[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3423.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3423

THE STATE EX REL. THE CITY OF XENIA, APPELLEE, v. GREENE COUNTY 

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL., APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip 

Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3423.] 

Annexation—Mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel county board of 

commissioners to grant city’s annexation petition—Board failed to show 

that city’s petition does not satisfy R.C. 709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7)—

Court of appeals’ judgment granting writ of mandamus ordering board to 

approve city’s petition affirmed. 

(No. 2019-1791—Submitted May 12, 2020—Decided June 25, 2020.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, 

No. 2018CA0021, 2019-Ohio-4805. 

_________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} This is an annexation case concerning roughly 45 acres of land located 

between the city of Xenia and Central State University. The Second District Court 
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 2

of Appeals granted the city’s request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Greene 

County Board of Commissioners (“the county”) to approve the city’s annexation 

petition. The county has appealed, arguing that a writ of mandamus cannot compel 

it to grant the city’s petition because, it says, it relied on its discretion in denying 

the petition and performed all its statutorily required duties. The county also argues 

that the city’s petition falls short of the statutory requirements for approval. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} In Ohio, “annexation is strictly a statutory process.” In re Petition to 

Annex 320 Acres to S. Lebanon, 64 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 597 N.E.2d 463 (1992). 

The General Assembly comprehensively reformed Ohio’s annexation processes in 

2001 with the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 621 (“S.B. 

5”). See State ex rel. Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 3 (discussing 

the legislation). S.B. 5 established three procedures “allow[ing] for expedited 

annexations when all the property owners within a parcel to be annexed sign an 

annexation petition.” Id. The three procedures are referred to as expedited type-1, 

type-2, and type-3 annexations. Id. at ¶ 5. 

{¶ 3} This appeal involves a type-2 annexation, which is governed by R.C. 

709.023. In a type-2 annexation, “the residents of the territory become residents of 

both the township and the municipality, subject to the taxes of both, and potentially 

able to receive services from either.” Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees at ¶ 7 (citing R.C. 

709.023(H)). A type-2 annexation petition must be filed with the clerk of the board 

of county commissioners. R.C. 709.023(B). After the petition is filed, the 

municipal corporation to which annexation is proposed must adopt an ordinance or 

resolution specifying what services it will provide to the territory proposed for 

annexation and when it will provide them. R.C. 709.023(C). A township or 

municipal corporation that opposes the proposed annexation may file objections 
January Term, 2020 

 3

with the board. R.C. 709.023(D). If objections are filed, the board must “review 

[the petition] to determine if each of the following conditions” are satisfied: 

(1) The petition meets all the requirements set forth in, 

and was filed in the manner provided in, section 709.021 of the

Revised Code. 

(2) The persons who signed the petition are owners of 

the real estate located in the territory proposed for annexation and 

constitute all of the owners of real estate in that territory. 

(3) The territory proposed for annexation does not 

exceed five hundred acres. 

(4) The territory proposed for annexation shares a 

contiguous boundary with the municipal corporation to which 

annexation is proposed for a continuous length of at least five per 

cent of the perimeter of the territory proposed for annexation.

(5) The annexation will not create an unincorporated 

area of the township that is completely surrounded by the territory 

proposed for annexation. 

(6) The municipal corporation to which annexation is 

proposed has agreed to provide to the territory proposed for 

annexation the services specified in the relevant ordinance or 

resolution adopted under division (C) of this section. 

(7) If a street or highway will be divided or segmented 

by the boundary line between the township and the municipal 

corporation as to create a road maintenance problem, the municipal 

corporation to which annexation is proposed has agreed as a 

condition of the annexation to assume the maintenance of that street 

or highway or to otherwise correct the problem. 
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R.C. 709.023(E). 

{¶ 4} A board of county commissioners must grant a petition that satisfies 

all the conditions and must deny a petition that does not. R.C. 709.023(F). 

Although “[t]here is no appeal in law or equity from the board’s entry of any 

resolution under this section,” a party may request “a writ of mandamus to compel 

the board * * * to perform its duties * * *.” R.C. 709.023(G).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 5} In September 2017, the city filed a type-2 annexation petition with the 

county seeking approval to annex roughly 45.6 acres of territory located in Xenia 

Township. The city owns approximately 41.1 acres of the territory proposed for 

annexation, and its ownership interest consists of a narrow strip of land used for a 

bicycle path. The path runs outward from the city in a northeasterly direction, 

where it ends adjacent to the remaining roughly 4.5 acres of the territory proposed 

for annexation—a triangular-shaped parcel owned by Central State University. A 

report prepared by the city’s staff explained that the city would benefit from the 

annexation by receiving income-tax revenue from Central State University’s 

employees and contractors and that Central State University, in turn, would benefit 

by becoming a recipient of the city’s services. Central State University consented 

to the city’s proposal to annex the 4.5-acre parcel. 

{¶ 6} The township trustees urged the county to deny the petition, which the 

county did after determining that the city’s petition did not satisfy R.C. 

709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7). The city then filed an original action in the court of 

appeals requesting a writ of mandamus ordering the county to approve the petition. 

The court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment, granted the city’s 

motion for summary judgment, and issued the writ. The county has appealed. The 

Ohio Township Association has filed an amicus brief in support of the county, and 

the Ohio Municipal League has filed an amicus brief in support of the city. 
January Term, 2020 

 5

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶ 7} For a writ of mandamus to issue in a type-2 setting, the relator must 

establish that it has a clear legal right to the requested relief by showing that it 

satisfies the conditions necessary for annexation. State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone 

Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 

N.E.3d 404, ¶ 26. If the relator can show that it satisfies the conditions, a board of 

county commissioners has a clear legal duty to approve the annexation. Id. 

Because R.C. 709.023(G) authorizes an action in mandamus, a court need not 

consider whether the relator lacks an adequate remedy at law. Id.

{¶ 8} This court exercises de novo review in an appeal from a grant of 

summary judgment. Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140 Ohio 

St.3d 193, 2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8. Summary judgment may be 

granted only when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) upon viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach 

only a conclusion adverse to the nonmoving party. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 9} Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We first address the county’s 

claim that a writ of mandamus is an improper vehicle to compel it to grant the city’s 

petition. We then address the county’s claim that the city’s petition fails to satisfy 

the conditions specified in R.C. 709.023(E). 

A. Whether a writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel the county to grant 

the city’s petition 

{¶ 10} A writ of mandamus is a command directing the “performance of an 

act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or 

station.” R.C. 2731.01. A writ cannot compel the exercise of a permissive act. 

State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft, 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992). Nor can 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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it “issue to control an officer’s exercise of discretion, but it can be issued to compel 

him to exercise it when he has a clear legal duty to do so.” Id.

{¶ 11} The county claims that mandamus does not lie because it applied its 

discretion under R.C. 709.023(E) in denying the city’s petition. Because a board 

of county commissioners is a statutory creation, with only “such power and 

jurisdiction as are conferred expressly by statutory enactment,” State ex rel. Shriver 

v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 148 Ohio St. 277, 74 N.E.2d 248 (1947), 

paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, the county must locate its claimed 

discretionary powers in the text of division (E)’s seven conditions. We discern no 

such powers here. Division (E)’s seven conditions are tightly written legal rules 

requiring straightforward application, see, e.g., R.C. 709.023(E)(3) (“The territory 

proposed for annexation [must] not exceed five hundred acres”), not open-ended 

standards permitting a “power of free decision or choice within certain legal 

bounds” or a “latitude of decision [to] decide[] questions * * * not expressly 

controlled by fixed rules of law,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

647 (1993) (defining “discretion”). Tellingly, the county does not develop an 

argument centered on division (E)’s seven conditions that shows otherwise.1

{¶ 12} Had the General Assembly intended to confer discretion on a board 

of county commissioners in a type-2 setting, it would not have been difficult to use 

wording to that effect. Under what we have termed the “traditional” method of 

annexation, Sugarcreek Twp. v. Centerville, 133 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-4649, 

979 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 3, a board must consider whether “the general good of the 

 

1. The county argues for the first time in its reply brief that it performed a ministerial act when it 

reviewed the petition, determined that it did not satisfy all of R.C. 709.023(E)’s conditions, and 

denied it. That argument is not only in tension with the county’s claim in its merit brief that it 

exercised discretion in reviewing the petition, applying division (E), and denying the petition, see 

Maloney v. Rhodes, 45 Ohio St.2d 319, 322, 345 N.E.2d 407 (1976) (distinguishing a discretionary 

act from a ministerial act)—the argument is also tardy, see Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 151 Ohio St.3d 

85, 2017-Ohio-7555, 86 N.E.3d 287, ¶ 11, fn. 1 (disregarding an argument raised for the first time 

in a reply brief). 
January Term, 2020 

 7

territory proposed to be annexed will be served” by the annexation, R.C. 

709.033(A)(5). Interpreting virtually identical language found in R.C. 709.033’s 

predecessor, we observed that such language presents a “question of fact within the 

discretion of the board.” In re Annexation of 118.7 Acres in Miami Twp. to 

Moraine, 52 Ohio St.3d 124, 132, 556 N.E.2d 1140 (1990). Division (E)’s seven 

conditions do not contain this type of open-ended language. 

{¶ 13} Turning from the statutory text to our caselaw, we observed in Butler 

Twp. Bd. of Trustees that S.B. 5 put “in place firm standards to govern the 

consideration of annexation petitions * * *.” 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-6411, 

858 N.E.2d 1193, at ¶ 8. And in Natl. Lime & Stone, we explained that when a 

type-2 annexation petition satisfies all seven of division (E)’s conditions, a board 

“has no discretion to deny the petition” and a writ of mandamus will issue. 152 

Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, at ¶ 2. The boards in those two 

cases did not raise precisely the same argument that the county is raising here, but 

we see no reason why the logic of those two decisions does not apply here. 

{¶ 14} The county next contends that mandamus does not lie because it 

performed all its statutorily imposed duties. It points to division (G), which 

provides that a party may pursue relief in mandamus to “compel the board of county 

commissioners to perform its duties under this section,” R.C. 709.023(G). In the 

county’s view, it performed its statutory duties when it reviewed the petition, 

determined that it does not comply with the statutory conditions, and adopted a 

resolution denying it. See R.C. 709.023(E) and (F). 

{¶ 15} The county’s argument fails under Natl. Lime & Stone. There, a 

board of county commissioners denied a mining company’s type-2 annexation 

petition. The company then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court 

of appeals to compel the board to grant the petition, which the court of appeals 

dismissed. We reversed and granted the writ, determining that the company had 

satisfied division (E)’s conditions. As we explained, when a relator satisfies all the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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statutory conditions, it establishes a “clear legal right to the requested relief and a 

clear legal duty on the part of the commissioners to provide it,” meaning that a 

board “must grant the annexation.” Id. at ¶ 32 (citing R.C. 709.023(F) and (G)). It 

follows from Natl. Lime & Stone that the county’s performance of its three 

statutorily imposed duties does not, on its own, foreclose the possibility that the 

county could be compelled to grant the city’s petition in a mandamus action. 

Indeed, if the county were correct here, we would not have reversed the court of 

appeals’ judgment and granted the writ in Natl. Lime & Stone. 

B. Whether the city’s petition satisfies the conditions of R.C. 709.023(E)

{¶ 16} The county claims that the city’s petition fails to satisfy four of the 

seven conditions specified in R.C. 709.023(E). We address the conditions in turn.

1. Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(1) 

{¶ 17} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(1), a petition must “meet[] all the 

requirements set forth in” and be “filed in the manner” prescribed by R.C. 709.021. 

R.C. 709.021(A) provides: 

When a petition signed by all of the owners of real estate in 

the unincorporated territory of a township proposed for annexation 

requests the annexation of that territory to a municipal corporation 

contiguous to that territory under one of the special procedures 

provided for annexation in sections 709.022, 709.023, and 709.024 

of the Revised Code, the annexation proceedings shall be conducted 

under those sections to the exclusion of any other provisions of this 

chapter unless otherwise provided in this section or the special 

procedure section chosen. 

(Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2020 

 9

{¶ 18} The word “contiguous” in R.C. 709.021(A) is undefined by statute, 

leading the county to argue that the word should be understood according to the 

contiguity principles we announced in Middletown v. McGee, 39 Ohio St.3d 284, 

530 N.E.2d 902 (1988), a pre-S.B. 5 decision that addressed whether a territory 

proposed for annexation was contiguous with the annexing municipality. We 

observed in McGee that although “the law is unsettled as to what degree of touching 

is needed to fulfill the contiguity requirement,” there “is general[] agree[ment] that 

some touching of the municipality and the territory to be annexed is required.” Id.

at 287. We explained that Ohio courts had looked with disfavor on the “use of 

connecting strips of land to meet the contiguity requirement when annexing 

outlying territory not otherwise connected to the municipality. Such annexations 

are usually referred to as ‘strip, shoestring, subterfuge, corridor, and gerrymander 

annexations.’ ” Id., quoting Watson v. Doolittle, 10 Ohio App.2d 143, 148-149, 

226 N.E.2d 771 (6th Dist.1967). Applying these principles, we concluded that a 

section of the territory proposed for annexation, which included a strip of roadway 

that extended outward from the annexing municipality for several miles, could not 

lawfully be annexed, because it was “not sufficiently contiguous” to the 

municipality. Id. at 288.

{¶ 19} The county asserts that because R.C. 709.023(E)(1) incorporates

R.C. 709.021, a type-2 annexation petition must conform to McGee’s contiguity 

principles. The city responds that the sole contiguity requirement in a type-2 setting 

lies in R.C. 709.023(E)(4), which requires that the territory proposed for annexation 

have a boundary contiguous with the municipal corporation of “at least five per 

cent” of the territory’s perimeter. We conclude that McGee does not apply here. 

{¶ 20} As McGee itself makes clear, the General Assembly had not, at the 

time we decided that case, defined the word “contiguous” for the purpose of 

applying Ohio’s annexation statutes. That statutory silence led us to draw from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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caselaw in determining the minimum degree of touching necessary for a territory 

and an annexing municipality to be contiguous. See id. at 287. 

{¶ 21} Here, in contrast, the General Assembly has defined the minimum 

degree of touching necessary in a type-2 setting. As set forth in R.C. 709.023(E)(4), 

the territory proposed for annexation must have a boundary contiguous to the 

annexing municipality for a “continuous length of at least five per cent” of the 

territory’s perimeter. See also Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Canal Fulton, 185 

Ohio App.3d 267, 2009-Ohio-6822, 923 N.E.2d 1180, ¶ 38-40 (5th Dist.) (rejecting 

the view that a type-2 annexation petition must satisfy contiguity requirements in 

addition to those prescribed by R.C. 709.023(E)(4)); 1 Gotherman, Babbitt & Lang, 

Baldwin’s Ohio Practice: Local Government Law—Municipal, Section 2.19, at 3 

(Sept. 2019) (“territory that is a ‘balloon on a string’ may nevertheless be annexed 

using the expedited type-2 annexation process provided that the territory shares a 

contiguous boundary with the municipal corporation for a continuous length of at 

least 5% of the perimeter of the territory”). It follows that applying McGee’s 

contiguity principles in a type-2 case would render meaningless the specific 

contiguity limitations embodied in R.C. 709.023(E)(4). See In re Adoption of M.B., 

131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, 963 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 19 (disfavoring an 

interpretation that renders a statute meaningless); R.C. 1.47(B) (“The entire statute 

is intended to be effective”). 

{¶ 22} Another problem with the county’s argument is that it is in tension 

with our decision in Natl. Lime & Stone, 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 

N.E.3d 404. There, we considered whether each of the seven conditions applicable 

in a type-2 setting were satisfied. Not once did we refer to McGee’s contiguity 

principles in determining whether the territory proposed for annexation was 

contiguous with the annexing municipality. Instead, we simply performed the 

analysis prescribed by R.C. 709.023(E)(4), determining that the territory proposed 

for annexation was sufficiently contiguous because it “share[d] a contiguous 
January Term, 2020 

 11 

boundary of at least 5 percent of the territory’s perimeter.” Natl Lime & Stone at 

¶ 30. To be sure, Natl. Lime & Stone does not squarely resolve the argument that 

the county raises here. But even so, it would be hard to characterize the above 

language of Natl. Lime & Stone as dicta because its contiguity analysis was 

essential to the judgment.2

{¶ 23} The county urges this court to apply State ex rel. Overholser 

Builders, L.L.C. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2007 CA 

36, 2008-Ohio-6338, ¶ 37-39, a decision holding that McGee’s contiguity 

principles apply to type-1 annexation petitions filed under R.C. 709.022. But 

Overholser Builders does not apply here, because the city filed its annexation 

petition under R.C. 709.023, not R.C. 709.022. 

{¶ 24} In summary, we hold that R.C. 709.023(E)(4) establishes the sole 

contiguity requirement in a type-2 setting. Because the county does not otherwise 

contend that the city’s petition departs from R.C. 709.023(E)(1), we conclude that 

the petition satisfies the requirements of that provision. 

2. Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(4) 

{¶ 25} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(4), the territory proposed for annexation

must have a boundary contiguous with the municipal corporation of at least 5 

percent of the territory’s perimeter. The city attested to the court of appeals that 

the territory proposed for annexation has a perimeter of 36,302.11 feet and has a 

boundary contiguous with the city of 1,929.14 feet, equating to a shared boundary 

of roughly 5.31 percent of the territory’s perimeter. For its part, the county attested 

that the territory proposed for annexation has a perimeter of 38,317.34 feet and has 

a boundary contiguous with the city of 1,929.14 feet, equating to a shared boundary 

of roughly 5.03 percent of the territory’s perimeter. The court of appeals 

 

2. Our decision in Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees does not require a different result. There, we observed 

that “balloon-on-a-string annexations can be a significant problem.” 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-

Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.3d 1193, at ¶ 40. But we did not hold in that case that they are unlawful under 

R.C. 709.023. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 12 

determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact about the petition’s 

compliance with R.C. 709.023(E)(4) because, although the parties’ numbers 

slightly diverge, they nevertheless establish that the shared boundary exceeds the 5 

percent threshold. 

{¶ 26} The county now points to a different category of evidence, urging us 

to consider the city’s future plans for annexing additional territory. Specifically, 

the county cites a city report describing the city’s future plan to annex roughly 159 

acres of territory, at least some of which Central State University has an interest in. 

According to the county, if one were to account for the city’s future annexation 

plans, the shared boundary would fall to 4.29 percent. 

{¶ 27} The problem with the county’s argument is twofold. First, Ohio law 

directs a board of county commissioners to review a petition to determine whether 

it satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)’s seven conditions, not a municipal corporation’s intent 

to annex additional territory at some indeterminate point in the future. We decline 

the county’s invitation to rewrite the statute by considering the city’s future plans. 

See State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 N.E.2d 540 (1999) (“In construing

a statute, we may not add or delete words”). Second, the county’s argument 

conflicts with the statement of facts that it and the city jointly filed below, which 

states, among other things, that the city’s petition seeks to “annex 45.637 acres of 

territory, more or less, in Xenia Township to the City of Xenia.” 

{¶ 28} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(4)’s 

requirements. 

3. Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(5) 

{¶ 29} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(5), the petition must show that the 

“annexation will not create an unincorporated area of the township that is 

completely surrounded by the territory proposed for annexation.” The county 

claims that the city’s petition does not satisfy this condition because the proposed 

annexation of the bicycle path would create two township islands. The first area, 
January Term, 2020 

 13 

known as the Green Parcel, is a triangular-shaped parcel that is bounded by the city 

on two sides, with the bicycle path running along the third side. The second, the 

Douglas Street area, is a quadrilateral-shaped group of parcels that are bounded by 

the city on three sides, with the bicycle path running along the fourth side. 

{¶ 30} The city does not dispute that the proposed annexation would create 

two township islands. But it correctly points out that R.C. 709.023(E)(5) forbids 

only township islands that are “completely surrounded by the territory proposed for 

annexation,” not islands that are created by the coupling of pre- and post-annexation 

boundaries. Here, “the territory proposed for annexation” would form merely one 

side of the triangular-shaped island and one side of the quadrilateral-shaped island. 

{¶ 31} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(5)’s 

requirements. 

4. Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(7) 

{¶ 32} R.C. 709.023(E)(7) provides that “[i]f a street or highway will be 

divided or segmented by the boundary line between the township and the municipal 

corporation as to create a road maintenance problem, the municipal corporation” 

must have “agreed as a condition of the annexation to assume the maintenance of 

that street or highway or to otherwise correct the problem.” 

{¶ 33} Although the city essentially replicated this language in its petition, 

during deliberations on the petition, one of the county commissioners inquired 

about the scope of the city’s agreement. The city’s attorney initially responded that 

the city would maintain portions of affected roads that crossed over the bicycle path 

but would not maintain any other portions of the roads, because the city would not 

have jurisdiction over the latter portions. The attorney later clarified this response, 

saying that the city would comply with “whatever legal requirements” regarding 

road maintenance would apply. 

{¶ 34} The county claims that the attorney’s statements invalidate the city’s 

agreement to assume road-maintenance duties. But as the court of appeals 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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observed, R.C. 709.023(E)(7) provides that a municipal corporation must agree 

either to “assume the maintenance of th[e] street or highway or to otherwise correct 

the problem.” (Emphasis added.) In light of the clause’s disjunctive phrasing, it 

does not matter whether the attorney’s statement undermined the city’s promise to 

assume street-maintenance duties, because the city had agreed “to otherwise correct 

the problem,” id.

{¶ 35} The county next argues that the city failed to present to the township 

or any agency an agreement concerning road-maintenance issues; however, the 

county cites no law that requires a municipal corporation to do this. 

{¶ 36} Last, the county claims that the city had failed to correct roadmaintenance problems arising from prior annexations. Thus, the argument runs, 

the city will fail to correct problems arising from the proposed annexation. This 

argument is speculative, and even if true, it fails to establish a genuine issue of 

material fact concerning whether the city in fact agreed in its petition to correct 

road-maintenance-related problems. 

{¶ 37} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(7)’s 

requirements. 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court 

appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 

and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 

Donnette A. Fisher, Director of Law, for appellee. 

Stephen K. Haller, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Elizabeth A. 

Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants. 
January Term, 2020 

 15 

 Frost, Brown, Todd, L.L.C., Philip K. Hartmann, Yazan S. Ashrawi, and 

Christopher D. Thomas; and Garry E. Hunter, General Counsel, urging affirmance 

for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 

 Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Peter N. Griggs, Julia E. Donnan, and 

Jennifer L. Huber, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Township Association. 

_________________