Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-446 | August 10, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark D. Altenhof

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Megan M. Smith

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J.A.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 10, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JV-446

Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Deborah A. 

Domine, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

20C01-1907-JD-241

Baker, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-446 | August 10, 2020 Page 2 of 10

[1] J.A. appeals the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication and modification of 

disposition order committing him to the Indiana Department of Correction 

(DOC), arguing that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the adjudication; 

(2) the juvenile court erred by not placing him in a more rehabilitative

environment; and (3) the juvenile court erred by ordering J.A. to pay 

restitution. Finding the evidence sufficient and no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On August 7, 2019, the State filed a petition alleging that then-sixteen-year-old

J.A. was delinquent for committing acts that would be Level 6 felony resisting 

law enforcement and Level 6 felony auto theft had they been committed by an 

adult. According to the petition, on July 30, 2019, J.A. and two other boys were 

hanging out when they spotted a Nissan Altima. The vehicle was unlocked and 

the keys were inside. The three boys entered the vehicle and drove away; J.A. 

was not the driver. Law enforcement spotted the speeding vehicle and 

attempted to stop it. However, the driver did not stop and ultimately crashed 

the vehicle. Law enforcement witnessed J.A. and the two boys exit the vehicle 

and flee on foot. J.A. was eventually arrested.

[3] J.A. admitted to the auto theft charge, but contested the resisting law 

enforcement charge. Consequently, following an August 12, 2019, hearing, the 

juvenile court adjudicated J.A. delinquent for the auto theft charge, delayed 

adjudication on the resisting law enforcement charge, placed J.A. on supervised 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-446 | August 10, 2020 Page 3 of 10

probation in the Elkhart County Juvenile Detention Center, and ordered J.A. to 

pay restitution as a condition of his probation. 

[4] J.A.’s probation officer found long-term placement for J.A. at the Youth 

Opportunity Center (YOC). Upon arrival, YOC completed a comprehensive 

evaluation of J.A. and established a treatment plan to assist J.A. with his 

myriad behavioral issues. On September 26, 2019, the juvenile court ordered 

the person whose Nissan Altima was stolen and J.A.’s parents to participate in 

the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP) to agree on a restitution 

amount. Thereafter, on October 23, 2019, the juvenile court ordered J.A.’s 

father to pay $750 and his mother to pay $250 while the matter was pending.

[5] The juvenile court eventually held a January 10, 2020, evidentiary hearing on 

the allegation that J.A. committed an act that would be Level 6 felony resisting 

law enforcement had it been committed by an adult. However, during the 

hearing, J.A. admitted to the lesser-included offense of what would be Class A 

misdemeanor resisting law enforcement had it been committed by an adult. 

Based on reports that J.A. was doing well at YOC, the juvenile court

adjudicated J.A. delinquent on the misdemeanor offense, but continued J.A.’s 

placement there. Further, the juvenile court delayed action on the issue of 

restitution because it had not yet received documentation regarding the value of 

the victim’s vehicle.

[6] On January 22, 2020, the Elkhart County Probation Department filed a report 

alleging that J.A. had violated the terms of his probation. The report alleged
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-446 | August 10, 2020 Page 4 of 10

that J.A. and some other YOC residents left their units, refused to return to 

them, and urinated in their pods. The report also alleged that J.A. kicked a staff 

member in the groin, punched another staff member in the face, choked a third

staff member, continued punching and headbutting other staff while being 

restrained, and interfered with other peers also being restrained. 

[7] Following a January 28, 2020, hearing at which J.A. admitted to committing 

some, but not all, of those acts, the juvenile court found that J.A. had violated

the terms of his probation. YOC’s residential program director informed the 

juvenile court that YOC “has exhausted all services” for J.A. and that due to 

his “history of violent, aggressive behaviors, including two attacks on his 

mother,” J.A. could no longer be placed with them. Tr. Vol. II p. 118. At this 

time, the juvenile court also considered J.A.’s delinquency record and previous 

offenses. These included admissions in August 2019 to charges that would be 

Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana and Class C misdemeanor 

possession of paraphernalia had they been committed by an adult. 

[8] Additionally, the juvenile court reviewed the numerous times in which the 

juvenile court intervened to address his offenses. According to the juvenile 

court:

Those interventions include: A psychological evaluation 

completed in 2017, which recommended state hospital placement, 

in which he was not accepted; probation supervision; drug screens; 

case management; individual and family therapy; medication 

management; time in [the Juvenile Detention Center]; diagnostic 

testing; VORP; placement at YOC; and informal courts. [J.A.] has 

also had an extensive history of inpatient hospitalizations. 
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Id. at 119. Based on this evidence, the juvenile court modified J.A.’s disposition 

order by committing him to the DOC.

[9] Also, regarding the outstanding issue of restitution, the juvenile court 

determined—based on the Nissan Altima’s Kelly Blue Book value and the bill 

of sale—that the value of the vehicle was $3,515. And since Father and Mother 

had already paid $1,000 in restitution, the juvenile court ordered that J.A. pay 

$2,515 to the victim. However, the juvenile court held that J.A. did not have to 

make restitution payments until after the completion of his sentence. J.A. now 

appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[10] First, J.A. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency 

adjudication for an action that would be Level 6 felony auto theft had it been 

committed by an adult. “When reviewing a juvenile delinquency adjudication, 

we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 

judgment.” B.R. v. State, 823 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “We 

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. “If there is 

substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the 

delinquent act, we will affirm the adjudication.” Id.
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[11] Specifically, J.A. contends that “there was no evidence presented during the 

factual basis that J.A. was the one who stole the car, or at any point in time, 

exerted unauthorized control over it.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. However, it is 

undisputed that “in juvenile cases, . . . a defendant may not appeal a 

delinquency adjudication following his admission to the facts of the offense.” 

J.H. v. State, 809 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, because postconviction procedures are not available to juvenile delinquents, the proper 

“avenue[] of relief” would be a Trial Rule 60 motion. Haluska v. State, 663 

N.E.2d 1193, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[12] And here, J.A. plainly admitted to committing an act that would be Level 6 

felony theft had it been committed by an adult. We need not conduct an 

analysis to determine, in J.A.’s words, whether “[t]here was an insufficient 

factual basis to adjudicate J.A.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. The very fact that J.A. 

admitted to the allegation effectively precludes him from then seeking relief 

through direct appeal on this count. Thus, because of J.A.’s admission, the 

evidence is sufficient. 

II. Placement Modification

[13] Next, J.A. argues that the juvenile court erred when it placed him in the DOC. 

Specifically, J.A. contends that the juvenile court did not consider a more 

rehabilitative environment before modifying the disposition order. 

[14] We will reverse a juvenile court’s placement of a delinquent minor only if the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 
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before it. C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 216-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The choice 

of a disposition for a juvenile is within the sound discretion of the juvenile 

court, and it is accorded wide flexibility in making that judgment. E.L. v. State, 

783 N.E.2d 360, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). That disposition is subject, however, 

to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the community’s 

safety, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. Id.

[15] Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6(1) states that a juvenile court shall enter a 

dispositional decree that is “in the least restrictive (most family like) and most 

appropriate setting available; and . . . consistent with the best interest and 

special needs of the child[.]” However, even if less restrictive options are 

available, a juvenile court’s placement of a juvenile in the DOC is not 

erroneous when “earlier attempts at rehabilitation through less restrictive means 

were unsuccessful.” D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

[16] While the goal of child placement within the juvenile court system is 

rehabilitation and not punishment, R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2010), the ultimate decision to place J.A. in the DOC was still 

appropriate, and the juvenile court did not err by doing so.

[17] When presented with multiple opportunities for rehabilitation, J.A. has shown 

few signs of progress. When he was placed in YOC, there were reports that J.A. 

exhibited problematic behavior by urinating in front of others; choking, 

headbutting, and punching various staff members; evading restraint; obstructing 

staff from restraining other patients; and deliberately disobeying orders. 
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Further, the juvenile court noted that J.A. admitted to committing acts that 

would be serious drug crimes had they been committed by an adult. And 

despite the various treatment and rehabilitative options supplied by the juvenile 

court system such as drug screens, case management, family and individual 

therapy, medication management, diagnostic testing, and inpatient 

hospitalizations, J.A. has proven that he will not take full advantage of the 

programs already offered to him. 

[18] This Court has expressly held that “violation of a single condition of probation 

is sufficient to revoke probation.” M.J.H. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 376, 377 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003). Moreover, this Court has also held that a delinquent juvenile’s 

placement in the DOC may still be appropriate even if less restrictive or less 

harsh alternatives are available. K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). Given J.A.’s questionable and, at times, dangerous behavior of 

disrespecting authority, disobeying express orders, committing physical battery, 

and possessing drugs and drug paraphernalia, placement in the DOC is an 

appropriate option. See J.B. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 714, 718-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006) (holding that juvenile’s placement in the DOC was warranted after 

violating probation, committing new offenses, and failing to take advantage of 

prior opportunities for treatment).

[19] In truth, the juvenile court could have ordered placement in the DOC at an 

earlier time. Nevertheless, the juvenile court here showed leniency and 

exhausted all options. Consistent with J.A.’s best interests and the safety of the 
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surrounding community, we find that it was not erroneous for the juvenile court 

to modify J.A.’s disposition by placing him in the DOC.

III. Restitution

[20] Finally, J.A. argues that the juvenile court erred by ordering him to pay 

restitution. More specifically, J.A. contends that while “the juvenile court 

inquired into Father and Mother’s ability to contribute to restitution, the court 

failed to inquire into J.A.’s ability to pay.” Appellant’s Br. p. 19.“An order of 

restitution is a matter within the trial court’s discretion[.]” M.L. v. State, 838 

N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We will reverse a juvenile court’s 

determination on restitution only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[21] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6), when restitution is ordered 

as a condition of probation or a suspended sentence, the trial or juvenile court 

must inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay. See also Ladd v. State, 710 

N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). And here, while the juvenile court did 

not conduct this type of inquiry, it still has an opportunity sometime in the 

future to determine whether J.A. can pay the restitution amount; the juvenile 

court expressly stated so at the end of the January 28, 2020, hearing. 

Specifically, the juvenile court said:

I’m entering—I’m not. I’m ordering that [J.A.] pay restitution as a 

term of the modification that I am now ordering in the amount of 

200 – 2,000 – I’m sorry – $2,515. That is based on the Kelley Blue 
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Book evaluations of the estimates of the price of the car and based 

on the bill of sale. When [J.A.] is released from the [DOC], I will 

look at resuming jurisdiction because I can’t order it now.

Tr. Vol. II p. 136. In other words, the juvenile court will return to the matter of 

restitution and, at that time, evaluate J.A.’s ability to pay. Therefore, any 

discussion regarding restitution is premature. Accordingly , the juvenile court 

did not err.

[22] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.