Honora ble W illiam W. S chwa

rzer, United States District Judge f or the Nor thern District of * California, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0266n.06 F iled: May 16, 2008 06-4027 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. AN DREW E . HU NT , Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COUR T F O R THE SOU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

BE F ORE: M OO R E a nd M c KEA G U E, C ir c ui t J ud g e s ; a nd SC HW A R Z ER , D is t r ic t

Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Def endant Andr ew E. H unt was on parole when, actingon
an in fo rm ant’ s ti p, de fe nd ant’ s p aro le of fi c e r s e arc he d h is h ome and fo un d a loa de d h and g un in defe ndant’s bedroom. Def endant was indicted on a felon-in- possession c harg e. After his m o t ion to suppress statements wa s denied, de fend an t wa s fo u nd guilty by a jury . He wa s sentence d to a prison term of 85 months. On appea l, defe ndant asser ts seven cla ims of error . Finding that all seven
c la ims la c k me ri t, w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 2 - I I n Aug ust 2004, defenda

nt AndrewE. Hunt was on pa role fr om the Oh i o De p ar tment of Re ha bil itatio n a

nd Cor re c tio n, havin g be e n c on vic te d o f f e lon iou s a ssa

ult in 1 99 7. He re sid e d w ith his wife and da

ug hter in Columbus. Hunt was supervised by parole office r J ennife r Clemans. On Aug ust 25, 2004, acting on an informant’s tip that Hunt was in possession of t wo fire arms, Clemans assembled a

team of f ellow par ole offic ers to conduc t a sea rch of Hunt’s home. Wh e n th e o f

f ic e r s ar r iv e d a t th e H u n t r e s id e n c e , th e y w e r e a ll o w e d in b y Hunt’s wife , Nichole. Andr ew Hunt wa s in the s hower

. When he emerg ed from the s hower , he had a g ray towel
wra pped ar ound his waist. He aske d and re ceive d permission to g o to his bedroom to g et dre ssed. When he finished dre ssing, a lone behind the closed bedroom door, Hunt was e scorted to a differ ent
ro om an d the be dr oo m wa s sea rc he d. Th e of

fi c e rs fo un d a loa de d . 38 c a lib e r r e vo lve r a nd fi ve loo se rounds wra

pped in a we t gr ay

towel on the bed. Hunt told Cl emans that he didn’t know about the g un. Nichole Hunt a lso disclaimed any knowled ge of the g un. Hunt was plac ed under arr est for violating the c onditions of his parole. Six day s late r, on

Au g us t 31 , w hil e Hunt rem a ine d in c us tod y a t th e F ra

nk lin County Cor re c tio ns Ce nte r, Cle mans deli vere d and re a d a fo rm a l no tif

ic a tio n o f r e le a se vio la tio n to him

. Hunt was re quired to initial th e fo rm , re s p o n ding to the c harg es that he posse ssed a f irea rm and possessed ammunition by either admitting, admitting with e x planation, or denying the char g es. As he initialed the for

m, Hunt told C lemans t hat “it wasn’ t his gun, that he was holding it for Will , and that Wil l had broug ht it to hi m like two weeks a g o.” He aringtr., J A 103. Hunt was ultimately found to have violated the conditions of his parole a nd a 240-da

y prison term wa s imposed.06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 3 - Six months later, on April 14, 2005, based on the above fac ts, defenda nt Hunt was indicted in the Southern District of Ohio, char g ed with being a felon in possession of a f irea rm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) and § 924(a )(2) . Def endant moved to suppre ss any and all stateme nts made by him duri ngc us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n becau se he ha d n ot b e e n a dv ise d o f h is Miranda ri g hts

. Following an evidentiar

y hear ing, the district c ourt denied the motion, finding that, althoug h Hunt had not bee n Mirandized , his state ment to Clemans on Aug ust 31, 2004 was spontaneous, not the product of inter

rog ation, and ther efor e not excludable. Trial commenc ed on November 8, 2005. At the conc lusion of a two-da y trial, the jury found defe ndant g uilty

as cha rg ed. On July

14, 2 0 0 6 , d ef

endant was sentenc ed to a pr ison term of 85 months. This appeal followed. II A. Sup pression Motion F ir st, de fe nd ant c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion to s up pr e ss s ta te me nts
. The district cour

t held the statement made by defe ndant on Aug ust 31 was spontaneous and not the product of inter

rog ation. There fore , the fa ct that def endant ha d not been Mirandized was hel d to have no imp a c t on the a dmi ssi bil ity of the state me nt. On a pp e a l, de fe nd ant a

rgue s o nly

g e ne ra lly that he should have been g iven Miranda war nings both in his home on Aug ust 25 and at the jail on Aug ust 31 beca

use he w as subject to cus todial interrog ation on both occa sions. On reviewof an order denying a motion to s uppress, we revie w finding s of fa ct for c lear err or and c onclusions of law de novo

. Un ite d S

tat es v . Co le , 315 F.3d 633, 636 ( 6th Cir. 2003).06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 4 - Def endant’ s wr i t t en motion to s uppress did not clea rly identify the statement(s) he soug ht to suppress. Considering the proofs pr esente d at the hear ing, the district court prope rly treated the motion as being direc ted at the state ment defe ndant made o n Au g ust 31, ex plaining that he was holding the gun for Will. The court’s r uling wa s theref

ore limited to the Aug ust 31 statement. On
a pp e a l, d e fe nd ant doe s not ch a lle ng e the dis tr ic t court ’s de nia l of the mot ion to s up pr e ss h is Aug us t 31 statements. R ather , althoug h defe ndant contends he should have be en g iven Miranda wa rn i n gs both at his home on Aug ust 25 a nd at the par ole offic e on August 31, his arg ument is focused on the statements he made at his home. Def endant c ontends he made statements in response to interrog ation while in custody

on Aug ust 25 and that he ought t o have been advised of hi s rig hts to remain silent and consult with an attorney prior to questioning , per Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). T h at t h e s t at em ents he made on Aug ust 25 were introduced at trial and not suppessed, wa s err or, de fe nd ant c on te nd s. B e c a us e de fe nd ant d id n ot i nc lud e his Au g us t 25 state me nts a s a s ub ject o f h is m oti on

to suppress and did not objec t to the introduction of t he st atements at trial, the trial cour t’s admission of t he st atements is re viewed only for plain e rror . See United States v. Murphy , 241 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2001). When unpreser ved, a de fenda

nt’s contention on appe al will preva il only if the trial
co u rt co m m i t t ed (1) err or (2) that is plain and (3) that affe cts substantial rig hts. United States v. Bake r , 4 5 8 F. 3 d

5 1 3 , 5 1 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) (c i t i n g Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1 99 7) ). I f t

he se thr e e c on dit ion s are me t, t he c ourt may no tic e a fo rf

e ite d e rr or

wh e re the e rr or

a lso “ser iously aff ect[s] the fa irness, integ rity , or public reputation of judicial proce eding s.” Id. (quoting Johnson , 5 20 U. S. at 467)

. “ Pla in er ro rs are lim ite d to thos e ha rm fu l one s so r ank

that th e y sh ou ld06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 5 - ha v e b e e na

p p ar e n tt o t h e t r i a l j u d g e w i t h o u to b j e c t i o n , o r

t h a ts t r i k e a tf

u n d a m e n t a l f

a i r n e s s, honest y , or public re putation of the trial.” Murphy , 2 4 1 F. 3 d at 4 5 0 -5 1 (q u o t i n g United States v. Evans , 883 F.2d 496, 499 ( 6th Cir. 1989) (citation and quotations omitted)). Th e g ov e rnme nt m a int a ins that in tr od uc tio n o f t he state me nts ma de by de fe nd ant o n A ug us t 25 did no t a ff

e c t hi s su bs tanti a l r ig hts and

did no t se ri ou sly

a ff e c t th e fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty

or pu bli c
re pu ta tio n o f t

he jud ic ia l pr oc e e din g s. I nd e e d, Cle mans te sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t H un t, i n r e sp on se to discovery of the .38 c aliber revolve r on the bed, told he r that he didn’t know w hat she wa s talking about; that there we re no guns in his possession. Thi s statement was c onsistent with Hunt’s own la te r t ri a l te sti mony , to the e ff

e c t th a t he did no t know a bo ut a fir e arm a t this r e sid e nc e on Au g us t 25, 2004. This statement, which ser ved mer ely

to buttress his own t rial t estimony , could hardly have resulted in pre

judice to defendant or otherwise affe cted his substantial rig hts. Def endant, who ha s the burde n of showing entitlement to relief, ha s not sug g ested how he was prejudice d. He ha s not pr e se nte d a

ny me ri tor iou s r e a so n to dis tur b e ith e r the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion to s up pr e ss or the district cour

t’s admission of testimony reg arding his Aug ust 25 statements. Acc ording ly , we find no plain err or; defe ndant’s first c laim of err or is overr uled. B. Inef fective Assistance De fe nd ant c on te nd s h is tr ia l c ouns e l r e nd e re d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l by

fa ili ngto move to suppress the f

ruits of the August 25 searc h of his home, i .e., the r evolver and ammunition. Def endant c ontends the re cord is devoid of any basis for c oncluding that the sea rchingparole office rs ha d r e a so na

ble g ro un ds fo r b e lie vin g that he wa s in vio la tio n of the te rm s of his pa ro le . Abs e nt a06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 6 - showing of re asonable suspicion, he contends the sear ch was in violation of his F ourth Amendment rig ht s . See U

nited States v. Loney , 3 31 F .3 d 5 16 , 5 20 -2 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 3) ; United States v. Pay ne , 181 F.3d 781, 786-91 (6th Cir. 1999). Fa ilure of his attorne y to raise this issue is said to have be en
c on sti tut ion a lly

de fi c ie nt, i.e ., a

fa ili ng ou tsi de the ra

ng e of c omp e te nc e de mand e d of a tto rn e y s in criminal ca ses under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The r e c o r d o f ju s ti f

ic a ti o n f o r th e A u g u s t 2 5 s e ar c h h a s n o t b e e n d e v e lo p e d , b e c a u se the
sear ch wa s never challeng ed. I t follows that the ineff ective a ssistance c laim must be pursued, if at all, as a matter of c ollatera l relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a proce ss w hich would allow the re cord to be prop erly

develope d. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . S an de rs , 404 F.3d 980, 986 ( 6th Cir. 2005) ( r e c o g n iz in g th a t ty

p ic a ll y , in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e c la im s ma

y n o t b e p u r s u e d o n d ir e c t a p p eal, but rathe r in a post-c onviction proce eding under § 2255) ; Un ite d S tat es v . Cr owe , 2 91 F .3 d 8 84 , 8 86 (6 th Cir. 2002) (same ). We there fore reje ct def endant’ s second c laim of err or, without prejudice

. C. Ano nym ous Tip Te st im ony At the commenc ement of tria l , defe ndant made a motion in l imine to lim it testim ony by g overnme nt witnesses conc erningthe informant’ s tip that led t o the August 25 sear ch of de fenda nt’s residenc e. The trial court g rante d the motion. With refer ence to United States v. Cromer , 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004), t he court direc ted t he Assis tant U.S. Attorney to instruct his witness, J ennife r Clem an s, to mention only that a par ole offic er ha d rec eived a tip and that in response to that tip, office rs went to def

endant’s h o u s e. I n this manner, the tea ching of Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), would be obse rved. By so limit ing Clemans’ testimony reg arding the t ip, the court
so ug ht, in c los e c on fo rm ity wi thCromer , to avoid the pre sentation of any “testimonial” out-of- court06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 7 - statement and e nsure that the tip wa s mentioned strictly for ba ckg round informat i on, not to prove the truth of the state ment. See Crome r , 389 F.3d at 676. Clemans testified prec isely as direc ted. Her testimony included no substantive information convey ed by the tip; it s imply explained why

the offic ers we nt to defenda nt’s home on Aug ust 25, 20 04 . T he tes tim on y

wa s c on sis te nt w iththe c ourt ’s lim ine ru lin g ma de a t de fe nd ant’ s r e qu e st. Def endant did not obj ec t t o Clemans’ testimony when g iven. Now, howe ver, he contends that allowing any

mention of the tip at all repr esente d an abuse of discre tion, because the tip repre sented evidenc e of his possession of the f irea rm. De fe nd ant’ s argume nt i s feckle ss. F ir st o f a ll, it i s su bje c t to pla in e rr or

re vie w b e c a

us e defe ndant di d not prese rve the claim by objecting below. Second, he ha s not demonstrated that a ny
e rr or oc c ur

re d, muc h le ss pla in e rr or that a ff e c te d his su

bs tanti a l r ig hts and

imp ug ne d th e int e g ri ty of the judicial proc ess. Def endant ba ses hi s objection on Cromer ; y et Clemans’ testimony was enti rely consistent with the teac hing of Cromer , 3 8 9 F
. 3 d a t 6 7 6 ( e xp li c it ly

r e c o g n iz in g th at
asser ti o n s o ffered not for

their conte nt, but merely to expl ain why

the g overnme nt commence d investigation, are not off

ere d to establish the t ruth of t he matter asser ted and are not barr ed by

the Confrontation Clause per Cra wfo rd ). The district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony . Def

endant’ s third claim of er ror is over

ruled. D. P rosec utorial Misconduct Def endant complains of t wo i nstance s of prosecutorial mi sconduct, the first relating to the Assistant U.S. Attorney ’s questioning of def endant on c ross-examination, a nd the sec ond relating06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 8 - to the Assistant U.S. Attorney ’s denigration of def endant’ s case in closing a

rg ument. No objection
wa s ma de in c on ne c tio n w ithe ith e r “ mis c on du c t” duri ngtr ia l. S o, a g a in, pla in e rr or re vie w a pp lie s. The s t an dards g overningdefe ndant’s prose cutorial misconduct c laim are summarized as fo llo ws : I n revie wing alleg ations of prose cutorial misconduct, this Court conducts a two- step inquiry

. U

n i t e d S t a t es v . F r a n c is , 170 F.3d 546, 549 ( 6th Cir.1999). First, we deter mine if the statements wer e improper. Id. I f they wer e improper , we c onsider the following fac tors to de termine if the comments we re f lag rant e noug h to warr ant reve rsal: (1) w hether

the prosec utor' s rema

rks or conduct tended to mislea d the jury or pre judice the a ccuse d; (2) whe ther the r emar ks were isolated o r ex t ensive; (3) wh e the r t he re mark s w e re a c cid e nta lly or de lib e rate ly

ma de ; and

(4 ) t he ov e ra ll streng th of the evide nce a g ainst the ac cused. Id. Un ite d S tat es v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 522 ( 6th Cir. 2005). See also, U nited States v. Carter , 236 F.3d 777, 783 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 01). In deter mining whe ther the pr osecuting attorney ’s re marks we re imp ro pe r, the y

mus t be consid e re d w ith in t he c on te xt of

the tr ia l a s a

wh ole , w itha tte nti on

to whether they may have b ee n i n v i t ed by

defe nse counse l’s conduct. Ba rn e tt , 398 F.3d at 522-23. Prosecutoria l misconduct may constitute plain err or, justify ing r elief not wi thstanding de fenda nt’s failure to object at trial, but only if it was “e x ceptionally

flag rant.” Carter , 236 F.3d at 783. F ir st, de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e pr os e c uto r, thr ou g h th e fo llo wi ng ex cha ng e , im pr op e rl y implied that he, the def

endant, ha d the burde n of provinghis innocence : Q: Mr. Hunt, y ou have got g ood attorney s, rig ht? And if y ou think there is other e vid e nc e y ou

ne e d to g e t in , th a t’ s k ind of y our j ob , r ig ht? A: Yes . . . . Q: Idon’t want y ou to try to sug g est to the j ury that there ’s this other stuff no one is talking a

bout.06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 9 - Trial tr., JA 468-69. I mproper b u rd en -s h i ft ing is a violation of due proc ess. See U nited States v. Newton , 389 F.3d 631, 638 ( 6th Cir. 2004), vacate d on other grounds , 54 6 U. S. 8 03 (2 00 5) . Y e t, when view ed in context, the above exchang e is seen not to have be en improper and wa s cer

tainly not exceptionally

flag rant. I n defe ndant’s answ er immediate ly prior to the above-quoted ex chang e, he ha d insinuated that the g overnme nt was deliber ately withholding evide nce f

rom the j ury , say

ing: “ There has bee n a lot of thing s mentioned like things she [i.e., Clemans] said to me while I was in the household that hasn’t bee n broug ht up, a lot of things that ha ppened an d t ra nspired while the w hole orde al was taking place that has not bee n broug ht into the trial.” Trial tr., JA 468. I t thus ap p ea rs t hat the Assistant U.S. Attorney ’s point, though c lumsil y made, wa s invited by and re sponsive to defe ndant’s testimony . Read in conte x t, it is clea r that the prosec utor’s rema rks wer e not intended to shift the burd e n o f p ro of or oth e rw ise mis le a d the jur y or pr e jud ic e the de fe nd ant. Th e y we re int e nd e d s imp ly to d isp e l th e no tio n, su g g e ste d b y de fe nd ant, tha

t th e g ov e rnme nt h a d im pr op e rl y wi thh e ld information. The r emar

ks were not improper and do not c onstitut e prose cutorial misconduct. See Newton , 389 F.3d at 638 (finding no misconduct in pr osecutor’ s reply to defe nse insinuations that g overnme nt hid evidence from jury ). Second, defe ndant complains of closing argument rema rks by the Assistant U

. S
. At t orney to the eff ect that de fenda

nt and his wife ha d lied or g iven fa lse statements. “I t is well-established that the persona l opinion of counsel has no place at trial.” United States v. Collins , 78 F.3d 1021, 1039 (6th Cir. 1996). “I t is unprofessional for counsel to express a persona l be lief or opinion in the truth or falsity of any

testimony .” Id

. at 1039-40. “On the other ha nd, counsel must be g iven leew ay06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 10 - to argue re asonable infere nces f rom the evide nce. Wher e ther e is conflicting testimony , it may be
rea sonable to infer , and ac cording ly to argue, that one of

the two sides is ly ing.” Id . at 1040. I n th is c a se , th e jur

y c e rt a inl y he ard e vid e nc e of

c on flict in g sta te me nts . In f a c t, b oth defe ndant and his wife admitted in the ir testimony that they had lied. Def endant a dmitted that the sto ry he g a ve Cle mans on

Au g us t 31 , i. e ., tha

t he wa s h old ingthe g un

fo r Will, wa s a

lie . N ic ho le Hunt admitted that she lied to Clemans on Aug ust 25, when she disclaimed any knowledg e of the
re vo lve r w he n it

wa s found on the be d. He nc e , w he n th e As sis tant U .S. Attor ne y re fe rr e d to the ir lies and commented on their credibility , he wa s not inappropriate ly expressing his per sonal belief, but was commenting on evidentiar y fac ts. Defe ndant and his wi fe ad m i t t ed having made pr ior statements inconsistent w ith their trial testimony , prior stateme nts which they char acte rized as lies and which the y

disavowed by

explaining why

they had lied. Def endant has thus failed to show that the Assistant U.S. Attorney ’s re marks we re imprope r
a t all. No r ha s he de mon str a te d tha t the re mark s pre jud ic ia lly a ff e c te d d e fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts or the fa irness, integ rity

or public re putation of the judicial proc eeding s. The allowa nce of the
rema rks ce rtainly

does not a

mount to any

thing a pproxi mating pla in error . Acc ording ly , defe ndant’s prosec utorial misconduct cha lleng e is reje cted. E. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence De fe nd ant main tains th e re wa s in su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e of

his po sse ssi on

of the re vo lve r t o sustain the g overnmen t ’s b u rd en of proof beyond a re asonable doubt. He insists that his wife
cre d i b ly testified at trial that she br oug ht the g un into the home, unbeknownst to him, for selfprotec tion.06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 11 - I n evaluating the suf

ficienc y of the e vidence , we may not weig h t h e evidence pr esente d, consider the cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, or substitute our judgme nt for that of t he jury

. United States

v . D av is , 177 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1999). The judgment m ust be upheld as longas the e vidence , vie we d in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he pr os e c uti on , a

nd a ft e r g ivi ngthe g ov e rnme nt t he be ne fi t of all infer ence s that could rea sonably be dra wn from the testimony , could j ustify a rational trier of fac t in f in d in g th e e le me n ts o f th e c h ar g e d c r im e p r o v e n b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t. Id

. Circumstantial evidenc e alone may be suff icient to sustain a convic tion and such evide nce ne ed not exclude ever

y rea sonable e x planation except that of guilt. United States v. Charles , 138 F.3d 257, 26 5 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 8) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . P e te rs , 15 F.3d 540, 544 ( 6th Cir. 1994). There was strongcirc umstantial evidence connec ting de fenda nt to the revolv e r . T h e r e v olver was f o u n d o nth e b e d , w h e r e d e f

e n d an t h a d

ju s t b e e ns itti n g , w r a

p p e d in a w e t t owel c los e ly
rese mbling the towe l that had just been obser ved wr apped a

round def endant’ s body

as he e x ited the shower moments e arlier . Both de fenda nt and his wife g ave c onflicting stories about the g un, which stories the jury

was e ntitled to dis believe—e specia lly in light of de fenda nt and his wife both having

a dmi tte d ly

inga bo ut t he g un a t on e po int

or ano the r. Vi e wi ngth e evid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the pr osecution, we can ha rdly conclude that no rational trier of f ac t co u l d fi nd the
e le me nts of

the c ri me c ha

rg e d p ro ve n b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. F . Unreasonable Sentence Prior to sentencing , defe ndant objecte d to the proposed two- level obstructio n -of-justice enhanc ement of his off

ense le vel. The district c ourt overr uled his objecti o n and applied the enhanc ement, finding that defe ndant had made false statements both to his parole off icer and, on the06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 12 - rec ord at the suppr ession hear ing, to the c ourt. Def endant maintains on a

ppeal t h at s i n ce he was
never char g ed with and c onvicted of pe rjury , the enha nceme nt should not have bee n appli ed. He contends the c ourt should ha ve applied an advisory Sentencing Guideline rang e of 63 to 93 months and he should have bee n sentenc ed at the low e nd of the ra ng e. A judg ment of sentenc e is revie wed f or re asonabl en es s u n d er

an ab u s e- o f- d i s cr et i o ns t an d ar d. Gall v. United States , 128 S.Ct . 586, 594 (2007). To obta in relief, a n appellant must show that the sentenc e is either procedur ally or subs tantively unrea sonable. Id . at 597; United Sta te s v . V owe ll , 516 F.3d 503, 509 ( 6th Cir. 2008). A sentenc e may be held proce durally unrea sonable if it is marke d by “sig nificant proc edura l error , such as fa i l i n g t o calc ulate (or improperly

calc ulating) the Gu ide lin e s r ang e , tr e a tin g the Gu ide lin e s a s ma nd a tor y , f a ili ngto c on sid e r t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, selec ting a

sentenc e base d on clea

rly err oneous fa cts, or fa iling to ade q u at el y explain the chosen sentenc e—including an explanation for any deviation from the G uidelines rang e.” Ga ll , 1 28 S.Ct
. at 597. Def

endant ha s not spe cified whether his se ntencing challeng e is procedur al or substantive. To the extent he argues that the district cour t erre d in finding f

acts justifying the o b s t ruction-ofjustice enhanc ement, leading to an improper calc ulation of the Guidelines, he appea rs to contend that his 85-month sentence is the product of unr easona ble proc edure . Yet, he doe s not dispute the sentenc ing c ourt’s finding that he gave materia lly false statements to Clemans and to the cour t at the
su pp re ssi on he ari ng . H e c on te nd s r a the r t hat th e e nh anc e me nt s ho uld no t be ap pli e d unle ss a

nd un til he is c on vic te d o f p e rj ur

y fo r t he fa lse state me nts
. Se c tio n 3 C1. 1 o f t

he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s p ro vid e s:06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 13 - I f (A) the d ef

endant willfull y

obstructed or

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the a dminist ration of just ice with respe ct t o the investig ation, prosec ution, or sentenci ng of the instant offe nse of c onviction, and (B ) the obstruc tive conduct re la te d to (i ) t

he de fe nd a

nt' s of fe ns e of c on vic tio n and any re le va nt c on du c t; o r ( ii) a c los e ly re la te d o ff

e ns e , in c re a se the of

fe ns e le ve l by

2 le ve ls. Am on g the no n- e xha

us tiv e lis t of

e xamp le s o f q

ua lif y ingob str

uc tiv e c on du c t pro vi ded in Application Note 4, we find: (f) providing materia lly

false inf ormation to a judg e or ma g istrate; (g ) prov i d i n g materia lly false inf

ormation to a law e nforc ement off icer that signific antly

obstructed or impeded the off icial investig ation or prose cution of the instant offense

. I t follows that, even thoug h defe ndant was not charg ed with or c onvicted of pe rjury , his admission that he prov i d ed materially false inf ormation to his parole off icer and to the cour

t established conduct that c lear ly

qualified for

the obstruction enha

nceme nt. See als o Gi b s o n v. United States , 271 F.3d 247, 259-60 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding obs truction enhanc ement based on unconvicted conduct amounting to per jury ), overruled on othe r grounds , United States v. Leac hman , 309 F.3d 37 7, 38 3 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 2) . A c c or din g ly , d e fe nd ant’ s p ro c e dural unre a so na ble ne ss c ha lle ng e is meritless. Arguably , defe ndant is a lso c ontending that his sentence is substantively unrea sonable, i.e., g reater than ne cessa

ry to comply

with the purposes of se ntencing . The Supreme Court has define d the sc op e of

su bs tanti ve un re a so na

ble ne ss a bu se -o f- dis c re tio n r e vie w a s f oll ow s: Whe n c on du c tin g thi s re vie w, the c ourt wi ll, of c ours e , take int o a c c ount t he tot a lity of the c ircumstance s, including the extent of any varia nce f rom the Guidelines r ang e. I f the sente nce is withi n t h e Gu i delines ra ng e, the a ppellate c ourt may , but is not require d to, apply

a pre sumption of reasona bleness. [ Rita v. United States , — U. S. — , 127 S.Ct . 2456, 2462-68 (2007) ]. But if the sentenc e is outside the Guidelines06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 14 - rang e, the c ourt may

not apply a presumption of unrea sonablene ss. I t may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due def er en ce to the district c ourt’s decision that the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, on a whole, justify the extent of the varia nce. T he fac t that the appellate c o u

r t mig ht rea sonably

have c oncluded that a

differ ent sentenc e was a ppropriate is insufficient to justify reve rsal of the district court. Ga ll , 128 S.Ct . at 597. I t is incumbent upon de fenda nt to establish that his sentence is unreasona ble. Un ite d S tat es v . Cr owe ll , 493 F.3d 744, 752 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Def endant’ s only

appellate objection to the manner in w hich the district cour t calculated the Guidelines ra

ng e havingbeen ove rruled, i t i s appar ent that the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e used by the dis tr ic t c ourt , 7 7 to 96 mon ths , w a s p ro pe rl y c a lc ulate d. F ur

the r, be c a us e de fe nd ant’ s 8 5- mon th prison sentenc e is within t h i s proper ly calc ulated advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e, it is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of re asonable ness. United S t a t es v. Sex ton , 512 F.3d 326, 332 ( 6th Cir. 20 08 ); United States v. W illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Def endant’ s substantive unrea sonablene ss a r g u me nt b o il s d o wn

to a me r e alleg ation that “the D is tr ic t C o u rt s h o u ld

h a v e o n ly

im p o s e d a s e n te n c e o f

6 3 mo n th s im

p r is o n me n t, n o t 8 5 mo n th s .” This a ll e g a ti o n , u n s u

p p o rte d b y an y e v id e n c e o r

ar g u me n t, is c le ar ly

in s u f f ic ie n t t o r e b u t t

he presumption of re asonable ness. See Se xton , 51 2 F .3 d a t 33 2 (t

he qu e sti on wh e the r, in the fir st ins tanc e , th e a

pp e llate c ourt wo uld have imp os e d the same se nte nc e is b e y on d th e sc op e of a pp e llate
re vie w) ; United States v. Brogdon , 503 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2007) (mere alleg ation that sentenc e is g re a te r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o r e bu t th e pr e su mpt ion of re a sonabl e ne ss a c c or de d to

w i t h i n - G u i d e l i n e s s e n t e nc e ); Un i t ed Stat es v. Phinaze e , 515 F.3d 511, 519 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (since substantive unrea sonablene ss review i s fo r abuse of discre tion, appellate c ourt must be war y of substitut ing its judg ment for that of the district court).06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 15 - Ac c or din g ly , de fe nd ant’ s c on te nti on tha t hi s se nte nc e is u

nr e a so na ble , w he the r c on str

ue d to be a pr ocedur al or substantive c halleng e, is reje cted. G. C onstitutional ity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) F ina lly , in

an a rgume nt n ot i nc lud e d in

de fe nd ant’ s c ouns e l’ s b ri e fi ng , b ut as se rt e d o nly in defe ndant’s own pro se briefs, de fenda nt contends his conviction must be re v e r s e d b e cause the fe loni n -p o s s es s i o nl aw h e i s ad

j u d g ed to have viola t edi s u n co n s t i tu t i o n al

. T h e c o n s t i tu t i o n al i t y ch al l en ge is presente d in two parts. Def endant c ontends first that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) repr esents an imprope r exercise of

Congr ess’ Commerc e Clause powe r. This a rg ument was squar ely

addre ssed and r ejec ted in United States v. Loney , 331 F.3d 516, 524 ( 6th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Carnes , 309 F.3d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 2002). See also United St ates v. Thompson , 361 F.3d 918, 923 ( 6th Cir. 2005). W h i l e d e f

e n d an t g o e s t o g r e a tl e n g t h s t o e x p l a i n w h y Loneyis wrong ly

decide d, he fa ils to cite a single case in any

jurisdiction that has been pe rsuade d by the ar g ument. Unless and until overturne d by th e Sixth C ir c uit en banc or by the Supreme Court, Thompson , Loney , and Carnes ar e b in d ing and must be followed. We theref ore r ejec t defe ndant’s ar g ument that the fe lon-in-possession law repr esents an imprope r exercise of leg islative power unde r the Commerc e Clause. I n a se c on d ch a lle ng e to the c on sti tut ion a lity of the law, de fe nd ant c on te nd s it wa s n ot v a lid ly
enac ted in the first place

. Def endant a ppear s to contend primar ily that the bill from which Title 18
o ri gi n at ed was ne ver pa ssed in the same f orm by both the House a

nd the Senate be fore it was prese nted to the P resident for approval and si g ning in 1948, in violation of t he Prese ntment Clause, U.S. C o n s t
. ar t
. I , § 7, cl. 2. B eca use Title 18 was not va lidly enac ted, the law unde r which defe ndant was c onvicted is said to be void ab ini tio
.06-4027

United States v. Hunt

- 16 - Th e qu e sti on s su

rr ound ingthe e na c tme nt o f T itl e 18 we re ne ve r r a ise d in the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Or din ari ly , is su e s n ot r a ise d in the dis tr ic t court wi ll not be a dd re sse d in the fi rs t in sta

nc e on a pp e a l. United States v. W

right , 343 F.3d 849, 867 ( 6th Cir. 2003); Saylor v. United States , 315 F.3d 664, 669 (6th Cir. 2003). Moreove r, an issue not ra ised in an ap p el l an t ’s opening brie f nee d not be considere d. United States v. Abboud , 4 38 F .3 d 5 54 , 5 89 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; United St ates v. Madde n , 40 3 F. 3d 34 7, 35 1, n. 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . M oo re , 376 F.3d 570, 576 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Her e, on a novel constitutional theory , the cour t has bee n aff

orded ne ither the be nefit of a lower c ourt
ru lin g no r a dv oc a c y

by c omp e te nt c ouns e l on

e ith e r s ide . U nd e r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s, we de c lin e to consider the issue. III For all the fore g oing r easons, a ll o f d ef en d ant’s claims of error

are reje cted a

nd the lower
c ourt ’s jud g me nt i s AF F IR M ED
.