute as a means of making the process comprehensive is problematic 

for two reasons. First, although civil society actors welcome participation in the peace 

process, they will not accept being an afterthought. Should their role be merely an epilogue 

to the main government-rebel talks, there is a risk that civil society actors—and their 

constituencies—will reject the process. Second, the progress of the government-rebel track 

has been erratic and subject to collapse. Once assembled, the civil society vehicle would 

likely be more stable and have the potential to advance consensus on the issues even if the 

government-rebel talks stall. 

Progress—or lack thereof—in the government-rebel negotiations does not lessen the 

need for a strong and autonomous civil society track, which should be conceptually linked 

to the government-rebel process but allowed to progress independent of it. Should a 

government-rebel agreement occur in the interim, it is important that civil society still be 

allotted a role and that the agreement not be portrayed as final and exclusive. For example, 

one possible permutation sees the government-rebel negotiations yielding a framework 

agreement, with civil society filling in some of the details. 

Civil society as a player in the 

peace process can no longer be 

treated as an afterthought.
18

The civil society approach is a long-term, labor-intensive process. It requires widespread, 

intensive contact in Darfur, eastern Chad, and Khartoum, as well as with the Darfur diaspora. 

Facilitators require a strong grounding in the political and ethnic geography of Darfur and a 

diplomatic sensibility to engage civil society actors on a wide range of sensitive topics. The 

actual process of engagement is crucial. For example, securing ten IDP participants from 

a certain camp may actually be detrimental if the selection process lacks legitimacy. Success cannot be evaluated in terms of numbers of participants or locations. The benchmark 

will be how widespread the perception of inclusion is within civil society and whether the 

participation of key groups has been secured. 

Success will require long-term investment in the civil society track. UNAMID, which 

currently leads civil society efforts, has the advantage of being present throughout Darfur. 

It needs to invest appropriate resources into leading the initiative. Given the vastness of 

the task, UNAMID should be prepared to draw on external resources to bolster its role, and 

donors should prepare themselves to support this. 

The tension among the roles of JMST, UNAMID, and AUHIP requires attention, because 

the success of the civil society track going forward will depend in large part on the ability 

of these organizations to find a constructive synergy. Effective cooperation and coordination among international actors is more important than ever. AU-UN hybrid institutions and 

countries that could potentially place leverage on Darfur rebel leaders and intellectuals, 

such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Qatar, as well as neighboring countries, 

should make the civil society track a priority in their efforts.

For the international community, the first lesson to learn from previous civil society initiatives is that, although complex, this track might be much more rewarding in the long term 

than the track-one negotiations between the government and rebel leadership. But seizing 

this opportunity will require a real culture change on the part of international mediators.
19

Notes

1. Jago Salmon et al., Drivers of Change: Civil Society in Northern Sudan (Khartoum: UK Department for International 

Development [DFID], 2007).

2. Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups, Working Paper no. 

6 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, July 2007), www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/

SWP%206%20Darfur%20rebels.pdf; Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (London: 

Zed Books, 2008).

3. Adam Azzain Mohammed, “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur,” in War in Darfur and the Search for 

Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 210.

4. Concordis International, Developing Darfurian Unity: Final Report (London: Concordis International, 2008); Dar es 

Salaam Declaration on Reenergizing the Peace Process in Darfur, July 30, 2008; Darfur Relief and Documentation 

Center (DRDC), “Conclusion and Recommendations” (Workshop on Reenergizing the Peace Process in Darfur: 

Civil Society Voice, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, July 28–30, 2008). For more on the Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue, 

see www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/research/details/know_transfer/sudan_peace_project/die_projekte/heidelberg_

darfur_dialog.cfm. 

5. “Sudan: Civil Society Cancels Darfur Peace Conference,” allAfrica.com, May 8, 2009, http://allafrica.com/

stories/200905080704.html. 

6. Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Group, “Outcome Document,” 2010, www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/hdd_outcome_

document.pdf.

7. Julie Flint, Rhetoric and Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict, Working Paper no. 19 (Geneva: Small 

Arms Survey, 2010), 36, www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-19-The-Failure-to-Resolve-the%20

Darfur-Conflict.pdf.

8. African Union, “Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD),” October 29, 2009, 31, xviii, 

www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SKEA-7XFEKC?OpenDocument; Alex de Waal, “There Is Nothing to Do 

but to Sit around the Table: The AU Panel and Civil Society,” Making Sense of Sudan, Social Science Research 

Council (SSRC) Blog, June 28, 2009, http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2009/06/28/“there-is-nothing-to-do-but-tosit-around-the-table”-the-au-panel-and-civil-society/.

9. Authors’ interviews, Khartoum and Darfur, November–December 2009.

10. Final Declaration of the Consultative Meeting of the Darfurian Civil Society, November 20, 2009, Doha, Qatar, 

www.darfurinfo.org/doha-english-rough.pdf.

11. Ibid.; Ali B. Ali Dinar, “Contextualizing the Doha Meeting: The Process and the Declaration,” Sudan Tribune, 

December 3, 2009, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33323; Flint, “Rhetoric and Reality,” 37; Julie Flint, 

“Civil Society and Doha: Where Next?” Making Sense of Sudan, SSRC Blog, December 4, 2009, http://blogs.ssrc.

org/sudan/2009/12/04/civil-society-and-doha/.

12. On October 29, 2009, the African Union Peace and Security Council reconstituted the AU High-Level Panel on 

Darfur (AUPD) as the AUHIP, also chaired by ex-South African president Thabo Mbeki.

13. Nelson Kasfir, “The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 36 

(no. 2): 1998, 1–20.

14. UNDP, “Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Darfur,” 2009, 2.2.

15. Flint, “Rhetoric and Reality,” 36.

16. Bec Hamilton, “Who, Exactly, Represented Darfuris in Doha?” www.bechamilton.com, November 23, 2009, http://

bechamilton.com/?p=1544.

17. Authors’ interviews with witnesses, Darfur, December 2009, and Doha, July 2010.

18. Authors’ interview with a JMST official and with General Ali Safi Al-Nur, Khartoum, December 2009. 

19. 24 Hours for Darfur, Darfurian Voices (New York: 24 Hours for Darfur, July 2010).

20. Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, interview with authors, location withheld, May 2009.

21. See, for instance, Abdelbagi Jibril, “Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?” Human Rights 

and Advocacy Network for Democracy (HAND), July 2010, 20.

22. JEM leader Suleiman Jamous, interview with authors, N’Djaména, Chad, March and April 2010; “JEM Directs 

Heavy Criticism at Darfur Mediators and UNAMID,” Sudan Tribune, April 14, 2010, www.sudantribune.com/spip.

php?article34751.

23. Authors’ interviews with various participants at Doha 1, Sudan, November–December 2009.

24. There is some overlap between both categories. UNDP, “Mapping,” 3.1.

25. Ibid., 1.3.

26. Ibid., 5.4.

27. Ibid., 3.1.

28. Authors’ interview with CSOs, Khartoum and El Fasher, November and December 2009.

29. UNDP, “Mapping,” 2.4.6.

30. Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, “The Emergence of Grassroots Security and Livelihood Agreements in Darfur” 

(unpublished report for the U.S. Agency for International Development, 2010), 27.

31. “Disturbance in Darfur’s IDP Camps,” HAND, August, 13, 2010.

32. 24 Hours for Darfur, Darfurian Voices, 22.

33. Adam Azzain Mohammed, The Darfur Crisis: Three Conflicts, Not One (Khartoum: Public Administration and 

Federalism Studies Institute, University of Khartoum, June 2008).

34. Salmon, Drivers of Change, 11.

35. Azzain Mohammed, The Darfur Crisis.

36. Authors’ interviews with various participants of Doha 1, Khartoum and Darfur, November–December 2009.
37. Authors’ interviews with civil society members and international officials, El Fasher, December 2009, and Doha, 

July 2010.

38. Authors’ interview with Chadian Zaghawa official, Chad, April 2010.

39. It is estimated that the Fur constitute around one-third of Darfur’s population.

40. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 62–64; Tanner and Tubiana, “The Emergence of Grassroots Security and 

Livelihood Agreements in Darfur”; Jérôme Tubiana, “‘Seule une tortue peut mordre une tortue’: accords entre 

groupes rebelles et communautés arabes au Darfour,” Politique Africaine 118 (2010): 205–24.

41. Authors’ interviews with Abbala leaders in JEM, Chad, March–April 2010.

42. Authors’ interviews with civil society members and Abbala militia leaders, Khartoum and Darfur, November–

December 2010.

43. Authors’ interview with Hemmeti, Nyala, December 2010.

44. Authors’ interview with a participant of the Doha Conference, Khartoum, December 2010.

45. Unpublished information provided by 24 Hours for Darfur.

46. Jérôme Tubiana, “Land and Power: The Case of the Zaghawa,” Making Sense of Sudan, SSRC Blog, May 2008, 

http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2008/05/28/land-and-power-the-case-of-the-zaghawa/.

Of Related Interest

•	 Why Sudan’s Popular Consultation Matters by Jason Gluck (Special Report, September 

2010)

•	 Local Justice in Southern Sudan by Cherry Leonardi, Leben Moro, John Ryle, Martina 

Santschi, and Deborah Isser (Peaceworks, September 2010)

•	 Scenarios for Sudan’s Future, Revisited by Jon Temin and Jaïr van der Lijn (Peace Brief, 

August 2010)

•	 Improving Natural Resource Management in Sudan by Paul Sullivan and Natalie Nasrallah 

(Special Report, June 2010)

•	 Negotiating Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements by Jon Temin (Peace Brief, January 

2010)

•	 Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political Violence through 2011 by Alan Schwartz (Special 

Report, August 2009)

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