UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Series V: The Early Postwar Period

Volume VI

The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization 

and the Establishment of NSA:

1940 - 1952

Thomas L. Burns

CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

2005

The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization 

and the Establishment of NSA:

1940 - 1952

Page iii

Table of Contents

Page

Forewords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Introduction: The Struggle to Control a Unique Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter I: Early Army-Navy COMINT Relations, 1930-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Chapter II: The Military Services and the Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Chapter III: The Emerging National Intelligence Structure and the United States Communications

Intelligence Board, 1946-1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Chapter IV: Creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency, 1949-1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Chapter V: AFSA, the CONSIDO Plan, and the Korean War, 1949-1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Chapter VI: The Brownell Committee and the Establishment of NSA, 4 November 1952 . . . . . . . . . 81

Chapter VII: Summary: The Struggle for Control Continues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Notes on Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127

Page v

Forewords

The Center for Cryptologic History (CCH) is proud to publish the first title under its own imprint,

Thomas L. Burns’s The Origins of NSA.* 

In recent years, the NSA history program has published a number of volumes dealing with exciting and even controversial subjects: a new look at the Pearl Harbor attack, for example. Tom Burns’s

study of the creation of NSA is a different kind of history from the former. It is a masterfully researched

and documented account of the evolution of a national SIGINT effort following World War II, beginning with the fragile trends toward unification of the military services as they sought to cope with a

greatly changed environment following the war, and continuing through the unsatisfactory experience

under the Armed Forces Security Agency. Mr. Burns also makes an especially important contribution

by helping us to understand the role of the civilian agencies in forcing the creation of NSA and the

bureaucratic infighting by which they were able to achieve that end.

At first glance, one might think that this organizational history would be far from “best seller”

material. In fact, the opposite is the case. It is essential reading for the serious SIGINT professional,

both civilian and military. Mr. Burns has identified most of the major themes which have contributed

to the development of the institutions which characterize our profession: the struggle between centralized and decentralized control of SIGINT, interservice and interagency rivalries, budget problems,

tactical versus national strategic requirements, the difficulties of mechanization of processes, and the

rise of a strong bureaucracy. These factors, which we recognize as still powerful and in large measure

still shaping operational and institutional development, are the same ones that brought about the birth

of NSA.

The history staff would also like to acknowledge a debt owed to our predecessors, Dr. George F.

Howe and his associates, who produced a manuscript entitled “The Narrative History of AFSA/NSA.”

Dr. Howe’s study takes a different course from the present publication and is complementary to it,

detailing the internal organization and operational activities of AFSA, and serves as an invaluable reference about that period. The Howe manuscript is available to interested researchers in the CCH.

It remains for each reader to take what Tom Burns has presented in the way of historical fact and

correlate it to his/her experience. This exercise should prove most interesting and illuminating.

Henry F. Schorreck

NSA Historian

1990

*The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952 is an

unclassified version of The Origins of NSA, released for public review.

Page vii

I

t may not be politically correct to say it, but the National Security Agency may be the last institutional

legacy of the New Deal. NSA was established by President Harry S. Truman in late 1952, drawing on

activities and organizations that traced from the 1930s and 1940s. 

The United States had had vigorous communications intelligence (COMINT) activities in the American

Civil War and World War I. After each of these conflicts, however, the organizations had been abolished

and the activities ended. 

Although the contribution of cryptology — both cryptanalysis and cryptography — was so far-reaching

on the operations of World War II, there was little question that the activities would continue. However,

the shape of the organizations to do it, their institutional home, and the level of effort were far from certain. 

The post-WWII period in American politics was a bad time for fostering cryptology. The war had shown

that it was necessary to use expensive machines to make and break codes or ciphers. Yet, this was a time

of drastic budget cuts and personnel reductions in the government. For the major figures in the national

security field, cryptology was a small but important issue; they were concerned primarily with the question

of unification of the armed services and the possible creation of a central intelligence organization. 

Thomas Burns clarifies the struggle of disparate forces concerned with cryptology, and shows clearly the

intermediate steps taken before the creation of NSA. He deals forthrightly with the positive and negative

aspects of the predecessor organizations, with their accomplishments and missed opportunities, and the

factors that triggered the emergence of a new COMINT organization. 

This is a story that in the past has been only partially glimpsed. Mr. Burns originally intended this as

an in-house study. It is now available to help those interested in intelligence or cryptologic history to understand the forces that produced a major institution in the field. 

For background, the reader might also want to consult Robert L. Benson’s A History of U.S.

Communications Intelligence during World War II: Policy and Administration, published by the Center

for Cryptologic History in 1997. 

David A. Hatch

NSA Historian

2005

Page ix

Acknowledgments

Many people played a part in developing this expanded report on the origins of NSA. In particular, I

want to extend thanks for the research help I received from the Office of Archives and Repository Services

of the Telecommunications Organization and from my colleagues in the Center for Cryptologic History

(CCH).

During the saga associated with the preparation of this volume, I became indebted to Henry F.

Schorreck, NSA Historian, for his continuing confidence and support. In the latter stages of the review

process, David W. Gaddy, Chief, CCH, and David A. Hatch, drawing on their broad experience and knowledge of the Agency , provided fresh perspective and comments. My appreciation goes to Arleone (Archie)

M. Fisher for entering the draft manuscript into the word processor. Among the cycle editors, Gwen L.

Cohen provided the initial editing of text, as well as the selection of photographs. Barry D. Carleen and his

staff provided the editing actions associated with the final preparation of the manuscript. Special thanks are

due to Jean M. Persinger and Donald K. Snyder for their editing contributions.

Finally, my appreciation goes to Gerald K. Haines, our former colleague, for his unfailing assistance in

the shaping and organizing of the report, for his enthusiasm about the project and its scope, and for his

helpful suggestions for sharpening and clarifying the text.

Thomas L. Burns

Page 1

More than sixty years have passed since the

outbreak of World War II. During that war, a

small number of organizations provided the total

intelligence gathering activities of the United

States government. Army and Navy authorities

played a preeminent role in the production of this

intelligence. Since 1945 a great number of organizational changes have occurred in the management and direction o f U.S. intelligence activities,

and the intelligence community has greatly

expanded. There is now a National Security

Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National

Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), and National

Security Agency (NSA), as well as the military

services, Department of State, Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy,

Department of the Treasury, and Commerce

Department. All are involved in intelligence activities, and all rely on or have access to communications intelligence (COMINT). COMINT is a

unique, extremely valuable intelligence source.

This study traces the evolution of the military

structures from the early 1930s to the establishment of a unique agency to deal with

COMINT–the National Security Agency–in 1952.

In the late 1930s, the major COMINT issue

among the services related to the coverage of foreign diplomatic targets. Regardless of duplication, each service insisted on holding onto whatever diplomatic targets it could intercept. The

realities of World War II, however, finally forced

the services to work out an agreement on wartime

cryptanalytic tasks. The Navy, because of its limited resources and its almost total preoccupation

with Japanese and German naval traffic, ultimately softened its position and asked the Army

to take over the entire diplomatic problem for the

duration of the war. Based on an informal agreement by the Army and the Navy, the Army

assumed responsibility for all targets in the 

diplomatic field, as well as its own commitments

in the military field.

As late as 1942, however, the Army and Navy

still resisted the introduction of any major

changes in their relationship and sought to maintain their traditionally separate cryptanalytic

roles. Each service worked independently and

exclusively on its assigned cryptanalytic tasks, as

was agreed upon previously, and later endorsed

by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The services

not only continued to demonstrate little enthusiasm toward closer cooperation in COMINT matters, but maintained their traditional hostility

towards proposals for merger, or even towards

opening up new dialogue on operational problems. Consequently, their interaction on

COMINT matters was minimal.

Nevertheless, out of the disaster at Pearl

Harbor came persistent demands for the establishment of a truly centralized, permanent intelligence agency. As early as 1943, proposals for the

establishment of a single United States intelligence agency became the routine topic for discussion in the various intelligence forums of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, the military

COMINT authorities foresaw their vulnerability

to congressional criticism and future reductions

in resources since they conducted their COMINT

operations on a fractionated and sometimes

duplicatory basis. Recognizing these threats to a

continuation of their separate existence, the services, after two years of superficial coordination,

established closer technical cooperation among

their COMINT organizations.

During the war, the independent Army and

Navy organizations accomplished a great number

of spectacular intelligence successes in support of

Introduction

The Struggle to Control a Unique Resource
Page 2

the Allied war effort. These included cryptanalytic breakthroughs against the communications of

German submarines, German and Japanese

armed forces, and the diplomatic communications of the Axis countries of both the European

and Pacific theaters. The victory at Midway and

the submarine war in the Atlantic are but two

examples of how intelligence derived from enemy

communications contributed to the success of the

U.S. war effort. Ironically, these successes later

became the measuring rod for criticism of the

postwar military COMINT organizations.

By the end of World War II, many policy makers had a new respect for COMINT. However,

there were also major questions concerning the

management and control of this valuable

resource. In 1951 President Truman established a

presidential commission under the chairmanship

of George A. Brownell to study the communications intelligence effort and to make recommendations concerning the management of the effort.

From the Brownell Report grew the managerial

foundation of the organization now known as the

National Security Agency.

This study documents the origins of the

National Security Agency. It is an attempt to set

before the reader the “what happened” in terms

of the issues and conflicts that led to Truman’s

decision to establish a centralized COMINT

agency. It traces the evolution of the military

COMINT organizations from the 1930s to the

establishment of the National Security Agency on

4 November 1952.

While the lineal origins of the National

Security Agency are clearly traceable to the military COMINT structures and represent a fairly

simple audit trail of organizations, there is more

to the origin of NSA than a mere chronology of

organizations. The political struggles and operational considerations that led to the establishment of NSA are complex. The National Security

Act of 1947, the expanding intelligence requirements of the growing intelligence community,

and the continuing controversy between the military and civilian agencies over the control of intelligence became prominent factors in the move to

reorganize the nation’s cryptologic structure.

This account seeks to highlight the main

events, policies, and leaders of the early years. Its

major emphasis is directed toward communications intelligence and its identification as a

unique source of intelligence information. One

theme persists throughout: the jurisdictional

struggle between the military and civilian authorities over the control and direction of the

COMINT resources of the United States. Special

attention is also directed toward consumer relationships, intelligence directives, and consumer

needs–particularly when those considerations

may have influenced the shaping and formulation

of the cryptologic structure.

The communications security (COMSEC) role

of NSA is addressed only in the broad context of

representing a basic responsibility of the new

agency. The development of national COMSEC

policies did not take place until after the establishment of NSA, which is outside the scope of

this report. As directed by President Truman on

24 October 1952, the solutions to national COMSEC problems and the formulation of those solutions in directives became the responsibility of a

special committee of the National Security

Council for COMSEC matters. The beginnings of

an expanded COMSEC role for NSA did not occur

until the mid-1950s, following the issuance of a

preliminary report (NSC 168) on 20 October

1953, which provided the basis for a later clarification of COMSEC roles and responsibilities

within the government.

The study is organized basically in a chronological approach with chapters reflecting the prewar period, the war years, and the immediate

postwar era. Major events or policy actions are

reflected within this chronology. The early chapters address the evolution of the Army and Navy

COMINT relationships from 1930 through the
Page 3

war years and later the establishment of a third

cryptologic service, the Air Force Security Service

(AFSS), in 1948. Next, emphasis is placed on the

three-year period from 1946 to 1949, which

marked the passage of the National Security

Act of 1947 and the beginning of high-level efforts

to centralize U.S. intelligence responsibilities.

This section traces the organization of the

COMINT structure as military authorities moved

in the direction of a joint Army and Navy

Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB)

and closer cooperation. This period of experimentation included the establishment of the

Joint Army and Navy Operating Plan in 1946 and

of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in

1949. Both structures encountered great difficulties, with AFSA receiving continuing criticism

from the consumer community for its performance during the Korean War. Finally, as the prologue to the establishment of NSA, there is an

extensive discussion of the Brownell Committee,

including the reasons for its establishment and

the nature of its deliberations. The study concludes with an overall review of the organizational changes and a suggestion that struggle for control of this unique resource is far from over.

Page 5

During the 1930s and throughout World War

II, the United States Army and the United States

Navy dominated the U.S. COMINT effort. The

Army and Navy COMINT organizations operated

as totally autonomous organizations. They were

fiercely independent, with little dialogue or cooperation taking place between them. Their working

relationship represented a spirit of strong rivalry

and competition, with overtones of mutual distrust. During the first two years of the war, the

Army and Navy persisted in maintaining their

totally separate cryptanalytic roles. Each worked

independently and exclusively on its assigned

cryptanalytic tasks, as approved earlier by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Franklin D.

Roosevelt. Each service continued to oppose

cooperation in COMINT matters. Both maintained a traditional hostility toward thoughts of

merger, or even of opening up a dialogue with the

other on cooperation.

Near the end of World War II, as the service

COMINT organizations foresaw major reductions

in their COMINT programs, their attitudes

toward cooperation began to change. Moreover,

as the pressures mounted for organizational

change in the entire U.S. intelligence structure,

the service COMINT authorities now initiated

voluntary moves toward closer interservice

cooperation, primarily as a self-preservation

measure. In 1944, for example, the services

expanded their cooperation on operational functions related to collection and cryptanalysis.

The services also established the last joint forum

for discussion of cryptologic matters,

the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence

Coordinating Committee (ANCICC). ANCICC, in

turn, quickly evolved into the first overall

COMINT policy board, the Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIB). As

further evidence of the broadening of the

COMINT base. the Department of State accepted

an ANCIB invitation to join the Board in

December 1945. A civilian agency was now a part

of the COMINT decision-making process.

As early as the World War I era, the U.S. Army

and Navy COMINT organizations intercepted

and processed foreign military and non-military

communications for intelligence purposes. For all

practical purposes, each functioned on a totally

autonomous basis. Each service operated 

independently of the other, and each conducted

its own intercept and exploitation activities. In

this early period, intelligence requirements did

not exist as we know them today. Generally. each

service determined its own intercept targets and

then, based on its own processing priorities,

decrypted or translated whatever communications could be exploited. The Army and the

Navy COMINT organizations disseminated 

the decrypts to the intelligence arms of their 

parent services, as well as to other governmental

officials.

Except for a very restrained and limited

exchange concerning cryptanalytic techniques,

little cooperation or dialogue took place

between the military COMINT organizations.

Traditionally, each worked exclusively on those

military and naval targets of direct interest to

itself. Thus, the Army handled military radio stations and military messages, and the Navy handled naval radio stations and naval messages. The

coverage of diplomatic targets, however, reflected

a totally different story.

The coverage of diplomatic links always

ranked as a top priority for both the Army and

Navy, as it represented the only intelligence of

Chapter I

Early Army-Navy COMINT Relations, 1930-1945
Page 6

real interest to non-military consumers, namely,

the Department of State and the White House.1

Recognizing the need for budgetary support from

these influential customers, each service sought

to retain a posture of maximum coverage on

diplomatic targets. Consequently, the Army and

Navy, operating under an unwritten and loose

agreement, shared the responsibility for the 

intercept and processing of diplomatic traffic,

with each service making its own determination

concerning what diplomatic coverage it would

undertake.2

Despite the increasingly apparent need for

cooperation, neither service, because of strong

mutual distrust, pressed very hard for a cooperative agreement. The nearest that the services

came to concluding an agreement during the

1930s occurred in April 1933. The occasion was a

planning conference of representatives of the

War Plans and Training Section of the Army and

representatives of the Code and Signal Section of

the Navy.3 The agenda for the conference was

very broad, including items on both communications security and radio intelligence matters. The

conferees reached a very limited informal agreement on a delineation of the areas of paramount

interest to each service.4 Although formal implementation of the agreement never took place, the

conference itself was a significant milestone. For

the first time in the modern era, the services had

agreed, at least in principle, on the need for a joint

Army-Navy dialogue on COMINT matters.

From 1933 to 1940, little change took place in

this relationship. Each service continued to go its

own way, working generally on whatever traffic

was available to it. In the fall of 1939, General

Joseph A. Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer, U.S.

Army, and Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of

Naval Communications, attempted an informal

agreement concerning diplomatic traffic.5 They

agreed that diplomatic traffic would be divided

between the two services on the basis of nationality. This agreement, like the one in 1933, 

however, was never implemented. The Army

Signal Corps, on orders from its General Staff,

worked on German, Italian, and Mexican diplomatic systems, thereby duplicating the Navy’s

efforts in this area. This effort completely 

nullified the earlier agreement negotiated by

Mauborgne and Noyes.6

General Joseph A.

Mauborgne

Chief Signal Officer, U.S.

Army

Rear Admiral Leigh

Noyes

Director of Naval

Communications
Page 7

By the summer of 1940, the war in Europe,

coupled with the increasingly warlike posture of

the Japanese in the Pacific, brought renewed

pressures for closer Army-Navy cooperation. In

addition, changes occurred in some foreign cryptographic systems that foretold the beginning of

new technical challenges for both services.

Despite the strong service antagonisms, the

inevitability of closer cooperation and pooling of

COMINT resources in some manner became

apparent to many Army and Navy officials.

In mid-1940, a new round of formal ArmyNavy discussions took place concerning

“Coordination of Intercept and Decrypting

Activities.” The services established a Joint ArmyNavy Committee, under the chairmanship of

Colonel Spencer B. Akin and Commander

Laurance F. Safford, to develop a method of

dividing intercept traffic between them.7

The Army and Navy planners had no problem

in reaching agreement on the division of responsibility for the coverage of counterpart targets.

They simply opted for the status quo in the intercept coverage of military and naval targets. Thus,

the Army retained the sole responsibility for the

intercept and analysis of all foreign military traffic, and the Navy concentrated on the intercept

and analysis of all foreign naval radio traffic.8

The discussions, however, failed to generate a

solution to the issue of diplomatic coverage. Each

service presented a number of proposals and

counterproposals, but neither would yield any of

its responsibility for coverage of diplomatic traffic.9 The primary diplomatic targets under discussion at this time were German, Italian, Mexican,

South American, Japanese, and Soviet.

Given the attitudes of the two services, there

seemed little likelihood of achieving any agreements on diplomatic targets. The Army, having

canceled the earlier 1939 understanding with the

Navy, continued to work on German, Italian, and

Mexican diplomatic systems, as well as on a number of machine problems of interest to the Navy.

By 1940, the Navy, because of its heavy commitment to operational naval problems, stopped

working on the German, Italian, and Mexican

diplomatic targets. As a matter of principle, however, the Navy refused to concur on the exclusive

assignment of these diplomatic targets to the

Army on a permanent basis.1o Another even more

contentious item arose at the conference concerning the coverage of Japanese diplomatic traffic.

Japan had become a prime intelligence target

whose diplomatic communications were obviously of paramount interest and importance to each

service – as well as to civilian U.S. officials.

Neither service would relinquish any coverage of

Japanese diplomatic communications.

Colonel Spencer B. Akin Commander Laurance F.

Safford
Page 8

In short, the joint conference resolved little.

Since each service COMINT organization viewed

its survival as being contingent upon the 

production of diplomatic intelligence, neither

consented to giving up diplomatic coverage on a

permanent basis. Colonel Akin and Commander

Safford finally opted to refer the matter to their

superiors – General Mauborgne and Admiral

Noyes – for a decision on how to divide the

Japanese COMINT problem.

As a last resort, Mauborgne, attempting a

Solomonic approach, suggested that the Army

and Navy simply alternate daily in their 

diplomatic coverage of certain functions such as

decryption and translation duties. Adopting this

suggestion as the way out of their dilemma,

Mauborgne and Noyes informally concluded 

an agreement in August 1940, which became

known as the “odd-even day” agreement. The

agreement established the immediate prewar

basis for the division of labor on all Japanese

intercepts and delineated the responsibilities for

decryption, translation, and reporting of

Japanese diplomatic traffic. 11

Under the terms of the agreement, the Army

assumed responsibility for decoding and translating the intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic and

consular service on the even days of the month.

The Navy became responsible for translating the

messages of the Japanese diplomatic and 

consular service on the odd days of the month.

The agreement also included a restatement of the

COMINT responsibilities for the intercept of

Japanese military and naval traffic. The Army

retained its responsibility for decoding and 

translating intercepts of the Japanese Army

(including military attachés). The Navy continued

to have the exclusive responsibility for the 

intercept and translation of the Japanese Navy

targets (including military attachés).12

As a corollary to the informal odd-even

arrangement, Mauborgne and Noyes ratified a

supplemental technical agreement on 3 October

1940 concerning the division of intercept.13

Colonel Akin and Commander Safford countersigned this agreement for the Army and Navy

COMINT organizations. The agreement essentially represented a joint analysis of the existing

intercept facilities and their capabilities. It reiterated the need for closer Army-Navy cooperation

in order to provide better intercept coverage and

to reduce duplication of effort. The report also

reflected the considerable reliance placed at that

time on the courier forwarding of traffic, both by

air mail and surface transport, to achieve timeliness.14 During the early part of World War II, the

intercepted traffic was sent by sea, or by aircraft,

and often arrived months late at its destination.

This situation gradually changed as new radio

teletype systems were installed.

The Mauborgne-Noyes odd-even verbal

agreement remained in effect from 1 August 1940

until shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor on 7 December 1941.15 This odd-even

arrangement proved to be fundamentally

unsound. Cryptanalytically, alternating the

responsibility for reporting greatly increased the

risk of error, duplication, and omission. It also

destroyed the element of continuity so critical to COMINT reporting and cryptanalysis.16

Politically, however, the odd-even day arrangement accomplished a public relations function

that was vitally important to the services. This

arrangement divided the problem equally and

permitted each to retain visibility with the White

House and those officials who controlled the

budget process.

Ten years later, Admiral Joseph N. Wenger

defended the odd-even day arrangement. He

indicated that in 1940 each service had all the

available intercept in the Japanese diplomatic

traffic and in some cases the means for breaking

them. As a result, whenever an important message was read, “each service would immediately

rush to the White House with a copy of the translation in an effort to impress the Chief Executive.”

According to Wenger, the awkwardness of this
Page 9

situation was the main reason for the adoption of

the odd-even day arrangement as the only acceptable and workable solution for the services.

Wenger conceded that the odd-even arrangement

for processing traffic was a strange one, but in his

view it was practical since traffic could be readily

sorted according to the cryptographic date.17

Wenger did not mention that it also achieved its

main purpose, as each service remained visible to

the White House.

The Wenger view represents the pragmatic

view traditionally taken by the Army and Navy

authorities at the time. Later assessments, however, differ in their treatment of the odd-even

split, and are generally not as charitable. In a

recent NSA cryptologic history, author Fred

Parker presents a new perspective on the issue.

While recognizing the Navy’s limited resources,

compounded by the primacy of the war in the

Atlantic, he contends that the Navy misgauged

the relative importance of Japanese diplomatic

communications, and in the process lost valuable

time in its pursuit of the more critical Japanese

naval targets. He concludes that “had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the

Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese

diplomatic traffic, the United States would have

had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by

these messages, might have avoided the disaster

of Pearl Harbor.18

The attack on Pearl Harbor brought about

increased activity in the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities. By the spring of 1942, a growing

number of U.S. agencies began to conduct their

own communications intelligence operations.

Agencies now engaged in COMINT activities

included the Department of State, Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Federal

Communications Commission (FCC), as well as

the Army and Navy.19 This proliferation of

COMINT activities became a matter of great concern to the military COMINT organizations.

Because of security considerations, as well as the

scattering of scarce analytic resources, the Army

and Navy sought to restrict sharply the number of

U.S. agencies engaged in the cryptanalysis of foreign communications.

Turning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military authorities requested a high-level decision

limiting governmental activities in COMINT matters. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the

national responsibility for adjudicating issues

related to intelligence, it represented the only

forum available for defining U.S. jurisdictional

responsibilities in the field of cryptanalysis. In its

response, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

of the JCS established a new Inter-Departmental

Committee, entitled “Committee on Allocation of

Cryptanalytical Activities.” This committee,

which had the task of surveying the entire field of

cryptanalysis in the United States, included members from the Army, Navy, and FBI. It scheduled

a conference for 30 June 1942.20

Leaving nothing to chance in their advance

preparations, Army and Navy officials held a

number of closed meetings prior to the meeting of

the full committee. They sought primarily to

resolve their long-standing disagreement on coverage of diplomatic targets. Five days before their

meeting with the FBI, the Army and Navy succeeded in reaching an agreement on the division

of COMINT responsibilities between their organizations.21 The solution, urgently promoted backstage, resolved the nagging question of how to

allocate service responsibility for diplomatic traffic. At the Navy’s request, on 25 June 1942 the

Army-Navy participants agreed to transfer the

entire diplomatic problem to the Army for the

duration of the war.

Many factors contributed to this decision.

One related directly to a question of COMINT

resources and capabilities. At the time, the war

was primarily a naval war in both the Atlantic and

Pacific theaters. As a result, the Navy, with its

limited personnel resources, wanted to place its

total emphasis on the naval problems. It recog-
Page 10

nized that its original ambitions for COMINT

activities far exceeded its level of COMINT

resources. For example, because of the restrictive

Navy policy permitting only military personnel to

work on COMINT-related matters, the Navy had

a grand total of thirty-eight people assigned to

diplomatic operations.22 The Army, however,

with a larger and predominantly civilian organization, was doing relatively little in military cryptanalysis. Since military traffic was virtually

impossible to copy at long distances because of

the low power used, the Army had very little to

work on except diplomatic traffic.23 As a result,

the Army was able to assume exclusive responsibility for the diplomatic field without prejudicing

its work on military targets.

A second factor, known to be of great concern

to the Navy, was the planned relocation of the

Army’s COMINT facility from the old War

Department Munitions Building on Constitution

Avenue in Washington, D.C., to a site near

Frederick, Maryland. Because of the distance to

Frederick, the Navy viewed such a relocation as

virtually ending the close daily collaboration

between the Army and Navy on the diplomatic

problem. In addition, both services, now sensitive

to criticisms following the attack on Pearl Harbor,

were anxious to forestall future charges about

duplication of effort, wasted COMINT resources,

and critical delays in the reporting of intelligence

information.24

The new agreement concerning the transfer of

diplomatic coverage also included guidelines governing the dissemination of COMINT from diplomatic sources to U.S. authorities.25 Despite the

transfer of the basic responsibility for the diplomatic problem to the Army, the prior Army-Navy

arrangements for the dissemination of diplomatic COMINT product remained in effect. The Army

continued to supply the State Department with

intelligence, and the Navy supplied the president

with COMINT product. Following the 25 June

1942 agreement, the Army provided translations

and decrypts to the Navy for delivery in the Navy

Department and to President Roosevelt.

At the insistence of the Army, the 25 June

1942 agreement was a purely verbal arrangement

War Department Munitions Building
Page 11

between the officers in charge of the cryptanalytic sections. Commander John R. Redman, USN,

represented the Navy, and Colonel Frank W.

Bullock, USA, spoke for the Army.26 The agreement later became known as the “Gentlemen’s

Agreement.” Despite its informal nature, this

understanding constituted a landmark in terms

of Army-Navy collaboration in cryptanalysis. The

earlier agreements were, in effect, little more than

agreements “to talk” and generally resulted in no

changes in the service roles. This agreement,

however, became the first joint arrangement of

any substance and the one that determined the

shape and scope of a later wartime cooperation

between the Army, Navy, and FBI.

When the full committee of Army, Navy, and

FBI representatives convened on 30 June 1942, it

simply accepted the earlier Army-Navy agreement and formally incorporated its provisions in

a new document. The new document also

addressed other issues that directly influenced

the scope of U.S. cryptanalytic actions for the next

few years. The agreement concluded that the conduct of cryptanalytic actions should be confined

exclusively to the Army, Navy, and FBI, and it

established the wartime policy governing the dissemination of the intelligence. In addition, the

committee created a permanent standing committee to monitor the implementation of the

agreement and to facilitate resolution of any

problem areas. The formal Agreement of 30 June

1942 now became the official benchmark for the

division of cryptanalytic responsibilities within

the United States.27

On 6 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

reported to President Roosevelt that such an

agreement had been reached, and recommended

that other U.S. agencies be excluded from the

field.28 On 8 July 1942, Roosevelt instructed

Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget, to issue

instructions “discontinuing the cryptanalytic

activities of the Federal Communications

Commission, the Office of Strategic Services, the

director of Censorship as well as other agencies

having this character .”29

The presidential memorandum did not relate

to or affect the division of responsibilities developed by the Army, Navy, and FBI in the 30 June

meeting. It was always clear (at least to the military participants) that the 30 June 1942 agreement, as endorsed by the president, was a

wartime arrangement made primarily to eliminate the FCC, OSS, and others from the cryptanalytic field, and to restrict the COMINT activities

of the FBI.30

Commander John R. Redman,

USN

Colonel Frank W. Bullock, USA
Page 12

In implementing the agreements of June

1942, the Army assumed the Navy’s previous

responsibility for all cryptanalysis on other than

naval problems and naval-related ciphers.31 Thus,

all foreign military traffic and all diplomatic communications fell to the Army. The Navy acquired

responsibility for enemy naval traffic, enemy

naval air and weather systems, and through its

wartime control of the Coast Guard, surveillance

of clandestine communications. The conference

concluded that there was sufficient clandestine

material to occupy both the FBI and the Navy

(Coast Guard) with reference to Western

Hemisphere clandestine work since both were

engaged in it and had a vital interest in the

results. For other than the Western Hemisphere,

the Navy (Coast Guard) acquired exclusive

responsibility for international clandestine 

communications. The FBI in addition to sharing

the responsibility with the Navy for clandestine

targets in the Western Hemisphere, worked

domestic voice broadcasts and domestic 

criminal actions.32 This overall division of 

cryptanalytic effort proved to be an effective

wartime arrangement.

Coincidental with the negotiations over the

allocation of cryptanalytic targets and in anticipation of new and greatly expanded operational

missions, each service initiated search actions for

the acquisition of new sites to house their already

overcrowded facilities. Within one year, the services accomplished major relocations and expansions of their operations facilities within the

Washington, D.C., area. 

The site ultimately selected by the Army came

to the attention of the authorities quite by chance

in the spring of 1942. On returning from an

inspection of the proposed site for a monitoring

station at Vint Hill Farms, near Warrenton,

Virginia, the Search Team, among whom was

Major Harold G. Hayes, Executive Officer, Signal

Intelligence Service (SIS), happened to notice the

impressive grounds and facilities of the Arlington

Hall Junior College at 4000 Lee Boulevard,

Arlington. Almost immediately, the Army sought

to acquire the property, which was then in

receivership. The property, as it turned out, was

not on the governmental list for possible purchase, nor was it on the market at the time. The

Army, however, sought to acquire it through a

straight purchase arrangement, but failed to

reach agreement with the seller on the price.

Arlington Hall Junior College officials valued the

buildings and grounds (approximately ninety-six

Aerial view of Arlington Hall Station
Page 13

acres) at $840,000 while the Army appraised the

property at $600,000. Following litigation

actions and condemnation of the property under

the War Powers Act, the court established the

final price at $650,000. The SIS took official possession of the property on 14 June 1942. By the

summer of 1942, the Army’s Signal Intelligence

Service organization completed the move from

the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue

in Washington, D.C., to its new location, now

called Arlington Hall Station.33

The Army then began a major building 

program to accommodate the wartime expansion

of personnel and equipment. The building program provided for the construction of temporary

buildings, without air conditioning or other

refinements. The initial expansion included a

rehabilitation of the main school building and the

construction of barracks for enlisted men and

operations buildings. In September 1942 the

Army started construction of the new barracks

and broke ground for the construction of a new

operations building. Operations A Building, 607

feet long by 239 feet wide, provided approximately 240,000 square feet of floor space, and was

designed to accommodate 2,200 personnel.

Within two months, operational elements started

to move into the new quarters as the spaces

became ready for occupancy. By November 1942,

however, the SIS announced a further expansion

of its civilian personnel to a total of 3,683 

employees. Consequently, the Army broke

ground on 4 December 1942 for the construction

of a second operations building similar to

Operations A Building, but somewhat smaller in

size. The new Operations B Building became fully

occupied by 1 May 1943.34

The same situation applied to the Navy –

namely, a pressing need for additional personnel,

space, and security in order to meet the increased

operational requirements of war. In 1942, Navy

planning called for a major expansion of its

COMINT unit, the Supplemental Branch (OP-20-

G) located in the Navy Department on

Constitution Avenue in Washington. The Navy,

preferring to stay in Washington, acquired the

site of the Mount Vernon Seminary at 3801

Nebraska Avenue. On 7 February 1943 OP-20-G

moved from the Navy Department to its new site

of thirty-five acres, now called the

Communications Supplementary Annex,

Washington (CSAW). Commensurate with the

size of the property, which was considerably

smaller than Arlington Hall Station, the Navy

Aerial view of Navy Headquarters at Nebraska Avenue, March 1949
Page 14

undertook a building program to meet its particular needs. Unlike the Army, however, the Navy

tended to construct permanent buildings rather

than temporary structures. The expansion of the

CSAW site included modifications of existing

structures, construction of new support facilities,

and construction of a major new building.35

During the first two years of the war, the services continued to expand their COMINT

resources, both in Washington and overseas.

Despite the proximity of their COMINT headquarters and the working agreement, each service

remained aloof and zealously guarded its own

operations. Each worked independently of the

other. By the end of 1943, however, with the end

of the war in sight, the COMINT authorities in

both services foresaw that the survival of their

COMINT operations would be in jeopardy if they

persisted in maintaining totally independent

operations. This factor became the main catalyst

in developing closer cooperation.

The year 1944 marked the beginning of a new

period in Army-Navy collaboration in cryptanalysis. During 1944 the Army and Navy completed a

number of supplemental agreements, all of which

reflected logical extensions or clarifications of the

earlier 1942 agreement and which moved in the

direction of establishing closer coordination. On

19 January 1944, for example, a joint agreement

signed by General George C. Marshall and

Admiral Ernest J. King promulgated the “Joint

Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination

and Use of Communications Intelligence

Concerning Weather.” The agreement addressed

the special nature and perishability of Japanese

weather intelligence. Heretofore, the services traditionally handled weather intelligence as a special category of intelligence, with each having

totally separate rules to govern its classification,

handling, and dissemination. The King-Marshall

agreement changed this by establishing new uniform security regulations to govern all U.S. services in their handling of Japanese Special

Weather Intelligence (SWI).36 On 7 April 1944 an

additional Army-Navy agreement defined the

basic allocation of cryptanalytic tasks against

Japanese weather systems. This second agreement included specifics on the realignment of

cryptanalytic tasks on the weather problem, a

new policy statement authorizing a complete

exchange of all information concerning weather

systems, and new guidelines governing the

exchange of weather intelligence.37

The Army-Navy authorities also completed

two additional policy agreements in 1944. On 4

February 1944 Marshall and King issued a “Joint

Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange of

Communications Intelligence.” This agreement,

applicable only to the Washington area and only

to the Japanese problem, provided for the first

exchange of liaison officers between Army and

Navy communications intelligence organizations.

In addition to their liaison role, the officers were

to “have access to the . . . intelligence files and

records” in the Army (SSA) and Navy (OP-20-G)

COMINT organizations.38 (As the Army’s Signal

Intelligence Service evolved, it became the Signal

Intelligence Division (1942); the Signal Security

Service (1942); the Signal Security Agency (1943);

and the Army Security Agency (1945). The second

agreement, which formalized a long-standing

working arrangement, concerned the sharing of

communications circuits. During the early years

of the war, the Army permitted the Navy to use

the Army’s communications circuits to Australia.

In response to a Navy request, on 15 June 1944

Major General Harry C. Ingles, Chief Signal

Officer, agreed to the “continued and perhaps

increased movement of Navy traffic over the

channels of Army Communications Service,

extending between the United States and

Australia.”39

Despite the progress taking place in the

course of Army-Navy cooperation in COMINT

matters, the June 1942 agreement

remained the dominant and most important

component governing their intelligence relation-
Page 15

ships. While the services did agree to a minimal

expansion of intelligence arrangements existing

on the periphery of their basic dealings, neither

sought to amend the earlier agreement. As the

war progressed, the cryptologic services continued to concentrate on the targets previously allocated to them. The Army processed the foreign

diplomatic communications, while the Army and

Navy targeted their efforts, on a counterpart

basis, against the military and naval communications of Japan and Germany. This breakout of

cryptanalytic tasks proved to be conceptually

sound and completely acceptable to each service.

Also, the communications security practices

of foreign countries reinforced the U.S. decision

concerning the division of the intelligence effort

between the Army and Navy. Developments during World War II indicated that there existed no

centralized control within Japan and Germany

over the development of their cryptosystems. The

systems employed by the Japanese and German

users were designed separately by their foreign

offices and armed services. Having worked independently for so many years, this fractionation of

foreign responsibility for crypto-development

worked to the advantage of the Army and Navy in

their technical efforts to exploit enemy communications. Moreover, the organizational design 

of the U.S. cryptologic structure facilitated the 

targeting of enemy communications on a totally

decentralized basis by existing organizations 

– and without the requirement for establishing 

a unified center for the analysis of 

communications.40

Devoting extensive resources and talent to

their missions, the Army and Navy COMINT

organizations accomplished some remarkable

exploitation of enemy communications during

the war. The Army enjoyed extraordinary successes against foreign Japanese diplomatic traffic

enciphered in an electro-mechanical system

known as the “Red” and subsequently as the

“Purple” machine. The Army also exploited the

Japanese Water Transport Code, which it broke

in April 1943, as well as other military systems.41

In its exploitation of the Water Transport Code,

which utilized a Japanese Army cryptographic

system, the Army provided valuable advance

warning about the movements of Japanese merchant shipping that operated in support of enemy

ground forces and helped eliminate nearly ninety-eight percent of the Japanese merchant fleet

by the end of the war. Similarly, the Navy enjoyed

its share of spectacular successes against

Japanese and German naval communications.

Navy COMINT provided the breakthrough to JN25, the major Japanese fleet system, that helped

the United States win the battles of Coral Sea and

Midway, the turning points in the Pacific War.42

The Navy also achieved a number of other critical

breakthroughs in the decoding of Japanese convoy messages, as well as German communications concerning the movements of submarines

in the Atlantic.43

While their cryptanalytic accomplishments

were impressive, both services recognized that

their joint efforts were far from ideal. The war

compelled them to develop closer COMINT relationships with each other, but there still persisted

a highly competitive and frequently hostile relationship. Each service cooperated with the other

Major General Harry C. Ingles,

Chief Signal Officer
Page 16

to the extent agreed upon – but there was little

evidence of enthusiasm or voluntary efforts to go

beyond the formal arrangement. A spirit of competition rather than coordination continued

throughout the early years of World War II. In

such an atmosphere, the intensity of competing

interests tended to create unnecessary difficulties

for each organization. Recurring problems, such

as the recruitment of suitable personnel or the

procurement of highly complex and unique cryptanalytic machinery, were often complicated by

the competition of both services for the same

items.44 Thus, limited coordination and the

absence of free and open dialogue between the

services on day-to-day operational relationships

meant that the Army and Navy were often working at cross-purposes. 

Even in such a sensitive area as foreign relationships, each COMINT service demonstrated a

predisposition to act completely independently.

For example, the Army and Navy persisted in

establishing their own technical agreements with

their British counterparts, but without coordination or dialogue with the other U.S. service. These

agreements frequently conflicted, usually with

respect to the amount and kinds of intelligence

information to be exchanged. Because of these

diverse agreements, a potential for serious damage to American intelligence interests always

existed.45

Similarly, on U.S. intelligence matters, each

service operated with little consideration for the

parallel activities and interests of the other. A policy of non-coordination seemed to prevail, which

applied particularly to the relationships of the

intelligence services with each other and with the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the FBI.

Lacking any central authority for intelligence

activities, the services for the most part had free

rein in their operations. An internal FBI memorandum in 1939 to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover

testifies to the disunity in noting that “another

feud had broken out between the Army and Navy

Intelligence sections” because the Army Military

Intelligence Division (G-2) had approved the

request for representatives of the Japanese Army

to examine certain plants and factories in the

United States after the Navy had turned down the

request.46 This pattern of independent and

autonomous operations by the intelligence 

services continued throughout the war years.

Since no national intelligence structure existed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff served as the primary

U.S. mechanism to govern U.S. intelligence activities during World War II. The need for establishing a coordinating committee composed of representation from the various departments and

agencies was recognized early in the war, resulting in the creation of the Joint Intelligence

Committee (JIC) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At its first meeting in March 1942, the membership consisted of the intelligence chiefs of the

Army and Navy, and one representative each

from the Department of State, the Board of

Economic Warfare (later the Foreign Economic

Administration), and the Coordinator of

Information (subsequently the Office of Strategic

Services). The intelligence chief of the Army Air

Corps was added in 1943.47

As its principal function, the JIC provided

intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities for

use in developing strategic war plans for the JCS.

In addition, the JIC provided advice and assistance to the JCS on other intelligence matters and

also served as a coordinator of intelligence operations conducted by the member agencies. The

JIC, with its many subcommittees, provided the

primary forum for community discussion of intelligence reports, estimates, requirements, and

related topics. During the first two years of the

war, it was within the JIC that the first joint producer and consumer discussions concerning

COMINT matters took place. The topics included

such recurring items as possible ways to improve

COMINT product, COMINT dissemination 

procedures, and the matter of cooperation

between the COMINT organizations.48
Page 17

As early as 1942, however, it became evident

that COMINT agencies were making independent

decisions concerning requirements and the priorities of intercept, cryptanalysis, and reporting.

While the consumer representatives such as State

and OSS may have been uneasy about this situation, they were unable to change things because

of their lack of influence in directing the overall

COMINT structure. It was basically controlled by

the U.S. military. Toward the end of the war, the

question of how to influence and guide the collection and reporting priorities of the U.S. COMINT

structure surfaced as a fundamental issue within

the U.S. intelligence community. Nothing really

changed at the time, however, and the ramifications of this unresolved issue extended well into

the postwar period.49

In much the same vein, recognizing the magnitude of the intelligence picture, and seeking to

benefit from “lessons learned” during the war, the

Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

started to explore the concept of establishing a

central intelligence organization for the United

States for the postwar period. Brigadier General

William J. Donovan, head of the Office of

Strategic Services, became a major catalyst for

these discussions.50 In late 1944 Donovan, functioning as a member of the Joint Intelligence

Committee of the JCS, presented his first proposal for the establishment of a central intelligence

agency. Among other things, Donovan’s proposal

recommended the establishment of a national

intelligence authority and a central intelligence

agency. While Donovan’s proposal generated

much discussion in the JCS Committee structure,

it never went beyond the proposal stage during

the war and remained within the JCS structure.51

When discussing COMINT activities, the various JCS committees always emphasized the need

for much closer cooperation by the COMINT producers. This consideration, coupled with the

recurring proposals for centralization of intelligence activities, brought new fears to the

COMINT service organizations, however. The

COMINT authorities in each service recognized

that a disunited COMINT structure would be

more vulnerable to a takeover in the event 

centralization of intelligence actually was forced

upon them.52

Yet another consideration influenced the

thinking of the COMINT hierarchy. Recalling an

earlier parallel from World War I, both Army and

Navy policy makers became apprehensive about

the effect of demobilization on their COMINT

organizations. They were concerned lest the 

situation that had occurred at the end of World

War I might happen again – namely, dwindling

appropriations and the inability to provide for

future COMINT needs. In looking at the pattern

following World War I, one Navy study 

concluded that “lost opportunities and neglect,

which was the fate of all American military and

naval enterprises in the postwar era, was suffered

[sic] by United States Army and Navy

Communication Intelligence organizations.”53 No

one in the Army or the Navy wanted a repeat of

the World War I experience.

Moving in the direction of still greater cooperation,

on 18 April 1944 the services set up an unofficial 

working committee known as the Army-Navy Radio

Intelligence Coordinating Committee. Members of the

committee were Colonel Carter W. Clarke and Colonel

W. Preston Corderman for the Army; and Captain

Philip R. Kinney, Captain Henri H. Smith-Hutton, and

Commander Joseph N. Wenger for the Navy. The 

committee’s mission involved policy, planning, and

technical matters. It met monthly, and, in general,

worked on postwar plans, coordination of future 

operating plans in the Pacific, and coordination of 

relationships and agreements with allied radio 

intelligence activities. Initially, the committee had no

formal organization and little official power.54

Following its first two meetings (18 April and 19 May

1944), the committee changed its name to Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee

(ANCICC) to reflect the increasing usage of the term

“communications intelligence” in place of “radio

intelligence.”55
Page 18

The establishment of ANCICC represented a

significant step forward in the area of service

cooperation. There now existed a forum, albeit

informal and with a limited charter, empowered

to consider a broad range of COMINT problems.

On controversial or critical issues, ANCICC

lacked the authority to make decisions. COMINT

officials from both services, such as Carter Clarke,

Preston Corderman, and Joseph Wenger, recognized the obvious need for another, higher level

board, with broader authority, to discuss

COMINT problems independently of other forms

of intelligence. Each service, therefore, agreed to

study the possibility of establishing a higher level

military board to govern COMINT matters.56

In less than a year, the services succeeded in

establishing such a policy board. In an exchange

of letters in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of

Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S.

Fleet (COMINCH), and General George C.

Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, agreed in

principle to the establishment of an Army-Navy

Intelligence Board. Based on national intelligence

interests, they considered it imperative that the

Army and Navy intelligence organizations work

more closely together on an interdepartmental

and permanent basis.57

On 10 March 1945 Marshall and King

cosigned a Joint Memorandum to the Assistant

Chief of Staff (G-2), to the Commanding General,

Signal Security Agency, to the Director of Naval

Intelligence, and to the Director of Naval

Communications, that formally established the

Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board

(ANCIB). The Marshall-King memorandum

defined the authorities and responsibilities of the

new board, and redesignated the informal ANCICC as an official working committee of ANCIB.58

Because of security considerations, Marshall

and King insisted that ANCIB function outside

the framework of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

report directly to them. Their major concern

about security was the exposure of sensitive

COMINT information via the multilayered correspondence channels of the JCS. The placement of

ANCIB within the JCS structure would have

required the automatic routing of all papers and

reports through the JCS Secretariat, thereby

exposing ULTRA intelligence to personnel not

considered as having the “need-to-know.”59

According to its charter, ANCIB was established primarily to avoid duplication of effort in

COMINT matters and to ensure a full exchange of

technical information and intelligence between

the services. However, it also included a selfrestricting provision that required unanimity of

agreement on issues requiring a decision by the

board. This rule enabled the military COMINT

structures to appear to coordinate operations on

a voluntary basis without, in fact, yielding any of

their independence. By simply exercising its veto

power, a service could prevent the implementation of any controversial proposal. In later years,

the rule of unanimity developed into a major

problem for the entire intelligence community.

Nevertheless, the Marshall-King agreement represented a significant milestone in service cooperation–the establishment of the first interdepartmental board devoted solely to COMINT

matters. With the establishment of a joint ArmyNavy board, the services created their own selfgoverning mechanism to administer their

COMINT effort. When discussing the merits of

establishing a new Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Board, Rear Admiral Joseph R.

Redman presented very bluntly some of the fears

and concerns of the military services. He stated in

a letter to Vice Admiral Richard S. Edwards, Chief

of Staff, Office of Naval Operations:

. . . The public is acutely conscious of the

lack of unified direction. . . in American

intelligence activities. The supposedly

secret plan of the OSS for coordination

of all these activities is widely known...

In addition, there seems to be little

doubt that other civilian agencies will

insist on a reorganization of American
Page 19

intelligence activities. It is important

that the Army and Navy take progressive steps. . . to ensure that their legitimate interests in communication intelligence are not jeopardized by the

encroachment of other agencies. The

formal establishment of an Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Board

will ensure that communication intelligence, the most important source of

operational intelligence, will be discussed independently of other forms of

intelligence. . . . Finally, informed

observers will have some assurance

that nothing has been left undone to

ensure that another Pearl Harbor will

not occur.60

Whatever motivations may have contributed

to the establishment of ANCIB, the new board

became a powerful joint institutional force in the

adjudication of COMINT matters, both at the policy and operational levels. The establishment of

ANCIB did not diminish the competition between

the Army and Navy COMINT organizations, however. Despite the new ANCIB, the services were

more determined than ever to preserve their separate COMINT organizations. They viewed

ANCIB as a valuable joint mechanism that would

assist in sheltering their COMINT activities from

external scrutiny and in the resolution of joint

problem areas. But they also foresaw that the

structure of the new board would permit each

service to remain totally independent.61

In the closing days of the war, the services

seemed to be driven by two compelling and overlapping objectives. First, they desired to find a

way to formalize their joint day-to-day relationships as an initial step toward protecting the

existing COMINT resources of the Army and

Navy from drastic budget cuts. Second, they

believed some way had to be found to continue

the progress achieved during the war in conducting COMINT collaboration with Great Britain.62

This wartime liaison with the British in COMINT

proved to be highly beneficial to each country, as

it permitted a sharing not only of cryptanalytic

techniques but also of cryptanalytic successes.

The establishment of ANCIB marked the first

step toward accomplishing the first objective. 

The Army and Navy now had an 

interdepartmental forum for joint discussion of

COMINT matters. Accomplishing the second

objective required considerable internal joint 

discussions, as well as a new round of external

negotiations with British officials.

The origins of the highly secret U.S.-U.K.

COMINT cooperation stemmed from the 

outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the

German blitzkrieg through sections of Western

Europe. By the summer of 1940, Great Britain,

under heavy siege by German forces, intensified

its efforts to acquire military assistance from the

then neutral United States. President Roosevelt,

at least in the early days of the war, sought to

achieve a partial posture of neutrality for the

United States, but it was evident that he personally favored a policy of “all-out aid” to Great

Britain. When Winston Churchill became the

prime minister of the United Kingdom in May

1940, Roosevelt and Churchill quickly established

a direct and personal communications channel

on matters related to the war. This 

extraordinarily close relationship of the two leaders reinforced the concept of a strong British-U.S.

alliance, and influenced many of the joint military

decisions during the course of the war.63

In 1940, following a number of high-level

conferences in London and Washington, the two

governments concluded “a general, though secret

agreement. . . for a full exchange of military information.”64 Following this very broad agreement,

the United Kingdom and United States representatives began very limited exploratory talks in

August 1940 concerning the establishment of a

cryptanalytic exchange between the two nations.

These discussions marked the beginning of a

cryptanalytic exchange, but one that functioned
Page 20

on a very limited and cautious basis and that took

place at a service-to-service level.65 Close 

cooperation did not actually begin until February

1941. Each U.S. service, from the outset, 

worked independently in developing its own

agreements or understandings with its British

counterpart and seldom told the other of its

accomplishments.

In July 1942, basically unaware of the service

competition in this field, Prime Minister

Churchill brought up the subject by informing

Roosevelt that the British and American naval

“cipher experts” were in close touch but that a

similar interchange apparently did not exist

between the two armies.66 Roosevelt asked

Marshall to take this up with Field Marshall Sir

John Dill, British Ministry Office Liaison Officer

in Washington.67 In a response to Marshall’s

request for information, on 9 July 1942 Major

General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-2, stated that an interchange of cryptanalytic

information between the British and American

armies had been taking place for over a year and

that it appeared to be satisfactory to both sides.68

Strong further stated that if the Navy exchange of

cryptanalytic information with the United

Kingdom seemed to be more advanced, it was

simply because coordination between the two had

been necessary for a much longer time.

In 1943, however, the U.S. Army and British

authorities completed a formal agreement 

concerning collaboration on their major military

COMINT targets. Under the agreement, the U.S.

Army assumed as a main responsibility the 

reading of Japanese military and air traffic. The

British Government Code and Cypher School

(G.C. & C.S.) assumed a parallel responsibility for

a cryptanalytic effort against German and 

Italian military and air traffic. The agreement

provided for complete interchange of technical

data and special intelligence from the sources

covered, and for dissemination of such 

intelligence to all field commanders through special channels. On 10 June 1943, Major General

Strong signed the agreement for the U.S. War

Department, and Edward W. Travis, Deputy

Director, G.C. & C.S., signed for the British.”69

Thus, during the war years the Army and

Navy followed the established policy of working

independently with the British, with each U.S.

service having separate agreements or understandings with its British counterpart. In general,

because of mutual distrust, each consistently

failed – or refused – to inform the other of the

existence or nature of their agreement with the

United Kingdom.

The first clear indication that the services

were beginning to be more open with each other

concerning their foreign COMINT arrangements

occurred during 1944. This change of attitude

came about, in part, because of the establishment

of the new Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Coordinating Committee; a general

acceptance of the need for tighter control of foreign agreements on COMINT matters; and the

likelihood of continuing U.S. collaboration with

the British.7O Using the informal forum provided

by ANCICC, each service began to reveal the

specifics of its agreements with foreign nations,

especially their COMINT relationships with Great

Britain. It was small progress and did not undo

immediately the independent agreements made

earlier by each U.S. service with foreign organizations. Nevertheless, it was progress.

In exploring the possibility of establishing

postwar collaboration with the United Kingdom,

many alarming reports emerged about the earlier

lack of Army-Navy coordination and the existence of overlapping agreements with the United

Kingdom. For example, the Navy noted, “the lack

of coordination between the Army and the Navy

was strikingly demonstrated by an Army-British

agreement which was made during the war without the concurrence of the Navy, even though it

directly affected the air material in which the

Navy had a vital interest. It also provided for a

complete exchange between the Army and the 
Page 21

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill established a direct

channel of personal communications in 1940, reinforcing strong

ties between the United States and Great Britain.
Page 22

British of all technical material, although the

Navy had an agreement to make only a limited

exchange with the British.”71 The Navy cited similar problems in some of its COMINT relationships with U.S. consumers. It noted that both

services experienced similar difficulties stemming from their unilateral dealings with the FBI

and OSS. It was not until the creation of the 

informal ANCICC that the Army and Navy

achieved a united front in dealing with these

agencies.72 By the end of the war, Army and Navy

officials came to realize that COMINT agreements with foreign governments or other domestic agencies could no longer be determined on an

ad hoc basis by each service.

At the same time, ANCIB undertook its own

efforts to strengthen the U.S. COMINT structure.

As a part of this effort, ANCIB sought to find a

way to continue U.S.-U.K. collaboration in

COMINT, and to establish itself as the sole U.S.

spokesman for the conduct of policy negotiations

with all foreign countries on COMINT matters.73

The board saw British-United States cooperation as the key. By early 1945, as the primary

wartime targets began to dry up, Great Britain

and the United States began a redirection of their

COMINT efforts. At that time, there emerged a

dominant view among the allied nations that the

Soviet Union was a hostile and expansive power

with whom good relations seemed highly unlikely, at least for the immediate future. Since both

nations recognized the mutual benefits of their

earlier collaborative efforts, they agreed to 

investigate the feasibility of establishing some

form of postwar collaboration on the Soviet problem that heretofore had received minuscule

attention. Motivated in large part by sensitivity

and security considerations, and seeking to avoid

a repetition of the many separate wartime agreements with each other, representatives of both

nations agreed that a new set of ground rules

would be necessary for their next round of collaboration. Both authorities agreed to establish

mechanisms within their own countries to bring

about a greater degree of centralized control of

their COMINT resources. This move to establish

a new cycle of British-U.S. collaboration also

meant that the U.S. services would have to be

more open with each other about their COMINT

programs and successes.

Within the U.S. intelligence structure, the

Army and Navy now endorsed the concept of centralized control to govern their foreign COMINT

relationships. In the negotiation process, the

services agreed to the establishment of welldefined policies and procedures to govern the

conduct of United States COMINT liaison with

MaJor General George V.

Strong

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Edward W. Travis

Deputy Director, G.C. & C.S.
Page 23

the British COMINT authorities. Under the new

concept, all U.S. foreign liaison with Great

Britain on certain problems would take place

under the auspices of the United States policy

board (ANCIB/ANCICC) rather than individually

by each service.

Five years after the initial U.S.-U.K. collaboration in COMINT, the two nations began a new

chapter in their cooperation in COMINT matters.

Following several months of technical discussions, both in London and Washington, representatives of the London Signals Intelligence Board

(LSIB) and the Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Board on 15 August 1945 informally

approved the concept of establishing U.S.-U.K,

cooperation on certain problems.74 This unwritten agreement was predicated on an understanding arrived at by Group Captain Eric Jones, RAF,

and Rear Admiral Hewlett Thebaud, Chairman of

ANCIB. The informal understanding identified

LSIB and ANCIB as the respective governmental

authorities for all COMINT negotiations and outlined in general terms the framework and procedures to govern the new working partnership.

This growing collaboration soon resulted in a

broad exchange of operational materials between

the COMINT centers of both nations, and in the

establishment of reciprocal Joint Liaison Units

stationed in London and Washington. These liaison units evolved into the liaison mechanisms

that exist today, the Senior U.S. Liaison Officer,

London (SUSLO), and the senior U.K. Liaison

Officer, Washington (SUKLO).75

In the implementation of this increased cooperation, ANCICC established the Army and Navy

COMINT organizations as its focal points, to

serve on a rotating basis for the conduct of liaison

with Great Britain. Initially, an Army officer 

represented ANCICC in London, assisted by a

Navy officer. Similarly, a naval officer, assisted by

an Army officer, represented ANCICC in

Washington. This detail rotated every six months,

so that first one service represented ANCICC as

senior liaison officer, followed by a member of the

other service. This system worked very well. It

served to keep each service in the forefront on

operational and policy matters while at the same

time providing a new degree of centralized 

control over COMINT activities under the aegis of

ANCIB. It also helped to prevent the United

Kingdom from playing one service off against the

other, as had occurred frequently during 

World War II.76

These arrangements became the springboard

for further U.S.-U.K. negotiations to consider the

establishment of even broader collaboration for

the postwar period. With this objective in mind,

the COMINT authorities brought the matter of

U.S.-U.K. collaboration to the attention of

President Truman through the State-War-Navy

Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). In 1945, in a

joint memorandum to Truman, Acting Secretary

of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of War Henry L.

Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy James V.

Forrestal recommended the continuation of collaboration between the United States Army and

Navy and the British in the field of communications intelligence.77 On 12 September 1945,

Truman concurred. He authorized the Army and

Navy “. . . to continue collaboration in the field of

communication intelligence between the United

States Army and Navy, to extend, modify. or discontinue this collaboration as determined to be in

the best interests of the United States.”78 Based

on this presidential authorization, the Army and

Navy immediately initiated U.S.-U.K. discussions

through ANCIB to explore expanded postwar collaboration in COMINT .79

As ANCIB pursued its objectives, however, a

new COMINT unit, outside the military structure,

appeared in the U.S. intelligence community: the

Department of State unilaterally established its

own unit to exploit COMINT. Because of the

desire to bring all the COMINT activities of the

United States under the control of ANCIB, ANCIB

officials agreed to seek the expansion of its membership to include State.
Page 24

On 13 December 1945, ANCIB forwarded its

proposal for expansion of the board to General

Eisenhower and to Admiral King for approval.

They approved the recommendation, and the

Department of State accepted membership on

ANCIB, effective 20 December 1945. ANCIB and

its working committee became the State-ArmyNavy Communication Intelligence Board 

(STANCIB) and the State-Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (STAN-CICC).80 Alfred McCormack,

special assistant to the secretary of state, became

the first State Department member of

STANCIB.81 A civilian agency was now an official

part of the United States COMINT structure.

In summary, by the end of the war. the United

States COMINT services had reason to be proud

of their accomplishments. They had achieved

spectacular COMINT successes against the 

military and diplomatic communications of

Germany and Japan. To achieve a greater degree

of efficiency and to avoid costly duplication, they

had set up their own self-governing 

mechanisms–a policy board (ANCIB) and a

working level committee (ANCICC). Despite all

their efforts, however, they still basically 

functioned as independent units in the 

COMINT arena.

These successes notwithstanding, out of the

disaster at Pearl Harbor came recurring demands

for a truly centralized permanent intelligence

agency and increased participation of the civilian

agencies in COMINT matters. Proposals for the

establishment of a single United States 

intelligence agency became routine topics for 

discussion in the Joint Intelligence Committee 

of the JCS and in congressional investigations.

The combination of service competition,

pending budget reductions, and high-level 

investigations foretold sweeping changes in the

intelligence structure in the postwar years. The

end of World War II signaled the beginning of the

end of the exclusive military domination of the

Army and Navy COMINT organizations. Civilian

agencies now pressed for a much greater voice in

the direction of U.S. COMINT activities.
Page 25

Immediately following World War II,

American policy makers looked for ways to

achieve major reductions in the military budget.

Despite the spectacular successes achieved by the

Army and Navy COMINT organizations during

the war, they quickly became prime candidates

for reorganization and for major reductions in

their resources. As the Pearl Harbor investigations continued, interest in intelligence matters

also increased dramatically. For the first time,

U.S. intelligence operations came under outside

scrutiny. By 1946 service COMINT officials found

that they were no longer able to act as free agents

in making many of the basic decisions affecting

their COMINT operations.

Their days of complete autonomy were 

numbered. Other fundamental intelligence 

relationships were also changing. Within the

COMINT community, the addition of the State

Department to the membership of the COMINT

policy board changed not only the composition of

the board but the scope of its intelligence 

interests as well. At the international level, the

Great Britain-United States negotiations to

extend COMINT collaboration into the postwar

period were nearing completion. Finally, in the

military itself, there now existed demands for

closer cooperation between the Army and Navy

COMINT organizations.

In addition, developments during World War II

forced a new reassessment and push toward unification

of the military services at the national level. Despite

widespread agreement on the need for postwar organizational reform of the military services, there existed

deep philosophical differences and suspicions among

the services that could not be resolved easily. As debate

progressed during this period it became clear that

Congress would have to legislate a structure that

would be acceptable to the military services.

All of these activities – foreign negotiations

and unification – impacted on the COMINT

structure that sought to achieve its own degree of

unification within the intelligence organizations

of the War and Navy Departments. As a principal

means of achieving closer cooperation, the service

COMINT organizations responded to these pressures by establishing a joint operating agreement.

This new alliance called for a collocation of the

Army and Navy COMINT processing activities in

the United States, as well as cooperation in their

COMINT collection and reporting programs.

While the services remained organizationally

independent, the joint operating agreement did

call for a totally new managerial concept, namely,

operating on the basis of shared” or “joint” control over a number of COMINT targets and

resources. While this was a difficult period of

adjustment for the COMINT services, they not

only survived but made some significant

COMINT contributions during this time.

As the services moved into the postwar period, they found that peacetime operations, rather

than simplifying the conduct of their COMINT

operations, brought new problems and highlighted even more the glaring disunity of the

U.S. COMINT structure. By 1946 the harsh realities of the new situation began to hit home.

Operationally, the services had lost their wartime

targets of Germany and Japan, and the source of

many spectacular successes. At the same time, the

services were confronted with the specter of rapidly shrinking resources. Shortly after V-E and

V-J Days, their parent headquarters ordered

drastic reductions of their COMINT facilities.

Demobilization actions were under way with dire

consequences for the service COMINT 

operations.

Chapter II

The Military Services and the Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949
Page 26

While the services no longer had the urgency

of a wartime situation to support their requests

for resources, the likelihood of going through an

extended period of austerity did have one 

practical effect. It forced the services to reevaluate

their joint posture and to think more seriously

about closer cooperation between their 

organizations. Because of the new public 

investigation of Pearl Harbor with its intensive

probings into intelligence matters, the COMINT

officials saw that they would be vulnerable, once

again to charges of duplication of effort and 

inefficient use of resources if they continued to

maintain totally separate and independent

COMINT organizations.

Fortuitously, in the postwar period a new

operational target emerged for the U.S. COMINT

services. As the hostility of the Soviet Union

toward the West became more apparent, the

Army and Navy began to plan for a major adjustment of their COMINT coverage, to focus on

Soviet targets. But the realignment was not all

that simple. Some very fundamental questions

existed concerning intercept and processing that

could only be answered on a communal basis. For

example, what were the new collection priorities?

What were the new intelligence priorities? Who

would establish these priorities? What were the

interests and roles of the non-military consumers? How would the intercept and processing

of the Soviet material be divided between the

services? It became obvious that the service

COMINT organizations, as constituted, could not

answer these questions.

Because of these problems, the services perceived an immediate need for accomplishing

some form of cooperation that went well beyond

the scope of any previous efforts. The military

authorities fully recognized that, at best, they had

made only superficial progress toward the establishment of closer cooperation between their

organizations in the production of COMINT.

Earlier moves toward closer cooperation, dictated

by wartime necessity, had been carefully designed

to be limited in scope, as well as to avoid any

interference with the primary interests of each

service. The wartime agreements had accomplished little more than a basic division of labor

and had avoided the real issue of establishing a

centralized cooperative effort. In the main, the

spirit of the earlier measures seemed to reflect an

inherent attitude that cooperation in COMINT

matters was a necessary evil, rather than any real

conviction about the benefits of centralization or

cooperation.

Seeking to shelter their vital COMINT functions from further budget reductions, the military

authorities intensified their efforts to achieve

closer cooperation and coordination between

their COMINT organizations. The likelihood of

further budget reductions and the question of

survival of their separate COMINT organizations

forced the two organizations together.

A few Army and Navy officials, aware of the

magnitude of the COMINT successes during

World War II, became the prime movers in the

effort to preserve the Army and Navy COMINT

structures. Three officers in particular stand out

in the postwar era – Colonel W. Preston

Corderman, USA, Colonel Carter W. Clarke, USA,

and Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN.1 As early as

1943, these officers took the essential first steps in

pressing for the preservation and fusion of the

military COMINT resources. Over the next few

years, they consistently took the lead in facilitating a dialogue between the services to foster the

preservation of military COMINT resources. For

the most part, they sought to promote service discussions covering a broad range of organizational

relationships, such as division of responsibility on

cryptanalytic tasks, the feasibility of joint operations, and possible ways to avoid unnecessary

duplication. Each of these officers encountered

varying degrees of opposition, sometimes from

within their own service, and sometimes from the

other service. Despite the continuing lack of

enthusiasm encountered at various echelons of

the military structures for consolidation, they had
Page 27

the foresight to view COMINT as a national asset

that would be vital in meeting future U.S. 

intelligence needs. Corderman, Clarke, and

Wenger never wavered in their single-minded

determination to save the existing military

COMINT structure from a dismantling process

through budget cuts.2

Of the postwar intelligence machinery,

the establishment of the Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Board was probably the most important component for the 

Army and Navy. With the creation of ANCIB in

March 1945, Corderman, Clarke, and Wenger

succeeded in establishing the nucleus for a 

structured, communal approach to the basic handling of COMINT matters – and in moving the

services toward toward greater cooperation in

their intelligence relationships. Operating with 

a very limited charter, ANCIB quickly emerged as

a policy mechanism for the COMINT services and

brought a new semblance of unity and order to

the COMINT structure.

Reinforcing their goal of creating a self-governing mechanism for the COMINT agencies, the

leaders brought about the establishment of an

expanded policy board – the State-Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Board – in

December 1945. The members established STANCIB as the primary governmental mechanism to

coordinate and guide the activities of the

COMINT structure and to assist in its reorganization during the postwar period.3 In retrospect, the

development of a strong role for the policy board

stands as a tribute to the military leaders, particularly when recognizing that STANCIB was operating without an official charter.

Despite the fresh dialogue and new perspective on a broad range of COMINT matters, one

critical element was still lacking within the

COMINT structure that could prevent STANCIB

from acting as the COMINT broker, at either the

international or domestic level. While the services had achieved considerable progress in expanding their dialogue at the policy level, they had not

made similar progress in designing an operational plan that would enforce closer cooperation

at the working level. Unless some additional

leverage was brought to bear upon the services,

the authorities recognized that the Army and

Navy had gone about as far as they could – or

would – go in achieving closer cooperation at the

working level. Since voluntary merger was not

likely to occur, direct intervention by higher

authority was inevitable.

The proposal to merge the Army-Navy communication intelligence activities had been under

periodic discussion by the services as early as

1942. The Army authorities generally supported

the proposals for merger, while naval officers

were unanimously opposed. For the Army, Major

General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-2, repeatedly expressed his strong support of

the concept.4 From the outset, however, the naval

authorities opposed the concept of merger.

Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval

Operations, supported the position of the Navy’s

intelligence and COMINT officials that its

COMINT operations should remain under exclusive naval control.5

The Navy’s persistent opposition to the centralization of cryptologic resources stemmed, in

large part, from its perception of its fundamental

intelligence needs, as contrasted with those of the

Army. The Navy considered that its intelligence

requirements expressed statements of need for

intelligence information of a strategic nature and

of national-level interest, that could be properly

handled only by a full-scale technical center

under the operational control of the Navy. In contrast, the Navy perceived the Army’s intelligence

requirements as reflecting needs of a more limited nature, which were exploitable in the field at a

tactical level. Leaving little room for negotiation

on the issue, the Navy generally discouraged

exploration of the concept of merger during the

1940s.
Page 28

But the developments associated with the end

of World War II brought about a general 

reopening of the feasibility of the merger concept.

By V-J Day (14 August 1945), a number of new

problems confronted the services that involved

both operational and political considerations and

that forced them to take a new look at their 

cryptologic organization.

At the same time, there existed a number of

parallel developments at the national level that

also seemed to threaten the COMINT services.

Confronted with the reality of budget cuts, the

services recognized that they would have to

acquire new priority tasks in order to justify the

continuance of their separate organizations.

Moreover, the concept of centralization had

acquired new credibility and momentum within

the upper levels of the government. There existed

growing pressures, emanating from both the

presidential and congressional levels, to establish

a new centralized intelligence agency and to

accomplish, in some form, an integration of the

military services. Once again, the issue for the

military organizations related directly to the

question of their continued existence.

Because of these factors, the Army and Navy

command authorities moved to a position that

clearly supported a merger of the COMINT services. A few days after the surrender of the

Japanese, because of budgetary retrenchment

actions and the loss of the major wartime targets,

the Army and Navy command authorities clearly

supported a merger of the COMINT services. An

exchange of Army-Navy correspondence

appeared to set the stage for accomplishing a

merger action. General George C. Marshall, Chief

of Staff, U.S. Army, in a letter of 18 August 1945

to Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval

Operations, recommended a complete physical

merger of the COMINT processing activities of

the Army and Navy.6 He proposed that the Joint

Policy Board (ANCIB) study the proposals and

develop specific recommendations on “how to

insure complete integration.” In his response of

21 August 1945, King expressed complete 

agreement with Marshall. King also noted that he

had directed the Navy members of ANCIB to

work with the Army representatives in the 

development of recommendations.7

With the Marshall and King exchange, the

basic decision to merge the COMINT activities

was made. All that remained was simply the matter of developing the ways and means for executing the decision for merger. On the surface it

looked simple. Implementing the merger became

the responsibility of ANCIB and its working committee, ANCICC.

On 28 August 1945 ANCICC responded by

establishing a Subcommittee on Merger Planning

(SMP). In its instructions to the SMP, ANCICC

noted that the subcommittee had the task “of

making recommendations in implementing the

decision of General Marshall and Admiral King

that the Army, Navy intercept, cryptographic, and

cryptanalytical activities be merged under joint

direction.” The ultimate objective of the committee was to accomplish a prompt and complete

merger of Army and Navy organizations in one

location under ANCIB.8

One of the main tasks assigned to the 

committee was the selection of a site for the 

consolidated COMINT operations. Because of 

the need for direct exchange between producers

and consumers, the committee concluded that

the activity should remain in the Washington

area. ANCICC presented an analysis and 

comparison of the Army site at Arlington Hall

with the Naval Communications Annex (which 

it called the Mount Vernon Seminary). Because 

of its greater potential for expansion, the 

committee selected Arlington Hall as its first

choice for the relocation of all COMINT activities.

The Arlington Hall site of ninety-six acres was

considerably larger than the Navy site of 

thirty-five acres. In its final report of 7 

September 1945, however, the committee 

concluded that both sites should be retained, with
Page 29

COMINT activities to be located at one, and communications security activities at the other.9

During the policy deliberations within

ANCIB, Colonel Corderman, Chief, Army

Security Agency, reiterated the traditional Army

position for an immediate and complete physical

merger of the two organizations. While Captain

Wenger, head of OP-20-G, fully supported the

concept of eventual consolidation, he personally

espoused the view that merger should be 

accomplished as a gradual process in order to

accommodate differences in organization and

methods. These differences in approach, 

however, did not affect the final report that 

recommended a complete merger.10

But the situation soon changed within the

Navy. The command authorities of the Navy, 

supporting the traditional naval view concerning

central authority, overrruled Wenger at the

eleventh hour. When ANCICC considered the

final report on 12 September 1945, a new Navy

submission completely nullified Wenger’s earlier

concurrence and indicated that even the concept

of gradual consolidation went further than the

Navy was willing to go. The Navy memorandum

stated that 

a full physical merger of Army and

Navy communications intelligence

activities does not seem desirable to the

Navy. . .

The memorandum also pointed out that 

the Navy must retain complete control

over all elements of naval command, so

that the Navy will be free to meet its

interests, solve its special problems . . .

[and] must, therefore, have complete

control over its operational intelligence.11

The Navy’s abrupt reversal of its earlier position brought to a complete standstill the entire

move toward consolidation. On 26 September

1945 ANCICC closed out the activities of its

Special Committee on Merger Planning and

referred the matter to ANCIB for guidance.12

ANCIB, however, had no authority to resolve the

conflict between the services and looked instead

to the departmental authorities for resolution. In

trying to pick up the pieces, Marshall and King

exchanged four additional letters during

September and October 1945. But the letters

reflected no change of positions, as each simply

reiterated the previous position of its intelligence

service, with no specific suggestions offered for

compromise. 13

On 14 October 1945 King reported to James V.

Forrestal, secretary of the navy, that he and

General Marshall continued to agree that the

coordination of signal intelligence activities could

be improved, but they had not achieved a solution

satisfactory to both services. King noted that both

services agreed that the processing of some 

types of traffic should be jointly undertaken, 

but the exact manner in which this might be

accomplished remained unresolved.

The Army favors a complete merger of

our cryptanalytic Units under one

director, whereas the Navy, desirous of

insuring its control of operational intelligence essential to naval commands,

does not favor a complete merger but

would rather effectuate the desired

results by joint effort under joint direction.14

By December 1945, however, new participants appeared on the scene. General of the Army

Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced General Marshall

as Chief of Staff of the Army, and Fleet Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz relieved Admiral King as Chief

of Naval Operations. In a positive move toward

solution of the problem, Eisenhower reopened

the issue in a letter of 2 January 1946, suggesting

that “we should make a fresh start on this entire

subject.” Remarking about their earlier experi-
Page 30

ences as commanders of combined forces,

Eisenhower commented that “we both know how

vital it is to resolve any differences of opinion and

to achieve complete integration as soon as possible.” His proposal was very simple. He proposed

that the Army and Navy members of ANCIB

should either solve the problem by themselves or

develop alternative proposals for decision by

Eisenhower and Nimitz.15

Nimitz readily accepted Eisenhower’s suggestion for making a fresh start on the issue of how

to integrate and coordinate the COMINT activities of the Army and Navy. As evidence of a softening of the Navy’s position, Nimitz instructed

the Navy members of ANCIB to consider the

problem with open minds, free of any restrictions

stemming from earlier policy guidance.16

With the new push from Eisenhower and

Nimitz, the COMINT officials of the Army and

Navy began to reassess their earlier positions. In

lieu of having a solution directed by higher

authority, both services obviously preferred to

solve the problem at the COMINT level. Even the

monolithic Navy, after having derailed the earlier

efforts toward merger, indicated a surprising new

willingness to go along with the move toward

consolidation. As the spokesman for the Navy

COMINT organization, Wenger pressed again for

the concept of gradual consolidation as representing an attainable solution.17 Similarly, the

Army advocates of consolidation ultimately modified their earlier position on merger and came to

acknowledge that the objective of a complete

merger would have to be deferred for a later date.

Corderman, one of the main proponents of merger, had also insisted previously that the senior

joint official selected to head the merger should

be identified as the “Director” rather than

“Coordinator.” Before the new negotiations were

over, however, Corderman would yield on this

point as well.18 

The Navy resubmitted Wenger’s earlier concept paper as its new bargaining position. In

effect, the naval authorities supported a position

that went one step further in the move toward

consolidation but that still fell short of complete

merger. The Navy officials would support a concept described as the establishment of an “effective working partnership” between the Army and

Navy. In a modification of Wenger’s earlier paper,

the Navy proposed the establishment of a new

position, the Coordinator of Joint Operations

(CJO). The CJO would not function as a czar with

unlimited authority, but rather would have the

responsibility for facilitating interservice coordination and cooperation. Under the terms of the

new Navy proposal, the services would function

as coordinating but independent organizations.

Some joint operations would be established.

Further, the services would ensure a continuous

cooperation an exchange of information on all

other COMINT problems. Policy control of the

structure would be vested in a Joint Policy Board

(ANCIB-STANCIB) that in turn would reflect the

interdepartmental authority of the chief of staff,

U.S. Army, and the commander in chief, U.S.

Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.19

By early 1946, the British-United States of

America Agreement (BRUSA) negotiations, initiated in 1945 to establish postwar collaboration in

COMINT between the two nations, were nearing

completion. Since the concept of BRUSA collaboration was predicated in part on the existence of

centralized controls of COMINT activities within

both countries, the approaching ratification and

implementation of the agreement brought a new,

compelling urgency for the United States to put

its own house in order. These international considerations, coupled with the departmental pressures stemming from the Eisenhower-Nimitz

exchange, prompted new discussions in STANCIB concerning possible ways to merge the Army

and the Navy COMINT organizations.

On 13 February 1946 STANCICC considered

at length the earlier Navy proposal for closer

cooperation of the Army-Navy communications
Page 31

intelligence activities.20 Moving very quickly on

the issue, on 15 February 1946 STANCIB

approved in principle the framework for a new

concept of Army-Navy cooperation in COMINT.

The Navy’s insistence on establishing a “Joint

Effort under Joint Direction” prevailed in the discussions of the COMlNT policy board. STANCIB

accepted the framework for a new period of

Army-Navy cooperation in COMINT, based on

the Navy’s earlier proposal of “joint” but 

“separate” COMINT activities.21

The STANCIB decision ruled out the 

possibility of any actual merger of Army-Navy

COMINT processing activities. Instead, the 

services would now undertake new initiatives 

to achieve closer cooperation on all phases of 

the COMINT process. This improved cooperation

would be achieved by establishing closer 

working liaison day-to-day in the functional areas

of intercept, analysis, and reporting. 

Integration of technical personnel from 

the opposite service would also take place – 

primarily on analytic problems – at Arlington

Hall and the Naval Communications Station. 

The new agreement, however, pertained only 

to the collection and production of 

information from foreign communications. 

It excluded such intelligence functions as 

estimates or the dissemination of COMINT 

information as finished intelligence.

The COMINT organizations would coordinate

their activities but would remain totally 

independent organizations. In addition to the

integration of Army-Navy personnel on 

certain analytic problems, STANCIB divided the

Army-Navy responsibility for some targets along 

the traditional lines and identified others as 

a “joint” responsibility, to be placed under 

the direction 0f the new Coordinator of 

Joint Operations. To implement this new 

concept of Army and Navy cooperation, 

STANCIB directed the chiefs of ASA

(Army Security Agency) and OP-20-G to draw up

the details of a plan and statements of 

general principles governing the roles and

responsibilities of the services and the

Coordinator of Joint Operations.22

By approving this

new concept of

“partnership,”

STANCIB succeeded in keeping its

efforts to reorganize

the U.S. COMINT

structure in tandem

with the progress of

the BRUSA negotiations. By 1946

STANCIB, although

lacking a national

charter, had succeeded in positioning itself as the primary U.S. authority and spokesman for policy

negotiations with foreign nations on COMINT

matters. At the same time, STANCIB also greatly

enhanced its stature as the central organization

for promoting closer cooperation between the

U.S. services.

On 5 March 1946 the U.S.-U.K. 

representatives formally signed the 

British-United States of America Agreement,

which authorized continued postwar 

collaboration in COMINT matters on a governmental basis. Lieutenant General Hoyt S.

Vandenberg, STANCIB chairman, signed the

agreement for the United States, and Colonel

Patrick Marr-Johnson, representing the 

London Signals Intelligence Board, signed for the

United Kingdom.23

As a follow-up to the BRUSA Agreement, a

“Technical Conference” took place in London 

several months later. The primary task of this

conference was to develop the overall blueprint

for the development of technical appendices to

Lieutenant General Hoyt

S. Vandenberg, STANCIB

chairman
Page 32

the agreement. Over the next few years, this 

initial effort resulted in the development of a

number of appendices to the BRUSA Agreement,

which governed such areas as security, 

collection, liaison, and other aspects of 

collaboration.24

On 22 April 1946, six weeks after ratification

of the BRUSA Agreement, STANCIB issued the

“Joint Operating Plan” (JOP). The JOP

also became known as the “CordermanWenger Agreement,” named for the 

principal Army and Navy negotiators 

(Colonel W. Preston Corderman, USA, and

Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN).25

As an integral part of the plan, STANCIB

approved an expansion of its own charter. This

change provided for the establishment of a fundamentally new position, the Coordinator of

Joint Operations. The new coordinator, it was

hoped, would become the driving force in unifying the COMINT structure. According to the charter, the CJO would function in a dual capacity and

under dual command lines. First, the CJO would

function as an executive for STANCIB, and thus

would be responsible for directing the implementation of STANCIB’s policies and directives relating to intercept and processing tasks, as well as

for all joint projects with other U.S. and 

foreign intelligence agencies. In addition to his

STANCIB role, the CJO would acquire a new

leadership role within the Army and Navy

COMINT structures on day-to-day operations

involving joint tasks. Organizationally, the 

CJO would have dual subordination lines, 

reporting to STANCIB as the CJO, and to his 

individual service in his capacity as chief of a 

military COMINT organization. 26 

Under the Joint Operating Plan, there were

two key positions that governed the conduct of

COMINT operations. These were the CJO and 

the chairman of the working committee 

(STANCICC) of the COMINT Policy Board

(STANCIB). The chief of the Army and Navy

COMINT organizations rotated yearly as the

incumbent of each position. This rotation of 

the senior service officials gave each service 

a continuing and powerful voice in the 

“coordination” and “policy” roles.27

The STANCIB-STANCICC structure served to

facilitate resolution of some disagreements, but

there were still problems. The rule of unanimity

still prevailed on the policy board as well as on 

its working level committee. Thus, whenever

STANCIB-STANCICC failed to reach a 

unanimous decision on an issue, it remained

unresolved. 

Vandenberg, as chairman of STANCIB, recommended that the first coordinator be selected

from the Army because of its wartime COMINT

activity.28 Following this recommendation,

STANCIB selected Colonel Harold G. Hayes, chief

Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN

Colonel W. Preston Corderman, USA
of the Army Security Agency, as the first CJO on 1

May 1946. The operating chiefs of ASA and OP20-G came responsible to Hayes for accomplishing those tasks that he allocated to them.29 Hayes

was “to coordinate,” however, and not “to direct.”

It was an important distinction.

Under the plan, the Army and the Navy maintained their independent COMINT organizations.

The Joint Operating Plan directed that the

responsibility for each COMINT problem be allotted to the Army or Navy in such a way as to prevent any duplication or overlapping of effort.

Thus each service continued to control a large

percentage of its own intercept and processing

capacities. Each service also performed “tasks of

common interest,” such as work on weather targets. Although the CJO allocated these tasks to

the services, the actual intercept facilities

remained under the tasking and control of the

services. The CJO, however, did control and coordinate the intercept coverage and reporting on

the “Joint Tasks.”

The term “joint” applied generally t0 all tasks

not strictly Army or Navy. These tasks represented areas of special interest. The CJO exercised his

authority over these tasks by establishing a 

committee’on group structure, designed along

functional lines, that reported to him. These 

areas included intercept, processing, and liaison

activities.30

Administratively, three subordinate groups

assisted the CJO: a Joint Intercept Control Group

(JICG), a Joint Processing Allocation Group

(JPAG), and a Joint Liaison Group (JLG).31 A

deputy coordinator served as the chief of each

group. While the CJO was to use existing facilities

whenever feasible, each service also assigned personnel to him for his own staff support. This

included clerical, administrative, and analytical

assistance. The coordinator’s senior assistant was

from the opposite service and normally served as

chief of the JPAG. Captain Charles A. Ford, USN,

served as the first chief of JPAG. The officer in

charge of the Joint Liaison Group was also from

the opposite service. Commander Rufus L. Taylor

served as the first chief of the JLG under Hayes.

The officer in charge of the Joint Intercept

Control Group was from the same service as the

coordinator; Lieutenant Colonel Morton A.

Rubin, USA, served as first chief of the JICG.32

The mission of the Joint Intercept Control

Group was to develop a plan for intercept coverage that would provide intelligence of maximum

value to the consumers. The JPAG allocated processing responsibilities to the Army and Navy. As

the U.S. overseer of foreign liaison, the JLG

arranged for and supervised U.S. working

arrangements in COMINT with the United

Kingdom and Canada. In addition, six standing

subcommittees of the COMINT policy board

served as advisory committees in the areas of

intercept, direction finding, cryptanalytic

research and development, communications

intelligence and security, traffic analysis, and collateral information. In this complex structure of

functional groups and STANCICC subcommittees, the deputy coordinators of the groups and

chairmen of the STANCICC submmittees were

under the direct supervision of the CJO.33

Page 33

Colonel Harold G. Hayes, Chief of Army

Security Agency, first coordinator of Joint

Operations.
Page 34

After the establishment of the JOP in April

1946, additional organizational changes took

place affecting the STANCIB structure. After

examining a draft of the BRUSA Agreement, J.

Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, expressed an

interest in obtaining membership on STANCIB.34

Adding the FBI to its membership on 13 June

1946, the board and its subordinate committee

became the United States Communication

Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the United States

Communication Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (USCICC).35 When Lieutenant

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, assistant chief of

staff, G-2, became the second Director of Central

Intelligence in June 1946, USCIB agreed to

expand its membership once again by including

the DCI as the representative of the newly established Central Intelligence Group (CIG).36 (The

CIG came into existence on 22 January 1946.) 

As the membership of the policy board

increased, the civil agencies such as the

Department of State, FBI, and the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to participate in

the activities of USCIB and the JOP of the Army

and Navy. (The National Security Act of 1947

established the CIA on 18 September 1947, superseding the CIG.) As members of USCIB, however,

they participated only as observers in the activities of the Joint Intercept Control Groups and the

Group. From 1946 to 1949, these committees of

USCIB and the CJO were the primary mechanisms available to the intelligence consumers for

expression of their intelligence priorities and specific requirements for COMINT information.37

A major problem area for the JOP proved to

be intelligence requirements. The military 

services continued to handle their requirements

basically on a service-to-service basis. For 

example, the Army G-2 tasked the Signal 

Security Agency for its COMINT requirements,

with the same parallel applying to the Navy.

However, the area of “joint” interests remained

poorly defined, both for military targets and 

for other broad targets of interest to civilian 

agencies. Despite the organizational change 

in the COMINT structure, the civilian 

agencies quickly recognized that they still had 

no real voice or representation in the adjudication

or establishment of intelligence priorities.38

Changes were taking place, however, that would

give a new prominence to the consumer role, as

well as a greater participatory role for the civilian

agencies in the operations of the COMINT 

structure. 

After operating for three years under a purely

interdepartmental charter, USCIB acquired a

new national charter in 1948. The new National

Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 9,

“Communications Intelligence,” established

USCIB as a national COMINT board reporting

directly to the National Security Council rather

than to the military departments. The charter,

however, was not appreciably strengthened, and

still reflected a preponderance of military membership. But the change of subordination, coupled with the establishment of CIA in 1947, meant

that the military COMINT community could no

longer act in a totally independent manner.39

Under the JOP, the primary vehicle for the

dissemination of COMINT to consumers was the

published translation or bulletin, issued in a standard format prescribed by the JPAG.40 The Army

and the Navy generally issued separate bulletins

on their respective targets. Bulletins on jointinterest targets were published as joint ArmyNavy products. Within this overall framework

also existed a number of separate reporting series

for major categories of information such as Soviet

COMINT. As provided in the BRUSA Agreement,

bulletins were exchanged with GCHQ.41

The creation of the JOP marked the introduction of major changes involving producer and

consumer relationships. These changes provided

the consumers with greatly expanded technical

information in COMINT reporting and granted

them greater access to COMINT activities. At its

thirtieth meeting, 27 April 1948, USCIB approved
Page 35

a CIA request for greater access to COMINT activities. 42 This decision authorized all of the consumer agencies to receive unfinished products

considered necessary for the fulfillment of their

mission of producing finished intelligence. In

addition, consumers now had the option of placing indoctrinated representatives within the

COMINT production organizations of the Army

and the Navy. The ground rules governing these

relationships required that specific arrangements

be worked out in each case, primarily through

working-level contacts or through the service

COMINT authorities. Lacking resolution via

these channels, the consumer still had the option

of referring the matter to USCIB for further 

consideration. 

During this period, any evaluative process or

further dissemination of COMINT became the

responsibility of each consumer. Generally, the

agencies accomplished this by collating the

COMINT with other intelligence information and

by preparing special fusion reports containing

both COMINT and other intelligence sources,

Since most of the USCIB members prepared their

own community-wide reports, this resulted in a

wide variety of publications. These included a

daily summary published by the Department of

State; the Army’s summary; and the Navy’s

“Soviet Intelligence Summary,” both issued

weekly; and various other special reports issued

by the Army, Navy, and CIA.43

To assist the agencies in their evaluation of

COMINT, the Army-Navy COMINT bulletins

included specific data related to the origins of

intercept. In addition, the consumers, on request,

could receive unfinished COMINT products considered necessary for their own evaluation.44

Each consumer also prepared its own estimates.

This often resulted in a number of different intelligence estimates on any one subject – with no

organization producing a consolidated estimate.

Thus, the difficulties associated with centralization of the COMINT organizations extended to

the entire intelligence process, and to the consumer membership of USCIB such as CIA, State,

Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

In summary, in response to growing national

pressures, and as a principal means of achieving

closer interservice cooperation, the COMINT

services established a joint operating agreement

rather than undertake a merger of their separate

COMINT organizations. The mechanics of this

new alliance called for a collocation of the Army

and Navy COMINT processing activities in the

United States, as well as for major organizational

changes in their collection and reporting tasks.

The move to establish joint service operations

reflected a realization of their increasing interdependence as well as of the inevitability of still further changes in the management of COMINT

resources. While the services remained organizationally independent, the joint operating agreement called for the introduction of a totally new

managerial concept for the services, namely,

operating on the basis of “shared” control over

COMINT resources. 

Because of the magnitude of the governmental changes from 1946 to 1949, the JOP represented a period of great adjustment for the

COMINT services, as well as for the entire intelligence community. At a time when the services

and Congress were still debating the unification

issue, the creation of the JOP occurred harmoniously and by mutual agreement of the Army

and Navy. By collocating and integrating their

COMINT processing centers at Arlington Hall

and the Naval Security Station, the JOP achieved

a level of interservice cooperation never previously accomplished by any military organization. 

The concept of the JOP was very simple. It

called for the services to act as coordinated but

independent agencies. In developing the blueprint for the JOP, the primary objective was to

devise a structure that by its very nature would

promote greater cooperation and dialogue

between the military COMINT organizations. At

the same time, Army and Navy authorities insist-
Page 36

ed on maintaining their separate identities and

organizations. In the implementation, some elements of the reform process proved to be highly

effective as the services actually began to cooperate on COMINT matters. The plan was seriously

flawed, however, as it stemmed from a proliferation of military command lines and created a rash

of new bureaucratic channels requiring coordination. For example, the CJO functioned under dual

subordination, reporting to USCIB as the CJO,

and to his individual service as the chief of a military COMINT organization. This dichotomy of

authority proved to be not only conceptually

unsound but detrimental to the timeliness of

COMINT operations. 

Another organizational drawback of the JOP

structure was that it called for a large committee

structure to work on functional matters of an

operational nature and to operate under the aegis

of the CJO. While these committees soon became

pivotal coordination points, they also became

representative of a “management by committee”

syndrome with all the traditional weaknesses of a

committee process, such as procedural delays and

the inability to make timely decisions. 

In a more positive vein, however, the JOP

merits high marks for some very significant

accomplishments. Considering the innate service

opposition to the concept of merger of their

COMINT processing activities, it was a major

achievement that the services agreed to adopt a

concept of collocation and integration of any

kind. By establishing a form of quasi-consolidation, and operating on the principle of gradual

change, the JOP constituted a compromise. It

provided a logical transitional structure for the

services as they entered the postwar period. In

addition, the JOP accomplished sweeping organizational changes for the services, such as realignments of operational elements, personnel, and

mission without causing a catastrophic upheaval

of their operational missions and functions. 

By achieving a nominal degree of centralization of U.S. COMINT efforts, the JOP facilitated

the ratification of the BRUSA Agreement.

Without this tightening of controls over the Army

and Navy COMINT activities, the BRUSA

Agreement would not have been attainable, as it

implicitly called for greater centralized control of

COMINT activities within both nations. 

Operationally, the JOP facilitated the realignment of U.S. COMINT targets for peacetime,

including the assumption of a new national 

target, coverage of the Soviet Union. 

Finally, by virtue of the cosmetic fusion of the

two services via the JOP, the Army and Navy

COMINT organizations were largely able to 

survive the chaotic period of demobilization and

budget reductions following the war. Despite

heavy attrition, these two organizations 

maintained a solid operational base, along with a

cadre of professional talent, for the next cycle of

reorganization. 
Page 37

The period 1946-1949 marked the beginning

of efforts at both the presidential and congressional levels to view intelligence matters as a

national responsibility. As a first step toward the

centralization of U.S. intelligence activities, in

1946 President Truman established a National

Intelligence Authority (NIA) and a Central

Intelligence Group (CIG). One year later, in the

summer of 1947, Congress passed the National

Security Act, which resulted in a further realignment of the national intelligence structure. This

landmark legislation disestablished the NIA and

CIG and created a National Security Council and

a Central Intelligence Agency. The act also provided for a secretary of defense and a realignment

of the U.S. defense organization. These changes

were only the beginning.1

The COMINT structure felt the impact of 

these changes almost immediately. By 1948 the

United States Communications Intelligence Board

had a new official charter that made it subordinate

to the National Security Council. This was the 

result of a series of controversies over the 

jurisdiction of COMINT issues. The participants in

making these changes were James V. Forrestal, 

secretary of defense; Admiral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, DCI; Admiral Sidney W. Souers,

executive secretary, NSC; and the members of

USCIB, Army, Navy, State Department, and the

FBI. The main battle was fought over what 

organization should “control” USCIB, as well as the

various components of the COMINT structure. This

was essentially decided when the National Security

Council issued USCIB’s new charter in 1948. 

As an agency of the NSC, USCIB now acquired

a greatly enhanced policy role in the intelligence

community. In addition, the new charter recognized that the civilian agencies had a vital part to

play in the development of national intelligence policy and in the establishment of national 

intelligence priorities. A review of the debates during the reform process strikingly illustrates the

major changes in the U.S. intelligence 

structure and USCIB. It also shows the sharp 

divisions that existed among the members of the

intelligence agencies. 

At the end of the Second World War, there

existed no semblance of unified control over the

conduct of U.S. COMINT activities – nor was

there any external body that had sufficient

authority to provide guidance and direction to the

extremely powerful military COMINT structure.

The primary management controls over the

COMINT functions came from three sources,

namely, USCIB, and the headquarters of the

Army and Navy COMINT organizations. A creation of the military departments, USCIB served

as the nominal policy authority for COMINT 

matters, while the military departmental 

authorities provided a number of internal 

controls relating primarily to administrative 

and budgetary matters. 

By 1946 USCIB’s membership included 

representation from the Army, the Navy, the FBI,

the Department of State, and the CIG. Because of

the dual representation accorded each service, the

Army and Navy played dominant roles in the activities of USCIB and its many subcommittees. For

example, the assistant chief of staff, G-2, and the

commanding officer, Army Security Agency, 

represented the Army. The assistant chief of 

staff for Intelligence, U.S. Fleet, and the director 

of Naval Communications provided representation

for the Navy. Each had a vote; the other members 

of USCIB – FBI, State, and the CIG - had only 

one representative and one vote each.2

Chapter III 

The Emerging National Intelligence Structure and the United States

Communications Intelligence Board, 1946-1949 
Page 38

James V. Forrestal, first secretary of defense, 1947-1949

Admiral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter

director of Central

Intelligence

Admiral Sidney W. Souers

executive secretary, NSC
Page 39

During this early period, the Army provided

coverage of the intelligence interests of the

Army Air Force. In May 1947, however, the

Army Air Force obtained its own separate representation. On 7 May 1947 USCIB invited the

commanding general, Army Air Force, to appoint

representatives to USCIB and to its subordinate committee, the U.S. Communications

Intelligence Coordinating Committee (USCICC).

On 29 May 1947 the Army Air Force designated

Major General George C. McDonald, assistant

chief of staff, Army Air Force, as its representative

to USCIB. Brigadier General Francis L.

Ankenbrandt, communications officer, Army Air

Force, became the representative to USCICC.3 

USCIB’s early charter of 31 July 1946 stated

that USCIB would meet only to decide questions

of major policy or to consider matters that its

working committee, USCICC, could not resolve.4

Procedurally, USCIB elected its own chairman,

usually the senior member, who served for one

year. It met at the will of the chairman, or subject

to the concurrence of a majority, and the request

of any member. The rule of unanimity governed

both USCIB and USCICC discussions. When

agreement could not be reached, the only option

was to refer the matter to higher authority within

the members’ departmental organizations. In

short, USCIB functioned solely in the capacity of

providing guidance and coordination for the services, which they were free to accept or reject.5 

Despite the limited nature of its founding document, the Marshall and King Agreement of

1945, USCIB achieved considerable progress as

the self-appointed authority for COMINT matters. By expanding its membership to include the

FBI, State Department, and the CIG, USCIB had

become a joint military and civilian board, with

increasing involvement in the activities of the

entire U.S. COMINT structure. Unfortunately,

the governing documentation of USCIB had not

kept pace with the scope of its activities.

The documentation relating to membership

changes was reflected only in the interdepartmental correspondence and in the subsequent

updates of the USCIB Organizational Bulletin.

The actual enabling document remained

unchanged with no attempts made to amend or to

reissue the document at a higher level to reflect

the broader role and responsibilities of USCIB.6

Within the government, the nature of the

intelligence process itself tended to foster the

continuing independence, if not isolation, of the

military COMINT activities. Long before Japan’s

attack on Pearl Harbor, the services traditionally

handled communications intelligence, as well as

all matters related to the COMINT process, as

extremely sensitive information, releasable only

by a strict interpretation of the “need-to-know”

principle. The advent of World War II reinforced

this well-established practice as the dual requirement for secrecy and anonymity of organizations

intensified. Even within the COMINT structure

itself, ULTRA and MAGIC materials, for example,

were always strictly guarded and controlled, with

only a very limited number of people being aware

of these sources and their origins.7 Distribution

was made only to an authorized list of recipients,

which included key military commanders and a

few top officials of the armed forces, the FBI, and

the Department of State. 

These dual factors – the rigorous compartmentation practices and the absence of any dominant central authority – tended to foster an

atmosphere of independence and isolation

among the services. Except for administrative

and budgetary guidance provided by their own

departmental authorities, the Army and Navy

COMINT organizations generally remained sheltered from critical review by external authority.

They continued to be free agents and made their

own decisions concerning their intelligence priorities and intercept coverage. When the USCIB

became more active in these areas, it soon found

itself powerless to direct the COMINT activities,

primarily because of the inherent weaknesses of
Page 40

the USCIB charter and the military domination of

the structure. As a result, the services generally

encouraged and facilitated continuation of the

status quo, thereby assuring themselves of almost

complete freedom of action in the running of the

COMINT business. 

The same amorphous situation applied to

general intelligence collection as well. No single

organization had the overall authority and

responsibility for the oversight of matters relating

to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of

all-source intelligence information; nor did any

central organization exist with authority over 

the many and diverse producers of intelligence 

information. Each military department had 

its own intelligence branch and producing 

elements, as did the Departments of Justice,

Treasury, and State.8

Long before V-E and V-J Days, considerable

discussion and debate took place within the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, as

well as in State and the FBI, concerning the

organization and nature of the U.S. intelligence

gathering apparatus for the postwar period.9

By the fall of 1945, President Truman, known 

to favor a concept of centralized control, had

already received several proposals for the establishment of a peacetime intelligence structure. 

He had drafts from the War Department, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Strategic

Services, the two military services, the Bureau 

of the Budget, and the Department of State. A

number of these plans, primarily from the 

military organizations, recommended the 

establishment of a single centralized agency, 

but differed considerably on the designation 

of the controlling authorities. Proposals from 

the Department of State and the Bureau of 

the Budget generally recommended a status 

quo approach that would permit the 

intelligence offices of all departments to remain

independent agencies, with no centralized agency

to be established. Under this concept, 

however, there would exist a number of 

advisory committees to assist a National

Intelligence Authority in providing guidance 

to the intelligence activities of the various 

departments. 10 

Within a few months, Truman acted to 

centralize the intelligence structures. In a letter

dated 22 January 1946 to the secretaries of state

(James F. Byrnes), war (Robert P. Patterson),

and navy (James V. Forrestal), Truman

established a National Intelligence Authority

(NIA) and ordered the secretaries to establish a

Central Intelligence Group.11 One day later,

Truman appointed Rear Admiral Sidney W.

Souers, the deputy chief of Naval Intelligence, as

the director of the CIG, and the first Director of

Central Intelligence (DCI). 

The membership of the NIA consisted of the

secretaries of state, war, and navy, and the president’s personal representative, Rear Admiral

William D. Leahy, his chief of staff.12 Based on the

presidential directive, its mission was to ensure

“that all Federal foreign intelligence activities are

planned, developed and coordinated so as to

assure the most effective accomplishment of the

intelligence mission related to the national 

security.” Truman further directed the secretaries

“to assign persons and facilities from your 

respective organizations, which persons shall 

collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and

shall, under the direction of a Director of 

Central Intelligence, assist the National

Intelligence Authority.”13 

The initial CIG was a unique structure. It had

no assets or resources of its own. As a “collective

interdepartmental group,” it operated within the

limits of the resources provided by the State, War,

and Navy Departments. As an interdepartmental

coordinating group, the CIG was responsible for

planning and coordinating the government’s

intelligence activities and for evaluating and disseminating intelligence. Because of its limited

charter and its limited resources, the CIG proved

to be an interim, ineffective structure, However,
Page 41

by the mere establishment of the CIG, Truman

had succeeded in setting in place the initial

framework for the development of a centralized

intelligence structure. 

In addition, Truman’s letter directed the

establishment of the first postwar Intelligence

Advisory Board (IAB), which served in an 

advisory capacity to the DCI. The IAB’s 

membership consisted of representatives from

the principal military and civilian agencies of the

government that had functions related to 

national security, as determined by the National

Intelligence Authority. The initial membership

from the four departmental intelligence 

services consisted of Colonel Alfred McCormack,

USA, State; Lieutenant General Hoyt

Vandenberg, Army; Rear Admiral Thomas B.

Inglis, Navy; and Brigadier General George C.

McDonald, Air Force. 14 

Eighteen months later, still further changes

took place at the national level, all of which greatly strengthened the initial presidential efforts

toward centralization. Following months of

intense debate by congressional and departmental authorities over the nature of America’s security and defense force, Congress passed and

President Truman signed into law the National

Security Act of 1947 on 26 July 1947.15

With the passage of the National Security Act,

also known as the Unification Bill, Congress abolished the National Intelligence Authority and its

operating component, the Central Intelligence

Group. In their place, the National Security Act

established the National Security Council and the

Central Intelligence Agency. Among other things,

the Act created a National Military Establishment

(NME) and three coequal departments of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force within the Defense

Department. It also established the United States

Air Force, a War Council, and a Research and

Development Board. 16

The mission of the newly established National

Security Council was to serve in an advisory

capacity to the president in matters concerning

the integration of domestic, foreign, and military

policy. Its permanent membership consisted of

the president, vice president, the secretary of

state (Dean G. Acheson), secretary of defense

(James V. Forrestal), and the chairman, National

Resources Board. Optional attendees, depending

upon the subject matter, were the secretaries and

under secretaries of other executive departments

and the military departments, the chairman of

the Munitions Board, and the chairman,

Research and Development Board.17 The initial

membership of the NSC did not include the DCI. 

The effect of the National Security Act of 1947

on the direction and organization of COMINT

activities was not at first discernible. Under the

act, the National Security Council (NSC) received

the broad mission of advising the president on

matters of policy concerning national security.

The new CIA, headed by the DCI, acquired a

statutory base and became an independent

agency under the NSC. This new intelligence

agency had the stated responsibility for correlating, evaluating, and disseminating national intelligence; for rendering intelligence services to

other agencies; and for advising the NSC in intelligence matters.18 Under this vague charge, however, the relationship of the CIA to the COMINTproducing agencies remained obscure. It would

be many years before CIA would assume its full

responsibilities as initially conceived in the

National Security Act. 

From a military perspective, however, the

National Security Act of 1947 had an immediate

impact on the COMINT community. After the

establishment of a separate Department of the Air

Force, the Army Security Agency (ASA) continued to provide COMINT support and other support services to the Air Force on a transitional and

interim basis. On 3 June 1948 ASA established an

Air Force Security Group (AFSG) as a unit within

its own Plans and Operations Staff. The AFSG,
Page 42

composed exclusively of Air Force personnel,

operated as an Army element on an 

interim basis, with the mission of assisting the

Air Force in its gradual assumption of 

COMINT responsibilities. By January 1949, 

following the approval by the secretary of 

defense of an Army and Air Force Agreement, 

the Army transferred personnel, facilities, and

missions to the new Air Force Security Service

(AFSS). On 1 February 1949 Colonel (later 

Major General) Roy H. Lynn, USAF, became 

the first commander of the USAFSS.19

USCIB also changed and became much 

more active in COMINT matters. Two 

months after the passage of the National

Security Act, USCIB began to hold regular

monthly meetings. This action came about 

mainly at the urging of Admiral Earl Stone, 

one of the Navy members 

of USCIB, at the twenty-first meeting of 

USCIB on 4 November 1947. At the same 

meeting, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, 

who became the third DCI on 1 May 1947, raised 

the issue of USCIB’s outdated charter. He 

commented that the existing interdepartmental

charter in the form of an agreement by 

Marshall and King did not include the more

recent members of USCIB – the CIA and the

Department of State. Hillenkoetter, obviously

eager to use his new departmental authority,

pressed for the issuance of a higher-level 

charter to be issued in the form of an 

executive order by the president. Following

Hillenkoetter’s urging, USCIB directed its 

subordinate committee, USCICC, to examine the

question of the proposed charter and to prepare

several alternate versions.20

President Truman signing amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

Major General Roy H. Lynn, USAF
Page 43

No disagreement existed among the military

services on the need for a new charter. They recognized that USCIB had been performing as a

national-level structure, but without the benefit

of a charter commensurate with the scope of its

activities and responsibilities. In the area of foreign collaboration in particular, they considered

that USCIB needed a more authoritative charter

because of the growing U.S. involvement in foreign COMINT relationships. When General

Vandenberg signed the agreement for USCIB in

1946, he did so only after receiving prior approval

of the agreement from Admiral Leahy, chief of

staff to President Truman.21 Consequently, the

Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives enthusiastically supported the view that USCIB’s

authority should stem from a national-level

issuance rather than from the existing military

documentation. Despite the apparent agreement,

the task would not be accomplished easily. Many

jurisdictional and political problems now surfaced, the foremost of which related to the basic

question of control.”22

During this period, a membership change also

took place in USCIB. In November 1947 the FBI

voluntarily withdrew from the USCIB. In his letter of withdrawal, J. Edgar Hoover noted that

“USCIB’s discussions have been primarily concerned with methods of policy formulation within the Armed Services.” At the twenty-first meeting of USCIB, however, the remaining members

expressed the view that as a practical matter, the

FBI was withdrawing from the cryptanalytic field

primarily because of a lack of funds.23

Since the FBI had never been a very active

participant in the activities of USCIB, its withdrawal had no immediate impact on the intensity

of the charter discussions. The representatives of

the State Department and the CIA continued to

play the major role in representing the “civilian”

interests in the USCIB deliberations. The representatives of State, in particular, were 

consistently articulate and persuasive in the presentation of their positions. Their position, 

however, was not always predictable, as they 

frequently joined the military members in 

opposition to CIA efforts to acquire greater 

control of all intelligence operations.24 

The competing interests of the board’s military and civilian membership occupied center

stage in the USCIB deliberations. Each group

pressed for the supremacy of its own interests in

the realignment of the COMINT policy board and

in the competition for scarce COMINT resources.

The battle lines reflected the JCS interests as

opposed to the interests of the State Department

and the new CIA.25 The controversy over the proposed new USCIB charter continued for the next

seven months. The basic issues were (1) what

organization should be the parent body of USCIB

and (2) what should be the role of USCIB –

should it control or coordinate the national communications intelligence effort? 

On the first issue, the parent body of USCIB,

the Navy, the State Department, and the DCI,

preferred that the NSC or the secretary of 

defense have overall supervision. The Army and

the Air Force favored the JCS as the ultimate

authority. A compromise, originally suggested 

by the Navy, and later proposed formally by 

the State Department, was the creation of a

“Committee of Four” as an appellate body for

USCIB. Such a committee would be composed of

the three service chiefs of staff and the under 

secretary of state. USCIB accepted this proposal

on 3 February 1948.26

On the second issue, whether USCIB should

control or coordinate intelligence activities, there

was a wide divergence of views among the members of USCIB. At the USCIB meeting of 6

January 1948, the members analyzed at length

the nature of USCIB’s political power over

COMINT. Navy officials supported the view of the

DCI and State that USCIB should exercise control

authority over COMINT because of the national

aspects of the COMINT effort. They uniformly

identified the COMINT function as representing
Page 44

an intelligence resource of national potential

rather than one of purely military interest. They

further believed that the services had failed in

their efforts to improve interservice coordination,

and they strongly favored granting USCIB control

of facilities assigned to common interest targets.

Hillenkoetter even insisted that “COMINT agencies are military units in a limited sense because

the civilian departments and agencies have an

equal interest in the COMINT product.”27 Hence,

it was a national resource and should be 

controlled by USCIB. 

While the Navy strongly opposed the centralization of COMINT resources, it moved in the

other direction in terms of how the COMINT policy board should be subordinated. For example,

during the preliminary U.S. actions associated

with the BRUSA Agreement of 1945, the Navy

expressed concern in STANCIB meetings about

the limited scope and questionable legality of the

STANCIB charter, particularly in the area of foreign relations. Similarly, in recognition of the

unique intelligence requirements of the CIA and

the Department of State, the Navy had cited the

need for a neutral, national forum to allocate

intelligence priorities. In effect, the Navy had

consistently argued for a stronger USCIB to

reflect national interests. Considering the centralization of intelligence resources and the subordination of USCIB to be two separate issues, the

Navy never considered its position on these issues

to be contradictory. 

The Army and Air Force members of USCIB,

however, were equally adamant in their opposition to any arrangement that would give USCIB

primary control over COMINT functions. They

objected to placing USCIB, with its civilian members, in a chain of command between the military

authorities and their operating COMINT agencies. Nevertheless, the Army and Air Force supported a lesser coordinating role for USCIB, with

the primary control over the COMINT activities

remaining in each department and agency. In

fact, the Army officials preferred to dilute the

authority of USCIB even further. They suggested

that the role of the board should be confined to

establishing intelligence priorities, with a coordinator functioning under the jurisdiction of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS would handle the

allocation of cryptanalytic tasks and intercept

coverage.28

On 3 February 1948 the board tentatively

defined its role as being one of providing “authoritative coordination” rather than “unified direction.”29 In essence, the board adopted a modified

Army and Navy position. As established under

the earlier Army-Navy operating agreement,

there would be a Coordinator of Joint Operations,

but he would continue to operate under the direction of USCIB rather than JCS.30

At the same meeting, USCIB accepted a draft

executive order and a draft revision of its charter.

The board then established a rigorous method for

approval. It stipulated that the draft documents

be forwarded to the chief of intelligence of each

member organization for discussion. The DCI

had the responsibility for clearing the documents

with the secretary of defense. When everyone had

approved the drafts, a master memorandum

would be signed by the secretary of state, secretary of defense, secretary of the army, secretary of

the navy, and secretary of the air force. This

memorandum, in turn, would then be transmitted to the DCI for presentation to Admiral Leahy,

who in turn was to present it to the president.31

In his 13 February 1948 response to the three

service secretaries, Secretary of Defense Forrestal

dramatically rejected the proposed documents.

He felt strongly that the use of an executive order

was not necessary and that in accordance with the

National Security Act of 1947, USCIB should be

subordinate to the National Security Council and

that the NSC was the proper office to provide

direction to the board.32 His memorandum

caused considerable anguish within the military

structure as the JCS, Army, and Air Force

expressed a strong disagreement with the direc-
Page 45

tion of the guidance. They believed that a military

structure and not a joint board such as NSC

should be the primary voice in the control of

USCIB activities. The Navy, however, did not

have any problem with the proposal. From the

outset of the discussions, the Navy viewed

COMINT as a national resource and endorsed the

placement of USCIB under the NSC.33

Before the dispute was finally settled,

Forrestal and Hillenkoetter played major roles in

shaping USCIB’s new charter. Hillenkoetter

pressed for a more important role for CIA, for CIA

control of the COMINT function, and for the

placement of USCIB under the National Security

Council. Forrestal, despite his role as the secretary of defense, also clearly preferred that the

USCIB not be placed in a subordinate position to

the military structure. He consistently advocated

that there should be some sort of a direct relationship between USCIB and the NSC. He

believed that these were national functions and

therefore demanded a correlation with a national

authority representing all elements of the government. Forrestal’s concepts on this point paralleled the Navy’s views as well as those of Admiral

Souers, the first DCI, now serving as the executive

secretary of the National Security Council. 

Forrestal’s opposition to the use of an executive order for promulgation of the USCIB charter

apparently stemmed in part from earlier instructions he had received from President Truman.

Truman wanted to minimize the number of

requests for presidential orders on the premise

that the establishment of the National Security

Council had as one of its main purposes the

removal of this onus from the chief executive.34

Irritated over the lack of progress in issuing

USCIB’s charter, the secretary of defense

addressed a second and final memorandum to

Hillenkoetter on 17 March 1948. Forrestal

stressed that he had not changed his mind since

his original memorandum and that the DCI

should get on with the business of providing uscm

with its new charter. Forrestal’s main objective

was to achieve the placement of USCIB under the

NSC. The wording of Forrestal’s memorandum

left no doubt that the charter would ultimately

appear in one of the regular National Security

Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID).35 

With Forrestal’s memorandum, the level and

intensity of the debate changed. Assured of the

backing of Forrestal, CIA redrafted the charter to

give the DCI greatly expanded authority and 

control. This second draft would have established

USCIB under the NSC to effect “authoritative

coordination and unified direction” of COMINT

activities and to advise the DCI in matters 

relating to the protection of COMINT sources 

and “those matters in the field of communication

intelligence for which he is now responsible or

may hereafter be responsible.”36 When the Navy

member objected to the DCI exercising “unified

direction” over COMINT activities and to 

the broad extension of the DCI role to 

“matters for which he may hereafter be made

responsible,” Hillenkoetter acquiesced and 

modified his draft.37

His new proposal established USCIB under

the NSC and authorized it to act for the NSC,

under the principle of unanimity (except in electing a chairman by majority vote), in carrying out

its responsibility for “authoritative coordination”

(but not “unified direction”) of COMINT activities. It also stated that the board would advise the

DCI in “those matters in the field of COMINT for

which he is responsible.”38 At the thirty-first

meeting of USCIB on 13 May 1948, USCIB

approved the redraft with only minor editorial

amendments.39 On 18 May 1948, the DCI forwarded the proposed directive to the executive

secretary of the NSC.

But the struggle was far from being over.

Admiral Sidney W. Souers, executive secretary,

NSC, returned the draft to Hillenkoetter for

reconsideration and further discussion. Souers,

who had served as the first DCI, suggested the
Page 46

strengthening of the role and authority of the DCI.

In particular, he sought to establish the DCI as the

predominant authority in USCIB.4o 

After receiving the comments from the NSC,

Hillenkoetter withdrew his concurrence of the earlier USCIB version. Hillenkoetter now had two

powerful supporters – Forrestal, who insisted that

USCIB be subordinated to the NSC, and Souers, the

former DCI, who urged that the role of the DCI

should be greatly strengthened in terms of its relationship with USCIB. Combining these elements,

Hillenkoetter developed a third and final draft that

would dramatically change the nature of USCIB.41

A central element of this revision was the downgrading of USCIB to serve in the role of advisor and

assistant to the DCI. As the designated agent of the

NSC, the DCI would now become not only the coordinator of COMINT activities, but the overseer as

well. In the process, the DCI would also acquire the

responsibility for executing all NSC directives. In

short, the revision reflected a substantive change of

policy as it would change the nature of the USCIB

structure, and it would give to a non-military

agency a position of coordination and control in the

field of military departmental intelligence.42 

Because of Hillenkoetter’s reliance on Forrestal,

the service intelligence chiefs felt powerless about

the new developments. The Army and Air Force

were particularly upset with the concept of CIA’s

controlling the shaping of the charter and the

attachment of USCIB to the National Security

Council. Although the service intelligence chiefs

strongly opposed the new charter draft, they failed

to make any headway against it. The civilian service

secretaries (Army, Kenneth C. Royall; Navy, John

L. Sullivan; Air Force, W. Stuart Symington) were

reluctant to confront Forrestal after he had stated

his views of the USCIB charter so forcefully and

unequivocally. 43

Hillenkoetter’s third draft, which greatly

strengthened the DCI role over the board, went too

far. It evoked strong opposition from almost everyone. The Department of State, in the person of W.

Park Armstrong, Jr., became the spokesman for

this new opposition. In a memorandum to all the

members of USCIB of 7 June 1948, Armstrong

protested that the draft reverted to a viewpoint

previously considered objectionable by the

Department of State and that “it contravened, misconstrued, and overlooked many fundamental

principles requisite to a secure and efficient utilization of communications intelligence by the United

States Government.” Armstrong objected to the

DCI becoming the national authority and coordinator for COMINT activities. He also argued against

the parallel downgrading of USCIB to the status of

a mere advisory mechanism, existing solely for the

benefit or the DCI. He maintained further that no

consideration ever justified giving the DCI a position of primary control over departmental intelligence. Armstrong stressed that it was unnecessary

under the law and militarily unsound to place the

head of a non-military agency in control of strictly

military functions that were vitally important to the

military departments and that were integrated

within the military commands. Armstrong’s memorandum insisted on the reinstatement of the earlier version in the second draft of 13 May 1948 as

unanimously accepted by USCIB and the

Intelligence Advisory Council (IAC).44 

In retrospect, the role played by Armstrong on

the USCIB was highly unusual. Armstrong’s position was contrary to the normal pattern in which

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
Page 47

the State Department usually joined forces with the

CIA in opposition to the military control of

COMINT activities. Although the State Department

was indeed generally unhappy with the military

direction of COMINT activities, it now became

alarmed about the obvious CIA ambitions to

acquire direct control of all intelligence. This resulted in Armstrong’s forming a most unusual alliance

with the military members in opposition to the DCI.

State’s position was quite clear. If USCIB needed a

new national charter, State preferred the status quo

to DCI domination. Major changes in the military

structure would have to come later. 

Following the vigorous protest by Armstrong,

Hillenkoetter, as directed by USCIB, submitted a

summary report of all viewpoints on 7 June 

1948 to the executive secretary of the NSC.45 With

the secretary of state now a member of the NSC,

and with the other members of USCIB

unanimously opposed to the third revision, it

became clear that the DCI (who was not a 

member of the NSC) had lost the battle. In its 

deliberations, the NSC approved the earlier version

endorsed by USCIB. 

The National Security Council on 1 July

1948 issued NSCID No.9, “Communications

Intelligence.” This directive was a major 

organizational turning point for USCIB and the

newly established DCI. USCIB now had an official

national charter that linked its subordination 

to the National Security Council. The charter also 

reflected another significant change: It accorded 

a new status and prominence to the agencies 

on board, namely, the DCI and the Department 

of State.46

Since the FBI had voluntarily dropped out of

USCIB earlier, the new board was reorganized with

two representatives from each armed service, two

representatives from the , and two from the CIA.

Except for the election of a chairman based on

majority vote, decisions of USCIB continued to

require the unanimous vote of all members. Other

than establishing a basic change in its 

subordination, the new charter did not strengthen

the authorities and responsibilities of USCIB.

USCIB had “authoritative coordination” not “direction or control” over all COMINT activities.

In summary, the period 1946-1949 marked the

beginning of efforts to establish a new central

mechanism for the handling of national security

matters, including unification of the armed forces.

With President Truman serving as a focal point,

these efforts resulted in the enactment of the

National Security Act of 1947, which created a new

hierarchy for the handling of national security and

intelligence matters. The act established a National

Security Council to serve in an advisory capacity to

the president, and a Central Intelligence Agency to

be headed by a director of Central Intelligence, who

reported to the president. The act also directed a

major realignment of the military structure.

The first impact of these new authorities on the

COMINT world took place in USCIB. DCI

Hillenkoetter, with strong support from Secretary

Forrestal, succeeded in obtaining a revision of the

charter for USCIB. On 1 July 1948 the National

Security Council issued National Security Council

Intelligence Directive Number 9, a new charter for

USCIB that subordinated USCIB to the NSC rather

than to the military authorities. This provided positive recognition to the growing concept that intelligence matters had broader ramifications than those

of purely military connotations or interests. The

civil agencies, such as State Department and the

CIA, now had a new status and voice in a forum previously dominated by the military organizations.

Forrestal supported Hillenkoetter on the subordination issue, but his support ended there. In his

eagerness to revise and expand the charter,

Hillenkoetter alienated the military and State

Department representatives in his efforts to acquire

substantive CIA control over COMINT, as well as

over other intelligence matters. As a result, a very

superficial and limited revision of the charter

emerged, which meant that many of the vestiges of

military control remained. Among other limita-
Page 48

tions, the revision perpetuated the requirement for

unanimity among the membership on issues

passed to the Board for decision.

On the military side, the National Security Act

had an additional impact on the COMINT community with the establishment of the Air Force as a

separate department. This resulted in the establishment of the new COMINT organization, the U.S. Air

Force Security Service. A third military COMINT

organization now existed competing for COMINT

resources and for the assignment of cryptanalytic

targets and tasks.
Page 49

On 20 May 1949 Louis A. Johnson, secretary of

defense, established a new defense agency, the

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Johnson

directed a merger of the

COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy

and placed the new AFSA

structure under the control

and direction of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. AFSA’s mission was to conduct all

communications intelligence and communications security activities

within the Department of

Defense, except those performed by the military

services. With AFSA, Johnson hoped to achieve a

degree of unification of the services as well as 

“efficiency and economy” in the management of 

the cryptologic structure. He also sought to 

minimize the resource and duplication problems

associated with the new Air Force Security Service

and its rapidly expanding cryptologic organization. 

The predominantly negative reactions to AFSA

included the usual controversy over unification, as

well as jurisdictional concerns over basic intelligence authorities and relationships. The Navy and

Air Force had opposed consolidation, while the

Army supported the general concept. Even greater

protests came from the USCIB structure, mainly

from the representatives of the Department of State

and the CIA. They maintained that the AFSA charter was in direct conflict with the new national charter of USCIB. Johnson’s refusal to consult or even

to coordinate with USICB added to the ill will.

Elements in the JCS moved to modify AFSA’s charter within a few months after its establishment. JCS

2010/6 accomplished a number of substantive

changes in the AFSA charter, all of which sought to

weaken the role and authorities of AFSA. The

changes stressed the autonomous role of each 

military COMINT organization. The net result of

these actions was not unification, but an 

acceleration of the controversy within the 

intelligence community over the control of the

COMINT structure. 

AFSA failed for two reasons. It did not succeed

in centralizing the direction of the COMINT effort;

and it largely ignored the interested civilian 

agencies – the Department of State, the CIA, and

the FBI. The director did not have the authority to

“direct” the military services, nor did he have the

authority to suppress conflicts and duplication

among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As a result,

AFSA spent most of its existence negotiating 

with the services over what it could do. The full

extent and impact of the operational weaknesses 

of AFSA did not become widely recognized until 

the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950. 

As part of the original National Security Act,

Congress created the United States Air Force on 18

September 1947. The separation of the Air 

Force from the Army resulted in an additional 

cryptologic branch, first through the Air Force

Security Group (AFSG) and then through the 

U.S. Air Force Security Service (AFSS). In the 

transition to a three-service structure, the Army

continued to provide the Air Force with support,

including cryptologic activities. On 3 June 

1948, Headquarters, ASA, established the AFSG

(as part of its Plans and Operations staff), with 

an initial cadre of eleven officers under Major 

Idris J. Jones.1 The Air Force, however, clearly 

preferred to have direct control of its own 

COMINT production. On 20 October 1948 Air

Force officials established a new major Air 

Louis A. Johnson,

secretary of defense

Chapter IV

Creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency, 1949-1952
Page 50

Force command, the Air Force Security Service

(AFSS) , with temporary headquarters at Arlington

Hall Station. 

Over the next three years the Air Force, as an

independent service, had a major impact on the

Army-Navy COMINT organizations. The establishment of the AFSS indicated that Air Force officials

demanded a security service or cryptologic organization equal to the Army or the Navy COMINT

structures. 

Competition for COMINT targets and resources

intensified. Moreover, the three services now competed for recruitment of personnel to augment (or

replace) the dwindling military competence in

COMINT. 

Traditionally, the Army and the Navy held

divergent views on the use of civilian personnel in

manning their COMINT organizations. Reliance on

civilian personnel represented no major change for

the Army. Throughout the 1930s the Army 

recruited high-level mathematicians as well as 

civilians with other technical skills for its 

cryptologic organization. During World War II, the

Army continued to rely on a large civilian 

workforce. In contrast, at the conclusion of the war,

the Navy COMINT organization employed only

about seventy civilians out of almost eleven 

thousand persons.2 The latter, however, did include

a large number of engineers, scientists, and 

college professors who became naval officers 

during the war. Many of these were recruited 

personally by Commander Joseph N. Wenger

from 1938 to 1939, as part of his attempt to seek

candidates for the Naval Reserve program and

cryptologic work.3 Wenger’s ultimate purpose, of

course, was to offer direct commissions to selected

individuals, thereby facilitating their immediate

assignment to the Navy COMINT organization.

This situation reflected the traditional Navy policy

of having a purely military organization. The Navy

philosophy stressed the belief that a military organization permitted stricter security control, 

facilitated rotation of personnel, provided greater

flexibility in assignments, and reflected better overall control of COMINT operations by the military

commanders. 

In the postwar period of budget reduction, Navy

officials found it necessary, however, to modify

drastically their deeply ingrained opposition to the

use of civilians in their COMINT organization.

However desirable a completely military organization might be in war, these Navy officials recognized that such an approach would be difficult to

achieve in peacetime. They therefore established a

number of positions in the upper levels of the civil

service grades for key cryptologic personnel. For

many policy makers, this raised the old fundamental question for possible conflict between military

and civilian authority. The issue became a matter of

reconciling how naval and civilian authority could

exist side by side and still retain naval control over

the COMINT mission.

In effecting the transition to a greater use of

civilian personnel, the Navy rationalized the change

on the basis of a definition concerning the two types

of control, “management” and “technical.”4 It

defined management control as the day-to-day

administration and control of operations of a unit

in the performance of its primary function. It

defined technical control as the specialized or professional guidance needed by a unit to perform its

primary function. Using this distinction between

management mechanisms, Navy officials in the

postwar era delegated responsibility for technical

direction over COMINT matters to top-level civilian

employees, while reserving management and policy

authorities exclusively for military officers. Under

this concept, the Navy authorities determined

“what is to be done while the civilian technicians

determined how it is to be done.”5

The Navy’s change of heart about the use of

civilians in COMINT activities and its rationalization about the nature of their role generally

resolved the Navy dilemma. But manpower problems still remained for the three services. As the

new Air Force Security Service sought to recruit
Page 51

personnel from the Army and Navy COMINT

organizations, competition between the services for

the dwindling manpower intensified. This situation

caused Department of Defense authorities to focus

anew on the basic question of whether a consolidated and centralized agency should be established. In

addition to manpower questions, there existed a

number of other operational considerations as well.

For example, on the technical side, since the cryptography of the Soviet Union was known to be centrally controlled, a growing recognition developed

among U.S. policy makers that a centralized cryptanalytic attack by the United States on Soviet systems would be beneficial.6

In late July 1948 Kenneth C. Royall, secretary of

the army, formally brought the problem to the

attention of Forrestal. Royall reasoned that the only

way to avoid the increased costs associated with the

new AFSS would be to establish some form of unified or joint security agency capable of serving the

armed forces as a whole at the Washington level.

He noted that field COMINT and security functions

should probably continue to be the responsibility of

the separate service departments and recommended that the secretary establish a study group to

review the entire question of unification of the

COMINT effort.7

By this time, “economy and efficiency” had

become the watchwords of the Truman administration as it sought to balance the national budget. A

major corollary to this recurring budgetary theme

was the continuing campaign to reorganize or unify

the armed forces, especially their intelligence apparatus. This issue represented a carry over, in large

part, from the earlier congressional investigations

into interservice cooperation – or the lack thereof –

preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. The majority

report of the congressional investigation of the

Pearl Harbor attack recommended on 20 July 1946 

that there be a complete integration of

Army and Navy intelligence agencies in

order to avoid the pitfalls of divided

responsibility which experience has been

made so abundantly apparent; . . . 

efficient intelligence services are just as

essential in time of peace as in war.8 

Drawing on this report, Forrestal and his advisers took a critical look at the military COMINT services. They questioned the wisdom of having a dual

track Army-Navy COMINT structure, especially

given the complexity and centralization of the

Soviet communications security effort; the need for

developing a coordinated United States analytic

attack against the Soviet COMINT target; and the

need for recruitment and training of personnel in

unique cryptologic technical skills. Prompted by the

specific proposal from Royall, and by the skyrocketing costs for cryptologic activities, Forrestal was

looking for a way to avoid an increase in the budget. He associated the projected higher costs for

cryptologic activities primarily with the plans of the

Air Force for a new COMINT agency of its own.

Hoping to reduce COMINT costs by preventing

duplication from becoming triplication, Forrestal

decided to postpone the Air Force plans for expansion until he had explored the feasibility of combining all military COMINT activities at the

Washington level.9 

Forrestal referred Royall’s memorandum to his

War Council, the new advisory mechanism established under the National Security Act of 1947,

whose mission was “to advise the Secretary of

Defense on matters of broad policy pertaining to

the Armed Forces.”11 Chaired by Forrestal, the War

Council was composed of the three service secretaries and the service chiefs. On 3 August 1948 the

council recommended that a study group be established to consider the cryptologic needs of the

entire government, including both military and

civilian interests. 

Accepting the council’s recommendation, on 19

August 1948 Forrestal established a military committee to consider the “creation of a Unified Armed

Forces Security Agency. The Terms of Reference for

the committee gave the study a purpose, directed at

both foreign communications intelligence and the
Page 52

security of United States communications.11

Forrestal’s general mandate to the committee considered two broad questions: 

Should there be created a joint or unified

Armed Forces agency for the production

of communications intelligence and, if so,

what form should it take? 

Should there be joint or unified cryptographic security activities of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force, and if so, what form

should they take? 

The committee consisted of six officers: for the

Army, Major General Alexander R. Bolling,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Harold C.

Hayes, Chief, Army Security Agency; for the Navy,

Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, Naval

Communications, and Captain William S. Veeder;

and for the Air Force, Major General Charles P.

Cabell, Director of Intelligence, and Brigadier

General Francis L. Ankenbrandt, Director for

Communications.12 

At its first meeting on 25 August 1948, the committee selected Admiral Stone as its chairman. This

resulted in the group’s common designation as the

Stone Board.13 Hayes, however, was the only committee member actively engaged in the production

of COMINT at the time, as well as the only member

having any experience in COMINT. 

While the committee focused essentially on

communications intelligence and communications

security activities from a military point of view, it

also recognized the cryptologic interests of other

parts of the government. Its Terms of Reference

instructed it to consult with the State Department

and the CIA as part of its fact-finding effort for the

preparation of a final report.14

Despite Forrestal’s interest in consolidation, the

establishment of the new agency did not come

about easily. Lasting several months, the Stone

Board deliberations revealed that the Navy and the

Air Force were not ready to accept the kind of unification proposed by the Army. After considerable

debate, the Stone Board submitted its final report

to Forrestal in December 1948.15 The Stone Board’s

report, actually a majority report and an accompanying minority report, did not reconcile the conflicting views of the services. 

The majority report, written by the Navy and

Air Force, essentially recommended a continuation

of the basic arrangements existing under the old

Joint Operating Plan. It added several organizational changes related primarily to the new Air

Force Security Service and proposed exempting

tactical support areas from central control. The

majority report also proposed the allocation of joint

tasks to a new Air Force agency “on an equal basis

with the Army and Navy.” In addition, the Navy and

Air Force sought to exempt from unified control

those parts of the effort that pertained directly to

the specific military responsibility of each service

and that would remain in each service as a command function. Navy and Air Force officials justified their recommendation in terms of the need for

flexibility of operation and speed of decision in

matters pertaining to responsibilities of the services during wartime. In short, they basically desired

to maintain the status quo and their own separate

and independent cryptologic efforts. Consolidation

was not in their plans. 

In the minority report, the Army officials took a

far different approach. They emphasized economy

and the avoidance of duplication of effort.16 The

Army officials argued that foreign communications

were becoming increasingly sophisticated and consequently were much more difficult to exploit.

Accordingly, the Army plan placed primary importance on maintaining and exploiting technical relationships among all analytic problems. To achieve

this capability, the Army recommended consolidation of the COMINT services into a single unified

agency. The unified agency would have responsibility for central control of processing and dissemination activities for the entire U.S. COMINT effort. In

effect, the minority Army plan proposed that all
Page 53

COMINT production other than intercept and field

processing be conducted by one organization,

staffed by personnel from the three services. This

new unified agency “would determine COMINT

implementation priorities based on intelligence

requirements. . . and would determine the specific

employment of the intercept facilities.”17

Under the Army concept, no single service

would perform central processing activities in the

United States. The services could, however, perform a limited field processing effort, primarily on

tasks of a direct support nature as necessary for

military operations of each service. The individual

services would each maintain COMINT organizations to conduct intercept, direction finding, and

necessary field processing; to train service personnel; and to engage in research and development

actions for COMINT operations. As part of their

basic responsibility to the new joint agency, the

services would provide “intercept facilities and personnel.” Their fixed field sites would conduct intercept activities in response to the tasking of the new

joint structure. 

In support of its proposal, the Army drew a parallel between the Navy-Air Force proposal and the

situation that prevailed in the German COMINT

services during World War II. According to the

Army, at the end of the war all of the German

COMINT services and agencies were independently duplicating the work of one another in an atmosphere of great hostility. The Army believed that the

establishment of three independent COMINT activities would be divisive to United States interests

and would, in time, degenerate into a situation similar to that encountered by the German SIGINT

services during the war.18

In contrast to the German structure, the Army

cited the coordination and accomplishments

achieved by the British in their intelligence structure. In the Army’s view, the COMINT organization

of the British, with approximately thirty-five years

of continuous experience in this field, had been unified in a manner similar to that described in the

Army proposal.19 Citing the German and British

examples, the Army plan stressed the need for consolidating into a single armed forces activity all but

the most narrowly defined problems of primary

interest to each service. 

While the majority and minority reports disagreed on the issue of consolidation, they did agree,

in principle, on the need for better integration of

overall COMINT support. Both plans agreed that all

three services should participate in this integration

under the coordination of an Armed Forces

Communications Intelligence Board (AFCIB) and a

Director of Joint Operations (DJO).20 Both reports

proposed that the new Armed Forces

Communication Intelligence Board be subordinate

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that it consist of the

military members of USCIB. This new AFCIB

would be the policy board for providing guidance to

COMINT activities, and would provide liaison with

USCIB on all matters within the cognizance of

USCIB. The role of the DJO would vary, however,

under each report. Under the majority report, the

DJO would represent an expanded role for the

existing Coordinator of Joint Operations. Under

the Army report, the DJO would, in effect, have two

hats, serving as director of the new unified agency,

and as the Director of Joint Operations. 

The military services were not the only ones

interested in the Stone Board Report. From the outset, the civilian agencies – the Department of State

and the CIA – followed the activities of the Stone

Board closely, and soon expressed strong objections to various parts of the final report. The main

issue raised by the CIA and the State Department

concerned the establishment of an Armed Forces

Communications Intelligence Board whose relationship to USCIB was unclear. CIA and State

authorities viewed the new board as a threat to

USCIB.21 

While the relationships of AFCIB may have

been unclear, the strategy of the military services

was obvious. Their intent was to establish AFCIB as

a purely military structure running parallel to
Page 54

USCIB, but as one that would contravene the policy

role of USCIB. It would, in effect, leave USCIB with

no significant role. With this proposal, the military

had resurrected the acrimonious issue of one year

earlier when the NSC had established USCIB as

subordinate to the NSC rather than the JCS. 

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, , strongly argued that the creation of an Armed Forces

Intelligence Board would clearly be in conflict with

the new authority granted to USCIB by the issuance

of NSCID No.9 in 1948.22 In his view, the creation

of an AFCIB would serve to give the military

authorities total control over activities that should,

in the national interest, be directed more to the

requirements of the civil agencies. Hillenkoetter

also took the position that in the Cold War the

Central Intelligence Agency and State Department

were the primary players on the covert and diplomatic front. According to his estimate, threefourths of the current production of COMINT came

from sources of primary interest to the CIA and the

State Department. 

W. Park Armstrong, special assistant to the secretary of state, also attacked the concept of an

AFCIB as a “military controlled structure parallel to

USCIB and independent of it.” His strong objection

also reflected the view that the non-military consumer would lose the ability to influence the military COMINT structure in terms of stating its

requirements for COMINT information.23

The civilian objections, along with the basic

service disagreement over consolidation, prevented

any immediate action. A serious illness suffered by

Forrestal also contributed to the postponement of

any final decision. The two reports submitted by the

Stone Board awaited disposition in the office of the

Secretary of Defense for more than four months. 

When Louis A. Johnson became the secretary of

defense on 28 March 1949 following Forrestal’s

death, he acted quickly to resolve the issue. He

called in General Joseph T. McNarney, USA, known

to be a supporter of the consolidation concept, to

assist in resolving the dilemma.24 McNarney, who

served as director of Management Services for

Johnson, recommended a plan that required a

merger, but left the three services the right to maintain their separate organizations. It was a compromise solution. Johnson later reissued it as a draft

directive calling for the establishment of an Armed

Forces Security Agency that would be along the

lines of the recommendations in the Army minority

report. The new Johnson directive was then scheduled for discussion and decision by the JCS and the

Secretary’s War Council. 

At a JCS meeting in the morning of 18 May

1949, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force chief

of staff, suddenly announced the reversal of the earlier Air Force position and indicated that the “Air

Force supported the Army’s consolidated concept

and not the Navy’s non-consolidated concept for

COMINT processing.”25 Vandenberg appears to

have voted for merger only after having obtained

prior assurance that each service would be allowed

to have its own agency for the conduct of those

cryptologic operations peculiar to its needs.26 With

this official reversal of the Air Force vote, the Navy

remained the sole dissenter to the establishment of

an Armed Forces Security Agency. But its position

soon collapsed. At an afternoon meeting on the

same day, the Secretary’s War Council met to consider Johnson’s draft directive. At the council meeting, the newly appointed secretary of the navy,

Francis P. Matthews, overruled the position of the

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfield,

and argued for consolidation of the COMINT structure.27 Thus, by the evening of 18 May Johnson had

succeeded in overturning the split report of the

Stone Board and gaining the support of all three

services for consolidation. 

The reasons for the change of position by the

Air Force and Navy officials were probably associated more with high-level political factors rather

than any conceptual changes by the services themselves. From 1947 to early 1950, President Truman,

Congress, and the secretaries of defense actively

supported a concept of genuine unification of the
Page 55

military services. As a result, this period was characterized by a number of bitter interservice rivalries

and disputes concerning the issue of unification as

well as questions concerning the role of each service. Many of the same officials who participated in

the Stone Board decision were also active in other

ongoing political battles within the National

Military Establishment. One such battle, associated

with the Navy’s desire to hold nuclear weapons,

came to a climax at the time of the deliberations

about AFSA in 1949. The Navy and Air Force were

in violent disagreement over the strategic role of

the Navy and clashed over the construction of a new

super carrier and the development of the latest

strategic bomber, the B-36. This resulted in a chain

reaction of events achieving national prominence,

and soon involved both the executive and legislative

branches of the government. These conflicts 

resulted in Johnson’s cancellation, on 23 April

1949, of the construction of the 65,000-ton aircraft

carrier, the USS United States; the resignation of

Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan on 19 April

1949; and the continuing public rivalry between the

Air Force and Navy, usually labeled “the revolt of

the admirals.”28 

Thus, the atmosphere for cooperation and consolidation was volatile. However, by the time the

vote on the AFSA merger took place, Johnson had

appointed a new secretary of the navy, Francis P.

Matthews, whom he had selected personally.29

Matthews supported Johnson’s position. As for the

Air Force, Vandenberg, as Air Force chief of staff,

had consistently and actively promoted the growth

of the Air Force as an independent service. In addition to the commitment for an independent cryptologic arm for the Air Force, it is also likely that

Vandenberg envisaged receiving greater financial

support for aircraft programs if he went along with

consolidation in other areas such as the merger of

cryptologic activities. 

There also existed other pressures on the services. As a political reality, the Navy-Air Force decision to vote for merger was consistent with

President Truman’s desire for unification of the

military COMINT organizations which, in turn,

reflected the mood in Congress, as well as the tenor

of the National Security Act. In later years,

Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, USA, a 

participant in the AFSA deliberations, commented

about the political pressures existing at the time.

Clarke, an official with many years of service in ASA

and the office of the Army Chief of Staff for

Intelligence, maintained that while Johnson

pressed hard for merger, the real leverage for final

service approval of the AFSA concept came from

Truman and Congress.30

During the sessions of the Stone Board, the

Navy made elaborate studies and charts of the

major elements in both the majority and minority

reports. As a result of this critical analysis, the Navy

developed a unique grasp of the weaknesses and

strengths of each report. Recognizing that the

establishment of a consolidated agency was

inevitable, and seeking to strengthen the operations

of the new agency, the Navy sought at the eleventh

hour to have some positive changes made to

strengthen the new organization. 

On behalf of the Navy organization, Stone conferred at length with General McNarney about the

directive and proposed some substantive changes

in the text. In particular, the Navy sought changes

in the charter concerning the distinction existing

between “fixed” and “mobile” collection sites. The

draft directive stated that the fixed intercept installations would be “manned and administered by the

service providing them, but will be operationally

directed by AFSA.” On the other hand, the mobile

sites were to be excluded from any AFSA control

and would be operationally controlled by the parent

service. With unusual foresight, the Navy sought to

eliminate this distinction, which it correctly predicted would be an issue of great difficulty for the

new agency. McNarney, however, refused to make

any substantive changes, insisting that his authority, as executive secretary of the War Council,

extended only to editorial changes.31
Page 56

With a unanimous vote now supporting the

concept of merger, Johnson was ready to act. On 20

May 1949, Johnson ordered the issuance of JCS

Directive 2010, establishing an Armed Forces

Security Agency for the conduct of communications

intelligence and communication security activities

within the National Military Establishment. The

new agency would be headed for a two-year term by

a flag or general officer, to be chosen in turn from

each service. The agency would function under the

management control of the JCS, and would conduct

its common activities “in not more than two major

establishments.” Johnson’s directive established a

date of 1 January 1950 for completion of the merger of the COMINT services.32 

In taking this decisive action only two months

after coming into office, Johnson ended the

impasse that had existed for over a year. With the

formation of AFSA, the military COMINT structure

acquired a new identity and structure. While

Johnson sought to recognize the unity of the

COMINT mission and resources, he believed that a

consolidation of the service COMINT efforts would

be responsive at the same time to the public pressure for effecting greater economies in government. 

Because of the concerns expressed earlier by the

civilian agencies, Johnson also sent parallel letters

to Dean Acheson, secretary of state; Rear Admiral

Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, director of Central

Intelligence; and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,

executive secretary of the National Security

Council.33 He informed them of the formation, with

the approval of the president, of a unified cryptologic establishment – the Armed Forces Security

Agency (AFSA) – and of the subordination and missions of the new structure. The tone of the letters

was conciliatory as Johnson sought to assure each

that the implementation of his new directive would

not interfere with the functions of the USCIB. The

final AFSA charter included no vestiges of a highlevel Armed Forces Communications Intelligence

Board, which had drawn such violent protests earlier from the CIA and the Department of State. 

The JCS then reissued Johnson’s directive as

JCS 2010 on 20 May 1949. The JCS established a

steering committee to assist in the planning of the

many administrative, logistic, and operational

actions necessary for physical merger of service

resources. Its members were those representatives

of the military departments then serving on USCIB.

The Johnson Team

left to right: Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray; Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson; Secretary of

the Navy Francis P. Matthews; and Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington
Page 57

They were, for the Army, Major General S. Leroy

Irwin and Colonel Carter W. Clarke; for the Navy,

Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis and Rear Admiral

Earl E. Stone; and for the Air Force, Major General

Charles P. Cabell and Colonel Roy H. Lynn.34 

In the selection process for the position of the

director, AFSA, each service proposed one candidate. The nominees were Major General J. V.

Matejka, USA, Chief Signal Officer, USEUCOM;

Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, USN, Director of Naval

Communications; and Major General Walter E.

Todd, USAF, Joint Staff. On 15 June 1949, the JCS

selected Stone. 

The appointment

of Stone, who had

no experience in

COMINT, was a sign

to some that consolidation might be

aborted. Stone, who

represented the service most consistent in

its desire for cryptologic autonomy, had

signed the majority

report opposing the

creation of the

agency he was now to

head. Consolidation

seemed in jeopardy. 

As a result of AFSA’s creation, the existing CJO

(Admiral Wenger) and the director, AFSA, now had

overlapping responsibilities. The CJO had been

established earlier as USCIB’s executive for the discharge of certain responsibilities, which the services, along with the civil agencies, had agreed should

be vested in USCIB. Subsequently, with the establishment of AFSA and without prior concurrence of

USCIB, these responsibilities were arbitrarily

assigned to the director, AFSA. This situation presented a major dilemma for USCIB, particularly in

the policy area of foreign liaison, a responsibility

that NSCID No.9 assigned to USCIB. 

At the forty-first meeting of USCIB on 17 June

1949, the representatives of the Central Intelligence

Agency (Admiral Hillenkoetter) and the

Department of State (W. Park Armstrong) cited the

conflicts existing between the new AFSA directive

and the responsibilities of USCIB and the role of the

CJO under NSCID No.9. The military members of

USCIB were unresponsive to the complaints of the

CIA and State Department members, refusing

essentially to go counter to a directive from the secretary of defense. The meeting ended with the

agreement that the CIA and State Department

should address a letter to Secretary Johnson

expressing their views about the conflicts between

the USCIB and AFSA charters.35

On 27 June 1949 Hillenkoetter sent such a letter to Johnson. Johnson, however, took no action.

General McNarney, head of Johnson’s management committee, met with USCIB to discuss the letter, but adamantly refused to pursue any changes to

the AFSA directive.36 Hillenkoetter and Armstrong

concluded that McNarney’s views were inflexible

and that further effort to change them was futile.

They would have to wait for a new opportunity. 

Although USCIB’s non-military members were

unanimous in their opposition to the establishment

of AFSA, they were unable to convince USCIB to

take any stronger action protesting the 

establishment of AFSA. Because of charter 

limitations and the preponderance of military

membership, USCIB would not challenge

Johnson’s plan. Recognizing that they could do

nothing about the establishment or the structure of

AFSA, the USCIB had no choice but to cooperate

with the new agency during the interim period of its

establishment. Further, lacking any response to

Hillenkoetter’s letter, the only solution for 

USCIB out of its jurisdictional dilemma was to

appoint the director, AFSA, as the CJO.37 In his

capacity as CJO, the director of AFSA had a 

parallel responsibility to USCIB, which made 

the situation salvageable for USCIB. 

Consequently, USCIB agreed that the existing CJO

(Admiral Wenger) should serve as the deputy 

Rear Admiral Earl E.

Stone,

first director of AFSA
Page 58

CJO during the transition period, to assist 

primarily in the area of Second Party collaboration. 

When Johnson established AFSA in May 1949,

he simultaneously ordered the establishment of an

advisory mechanism to exist within the AFSA structure. His directive defined the nature, role, and

composition of the Armed Forces Communications

Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC), designed

to serve solely in the capacity of an advisory mechanism for AFSA and the JCS. Johnson’s directive,

however, indicated very clearly that AFSA, subject

to the JCS, had the primary responsibility for formulating and implementing plans, policies, and

doctrine relating to communications intelligence

and communications security activities. AFSA, in

effect, had the actual responsibility for running the

COMINT and COMSEC operations, excluding only

those responsibilities that were delegated individually to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.38

This dichotomy of organizational roles and division of labor did not last long. Within two months

after the establishment of AFSA, the JCS proposed

substantive changes to Johnson’s directive. On 28

July 1949 JCS issued a new charter for AFCIAC,

which not only changed the nature and role of the

AFCIAC mechanism, but affected areas of authority of AFSA as well. After circulating the document

to Johnson for information, the JCS approved the

new AFCIAC charter on 1 September 1949.39

The changes in JCS 2010/6 tended to diminish

the connotation of AFSA as representing a “unified”

organization, while at the same time placing greater

emphasis on “joint” operations. JCS accomplished

this by transferring responsibilities to AFCIAC

from the JCS, as well as from the director, AFSA. As

noted above, AFSA initially had the authority to formulate and, after JCS approval, to implement

plans, policies, and doctrine relating to communications intelligence and communications security

activities. Under the new AFCIAC charter, however,

AFSA no longer performed these basic tasks.

Instead AFCIAC became the structure to “determine policies, operating plans and doctrines for the

AFSA in its production of communications intelligence, and in its conduct of communications security activities.” In addition to its originally assigned

advisory functions, AFCIAC acquired considerable

staff authority over AFSA. Thus, AFCIAC no longer

functioned as an advisory mechanism within AFSA,

but “became the agency of the JCS charged with the

responsibility for ensuring the most effective operation of the AFSA.” As the new policy authority and

overseer of AFSA’s operations, AFCIAC emerged as

the real power in the COMINT structure. 

In short, before the AFSA structure even

became operational, the JCS had eroded much of

AFSA’s already limited authority. As happened during the period of the Joint Operating Plan, the military authorities turned once again to the use of a

“committee” structure to run the COMINT organization. They also repeated the practice of excluding

the civilian agencies from any participation in the

committee process. These charter changes tended

not only to destroy the separate identity of AFSA,

but also to preserve the independent identity of the

separate military COMINT services. The net result

was an acceleration of the antagonism within the

intelligence community over the control of the

COMINT structure. 

At the fourth meeting of AFCIAC, the council

proposed to the JCS that its name be changed to

Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC).

Admiral Stone proposed the use of the word “security” because it was a generic term that embraced

both the communications intelligence and communications security fields. Because of AFCIAC’s jurisdiction over COMINT as well as COMSEC, the new

title was considered to be more accurate. It also

avoided the use of the term “communications intelligence,” which at that time was considered to be

classified. Following JCS approval of the change on

22 October 1949, the secretary of defense approved

the change on 9 November 1949. After that, the

Council was known as AFSAC.40 

The Director, AFSA, chaired the AFSAC, which

now became the mechanism through which AFSA
Page 59

reported to the JCS. AFSAC had ten members,

including the chairman – three each from the three

services, one from each of their communications,

intelligence, and cryptanalytic organizations.

Consistent with the traditional practice in 

arrangements for joint operations, actions on 

substantive matters brought before AFSAC could

be taken only by unanimous vote. Because of the

diversity of the membership and their different

interests, the requirement for unanimity made

decision-making difficult, if not impossible. This

factor ultimately caused major problems for AFSA,

as the services tended to vote along party lines

whenever major issues arose. The hope that AFSA

would develop a truly consolidated intelligence

effort seemed remote. 

Stone began his tour as Director, AFSA, and the

CJO on 15 July 1949.41 He was assisted by three

deputy directors. Each deputy served as the liaison

between AFSA and his parent service, and assumed

specific functions within AFSA. Colonel Samuel P.

Collins, the Army deputy director (AFSA-00A), was

responsible for communications security, research

and development, and communications. Captain

Joseph N. Wenger became the Navy deputy director (AFSA-00B), and assumed control of COMINT.

Wenger also received an additional duty in a major

policy area. When USCIB appointed Stone as the

CJO, Wenger, who was CJO at the time, agreed to

step down and to become the deputy CJO. As the

deputy CJO, Wenger then assumed the responsibility for directing foreign liaison relationships on

behalf of the dual interests of USCIB and AFSA. On

the Air Force side, Colonel Roy H. Lynn of the Air

Force (AFSA-00C) became responsible for staff and

administrative functions.42

On the question of physical consolidation of

facilities, neither the Army site (Arlington Hall

Station) nor the Navy site (Naval Security Station)

could accommodate all of AFSA’s COMINT and

COMSEC functions. One proposal was to make the

split along COMINT-COMSEC lines; another

placed all analysis on Soviet problems at Arlington

Hall and all other cryptanalytic problems (ALL) at

the Navy site; a third left physical arrangements as

they were, with a mixture of both COMINT and

COMSEC remaining at the two installations.43 

Stone opted for a division along the major 

functional lines of COMINT and COMSEC. He

placed almost all of the COMINT operations and

related research and development activities at

Arlington Hall and all COMSEC operations, with

related research and development aspects, at the

Naval Security Station. Staff and other support

functions were divided between the two sites

depending on equipment and other logistical 

considerations. Stone established his new 

headquarters and administrative offices at the

Naval Security Station.44

Stone also established four monitor groups –

representing major functional areas – to direct the

actual integration of the service elements into

AFSA. The COMINT Monitor Group, headed by

Captain Redfield Mason, was concerned with the

merger of the largest of AFSA’s operating units.

This organization was to merge the Army Security

Agency’s Operations Division (AS-90) with the

Processing Department (N-2) of the Navy’s

Communications Supplementary Activity,

Washington (CSAW), as well as related units of

both agencies. It also had the responsibility for the

assimilation of two committee structures that operated under the aegis of the superseded Joint

Operating Plan. This included the JPAG and the

JICG of the JOP. The resulting structure became

the Office of Operations, with Mason designated as

its first chief.45 

With the physical merger of the Army and Navy

COMINT processing organizations into the AFSA

structure, each service contributed many talented

individuals with distinguished careers in cryptography. A number of these had achieved technical

accomplishments of exceptional merit and possessed a combination of knowledge and experience

that would become invaluable assets to the new

agency. The Army’s principal cryptologists were

civilians, most of whom had acquired wartime com
Page 60

Captain Redfield Mason

chief, COMINT Monitor

Group

Dr. Abraham Sinkov

chief, Communications

Security Monitor Group

Dr. Solomon Kullback

chief, Research and

Development Monitor

Group

Captain John S. Harper

chief, Administration

Monitor Group

AFSA Monitor Group

Chiefs
Page 61

missions; the Navy’s leading cryptologists were

mostly career Navy officers. 

Moving into the AFSA structure in 1949,

William F. Friedman clearly stood out as the dean

of Army cryptologists. During his career in the War

Department and the Signal Intelligence Service,

Friedman’s contributions embraced not only 

cryptanalytic operations but research and development activities (both COMINT and COMSEC) and

cryptologic education as well. While Friedman has

received recognition for his abilities in the field of

cryptanalysis, possibly his most lasting contribution may be in the area of training. Singularly gifted

as both a teacher and a writer, Friedman left a legacy of training lectures and programs that have

broad application even today. In April 1930, in his

search for new talent for the newly established

Signal Intelligence Service, Friedman personally

recruited three young mathematicians – Frank B.

Rowlett, Abraham Sinkov, and Solomon Kullback –

as junior cryptologists. As the Army continued its

recruitment through the 1930s, the SIS gradually

developed a small cadre of personnel who were

highly trained in cryptology. During World War 

II, Rowlett, Sinkov, and Kullback, in particular,

attained high personal accomplishments. 

They became representative of a new generation of

cryptanalysts. 

In contrast, the manpower of the Navy’s

COMINT organization in 1949 essentially represented a military cadre. The new Navy policy of the

postwar period that moved in the direction of

increased recruitment and use of civilian personnel

had not been in effect long enough to have a significant impact on its overall structure. The Navy

authorities, by encouraging professional careers in

cryptology for its officers, had traditionally placed

primary reliance on naval officers for the performance of COMINT duties. By the time AFSA was

established, many Navy officers had acquired a

broad background in communications intelligence

matters, some dating back to the mid-1920s,

including a number of assignments as either producers or consumers of intelligence. During World

War II, officers certified in the cryptologic field

Frank B. Rowlett
Page 62

filled positions of major responsibility for the Navy

in Washington and in field installations. Some of

these field installations were Fleet Radio Unit, Pearl

Harbor (FRUPAC) in Hawaii; Fleet Radio Unit,

Melbourne (FRUMEL) in Australia; Radio Analysis

Group Forward Area (RAGFOR) on Guam; and a

number of communications and intercept sites.

Based on this broad depth of training and experience, AFSA acquired a talented and highly professional organization from the Navy. The list of officers assigned to AFSA with their initial assignments

included Captain Joseph N. Wenger, deputy director, AFSA (for COMINT); Captain Laurance F.

Safford, special assistant to the director; Captain

Thomas A. Dyer, chief, Plans and Policy; Captain

Redfield Mason, chief, Office of Operations; and

Captain Wesley A. Wright, chief of the Special

Processing Division. 

The other monitor groups were Research and

Development, headed by Dr. Solomon Kullback;

Communications Security, headed by Dr. Abraham

Sinkov; and Administration, headed by Captain

John S. Harper, USN. William F. Friedman became

research consultant for the new AFSA. Frank B.

Rowlett, a member of the Army team that broke the

Japanese diplomatic system (Purple) during World

War II, became AFSA’s technical director.

Initially, Stone had two roles: one as director,

AFSA, and the other as the coordinator and executive agent for USCIB. As the director, Stone reported to Secretary of Defense Johnson through the

JCS. He had the responsibility for all cryptologic

activities in the Department of Defense. He was

responsible for the furnishing of COMINT, not only

to the military services, but also to other government departments. As director, he was also subject

to the policies and rules of USCIB governing the

production and dissemination of COMINT.

However, once the COMINT was distributed to

authorized intelligence recipients, Stone had no

jurisdiction over its use or physical security. These

became the responsibility of the user.46 When acting as the coordinator and executive agent for

USCIB, Stone worked under a different authority

and in wider fields than he did as the director,

AFSA. As coordinator, Stone was responsible to the

NSC through the USCIB. In this capacity, his

authority extended to the use of COMINT by any

U.S. agency. As director, AFSA, or as coordinator of

USCIB, Stone was an ex officio member of USCIB,

without a vote, and was ineligible to become chairman of USCIB (which was then held on a rotating

basis among the membership).47 Later, this lack of

voting status in USCIB became a major obstacle for

Stone and his successor as they were excluded from

participation in the actual decision-making process

of the Board. 

During his first year, Stone constantly sought to

clarify the nature and role of the AFSA structure

and to accomplish all necessary consolidation

actions. For the first seven months, his major objective was to develop administrative policies and procedures for the continuation of communications

intelligence and communications security activities. He placed major emphasis on actions dealing

with physical and administrative consolidation,

and budget and financial factors. In his first

progress report to AFSAC, Stone cited 15 July 1949

as the date of the formal activation of AFSA.48 The

report also noted the following as AFSA’s milestones: On 1 October 1949, AFSA assumed operational control of its cryptologic activities; and on 25

December 1949, AFSA assumed administrative

control of all its allocated civilian personnel. The

transfer and consolidation of facilities and personnel in a six-month period was a significant accomplishment. Merger seemed a reality. 

The contrast between the earlier JOP, and the

new AFSA was readily apparent. The effort against

the several targets was performed jointly by the

CJO assisted by his small staff (committees) for

intercept control, allocation of processing tasks,

and foreign liaison. Under the JOP, the services

worked together on a voluntary basis, operating

essentially under a “management by committee”

approach, with each service retaining its own independence – particularly when joint agreement

could not be reached. AFSA differed from the JOP
Page 63

principally in that the COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy in the United States were

now physically merged at two locations. It performed both military and non-military tasks. It was

a major step toward consolidation.

With the merger of the Army and Navy

COMINT processing organizations under AFSA,

there no longer existed any need for the JICG or the

JPAG, both of which were creations of the earlier

Joint Operating Plan. The functions of the Joint

Intercept Group and the Joint Processing Group

were merged into a new AFSA Office of Operations.

The duties of the JLG, however, required no

realignment within the AFSA structure. The JLG,

which dealt essentially with foreign liaison matters,

continued to be a responsibility of the CJO under

his USCIB hat. The responsibility for foreign

COMINT liaison, administered by the JLG and its

supporting staff, remained the responsibility of

USCIB. This function remained under Stone as the

Coordinator of Joint Operations. 

Although the processing activities of the Army

and Navy were now merged and the three services

now functioned under AFSA as a joint agency of the

JCS, the new agency faced some fundamental problems. The services generally took full advantage of

the many loopholes existing in the AFSA charter in

order to preserve their independence. For example,

the AFSA charter withheld from AFSA any authority for the tasking of mobile collection sites.49 This

“exclusion” clause caused serious operational problems for AFSA from the outset. Initially, the Army

and Navy reserved “mobile” or close-support facilities in the field for their exclusive control.

According to the military services, this ensured that

each satisfied the requirements of its own commanders for the production of COMINT for tactical

purposes. This blanket delegation of authority to

the services proved to be a major problem for

AFSA, particularly in its relationships with the

newly established Air Force Security Service.

By the simple act of declaring an intercept facility as mobile, a service could withhold any collection activity from Stone’s control. The Air Force

used this exclusion to the maximum by conveniently identifying all of its intercept facilities as mobile

sites. Because of this situation, AFSA and the U.S.

Air Force concluded an agreement on 18 September

1950 that essentially reflected a shared arrangement for AFSA/AFSS tasking of Air Force mobile

collection sites.50 The agreement concluded with

the candid admission “that the agreement was

made unilaterally between AFSA and the Air Force,

in view of the fact that the latter is not providing

any fixed intercept installation for operational

direction of the Director, AFSA.” This sharing of

tasking reflected the best arrangement that AFSA

was able to achieve with the AFSS. During the

remainder of Stone’s tour, as well as his successor’s,

the Air Force continued to withhold the assignment

of fixed stations from AFSA’s control by continuing

to identify all of its sites as mobile.51

Later these same difficulties over the question

of fixed and mobile collection sites extended to relationships with the Army, but to a lesser degree.

While the Army did not exclude AFSA from tasking

its mobile sites, it did establish elaborate procedural channels for the relay of AFSA tasking instructions. Except in an emergency, AFSA could not task

the sites directly, but had to go through intermediary channels, such as headquarters installations in

the United States and in the field. The process was

cumbersome and inefficient and worked against

the timeliness of COMINT reporting.52 The Navy

was the only service that did not create problems in

this area. 

Another broad question that plagued AFSA officials was the division of responsibility between

AFSA and the services. In its relationships with the

services on processing and reporting matters, for

example, AFSA once again found itself at odds with

the AFSS. Neither the Army nor the Navy undertook to establish processing units within the United

States. The Air Force, however, insisted on having

its own processing unit within the United States.53

AFSA considered this a major violation of its

responsibilities. It asked the JCS to settle the dis-
Page 64

pute. Since the JCS failed to rule publicly in favor of

either organization, the Air Force finally abandoned

its plans for establishing a domestic processing

unit.54 The issue, however, did not go away. During

the entire period of AFSA’s existence, its relationships with the Air Force remained highly contentious over this issue, as well as over the question

of mobile collection facilities. 

Although in principle the military cryptologic

community was officially committed to making the

merger work, this commitment was not reflected

uniformly throughout the services. There still

remained much open hostility and skepticism

about the workability of the concept of consolidation. In addition, the non-military members of

USCIB continued to raise questions about AFSA’s

role and its relationships to USCIB. They complained about the lack of a civilian voice in this military hierarchy.55

By June 1950 AFSA had been operational for six

months. It was still preoccupied with efforts to sort

out its managerial role and its authority in the

COMINT structure, as well as its relationships with

the consumer community. The outbreak of the

Korean War on 25 June 1950, however, completely

changed the focus of AFSA’s activities. The war put

new pressures on all U.S. intelligence sources. Both

military and civilian intelligence authorities 

immediately pressed for an improvement in the

quality and timeliness of COMINT reporting.56 The

war, however, quickly revealed the limitations of

AFSA. Duplicate collection efforts, processing

problems, service rivalries, and communication

delays were prevalent. AFSA’s limited ability to

direct COMINT activities in support of national 

targets soon became evident to the entire 

intelligence community. 

As the Korean War continued, the U.S.

COMINT community achieved a mixed record of

successes and failures. Because of the practice of

counterpart coverage, each service concentrated on

intercepting and processing the communications of

its foreign counterpart. For example, the Army and

Air Force intercepted the communications of the

Korean military ground and air forces, respectively.

The Navy handled the communications of Korean

naval forces. Because of this reliance on counterpart coverage, the major COMINT successes took

place in the area of tactical support. The Army and

Air Force, working independently on the low-grade

communications of their counterpart targets, had

the most success. The field exploitation of North

Korean and Chinese Communist traffic both voice

and plain text proved to be of significant value to

the U.S. field commanders.

By late 1951, because of the continued absence

of COMINT from some enemy communications,

the U.S. intelligence community, both military and

civilian, became increasingly impatient with the

quality and timeliness of AFSA’s COMINT reporting. The military desired increased expenditures of

effort and personnel on the analytic problem. The

civilian officials complained about the lack of channels for expressing their intelligence requirements

and priorities to AFSA.57 Pressure mounted on

Stone and AFSA to improve the responsiveness of

the COMINT structure.

As Stone’s two-year tour was coming to a close,

AFSA convened in January 1951 to nominate a successor. According to the agreed procedures, the

council would consider nominations made by the

Army and the Air Force, but not the Navy, since the

Navy had provided the first director. The Air Force,

however, declined, and supported the Army’s candidate, Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA.58 On

15 February 1951, the secretary of defense approved

the appointment of Canine as director, AFSA.59

During World War II, Canine, an artillery officer, had served under General George Patton as

chief of staff, XII Corps, Third Army. Other than

having been a user of intelligence, Canine came to

the AFSA job with no prior intelligence experience.

However, prior to assumption of his AFSA duties,

Canine had a unique opportunity to participate

directly in a great number of matters involving
Page 65

AFSA’s responsibilities and relationships.60 As the

Army’s alternate member of AFSAC and USCIB, he

participated in their meetings for a six-month period and learned firsthand about many of the issues

confronting AFSA. This extended period of orientation gave him a valuable preview of the AFSA structure before his formal assumption of the position. 

On 15 July 1951 Canine succeeded Stone as the

second director, AFSA. Canine’s arrival heralded no

immediate major changes in the AFSA structure,

however. AFSA continued to operate under a multiple control arrangement, functioning under the

guidance of USCIB and the JCS. USCIB provided

limited guidance on policy matters, while the JCS

provided the management and operational authority over AFSA. The Armed Forces Security Advisory

Committee continued to oversee the operations of

AFSA for the JCS, and at the same time exercised a

heavy hand in the direction of AFSA activities. As

noted earlier, AFSA did not have complete freedom

of action in the policy and planning areas. very early

revision of the AFSA charter required that all major

policy and planning actions by AFSA had to have

prior approval of AFSAC. Concerning the very 

critical policy question of the division of responsibility between AFSA and the services, AFSAC

consistently supported the service views rather

than AFSA’s. AFSAC also required unanimous

approval by the members prior to taking action on

an issue. This meant that it was very difficult, if not

impossible, for AFSA to win a favorable decision on

controversial issues. 

Canine’s arrival also brought no real changes in

terms of AFSA’s working relationships with the

service COMINT organizations. If anything, a

steady deterioration in these working relationships

continued. After the establishment of AFSA, even

the Army’s initial support and enthusiasm for the

centralized concept began to diminish and soon

matched that of the other services in opposition to

unification. In the Army’s case, the change was due

primarily to the reassignment of Brigadier General

Carter W. Clarke, USA, chief, Army Security

Agency, who was considered to be the primary

architect of the consolidation concept.61 Clarke

became commanding general, Southwestern

Command, Japan, and remained temporarily out of

the intelligence field until returning to Washington

in late 1953.62 With Clarke’s departure, no one in

authority in the Army wholeheartedly supported

consolidation. 

The services did agree on one major issue. They

were united in their belief that the director should

have no authority over them. They viewed him solely in the role of “coordinator,” not “director.” Each

of the first two directors of AFSA, Stone and

Canine, bitterly fought this concept. They believed

this approach to be contrary to the spirit and intent

of the AFSA charter. It inhibited them from doing

their job properly. As a result of continuing 

pressure from Stone and Canine for changes, hostility continued to build between AFSA and the

COMINT services. 

Despite Stone and Canine’s efforts, by

December 1951 management and control issues

remained unresolved. Critical to the successful

functioning of AFSA were centralized processing;

better communications, including courier forwarding of raw traffic as well as improvement of AFSA’s

own communications capability; and AFSA’s control and direction of the services. 

In summary, while logic seemed to argue for

physical merger of the service COMINT activities,

the actual establishment of the Armed Forces

Security Agency did not occur without major opposition. Most authorities, both military and civilian,

opposed its establishment. 

With the exception of Defense Secretary

Johnson and the initial support of the Army, the

majority of the military authorities strongly

opposed AFSA as conceptually unsound. The Navy

and the Air Force felt that they would lose control of

their resources as well as the ability to provide timely tactical support to their field commanders. Of the

civilian authorities, the representatives of the

Department of State and the CIA proved to be even
Page 66

more strident in their opposition to the establishment of AFSA. They viewed the AFSA concept as

detrimental to national intelligence interests, and

representative of still another effort by the military

to control COMINT resources and intelligence priorities. From their perspective, the AFSA charter

completely ignored the roles and authorities of

USCIB as established by the NSC in July 1948. 

Despite this opposition, Secretary Johnson

almost singlehandedly accomplished the establishment of AFSA. Because of the new national interest

in unification, as well as presidential support,

Johnson pushed through the establishment of the

Armed Forces Security Agency on 20 May 1949. In

the process of establishing AFSA, Johnson overrode the objections of USCIB, the Navy, and the Air

Force. General Canine described the situation best

when he characterized the establishment of AFSA

“as representing Johnson’s shotgun wedding of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force organizations.”63 

The original charter, as issued by Johnson,

would have permitted a more autonomous role for

the new agency. But an almost immediate modification of the AFSA charter by the JCS greatly

diminished the authority of AFSA and effectively

ruled out any real change of direction for the

COMINT structures. Because of the charter change,

the Armed Forces Security Council, originally

envisaged as an internal advisory mechanism for

AFSA, became instead a military tribunal that

directed the activities of AFSA – and left AFSA little authority of its own. The military authorities

sought to dominate and control all COMINT assets

and to prevent them from coming under the direction of the CIA and the Department of State. This

proved to be a tactic that they would later regret. 

During its three years of existence, AFSA was

continually confronted with unresolved operational

and jurisdictional problems, many of a critical

nature. But AFSA did succeed in accomplishing the

physical merger of the COMINT processing activities of the Army and Navy organizations.

Organizationally at least, AFSA must be viewed 

as an important step, no matter how incomplete, 

in the movement toward the establishment of 

a national cryptologic effort. The AFSA concept 

and structure became another building block – 

and training ground – in the progression toward

the centralization of a United States COMINT

authority. 
Page 67

From its inception, AFSA faced pressures to

restructure it, to weaken its authority, or to abolish

it altogether. Almost immediately after AFSA was

created, the Army proposed the creation of a new

military intelligence agency to be known as the

Consolidated Special Information Dissemination

Office (CONSIDO). It would control U.S. COMINT

requirements and the dissemination of all

COMINT. The draft proposal provided for exclusive

military control over the U.S. COMINT effort. It

quickly drew bitter opposition from the civilian

agencies: CIA, the State Department, and the FBI.

No sooner had the CONSIDO proposal been rejected than the Korean War broke out and AFSA again

found itself in the middle of a major controversy.

The war spotlighted AFSA activities and highlighted major weaknesses in the U.S. COMINT structure. Even before the war ended. AFSA became the

center of a high-level investigation to reevaluate the

role and placement of the U.S. COMINT organization in the overall U.S. intelligence structure. 

When AFSA was established in 1949, Secretary

Johnson considered a parallel Army proposal to

create a Consolidated Special Information

Dissemination Office. The Army’s plan, with support from the Navy and Air Force, sought to bring

all consumers together in a central evaluation unit.

The new office would be under military control, and

would serve as an “intelligence” counterpart of the

COMINT structure. CONSIDO would be charged

with the responsibility for performing the requirements and dissemination functions related to the

COMINT process for the entire intelligence community. Even more controversial than the original

plans for the establishment of AFSA itself, the proposal had far-reaching implications and led to a

new struggle between the military and civilian

members of USCIB over the control of basic intelligence functions and relationships.1

The proposal itself was not new. Near the end of

World War II, there had been extensive discussions

by the Army and the Navy concerning the concept

of a joint evaluation and dissemination center for

COMINT product. However, when the services

could not reach agreement on a proposal to merge

their cryptologic activities, the concept was abandoned. The idea, however, remained alive within

each service. Many military officials continued to

believe that there should be an integrated COMINT

structure charged with responsibility for performing intelligence functions such as the evaluation

and dissemination of COMINT product. Three

months before the establishment of AFSA, William

F. Friedman, chief, Technical Division, played a

major role in regenerating the plan. Working in

conjunction with the Intelligence Division,

Department of the Army, Friedman reworked the

proposal, which the Army forwarded to Secretary

Johnson a few days before the establishment of

AFSA.2

The plan recommended the establishment of a

new consolidated intelligence agency that would be

composed of analysts from the various intelligence

agencies, and would operate under the aegis of a

military organization – either the director, AFSA,

or some other military organization. The chief,

CONSIDO, would exercise total control over the

development of COMINT requirements, as well as

the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of

all intelligence based upon COMINT raw material.

The proposal envisioned the establishment of a

CONSIDO office in Washington and the establishment of overseas branches.3

The stated fundamental objective of the

CONSlDO consolidation plan was to improve

Department of Defense intelligence and contribute

to “efficiency and economy.” With the establishment of CONSIDO, the COMINT exploitation units

Chapter V 

AFSA, the CONSIDO Plan, and the Korean War, 1949-1952 
Page 68

of all other departments were to be abolished.

CONSIDO was to provide integrated intelligence

estimates on all available COMINT and was to

reflect the joint view of all intelligence agencies.4

General Joseph T. McNarney, special assistant to

the secretary of defense, became an enthusiastic

supporter of the plan, believing it would result in

great savings. He directed that the proposal be

coordinated with State, CIA, and the FBI in order to

make it as acceptable as possible to them.

McNarney, however, showed little real consideration for the civilian views. He remarked that he was

“sure that it had been made clear to these agencies

previously that the consolidation was a Department

of Defense matter and would take place regardless

of their opinions.”5

Secretary Johnson did not immediately endorse

the proposal, but instead referred it to the JCS for

review.6 During the next several months, various

redrafts emerged throughout the intelligence community for establishing some form of “CONSIDO.”

The main issues always focused on what organization would control the CONSIDO structure, and the

role of CIA, State, and the FBI in a CONSIDO-type

intelligence operation. Pentagon officials recommended that AFSAC, the same committee that

directed the activities of AFSA, control CONSIDO.

This, of course, would keep control of the organization in the hands of the military authorities. The

three civilian elements adamantly opposed exclusive military control over CONSIDO or any organization that sought to administer the intelligence

requirements process for the total U.S. COMINT

effort and that sought to establish strictly military

control over policies governing evaluation and dissemination of COMINT information. 

The debate finally reached the USCIB, when

Colonel James R. Lovell of the Joint Intelligence

Committee of the JCS presented the CONSIDO

proposal on 2 December 1949.7 In the ensuing discussions, the USCIB representatives generally reaffirmed their organizational positions. State and CIA

indicated they would not support the concept

unless they were made jointly responsible with the

Department of Defense for running CONSIDO.

Both the State Department and the CIA supported

William F. Friedman
Page 69

the concept of a CONSIDO-type operation, but they

opposed the specific proposal because of its 

military orientation.8

W. Park Armstrong, speaking for State, insisted

that “the civilian agencies retain their position of

equality with regard to their authority and responsibilities in the COMINT field.”9 In a memorandum

to the members of USCIB, Admiral Hillenkoetter,

DCI, also stated his vehement objections to the

CONSIDO proposal. He considered the plan to be

in complete derogation of the COMINT roles of the

DCI as assigned by the National Security Act of

1947 and USCIB as established by NSCID No. 9. He

objected to placing intelligence functions, such as

evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of AFSA

product, under exclusive military control. Stating

that intelligence requirements and priorities were a

clear-cut legal responsibility of the CIA,

Hillenkoetter further objected to the placement of

these functions under the JCS. In short,

Hillenkoetter stressed that many of the CONSIDO

functions were national in nature and could not

arbitrarily be assigned to a structure totally under

military control.10

Within the new AFSA structure itself existed a

wide divergence of opinion concerning CONSIDO.

Many of the senior military officials felt that the

CONSIDO proposal was conceptually sound.

However, Admiral Stone, the director of AFSA,

firmly opposed the CONSIDO concept. Because of

possible infringements on AFSA’s mission and

function, Stone argued against the establishment of

an additional agency outside the AFSA framework

for the production of communications intelligence.

Stone took the position that approval of CONSIDO

would require a simultaneous revision of AFSA’s

charter. He stressed that AFSA must be responsive

to the needs of the State Department and CIA as

well as those of the military.11 

Because of the objections raised by State and

CIA (AFSA was not a voting member of USCIB),

USCIB referred the issue to an ad hoc committee

under the chairmanship of T. Achilles Polyzoides of

the Department of State.12 The committee continued to struggle for several more months to develop

a compromise solution. Although all members of

USCIB agreed that the six agencies represented on

USCIB might integrate COMINT exploitation activities, they could not agree upon the best form of

organization for that purpose. Two quite different

proposals finally emerged from the ad hoc committee. One would establish a CONSIDO under the

control of USCIB; the other would establish a CONSIDO under the control of the military.13 

The end of the CONSIDO discussions took place

at the fifty-third meeting of USCIB on 14 July 1960.

Under USCIB rules, a unanimous vote was required

on all USCIB decisions. Since the members were

sharply divided on the subordination of CONSIDO,

“all the members agreed that CONSIDO should be

removed from the agenda, subject to a possible

restoration at a later date.”14 This action marked

the conclusion of formal discussions over CONSIDO. It never reappeared on the USCIB agenda. 

Although CONSIDO was dead, it left permanent

scars within the intelligence community. It clearly

illustrated the difference of opinion between the

civilian agencies and the military establishment

about the control of United States intelligence

resources.15 The distinction between “military” and

“national” interests began to receive greater attention. The CONSIDO concept soon became the symbol of a new battle to acquire control over the entire

intelligence process. 

As AFSA struggled to establish itself, the North

Koreans launched an attack against South Korea on

25 June 1960. AFSA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community were caught unprepared. The

COMINT requirement in force in June 1950 (issued

by the Intelligence Committee of USCIB) stressed

primarily the need for information concerning the

capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and

Communist China. South Korea was considered to

be outside the defensive perimeter of the United

States. The list of countries and subjects “considered to be of greatest concern to U.S. policy or secu-
Page 70

rity” included no reference to Korea. Korea was

included in the list of secondary requirements. This

category was identified as being of “high 

importance” and as one that required “expeditious”

handling to the extent possible. Korea was included

as Item 15 in a list of 16 items. Item 15 read: 

“North Korean-Chinese Communist Relations,”

and “North Korean-South Korean Relations,

including activities of armed units in border

area.”16 This low priority statement of interest

clearly did not reflect any great consumer interest –

nor was it sufficient to justify broad COMINT 

coverage of North Korean communications prior to

the invasion of South Korea. 

Because of the absence of consumer intelligence

requirements on Korea, AFSA had established no

COMINT effort of any kind on North Korean communications.17 There was no effort on the North

Korean problem even on a “caretaker” basis. At the

time of the invasion, the only intercept available to

AFSA was a limited amount of unidentified traffic.

The communications of North Korea first became

known to AFSA in 1950 during the course of routine intercept searches for Soviet links. The United

States initially intercepted North Korean communications in May 1949 when a search position at an

Army installation intercepted an unidentified radio

net using Soviet communications procedures. On

21 April 1950, at the request of Army G-2, AFSA

assigned an intercept position to the specific mission of searching for and developing information

on North Korean communications.18 As a result of

these searches, 220 cipher messages were

obtained.19 For the purpose of identification, this

traffic had passed back and forth between the group

of AFSA analysts working the Soviet and other

problems. By the end of April, the Soviet analysts

had concluded that the messages were “probably

North Korean,” but the two analytic groups could

reach no agreement. It was not until after the war

had started that the traffic was firmly identified as

North Korean.20

The outbreak of the war severely strained the

limited COMINT resources available to the United

States and required considerable diversion of

resources and tasking. Not only was the collection

and reporting posture on Korean targets very weak

in June 1950 but this situation extended to all supporting backup areas as well. There were no traffic

analysts working on North Korean communications, no Korean linguists, no dictionaries of the

Korean language, no books on the Korean 

language, no Korean typewriters – and an 

almost total absence of knowledge of North

Korean terminology .21 

After the initial attack, AFSA made immediate

and drastic adjustments in its COMINT posture,

focusing on the now urgent North Korean tasks.

Two weeks after the invasion, the intercept coverage of North Korean communications had been

increased.22 Drastic changes in other intercept coverage also took place. For example, COMINT processing activities both in the United States and

overseas established twenty-four-hour operations.

At the same time, however, there was no compensating reduction in the priorities of other USCIB

requirements.23 As a result, AFSA continued its

intercept and reporting of other targets. This coverage included priority reporting on the Soviet Union.

The increasing number of priority targets and the

limited intercept capabilities presented AFSA with

serious problems in allocating its resources for

intercept and processing activities. Lacking any

unified direction from the consumers, AFSA generally became the tiebreaker in making decisions on

conflicting priorities. In other cases it simply

deferred to the decision of the military services

based upon their intercept capability.24

Ironically, the outbreak of the Korean War

proved to be beneficial to AFSA in one respect. By

bringing national-level attention to the AFSA

plight, the war helped to break the budgetary straitjacket that had hampered AFSA. In addition, the

possibility that the war might expand to a global

conflict led the levying of a multitude of new

requirements on AFSA, mainly for intelligence

information about the USSR, China, and North

Korea. It quickly became evident that the struggling
Page 71

AFSA needed additional resources. This led to

increases in AFSA’s authorizations for manpower

and facilities, as well as an expansion of the

resources for entire U.S. COMINT effort.25

The Korean War brought into focus another

problem for AFSA that would require more than a

simple expenditure of resources to fix. It was organizational and related to AFSA’s position in the

COMINT structure and its authority to direct the

activities of the military services. With the Korean

War, AFSA sought to establish itself as the central

U.S. authority for COMINT matters. Unfortunately,

the conflict between AFSA and the services could

not be resolved and greatly impeded AFSA’s efforts

to fulfill its overall intelligence role. The difficulties

stemmed from the inherent weakness of AFSA’s

charter with its ambivalence about the roles and

authorities or the principal participants in the

COMINT process. 

When Secretary Johnson established AFSA, he

designated the new agency as the central defense

authority for the communications intelligence

activities of the United States, but with one significant exception. The charter excluded from AFSA’s

control those COMINT facilities and activities that

served in direct support of the field commanders

for the purpose of providing tactical intelligence.26

The control and direction of these latter activities

remained the responsibility of the military departments. This exclusion clause proved to be highly

divisive. It resulted in a continuing and frequently

bitter feud between AFSA and the services over who

was actually in charge of COMINT. The Army and

Air Force, in particular, took advantage of the

clause and came into frequent conflict with AFSA

over jurisdictional issues. The conflict usually

involved tasking matters – questions primarily

related to the exercise of operational and technical

control over the military field installations. As a

practical matter, during the Korean War the Army

and Air Force directed their major emphasis

toward the development of their own field collection and processing activities, primarily to meet the

intelligence needs of their field commanders. In the

judgment of the military COMINT services, they

were tasked primarily by military authorities for the

intercept of military counterpart traffic at the tactical level. Secondarily, they were tasked by AFSA to

intercept other targets of interest to the rest of the

intelligence community. This latter category

included the intercept of targets identified as being

of joint interest, such as civil links. This division of

effort resulted in the issuance of separate and independent tasking from both the military intelligence

officials and AFSA.27 The unfortunate split in the

exercise of control over the COMINT effort constituted a direct challenge to AFSA’s dominant role in

U.S. COMINT. 

Admiral Stone, alarmed by the continuing feud,

sought to clarify and resolve the conflict. Issuing

AFSAC 60/26 on 13 September 1950, Stone proposed a more precise definition of the division of

responsibility between AFSA and the services, as

well as a greater role for AFSA in the tasking of field

sites. Stone did not question the need for the services to conduct field processing activities in support

of the field commanders, but he maintained that

AFSA should be the primary organization to provide the centralized operational direction of field

processing efforts. He proposed specific procedures

for accomplishing a division of responsibility

between AFSA and the services.28

In AFSAC 60/26, Stone stated plainly what he

considered to be AFSA’s role as the centralized

COMINT authority in guiding the overall direction

of the entire U.S. COMINT effort including those

field operations that were delegated to the military

departments for direct support purposes.29 Stone’s

proposal, at least in the view of the Army and Air

Force, was totally unacceptable. It reopened all the

earlier arguments over the validity and fundamental purpose of the AFSA concept. The Army’s official response, to Stone’s amazement, totally rejected the idea of AFSA’s exercising any operational

direction and control over the Army’s field processing effort. Stone noted on his copy of the Army’s

response that it was the most extraordinary example of a complete reversal of position that he had
Page 72

ever seen. In essence, the Army now claimed that

AFSA did not have the responsibility for providing

the Army’s field commanders with combat

COMINT. The Army maintained that it would

reserve to itself the right of conducting all of its

intelligence operations as it deemed necessary or

desirable.31 Similarly, the Air Force, stressing the

need for having its own independent processing

capability, rejected AFSAC 60/26, and insisted on

controlling Air Force operations for the production

of combat air intelligence.31

In a reversal of its earlier position, the Navy

became the only service to support Stone’s paper.32

This switch was due in large part to Captain Joseph

N. Wenger, USN, and his perception of the AFSA

role. Wenger’s participation in joint Army and Navy

discussions extended from the late 1930s to the

early 1950s. During the Stone Board deliberations,

he provided staff support to the Navy member and

was an articulate spokesman against the AFSA concept. Despite his personal feelings about the wisdom of the merger, Wenger, as a deputy director of

the new AFSA, played a key role in implementing

the merger actions. Motivated mainly by the realities of the situation, however, Wenger came to recognize that even greater centralization actions

would be necessary in the future. He became a supporter of the AFSA concept and personally drafted

the paper (AFSAC 60/26) that laid out a strong role

for AFSA in directing the COMINT effort.33 This

now became the Navy position. 

In assessing the Army’s strong disagreement

with AFSAC 60/26, Wenger remarked about the

ironies of the situation. He recalled that the Army

had been the main proponent for the establishment

of AFSA, whereas the Navy had opposed it, primarily for operational reasons. According to Wenger,

the new Army position was completely counter to

what was understood to have been the aim of AFSA

and to what experience had shown to be the technical realities of COMINT operations. He also saw a

real threat to the continued existence of AFSA if the

Navy came to support the Army and Air Force position over control of field resources. If this happened, Wenger speculated that the services would

acquire complete independence in large sections of

the COMINT problem, thereby depriving AFSA of

its primary reason for existence as a military agency

– the centralization and coordination of U.S.

COMINT.34 He recognized that the Army and Air

Force dissents simply represented a reopening of

the earlier controversy over the issues of centralization, but with one radical difference. The Army and

the Navy, who had been the principal players during the Stone Board deliberations, were no longer

speaking from positions of great operational

strength. Each had lost its primary COMINT processing center to AFSA. 

According to Wenger, when AFSA absorbed the

COMINT processing activities of the Army and

Navy, both services lost highly skilled organizations

that had taken years to develop and would require

many years to replace. Each organization had

turned over a major portion of its COMINT-trained

manpower, its COMINT machinery, and its

COMINT facilities to AFSA in an effort to make that

organization work. The Air Force, however, had lost

nothing, as it possessed no major resources of its

own at the time. In the Navy view, the magnitude of

loss for the Army and Navy revolved around the

particular needs of each for the production of combat intelligence – which the Navy believed differed

greatly for each service. During the Stone Board

discussions, the Navy repeatedly stressed this

aspect. It asserted that much of the Army’s combat

intelligence program was targeted against lowlevel systems, which were exploitable in the field at

the tactical level. In contrast, Wenger and other

naval officials always maintained that the entire

naval problem could be handled properly only in a

full-scale technical center, as its complexity

required exploitation at the highest analytical

level.35 Based on this rationale, the Navy consistently maintained that it had suffered a greater loss

than the Army when AFSA absorbed the two processing centers in 1949. 

Navy authorities now perceived AFSA to be a

permanent organization and that the Army and
Page 73

Navy must rely on it for COMINT support. While

the Navy authorities had earlier opposed the creation of AFSA, they now felt that it was too late to

think in terms of restructuring or abolishing it, particularly during an ongoing war. Consequently,

Navy officials, led by Stone and Wenger, supported

AFSA and helped it to expand its technical

resources and capabilities, including its professional talent and complex machine equipment. They

believed that such an expansion of AFSA’s technical

capabilities would help AFSA meet the future intelligence needs of the three services as well as those

of the other members of the intelligence community.36 In taking this position, Navy authorities made

it clear that they would oppose any effort by the

Army and Air Force to undo the AFSA merger. 

With only the support of his own service, however, Stone made little progress in his efforts to

strengthen the concept of a centralized COMINT

authority. Discouraged, Stone finally agreed to

defer any further consideration of AFSAC 60/26 by

the members of the Armed Forces Security Agency

Council. Recognizing that he would not win support

in the JCS for AFSA control of field relationships,

Stone also chose not to submit AFSAC 60/26 to the

JCS for decision. Instead he modified his initial

broad approach and narrowed his argument to a

single issue – Air Force processing of COMINT in

the United States.37

In a memorandum to the JCS (AFSAC 60/42)

of 24 November 1950, Stone took on a head-on

challenge from the AFSS concerning the role and

authorities of AFSA. AFSS insisted on establishing

its own centralized processing activity at Brooks Air

Force Base, Texas. Stone asserted that this plan was

in direct conflict with the AFSA charter.38Although

the JCS never took official action, the AFSS

canceled its plan to develop Brooks as a 

centralized processing center. The Air Force, however, soon announced new plans (AFSAC 60/49) to

establish additional major processing centers.39

This action strongly reinforced the concept that the

services were in charge of conducting tactical field

operations. 

With this sequence of actions involving AFSAC

60/26 and AFSAC 60/49, the Army and the Air

Force prevailed over AFSA in their insistence that

the services, not AFSA, should maintain the dominant role in controlling the activities of their field

resources. The distance from Washington, as well

as the need for timeliness in reporting the intelligence information, contributed to this victory.

Moreover, this was an era when service collectors

were tasked primarily with the intercept of the

communications of their foreign counterpart service, and secondarily with the intercept of joint targets (e.g., civil). Thus, for a combination of reasons,

the military commanders in Korea would rely primarily on their respective military services for tactical intelligence rather than on AFSA. While AFSA

officials continued to believe that AFSA should

exercise operational and technical control over all

COMINT activities, they did not have sufficient

power and authority to impose their will on military

COMINT services. 

As the Korean War continued, both the Army

and the Air Force organizations expanded their

field intercept capability and established their own

field processing activities. Despite the continuing

controversy, the operational elements of AFSA and

the military services worked together in great harmony. In their day-to-day coordination on operational matters, they demonstrated a strong spirit of

mutual cooperation and assistance. They freely

exchanged information and technical details related to the collection and analytic processes, including such items as translations, cryptanalytic recoveries, and intercept data. There were also personnel

exchanges between AFSA and the services over a

broad range of operational functions. For example,

AFSA sponsored continuing programs for AFSA

personnel to perform temporary duty assignments

in the field in order to assist the services – and for

military personnel to participate in orientation and

training programs at AFSA prior to their assignment to the field. By the time the war ended, these

field programs became major focal points for

COMINT reporting and provided unique intelligence contributions to the field commanders. 
Page 74

From the beginning of the war, it was evident

that U.S. combat forces in Korea would rely on the

individual service processing units in the Far East

for tactical COMINT support. Starting with only

one intercept station, the Army COMINT organization ultimately acquired the largest contingent of

field units in support of U.S. operations in Korea.

The Army set up its field headquarters, the Army

Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC). ASAPAC also

served as a major processing center in the theater,

directing Army fixed intercept sites located in

Hawaii and Korea. In addition, ASAPAC established a number of advance detachments in Korea.

By 1951 the 501st Communications Reconnaissance

Group headed all Army COMINT units in

Korea. Subordinate units were designated

Communications Reconnaissance Battalions or

Companies (CRB, CRC). ASAPAC exercised overall

control of Army COMINT operations in Korea,

including South Korean detachment.

At the outbreak of war, there was only one Air

Force unit in the Far East, with scattered detachments. After the North Korean attack, the Air Force

established a detachment in Korea for intercept and

reporting and for direction of a South Korean unit.

In 1951 the Air Force began to deploy smaller teams

to Korea for the production of tactical COMINT for

the 5th Air Force. Eventually, the Air Force established an area headquarters which gradually

assumed responsibility from ASAPAC for the intercept and processing of the ground communications

of the North Korean Air Force.

The reliance on counterpart coverage, coupled

with the small number of North Korean or Chinese

naval forces involved in the war, precluded any

major role for U.S. naval COMINT units. In the

course of the war, however, a Navy radio facility did

provide important assistance to the overall Far East

COMINT effort. Detachments afloat also contributed unique intercept of Soviet nets and

Chinese activities.

At the Washington level, AFSA also attempted

to improve its relations with consumers. Stone, in

his role as AFSA director and executive agent of

USCIB in COMINT matters, attempted to keep the

consumer community current on all AFSA actions.

He not only encouraged the establishment of consumer liaison offices at Arlington Hall but also promoted an expansion of the direct dialogue between

intelligence analysts and COMINT producers.

Traditionally, the two performed their tasks with

little interaction. This new dialogue took place in an

era when the COMINT community was particularly

sensitive to the release of “technical” information or

“tech data” to consumers. The term “tech data” generally referred to the operational details of the

intercept, analysis, and translation process. It

included specifics related to collection sources, callsigns, identification of communications links, identification of cryptographic systems, and other

details of the analytic process.39 The issue over providing technical data to the consumers was never

resolved. It continued to be a source of conflict

between COMINT producers and consumers. Many

consumers, especially CIA, demanded the data. The

producers opposed providing it. 

Initially, Stone’s push for a freer interchange

between producers and consumers caused considerable opposition within the COMINT family itself.

Many AFSA personnel viewed the move toward

closer dialogue as blurring the distinction that traditionally existed between the roles of the COMINT

analyst and the intelligence analyst. The COMINT

analyst was to provide only raw data. The intelligence analyst produced finished intelligence.

Because of the war and its pressing priorities, however, such distinctions soon dissipated.40

Despite such problems, there existed major

areas of cooperation among the intelligence producing agencies in Washington. Long before the

establishment of AFSA, the Army G-2 and the

Office of Naval Intelligence established collocated

offices with their service counterparts at Arlington

Hall Station and the Communications

Supplementary Activity, Washington. Within each

service, the consumer and producer elements

developed harmonious working relationships and
Page 75

operated with a minimum of correspondence or

formality. These consumer contacts extended not

only to the COMINT processing elements but to the

policy-making officers or the COMINT organizations as well.41

When AFSA was established, many of the Army

and the Navy COMINT officials simply moved over

to new positions of authority corresponding to their

previous roles in their old agencies. In this manner,

the liaison arrangements between the military producers and consumers operated smoothly during

the transition period. 

This liaison arrangement worked particularly

well for the Army’s Special Research Branch (SRB)

during the Korean War. One of the most active consumers was G-2. Early in the war, SRB collocated

personnel in AFSA’s North Korean section, where

they worked closely with the AFSA COMINT analysts in almost all phases of the exploitation

process. Since the SRB representatives scanned all

translations and traffic analysis reports prior to

publication, they were able to develop a unique perspective of COMINT operations. In addition to this

direct participation in COMINT activities, SRB

served as a general channel for the dissemination of

COMINT from AFSA to the Far East commands.42

In contrast to the long-standing working

arrangements of the Army and Navy consumers

with their military COMINT counterparts, the Air

Force started from scratch. When the Air Force

became a separate service in 1947, the Army 

continued to provide intelligence support to the

new service on an interim basis. Within a year, the

Air Force activated the AFSS, its own COMINT 

processing organization that began operations 

at Arlington Hall Station on 1 February 1949 and 

relocated to Brooks Air Force Base in Texas in 

May 1949.43

Responding to the demand for more timely

COMINT product, the Air Force relocated a part of

its Office of Intelligence (AFOIN-C/R), under

Colonel Horace D. Neely, to Arlington Hall in 1950.

The purpose of the move was to enable Air Force

intelligence analysts to work more closely with

AFSA, as well as with the Army (Special Research

Branch) and Navy (OP-922YI) intelligence organizations. The operations of the new AFOIN-C/R

soon paralleled that of other consumers, with its

intelligence analysts consulting freely with processing personnel in AFSA’s working areas.44

In time, however, the AFSS assumed administrative control of all Air Force COMINT activities in

the Washington area. By February 1952 all of the

Air Force units were combined into the

Washington, D.C., Control-Collection Office

(WDC/CCO) of AFSS headed by Colonel James L.

Weeks. This organization represented the Air Force

in a dual capacity, both as a producer and user of

COMINT. As a COMINT producer, it worked with

AFSA’s Office of Operations in the development of

intercept assignments and served in a general liaison capacity as AFSA’s point of contact with the

AFOIN-C/R and the AFSS. As a consumer, it produced finished intelligence and represented the Air

Force on USCIB and AFSA boards and committees.

By 1952 the Air Force was the largest consumer delegation resident at AFSA, with well over 100 people

assigned to its control-collection office.45

Although the Department of State’s active

involvement in postwar COMINT dated back at

least to 1945, when it joined with the Army and

Navy organizations to form STANCIB, the establishment of a full-time State liaison officer at

Arlington Hall did not come about until the Korean

War.46 It grew out of discussions of the USCIB on

14 July 1950 concerning mobilization and later discussions on the subject between Rear Admiral

Stone and W. Park Armstrong, the State

Department’s representative on USCIB. When

Armstrong suggested State’s willingness to provide

direct financial support to AFSA for increasing

COMINT output, Admiral Stone countered by suggesting that the establishment of a State

Department liaison group in AFSA might be more

useful, Stone felt that State could assure fulfillment

of its intelligence requirements by an “on-the-spot
Page 76

audit of the COMINT production program,” and

could also handle such working problems as 

determination of priorities and transmission of 

collateral.47

Armstrong accepted Stone’s offer, but the State

Department took no official action until a year later.

On 15 July 1951, the department established a 

liaison unit at Arlington Hall consisting of 

John Crimmins and three assistants. The unit 

had no specific title at first, but was later 

designated the “Field Branch, Special Project Staff.”

The new Field Branch followed the pattern of operation of other liaison offices, but on a much smaller

scale. It worked directly with AFSA 02, advising it

of State Department COMINT requirements. It also

worked directly with the analytic and collection 

elements of the AFSA Office of Operations in 

order to provide more detailed information about

the requirements transmitted through the USCIB

committee structure.48

AFSA’s relationship with CIA underwent a

greater change than with any other consumer

group. Although initially uncertain of its charter

and authorities, the new CIA gradually began to

seek greater participation in COMINT activities. In

response to a request from DCI Admiral

Hillenkoetter, in 1948 USCIB authorized CIA direct

access to COMINT activities. USCIB also authorized, under certain circumstances, the direct participation by consumers in actual COMINT production activities. It represented a major change in the

consumer-producer relationship.49

Shortly after the physical merger of Army and

Navy COMINT processing activities in 1949, CIA,

with the concurrence of Admiral Stone, moved into

its first official liaison office at Arlington Hall.

Starting in late 1949, John S. Ward served parttime as the first CIA liaison officer. During this period, the main CIA interest was Soviet plain text.

Based upon the earlier USCIB decision, CIA

arranged with AFSA for the assignment of some

CIA personnel to the Russian Language Branch

(AFSA 246) where they were integrated within the

AFSA structure. With the support and guidance of

AFSA personnel, CIA carried on its own research in

the plain text unit. In addition, CIA assigned a 

limited number of personnel to work in the 

collateral and COMINT files of the Central Records

Office (AFSA 25).50 With the onset of the Korean

War, CIA merely expanded its cooperative effort

with AFSA. 

By 1951 the entire consumer community had

liaison offices at Arlington Hall. Because of their

well-established relationships with their military

counterparts in COMINT, however, and because of

AFSA’s military orientation, the Army and the Navy

representatives enjoyed a greater access to AFSA’s

operational offices than those from the Department

of State and the CIA. AFSA, as a predominantly 

military organization, tended to be more responsive

to the military when determining intercept 

priorities. Nevertheless, the representatives of the

civilian agencies welcomed the establishment of a

beachhead at Arlington Hall and the opportunity

for direct and continuing dialogue between the 

producers and consumers on intelligence matters.

While these measures contributed to a less 

confrontational attitude within the intelligence

community, representatives of the civilian agencies

still felt uncomfortable with the basic design of the

U.S. COMINT structure and their lack of influence

with AFSA. It was a continuation of the strong

objections expressed by officials of the State

Department and CIA when AFSA was first established as an autonomous intelligence arm of the

Department of Defense.51

Despite problems, AFSA did succeed in making

significant changes in its relationships with the

consumers. Stone designed a new “open-door” policy for COMINT relationships with consumers,

both military and civilian. He encouraged and facilitated the establishment of consumer offices at

Arlington Hall in an effort to improve the dialogue

between the producers and consumers. Both

seemed to benefit. The consumers, by virtue of their

physical presence at the COMINT center and by

their participation in AFSA’s priority mechanism,
Page 77

saw at first hand the inner workings of the AFSA

structure – as well as the major problems confronting AFSA. In addition, the consumers began to

display a greater appreciation of COMINT as a

unique and valuable source of intelligence information. Although the concept of exercising “oversight”

over the COMINT structure had not yet materialized, the intelligence community began to move in

the direction of discussing more critically and more

openly the quality, the utility, and the timeliness of

COMINT reporting. Joint community actions and

discussions of an evaluative nature now occurred

more frequently. For example, the USCIB

Intelligence Committee began publishing a monthly report listing the total number of COMINT messages published. It was broken down by country

and series and indicated whether the messages

were plain text or encrypted. The report also

showed the statistical improvements in volume

over the previous month. Despite the improving

relationships, AFSA made no real progress in

resolving the serious management and operational

problems affecting its relationships with the military COMINT services by the summer of 1951. 

The basic question of operational control of

service intercept facilities remained unresolved.

Stone, the first director of AFSA, in fact controlled

fewer intercept positions than his predecessor, the

Coordinator of Joint Operations under the earlier

Joint Army-Navy Operating Plan. Under the Joint

Operating Plan, the CJO had direct access to joint

intercept positions and a restricted access to all

other intercept positions. But Stone, as AFSA director, did not have this same access. As noted earlier,

a large number of the intercept facilities, namely

the mobile collection sites, were removed totally

from the control of AFSA. These sites were under

the exclusive operational control of the services.

Even in exercising AFSA’s authorized control over

the fixed intercept sites, Stone had to operate under

a rigid set of arrangements and rules prescribed by

each service.52 The system was not designed to

enhance timely reporting of COMINT information. 

Another nagging problem for AFSA was the

extent to which the services conducted their own

autonomous processing activities in the field. While

AFSA’s protestations over the control of the field

processing centers had abated somewhat with the

Korean War, the problem remained. The services

continued to dilute AFSA’s role as a central authority. In particular, problems with the Air Force

intensified as the AFSS persisted in its efforts to

acquire primary control over the total air problem.

Even more damaging to U.S. COMINT than the

friction generated by this issue was the broader

question of duplication and waste of resources both

in the field and stateside processing centers. 

For example, in early 1951 ASAPAC and AFSS

both covered Chinese Communist and Soviet targets. Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G-2 of

the General Headquarters, Far East Command

(FECOM) requested that a high-level AFSA team

visit the theater to assist G-2, FECOM, and

ASAPAC in a consultative capacity. On 12 March

1961, Stone sent two of his senior officials to the Far

East Command to brief Willoughby and review the

field operational problems. Benson K. Buffham,

assistant chief, General Processing Division, and

Herbert L. Conley, a senior manager and collection

specialist, went to Korea. In their final report of 2

April 1951, Buffham and Conley cited the duplicative efforts of AFSA, ASAPAC, and the AFSS on the

North Korean problem. Among their recommendations they proposed that ASAPAC and AFSS divide

and coordinate their efforts, particularly on certain

Benson K. Buffham Herbert L.Conley
Page 78

Soviet and Chinese Communist problems. Despite

the urgency of their recommendations, duplication

continued until March 1952, when the AFSS

assumed total responsibility for the Chinese

Communist and Soviet problems.53

During 1951 AFSA confronted a number of

operational problems as well. U.S. COMINT contributions to the war effort were far below the achievements of COMINT during World War II.54

Suffering from a shortage of intercept facilities,

short tours of duty by military personnel, and difficulty obtaining linguists, AFSA could not fully

exploit COMINT possibilities during the war.55

Moreover, by the fall of 1951, the North Koreans

introduced new and more sophisticated cryptographic systems. 

As the war dragged on, AFSA concentrated its

efforts at increasing the flow of tactical COMINT

from the services to the field commanders. The real

COMINT success story of the Korean War proved to

be in the area of tactical support. Because of the

nature of the land war, coupled with the assignment

of counterpart coverage to each service, the Army

and Air Force controlled, almost totally, the intercept coverage and reporting on the Korean and

Chinese targets. In providing direct support to the

Eighth Army and the UN Forces, the Army and Air

Force are generally acknowledged as having made

the principal military contributions to the COMINT

effort in Korea. An unpublished NSA review of

COMINT in the Korean War written in 1953

emphasized this point: 

Perhaps the most interesting development of COMINT in a tactical support role

was the sucessful expansion and utilization of low-level voice intercept. In August

1961, the effort was of the most rudimentary nature–but the nature of the intelligence provided was of such immediate

tactical value to the corps, division and

regiment commanders that those commanders clamored for additional support. By the end of October 1951, seven

low-level voice teams had been formed in

support of the U.S. I and IX Corps. By

June 1952, there were ten teams in action

along the Eighth Army front.

These teams were able to advise frontline

unit commanders of imminent enemy

artillery or infantry action and their

advance warnings through the balance of

the war were instrumental in the success

of UN counter actions and the saving of

many UN lives.56

The results of the COMINT successes in the

exploitation of Korean and Chinese military and air

force communications, to most intelligence consumers, still looked extremely thin. Many officials

in the U.S. intelligence community, aware of the

impressive contributions made by COMINT in

World War II, complained about AFSA.

While the military services were, in general, satisfied with AFSA’s attention to their intelligence

requirements, State Department and CIA officials

were not. They felt that their intelligence requirements were not being met. They complained about

their lack of input in establishing intelligence

requirements and AFSA’s lack of authority in translating these priorities to the collectors. AFSA officials made vague attempts to pacify the civilian

complaints stating that “we will take care of it,” that

“of course, this is of interest to all of us,” and “you

can be sure that you will get your share.” But this

did not satisfy the State Department nor the CIA. In

truth, the civilian agencies were correct. There was

no existing mechanism whereby the rapidly growing CIA could express its needs for information to

the cryptologic community. Similarly, for the State

Department, there existed no regularized channels

it could use with any degree of assurance needs

would even be considered by AFSA.57

By 1951 the flaws of the AFSA experiment were

clear. The division of responsibility between AFSA

and the services prevented AFSA from undertaking

any serious new initiatives to improve the total U.S.
Page 79

COMINT product. As a direct corollary of this,

Stone’s lack of authority over the services greatly

diminished the quality and timeliness of COMINT

reporting and resulted in duplication of COMINT

coverage. Fractionalization prevented AFSA from

operating as a centralized COMINT organization. 

Because AFSAC invariably supported the service viewpoints rather than AFSA’s on the issue of

AFSA’s authority, AFSAC was of no assistance to

AFSA in resolving the serious jurisdictional disputes. The last avenue of appeal was to USCIB.

However, USCIB was little more than a coordinating body with no real authority over the AFSA

structure itself or its organizational role. Although

USCIB had a vital interest in the intelligence produced by the military components, it could not

resolve the jurisdictional issues between AFSA and

the services.58

In summary, AFSA received persistent criticism

from the time of its creation. The U.S. Army’s CONSIDO proposal was an attempt by the U.S. military

to establish a separate COMINT intelligence agency

parallel to AFSA that would maintain strict military

control over most U.S. COMINT sources. It met

with bitter opposition from the civilian intelligence

agencies such as CIA and the Department of State.

Although the proposal was defeated, the deliberations concerning CONSlDO reinforced the generally hostile climate existing in intelligence matters,

and the continuing concerns of CIA and State that

their intelligence needs were not being met. 

The Korean War proved to be a major turning

point in the history of the U.S. COMINT structure.

At the outbreak of the war, glaring weaknesses

appeared in the AFSA structure. There were major

problems with resources, intercept and reporting

capabilities, and the cryptanalytic attack itself.

Most importantly, the war illustrated AFSA’s

inability control the COMINT organizations of the

services and its inability to control and direct U.S.

COMINT resources in an efficient, effective manner. Despite AFSA’s attempts at increased coordination and some success with the exploitation of

low-level technical communications, U.S. policy

makers came to see AFSA as a basic failure. It did

not or could not duplicate the COMINT successes of

World War II. It thus became the centerpiece in a

high-level investigation to reform and redirect the

entire U.S. COMINT structure.

Page 81

On 24 October 1952, President Truman issued

an extraordinary directive that changed the organization and direction of the U.S. communications

intelligence structure and laid the policy framework

for the modern system. Truman stated that the

communications intelligence function was a

national responsibility rather than one of purely

military orientation. This triggered actions that

reorganized the U.S. military COMINT effort and

strengthened the COMINT roles of the USCIB and

the NSC and brought a wider role for the civilian

agencies in U.S. COMINT operations. The president’s memorandum also contained the first reference to a “National Security Agency,” to be established in place of the Armed Forces Security

Agency. Under Truman’s directive, the Department

of Defense became the executive agent of the government for the production of communications

intelligence information, thereby removing the JCS

as the controlling authority for the COMINT

process. 

Truman’s directive stemmed from the recommendations of a presidential commission known as

the Brownell Committee. Truman established the

committee to conduct an investigation of the efficiency and organization of the entire U.S. communications intelligence effort. By December 1951

AFSA’s disappointing wartime performance had

been brought to the attention of the White House,

and Truman responded by calling for a complete

review of the COMINT structure. Setting up a mostly civilian committee, however, caused great alarm

within the military, particularly in the JCS. In

February 1952 the JCS complained that it had no

part in the deliberations leading to the committee’s

establishment and that the U.S. military had been

excluded from membership on the committee and

its support staff. 

The final Brownell Report emphasized the need

for the establishment of one organization to manage the communications intelligence activities of

the government. The report provided a strong

indictment of service unification as it existed under

AFSA as well as an indictment of the management

and policy echelons existing above AFSA. The

report recommended a complete reorganization of

the U.S. COMINT effort, and provided a blueprint

for the new structure. As its main theme, the

Brownell Committee pressed for the elevation of

the COMINT structure to a new status, requiring

national-level attention and interest. It also spoke

out against the almost total autonomy of the military in COMINT matters. This chapter details the

history of the creation of the Brownell Committee,

its report to the president, and subsequent acts that

had a major impact on the U.S. intelligence community and led to the creation of the National

Security Agency. 

By 1951 the CIA and the Department of State

representatives of USCIB felt vindicated in their

original opposition to the establishment of AFSA.

The problems associated with the operations of

AFSA had grown considerably and now extended to

a broad range of intelligence community relationships. Organizationally, the fundamental issue over

the division of responsibility between AFSA and the

military COMINT services appeared to be no closer

to a solution. The Korean War evoked new criticisms of the AFSA structure. A spirit of disunity and

turmoil characterized the activities of the entire

intelligence community. 

The major players of the intelligence community were locked in a struggle over “who was in

charge” and over the acquisition of expanded

responsibilities and authorities. The military and

civilian agencies continued to argue over basic

Chapter VI

The Brownell Committee and the Establishment of NSA, 4 November 1952
Page 82

jurisdictional and organizational relationships.

These disputes greatly complicated the entire intelligence picture. The new CIA, seeking to expand its

role, pushed for greater authority in the total intelligence process. While the Department of State had

different intelligence interests than CIA, it generally aligned itself with CIA on most issues during the

USCIB meetings and in the protests over the lack of

civilian/military equality in the COMINT field.1 

In particular, the vigorous and heated discussions over the establishment of AFSA, and later

over the JCS proposal to establish a new military

intelligence agency, CONSIDO, constituted headon challenges, not only to the role of CIA in the

intelligence field, but to the authority of the

National Security Council as well. Although the

CONSIDO proposal was dropped, CIA and State

viewed it as an attempt to acquire a dominant and

proprietary role for the military in such intelligence

functions as estimates, evaluations, and dissemin

action of intelligence.2 CIA and State perceived a

constant erosion in their ability to get the 

COMINT structure to consider and satisfy their

intelligence needs.3

The stage was set for reform. But what shape

should the reform take? What were the avenues for

resolution of the “AFSA problems” – and the

increasing tension within the community over the

ownership and control of ancillary COMINT functions? AFSA by itself could not resolve the many

managerial and operational conflicts. Nor did there

appear to be any likelihood of a solution emanating

from USCIB, which remained powerless because of

its limited charter and military-dominated membership. Because of its membership majority, the

military organizations were able to control the

board in its working-level committees.4 

Given the rigidity of the existing COMINT

structure, CIA and State officials probably concluded that further dialogue would be fruitless. Taking

direct action, they pressed for fundamental changes

in the intelligence structure. It was an opportune

time. The Truman administration was extremely

budget conscious and was known to favor centralizing and consolidating intelligence responsibilities

and functions.5

There was also a new DCI on the scene. General

Walter Bedell Smith, USA, appointed by President

Truman on 21 August 1950, succeeded Admiral

Hillenkoetter as the fourth director of Central

Intelligence. The appointment of Smith represented a significant change of leadership for CIA and

foretold a change in the CIA posture as well as in its

approach to intelligence community relationships.

Having served as chief of staff under General

Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater

from 1942 to 1945, and as U.S. ambassador to the

Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949, Smith had gained

the personal support and confidence of President

Truman. Known to be an exceptionally strong and

forceful executive, Smith was highly respected by

Eisenhower and other top military and government

officials, particularly for his organizational talents.

During his three-year tour as DCI, Smith played a

preeminent and rigorous role in the organizational

evolution of the DCI and CIA roles. This, in turn,

had a major impact on the entire intelligence community. Aggressive action became a keystone of

Smith’s new approach.6

With a view to reforming the COMINT structure, Smith brought the AFSA problem to the atten

General Walter Bedell Smith, DCI
Page 83

tion of the NSC on 10 December 1951 and 

recommended an overall survey of the COMINT

structure. His recommendation for such a survey

was based on a study by Kingman Douglass, who

was then the CIA COMINT officer. The NSC, in

turn, forwarded Smith’s proposal to President

Truman. Three days later, Truman directed

Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of

Defense Robert Lovett, assisted by Director of

Central Intelligence Smith, to review in depth the

communications intelligence activities of the

United States government.7

Acheson, Lovett, and Smith responded by creating a high-level committee to accomplish the survey. On 28 December 1951, they created the

Brownell Committee, headed by George A.

Brownell, a prominent New York City attorney.

Brownell was assisted by Charles E. (“Chip”)

Bohlen, counselor, State Department; William H.

Jackson, special assistant to the DCI; and Brigadier

General John Magruder, USA (Ret.), special assistant to the secretary of defense. The CIA and the

Department of State provided the staff members of

the committee: Lloyd N. Cutler and Harmon

Duncombe, CIA; Grant C. Manson and Benjamin R.

Shute, State. All of the staff members had served

previously in the Special Intelligence Branches of

the Army or the Navy. The Brownell Committee

and its support staff took up residence at CIA and

were administratively supported by CIA. The carefully tailored composition of the Brownell

Committee and its supporting staff omitted one

important group. The military authorities, who

heretofore had dominated the U.S. COMINT structure, were not included at any level in the actual

review process.8

Acheson, Lovett, and Smith directed the

Brownell Committee to undertake a survey of the

COMINT structure and to submit recommendations on two general subjects: 

(1) the needs of each governmental

department and agency for the production of departmental intelligence, and of

the Director of Central Intelligence for the

production of national intelligence, and 

(2) the most effective allocation of responsibilities for COMINT activities, and the

extent to which these activities should be

performed by a single department or

agency as a service of common concern -

and to which department or agency such

assignment should be made.9

In short, the committee was to look at centralization and placement of the entire U.S. COMINT

effort in the U.S. intelligence community. 
Page 84

George A. Brownell
Page 85

Meeting of the National Security Council, January I951
Page 86

The establishment of the Brownell Committee

provoked immediate outcries within the U.S. military. Four weeks after the creation of the committee, the Joint Chiefs summoned the director, AFSA,

the three service directors of intelligence, and the

deputy director, Joint Intelligence Group, JCS, to a

special meeting to discuss the Brownell

Committee’s investigation of COMINT activities.1O

On 4 February 1952, Major General Ralph J.

Canine, USA, Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson,

USN, Major General Alexander R. Bolling, USA,

Major General John A. Samford, USAF, and

Brigadier General Richard C, Partridge, USA, met

with the Joint Chiefs. The message of the meeting

was clear – the Joint Chiefs were alarmed over the

activities of the Brownell Committee. The service

chiefs complained that they had not been consulted

about the investigation prior to its conception, that

they had no representation on the board, and that

the line of questioning indicated a possibility that

the board would recommend transfer of AFSA from

the control of the JCS. Despite their forebodings,

however, the options open to the JCS remained

limited, particularly in light of the fact that the committee was already in operation. Without the unanimous support of the NSC or the USCIB, the JCS

was obviously in no position to risk a head-on challenge with the president or the secretary of

defense.11

In trying to salvage something, the JCS had little choice but to settle for some rather pro forma

actions. They asked General Omar Bradley, chairman, JCS, to meet with Secretary Lovett and “again

express the considerable concern of the JCS over

the possible transfer of AFSA from their jurisdiction.” They also decided that the JCS would make

its own full-scale review of the AFSA problem – but

at a later date – to determine whether more authority should be given to the director “so he could actually control in one organization the COMINT effort

of the United States.”12 While this projected study

was a tacit admission that all was not well within

the COMINT structure, it reflected a glimmer of

JCS optimism that somehow the Brownell effort

would wither and die without producing any tangible results. The JCS never got around to conducting

its projected study. The Brownell Committee

moved too swiftly. 

The final Brownell Report, submitted to

Acheson and Lovett on 13 June 1952, confirmed

that JCS apprehensions about the loss of AFSA

were well founded. The report completely demolished the concept of unification of the three services as it existed under AFSA. The committee concluded that the structure of COMINT activities did

not reflect unification under single control, but

rather a structure of four associated agencies – one

of which, AFSA, performed limited functions in

ways acceptable to those who controlled the other

three. In short, it was a military organization controlled by the military.13 

The report hammered out the theme that the

director, AFSA, had insufficient authority or control over the COMINT activities of the three services. It noted, “. . . that for all practical purposes the

AFSA charter made AFSAC (which is nothing

except a committee made up of the three services)

Charles E. (“Chip”)

Bohlen

William H.Jackson BGen John

Magruder, USA,

Ret.
Page 87

the boss of AFSA, which in turn is completely

dependent upon the Service organizations for all its

communications and practically all of its collection

of COMINT.”14 In reviewing the management

framework in which AFSA operated, the report

noted that the director had to spend much of his

time and energy on cajolery, negotiation, and compromise in an atmosphere of bitter interservice

rivalry. According to the report, the director of

AFSA had no real degree of control over the service

COMINT units – but rather was under their control

by virtue of their representation on AFSAC. His

only appeal was to the same three services. 

The committee also had harsh words for other

parts of the U.S. intelligence structure. It strongly

criticized the management and policy structures

existing above AFSA (USCIB, JCS, and AFSAC) for

their total lack of effectiveness in providing guidance, direction, and management support to AFSA.

Noting that “the U.S. Communications Intelligence

Board (on which the State Department, the Central

Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, as well as the three services, are 

represented) has inadequate authority and has

become an ineffective organization,” the committee

concluded that “the COMINT effort of today has 

too many of the aspects of a loose combination 

of the previous military organizations and too few

of a true unification of the COMINT activities and 

interests of all the interested departments 

and agencies.”15 

In reaching its conclusions, the Brownell

Committee stated that its basic thinking was influenced by “two controlling but somewhat conflicting

factors.”16 As a first and fundamental premise, it

believed that all of the interested services and agencies should have a voice in determining AFSA policies and giving it guidance. Second, as a counterbalance to this, and in order to strengthen the

COMINT structure, the committee stressed that

AFSA should be placed under a single governmental department for administrative purposes. This

line of reasoning signaled, for the first time, the

identification of COMINT resources as being

national in nature. It signaled too the probable end

of the era of exclusive military control of COMINT

resources. Thus, in the view of the committee, the

removal of the COMINT structure from JCS control

was a necessity. Ideally, and in order to provide an

effective COMINT response to the intelligence

requirements of all consumers, the responsibility

for the COMINT function should be centralized in a

neutral governmental agency that would have some

latitude in its operation. 

The Brownell Report concluded that a point had

been reached in the evolution of the United States

intelligence community that now made it essential

“to carry further the 1949 reorganization of the

COMINT structure.”17 It proceeded to outline many

actions that should be taken “to strengthen AFSA

itself and to increase its authority over COMINT

results.” These recommendations, directed essentially toward a reorganization and unification of the

COMINT structure, addressed a number of broad

COMINT relationships, both within and outside the

COMINT structure. The scope of the recommendations extended into the major operational and management phases of the COMINT business, including the production of COMINT, the centralization

of COMINT authority, the management of

COMINT resources, and policy oversight of

COMINT resources.18

From the outset, the Brownell Committee recognized that complete unification would be impossible because of the dependence upon the military

structures to man field stations. Consequently,

Brownell concluded that the service units must

retain their own authorities and responsibilities

within their military departments. To ameliorate

this and to assist AFSA in its mission of providing

effective, unified organization and control of

COMINT, the Brownell Report recommended that

AFSA should have operational and technical control over all the COMINT collection and production

resources of the military services. The Brownell

Committee also supported the services’ traditional

position that they must control the close and direct

intelligence support of the forces in the field. The
Page 88

committee fully recognized that it was creating a

problem area between the new central authority

and the services, but concluded that a solution

could be found “with sincere and intelligent cooperation between the commanders involved.” 

Specifically, the committee proposed structural

changes affecting the three levels of AFSA’s 

organizational relationships: below AFSA (i.e.,

external service relationships); within AFSA; and

above AFSA (i.e., USCIB and the Department of

Defense). As to the first, the committee 

recommended that AFSA be established as the keystone of the COMINT organization – with its 

mission clearly defined by presidential 

memorandum. As outlined by the committee, the

mission statement would give AFSA the responsibility and authority for providing a unified organization and control of the COMINT activities of most

of the federal government.19

For those changes projected within AFSA itself,

the committee concentrated principally on “people”

considerations. It recommended that the director

be a career military officer of at least three-star

rank, with a tour of at least four years, rather than

the two-year rotational tour established by the

AFSA charter. The option of appointing a civilian

director was left open if the particular circumstances warranted. The military director would

have a career civilian as deputy – with the converse

to apply in the event of a civilian director. In

stressing the need for the development of a strong

personnel program, the final report included a

major discussion of a broad range of personnel 

considerations. The report concluded that the 

existence of a well-rounded personnel 

development program was essential to the future

growth and success of AFSA. It stressed the 

dimensions of the “people” problems then existing

at AFSA, including the exceedingly high rate 

of turnover among AFSA civilians and the lack of

professional and managerial opportunities for the

civilian workforce. The report strongly 

recommended that AFSA initiate greatly 

expanded efforts to develop career and professionalization programs for civilian and military 

personnel – at both the managerial and 

professional levels.20

In discussing projected organizational changes

“above the AFSA level,” the committee remarked

that this category represented the single most difficult question it confronted. As the cornerstone of its

recommendation in this area, however, the committee expressed no qualifications about the need

for severing the relationship between the JCS and

AFSA. It recommended the immediate termination

of the 1949 “experiment” that had placed AFSA

under the control of the JCS. As a corollary, the

committee proposed the abolition of AFSAC. In

place of JCS control, the Brownell Committee suggested that AFSA be directly subordinated to the

Department of Defense as the executive agent of the

government for COMINT activities.21

In much the same vein, the report recommended a revitalization and restructuring or USCIB. The

report proposed sweeping membership changes

including a significant decrease or military representation as well as the simultaneous elevation of

AFSA to a position of full voting membership on the

new USCIB. The report recommended that USCIB’s

membership consist or a representative of the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the DCI, the

chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the

FBI, and the director of AFSA. It further recommended that the DCI become the permanent chairman of USCIB. This would bring to an end the longstanding practice of selecting a new USCIB chairman annually, based upon a vote of the membership. The report also included a new procedural

methodology to govern USCIB operations – with

the objective or giving it a greater responsibility “for

policy and coordination” in COMINT matters. It

also proposed to establish a majority-rule principle

when voting in USCIB on matters under the jurisdiction of AFSA. For those COMINT matters outside the jurisdiction of AFSA, however, it proposed

retention of the rule requiring unanimous agreement of the members.22
Page 89

Finally, in a related matter, the committee discussed the existing manpower levels and dollar

expenditures of the entire U.S. COMINT effort in

order to provide an indication of the cost to the government for the production of COMINT. It developed the data based upon figures received from

AFSA and the three services. While acknowledging

that its figures were possibly only little better than

informed guesses, the committee cited these as representing a reasonable approximation of the

resources spent in acquiring and processing communications intelligence information.23

In this investigation, the committee established

the combined manpower levels for AFSA and the

three cryptologic services, and it estimated direct

cost expenditures for the combined activities.

Because of security factors, the report noted that

the cryptologic budgets were not subject to the

usual checks and balances normally associated with

the budget cycle processs. Considering this as well

as the magnitude of the expenditures for COMINT,

the committee concluded that the fiscal process

represented another compelling reason for establishing a strong and responsible AFSA – operating

under the positive guidance of a policy board acting

with real authority.24

On 23 June Secretary Lovett sent the Brownell

Report to General Canine for his personal comments and recommendations. In a lengthy

response, Canine enthusiastically supported the

major conclusions and recommendations of the

report. Canine did, however, take issue with some

aspects of the report. The committee had proposed

an extension of the responsibilities of AFSA to

include a communications security responsibility

for the entire United States government rather than

merely the Department of Defense, as was then the

case. Canine agreed in principle with the proposal

but pointed out that the committee had included

very little on communications security in its report.

He recommended that the proposed directive be

confined to COMINT, with communications security to be made the subject of another study and to be

addressed in a separate directive. Canine also

argued strongly against retention of the rule of unanimity – even for COMINT matters outside the

jurisdiction of AFSA. He pointed out that this

would only serve to perpetuate one of the chief difficulties that had hampered USCIB in the past. He

urged the acceptance of a majority-rule principle to

govern all USCIB decisions. Lastly, Canine pointed

out that the Brownell Report had omitted the generally accepted identification of COMINT activities

as being outside the framework of security rules

governing other intelligence activities. Canine recommended that the same stringent security considerations then existing in NSCID No.9 be carried

over into the new directive.25

During the next four months, extended negotiations took place among the representatives of the

Department of State, the CIA, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, and AFSA over the exact

wording of the implementing presidential memorandum. Some of the issues discussed included the

definitions of communications intelligence and finished intelligence; principles to govern the production of COMINT by the cryptologic structures; and

a number of other policy considerations concerning

relationships between producers and consumers in

the production, evaluation, and dissemination of

Major General Ralph J. Canine
Page 90

COMINT. The principals in these discussions and

drafting sessions were W. Park Armstrong, State;

Loftus E. Becker, CIA; General Magruder, Office of

Secretary of Defense; Admiral Wenger, AFSA; and

General Canine.26

Truman’s directive, approved on 24 October

1952, affirmed that communications intelligence

was a national responsibility. Truman directed the

secretaries of State and Defense as a Special

Committee of the NSC for COMINT, to establish,

with the assistance of the Director of Central

Intelligence, policies governing COMINT activities.

He designated the Department of Defense as the

executive agent of the government for the production of COMINT information. His memorandum

also contained the first reference to the National

Security Agency. In addition, Truman’s memorandum provided the basis for a reconstitution of

USCIB with broadened duties and responsibilities

to correspond to those recommended by the

Brownell Committee.27

On 24 October 1952 the National Security

Council issued a parallel document, National

Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 9,

Revised, entitled “Communications Intelligence.”

This directive established the new membership of

USCIB, defined its duties and responsibilities, 

and prescribed the procedural methodology 

governing its participation in COMINT matters.

The NSC directive implemented much of Truman’s

directive.28

The composition of the new USCIB differed

only slightly from that proposed by the Brownell

Committee. Under the NSC directive, the three

armed services retained their membership, while

the Joint Chiefs were not represented at all. The

director, NSA, became a full voting member. The

NSC directive also made the DCI the permanent

chairman and provided that board decisions should

be based upon majority vote. The NSC directive

also stated that each member of the board “shall

have one vote except the representatives of the

Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence

Agency who shall each have two votes.”29 The

restructuring of USCIB meant that it became the

new mechanism and forum for establishing and

adjudicating problems associated with intelligence

and processing priorities. With the new voting

structure, this assured a more balanced participation by military and civilian representatives of

USCIB in the decision-making process.

Simultaneously with the release of NSCID No.9

Revised, President Truman issued a second directive that declared communications security to be a

national responsibility to be discharged by a new

United States Communications Security Board. He

designated the secretaries of State and Defense as a

Special Committee of the National Security Council

on COMSEC matters and directed them to develop

policies and directives relating to the communications security function, including responsibilities,

authorities, and procedures.3o

There remained establishment of the “National

Security Agency,” as called for by Truman’s directive. Secretary Lovett, as the executive agent of the

government for communications intelligence, had

the basic responsibility for starting the new agency.

In the conversion of AFSA to NSA, Lovett had to

deal with the issue of communications security.

Since Truman’s memorandum of 24 October 1952

had excluded communications security from the

scope of the COMINT directive, Lovett had to

define the extent of the new agency’s role in communications security matters. Accordingly, Lovett

issued two memoranda associated with the establishment of NSA.31

In a remarkably sparse announcement,

Secretary Lovett accomplished the actual establishment of the new National Security Agency in his

memorandum of 4 November 1952. In his memorandum to the service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, and the director, National Security Agency,

he described in general terms the basic institutional changes that now governed the cryptologic community. Lovett declared:
Page 91

• The designation of the Armed Forces

Security Agency was changed to the

National Security Agency.

• The administrative arrangements for

military and civilian personnel, funds,

records, and other support categories

previously authorized for AFSA were now

available and in effect for NSA.

• All COMINT collection and production

resources of the Department of Defense

were placed under the operational and

technical control of the director, NSA.

• Communications security activities previously assigned to AFSA were now

assigned to the director, NSA. 

• Addressees were directed to appoint a

representative to a working group to be

chaired by the director, NSA, to develop

necessary directives for formal implementation of NSCID No. 9.

32

With Lovett’s

memorandum,

Canine acquired a

new relationship

with the military

services and their

COMINT activities.

Theoretically, he

now had control

over all COMINT

collection and production resources.

Canine started a

four-year term of

office as the director of NSA on 4 November 1952.

In accordance with its new charter, he received a

third star. Each of the services assigned one or two

two-star grade officers to the new agency. This

change was consistent with Truman’s decision to

elevate the status of the unified agency. The reorganization of AFSA removed the COMINT structure

from exclusive military control and theoretically

gave all intelligence agencies, military and civilian,

an equal voice in the COMINT processing and

requirements process.

The new directives, however, did include a “delegation of authority” provision that diluted to some

degree the concept of central control. The drafters

of the final directives, accepting the Brownell conclusion, supported the position that the services

must retain control of the close and direct intelligence support of the forces in the field.

Consequently, the final directives made provision

for this broad exception by requiring the director to

delegate responsibility to the services for direct

support as may be required. 

The shock waves of reorganization quickly hit

the JCS. With the issuance of President Truman’s

directive and Lovett’s follow-up memorandum, the

dire predictions about the JCS loss of AFSA had

come true. The director, NSA, was no longer under

the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff except, 

during a transition period, for COMSEC matters.

By creating a new agency, Truman had shifted 

control of COMINT from the JCS to the

Department of Defense and the new USCIB. The

likelihood of bringing about any reversal of this 

policy appeared remote. 

Three months after the establishment of NSA,

Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, USAF, director, J-2, presented General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the JCS, with a lengthy appeal. In Cabell’s

view, the Brownell Committee had largely overlooked the progress achieved in the postwar evolution of AFSA.33 Addressing the allegation of AFSA’s

failure to satisfy the intelligence requirements of

State and CIA, Cabell maintained that a major part

of the requirements problem had stemmed directly

from the failure of State and CIA to seek adjustments in requirements through the existing mechanisms. They had sought a “revolution” instead.

Making one final gesture to retain JCS control over

the U.S. COMINT effort, Cabell proposed that the

secretary of defense delegate responsibility for

Robert Lovett, secretary

of defense
Page 92

direction and oversight of the new NSA to the 

director of the Joint Staff of the JCS. Bradley forwarded the proposal to Lovett, who chose not to

override the spirit of the earlier presidential 

guidance. Instead, Lovett opted to place within his

own office the responsibility for exercising a supervisory role over the new NSA. Lovett delegated this

responsibility to General Graves B. Erskine, USMC,

(Ret.) as the newly established special representative of the secretary’s office, who would function

without organizational ties to the JCS. This

sequence marked the end of JCS efforts to 

change the direction of the Brownell Report and its

implementation.34

Established in the fall of 1952, NSA superseded

AFSA. The Brownell Committee had succeeded in

writing the organizational obituary of AFSA in less

than six months. Its report was one of the most significant and far-reaching reviews ever prepared on

the COMINT activities of the United States. The

recommendations of the committee were accepted

and put into effect almost in toto, resulting in a

major restructuring of the COMINT community.

The report became a kind of Magna Carta for U.S.

COMINT activities and the new NSA. Within four

months of its completion, a chain reaction of new

national-level issuances followed that affected the

entire COMINT structure and produced a new

COMINT agency. 

In summary, there probably never existed a

more propitious time for making fundamental

changes in the U.S. COMINT structure than in 1951

when the Brownell Committee came into being.

After a six-year postwar period of self-study and

organizational experimentation, the COMINT community was still groping for answers to a number of

major questions. There was also a strong new DCI,

who was determined to strengthen the role and

mission of his young agency and to establish its permanent niche in the national intelligence structure.

The Korean War, in highlighting the intelligence

failures of the entire U.S. community, revealed that

a great amount of discord and turmoil existed in the

intelligence structure and provided an example for

the voices that clamored for fundamental change. 

The Brownell Committee, established to conduct an unprecedented wartime probe of the

COMINT community, was well staged and well

directed by officials from State and CIA. Within six

months it produced an impressive report in support

of centralization and unification. It radically altered

the existing U.S. COMINT structure and permitted

U.S. military officials little time to counter its major

recommendations. 

In the long struggle between the military and

civilian agencies over the control of COMINT

resources, the turning point came when DCI Smith

orchestrated the founding of the Brownell

Committee. With Truman’s approval, it began its

work without the foreknowledge or participation of

the military community. Its primary committees

and its supporting staff operated without representation from the military community. From the 

outset, the CIA and State Department dominated

the Brownell Committee. There were old 

animosities to resolve, and CIA and State, while

undoubtedly motivated by national security considerations, left nothing to chance in their efforts to

realign the COMINT structure and ensure their

greater participation in the intelligence process. 

Operationally, the Brownell Committee went as

far as it could in its proposals for the centralization

of COMINT resources. Because of the almost total

dependence upon the military installations for the

intercept of traffic, the committee concluded that

complete centralization of COMINT would not be

possible. It recognized that the COMINT services

would have to be incorporated into the new centralized structure. Despite this difficulty, the

Brownell Report strongly recommended the establishment of a central authority to guide the activities of the military COMINT organizations. 

As a result of the Brownell Report, a revised

National Security Council Directive of 1952 defined

the mission and authority of the new National
Page 93

Security Agency. NSA remained within the

Department of Defense, subject to the direction of

the secretary of defense. The director acquired new

authorities and responsibilities to assist him in providing unified operational and technical control of

COMINT. He acquired operational and technical

control over all military COMINT collection and

production resources of the United States He was

authorized to issue instructions directly to operating units of military agencies engaged in the collection and production of COMINT. The directive did,

however, contain one “exception” clause that weakened NSA authority. The directive required that the

director make provision for delegation of operational control of COMINT activities to the military

services for direct support purposes, as he deemed

appropriate. This supported the traditional military

position regarding tactical COMINT. 

The committee recognized that this exception to

the director’s control authority would further weaken the concept of centralized control. But in creating a gray area between the services and the central

authority, it somewhat optimistically concluded

that a solution could be found by the development

of greater cooperation between the director and the

field commanders.35

The implementation of the Brownell Report

clearly represented a strong positive move toward

unification of the COMINT effort. Because of 

factors associated with the organizational nature of

the military structures, there remained the same

number of agencies engaged in cryptologic 

activities. But NSA represented a vastly stronger

structure than AFSA. With the acknowledgment 

by Brownell that direct support to field forces

should be controlled by the Service Cryptologic

Agencies rather than NSA, the services retained a

significant degree of independence. This still 

presents problems today. 

Page 95

World War II marked a key juncture in the

growth and expansion of the U.S. Army and Navy

COMINT operations. The war had a monumental

and immediate impact on U.S. COMINT collection

and reporting operations. Even more significantly,

World War II marked the start of ten years of

change and evolution for the military cryptologic

services. After World War II, there was no 

returning to the era of total independence for the

military COMINT organizations. Massive changes

culminated with the establishment of the 

National Security Agency in 1952 and the 

strengthening of the United States Communication

Intelligence Board. While the organizational 

origins of the new agency represent a fairly simple

audit trail, the political struggles and crosspressures that led to the establishment of NSA are

far more complex. The expanding intelligence

requirements of the federal government, the 

passage of the National Security Act of 1947, 

budgetary considerations, and bureaucratic infighting between the military and civilian agencies

all were prominent factors in the effort to centralize

the communications intelligence functions of the 

federal government into one agency. 

By the summer of 1942, as a result of action by

President Roosevelt, the Army and Navy 

cryptologic structures became the principal U.S.

organizations devoting efforts to foreign 

communications intelligence activities. 

Their organizations had evolved along different

lines, within different departments, and no 

one organization directly supervised their 

efforts. As a result of this 

dichotomy of origins and structure, a wellestablished pattern of independence – if not 

isolation – characterized Army-Navy 

relationships on COMINT matters. In June 1942

the services did reach an agreement on a division of

cryptanalytic tasks, but there occurred no immediate change in their working relationships. 

Until 1942 the Army and Navy resisted the

introduction of any major changes to their relationships and sought to maintain their traditionally

separate cryptanalytic roles. Each worked independently and exclusively on its assigned cryptanalytic tasks. The services not only continued to

demonstrate little enthusiasm toward closer cooperation in COMINT matters, but maintained their

traditional hostility toward proposals for merger, or

even of opening up a new dialogue on operational

problems. Consequently, cooperation on COMINT

matters was minimal during the first two years of

the war. 

Nevertheless, out of the disaster at Pearl Harbor

and the pressures of all-out war came persistent

demands for the establishment of a truly centralized, permanent intelligence agency. As early as

1943 proposals for the establishment of a single

United States Intelligence Agency routinely surfaced in the various intelligence forums of the JCS.

At the same time, some military COMINT authorities foresaw their vulnerability to congressional

criticism and future reductions in resources since

they conducted their COMINT operations on a fractionated and sometimes duplicatory basis.

Recognizing these threats to a continuation of their

separate existence, the Army-Navy COMINT

organizations took steps to establish closer technical cooperation.

In 1944 some positive signs of the services 

moving toward an expansion of interservice 

cooperation occurred. That year saw the conclusion

of a number of technical agreements between the

services and the first exchange of liaison officers in

Washington on a number of certain problems. 

Chapter VII

Summary: The Struggle for Control Continues
Page 96

It also saw the establishment of ANCICC. While the

dialogue was carefully prescribed and did not

change the overall independent operations, it 

represented movement toward some form of 

consolidation. 

Operating as separate COMINT organizations,

both the Army and Navy experienced major successes during the war. Included were cryptanalytic

breakthroughs against the communications of

German submarines and armed forces. These

accomplishments heightened the sense of value

and appreciation of intelligence among the military

commanders and the leaders or the government.

Communications intelligence generally came to be

identified as the most important form of intelligence. Ironically, the magnitude or these intelligence successes later became the measuring rod for

criticism of the postwar achievements of the military COMINT organizations. 

As the war came to a conclusion, some Army

and Navy officials realized that the loss of their 

primary targets meant dire consequences for 

their organizations and budgets. Because of 

worsening Soviet-U.S. relations, however, the 

services began to explore the possibility of directing

a major effort against Soviet targets. The services

also anticipated major organizational changes in

intelligence activities as the war wound down. The

first of these changes occurred within a few months

after V-J Day when President Truman ordered the

establishment of new intelligence organizations,

and authorized continuing relations with the

British cryptologic organization. In January 1946

Truman created a National Intelligence Authority,

a Central Intelligence Group, and a Director of

Central Intelligence. 

Eighteen months later, Congress passed the

National Security Act of 1947, which reinforced and

amplified the earlier Truman action concerning

centralization of the U.S. intelligence effort. The act

gave birth to a National Security Council, a Central

Intelligence Agency, and a National Military

Establishment, with three coequal departments of

the Army, Navy, and Air Force. By 1948 a third military COMINT organizatioj emerged, the Air Force

Security Service. It began competing for scarce

COMINT targets and resources.

Within a few months after the Truman

Directive of 1946, the service COMINT organizations initiated their own reorganization effort. This

effort marked the beginning of six years of experimentation. Basically, the military authorities

sought to centralize military control over COMINT

activities and to develop an organization that would

be responsive to military needs, especially with

regard to the Soviet Union. 

The first major change occurred in May 1946

when the services formed a joint working agreement, which became known as the Joint Operating

Plan. The plan brought about a voluntary collocation of Army and Navy processing activities in the

United States. Under the JOP, however, the services retained their separate identities and organizations. The plan also called for a radically new position, the Coordinator or Joint Operations. The position was literally that – a coordinator, not a director

of operations. 

Under the new JOP a new layer of committees

subordinate to the CJO was also created. The CJO

became a super-chairman for all the committees

established under the JOP. Although he had a coordination role, he was powerless to direct the services, even on matters of joint tasks. This management

weakness was compounded further when ArmyNavy officials failed to reach agreement on what

constituted joint tasks or the amount of their manpower contributions to joint tasks. Moreover, by

this time, the civilian agencies had come to recognize that they had little or no voice in setting intelligence priorities for COMINT. Military interests

simply dominated the process. 

In late 1947 a major struggle developed between

the military and civilian members of USCIB.

Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the third DCI,

became the primary catalyst for the issuance of a
Page 97

new charter for USCIB. Hillenkoetter’s general

intent was to rewrite the charter to reflect the

expanded membership of USCIB and to correlate

the authorities of the Communications Intelligence

Board with the National Security Act of 1947.

Hillenkoetter wanted to give the civilian agencies a

greater voice on policy matters relating to

COMINT. He openly sought to bring U.S. COMINT

under the direct control of the DCI. 

After several months of negotiations, the 

members of USCIB (Army, Navy, Air Force, State,

and CIA) could not agree on which organization

should have the ultimate authority over the

COMINT community. (The FBI retired from the

board in 1947.) The board was deadlocked. The

armed services took the position that USCIB should

report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. State and, 

however, believed that the board should report

stalemated questions to the National Security

Council instead. 

On 1 July 1948 the National Security Council

broke the deadlock by issuing National

Security Council Intelligence Directive No.9,

“Communications Intelligence.” The new directive,

with the strong personal support of the secretary of

defense, James Forrestal, represented a major victory for the civilian members of USCIB. Under the

provisions of the new NSCID No.9, USCIB reported

to the NSC as its parent body rather than to the

individual military department heads. Also, for the

first time, USCIB had an official charter issued at

the national level. The rule of unanimity continued

to govern USCIB’s decision-making process, 

however, and hindered the effective functioning of

the board. 

Although Hillenkoetter achieved a major victory with the issuance of NSCID No. 9, he failed in his

attempt to place the COMINT functions directly

under the DCI. In the view of most military authorities, however, the outcome was still a catastrophe.

The JCS clearly lost out in its counterproposal to be

designated the “parent body” of USCIB for unresolved issues. Nevertheless, while NSCID No.9

effectively dealt the JCS a blow in its efforts to 

control U.S. COMINT activities, it did not result 

in any immediate change in the day-to-day 

activities of USCIB and its subordinate committees.

Since the military organizations had a majority on

the board, they continued to dominate the discussions. The situation was clearly changing, however.

As the major beneficiaries of the new directive, the

State Department and CIA began to exert a much 

greater influence in all COMINT deliberations 

and decisions. 

Within ten months of the issuance of the NSC

directive, another major change took place in the

intelligence structure. On 20 May 1949 Defense

Secretary Louis Johnson directed a physical merger of the central processing activities of the three

cryptologic services by establishing the Armed

Forces Security Agency. He placed the cryptologic

functions under the exclusive control of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. AFSA came about as a result of two

interrelated political factors. On the one hand was

the announced objective of Secretary Johnson to

achieve “efficiency and economy” in the management of the cryptologic effort. On the other was the

obvious strategy of the JCS to strengthen and to

reestablish its hold on COMINT resources. The military was once again in a dominant position on

COMINT matters. 

From the perspective of the civilian agencies,

the creation of AFSA meant the renewal of the military and civilian struggle over the control of

COMINT resources. CIA and State Department

representatives argued strongly against AFSA,

which in their view existed in direct conflict with

the new USCIB charter. They maintained further

that AFSA was established without their participation and over their protests. Secretary Johnson,

however, not only refused to discuss it directly with

them, but refused as well to make any changes in

the basic AFSA charter. Johnson did make one concession. He canceled the proposed Armed Forces

Communication Intelligence Board, which would

have become a policy board running parallel to

USCIB. 
Page 98

Although the establishment of the Armed

Forces Security Agency seemed to represent a consolidation of the U.S. COMINT effort and a more

efficient approach to U.S. COMINT activities, AFSA

was fundamentally unsound from both a conceptual and managerial viewpoint Pentagon authorities,

however, viewed AFSA as a reasonable and evolutionary step toward “service unification.”

Unification proved to be an ephemeral and elusive

concept, however. 

Although some military officials acquiesced in

the concept of consolidation, it soon became clear

that the bureaucracy in each service never seriously envisioned a true merger and the resulting

diminution of its own responsibilities and authorities. AFSA was the creation of Louis Johnson, secretary of defense. He sought to achieve a degree of

unification of the services as well as “efficiency and

economy” in the management of the cryptologic

structure. While a form of merger took place, no

fundamental changes were made in the way each

service conducted its own operations. 

In the actual implementation of the AFSA charter, the services took full advantage of loopholes in

the charter to preserve their independent status.

For example, the Air Force used the “exclusion

clause” in AFSA’s charter (which withheld from it

any authority for the tasking of mobile collection

sites) to exclude AFSA from any role in controlling

Air Force collection sites. In fact, by 1952, AFSA

had no authority over any Air Force collection sites.

All had been conveniently identified by the Air

Force as mobile facilities. In addition, two months

after forming AFSA, the Joint Chiefs made substantive changes in the AFSA charter, and drastically

diluted its basic authorities. 

These problems, combined with a waning military support for the general AFSA concept, foretold

its ultimate demise. Of the three COMINT services,

it was ironic that the Navy, which from the outset

had strongly opposed even the AFSA concept of

cooperation, ultimately provided the greatest support for AFSA. Although the Army, in the person of

Colonel Carter W. Clarke, became identified as the

originator of the AFSA concept, Army support for

its offspring quickly diminished and could be 

characterized at best as lukewarm. The Air Force,

with its newly established AFSS, aggressively

opposed AFSA, seeking primarily to build its own

structure and achieve total independence in

COMINT matters. 

From AFSA’s first days, there was no way in

which its first director, Admiral Earl Stone, could

make it operate as a centralized unified structure.

However, the full extent and impact of the 

weaknesses of the AFSA charter would not become 

widely known – or recognized – until the onset of

the Korean War. By 1951 General Ralph Canine, the

second director, AFSA, was encountering the same

open opposition from the services to his efforts 

at centralization and consolidation as Stone had

experienced. 

The Korean War revealed the inherent weaknesses not only of the AFSA structure, but of the

USCIB as well. During the Korean War, U.S.

COMINT produced a mixed record. Its major successes took place in the area of tactical support,

achieved primarily by the Army and Air Force.

AFSA came under heavy criticism because 0f its

problems in attempting to control and direct the

military COMINT services. The civilian members of

USCIB now pointed to the lack of direction and

unity in the COMINT effort. AFSA was not 

providing results. 

The Army proposal to establish a new military

agency to be known as the Consolidated Special

Information Dissemination Office (CONSIDO)

shocked the civilian members of USCIB. The proposal drastically limited civilian input on COMINT

matters. CONSIDO soon became the symbol of a

new battle between the military and civilian members of USCIB for control of COMINT. 

CIA and State officials completely understood

the military rationale for the establishment of AFSA

– although they thoroughly disagreed with it. The
Page 99

CONSIDO proposal, however, represented an even

more encompassing threat to civilian input to the

COMINT process. Not only was the control of

COMINT and its dissemination at stake, but the

control of all-source intelligence estimates and

evaluation actions appeared to be at risk as well.

The concept of a military CONSIDO controlling dissemination, estimates, and evaluative actions

seemed to crystallize the major fears of the civilian

agencies about their diminishing policy role in all

intelligence matters. Because of this major opposition, the proposal died in USCIB in December 1950. 

The long debate over CONSIDO left a lasting

impression on CIA, State, and the FBI (reinstalled

as a member of USCIB in 1950). They now believed

that the military authorities would not relent in

their pursuit of the CONSIDO-type concept, and

would probably submit an amended version of

CONSIDO at a later date. 

By 1951 it was clear to the civilian agencies that

the military organizations were incapable of jointly

developing a structure that would meet, without

bias, the needs of the growing United States intelligence community. After six years of experimentation and reorganization and two attempts to consolidate and centralize the communications intelligence activities of the United States, instability, disunity, and decentralization still existed. and State

were not totally altruistic in their opposition to military plans. They often appeared more concerned

about the long-range overtones of military control

of the intelligence role than about the actual level of

COMINT support received during the Korean War,

for example. They realistically concluded, however,

that any fundamental reworking of the communications intelligence structure would come about

only as a result of outside intervention. Any further

joint military-civilian dialogue seemed useless.

Working together, CIA and State officials proceeded to develop their own strategy for a “new look” at

the organization of the COMINT structure. This

time the civilians would have a major input. 

The military authorities previously had set up

AFSA without prior coordination with USCIB or the

civilian members of the COMINT community. Now

a complete reversal took place. The military authorities were completely left out of the deliberative and

decision-making process leading to the termination

of AFSA and the creation of a new centralized

COMINT agency. 

General Walter Bedell Smith, as the fourth DCI,

became the catalyst for bringing about a new

national-level review of the COMINT structure. In a

memorandum to the National Security Council,

dated 10 December 1951, Smith recommended an

overall review of United States COMINT activities,

based upon an earlier study by Kingman Douglass.

The NSC, in turn, forwarded the proposal to

President Truman. Three days later, on 13

December 1951, Truman directed Secretary of State

Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Robert

A. Lovett, assisted by Director of Central

Intelligence Smith, to review in depth the 

communications intelligence activities of the

United States. The resulting review process was

carefully orchestrated. 

On 28 December 1951, in response to Truman’s

request, Acheson and Lovett established the

Brownell Committee to study the existing structure

and make recommendations. George A. Brownell,

an eminent attorney in New York City, headed the

committee. Brownell served as chairman, assisted

by Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, counselor, State

Department; William H. Jackson, special assistant

to the DCI; and Brigadier General John Magruder,

USA (Ret), special assistant to the secretary of

defense. The CIA and the Department of State provided the four staff members for the committee, all

of whom had served previously in the special intelligence branches of the Army or Navy. During the

period of the survey, the Brownell Committee and

its support staff resided at CIA and received 

administrative support from the CIA. The military

organizations had no representation on the

Brownell Committee or on its support staff. 
Page 100

Within six months, the Brownell Committee

completed its report. It stressed the need for the

unification of U.S. COMINT responsibilities and

recommended a major overhaul of the existing

COMINT organization as well as the USCIB structure. The final Brownell Report completely demolished the concept of “unification” as it existed

under AFSA. During the next four months, extended negotiations took place among the representatives of CIA, Departments of State and Defense, and

the director, Armed Forces Security Agency, over

the exact wording of the implementing directives to

be issued by the president. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

were also excluded from these discussions. Ten

months after the establishment of the Brownell

Committee, Truman, accepting the report, issued

two directives that led to the establishment of the

National Security Agency with its dual responsibility for the communications intelligence and communications security activities of the government.

There would be a centralized authority for U.S.

COMINT activities, and the civilian authorities, by

virtue or a major restructuring of USCIB, would

play a major role in directing the scope of NSA’s

operations. 

In conclusion, the directive establishing NSA

clearly identified the national rather than the solely

military character of U.S. COMINT activities.

Within well-defined limits it strengthened the role

and authorities of the director, NSA, over COMINT.

It greatly expanded administrative and operational

controls over all U.S. cryptologic activities. For the

first time, the director acquired the authority to

issue instructions directly to military units without

going through military command channels.

However. there remained some significant built-in

limitations in the NSA charter. Although a nominal

unification took place, efforts to unify and centralize COMINT authorities and responsibilities in one

organization achieved only a partial and limited

success. 

From the outset, the designers of the NSA charter clearly recognized that complete unification

would be impossible because of the dependence

upon the military structures to man field stations.

Consequently, although the service units were

incorporated organizationally into the central

organization. they retained their own authorities

and responsibilities within their military departments. To ameliorate this, and to assist NSA in its

mission of providing effective unified organization

and control of COMINT, the enabling directives

provided that NSA would have operational and

technical control over all the COMINT collection

and production resources of the United States.

Even this did not solve the problem. 

There also existed a “delegation of authority”

clause in the new charter that further diluted the

concept of centralized control. The Brownell

Committee, as well as the drafters of the implementing presidential directive, supported the services’ traditional position that they must control the

close and direct intelligence support of the forces in

the field. Consequently, the final directive made

provision for this broad exception by requiring the

director to delegate responsibility to the services for

direct support as may be necessary. The committee

fully recognized that it was creating a problem area

between the central authority and the services, but

concluded that a solution could be found “with sincere and intelligent cooperation between the commanders involved.” 

Finally, despite the reorganization the same

number of agencies remained engaged in cryptologic activities as before – namely, NSA, CIA, Army,

Navy, and Air Force. NSA had in many respects

simply replaced the defunct AFSA. The services

retained a significant degree of independence. They

retained their own separate organizations and 

identities, as well as administrative and logistic

control of their field operations. The struggle over

who would control U.S. COMINT resources would

continue. 
Page 101

Abbreviations 

AFCIAC–Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (later redesignated as

Armed Forces Security Agency Council) 

AFCIB–Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board 

AFOIN–Air Force Office of Intelligence 

AFSA–Armed Forces Security Agency 

AFSAC–Armed Forces Security Agency Council 

AFSG- Air Force Security Group 

AFSS - Air Force Security Service 

ANCIB–Army-Navy Communications Intelligence

Board (joint policy board that later became StateArmy-Navy Communications Intelligence Board) 

ANCICC–Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working level committee of Army-Navy Communications Intelligence

Board) 

ASA–Army Security Agency 

ASAPAC–Army Security Agency Pacific 

CAHA–Cryptologic Archival Holding Area 

CIA–Central Intelligence Agency 

CIG–Central Intelligence Group 

CJCS–Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJO–Coordinator of Joint Operations 

CNO–Chief of Naval Operations

COI–Coordinator of Information 

COMINCH–Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

COMINT-Communications Intelligence 

COMMSUPDETS–Communications

Supplementary Detachments

COMSEC–Communications Security 

CONSIDO–Consolidated Information

Dissemination Office 

CRB–Communications Reconnaissance Battalion 

CRC–Communications Reconnaissance Company 

CRG–Communications Reconnaissance Group

CSAW–Communications Supplementary Annex,

Washington (Navy facilities at Ward Circle,

Washington, D.C.) 

DCI–Director of Central Intelligence 

DIA–Defense Intelligence Agency

DJO–Director of Joint Operations 

DJS–Director, Joint Staff 

DoD–Department of Defense

DOE–Department of Energy 

ELINT–Electronic Intelligence 

E.O.–Executive Order 

FBI–Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC–Federal Communications Commission 

FECOM–Far East Command 

G.C. & C.S.–British Government Code and Cipher

School 
Page 102

GCHQ–Government Communications Headquaters (U.K. SIGINT Organization) 

G-2–Intelligence Division, War Department

General Staff 

IAB–Intelligence Advisory Board 

IAC–Intelligence Advisory Council 

JIC–Joint Intelligence Committee (within the Joint

Chiefs of Staff structure) 

JICG–Joint Intercept Control Group 

JCS–Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JLG–Joint Liaison Group 

JN-25–U.S. Navy designator for Japanese 5-digit

code used by Japanese fleet 

JOP–Joint Operating Plan of Army and Navy,

1946-1949

JPAG–Joint Processing Allocation Group

LSIB–London Signals Intelligence Board

NIA–National Intelligence Authority 

NME–National Military Establishment

NSA–National Security Agency 

NSC–National Security Council 

NSCID–National Security Council Intelligence

Directive 

NSS–Naval Security Station 

ONI–Office of Naval Intelligence

OPNAV–Office of Naval Operations 

OSD–Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSS–Office of Strategic Services 

RAF–Royal Air Force

SCA–Service Cryptologic Agency 

SECNAV–Secretary of Navy 

SIGINT–Signals Intelligence 

SIS–Signal Intelligence Service (Army) 

SMP–Special Committee on Merger Planning 

SRB–Special Research Branch (Army Intelligence) 

SSA–Signal Security Agency (Army) 

STANCIB–State-Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Board (joint policy board that later

became the United States Communications

Intelligence Board) 

STANCICC–State-Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working

level committee of State-Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Board) 

SUKLO–Senior U.K. Liaison Officer 

SUSLO–Senior U.S. Liaison Officer 

SWI–Special Weather Intelligence 

SWNCC–State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

USA-U.S. Army 

USAF–U.S. Air Force 

USCIB–United States Communications Intelligence Board 

USCICC–United States Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee (working level
Page 103

committee of United States Communications

Intelligence Board) 

USEUCOM–U.S. European Command 

USN–U.S. Navy 

WC–War Council

WDC/CCO–Washington, D.C., Control-Collection

Office (Air Force Security Service) 

Page 105

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Admiral Joseph R. Redman,OP-2o, memorandum for

the Secretary of the Navy. “The Navy’s Interest in the

Processing of Intercepted Foreign, non-military

Communications,” 24 September 1945 Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CDIB 38,

NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Redman memorandum, 24

September 1945.) 

2. History of the Signal Security Agency in World War

II, “Organization, 1939-1945,” (ASA, 1945), Vol. I, Part I,

90-103, History Collection, NSA, Series IV (TS).

(Hereafter cited as History of the Signal Security

Agency, Vol. I, Part 1.) 

3. John W. McClaran, OP-20-G, memorandum for the

Director, 12 April 1933, (Documents on Pre-1952

Cryptologic Organization and Policy, Vol. 1, (Pre-1942)),

History Collection, NSA, Series VII (s). 

4. The Navy had the primary responsibility for naval

radio activities relating to all foreign powers, and for the

diplomatic radio intelligence activities of the four major

naval powers (England, France, Italy, and Japan). The

Army had the primary responsibility for military radio

traffic relating to all foreign powers, and for the diplomatic traffic of all foreign powers other than England,

France, Italy, and Japan. 

5. Laurance F. Safford, OP-20-G, memorandum for OP20, “Coordination of Intercept and Decrypting Activities

of the Army and Navy,” 25 July 1940, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBID 38,

N5A (5). (Hereafter cited as Safford memorandum, 25

July 1940) 

6. Ibid. 

7. Commander Laurance F. Safford and Colonel Spencer

B. Akin, Directive to Joint Army-Navy Committee, 31

July 1940, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession

No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S). 

8. Commander Laurance F. Safford, OP-20-G, memorandum for Admiral Leigh Noyes, 27 July 1940,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614,

CBIB 38, NSA (S). 

9. Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940. 

10. Ibid. 

11. John R. Redman, OP-20-G, memorandum to the Vice

Chief of Naval Operations, “Cryptanalytical and

Decryption Operations on Diplomatic Traffic,” 25 June

1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No.

4614, CBIB 38, NSA(S); and Laurance F. Safford, memorandum for OP-20-G, “Responsibility for Decoding and

Translating Japanese Intercepts,” 14 February 1946.

History Collection, NSA, Special Series VII, Box 4.

(Hereafter cited as Redman memorandum, 25 June

1942 and Safford memorandum, 14 February 1946.) 

12. Ibid. 

13. Colonel Spencer B. Akin and Commander Laurance

F. Safford, memorandum for Chief Signal Officer and the

Director of Naval Communication, Traffic Division, 3

October 1940, History Collection, NSA. 

14. Ibid.

15. Safford memorandum, 14 February 1946. 

16. Redman memorandum, 24 September 1945. 

17. Joseph N. Wenger, Vice Director, NSA, memorandum for Grant Manson, Staff Member, Brownell

Committee, “Draft of Part I of the Brownell Committee

Report,” 27 March 1952, History Collection, NSA, Series

VI.C (TSC); History of the Signal Security Agency, Part

I, 90. 

18. Frederick D. Parker, A New View to Pearl Harbor:

United States Navy Communication Intelligence, 1924-

1941, United States Cryptologic History Series, (NSA,

1988), Series IV, World War 11. Vol. II, 53-55,1988 (s). 

19. Captain John R. Redman, memorandum for Captain

Joseph N. Wenger, (OP-20-G), “Army-Navy Agreement

Concerning Allocation of Diplomatic Traffic,” 9 February

1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No.

4614, CBIB 38, NSA(TS). 

20. Ibid. 

21. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942. 

22. Safford memorandum, 25 July 1940. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942; and Joseph

N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-2o-G, “Future

Cooperation between Army and Navy,” 1 June 1943,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 4614,

CBIB 38, NSA(S). 

25. Redman memorandum, 25 June 1942. 

26. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-20-G,

“Future Cooperation between Army and Navy,” 1 June

1943, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No.
Page 106

4614, CBIB 38, NSA (S); and History of Signal Security

Agency, World War 11, 93. 

27. Report of the Army-Navy-FBI Allocation Committee,

“Report of Conference Appointed to Study Allocation of

Cryptanalysis,” 30 June 1942, Cryptologic: Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 4614, CBIB 38, NSA (s).

(Hereafter cited as Report of Allocation Committee, 30

June 1942.) 

28. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and

George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, memorandum for the

President, 6 July 1942, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 4609, CBlB 38, NSA(S). 

29. Franklin D. Roosevelt, memorandum for the

Director of the Budget. 8 July 1942, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38, NSA(S)

30. Redman memorandum, 25 September 1945.

31. Report of Allocation Committee, 30 June 1942. A

summary of the committee’s allocation for cryptanalyis

follows: 

Diplomatic: Army 

Enemy Naval Operations: Navy

Enemy Military Operations: Army 

Western Hemisphere Clandestine: FBI-Navy 

International,Clandestine

(other than Western Hemisphere): Navy 

Trade Codes: (To be assigned by 

Committee) 

Army Weather: Army 

Navy Weather: Navy 

Domestic Criminal: FBI

Voice Broadcast: FBI

Cover Text Communications: FBI

Miscellaneous: (To be assigned by 

Committee)

32. Report of Allocation Committee, 30 June 1942. 

33. History of Signal Security Agency, Vol. I,Part 1, 121. 

34. Ibid. 

35. The NAVSECGRU Bulletin, Vol III, Number 2,

March-April 1969 History Collection, NSA. Series XII.H

(U).

36. OP-20-G “Outline of the Collaboration in

Cryptanalysis Between the Army and the Navy,” 18

August 1944, 7, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 4609, CBIB 38. (Hereafter cited as

Outline of Collaboration by Army and Navy, August

1944.) 

37. Outline of Collaboration by Army and Navy, August

1944, 8 (TS). 

38. George C. Marshall and Ernest J. King, “Joint ArmyNavy Agreement for the Exchange of Communications

Intelligence” 4 February 1944, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 2465, CBIB 14, NSA (S).

(Hereafter cited as Joint Army-Navy Agreement, 4

February 1944.) 

39. SRH-200, OP-20-G File on Army-Navy

Collaboration, 1831-1945, Part 2, 7, Special Research

History (SRH) 200; Record Group 457, National

Archives. (Hereafter cited as RG-457, NSA.) 

40. Briefing by Brigadier General Woodbury M. Burgess,

USA, Assistant Director for Production, February 1957,

File: Robertson Committee Background, History

Collection NSA, Series VI.C (8). 

41. History of the Signal Security Agency, “The

Japanese Army Problem - Cryptanalysis,” 13 May 1947,

Vol. 3, 24.

42. Henry F. Schorreck. The Role of COMINT in the

Battle of Midway, SRH 230, 00-457.

43. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State

and the SecDef, 13 June 1952, 22-29. History Collection.

NSA, Series V.F (TSC). 

44. Admiral Joseph R. Redman, OP-20, memorandum

for Admiral Edwards, “Formalization of Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee

(ANCICC)–Need for,” 18 January 1940, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463, CBIB 14,

NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Formalization of ANOCC,

18 January 1945.) 

45. Joseph N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for OP20 via F20, Liaison,” 16 July 1945, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 7779, CBQM 36, NSA (U). 

46. Dennis DeBrandt, “Structuring Intelligence For

War,” CIA Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 32, No.1, Spring

1988, 43-56 (U). 

47. James S. Lay, CIA, draft manuscript, undated, entitled “History of USCIB,” Vol I, 3, History Collection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (8). (Hereafter cited as Lay

Report.) 

48. Ibid. 

49. During this period, intelligence requirements were

generally handled on a service-to-service basis. For
Page 107

example, the military consumers would originate their

intelligence requirements and forward them to the

respective COMINT organizations for satisfaction.

Following the establishment of USCIB, and the passage

of the National Security Act of 1947, minor procedural

changes in the process started to take place in the postwar years. The first major effort to change the requirements process occurred in the mid-1960s with the establishment of the Intelligence Guidance for COMINT

Programming (IGCP). Further changes took place in the

mid-1970s when the intelligence community established

a National SIGINT Requirements System (NSRS) that

superseded the IGCP. 

50. Lay Report, Vol. 1, 5.

51. In 1941 New York lawyer William J. Donovan was

appointed Coordinator of Information (COI) by

President Roosevelt. In 1942 this organization was

redesignated the Office of Strategic Services and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its

mission was to collect and analyze strategic information

as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct

special operations not assigned to other agencies. United

States Government Organization Manual, Summer

1944, 162. See also John Ranelagh, Thc Agency: The

Rise and Decline of thc CIA (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1986). 

52. Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1945. 

53. Ibid. 

54. J0seph N. Wenger, memorandum for the Chairman,

USCIB, Report on the Status and Authority of USCIB,

USCICC, its members and the Coordinator of Joint

Operations,” 7 February 1947, Appendix A, 1,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5061,

CBIB 23, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger Report

to USCIB, 7 February 1947.)

55. Minutes of third meeting of Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee,

19 June 1944, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 2154, CBPC 26, NSA (TSC). 

56; General George C. Marshall, memorandum for

Admiral Ernest King, “Army-Navy Communication 

Intelligence Board–Establishment of,” 9 March 1945,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2463,

CBIB 14, NSA (TS). 

57. Wenger Report to USCIB, 7 February 1947, Annex C1.

58. Wenger Report to USCIB, 7 February 1947, Annex C2.

59. Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1945. 

60. Ibid.

61. ANCIB was primarily structured to serve as a coordinating mechanism for handling the joint plans and operations of the Army and Navy COMINT organizations,

and such other issues as could be resolved amicably.

From the outset, however, ANCIB was intended to function only as a brokering or coordinating organization,

and not as an authoritarian voice. While the COMINT

services accepted ANCIB as a coordinating and negotiating mechanism, they never viewed ANCIB’s charter as

giving it sufficient authority to cut across the command

channels of the Army and Navy whenever disagreements

arose. The heads of the Army Security Agency and the

Navy Supplementary Activity continued to be directly

responsible to their respective military commanders. 

62. Dean Acheson, Henry L. Stimson, and James V.

Forrestal, joint memorandum for President Truman,

“Collaboration with the British in the Communication

Intelligence Field, Continuation and Extension of,”

undated, History Collection, NSA., Series V.A (TSC).

(Hereafter cited as Acheson, Stimson, and Forrestal

memorandum.) 

63. Richard Hough, The Greatest Crusade - Roosevelt,

Churchill, and the Naval Wars (New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc. 1986), 25-27. 

64. History of the Signal Security Agency, Vol. 1, Part I,

144. 

65. Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer, memorandum for OP-20-G, “Cryptanalysis: FBI Activities and

Liaison with the British,” 8 June 1942, History

Collection, NSA Series XII.H. Box No. 47 (S). 

66. Franklin D. Roosevelt., memorandum for General

Marshall, dated 9 July 1942. Text of memorandum is

quoted in History of the Signal Security Agency in

World War II, Vol. 1. Part I, 118. 

67. Ibid. 

68. Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-2, memorandum for Chief of Staff, 9 July 1942.

Text of memorandum is quoted in History of the Signal

Security Agency, Vol. 1, Part I, 110. 

69. Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, USA,

Deputy Chief of Staff’, memorandum for the Chief of

Staff, “ Agreement between British Government Code
Page 108

and Cipher School. and U.S. War Department in regard

to certain Special Intelligence,” 10 June 1943,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2401,

CBTJ 66, NSA(S). 

70. Outline of Collaboration by Army and Navy, August

1944, 44-48. 

71. Formalization of ANCICC, 18 January 1940. 

72. Ibid. 

73. Minutes of 27th meeting of the State-Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee,

13 February 1946, History Collection, NSA. Series XII.H,

Box 37 (TS). 

74. Rear Admiral Hewlett Thebaud, Chairman,ANCIB,

memorandum for General Clayton Bissell, Admiral John

R. Redman, and General W. Preston Corderman,

“British Reply to U.S. Proposal” 15 August 1945,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 7779,

CBQM 36, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as British Reply.)

75. John F. Callahan and Wason G. Campbell,

Secretariat of STANCIB/STANCICC, memorandum for

members of STANCICC, “Establishment of a U.S.

Combined Intelligence Liaison Center in Great Britain,”

3 May 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding, Area,

Accession No. 2156, CBPC 27, NSA(S). 

76. Ibid.

77. Acheson, Stimson, and Forrestal memorandum. 

78. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for Secretaries of

State, War, and Navy, 12 September 1946, History

Collection, NSA. Series V.A (TS). 

79. Minutes of the 22nd meeting of Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee,

16 October 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 2154, CBPG 26, NSA(TSC). 

80. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Senior Member,

ANCIB, memorandum for General Eisenhower and

Admiral King, 13 December 1945. “State Department

Representation on ANCIB-ANCICC,” Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area. Accession No. 5061, CBIB 23,

Annex 0-2, 1, NSA (TSC). 

81. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Senior Member.

ANCIB, memorandum for Alfred McCormack, “State

Department Representation on ANCIB-ANCICC,” 11

December 1945, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 5061, CBIB 23, Annex 0.2, 2, NSA (TS).

Alfred McCormack entered the War Department as special assistant to Henry Stimson, secretary of war in 1942.

He was appointed deputy chief special branch. Military

Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff on

17 June 1942. In 1944 he became director of Intelligence,

Military Service, in charge of providing intelligence for

the Operations and Planning Division and for the command in all theaters of war. On 1 October 1945

McCormack became special assistant to James F.

Byrnes, secretary of state, with the task of organizing an

intelligence unit in that department. He resigned from

State in April 1946. 

Chapter II

1. The Navy provided posthumous recognition of

Admiral Wenger on 7 July 1976, with the dedication of

the Rear Admiral Joseph N. Wenger Naval Cryptologic

Museum. In the dedication ceremony, special note was

made of his “helping to establish the Armed Forces

Security Agency and later serving as Vice Director of its

successor, the National Security Agency.” 

2. Minutes of the 14th meeting of Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee,

9 May 1945, Section III (Army Proposal Regarding

Army-Navy Collaboration), 7-8, Accession No. 2154,

CBPC, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

Captain J.N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for

Captain W.R. Smedberg, III (F-20). “Policy regarding

collaboration between the Army and the Navy in the

Communication Intelligence Field,” 30 May 1945,

Accession No. 5061 N. CBIB 23, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (S). 

3. Minutes of 8th meeting of Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 8

November 1944, Section (Joint American-British

Postwar Agreement), 6-8, Accession No. 2154, CBPC 26,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

4. OP-20-G staff study, “Outline of the Collaboration in

Cryptanalysis between the Army and Navy,” 18 August

1944, Part VII (Discussions prior to 1944), 55-69,

Accession No, 2468, CBIB 15, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

5. Ibid., 58. 

6. George C. Marshall, memorandum to Admiral King,

“Signal Intelligence,” 18 August 1945, Accession No.

5061 N, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TSC). 
Page 109

7. Fleet Admiral ErnestJ. King, memorandum for

General George C. Marshall, “Signal lntelligence,” 20

August 1945, Enclosure B to ANCIB minutes, 21 August

1945, Accession No. 2155, CBPC 27 , Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

8. John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard,

Secretariat, ANCICC, memorandum for the

Subcommittee on Merger Planning (SMP), 30 August

1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

9. John V. Connorton and Robert F. Packard,

Secretariat. ANCICC, memorandum to members of

ANCICC. “Recommendations of SMP concerning a location for the merged Army-Navy C.I. Organization,” 7

September 1945, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area NSA(TS). 

10. Ibid. 

11. Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman, USA,

Acting Chairman, ANCICC, memorandum for ANCIB,

“Merging of Army-Navy Communication Intelligence

Activities,” 26 September 1945, Accession No. 2468,

CBIB 15, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

12. Ibid. 

13. See Documentary Appendix to Part I, History of

AFSA/NSA (Hereafter referred to as Documentary

Appendix for AFSA/NSA) (Enclosure A), History

Collection, NSA, Series V.A.(TS). Copies of all of the letters in the Eisenhower and Nimitz exchange of 1945 concerning merger are included in this file.

14. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, memorandum for

Secretary of the Navy, “The Navy’s lnterest in the

Processing of Intercepted Foreign Communication.” 14

October 1946, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

15. See Documentary Appendix A for AFSA/NSA, Item

11. 

16. See Documentary Appendix A for AFSA/NSA, Item

12. 

17. Memorandum, STANCICC to STANCIB,

“Coordination of the Army and Navy Conmunication

Intelligence Activities,” 15 February 1946 (Incl. A of minutes of STANCIB-STANCICC joint meeting, 15 February

1946), History Collection, NSA. Series XII.H. Box 36

(TSC).

18. Ibid. 

19. Joseph N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for

Captain W.K. Smedberg, III, (F-20), “Policy regarding

collaboration between the Army and Navy in the

Communication Intelligence Field,” 30 May 1945,

Accession No. 506lN, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

20. Minutes of 27th meeting of the State-Army-Navy

Communications Intelligence Coordinating

Committee,13 February 1948, History Collection, NSA.

Serial XII.H, Box 37 (TS). 

21. Minutes of joint meeting of the State-Army-Navy

Communication Intelligence Board and the State-ArmyNavy Intelligence Coordinating Committee, 15 February

1946, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 36.

(TSC). 

22. Ibid. 

23. British-United States Communication Intelligence

Agreement, 5 March 1946, History Collection, NSA,

Series XII.H. Box 47 (TSC). 

24. See Wenger Collection in Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area for information and chronology concerning the development of the separate appendices to the

BRUSA Agreement. See Accession No. 9090 and 9091,

CBIB 24. 

25. Colonel W. Preston Corderman and Captain Joseph

N. Wenger, memorandum for STANCIB, “Coordination

of Army and Navy Communication Intelligence

Activities,” 5 April 1946, Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 2468, CBIB 15, NSA (TS). (Hereafter

referred to as Corderman-Wenger Agreement.) The data

for approval, 22 April 1946, is that given in Captain

Wenger’s memorandum to Chairman, UBCIB, “Report

on the status and authority of USCIB-USCICC, its members and the Coordinator of Joint Operations,” 7

February 1947. (Annex A, Item 19). See Accession No.

5061 N, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area. NSA (TS). 

26. Ibid.

27. See Dr. George F. Howe’s “Narrative History of

AFSA/NSA,” Part I, 28-30, History Collection, NSA,

Series V.A. (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Howe’s “History of

AFSA/NSA”). 

28. Minutes of joint STANCIB/STANCICC meeting, 15

February 1946 (Item 3), History Collection, NSA, Series,

XII.H. Box 36 (TS). 

29. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” 28-30.
Page 110

30. E.M. Huddleson, Jr., Director, Special Projects Staff,

Department of State, memoranda for the Coordinator of

Joint Operations, “Communications Intelligence

Priorities,” 24 June and 19 November 1946, Accession

No. 1984, CBPC 27, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TSC). 

31. Corderman-Wenger Agreement.

32. Memorandum for CJO, Subject: Report of Joint

Intercept Control Group for the period 1 April 1946 to 28

February 1947,6 March 1947, from Lieutenant Colonel

Morton A. Rubin, USA. Cryptologic Archival Holding

Area, Accession No. 1379, CBPB 57, NSA (TS). 

33. See enclosure to Corderman-Wenger Agreement of 5

April 1946, entitled “Coordination of the Army and Navy

Communication Intelligence Activities, 15 February

1946,” Accession No. 2468, CBIC 15, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (S). 

34. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director. FBI,

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chairman,

STANCIB, 14 February 1946, included as Annex Q to

memorandum for members of USCICC, 25 August 1945,

Accession No. 5061 N, CBIB 23, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (Restricted). 

35. Copy of memorandum from Lieutenant General

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA, Chairman, STANCIB, to J.

Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI. “FBI Representation on

STANCIB,” 4 June 1946, included as Annex S to memorandum for members of USBCICC, 25 August 1945,

Accession No. 5061, CBIB 23, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (Restricted). 

36. Major General S.J. Chamberlin, Senior Member,

USCIB, memorandum for Lieutenant General Hoyt S. 

Vandenberg, DCI, “Central Intelligence Group

Representation on USCIB,” 3 July 1946. For text of

memorandum see J.N. Wenger memorandum for the

Chairman, USCIB, “Report on Status and Authority of

USCIB-USCICC.” 7 February 1947, Annex U, Accession

No. 5061, CBSB 23, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TS). 

37. See Accession Nos. 1984 and 1377, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA, for a great variety of correspondence concerning the intelligence requirements of

the civilian members of USCIB. These requirements are

originated by the Department of State, CIA, and the FBI,

and are addressed to the intelligence and priorities committees of USCIB and the CJO. 

38. J.N. Wenger, memorandum for CJO, “Priority

Problems,” 24 October 1946, Accession No. 1984, CBSC

27, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). See

also minutes of 34th meeting of USCICC (Item 3), 9

October 1946, History Collection. NSA, Series XII.H.

Box 37 (TSC). 

39. Grant Manson, State Department Member Of USCIB

Intelligence Committee, “State Department Proposals

for Modification of Requirements Expression,” 25

February 1949, Accession No. 7674, CBSC 72,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

40. George F. Howe Historical Study of COMINT under

the Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949, 164-65, History

Collection, NSA, Series V.E (TSC). 

41. Ibid. 

42. Minutes of 30th meeting USCIB, 27 April 1948, with

enclosure (UBCIB: 5/36, 9 April 1948), History

Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 37 (TSC). 

43. Historical Study, Joint Operating Plan, 165.

44. Ibid., 164. 

Chapter III

1. One year later, further changes took place at the

national level, which primarily involved the military

services and the defense establishment. Congress, in

August 1949, amended the National Security Act converting the National Military Establishment into the

Department of Defense, and making it a cabinet-level

agency. By this time, there was a new secretary of

defense, Louis A. Johnson. The new act made the three

military services subordinate departments within the

new Department of Defense structure. At the same time,

Johnson acquired unqualified authority and control over

the entire organization and became the “principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the

Department of Defense.” Steven L. Rearden, The History

of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative

Years, 1947-1950, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Historical

Office, Office of the SecDef, 1984), 53-60. (Hereafter

cited as Rearden, The Formative Years.) 

2. United States Communications lntelligence Board,

Organizational Bulletin No. II, 31 July 1946, 8, History

Collection. NSA., Series XII.H. Box 34 (TS). (Hereafter

cited as USCIB Organizational Bulletin.) 

3. Ibid., 6-7. 
Page 111

4. Ibid. 

5. Ibid. 

6. On 10 March 1945 General George C. Marshall, and

Admiral Ernest J. King co-signed a Joint Memorandum

to the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2) and the

Commanding General, Signal Security Agency and the

Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval

Communications, which formally established the ArmyNavy Communications Intelligence Board. For the text

of memorandum see the USCIB Organizational Bulletin,

2-3. 

7. The term ULTRA is generally used to refer to the

British exploitation of German messages encrypted on

the Enigma machine. The term MAGIC refers broadly to

the work of the United States in reading high-level diplomatic communications of the Japanese in the Pacific

Theater, primarily on the Purple machine. 

8. See Rearden, The Formative Years, 141.

9. Lay Report. 

10. Thomas F. Troy. Donovan and the CIA: A History of

the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency

(Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of

Intelligence, 1981), 305-40. (Hereafter cited as Troy,

History of CIA) 

11. See Troy, History of CIA, 464, for the text of Truman

memorandum to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. 

12. Ibid., 351. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

15. See Rearden, The Formative Years, 23-27. 

16. Ibid., 24-27. 

17. Ibid. 

18. For the text of Truman memorandum establishing

the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), see Troy, History

of CIA, 464. 

19. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” Part 1, 143. 

20. Minutes of the 21st and 22d meetings of USCIB, 4

and 19 November 1947, History Collection, NSA, Series

XII.H. Box 36 (TS). 

21. See minutes of 25th and 27th meetings of the United

States Communication Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (USCICC), 17 February 1946 and 23 October

1946, 4-5 and 3-6, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H.

Box 36 (TS). 

22. Starting with its 21st meeting on 4 November 1947,

USCIB discussed the question of ‘“control” authorities

over USCIB during many meetings. (Hereafter cited as

minutes of 21st Meeting of USCIB.) In particular, see

minutes for the 25th meeting of USCIB, 19 December

1947, History Collection, NSA, Series XIL.H. Box 36

(TSC). 

23. See minutes of 21st meeting of USCIB. 

24. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the

Secretary for Research and Intelligence, memorandum

to all the members of USCIB. “Amended Draft of NSCID

Establishing USCIB,” 7 June 1948, History Collection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (c). (Hereafter cited as

Armstrong memorandum, 7 June 1948). 

25. Minutes of 26th, 27th, and 28th meeting of USCIB, 6,

20 January 1948 and 3 February 1948, History

Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38 (TS). 

26. Lay Report, 32-34. See also minutes of 28th meeting

of USCIB, 3 February 1948. 

27. See minutes of 26th meeting of USCIB, 6 January

1948. 

28. Ibid. 

29. See minutes of 28th meeting of USCIB, 3 February

1948. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Forrestal memorandum for Secretaries of Army,

Navy and Air Force, 13 February 1948, Spint File, CIA

Archives, Langley, USCIB Charter (TS). 

33. Grant Manson, State Department Liaison Officer,

memorandum to Park Armstrong, Special Assistant.

State Department, 3 March 1948, History Collection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (S) 

34. lbid. 

35. Grant Manson, State Department Liaison Officer,

memorandum for the record, “Current Developments on

the Charter,” 23 March 1948, History Collection, NSA,

Series XII.H. Box 47 (TS). 

36. R. H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum to

Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Chairman, USCIB,

22 March 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H.

Box 47 (S). 

37. Lay Report, 34-35. 

38. Lay Report, 34-36. 

39. See minutes of 31st meeting of USCIB, 13 May 1948. 

40. See Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA” for an excellent

account of this entire sequence concerning the USCIB

charter. In particular, see 122-29. 
Page 112

41. See Armstrong memorandum, 7 June 1948. The

enclosure to the basic memorandum summarizes the for

issues between CIA and other members of USCIB concerning the charter controversy. 

42. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” 126-28. 

43. Grant Manson, memorandum, “Various Views

Concerning Developments on the Charter,” 25 March

1948, History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 47 (TS). 

44. See Armstrong memorandum of 7 June 1948. 

45. C. T.R. Adams and J.E. Fitzpatrick, Ad Hoc

Secretariat, memorandum for the DCI, “Action agreed

upon at the time of the Ad Hoc meeting of the IAC held

at 1410 on 11 June 1948,” History Collection, NSA, Series

XII.H. Box 34 (C). Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter,

DCI, memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council, “Proposed NSC Intelligence

Directive, Communication Intelligence,” 11 June 1948,

History Collection, NSA, Series XII .H. Box 34 (S). 

46. NSCID No.9, “Communications Intelligence,” July

1948, History Collection, NSA, Series V.A. (C). 

Chapter IV

1. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” Part I, 1-26. 

2. Joseph N. Wenger, USN, memorandum for Director,

AFSA, “Consolidation of CSA and ASA.” 12 July 1949,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791,

CBPI 48, NSA (TS). 

3. Interview of Stuart MacClintock, 25 February 1986, by

Robert D. Farley, OH-05-88, Center for Cryptologic

History, NSA (S). 

4. Joseph N. Wenger, OP-20-G, memorandum for Civil

Service Board, Staff and OINC NEGAT, Authority of

Civil Service Appointees,” 24 April 1946, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48,

NSA (TS). 

5. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum for OP-20, “Civil

Service,” 18 December 1945, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 3791, CBPI 48, NSA (TS). 

6. Woodbury M. Burgess, USAF, “Briefing of Robertson

Committee,” 1957, History Collection, NSA, Series VI.C. 

7. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, memorandum for James V. Forrestal, “United Armed Forces

Security Agency,” 24 July 1948. Accession No. 2459,

CBID 14, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (U). 

8. Report of the Joint Committee of the Investigation of

the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, 1946, 253, NSA

Cryptologic Collection, NSA (U). 

9. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” Part I, 144-46.

10. Rearden, The Formative Years, 53-56. 

11. James V. Forrestal, memorandum to Secretaries of

the Army, Navy, and Air Force, “Terms of Reference for

the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed

Forces Security Agency ,” 19 August 1948, History

Collection, NSA, Series VII. Box 4 (S) (Hereafter cited as

Forrestal Letter.) 

12. Ibid. 

13. Minutes of the 1st meeting of the Committee on the

Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency, 7

September 1948, History Collection, NSA, Series V.F

(TS). 

14. Forrestal Letter. 

15. Earl E. Stone, memorandum for SecDef, “Committee

on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security

Agency–Report of,” 30 December 1948, Historical

Collection, NSA, Series V.F (TS). (Hereafter cited as

Stone Board Report). 

16. Ibid., (Tab D–Army View). 

17 .Ibid., 6. 

18. Ibid., 6. 

19. Ibid., 5. 

20. Ibid., (Part A), 9. 

21. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949

(USCIB 25/1), “Establishment of Armed Forces Security

Agency “ History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 37

(TSC). (Hereafter cited as 41st meeting of USCIB.) 

22. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, memorandum for

SeeDef, “Report of the Committee on the Creation of a

Unified Armed Forces Security Agency,” 14 January

1949, History Collection, NSA, Serisa XII.H. Box 38

(TSC). 

23. 41st meeting of USCIB, and Howe’s “History of

AFSA/NSA,” 155. 

24. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State

and SecDef, 13 June 1952, p. 21, History Collection, NSA,

Seriea V.F (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Brownell Report.) 

25. Minutes of 13th meeting of AFSAC, 28 April 1960,

(AFSAC 25/74), 14-15, History Collection, NSA, Series

XII.A (TS). 

26. George F. Howe, “The Early History of NSA,”

Cryptologic Spectrum, (Spring 1974), 11-17. 
Page 113

27. Howe’s History of AFSA/NSA, 158-59. 

28. Rearden, The Formative Years, 410-22. 

29. Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Ret.), “The Admiral’s

Revolt,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February

1986). 

30. Interview of Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, 3

May 1983, by Robert D. Farley, OH-03-83, History

Collection, NSA. (Hereafter cited as Carter Clarke interview.) 

31. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” 59. 

32. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, “Organization of Cryptologic Activities within the

National Military Establishment,” 20 May 1949,

Accession No. 6490, CBIB 44, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area (TS). (Hereafter cited as Johnson Directive

Establishing AFSA)

33. Louis Johnson, letter to Secretary of State, 20 May

1949, Accession No. 6490, CBIB 44, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

34. Johnson Directive establishing AFSA. 

35. 41st meeting of USCIB. 

36. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” 165-66. 

37. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB. 

38. Johnson Directive establishing AFSA. 

39. JCS 2010/6, Charter for Armed Forces

Communication. Intelligence Advisory Council, 28 July

1949, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No.

1404, CBSD 11, NSA.(TS). (Hereafter cited as JCS

2010/6.) 

40. JCS 2010/12, Change in title of “Armed Forces

Comunications Intelligence Advisory Council,”

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404,

CBDD 11, NSA (TS). 

41. While Stone reported as Director on 15 July 1949, the

earlier date of Johnson’s Directive, 20 May 1949, is generally cited as the date for the establishment of AFSA. 

42. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” Part II, 3-6.

43. Ibid. 

44. AFSAC 25/29, Progress Report as of 30 January

1950 by Director, AFSA, to AFSAC, 27 January 1950,

Accession No. 5253, CBSB 71, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area. NSA (TS) and Howe’s “History of

AFSA/NSA,” Part II, 15-45. Howe’s “History of

AFSA/NSA,” Part II, 15. 

46. Ibid. Part II, 40. 

47. Travis M. Hetherington, Chief Plans and Policy

Divisions, memorandam for General Canine,

“Establishment of a USCIB Coordinator’s Group,” 13

May 1952, with enclosure,. 3-4 of enclosure, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2960, CBSB 33,

NSA (TS). 

48. Ibid. 

49. Earl Stone, memorandum for members of AFSAC,

Progress Reports of 30 January 1950,” 27 January 1950,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 5253,

NSA (TS). 

50. Johnson Directive establishing AFSA. 

51. AFSA/Air Force Agreement on Task Assignment to

AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites, 22 September 1950

(AFSAC: 60/24), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 4820, CBSB 57, NSA (TS). 

52. Joseph N. Wenger, memorandum to George F.

Howe, NSA Historian. Comments on Historical Study,

25 May 1960, Part D, XII, History Collection, NSA,

Series VI.D (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger, comments

on AFSA/NSA History.) 

53. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” 78-30, 92-94. 

54. JCS 2010/23, “Division of Responsibility between

Armed Forces Security Agency and the Military

Services,” 18 November 1950,Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, NSA.(TS). 

55. Ibid. 

56. During 1949 and 1950, CIA and State continually

stressed the issue of their lack of an authoritative role in

USCIB activities. In particular, see minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949, 2-8, History Collection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Box 34 (TS). 

57. Louis W. Tordella, “Presentation to Eachus Study

Group,” 10 September 1968, 12, History Collection, NSA,

Series VI.D (TSC). 

58. Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Assistant Chief or Staff, G-2, Director of

Naval Intelligence, Director of Intelligence, USAF,

“F0rmulation of Special Intelligence Requirements,” 18

August 1950, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 39058, NSA. (TS). 

59. JCS 2010/28, “Succession of Directors, Armed

Forces Security Agency,” 17 February 1951, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11,

NSA. (TS). 
Page 114

60. Ibid., and Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA”, Part II,

137. 

61. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” Part II, 137-38. 

62. Interview of Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, 9 February

1983, by Robert D. Farley, OH-03-83, Center for

Cryptologic History, NSA and Wenger, comments

AFSA/NSA History, Center for Cryptoogic History, NSA. 

63. Carter Clarke interview. 

64. Major General Ralph J. Canine, Director, NSA,

Presentation to Agency seniors at Arlington Hall Station,

25 November 1952, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 4918, CBNB 61, NSA (TS). 

Chapter V

1. See minutes for 48th meeting of USCIB, concerning

CONSIDO, 13 January 1950. Accession No. 6490 (Folder

#2), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). 

2. Howe’s “History of AFSA/NSA,” Part II, 126-29. 

3. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, “Maximum Exploitation of COMINT,” 19 May

1949, with enclosure, Accession No. 6491, CBIB 45,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

(Hereafter cited as Johnson Memorandum, 19 May

1949, concerning CONSIDO.) 

4. Ibid. 

5. Major General S. Leroy Irwin, USA, Director of

Intelligence, memorandum for Joint Intelligence

Committee, “Conference with General McNarney on

Draft. CONSIDO Paper,” 20 October 1949, Accession

No. 6491, CBIB 45, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TS). 

6. Johnson memorandum, 19 May 1949, concerning

CONSIDO. 

7. USCIB 26/1, Item 7 of the Agenda for 47th meeting of

USCIB, 2 December 1949, “Presentation of Draft CONSIDO Paper,” Accession No. 6490 (Folder 12), CBIB 45,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

8. USCIB 26/4 Item 2, Section I, of the Agenda for the

48th meeting of USCIB, held 13 January 1950, “Draft

Proposal on the Establishment of CONSIDO,” Accession

No. 6490 (Folder #1), CBIB 44, CBIB, History

Collection, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as USCIB 26/4,

13 January 1950.) 

9. USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950. 

10. Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter, USN, DCI, memorandum for USCIB Members, 12 January 1950,

Accession No. 6491, CBIB 45, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area. NSA. (TSC). 

11. USCIB 26/4, 13 January 1950. 

12. Ibid. 

13. USCIB 26/7, Item 2 of the Agenda for the 49th meeting of USCIB, held on 16 March 1950, “Draft Proposal on

Establishment of CONSIDO,” History Collection, NSA,

Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TSC). 

14. USCIB 26/13, Item 2 of the Agenda for the 53rd

meeting of USCIB, held on 14 July 1950, “Draft Proposal

on Establishment of CONSIDO,” History Collection,

NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1 (TS.) 

15. See minutes of 30th meeting of USCIB, 27 April 1948,

2-7, w/encl (memorandum for Rear Admiral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence, for

Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin. Rear Admiral T .B.

Inglis, and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, dated 21 April

1948. History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H, Box 38.1

(TSC)

16. Charles P. Collins, CIA, Chairman, USCIB

Intelligence Committee, memorandum to Coordinator

of Joint Operations, “Recurrent lntelligence

Requirements List No. 3.” 15 May 1950, Accession No.

1378, CBPS 57, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA

(TSC). 

17. Ibid. 

18. Captain Mason, Chief of Office Operations, teletype

message for Captain Wenger, V/DIR, undated, but

apparently originated soon after the start of the Korean

War. During this period, there existed a teletype circuit

(known as “pony” circuit) between the Office of

Operations at Arlington Hall Station and the AFSA

Directorate at Naval Security Station. The circuit was

used primarily for exchange of operational communication between AFSA officials. Copy of message is in

Wenger Collection. See Accession No. 9139, CBIB 26,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC).

(Hereafter cited as Mason to Wenger Message.) 

19. The U.S. COMINT Effort During the Korean Conflict,

June 1950 - August 1963, unpublished manusript, 8

January 1954), 1-2, History Collection, NSA, Series V.M

(TSC). (Hereafter Korea.) 

20. Ibid., 2.

21. Ibid., 3. 
Page 115

22. Mason to Wenger Message.

23. Korea, 2-3. 

24. Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Director of

Naval Intelligence, Director of lntelligence, USAF,

“Formulation of Special lntelligence Requirements,” 18

August 1950, Accession No. 39058A, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). See also responses

from Army, Navy, and Air Force as promulgated by

AFSAC 6O/25, Accession No. 39058A, NSA (TS). 

25. Korea, 33-34, 57-58. 

26. Louis Johnson, memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, “Organization of Cryptologic Activities within the

National Military Establishment,” 20 May 1949,

Accession No. 1404, CBDD 11, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

27. Brigadier General W.N. Gilmore, Chief, ASA, memorandum for Major General Bolling, Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-2, “Korean lntercept Effort Prior to the Outbreak

of Korean Hostilities,” 5 October 1950, Accession No.

9139, CBIB 26, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA

(TSC). 

28. AFSAC 60/26: Report by the Director, AFSA, to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, via the Armed Forces Security

Agency Council, “Division of Responsibility Between

AFSA and the Services,” 18 September 1950, Accession

No. 5864 (Folder #3), CBIB, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

29. Ibid. See also Joint memorandum from Rear

Admiral Felix Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,

Rear Admiral John R. Redman, Director of Naval

Communications, and Captain L.S. Howeth, Head

Security Branch, Naval Communications, for Chairman,

Armed Forces Security Agency Council, “Comments on

AFSAC 60/26,” 27 October 1950, Accession No. 5864

(Folder #3), CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TS). 

30. Stone wrote these informal remarks on the Army’s

response to AFSAC 60/30, 19 October 1950, Accession

No. 9092, CBIB 24, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TS). 

31. AFSAC 60/30, 19 October 1950: Major General C.P.

Cabell, Director of lntelligence, USA, memorandum for

Chairman, AFSAC, “Report by DIRAFSA, AFSAC

60/26,” Accession No. 5864 (Folder #3), CBIB 31,

Wenger Collection, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TS). 

32. AFSAC 60/33, 24 October 1950: Major General

Alexander R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 memorandum for Chairman, AFSAC, “Comments on AFSAC

60/26,” Accession No. 9092, CBIB 24, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

33. Memorandum for the Record by Captain Joseph N.

Wenger, Deputy Director, AFSA, “Comments on AFSAC

60/26,” November 1960, Accession No. 5864, (Folder

#3) CBIB 31, Wenger Collection, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

34. Captain Joseph N. Wenger, USN, Deputy Director,

AFSA, memorandum for Director, AFSA, “Army

Comments on AFSAC 60/26,” 26 October 1950,

Accession No. 5864, CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). (Hereafter cited as Wenger

memorandum, 26 October 1950). 

35. Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950. See also

memorandum from Captain Rufus L. Taylor, OP-32,

“Comments on JCS 2010/24,” 15 January 1951,

Accession No. 5864, CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

36. Wenger memorandum, 26 October 1950. 

37. Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for Major General Alexander R. Bolling, USA,

“AFSAC 60/26,” 1 November 1950, Accession No. 9092,

CBIB 31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

38. AFSAC 60/42: Admiral Earl E. Stone, Director,

AFSA, memorandum for Members of AFSAC, “Division

of Responsibility Between AFSA and the Military

Services,” 24 November 1950, Accession No. 6864, CBIB

31, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS).

39. Minutes of 53rd meeting of USCIB, 14 July 1950, 6-

11 (USCIB 77/4: Selective Intelligence Mobilization),

History Collection, NSA. Series XII.H. Box 36.1 (TS). 

40. Consumer Liaison Units, 1949-1957, April 1957, 7-

10. Accession No. 10684, CBRI 52, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Consumer

Liaison)

41. Ibid., 2-11 

42.Ibid., 3-11.

43. Colonel Roy H. Lynn, memorandum for Coordinator

of Joint Operations, “Scheduling of USCIB Committee

Meetings,” 2 May 1949, Accession No. 1426, CBPB 63,

Cryptologic Archival Ho1ding Area NSA (S). Colonel
Page 116

David Wade, USAF, Vice Commander, memorandum for

CJO, “Transmission of Classified Material to this

Headquarters,” 9 May 1949, Accession No. 1426, CBPB

83, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (S). 

44. Consumer Liaison, 19-23. 

45. Ibid. 

46. Within the State Department, the Special Projects

Staff (SPS) became responsible for the receipt and dissemination of COMINT. In May 1947, Robert F. Packard

served as the first COMINT liaison officer for the SPS,

which was then located at the Pentagon. See Consumer

Liaison, 33-34. 

47. Minutes of 53rd meeting of USCIB, 14 July 1960, 6-

11, (USCIB 77/4.: Selective Mobilization), History

Collection, NSA, Series XII.H, Box 38.1 (TS). 

48. T. Achilles Polyzoides, Director, Special Projects

Staff, Department of Stete, memorandum for Director,

AFSA, “Establishment of a Department of State (Special

Projects Staff) Liaison Unit at AFSA 02,” 25 June 1951,

History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H (TS). Admiral

Stone, Director, AFSA, memorandum for the Special

Assistant, Department of State, ‘“Establishment of a

Department of State (Special Project. Staff) Liaison Unit

at AFSA 02,” 5 July 1951, History Collection, NSA, Series

XIl.H (TS). 

49. See minutes of 30th meeting of USCIB, 27 April

1948, 2-7, w/encl (memorandum for Rear Admiral

Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director, Central Intelligence,

for Lieutenant General S.J. Chamberlin, Rear Admiral

T.D. Inglis, and Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, dated 21

April 1948. History Collection, NSA Series XII.H, Box 38

(TSC). 

50. Ibid.

51. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949

(USCIB 25/1) “Establishment of Armed Forces Security

Agency,” History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1

(TSC) 

52. AFSA/Air Force Agreement on Task Assignments to

AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites, 22 September 1950

(AFSAC 60/24), Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

Accession No. 4820, CBSB 57, NSA (TS). Wenger

“Comments on Historical Study.” 

53. Major General Charles A. Willoughby, G-2, Far East

Command. message dated 12/1908Z March 1951,

addressed to ACSI, Washington, Accession No. 9139,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TS). Captain

J.S. Holtwick, USN, Chief, Office of Operations, memorandum for B.K. Buffham and H. Conley, “Visit to FEC,”

12 March 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (9). Major General Charles A.

Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East

Command, memorandum for Herbert Conley and

Benson K. Buffham, 15 March 1951, Accession No. 9139,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC). Report

of Tour of Far East Command, by B.K. Buffham and H.L.

Conley, 4 April 1951, Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic

Archival Holding Area, NSA (TSC), 

54. Brownell Committee, Report to the Secretary of State

and SecDef, 13 June 1952. 62, History Collection, NSA,

Series V.F . (TSC). (Hereafter cited as Brownell Report.) 

55. Ibid. See also Captain Redfield Mason, Chief, AFSA

02, memorandum for Commanding General, ASA,

“Korean Linguists for ASAPAC,” 1 August 1950,

Accession No. 9139, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area,

NSA (TSC). 

56. These improvements are generally attributed to the

intervention of Soviet advisors who became alarmed

over the communications procedures of the North

Koreans. See Richard Chun, “A Bit on the Korean

COMINT Effort,” (unpublished manuscript, 1971), 3,

History Collection, NSA, Series V.M. (TSC). 

57. Robert E. Drake, “The COMINT Role in the Korean

War,” (unpublished manuscript, Circa 1954), 6, History

Collection, NSA, Series V.M (TSC). 

58. Louis W. Tordella, “Presentation to Eachus Study

Group,” 10 September 1968, 12, History Collection, NSA,

Series VLD (TSC). 

58. The minutes of the USCIB meetings from 1949-1950

provide evidence of the beginning of a gradual change in

the attitude of the CIA representatives. DCI

Hillenkoetter, who served as the third DCI from 1 May

1947-7 October 1950, became more assertive in his

efforts to carve out a greater role for CIA in the national

intelligence process. In particular, see USCIB 26/4, 13

January 1950. See also the minutes of the 41st meeting of

USCIB, concerning the establishment of AFSA, 17 June

1949. History Collection, NSA, Series XII.H. Box 38.1

(TSC). (Hereafter cited as minutes of 41st meeting of

USCIB, 17 June 1949.) 
Page 117

Chapter VI

1. During the USCIB meetings of 1949 and 1950, CIA and

State continually raised the issues of their lack of an

authoritative voice in guiding the activities of AFSA. In

particular, see the minutes of the 41st meeting of USCIB,

17 June 1949, 2-8, History Collection, NSA, Series X.II.H

(TS). (Hereafter cited as minutes of 41st meeting of

USCIB, 17 June 1949.) 

2. In later years, a portion of the CONSIDO concept was

resurrected anew and implemented by the SIGINT

Policy Board. Twenty-five years after the disapproval of

the CONSIDO Proposal, the National Foreign

Intelligence Board established the National SIGINT

Requirements System (NSRS) as a community requirements mechanism in 1975. 

3. Minutes of 41st meeting of USCIB, 17 June 1949. 

4. The standing requirement for a unanimous vote on

major decisions had prevailed in USCIB for a number of

years. Consequently, it became very difficult for the representatives of CIA and State to win support for a favorable decision in USCIB on controversial issues, particularly when they sought to acquire an enhanced role in

influencing the AFSA intelligence process. See NSCID

No. 9, “Communications Intelligence,” 1 July 1948,

History Collection, NSA, Series V.A. (TS). 

5. John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of

the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986, 102-

11 and Rearden, The Formative Years, 20-27. 

6. Lawrence K. White on the Directors. Oral History

Interview by Dino Brugioni and Urban Linehan, Studies

in lntelligence (CIA), Winter 1987. Vol. 31, No.4. 1-6. 

7. Walter B. Smith, DCI, memorandum for Executive

Secretary. National Security Council, “Proposed Survey

of Communications Intelligence Activities,” 10

December 1951 (CIA Archives) (TSC). 

8. Robert A. Lovett and Dean G. Acheson letter to

Brownell, Bohlen, Magruder and Jackson, 28 December

1951 (Exhibit A in Brownell Report). History Collection,

NSA, Series V.F (TSC). 

9. Ibid. 

10. Lieutenant General Ralph J. Canine, “Memorandum

for the Record,” 7 February 1952, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area. Accession No. 6009, CBSD 75. NSA.(S). 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Brownell Report, 62. 

14. Ibid., 50. 

15. Ibid., 6. 

16. Ibid., 134. 

17. Ibid., 6, 121-28. 

18. Ibid., 121-28. 

19. Ibid., 7 of cover letter. 

20. Ibid., 124-28. 

21. Ibid., 129-34.

22. Ibid., 131-34.

23. Ibid., 53-56. 

24. Ibid. 

25. Ralph J. Canine, Director, AFSA, memorandum for

SecDef, “Brownell Committee Report,” 8 July 1952.

Cryptologic Archive Holding Area, Accession No. 5741 N,

CBSC 33, NSA (TS). 

26. Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral J.N.

Wenger, Deputy Director for Intelligence, AFSA, “Draft

of Proposed Presidential Directive for Organizing the

COMINT Activities of the U.S.,” 14 October 1952,

Accession No. 5741 N, CBSC 33. Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA (TS). 

27. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense, 24 October 1952.

History Collection. NSA, Serial V.A (TS). 

28. National Security Council Intelligence Directive

No.9, Revised, Communications Intelligence, 24

October 1952, Cryptologic Archival Holding Area.

Accession Number 14842, CBBD 76, NSA (TS). 

29. Ibid. 

30. Harry S. Truman, memorandum for the Secretary of

State and the SecDef, “Communications Security (COMSEC) Matters,” History Collection, NSA, Series V.A (TS). 

31. Robert A. Lovett, SecDef, memorandum. for the

Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Director,

National Security Agency, “Interim Implementation of

NSCID No.9,” Revised 4 November 1952, History

Collection. NSA, Series V.A (TS). 

32. Ibid. 

33. Lieutenant General C.D. Cabell, Director Joint Staff,

memorandum for General Bradley, General

Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Fechteler,

“National Security Agency,” 9 February 1963,

Cryptologic Archival Holding Area, Accession No. 2466,

CBIB 15, NSA (S). 

34. Ibid. 
Page 118

35. Almost four decades later, the national directives

unequivocally identify NSA as the central authority in

the field of U.S. cryptology. NSCID No. 6, issued in

February 1972 charges the director with “full control”

over all SIGINT collection and processing activities,

which now include COMINT and electronic intelligence

(ELINT) processing. But, as in 1952, there still exist a

number of grey areas between NSA and the services,

mainly because of charter limitations and exceptions to

the authority of NSA. Moreover, national directives also

provide for the delegation of SIGINT authorities, as necessary, to the military services for conducting a number

of direct support activities, including tactical ELINT

operations. While considerable progress has been made

in pulling together U.S. SIGINT activities into the semblance of a single system, divided control still exists. 
Page 119

Notes on Sources 

Most of the documents used in the preparation of this

history are in the holdings of the NSA/CSS Records

Center and Archives and the Center for Cryptologic

History. A diverse number of sources originated these

holdings, which reflect a broad range of departmental,

national, and operational relationships extending over

this period of cryptologic history. The NSA/CSS Records

Center and Archives holds three basic groups of resource

materials: the stored records that are held for a 

temporary period pending a disposition review by the

owning organization; the retired records that are 

undergoing an appraisal to determine their archival

value; and the accessioned records that are filed as 

permanent Agency records in the Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area (CAHA), or Archives. The Agency’s 

Center for Cryptologic History maintains its own

research collections. 

Among Agency records, two separately organized collections deserve special mention. These are the accessioned

records of the Archives and the special collections maintained by the Center for Cryptologic History. For the

researcher, there is very little distinction between the

kind of records in the Archives and those maintained in

the Center for Cryptologic History. There are major distinctions, however, in the method of organization and

arrangement of the documents for retrieval purposes –

and in the continuity accorded historical themes. These

differences in organization stem mainly from basic differences in the approach to records keeping as well as

factors associated with the organizational evolution of

each organization. In the course of developing into

today’s structures, each organization underwent a different sequence of growth, and each developed its own

operating concepts and methodology. 

Starting with the AFSA period and extending into the

NSA years, the Office of the Adjutant General (AG)

served as the first administrator of cryptologic records.

During the early 1950s the AG established the beginnings of the Agency’s records management program and

directed the creation of a Records Repository for the

retention of vital records. These early rudimentary

actions safeguarded from destruction massive holdings

acquired from the World War II era as well as other

essential records associated with the establishment of

AFSA and NSA. However, as NSA directed its primary

energies toward its operational missions and as organizational changes occurred, the position of Agency officials concerning the priority of non-operational tasks of

this nature became clear. The resource allocation officials consistently demonstrated little enthusiasm for the

program and generally provided only token support in

terms of resources and priorities. 

In responding to its new national role, NSA commenced

a pattern of frequent organizational change that extended from 1952 until the late 1970s. This pattern of recurring institutional change impacted unfavorably on the

direction and emphasis accorded its records management function. During this period of approximately

twenty-five years, the management responsibility for the

task rotated among at least six key components: Office of

the Adjutant General, Office of Administrative Services,

Comptroller, Office of Policy, Office of Management

Services, and Office of Telecommunications. Despite this

cycle of change and the continuance of the strictures on

resources, the records management program achieved

some progress over the years. But, overall, these circumstances clearly affected the quality and scope of the program and impeded its implementation. They also

encouraged the creation of special collections of historians and history-minded technicians. 

As the Agency expanded, the lack of storage facilities

emerged as another major problem in the conduct of the

Agency’s records management program. Until the late

1970s, the Agency resorted to storing its record holdings

at several different locations within the Agency as well as

a number of locations outside NSA’s control. These

external locations included facilities at Crane, Indiana;

Arlington Hall Station; Vint Hill Farms; Torpedo

Station, Alexandria, Virginia; and Fort Holabird,

Baltimore. The dispersal of records represented an 

inefficient method of operation and impacted negatively

on the various steps in the review and disposition cycle.

As a practical matter, however, perhaps the greatest

damage occurred in the retrieval process. The dispersal

of stored, retired, and permanent records not only 

affected the quality and timeliness of service provided to
Page 120

operational elements, but it also impeded the retrieval

efforts of researchers and historians. 

All of these factors contributed to a lack of direction and

stability for the entire records program. The big push for

change did not come until 1977, when the Agency established the Cryptologic Archival Holding Area (CAHA) –

or Archives, as it is commonly called. The establishment

of an Archives stemmed from action by President Carter

directing the mandatory declassification of intelligence

documents that were thirty years old or older. In complying with Executive Order 12065, Admiral Inman, the

director of NSA, ordered that a new urgency be placed on

declassification matters and on the records management

program of NSA. As an integral part of this action,

Inman directed the immediate establishment of a new

archival office to assume archival responsibility for all

elements of the Agency and to function under the control

of the Director’s Policy Staff. By 1980, with the physical

relocation of all of the stored, retired, and accessioned

records in the Office of Archives and Repository

Services, the Agency concluded its first serious attempt

to establish an archival program. 

Of the records processed thus far by the archives since its

establishment in 1977, the accessioned records generally

start with the World War I era and extend to 1960. The

accessioned records yielded significant information for

this study. These records are arranged and filed under a

nine-letter code group, called a Cryptologic Record

Group (CRG), which identifies the file location as well as

the “origin, geographic pertinence, and subject content”

of the record. The most useful part of this immense collection is its subject correspondence file of letters, memoranda, reports, and other correspondence between the

Army and Navy cryptologic organizations and between

the military services and officials in the defense establishment, the National Security Council, the White

House, and other executive departments. There are also

a number of Special Collections within these holdings,

such as the Wenger Collection, personal papers, and various project files, that proved to be extremely valuable. 

The Center for Cryptologic History traces its origins to

the AFSA era when a history office was established as a

very small element within the training division (AFSA

14). But shortly after the establishment of NSA in 1952,

the history function received new attention and emphasis at the Directorate level. This change occurred mainly

because of the interest of General Canine, who wanted

the events associated with the establishment of NSA to

be documented from a historical viewpoint. He supported the recruitment of three professional historians and

created a new history element, which functioned as a

part of his Plans and Policy Staff. Following the appointment of Dr. George F. Howe as the first professional historian, the history program enjoyed some degree of highlevel support and recognition which lasted for several

years. Within a few years, however, following the retirement of General Canine, the political situation began to

change for the history element. By the mid-1950s, as the

growing Agency became increasingly preoccupied with

more pressing operational considerations, the position

of the history group began to deteriorate. Lacking any

sponsorship at the Directorate level, the group encountered great difficulty in obtaining support and resources

for conducting even a modest history effort. 

Like the early Records Office, the History Office became

a casualty of frequent reorganization actions, as well as

periodic resubordinations within the Agency. By 1989

the History Office had been placed organizationally in at

least seven different Key Components. These Key

Components included the Training Office, Plans and

Policy, the Central Reference Organization in the Office

of Operations, the Policy Staff, the Management

Organization, the National Cryptologic School, and the

Office of Telecommunications. 

Vice Admiral Studeman’s 17 September 1989 memorandum announced the decision to establish the Center for

Cryptologic History as an element of the director’s staff

and marked a new departure for the Agency’s history

program. Personnel were transferred from the Office of

Telecommunications the following month to constitute

the core of the new organization, with Henry F.

Schorreck retaining his position as NSA historian.

Components of the Center include the oral history program and the publishing arm (which also publishes

Cryptologic Quarterly, the Agency’s professional journal) as well as the research collections and historians. 
Page 121

During the years of austerity, the NSA Historian of

necessity performed only limited research activities and

concentrated on the development of historical records

relating to the evolution of the cryptologic structure of

the United States. Today, the Center for Cryptologic

History, by virtue of its History Collection, is a major

holder and authority on early U.S. cryptologic records.

The collection is designed to assist in meeting the needs

of Agency researchers and in providing information support services to Agency officials. 

The records in the History Collection begin with the

American Revolution and extend into the present. These

holdings are divided into Series, generally on a chronological basis, with further subdivisions made topically.

The History Collection contains published and unpublished manuscripts, a broad range of policy and operational correspondence, personal collections, crisis files,

historical studies, and transcripts of oral history interviews. Another important collection of historical records

exists as a totally separate entity within the Center. The

“Cryptologic Collection” became a part of the History

Collection in 1987. Originally a part of the Technical

Documents Section of the NSA Library, the Cryptologic

Collection is slanted heavily toward technical matters. 

It contains a wealth of material on cryptographic 

systems from the World War II period and earlier,

descriptions of cryptanalytic solutions and techniques,

and extremely useful information concerning 

cryptologic organizations. 

Among the records acquired from the three services for

this early period, the holdings contributed by the Army

are noteworthy and are the most prolific of the three military services. During the early 1980s, the U.S. Army

Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) welcomed NSA personnel in their screening of INSCOM

holdings from World War I to the post-World War II

period. As a result of this cooperation, the Archives now

holds an immense collection of Army cryptologic records

for the early years of cryptology. 

The archival holdings acquired from the Navy and Air

Force vary considerably. With particular reference to the

Navy, the Archives does hold a collection of Army-Navy

records that devolved to NSA following the organizational realignments occurring during the postwar years.

Initially this sequence began with the Joint Army-Navy

Operating Agreement of 1946, which forced each service

to move toward closer cooperation on cryptologic matters. The Agreement resulted in a first-time consolidation of a broad range of Army-Navy operating documents and correspondence, including the records of the

various Joint Committees. As a part of this process, the

Navy also intermixed with its contemporary holdings

some earlier naval records dating to the immediate prewar period. As further organizational changes occurred,

this collection of joint Army-Navy holdings passed to the

custody of each successor structure. The cycle of institutional change, extending over six years, included the

establishment of AFSA in 1949 and ended with the creation of NSA in 1952. Today this legacy of Army-Navy

records is invaluable, not only for research, but also as a

source of accurate perspective on the nature and problems of these early joint operations. 

Because of its later arrival as a third cryptologic service,

the Air Force records for this early period do not start

until after World War II. The Air Force created the Air

Force Security Service (AFSS) as a separate command in

Texas in 1949, five months before the establishment of

the Armed Forces Security Agency. During a transition

period, the initial AFSS structure relied on the Army

Security Agency for administrative and operational support. By the time of the Korean War, however, the AFSS

started to function as an independent service and

acquired its own facilities and targets. Still, even for this

latter period, there is a paucity of internal Air Force documentation at NSA concerning the inner workings of the

new cryptologic service. This may have been due, in part,

to the remote location of AFSS Headquarters in Texas.

Today the Air Force unit histories appear to constitute

the bulk of the Air Force cryptologic records in the

archives. But for the purposes of this report, these unit

histories proved to be of minimal value. 

The combined holdings of the Archives and the Center

for Cryptologic History contain significant documentation issued not only by the military services (both the

cryptologic and intelligence organizations), but also by

the evolving United States Communication Intelligence

Board (ANCIB–STANCIB–USCIB) and the civilian consumer agencies. In particular, the correspondence, agen-
Page 122

das, and minutes of the initial policy boards

(ANCIB–STANCIB–USCIB) provided exceptional 

perspective about the nature of the conflicts and power

struggles taking place within the intelligence structure

during the postwar period from 1945 to 1952. The 

internal correspondence from some consumer agencies

gave special insights into the unity reflected by the 

representatives of CIA and State in their joint opposition

to the exclusive military control of the COMINT effort.

This block of records also provided enlightening perspective, once again from the point of view of the 

non-military consumer, about the AFSA structure and

the activities of the Brownell Committee. 

Oral interviews, conducted mainly by Robert D. Farley,

the first NSA Oral Historian, and his successors and

selected Special Research Histories (SRH), resulting

from declassification, helped fill out the documentary

record. 
Page 123

Primary Sources 

U.S. Congress 

U.S. Congress, House Hearings, Committee on

Expenditures in the Executive Departments, National

Security Act of 1947, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947. 

U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings, National Security Act

Amendments of 1949, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949. 

U.S. Congress, Joint Committees, Report of the Joint

Committee of the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor

Attack, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 1946. (Joint

Committee Print.) 

Presidential Papers 

Acheson, Dean, Henry L. Stimson, and James V.

Forrestal, Memorandum for President Truman,

“Continuation and Extension of Collaboration with the

British in the Communications Intelligence Field,”

undated, NSA Center for Cryptologic History. 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., memorandum for the Director of

the Budget, 8 July 1942, NSA Archives. 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., memorandum for General

Marshall, 9 July 1942, NSA Center for Cryptologic

History. 

Truman, Harry S., memorandum for the Secretaries of

State, War, and Navy, 12 September 1945, NSA Center

tor for Cryptologic History. 

Truman, Harry S., memorandum for the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense, 24 October 1952,

NSA Center for Cryptologic History. 

Truman, Harry S., memorandum for the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense, “Communications

Security (COMSEC) Matters,” 24 October 1952, NSA

Center for Cryptologic History. 

National Directives 

United States National Security Council, NSCID Number

9, Communications Intelligence, 1 July 1948. 

United States National Security Council, NSCID Number

9, Revised, Communications Intelligence, 24 October

1952. 

International and United States

Military Agreements 

“Army-Navy Agreement concerning Allocation of

Diplomatic Traffic,” 30 June 1942, NSA Center for

Cryptologic History. 

“Agreement between British Code and Cipher School

and U.S. War Department concerning Special

Intelligence,” 10 June 1943, NSA Archives. 

Marshall, George C. and Edward J. King, “Joint ArmyNavy Agreement for the Exchange of Communications

Intelligence,” 4 February 1944, NSA Center for

Cryptologic History. 

“Outline of the Collaboration in Cryptanalysis between

the Army and the Navy,” 18 August 1944, NSA Archives. 

“British-United States Communications Intelligence

Agreement,” 5 March 1946, NSA Center for Cryptologic

History. 

“Corderman-Wenger Agreement concerning

Coordination of Army and Navy COMINT Activities,” 6

April 1946, NSA Archives. 

“Establishment of a United States Combined

Intelligence Liaison Center in Great Britain,” 3 May

1946, NSA Archives. 

“AFSA/Air Force Agreement on Task Assignments to

AFSS Mobile Intercept Sites,” 22 September 1960,

AFSAC 60/24, NSA Archives. 
Official Documents Issued by United

States Intelligence Boards 

Most important to this study were the minutes, agendas,

and organizational bulletins of the evolving ANCIBSTANCIB-USCIB structures. High-ranking officials of

the military cryptologic organizations and the civilian

agencies presented their views on the COMINT structure, its functioning, and its placement in the national

intelligence structure. From 1945 to 1952, the issuances

of the early intelligence boards revealed the conflicts and

struggles of the intelligence community relating to the

issues of unification and the consolidation of cryptologic

responsibilities. These unique sources are in a single

consolidated grouping within the NSA Center for

Cryptologic History. This brief list reflects only a sampling of the documents available for this period 

Minutes of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence

Coordinating Committee, 1944- 1945 

Minutes of the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence

Board, 1945-1946

Minutes of the State-Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Board, 1945

Minutes of STANCIB concerning the establishment and

operation of the Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949

Minutes of USCIB Meetings concerning the establishment of AFSA in 1949 and the parallel proposal concerning the CONSIDO Plan

Executive Department Documents and

Reports

Army-Navy-FBI Allocation Committee, “Report of

Conference Appointed to Study Allocation of

Cryptanalysis,” 30 June 1942, NSA Archives. 

“Report of Joint Army-Navy Intercept Control Group for

the period 1 April 1946 to 28 February 1947,” 6 March

1947, NSA Archives. 

Stone Board Report to the Secretary of Defense concerning the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security

Agency, 30 December 1948, NSA Center for Cryptologic

History. 

Progress Report by Director, AFSA, to Armed Forces

Security Advisory Council, 27 January 1950, NSA

Archives. 

Report by Director, AFSA, to Armed Forces Security

Advisory Council, concerning Division of Responsibility

Between AFSA and the Services, 18 September 1950,

AFSAC 60/26, NSA Archives. 

Joint Military Memorandum to Army and Navy

COMlNT Committee, 31 July 1940. 

Joint Army and Navy Report to Chief Signal Officer and

the Director of Naval Communications, 3 October 1940. 

Report by Secretariat of Army-Navy Communications

Intelligence Coordinating Committee concerning

Merger Planning, 30 August 1945. 

United States Communications Intelligence Board

Organizational Bulletin No. II, 31 July 1946. 

Secretary of Defense, “Promulgation of Terms of

Reference for the Committee on the Creation of a Unified

Armed Forces Security Agency,”19 August 1948. 

JCS 2010/12, Organizational Announcement concerning

Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory

Council, 28 July 1949. 

Secretary of Defense Directive, “The Establishment of

the Armed Forces Security Agency within the National

Military Establishment,” by Louis A. Johnson, 20 May

1949. 

JCS 2010/23, “Division of Responsibility Between AFSA

and the Military Services,” 18 November 1950. 

AFSAC 60/49, “Announcement of the Establishment of

AFSS Group Headquarters, 18 June 1951. 

Page 124
Page 125

Secretary of Defense, “Implementation of NSCID

Number 9,” Revised, by Robert A. Lovett, 4 November

1952. 

Historical Studies and Monographs

History of the Signal Security Agency in World War II,

“Organization, 1929-1945” (ASA 1945), Vol. I, Part I. 

History of the Signal Security Agency. “The Japanese

Army Problems–Cryptanalysis.” (ASA 1947). 

Parker, Frederick D., A New View to Pearl Harbor:

United States Communication Intelligence, 1924-1941,

United States Cryptologic History Series. (NSA 1988) 

Oral Interviews 

Clarke, Carter W., Interviewed by Robert D. Farley,

Clearwater, Florida, 3 May 1983, NSA Center for

Cryptologic History. 

MacClintock, Stuart, Interviewed by Robert D. Farley,

Fort Meade, Maryland, 25 February 1986, NSA Center

for Cryptologic History. 

Stone, Earl E., Interviewed by Robert D. Farley, Carmel,

California, 9 February 1983, NSA Center for Cryptologic

History. 

White, Lawrence K., Interviewed by Dino Brugioni and

Urban Linehan, Washington, D.C., 8 June 1972, CIA

History Office. 

Special Research History (SRH) 

SRH200 – Army-Navy Collaboration, 1831-1945, Part

2. 

SRH230 – The Role of COMINT in the Battle of

Midway, Henry F. Schorreck. 

Unpublished Studies 

Chun, Richard A., A Bit on the Korean Effort. Typescript.

Working note prepared for NSA History Office, 1971. 

Drake, Robert E., The COMINT Role in the Korean War.

Typescript. Study prepared for the Director, NSA, circa

1954. 

Howe, George F., “Narrative History of AFSA/NSA,”

Parts I-IV, (NSA 1959). 

Howe, George F., “Historical Study of COMINT under

the Joint Operating Plan, 1946-1949” (NSA).

The U.S. COMINT Effort During the Korean War June

1950-August 1953. Typescript. 1954

Lay, James S., History of USCIB. Vol. I. Typescript.

Study prepared for CIA Historical Office, undated. 

Secondary Sources 

Hough, Richard, The Greatest Crusade–Roosevelt,

Churchill, and the Naval Wars (New York: William

Morrow and Co., 1986). 

Ranelagh, John, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of

the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986). 

Rearden, Steven L. The History of the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, The Formative Years, 1947-1950

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984). 

Troy, Thomas F., Donovan and the CIA: A History of the

Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency

(Central Intelligence Agency, 1981). 

Schratz, Paul R., The Admiral’s Revolt (U .S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, February 1986). 

Page 127

Acheson, Dean: 24, 41, 56, 83, 99

Air Force Office of Intelligence (AFOIN): 75

Air Force Security Group (AFSG): 41, 49

Air Force Security Service (AFSS): 3, 42, 49-51, 63, 73,

75, 77-78, 98

Akin, Colonel Spencer B.: 7-8

Ankenbrandt, Brigadier General Francis L.: 39, 52

Arlington Hall: 12-13, 28, 31, 35, 50, 59, 74

Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory

Council (AFCIAC): 58

Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Board

(AFCIB): 53-54

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA): 3, 49, 55-59, 61-

74

Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC): 58-59,

62, 65-66, 68, 71-73, 79, 87-88

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr.: 46-47, 54, 57, 69, 75-76, 90

Army Security Agency (ASA): 31-32, 41, 49, 55

Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC): 74, 77-78

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board

(ANCIB): 3, 5, 18, 22-24, 27-30

Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (ANCICC): 5, 18, 22-24, 28-29, 96

Army-Navy Joint Operating Plan (JOP): 32-36, 59, 62-

63, 96

B-36 Strategic Bomber: 55

Becker, Loftus E.: 90

Bohlen, Charles E. (“Chip”): 83, 86, 99

Bolling, Major General Alexander R.: 52, 86

Bradley, Brigadier General Omar: 86, 92-93

British-United States of America Agreement (BRUSA):

30-34, 36, 44

Brownell, George A.: 3, 83-84, 99

Brownell Committee: 3, 81, 83, 87-88, 90-92, 99-100

Brownell Report: 2, 81, 86-87, 89, 92-93, 100

Buffham, Benson K.: 77

Bullock, Colonel Frank W.: 11

Bureau of the Budget: 40

Byrnes, James F.: 40

Cabell, Major General Charles P.: 52, 57, 91

Canine, Major General Ralph J.: 64-66, 86, 89-91, 98

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 1, 34-35, 41-47, 49,

52-54, 56-57, 66-69, 74, 76, 78-79, 82-83, 89-92, 97-99

Central Intelligence Group (CIG): 34, 37, 39-40

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO): 18, 27-30, 54

Churchill, Winston: 19-21

Clarke, Colonel Carter W.: 18, 26-27, 55, 57, 65, 98

Collaboration: 10-11, 14, 19-20, 22-25, 30-32, 43, 58

Collins, Samuel P.: 59

Collocation: 25, 35-36, 96

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH): 18

Communications Reconnaissance Battalion (CRB): 74

Communications Reconnaissance Company (CRC): 74

Communications Reconnaissance Group (CRG): 74

Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington

(CSAW): 14, 59

Conley, Herbert L.: 77

Consolidated Special Information Office (CONSIDO):

67-69, 79, 82, 98-99

Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO): 30, 32-34, 36,

57, 59, 62-63, 77, 96

Corderman, Colonel W. Preston: 18, 26-27, 29-30, 32

Crimmins, John: 76

Cutler, Lloyd N.: 83

Denfield, Admiral Louis: 54

Department of Defense (DOD): 49, 51, 62, 67-68, 76, 81,

88-91, 93

Department of State: 1, 5-6, 9, 16, 24, 34-35, 37, 39-40,

42, 44, 46-47, 49, 53, 56-57, 65-66, 69, 75-76, 79, 81-83,

89, 99

Dill, Sir John: 20

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): 34, 37, 40-47, 69,

76, 82-83, 88, 90, 92, 96-97, 99

Director of Joint Operations (DJO): 53

Donovan, Brigadier General William J.: 17

Douglass, Kingman: 83, 99

Duncombe, Harmon: 83

Edwards, Vice Admiral Richard S.: 18

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 24, 29-30, 82

Erskine, Brigadier General Graves B., USMC: 92

INDEX
Page 128

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): 1, 9, 11-12, 16, 22,

33-34, 37, 39-40, 43, 47, 49, 67-68, 88, 97, 99

Federal Communications Commission (FCC): 9, 11

Forrestal, James V.: 24, 29, 37-38, 40-41, 44-45, 51-52,

54, 97

Friedman, William F.: 61-62, 67-68

Government Code and Cypher School (G.C. & C.S.),

U.K.: 20, 22

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),

U.K.: 34

Harper, Captain John S.: 60, 62

Hayes, Major Harold G.: 12, 32-33, 52 

Hillenkoetter, Admiral Roscoe H.: 37-38, 42, 44-48, 54,

56-57, 69, 76, 82, 96-97

Hoover, J. Edgar: 16, 33, 43

Ingles, Major General Harry C.: 14-15

Inglis, Rear Admiral Thomas B.: 41, 57

Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB): 41

Intelligence Advisory Council (IAC): 46

Irwin, Major General S. Leroy: 57

Jackson, William H.: 83, 86, 99

Japanese Special Weather Intelligence (SWI): 14

Joint Army-Navy Agreement for the Exchange of

Communications Intelligence: 14

Joint Army-Navy Regulations for the Dissemination and

Use of Communications Intelligence Concerning

Weather: 14

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 9, 17-18, 24, 43-45, 49, 54, 56-

59, 62-63, 65-66, 68-69, 73, 81-82, 86-88, 91-92, 95, 97

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), JCS: 9, 16

Joint Intercept Control Group (JICG): 33, 59, 63

Joint Liaison Group (JLG): 33, 63

Joint Processing Allocation Group (JPAG): 33-34, 59, 63

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 14, 18, 24, 28-29, 39, 42

Kinney, Captain Philip R.: 17

Korean War: 3, 49, 64, 67, 70-71, 73, 75-81, 92, 97-98

Kullback, Dr. Solomon: 61-62

Leahy, Rear Admiral William D.: 40, 43-44

London Signals Intelligence Board (LSIB): 23

Lovell, James R.: 68

Lovett, Robert: 83, 86, 89-92, 99

Lynn, Colonel Roy H.: 42, 57, 59

Magruder, Brigadier General John: 83, 86, 99

Manson, Grant C.: 83

Marr-Johnson, Colonel Patrick (U.K.): 31

Marshall, General George C.: 14, 18, 20, 28-29, 42

Mason, Captain Redfield: 59-60, 62

Matejka, Major General J. V.: 57

Matthews, Francis P.: 54-56

Mauborgne, General Joseph A.: 6, 8 

McCormack, Alfred: 24, 41

McDonald, Brigadier General George C.: 39, 41 

McNarney, General Joseph T.: 54-55, 57, 68

Munitions Building: 10, 13 

National Intelligence Authority (NIA): 37, 40

National Military Establishment (NME): 41, 55-56, 96

National Security Act of 1947: 2, 34, 41-42, 44, 47, 51, 69,

95-97

National Security Agency (NSA): 1-3, 9, 78, 90-93, 95, 98

National Security Council (NSC): 1-2, 37-38, 41, 43-47,

54, 62, 66, 81, 83, 86, 90, 97, 99

National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number

9: “Communications Intelligence” (NSCID No. 9): 9, 34,

47, 69, 91, 97

Navy Security Station (NSS): 59

Neely, Horace D.: 75

Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W.: 29-30

Noyes, Rear Admiral Leigh: 6, 8

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI): 74

Office of Strategic Services (OSS): 11, 16-17, 18, 22

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD): 54, 89

Parker, Frederick D.: 18

Partridge, Brigadier General Richard C.: 86

Patterson, Robert P.: 40

Pearl Harbor: 1, 8-10, 19, 24-26, 39, 51, 62, 95

Polyzoides, T. Achilles: 69

Redman, Admiral Joseph R.: 18

Redman, Commander John R.: 11

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 1, 5, 10-11, 19-21, 95

Rowlett, Francis B.: 61-62

Royal Air Force (RAF): 23
Page 129

Royall, Kenneth C.: 46, 51

Rubin, Lieutenant Colonel Morton A.: 33

Safford, Commander Laurance F.: 7-8, 62

Samford, Major General John A.: 86 

Senior U.K. Liaison Officer (SUKLO): 23

Senior U.S. Liaison Officer (SUSLO): 23

Shute, Benjamin R.: 83

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): 53

Signal Intelligence Service (Army), (SIS): 12-13, 61

Sinkov, Dr. Abraham: 60-62

Smith-Hutton, Captain Henri H.: 17

Souers, Admiral Sidney W.: 37-38, 40, 45-46, 56 

Special Committee of Merger Planning (SMP): 28

Special Research Branch (Army Intelligence) (SRB): 75

State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board

(STANCIB): 24, 27, 30-34, 44, 75

State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence 

Coordinating Committee (STANCICC): 24, 32-33

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC): 24

Stimson, Henry L.: 24

Stone Board: 52-55, 72

Stone, Admiral Earl E.: 52, 57, 73

Strong, Major General George V.: 5-7, 20-22, 27, 45-47,

53-54, 72-73, 76, 81-82, 88-89, 92-93, 97

Sullivan, John L.: 46, 55

Symington, W. Stuart: 46, 56

Taylor, Commander Rufus L.: 33

Thebaud, Admiral Hewlett: 23

Todd, Major General Walter E.: 57 

Travis, Edward W. (U. K.): 20, 22 

Truman, Harry S.: 2, 24, 37, 40-43, 45, 47, 54-55, 81-83,

90-92, 96, 99-100

U.S.-U.K. Relationship: 19, 22-24, 31 

Unanimity: 18, 32, 39, 45, 59, 89, 97 

United Nations (UN): 78

United States Communication Intelligence Board

(USCIB): 34-37, 39-40, 42-47, 49, 53-54, 56-57, 59, 62-

70, 74-77, 79, 81-82, 86-91, 96-100

United States Communication Intelligence Coordinating

Committee (USCICC): 34, 39, 42

Vandenberg, Lieutenant General Hoyt S.: 31-32, 34, 41,

43, 54-55

Veeder, Captain William S.: 52

War Council (WC): 41, 51, 54-55

Ward, John S.: 76

Washington, D.C. Control-Collection Office

(WDC/CCO): 75

Weeks, Colonel James L.: 75

Wenger, Admiral Joseph N.: 8-9, 18, 26-27, 29-30, 32,

50, 57, 59, 62, 72-73, 90

Willoughby, Major General Charles A.: 77