IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Acme Standex, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1397 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: March 9, 2018

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Gomez and Roma :

Aluminum Co. Inc.), :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: November 20, 2018

Petitioner Acme Standex (Acme) petitions for review of an order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed the decision of the 

Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). The WCJ granted Freddie Gomez’s 

(Gomez) claim petition and denied Acme’s petition to join Roma Aluminum 

Company, Inc. (Roma) as an additional defendant. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Employment

Gomez worked for Acme as a sheet metal machine operator. Starting 

in 2010, Gomez began to experience pain in his right knee and both of his thumbs. 

Gomez’s pain gradually worsened, and, on October 5, 2012, Gomez told Acme’s 
2

owner that he could no longer work there. Within a month of leaving his 

employment with Acme, Gomez began working for Roma, a window company, 

where he worked until September 8, 2014, when Gomez underwent surgery on his 

right knee. On November 3, 2014, Gomez filed a claim petition under 

Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1against Acme, seeking workers’ 

compensation benefits starting October 5, 2012.

The WCJ held hearings starting on January 15, 2015. Because the 

testimony bears on the ultimate outcome of this case, we begin by recounting the 

relevant testimony in some detail.

B. Testimony Before the WCJ

1. Gomez

Gomez testified that he worked for Acme for 25 years. (Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 13a.) The position entailed about 55 hours a week of lifting heavy 

bundles of metal pipe and coils, weighing up to 70 pounds. (R.R. at 14a.) Pertinent 

to his workers’ compensation claim, Gomez testified that his position also required 

him to climb onto and jump down from Acme’s machinery. (R.R. at 14a, 17a.) The 

work for Acme caused him pain in both his knees, with the right knee being worse, 

and pain in his thumbs when his thumbs would “lock up.” (R.R. at 16a.) 

In 2010, when he began to experience pain, he reported his injuries to his supervisors 

and asked to be moved to a seated position, but his supervisors rejected his request. 

(R.R. at 17a.) He also requested that Acme send him to Acme’s workers’

compensation clinic or to a doctor, but his supervisors responded by telling him to 

“wait a while and see” if he continued to have issues with his knees and thumbs. 

(R.R. at 17a-18a.)

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708.
3

Gomez testified that the pain became bad enough that he decided to see 

a doctor on his own, rather than wait for Acme’s assistance in seeking treatment. 

(R.R. at 17a-18a.) He received cortisone shots in his knees, which helped to alleviate 

some of the pain. (R.R. at 19a, 20a.) He later went to Acme’s workers’ 

compensation clinic and received cortisone shots in his thumbs. (R.R. at 20a.) He 

used all of his sick days and vacation days trying to recover. (R.R. at 20a.) The 

cortisone shots provided only temporary relief, and his symptoms returned after he 

returned to work. (R.R. at 20a-21a.) He continuously complained to his supervisors 

that he was experiencing pain and repeatedly requested a seated position. 

(R.R. at 21a.) His pain worsened after Acme downsized in 2011-2012, which 

resulted in an increased workload for him. (R.R. at 21a.) He decided to stop working 

for Acme on October 5, 2012, because the pain became too great to continue 

working there. (R.R. at 22a.) 

Gomez testified that he started working for Roma, a window company, 

shortly after leaving Acme. (R.R. at 23a.) Initially, the workload at Roma was 

lighter than his workload with Acme. (R.R. at 23a-24a.) The work picked up after 

about a year, however, and Roma required him to lift heavier and heavier pieces of 

glass. (R.R. at 23a-24a.) As the work at Roma became more strenuous, his ailments 

slowed him down, and he needed frequent breaks. (R.R. at 24a.) He was only able 

to work at Roma for about a year and a half before he informed Roma’s owner that 

he needed to stop working and undergo surgery.2(R.R. at 23a, 223a-24a.)

 

2 At several points in Gomez’s testimony, the attorneys in this case questioned Gomez 

about the pain he was experiencing when he left his position at Acme relative to the pain he was 

experiencing when he left his position at Roma. Gomez gave varying answers that fell into three 

categories: (1) the pain was the same when he left Acme as when he left Roma; (2) the pain was 

worse when he left Roma, as evinced by the fact that he needed surgery when he left Roma; 

and (3) the pain levels went up and down with such frequency that he could not pinpoint the times 
4

Gomez testified that on September 8, 2014, Ira Sachs, M.D., performed 

surgery on his right knee. (R.R. at 25a.) The surgery did not improve his right knee 

pain. (R.R. at 26a-27a, 230a.) Following the surgery, he received physical therapy,

and Dr. Sachs prescribed him pain relievers. (R.R. at 26a.) He did not receive 

treatment for his thumb pain and left knee pain. (R.R. at 26a.) He testified that after 

surgery, he began to experience low back pain and that, due to that pain and his 

continued knee pain, he is unable to sit or stand for long periods of time. 

(R.R. at 217a, 235a-36a.) Gomez further testified that Dr. Sachs did not release him 

to return to work. (R.R. at 26a.) Moreover, Gomez did not believe, based on his 

ailments, that he would ever be able to work in his former position for Roma. 

(R.R. at 26a-27a.) Gomez has not worked since 2014. (R.R. at 231a.)

Finally, pertinent to the instant appeal, Gomez testified that his knee 

injuries had a gradual onset and that there was no specific incident that he believed 

caused his injuries. (R.R. at 222a-23a.)

2. Dr. Lipton

Andrew Lipton, D.O., testified on behalf of Gomez. He began treating 

Gomez in the Spring of 2015. At that time, Gomez complained of bilateral knee 

pain that worsened with sitting, standing, and walking, and that interfered with his 

sleep. (R.R. at 58a.) Dr. Lipton diagnosed Gomez with “bilateral[] knee pain with 

status post-arthroscopy of the right knee and low back pain.” (R.R. at 60a-61a.) Dr. 

 

when the pain was worse. In their briefs, the attorneys both express frustration at the discrepancy 

or selectively quote the portions of Gomez’s testimony that most benefit their arguments. We need 

not examine these discrepancies, however, because, as explained in the legal discussion below, in 

a workers’ compensation case, the resolution of conflicts in evidence is left to the WCJ. Williams 

v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 A.2d 137, 143-44 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2004).
5

Lipton testified that he reviewed an MRI of Gomez’s right knee from July 8, 2010

(2010 MRI). (R.R. at 61a.) Regarding that 2010 MRI, Dr. Lipton testified: “[T]he 

biggest impression was tear of the body of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus, 

likely a complex flap tear. Possibly a ganglion versus a parameniscal cyst, bursitis, 

and small popliteal cyst.”3(R.R. at 62a.) 

Dr. Lipton testified that Dr. Sachs performed surgery on Gomez “to 

treat his medial meniscus tear and flap, and it was an arthroscopy and synovectomy 

and a partial meniscectomy from my recollection.” (R.R. at 63a.) Dr. Lipton ordered 

an MRI to evaluate the knee for a “possible surgical reevaluation or re-intervention.” 

(R.R. at 61a.) His testimony continued: 

Q. What was significant, if anything, about the second 

MRI?

A. Well, the second MRI did pick up degenerative 

changes as its main impression, but then they [sic] 

also picked up an oblique tear of the posterior horn, 

which was on the first one, but they [sic] don’t 

mention anything about the flap. So I assume from 

the changes that’s the post-surgical changes that Dr. 

Sachs addressed, the piece that was flapping and

giving him issues, but did not address the oblique 

tear which was still there on 6/11/2015.

. . . .

Q. In the repeat study, are there any new findings or 

interval changes?

A. This may be better commented on by a radiologist, 

but the radiologist -- and there’s two different 

radiologists initially -- related the tear as a tear of 

the body of the posterior horn. The body is the 

widest part of it, implying across the body, likely a 

complex flap tear, versus the repeat MRI says 

 

3 Matthew McLean, M.D., ordered the MRI in 2010. Dr. McLean did not testify in this 

case. The record does, however, contain the radiology report that pertains to the 2010 MRI. (See

R.R. at 109a-10a.) 
6

oblique tear, which is a different kind of across, and 

angle tear. So it’s -- a possibility is that either an 

extension of the medial meniscus tear that was there 

before or a new tear.

Q. In your review of the surgical report, does it appear 

that Dr. Sachs visualized the findings and addressed 

them, or did he leave something, or can you make 

that opinion from your review of the surgical 

report?

A. From the surgical report and the differences in the 

five-year gap, that there’s no more flap tear, I can 

assume that the surgical intervention by Dr. Sachs 

addressed at least part of the tear or the flap tear, and 

that’s all I can assume from that.

Q. Can you say whether, if he had stopped working 

after he had worked for [Acme], he would have 

needed the surgery to address these findings 

from 2010 or not? Can you say --

A. There’s no way for me to comment on this. Not 

having my physical exam back then and five years 

between these images, there’s no way for me to 

comment on that.

(R.R. at 64a-65a, 80a-82a.)

Dr. Lipton testified that Gomez’s injuries were work related: 

Q. Doctor, can you explain for the Judge how his right 

knee issues are related to any work causation?

A. So, basically, we have somebody that presents with 

a[n] ongoing and repetitive stress issue over time, 

so there was no definitive, oh, I fell and I hurt it with 

one episode. He gives me the history an ongoing 

aggravation, like a degenerative change. So it’s 

hard to pinpoint the exact mechanism of injury 

when it’s repetitive and over a couple years’ period. 

But that would be my description of his source of 

injury.

(R.R. at 66a-67a.) The testimony continued:

Q. What’s your update and final diagnosis for him? 

A. Bilateral knee pain and low back pain.
7

Q. Are those both related to the work injury?

A. I see the clear correlation of the knee pain, and I 

believe due to the surgical intervention and the 

rehab, the low back pain is a likely compensatory 

type of response to walking on one leg or having 

pain in the knee for a couple of years. So he didn’t 

give any specific incident to when the back pain 

started, but he did report it after the surgery.

(R.R. at 67a-68a.)

Dr. Lipton testified that he believed Gomez aggravated his injuries 

while working at Roma. (R.R. at 90a.) In an attempt to discern the role that Gomez’s 

employment at Roma had on his injuries, counsel for Roma elicited the following 

testimony from Dr. Lipton:

Q. Do you know whether he was doing any jumping or 

any flexing of his knees while at Roma?

A. He reported to me incidentally that the job prior to 

Roma he was up and down and jumping, but the 

Roma job was carrying, loading and unloading of 

glass units.

Q. What’s the difference, if there’s any, in those two 

mechanisms, being up and down, if someone had to 

jump up onto a table and then climb down from a 

table, versus just carrying? Is there a difference in 

impact on the knees? 

A. There is. We typically see the jumping up and down 

causing more of an acute issue and a tear versus the 

up and down and carrying more of a degenerative 

issue and chronic.

Q. If you had to relate the findings shown on the 2010 

MRI to an acute cause or carrying -- an acute cause 

like you were just talking about, jumping up and 

down and flexing versus carrying, what would you 

say it was more related to, if you can say that? I 

don’t want you to -- 

A. Because of the flap and complex tear, I -- you 

know, my -- it would be a guess, but I would 
8

say that’s a -- more of an acute traumatic tear versus 

a degenerative change. That would be an opinion.

Q. Would that be more consistent with jumping up and 

down and getting up and down or carrying, if you 

can tell? 

A. It would be more consistent with jumping, but it 

could be either mechanism.

(R.R. at 91a-93a.) 

Dr. Lipton also testified regarding the report authored by Eugene A. 

Elia, M.D., who had conducted an independent medical examination of Gomez on 

behalf of Acme: 

Q. After you reviewed that, did you agree or disagree 

with anything that [Dr. Elia] found?

A. . . . [O]n his exam, [Dr. Elia] calls it trace synovitis. 

[Gomez] has been up and down on his exam with 

different amounts of fluid. I called it a bursitis and 

a joint effusion, and this surgeon [(Dr. Elia)] did 

not. 

. . . . 

This surgeon says there was no indication 

that he sustained a right medial meniscal tear at 

work. And, again, the exact history of when he 

developed this was hard to pinpoint, as he did report 

it over a two-year period. So I don’t see how he 

could say that definitely, just as I can’t say 

definitively it happened at work, but it makes sense 

from his history and the presentation and the 

imaging that this was a degenerative change and an 

aggravation of a meniscal tear.

(R.R. at 69a-70a.)

3. Dr. Elia

Dr. Elia testified and submitted an independent medical examination 

report on behalf of Acme. Dr. Elia testified that Gomez had “trace synovitis which 

is a very mild inflammation.” (R.R. at 139a.) He testified that range of motion in 
9

Gomez’s right knee was 0 to 130 degrees, as compared to 0 to 135 degrees on the 

left. (R.R. at 139a.) Dr. Elia testified that Gomez had no effusion (water in his 

knee), no tenderness along the cartilage or meniscus, no tenderness of the back of 

the knee, no tenderness or crepitus (a cracking sensation) in the kneecap, no sign of 

an anterior cruciate ligament or meniscus tear, no fullness, and Gomez’s knee 

strength was a “five out of five.” (R.R. at 139a.) He testified that Gomez’s left knee 

was “completely normal.” (R.R. at 139a.) 

Dr. Elia initially testified that he did not believe Gomez suffered a right 

medial meniscus tear while he was working at Acme (between 1987 and 2012). 

(R.R. at 145a-46a.) He then testified that the 2010 MRI showed “a tear of the medial 

meniscus” as well as “other small findings like a small ganglion cyst and some 

bursitis.” (R.R. at 156a.) Dr. Elia also testified that Gomez underwent surgery on 

September 8, 2014 to repair the same tear shown in the 2010 MRI. (R.R. at 168a.) 

Thus, although Dr. Elia’s testimony begins by positing that Gomez did not tear his 

meniscus at Acme, it ends by acknowledging that he tore his meniscus while at 

Acme, but it was not disabling until after he left his employment at Acme. 

Part of Dr. Elia’s testimony appears to reflect Acme’s position as to 

why Gomez’s 2010 MRI evinced a torn meniscus but he continued to work and did 

not undergo surgery until 2014:

Q. Doctor, is the finding of a tear in and of itself a 

disabling event for patients?

A. No, not at all.

Q. Can you explain that to the Judge why it’s not in and 

of itself a disabling event?

A. Well, many of us have -- actually have tears of our 

cartilage or meniscus in the knees and we’re 

basically asymptomatic. It’s the symptomatic and 

disabling ones that need to be treated.
10

Q. And specifically, Doctor, based upon your review 

of the other medical records in this case and 

[Gomez’s] testimony, was this finding, in and of 

itself a disabling event for [Gomez]?

A. No, it wasn’t because there was no 

recommendations at the time that I know for 

surgery, and certainly he was able to continue 

working in a fairly vigorous job at Acme without 

having any restrictions or problems.

Q. And, specifically, given the date of this test that was 

performed in 2010, he continued to work based on 

your understanding for how long?

A. Two years.

Q. An [sic] then even following those two years, how 

long did he work at Roma until the surgery was 

performed?

A. Until almost another two years.

Q. Doctor, you touched upon this in your last answer, 

but is it possible for someone to have another tear 

of their [sic] medial meniscus and be 

asymptomatic?

A. Certainly.

Q. Do you ever see patients who have objective 

findings like a tear who are initially asymptomatic 

and then become symptomatic?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever had patients or have you ever 

reviewed any medical records regarding patients 

who demonstrate an objective findings [sic] like a 

meniscus tear and that surgery is not immediately 

recommended or needed?

A. Yes.

Q. And, specifically, in this case, Doctor, do you have 

an opinion as to whether a change in [Gomez’s]

condition took place at a given time that would then 

warrant surgery?

A. There doesn’t appear to be an incident that would 

have created that need.
11

Q. But eventually [Gomez] did undergo surgery in 

2014?

A. He did.

Q. Are you able to testify within a reasonable degree 

of medical certainty as to a specific event that would 

have caused that need for surgery?

A. No.

Q. Is it possible that [Gomez’s] work duties at the 

window and glass company, the second job, would 

have caused the need to have a surgery?

A. Not specifically. There would have been an 

incident that would have created an almost 

disabling event and he would have had severe pain 

and not been able to continue working.

Q. Is it possible that his increase in symptoms were 

caused by his job while working at the glass 

company?

A. It’s possible. 

Q. Is it possible that [Gomez’s] increase in pain was 

due to a completely unrelated work event outside of 

any job that he would have been performing?

A. Yes.

(R.R. at 156a-59a.)

Summarizing this testimony, Dr. Elia’s position appears to be that 

Gomez’s meniscus tear was not disabling prior to his departure from employment 

with Acme; the disabling event could have occurred while Gomez was employed at 

Roma, or it could have occurred from activities outside of work. (See R.R. at 171a 

(“Just getting out of bed can tear your meniscus or putting in a light bulb up on a 

ladder or cleaning leaves out of a gutter . . . .”).)

Dr. Elia concluded that Gomez strained both his knees. (R.R. at 145a.) 

He testified that Gomez had fully recovered from those knee strains and did not 

require any additional medical treatment. (R.R. at 146a-47a.) He further testified 
12

that Gomez could return to work without any restrictions and that he was able to 

work in a role such as the position he held at Acme. (R.R. at 146a.) 

On cross-examination, Dr. Elia acknowledged that he did not know 

how many hours Gomez worked at Acme, if he worked weekends, or how many 

times per day at Acme Gomez was required to climb onto and jump down from 

machinery. (R.R. at 163a-64a.)

4. Dr. Nolan

Roma called John P. Nolan, M.D., who also conducted an independent 

medical examination of Gomez. Dr. Nolan testified that the 2010 MRI showed that 

Gomez had a medial meniscus tear in his right knee. (R.R. at 303a.) He testified 

that he could not determine what caused the meniscus tear in 2010 or if there was 

any work injury. (R.R. at 304a-05a.) He testified that the findings in the 2010 MRI 

justified surgery and Gomez may have needed surgery then. (R.R. at 316a, 332a.) 

There was no evidence that Gomez aggravated his injury while working at Roma, as 

the surgery addressed the same tear that was shown in the 2010 MRI. (R.R. at 333a.) 

Dr. Nolan testified that, based on what Gomez reported, Gomez’s tear was 

symptomatic in 2010 when he had the MRI because a doctor would not have ordered 

an MRI if Gomez was not symptomatic. (R.R. at 313a.) Finally, Dr. Nolan testified 

that while Gomez may have some arthritis and might benefit from some additional 

medical treatment, there was nothing that he noticed during his examination of 

Gomez that would preclude Gomez from returning to work. (R.R. at 331a-32a.)

5. Jacob Gulli

Roma’s owner, Jacob Gulli (Gulli), testified regarding Gomez’s 

employment at Roma. Gulli testified that before he hired Gomez, he made it clear 

that the job required Gomez to be on his feet all day. (R.R. at 263a.) He emphasized 
13

that the job entailed lifting: “It did involve lifting, yes. And that’s one thing we 

stated when we hire anybody, that they have to be physically able to do anything.” 

(R.R. at 285a-86a.) Gomez did inform him that he left his old job because he was

injured there, but Gomez stressed that his injuries would not affect his ability to 

perform the duties of the position at Roma. (R.R. at 263a.) Gulli acknowledged that 

Gomez’s personnel file did reflect that Gomez had bad knees. (R.R. at 264a.) The 

notation about Gomez’s knees appeared to be in the handwriting of Gulli’s daughter, 

who worked at Roma at the time. (R.R. at 264a.) While Gomez did inform him that 

he was injured at his last job, Gulli did not know the injuries related to Gomez’s 

knees. (R.R. at 291a.)

Gulli testified that Gomez’s position entailed cutting glass, washing 

glass, assembling window units, finishing window units, and moving glass from one 

area to another. (R.R. at 261a-62a.) Gomez did not appear to have any issues 

performing his job duties. (R.R. at 265a.) Gomez never approached him to report 

an injury or made any other indication that his job at Roma worsened his injuries. 

(R.R. at 273a.) He interacted with Gomez on a daily basis and he would have 

approached Gomez if he noticed any limping or other indication of an injury. 

(R.R. at 271a-72a, 283a.)

Gulli testified that he first learned of Gomez’s knee issues when Gomez 

informed him about the surgery. (R.R. at 274a.) Gomez informed Gulli that his

doctor told him that he had to have knee surgery and that “if he didn’t have surgery, 

he would have collapsed, [and] that would have been the end of his knees.” 

(R.R. at 284a.) Gomez initially told Gulli that he would miss 4 to 6 weeks of work. 

(R.R. at 276a.) After 7 to 8 weeks of missed work, Gulli called Gomez to ask about 

the prolonged absence. (R.R. at 276a.) Gomez informed Gulli that he was still 
14

experiencing a lot of pain, so much so that he could not attend physical therapy. 

(R.R. at 277a.) After another doctor’s appointment, Gomez informed Gulli that he 

would miss at least 6 more weeks of work so that he could attend physical therapy. 

(R.R. at 278a.) Counsel for Acme questioned Gulli about the prospect of Gomez 

filing a Workers’ Compensation claim against Roma:

Q. So at no point did you suggest he go through 

Workers’ Compensation, correct? 

A. No sir, because I was never told that it was an injury 

that occurred at [Roma].

. . . .

Q. Do you think he might have been afraid to file a 

Workers’ Compensation claim for fear that he 

would lose his job? 

A. No, sir, because I never indicate -- the first thing I 

tell an employee when he comes in, the day you step 

in here, you’re [covered] under Workman’s [sic] 

Comp.

(R.R. at 289a-90a.)

C. WCJ Decision

On June 16, 2016, the WCJ issued a decision and order, granting 

Gomez’s claim petition against Acme and denying the joinder petition against Roma. 

The WCJ determined that Gomez met his burden of proving that he sustained a 

work-related injury of his right knee, but that he did not meet his burden regarding 

the remaining injuries of the claim petition—i.e., his hand injuries and the low back 

injury. The WCJ based his decision primarily on the following findings of fact: 

12. This Judge finds the testimony of [Gomez] credible 

that he sustained a work[-]related injury to his knees 

while working for Acme as the result of jumping off 

and on machines and that he could no longer 

continue working for Acme because of the pain in 

his knees. In so finding, this Judge notes that 

[Gomez’s] job duties were not contradicted. Acme 
15

also did not contradict that [Gomez] had reported 

his knee pain and asked for lighter duty work. 

[Gomez] stopped working at Acme and the same 

month obtained a job at Roma which he thought was 

going to be lighter. The job was lighter at first and 

then became heavier which caused his knees to 

become more symptomatic. [Gomez] was never 

pain free after he stopped working for Roma.

13. This Judge finds the testimony of Dr. Lipton 

credible that on October 5, 2012 [Gomez] sustained 

a right knee medial meniscal tear which resulted in 

surgery on September 8, 2014 and a left knee strain

as the result of his repetitive and stressful job duties 

at Acme and that he has not recovered from the right 

knee injury. This Judge finds that [Gomez’s]

surgery and his job duties at Roma were a 

recurrence of the original injury at Acme. In so 

finding, this Judge notes that [Gomez] had worked 

for Acme for 25 years and Dr. Lipton credibly 

testified that [Gomez’s] knee condition was the

result of his longstanding and repetitive job duties. 

While Dr. Lipton’s testimony was equivocal 

regarding the exact mechanism of the tear, he did 

note that it was more consistent with an acute 

trauma as the resulting [sic] of the jumping [Gomez]

did at Acme. Dr. Lipton did unequivocally testify 

that [Gomez’s] repetitive and physically stressful 

job duties aggravated the right knee such that he 

had to stop working on October 5, 2012. Where the 

testimony of Dr. Lipton conflicts with the testimony 

of Drs. Elia and Nolan pertaining to the right knee, 

this Judge accepts the testimony of Dr. Lipton and 

rejects the testimony of Drs. Elia and Nolan.

14. This Judge does not find Dr. Elia’s testimony 

credible that [Gomez] only sustained a right knee 

strain and sprain while working at Acme from 

which he had recovered. In so finding, this Judge 

notes that the 2010 MRI of the right knee showed a 

tear of the body of the posterior horn of the medial 

meniscus. In addition, Dr. Elia admitted that he did 

not know how many hours a week [Gomez] worked 

for Acme or how often [Gomez] had to jump off and 
16

on the machines. Dr. Elia also agreed that an 

asymptomatic degenerative condition can become 

symptomatic as the result of repetitive trauma. Dr. 

Elia did not see any records that indicated that 

[Gomez] reported knee pain from any activities 

outside of work. This Judge finds the testimony of 

Dr. Elia credible that [Gomez] sustained a left knee 

strain but not credible that he had fully recovered 

from the injuries to his knees. Dr. Elia’s opinion of 

full recovery is rejected as this Judge accepts the 

testimony of [Gomez] and Dr. Lipton on this issue.

15. This Judge does not find the testimony of Dr. Nolan 

credible that [Gomez’s] meniscal tear and surgery 

were not caused or aggravated by his employment 

at Acme. In so finding, this Judge notes that Dr. 

Nolan could not render an unequivocal opinion as 

to the cause of the meniscal tear in 2010. However, 

Dr. Nolan did agree that [Gomez’s] job duties at 

Acme could have caused or aggravated the knee 

pain [Gomez] was experiencing in 2010. Dr. Nolan 

further agreed that the findings in the 2010 MRI 

would have justified surgery at that time.

16. This Judge notes that Dr. Lipton did not offer any 

testimony that he treated [Gomez’s] hands and did 

not render an opinion on causation. This Judge 

further notes that Dr. Lipton did not offer 

unequivocal testimony that [Gomez] sustained a 

work[-]related low back injury. Dr. Lipton testified 

it was harder to correlate a low back injury to the 

work injury because [Gomez] did not relate low 

back pain while working. Dr. Lipton’s testimony on 

this issue was equivocal.

17. This Judge finds the testimony of [Gulli] credible 

that [Gomez] did not complain to him that his job 

duties caused him to have knee problems and that 

he did not observe [Gomez] perform his job with 

any difficulty. [Gulli] was aware [Gomez] went out 

of work for knee surgery but was not aware there 

was an allegation that his knee was worsened by his 

job duties at Roma until the Joinder Petition was 

filed.
17

18. This Judge finds that [Gomez] sustained a 

work[-]related injury on October 5, 2012 while 

working for Acme in the nature of a right knee 

medial meniscal tear which resulted in surgery on 

September 8, 2014 and a left knee strain as the result 

of his repetitive and stressful job duties. [Gomez]

sustained a recurrence of said injury while working 

for Roma which resulted in surgery and disability as 

of September 8, 2014. In so finding, this Judge 

notes that [Gomez] had worked for Acme for 25 

years and had to stop working in October 2012 

because of knee pain. He began working for Roma 

later that month in a lighter position. The job at 

Roma became heavier and [Gomez] sustained a 

recurrence of his symptoms. This Judge finds it 

significant that the 2010 MRI of the right knee 

showed a tear of the body of the posterior horn of 

the medial meniscus.

(R.R. at 363a-65a (emphasis added).)

D. Board Decision

On September 8, 2017, the Board issued an opinion and order, 

affirming the decision of the WCJ. The Board determined that the WCJ did not err 

in granting Gomez’s claim petition because the record evidence demonstrated that 

he sustained an injury during the course and scope of his employment with Acme. 

The Board also determined that the WCJ correctly denied Acme’s joinder petition. 

The Board reasoned that Gomez had surgery in 2014 to treat the same injury that 

Gomez had while he worked at Acme and, thus, Gomez suffered a recurrence rather 

than an aggravation of that injury. Next, the Board determined that Gomez’s claim 

petition was timely under Section 315 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 602. Citing Williamette 

Industries v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lockett), 647 A.2d 665 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), the Board reasoned that in cases of cumulative trauma, where 

there is no specific injury-causing event, courts look to the last day of employment 

as the date of injury. As such, the Board reasoned that the date of injury for Gomez’s 
18

claim was October 5, 2012, and he therefore met the 3-year statute of limitations. 

Finally, the Board determined that the WCJ did not disregard any evidence and 

issued a well-reasoned decision. 

E. Issues on Appeal

On appeal,4 Acme presents five arguments for our consideration. First, 

Acme contends that several of the WCJ’s findings of fact are not supported by 

substantial evidence. Second, Acme argues that Dr. Lipton’s testimony was 

equivocal. Third, Acme argues that the WCJ’s decision was not well-reasoned in 

that it did not address the distinction between a recurrence and an aggravation and 

additionally failed to explain the WCJ’s findings. Fourth, Acme argues that 

Gomez’s claim petition was untimely because he was injured in 2010 but did not file 

his claim petition until 2014. Finally, Acme argues that substantial evidence 

supported the denial of the claim petition and the granting of the joinder petition. 

In response, Gomez argues that the WCJ’s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence and was reasoned and that Gomez’s claim petition was timely. 

As to Dr. Lipton’s testimony, Gomez argues that the testimony, taken as a whole, 

was not equivocal in that Dr. Lipton opined that Gomez’s injuries were consistent

with the repetitive jumping up and down movements associated with his job at 

Acme. As to the timeliness of the claim petition, Gomez argues that his claim 

 

4 This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. 

C.S. § 704. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “in construing the Act we are mindful that 

the Act was intended to benefit the injured employee, and, therefore, must be construed liberally 

in the employee’s favor in order to effectuate its humanitarian objectives.” Gentex Corp. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Morack), 23 A.3d 528, 534 (Pa. 2011) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1928(c)). 

“As such, borderline interpretations are to be decided in favor of the claimant.” Id. 
19

petition was timely because, when an injury is cumulative, the injury date for 

purposes of the statute of limitations is the last day worked rather than the date of 

diagnosis. Thus, the statute of limitations did not begin to run in 2010 as a result of 

the 2010 MRI, it began to run on October 5, 2012, when Gomez stopped working 

for Acme. Finally, as to the WCJ’s denial of Roma’s joinder petition, Gomez argues 

that he suffered a recurrence of the original injury at Roma rather than an 

aggravation, because his work at Roma did not materially contribute to his disability. 

The WCJ, therefore, correctly denied the joinder petition seeking to join Roma.

Roma also filed a brief. Roma first agrees with Acme that the WCJ’s 

decision granting the claim petition was not based on substantial, competent, and 

unequivocal medical evidence. Roma also sides with Acme that Gomez’s claim 

petition is untimely under the statute of limitations. Roma argues, alternatively and 

now diverging from Acme’s position, that if this Court does affirm Gomez’s claim 

petition, then the WCJ correctly determined that the re-emergence of Gomez’s knee 

pain was a recurrence rather than an aggravation.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence

At the outset, we note that it is well settled that the WCJ is the sole 

arbiter of credibility and evidentiary weight. Womack v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Sch. Dist. of Phila.), 83 A.3d 1139, 1154 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 

94 A.3d 1011 (Pa. 2014). In determining whether the WCJ’s findings are supported 

by substantial evidence, we may not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of the 

witnesses but must simply determine whether the WCJ’s findings have the requisite 

measure of support in the record as a whole. Elk Mountain Ski Resort, Inc. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tietz, deceased), 114 A.3d 27, 32 n.5 
20

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). It is irrelevant whether there is evidence to support a contrary 

finding; if substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s necessary findings, we may not 

disturb those findings on appeal. Williams, 862 A.2d at 143-44.

It is also well settled that with respect to a claim petition, the claimant 

bears the burden of proving all elements necessary for an award. Inglis House v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993). Pursuant to 

Section 301(c)(1) of the Act,

5

an employee’s injuries are compensable if they 

“(1) arise[] in the course of employment and (2) [are] causally related thereto.” 

ICT Group v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Churchray˗Woytunick), 

995 A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Further, an employee must demonstrate that 

he is disabled as a consequence of the work-related injury. Cromie v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Anchor Hocking Corp.), 600 A.2d 677, 679 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). 

Unequivocal medical evidence is required where it is not obvious that an injury is 

causally related to the work incident. Id. “The question of whether expert medical 

testimony is unequivocal, and, thus, competent evidence to support factual 

determinations is a question of law subject to our review.” Amandeo v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “In such 

cases, we review the testimony as a whole and may not base our analysis on a few 

words taken out of context.” Id. “Taking a medical expert’s testimony as a whole, 

it will be found to be equivocal if it is based only upon possibilities, is vague, and 

leaves doubt.” Kurtz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Waynesburg College), 

794 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). “[M]edical testimony is unequivocal if a 

medical expert testifies, after providing a foundation for the testimony, that, in his 

 

5

77 P.S. § 411(1).
21

professional opinion, he believes or thinks a fact exists.” O’Neill v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (News Corp. Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

Here, Acme challenges the WCJ’s credibility determination set forth in 

Finding of Fact 12. Acme contends that “the WCJ erred by finding [Gomez] credible 

that he sustained a work-related injury to his knees while working for Acme, and 

stopped working for Acme [due to] the pain in his knees[,]” because such finding is 

not supported by the record. (Acme’s Br. at 11.) Stated more simply, it appears that 

Acme takes issue with the WCJ’s reliance on Gomez’s testimony to establish 

causation. Given, however, that Gomez was required to establish causation through 

unequivocal medical evidence because the cause of his injuries was not obvious, 

Gomez’s testimony relative to causation is irrelevant to the WCJ’s decision. See 

Cromie, 600 A.2d at 679. In addition, when we read Finding of Fact 12 in its 

entirety, it appears that the WCJ intended Finding of Fact 12 not to establish 

causation but rather as a mechanism to credit Gomez’s testimony relative to the 

description of his job duties at Acme and the fact that he stopped working for Acme 

due to the pain in his knees, because without such testimony there would be no 

factual basis to support Dr. Lipton’s opinion that Gomez’s knee injuries were

causally related to his job at Acme. The WCJ’s findings in that regard are supported 

by the record as Gomez testified: (1) his position at Acme required him to climb 

onto and jump down from machinery; (2) his position at Acme caused him to 

experience pain in both his knees; and (3) he stopped working for Acme on 

October 5, 2012 because of the pain in his knees. (See R.R. at 14a, 16a-17a, 22a.)

Acme also challenges the WCJ’s credibility determination set forth in 

Finding of Fact 13. Acme contends that the WCJ erred by finding Dr. Lipton’s 

testimony credible to establish that Gomez sustained a repetitive injury to his knees 
22

on October 5, 2012, while working for Acme, because the WCJ determined that 

Dr. Lipton’s testimony was equivocal regarding the mechanism of Gomez’s injury. 

In so doing, Acme focuses its arguments on the WCJ’s inconsistent findings with 

respect to the cause of the medial meniscus tear. In other words, Acme questions 

how the WCJ could find that Dr. Lipton’s testimony established that Gomez 

sustained a right knee medial meniscus tear on October 5, 2012, but also find that 

Dr. Lipton’s testimony was equivocal regarding the exact mechanism of the medial 

meniscus tear. While we agree that there are inconsistencies in the WCJ’s findings 

with respect to the underlying cause of the medial meniscus tear and that such 

findings may not be supported by substantial evidence, a finding regarding the cause 

of the medial meniscus tear was not necessary to the WCJ’s determination in this 

matter. The operative question is not when the medial meniscus tear itself occurred, 

but, rather, when the medial meniscus tear became disabling. In that regard, the 

WCJ found that Dr. Lipton unequivocally testified that Gomez’s “repetitive and 

physically stressful job duties [at Acme] aggravated the right knee such that he had 

to stop working on October 5, 2012.” (R.R. at 364a.) This finding is supported by 

the record. 

Dr. Lipton’s testimony, taken as a whole, establishes that Gomez 

suffered an aggravation of his right knee medial meniscus tear and bilateral knee 

pain while working for Acme on October 5, 2012. Dr. Lipton related Gomez’s knee 

injuries to the repetitive stress that Gomez endured while working for Acme—i.e., 

the climbing onto and jumping down from machinery. While Dr. Lipton admitted 

that it is “hard to pinpoint the exact mechanism of injury when [it is] repetitive and 

over a couple years’ period[,]” the law does not require him to do so. As explained 

more fully below, in a repetitive trauma/aggravation case, every aggravation is a new 
23

injury and the last date the aggravation occurs constitutes the date of the injury. See 

Armco, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mattern), 667 A.2d 710, 717 

(Pa. 1995). In other words, Dr. Lipton recognized that Gomez suffered a new 

aggravation of his right knee medial meniscus tear each day that he was required to 

climb onto and jump down from machinery at Acme. Dr. Lipton’s testimony

relating Gomez’s knee injuries to his work at Acme, coupled with Gomez’s 

testimony that he stopped working for Acme on October 5, 2012, due to the pain in 

his knees, establishes the necessary causal connection between Gomez’s knee 

injuries and his work at Acme. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the WCJ’s 

decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 

B. Aggravation versus Recurrence

In Pennsylvania workers’ compensation law, where a case presents a 

fact pattern in which there is an injury and subsequent worsening of the injury, 

Pennsylvania courts distinguish between a “recurrence” and an “aggravation” of the 

initial injury. A recurrence occurs where a disability results directly from a prior 

injury that re-emerges from an intervening incident that does not contribute 

materially to the disability. SKF USA, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Smalls), 

728 A.2d 385, 387 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1999). An 

aggravation, or new injury, occurs where the intervening incident does materially 

contribute to the renewed disability.6 Id. Whether or not the intervening incident 

 

6 This Court clarified in SKF USA that aggravation versus recurrence cases are not meant 

to suggest that the intervening incident in no way contributes to the disability: 

In most situations where this sort of dispute arises, both the original injury and the 

subsequent occurrence contribute in some way to the disability at issue. 

Nonetheless, in order to adjudicate the rights of the parties, we frequently must 

attribute causation of the current disability to one event or the other.
24

materially contributed to the disability is a question of fact to be determined by the 

WCJ. S. Abington Twp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Becker & ITT Specialty Risk 

Servs.), 831 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).

In the instant matter, this distinction between Gomez suffering an 

aggravation or a recurrence bears on the nub of the case—the operative question: 

Who pays, Acme or Roma? When a workers’ compensation claimant has sustained 

a recurrence of a prior injury, the employer at the time of the initial injury will be 

held liable for all disability benefits resulting from the re-emergence of the injury. 

Pope & Talbot v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pawlowski), 949 A.2d 361, 369 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2008). If, on the other hand, the claimant suffers an aggravation, the current

employer is responsible for all medical and wage loss benefits arising from the new 

injury. Id. Here, the WCJ held Acme liable because the WCJ determined that 

Gomez suffered a mere recurrence of his disabling knee injuries. That is, the WCJ 

determined Gomez’s work at Roma did not materially contribute to his disabling 

injuries. Had the WCJ determined that Gomez suffered an aggravation at Roma, 

then Roma, rather than Acme, would be liable.

Acme’s argument that Gomez suffered an aggravation, rather than a 

recurrence, fails first because, as stated above, that determination is a factual one, 

made by the WCJ. S. Abington Twp., 831 A.2d at 181. We do not disturb a WCJ’s 

factual determinations on appeal, provided they are supported by substantial 

evidence. In support of its argument, Acme argues that the WCJ could not have 

determined that Gomez suffered an aggravation while working at Acme but only 

suffered a recurrence at Roma, but offers no authority in support thereof. To the 

 

SKF USA, 728 A.2d at 387. Thus, whether to assign liability to the second employer, the focus of 

the Court’s analysis is to determine if the second employment materially contributed to the 

disability. Id.
25

extent Acme argues that the WCJ’s recurrence determination is not supported by 

substantial evidence, the credited testimony in this case defeats that argument. 

Gomez worked for Acme for 25 years, while he worked for Roma for less 

than 2 years. As explained more fully above, Dr. Lipton opined that Gomez’s job 

duties at Acme, climbing onto and jumping down from machinery, caused his knee 

injuries. Gomez was able to perform at Roma because, at least initially, his job 

duties were less physically demanding than his job duties at Acme. Just because the 

WCJ could have reached a contrary finding is nihil ad rem, beside the point. Verizon 

Pa., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mills), 116 A.3d 1157, 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Frantz), 

790 A.2d 1084, 1088 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Even though there may be evidence 

which might indicate a contrary conclusion, the decision of the WCJ must be 

affirmed if substantial evidence is presented to support the WCJ’s finding.”). Here, 

the testimony and evidence presented to the WCJ entailed “relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support” the finding that Gomez 

suffered a recurrence of his knee injuries while at Roma. Stepp v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 601 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

The Board did not err by affirming on this ground.

C. Statute of Limitations

Acme next argues that Gomez’s claim petition was untimely and that 

the WCJ and the Board erred in determining that October 5, 2012, was the date of 

injury. Section 315 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 602, provides a 3-year statute of repose for
26

filing a workers’ compensation claim petition.

7

 The “‘[f]ailure to file a claim within 

the statutorily prescribed period extinguishes the right, as well as the remedy, under 

the . . . Act.’” Armco, 667 A.2d at 715 (quoting Berwick Indus. v. Workmen’s Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Spaid), 643 A.2d 1066, 1067 (Pa. 1994)). 

Citing to cases such as Armco, Acme and Roma emphasize that the 

statute of repose begins to run on the date of injury, rather than the date of disability. 

Acme and Roma further argue that where an employee has lost no time from work, 

the date of injury is the date of diagnosis under Brooks v. Workmen’s Compensation

Appeal Board (Anchor Glass Container), 624 A.2d 821 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal 

denied, 637 A.2d 291 (Pa. 1993), and Piad Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Moskyok), 761 A.2d 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), appeal denied, 

771 A.2d 1292 (Pa. 2001). Thus, Acme and Roma argue that the statute of repose 

should have begun to run in 2010 after the 2010 MRI revealed a tear in Gomez’s 

medial meniscus. Roma also argues (separately from Acme) that if this Court

determines that Gomez’s claim petition was timely, then the WCJ correctly found 

that Acme was the responsible employer. 

In response to the arguments by the employers, Gomez argues that the 

WCJ correctly determined that his date of injury was October 5, 2012. Gomez 

argues that this matter is more analogous to USAir, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation 

 

7 Section 315 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, 

unless, within three years after the injury, the parties shall have agreed upon the 

compensation payable under this [Article III]; or unless within three years after the 

injury, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in [Article IV] 

hereof.

(Emphasis added.)
27

Appeal Board (Schwarz), 634 A.2d 714 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).

8

 Under USAir, Gomez 

argues, the date of injury in this case should be the final day of employment at Acme 

because he suffered aggravations of his meniscus tear until the time he left. 

In Brooks, a machinist at a glass container manufacturer developed 

carpal tunnel syndrome for which he received a diagnosis in May 1985. The 

machinist continued to work until 1988 when he underwent surgery. The machinist 

filed a claim petition in June 1989. Finding he filed his claim more than 3 years 

after the date of his injury, the referee (predecessor to the WCJ) dismissed his 

petition as untimely, and the Board affirmed. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed 

as well. We reasoned that the machinist was aware of his injury in 1985 but failed 

to file until nearly four years later. We also distinguished precedent from this Court 

by noting that the machinist was aware of the work-relatedness of his injury when 

he received his diagnosis and, in contrast to hearing loss cases, in Brooks there was 

no “special difficulty as far as isolating a single moment in time when the injury has 

occurred.” Brooks, 624 A.2d at 824.

Months after we decided Brooks, we decided USAir. In USAir, a flight 

attendant during the 1970s and 1980s developed pain in her feet as a result of USAir 

requiring her to wear high heels and be on her feet for long periods of time. In 

October 1989, the flight attendant underwent surgery on her feet and informed 

USAir that her injuries were work related. In March 1990, the flight attendant filed 

a claim petition. The flight attendant’s surgeon opined that her injuries were 

“certainly aggravated” after the initial onset of foot pain by continuing to work long 

 

8 Gomez also cites to Curran v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Maxwell 

Industries), 664 A.2d 667 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), appeal denied, 673 A.2d 337 (Pa. 1996), and 

Roberts v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Double R Enterprises), 719 A.2d 847 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998), but does not develop an argument regarding those cases. 
28

hours in high heels. USAir, 634 A.2d at 715 (emphasis omitted). The referee

dismissed her claim as untimely under Section 311 of the Act9(providing a 120-day 

period for providing notice to the employer of an injury); the referee reasoned that 

she had known about her injuries for 10 years but failed to notify USAir. 

On appeal to this Court, we vacated and remanded so that the referee 

could make a finding of fact addressing the credibility of the flight attendant’s 

surgeon’s opinion that the flight attendant aggravated her injuries. If the flight 

attendant suffered daily aggravations, the date of injury would be her last day 

worked, but we were precluded in our analysis due to the lack of a factual finding 

regarding that testimony.10 Notably, in USAir, we distinguished Brooks. We 

explained that Brooks was distinguishable because, unlike the flight attendant in 

USAir, the machinist in Brooks “presented no medical evidence to the effect that by 

performing daily work duties, [the machinist] suffered a new injury each day on the 

job.” USAir, 634 A.2d at 718 n.7. 

In Piad, the employer’s two successive insurance carriers disputed 

which would be held liable to a tool and die maker diagnosed with carpal tunnel 

syndrome, epicondylitis, and tendonitis. The first carrier was the carrier when the 

tool and die maker first became symptomatic for his injuries but before he received 

a medical diagnosis or incurred any medical expenses. The second carrier was the 

 

9

77 P.S. § 631.

10 Judge McGinley concurred in USAir, and wrote separately to recount extensively the 

not-always-clear nature of the caselaw in this area. USAir, 634 A.2d at 719-25 (McGinley, J., 

concurring). He concluded, “I believe we must establish a uniform approach to these types of 

cases and that claimants suffering work-related injuries similar to the one here should receive 

benefits.” Id. at 725. Concerning notice under Section 311 of the Act, Judge McGinley wrote: 

“Although employers certainly have an interest in learning of such matters at the earliest possible 

date[,] the penalty of dismissing otherwise meritorious claims because the claimant continues to 

work with pain after a diagnosis is very unfair and not within the spirit of the Act.” Id.
29

carrier when the tool and die maker received the diagnosis and subsequent medical 

expenses. We determined that the date of diagnosis, the latter of the two potential 

injury dates, was the operative date in Piad. 

We agree with Gomez that the 3-year statute of repose began to run on 

the last day that he aggravated his meniscus tear—October 5, 2012. While USAir

addressed the date of injury as it applied to timeliness under Section 311 of the Act

(relating to notice to an employer), both the Supreme Court and this Court have 

applied the same logic to timeliness under Section 315 of the Act. Armco, 

667 A.2d at 717; Williamette Indus., 647 A.2d at 668. Aggravations are treated as 

new injuries. “Accordingly, the last day the aggravation occurs, which will most 

often be the last day of work, is the date from which the [3-]year limitation should 

be calculated.” Armco, 667 A.2d at 717. Here, the WCJ determined that Gomez 

suffered continuous aggravations of his meniscus tear until he left his employment 

with Acme. That determination is supported by the credited testimony of Gomez 

and Dr. Lipton. Thus, Gomez’s last day at Acme was his “date of injury” for 

purposes of Section 315 of the Act. The Board did not err, therefore, by determining 

that Gomez’s claim petition was timely.11 

D. Reasoned Decision

Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834, requires that a WCJ issue a 

reasoned decision, providing, in pertinent part:

All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a 

reasoned decision containing findings of fact and 

 

11 The cases cited by the employers, Brooks and Piad, are inapplicable. As we noted in 

USAir, Brooks did not involve medical evidence of aggravations of the machinist’s injury. See

USAir, 634 A.2d at 718 n.7. Piad appears to be useful to the limited situations where a court must 

address which of an employer’s successive insurance carriers was responsible for benefits. Neither 

aid in our analysis of determining the date of injury where there is medical evidence of regular 

aggravations following a diagnosis.
30

conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole 

which clearly and concisely states and explains the 

rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why 

and how a particular result was reached. The workers’ 

compensation judge shall specify the evidence upon which 

the workers’ compensation judge relies and state the 

reasons for accepting it in conformity with this section. 

When faced with conflicting evidence, the workers’ 

compensation judge must adequately explain the reasons 

for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. 

Uncontroverted evidence may not be rejected for no 

reason or for an irrational reason; the workers’ 

compensation judge must identify that evidence and 

explain adequately the reasons for its rejection. The 

adjudication shall provide the basis for meaningful 

appellate review.

To be “reasoned,” a WCJ must issue a decision that permits an appellate court to 

exercise adequate appellate review without further elucidation. Ace Wire Spring and

Form Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Walshesky), 93 A.3d 923, 934 (Pa. 

Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 6 (Pa. 2014). In order to satisfy this standard, 

however, a WCJ does not need to discuss every detail of the evidence in the record. 

Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 191, 194 

n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 635 (Pa. 2007). Rather, 

Section 422(a) of the Act requires a WCJ to issue a reasoned decision so that this 

Court does not have to “imagine” the reasons why a WCJ made a particular 

credibility determination or how the WCJ reached a particular conclusion. Id.

at 196.

Here, only Acme argues that the WCJ’s decision is not reasoned. 

Though Acme couches this argument in terms of how reasoned the decision was 

under Section 422(a) of the Act, Acme appears to argue that Findings of Fact 14, 15, 

and 18 are not supported by substantial evidence, as opposed to arguing that the 

decision lacks adequate explanation. In Finding of Fact 14, the WCJ rejected 
31

portions of Dr. Elia’s testimony and found such testimony to be not credible. In 

Finding of Fact 15, the WCJ rejected portions of Dr. Nolan’s testimony and found 

such testimony to be not credible. The WCJ adequately explained the basis for these

credibility determinations. In Finding of Fact 18, the WCJ summarized the factual 

determinations relative to the injuries sustained by Gomez. By arguing that the 

WCJ’s credibility determinations with respect to Dr. Elia’s and Dr. Nolan’s 

testimony and overall factual determinations are not supported by substantial 

evidence, Acme is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and make 

alternative credibility determinations, which we will not do. See Elk Mountain Ski 

Resort, Inc., 114 A.3d at 32 n.5. As explained more fully above, the WCJ’s 

determination that Gomez sustained a work-related injury while working for Acme 

on October 5, 2012, is supported by the record—i.e., Dr. Lipton’s and Gomez’s 

testimony. 

E. Joinder Petition

Acme’s final argument is that substantial evidence supported a denial 

of the claim petition or, at the very least, a grant of the joinder petition. Aside from 

rearguing prior sections of its brief, Acme’s argument seems to be that if Gomez 

sustained daily aggravations at Acme, he sustained at least one future aggravation at 

Roma. We reiterate that it is irrelevant whether there is evidence to support a 

contrary finding; if substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s factual findings, we do

not disturb those findings on appeal. Williams, 862 A.2d at 143-44. The WCJ 

determined that Gomez’s date of injury was his final day of work at Acme and, as 

detailed above, that finding is supported by substantial evidence. The fact that the 

WCJ could have made different findings is immaterial. We conclude, therefore, that 

the WCJ did not err in denying the joinder petition. 
32

III. CONCLUSION

Like many of our workers’ compensation cases involving repetitive 

damage to a body part over a span of years, this case reflects the difficulty in 

addressing the statutory requirements of the Act and the assignment of liability 

where there are multiple employers. Nevertheless, Acme has failed to provide any 

basis for which we should disagree with the adjudications by the WCJ and Board 

below. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order. 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Acme Standex, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1397 C.D. 2017

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Gomez and Roma :

Aluminum Co. Inc.), :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of November, 2018, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED. 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge