[Cite as Cab E. L.L.C. v. Pinchak, 2011-Ohio-6479.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96934 

CAB EAST, LLC

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

DANIEL N. PINCHAK

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Shaker Heights Municipal Court 

Case No. 10 CVF 00823 

BEFORE: Cooney, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 15, 2011 
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James R. Douglass 

James R. Douglass Co., LPA 

20521 Chagrin Blvd., Suite D 

Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Keith D. Weiner 

Michael S. Berkowitz 

Suzana Kukovec-Krasnicki 

Keith D. Weiner & Assoc. Co., LPA 

75 Public Square 

Fourth Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel Pinchak (“Pinchak”), appeals the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to reinstate the stay pending arbitration with plaintiff-appellee, Cab 

East LLC (“Cab East”). However, Pinchak’s entire argument relates solely to the trial 

court’s order granting his initial motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. Finding 

no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} In June 2010, Cab East filed a complaint against Pinchak for breach of 

contract, claiming that Pinchak leased a vehicle from Land Rover Capital Group LLC, 

one of Cab East’s subsidiaries, and defaulted on his lease payments. Pinchak claims that 

he never negotiated a lease with Land Rover Capital and never received a leased vehicle 
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from Cab East. Instead, Pinchak claims that he was threatened at gunpoint by the 

Westside Automotive Group finance manager, who forced Pinchak to go to the dealership 

and sign a lease agreement for a 2007 Land Rover. However, when the initial bills for 

the lease arrived at Pinchak’s address, he paid them. Pinchak claims to have paid the 

first few bills in “an unsuccessful effort to preserve his creditworthiness.” Thereafter, 

Pinchak defaulted on his lease payments. 

{¶ 3} In February 2011, Pinchak filed a motion to stay the proceedings pending 

arbitration pursuant to the lease agreement.1

 On March 8, 2011, the trial court granted 

his motion and ordered Pinchak to initiate arbitration on or before April 29, 2011, if he 

elected to do so. On April 29, 2011, arbitration had not yet been initiated, and Cab East 

filed a motion to lift the stay and requested leave to file a motion for summary judgment. 

Both requests were granted by the trial court. Cab East then filed its motion for 

summary judgment. Rather than opposing this motion, Pinchak filed a motion to 

reinstate the stay. The trial court denied Pinchak’s motion to reinstate the stay and 

granted Cab East’s motion for summary judgment. Cab East was awarded the entire 

outstanding balance of $13,894.32. 

{¶ 4} Pinchak now appeals, raising one assignment of error, claiming that the trial 

court erred in its initial order that required him to initiate arbitration. However, his 

 1

Pinchak’s motion also noted that Exhibit A of the complaint “clearly provides” for arbitration 

and “either party may require that any claim” in the contract be resolved by arbitration. 
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notice of appeal filed on June 14 relates to the court’s denial of his motion to reinstate the 

stay. 

{¶ 5} It is clear from his brief that the merits of Pinchak’s instant appeal and the 

arguments contained therein, are directly related to the court’s order that granted his 

initial motion to stay the proceedings. Pinchak’s argument that the trial court 

erroneously shifted the burden regarding the initiation of arbitration, is directly related to 

the court’s order of March 8, 2011. Both parties concede that this order granted 

Pinchak’s motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration and ordered Pinchak to 

initiate arbitration on or before April 29, 2011, if he chose to do so. The order stipulated 

that if arbitration had not been initiated on or before April 29, 2011, then the case would 

proceed to trial. 

{¶ 6} If Pinchak objected to the trial court’s initial order granting the stay because 

he felt it erroneously shifted the burden of initiating arbitration, he should have appealed 

that order. It is well established that any order that grants or denies a stay is a final, 

appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2711.02(C), which states: 

{¶ 7} “an order * * * that grants or denies a stay of a trial of any action pending 

arbitration, including, but not limited to, an order that is based upon a determination of 

the court that a party has waived arbitration under the arbitration agreement, is a final 

order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure * * *.” 
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{¶ 8} Thus, Pinchak should have appealed the initial order of March 8, 2011 

within the 30-day time frame set forth in App.R. 4(A) if he wished to challenge that 

order. 

{¶ 9} Pinchak’s current appeal has failed to demonstrate any error by the court in 

its granting summary judgment for Cab East and denying Pinchak’s motion to reinstate 

the stay. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal 

court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________________ 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR