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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION
No. 04-08-00520- CV Ba ron C. CLARK , Appellant

v . Carlos P ORTER , Appellee F ro m th e 13 1s t Judi c ia l D istri c t Co ur t, B e xar County , T e xas Trial Court No. 2002-CI -03220 Honora ble Peter Saka i , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini , J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini , J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Aug ust 26, 2009 AFF I RMED Appellant B aron C. Clark, the pla int i ff b el o w, appe als from a take- nothing judg ment rende red a g ainst him in a commercia l brea ch of c ontrac t suit. Beca use we conclude the trial cour t’s pretria l gr anting of a motion for judgment was not er ror in lig ht of deeme d admissions, a nd the trial court did not e rr in de nying Clark’s motion for sanctions and assessing costs ag ainst Clark, we a ffirm the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04
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1 ... T h e l e a s e , w h i c h de s i g n a t e s Ce n t e r v i e w Pr of e s s i on a l Bui l di n g , L
. P. a s t h e l a n dl or d, i s s i g n e d by Bar on C. C la rk . C la rk is C e n te rv ie w ’s m a n a g ing p a rtn e r a n d re g ister e d a g e n t.

- 2- B ACKG ROUND On Marc h 2, 2002, Centerview Professional B uilding, L .P., sued appellee Carlos Porter for br e a c h of a c omm e rc ia l le a se c on tr a c t. 1 Porter answ ere d, and filed c ounterc laims ag ainst Centerview and Clark. Eve ntually , Porter’s c ounterc laims were s e ttled and non-suited, and Clar k was substituted for Cente rview. Por te r se nt Cla

rk tw e nty -n ine re qu e sts fo r a dmi ssi on s. Cla rk did no t ti me ly

re sp on d to the se reque sts. L ater , Clark maintained that he had responde d to the reque sts f or admissions, albeit more than six months after the response s were due. Porter m o v ed fo r s ummary judgme nt based on the de e me d a dmi ssi on s. Trial on the mer its was set for A pril 7, 2008. Be fore the benc h t ri al beg an, the tria l court
c on sid e re d a

nd de nie d Porte r’ s summ ary jud g me nt mot ion , a nd str uc k Cl ark ’s purp or

te d r e sp on se to the reque sts f

or admissions a s untimely
. Porter then moved for judgme nt ba sed on t h e d eemed admissions. The trial court g rante d the motion for judg ment and re ndere d a take -nothing judgme nt in favor of

Porter. T h e t ri al co u rt m ad e f

i n d i n gs o f f

ac t , i n cl u d i n g th e f

o l l o wi n g: 4. On or about September 17, 2003, R eq u es t s for Admissions wer e sent to the Plaintiff. 5. B aro n Clark a tta c he d a cop y of un sig ne d an d und a te d Res po ns e s to Re qu e st[s ] fo r A dmi ssi on [s] a s E xhibi t G to h is Pl a int if f’ s Re sp on se to D e fe nd ant’ s Re sp on se to D e fe nd ant C arl os Por te r’ s Mo tio n fo r Sanc tio ns and Mo tio n to Show Authority

/Dismiss filed on April 7, 2004. 6. B aro n Cl ark

a tta c he d a

c op y of un sig ne d and

un date d Re sp on se s to Re qu e st[s ] for Admissions as Exhi bit C t o his Pl aintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary J udg ment filed on Mar ch 28, 2008.04
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- 3- 7. No ce rtificate of ser vice a ppear s on the alleg ed re sponses to reque sts for a dmi ssi on s. 8. B aro n Cl ark

c ou ld pr e se nt no pr oo f tha t he tim e ly re sp on de d to the Re qu e sts fo r A dmi ssi on s d ir e c te d to the Pla int if f b y the De fe nd ant. T h e t ri al co u rt al s o m ad e c o n cl u s i o n s o f l aw , i n cl u d i n g th e f o l l o wi n g: 2. Ba

ron C. Clark failed to timely respond to Request[s] for Admissions and the admissions were de emed a dmitted. 3. Th e de e me d a dmi ssi on s d ic tate d ju dg me nt i n f avo r o f t he De fe nd ant. A R G U M EN TS P R ESENTED On appe al, Clark’s primary complaint is that the trial court e rre d in gr anting Porter’s motion fo r j ud g me nt a

nd us ingthe de e me d a dmi ss io ns to b ar h is b re a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im. Cla rk a lso
c omp la ins the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

fo r s anc tio ns and

in a sse ssi ngc os ts a g a ins t hi m. Although Clar

k raises othe r complaints, our opinion is limi t ed to the issues nece ssary to the final d is p o s it io no f

th is a p p e al. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.1. (statingappellate courts must hand down a
wr itt e n o pin ion

that is a s br ie f a s pr a c tic a ble but th a t a dd

re sse s e ve ry

iss ue ra ise d a

nd ne c e ssa ry to the final disposition of the appea l).

M OT I ON F OR J UDGMENT /D E E M E D A DM I S S I ONS Clark’s complaint about the motion for judg ment focuse s on the timing of the motion, which he asserts was premature
. I n a bench t rial, a judge may g rant a motion for judgme nt, which is the leg al equivalent of

a dire cted ve rdict in a jury trial. See Qantel Business Sys.,Inc . v. Custom Controls Co. , 76 1 S. W.2 d 3 02 , 3 03 (T e x. 19 88 ); Bledsoe Dodge, L.L.C . v. Kuberski , 2 7 9 S. W. 3 d 8 3 9 , 8 4 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —D a l l a s 2 0 0 9 , n o p e t
. )
. O r d i n ar i l y , a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s h o u l d n o t b e g r an t e d a g a i n s ta pa rt y befor e the par

ty has a ha d a full opportunity to present its ca se and ha s rested. Tana Oil & Gas Corp.
v . M c Cal l , 104 S.W .3d 80, 82 (Tex. 2003)
. In fac t, it is g ener ally reve rsible er

ror f or the trial c ourt04
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- 4- to direct a verdic t without allowing the plaintiff to pr esent a ll of its evidence. W edgeworth v. Kirskey , 985 S.W .2d 115, 116 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) . Howeve r, in at lea st one instance, the Texas Supreme Court has he ld that the g rantingof a dire cted ve rdict befor e the close of plaintiff’s evidenc e did not require reve rsal whe n no harm wa s shown. Se e Tan a O il & Gas , 104 S.W .3d at 82 (holding that direc ted ver dict g rante d during first witness’s testimony was “irre g ular” but not error beca use proof of all cla ims would sti ll not entitl e plaintiffs to the only damag es sought). I m portant to our ana ly sis in thi s case is the exi stence of dee med admissions. Under Te x as Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 19 8. 1, a pa rt y may se rv e on ano the r pa rt y wr itt e n re qu e sts tha

t th e oth e r p art

y ad m i t the truth of any

matter within the scope of discover y . T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 9 8
. 1
. T h e r e s p o n ding pa rt y mus t se rv e a

wr itt e n r e sp on se on

the re qu e sti ng pa

rt y wi thi n 30 day s af

te r se rv ic e of

the re qu e st. T EX . R. C IV . P. 198.2 (a)
. Absent a timely response , the m atter in the re quest is considere d admitted without the necessity

of a c ourt order
. Id
. 19 8. 2( c ). “ A matte r a dmi tte d un de r t his ru le is c on c lus ive ly established as to the pa

rty making the admission unless the co u rt p ermit s the party to withdraw or amend the a dmission.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 198.3. Thus, u n an s wer ed re quests for a dmissions are automatically

deeme d admitted, unless the court permits their withdraw al or amendment. Ma rsh all
v . V ise , 767 S.W .2d 699, 700 (Tex. 1989). A r e qu e st f

or admissi on , o nc e a dmi tte d o r d e e me d, is a jud ic ia l a dmi ssi on , a

nd the pa rt y making the admission c annot introduce c ontrovertingevidenc e on the issue. Id .; Continental C arbon Co. v . Sea-Land Serv ., Inc. , 27 S.W.3 d 184 , 190 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, pe t. d e nie d) ; Beasley v. Burns , 7 S.W .3d 768, 769-70 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) . Dee med admissions filed with the trial court cler

k and part of the rec ord at the time of trial nee d not be introduce d in evidence to be prope rly

befor e the c ourt. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. D ean , 549 S.W .2d 41, 43 (Tex. Civ.04
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- 5- App .—Tyle r 1 97 7, wr it d ism ’d w. o. j.) ; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fire Ins. Ex ch. , 5 0 8 S. W. 2 d 7 0 3 , 7 04 (T e x. Civ . App .—

Wac o 1 97 4, no wr it)
. Ho we ve r, a t tr ia l a pa rt y re lyingon

de e me d a dmi ssi on s mu st protec t the rec ord by

objectingto controver

ting e vidence and to the submission of any issue bear ing
on the facts admitted. Marshall, 767 S.W .2d at 700. Fa ilure to proper ly protec t the rec ord wa ives the rig ht to rely on the controve rted a d m i s sions. Se e id . (holding party waived his rig ht to rely

upon
a dmi ssi on s w hic h w e re c on tr ov e rt e d b y te sti mony

a dmi tte d at tr ia l w ith out ob je ction) ; se e als o Ace vedo v

. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline , 131 S.W .3d 99, 104-05 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (discussing waiver of rig ht to rely

on deeme d admissions in the summary judgme nt and trial contexts). He re , Po rt e r s e rv e d Cl ark

w i t h r e q u e s t s f or a dmi ssi on s th a t w e re ne ve r t ime ly ans we re d. Thus , the matte rs in t

he re qu e sts fo r a dmi ssi on s w e re a uto matic a lly

a dmi tte d. Whe n th is c a se wa s c a lle d to trial, the deemed admiss ions wer e on file and befor e the court, and Clark had not moved to withdraw the a dmi s s io n s . A n e v a lu a ti o n o f Cl ar k ’ s a ll e g a ti o n s an d th e d e e me d a dmi s s io n s b e f o r e th e court shows that Clark was pr eclude d from re cover ing on his bre ach of contra ct claim. Clark’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim was ba sed on alleg ations that Porter bre ache d the lease by (1) f ailing or ref

using “to pay all the rent due for the months of August 1, 2000 until prese nt,” and ( 2)

“ a ba nd on ingand

va c a tin g the pr e mis e s o n or a bo ut July 19 , 20 00 , in dir e c t vio latio n of the de fa ult provisions of the [l] ease .” The rec ord fur ther indicates the bre ac h o f co n t ract claim was ba sed on Por te r’ s f ail ure to pay

c omm on ma int e na

nc e e xpe ns e s, pr op e rt

y ta xes, and

ins ur anc e fe e s in
a c c or da nc e wi th t he te rm s of the le a se . In h is a ns we r, Por

te r c la ime d h is o bli g a tio ns un de r t he le a se
wer e excused by

Clark’s ea

rlier ma te r ia l b r e a ch of the lease . Specifica lly , Porter maintained that Clark enter ed the lea sed pre mises and re moved all his signs, and that the sig ns were cruc ial to his operation04
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- 6- and a material pa

rt of the lea s e; an d t hat Clark eng ag ed in other c onduct—including threats of phy sical violence , stalking, ha rassment, a

nd preve nti n g P o rter’ s use of the pr emises—which interfe red w ith Porter’s rig ht to quiet enjoy ment of th e leased pre mises and constituted a fur ther materia l brea ch of the contra ct by Clark. Whe n o ne pa

rt y to a c on tr a c t c omm its a

materi al brea ch of t

hat c on tr a c t th e oth e r p art y is discharg ed or excused from further pe rfor mance . Mustang Pipeline Co., Inc. v . Driver Pipe line Co., Inc. , 13 4 S. W.3 d 1 95 , 1 96 (T e x. 20 04 ); Hernande z v. Gulf Group Lloyds , 8 7 5 S. W. 2 d 6 9 1 , 6 9 2 ( T e x. 1994). Whether a

party ’s initial breac h is material to excuse the other party ’s per formanc e of a contra ct is g ener ally

a fa ct question. See M

ustang Pipeline Co. , 134 S.W .3d at 198-99. I n the pre sent ca se, Clark wa s deeme d to have a dmit t ed t h e following : (1) in J une of 2000, Porter wa s in compliance w ith all the terms of the lea se agree ment; (2) in J uly of 2000, Porter wa s
curr ent on all amounts cha rg ed by Clark for the lease d premises; (3) pr ior to J uly of 2000, Clark
remove d Porter’s sig nag e in bre ach of the lease ag ree ment; (4) in J uly of 2000, Clark rem oved Porter’s sig nag e in bre ach of the lease ag ree ment; (5) Clark re m oved all of Porter ’s sig ns from the lease d premises a

nd the common ar eas in violation of the lea se ag ree ment prior to the alleg ed bre ach by Por te r; (6 ) t he pr ov isi on s f

or sig na g e we re a

mate ri a l e le me nt o f t

he le a se a g re e me nt; (7 ) i n July of 2000, Clark thre atene d to “kick” Porter’s “ass” in br eac h of Clark’s duty to allow Porter the quiet enjoy ment of the lea sed premises; (8) in J une and July of 2000, Clark stalked Porte r in brea ch of Clark’s duty

to allow Porter the quiet enjoy ment of t he leased premises; (9) in J anuar y of 2000, Clark threatened to lock Porter

out of the lease d premises unless Porter paid funds to Clar k that wer e not authorized by

the lease ag ree ment; (10) Porter’s obl iga tions under the lease ag ree ment wer e excused beca use of a materia l brea ch of the lease ag ree ment by Clark th at prec eded a

ny alleg ed bre ach by04
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- 7- Porter; (11) Clar

k’s conduc t prior to Aug ust of 2000, and ea ch ac t independently or take n toge ther constituted a mater ial brea ch to Porter’ s rig ht to quiet enjoy ment of the lea sed pre mises and a br eac h of Porter’ s rig hts under the lea se ag ree ment; and (12) be cause Clark bre ac hed the lea se agree ment and/or pre vented Porter ’s per formanc e under the lease ag ree ment and/or a nticipatorily

brea ched the lease ag ree ment, Porter wa s excused from any perf ormanc e and ha d no liability to Clark. B a se d o n th e de e me d a dmi ssi on s, Por te r wa s c ur

re nt o n a ll amou

nts c ha rg e d und e r t

he le a se ag ree ment as of July

2000, and wa s ex cu s ed fr o m further perf ormanc e bec ause of

Clark’s ea

rlier materia l brea ch of the lease ag ree ment. As a re sult of the deeme d admissions, there we re no c ontested fa ct issues remainingin this case, and Clar k was not entitled to admit evidenc e contr adictingthe deeme d admiss i o n s . And, by moving f

or judg ment when he did, Porter protec ted the re cord a nd avoided a ny waiver of the de emed a dmissions as he w as re quired to do. See Ma rsh all , 767 S.W .2d
a t 70 0 ( statin g a

pa rt y re lyingon

de e me d a dmi ssi on s a

t tr ia l mu st p ro te c t th e re c or d by ob je c tin g to the int ro du c tio n o f c on tr ov e rt inge vid e nc e and to t he su bmi ssi on of any

iss ue be ari ngon

the fa c ts
a dmi tte d) ; J

ole t v . G ar c ia , No. 05-97-01461- CV, 2000 WL 276906, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar ch 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 , p e t. d e n ie d ) ( me m. o p . , n o t d e s ign a te d f o r p u b li c a ti o n ) ( c o n c lu d in g th a t t h e d e f endant preve nted the introduction of e vidence contra dictin g deeme d admissions by moving f or judg ment befor e the of

fer of any evidenc e). I n Tan a O il &Ga s Co rp . v . M c Cal l , the Texas Supreme Court conc luded t hat t he g rantingof a dire cted verdic t be fore the close of the plaintiff’s case was “ irregular” but not error beca use eve n if the plaintiff ha d admitted evidenc e on her claims, she would st ill have not been entitled to judgment
as a matter of law . 104 S.W .3d at 82. The c ase be fore us is analog ous. Here , beca u s e the deemed admissions were the only evidenc e before the court and Clark was preclude d from introducingany04
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- 8- contra dictory

evidenc e, the pr etrial g rantingof Porter’ s motion for judgme nt, although ir regular, wa s
no t e rr or . We, the re fo re , ov e rr ule Cla rk ’s iss ue c on c e rn ingthe g ra nti ngof the mot ion

fo r j ud g me nt. M OT I ON F OR S ANCT I ONS R u l e 1 3 a u t h o r i z e s a

t r i a l c o u rtt o i mp o s e s an c t i o n s a g a i n s tan a t t o r n e y, a r e p r e s e n t e d

p arty,
or bo th, wh o f

ile a g ro un dle ss p le a din g br ou g ht i n b a d f a ith or br ou g ht f

or the purp os e of

ha ra ssm e nt. T EX . R. C IV . P. 13. Her e, Clark f iled a Rule 13 motion for

sanctions claimingcer

tain statements made in P or te r’ s ans we r— sp e c if

ic a lly fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns c on c e rn ingPor te r’ s d e fe ns e s—

we re g ro un dle ss and fa lse. On appe al, Clark ar gu es t h e trial court err ed bec ause it denie d his moti on for sa nctions “without first havinghear d the motion.” We disag ree . T h e re co rd shows t he trial c ourt provided Clark the opportunity to present his motion for
sanc tio ns , s tatin g , “Okay . M r. Cla rk , le t’ s g o w ithy our s anc tio ns .” Cla rk the n b e g an a

rguin g his motion for sanctions. When it became clea r that C lark’s sa

nctions motion related to the fa ctual
a lle g a tio ns ma de in P or

te r’ s ans we r, the tr ia l ju dg e po stp on e d f ur the r a rgume nt o n th e mot ion

un til afte r the mer its of the suit were a ddresse d. C l ar k n ev er r e-ur g ed his motion for sanctions. We, there fore , overr

ule Clark’s issue c oncer

ning his motion for sanc tions. C OSTS Finally , Clark ar g ues the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in awardingcosts to Porter. Texas Rule of Civil P roce dure 131 pr ovides, “The succe ssful party to a sui t shall rec over of his adversa ry all costs incurre d there in, e x cept wher e otherwise pr ovided.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 131. A defendant who obtains a take -nothing judgme nt is a succe ssful party
. Impe rial L ofts, L td. v. Impe rial W oodworks , Inc ., 24 5 S. W.3 d 1, 8 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 20 07 , pe t. d e nie d) ; Denne y v. Tex as Employers I

ns. Ass’n , 78 0 S. W.2 d 4 12 , 4 13 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 89 , no wr it) . Thu s, the tr ia l court did no t a bu se its04
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- 9- discretion in a

war ding c osts to P orter. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gray son , 983 S.W .2d 769, 770 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (r ever sing the t ri al co u rt ’s awa rd of c osts to a pla int if f o n a take -n oth ingjud g me nt a nd awa rd ingc os ts to th e de fe nd ant) . We , th e re fo re , o ve rr ule Cla rk ’s iss ue c on c e rn ingc os ts. C ONCL US I ON The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice