About the Report

In response to the recent surge in the number of American 

Muslims involved in terrorist activities, several agencies in 

the U.S. government have begun devising a comprehensive 

counterradicalization strategy. In doing so, they are 

following the lead of certain European countries that have 

invested significant human, financial, and political capital 

in counterradicalization programs. The challenges European 

authorities have had to face are similar to those their 

U.S. counterparts are expected to confront, and several lessons 

are at hand from the European experience. 

Lorenzo Vidino, a 2009–10 Peace Scholar with the United 

States Institute of Peace, is currently a TAPIR fellow at the 

RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He previously held 

fellowships at the Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 

His latest book, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West, was 

published by Columbia University Press 

in September 2010. 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 262 November 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Lorenzo Vidino

Countering Radicalization 

in America 

Lessons from Europe

Summary

•	 The recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. 

authorities to question the long-held assumption that American Muslims are immune to 

radicalization, and to follow the example of other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counterradicalization strategy.

•	 Radicalization is a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of 

various personal and structural factors. Because no one theory can exhaustively explain 

it, policymakers must understand the many paths to radicalization and adopt flexible 

approaches when trying to combat it.

•	 The role of religion in the radicalization process is debated, but theories that set aside 

ideology and religion as factors in the radicalization of Western jihadists are not convincing. Policymakers who choose to tackle religious aspects should do so cautiously, however, 

cognizant of the many implications of dealing with such a sensitive issue. 

•	 Policymakers need to determine whether a counterradicalization strategy aims to tackle violent radicalism alone or, more ambitiously, cognitive radicalism. The relation between the 

two forms is contested. Challenging cognitive radicalism, though possibly useful for both 

security and social cohesion purposes, is extremely difficult for any Western democracy.

•	 Finding partners in the Muslim community is vital to any counterradicalization program. 

In light of the fragmentation of that community, a diverse array of partners appears to be 

the best solution. There is the risk, however, that counterradicalization efforts could be 

perceived by Muslims as unfairly targeting them.

•	 Partnerships with nonviolent Islamists could provide results in the short term, but there 

are doubts as to their long-term implications. All aspects of a partnership with such groups 

should be carefully examined before any decision is made.

•	 Policymakers need to find ways to empirically measure their programs’ effectiveness.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

The Impetus to Counterradicalization 2

Understanding the Radicalization Process 3

Determining the Role of Religion 3

Defining the Aims of Intervention 4

Choosing Partners 6

Avoiding Stigmatizing the Muslim Community 9

Assessing Success and Failure 10

Policy Recommendations 10 
2

The Impetus to Counterradicalization

Since 2009, U.S. authorities have witnessed a remarkable surge in the number of American 

Muslims engaged in terrorist activities. Dozens of cases have been identified nationwide 

involving militants of diverse backgrounds.1 Although some have simply been fellow travelers inspired by jihadist ideology, others have had strong operational links to the upper 

echelons of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. This development has led many to question the 

long-held assumption that American Muslims, unlike their European counterparts, are virtually immune to radicalization. This realization has recently led the Obama administration 

to ask several governmental agencies to craft policies to “counter violent extremism” and 

devise appropriate counterradicalization plans.2

In doing so, the Obama administration is following the lead of numerous other countries. 

Basing their judgment on direct experience and academic studies, many governments have 

come to reject the more simplistic assumptions about radicalization. Few believe that terrorists 

are deviants who are born terrorists or that once a terrorist, always a terrorist. On the contrary, 

it is widely believed that, in at least some cases, the radicalization process that leads people to 

carry out acts of politically motivated violence can be prevented or even reversed.

Working from these revised assumptions, several countries have created counterradicalization programs that differ markedly in their extent and aims. Counterradicalization commonly includes three types of programs, each with a distinctive objective: deradicalization, 

disengagement, and radicalization prevention.3 Deradicalization measures seek to lead an 

already radicalized individual to abandon his or her militant views. Disengagement entails 

a less dramatic shift whereby an individual abandons involvement in a terrorist group or 

activities while perhaps retaining a radical worldview. Radicalization prevention measures 

seek to prevent the radicalization process from taking hold in the first place and generally 

target a segment of society rather than a specific individual. 

Certain Muslim-majority countries, having been the first targets of al-Qaeda’s or alQaeda–inspired attacks, have been among the first to engineer counterradicalization programs, focusing mostly on deradicalization and disengagement. The programs implemented 

in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, for example, have attracted the attention of experts and 

policymakers for their innovative approaches.4 Although the lessons to be derived from 

these efforts are extremely interesting, U.S. policymakers are likely to find the experiences 

of other Western, non-Muslim-majority countries more relevant. Over the past few years, 

Singapore, Canada, and several European countries have invested considerable human, 

financial, and political capital in counterradicalization programs. Initiatives included in 

these programs range from the deradicalization of incarcerated al-Qaeda militants to the 

creation of Muslim-oriented magazines and TV programs, from government-sponsored 

lectures by moderate Muslim clerics to field trips to Auschwitz, and from professional development seminars to soccer matches with police officers.

The counterradicalization programs implemented in Western countries differ greatly 

from one another in terms of aims, budget, and underlying philosophy. Each experience is 

deeply shaped by political, cultural, and legal elements unique to that country. Moreover, 

the programs have been in place for just a few years, and it is therefore difficult to assess 

fully their impact. Nevertheless, the experience to date points to certain key characteristics 

and challenges common to all Western counterradicalization programs. This report draws on 

the accumulated experience of various European countries to outline six core challenges a 

future U.S. domestic counterradicalization program is likely to face.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, 

Washington, D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, 

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of 

International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. 

Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, 

Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International 

Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

Understanding the Radicalization Process

A logical first step in creating a counterradicalization program is understanding the radicalization process. Yet few issues have proven more divisive and controversial among experts, 

both within and outside government, than trying to identify the reasons that drive people 

to embrace radical views and then to act on them in violent ways. As a consequence, and 

absent reliable supporting evidence, theories about radicalization abound.5 Some focus on 

structural factors such as political tensions and cultural cleavages, sometimes referred to as 

the root causes of radicalization. Others emphasize personal factors, such as the shock of a 

life-changing event or the influence of a mentor. In a May 2010 Special Report titled “Why 

Youth Join al-Qaeda,” U.S. Army Colonel Matt Venhaus aptly divided those seeking to join 

jihadist networks into revenge seekers needing an outlet for their frustration, status seekers 

needing recognition, identity seekers in need of a group to join, and thrill seekers looking 

for adventure.6 Finally, several theories have been formulated to explain the radicalization 

specifically of Western Muslims; these range from a search for identity to anger over relative 

economic deprivation.7

It seems that radicalization is a complex and highly individualized process, often shaped 

by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. And just as there is no 

grand theory of radicalization and no common terrorist profile, there is no single explanation for why people deradicalize or disengage from a militant group. The factors that trigger 

this process are as many and varied as those that lead individuals to radicalize. 

Aware of these complexities, most authorities have understood the need to adopt 

highly flexible approaches to counterradicalization. There is broad consensus that no single 

approach will work in all cases, and in some cases none will. Methods used in radicalization 

prevention might not be appropriate in deradicalization. Efforts should be adapted to the 

specific circumstances, supported by a deep knowledge of the characteristics of the individual or group they are directed to, and continuously assessed.

Determining the Role of Religion

Few issues are more heavily debated than the importance of religion in the radicalization of 

jihadist militants, with the extremists in the debate attributing to it either a central role or 

no role at all. Most Muslim-majority countries that have implemented counterradicalization 

programs view religion as a major factor, though not the only one, in radicalization. They 

generally see jihadists as having absorbed a twisted interpretation of Islam and consider 

their own interpretation of Islam to be the antidote. Several examples can be adduced in 

this connection. Hamoud al-Hitar, a Yemeni judge and founder of Yemen’s counterradicalization program, refers to jihadists detained in the country’s prisons as “the deceived group” 

and believes that a dialogue showing them the fallacies of their theological positions will 

deradicalize them.8 In Saudi Arabia, authorities have based their richly funded program on 

the assumption that jihadists are naïve men who have been fooled by cunning recruiters 

into believing a false interpretation of Islam, and see an education in “true Islam” as the 

solution. Indonesia’s efforts are based on similar assumptions. Indonesian authorities have 

benefited from the cooperation of two former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) militants who have 

engaged fellow militants detained in the country’s prisons by challenging their views from 

a theological perspective. “When their Islamic argument is already defeated,” explains a 

top Indonesian official, “then it is easy for us. Then we enter.”9 In Singapore, the Religious 

Rehabilitation Group (RRG), a body of local Muslim clerics and experts established to combat 

radicalization in that island state, has similarly emphasized the need for engaging militants 

on a theological level. According to the RRG, JI’s “simplistic, literal, nonintellectual interJust as there is no grand 

theory of radicalization and no 

common terrorist profile, there 

is no single explanation for why 

people deradicalize or disengage 

from a militant group.
4

pretation extinguishes centuries of mainstream Islamic intellectual tradition” and “can only 

be de-legitimized by ideological and theological refutation.”10

Many argue that Western countries should follow a similar approach. Although in some 

cases addressing socioeconomic and personal factors might suffice, in others it will be necessary to address ideological and theological aspects of the radicalization process. European 

governments have therefore often resorted to supporting individuals and organizations that 

have challenged jihadist ideology from a theological perspective. Authorities have created 

university courses to train imams, organized lectures of Muslim clerics, and more generally 

provided a platform for various voices considered moderate. The underlying idea is to help 

these voices reach a wider audience. Those who are exposed to moderate or mainstream 

interpretations of Islam are in turn expected to be less likely to embrace (or to become more 

resilient to, in counterradicalization parlance) radical interpretations of it.

Such an approach on the part of Western countries is not universally endorsed, however. 

Some hold that other factors, such as politics and socioeconomics, play a much larger role 

in the radicalization of Western Muslims.11 Others acknowledge the importance of the religious aspect but raise feasibility issues. Most Western countries embrace the principle of 

separation of religion and state. Steep constitutional and legislative limits therefore prevent 

many governments from supporting, even indirectly, religious activities. But even if these 

limits could be bypassed, governments that funded some groups over others could expose 

themselves to the charge of exercising an undue influence in religious affairs. It is not the 

role of the government, critics of this approach say, to promote a certain sect (for example, 

the Sufis) as a way to counter the influence of a school of thought (such as Salafist) that 

authorities deem dangerous.

Moreover, such an exercise in religious engineering could prove counterproductive. Western policymakers, who often lack even a basic knowledge of Islam, are unlikely to determine 

its evolution, and their attempts to do so could backfire. Scholars at London’s International 

Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, for example, argue that “promoting ‘good Islam’ means that the ‘other Islam’ (or ‘bad Islam’) is what the West fears 

most, and it therefore unwittingly promotes al-Qaeda’s claim to be the only alternative to 

Western globalization.”12 In substance, a government’s support of an interpretation of Islam 

it considers more attuned to its views could be seen as strengthening the jihadist argument 

that the West is at war with Islam. 

Defining the Aims of Intervention

Any government devising a program to stem radicalization needs to define its aim with 

precision. A first determination is whether the program seeks to counteract the violent 

form of radicalization or, more broadly, its cognitive form. Cognitive radicalization is the 

process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those of the 

mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with 

a new structure based on a completely different belief system. Violent radicalization occurs 

when an individual takes the additional step of using violence to further the views derived 

from cognitive radicalism. Violent radicalization poses an immediate threat to the security 

of the collectivity, and all counterradicalization programs therefore target it. But should a 

government also target cognitive radicalism? 

A number of European governments have limited their interventions to what could be 

termed a narrow definition of radicalism, indissolubly linking it to violence. The declared 

aim of Prevent, the British government’s counterradicalization strategy, for example, is 

“stop[ping] people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.”13 Under this interpretation the state should not concern itself with the fact that an individual espouses ideas 

Should a government target 

cognitive radicalism? 

European governments 

have . . . often resorted 

to supporting individuals 

and organizations that have 

challenged jihadist ideology 

from a theological perspective. 
5

considered radical, not least because such an assessment is highly subjective. Governmental 

intervention is warranted only when such radicalism clearly leads to the commission of acts 

of violence.

Authorities in other countries have opted for a broader definition of radicalization and 

therefore a more encompassing statement of aims. The AIVD, the Netherlands’ domestic 

intelligence agency, states that its role is to monitor radicalization leading to terrorist 

violence, but it is equally concerned about “forms of non-violent radicalisation which could 

severely disrupt society.”14 These include “the creation of parallel community structures 

with forms of self-defined justice and the propagation of anti-democratic behaviour which 

could result in polarisation, inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions and serious social 

unrest.” Therefore, the working definition of radicalization used by Dutch authorities is “the 

growing preparedness to wish to or to support fundamental changes in society that do not 

fit within our democratic system of law.” Whether these sentiments are accompanied by the 

use of violence will determine how Dutch authorities will intervene, but both violent and 

cognitive radicalization are considered phenomena the government should tackle.

The reasoning behind adopting the broader definition of radicalization is that, aside from 

its impact on the social cohesion of the extremely diverse societies of Western Europe, cognitive radicalism is widely understood to be the logical antecedent to behavioral radicalism. 

Because all terrorists have undergone a radicalization process and hence, before becoming 

violent radicals, were cognitive radicals, it is argued, the state should intervene as early 

as possible in the process to prevent the spread of radical ideas. Critics who challenge this 

position state that there is “no empirical evidence of a causal link between extremism and 

violent extremism.”15 They point out that though it might be true that all terrorists are 

radicals, the vast majority of radicals never make the leap into violence.16 The rhetoric of 

a “slippery slope from political mobilisation to anger and, finally, to violent extremism and 

terrorism” is, according to some, flawed and not supported by facts.17

Another criticism comes from those who believe that cognitive radicals should be “tackled as social problems, not as a ‘subset’ of the al-Qaeda threat.”18 A report by the British 

think tank Demos clearly describes this position: 

Certain kinds of behaviour, dress and attitudes—for instance among the Salafi 

community—are problematic for a secular, liberal state such as the UK, and raise wider 

questions about the status of faith in British politics, the legitimacy or otherwise of 

certain forms of sharia law, and an individual’s right to behave in the private realm 

in ways that might be at odds with social norms or even laws. These are important 

questions that we need to debate as a society, but we must not let them get in the 

way of the priority of tackling terrorism.19

In substance, it is argued that certain ideologies do undermine social cohesion and 

that the government should aim at fostering integration and empowering disenfranchised 

communities to prevent the diffusion of such ideologies among them. Yet these efforts 

should be pursued separately from counterterrorism efforts.20 According to critics of current approaches, a counterradicalization strategy that blurs the line between supporting 

social cohesion and countering terrorism is likely to achieve neither.21 Authorities in various European countries have pointed out that linking well-intended integration and social 

cohesion initiatives with counterterrorism efforts irremediably taints the former, as the 

Muslim community feels stigmatized and believes itself to be perceived by the government 

as a security threat.22 These sentiments further alienate some members of the Muslim community, possibly fueling a turn to radicalization.

The single most important factor influencing the decision of policymakers to focus 

counterradicalization efforts on violent radicalism or cognitive radicalism is the security 

threat facing their country. Governments confronting a severe threat of a terrorist attack 

are more likely to focus on violent radicalization than on more general and less immediately 

Cognitive radicalism is widely 

understood to be the logical 

antecedent to behavioral 

radicalism.
6

visible threats to social cohesion. Another factor influencing the decision is the institutional 

mandate of the body making the decision. Institutions whose mandate is simply to prevent 

acts of violence are likely to focus solely on violent extremism. On the other hand, institutions that aim at preserving a harmonious and cohesive society are more likely to adopt a 

broader definition. A country’s political culture is also important. Great Britain has a long 

tradition of tolerance for extreme rhetoric and potentially subversive activities, and some 

continental European countries have a much lower threshold and are more prone to move 

against cognitive radicalism before specific acts of violence emerge.

Most European countries have struggled to find a balance. In the interests of social cohesion and security, should a democratic state fight ideas it dislikes? There are many reasons 

why any government would want to oppose the spread of radical views, both from a social 

cohesion perspective and from a security perspective. Although the means to counteract 

violent and nonviolent radicals should be different, some argue that the latter should also 

be challenged. Yet the legal, political, and moral issues arising from doing so are significant. 

In a free democratic society, being a radical is a sacrosanct right, and the state should not 

impinge on its citizens’ freedom to espouse any kind of idea. As a consequence, most Western democracies, lacking the legal tools and the political will to engage in an all-out war of 

ideas, have often found it easier to focus on violent extremism. 

In this regard, the recent convergence of views among British and Dutch counterradicalization authorities is instructive. The British, who have traditionally identified “violent 

extremism” as the target of their efforts, have recently begun to express what appears to 

be a reassessment of their goals. In 2009, the Home Office stated that its aim is “not simply 

about tackling violent extremism” but “is also about tackling those who espouse extremist views that are inconsistent with our shared values.”23 The Dutch, by contrast, have 

traditionally identified radicalization more broadly as any rejection of democratic values, 

even if not accompanied by violence. Faced with myriad practical difficulties in developing 

programs to challenge nonviolent Islamism, however, they are increasingly focusing just on 

violent radicalization.24

Choosing Partners

No counterradicalization effort can succeed without the help of the Muslim community, and 

establishing strong trust-based partnerships with individuals and organizations in it is considered of paramount importance. But Western Muslim communities are deeply divided along 

ethnic, national-origin, linguistic, sectarian, and political lines.25 The consequence of this 

fragmentation is that in all Western countries, no single organization can legitimately claim 

to represent a section of the Muslim community even close to being a majority. Unlike their 

counterparts in Muslim-majority countries and even in Singapore, which can count on an 

established and widely respected Islamic leadership, Western policymakers have to decide 

which of these many organizations to partner with. Choosing many local partners, which are 

more likely than large national organizations to have roots in the specific community, is the 

best way to address this problem. Further, creating partnerships with multiple organizations 

is more likely to harness the full potential of the Muslim community than is relying on few 

self-appointed middlemen.

Issues of credibility and legitimacy are paramount.26 Which voices are listened to in the 

community and can deliver the government’s message? In this regard, a particularly controversial matter is the role of nonviolent Islamists. In virtually all Western countries, networks 

and organizations close to the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami, or to the nonjihadist/

political Salafists have gained a certain amount of influence, particularly among secondgeneration Western Muslims. These groups espouse various tenets of Islamist ideology that 

Most Western democracies, 

lacking the legal tools and the 

political will to engage in an 

all-out war of ideas, have often 

found it easier to focus on 

violent extremism.
7

make them radical in the eyes of most Western observers, particularly those having to do 

with religious freedom and women’s rights. Yet even though they endorse acts of violence 

in certain Middle Eastern theaters, they do not advocate violence in the West. On the contrary, they have often publicly condemned terrorist acts carried out by al-Qaeda in Europe 

and North America. Could these “nonviolent Islamists” become partners of the government 

against violent radicalization?

A large number of experts believe that any government would be foolish not to harness 

the enormous potential that a partnership with nonviolent Islamists could hold.27 Although 

some of their views might be offensive, nonviolent Islamists genuinely oppose violence 

and are in a unique position to influence those most likely to engage in violence. Only they 

have the legitimacy and street credibility to be listened to by young Muslims on the path 

to radicalization. Governments should therefore, it is thought, empower the work of these 

groups, which constitute the ultimate bulwark against violent radicalization.

One of the most enthusiastic supporters of this view is Robert Lambert, the former 

head of the Muslim Contact Unit, the section of the London Metropolitan Police devoted 

to engaging the city’s Muslim community. Lambert argues that the “ideal yes-saying” 

Muslim leaders lack credibility in their communities and have no knowledge of radicalism.28

Claiming that only nonviolent Islamists have the credibility to challenge the narrative of 

al-Qaeda and influence young Muslims who might be on the path to violent radicalization, 

he advocates “police negotiation leading to partnership with Muslim groups conventionally 

deemed to be subversive to democracy.”29 Lambert uses as an example of this potential the 

counterradicalization program STREET (Strategy to Re-Empower and Educate Teenagers), run 

by strict Salafists in the Brixton area of London.30 According to Lambert, STREET, thanks to 

its combination of “street skills and religious integrity,” has been particularly successful in 

counteracting the recruitment efforts of al-Qaeda–linked preachers in the area.31

Lambert’s position is based on his extensive professional experience and his view of 

nonviolent Islamists as a firewall, preventing cognitive radicalization from becoming behavioral. The Danish security services (PET) share this view, arguing that in some cases “it is 

precisely these individuals who have the best chance of influencing the attitudes of the 

young people who are in a process of radicalisation, in a non-violent direction.”32 Others 

disagree and see nonviolent Islamist organizations not as firewall but rather as a conveyor 

belt for further radicalization. German security services, for example, publicly state in their 

annual reports that nonviolent Islamist organizations “do not carry out recruitment activities for the purpose of the violent ‘Holy War’ (Jihad). They might rather claim to immunise 

young Muslims against Jihadist indoctrination by presenting to them an alternative offer of 

identification. However, one has to critically ask whether their activities that are strongly 

directed at preserving an ‘Islamic identity’ intensify disintegration and contribute to the 

development of Islamist parallel societies.”33 Moreover, they argue, there “is the risk that 

such milieus could also form the breeding ground for further radicalization,” laying the 

ideological groundwork for violent groups.34 

Some British critics have laid out similar arguments. Former Home Secretary Jacqui 

Smith has stated that nonviolent Islamists “may not explicitly promote violence, but they 

can create a climate of fear and distrust where violence becomes more likely.”35 In the words 

of the Quilliam Foundation, a London-based think tank established by former members of 

Hizb ut-Tahrir who have rejected Islamism, nonviolent Islamists “advocate separatist, confrontational ideas that, followed to their logical conclusion, lead to violence. At the very 

least, the rhetoric of radicals provides the mood music to which suicide bombers dance.”36

In light of these divisions it is difficult to assess whether Western governments can 

achieve their interests by engaging with nonviolent Islamists. Different perceptions of what 

the state interest is lead to different answers. If the state interest in counterradicalization 

Could these “nonviolent 

Islamists” become partners of 

the government against violent 

radicalization?
8

programs is to prevent terrorist attacks, then, prima facie, there are reasons to think that 

engagement might bear fruit, at least in the short term. But if success in counterradicalization is deemed the almost complete marginalization of extremist and anti-integration 

ideas among young Western Muslims, then many believe that partnering with nonviolent 

Islamists is counterproductive. In that case, short-term and occasional forms of cooperation 

with nonviolent Islamists might be used to achieve gains against jihadists, but such tactical partnerships should not develop into a permanent strategy. The long-term implications 

would likely offset the results obtained in the security field.

Many security officials in European countries embrace the view that identifying the 

enemy only in violent groups is self-deceiving. Alain Grignard, deputy head of the Belgian 

police force’s antiterrorism unit and a professor of Islamic studies at Brussels Free University, 

calls al-Qaeda an “epiphenomenon,” the most visible aspect of a much larger threat that 

is political Islam.37 Alain Chouet, the former head of France’s counterintelligence service 

DGSE, agrees with Grignard, observing that “Al-Qaeda is only a brief episode and an expedient instrument in the century-old existence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The true danger is 

in the expansion of the Brotherhood, an increase in its audience. The wolf knows how to 

disguise itself as a sheep.”38

Chouet’s comparison of the Muslim Brotherhood to a wolf in sheep’s clothing is echoed 

by many security experts, who fear that nonviolent Islamists are attempting to benefit from 

what in social movement theory is known as positive radical flank effect.39 According to 

the theory, more moderate wings of a political movement improve their bargaining position 

when a more radical fringe emerges. Applied to nonviolent Islamists, the positive radical 

flank effect would explain why the emergence of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups has led 

European governments to see the less radical fringe—the nonviolent Islamist groups—more 

benignly, and even to flirt with the idea of establishing forms of partnership. The emergence 

of a severe and prolonged terrorist threat, argue people like Chouet, has led European governments to lower the bar of what is acceptable and to endorse extremist organizations as 

long as they oppose violence on the Old Continent. 

Yet, argue many, the social engineering program envisioned by nonviolent Islamists, 

which entails a rejection of many core Western values, is the real problem. And by empowering them through various forms of partnership, authorities make an enormous mistake of 

short-sightedness. Espousing this view, Shiraz Maher, a former high-ranking member of the 

British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has written that

the central theoretical flaw in PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism, Britain’s 

counterradicalization strategy] is that it accepts the premise that non-violent extremists 

can be made to act as bulwarks against violent extremists. Non-violent extremists have 

consequently become well dug in as partners of national and local government and 

the police. Some of the government’s chosen collaborators in “addressing grievances” 

of angry young Muslims are themselves at the forefront of stoking those grievances 

against British foreign policy; western social values; and alleged state-sanctioned 

“Islamophobia”. PVE is thus underwriting the very Islamist ideology which spawns an 

illiberal, intolerant and anti-western world view. Political and theological extremists, 

acting with the authority conferred by official recognition, are indoctrinating young 

people with an ideology of hostility to western values.40

Both arguments have some merit, and it is easy to see why the choice of partners can 

be the most challenging decision officials have to make. Intuitively, it can be argued that 

in some cases nonviolent Islamists act as a firewall, in others as a conveyor belt, yet there 

is little conclusive evidence to support either argument. It is fair to say they could serve 

a role in limited deradicalization efforts, in that they seem best positioned to intervene 

with already radicalized individuals. Partnering with them in radicalization prevention, 

on the other hand, is more controversial. Such a decision should be made only after an 

informed and nonideological assessment of the short- and long-term consequences of any 

form of engagement.

Nonviolent Islamists . . . 

could serve a role in limited 

deradicalization efforts, in that 

they seem best positioned 

to intervene with already 

radicalized individuals.
9

In sum, the lack of a clearly defined path to radicalization and the dearth of evidence 

on it make conclusive assessments of the role of nonviolent Islamist organizations in the 

radicalization process impossible. As a consequence, policies swing almost erratically. Most 

recently, though, British authorities, who had arguably been the most open among Europeans to tactical partnerships with nonviolent Islamist groups, have signaled a change of 

policy. Making clear that those who express views “which fall short of supporting violence 

and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise 

community cohesion” should not be criminalized, the government also stated such groups 

would no longer receive any form of public support.41

Avoiding Stigmatizing the Muslim Community

Prevent and other counterradicalization programs implemented in Europe have often been 

accused of unfairly targeting Muslims.42 Communities that since 9/11 have been the frequent targets of negative portrayals in the media have reported feeling stigmatized by 

counterradicalization programs and being treated as “suspect communities,” as security 

threats rather than as full-fledged citizens. Many have argued that counterradicalization 

programs imply that Muslims are inherently prone to terrorism and represent a special problem. They point out that other forms of extremism, such as that coming from the far right, 

pose a significant threat to both social cohesion and security, yet only Islamism has been 

targeted with uncommon vigor. Some critics have also argued that programs such as Prevent 

are in reality nothing more than covers for spying on Muslims, leading a British Muslim community activist to call it “the biggest spying programme in Britain in modern times and an 

affront to civil liberties.”43

Authorities have often denied the claims that counterradicalization programs unfairly 

target Muslims or are used to spy on them, yet these perceptions remain widespread. It is 

critical for authorities to challenge these views, which can severely hamper the credibility 

and effectiveness of their programs. Branding and marketing are therefore no less important 

aspects of a counterradicalization program than its substance is. If the community perceives 

every governmental gesture, even the best intentioned, as being made only to stop radicalization, it could “alienate[s] the very community that it seeks to engage and influence 

positively, unwittingly heightening potential vulnerabilities to radicalisation.”44

Another criticism often levied against counterradicalization programs, and particularly 

their deradicalization components, is that they infringe on civil liberties and criminalize 

thought rather than behavior. A scheme that has been the focus of particularly intense 

attention is the Channel program, a deradicalization intervention system created by British 

authorities. Like similar systems in various European countries, Channel seeks the help of 

civil servants, teachers, social workers, community leaders, and other members of the public, 

who are instructed to report individuals they consider exhibiting signs of radicalization. A 

panel of experts that includes police officials, community leaders, and other authorities 

then assesses the case and might recommend some form of intervention, in most cases 

mentoring sessions with individuals the subject respects. 

These referral schemes have been criticized as intrusive and as targeting people for 

expressing a view. The issue was raised in hearings held in the House of Commons in March 

2010. Charles Farr, director general of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism at the 

Home Office, gave an explanation as to why, in the government’s view, Channel is not set 

up to criminalize individuals whose views are radical but not a criminal offense but, on the 

contrary, “precisely to avoid them criminalising themselves.”45 In the same testimony, Farr 

pointed to the poignant example of Hasib Hussain, one of the four British Muslims who 

carried out the suicide attacks in London on July 7, 2005:

Authorities have often 

denied the claims that 

counterradicalization programs 

unfairly target Muslims or 

are used to spy on them, 

yet these perceptions 

remain widespread.
10

We started to unpick what was known about Hasib Hussain. He had never come 

to the notice of the police at any stage in his young life and therefore in terms of 

opportunities for the police to intervene to prevent what went on to occur, there were 

just no hooks there. However, what we did discover is that as a model student whilst 

at Matthew Murray School his exercise books were littered with references to al-Qaeda, 

and the comments could not have been taken as other than supportive comments 

about al-Qaeda. To write in one’s exercise book is not criminal and would not come 

on the radar of the police, but the whole ethos, the heart of Prevent is the question 

for me of whether someone in society might have thought it appropriate to intervene. 

What do I mean by intervention? I do not mean kicking his door down at 6 o’clock 

in the morning and hauling him before the magistrates. I mean should someone have 

challenged that? They are the sorts of cases that get referred through the Channel 

scheme.46

Farr’s statement highlights the dilemma facing European policymakers. On the one hand, 

the idea of establishing a police-led system that singles out individuals simply for expressing 

views that, according to very vague and subjective standards, could be considered extremist 

is at odds with the ideals of all Western democracies and could stigmatize the Muslim population. On the other hand, traditional law enforcement techniques cannot always detect and 

neutralize the ever-evolving terrorist threat, and seemingly intrusive means such as Channel 

could serve a valid purpose. Policymakers therefore find themselves dealing with a “damned 

if you do, damned if you don’t” dilemma in implementing some of the more intrusive measures of a counterradicalization strategy. 

Assessing Success and Failure

Measuring the effectiveness of counterradicalization programs is an inherently difficult task. 

Even the most comprehensive and well-thought-out deradicalization programs are unlikely 

to be completely successful. If, for example, one hundred individuals go through a deradicalization program and only a handful of them revert to terrorism, how is the program to 

be assessed? The success of radicalization prevention is even more challenging to evaluate 

because it requires planners to prove a negative: the number of individuals who did not 

become terrorists because of the program.

Governments have attempted to set clear metrics to empirically verify the effectiveness of 

their actions, ranging from simple quantitative analyses of program participation to more complex indexes seeking to determine the level of community engagement. Yet all these attempts 

fall short of providing a clear assessment. Nevertheless, measuring effectiveness is increasingly 

necessary. In times of deep budget cuts, demonstrating that the resources dedicated to counterradicalization programs are allocated for a reason is of paramount importance.

Policy Recommendations

Counterradicalization programs are an immensely complex and controversial subject. They 

touch on extremely sensitive issues, such as religion, identity, and integration. They can be 

highly intrusive, impinge on civil liberties, and risk further alienating the very group they 

seek to reach. Despite these enormous difficulties, a preventive approach and a deradicalization effort are necessary components of a comprehensive counterterrorism policy. Countries 

such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark have been at the forefront of devising 

counterradicalization programs. Their experiences hold some lessons that U.S. authorities 

should keep in mind as they devise their own counterradicalization program.

•	 Policymakers should first understand the radicalization process. Understanding the 

process is key to the subsequent development of countermeasures. The absence of a 

grand theory of radicalization reflects not the failure of experts but rather the multifaceted 

nature of the phenomenon. However, the absence of a single path to radicalization and the 
11

complexity of factors causing it should not discourage policymakers from intervening. 

Through understanding the many factors—personal, structural, ideological—that shape 

the path to radicalization, authorities are in better position to devise a flexible approach 

built on an extensive knowledge of the individual or group targeted. It should be accepted 

that many efforts may ultimately prove ineffective, but the best recipe for success is a 

holistic and flexible approach.

•	 Policymakers need to decide whether to target only violent radicalism or, more 

broadly, cognitive radicalism. Any state has two reasons to opt for the latter. The former 

is strictly security-related. It is unquestionably true that the majority of cognitive radicals 

do not become violent radicals. But it is equally true that terrorism is not born in a vacuum 

and that most of those who commit acts of politically motivated violence first embrace a 

radical worldview. Moreover, some ideas espoused by Islamist groups severely undermine 

integration and social cohesion, making governmental intervention opportune. Such 

intervention would take very different forms, depending on whether it sought to tackle 

cognitive or behavioral radicalism. In a liberal democracy, individuals should be allowed 

to express their views, as abhorrent as they might be. But it is not unreasonable for a 

government to seek to oppose these views by introducing a counternarrative or by lending 

support to alternative voices.

•	 Policymakers should be aware of the deepening role of ideology in the radicalization of 

Western Muslims. Although some scholars still challenge the notion that religion plays any 

role in the radicalization of Western Muslims, it is increasingly evident that jihadist ideology, 

which is based on a particularly extreme interpretation of Islam, is the main driver behind 

the radicalization of some Western Muslims. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than 

in the United States, where most militants arrested over the past few years have had few 

to no economic problems. Poverty might be a driving factor for militants in areas of Africa, 

the Middle East, or South Asia, but very few Western Muslims join al-Qaeda for economic 

gain. Relative deprivation and economic segregation could contribute to the sense of disenfranchisement felt by many Western Muslims but would not in themselves cause violent 

radicalization without the existence of an ideology that interprets them and provides an 

alternative. Among jihadists, this ideology is unquestionably a religious one.47

•	 Therefore, an effective counterradicalization strategy must be prepared to intervene 

in ideological and theological matters. Despite the many difficulties of treading on such 

sensitive grounds, and despite the legal obstacles originating in the principle of separation 

of religion and state, the U.S. government should find ways to counter the theological 

message of violent Islamism. Because efforts to intervene in theological matters could 

potentially backfire (on numerous grounds), they should be preceded by a careful evaluation of opportunities, limits, and long-term implications. These determinations should be 

made at the highest levels and then implemented uniformly at the local level, as a lack of 

message consistency will severely undermine any effort.

•	 Counterradicalization programs should choose partners carefully. Efforts to counter 

radicalization, especially its theological components, are best conducted in partnership 

with the Muslin community. Identifying potential partners is problematic, as the Muslim 

community is fragmented, with no group representing more than a fraction of U.S. Muslims. 

Choosing many local partners with roots in specific communities is likely to build more trust 

and be more effective than partnering with large organizations at a national level.

Partnerships with nonviolent Islamist groups pose a special problem. Such partnerships 

have achieved results in the security field, yet concerns about the long-term consequences 

for integration and social cohesion are always present. Partnership decisions should be 
12

made only after a careful assessment of the nature of the specific group being engaged 

and the full spectrum of potential outcomes a partnership with it could trigger.

•	 Policymakers and program managers should deliver appropriate messages to mitigate 

problems in implementation. Even after program aims are defined and partners chosen, 

problems are likely to arise during the implementation phase. Appropriately framing and 

marketing initiatives is fundamental to avoiding the perception in the Muslim community 

that the U.S. government sees the community only through the lenses of counterterrorism 

or considers it an inherent security problem. No matter how well crafted, counterradicalization programs are destined to fail if they do not manage to overcome this perception.

•	 Policymakers need to devise metrics to empirically measure the results of their 

actions. Measurement is necessary not just to assess the successes or deficiencies of the 

programs but also to demonstrate their effectiveness and to survive budget cuts.
13

Notes

1. In 2009–10, some seventy American citizens were charged with or convicted of terrorism or related crimes (U.S. 

Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing, Nine Years After 9/11: 

Confronting the Threat to the Homeland, September 22, 2010). See also Lorenzo Vidino, The Homegrown Terrorist 

Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Special Report ARI 171/2009 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, December 18, 2009).

2. See www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/138175.htm and www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_

recommendations.pdf.

3. For some definitions, see Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective 

Disengagement (London: Routledge, 2009); Froukje Demant, Marieke Slootman, Frank Buijs, and Jean Tillie, 

Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalization, IMES Report Series (Amsterdam: Institute 

for Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2008).

4. For an overview of the Saudi program, see Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Re-Education and Rehabilitation in 

Saudi Arabia,” in Bjørgo and Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind, 212–23. For Indonesia, see “Deradicalisation” 

and Indonesian Prisons (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 19, 2007). 

5. See, for example, Ryan Evans and Peter Neumann, Islamist Militant Radicalisation in Europe: A Critical Assessment 

of the Literature (London: International Center for the Study of Radicalisation, April 2009), and Transnational 

Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law Consortium, Causal Factors of Radicalisation, (The Hague: TTSRLC, April 

2008), www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Causal%20Factors.pdf.

6. Colonel John “Matt” Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” USIP Special Report (Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace, May 2010), 8–11.

7. For an excellent overview of the literature on radicalization among European Muslims, see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, 

“Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, 

no. 9 (2010): 797–814.

8. Abdul-Aziz Oudah, “Judge Hamoud al-Hitar, Minister of Islamic Affairs, Talks about Using Dialogue to Confront 

Extremists,” Yemen Observer, June 4, 2008, www.yobserver.com/reports/10014374.html (accessed September 4, 

2009).

9. Quoted in Natalie O’Brien, “Terrorists Who Say No to Terrorism,” Australian, October 22, 2007.

10. Religious Rehabilitation Group, sample presentation no. 1, www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/trans.pdf (accessed September 

14, 2009); Mohamed Feisal bin Mohamed Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in 

Singapore,” www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/The_roles_of_RRG.pdf (accessed September 14, 2009).

11. This is the opinion, for example, of the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee as 

outlined in its March 2010 report, Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session, 3. 

12. Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and 

Political Violence (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2008), 13.

13. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (London: Home Office, March 2009), 80. 

14. The Radical Dawa in Transition: The Rise of Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands (Zoetermeer: AIVD, 2007).

15. Rachel Briggs, “Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom,” International 

Affairs 86, no. 4 (2010): 971–81.

16. Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell, From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society

(London: Demos, July 2010), 8–9.

17. Rachel Briggs, Catherine Fieschi, and Hannah Lownsbrough, Bringing It Home: Community-Based Approaches to 

Counter-Terrorism (London: Demos, 2006), 43.

18. Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism

(London: Demos, 2010), 14.

19. Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough, Bringing It Home, 17.

20. Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, The Edge of Violence, 22; Bartlett and Birdwell, From Suspects to Citizens, 3; Briggs, 

“Community Engagement for Counterterrorism.”

21. Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, The Edge of Violence, 22.

22. See, for example, H.C. Communities and L.G. Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism.

23. Home Office statement regarding the BBC program Muslim First, British Second, February 16, 2009, http://news.

bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7888000/7888793.stm.

24. Interviews with Dutch officials, The Hague, December 2009.

25. Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” 

Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (September 2006): 457–79.

26. In the UK, the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU) conducted extensive research on the 

matter, interviewing hundreds of British Muslims. The resulting report is Credible Voices: Exploring Perceptions of 

Trust and Credibility in Muslim Communities (London: Home Office, March 2010).

27. Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, The Edge of Violence, 7.

28. Robert Lambert interview, London, December 2008.

29. Robert Lambert, “Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study,” 

Political Science & Politics 41 (2008): 31–35.

30. Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalisation Fails: The Persistence 

of a Failed Discourse,” International Affairs 86, no. 4 (2010): 897.

31. Ibid., 898.

32. A Common and Safe Future: Proposal for an Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation among Young 

People (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, June 2008), 36.

33. Integration as a Means to Prevent Extremism and Terrorism: Typology of Islamist Radicalisation and Recruitment

(Koëln: Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), January 2007), 5.
14

34. Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Koëln: Federal Office for the Protection of the 

Constitution, 2005), 190.

35. Alan Travis, “Time to Tackle the Non-Violent Extremists, Says Smith,” Guardian, December 11, 2008.

36. Quilliam Foundation, “Pulling Together to Defeat Terror,” April 2008, 3, www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/

stories/pdfs/pulling-together-to-defeat-terror.pdf.

37. Quoted in Sylvain Besson, La Conquête de l’Occident (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 40.

38. Quoted in Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (New York: Encounter, 2008), 103.

39. See, for example, Herbert H. Haines, “Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970,” in Social 

Movements, eds. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1997), 440–41.

40. Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups

(London: Policy Exchange, 2009), 5. 

41. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST 2).

42. H.C. Communities and L.G. Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism.

43. “Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy ‘Spies’ on Innocent,” Guardian, October 16, 2009; Arun Kundnani, Spooked! 

How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism (London: Institute of Race Relations, October 2009); H.C. Communities and 

L.G. Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism, 8.

44. H.C. Communities and L.G. Committee, Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session, March 2010, 8.

45. Ibid., 16.

46. Ibid., 17.

47. Although not necessarily representative of the views of other Western jihadists, a comment by Omar Hammami, 

the Alabama-born convert to Islam currently occupying a high-ranking position in al-Shabaab, is very telling in 

that sense. “They can’t blame it on poverty or any of that stuff,” he wrote his sister on Facebook, explaining his 

reasons for joining the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia. “They will have to realize that it’s an ideology and it’s a way 

of life that makes people change” (Andrea Elliot, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times, January 27, 2010).

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