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2019 PA Super 341

*Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.

DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 

WAREHOUSE, INC. AND STUART 

LACHEEN

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALLEN INVESTMENTS, LLC AND ALLEN 

INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC

v.

WILLIAM ALLEN,

 APPELLANT No. 300 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered December 26, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): August, 2010 No. 02381

DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 

WAREHOUSE, INC.,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALLEN INVESTMENTS, LLC,,

Appellant No. 2286 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered June 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 100802381

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E. and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2019
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Appellant, William Allen, intervener in the underlying proceeding, 

appeals from the December 26, 2017 order,

1 granting his motion to open the 

October 10, 2010 default judgment entered against Allen Investments, LLC, 

and Allen Investment Properties, LLC (collectively “Allen Investments”) and in 

favor of Digital Communications Warehouse, Inc., et al. (“Digital”). 

Additionally, Allen Investments appeals from the June 19, 2018 order denying 

its petition to strike and/or open the default judgment entered against it.

2

 

After careful review, we quash William Allen’s appeal at No. 300 EDA 2018; 

we affirm in part and reverse in part the June 19, 2018 order underlying Allen 

Investments’ appeal docketed at No. 2286 EDA 2018, and remand for further 

proceedings. 

The trial court has summarized the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this matter as follows: 

The underlying matter in this case stems from a breach of 

contract claim for the purchase of televisions. On February 17, 

2009, [Digital] entered into a contract for the purchase of 

television monitors with [Allen Investments]. Under the contract, 

[Digital] agreed to pay [Allen Investments] ... []$3,885,000.00[] 

for delivery of ... []3,100[] television units, and [Allen

Investments] warranted that it had legal title to the units as well 

as full authority to sell them to [Digital]. At the time of the 

contract’s signing, [Digital] agreed to a ... []$5,000.00[] deposit 

and had already procured a buyer for the television units. Shortly 

thereafter, [Allen Investments] induced [Digital] to enter into a 

____________________________________________

1 The order is dated December 22, 2017, but was not entered on the docket 

until December 26, 2017. 

2 For ease of disposition, we consolidate the appeals at Nos. 300 EDA 2018 

and 2286 EDA 2018 sua sponte, due to the similarity of the issues involved. 
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shipping contract in an effort to facilitate the product delivery, 

however, [Allen Investments] never delivered the television units, 

nor did [Allen Investments] ever actually have legal title or 

authority to the units. 

[Digital] filed suit against [Allen Investments] in 

Pennsylvania on August 17, 2010, claiming damages [for] breach 

of contract, misrepresentation, and fraud. [Allen Investments]

failed to respond to the complaint or enter an appearance, and on 

October 14, 2010, [a] default judgment was entered against 

[Allen Investments] in the amount of ... []$14,601,000.00[].[3] 

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO II”), 1/4/19, at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). 

On June 8, 2017, William Allen petitioned to intervene and 

[to] strike and/or open the default judgment. Mr. Allen alleged 

that his son, Marc Gregory Allen, had created [Allen Investments, 

LLC and Allen Investment Properties, LLC]1 and had fraudulently 

assigned to Allen Investments, LLC ownership of multiple 

properties belonging to William Allen, including a Palm Harbor, 

Florida condominium complex. William Allen further alleged that 

Mr. Lacheen, who then held the judgment against [Allen

Investments], was attempting to attach Mr. Allen’s properties to 

collect on the outstanding default judgment. 

1 Digital [] avers in its compliant [sic] that [Allen 

Investments, LLC and Allen Investment Properties, LLC] 

were both incorporated in Florida.

On July 21, 2017, the court issued a rule to show cause why 

Mr. Allen’s petition to intervene should not be granted. After 

briefing, the court entered an order dated July 13, 2017, which 

granted the petition to intervene, added William Allen to the case 

as a party, and granted [him] 20 days to file “an appropriate 

petition or motion challenging the underlying judgment and/or 

execution.”

____________________________________________

3 “Digital [] assigned the judgment to Jade Electronics Distributors, Inc. on 

September 15, 2011, which subsequently assigned the judgment to Stuart 

Lacheen on February 1, 2013.” Trial Court Opinion (“TCO I”), 7/31/18, at 1 

(citation to record omitted). 
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On August 1, 2017, Mr. Allen filed a petition to strike [the] 

default judgment and/or open [the] default judgment and/or stay 

execution pending final termination of an action pending in 

Florida. The court entered an order on September 7, 2017, 

allowing the parties 60 days to conduct discovery on the issues of 

service and timeliness of the motion, and 30 additional days for 

briefing. On December 14, 2017, an order was entered granting 

Mr. Allen’s petition to strike the default judgment as to damages 

only, and stating that an assessment of damages hearing would 

be scheduled forthwith. On December 21, 2017, [] Digital [] filed 

a motion for reconsideration of the December 14 order, asking 

that it be amended to make clear that the date of the judgment 

on liability remained October 10, 2010[,] and that the December 

14 order only affected the damages award. On December 26, 

2017, an order was entered granting the motion for 

reconsideration, vacating the December 14 order, and clarifying 

that the motion to strike was granted only as to damages. Mr. 

Allen timely filed a notice of appeal of the December 26 order on 

January 18, 2018. 

TCO I at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization and citations to record omitted).4, 5

Subsequently, on January 22, 2018, Allen Investments filed its own

petition to strike and/or open the remaining default judgment. The court 

entered an order on June 19, 2018, which denied Allen Investments’ petition. 

On July 10, 2018, Allen Investments filed a timely notice of appeal, followed 

by a timely, court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. 

____________________________________________

4 The trial court did not direct William Allen to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

5 On April 5, 2018, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why this appeal 

should not be dismissed as premature, because the December 26, 2017 order 

specifically contemplates that the court will hold an assessment of damages 

hearing. William Allen filed a timely response on April 12, 2018. Accordingly, 

we discharged the April 5, 2018 show-cause order and referred the issue of 

appealability to the merits panel assigned to this case. 
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William Allen now presents the following issues for our review: 

A. Was there defective service so that the record for the 2010 

default judgment contains a fatal error on its face requiring the 

default judgment to be stricken?

B. Did the [c]ourt lack power to enter the default judgment 

against [Allen Investments] because [Allen Investments was]

not subject to general or specific jurisdiction in Pennsylvania 

and because proper service was never affected?

C. Even assuming service and jurisdiction had been proper, do the 

circumstances of this case nevertheless warrant the opening of 

the default judgment?

D. In his motion, did [William Allen] seek relief as to both 

damages and liability? 

E. Should [William Allen] have been allowed to file a response in 

opposition to [Digital’s] motion for reconsideration of the trial 

court’s December 13, 2017 [o]rder?

Brief for William Allen at 5-6. 

Additionally, Allen Investments raises the following sole issue for our 

review: “Should this [c]ourt reverse the denial [of] a petition to strike a 

default judgment where ... [Digital] failed to serve original process in any 

manner authorized by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure?” Brief for 

Allen Investments at 4. 

Before we address the merits of Appellants’ claims, we must first 

determine whether these appeals are properly before us, because “the 

question of appealability implicates the jurisdiction of our court.” Jacksonian 

v. Temple University Health System Foundation, 862 A.2d 1275, 1279 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting In re Estate of Israel, 645 A.2d 1333, 1336 (Pa. 

Super. 1994)). “An appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order 
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certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right 

(Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 

1311, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).” 

Bloome v. Alan, 154 A.3d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2017). Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 311 provides for interlocutory appeals as of right and 

states: 

(a) General rule.—An appeal may be taken as of right and 

without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

(1) Affecting judgments. – An order refusing to 

open, vacate, or strike off a judgment. If orders 

opening, vacating, or striking off a judgment are 

sought in the alternative, no appeal may be filed 

until the court has disposed of each claim for 

relief. 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1). 

Instantly, William Allen appeals from the December 26, 2017 order 

which purports to grant a motion to strike a judgment as to damages only.

The order expressly states, in relevant part: “The Intervener[’s], William 

Allen[], motion to strike default judgment is GRANTED as to damages. The 

October 10, 2010 judgment amount of $14,601,000 is stricken.... An 

assessment of damages hearing shall be scheduled forth with.” Order, 

12/16/17, at 1 ¶2-3. By its nature, an order striking a default judgment is 

not a final order that disposes of the matter. Instead, such an order “annuls 

the original judgment and the parties are left as if no judgment had been 

entered.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Associates, 683 
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A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996).6 Despite the language of the trial court’s order, we 

conclude that the December 26, 2017 order essentially opened the default 

judgment as it did not disturb the original liability judgment and, thus, we will 

treat it as an order granting the petition to open the judgment for the purpose 

of this appeal. 

As the order clearly does not meet the criteria for finality outlined in 

Rule 341, nor is it a collateral order,7 we must determine whether William 

Allen may take an interlocutory appeal from the order as of right. The Official 

Note to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) clarifies that an order granting a motion to strike 

or open a judgment is not appealable as would be an order denying a motion 

to strike or open a judgment. See Official Note to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) (“The 

1989 amendment to subparagraph (a)(1) eliminated interlocutory appeals of 

right from orders opening, vacating, or striking off a judgment while retaining 

the right of appeal from an order refusing to take any such action.”). Thus, 

the trial court’s December 26, 2017 order opening the October 10, 2010 

____________________________________________

6 See also United Parcel Service v. Hohider, 954 A.2d 13, 16 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (noting that an order granting a motion to strike a judgment anticipates 

further litigation, as it places the parties back in the position they were in prior 

to the entry of the judgment).

7 A collateral order is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the 

main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied 

review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until 

final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 

313(b). 
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default judgment is interlocutory and not appealable.8 Consequently, we must 

quash William Allen’s appeal at No. 300 EDA 2018 for lack of jurisdiction. 

The order from which Allen Investments appeals, on the other hand, is 

clearly an interlocutory order from which a party may appeal as of right. See

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1). Thus, we now proceed to address the merits of the issue 

raised by Allen Investments and remain mindful of the following:

An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment 

implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Oswald v. 

WB Public Square Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). Issues regarding the operation of procedural rules 

of court present us with questions of law. Id. Therefore, “our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Id. 

“A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding 

which operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a 

judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity 

appearing on the face of the record.” Midwest Financial 

Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 78 A.3d 614, 622-23 (Pa. Super. 

2013). “[A] petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits 

of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is 

aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that 

entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief.” Oswald, 

supra at 794. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies the 

prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. Erie Ins. Co. v. 

Bullard, 839 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa. Super. 2003). When a 

prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment is 

void ab initio. Id. “When deciding if there are fatal defects on 

the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a 

default judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record 

when the judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s 

____________________________________________

8 Even if we were to consider the December 26, 2017 order as an order 

granting a motion to strike a default judgment, we would reach the same 

conclusion. Rule 311(a)(1) clearly precludes appeals as of right from an order 

granting either a motion to open a judgment or a motion to strike a judgment.
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Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 90, 700 A.2d 915, 917 

(1997). 

A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three 

jurisdictional elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the 

parties; subject matter jurisdiction; or the power or 

authority to render the particular judgment. The term 

“jurisdiction” relates to the competency of the individual 

court, administrative body, or other tribunal to determine 

controversies of the general class to which a particular case 

belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack a judgment 

or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such judgment or 

decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the 

subject matter or the person is null and void, and can be 

attacked by the parties at any time. A petition to strike a 

judgment founded on a jurisdictional deficiency is therefore 

not subject to the same “timeliness” considerations as a 

petition to open the judgment. 

Green Acres Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 

1261, 1267-68 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi 

Corp., 674 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Pa. Super. 1996)). 

 In contrast, 

[a] petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the 

equitable powers of the court. The decision to grant or deny a 

petition to open a default judgment is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a 

manifest abuse of discretion or error of law. ... An abuse of 

discretion is not a mere error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment 

exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, 

discretion is abused. 

Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributors, Inc., 29 A.3d 23, 25 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

“Generally speaking, [under Pennsylvania law,] a default judgment may 

be opened if the moving party has (1) promptly filed a petition to open the 

default judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing 
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to file a responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the 

allegations contained in the complaint.” Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

986 A.2d 171, 175-76 (Pa. Super. 2009). With regard to the first prong, 

whether the petition to open was timely filed, we note:

The timeliness of a petition to open a judgment is measured from 

the date that notice of the entry of the default judgment is 

received. The law does not establish a specific time period within 

which a petition to open a judgment must be filed to qualify as 

timeliness. Instead, the court must consider the length of time 

between discovery of the entry of the default judgment and the 

reason for delay. In cases where the appellate courts have found 

a “prompt” and timely filing of the petition to open a default 

judgment, the period of delay has normally been less than one 

month. 

Id. at 176 (internal citations omitted). 

Here, Allen Investments argues that the trial court erred in denying its 

petition to strike the default judgment on the grounds that the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction, which renders the judgment a nullity. See Brief of Allen 

Investments at 10. Allen Investments bases its lack-of-jurisdiction claim on 

its assertion that Digital failed to properly complete service of the underlying 

complaint in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 403. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure provide that when a defendant resides or is located outside the 

Commonwealth, the plaintiff may serve original process “by any form of mail 

requiring a receipt signed by the defendant or his authorized agent.” Pa.R.C.P. 

403. See also Pa.R.C.P. 404(2). Service is complete upon delivery of the 

mail. Id. Instantly, it is undisputed that the complaint was mailed to Allen 

Investments at 819 County Road 1, Palm Harbor, FL 34683, on August 20, 
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2010, which is evidenced by a certified mail receipt signed by “D.M. Thomas,” 

an individual identifying herself on the receipt as an agent of Allen 

Invetsments. The parties dispute, however, whether D.M. Thomas is, in fact, 

a proper authorized agent of Allen Investments for the purpose of original 

process.

9

 

In support of its denial of the petition to strike the judgment, the trial 

court opined: 

[Allen Investments] cannot allege a fatal defect or irregularity on 

the face of the record because [its] agent was properly served at 

its business address of 819 County Road 1, Palm Harbor, FL 34683 

on August 20, 2010 (Affidavit of Service filed August 24, 2010). 

Pa.R.C.P. [] 404(2) controls in this matter because [Allen 

Investments] maintained an address outside the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania. Under [Rule] 404(2), “[o]riginal process shall be 

served outside the Commonwealth within ninety (90) days of the 

issuance of the writ or the filing of the complaint or the reissuance 

or the reinstatement thereof by mail in the manner provided by 

Rule 403.” Under [Rule] 403[,] service by mail is complete upon 

delivery of the mail requesting a receipt signed by an authorized 

agent of the defendant. At the time of service, [Allen 

Investments] had been placed under receivership in Florida for 

fraudulent business activities. Denise Thomas, the individual 

whose signature appears on the [a]ffidavits of [s]ervice, was an 

agent of the receiver who was authorized to conduct [Allen 

Investments’] business functions in order to prevent future fraud 

and theft. Accordingly, Denise Thomas was an appropriate, 

authorized agent to accept service on behalf of [Allen 

Investments]. Therefore, because a valid [a]ffidavit of [s]ervice 

exists on the record, [Allen Investments] cannot allege a fatal 

defect or irregularity. Accordingly, this [c]ourt properly denied 

____________________________________________

9 Allen Investments avers that D.M. Thomas was never authorized to accept 

original process on its behalf. See Brief of Allen Investments at 6.
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[Allen Investments’] Petition to Strike Default Judgment and [its’] 

claim must fail.

TCO II at 3-4. 

On appeal, Allen Investments argues that the trial court erred in basing 

its finding of proper service on a receivership order entered by a Florida court 

in an unrelated foreclosure action. See Brief of Allen Investments at 6-7, 14-

15.

10

 Pursuant to the receivership order dated June 1, 2010, Broderick & 

Associates, Inc. (“B&A”) was appointed as receiver for the express purpose of 

collecting rents from tenants of the Florida properties. Id. at 7. The order 

does not reference Allen Investments, as it was not a party to the action. Id.

at 6. It is undisputed that D.M. Thomas was an employee of B&A. Id. at 14.

Allen Investments avers, however, that B&A was not authorized to accept 

service of original process in the present action and that service of the 

complaint on D.M. Thomas was, therefore, improper. Id. 

It is well-settled that in considering the merits of a petition to strike, the 

court is limited to “a review of only the record as filed by the party in whose 

favor the warrant is given.... Matters dehors the record ... will not be 

considered. If the record is self-sustaining, the judgment will not be stricken.” 

Resolution Trust Corp., 683 A.2d at 273. However, “if the truth of the 

____________________________________________

10 The foreclosure action was brought by a lender against William Allen for 

breach of the terms of a loan secured by certain Florida properties owned by 

William Allen. Id. at 6 (citing Shapiro v. Allen, No. 09-012417 CI (Fla. 6th

Cir. Ct. filed 2009)).
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factual averments contained in such record are disputed, then the remedy is 

by a proceeding to open the judgment and not to strike.” Id. 

Based on the foregoing, we ascertain no fatal defect on the face of the 

record. See Davis v. Walker, 2017 WL 2290137 (Pa. Cmwlth., filed May 24, 

2017)11 (recognizing that any evidence to support the defendant’s argument 

that the individual who signed the return receipt cards was not an authorized 

agent could not be considered in a motion to strike because any such evidence 

was outside the record). The Davis court based it finding on the opinion in 

Aquilino v. Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, 884 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Super. 

2005), in which we examined the limited inquiry that can be made by the trial 

court in reviewing a petition to strike a default judgment due to the failure of 

personal service. 

In that case, the plaintiff used Federal Express to deliver the 

complaint to one of the defendants at his Peruvian residence, with 

the “return receipt” stating that it was accepted at his residence 

by “Recept/Frnt desk.” The defendant argued that a default 

judgment entered against him should have been stricken because 

personal service of the complaint was not made as the return 

receipt did not establish that it was signed by him or his authorized 

agent. In rejecting that argument, the Superior Court stated:

The record indicates, however, that the receptionist at the 

front desk of the Peruvian address signed for and accepted 

service of the complaint. [Pa.R.C.P.] 402(a)(2)(ii) permits 

acceptance of service “at the residence of the defendant to 

the clerk ... of the hotel, inn, apartment house, boarding 

house or other place of lodging at which he resides;” and 

____________________________________________

11 “Unpublished memorandum opinions of the Commonwealth Court issued 

after January 15, 2008 may be cited for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 

3716(b).” Dixon v. Northwestern Mutual, 146 A.3d 780, 786 n.7 (Pa. 

Super. 2016).
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[Pa.R.C.P.] 402(a)(2)(iii) permits acceptance of service “at 

any office or usual place of business of the defendant to his 

agent or to the person for the time being in charge thereof.” 

The mission was defendant’s residence and, most likely, his 

place of business. Although it is not clear that the 

receptionist at the front desk was the person who received 

mail on behalf of residents ... there is equally no indication 

to the contrary, thus preventing us from concluding that 

there is a fatal defect on the fact of the record.

Davis, 2017 WL 2290137, at *3 (quoting Aquilino, 884 A.2d at 1283). 

Similarly, in the present case, the trial court was unable to consider Allen 

Investments’ argument that D.M. Thomas was not an authorized agent in the 

context of its motion to strike the judgment, as such evidence was outside the 

record. Accordingly, we discern that the trial court properly denied the motion 

to strike. 

The proper remedy, here, is to open the judgment, as the truth of the 

averments contained in the record is clearly in dispute. The trial court denied 

Allen Investments’ motion to open the default judgment, however, on the 

following grounds:

[Allen Investments] brought its motion seven (7) years after the 

entry of default judgment. [It] failed to adequately explain the 

delay[,] noting only that the default judgment was entered [in] 

March [of] 2011 [sic], and that Marc Allen, sole principal of [Allen 

Investments], spent three years in prison from 2012 to 2015. 

[Allen Investments] admitted that in 2015, when Marc Allen was 

released from prison, no steps were taken to address the default 

judgment until the present motion was filed on January 22, 2018. 

Therefore, [Allen Investments] failed to demonstrate that this 

petition to open default judgment was prompt and also failed to 

adequately explain the seven[-]year delay. In addition, [Allen 

Investments] has not even articulated a meritorious defense. 

TCO II at 4-5 (citations to record and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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“Ordinarily, if a petition to open a judgment is to be successful, it must 

meet the following test: (1) the petition to open must be promptly filed; (2) 

the failure to appear or file a timely answer must be excused; and (3) the 

party seeking to open the judgment must show a meritorious defense.” 

Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. 

1997). “However, where the party seeking to open a judgment asserts that 

service was improper, a court must address this issue first before considering 

any other factors.” Id. As our Supreme Court explained, 

[i]f valid service has not been made, then the judgment should be 

opened because the court has no jurisdiction over the defendant 

and is without power to enter a judgment against him or her. In 

making this determination, a court can consider facts not before 

it at the time the judgment was entered. Thus, if a party seeks 

to challenge the truth of factual averments in the record at the 

time judgment was entered, then the party should pursue a 

petition to open the judgment, not a petition to strike the 

judgment.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, we deem the trial 

court’s failure to determine whether service of the complaint was proper prior 

to considering any other requisite factors regarding the opening of the 

judgment to be a clear error of law.12 Under these circumstances, we conclude 

that the trial court erred in denying Allen Investments’ petition to open the 

default judgment. 

____________________________________________

12 The record indicates that the trial court failed to consider Allen Investments’ 

lack of service argument presented at the June 18, 2018 hearing on its petition 

to strike/open the default judgment but, rather, focused primarily on the 

passage of time between the entry of the default judgment and the filing of 

the petition. N.T. Hearing, 6/18/18, at 4-16.
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Allen Investments’ 

motion to strike the default judgment. We further reverse the trial court’s 

order denying Allen Investments’ motion to open the default judgment and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. 

Appeal at No. 300 EDA 2018 quashed. Appeal at No. 2286 EDA 2018 

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/19