27698 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 111 / Thursday, June 11, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

and the ATR service bulletins contained in 

Table 2 of this AD, for related information. 

TABLE 2—RELATED SERVICE INFORMATION

ATR Service Bulletin— Revision— Dated— 

ATR42–92–0015, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 01 February 11, 2009. 

ATR42–92–0018, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 02 February 13, 2009. 

ATR72–92–1016, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 01 February 11, 2009. 

ATR72–92–1018, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 02 February 13, 2009. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use the service information 

contained in Table 3 of this AD to do the 

actions required by this AD, as applicable, 

unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact ATR–GIE Avions de 

Transport Re ́gional, 1, Alle ́e Pierre Nadot, 

31712 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 

(0) 5 62 21 62 21; fax +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18; 

e-mail continued.airworthiness@atr.fr; 

Internet http://www.aerochain.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

TABLE 3—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

ATR Service Bulletin— Revision— Dated— 

ATR42–92–0015, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 01 February 11, 2009. 

ATR42–92–0018, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 02 February 13, 2009. 

ATR72–92–1016, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 01 February 11, 2009. 

ATR72–92–1018, excluding Accomplishment Report .......................................................................................... 02 February 13, 2009. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 2, 

2009. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–13405 Filed 6–10–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–0163; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–046–AD; Amendment 

39–15929; AD 2009–12–06] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 737–300, –400, –500, –600, –700, 

–700C, –800, and –900 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Boeing Model 737–300, –400, –500, 

–600, –700, –700C, –800, and –900 

series airplanes. This AD requires 

installing a new circuit breaker, relays, 

and wiring to allow the flightcrew to 

turn off electrical power to the in-flight 

entertainment (IFE) systems and other 

non-essential electrical systems through 

a switch in the flight compartment, and 

doing other specified actions. This AD 

results from an IFE systems review. We 

are issuing this AD to ensure that the 

flightcrew is able to turn off electrical 

power to IFE systems and other nonessential electrical systems through a 

switch in the flight compartment. The 

flightcrew’s inability to turn off power 

to IFE systems and other non-essential 

electrical systems during a non-normal 

or emergency situation could result in 

the inability to control smoke or fumes 

in the airplane flight deck or cabin. 

DATES: This AD is effective July 16, 

2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of July 16, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe 

Salameh, Aerospace Engineer, Systems 

and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, 

FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

425–917–6454; fax 425–917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Boeing Model 737–300, –400, 

–500, –600, –700, –700C, –800, and 

–900 series airplanes. That NPRM was 

published in the Federal Register on 

November 7, 2007 (72 FR 62802). That 

NPRM proposed to require installing a 

new circuit breaker, relays, and wiring 

to allow the flightcrew to turn off 


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electrical power to the in-flight 

entertainment (IFE) systems and other 

non-essential electrical systems through 

a switch in the flight compartment, and 

doing other specified actions. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received from 

the six commenters. 

Request To Exclude Certain Airplanes 

From the Applicability 

Mr. Ian S. Murton requests that we 

revise paragraph (c)(2) of the 

applicability of the NPRM to exclude 

Model 737–700 series airplanes having 

variable numbers (V/Ns) YB101 through 

YB114 inclusive. These airplanes are 

listed in the effectivity of Boeing Service 

Bulletin 737–24–1147, Revision 1, dated 

March 1, 2007, which is referenced in 

paragraph (c)(2) of the NPRM. As 

justification, the commenter states that 

the operator of these airplanes has 

owned the airplanes since delivery from 

Boeing, and that IFE systems are not 

installed on these airplanes. The 

commenter also states that the operator 

took possession of the airplane having 

V/N YB114 18 months after Boeing 

issued the original issue of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1147, dated 

November 20, 2003, and that the 

operator decided not to accomplish the 

actions specified in that service bulletin. 

The commenter would like to know 

how the proposed requirements of the 

NPRM would affect this range of 

airplanes. The commenter also states 

that perhaps the applicability of the 

NPRM should be amended to include 

only airplanes that have the IFE systems 

installed. 

We disagree with revising the 

applicability of this AD because we 

have determined that the unsafe 

condition exists on the airplanes 

identified in the Boeing service 

bulletins that are referenced in 

paragraph (c) of this AD. The 

effectivities of those service bulletins 

are based upon the delivered 

configuration of the airplanes. Boeing 

has confirmed that it installed IFE 

systems on airplanes having V/Ns 

YB101 through YB114 inclusive. If the 

IFE systems were either removed after 

delivery, or have never been installed 

contrary to the effectivity of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1147, Revision 

1, dated March 1, 2007, then under the 

provisions of paragraph (k) of this AD, 

we will consider requests for approval 

of an alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) if sufficient data are submitted 

to substantiate that the design change is 

not necessary. We have not changed the 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Exclude Certain Boeing 

Business Jets From the Applicability 

Boeing Executive Flight Operations 

requests that we revise paragraph (c) of 

the applicability of the NPRM to 

exclude certain Boeing business jets 

(BBJs) equipped with a passenger 

entertainment switch (PES), certified 

under a Supplemental Type Certificate 

(STC). If these airplanes are not 

excluded from the applicability, then 

the commenter requests that the FAA 

provide additional detail on what 

specific interior systems or equipment 

need to have a means of disconnection, 

so that operators can accurately petition 

and apply for an AMOC. The 

commenter states that Boeing delivered 

these airplanes without an interior to a 

customized completion center, where 

they were modified to a custom interior 

specification and design that are 

certified by an STC. 

According to the commenter, many of 

the BBJ interior installations incorporate 

either a PES, or load shed switching, 

that will remove power from the interior 

equipment and systems, as required by 

sections 25.1309, 25.1351, 25.1353, and 

25.1355 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.1309, 14 CFR 

25.1351, 14 CFR 25.1353, and 14 CFR 

25.1355). The commenter also states 

that Boeing Service Bulletin 737–24– 

1147, Revision 1, dated March 1, 2007, 

does not consider the BBJ and BBJ2 

configurations separate from 

commercial airline interior 

configurations and does not provide 

enough details as to what systems or 

equipment need to be isolated with the 

PES disconnects. 

We disagree with revising the 

applicability of this AD because we 

have determined that the unsafe 

condition exists on the airplanes 

identified in the Boeing service 

bulletins that are referenced in 

paragraph (c) of this AD. The 

effectivities of those service bulletins 

are based upon the delivered 

configuration of the airplanes. 

The ‘‘load shed switching’’ function is 

for an overload condition during normal 

operation where power will be removed 

from non-essential systems, such as 

galley, IFE systems, etc. This AD, 

however, has a different purpose, which 

is to independently remove power from 

the IFE systems and other non-essential 

equipment in case of emergency, 

according to FAA Policy Memorandum 

PS–ANM100–2000–00105, ‘‘Interim 

Policy Guidance for Certification of InFlight Entertainment Systems on Title 

14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft,’’ dated 

September 18, 2000. Policy 

Memorandum PS–ANM100–2000– 

00105 specifies that there should be a 

manual main shutoff switch within 

reach of flight or cabin crews to be used 

in case of emergency to shut off all nonessential power. FAA Policy 

Memorandum ANM–01–111–165, 

‘‘Policy Statement on Certification of 

Power Supply Systems for Portable 

Electronic Devices (PES) on Part 25 

Airplanes,’’ dated March 18, 2005, 

covers the PES power removal switch as 

well. 

Under the provisions of paragraph (k) 

of this AD, we will consider requests for 

approval of an AMOC if sufficient data 

are submitted to substantiate that an 

alternate design change would provide 

an acceptable level of safety. We have 

not changed the AD in this regard. 

Requests To Allow Certain Service 

Bulletins as AMOCs 

Aircraft Maintenance Engineering 

Services SARL requests that we 

consider the following service 

information as AMOCs to the proposed 

requirements of the NPRM: 

• Lufthansa Technik Engineering 

Bulletin 737–EB24–0073, Revision 01, 

for addressing the unsafe condition on 

the Model 737–700 series airplane 

having serial number (S/N) 29972. 

• Lufthansa Technik Engineering 

Bulletin 737–EB24–0088, Revision 01, 

for addressing the unsafe condition on 

the Model 737–800 series airplane 

having S/N 32438. 

• Raytheon Service Bulletin 737IGW– 

24–1, dated August 11, 2000, for 

addressing the unsafe condition on the 

Model 737–700 series airplane having 

S/N 28976. 

The commenter states that these 

bulletins address the intent of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1147, Revision 

1, dated March 1, 2007. The Lufthansa 

Technik engineering bulletins provide 

procedures for installing a cut-off switch 

in the P5 panel to interrupt electrical 

power to the IFE system. The Raytheon 

service bulletin provides procedures for 

installing a flight compartment switch 

for removing power from the IFE 

systems and other non-essential 

systems. The procedures in the 

Raytheon service bulletin were 

accomplished in accordance with STC 

ST09106AC–D, issued July 6, 2000. 

We disagree because an AMOC can be 

granted only after an AD has been 

issued. In addition, we have not 

included the Lufthansa and Raytheon 

service bulletins as a method of 

compliance within this AD; we do not 

consider it appropriate to include 

various provisions in an AD applicable 

only to individual airplane serial 


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numbers or to a single operator’s unique 

use of an affected airplane. Once we 

issue this AD, the commenter may 

request approval of an AMOC under the 

provisions of paragraph (k) of this AD. 

Sufficient data must be submitted to 

substantiate that the design change 

would provide an acceptable level of 

safety. We have not changed the AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Revise Paragraph (f) of the 

NPRM 

Boeing requests that we delete the last 

sentence of paragraph (f) of the NPRM, 

which states: ‘‘Concurrently Modify P5– 

13 Module Assembly on Model 737–300 

Series Airplanes.’’ Boeing states that the 

sentence is redundant and confusing 

because the concurrent requirements are 

addressed by paragraph (h) of the 

NPRM, and that those requirements 

only apply to a certain group of 

airplanes. 

We disagree because the phrase that 

the commenter refers to is not a 

sentence in paragraph (f) of the NPRM. 

That phrase is the heading for paragraph 

(g) of the NPRM, which gives the 

concurrent requirements. No change to 

the AD is necessary in this regard. 

Request To Extend the Compliance 

Time 

The Air Transport Association, on 

behalf of its member American Airlines, 

requests that we extend the compliance 

time from 60 to 72 months. American 

Airlines states that it is requesting this 

extension to align the compliance time 

with its heavy maintenance program 

and to avoid an unnecessary financial 

burden. American Airlines states that 

incorporating the modification requires 

extensive ‘‘power off A/C time,’’ and 

that this can be accommodated only at 

a heavy C check, which is scheduled by 

most in the industry at 72-month 

intervals. American Airlines also states 

that the proposed 60-month compliance 

time will have a substantial impact by 

requiring the unscheduled removal of 

its airplanes from service. American 

Airlines estimates that 14 of its affected 

airplanes will require special 

scheduling and out-of-service time, 

which equates to about 42 days for an 

additional cost impact of $600,000. 

We disagree with extending the 

compliance time. In developing an 

appropriate compliance time for this 

action, we considered the safety 

implications, parts availability, and 

normal maintenance schedules for the 

timely accomplishment of the 

modification. In consideration of these 

items, we have determined that a 60- 

month compliance time will ensure an 

acceptable level of safety. However, 

according to the provisions of paragraph 

(k) of this AD, we might approve 

requests to adjust the compliance time 

if the request includes data that prove 

that the new compliance time would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Change Made to Paragraph (i) of This 

AD 

We have revised paragraph (i) of this 

AD to specify that the requirements of 

that paragraph apply to ‘‘* * * Groups 

3 through 139. * * *’’ In the NPRM, we 

inadvertently specified that the 

proposed requirements would apply to 

Groups 1 through 139. This change 

agrees with paragraph 1.B. of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1147, Revision 

1, dated March 1, 2007. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the change described previously. 

We also determined that this change 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 1,617 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs, at an average labor rate 

of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to 

comply with this AD. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Model Action Work hours Parts Cost per 

airplane 

Number of 

U.S. 

registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

737–300, –400, and –500 

series airplanes.

Installation of circuit 

breaker, relays, and 

wiring.

Up to 31 ........... Up to $2,925 ..... $5,405 1 $5,405 

737–300 series airplanes Concurrent modification of 

P5–13 module assembly.

1 ....................... $2,327 .............. 2,407 1 2,407 

737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series 

airplanes.

Installation of circuit 

breaker, relays, and 

wiring.

Up to 52 ........... Up to $10,968 .. 15,128 586 8,865,008 

Concurrent modification of 

P5–13 module assembly.

4 ....................... $9,241 .............. 9,561 586 5,602,746 

737–800 series airplanes Installation of wiring for 

the No. 4 VDU.

12 ..................... $3,372 .............. 4,332 2 8,664 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 


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substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2009–12–06 Boeing: 

Amendment 39–15929. Docket No. FAA– 

2007–0163; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM– 

046–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective July 16, 2009. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to the Boeing airplanes 

identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of 

this AD, certificated in any category. 

(1) Model 737–300, –400, and –500 series 

airplanes, as identified in Boeing Service 

Bulletin 737–24–1145, dated March 4, 2004. 

(2) Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and 

–900 series airplanes, as identified in Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1147, Revision 1, 

dated March 1, 2007. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from an in-flight 

entertainment (IFE) systems review. We are 

issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew 

is able to turn off electrical power to IFE 

systems and other non-essential electrical 

systems through a switch in the flight 

compartment. The flightcrew’s inability to 

turn off power to IFE systems and other nonessential electrical systems during a nonnormal or emergency situation could result 

in the inability to control smoke or fumes in 

the airplane flight deck or cabin. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Install Circuit Breaker, Relays, and Wiring 

on Model 737–300, –400, and –500 Series 

Airplanes 

(f) For Model 737–300, –400, and –500 

series airplanes: Within 60 months after the 

effective date of this AD, install a new circuit 

breaker, relays, and wiring to allow the 

flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the 

IFE systems through the IFE/galley switch 

and do all other specified actions as 

applicable, by accomplishing all the 

applicable actions specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1145, dated March 

4, 2004. 

Concurrently Modify P5–13 Module 

Assembly on Model 737–300 Series 

Airplanes 

(g) For Model 737–300 series airplanes 

identified as Group 6 airplanes in Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1145, dated March 

4, 2004, and equipped with P5–13 module 

assembly part number (P/N) 69–37321–81: 

Prior to or concurrently with accomplishing 

the actions required by paragraph (f) of this 

AD, replace the lightplate assembly of the 

P5–13 module assembly with a new 

lightplate assembly and reidentify and test 

the modified P5–13 module assembly, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Component Service 

Bulletin 69–37321–31–03, dated August 21, 

2003. 

Install Circuit Breaker, Relays, and Wiring 

on Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and 

–900 Series Airplanes 

(h) For Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, 

and –900 series airplanes: Within 60 months 

after the effective date of this AD, install a 

new circuit breaker, relays, and wiring, as 

applicable, to allow the flightcrew to turn off 

electrical power to the IFE systems and other 

non-essential electrical systems through a 

utility switch in the flight compartment, by 

accomplishing all of the applicable actions 

specified in Parts 1, 2, or 3 of the Work 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737– 

24–1147, Revision 1, dated March 1, 2007. 

Concurrently Modify P5–13 Module 

Assembly on Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 Series Airplanes 

(i) For Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, 

and –900 series airplanes identified as 

Groups 3 through 139 inclusive in Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–24–1147, Revision 1, 

dated March 1, 2007, and equipped with P5– 

13 module assembly P/N 285A1840–3 or –4: 

Prior to or concurrently with accomplishing 

the actions required by paragraph (h) of this 

AD, modify the P5–13 module assembly, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Component Service 

Bulletin 285A1840–24–02, dated August 28, 

2003. 

Wiring Installation for the Video Display 

Unit (VDU) 

(j) For Model 737–800 series airplanes 

identified in paragraph 1.A.1. of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–23–1189, dated June 27, 

2002: Prior to or concurrently with 

accomplishing the actions required by 

paragraph (h) of this AD, install wiring for 

the No. 4 VDU cluster, an INOP marker, and 

stow clip at the P6–1 circuit breaker panel; 

reroute certain wiring for the No. 4 VDU 

cluster between stations 685 and 767; and do 

a continuity test of the newly installed and 

rerouted wiring; in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–23–1189, dated June 27, 

2002. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(k)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to Attn: Joe 

Salameh, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and 

Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle 

ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 425– 

917–6454; fax 425–917–6590. Or, e-mail 

information to 9–ANM–Seattle–ACO–AMOC– 

Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) You must use the applicable service 

information contained in Table 1 of this AD 

to do the actions required by this AD, unless 

the AD specifies otherwise. 

TABLE 1—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Service information Revision level Date 

Boeing Component Service Bulletin 69–37321–31–03 ............................................................................ Original .................. August 21, 2003. 


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TABLE 1—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE—Continued 

Service information Revision level Date 

Boeing Component Service Bulletin 285A1840–24–02 ........................................................................... Original .................. August 28, 2003. 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–23–1189 ..................................................................................................... Original .................. June 27, 2002. 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–24–1145 ..................................................................................................... Original .................. March 4, 2004. 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–24–1147 ..................................................................................................... 1 ............................ March 1, 2007. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 1, 

2009. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–13305 Filed 6–10–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0005; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–164–AD; Amendment 

39–15927; AD 2009–12–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; 

Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. 

(CASA), Model C–212–CB, C–212–CC, 

C–212–CD, C–212–CE, C–212–CF, and 

C–212–DE Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Incidents have been reported on BrittenNorman BN–2 aircraft, where cracks were 

found in the inner shell of the pitot/static 

pressure heads. The investigation concluded 

that these pitot tubes, supplied by Thales 

Optronics, could be operated outside their 

voltage specification. On December 15th, 

2005, CAA [Civil Aviation Authority] United 

Kingdom issued AD G–2005–0034 (EASA 

approval number 2005–6447), later 

superseded by EASA AD 2006–0143, to 

require inspections and leak tests on BrittenNorman aircraft. Subsequently, it has been 

discovered that the same tubes are supplied 

to EADS–CASA for installation on C–212 

aircraft, one for the pilot side and one for the 

co-pilot side. So far, EADS–CASA has not 

received any report of cracked pitot tubes 

from C–212 operators. 

This condition, if not corrected, could 

result in incorrect readings on the pressure 

instrumentation, e.g., altimeters, vertical 

speed indicators (rate of climb) and airspeed 

indicators, potentially leading to navigational 

errors. 

* * * * * 

The unsafe condition could reduce the 

ability of the flightcrew to maintain the 

safe flight and landing of the airplane. 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective July 

16, 2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of July 16, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace 

Engineer, International Branch, ANM– 

116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–1112; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on February 23, 2009 (74 FR 

8043). That NPRM proposed to correct 

an unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

Incidents have been reported on BrittenNorman BN–2 aircraft, where cracks were 

found in the inner shell of the pitot/static 

pressure heads. The investigation concluded 

that these pitot tubes, supplied by Thales 

Optronics, could be operated outside their 

voltage specification. On December 15th, 

2005, CAA [Civil Aviation Authority] United 

Kingdom issued AD G–2005–0034 (EASA 

approval number 2005–6447), later 

superseded by EASA AD 2006–0143, to 

require inspections and leak tests on BrittenNorman aircraft. Subsequently, it has been 

discovered that the same tubes are supplied 

to EADS–CASA for installation on C–212 

aircraft, one for the pilot side and one for the 

co-pilot side. So far, EADS–CASA has not 

received any report of cracked pitot tubes 

from C–212 operators. 

This condition, if not corrected, could 

result in incorrect readings on the pressure 

instrumentation, e.g., altimeters, vertical 

speed indicators (rate of climb) and airspeed 

indicators, potentially leading to navigational 

errors. 

For the reasons described above, this EASA 

AD requires the inspection of the affected 

pitot tubes, and, if cracks are found, 

replacement of those tubes with the new P/ 

N [part number] 212–A0150–0001 and 212– 

A0150–0002 pitot tubes. 

The unsafe condition could reduce the 

ability of the flightcrew to maintain the 

safe flight and landing of the airplane. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM or 

on the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 


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