[Cite as State v. Bartoe, 2011-Ohio-2521.]

 Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 No. 95286 

 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

JACOB BARTOE

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-529964 

BEFORE: Kilbane, A.J., Jones, J., and S. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 26, 2011 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Robert A. Dixon 

The Brownhoist Building 

4403 St. Clair Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44103 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center - 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jacob Bartoe (Bartoe), appeals his sentence. 

 Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} In October 2009, Bartoe, and codefendant Christopher Jones 

(Jones) were charged with two counts aggravated robbery (Counts 1 and 2) 

and two counts of kidnapping (Counts 3 and 4). All four counts carried a 

one- and three-year firearm specification and a weapon forfeiture 

specification. Bartoe proceeded to a jury trial, at which the following 

evidence was adduced. 

{¶ 3} On October 8, 2009, Stephen Donahue (Donahue), Bartoe, and 

Jones drove to Devon Boepple’s (Boepple) apartment. Inside the apartment, 

the group smoked marijuana. At some point, Donahue went into the 

bathroom. When he walked out, Donahue observed Jones with a gun. 

Jones pointed the gun at Donahue and Beopple, ordering Beopple to give him 

her money. Then, Bartoe grabbed Donahue in a choke hold and Jones hit 

Beopple with his gun. He also punched Beopple several times. Donahue 

struggled with Bartoe and was released from Bartoe’s hold after he hit Bartoe 

in the head with an ashtray. At the same time, Beopple managed to flee 
from Jones and ran to her neighbor’s apartment for help. Bartoe and Jones 

then fled from the apartment. Donahue attempted to chase after Bartoe and 

Jones, but they drove away. 

{¶ 4} At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Bartoe guilty of all 

charges and firearm specifications. The trial court found Bartoe guilty of all 

weapon forfeiture specifications. Counts 1 and 2 merged for purposes of 

sentencing and the State elected to proceed with Count 1. On May 28, 2010, 

the trial court sentenced Bartoe to four years in prison on each of Counts 1, 3, 

and 4, to be served concurrently to each other, and three years in prison on 

the firearm specifications, to be served consecutively to Counts 1, 3, and 4, for 

an aggregate of seven years in prison. 

{¶ 5} Bartoe now appeals, raising the following single assignment of 

error for review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE 

“[Bartoe] was denied due process of law when the court 

imposed a sentence that was disproportionate to that 

imposed upon a more culpable codefendant, in violation of 

R.C. 2929.11(B)[.]”

{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth the applicable standard of 

appellate review of a felony sentence in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 

2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶4: 

“In applying [State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 

2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470,] to the existing statutes, 
appellate courts must apply a two-step approach. First, 

they must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with 

all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence 

to determine whether the sentence is clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is 

satisfied, the trial court’s decision shall be reviewed under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard.”1

{¶ 7} Bartoe argues that his sentence was contrary to law because it is 

disproportionate to the sentence imposed on codefendant Jones. Apparently, 

the State offered Jones a plea deal in exchange for his testimony in Bartoe’s 

case. On June 2, 2010, Jones pled guilty to amended charges, which 

included one count of aggravated robbery, a one-year firearm specification, 

and a weapon forfeiture specification. The trial court sentenced Jones to an 

aggregate of four years in prison. Bartoe contends that since his sentence is 

inconsistent with Jones’s sentence, the trial court imposed his sentence 

without regard to R.C. 2929.11(B) and violated his constitutional rights. 

{¶ 8} We note that while Foster eliminated mandatory judicial 

fact-finding, it left R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 intact, setting forth the 

statutory factors that the trial court must consider when imposing its 

sentence. Kalish at ¶13. 

{¶ 9} Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2929.11(B) provides that: “[a] 

sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the 

 1We recognize Kalish is merely persuasive and not necessarily controlling 

because it has no majority. The Supreme Court split over whether we review 

sentences under an abuse-of-discretion standard in some instances. 
two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this 

section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the 

offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with 

sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”2 

{¶ 10} This court has previously recognized that there is no requirement 

for judicial findings in either R.C. 2929.11 or R.C. 2929.12, and that the trial 

court is required only to carefully consider the statutory factors before 

imposing its sentence. State v. Samuels, Cuyahoga App. No. 88610, 

2007-Ohio-3904, ¶15. Furthermore, the Kalish court recognized that R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12 are not fact-finding statutes; rather, they “serve as an 

overarching guide for trial judges to consider in fashioning an appropriate 

sentence.” Id. at ¶17. “In considering these statutes in light of Foster, the 

trial court has full discretion to determine whether the sentence satisfies the 

overriding purposes of Ohio’s sentencing structure.” Id. 

 2R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that: “[a] court that sentences an offender for a 

felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The 

overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime 

by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To achieve those purposes, 

the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, 

deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and 

making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” 
{¶ 11} In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate 

that Bartoe’s sentence is contrary to law. First, his sentence is within the 

permissible statutory range. Second, the record reflects that the trial court 

considered the factors in R.C. 2929.11. Accordingly, Bartoe’s sentence is not 

contrary to law. 

{¶ 12} Having satisfied step one, we next consider whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. An ‘“abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an 

error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140, quoting State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 

157, 404 N.E.2d 144. Here, the trial court indicated that Bartoe did in fact 

operate in concert with Jones. Bartoe placed Donahue in a choke hold, while 

Jones bludgeoned Boepple with a gun. Based on these facts, we do not find 

that Bartoe’s sentence was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

{¶ 13} Finally, as for Bartoe’s claim that his sentence is disproportionate 

to Jones’s sentence, we find that he failed to raise this argument below. This 

court has previously held that in order to support a claim that a “sentence is 

disproportionate to sentences imposed upon other offenders, a defendant 

must raise this issue before the trial court and present some evidence, 

however minimal, in order to provide a starting point for analysis and to 

preserve the issue for appeal.” State v. Edwards, Cuyahoga App. No. 89181, 
2007-Ohio-6068, ¶11. See, also, State v. Redding, Cuyahoga App. No. 90864, 

2008-Ohio-5739. 

{¶ 14} In the instant case, Bartoe stated at the sentencing hearing that 

“since the court found me guilty of participation with [Jones], I just ask that 

you treat us fairly as the team that you say we acted as and you give us both 

the same penalty we deserve.” This limited dialogue, however, was 

insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Jones was sentenced after 

Bartoe was sentenced, therefore, Jones’s sentence was outside the record and 

the trial court could not use it as a starting point for its analysis. “Without a 

starting point for the trial court to begin analysis, the issue has not been 

preserved for appeal and we decline to address it.” State v. Thomas, 

Cuyahoga App. No. 94335, 2011-Ohio-183, at ¶24, citing State v. Woods, 

Cuyahoga App. No. 82789, 2004-Ohio-2700. 

{¶ 15} Having found that Bartoe’s sentence was neither contrary to law 

nor an abuse of discretion, his sole assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, J., and 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR