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UNREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 

AFRICA: RAMIFICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 6, 2011 

Serial No. 112–16 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

VACANCY

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Vice Chair 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KEVIN GUNDERSEN, Staff Director 

ALAN CARROLL, Subcommittee Clerk 

STEPHEN VINA, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence .................................................................................................... 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

WITNESS

Mr. Rick ‘‘Ozzie’’ Nelson, Director and Senior Fellow, Homeland Security 

and Counterterrorism Program, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow and Executive Director, Center for Law 

and Counter Terrorism, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Mr. Philip Mudd, Senior Research Fellow, New America Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

(1) 

UNREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 

AFRICA: RAMIFICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY 

Wednesday, April 6, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:33 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Meehan, Cravaack, Walsh, Quayle, 

Long, Speier, Thompson, Cuellar, and Jackson Lee. 

Mr. MEEHAN [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland Security, 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to 

order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the 

unrest in the Middle East and North Africa and the ramifications 

on homeland security. 

As is customary, I want to take a moment to make my own opening statement. 

I would like to welcome everybody to today’s Subcommittee on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence for this hearing. 

I would like to begin by taking an opportunity to thank Ranking 

Member Jackie Speier on her first subcommittee hearing. We will 

be chairing this together for the first time. I look forward to working with you in a bipartisan manner on these important homeland 

security issues. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on the on-going 

unrest in the Middle East and North Africa and its impact on U.S. 

homeland security. Just about a month ago, on March 2, this subcommittee met to hear testimony of the threat posed by al-Qaeda 

on the Arabian Peninsula to the U.S. homeland. One of the key 

takeaways from that hearing was the level of instability in Yemen 

and the surrounding areas. 

A lot has changed in just 1 month. Unfortunately, many of the 

predictions that we heard from the witnesses have come to fruition 

in a very short period of time, including a teetering government on 

the brink of collapse in Yemen and a decrease in counterterrorism 

cooperation. 

In addition to facing an unstable government in Yemen, the 

United States has engaged in military operations against Libya. 

The Saudis have sent troops to Bahrain. Protests growing in Syria. 

The Egyptian military has assumed control of its country. 
2 

So overall, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa is 

changing by the day. All you have to do is pick up the morning’s 

news to see how 24 hours can significantly shape and impact the 

region. 

This has major ramifications for United States homeland security, especially as it relates to counterterrorism and intelligence, 

the two areas which this subcommittee is responsible for overseeing. 

As I mentioned, events in Yemen present challenges for the 

United States’ homeland security. Current unrest there has left the 

regime of President Saleh on the brink of collapse. Whatever the 

impression of President Saleh may be—and there are many who 

will argue that he is a flawed leader—he has been cooperative with 

the United States on counterterrorism priorities, particularly the 

fight against AQAP, providing the necessary intelligence to go after 

the enemy. As we speak, President Saleh struggles against insurrection, defections, and Yemen harbors safe haven for al-Qaeda. 

I am very concerned about what the alternatives will be and how 

that affects the United States’ ability to search for and mitigate 

AQAP’s ability to attack this homeland. 

In Egypt, the whole world watched peaceful demonstrations demand change and more individual rights. There were also multiple 

reports that prisons were emptied during the unrest and Islamists 

who took to violence in opposition to the previous regime had escaped. 

Quite simply, hundreds of radicalized Islamists on the loose 

throughout the Middle East and North Africa is dangerous. I would 

like to note that it was the 2006 prison break in Yemen that heavily contributed to the creation of AQAP, the terrorist organization 

that has now come dangerously close to attacking the United 

States. 

Last, events in Libya were completely unforeseen just 1 month 

ago, and I have concerns about the United States’ commitments 

that we all jointly are engaged in, but most importantly for the 

United States Homeland Security, there is the possibility that 

Colonel Gadhafi returning to terrorism, either as a last gasp at 

saving his regime or as retribution for U.S. military action in 

Libya. 

More than most other individuals in the last 30 years, Colonel 

Gadhafi has illustrated both his intent and capability to conduct 

terrorist attacks against the United States interests, most notably 

the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 

Just last week, the NATO supreme allied commander, Jim 

Stavridis, James Stavridis, Admiral Stavridis, told Members of 

Congress that there were flickers of involvement of al-Qaeda 

among Libyan rebels. 

This is problematic, and I believe we must exercise due diligence 

in figuring out who is included among the rebels and who we 

choose to partner with in support among opposition in Libya. As 

everyone knows, the United States armed Islamist opposition 

groups in the 1980s against the Soviet Union, a successful policy 

in the short term, but the blowback was severe. We must do everything we can to avoid enabling our enemies to attack our homeland. 
3 

I look forward to hearing from this distinguished panel, and I 

now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Speier of California, for 

her 5-minute opening statement. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. 

I, too, look forward to working with you in a very bipartisan fashion that is consistent with this subcommittee in the past. I also 

want to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for being here. 

We know that you will shed great light on this issue. 

Over the last few months, we have witnessed an unprecedented 

wave of unrest and revolutionary fervor—furor in North Africa and 

the Middle East, including among some of our long-time allies. We 

have now joined in military action in Libya to prevent a humanitarian crisis. 

We know the wave of unrest spreading across the region began 

with one person’s frustration and sense of disenfranchisement, but 

the underlying symptoms of corruption, alienation, and oppression 

have long plagued the area. In the blink of an eye, the regimes in 

Tunisia and Egypt have been toppled, and protest movements have 

erupted in Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, and others, and their fates remain to be determined. 

In this hearing, we are examining important questions about 

how these events will influence the on-going international terrorist 

threat and our counterterrorism efforts across the region and the 

implications for our efforts here at home. 

For the first time in decades, relationships that we have relied 

on in the fight against terrorism are changing. In some cases, we 

have to work with new partners who will not necessarily respect 

past security agreements and practices. How do we most effectively 

bridge the divide between the old and new governments? 

Egypt and Tunisia, for example, have reportedly disbanded their 

long-feared state security forces. How will this affect our longstanding security relationship and joint counterterrorism efforts? 

There may also be political vacuums for prolonged periods of 

time in many of these countries, leaving open the possibility for 

terrorist groups to exploit the lack of coordinated operations and 

intelligence sharing. 

Of course, any change, and particularly unplanned-for revolutionary changes, present us with challenges, as well as opportunities. It is critical that we work with the new leaders to ensure that 

they not only have effective counterterrorism policies, but they respect the human rights of their own populations, as well. 

For too long, we have supported Middle East regimes with blinders on, fearing the alternatives would be far worse. Unfortunately, 

these blinders resulted in us being caught by surprise by what was 

actually happening on the streets, and now we are left scrambling 

to answer critical questions like: Who is taking power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen? Who is the Muslim Brotherhood? Who are the 

rebels in Libya? 

As we seek to answer these basic questions and define our approach to a reshuffled Middle East and North Africa, we must support the democratic ambitions of the people, while being pragmatic 

in our assessment of the threats to our homeland. 

In Yemen, al-Qaeda and the AQAP is already capitalizing on the 

unrest by consolidating their power in the tribal regions outside 
4 

the capital. We know that President Saleh is too consumed with his 

own political survival to make AQAP a priority and has even diverted counterterrorism forces to protect the last remnants of his 

regime. With or without President Saleh, we must continue to work 

with Yemen to combat AQAP as it attempts to plot against the 

homeland. 

In Libya, we must ensure that the flickers of al-Qaeda activity, 

as described by Admiral Stavridis, do not grow and subvert the efforts by the rebels to secure greater freedoms. 

Similarly, we must keep a close eye on Colonel Gadhafi, an unpredictable dictator with a long history of supporting terrorism, including allowing and supporting terrorist training camps on Libyan 

soil. 

In Egypt, we need more information on the thousands of inmates 

that were released or escaped from prison during the protests and 

whether they have ties to terror organizations. 

But before we jump to conclusions, we must have the facts to differentiate terrorist groups from other legitimate and indigenous political organizations. In Syria, we have a state sponsor of terrorism 

that could fall, opening the door for Hamas and Iran-backed 

Hezbollah to take advantage of the chaos. 

While the outlook may appear grim and the uncertainty overwhelming, many still believe that democracy is not a friend to alQaeda or its affiliates. Some jihadist propaganda, including the latest edition of AQAP’s Inspire magazine, is saying otherwise, so we 

must better understand what we can do to ensure that these democratic movements do not develop into potential recruiting grounds 

for violent extremism. 

Overall, we still know very little about how the terrorist threat 

may evolve, so we must keep a watchful eye as the events continue 

to unfold. We cannot afford to be caught off-guard again, as was 

the case when the protests started. Once we learned that the terrorist threats are changing, so must our counterterrorism efforts. 

We must take a hard look at our old and new partners in the region and re-evaluate our counterterrorism strategy as necessary. 

While protecting the homeland also begins abroad, we must also 

ensure our Federal, State, and local officials here at home are 

aware of the change in security environment and have the information and resources they need to keep America safe. 

With that, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about 

the challenges and opportunities ahead, and I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

We are also very grateful that we have in attendance today the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, and as the tradition of the committee, we will invite Mr. Thompson to make an 

opening statement, if he would like to do so. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I would. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this timely hearing. 

First, I want to welcome the gentlewoman from California, Ms. 

Speier, the new Ranking Member of the subcommittee. I look forward to working with her. 

I would also like to recognize some uniform fire service people 

from my home State of Mississippi, who are also in attendance at 

the hearing this morning. 
5 

I have no doubt, however, that Ms. Speier will continue the great 

work on this subcommittee and look forward to working with her 

in her new role. As I understand, this is your maiden hearing. 

Ms. SPEIER. It is my maiden hearing. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Absolutely. Okay. So I am also looking forward 

to our witnesses and their testimony today. 

There are many questions about how the events unfolding in the 

Middle East and North Africa will impact us at home today. The 

situation is changing every single day, and tyranny is being challenged in all corners of the region. 

Two countries have already removed their leaders, and the people have begun the process of rebuilding their countries in a more 

equitable way. In Yemen, the people are still fighting to change the 

status quo and gain more economic and political freedoms for all. 

In Libya, rebels, with the help of NATO, are struggling to end the 

42-year rule of a ruthless dictator. 

Because of the fragile conditions in the region, however, we have 

to be smart about how we frame the issues and how we react to 

developments. We must work to ensure that our words and actions 

do not inflame an already hostile environment. We also must operate with facts and sound intelligence, not hyperbole and speculation. 

While we embrace the spread of democracy across the Middle 

East and North Africa, we must also be realistic about the challenges ahead. Many countries have suspended their constitutions, 

dismissed their governments, and replaced their ruling parties. In 

some cases, we will have a blank slate to work with. In many, we 

may need to build new alliances to forge effective counterterrorism 

partnerships. 

But with a growing thirst for democracy now on our side, these 

challenges can be more freely addressed. Nonetheless, the terrorists also seek to take advantage of the chaos. Al-Qaeda and their 

affiliates have also applauded the unrest just as loudly as we have, 

but their applause rings hollow. 

Like many experts, I believe the uprising represents the people’s 

aspirations for greater political rights and economic opportunities, 

not for extremism and violence. These terrorists seem to be grasping for relevancy in a mass movement that is largely passing them 

by. 

Still, we must remain vigilant and guard against these small, but 

vocal strains of evildoers, because while the threat of terrorists exploiting the instability is real, the possibilities for good are endless. 

Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

I want to remind the other Members of the committee that they 

may submit opening statements for the record, if they would choose 

to do so. 

Now, we are pleased to have what will ultimately be four distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. Mr. 

Mudd informed us that he would be on his way earlier yesterday, 

and I am looking forward to the testimony from each of you. Let 

me remind you that the entire written statement that you give 

today will appear in the record. 
6 

Today’s first witness is Mr. Ozzie Nelson. Mr. Nelson is the director of homeland security and counterterrorism program and a 

senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Nelson is a former 

Navy helicopter pilot with over 20 years of operational and intelligence experience, including assignments on the National Security 

Council and at the National Counterterrorism Center. His work at 

CSIS focuses on counterterrorism, homeland security, and defenserelated issues. 

Mr. Nelson, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RICK ‘‘OZZIE’’ NELSON, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. NELSON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, Members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

Context is important when considering how unrest in the Middle 

East and North Africa will influence al-Qaeda specifically and 

Islamist terrorism generally. It makes little sense to talk in vague 

terms about recent events signaling the demise or revival of alQaeda in the region, because al-Qaeda and its affiliates differ significantly based on the local environments in which they operate 

and the local grievances that drive their agendas. 

Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has proven time and time again to 

be a creative and adaptive adversary. Where chaos exists, so too 

does opportunity. Moving forward, I will touch on Libya, Egypt, 

and Yemen. 

In Libya, much remains unknown about the rebels and their political organization. Still, there have been reports that at least 

some members of the opposition forces are affiliated with al-Qaeda. 

This raises some important considerations. 

First and foremost is the possibility that al-Qaeda elements could 

seize power in a post-Gadhafi Libyan government. Fortunately, the 

rebel movement appears diverse enough to forestall this possibility. 

A far more realistic possibility is that a protracted Libyan civil war 

may produce sufficient chaos to allow for the development of legitimate terrorist cells in the eastern part of the country. 

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, its allies notoriously exploit territories with weak central governments, carrying out—carving out 

physical safe havens that facilitate training and operational planning. Nascent terrorist cells in eastern Libya could still further destabilize already turbulent North Africa by creating a new base of 

support within the larger al-Qaeda movement. 

There are also concerns about Gadhafi returning to his rule, and 

the Chairman and the Ranking Member mentioned that. This gives 

us few appealing options for U.S. counterterrorism policy as it relates to Libya. Despite his about-face on combating terrorism in 

Libya, Gadhafi’s actions make his long-term presence untenable. 

Officials understand that any sort of ground invasion would only 

serve to fuel al-Qaeda’s toxic narrative of a war between West and 

Islam. Al-Qaeda uses this narrative as a major recruiting tool, so 
7 

the Obama administration has been smart to reject outright the 

idea of large-scale intervention. 

In deploying force, the United States and NATO have also wisely 

resisted calls to immediately arm rebel forces. Officials may eventually decide that this is the right course of action. Until then, the 

no-fly zone is buying time for authorities to learn more about the 

goals of the rebel forces. 

In Egypt, terrorism-related concerns are focused squarely on the 

role of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is likely to play a role in 

a post-Mubarak government and society. The uprisings in Egypt 

have been met with public concern over the possibility of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to control the affairs in Cairo. 

Were the Muslim Brotherhood actually to gain power in Egypt, 

it would face the burden of governing a society that is demanding 

jobs and reliable services and openness in government, the same 

underlying demands that have ignited the revolution. It is reasonable to expect that the burden of governing would temper the 

Brotherhood’s Islamist political ambitions. 

Many of the fears—growing protests—moving on to Yemen— 

growing protests against the rule of President Saleh pose legitimate questions about how AQAP may take advantage of regime 

change in Yemen. Saleh and the security services have been the 

lynchpin of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Yemen. As such, recent commentary on Yemen’s political crisis has tended to focus on 

the risks inherent in a Saleh’s resignation, specifically, that alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would enjoy even more freedom to 

operate. 

I would argue that political upheaval in Yemen is a concern with 

regard to AQAP irrespective of any damage done by the removal 

of Saleh. It is not at all clear that the Yemeni president has been 

an effective partner in combating terrorism. One Middle East observer recently noted that Sana’a’s government has failed to capture or kill a single al-Qaeda leader in the last 2 years. 

Instead, the regime has directed much of its attention to Yemen’s 

other security challenges, which include an insurgency in the north 

and the separatist movements in the south. 

Yemen’s litany of political, social, and economic challenges, combined with AQAP’s growing strength, means that there are no easy 

counterterrorism solutions. To the greatest extent possible, the 

United States must engage local Yemenis directly affected by 

AQAP’s activities, not just the government in Sana’a, as an attempt—an attempt to isolate AQAP. 

Beyond the limited scope of counterterrorism operations, the 

United States and its partners must address the underlying political, and social, and economic sources of Yemen’s instabilities. 

Regarding broader considerations for U.S. counterterrorism policy, recent events give us—in discussing how terrorism threats 

intersect with regional unrest, there has been a tendency to worry 

about a terrorist takeover of certain governments or states. In reality, this should never be the chief concern. 

Despite their potential for major attacks with destabilizing consequences, al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain marginal movements 

within the Middle East and North Africa. These groups will never 
8 

command anything close to the popular support necessary to govern a modern state. 

Instead, we should—still, we should not underestimate alQaeda’s lethality and maniacal focus on attacking the United 

States and the West. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations 

most stand to benefit from the emergence of a chaotic, factious, and 

ungoverned territories, whereupon these groups seek to establish 

safe havens for training and operational planning. 

I look forward to answering of the committee’s questions, and 

again, I appreciate your time. 

[The statement of Mr. Nelson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICK ‘‘OZZIE’’ NELSON

APRIL 6, 2011 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, Members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today. The past several months have brought extraordinary change to the Middle East and North Africa, and it is most appropriate 

that we examine how a broad array of political, social, and economic transformations in the region may affect U.S. National interests, particularly as these interests relate to homeland security and counterterrorism. 

Context is important when considering how unrest in the Middle East and North 

Africa will influence al-Qaeda specifically and Islamist terrorism generally. It makes 

little sense to talk in vague terms about recent events signaling the demise or revival of al-Qaeda in the region, because al-Qaeda and its affiliates differ significantly based on the local environments in which they operate and the local grievances that drive their agendas. I commend the committee for framing today’s hearing in a manner that allows for discussion of specific countries, and in this vein, 

I will begin my remarks by examining the terrorism dimensions at play in Libya, 

Egypt, and Yemen, respectively. 

As committee members and my fellow witnesses also know, al-Qaeda senior leadership has proven time and again to be a creative and adaptive adversary; where 

chaos exists, so too does opportunity. Given al-Qaeda’s transnational operations and 

aspirations, I will conclude my remarks with some broader observations about the 

implications that today’s unrest have for U.S. counterterrorism strategies in the 

Middle East and North Africa. 

TERRORISM CONCERNS IN LIBYA, EGYPT, AND YEMEN

Concerns over terrorism underpin one of the most pressing questions surrounding 

U.S. and NATO involvement in Libya: Whether the Obama administration and its 

European counterparts should more actively support rebel forces in their bid to depose Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi. Much remains unknown about the rebels and their 

political organization, the Transitional National Council. Still, there have been reports that at least some members of the opposition forces are affiliated with alQaeda. This fact raises some important considerations for U.S. and NATO policy in 

Libya. 

First and foremost is the possibility that al-Qaeda elements could seize power in 

a post-Qaddafi, putatively rebel-led, Libyan government. Fortunately, the rebel 

movement appears diverse enough to forestall this possibility. A far more realistic 

possibility is that a protracted Libyan civil war may produce sufficient chaos to 

allow for the development of legitimate terrorist cells in the eastern part of the 

country. Al-Qaeda and its allies notoriously exploit territories with weak central 

governments, carving out physical safe havens that facilitate training and operational planning. A chief concern is that Algerian-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), a formal al-Qaeda affiliate, might team up with Libyan rebel factions sympathetic to terrorism. Even absent coordination with an al-Qaeda affiliate 

like AQIM, nascent terrorist cells in eastern Libya still could further destabilize already turbulent North Africa by creating a new base of support within the larger 

al-Qaeda movement. Finally, given the recent history of Libyan extremists traveling 

to Iraq as foreign fighters, the growth of terrorist cells in the eastern part of Libya 

could mean another influx of foreign fighters into other conflict zones across the region. 

As if deciphering rebel intentions were not enough, there are also concerns about 

whether Qaddafi might return to terrorism should he maintain his rule. In his 
9 

1Michael Scheuer, ‘‘Why the Mideast revolts will help al-Qaeda,’’ Washington Post, March 4, 

2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030402322. 

html. 

lengthy reign, Qaddafi has been implicated in state-sponsored terrorism on multiple 

occasions, as with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. In recent years, he has combatted Islamist terrorism within Libyan borders, often working in harmony with 

Western goals. But now that hostilities have reignited between Qaddafi and the 

West, it is entirely conceivable that the Libyan leader may abandon that sort of cooperation should he remain in power. 

These facts suggest few appealing options for U.S. counterterrorism policy as it 

relates to broader Western strategies in Libya. Despite his about-face on combatting 

terrorism within Libya, Qaddafi’s recent actions make his long-term presence in the 

country untenable. Even though the United States and NATO do not seem to be 

currently discussing military operations in terms of regime change, we should not 

be surprised to see Western policy ultimately evolve to include a broader set of options for removing Qaddafi from power. Until then, deliberative action—like that 

currently being pursued by the United States and NATO—offers the surest course 

to mitigating terrorism risks in Libya. 

Officials understand that any sort of ground invasion would only serve to fuel alQaeda’s toxic narrative of a war between the West and Islam. Al-qaeda uses this 

narrative as a major recruiting tool, so the Obama administration has been smart 

to reject outright the idea of large-scale intervention. In deploying force, the United 

States and NATO have also wisely resisted calls to immediately arm rebel forces. 

Officials may eventually decide that this is the right course of action; until then, 

the no-fly zone is buying time for authorities to learn more about the makeup and 

goals of the rebel forces, which is essential to do before arming any group of militants with possible terrorist connections. 

Egypt, meanwhile, faces a much different set of issues than does its neighbor to 

the west. While terrorism-related concerns in Libya center on a largely-unknown 

threat, those in Egypt are focused squarely on the role that the Muslim Brotherhood 

is likely to play in a post-Mubarak government and society. The uprisings in Egypt 

have been met with public concern over the possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist political 

groups, might come to control political affairs in Cairo. These fears are founded on 

the Brotherhood’s historical ties to terrorism and the organization’s belief in Sharia, 

or Islamic law. 

Still, the Muslim Brotherhood long ago renounced violence, and the organization 

has an antagonistic relationship with al-Qaeda, especially its No. 2 in command, 

Ayman al Zawahiri, himself an Egyptian. Were the Muslim Brotherhood to gain actual power in Egypt, it would face the burden of governing in a society that is now 

demanding jobs, reliable services, and openness in government, the same underlying 

demands that ignited the revolution. It is reasonable to expect that this burden to 

govern would temper the Brotherhood’s Islamist political ambitions. Finally, the 

Egyptian military remains firmly entrenched, and is likely to cede power to elected 

civilians only through a gradual process of reforms. It is hard to imagine a situation 

in which the Egyptian military would abide a civilian government, especially one 

controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, which moved to become a state sponsor of 

terrorism. 

A more serious terrorism threat is posed by the categorical release of thousands 

of Egyptian prisoners, some of whom have extremist connections, over the past few 

months. In early March, it was reported that as many as 17,000 prisoners had been 

freed since Egypt’s uprisings began.1 While there are no reliable statistics on what 

percentage of these individuals are tied to terrorism, there have been reports of 

former prisoners associated not just with the Muslim Brotherhood, but also with 

Hamas and Hezbollah. The impact of categorical prison releases, then, may be felt 

not just in Egypt but in the larger region, in places like Israel and Lebanon, as recently-freed militants reconstitute connections with known terrorist groups or forge 

new partnerships. 

Many of the fears surrounding prison releases in Egypt stem from the recent experience in Yemen, the third country under consideration at today’s hearing. A February 2006 prison break in Sana’a freed a number of jailed militants, injecting key 

leaders into al-Qaeda’s efforts to reconstitute its capabilities on the Arabian Peninsula. The prison break ultimately facilitated the unification of disparate Saudi and 

Yemeni terrorist cells under the banner of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) in 2009. Today AQAP is considered one of the most lethal al-Qaeda affiliates; the group’s potential for regional and global attacks helps explain why so 
10 

2 Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘So Long, Saleh: Let’s be honest: We don’t need the Yemeni president to 

fight al-Qaeda,’’ Foreign Policy, February 10, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 

2011/02/09/sollonglsaleh?page=full. 

many counterterrorism experts view political instability in Yemen as one of the 

most challenging developments in the Middle East and North Africa. 

Growing protests against the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh pose legitimate 

questions about how AQAP might take advantage of regime change in Yemen. Saleh 

and his security services have been the lynchpin of U.S. counterterrorism strategy 

in Yemen, especially since the 2009 ‘‘Christmas day’’ plot, after which the Obama 

administration doubled counterterrorism assistance to the government in Sana’a. As 

such, recent commentary on Yemen’s political crisis has tended to focus on the risks 

inherent in a Saleh resignation—specifically, that AQAP would enjoy even more 

freedom to operate. 

I would argue that political upheaval in Yemen is a concern with regard to AQAP 

irrespective of any damage done by the removal of Saleh. It is not at all clear that 

the Yemeni president has been an effective partner in combatting terrorism. One 

Middle East observer recently noted that the Sana’a government has ‘‘failed to kill 

or capture a single al-Qaeda leader in the last two years.’’2 Instead, the regime has 

directed much of its attention to Yemen’s other security challenges, which include 

an insurgency in the north and a separatist movement in the south. As Saleh has 

remained preoccupied with these domestic battles, Yemen’s economy, which already 

was facing looming natural resource shortages, has continued its nosedive. 

Yemen’s litany of political, social, and economic challenges, combined with AQAP’s 

growing strength, means that there are no easy counterterrorism solutions to be had 

in the country. To the greatest extent possible, the United States must engage local 

Yemenis directly affected by AQAP’s activities, and not just the government in 

Sana’a, in an attempt to isolate AQAP. Beyond the limited scope of counterterrorism 

operations, the United States and its partners must address the underlying political, 

social, and economic sources of Yemen’s instability; doing so will have the greatest 

long-term impact in mitigating extremist violence in the country. Working through 

entities like ‘‘Friends of Yemen,’’ a collection of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

members and Western nations, will be essential to success in this endeavor. For example, Saudi Arabia channels up to $2 billion per year in development aid to 

Yemen; the United Arab Emirates contributed just under $1 billion last year. These 

countries can prove particularly helpful in implementing political and socioeconomic 

reforms, given their deep ties to Yemen’s people and institutions. 

BROADER CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AND NORTH AFRICA

While the cases of Libya, Egypt, and Yemen differ in significant ways, recent 

events in those three countries suggest some broader considerations for U.S. 

counterterrorism policy in the Middle East and North Africa. In discussing how terrorism threats intersect with regional unrest, there has been a tendency to worry 

about a terrorist ‘‘takeover’’ of certain governments or states. In reality, this should 

never have been the chief concern. Despite their potential for major attacks with 

destabilizing consequences, al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain marginal movements 

within the Middle East and North Africa. The groups will never command anything 

close to the popular support necessary to govern a modern state. 

Still, we should not underestimate al-Qaeda’s lethality and maniacal focus on attacking the United States and the West. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations 

most stand to benefit from the emergence of chaotic, factious, or ungoverned territories, whereupon these groups seek to establish safe havens for training and operational planning. This was the case in Iraq in the mid-2000s, and it is the case in 

Yemen today. Outside the region, al-Qaeda affiliates have taken advantage of political instability to establish training zones in places like northwestern Pakistan and 

Southeast Asia. 

This trend has important implications for U.S. counterterrorism policy in the Middle East and North Africa today. American policy has long leveraged relationships 

with friendly autocrats in the region; these arrangements were thought to provide 

the stability necessary to ensure U.S. economic and security interests. Especially 

since 9/11, these partnerships have often produced tangible counterterrorism successes. At the same time, however, such policies have served as a key component 

of al-Qaeda’s ideology—that the United States is purportedly complicit in supporting 

so-called ‘‘apostate regimes’’ and denying freedoms to Muslim peoples. Furthermore, 

the recent uprisings have demonstrated that an over-reliance on autocrats can actually lead to great instability, just the opposite of what American policymakers seek. 
11 

We are now faced with a rare historical moment—and a strategic opportunity— 

in which the political, social, and economic aspirations of Middle East and North 

African publics are aligned more closely with U.S. interests than ever before. Longterm, the best deterrent to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups will be the development of stable, prosperous, and free societies in the Middle East and North Africa. 

That goal is far easier said than done, and how to formulate a comprehensive strategy is beyond the scope of my testimony. Still, I want to close by reflecting on one 

issue, in particular: the continued importance of U.S. engagement and investment 

in the region. 

It may be tempting to view the recent uprisings, especially those against U.S.- 

backed authoritarian regimes, as a repudiation of American policy in the Middle 

East and North Africa. But such an assessment would miss an important part of 

the story. Here, it is helpful to reconsider Egypt. As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian 

military remains the one consistent, stabilizing force in the country, and is being 

relied upon to help implement progressive reforms. The military is in a position to 

guide the country through its present turmoil largely because of decades of U.S. and 

international bureaucratic and financial investment in Egypt’s security structures. 

For the United States, the problem in its policies toward Egypt has not been so 

much the fact of partnership with the ruling powers, but rather the decision not to 

make American support contingent on the implementation of gradual reforms in 

Egyptian society. 

Libya and Yemen, on the other hand, demonstrate how a lack of long-term U.S. 

investment can limit American options in times of crisis. After successfully convincing Qaddafi to give up nuclear weapons in 2003, the United States had an opportunity to further cultivate its relationship with Libya around more than just a 

narrow counterterrorism construct. Enhanced engagement with Tripoli could have 

included a major push for political, social, and economic reforms. Instead, an opportunity was missed and the United States is now forced to confront a chaotic, wartorn Libya. In Yemen, the United States has stepped up its engagement in recent 

years, but problems of the magnitude that Yemen faces require a comprehensive, 

long-term strategy for engagement with meaningful investments in political, social, 

and economic reforms. To this end, the United States must work with those partners that have a vested interest in regional stability, especially GCC members. 

Right now, the Obama administration has a narrow window in which to better 

align U.S. counterterrorism goals with the aspirations of millions of Muslims in the 

Middle East and North Africa. The key to doing this will be in understanding that 

security assistance and liberalization are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. I want to thank the committee for inviting me to testify today, and look 

forward to taking your questions. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. 

Our next witness is Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow and executive director for the Center for Law and Counterterrorism at the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Joscelyn is a senior fellow and executive director of the Center for Law and Counterterrorism at the foundation. He is a terrorism analyst and a writer 

living in New York. 

Most of his research and writing is focused on how al-Qaeda and 

its affiliates operate around the world. He is a regular contributor 

to the Weekly Standard and is a senior editor of the Long War 

Journal. His work has also been published by the National Review 

Online and the New York Post, and a variety of other publications. 

Mr. Joscelyn is an author of ‘‘Iran’s Proxy War Against America,’’ 

a short book published by the Claremont Institute that details 

Iran’s decade-long sponsorship of America’s terrorist enemies. He 

makes regular appearances on radio programs around the country, 

as well as on MSNBC. 

Mr. Joscelyn, thank you for being here today, and we will now 

recognize you to summarize your testimony. 
12 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR LAW AND COUNTER TERRORISM, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, thank you, Chairman Meehan, and thank 

you, Ranking Member Speier, for having me here today. I am not 

going to read from my written testimony. I am just going to talk 

a little bit about your opening statements, because I find a lot of 

room for agreement, actually, with what you had brought up, particularly Ms. Speier, when it comes to the long-term blinders that 

you see in our society in terms of dealing with these regimes in the 

Middle East. 

Really what we are seeing here is really the tension between 

long-term strategic interests and short-term National security concerns. I would say in the long term, dealing and backing a lot of 

these dictatorships has not produced the type of stability or produced the type of security that we would want. 

As we can see, you know, Hosni Mubarak was a decades-long dictator in Egypt. He was toppled by some protestors in Tahrir Square 

in a matter of weeks. That is not stability. 

So looking at our strategy going forward, I think America and 

the United States has to stand for something beyond just the shortterm approach to dictatorships and backing them and sort of giving 

them sort of carte blanche to deal with their—the way they deal 

with the internal dynamics of their societies. 

That said, looking at the short-term National security concerns— 

and this is why I think this is a homeland security issue—each one 

of these revolutions, each one of these protests does raise legitimate National security concerns in the short term. 

I would say—let’s start with Libya, where I think the Obama administration has rightly intervened to prevent a humanitarian crisis. As my colleague here said and noted correctly, I would say, 

there is a lot unknown about the rebels in Libya, but I would say 

this. The Transitional National Council—and if you look at the senior leadership there—they are not al-Qaeda, obviously. You can 

look at who they are and what they stand for. They are not, you 

know, the types of people we should be worried about, in my opinion. 

If you look, however, at the Darnah crowd in eastern Libya, who 

is increasing—to press reports have noted are providing the muscle, basically, for the opposition in fighting against Gadhafi’s forces, 

there are legitimate concerns about who those people are. I can 

talk a little bit further about that, if we get into it. 

But if you look at the leadership there in Darnah, which is a 

long-term hotbed for Islamists and jihadist beliefs, if you look at 

the leadership of who is running Darnah, who is training the rebels 

in Darnah, there are legitimate concerns about these people. Going 

forward, I would say that the United States has to take an approach of, we have to be concerned about what we do with this 

crowd. You know, do we arm them? Do we do any of the types of 

things that have been discussed? You have to be very careful in 

dealing with these people and who we are actually backing. 

All that said, Libyan dictator Gadhafi is not exactly a partner in 

the war on terror. You know, he has sort of been portrayed this 
13 

way in the on-going politicized debate over this, but I want to provide one quick note in the—my written testimony that I would like 

to bring to the fore on this. 

Colonel Gadhafi, in fact, back in 2003, got into a shouting match 

on international television with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi 

Arabia, after which Gadhafi turned to al-Qaeda and hired al-Qaeda 

for $2 million to try and kill Crown Prince Abdullah. This is all 

documented by the U.S. Treasury Department, court records, various press accounts. 

That is the type of dictator you are dealing with in Libya, okay? 

This is not a guy who is a valid partner, I would say, against alQaeda. Even though al-Qaeda would love to, I am sure, off Gadhafi 

tomorrow, this is not the type of guy who you can count on to be 

a real partner in the war on terror. 

Going to Yemen, it is an incredibly complicated situation. President Saleh is an uneven and duplicitous character, I would say. His 

cooperation has been incredibly problematic. 

I understand why there is this real tentativeness about dealing 

with Saleh and calling for his ouster or calling for the end of his 

regime, but I would say there, if you look at his whole history and 

the people who back him and his power, his power—his political— 

the political people who back him are in many ways the people we 

are concerned about anyway. In other words, if he were to fall, if 

he were to—if his regime were to come to an end tomorrow, if he 

were no longer the president of Yemen, basically the people who 

were backing him are probably the people who would orchestrate 

the guy who would supplant him. 

It is his dealings with those people that are really the problem 

in Yemen anyway. We can get into that a little further. 

In Egypt, I would say, my big concern with Egypt is, is this: I 

think in the short term and in the long term, obviously, the Muslim Brotherhood is going to acquire some representation in whatever new form of government comes to power. I think that is understandable. 

The problems I have there are two-fold. One, I think that we 

have to worry about the military, and the Muslim Brotherhood basically co-opting and putting an end to all the other types of dissidents and opposition and legitimate political interests that we 

have to—that should achieve representation in Egypt. 

On the second hand, we should—as Bernard Lewis recently said 

in a Wall Street Journal column, during an interview, we should 

have no delusions about what the Muslim Brotherhood is or what 

it represents or what it wants. You are talking about one of the institutions that is one of the foremost advocates of suicide bombings 

on the planet. 

So in the short run, I think we are going to have real problems 

in terms of how Egypt pans out, in terms of our counterterrorism 

cooperation there. But, again, going back to the long-term interests 

that I think Ranking Member Speier has rightly addressed, it 

doesn’t mean that you look the other way or don’t stand for something else in Egypt or any of these other countries. 

With that, I will conclude my testimony. 

[The statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:] 
14 

1 Charles Levinson, ‘‘Ex-Mujahedeen Help Lead Libyan Rebels,’’ The Wall Street Journal, 

April 2, 2001. The article is available on-line here: http://online.wsj.com/article/ 

SB10001424052748703712504576237042432212406.html. 2Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Ex-Gitmo detainee training Libyan rebels in Derna,’’ The Long War Journal, April 2, 2011. The article is available on-line here: http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 

archives/2011/04/ex-gitmoldetaineeltr.php. 3 A copy of the declassified memos can be found on-line here: http://projects.nytimes.com/ 

guantanamo/detainees/557-abu-sufian-ibrahim-ahmed-hamuda-bin-qumu/documents/5/pages/ 

480. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN

APRIL 6, 2011 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for asking 

me to testify today. 

Understandably, there is widespread trepidation about the events unfolding in the 

Middle East. Many fear that the removal of the region’s longstanding leaders will 

lead to something worse—that is, the rise of al-Qaeda or like-minded organizations. 

However, while there is always potential for al-Qaeda to take advantage of political 

instability, we should not view recent developments as purely a contest between dictators (or autocrats) and jihadists. From Yemen to Tunisia, there are other political 

actors struggling for a say in how their country is run. It is important that America 

and the West embrace these people and lend them support where appropriate. 

After all, the current unrest was not started by al-Qaeda, or any other malevolent 

actor. It began when a Tunisian street merchant set himself on fire to protest harassment by the local police. The mass protests that followed have exposed a fundamental truth about the Middle East that is often missed: The region’s regimes were 

not stable because there are millions of Muslims who do not wish to live under an 

autocracy. 

This is an important observation to keep in mind when discussing America’s 

counterterrorism efforts. For too long, policymakers have assumed that unequivocal 

support for men such as Hosni Mubarak is our only option. But it is obvious now 

that relying on such leaders is not a viable long-term solution. The faux stability 

of Mubarak’s regime was, for instance, swept away in just a few short weeks after 

decades of rule. 

With that perspective in mind, there certainly are bad actors who seek to capitalize on the unrest. Below, I will briefly outline some of the issues that may arise, 

from a counterterrorism perspective. 

LIBYA

The Libyan opposition is comprised of various interests and personalities, many 

of whom are secular-minded and no friend to al-Qaeda. 

The most worrisome rebels, however, are located in eastern Libya. The city of 

Derna, in particular, is a known jihadist hotspot and contributed a large number 

of fighters to the Iraqi insurgency. Derna’s rebel forces are currently led by three 

former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a known al-Qaeda 

affiliate.1 And the man who is reportedly training Derna’s rebels, Sufyan Ben 

Qumu, was formerly held at Guantanamo.2 In declassified memos prepared at 

Guantanamo, U.S. officials alleged that Qumu joined al-Qaeda in the early 1990s, 

after leaving the Libyan Army, and spent the next decade serving the jihadist terror 

network in various capacities.3

As the United States and NATO move forward, extreme caution should be exercised when dealing with the Derna faction of the Libyan rebellion. Every effort 

should be made to minimize their role in shaping Libya’s political future. And that 

is assuming the rebels can even overtake Col. Muammar Qaddafi, which is far from 

a certainty at this point. 

A wounded Qaddafi could easily turn to terrorism to punish those who opposed 

him, both at home and abroad. During the 1980s, Qaddafi was one of the world’s 

foremost sponsors of terrorism. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, some 

have looked upon Qaddafi as a partner against al-Qaeda because the LIFG targeted 

his regime. It is true that Qaddafi and al-Qaeda are not friends. But I would inject 

a note of caution here. 

In 2003, Qaddafi successfully hired al-Qaeda terrorists to kill Saudi Crown Prince 

Abdullah. Qaddafi and Abdullah had a televised shouting match concerning the war 

against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. During the course of that argument, Abdullah insulted Qaddafi, which the Libyan dictator did not take lightly. His intelligence 

operatives reached out to a contact living in the United States who successfully bro-
15 

4Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘The Libyan Terrorist: Muammar Qaddafi,’’ WeeklyStandard.com, February 24, 2011. http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/libyan-terrorist-muammarqaddafil552474.html. 5See, for example: John F. Burns, ‘‘Yemen Links to bin Laden Gnaw at F.B.I. in Cole Inquiry,’’ The New York Times, November 26, 2000. 

kered a deal with al-Qaeda operatives living in the United Kingdom to kill 

Abdullah. Libyan intelligence officers and an al-Qaeda cell were caught in Saudi 

Arabia as they planned the operation.4

This example is an important reminder that Qaddafi is willing and able to use 

terrorism to punish his perceived enemies. We should expect nothing less from a 

dictator who ordered the downing of Pan-Am 103 in 1988. 

YEMEN

Of all the countries currently in turmoil, al-Qaeda is strongest in Yemen. As 

Obama administration officials have rightly noted, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate outside of South Asia. The 

failed Christmas day 2009 terrorist attack and a host of other plots have demonstrated the group’s capability and intent. 

In order to counter AQAP’s growing threat, America has partnered with Yemeni 

President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who came into power in 1978 and has led a united 

Yemen since 1990. But President Saleh is an uneven and duplicitous partner in the 

fight against terrorism. 

On the one hand: Saleh’s regime provides some valuable intelligence against alQaeda; provides cover for unpopular American airstrikes; and Yemeni government 

forces have fought against al-Qaeda operatives. On the other hand: Saleh refused 

to take action against Sheikh Abdul Majeed al Zindani after Zindani was designated 

an al-Qaeda supporter by the United States and United Nations in 2004; al-Qaeda 

operatives have repeatedly been let out of prison or ‘‘escaped’’; Saleh’s government 

vocally supported the Iraqi insurgency and, at a minimum, looked the other way as 

Yemenis went off to fight American forces; and Saleh has allowed terrorist organizations such as Hamas to operate in the open. 

Thus, President Saleh is far from an ideal partner in the fight against terrorism. 

And in the nearly 10 years since the September 11 terrorist attacks, al-Qaeda has 

grown only stronger in Saleh’s Yemen, not weaker. 

Regardless, the U.S. Government has partnered with Saleh because it fears that 

his replacement may be even worse. This is, in part, understandable. Jihadist organizations, including al-Qaeda, have longstanding ties to Yemen’s military establishment. For instance, General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, who helped bring Saleh to 

power, backed Osama bin Laden for years and has been known to use jihadists in 

the fight against southern secessionists and Houthi rebels.5 If General al Ahmar, 

or someone like him, were to come to power, it is likely that the Yemeni government 

would be even less helpful. Similarly, if a member of Yemen’s Islamist establishment were to assume Saleh’s mantle, American interests would undoubtedly suffer 

in the near-term. 

However, President Saleh’s political power has always rested on his alliances with 

actors such as General al Ahmar and Sheikh Zindani, who is one of the heads of 

Yemen’s Islah party, the main opposition party. As a matter of straightforward 

logic, Saleh could never be a true partner against such men, who have extensive 

terrorist ties, because they ensured his continued rule. Now that al Ahmar, Zindani, 

and other powerbrokers have repudiated Saleh, it remains to be seen what political 

capital Saleh has left. It may be the case that Saleh’s days as Yemen’s ruler are 

numbered in any event, in which case the U.S. Government will find itself scrambling for a new partner. 

EGYPT

President Hosni Mubarak was a partner against al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations. And the Egyptian military, which continues to play a large role in defining 

Egypt’s politics, has no interest in seeing jihadist organizations take over the country. However, American counterterrorism efforts will likely be complicated should 

the Muslim Brotherhood assume a greater share of political power. 

Muslim Brotherhood leaders openly advocate jihad, and have endorsed terrorist 

violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hamas, which was designated a terrorist organization in the mid-1990s, is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s 

founding father, Hassan al Banna, called on Muslims to embrace what he called the 

‘‘Art of Death.’’ He believed that Muslims should love death more than they love 

life. It is no surprise, then, that we find Muslim Brotherhood leaders justifying sui-
16 

cide bombings to this day. And, of course, Hamas regularly employs suicide bombings as a weapon. 

Should the Egyptian military and Muslim Brotherhood enter some sort of powersharing arrangement, it will undoubtedly complicate American counterterrorism efforts. 

I look forward to discussing all of these topics, and more, during the hearing. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn. 

I would like to turn now to Mr. Brian—is it ‘‘Katulis’’? Is 

that—— 

Mr. KATULIS. Yes, sir, ‘‘Katulis.’’ 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. Mr. Brian Katulis, a senior fellow for 

the Center for American Progress. Mr. Katulis is a senior fellow 

there, where he focuses on United States National security policy 

in the Middle East and South Asia. He served as a consultant to 

numerous U.S. Government agencies, private corporations, and 

nongovernmental organizations on projects in more than two dozen 

countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, 

and Colombia. 

From 1995 to 1998, Mr. Katulis lived in the West Bank, the Gaza 

Strip, and Egypt and worked for the National Democratic Institute 

for International Affairs. 

Mr. Katulis received a master’s degree from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 

and a B.A. in history in Arab Islamic studies from a little school 

in the 7th Congressional District in Pennsylvania called Villanova, 

which I would like to note is where I am. Mr. Katulis was a Fulbright scholar in Jordan, and he co-authored ‘‘The Prosperity Agenda,’’ a book on U.S. National security. 

We are very grateful to have you here today, Mr. Katulis, and 

look forward to you summarizing your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. KATULIS. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you and all of the Members of the committee for 

taking the time for this hearing, because I think it is extremely important for you to do this today, but then to repeat it again and 

again, because 3 months into the uprisings in the Mideast, I see 

the U.S. Government slipping into a tactical crisis management 

emergency mode. I think it is important to use these hearings to 

take a step back periodically, assess the situation strategically, and 

not get caught up on each of the individual countries, which I think 

is what we are trying to do today. 

At the start of this year, I would say that the Middle East is in 

the beginning of a transition that I think will take years and perhaps the rest of this decade to unfold. I characterized the current 

uprisings as the start of a strategic shock akin to what we saw in 

the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 

start of the 2001 global war on terror. 

Each has had security implications for the Middle East on the 

whole, and they have had implications on the fight against terrorist 

networks. There are a lot of risks, which I will turn to. 

But the greatest opportunity, which I think there is strong unanimity here, is that these popular uprisings give us the chance to 

help move beyond the autocratic governments that have permitted 
17 

terrorist threats to fester alongside endemic poverty, weak governance, and corruption. 

The opportunity here is what I sometimes call as moving beyond 

our addiction to dictators. For decades, we have been addicted to 

dictators, and it is like our addiction to foreign oil that a lot of people talk about. We know it is bad for us. We know we need to move 

beyond it. We simply haven’t yet figured out how to move beyond 

it. 

I don’t want to repeat what other witnesses have said today, but 

I think there are four leading terrorist challenges that we should 

focus on. People have talked about Yemen, and I think we need to 

continue to focus on this day to day, for all of the reasons that 

other witnesses have highlighted. 

I would also highlight the fact—the worrisome trend in Yemen 

for years now of senior figures in the current government, actually, 

having ties to the al-Qaeda movement. I will point to the May 2010 

air strike last year that killed a number of AQAP fighters. It also 

killed a deputy governor of the Marib government, Jabir alShabwani. 

There are also worrisome links between some of the political parties, Islamist political parties, and terrorist movements in Yemen, 

and we need to, I think, discuss that and probe that more clearly. 

I think the second leading threat, which has been discussed already, are the threats posed by the Libyan civil war, which is ongoing. 

The third I would highlight, which we haven’t discussed, but I 

think is important for the United States and its allies, are the terrorist threats in states and territories bordering Israel. The prison 

breaks in Egypt and in Libya, I think, have some implications for 

our ally, Israel, and we are seeing signs already of possible renewed conflict along Israel’s southern and northern borders driven 

by not only Hamas and Hezbollah, but also challenging Islamist 

groups, Salafi jihadist groups that are challenging groups like 

Hamas and Hezbollah and trying to push them towards more aggressive action. 

Finally, we should not forget about Iraq, which had been the 

focus for so many years. Just last week, al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed 

credit for a horrific attack in Tikrit, which killed nearly 60 people 

in the provincial council headquarters. 

I outline in my testimony integrated strategies for dealing with 

this threat and certain advantages, four key advantages. No. 1, alQaeda to date has been irrelevant in the popular uprisings and has 

been left behind. No. 2, there are sharp divisions between and 

within the radical and violent Islamist terrorist groups, and we can 

discuss that. No. 3, Islamist political organizations and political 

parties in particular that play by the rules of the road could further marginalize these extremist fringes. The fourth strategic advantage I think we have in this fight is that key countries, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the emirates and many gulf countries, 

are in this fight with us today. 

In conclusion—and I think we have a tough policy challenge 

ahead. Based on my own experience, living and working in the 

Middle East for more than 5 years in the 1990s, one of the key 

challenges is having an integrated approach, marrying our mili-
18 

tary-to-military and intelligence-to-intelligence partnerships with 

efforts to increase better governance, democratic oversight, and a 

range of issues that fight corruption in these societies. 

Having that integrated approach requires full funding of organizations like the State Department and USAID. We can’t move into 

this fight without them being fully equipped. 

Then, second, I think we need to actually learn to live with political Islam. They will become an increasing voice in societies that 

open up. There is a variety and diversity of views among these 

groups, and we need to learn to deal with those that abide by the 

rules of the democratic game and are nonviolent. 

I will close my testimony here, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Katulis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: More than 3 months into the 

Middle East uprisings, the United States faces dangerous threats on a daily basis 

from that region of the world. Fast-moving events in the Middle East risk pulling 

our country deeper into the tactical, reactive, and crisis management mode that has 

frequently characterized U.S. foreign policymaking in the Middle East for decades. 

That is why it is important to take opportunities like today’s hearing to step back 

from the daily events and assess the security implications of the recent changes in 

the Middle East. 

At the start of this year, the Middle East entered a transition period that will 

likely take years to unfold. There may not be full clarity about the full implications 

of the changes underway until the latter part of this decade. The changes underway 

represent the fourth major strategic shock to the Middle East experienced at a regional level since 1979—the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and 

the 2001 start of the global war on terrorism. Each had their own ripple effects on 

the region. But the current uprisings and battles underway could do more to change 

the daily lives of people in the region for the better than those previous events. 

A major regional transformation appears inevitable given the overwhelming economic, political, and social problems many countries in the region face. The United 

States has a choice: Attempt to preserve an unsustainable status quo that started 

crumbling years ago, or use its considerable powers to shape outcomes in ways that 

make Americans safer while increasing security and prosperity for the people of the 

Middle East. 

The risks in this transition are considerable—civil wars, prolonged insurgencies, 

and new regional wars could open the space for terrorist networks to operate more 

freely. In addition, all of the problems that existed before these uprisings—Iran’s 

nuclear program and support for terrorism, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and 

Iraq’s reintegration into the region—remain major challenges and more complicated 

in light of recent events in the region. 

But the opportunities in this transition are also great—the greatest opportunity 

presented by the popular uprisings is to help key countries transition from the autocratic governments that permitted terrorist threats to fester alongside endemic poverty, weak governance, and corruption towards a more democratic system. The pathway ahead in the coming months and years is fraught with considerable risks that 

should not be downplayed, but standing by the autocratic regimes is no longer a viable option in many parts of the Middle East. 

LEADING TERRORIST THREATS AT THE START OF THE MIDDLE EAST’S TRANSITION

The top threat that the United States faces as a result of the uprisings and turmoil is the possibility that various terrorist networks could exploit the political unrest to sow wider chaos in the region or to plot new terror attacks against the 

United States or other U.S. allies. If regional intelligence and law enforcement agencies are distracted or weakened by internal political fights, this could present an 

operational opportunity for terrorist networks. 

The United States needs to keep focused on four key fronts in the coming weeks: 

1. Unrest in Yemen.—Prior to the Middle East uprisings, the threat posed to the 

United States by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, surpassed threats 

from al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The on-going polit-
19 

ical instability in Yemen over the past several months has diverted the Yemeni security establishment’s attention and resources away from the efforts to deal with 

AQAP. Following the attempted bombing of a U.S. plane in Detroit in December 

2009, the United States more than doubled its military assistance to Yemen in an 

effort to help government security agencies to deal with the increased threats. 

At the time of this prepared written testimony, events in Yemen are very fluid, 

with a great deal of uncertainty about the likely outcome of a possible leadership 

transition in the Yemeni government. The central challenge facing U.S. policymakers is maintaining and building counterterrorism and security cooperation with 

officials in key Yemeni security agencies while assisting in quiet efforts to help 

Yemen develop a roadmap for political and economic reforms that respond to the 

people’s concerns. 

2. Libya’s civil war.—A protracted internal conflict in Libya presents two possible 

distinct threats to U.S. National security. The risk that the Qaddafi regime may remain in power and return to global terrorist attacks as it has in previous decades, 

and risks associated with supporting rebel groups that contain terrorist elements. 

In previous Middle East civil wars—Iraq last decade, Algeria in the 1990s, and Lebanon in the 1980s—terrorist networks contributed to prolonged instability that led 

to the deaths of more than 100,000 people in each of these conflicts. On balance, 

the violence associated with these terrorist groups in these past conflicts was focused on internal battles with these countries, but the instability presented an opportunity for terror networks to build their operational and ideological capacities. 

3. Terrorist threats in States and territories bordering Israel.—In the Gaza Strip 

and Lebanon during the past few weeks, there have been increased signals that terrorist groups such as the Palestinian Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and more 

radical Islamist groups may be preparing for another conflict with Israel. Iran appears to continue its effort to ship weapons and offer financial support to terrorist 

organizations operating along Israel’s border. 

In addition, recent prison breaks in Egypt and Libya during the unrest in both 

countries present an additional terrorism risk—estimates of the number of terrorist 

suspects who escaped during the unrest in both countries range from several hundred to several thousand. Sami Chehab, a member of the Lebanese Hezbollah who 

escaped from an Egyptian prison, is reportedly back in Lebanon—Chehab had been 

arrested on suspicions that he was helping supply weapons to militants in the Gaza 

Strip. In February, Ayman Nofal, a senior Hamas commander, escaped from an 

Egyptian jail and made his way back to the Gaza Strip. These high-profile escapes 

may be just the tip of the iceberg of a larger number of terrorist suspects who are 

no longer in detention and may seek to upset a fragile security situation in the region. 

4. On-going terrorist threats linked to the turmoil in Iraq.—Although Iraq has 

faded from U.S. policy and political debates, the on-going violence in Iraq as U.S. 

troops continue to withdraw from the country represents a fourth threat. Al-Qaeda 

in Iraq, or AQI, claimed responsibility for last week’s raid and hostage situation 

that killed nearly 60 people in the provincial council headquarters in Tikrit—and 

this was just the latest in a series of high-profile targeted attacks by AQI. In addition to the threats AQI poses to stability in Iraq, the continued threat posed by foreign terrorists who fought in Iraq and returned to their home countries remains a 

major challenge for countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Libya. 

DEVELOPING INTEGRATED U.S. STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST THREATS AT A

TIME OF CHANGE IN THE REGION

Executing political and economic reforms in this combustible regional security environment will be no easy task. 

The current situation presents four main advantages that will make the tasks of 

dealing with these terrorist threats outlined above while marginalizing radical 

Islamist groups and advancing pragmatic political reforms manageable yet still difficult: 

1. Al-Qaeda’s irrelevance in uprisings.—For nearly the past 20 years, al-Qaeda, or 

AQ, has tried to build its ideological platform on two core pillars—tapping into popular discontent with the region’s autocratic and corrupt governments and fomenting 

anti-American and anti-Western attitudes. The fact that AQ and its affiliates had 

virtually nothing to do with the removal of leaders in places like Egypt and Tunisia 

and the widespread calls for political reform has further weakened its credibility. 

Looking ahead, it seems that AQ’s popular appeal will remain low given that most 

of the protesters in key countries support democratic political reforms, something 

that AQ leadership opposes. The most radical Islamists view democracy as anathema to their agenda, yet the people of the region widely support democratic political 
20 

reforms according to public opinion polls. If al-Qaeda continues to be opposed to democracy and uses violence to oppose democratic change, they will likely further 

marginalize themselves and be viewed as a threat to newly democratic states in the 

Middle East as much as they are in the United States. 

2. Sharp divisions within radical and violent Islamist terrorist groups.—The leading Islamist extremist groups lack a common strategy and remain sharply at odds 

with one another over matters of strategy, tactics, and operations. Although alQaeda central and its affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have worked to enhance their coordination, the movements lack a common military and political agenda and are facing challenges from 

fringe Salafist groups. 

3. Islamist political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood could further 

marginalize extremist fringes.—The third opportunity presented by the political 

openings in key countries of the Middle East is that democratic reforms could further lead to internal debates within more mainstream Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that contribute to further marginalizing fringe Islamist groups. Although the Muslim Brotherhood and groups like al-Qaeda share a common intellectual and political lineage, the ties between the different strands of today’s Islamists 

groups have frayed considerably and they disagree on core foundational principles. 

For example, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, AQ’s second in command, wrote a book attacking 

the Muslim Brotherhood for its willingness to participate in democratic politics. 

4. Strategic security and counterterrorism cooperation continues with key partners 

in the region and will likely continue in the coming years.—Despite the additional 

threats presented by the distractions and diversion of resources away from counterterrorism efforts in certain places like Yemen and Egypt, the United States still 

maintains strong coordination and partnerships with key countries in the region 

and it continues to work with leaders in the security establishments of most Middle 

East countries. In particular, bilateral security and counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and most countries of the Gulf region remains strong. For decades, the United States has invested 

resources and efforts at enhancing coordination, and democratic political openings 

won’t lead to quick and fast erosions of cooperation with most countries. 

Even as key countries open up to political reforms in the coming years, it will 

likely remain in the strategic self-interest of the countries and people of the region 

to protect themselves from violent extremism and terrorism. Countries such as 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen share a common interest with the United 

States and other global powers to make sure that radical nonstate actors don’t further undermine stability in their countries and weaken an already fragile regional 

security environment. 

Weighing these advantages against the risks, the United States should seek to 

adapt a new regional security approach that encourages pragmatic political and economic reforms while working to maintain security cooperation with existing institutions. In managing its interests in what is likely to be an extended period of transition, the United States will need to tailor its approaches to the unique circumstances of each country and our own security interests involved. Egypt and Tunisia have not been models for how we deal with Yemen or Bahrain, nor should they 

be. Each country has different internal dynamics and features, and our security interests vary from country to country. Here are two common principles and approaches that could be applied across the region and tailored to the circumstances 

of each country: 

1. Work for political and economic reform within existing institutional frameworks.—The leaders and people of the region are the ones who need to shape the 

reform agendas—and the United States should prepare to adapt the way it has done 

business in the region for decades. The transition in most Middle East countries will 

likely be gradual, and so will the changes in U.S. policy. The United States should 

leverage its existing relationships—particularly the military-to-military contacts and 

the strong ties it has with key countries in addressing common security challenges 

like terrorism—to support efforts to reform in systems so they can address the long 

list of problems. 

For decades, the United States has made substantial investments in security sector reform and support in a range of Middle Eastern countries—Iraq is just one example. It also has had long-standing programs of security sector support throughout 

the region, working to build the capacity of military and intelligence agencies 

throughout the Middle East. The challenge now facing the United States is adapting 

this decades-long policy approach in the face of future democratic openings. Instead 

of attempts at wholesale replacement of institutions like we saw in Iraq in 2003 

with the disbanding of the military, the United States should develop policies that 
21 

work to connect security systems to executive, judicial, and legislative authorities 

that can provide oversight and accountability. 

By adopting an integrated approach, the United States could help countries establish stronger foundations for better governance and anticorruption through governing. Security sector reform can promote better practices within governing systems—including fair and balanced oversight from democratic legislative branches 

and better working relationships with judicial authorities. This requires developing 

incentives to advance reform in implementing the rule of law. This will also require 

making investments in other types of U.S. power—diplomatic, development, and 

economic efforts—in order to have a more integrated approach that avoids the 

‘‘stovepiping’’—U.S. agencies not coordinating efforts with other U.S. agencies. In essence, the United States will need to develop a more comprehensive and integrated 

approach that links efforts by our military and intelligence agencies with efforts by 

the State Department and USAID. 

2. Prepare for the role of political Islam to increase in the Middle East.—Second, 

the United States will need to learn to live and deal with political Islam, which is 

likely to see its influence grow as societies open up to reform. The recent U.S. experience in Iraq demonstrates that the United States can learn to work closely with 

a range of Islamist political groups to enhance stability and advance U.S. strategic 

interests. The leading political parties in the current Iraqi government are Islamist. 

During the civil war in Iraq, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies exploited 

cleavages among Islamist groups and used these divisions to reduce the threat of 

groups like AQI and make them marginal and tactical threats, as opposed to strategic threats. 

Similarly, in other parts of the Middle East already experiencing reforms like 

Egypt or other countries likely to experience political change such as Jordan, 

Islamist parties and forces have become better organized and garnered stronger popular support. The United States should develop two bright red lines when it comes 

to offering support to a country in which Islamist political parties and forces play 

a role in the government. First, it should seek guarantees that Islamist movements 

would respect a broad range of universal democratic values as outlined in the U.N. 

Declaration of Human Rights. The notion that Islamism and democracy are fundamentally incompatible is outdated and needs to be tested as does the idea that 

Islamism represents an ideological challenge akin to that of communism during the 

Cold War. Seeking to isolate Islamist political parties before they have had a chance 

to prove themselves in political systems that are opening would be counterproductive. 

Second, the U.S. Government should maintain its policy of not working with 

Islamist groups currently on its foreign terrorist organization list. It must continue 

to make a distinction between those groups that have explicitly renounced violence 

and groups that have not. For those that have not renounced violence, it should 

press regional allies and other interlocutors to encourage those movements that 

espouse violence as a means for bringing about political change to update their 

views to reflect universal principles of respecting human rights and supporting nonviolent means. 

CONCLUSION

The popular uprisings of the Middle East have brought the region across a new 

threshold, and the changes underway will likely take years to unfold. The unrest 

has presented the United States with some new and pressing terrorist threats but 

the old way of doing business in the Middle East is no longer sustainable. America’s 

security need not come at the cost of supporting dictatorships and authoritarian governments that are corrupt and do not respect the rights of their people. The United 

States can enhance counterterrorism cooperation in the long run if it works with 

a wider range of institutions and accepts the reality that Islamist political groups 

could be among the most important allies in marginalizing and defeating Islamist 

extremists and terrorist groups. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Katulis. 

Since we began, I am very pleased—Mr. Mudd, thank you for 

taking the time to make it out to us today. We are very pleased 

to have you here today. 

Mr. Mudd is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation. Mr. Mudd joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1985 

as an analyst specializing in South Asia and then the Middle East. 

He began working at the CIA counterterrorism center in 1992 and 
22 

served on the National Intelligence Council and as the deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia. In 

2001, Mr. Mudd served as director of gulf affairs on the White 

House National Security Council. 

After 9/11, he served in Afghanistan and became deputy director 

of the CTC from 2003 to 2005. In 2005, Mr. Mudd was appointed 

to serve as the first-ever deputy director of the FBI National Security Branch. Mr. Mudd resigned from Government service in 2010. 

He is the recipient of numerous CIA awards and commendations, 

including the Director’s Award. Mr. Mudd also graduated from a 

place in the 7th Congressional District—there must be some kind 

of pattern here—called Villanova University, with a B.A. in English 

literature and an M.A. in English literature from the University of 

Virginia. 

So, Mr. Mudd, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP MUDD, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 

Mr. MUDD. Thank you for having me, and thanks for being patient for me getting here. The traffic out there—I wish this were 

the Transportation Subcommittee—is horrible. 

A couple of thoughts. You can read the testimony if you would 

like, but I will give you some thoughts that are maybe in addition 

to it. 

I remember when I was deputy director of the counterterrorism 

program at CIA when we still had our own facilities and were 

questioning people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and talking to 

the interrogators, as I often did. They talked about people like 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. He is not a terrorist. That is too small. 

He is a revolutionary. These guys were committed and smart and 

far longer in vision than many of us Americans are. They looked 

at the world in terms of decades and centuries and never anticipated that the revolution they started would end in their lifetimes. 

So as we assess this, I think we have to look at it with a long 

view, because these guys are persistent and they will be around for 

a while. I don’t think their view right now is terribly positive. I 

have seen what the North African militants have said about what 

is happening in Libya. I have seen what al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula has said out of Yemen. They are supportive of these revolutions publicly. I think they suffered a significant setback, not 

just to terrorism, but to the revolution. 

Let me tell you why, and let me close with a few thoughts on 

things that I would be thinking about if I were in your hot seat. 

When al-Qaeda set out on September 11 to stoke the revolution, 

they intended not just to do everything themselves, they intended 

to get other people to act as they acted. We started to see that after 

9/11. Affiliated groups in places like Indonesia started to attack 

Western targets in ways that they had never attacked these targets 

in the past. 

The Indonesian militants had been around for decades. They had 

local targets earlier. They wanted to oust the local government in 

Jakarta. Al-Qaeda convinced them that the real problem was the 
23 

head of the snake. So as al-Qaeda succeeded in 9/11, after 9/11, affiliated groups started to succeed. 

Then as I sat at the threat meetings for 41⁄2 years with Director 

Mueller and three attorneys general, I saw the movement shifting 

to this country, and it shifted not necessarily with al-Qaeda core, 

although we had that problem there, or with affiliated movements. 

It also shifted with like-minded kids, New York, Dallas. We had 

them here. 

So in a way, the revolution was metastasizing, but it suffered a 

few setbacks, two in particular. One is they killed too many innocents. If you look at polling data out of the Middle East, it is mixed 

over the past years. Pew does it; Gallup does it. But polling data 

shows you that all these countries that had people who might have 

said, ‘‘Hooray for al-Qaeda,’’ on September 12, 91⁄2 years ago started to say, ‘‘No,’’ not because they love us, but because al-Qaeda 

made the same mistake militants made in Algeria and Egypt in the 

1990s. They killed too many innocents, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan. 

We can go on and on. 

So the first setback they have suffered—and they are still reeling 

from this; I don’t believe they will ever recover from it—is they lost 

recruiting pools and financiers because they killed too many innocents. 

The second thing they have lost in the last 3 months is the opportunity to tell recruits that they can be recruited to go back into 

a place like Egypt and oppose a corrupt regime. Pretty tough to do 

that now, except—and this is significant—in the gulf sheikdoms. I 

wonder—this is a bit of an aside—whether the gulf sheikdoms are 

going to face more focus from al-Qaeda, because they are not going 

to focus obviously on Tunisia, Egypt, hopefully not on Libya soon. 

But they also faced the potential rise in political groups— 

Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood—whom they despise. I know 

there is a lot of commentary about the Muslim Brotherhood in this 

country. If you look at the statements between—publicly between 

al-Qaeda leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood, they hate each 

other. 

So al-Qaeda is sitting here saying, ‘‘We love this. We have got to 

be with the people.’’ I don’t think they have much option but to say 

it. What are you supposed to say, if you are trying to recruit a Libyan kid today? 

But I think the dynamic of the loss of popular support between 

the killing of innocents and the loss of the prospect of having and 

influencing these governments, they are sitting back saying, ‘‘I 

don’t like this so much.’’ 

A couple of things to worry about. These countries have endemic 

economic problems, and too many people out there in these countries are too optimistic about the prospect that political reform 

automatically means jobs. I think that is—short term, I think we 

will be okay on terrorism. Yemen is a significant problem; we ought 

to come back to that. But North Africa I think will be okay, because kids now potentially have a voice and al-Qaeda doesn’t. 

Mid-term—I am talking 2, 3, 5 years—I am worried some of 

these kids are going to say, ‘‘Shoot, this democracy thing didn’t 

work out so well, either.’’ 
24 

So to close, in your seat, we have got to think about aid and we 

have got to think about support for U.S. industry. They are going 

to be asking for free trade agreements in an agreement that is 

going to make us politically comfortable, because guaranteed these 

governments with an Islamist influence are going to come out saying things like, ‘‘We don’t like Israel.’’ 

So you are going to have a choice. The choice is to say, do we 

look long-term and understand the political processes lead to—people we don’t like? Because we have got to create economic environments where these kids don’t become a recruiting pool again. 

We have made terrific progress in the last 10 years. This organization, this revolutionary movement is slowly dying out in a way 

when I was deputy director of counterterrorism I didn’t think was 

happening. It is today. Let’s not lose it. 

[The statement of Mr. Mudd follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP MUDD

6 APRIL 2011 

The threat from North Africa and the broader Middle East has evolved profoundly 

during the past 20 years, with multiple stages of violence over decades that illustrate how susceptible this region has been to unrest and the call of violent jihadists, 

including al-Qaeda. The series of events include: 

• The concentration of North African extremists who went to Afghanistan in the 

1980s to fight the Soviets, and then the Soviet-backed Afghan regime, and who 

absorbed al-Qaeda ideology during their time there; 

• The return of these extremists to fuel anti-government violence, particularly in 

Algeria and Egypt, during the 19909s, with a parallel rise in networks that attacked in Western Europe, particularly France; 

• The migration of extremists from North Africa to Iraq, where jihadists of North 

African origin were overrepresented among foreign fighters; 

• The shift of local North African groups from local motivations and linkages to 

affiliation with al-Qaeda, and its focus on Western targets, during the past decade; and 

• The prospect that the extremists who come from this highly violent history will 

find a way to use the more recent unrest as a springboard to regain momentum 

they have lost during the past few years. 

With this backdrop, there is no disputing that North Africa has been one of the 

hotbeds of violent jihad, but experts differ over whether the recent unrest will offer 

jihadists an opportunity or a setback. In general, I would judge that these developments are a net negative for al-Qaeda and other jihadists who view the United 

States and its allies as legitimate targets for attack. To start, some of the key justifications for recruits to turn to an al-Qaedist message have disappeared: Leaders 

viewed as un-Islamic and corrupt are gone, and Islamists will have some sway within new governments. Youth who previously looked at bleak prospects and unresponsive regimes might see a reason to participate in this new change, and violent extremists would have little sympathy now in attacks that local populations would see 

as an assault on their revolutions. 

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have come out publicly in support of these rebellious 

populations, but there is little doubt that they are uncomfortable with these 

changes. First, they have a history of well-documented animosity toward the Muslim 

Brotherhood and its offshoots, such as Hamas, and the Brotherhood most likely will 

have significant influence in elections and new governments. Second, al-Qaeda is no 

fan of democracy. The statements of support are simply signs that the leadership 

of the last few decades of violent jihad cannot be seen as opposing what are so clearly popular revolutions. So they will pretend to ally with the will of the people, and 

bide their time. 

This is not to say that violence will subside. The disarray among security services 

might provide an opening for a spike in criminal activity. And the history of elections in the Middle East—Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon—is rife with examples of political parties defined by religion and ethnicity. Similar fissures in the new, hopeful 

democracies may lead to the same, almost guaranteeing political violence. 
25 

Over the longer term, economics will help decide whether these countries provide 

opportunities resulting in growth and job creation that might mitigate the threat 

of restive youth. For now, the picture is not good: Investment will slow with the unrest, and this slowdown might accelerate if foreign investors shy away longer term 

as a result of the uncertain climate. In general, these countries have high youth unemployment, low GDP growth rates, and large percentages of their populations 

under the age of 15. These youth probably see democracy as a rapid route to economic reform, and they may have mistaken expectations that new governments can 

quickly spark economic growth. If they are disappointed—and particularly if new 

governments are seen as corrupt—they may again be vulnerable to calls from extremists who will target the United States. 

Western actions might influence whether these violent extremists can ever take 

advantage of what emerges from these revolutions. New governments will see continuation of foreign aid as a sign that the United States respects the will of voters, 

even as it questions the ultimate aims of some Islamists. Meanwhile, in their push 

for rapid job creation, new governments will look for trade benefits from Washington, again as a way to placate populations who see democracy as a panacea for 

profound economic problems. 

We may well witness statements from some of these Islamists—during an Egyptian electoral process—that make us uncomfortable, such as questions about peace 

agreements with Israel. The emerging local, non-al-Qaeda Islamists are unlikely, 

however, to contribute to the jihadist threat to the United States, at least in the 

short term. They are going to have to deliver at home, and quickly, on the expectations of youth. They abhor al-Qaeda, and they will not countenance al-Qaeda statements of support. And, as is the case with many parties when they take power, they 

will immediately face practical questions—such as ensuring that they can attract 

foreign investment—that prod them toward pragmatism. 

Unrest in the Gulf has different dimensions. The Gulf leaders have more legitimacy than the presidents-for-life in countries such as Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, 

and Libya, and they have economic advantages as well. They are not immune to 

the wave of unrest—Bahrain is the prime example, but Morocco, Oman, and others 

have also witnessed protests—but these protests often call for reform, not revolution. 

This is not to say that this year’s picture is the same as next year’s. These countries too have an unusually high percentage of teenagers, and these youth, like their 

counterparts elsewhere, are not finding jobs they think are suitable to their degrees. 

Over time, job creation, foreign investment, and diversification may be as important 

in the Gulf as in the countries that have already gone through revolts. For now, 

though, the characterization of an ‘‘Arab Spring’’ across the Middle East is misleading: This unrest is far more focused on autocrats than on monarchs. In addition 

to providing opportunities, some of the future will hinge as well on how governments react to violence: The Moroccan king’s subtle approach has worked well, but 

in other areas, the quick resort to force by security services has alienated protesters. 

If there are more protests, one key indicator of their longevity will be not only the 

legitimacy of their demands but the question of whether the Moroccan approach becomes the norm. 

Our time horizons are shorter than those of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. They think 

of time in terms of decades and centuries, while we tend to look at weeks, months, 

or a few years as significant. Our annual threat assessments in this country during 

the past decade, for example, have at times characterized al-Qaeda as resurgent or 

on the ropes, rapid turnarounds in assessment that mask how the group views 

itself. A few years’ pressure is not a lifetime, and the jihadists we face are both 

smart and resilient. So while we watch the emergence of new democracies, and inevitably turn our attention elsewhere—a new nuclear crisis, humanitarian disasters, 

debates on immigration, health care reform—we can bet that our adversaries are 

waiting to see if they can seize an advantage. 

If we are to match the patience of jihadists, then, our reaction to this upheaval 

in the Middle East will require patience, and the art of the long view: Supporting 

nascent democracies but then recoiling when elections result in political posturing 

that makes us uncomfortable will risk losing an opportunity with the new democrats. And withdrawing economic support might accelerate a decline that will persuade possible jihadists to lose hope. As it stands, al-Qaeda is off-guard: So far, so 

good. But ‘‘so far’’ is just a few months at most: Years of engagement, patience, and 

a willingness to understand that our form of democracy is not universally viewed 

as successful will help us ensure that, years from now, we still see these revolutions 

as having a positive effect on mitigating threat to the U.S. homeland. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Mudd. 
26 

Thank you to each of the Members of the panel for your testimony. So at this moment, I will recognize myself for 5 minutes of 

questioning. 

I am sort of encouraged by the approach that each of you has 

taken and the recognition that we need to monitor this in the immediate, but look simultaneously in the long term. 

But one of the challenges that we have—particularly sitting on 

a committee like this—that this isn’t foreign affairs. This is in intelligence. We are looking at the impacts on our homeland. 

One of the concerns that I think we all share is trying to interpret this changing environment, not just in one place, but in multiple locations, and then try to project back how it will have an impact on us. 

Mr. Mudd, you know, in your written testimony, you—in your 

comment right now—you talked about al-Qaeda is off-guard. You 

know, it is not doing so good. That was sort of an encouraging observation. But we also know that al-Qaeda likes to—in the words 

of one of the panelists—it will navigate to areas where there is a 

vacuum. 

So we know there are vacuums in many of these locations. My 

question for you is, as we are looking at the long-term picture, we 

simultaneously have to deal with—you know, the increasing threat 

to our security. May we may be concerned—and what ought we be 

watching for as these events change to see if we are doing the right 

things to protect ourselves from acts of terrorism? 

Mr. MUDD. I think there are a couple things that I would look 

at if I were you. I can tell you, I will be looking at myself, and a 

lot of these you can find in the open source. The first is what the 

popular attitudes are towards the new governments in these countries and whether people believe they are being given jobs, which 

I think is the bottom line here. Some 23-year-old with three kids 

who has got a college degree and no job, that is a problem. 

The second is their perceptions of us. As you know, they view us 

now—or they viewed us in the past as the head of the snake. You 

have got kids from the—from the LIFG, the Libyan group now, saying, well, maybe these guys aren’t so bad, because they went and 

bombed Gadhafi. I think that is a short-term issue if they don’t see 

us as continuing to invest, assuming they take over Tripoli. So it 

is attitudes toward their own governments, economic performance, 

in light of huge population change. 

Mubarak comes in 30 years ago. In 1980, Egypt had 42 million— 

roughly 42 million citizens. In 2000, 30 years later, 85 million. A 

lot of people earn less than $2 a day. 

So we can talk about al-Qaeda ideology, but a lot of what my 

friends in the security business say is, increasingly kids who are 

joining these movements aren’t ideologues. They are angry kids 

who don’t feel like they have an opportunity. 

So economic performance is—a couple minor things, not minor, 

but more tactical. You look at problems that I saw when I was at 

CIA in terms of al-Qaeda and its affiliates can operate in, you have 

got two characteristics. One is safe haven, that is, places governments can’t go, and one—and the second is where you have some 

Islamist influence, Sahel, Horn of Africa, in the past, you had 

places maybe like southern Indonesia, southern Philippines. Yemen 
27 

has that prospect with a group that has shown itself willing and 

capable of reaching the United States. 

So I think that is the most intriguing place to watch. I am not 

sure al-Qaeda will do well there, for reasons we can talk about— 

I won’t go on too long. 

The final thing I would watch out for is remembering that Europe is visa waiver territory. The European countries have a much 

greater presence of people from—emigrants from the countries that 

we are concerned about in North Africa, in particular, I am talking 

about partly Libya, but also Tunisia, if you go into Italy, Morocco, 

and Algeria, if you go into France. 

If we go ugly, over the course of the next 1, 2, 3 years in North 

Africa, I would be concerned in working with my European security 

services to say, is anybody going to catch a flight from Paris to the 

United States, a Moroccan or Algerian, because he is ticked off 

about what the United States just did in Algiers? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Nelson, in your testimony, you had talked a little bit about 

al-Qaeda being a marginal movement, sort of similar to what Mr. 

Mudd said right now, but in some ways, might that inability to affect things directly within their own country make them in some 

ways a greater threat to us in the form of their desire to find a way 

to be relevant by acting out and carrying out acts against the 

United States and its interests? 

Mr. NELSON. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. Absolutely. 

Again, and that is where they thrive. Al-Qaeda thrives in the margins. They thrive, as Phil said, in these safe havens. I think this 

is the chaos which they are going to try to exploit. 

One of the many things that are problematic with safe havens 

is the idea of training, as well. Phil mentioned the visa waiver 

countries. One of the reasons that al-Qaeda has not been successful 

in its affiliates in attacking the United States have been, you know, 

tactical ineptitude, the inability to execute operations effectively. 

With a safe haven where they can get training and conduct operations and become more tactically proficient, we could see a greater 

threat in the United States, with more successful attacks, if those 

training grounds are allowed to manifest in these countries. 

Mr. MUDD. If I could correct the record, I didn’t say marginal. I 

said they are hurt. I think these guys are still—I believe—and if 

I had to bet in Vegas, I would say there will be an attack in this 

country. I don’t think it will be al-Qaeda; I think it will be some 

kid inspired by al-Qaeda. But they are not down. They are just 

hurt. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, thank you for that clarification. 

Let me just—before I move to Ms. Speier, I would like to ask 

unanimous consent that the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson 

Lee, a Member of the full committee, we are very pleased that she 

has joined us today and that she be allowed to sit in the dais for 

the purpose of this hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

Thank you, Ms. Lee. Ms. Jackson Lee, I appreciate your being 

here. 

At this point, let me turn it over to Ms. Speier for her questions. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
28 

Stunning testimony from all of you. I am trying to synthesize it 

all, so I am going to ask a series of short questions and ask you 

each to confirm or deny what I have heard from you. 

I think it was Mr. Katulis who referenced that al-Qaeda is really 

irrelevant at this point. Is that a fair comment about something—— 

Mr. KATULIS. Yes, I would say ideologically they are irrelevant, 

they are on the ropes, yes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Is that something that is agreed to by all of 

you? 

Mr. MUDD. No. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. No, although I understand where Mr. Katulis is 

coming from, and I agree that they are not the prime mover behind 

the revolutions. They are not the prime actor that started this off. 

However, they are relevant. They do have cards to play in this, and 

that is what I am concerned about. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Nelson. 

Mr. NELSON. That is correct. The al-Qaeda ideology is still very 

toxic and still very much a threat. 

Ms. SPEIER. The reference made to—excuse me—living with political Islam was kind of a startling thought that I hadn’t really 

considered before. I think that was you, Mr. Mudd, who made that 

statement? 

Mr. KATULIS. It was me. 

Ms. SPEIER. That was you, Mr. Katulis, okay. How do the rest 

of you feel about that? 

Mr. MUDD. I would just say sort of. We are going into elections. 

If you look at polling data again—and I try to draw as much as 

I can from facts as opposed to supposition—in many of these countries, polling data will tell you that more than 90 percent of the 

population supports a significant role of religion in government. 

So my point would be not just that we have to handle political 

Islam—I think that is right—we have to handle who people elect. 

In the Gaza Strip, they are going to elect Hamas. We didn’t like 

that too much. Now expand that to Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. They are going to elect people we don’t like. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes, I would say that that is—political Islam encompasses a number of different belief systems within it. I would 

say that there—if you are talking about the hard-line Islamists 

who, you know, have an extremist ideology, then I would say, we 

should be very uncomfortable in some of these areas if political 

Islam comes to rule. 

There are, you know, differences from country to country. It gets 

very complicated, unfortunately. But I will give you one quick example. 

The Obama administration’s ambassador to Yemen, Mr. 

Feierstein, recently said, you know, that one of the concerns that 

he had would be if somebody like Sheikh Zindani, Abd Majid 

Zindani, who is a very prominent sheikh in Yemen, were to come 

to power somehow through the process. He said, correctly I would 

say, that the Obama administration would have a problem with 
29 

that. That is an area where that would be ‘‘political Islam’’ coming 

to power, which would be very problematic. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Nelson. 

Mr. NELSON. It is the old adage, ‘‘Be careful what you ask for, 

you just might get it.’’ If we want democracy, then we have to let 

the countries vote the people they want into power. 

You can use the Turkey example from 2003, a democratic Turkey. The parliament voted not allow U.S. forces through Turkey 

into northern Iraq. We didn’t like that answer at the time for the 

purposes, but that is what the democracy decided. 

So going forward, if you want democracy, which I believe is the 

key to stability over the long term in these nations, in the near 

term, it might be slightly more dangerous than we would like it to 

be. 

Ms. SPEIER. We have spent billions and billions of dollars in that 

region supporting dictators. With the internet and the ability to access information, I worry that you have got a very youthful population looking at us and thinking that we have unclean hands. 

So a number of you have spoken about economic aid. How do you 

think we should fashion aid that will actually get to the people that 

will generate the jobs that will then create the kind of environment 

that a democracy would flourish in? 

Mr. KATULIS. First, if I could start, I would start with trade and 

economic development through the private sector, because I think 

we have done a lot of assistance to the Middle East and to some 

of the most impoverished countries. We are not very good at it, at 

this stage. I think the things that create jobs, I have noticed, in 

places from Pakistan all the way to Morocco, have been when the 

private sector can flourish. 

I think aid should be viewed as a bridge to helping these societies stand on their own, deal with the immediate crises. But if it 

is not viewed—if it is viewed as something more than a bridge, 

then we have got a problem. We will potentially perpetuate the cycles that we have lived through for the last 30 or 40 years. So it 

has to be an integrated approach. 

If I could clarify, on the political Islam point, my point is this, 

is that as these societies open up—and I have seen this in my work 

on democracy promotion throughout the Middle East in the 

1990s—you will have more parties that will participate that have 

an Islamist flavor. 

The notion that we can simply select and hand-pick secular 

democratic opposition is foolish, because Islam informs a lot of the 

political culture and, in fact, some of our best allies in the fight 

against terrorists have been rather Islamic. 

If you look at Turkey, if you look at Saudi Arabia, it is a country 

that is ruled by the Koran, and it has had different problems with 

terrorism, but to this day, I think most people would agree that on 

most issues, the United States and Saudi Arabia have been working closely on counterterrorism—it is not perfect—but they are a 

key ally. 

But back to your aid question. I think it is essential that we invest more in helping these societies stand on their own, but it 

needs to be connected to a long-term strategy that involves the free 

market and creating jobs that way. 
30 

Ms. SPEIER. My time is up, but if you have some quick response, 

I would appreciate it. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well. I would just say in Yemen, which I think 

you have highlighted very appropriately, is this great case where 

a lot of our aid has been tied to counterterrorism. We have seen 

that counterterrorism aid misused. 

Yemen is a country—it is a Kalashnikov country, where there 

are two to three guns for every man, woman, and child. You know, 

the average person earns $1 to $2 a day. They are running out of 

water. They are running out of oil. This is one of the most dire situations on the planet, I would say. 

The idea that you can just throw some money around for 

counterterrorism and ignore the greater long-term picture of what 

is going on there, I think, is foolish. That is basically what we are 

dealing with right now in Yemen. 

Keep this in mind, that President Saleh is growing more and 

more unpopular. As a friend of mine who lives in Yemen says, for 

the United States of America, President Saleh is the face of America in Yemen. So as all the problems are blamed on President 

Saleh for what is going on there, they see that we have not proposed anything in the longer term to really sort of address the real 

concerns that the average Yemeni has. That, I think is a big problem. 

That is where al-Qaeda and affiliated ideological groups can take 

advantage of the situation to basically say that America doesn’t 

stand for anything beyond just these narrow interests of Saleh. 

Mr. NELSON. If I could, Ranking Member, one thing that is important, look at the comparison between Egypt and Yemen and 

Libya. We have invested hundreds of millions—billions of dollars in 

Egypt. We are seeing a return on that investment now, in that 

Egypt is relatively stable. We have an army that is maintaining 

stability. We are seeing that return on investment. 

Where we haven’t invested, in Yemen and Libya, we are not seeing a return on investment. We haven’t, but we are seeing very unstable areas. 

Mr. MUDD. A couple comments. I think the comment about trade 

is dead-on. If I were you, I would be thinking about aid in terms 

of trade policy. How do you allow people to export clothes to the 

United States, for example? 

The second—I am not a huge believer in aiding a country that 

has 85 million people, but if you are going to provide aid, let me 

be blunt, since I am out of government. A lot of the people who 

most effectively deliver services in these societies are Islamists. 

They deliver better medicine and better health care, better food 

sometimes, better emergency response. 

So one of the things I would be thinking about is, they are very 

efficient and they don’t want to waste money. It is going to make 

people uncomfortable. I talk to them. So, you know, like I say, but 

the kind of aid you are talking about with the population sizes 

here, I think the much more significant issue is jobs, and you are 

not going to get jobs from aid. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
31 

Thank you for the panel. This has been a very insightful conversation, and I thank you very much. 

Mr. Nelson, being a fellow rotor head, if you don’t mind, I will 

pick on you first and pick your brain a little bit. You are the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. How do you advise the President 

right now in the current situation with Libya in how we are to engage? 

Mr. NELSON. I won’t be so bold as to put myself in that position, 

as I retired as a commander, but—and I don’t have all the operational intelligence to make that. But I would say what we need 

to do right now is we need to—the international community, not 

just the United States, needs to buy time in order to determine 

what exactly is transpiring on the ground. We need to understand 

who these rebel forces are before we commit resources further than 

what we already have. 

I guess we also have to make sure that there is not a humanitarian disaster, like a massacre or something like that, as well. So 

I think that the no-fly zone, I think some of the limited activities 

that have been mentioned in the media, to give us that—what is 

important. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. After analyzing that data, would you recommend 

a boots-on-the-ground strategy? 

Mr. NELSON. Absolutely not. I think that we have—what the last 

10 years have shown us is that a large-scale military intervention 

regarding counterterrorism is not a politically feasible option or an 

economically feasible option these days. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Mudd, that was a very insightful testimony. Thank you very 

much, really practical, down to Earth—— 

Mr. MUDD. You made my day. My dad is watching. 

Mr. CRAVAACK [continuing]. Common sense. I am on T&I Committee, so I will take your mention for action here. 

One of the things that—the complexity of this problem is just 

overwhelming to me. So when it starts getting into the weeds, such 

as it is, I like to take a look at a 30,000-foot level and kind of look 

down. You kind of expanded on it. 

If you are the Secretary—and I know we are usurping privileges 

here—but if you are the Secretary of State, how would advise the 

President right now in dealing with the complexity of this region, 

rather than the individual countries? 

Mr. MUDD. I would say we have to engage. We have to make 

choices about who we are as a country. There are American values 

issues here at stake. The value is—and this comes partly as an 

American citizen, but partly as a counterterrorism professional. I 

don’t want any more environments where kids are vulnerable to recruitment. 

So they are going to speak with a voice. First, we have to give 

them support to do that when they are in environments they are 

going to vote for people we don’t like. Once they vote for people 

that we don’t like, we are going to have to bite the bullet and say, 

look, we support elections. Sometimes that leads to discomfort. Pick 

your choice. If it is an autocrat who provides security versus a democrat who provides an election, pick your choice. 
32 

The last thing I would say is, we have got to engage economically 

with people we don’t like. So squeeze them with that money, but 

nonetheless talk to them. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Do you think those lines of communications will 

remain open? Or do you think it will be such a situation like in 

Iran? That is what I am afraid of. 

Mr. MUDD. No, I don’t think so. I mean, I think the revolutionary 

government in 1979 is different than the kinds of people you are 

looking at in North Africa. Let’s not forget: They need investment 

badly. I mean, I spend part of my new professional career as a private citizen talking to companies that invest out there. They are 

all nervous. 

So that, on the one hand, you are talking about already—look at 

Egypt—a decline in investment and a decline in economic performance, when you have people coming to power who are going to be 

elected to provide jobs. So what are those people coming to power 

going to say? They are going to say, ‘‘We need investment.’’ Even 

if they are just uncomfortable with us sometimes, they need us. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. That kind of dovetails on my next point. We all 

know that a revolution has passion and has focus, but it is the 

mundane-ness of peace that is tough to keep. What you said, Dr. 

Katulis—if I pronounced it correctly—one of the things I—you 

made a, Ms. Speier said, a startling statement in regards to that 

we must start to consider political Islam. 

I have a question how you define political Islam. Do you consider 

it Sharia law as political Islam? If so, how would that—that is a 

theocracy. It is really not any type of democracy that I know of. 

How would that dovetail with the democracies of the United 

States? 

Mr. KATULIS. Sharia law, no, if it means the repression of religious minorities, of women. In my testimony, my written testimony, I was very clear that there should be two bright, red lines. 

No. 1, any political Islamist movement that respects the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights, the full range of political rights and 

civil liberties that you and I enjoy in this country, and, No. 2, nonviolence, strict adherence to non-violence. 

You have many of these Islamist groups in countries like Turkey, 

Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the vast majority I think of the Muslim 

world, you have these actors. What I would hesitate to do is lump 

all of these trends together, which I think we did a couple of years 

into the global war on terror, and I actually think it was counterproductive, because some of our best allies in defeating the radical 

Salafists, the ones who turn to violence, will be those who are battling this in the Islamic world, and some of those will be Islamist 

parties. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Just a real quick yes-or-no, does the Muslim 

Brotherhood embrace those democratic values? 

Mr. KATULIS. It depends on who you are talking to. It really 

does. If I could—because you can’t answer it as a yes-or-no. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. 

Mr. KATULIS. The Muslim Brotherhood is a diverse organization 

that spreads not only from Egypt to Tunisia, but in places like Jordan. I met with some of the leadership a couple of weeks ago in 

Doha, Qatar, and what struck me is that they are out of touch with 
33 

their own base and out of touch with this new generation that 

could care less—this is my own impression—about some of their 

harangues of Israel and their statements about Sharia law. 

You have a new generation of Islamists potentially who represent 

demographically the majority of the populations in these countries. 

We don’t know enough about these people who were involved in the 

Facebook revolutions. Many of them are Islamists and they don’t 

like the old-line Muslim Brotherhood. 

So why I won’t say yes or no is that I think all of these organizations, like all political organizations, are dynamic and are open to 

the possibilities of change. My view is, the more our nongovernmental organizations, the more, you know, groups like the National 

Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute are 

able to engage them, you know, in unofficial contact, but to shape 

their agendas and push them to become more democratic, the better off we will be and these societies will be. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Cravaack. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 

Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you again for 

your courtesy. I, too, want to add my appreciation for this hearing, 

along with the Ranking Member. I am just excited about your partnership with Ranking Member Speier. This is a very important 

committee. 

I am in between the Judiciary Committee, and I want to thank 

the witnesses, as well, and just begin on a note that reflects some 

of the testimony that I was able to hear. I simply want to say that 

I have had the privilege—I co-chair the Algerian Caucus and have 

the privilege of being in most of the Mideast countries that have 

been mentioned or engaged in the revolution that we now see, just 

came back from Israel and was, frankly, in Israel the day of the 

bus bombing that was the first bombing of that kind for about 7 

years, although they are repeatedly receiving rocket fire now more 

than they have ever done before. So we live in different times. 

I happen to believe that there is something to this whole issue 

of engagement and negotiation. I want to raise my questions 

around that, particularly as it relates to Yemen and particularly as 

it relates to Libya. 

Egypt, for example, I think turned out differently for the very 

reason of their connectedness to the United States and, more importantly, when Mubarak had a chance to reflect this constant 

interaction with the West, training of his children in the West, had 

to have some impact on, do I really want to end this way? And he 

left. He made one commitment, is he didn’t want to leave the country, and I understand that he is protected by the military, but he 

is on Egyptian soil. And we wish for them the best, but there will 

have to be a lot of investment in Egypt, as well, as they reconstruct 

their government. 

Yemen, I walked the streets of Yemen and have seen the throngs 

of unemployed young men who are boxed in on the border by Saudi 

Arabia, who will not allow them to cross anymore. The economy is 

in shambles, and they spend their time smoking khat. And I think 
34 

that it is important that we try to understand the culture, because 

culture impacts, if you will, the National security of the United 

States and how we negotiate. 

So I would ask these questions, first, on Libya. Do we—I supported, as a progressive, if I might say, the cease-fire on humanitarian grounds. When I say the cease-fire, the no-fly zone. The 

question is: Do we have something to negotiate with now? 

Former Congressman Curt Weldon is in Libya as we speak. The 

Libyan government, Gadhafi was secular. Do we have the ability 

to have any level of negotiation? Will that be a value to us? 

I do think al-Qaeda has life. I think terrorism is franchised, and 

I don’t think you need thousands to do damage. You can have one 

person who is either inspired or either calling themselves al-Qaeda. 

So let me start with you, Mr. Mudd. Negotiations with Gadhafi 

or his agents at this present state, is there any value? Does that 

have an impact on National security in the United States? 

Mr. MUDD. Yes, it does. I can’t see a future with Gadhafi. We 

don’t like to talk about regime change because it goes back to Iraq, 

but that is what we are up against. There is no way we are going 

to be sitting around in 2 years saying, ‘‘Well, we negotiated a ceasefire, and the long-term solution is Gadhafi.’’ 

So if negotiation is to get him out of there, I think that is fine. 

If it is about continuation in power, I would say, heck no. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just—can I get quick answers like 

that? Because my time is running. 

Mr. KATULIS. I agree. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes, no, I am in total agreement with that. I 

would also add that, in terms of negotiation, which I think you 

have rightly pointed out is very important, we should reach out to 

the Transitional National Council and the members there. Part of 

the point is, you talked about al-Qaeda having life in Libya and 

elsewhere. Part of the reason why we need to do that is work with 

the parties that are not al-Qaeda in order to bolster their hands 

in Libya and elsewhere. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Sir. 

Mr. NELSON. Yes, I agree with Phil, just ensure that it is international involvement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. My point to the negotiations is, the negotiations can result in departure, but there needs to be—let’s get 

in here and get this dialogue going so that we can reason our way 

out on either departure from government, allowed to stay somewhere. We understand aging despots who may want to be in the 

country. 

So I do think we have to find an endgame. I think that impacts 

our National security. 

Let me go straight to Yemen. I think it was you, Mr. Joscelyn, 

who mentioned—or someone mentioned the ugly face of the present 

leadership of Yemen, and that being in the United States. I truly 

agree. 

But there is a point about the idea of investing in a country and 

doing something constructive, meaning creating jobs, providing 

medical care. Are those elements of a face that provides us with an 
35 

opportunity to improve our plight as it relates to our National security? 

Let me ask a follow-up question that is quite as strange. We 

have a gentleman who has the rights under the First Amendment 

who considers it his challenge and duty to burn the Koran. One of 

the ideas would be to completely ignore him, and most people were 

ignoring him and going about their daily business. It is difficult to 

ignore when you have the murder of seven U.N. officials, innocent 

officials, and mass confusion in Afghanistan. 

What do actions like that, in the face of our First Amendment 

rights—and as a lawyer, I know the Supreme Court decision that 

says you can’t holler ‘‘Fire’’ in a crowded theater—I, frankly, believe statements are important about whether or not we value or 

accept the actions on that side of it. 

But what do those kind of actions do, as well, as we are trying 

to haul in a new image, but also haul in all these revolutions to 

make them at least geared toward the cultural democracy that 

would be best for them? 

Let me start at this end, which I think is—it is not in order, and 

I cannot see. Mr. Nelson, I am sorry. 

Mr. NELSON. Okay. Thank you very much for the opportunity to 

respond. 

As far as Yemen is concerned, it is important that they get a 

democratically elected government in place, that the people have to 

get ownership of their country back. The country has to go back to 

the point where they could have some semblance of stable government that goes out beyond the city of Sana’a. 

With that said, the solution in Yemen is going to be international, and particularly at GCC, a Gulf Coast there, Arabian Peninsula problem, where they need to continue to be encouraged to 

invest. Saudi Arabia gives $2 billion about a year and the UAE $1 

billion. That is the kind of investment it is going to take over the 

long term to ensure that we can solve or at least help address some 

of the economic problems that drive this instability in Yemen. 

Again, as we see, when we don’t invest in a country, the international community and the United States, we get instability. 

When we invest, we get stability. 

As per your second question, the Koran burnings are just not 

helpful. I am not a lawyer, so I can’t, you know, just, you know, 

comment on the legality of it. I just think, again, as an American 

perspective, it is just not helpful. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not helpful. 

Mr. NELSON. It is not helpful at all, and it drives—it plays right 

into al-Qaeda’s narrative. Al-Qaeda needs the narrative that the 

United States and the West are at war with Islam to survive, and 

every time a Koran is burned or something like that happens, we 

play into their narratives and we help al-Qaeda’s message. 

Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can anybody just be quick? I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Yes, from the Chair, let me say, I think we are fortunate to have your opportunity here, and I would—I am pleased 

to indulge the gentlelady from Texas the time to allow you to elaborate on her question. 
36 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are very kind, Mr. Chairman, very kind. 

Thank you. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Let me just say, with respect to Yemen, you 

know, one of the issues that was brought up was trade and encouraging trade. The problem I have there—and I totally agree that we 

need to encourage free trade amongst all these countries and engage in trade with them—the problem I have with Yemen, which 

is what makes it such a dire situation, is I am not sure what Yemen’s going to trade. You know, I mean, this is a nation that is really bankrupt in every way you can imagine. 

So—and there are problems, obviously, we know with dumping 

aid into Yemen or any country. There are all sorts of issues. But 

we have to do it in order to try and build something there that is 

beyond what we have today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. With respect to the Koran burning incident, obviously, this is not helpful. You know, basically a nut job pastor in 

Florida has, you know, set off an international controversy. 

You know, the idea there is, as he can exercise his First Amendment right to do that, I think we can exercise our First Amendment right to condemn him, you know, for doing that. 

But by the same token, I would highlight one thing real quick. 

Notice how our enemies were able to take this incident—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. 

Mr. JOSCELYN [continuing]. Which was by one guy who does not 

represent any sizable percentage of the American population and 

seize on that to justify mass murder. I think that is something in 

the communications war and the propaganda war that really has 

to be highlighted here. They were able to take this guy, who 

doesn’t represent anybody, you know, besides himself and a few, 

you know, whatever in Florida, and, you know, basically turn that 

into a justification for mass murder. 

Mr. KATULIS. Really quickly on the jobs and economic development, the one point I would like to stress is the need to have an 

integrated political and economic reform approach. In many countries I have worked, like Egypt, Pakistan, and other places, these 

are stovepiped in the U.S. Government and we kind of look at economic reform in one box and then political reform, largely tied to 

an electoral calendar, and the election in another box. 

Forcing the agencies—and I know this is not the purview of this 

committee, but I know you, ma’am, also focused on this in Pakistan 

and other places—really having an integrated approach, because 

oftentimes we don’t look at how our economic assistance might benefit certain structures and centers of power and how that relates 

to the possibilities for political reform of their democratic system. 

That is a hard thing to do. We have never gotten it right. But 

where I first started in the Palestinian territories, in that small microcosm, I saw what I call our addiction to dictators. Yasser Arafat, 

we shoveled cash to him and his security services while there was 

a democratic opening, with the legislative council, and we were 

never really able to bring the two together in an integrated way. 

I don’t want to speak too much on this fool who burned the 

Koran, but I would say it is notable that the most and sharpest reactions come in the places where you have weak and failing states, 
37 

where there is this sense of a lack of strong national identity. We 

have seen this repeatedly in Afghanistan. It is astounding to me 

that nearly 10 years into Afghanistan, we still, after the hundreds 

of billions of dollars we have poured into there, we don’t have state 

structures that are existent in there to help deal with these lawless 

areas, which I think relate to people’s sense of who they are. 

When they see an incident like this, I think we have seen this 

in our own political culture, where the radical fringes play off each 

other. I agree with what Thomas has said here, is that we need to 

actually condemn it as strongly in as possible terms. 

Mr. MUDD. Quick thoughts on the Florida thing. I hate to even 

talk about it, but—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I agree. 

Mr. MUDD [continuing]. I think that is—to me, as a non-lawyer, 

it is a question of incitement and whether the law covers incitement. Free speech I believe in. Doing things that purposely lead to 

the killing of innocents, not so good. 

Second, on Yemen, there has been enough said about economics, 

but I agree with. A quick political comment that we haven’t made, 

that country was divided until relatively recently and faced multiple international security challenges. I am not an expert on Yemeni tribes here, but I would be thinking about ensuring, if we go 

down the road as we are of ousting him and going to elections, of 

ensuring that we think about what happened in Sudan, because I 

have got to believe there are people who are going to be saying we 

don’t want to live together anymore and how do we deal with that? 

Last, since I have the mike for a moment, somebody was asking 

earlier about things we could do and things this committee might 

do. For all these places that are transitioning, it is a small issue, 

but in my view significant for the future, I would be looking at how 

many slots we provide incoming military officers in U.S. training 

programs here in the United States, you know, lieutenant colonels, 

colonels. Those folks come and get trained on how democratic societies work and, furthermore, down the road, they become very good 

interlocutors for the United States. 

It is a small issue, but those schools are tough to get into. That 

would be a great program for us. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you so very much. That is a very good 

point. Those are very effective schools. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. 

At this point in time, I would like to recognize the gentleman 

from Missouri—or ‘‘Missouri,’’ depending on which part of the State 

you are from—Mr. Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am from ‘‘Missouri,’’ for 

the record. 

I want to thank you all very much for your testimony here today 

and taking time to be here with us. Start with Mr. Nelson and just 

work down, if I can, with kind of the same question for all of you. 

How legitimate do you think that the worries are about al-Qaeda 

opportunistically inserting themselves in the Libyan civil war? Is 

our involvement there going to exacerbate that? 

Mr. NELSON. Again, I think that—thank you very much for your 

questions—I think that al-Qaeda will insert itself in the civil war, 
38 

to the extent it will try to recruit and the extent that it will try 

to carve out some sort of area of operation for training and operations and planning. Again, I do not think that al-Qaeda will once 

or will put itself in a position to take any sort of governance role 

in Libya. 

Your second question was on the—— 

Mr. LONG. I just said that, if they—our involvement there, does 

that—I can’t pronounce it—exacerbate the problem? 

Mr. NELSON. Well, that is a very—— 

Mr. LONG. Or is our involvement in Libya, is that just going to 

be another reason—of course, they are going to be taking advantage everywhere they can—but do you think that our involvement 

there is going to help that effort for al-Qaeda? 

Mr. NELSON. It is a great point, and I think we have to balance 

that. It cannot be a U.S. heavy-handed presence in Libya. It needs 

to be international, encouraged the Europeans want to take lead on 

this, support the Europeans taking lead or at least the international community taking the lead. A heavy U.S. presence in 

Libya could serve to undermine our strategic goals, as some of the 

other panelists and Members have stated. 

Mr. LONG. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I would agree with what Mr. Nelson said. I would 

say that, you know, if you look at—for example, I would say alQaeda already is there in Libya. They are already players. They 

are not the dominant players, but in terms of the muscle of the opposition, there are worries some reports that they are, in fact, 

training and heavily involved. 

In fact, I was reporting on this former Guantanamo detainee who 

had—allegedly started serving Osama bin Laden in the 1990s who, 

in fact, is training some of the rebels in Darnah, 300-strong crew. 

That is very worrisome. 

Mr. LONG. That is the people we are helping? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I would be careful, because, see, the thing 

is that there are multiple parties in the opposition, okay? In the 

National Transitional Council, for example, you can look at the 

leadership there, they are not al-Qaeda. They are the types of people that we should be engaging, negotiating with, encouraging, trying to help as we can. 

The problem is, if you were to talk about U.S. involvement to the 

extent to where we are going to have, you know, boots on the 

ground, for example, I think you would very quickly find that we 

would exacerbate the problem. You would have places like Darnah 

where we would be fighting a counterinsurgency, which would be 

very problematic. 

So I think it depends on how America moves forward, how the 

United States actually looks to approach the opposition. We have 

to be very careful in terms of, you know, what we are calling for 

to do. I think that the terms of—you know, there our leaders in the 

opposition that are worth engaging, worth working with, but others 

we have to try and ostracize or minimize. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. KATULIS. Yes, I mean, clearly, al-Qaeda in some presence is 

part of the rebel group. I had the leader or the representative of 
39 

the Libyan opposition at my center on Monday for discussion. He 

is the former ambassador of Libya to the United States. It was 

clear to me that he didn’t know what the command-and-control 

structures were among the military. There is a lot of lack of clarity. 

That is why I am glad at these reports that we have CIA agents 

on the ground, people representative from the CIA. I hope they 

were there for a long time, because we don’t know what we don’t 

know in eastern Libya at this point. I would strongly oppose boots 

on the ground. I think it would help become a rallying cry—Libya 

become a rallying cry for al-Qaeda. I would oppose arming the 

rebels at this point, because we just don’t know who they are. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you. 

Mr. MUDD. Quick comment. I think al-Qaeda is probably a 

chump change player in the opposition right now and wouldn’t be 

top on my list of things to worry about. I think that would change 

if there was a presence on the ground as opposed to in the air, and 

I think it would change significantly. 

What we haven’t mentioned here is that, especially eastern 

Libya, but North Africa in general was overrepresented with foreign fighters going into Iraq a few years ago. So folks right now 

are saying, ‘‘We like this air cover.’’ Remember, a few years ago, 

they were saying, ‘‘Let me go to Iraq and kill a bunch of Americans,’’ so that is a tenuous level of support we have out there. 

But I think there would be popular opposition to an American 

presence. It is not just the al-Qaeda guys. You would be facing a 

serious problem on the ground. 

Mr. LONG. Okay, thank you. I appreciate your comments very 

much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Long. 

With the unanimous consent of the committee, at this point, I am 

asking indulgence as the Chairman just to ask one more very limited amount of questions myself, because of some of the issues that 

you have raised up, and then we will close down the hearing. 

But I am very intrigued by the idea of us—of your proposals to 

look as one of the ways we address us developing the economies in 

those regions, and particularly the concern that, Mr. Mudd, you 

have pointed out about the disparity that we have, where there are 

so many sort of youths that are in those areas that don’t have any 

kind of long-term prospect. 

But look at the most flourishing not just democracy, but economy 

we have in that region as being tied to Israel. How do we reconcile 

the fact that we have got to be concerned about, you know, the 

growing tension that exists with numbers of these—especially, you 

know, Hezbollah, Hamas, others that may actually be more encouraged if we see some of this expansion of room for them to move, 

while simultaneously they threaten Israel? 

Mr. Mudd, do you have a thought, or anybody else, on that particular issue? 

Mr. MUDD. Yes, quickly, you know—this is going to be painful— 

but groups that take power sometimes feel accountability in ways 

that constrains them from acting—what am I saying? When groups 

come to power, sometimes they get to be realistic. 

These guys may not like Israel, they may not like us, they may 

have indifferent attitudes toward us. Their primarily responsibility 
40 

is they just sparked a revolution where people are saying, ‘‘Hey, 

great. Now we have political change. Where is my job?’’ 

So I wonder whether—you know, as you look at Hamas, I would 

say they are more realistic than they were 10 years ago, still not 

people we like, but, heck, they got voted in, and they are—the guys 

firing rockets off into Israel now aren’t Hamas. This is Islamic 

Jihad. 

So I think one of the answers is, people are going to vote them 

in. Get over it, until they prove otherwise. The alternative is to say, 

well, yet again, we supported autocrats, but when the democrats 

vote, we don’t like them. We can’t be there. 

Mr. KATULIS. I was in Israel the week Hosni Mubarak stepped 

down as president of Egypt, and there is serious concern about the 

loss of strategic partnerships there. But I think there is a recognition that the changes are coming in the Middle East purely because 

of demographic, economic, and political pressures, and that we 

need—Israel needs to change its view to a certain extent. 

I would—I am glad you mentioned Hamas and Hezbollah. I 

would dig a little bit deeper. I think there are some immediate 

threats coming from some of the Salafist jihadist groups that are 

in the Gaza Strip right now, including Jaysh al-Islam and Jund 

Ansar Allah. These are groups that actually are challenging 

Hamas’ grip in the Gaza Strip. I think they are, you know, affiliated with Islamic Jihad. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you think that they could serve as a counterbalance, be sufficient to be able to not only deal as a political voice, 

but to be able to back off what we are seeing, and we are seeing 

rockets from Gaza right now? 

Mr. KATULIS. No, these are the guys that are responsible for the 

rockets. What I am saying is that Hamas, they are more pragmatic, 

building on what Mr. Mudd said. There are some voices in Hamas 

that are much more pragmatic, because they are feeling pressure. 

You know, there is internecine violence among these Islamists. 

My worry today—and my top worry is Yemen. We have all talked 

about that, for the U.S. homeland security. My second leading 

worry in the Middle East right now is not necessarily Libya, because I think that will play itself out in a certain way, and it is 

still unclear. I think there are real clear signs that there could be 

another regional war or some sort of conflict of the sort that we 

saw in 2006 on multiple borders of Israel. This could spark in 

many different ways. 

In some ways, we have already seen it in the last couple of weeks 

with some of these rockets into Israel and a response from Israel. 

That is a spark that I think could lead to a wider conflagration in 

the Middle East at a time where I think the Obama administration 

is doing the best that it can, but, again, it is in a tactical reactive 

crisis management mode. 

The last thing I would say—somebody asked, if Phil was Secretary of State, what would you do? I think the one thing that is 

missing from this Presidency—and I support him on many issues— 

is the lack of broader long-term vision, what we are talking about 

in this committee here, of where do we see the Middle East in 

about 10 or 15 years? 
41 

We, I think, lack concrete long-term goals for the region. We 

have interests we talk about. We talk about reacting to situations 

in the Middle East. But what I think we need to hear from this 

President is, how do all of these pieces fit together in a broader 

strategy that will help this region move through a transition in its 

own way? 

He tried to do that a bit in his Libya speech a week ago or so, 

on Monday, but he didn’t succeed, in my view. We should press this 

administration on how it is going to deal with this region strategically. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Your question actually raises an interesting 

thought. In the last several weeks, I have been talking to people 

I trust, analysts who follow these things very closely, inside government, who I—and they send me things that they say are—they are 

in open source they say I should read. 

One of the things they sent me was an account in the Asia Times 

by a Pakistani journalist named Syed Shahzad, who is very piped 

in to sort of what is going on, on the ground in northern Pakistan, 

I would say much more so than most journalists. 

His account I would encourage every Member of this committee 

to read, and I can forward it to you to read. It, in fact, raises the 

possibility—and I have seen some evidence of this myself in alQaeda’s public writings—that they are currently undergoing a 

transition in terms of debate internally of how they are going to position themselves for the long term. 

What is happening is there are some people in al-Qaeda, including leadership members who just returned from Iran in the last 

couple years, who are arguing that al-Qaeda needs to be more like 

Hamas, more like Hezbollah, more patient, more cagey, in terms of 

how they come to acquire power and consolidate their power. 

This is worrisome in a variety of ways, because I think that, you 

know, while the nihilistic brand of al-Qaeda, the dead-ender brand 

of al-Qaeda certainly had mass appeal to a certain extent in the 

Muslim world, although not nearly anywhere close to a majority— 

you know, there was a significant minority that supported it—that 

tactical shift that al-Qaeda could go through could, in fact, allow 

it to consolidate power and become an even more worrisome enemy. 

That is who I think you have to worry about here. You could see 

this in—you know, I think it was Ranking Member Speier who 

brought up al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s most recent edition of Inspire. You can actually see traces of this debate there in 

Inspire, where Anwar Awlaki is basically arguing that, you know, 

we need to do things a little bit differently, but at the same time 

try and take credit for what is going on and say, you know, alQaeda does have some cards here to play. 

I would take a look at that very carefully if I were in your shoes, 

in terms of how al-Qaeda adjusts its strategy going forward. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. Nelson, my time is up, unless you have a very quick observation. Just with unanimous consent, I will turn it to Mr. Cravaack 

for one last, quick question. 

Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Only one? This has been a great, great dialogue. 

Once again, I really appreciate it. 
42 

We touched a little bit about Israel. Can we ever have a developing relationship with some of these different factions? Because 

we are always going to support Israel. Can we ever have an open 

dialogue with these different factions? You kind of stole some of my 

thunder of what the Middle East is going to look like in about 4 

or 5 years. Can we have a dialogue with them and be able to support Israel at the same time? 

So I was wondering if you could comment on that. 

Mr. KATULIS. Well, I think the simple fact of the matter is, we 

already do have a dialogue with them, not the governments, but 

the non-government to non-government dialogue. Understanding 

them and understanding the motivations of the variety of Islamist 

groups I think is important to do. I am not so keen on, you know, 

sending our ambassadors to—particularly when I talked about 

those red lines. 

Those groups that don’t support a non-violent agenda and that 

don’t support the full basic human rights, I don’t think our Government should be in any business of dealing with them in any official 

capacity, as much as possible. 

What I do think we need to do is get smarter, particularly with 

this under-30 crowd, because we don’t know anything about the 

Facebook revolutionaries in Tahrir Square. Some of them are 

Islamist, some of them aren’t. 

I lived and worked in Egypt in 1997–1998, and this is the generation that is coming to power, and I think, at the end of the day, 

we are already engaging them in some sort of way, best to be done 

by nongovernmental organizations that understand and appreciate 

freedom and democracy as ideals and push them into a political 

context where they actually—those that are most extremist drop 

that, drop the violent kind of agendas. 

We can engage in that sort of way, and it need not be just the 

U.S. Government. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I think I agree with Mr. Mudd. In some of the 

travels I had in the Navy, the majority of people in this world— 

90 percent of us—just want to have a safe place to raise our kids, 

have a halfway decent job, have clean water to be able to drink, 

and be able to just have a halfway decent life. 

I think by promoting that, I think it will be great inroads. But 

the question I have is, the Middle East that you see in about 4 or 

5 years, can we have direct dialogues with these—whoever is going 

to emerge—and still, you know, be supporters of Israel, as well, 

and hopefully be able to squelch what is going in the Middle East 

right now? 

Mr. KATULIS. I think we can, but we have to be realistic about 

how easy it is going to be, because it is not going to be very easy. 

You are increasingly going to see countries that I think are like the 

Turkish government, which I think is a strong ally on some issues, 

but actually is quite difficult to deal with on other issues, like Iran, 

like Israel, and other things. 

This will require a different way of thinking about statecraft and 

diplomacy in the Middle East. Rather than black and white, we are 

going to have to engage in shades of grey and align our policies 

with new types of governments and try to shape and influence 

them. 
43 

I think the notion that we can just simply isolate countries for 

a long period of time, I think the strategic thrust of what we do 

in the Middle East over the next 5 years should be trying to connect this region with the rest of the world. This region has been 

largely left behind by the waves of globalization, and also trying to 

deal with the internal divisions within the region, up to and including the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

As difficult as that is today—you know, Shimon Peres, the president of Israel, is in town—I think we need to keep the notion of 

a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace alive, as grim as it looks today, 

because you won’t have that integration of the Middle East with 

the broader part of the world. You will see a different face of leadership, and my answer to you is that we can shape and change that 

leadership through smart engagement with those who come to 

power. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Yes, my hope is that we can all agree to disagree, 

but live in peace. That is my hope for the region. 

Mr. Mudd, real quick, Mr. Gadhafi, last gasp of trying to maintain power, do you see him using weapons of mass destruction as 

a tool? 

Mr. MUDD. No, I do not, unless you are talking about things like 

tear gas and chemicals to keep people off the streets. But I don’t 

think so. I think, actually, he is doing all right, right now, and it 

is going to take a heck of a move to get him out of there. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Cravaack. Thanks to each of 

our panelists for very, very valuable testimony. I appreciate not 

just the work that you put into preparing testimony for here, but 

for each of you, the work that you put in to your study of this very 

important region. It has been a great value to those of us on the 

committee. 

Members of the committee may have some additional questions, 

and if they do, they will ask you to be responsive in writing if they 

do. The hearing record will be open for 10 days. 

Thank you for being here today. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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