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THE DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: PAST, 

PRESENT, AND FUTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 1, 2011 

Serial No. 112–27 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

VACANCY

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Vice Chair 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KEVIN GUNDERSEN, Staff Director 

ALAN CARROLL, Subcommittee Clerk 

STEPHEN VINA, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence .................................................................................................... 3 

WITNESS

Ms. Caryn A. Wagner, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and 

Criminal Investigation, U.S. Coast Guard ......................................................... 11 

Mr. Daniel Johnson, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, U.S. Transportation Security Administration ........................................................................... 13 

Mr. James Chaparro, Assistant Director for Intelligence, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement .................................................................................. 15 

Ms. Susan Mitchell, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence 

and Operations Coordination, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ............... 17 

(1) 

THE DHS INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: PAST, 

PRESENT, AND FUTURE 

Wednesday, June 1, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Meehan, Cravaack, Quayle, Speier, and 

Cuellar. 

Mr. MEEHAN. The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on ‘‘The 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise—Its Past, Present, and Future.’’ I 

want to express my deep appreciation to each and every one of you 

for coming forward today and your prepared testimony. 

We are dealing with the realities of Congress right now and the 

vote schedule, so we are going to do our best to try to get in as 

much as we can in the form of your direct testimony. Ideally, we 

will be able to see what it takes with regard to what should be a 

quick vote procession, and then I know I will return and I suspect 

others. Hopefully we can ask if you would stay for any questions 

that may arise on this very, very important topic. 

So I would like to welcome today’s witnesses to discuss the 

growth and future of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

Before we begin today, I would like to take a moment to send my 

heartfelt condolences to one of our subcommittee members—I know 

that he is here today; I don’t know if he is going to be able to make 

the hearing—Billy Long from Missouri. 

Representative Long represents Joplin, Missouri. I know many of 

you who deal with homeland security are very well aware of the 

devastation by that tornado last week. I know I speak for all Members of the subcommittee when I say our thoughts and prayers are 

with Billy and the people in his district and the great people 

throughout Joplin in this difficult time. 

As we all know, the Department was created in response to the 

9/11 attacks and consisted in the merging of 22 different agencies. 

There has been great progress on solidifying our homeland, but 

more work remains. 

I have personal experience with the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, 

having been sworn in as United States attorney for the Eastern 
2 

District just days after 9/11. I worked closely with many of the 

DHS entities on a variety of issues during my time in office. 

With four terrorist attacks against our homeland since 9/11, multiple disrupted plots, and dozens of individuals indicted on terrorism charges, the threat to our homeland remains at an all-time 

high and is more diverse than ever. Even with the death of Osama 

bin Laden, we continue to face serious threats from terrorist 

groups, who are attempting to deploy foreigners and Americans to 

our homeland to conduct attacks. 

In addition, today we face a significant threat from radicalized 

individuals in the United States, including United States citizens 

who have lived here their entire lives and yet are still drawn to the 

ideology and conduct attacks. Most notable among these include 

U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, Times Square bomber Faisal 

Shahzad, and the New York City Subway bomber Najibullah Zazi. 

In today’s 112th Congress, this subcommittee has been threat-focused. Members have learned about the terrorist threat from 

Yemen, Pakistan, and counterterrorism ramifications of unrest in 

the Middle East and North Africa. Today, I look forward to learning more about what the men and women in the Department of 

Homeland Security, on the front lines, are doing in this war 

against terrorism. 

Our Customs and Border Patrol officers and Border Patrol 

agents are charged with preventing foreign terrorists and weapons 

from illegally entering the country. TSA officers are tasked with 

preventing terrorists from boarding our aircraft, which is the obsessive target of al-Qaeda since its inception. In fact, both myself and 

Ranking Member Speier have major international airports in our 

districts, so we know first-hand the challenges facing aviation security. 

The ICE agents are responsible for ensuring individuals who remain in the country illegally are apprehended and removed. The 

Coast Guard is tasked with protecting ports and other critical infrastructure, including an oil refinery and other critical assets in 

my own area, the Delaware River in my district. 

The men and women of DHS law enforcement, the boots-on-theground operators, rely heavily on intelligence to help them do their 

jobs, which includes everything from identifying suspicious individuals to tracking hundreds of thousands of shipping containers 

around the world. Ensuring a robust system of collaboration, information sharing, and analytic excellence across the Department Intelligence Enterprise is critical. 

The DHS Intelligence Enterprise has developed and changed dramatically over the years, and we are here today to understand 

where we have been, where we are today, and where we should be 

going. My hope is that this will be an in-depth discussion of the 

strengths and weaknesses of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise so 

that Members leave here with an understanding of the positive developments, of which there have been many, and a sense of the 

challenges that still remain. 

Through the course of today’s hearing, I also hope to learn about 

the level of cooperation and coordination among the component intelligence elements, how law enforcement and intelligence informa-
3 

tion is being shared and fused to create first-rate homeland security intelligence projects. 

Just on a last note, Secretary Wagner, I know that you are 

aware that I sent a letter to Secretary Napolitano, DNI Clapper, 

and Attorney General Holder with various questions regarding the 

treasure trove of intelligence gathered in the UBL raid. I want to 

do everything to ensure this college library of intelligence gets to 

the State and locals and on the front lines of the operators of DHS. 

I look forward to receiving a written response to that letter. But 

please let me know how we can help you in any way in moving forward on that important issue. 

So I look forward today to hearing from today’s witnesses. 

I would like now to recognize the Ranking Minority Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier, 

for any statement she may have. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

today on the Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise. I look forward to working with you to continue the subcommittee’s long history of oversight over the critical mission to coordinate the intelligence and information-sharing activities of the 

Department. 

This enterprise brings together the intelligence capabilities of the 

entire Department, from headquarters to the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis to analysts in the field working on various components. We are here to examine the progress that the Intelligence 

Enterprise has made since its creation and to identify areas needing improvement. 

Although we have come a long way to shore up intelligence gaps 

within the Department, several incidents over the past few years 

have revealed vulnerabilities and driven home the importance of 

maturing the Intelligence Enterprise. Does DHS have the funding 

it needs to continue building its intelligence architecture? Does it 

have the buy-in from the intelligence community and senior leadership across the Government? 

The chief intelligence officer of the Department, Under Secretary 

Caryn Wagner, leads the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. I am 

pleased that she is with us today to discuss how the enterprise is 

maturing. 

Some challenges the chief intelligence officer and the Intelligence 

Enterprise face appear deceptively simple, like developing a common lexicon for all intelligence professionals to use Departmentwide. 

Once you do that, please share that with us, because I, for one, 

continue to be challenged by many of the acronyms. 

Other challenges seem more complex, like bringing together components with distinct and sometimes competing priorities to serve 

the Department’s large customer base. 

To what extent is intelligence analysis and information sharing 

a priority in each component? How is the Department reducing duplication and redundancy of effort within DHS and between DHS 

and other elements the intelligence community? How much money 

should we be devoting to this, and can be it done better and more 

efficiently? 
4 

I am looking forward to hearing from all of the intelligence chiefs 

assembled here today to get answers to these questions and to see 

how all of you work together in this constrained budget environment to address the many threats to our homeland security. 

Documents combed through in the aftermath of the bin Laden 

operation have underscored how critically important it is for all the 

components, even with their unique missions, to work together. 

Letters attributed to bin Laden and his lieutenants have identified 

targets in major cities from coast to coast, and we know al-Qaeda 

was looking at our rail, aviation, and energy sectors. 

Do we have the right policies in place to permit the sharing of 

sensitive information while also protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens? Do we have the right technologies to allow 

the components to adequately communicate with their partners 

within DHS and the intelligence community, as well as State, local, 

and Tribal partners and the private sector? 

After this hearing, we expect to have a much better picture of the 

accomplishments and current capabilities of the DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise and, more importantly, how we can help you address 

your critical needs and meet your goals in the future. 

I would like to thank all the witnesses for being here today. 

While many of your accomplishments are designed to go unnoticed, 

know we appreciate your tireless efforts to keep America secure. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank you, Ms. Speier. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have five distinguished witnesses before us 

today on this very, very important topic. So let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in the 

record. I hope you will allow us to understand the most critical 

points of your testimony and do your best to try to work with us 

on the time deadlines, as well. 

Today’s first witness is Under Secretary and Chief Intelligence 

Officer Caryn Wagner from the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 

Under Secretary and CINT, we call it, Wagner—that is—how do 

you—it is CINT? Okay. I just need to make sure—was confirmed 

in her present post by the Senate in February 2010. 

Before that, she led a storied and distinguished career as a public servant, first as the signals intelligence and electronic warfare 

officer in the United States Army and, later, on the staffs of the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, at the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, and the Director of National Intelligence. 

Under Secretary Wagner also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in 

English and history from the College of William and Mary and a 

Master of Science degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern California. 

Under Secretary Wagner, you are now recognized to summarize 

your testimony. 
5 

STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished 

Members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today to discuss the DHS Intelligence Enterprise in the company 

of some of my key colleagues from the Homeland Security Intelligence Council. I view this hearing as a valuable opportunity for 

us all to update you on how we increasingly operate as a partnership to provide the best possible intelligence support to the Department, the intelligence community, and our many and varied external customers. 

Let me start with a few definitions since this can get confusing. 

I think you already have it, but the DHS Intelligence Enterprise 

consists of all elements of the Department that are engaged in directing, collecting, reporting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence and information in support of the Department’s 

many missions, as outlined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review. 

The Homeland Security Intelligence Council, or HSIC, acronym 

No. 2, is basically the board of directors of the Intelligence Enterprise. It is comprised of the heads of the intelligence elements of 

the components and other key members of the Intelligence Enterprise, such as the National Protection and Programs Directorate, 

which is responsible for infrastructure protection and cybersecurity. 

I chair the HSIC in my role as the chief intelligence officer, or 

CINT, for the Department, a role that was created in 2005 and formalized in legislation in the implementing recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007. As the CINT and as chair of the 

HSIC, I am responsible for overseeing the Intelligence Enterprise 

and performing a few key functions: 

First, reviewing the intelligence budgets of the components to ensure that they are adequate and not duplicative and advocating for 

component intelligence needs within the larger Department budget 

bill; second, identifying areas where the enterprise would benefit 

from standardized policies, practices, and procedures, and working 

with the HSIC members to develop and implement them; and, 

third, leveraging the expertise of the HSIC members to collectively 

address crosscutting intelligence topics and issues in support of Department missions. 

To speak very briefly to each of these functions, I recently received the fiscal year 2013 budget briefings from the key components, and I am working on crafting my response and my input to 

the Secretary for the Department’s resource allocation plan. Because I wear another hat—in addition to Under Secretary for Intelligence and CINT, I am also the Department’s information-sharing 

executive—I have the opportunity to weigh in on both the information-sharing and intelligence portfolios as part of the budget build. 

As you know, those two portfolios are closely related. 

The review process allows me to identify and act on capability 

gaps. As an example, in the fiscal year 2012 budget request that 

is currently on the Hill, I have put an initiative in there to provide 

additional personnel for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv-
6 

ices, a member of the HSIC who is not with us today, to assist 

them in reviewing the voluminous holdings of immigration data in 

response to a growing number of requests from law enforcement 

and National security queries. 

As for the standardized policies and processes, I want to highlight just a couple of those. First is our collective effort to standardize and improve our Homeland Security Intelligence Reports, or 

HIRs. After much discussion and examination of the varying processes across the enterprise, we developed a phased approach for 

transitioning to an enterprise process that will standardize thresholds, time lines, and training, and streamline the review and clearance process while ensuring compliance with all existing laws and 

policies. 

Improving HIR production across the board is important because 

HIRs are our primary method for getting the information that we 

gather in the course of performing our many missions to our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities, who can 

then use them in support of their own missions. You may hear 

more about HIR reporting from Mr. Chaparro because ICE is an 

enterprise best practice in terms of HIR reporting. 

We are also using the HSIC to develop a Department-wide counterintelligence strategy—something that, unfortunately, we were 

lacking in the past. We have created a counterintelligence working 

group under the HSIC which is made up of the Department’s CI 

representatives. In some cases, these representatives are the first 

ever in their components. So this group is going to report back to 

the HSIC on the strategy and develop plans for phased implementation of a new CI strategy across the Department. 

Another area where we are developing an enterprise approach is 

production management. As Congresswoman Speier asked, we are 

frequently asked about duplication and redundancy in the Department. It is, in fact, hard to have too much duplication because the 

missions of the various components are so distinct. But in the area 

particularly of CT threat, we definitely do need to coordinate and 

deconflict our efforts. 

So we produced our first program of analysis in 2010, which laid 

out our 17 key intelligence questions and the planned analysis and 

production in response to those questions. The first one was drafted 

by I&A and coordinated with the components, but it was largely an 

I&A document. The second one that we are kicking off now is intended to be a true enterprise document, developed collaboratively 

from the beginning, and articulating who is going to produce what 

on the full range of Department missions and threats to homeland 

security. 

Finally, a couple of examples in the area of collaborative focus on 

specific intelligence issues. Without going into classified details, we 

have put teams together on an ad-hoc basis to focus on things like 

spikes in the apprehension of specific groups along the border arriving without documentation, to try to figure out why and how 

they have arrived at the border and what their origins and motivations are. We had a very successful working group that focused on 

capabilities and gaps in discovering tunnels under the Southwest 

border. We have also put together a group to red team terrorist tactics, in cooperation with our interagency partners, as a way of en-
7 

suring that we and our State and local partners were planning for 

and implementing the most effective protective measures. 

The bottom line is that the HSIC and the DHS Intelligence Enterprise are force multipliers. We all do a better job when we work 

together, and we are getting better at working together. We also 

take it to the next level and work closely with our interagency 

partners, particularly at NCTC and FBI. 

Finally, I would just say, if you forgive my analogy, homeland security is a team sport, and I am pleased to be here with my colleagues and teammates to answer your questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Wagner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER

JUNE 1, 2011 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

my role as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chief Intelligence Officer 

(CINT) and the collaborative efforts of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

DHS is a complex organization with a broad, diverse set of missions. Intelligence 

is an important supporting factor in most, if not all, of these missions. Departmental 

intelligence programs, projects, activities, and personnel—including the intelligence 

elements of our seven key operational components, as well as the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—make up the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE). I&A is 

charged with ensuring that intelligence from the DHS IE is analyzed, fused, and 

coordinated to support the full range of DHS missions and functions, as well as the 

Department’s external partners. The operational components, most of which predate 

the creation of the Department, have intelligence elements that provide support tailored to their specialized functions and contribute information and expertise in support of the Department’s broader mission set. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 made the then-Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis responsible for establishing intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination priorities, policies, processes, standards, guidelines, and procedures for the intelligence components of the Department. As part of the Department’s 2005 Second Stage Review, the Assistant Secretary was designated as the 

DHS Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) to accomplish that mandate. The Assistant 

Secretary was subsequently elevated to Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (U/SIA) by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007, which also strengthened the influence of the CINT role. 

The CINT is responsible for leading and managing the activities of the DHS IE, 

and furthering a unified, coordinated, and integrated intelligence program for the 

Department. One of the CINT’s first leadership actions was to develop Management 

Directive (MD) 8110, which delineates the CINT’s authorities to oversee, define, and 

evaluate the Department’s intelligence activities and services. As a result of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the heads of 

DHS intelligence components are required to advise and coordinate with the CINT 

to support the mission of the Department. 

The CINT provides planning and programmatic guidance to the IE, conducts programmatic reviews, and provides formal input to the Secretary regarding intelligence-related budget requests from the Components. The CINT’s planning and programmatic guidance focuses Departmental resources and efforts toward priority intelligence and information-sharing needs to expand enterprise capabilities, develop 

capacity, and improve intelligence support to the DHS IE. In 2012, the CINT focus 

areas are training, secure connectivity, and collaboration across the IE. 

To ensure the DHS IE works together to support the DHS mission, the CINT regularly engages with the Components through weekly secure video teleconferences 

(SVTCs) to coordinate on threat reporting and planned production. Perhaps the 

most important and successful integration mechanism the CINT employs, however, 

is the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC). 

The HSIC was created in 2005 to serve as the DHS IE’s decision-making and implementation oversight body. The HSIC is composed of the heads of DHS’s intelligence components. HSIC members provide advice and assistance; coordinate the 

implementation of programs; and report to the CINT on intelligence matters related 

to: (a) Strategy and policy, (b) leadership and coordination, (c) training and career 
8 

development, (d) budget, management, and implementation, and (e) evaluation and 

feedback. The HSIC is empowered to establish subordinate boards and working 

groups to accomplish its oversight and program coordination responsibilities. 

The HSIC meets monthly to discuss current issues, receive strategic-level information briefings, and provide guidance. This forum provides a regular opportunity 

for HSIC members to inform and solicit feedback from their counterparts on new 

initiatives and to provide updates on existing programs. Subordinate working 

groups provide periodic updates on their progress and accomplishments. 

HSIC working groups are established as needed to address the dynamic requirements of the DHS IE. Chaired by the members of the DHS IE, the working groups 

are charged with developing action plans based on guidance from HSIC. Working 

groups can be short- or long-term, and focus on systemic and programmatic issues 

or on substantive intelligence topics. For example, the HSIC helped develop specific 

questions for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers to ask certain types 

of travelers or border crossers, and to identify intelligence and technology gaps to 

support counter-tunnel investigations and operations. In addition to coordinating 

the monthly HSIC meeting and following up on HSIC working group programs and 

activities, the CINT staff collects input from the DHS IE for compilation into two 

reference tools, the Intelligence Enterprise Catalog (IEC) and the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework (HSIPF). 

The IEC contains information on DHS IE assets, capabilities, and resources 

around the country and the globe. While not yet comprehensive, it serves as a useful 

reference point for the CINT and DHS IE when making decisions related to resource 

planning and current operations. The HSIPF aggregates the DHS IE’s intelligence 

priorities for the CINT to help the HSIC make informed IE-wide planning decisions. 

It serves much the same purpose for the DHS IE as the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) does for the National intelligence community. We continually refine the HSIPF to ensure it accurately captures DHS IE priorities and aligns 

most effectively with the NIPF. 

As post-9/11 operational necessity drove DHS’ formation from disparate legacy 

agencies, complex new departmental responsibilities obliged us to work together in 

enterprise fashion and forge a collaborative OneDHS intelligence culture. The DHS 

IE leaders represented on the HSIC have contributed their operational component 

experience and perspective to shape innovative intelligence methods in support of 

Departmental policy, programs, and operational needs. The following initiatives and 

programs are outgrowths of the cooperative, collegial spirit of the DHS IE as embodied in the HSIC. 

DHS TERRORISM TASK FORCE (DTTF)

The acting CINT stood up the DHS Terrorism Task Force (DTTF) to bring together representatives from across the DHS IE to rapidly disseminate information, 

garner feedback and/or solicit input to strategic-level issues. 

The DTTF, which is led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ensures that all information resident in each of the Components’ unique systems is 

identified and shared within the Department and the IC. The DTTF hosts a weekly 

SVTC to discuss current intelligence and threat updates, ensuring that the DHS IE 

is operating in unity to achieve the Department’s mission. 

The DHS Watchlisting Cell (WLC) was established within I&A in October 2010 

to serve as the focal point for Department-wide watchlist nominations to the National Counterterrorism Center and the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The 

WLC reached full operational capability on January 31, 2011. The WLC was placed 

in the DTTF to leverage established channels of communication with the Components and because of the time-sensitive aspect of watchlisting. 

The WLC is an improved construct to fulfill requirements directed by Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 6, which states that every department or agency in 

the Executive branch must have a mechanism in place to nominate for watchlisting 

all identifying and/or derogatory information on known or suspected terrorists in its 

possession. The WLC leverages intelligence and operations elements throughout 

DHS to ensure that all nominations are comprehensive; transmitted in a timely, coordinated, and standardized manner; and meet established criteria for submission 

to NCTC. 

HOMELAND INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

In 2010, the HSIC established the Homeland Security Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) to evaluate and optimize the production, review, and publication process of the Department’s intelligence reports. Until the establishment of the 

working group, there was no DHS-wide policy for intelligence reports addressing 
9 

component-specific limitations, statutory obligations, mission-specific needs, or production prioritization methods. DHS IE components noted that reporting thresholds 

were being applied inconsistently or subjectively, often hampering reporting time 

lines, production rates, and collaborative efforts. Additionally, there were no standardized or written processes for the writing, production, submission, or clearance of 

intelligence reports. Through a phased approach, the HIR–WG completed a comprehensive review of the existing HIR program, processes, and policies gathered 

from existing documentation, working group meetings, interviews, and surveys. Additionally, the HIR–WG examined the efficiency and effectiveness of the current operating models, the review and clearance process, reporting thresholds and definitions. Subsequent findings have led to the formation of 13 recommendations designed to establish training/certification, dissemination, auditing, and reporting 

threshold standards across the DHS IE. These improvements championed by the 

HSIC help to guarantee that our internal and external stakeholders receive key 

threat information in a timely manner, while ensuring compliance with all applicable laws and policies. Intelligence reports are our primary vehicle for communicating 

information collected by the DHS IE to the broader intelligence community for incorporation into all-source products. 

CTAB AND NTAS

The Counterterrorism Advisory Board (CTAB) is the Department’s mechanism for 

coordinating and integrating all aspects—intelligence, operations, and policy—of its 

counterterrorism mission, which spans operational components and headquarters 

elements. The Secretary appoints a Coordinator for Counterterrorism to chair the 

CTAB—currently the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate—while the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis/CINT and Assistant Secretary for Policy are vice-chairs. The CTAB is also responsible for recommending to the Secretary that an alert be issued under the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS). The CINT, working with the DHS IE, is responsible for monitoring threats to the homeland to determine if it reaches a level of specificity that 

might merit convening the CTAB to discuss issuing such an alert. When that happens, the CINT will consult both internally and externally to the Department before 

recommending that the CTAB be convened. The HSIC will serve as the mechanism 

for ensuring that key components are fully involved in the threat recommendation 

to the CTAB. 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP

The HSIC Subcommittee on Counterintelligence (the CI Working Group or CI– 

WG) supports the development of CI policies and procedures across the Department. 

Component representatives meet monthly to identify those areas requiring immediate attention and to establish necessary DHS-wide CI policy, instructions, and 

procedures. By integrating the analytical and operational elements of DHS’s CI Program, the CI–WG postures the Department to effectively identify, understand, and 

counter foreign intelligence activities. 

The Secretary has directed I&A to lead the Department’s counterintelligence program. The CIWG is working in concert with the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence to establish a CI-focused Insider Threat Program, which includes an ITenabled audit/monitoring capability, and is standardizing CI awareness training. 

The CI–WG has also developed a CI Program Directive, codifying the Secretary’s decision to consolidate the Department’s CI effort, and drafted a CI Implementing Instruction and CI Security Classification Guide. These documents will further help 

integrate Component efforts and execute an effective CI program across the Department. 

INTELLIGENCE CAREER FORCE MANAGEMENT BOARD

The Intelligence Career Force Management Board (ICFMB) is comprised of both 

human capital and professional development personnel from across the DHS IE. 

Charged with providing strategic direction and guidance in managing the DHS intelligence workforce, the board successfully produced a plan of action to address the 

Department’s high intelligence workforce turnover rates, uneven training, and lack 

of career development tools. The plan of action includes 11 initiatives aimed at reenergizing and refocusing the workforce through the establishment of cross-component career paths, common hiring standards, integrated training and training resources for common functions, and shared career development tools. These initiatives continue to support and move the DHS IE closer to its vision of a unified, diverse, agile, responsive, trained, and mission-ready DHS IE workforce, capable of 

supporting the many missions and operations of the Department, as well as the De-
10 

partment’s State, local, Tribal, territorial, private sector, and intelligence community customers. 

Currently, the Board is working to complete a DHS IE curriculum assessment, 

which will provide a 3-year outlook on course offerings, training requirements, and 

required resources for DHS IE leadership planning and budgeting purposes. The 

Board is also developing a baseline GS–0132 job description and a standard, anonymous exit interview that will give managers across the DHS IE greater insight into 

how, as an enterprise, we can strengthen our workforce. 

THE FUTURE OF THE DHS IE

The next frontier for the DHS IE is to begin to undertake enterprise-wide planning. This year will mark the first time the entire DHS IE will collaborate to 

produce a single Program of Analysis, which will help to ensure that, with respect 

to analytical efforts, redundancies are avoided, opportunities for collaboration are 

identified from the outset, and any overlap is carefully considered in light of the different approaches each Component may choose to take on a specific issue. The goal 

is to ensure that the DHS IE expends its intelligence resources in an effective and 

efficient manner and that all mission requirements are adequately covered. Also, as 

recommended by CBP, we are currently exploring the feasibility of a Departmental 

intelligence doctrine. 

The development and acquisition of new intelligence tools and systems is an area 

for additional collaboration. We are making great strides retrofitting existing databases and networks to interoperate across the DHS IE; the next step is to more 

closely coordinate our planning for new systems to ensure they are built from the 

ground up to be more collaborative. 

CONCLUSION

Since the establishment of the DHS CINT, Departmental intelligence integration 

and efficiency has continuously improved, providing increasingly unified intelligence 

support to the DHS mission. Key to these improvements has been the HSIC, which 

serves as the main unifying and integrating body of the DHS IE. Using this forum, 

senior intelligence leaders from across the Department have worked to educate each 

other on the individual intelligence component missions and functions to better 

identify areas of improvement and opportunities for cooperation. The HSIC allows 

the DHS IE to synergize our missions, especially in the areas of counterterrorism 

and border security. Working with our partners in the intelligence community, the 

CINT leads and manages the activities of the DHS IE, and furthers a unified, coordinated, and integrated intelligence program for the Department. It is through the 

collaborative efforts of the DHS IE that we leverage our collective strengths and 

proactively provide intelligence that supports the Department’s mission to secure 

the homeland. This partnership is a valuable asset that we must vigilantly cultivate 

and promote to ensure its success. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I would be happy to 

answer any questions you may have at this time. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Under Secretary Wagner, for your testimony. 

Our next witness will be Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin of the 

United States Coast Guard. 

The assistant commandant for intelligence and criminal investigations, Rear Admiral Atkin previously served as assistant commandant for operational policy and planning. He has also held the 

post of acting assistant commandant for marine safety, security, 

and stewardship. 

As an admiral in the Coast Guard, he additionally served as special assistant to the President and senior director for transborder 

security on the National Security Staff and first commander of the 

U.S. Coast Guard Deployable Operations Group, following a number of operational assignments throughout the United States. 

He is a graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy 

with a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematical sciences and 

also holds a Master of Science in management science from the 

University of Miami. 
11 

I also understand you may have a little interest in how the Coast 

Guard lacrosse program is doing this year. 

Well, Rear Admiral Atkin, you are now recognized to summarize 

your testimony for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS ATKIN, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT FOR INTELLIGENCE AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, U.S. COAST GUARD 

Admiral ATKIN. Thank you, sir. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, 

and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to provide testimony on the Coast Guard Intelligence 

Enterprise and how we work closely with our DHS Homeland Security Intelligence Council partners, the DHS Intelligence and Analysis staff, the Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration. 

As you said already, I am Rear Admiral Tom Atkin. I am the assistant commandant for intelligence and criminal investigations. 

The Coast Guard is the lead U.S. agency for maritime homeland 

security. We are the largest maritime law enforcement agency in 

the country, and we are an intelligence community member. We 

are on watch 24 hours a day. No other department or agency has 

the authorities or jurisdiction like the Coast Guard that allows us 

to touch the maritime domain in every area. 

For more than 220 years, the Coast Guard has safeguarded the 

Nation’s maritime interests on our rivers, in our ports, along the 

coastal regions, on the high seas, and around the world. We protect 

those on the sea, we protect America from threats delivered by the 

sea, and we protect the sea itself. 

The Coast Guard’s persistent presence in the maritime domain, 

due to our diverse mission sets and broad legal authorities, allows 

us to fill a unique niche within the intelligence community. As a 

member of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard is at the intersection between homeland security and National defense. As a Federal 

law enforcement agency and a National intelligence community 

member, the Coast Guard is also positioned as a bridge between 

these two important groups. 

Because of our unique access, our emphasis, and our expertise in 

the maritime domain, an area where other U.S. Government agencies are typically not present, we collect and report intelligence 

that not only supports our missions but supports the National security objectives. 

In August 2010, the motor vessel Sunsea, a 188-foot stateless 

bulk cargo carrier, crossed the Pacific carrying 492 illegal Sri 

Lankan migrants en route to Canada. As the vessel transited the 

Pacific, the Coast Guard Intelligence Enterprise played a key role 

by enabling Coast Guard operational and tactical commanders to 

closely monitor the case, prepare contingency plans, and effectively 

position response forces in the event the ship attempted to reach 

a port in the United States or conditions on board deteriorated and 

an at-sea interception was required. 

This vessel was of particular concern because the smugglers included members of the terrorist group Tamil Tigers. 
12 

Working with our international, Federal, and State partners, including the Department of Defense, we monitored the vessel’s 

movements, especially as it approached U.S. territory. We leveraged and integrated capabilities with our National intelligence and 

law enforcement counterparts. We analyzed similar past cases to 

make boarding teams aware of the conditions and the responses 

they might encounter if they were given the order to interdict the 

vessel. We assessed the potential threat posed by the crew and passengers. At any time, this vessel could have turned into a major 

search-and-rescue case or a significant interdiction event. 

The vessel was ultimately intercepted by Canadian forces off the 

coast of British Columbia. We provided effective, timely, accurate, 

and usable intelligence to ensure our forces were well-informed and 

ready to take action. This example highlights our unique maritime 

expertise, allowing us to lead and assist our law enforcement National intelligence and international partners to identify a potential 

threat and work toward a positive solution to protect our Nation. 

To support homeland security, the Coast Guard screens ships, 

crews, and passengers for all vessels required to submit a 96-hour 

advance notice of arrivals to a U.S. port. In 2010, we screened more 

than 257,000 ships and 71.2 million people. 

We work closely with Customs and Border Protection to utilize 

their automated targeting system, which enables real-time database checks and allows us to more easily identify suspected entities 

engaged in nefarious activities within the maritime domain. Our 

collaboration with CBP has been so successful that, earlier this 

year, we moved most of our screening effort to the National Targeting Center to better integrate our efforts with interagency personnel performing similar duties. 

Following screening, any informations on persons discovered with 

possible terrorism links are shared with other DHS components, 

the Department of Justice, and the intelligence community. 

I have only scratched the surface describing the broad capabilities and diverse relationships that define the Coast Guard Intelligence Enterprise. In our intelligence pursuits, the Coast Guard 

draws on our long and rich maritime history and experiences that 

result from our unique status as an armed service, a law enforcement agency, a Federal regulator, and a National intelligence community member. 

Each of the components that form the DHS Intelligence Enterprise brings something different to the table. We have made great 

strides in our collaboration through the Homeland Security Intelligence Council under the leadership of Secretary Wagner. We all 

understand that we are strongest when we stand together. We 

have worked to make significant progress in aligning our capabilities toward a common purpose: Defending the safety and security 

of the American people. 

Thank you for inviting me here to discuss the Coast Guard Intelligence Enterprise, DHS, and the HSIC. I look forward to your 

questions. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Rear Admiral Atkin, for your testimony. 

Our next witness is Mr. Daniel Johnson, the assistant administrator for intelligence at the Transportation Safety Administration. 
13 

Mr. Johnson began as assistant administrator for intelligence 

earlier this year and, prior to that, served in the United States Air 

Force. With 26 years’ experience at the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, most recently as wing and 

mission commander, he stands as leader on National and theater 

ISR operations and is a seasoned staff officer. 

He also worked at the Pentagon on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 

deputy director for joint requirements, oversight council, and targets. 

That must be quite a business card, when you have something 

like that. 

In that role, he provided intelligence support to the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. Johnson graduated from the Air War College at Maxwell Air 

Force Base in Alabama with a Master of Strategic Studies, received 

a Master of Public Administration from the University of Oklahoma, and a Bachelor’s degree in public administration and policy 

from Eastern Connecticut State University. 

Mr. Johnson, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL JOHNSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to be 

before you today to discuss the role of the Transportation Security 

Administration within the larger scope of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 

Since coming on board this January, I have had the opportunity 

and privilege to work closely with Under Secretary Wagner and my 

colleagues at the United States Coast Guard, Customs and Border 

Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, improving 

our internal and external collaboration and information sharing. 

As the assistant administrator for intelligence for TSA, I oversee 

three primary mission threads: Indications and warning; predictive 

analysis; and incident response. In accordance with the transportation security authorities, the TSA Office of Intelligence can receive, assess, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information for 

transportation security purposes that helps protect the 1.7 million 

passengers per day that use civil aviation, the 47,000 miles of highways, the 147 million maritime ferry passengers per year, the 29 

million passengers per day that use mass transit, the 1.6 million 

tons per year traveled by freight rail, and then, last, over 2.5 million miles of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. 

In my role as the head of intel for TSA, I am often asked what 

keeps me up at night. The answer is the global threats with a regional focus, coming primarily from al-Qaeda and its affiliate 

groups, who continue to pose a serious threat to transportation security. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, continues to 

threaten U.S. interests abroad and in the homeland. In particular, 

the group is fixated on aviation as a means to inspire fear and eco-
14 

nomically cripple the United States and Western interests. 

Through four editions of Inspire magazine, AQAP has referenced 

the October 2010 cargo plot, wrote about Abdulmutallab’s heroism 

and sacrifice as the Christmas day bomber, and even featured an 

article of how to make a bomb in the kitchen. 

Additionally, in light of the successful Osama bin Laden roll-up, 

we continue to track seized material being exploited from his compound in Abbottabad and monitor existing transportation threat 

streams from al-Qaeda and its affiliates who may seek to accelerate 

existing plots, prove their mettle, and/or legitimize their causes. 

TSA stakeholders include the passengers that are out there every 

day, field operations, and key critical infrastructure security owners and operators. Our mission is to provide them with the highestconfidence threat reporting on the various modes of transportation. 

In order to do this, we must work closely with the Homeland Security Intelligence Council to form an internal and external bench 

that enables collaboration and transparency for all our reporting. 

Over the past 6 months, I have reached out to the HSIC team, 

along with the intel and law enforcement communities, to internally collaborate on various threat assessments, along with reaching out externally and leveraging existing analysis being done by 

partners at the National Counterterrorism Center, the sector government coordination councils, fusion centers, private trade associations, and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

Additionally, under the leadership of Under Secretary Wagner, 

we have worked closely with DHS I&A on professional development 

and training. Within my office, we have created a development 

path that ranges from new hires to seasoned analysts that enables 

a continuous career progression. Similarly, we are on the ground 

floor of standing up our counterintelligence section. This will enable us to work closely with DHS on CI policies, instructions, and 

procedures. 

I look forward to continue to work with our intelligence partners 

to evolve the Intelligence Enterprise that not only shares data but 

collaborates among headquarters and components to enable higher 

confidence reporting to our stakeholders in the field. Within TSA, 

once again, there are passengers, our field operations, key infrastructure owners and operators. 

Thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee, and 

I am happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. I am grateful for your 

testimony. 

Our next witness is James Chaparro, who is the assistant director of intelligence for the United States Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. 

Mr. Chaparro’s public service includes 20 years’ experience, most 

recently as Deputy Under Secretary for Operations in the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis. Mr. Chaparro also has served as the director of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, special 

agent in charge of the ICE Denver field office, and held the position 

of interim director of immigration interior enforcement for ICE, 

upon the creation of DHS. 

Before that time, Mr. Chaparro worked with the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service as deputy assistant commissioner for 
15 

investigations, director of anti-smuggling, and assistant district director for investigations and special agent. 

Mr. Chaparro also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in political 

science from California State University at Long Beach. 

Mr. Chaparro, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES CHAPARRO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

Mr. CHAPARRO. Thank you. 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano 

and Director Morton, I would like to thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss ICE’s efforts in supporting the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. I hope to offer the subcommittee somewhat of a unique perspective because I have had the privilege—actually, the honor—of 

serving in leadership roles in both I&A and ICE, one of the larger 

components of DHS. 

ICE is uniquely positioned to advance the DHS mission. We do 

this through intelligence production, through law enforcement investigations focusing on terrorism, human smuggling, human trafficking, financial crimes, trade fraud, weapons proliferation, drug 

smuggling, illegal tunneling, and other illicit activities, and also 

through the outstanding work done in our Office of Enforcement 

and Removal Operations. 

As the DHS component with the most expansive investigative authorities, ICE has people assigned in over 200 U.S. cities and in 70 

offices in 48 countries around the world. ICE is both a vital contributor to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and a voracious consumer 

of its products and services. 

The ICE intelligence program is structured along three major 

lines. We have the headquarters office of intelligence; we have 

field-based intelligence teams that support our field offices directly; 

and then we also have intelligence liaisons, who we have strategically placed with interagency partners around the law enforcement 

and intelligence community. Together, this combined approach 

really allows us to have people who will help serve and make sure 

that we have the right information going to the right people at the 

right time. 

In her opening statement, Under Secretary Wagner provided an 

expansive overview of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. I would 

like to focus on how collaboration within that enterprise is progressing from the ICE perspective. 

The Homeland Security Intelligence Council, or HSIC, as previously mentioned by my counterparts, in my opinion, serves as an 

excellent venue to really coordinate on large strategic initiatives as 

well as making sure that we are working together on common 

threats. 

For example, ICE has leveraged the HSIC to advance important 

initiatives in the coordination of counter-tunnel investigations and 

operations. We have worked on our collaborative capabilities to determine and identify illicit smuggling pathways bringing people 

and goods to the United States illegally. Through our participation 
16 

in the HSIC, ICE facilitates a bi-directional information flow between our field components, between our headquarters elements, 

and between our external partners, both domestic and overseas. 

ICE plays a critical role in support of the National intelligence 

community, as well. ICE is the leading producer of DHS Homeland 

Intelligence Reports, or HIRs, which provide valuable intelligence 

reporting from ICE operations. We disseminate those externally to 

our partners. So far in fiscal year 2011, ICE has accounted for 

about 58 percent of the Department’s production of HIRs. 

Perhaps more importantly, however, is the fact that 54 percent 

of those HIRs were evaluated by the customers as either ‘‘high 

value’’ or ‘‘major significance,’’ which is very, very substantial in 

the intelligence world. The success rate of our reporting of HIRs I 

think is a commitment not only to the people producing them, but 

it is also a commitment to show that ICE is really committed to 

making sure that we are putting out our most valuable information 

so others can use it to strengthen National security efforts. 

ICE also has the leadership role in the DHS Threat Task Force, 

or DTTF. This is an interagency DHS entity that sits in the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis that works to ensure that DHS leadership maintains situational awareness on a continually and rapidly 

evolving terrorist threat stream picture. We do this through the enabling of counterterrorism threat coordination and by producing 

sensitive intelligence assessments. ICE’s participation in the DTTF 

also helps serve our needs at ICE because we are able to very rapidly glean information held by other DHS intelligence components, 

other DHS components, as well as the National intelligence community, and share that with our special agents on the ground who 

are working in JTTFs around the country to combat terrorist 

threats. 

ICE also plays an important role in the DHS information sharing 

with our Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement 

partners. We do this primarily through the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative, or LEISI. Since its inception, the LEISI 

has entered into eight significant law enforcement informationsharing agreements on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security. 

This includes an agreement recently signed with the International Justice and Public Safety Network. This is an important 

point because this will enable us to share information with 785,000 

State and local law enforcement officers around the country. This 

is something that I am very proud of, and I think it is an initiative 

that will really help the boots on the ground, not just in the Federal community but also in the State and local community. 

The importance of integrating intelligence into our investigations 

and operations cannot be overstated. Since 2006, DHS has leveraged the Border Enforcement and Security Task Forces, or BEST 

teams, which combine Federal, State, Tribal, and local and foreign 

law enforcement intelligence and law enforcement resources to synchronize efforts to combat existing threats. ICE intelligence provides strategic and operational support to the BEST teams, and we 

are working with I&A to increase the overall support addressing 

threats to the Southwest border, the Northern borders, as well as 

the maritime borders. 
17 

ICE’s Office of Intelligence also serves an important role in coordinating oversight of ICE’s intelligence functions, and we serve 

as the primary conduit for the DHS Intelligence Enterprise from 

ICE and also from ICE operations into the intelligence community. 

In a rapidly changing threat environment, however, we cannot be 

complacent with our successes. We are moving forward by increasing our strategic intelligence production—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chaparro, I am really—I actually am very focused on your testimony, and I appreciate it. But I am going to ask 

if what you can do is just sum it up very, very quickly so I can get 

to Ms. Mitchell. We will try to get to Ms. Mitchell, if she can do 

5 minutes. Then that will allow us to conclude this part. We will 

go do our votes and then get back as quickly as we can. 

Can you give me your concluding sense on this? 

Mr. CHAPARRO. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. 

In sum, ICE is a valuable partner with the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. We take great advantage of the services that are provided 

by our partners. We utilize the information in our day-to-day operations. 

I look forward to answering any questions that committee Members may have for me. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chaparro. 

We would like to identify our final witness, Ms. Susan Mitchell, 

the deputy assistant commissioner for the Office of Intelligence and 

Operations Coordination at Customs and Border Protection. 

I hope you will allow me the privilege of not sharing the same 

introduction as I did before, in the interest of time, but allow you 

to get right to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN MITCHELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS 

COORDINATION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 

Ms. MITCHELL. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, 

and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege 

and honor to appear before you with my colleagues and to discuss 

CBP, or Customs and Border Protection’s intelligence efforts and 

evolution. 

First, I would like to just highlight that, with almost 60,000 employees, CBP makes up the largest law enforcement organization in 

the Nation and has been given the responsibility to protect the 

United States from terrorists, weapons of mass effect, drug and 

human smugglers, agricultural disease, among other threats, all 

while fostering our Nation’s economic security and competitiveness 

through facilitating lawful international trade and travel. 

CBP provides a layered defense along nearly 7,000 miles of land 

border and along 95,000 miles of shoreline in partnership with the 

U.S. Coast Guard. 

At the core of CBP’s mission is to detect and deter the movement 

of foreign terrorists and terror-related materials across the U.S. 

border. I will give you two quick examples that highlight CBP’s efforts on this front. 

First, on December 14, 1999, CBP officers at Port Angeles, Washington, prevented the entry into the United States of the so-called 
18 

millennium bomber, an Algerian al-Qaeda member named Ahmed 

Ressam, who was transporting explosive materials and plotting an 

attack on Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve and 

was identified by behavioral analysis detection and physical examination of the vehicle he was driving. 

More recently, as you mentioned earlier, on May 3, 2010, CBP’s 

National Targeting Center worked with CBP officers at JFK Airport to apprehend the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, as he 

was attempting to flee the United States on a flight to the Middle 

East. 

Months earlier—and that really is the key—months earlier, he 

had hit on several of our targeting rolls for Pakistan travel. On 

that trip, he changed drastically from his normal patterns of traveling with his family, staying and documenting his stay at his 

home, versus the documents showing on this trip a Motel 8, traveling alone, and changing his return, coming back weeks after he 

originally booked his return flight. We were the first to identify 

him as a certain level of concern and fully document his travel and 

his admission interview. 

After the attempted bombing, we then provided the FBI with the 

keystone to link the phone number from the person who sold the 

car to the actual suspect, providing the FBI with his name, picture, 

and address. The phone then had been obtained and documented 

during that arrival process months earlier. We then posted a lookout in our system, while the former watch-listing process was occurring. Sure enough, he hit in our targeting systems when he attempted to flee the country. 

Our targeting worked both on the inbound process and the outbound attempt. We worked closely with our DHS partner TSA and 

our local partners at JFK Airport to stop that departure, as he had 

already boarded the flight. In this case, every second mattered, and 

it highlighted the need for real-time targeting and cooperation between Federal, State, and local partners. 

In the interest of time, I will discuss targeting more when you 

get back. I just wanted to hit on—CBP’s Office of Intelligence and 

Operations Coordination was established in 2007, merging the 

former offices of Anti-Terrorism and Intelligence, as well as components of the Office of Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Information Technology. OIOC serves as the coordinating facilitator that 

integrates and leverages all CBP’s diverse intelligence capabilities 

into a single, cohesive Intelligence Enterprise to create that intelligence-driven organization. 

We support the agency’s extended zone of security through the 

use of a multilayered approach to address threats to our borders, 

consisting of collecting advance traveler and cargo information, the 

use of enhanced law enforcement technical collection capabilities, 

and productive intelligence-sharing relationships with Federal, 

State, and local/Tribal agencies that also maintain a law enforcement presence at our border. 

I will talk about targeting when you get back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Mitchell. Thank you kindly for 

summarizing your testimony in that fashion. 
19 

So we have a series of three votes on the floor right now. The 

subcommittee will stand in recess until 5 minutes following the last 

vote in the series. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. MEEHAN. The committee will come to order. 

I want to say thank you again for your patience. I thank you for 

your testimony, as well. 

So, at this point in time, what I would like to do is to begin the 

questioning. I hope what we can do is do 5 minutes for each of us, 

and then, at the conclusion, if we have some remaining questions 

as well, because I think there is an awful lot of material to go 

through. 

So I will begin the questioning. 

Under Secretary Wagner, I am very grateful for your being here 

and for the role that you have undertaken in an agency in which 

there has been a great deal of, not just collaboration necessarily, 

but of course the role in which a number of agencies have been put 

together in an effort for us to more effectively and efficiently respond to the multiple challenges. That is difficult at any point in 

time. When you are talking about the sharing of intelligence across 

agencies, as well, difficult. I think we have made a great deal of 

progress in terms of breaking through some of the old stovepiping 

that existed, as well as some of the agency’s tendency to want to 

hold on to, you know, their role and their information. 

So I am grateful for the progress that has been made, but, of 

course, we still live in a very active world in which information 

flows and the threat is immediate. So I am certainly aware that 

one of the challenges that each of us has is the prioritization. Some 

elements of our infrastructure are defended in-depth against attack; others, not quite so much. We are always constantly worried 

about the ability of terrorists to adapt to what we have to do, as 

well. 

We are also quite aware that there were 12 homegrown-inspired 

jihadist terrorist plots just in the last year. Two attacks and 10 

plots by American citizens—lawful, permanent residents of the 

United States—were included in that. By comparison, over 7 years 

from the 9/11 attacks, there were an average of only about 2 such 

plots a year. So we are really in a period of enhanced concern. 

You discussed the Department of Homeland Security’s Threat 

Task Force, the DTTF, which is being brought to bear against, you 

know, specific incidents or National security investigations. I would 

really like to know what role that group is playing now, in light 

of the information that we have purportedly received from overseas 

and others with specific threats against some of our infrastructure. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to first just make clear that the name ‘‘DTTF’’ sometimes 

causes some confusion because it sounds suspiciously like the FBI’s 

JTTF, but they really do very different things. 

The DHS Threat Task Force was created by my Principal Deputy, who was then the Acting Under Secretary, in the wake of the 

Zazi and Headley cases. As Jim Chaparro mentioned, it was created largely as a way to pull together all of the disparate pieces 

of information that were in the Department and all of the expertise 
20 

in the Department to make sure that the Department leadership 

was up to speed on rapidly evolving threats. 

Since then, we have expanded the mission of the DTTF a little 

bit to be sort of the focal point of following emerging threats to the 

homeland and making sure that we have pulled all the right 

strings, touched all the right data sets, have reached out to our 

partners at FBI and the CTWatch and at NCTC to make sure that 

we are all up to speed and that we are doing what we need to do 

and everyone is on the same page. The DTTF is actually staffed by 

a mixture of I&A and component people. Currently, it is headed by 

someone from ICE. 

We beefed up the DTTF recently, on a surge basis, to be the focal 

point for dealing with the information that was flowing from the 

exploitation of material captured during the UBL raid. We appreciate the fact that we got extra people in from the components to 

help us deal with that. We were using the DTTF to be our focal 

point for reviewing that information and determining when we 

needed to request tear lines, working in partnership with FBI and 

NCTC, so that we could get information out to our State and local 

customers. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Are you satisfied that you are able to analyze in 

this treasure trove of information, that you have the capacity to be 

able to make some discretionary calls, but to be able to distinguish 

from among that trove of information and that there is a capacity 

to communicate that down appropriately to the local level? 

Ms. WAGNER. Absolutely. I think I have rarely seen such a good 

interagency effort on this, the task force that the CIA is leading, 

on which we as a department have, I believe, seven people participating who are linguists, who are helping with the gisting and 

translating. There are people from all over the community participating in that. 

We pulled together a group to work the tear-line issue. I am confident that we are getting the information that we need that needs 

to be shared with our State and local partners and with our critical 

infrastructure sectors. It has actually been going relatively smoothly, considering the volume of information. 

We have been working jointly with the FBI to put out most of 

the information that we have put out. We have put out probably 

about 12, I think, joint intelligence bulletins at various classifications levels and to various audiences—that is, based on this information and in combination with other information that is still coming in through regular intelligence channels. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Well, thank you. My time has expired, so, 

at this point in time, I will turn to Ranking Member Speier for 

questions she may have. Thank you. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony. As you were all speaking, I 

was thinking once again that you really are the unsung heroes who 

do this work, go unnoticed, and yet make sure that our country is 

safer because of it. So, thank you. 

Let me start by asking you, the House is presently considering 

a $1 billion cut to the DHS budget. How will this impact your specific intelligence functions within your departments and agencies? 
21 

If you could just go right across the line as quickly as you can, 

but make your points. 

Ms. WAGNER. I will start by saying that I think that we, my office specifically, has fared reasonably well, and we are appreciative 

of the mark that we received from the appropriators. I will defer 

to the others on any issues that they have. 

Admiral ATKIN. Thank you. 

My understanding is our budget has fared fairly well, as well, 

and that we aren’t anticipating any major cuts at this time. Certainly, any major cuts would have significant negative impact on 

our ability to collect and report information. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Ma’am, the same from TSA’s perspective; we are 

doing really well. 

Mr. CHAPARRO. From the ICE perspective, I think that we are 

doing well. 

I would want to make sure that there are a couple of critical 

pieces that are in there. One is, we had an annualization of some 

positions for our Southwest border supplemental. As you know, the 

work we are doing on the Southwest border is critical. I would not 

want to see that falter. So far, we are good, and I would like to 

hopefully keep it that way. 

Thank you. 

Ms. MITCHELL. CBP’s intelligence capability actually also fared 

well and received a small bump up for our targeting capabilities, 

which—I think one of the things you heard today is that the CBP 

targeting capabilities really do support all of our partner agencies. 

Ms. SPEIER. So the billion dollars is not from any of your budgets? 

Ms. WAGNER. If I could just add one thing that is not specifically 

an intelligence issue, but I think we are concerned about potential 

cuts to the grants, because the FEMA grant program is the source 

of a lot of funding for our State and local partners. While that is 

not specifically in my budget, we obviously are interested in ensuring that they receive enough funding to continue to be active participants in the homeland security enterprise. 

Ms. SPEIER. Are any of your agencies involved with reviewing the 

bin Laden treasure trove, as we tend to refer to it? 

You are all nodding your heads? So every one of you has a role 

in reviewing the materials. Okay. 

This is a diagram of this entity that you are all part of, with 

Under Secretary Wagner in the middle. It is somewhat confusing 

because there are straight lines and then there are dotted lines. It 

is very difficult to bring 22-plus agencies together under one roof 

that have been independent and have everyone work well together. 

So I am sure there have been many challenges, probably none of 

which you would like to discuss in public. 

But, as you have moved to adapt, I want to know whether or not 

there are still areas that we should be aware of, in terms of assisting you in unifying as a single agency? 

Ms. WAGNER. One of the areas that we, I think, still struggle 

with as a department is in integrating our information systems. As 

we came from a bunch of different places, we have a lot of different 

legacy systems. The Department has a great deal of data—travel 
22 

data, immigration data, cyber data. A lot of that data is resident 

in different little stovepipes. 

So we are working very, very diligently with the components and 

with the Department’s chief information officer and then in my capacity, as the information-sharing executive, to work through how 

to do a better job internally of ensuring we have appropriate access 

to our data and that we are not having to redo functions multiple 

times, check individuals multiple times against multiple databases 

because they are all more linked. 

We have a ways to go before we get to that goal, and that is 

something that we are still, you know, basically working on. 

But I would offer anyone else the opportunity to comment, if you 

are interested. 

Mr. CHAPARRO. No, I agree with Under Secretary Wagner. I 

think one of the biggest challenges we face is the vast volume of 

data that we have to sift through in order to identify these sometimes very vague or amorphous threats. Having the data tools and 

the connectivity to be able to look at TSA data or to be able to look 

at intelligence community data or travel data and to able to do that 

in an integrated fashion I think is a challenge that we all face dayto-day. 

Ms. SPEIER. Anyone else? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is a tremendous amount of collaboration 

that needs to occur, and you have to have those collaborative tools 

that are out there. How many different documents we have to go 

through every day and the analytical tools that could be out there 

to help us provide diffused products and put them into an analytic 

product at the end of the day could be very helpful. 

Admiral ATKIN. In the essence of time, I will concur with my colleagues. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

Ms. MITCHELL. The only one point I would like to add is we also 

need that ability to go from the high side to the unclass side, as 

well. Our systems need to be able to do that. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Speier. 

At this point in time, I would like to recognize the gentleman 

from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, also, to the witnesses, and thank you for your service 

to the country. You are the unsung heroes. You are the guys that 

don’t get the medals or the ribbons, but we appreciate all the 

things that you do and your troops do. So, thank you very much 

for that. 

My quick question is: Admiral, sir, could you please tell me what 

keeps you up at night? What is the main threat to your ability to 

do your job? 

Admiral ATKIN. Sir, as you know, right now we don’t have any 

imminent threat in the maritime domain. Being the new guy on 

the block, I am still learning quite a bit about what the intelligence 

community for the Coast Guard, the Intelligence Enterprise, is 

working on. 
23 

But I think my biggest concern is two-fold. One, it is the safeguarding of the Coast Guard personnel themselves. How do we provide the right force protection for those folks and the right intelligence support for that force protection? Then the next piece would 

be those transnational threats, whether they be criminal or terrorist organizations, and how they are trying to get into the country and attack the American people. 

So, not having a specific threat right now. It is really trying to 

identify, working with the colleagues here in DHS but across the 

intelligence community, to identify how they are coming into the 

country and then how to stop that. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Admiral. I do feel your pain when it 

comes to being the new guy on the block. 

Mr. Johnson, according to TSA, how would—you have kind of alluded to it in your opening testimony. Can you kind of expound 

upon that a little bit? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We had that closed-door session with you 

a couple of months ago. It continues to be AQAP and threats to 

aviation, followed closely by mass transit and different threats that 

are out there that are being espoused from a global threat perspective and providing a regional focus into the United States. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chaparro, could you kind of allude to it also, as well? 

Mr. CHAPARRO. The short answer is, my BlackBerry keeps me up 

at night. 

But all kidding aside, ICE has, you know, a very wide breadth 

of things that we cover. It is the violence from drug cartels, it is 

the pedophiles, it is the transnational criminal organizations that 

we investigate, it is the threats in the cyber world. 

So I think there are many, many things that we have to focus 

on in order to make sure that our citizens are safe. To be honest, 

I wish it were only terrorism. But it is that and, unfortunately, 

much, much more. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you for that. Thank you for being by your 

BlackBerry. 

Ms. Mitchell, could you expound, as well? 

Ms. MITCHELL. Sure. Thanks. 

I think for CBP the biggest thing that we are concerned with is 

kind of the unknowns. We believe we have a good handle on identifying those that we know are bad, but to ensure that our systems 

also have that predictive modeling capability that allows us to pick 

up on those travel patterns that should be of concern, kind of picking up on the clean skins. 

Also, the impact of global security, that we are partnering with 

a lot of the foreign governments to ensure that they are picking up 

on that same thought process for targeting as we have here. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Have you found the international community to 

be assisting you on that quite a bit, or is it more of a challenge? 

Ms. MITCHELL. I think, as they are finding that they, themselves, 

are targets, as well, and we can show some success stories in our 

targeting methodology, they are becoming much more willing partners. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. Wagner. 
24 

Ms. WAGNER. I think, listening to what everyone else has said, 

I think the one thing that keeps me up at night the most is having 

there be an attack on the homeland and discovering that we had 

data in the Department that was relevant to it. 

That is why I focus so much of my efforts on trying to make sure 

that we have the procedures in place to make sure that we are tapping every piece of information that we have, so that I hope never 

to be in that position. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I hope you never are, as well, ma’am. 

Two years ago, Secretary Napolitano asked the I&A to coordinate 

with the DHS in interaction with State and local fusion centers, 

where—you know, a lot of the genesis comes from the boots-on-theground level. I am from Minnesota. Because of an alert pilot that 

was giving instruction to a guy who wanted to take off in a 747— 

not know how to land, just wanted to be able to fly the plane—that 

is how some critical information could have flowed up the chain of 

command. 

Would you just kind of please update us on that progress? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think we have made a great deal of progress in 

the last few years in building a network of National fusion centers 

that share information both upwards with the National intelligence 

and law enforcement communities and sideways with each other, 

which is a really important regional aspect of this. 

What we are trying to do, both in I&A—but I&A basically is 

leading the efforts of the Department that includes all of the component participation—is to provide information, training, anything 

that we can do to help the fusion centers achieve a level of ability 

to analyze their own information, report on it, and understand 

what information is valuable to others so that it can be effectively 

shared. 

We have IOs, intelligence officers, out at all the fusion centers. 

There is also component representation at many of them. We provide training courses in writing, reporting, protecting civil rights 

and civil liberties. I think that we are seeing from most of the fusion centers improved levels of situational awareness and products 

coming out of them. We have a great interchange with them on a 

daily basis. 

We are focusing on implementing, with the Department of Justice, the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. The fusion centers are a key element of that. 

The Secretary has also been, as I am sure you are aware, promoting the ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ campaign. That is a 

way for us and the fusion centers then to leverage the American 

public to be on the lookout for information, behaviors that might 

potentially allow us to detect and disrupt activities. 

So, between the ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ campaign and 

the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative that is feeding 

both us and the FBI’s eGuardian system and just the constant 

interaction that we have, I think we are in a very good position to 

use those guys as the first line of defense in detecting and deterring homegrown violent extremism. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you very much, ma’am. 

I am over my time, sir. I apologize. I will yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Cravaack. 
25 

Now the Chairman would recognize the gentleman from Arizona 

for 5 minutes of questioning, Mr. Quayle. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Under Secretary Wagner, we hear a lot about the need to improve the level of information sharing between the various Federal 

agencies, but we don’t often hear about how that is done within 

each individual department. So, at DHS, what are you doing to improve kind of the intelligence collaboration and information sharing 

within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise? 

Ms. WAGNER. Well, actually, we are doing multiple things, because there is not a single silver bullet to solve information sharing 

or communications. 

So we start with the Homeland Security Intelligence Council that 

we discussed earlier. These are some of the key members. We meet 

regularly on a monthly basis in person, we have weekly teleconferences to make sure that we are all on the same page about the 

emerging threats and any other things that we are trying to address collaboratively. 

But, at the same time, we have multiple daily levels of interaction. For example, these folks have representatives on the DHS 

Threat Task Force, which is, again, keeping everybody up to speed 

on emerging and evolving threats. Our analysts work together on 

a daily basis to produce joint products, some of which go in the Secretary’s daily briefing book, many of which are shared with our 

State and local partners and with the rest of the intelligence community. 

So it is multiple interactions across the board. We also work 

closely on collection requirements, as well as on analysis and on developing analytic tools. 

So I can’t even discuss all the levels of interaction there are, but 

we have been trying to significantly improve the cooperation and 

the communication, and I think we have made a lot of progress. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. Chaparro, you said the drug cartel activities have been keeping you up at night sometimes. What are we doing from an intelligence standpoint to able to apprehend and to make sure that we 

are not seeing these drug cartels continue to move across our border? 

Mr. CHAPARRO. I think, as we have seen the drug cartel threat 

and violence evolve, particularly in Mexico but elsewhere as well, 

I have seen a higher level of emphasis placed by the larger intelligence community. I would say very candidly that they are being 

very responsive to our requests for information and support. 

It is a strain. I know that we have wars going on in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and the intelligence community is stretched very thin. 

But this is a threat this is very close to home, and it impacts our 

communities tremendously. 

So we are doing everything that we can possible from a law enforcement perspective to bring the cartel members to justice but 

also to make sure that information that is coming out of our operations, as we understand the cartel structure—where they are operating, how they are operating, how they are communicating—we 

are making sure that we are passing that information to the intelligence community to help them better sharpen their focus, as well. 
26 

Mr. QUAYLE. What is the ability to work with your counterparts 

on the Mexican side? Has that been fruitful? Have you been able 

to glean a lot of information and have a fairly good working relationship with them? 

Mr. CHAPARRO. I have been in this business a long, long time, 

and, in all honesty, I think the cooperation has never been stronger. I think, for example, when Special Agent Jaime Zapata was 

murdered in Mexico last February, the support that we received 

from the Mexican government as well as the U.S. law enforcement 

intelligence community was just unprecedented. 

So, the cooperation is good. You can always build and make 

things better, but I have never seen it as good as it is today. 

Mr. QUAYLE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Quayle. 

I hope that I might ask just one more round of questions myself, 

and the Ranking Member may have a few questions. 

Ms. Wagner, this sort of may seem counterintuitive because we 

spend a lot of time, in the intelligence field, trying to develop as 

much information as we can on emerging threats, which means we 

develop a lot of information about a lot of things, a lot of people. 

You are building a sophisticated network with fusion centers that 

are touching each and every one of our communities, and we have 

a broad spectrum of agencies that are simultaneously participating. 

So, within our treasure trove of information, there is information 

about a lot of people, including American citizens, among others. 

You know, in my own State of Pennsylvania, before I was elected, but I was very aware of information that was developed by one 

of our entities that was let out into the mainstream to the benefit 

of somebody that was really—it was a private entity that took advantage of that intelligence information. 

What are we doing to assure that the civil liberties and privacy 

protections are in place so that we access information appropriately 

but guard against inappropriate uses of that information? 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you for that question, because that is something that we focus on a lot. 

For all of us who are sort of intelligence activities, we have intelligence oversight that is embedded in our organizations. You know, 

it flows from the Executive Order 12–333 and the guidelines within 

which we operate. So we have pretty well-defined ways of training 

our people, of double-checking to make sure that we are following 

the rules, and periodically going through all of our reports and seeing how we are doing. 

For the National network of fusion centers, this is a new world 

in which they are operating. So we have focused a lot of time and 

effort and resources on training them to understand the rules regarding privacy and civil rights and civil liberties and Constitutionally-protected activities. 

We have worked with them to ensure that every fusion center 

has a privacy policy in place. We work with them to make sure 

that those are adequate, that everyone who is in the fusion center 

has been trained on what is in those policies, and that those policies are being followed. 
27 

We work very closely with our civil rights and civil liberties office 

to provide training teams out to the fusion centers to make sure 

that they are fully trained on all the same things that we all have 

grown up—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Do they then take that and reach out, as well, 

within their communities to local police and otherwise? 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes, they do. So I am confident that we are very 

much leaning forward to build in protection of privacy, civil rights, 

and civil liberties at the front end of all of our engagements with 

the fusion centers and in all of the products that we are putting 

out. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you for that and for your work on that. It 

is very, very vitally important, I think, as part of our mission, and 

often overlooked. 

Mr. Chaparro, you touched on a variety of things. As a former 

United States attorney, I used to stay up at night thinking about 

a lot of different issues and always, you know, is there something 

we could be doing better? 

You touched on one area in which agencies like yours might be 

the only people that have an opportunity to reach out and be a lifeline to some victims who live a horrible existence, and these are 

these victims of human trafficking go and others who are then put 

down into the system. How are we doing in that battle? 

Mr. CHAPARRO. I think that human trafficking is an area where 

ICE has really stepped out in front to take a leadership role in not 

only rescuing victims but aggressively going after and prosecuting 

the horrific criminals that commit these crimes. 

But, equally important, we have victim witness assistance coordinators in every single one of our field offices to ensure that the victims of human trafficking are able to get the help that they need 

in order to be able to recover. 

Similarly, we are working very closely with the community organizations, the nongovernmental organizations, and we are working 

both domestically and overseas to combat human trafficking. 

Mr. MEEHAN. How about with our local police departments and 

others? Because one of the things that used to be of concern to me 

is that you would often have local police departments that might 

come in, make an investigatory stop, look at somebody, realize, 

‘‘Well, this is an immigration violation but not necessarily worth 

my making an arrest for some particular purpose,’’ but they are 

looking past signals that may indicate that there is something 

more going on. 

Are we training local police to be able to identify the signs, to 

ask the appropriate questions, and then to come back to experts 

like you or partners? 

Mr. CHAPARRO. Absolutely. A big part of our efforts is the outreach that we do, including working in local human trafficking task 

forces around the country so that, as local authorities, as you said, 

identify signs that may be an indicator, they know to ask the right 

question, they know to go that step further. The outreach that we 

have is both in terms of formal training as well as various conferences, passing out brochures. Then there is no substitute for 

working hand-in-hand on the local task forces so that they can 

really understand what it is that they face. 
28 

Oftentimes, the signs are very hard to detect. The victims are 

often very scared to come forward. It really takes a lot of work 

sometimes to undercover these violations. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I will turn it to the Ranking Member, Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, have an abiding interest in the whole human sex-trafficking issue, so much so that I convened a workforce locally and 

have had the district attorneys, the U.S. attorney, the FBI, local 

police, all part of a training. We have met now five or six times. 

There was an all-day training just a couple weeks ago. 

But I will tell you this, that we really have just scratched the 

surface. While we may on a Federal level make resources within 

your jurisdiction available, we need to do much, much more. 

Just in the short time that we have been working on this issue, 

our local DA has gone back and recognized that two domestic violence complaints that came in on the same person with different 

complainants turned out to be a sex trafficker. It didn’t dawn on 

him until he had started participating in this program. 

So I bring it up only because I think we need to do more. I know 

that you are already taxed, but it is a horrific problem. The sex 

trafficking of those under the age of 18 is somewhere close to 

300,000 in this country alone. So I hope that we can see new initiatives come out from within your various agencies to help in that 

regard, as well. 

I have just one last question. It would appear, based on what we 

have been able to glean from the information that bin Laden had 

in his Abbottabad location, that rail was a very interesting target 

for them. I happen to have traveled with my daughter over spring 

break on a college tour along the East Coast, and we did it by 

train. I thought about it a lot, because I think the trains are incredibly porous. I don’t know what we have under way to try and 

address that issue, but I think that it is just ripe for some kind of 

an attack that will come from a lone wolf who is, you know, homebound right amongst ourselves. 

So if any of you have any thoughts that we would like to share 

with us on what we can or should be doing relative to rail, I would 

appreciate hearing it. 

Ms. WAGNER. I will just say one thing and then turn it over to 

Dan, since it is a TSA issue, just to say that we have obviously 

known, based on looking at events overseas, that rail has been a 

target of interest to terrorists and al-Qaeda affiliates if we just look 

at what has happened in London and Madrid and Moscow. 

So we have been publishing on the tactics and techniques that 

have been used in these attacks on rail to our law enforcement and 

public-sector partners to help them think through the appropriate 

protective measures for some time. 

But I will turn it over to Dan for any specifics. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We have specific analysts that look at rail specifically and also passenger rail, freight rail. They do annual assessments, both at the classified and unclassified level. It probably 

would be better if we went ahead and we had a closed-door session 

and walked you through the classified findings that we have within 
29 

the rail assessments that we have out there, especially in light of 

bin Laden’s roll-up. 

Ms. WAGNER. We want you to feel confident that we have been 

looking at this for quite a while. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I want to express my deep appreciation to 

this very, very distinguished panel, first, for your patience; second, 

for your excellent testimony and the preparation that went into it; 

but, last and most importantly, for your service. I think all of us 

appreciate that you are on the front line, and you are on a front 

line in what is now a very precarious time for our country. Yet, at 

the same time, you know, I don’t like to be alarmist because I 

think the work that you are doing is making a big difference. 

We have seen, over the course of the last year, an increase in 

real threats to our Nation, but simultaneously, if you were to have 

looked at this 10 years ago from September 11 and had predicted 

what may have been, I think there are few who would argue that 

we have not been vigilant and had some genuine successes. But no 

one goes to sleep at night and says, ‘‘Okay, because tomorrow is another day, and I know it is not on my watch.’’ 

So I want to thank you for your work, but more important, your 

service to our Nation. 

The Members of the committee may have some additional questions. I hope that if they do those that you will do your best to be 

as responsive as can you in writing. The hearing record will be 

open for 10 days. 

So, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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