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303 Nebraska Reports

McEWEN v. NEBRASKA STATE COLLEGE SYS.

Cite as 303 Neb. 552

Dr. Robert McEwen, appellant, v. Nebraska

State College System, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed July 12, 2019. No. S-17-638.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does 

not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a 

matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion 

independent of the lower court’s decision.

2. Statutes. The meaning of a statute is a question of law.

3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues 

presented for review, an appellate court must determine whether it has 

jurisdiction.

4. Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. A petition for further 

review and supporting memorandum brief must specifically set forth 

and discuss any error assigned to the Court of Appeals.

5. Courts: Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A district court 

sitting as an appellate court has the same power to reconsider its orders, 

both inherently and under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 2016), as 

it does when it is a court of original jurisdiction.

6. Pleadings: Judgments. A determination as to whether a motion, however titled, should be deemed a motion to alter or amend a judgment 

depends upon the contents of the motion, not its title.

7. Pleadings: Judgments: Time. In order to qualify for treatment as a 

motion to alter or amend a judgment, a motion must be filed no later 

than 10 days after the entry of judgment, as required under Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 25-1329 (Reissue 2016), and must seek substantive alteration of 

the judgment.

8. Appeal and Error. A clear distinction exists in Nebraska between proceedings by petition in error and an appeal.

9. Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A petition in error in 

the district court to review a judgment or final order of an inferior tribunal is in its nature an independent proceeding having for its purpose 

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www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

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McEWEN v. NEBRASKA STATE COLLEGE SYS.

Cite as 303 Neb. 552

the removal of the record from an inferior to a superior tribunal to 

determine if the judgment or final order entered is in accordance with 

the law.

10. Courts: Appeal and Error. An error proceeding is distinct and independent, while the appeal is a mere continuation of the same cause in 

another court.

11. Statutes. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning.

12. Statutes: Intent. When interpreting a statute, effect must be given, if 

possible, to all the several parts of a statute; no sentence, clause, or word 

should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided.

13. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. An appellate court must look to a 

statute’s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which 

best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would 

defeat it.

14. Statutes: Legislature: Presumptions: Judicial Construction. In determining the meaning of a statute, the applicable rule is that when the 

Legislature enacts a law affecting an area which is already the subject 

of other statutes, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of the 

preexisting legislation and the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court 

construing and applying that legislation.

15. Statutes: Appeal and Error. In interpreting a Nebraska civil procedure 

statute modeled upon a federal rule of civil procedure, an appellate 

court may look to federal decisions for guidance.

16. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. The purpose of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1329 (Reissue 2016), like many other provisions of Nebraska law, 

is to save parties from the delay and expense associated with unnecessary appeals, which can often be avoided by providing every reasonable 

opportunity for a lower court to correct its own mistakes.

17. Courts: Judgments: Time. No court is required to persist in error, and, 

if a court concludes that a former ruling was wrong, the court may correct it at any time while the case is still in the court’s control.

18. Statutes: Judicial Construction: Legislature: Presumptions: Intent. 

Where a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has 

not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has 

acquiesced in the court’s determination of the Legislature’s intent.

19. Judgments: Words and Phrases: Appeal and Error. A judgment 

entered by a district court at the conclusion of an error proceeding 

pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 (Reissue 2016) 

is a “judgment” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329 

(Reissue 2016).
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McEWEN v. NEBRASKA STATE COLLEGE SYS.

Cite as 303 Neb. 552

20. Judgments: Pleadings: Time: Appeal and Error. A motion to alter 

or amend a judgment, which motion seeks a substantive alteration of a 

judgment entered by a district court disposing of a petition in error and 

which motion is filed within 10 days of the entry of the judgment, will 

terminate the time for running of appeal pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1912(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).

21. Public Policy. While the doctrine of stare decisis is entitled to great 

weight, it is grounded in the public policy that the law should be stable, 

fostering both equality and predictability of treatment.

22. Courts: Appeal and Error. Overruling precedent is justified when the 

purpose is to eliminate inconsistency.

23. ____: ____. Some of the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere 

to the principle of stare decisis include workability, the antiquity of the 

precedent, whether the decision was well reasoned, whether experience 

has revealed the precedent’s shortcomings, and the reliance interests 

at stake.

24. Courts: Case Overruled: Appeal and Error. The Nebraska Supreme 

Court’s decision in Goodman v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 539, 742 

N.W.2d 26 (2007), and cases relying upon it are overruled to the extent 

they hold that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Reissue 2016) does not 

apply to a judgment of a district court acting as an intermediate appellate court.

25. Courts: Appeal and Error. Upon reversing a decision of the Nebraska 

Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court may consider, as it 

deems appropriate, some or all of the assignments of error the Court of 

Appeals did not reach.

Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, Inbody, 

Riedmann, and Arterburn, Judges, on appeal thereto from the 

District Court for Dawes County, Derek C. Weimer, Judge. 

Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and cause remanded 

for further proceedings.

Howard P. Olsen, Jr., and Adam A. Hoesing, of Simmons 

Olsen Law Firm, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

George E. Martin III and Leigh Campbell Joyce, of Baird 

Holm, L.L.P., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and

Freudenberg, JJ.
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McEWEN v. NEBRASKA STATE COLLEGE SYS.

Cite as 303 Neb. 552

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a series of decisions involving appeals, this court determined that a motion to alter or amend a judgment under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329 (Reissue 2016) does not apply to 

a decision of a district court acting as an intermediate appellate court. Thus, in those prior decisions, the motion was 

held not to terminate the time for appeal to a higher court.1

The question presented here is whether, given a longstanding 

distinction between appeals and error proceedings, § 25-1329 

applies to a district court’s judgment disposing of a petition 

in error.2 For numerous reasons, we conclude that it does. 

And because we conclude that the original reasoning was 

incomplete and that doing otherwise would exacerbate a “procedural minefield,” we overrule several previous decisions 

to the extent that they held § 25-1329 inapplicable to judgments of a district court acting as an intermediate appellate 

court. We therefore reverse the Nebraska Court of Appeals’ 

summary dismissal of this appeal and remand the cause for 

further proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND

Dr. Robert McEwen filed a petition in error in the district 

court for Dawes County, Nebraska, against the Nebraska State 

College System (NSCS), a system of three state colleges in 

Nebraska. He alleged that he was wrongfully terminated from 

his position as a tenured professor at Chadron State College.

Neither party disputes that the petition in error was timely 

filed. Responding to the petition in error, NSCS’ answer admitted that McEwen was discharged on March 16, 2016, that 

McEwen timely requested an additional hearing before NSCS’ 

board of trustees under a provision of the collective bargaining agreement, and that on April 18, NSCS’ chancellor 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 (Reissue 2016).
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McEWEN v. NEBRASKA STATE COLLEGE SYS.

Cite as 303 Neb. 552

denied the additional hearing, thereby finalizing the discharge. 

McEwen’s petition was filed on May 17. District court proceedings followed.

By a judgment styled as a memorandum order, the district 

court “overruled” his petition on March 31, 2017 (March 

judgment).

Exactly 10 days later, on April 10, 2017, McEwen moved 

for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an order vacating the 

March judgment. The alternative motion stated that it was 

based on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 2016).

After a hearing, the district court overruled both aspects of 

the motion, doing so by an order entered on May 25, 2017 

(May order). Because the court had not conducted a trial 

and reviewed only a transcript of the administrative proceedings, it concluded that a motion for new trial was not proper. 

Turning to McEwen’s alternative motion to vacate judgment, the court explained that it had made a mistake of fact 

regarding the presence of an individual at an administrative 

hearing. But the court concluded that the individual’s presence was not the “determining fact” in the court’s conclusions regarding the “‘17.3’” issue, referring to a section of 

a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the court did not 

change its decision regarding the merits of McEwen’s petition 

in error.

Within 30 days after the May order, McEwen filed a notice 

of appeal. In case No. A-17-638, the Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court’s 

summary order explained that McEwen’s motion for new trial 

did not “toll” the time to file a notice of appeal and that 

McEwen’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.

McEwen moved for rehearing in the Court of Appeals. 

He argued that the May order was itself a final order. He 

premised this argument upon § 25-2001 and this court’s decision in Capitol Construction v. Skinner.

3

 Notably, McEwen 

3 Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 279 Neb. 419, 778 N.W.2d 721 (2010).
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Cite as 303 Neb. 552

discussed two of our cases, Goodman v. City of Omaha4 and 

Timmerman v. Neth,

5 regarding the applicability of a motion 

to alter or amend a judgment 6 where a district court acts as an 

intermediate appellate court. Based on this case law, McEwen 

conceded, as he did at oral argument before this court, that his 

motion to vacate did not act as a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment, which would have terminated the running of the 

appeal time.

By a summary order in case No. A-17-638, the Court of 

Appeals denied rehearing. The court explained that McEwen’s 

motion to vacate did not “toll” the time to appeal from 

the March judgment. The court added, “Accordingly, by the 

time the district court entered [the May] order denying the 

motion to vacate, [McEwen] could only appeal from that 

order. However, [McEwen’s] brief on appeal argues only that 

the district court erred by denying his petition in error in the 

March [judgment].” Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded 

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the March 

judgment and left in place the dismissal of the appeal from the 

May order.

McEwen timely petitioned for further review, which we 

granted.7

After oral argument in this court, we requested supplemental 

briefing by the parties addressing whether, in light of the distinction traditionally recognized between petitions in error and 

appeals created by various statutes, the Legislature intended 

for motions to alter or amend a judgment under § 25-1329 

to apply to judgments entered in error proceedings and, if so, 

the proper application of that statute to the case before us. 

The parties promptly submitted supplemental briefs, which we 

have considered.

4 Goodman v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 539, 742 N.W.2d 26 (2007).

5 Timmerman v. Neth, 276 Neb. 585, 755 N.W.2d 798 (2008).

6 See § 25-1329.

7 See Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-102(F) (rev. 2015).
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Cite as 303 Neb. 552

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

McEwen assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction and (2) overruling 

his subsequent motion for rehearing.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of 

law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion 

independent of the lower court’s decision.8

[2] The meaning of a statute is a question of law.9

V. ANALYSIS

[3] The Court of Appeals denied McEwen’s motion for 

rehearing, basing its denial on Capitol Construction v. Skinner.

10

No doubt relying on prior decisions of this court, the court did 

not consider whether § 25-1329 affected the time for appeal 

from the March judgment. And neither party argued that question to the Court of Appeals. But that matters not. Before 

reaching the legal issues presented for review, an appellate 

court must determine whether it has jurisdiction.11 If an alternative basis supported jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals was 

bound to apply it unless it was foreclosed by existing precedent 

from this court.12 Here, the Court of Appeals quite reasonably 

concluded that Capitol Construction dictated that it lacked 

jurisdiction of McEwen’s appeal.

1. McEwen’s Primary Argument

On further review, McEwen relies primarily on the same 

argument he presented to the Court of Appeals in support of 

8 State ex rel. Rhiley v. Nebraska State Patrol, 301 Neb. 241, 917 N.W.2d 

903 (2018).

9 In re Interest of Samantha C., 287 Neb. 644, 843 N.W.2d 665 (2014).

10 Capital Construction, supra note 3.

11 Becher v. Becher, 302 Neb. 720, 925 N.W.2d 67 (2019).

12 See State v. Hausmann, 277 Neb. 819, 765 N.W.2d 219 (2009).
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rehearing there—that the district court’s order overruling his 

alternative motion to vacate was itself a final, appealable order 

under Capitol Construction.

[4] Before turning to that argument, we note that on further review, McEwen has abandoned his argument based on 

his motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals rejected that 

argument, and in McEwen’s brief in support of his petition for 

further review, he neither assigns error nor presents argument 

addressing the motion for new trial. It is well established that 

a petition for further review and supporting memorandum brief 

must specifically set forth and discuss any error assigned to the 

Court of Appeals.13 Therefore, we do not consider it.

Regarding McEwen’s motion to vacate, both his argument 

and the Court of Appeals’ summary disposition rely upon our 

decision in Capitol Construction, which we first summarize 

and then apply.

(a) Capitol Construction

Capitol Construction was an appeal from county court to 

district court, where the district court dismissed the appeal 

for lack of progression after the defendants, who brought the 

appeal, failed to reply to a progression letter.14 But the progression letter was sent only to the defendants’ trial counsel, 

who failed to either respond or forward the notice to appellate counsel.

Within 10 days of the dismissal, the defendants, through their 

appellate counsel, filed a motion to reinstate the appeal. The 

district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed to 

the Court of Appeals. This appeal was filed more than 30 days 

after the dismissal, but within 30 days of the denial of their 

motion to reinstate.

Before the Court of Appeals, the defendants sought review 

of the district court’s denial of their motion to reinstate. The 

13 See State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966, 840 N.W.2d 526 (2013).

14 Capitol Construction, supra note 3.
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Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely,15 and we 

granted further review.

[5] In analyzing the jurisdictional question, we first reiterated our holding in State v. Hausmann,

16 that a district court 

sitting as an appellate court has the same power to reconsider 

its orders, both inherently and under § 25-2001, as it does 

when it is a court of original jurisdiction.17

We then said that “an order denying a motion to vacate or 

modify a final order is itself a final, appealable order.”18 But 

we reasoned the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, because 

“[the] later order [was] based upon grounds that [made] it 

independently final and appealable and the merits of that order 

[were] the issue raised on appeal.”19 Although it was not necessary to our decision in Capitol Construction, we observed 

that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider 

an appeal challenging the merits of the earlier, progressionbased dismissal order. We then recited the familiar proposition 

that a motion for reconsideration does not toll the time for 

appeal and is considered nothing more than an invitation to 

the court to consider exercising its inherent power to vacate or 

modify its own judgment.20

(b) Not Independently Final 

and Appealable

Accepting for the moment the reasoning of Capitol 

Construction to the extent that that decision implicitly relied on 

Goodman, Timmerman, and Hausmann regarding § 25-1329, 

McEwen’s argument overlooked an important distinction: There 

15 Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 17 Neb. App. 662, 769 N.W.2d 792 

(2009), reversed, Capitol Construction, supra note 3.

16 Hausmann, supra note 12.

17 Capitol Construction, supra note 3.

18 Id. at 423, 778 N.W.2d at 725.

19 Id. at 425, 778 N.W.2d at 726.

20 See, e.g., Kinsey v. Colfer, Lyons, 258 Neb. 832, 606 N.W.2d 78 (2000).
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was no independent basis for appeal from McEwen’s alternative motion to vacate. Although the district court acknowledged a factual misstatement, it did not modify its judgment. 

There was no intervening new matter, as there was in Capitol 

Construction. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, McEwen’s 

attack ran only to the March judgment. As he stated in his 

original brief, “The errors assigned relate to [McEwen’s] rights 

under Section 17.3 of the [collective bargaining agreement].”21

The May order was not based upon grounds that made it independently final and appealable, and the merits of that order 

were not the issue raised on appeal.

2. Motions to Alter or

Amend in Appeals

It follows that unless McEwen’s alternative motion to 

vacate qualified as a motion to alter or amend a judgment 

pursuant to § 25-1329, his motion did not terminate the time 

for taking an appeal from the March judgment and his appeal 

from the May order could not circumvent the outcome that 

followed. Until we requested supplemental briefing, McEwen 

took the position that § 25-1329 did not apply. Now, his position has shifted.

Before turning to the specific question that we posed to the 

parties, we briefly recall the development of a motion to alter 

or amend a judgment created in 2000,22 which is codified as 

§ 25-1329, and our case law determining that it does not apply 

to an appellate decision of a district court acting as an intermediate court of appeals.

(a) State v. Bellamy

In State v. Bellamy,

23 we acknowledged a statute had been 

amended to provide that the running of the time for filing a 

21 Brief for appellant at 18.

22 See 2000 Neb. Laws, L.B. 921, § 7.

23 State v. Bellamy, 264 Neb. 784, 652 N.W.2d 86 (2002).
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notice of appeal would be terminated not only by a timely 

motion for new trial24 or by a timely motion to set aside a verdict 

or judgment,25 but, also, by a timely motion to alter or amend a 

judgment under § 25-1329. This amendment26 occurred in the 

same legislation that introduced a motion to alter or amend a 

judgment into Nebraska’s civil procedure statutes.

[6,7] Two important lessons from Bellamy suggest that 

McEwen’s motion might qualify as a motion to alter or amend. 

First, a determination as to whether a motion, however titled, 

should be deemed a motion to alter or amend a judgment 

depends upon the contents of the motion, not its title.27 This 

remains true.28 Thus, it matters not that McEwen’s motion was 

titled as an alternative motion to vacate. Second, in order to 

qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, 

a motion must be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of 

judgment, as required under § 25-1329, and must seek substantive alteration of the judgment.29 McEwen’s alternative motion 

to vacate was filed within 10 days of, and sought substantive 

alteration of, the March judgment. Thus, his motion seemingly 

met both of the Bellamy criteria.

In Bellamy, we implicitly recognized that § 25-1329 was 

modeled on Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) as it then existed.30 We cited 

numerous federal cases holding that a motion for reconsideration, if filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment, is the 

functional equivalent of a motion to alter or amend a judgment 

brought pursuant to rule 59(e).

24 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1144.01 (Reissue 2016).

25 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315.02 (Reissue 2016).

26 See 2000 Neb. Laws, L.B. 921, § 15.

27 See Bellamy, supra note 23.

28 See Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 

(2017).

29 See Bellamy, supra note 23.

30 28 U.S.C. app. rule 59(e) (2000).
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But in Bellamy, we did not address whether § 25-1329 

applies to a district court’s review of a judgment or final 

order of a lower court or tribunal. Nor did we examine, given 

that § 25-1329 was modeled on a federal rule which might 

have prompted us to consider federal interpretive decisions,31

whether rule 59(e) has been applied in cases where a federal 

district court reviews the decision of a federal agency.

(b) Inapplicable to Appeals

We were soon forced to confront whether § 25-1329 applies 

where an appeal is taken to the district court. In several cases, 

we determined that it did not. We briefly summarize those 

decisions.

(i) Statutory Appeal From 

Municipal Tribunal

Goodman v. City of Omaha32 was the first case to determine whether § 25-1329 applied to a district court’s hearing 

an appeal. The plaintiff appealed an Omaha Zoning Board 

of Appeals decision, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-413 

(Reissue 1997). The district court affirmed the board’s decision. The plaintiff moved for a new trial and moved to alter or 

amend the judgment. The district court denied both motions. 

After the plaintiff perfected an appeal to this court, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

We said, “The present case concerns an appeal from a zoning board of appeals to the district court.”33 We explained that 

decisions of a zoning board of appeals were reviewable by a 

31 See, e.g., Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 

N.W.2d 906 (2016); InterCall, Inc. v. Egenera, Inc., 284 Neb. 801, 824 

N.W.2d 12 (2012); Bailey v. Lund-Ross Constr. Co., 265 Neb. 539, 657 

N.W.2d 916 (2003) (federal cases construing federal civil procedural 

rules may be used for guidance in construing equivalent Nebraska civil 

procedural rules).

32 Goodman, supra note 4.

33 Id. at 543, 742 N.W.2d at 29 (emphasis supplied).
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district court pursuant to two specific statutes,34 but that the 

scope of the district court’s review was limited to the legality 

or illegality of the board’s decision.35 We relied upon an earlier 

decision characterizing the district court’s role under this statute as an appellate court.36 We then determined that the district 

court had functioned as an “intermediate appellate court of 

appeals, and not as a trial court.”37

Having determined that the district court was functioning 

as an intermediate court of appeals, we then explained that 

the district court’s order “was not a judgment, but, rather, was 

an appellate decision reviewing the judgment rendered by the 

Board.”38 We relied upon the statutory definition of a judgment as “the final determination of the rights of the parties in 

an action”39 and our description of a “judgment” in Strunk v. 

Chromy-Strunk as “a court’s final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties to an 

action as those rights and obligations presently exist.”40

The outcome in Goodman was clear. We held that because 

the district court was acting as an intermediate court of 

appeals and not as a trial court, a motion to alter or amend 

was inappropriate and would not terminate the time for filing 

an appeal.

(ii) APA Appeals

Timmerman v. Neth41 extended our decision in Goodman to 

a district court’s judicial review of an agency’s decision under 

34 See § 14-413 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-414 (Reissue 1997).

35 See Goodman, supra note 4.

36 Id. (citing Kuhlmann v. City of Omaha, 251 Neb. 176, 556 N.W.2d 15 

(1996)).

37 Goodman, supra note 4, 274 Neb. at 543, 742 N.W.2d at 30.

38 Id. at 544, 742 N.W.2d at 30.

39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Reissue 2016).

40 Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 917, 929, 708 N.W.2d 821, 834 (2006).

41 Timmerman, supra note 5.
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).42 There, the plaintiff 

appealed pursuant to the APA and the district court affirmed 

the agency’s decision. The plaintiff then moved to alter or 

amend the judgment. The district court overruled the motion, 

and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. While this 

appeal was taken within 30 days of the district court’s order 

overruling the motion to alter or amend, it was filed more 

than 30 days after the district court’s order affirming the 

agency decision. Citing our decision in Goodman, the Court of 

Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal as filed out of time. 

We granted further review.

In Timmerman, we adhered to our reasoning in Goodman. 

We held that because the district court was functioning as an 

intermediate court of appeals, the plaintiff’s motion to alter 

or amend the judgment did not toll the time for perfecting an 

appeal.43 We rejected the plaintiff’s argument that language in 

the APA, which referred to the district court’s decision in an 

APA appeal as a “judgment,”44 and language in the underlying 

license revocation statute,45 which also used the word “judgment,” called for a different outcome. We explained that “the 

word ‘judgment’ refers to different things in different contexts, 

and is often used generally to refer to the result of any kind of 

judicial decisionmaking process.”46 We reiterated our “specific 

holding that a ‘judgment,’ for purposes of § 25-1329, does not 

include an appellate decision of a district court.”47

We later applied the same reasoning in a purported APA 

appeal.48 Although we ultimately determined that there had not 

42 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 to 84-920 (Reissue 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2006).

43 See Timmerman, supra note 5.

44 § 84-918(1).

45 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-498.04 (Reissue 2004).

46 Timmerman, supra note 5, 276 Neb. at 589, 755 N.W.2d at 801.

47 Id.

48 See Jacob v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 294 Neb. 735, 884 N.W.2d 

687 (2016).
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been a final agency decision, our opinion did not question the 

reasoning from Goodman and Timmerman.

(iii) Appeals From County Court

We have articulated equivalent reasoning in connection with 

an appeal from a county court to a district court, which 

was then appealed to a higher appellate court. In State v. 

Hausmann,

49 we held that while an intermediate appellate court 

still has jurisdiction over an appeal, it has the inherent power 

to vacate or modify a final judgment or order.

But in so doing, we emphasized that “in the absence of an 

applicable rule to the contrary, a motion asking the [district] 

court to exercise that inherent power does not toll the time for 

taking an appeal.”50 We explained that a party can move the 

court to vacate or modify a final order, but that if the court 

does not grant the motion, a notice of appeal must be filed 

within 30 days of the entry of the earlier final order if the party 

intends to appeal it.51 To the extent that our reasoning applied 

to a motion seeking substantive alteration of the district court 

judgment and filed within 10 days of its entry, we implicitly 

followed Goodman and Timmerman.

3. Petitions in Error

We now turn to the question which prompted us to grant 

further review. Before examining the parties’ arguments, we 

recall the history of error proceedings in Nebraska and principles of law that flowed from the respective origins of error 

proceedings and appeals.

(a) History

The writ of error is not of statutory origin, but is derived 

from the common law.52 In contrast, the remedy or procedure 

49 Hausmann, supra note 12.

50 Id. at 827, 765 N.W.2d at 225.

51 Id.

52 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 29 (2019).
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by appeal is of civil-law origin and was introduced therefrom 

into courts of equity and admiralty.53 A common-law right of 

appeal does not exist.54

Our earliest statutes, including those governing petitions in 

error, stem from the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure.55 In 1858, 

the Territorial Legislature copied most of the Nebraska Code of 

Civil Procedure from Ohio’s code.56 It was not until Nebraska 

received statehood that the Legislature replaced actions at 

law and suits in equity with the civil action and specified that 

judgments and final orders in civil actions could be reviewed 

only by appeal.57 In 1871, the Legislature changed its mind 

and returned to error proceedings as the method for reviewing 

judgments and final orders in civil actions. But in 1873, the 

Legislature began to shift review of district court judgments 

in equitable and civil actions to appeals.58 The methods also 

changed in criminal cases, although it was not until 1982 that 

the writ of error was eliminated.59

Although, in 1905, error proceedings ceased to be a means 

for this court’s review of civil district court judgments and 

final orders, error proceedings in the district court to review 

judgments and final orders of courts and tribunals inferior 

in jurisdiction to the district court lived on.60 In 1974, the 

Legislature eliminated the petition in error as a method of 

obtaining district court review of county court judgments.61

53 Id., § 41.

54 Id.

55 See John P. Lenich, What’s So Special About Special Proceedings? Making 

Sense of Nebraska’s Final Order Statute, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 239 (2001).

56 See id.

57 See id.

58 See id.

59 See id.

60 See In re Estate of Berg, 139 Neb. 99, 296 N.W. 460 (1941).

61 Miller v. Brunswick, 253 Neb. 141, 571 N.W.2d 245 (1997).
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But petitions in error continue as a means of judicial review 

of the judgments and final orders of tribunals exercising 

judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district 

court.62 And that issue provides the basis for the proceeding 

now before us.

From this history, one can readily perceive that the 

Legislature did not treat error proceedings and appeals interchangeably. This history delineates two separate and distinct 

avenues for judicial review. And our case law supports that 

perception.

(b) Error Proceedings Clearly 

Distinct From Appeals

[8] Over 120 years ago, we said that a clear distinction 

exists in this state between proceedings by petition in error 

and an appeal.63 It was only a few years later when we 

explained that one cannot be denied his or her right of review 

in the appellate courts and that proceedings in error are always 

resorted to where no other method is pointed out or provided 

for.64 This principle remains vital and effective. Where no other 

method of appeal is provided, one may obtain judicial review 

by proceedings in error under §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908.65 The 

right of appeal in this state is purely statutory; unless the statute provides for an appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial 

tribunal, such right does not exist.66

[9,10] The respective proceedings differ in nature. “The 

proceeding by petition in error is substantially an independent 

action, in which the plaintiff, as the moving party, controls 

62 See § 25-1901.

63 See Western Cornice & Mfg. Works v. Leavenworth, 52 Neb. 418, 72 N.W. 

592 (1897).

64 See Dodge County v. Acom, 72 Neb. 71, 100 N.W. 136 (1904). 

65 See Moore v. Black, 220 Neb. 122, 368 N.W.2d 488 (1985).

66 From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56 N.W.2d 441 (1953). See, also, Heckman 

v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 894 N.W.2d 296 (2017).
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both the pleading and the process of the court.”67 A petition in 

error in the district court to review a judgment or final order 

of an inferior tribunal is in its nature an independent proceeding having for its purpose the removal of the record from an 

inferior to a superior tribunal to determine if the judgment or 

final order entered is in accordance with the law.68 It is in the 

nature of a new action in that a petition in error is required to 

be filed, and a summons is required to be issued upon the written praecipe of the petitioner in error.69 The term “appeal” is a 

process of civil-law origin and removes the cause entirely, subjecting the facts as well as the law to a review and retrial.70 An 

error proceeding is distinct and independent, while the appeal 

is a mere continuation of the same cause in another court.71 The 

dispositions of each also differ.

When judgment of reversal is entered in the error proceeding, that proceeding is at an end. When rendered on 

appeal, the same cause is still pending and undisposed 

of. But when, on appeal, the judgment of reversal also 

remands the cause for further proceedings in the inferior 

tribunal, it is manifest that the cause is fully disposed of 

so far as the district court is concerned.72

We have said that the subjects of review on petition in error 

and an appeal are so distinctively different and dissimilar that 

the provisions of the statute relating to each question cannot 

be taken together and construed as if they were one law and 

effect given to every provision.73

67 Polk v. Covell, 43 Neb. 884, 890, 62 N.W. 240, 242 (1895).

68 See Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23, 166 Neb. 548, 90 N.W.2d 58 (1958).

69 See id. (emphasis supplied).

70 Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Berger, 141 Neb. 598, 4 N.W.2d 571 

(1942).

71 See Ribble v. Furmin, 69 Neb. 38, 94 N.W. 967 (1903).

72 Id. at 43, 94 N.W. at 969.

73 Consolidated Credit Corporation, supra note 70.
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We acknowledge that our case law has not always spoken 

consistently. In Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone 

Co.,

74 we stated that the word “‘appeal’” is a word of “general 

application in the law. Ordinarily [it] refer[s] to the removal of 

proceedings from one court or tribunal to another for review.” 

And in McClellan v. Board of Equal. of Douglas Cty.,

75 we 

observed that it is now common for our court to refer to an 

“‘appeal by petition in error,’” citing six cases using this 

imprecise description.

[11-13] Ultimately, it is the Legislature’s intention in enacting § 25-1329 that matters. Statutory language is to be given 

its plain and ordinary meaning.76 When interpreting a statute, 

effect must be given, if possible, to all the several parts of 

a statute; no sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as 

meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided.77 An appellate court must look to a statute’s purpose and give to the 

statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that 

purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it.78

In our effort to determine the Legislature’s intent regarding § 25-1329, we sought the parties’ assistance. We turn to 

their arguments.

(c) Parties’ Arguments

McEwen first argues, essentially, that an error proceeding under §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 is a type of original civil 

action under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-101 (Reissue 2016) which 

abolished the distinctions between actions at law and suits in 

equity and substituted one form of action, called a civil action. 

74 Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 96 Neb. 245, 255, 147 

N.W. 674, 678 (1914).

75 McClellan v. Board of Equal. of Douglas Cty., 275 Neb. 581, 591, 748 

N.W.2d 66, 74 (2008).

76 Patterson v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 302 Neb. 442, 923 N.W.2d 717 (2019).

77 State v. Phillips, 302 Neb. 686, 924 N.W.2d 699 (2019).

78 Id.
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Viewing a petition in error as an original civil action, he reasons that it results in a judgment within the meaning of both 

§§ 25-1301(1) and 25-1329.

Backing away slightly, he suggests that there is no reason 

to believe the Legislature did not intend the term “judgment” 

in § 25-1329 to include a decision by a court or judge in a 

petition in error. He urges that we abandon Goodman and 

subsequent case law, characterizing Goodman as “not entirely 

consistent” with legislative intent.79 And he characterizes our 

existing jurisprudence in “appealing orders of judicial review 

from a district court” as a “procedural minefield.”80

NSCS relies upon our statement in McClellan that the distinction between the two methods of review “has largely been 

to distinguish the method of perfecting each or to explain each 

method’s peculiar rules of joinder of parties.”81 It urges that 

we read §§ 25-1329, 25-1301, and 25-1901 in pari materia 

with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1931 (Reissue 2016). It observes 

that both §§ 25-1901 and 25-1931 (which specifies the time 

for commencing a proceeding under § 25-1901) address steps 

taken after a judgment is rendered or a final order is made, 

in contrast to § 25-1329, which contemplates an action to 

be taken after the entry of a judgment. These differences, it 

argues, suggest ambiguity in the statutes. It would resolve 

the ambiguity by looking to legislative history, which shows 

that prior to 1999, § 25-1931 used “rendition” to describe the 

action taken by the inferior tribunal; that in 1999, the word 

“rendition” was changed to “entry”; and that in 2000, it was 

changed back to “rendition.”82 This, it argues, shows that the 

Legislature has “made the ‘rendition’ of the decision . . . the 

starting time for commencing the review process in the case 

79 Supplemental brief for appellant at 6.

80 Id. at 7.

81 McClellan, supra note 75, 275 Neb. at 590, 748 N.W.2d at 73.

82 See, § 25-1931 (Reissue 1995); 1999 Neb. Laws, L.B. 43, § 12; 2000 Neb. 

Laws, L.B. 921, § 16.
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of petition in error proceedings, but the ‘entry’ of the decision 

. . . the starting time for commencing the review process in 

other proceedings.” 83 It then argues that because § 25-1329 

uses the word “entry,” this statute does not apply to decisions 

rendered by the district court in petition in error proceedings. 

NSCS also suggests that the Legislature has acquiesced in 

our decisions.

(d) Applicable to Judgments 

on Petitions in Error

For well over 100 years, we have referred to a district court’s 

decision disposing of a petition in error under §§ 25-1901 to 

25-1908 as a “judgment.”84 And as recited above, we have 

described an error proceeding as substantially an independent 

action,85 in its nature an independent proceeding,86 in the nature 

of a new action,87 and distinct and independent.88 It is true that 

the scope of review in an error proceeding is limited.89 But the 

limited scope of review does not affect the nature of the proceeding or detract from its significance to the parties.

83 Supplemental brief for appellee at 6.

84 See, e.g., Butler Cty. Landfill v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 299 Neb. 

422, 908 N.W.2d 661 (2018); Thomas v. Lincoln Public Schools, 228 Neb. 

11, 421 N.W.2d 8 (1988); Anania v. City of Omaha, 170 Neb. 160, 102 

N.W.2d 49 (1960); Dovel, supra note 68; Olsen v. Grosshans, 160 Neb. 

543, 71 N.W.2d 90 (1955); Consolidated Credit Corporation, supra note 

70; Ribble, supra note 71; Bennett v. Otto, 68 Neb. 652, 94 N.W. 807 

(1903); Slobodisky v. Curtis, 58 Neb. 211, 78 N.W. 522 (1899); Tootle, 

Hosea & Co. v. Jones, 19 Neb. 588, 27 N.W. 635 (1886); Newlove v. 

Woodward, 9 Neb. 502, 4 N.W. 237 (1880).

85 Polk, supra note 67.

86 Dovel, supra note 68.

87 Id.

88 Ribble, supra note 71.

89 See Crown Products Co. v. City of Ralston, 253 Neb. 1, 567 N.W.2d 

294 (1997) (court is to determine whether tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and whether decision rendered is supported by sufficient relevant 

evidence).
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[14] Our decisions using this terminology and describing 

an error proceeding’s nature shaped the Legislature’s crafting 

of the language in § 25-1329. In determining the meaning 

of a statute, the applicable rule is that when the Legislature 

enacts a law affecting an area which is already the subject of 

other statutes, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of the preexisting legislation and the decisions of the 

Nebraska Supreme Court construing and applying that legislation.90 And in this instance, NSCS cites to legislative history 

demonstrating the Legislature’s familiarity with the subject. 

Thus, we are confident the Legislature understood that an 

error proceeding in the district court is distinct and independent from an appeal.

From the amendments to § 25-1931, NSCS reasons that 

because the “rendition of the judgment”91 by the “tribunal, 

board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in 

jurisdiction to the district court”92 starts the time for commencement of an error proceeding in the district court, this 

somehow means that the judgment of the district court at the 

conclusion of the error proceeding is not “entered” within 

the meaning of § 25-1329. We disagree. An appeal from 

the district court’s disposition of the proceeding is governed 

by § 25-1912, which uses both the term “rendered” and the 

term “entry” to establish time limits on appeals and specifically contemplates termination of the appeal time by a timely 

motion to alter or amend a judgment. Thus, the proper contrast 

is between §§ 25-1931 and 25-1912, which shows that the 

Legislature understood the difference between commencing an 

error proceeding in district court and commencing an appeal 

to the Court of Appeals from a district court’s judgment in an 

error proceeding. Rather than supporting NSCS’ position, this 

contrast supports applying § 25-1329.

90 White v. State, 248 Neb. 977, 540 N.W.2d 354 (1995).

91 See § 25-1931.

92 See § 25-1901.
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[15] Because § 25-1329 was modeled on a federal rule, 

we look to federal decisions for guidance. As noted above, 

§ 25-1329, when first adopted, was identical to a federal rule 

of civil procedure. We have frequently said that because the 

Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil Cases are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we may 

look to federal decisions for guidance in interpreting the 

Nebraska rules.93 We have interpreted a Nebraska criminal 

procedure statute using federal decisions, because the statute was patterned on a federal rule of criminal procedure.94

We now articulate an equivalent principle: In interpreting 

a Nebraska civil procedure statute modeled upon a federal 

rule of civil procedure, we may look to federal decisions 

for guidance.

Rule 59(e) has been applied in numerous proceedings 

before federal district courts reviewing final agency decisions.95 Thus, where a federal district court reviews an agency 

decision and enters a judgment, and a party files a timely 

motion under rule 59(e), the time for appeal runs from the date 

of entry of the court’s disposing of the motion.96 Because the 

Legislature modeled § 25-1329 on a federal rule that applied 

to federal district courts, including proceedings where the federal court reviewed an agency decision, this suggests that it 

93 E.g., Chafin v. Wisconsin Province Society of Jesus, 301 Neb. 94, 917 

N.W.2d 821 (2018).

94 See State v. Parnell, 294 Neb. 551, 883 N.W.2d 652 (2016).

95 See, Maxmed Healthcare, Inc. v. Price, 860 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(Departmental Appeals Board Medicare Appeals Council decision); Bass 

v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 211 F.3d 959 (5th Cir. 2000) (Farm Service 

Agency decision); Ashley v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 

707 Fed. Appx. 939 (11th Cir. 2017) (Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration decision); Leak v. Runyon, No. 95-1392, 1996 WL 

386609 (4th Cir. July 11, 1996) (unpublished disposition listed in table of 

“Decisions Without Published Opinions” at 91 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996)) 

(U.S. Postal Service decision).

96 See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
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intended § 25-1329 to apply to error proceedings commenced 

in a Nebraska district court.

[16,17] And this leads us to the purpose of the statute, 

which is obvious: The purpose of § 25-1329, like many other 

provisions of Nebraska law, is to save parties from the delay 

and expense associated with unnecessary appeals, which can 

often be avoided by providing every reasonable opportunity 

for a lower court to correct its own mistakes. As we have 

said before, no court is required to persist in error, and, if 

a court concludes that a former ruling was wrong, the court 

may correct it at any time while the case is still in the court’s 

control.97 Section 25-1329 enables a district court in an error 

proceeding, a court which is no less susceptible of error than 

any other, to give thoughtful consideration to an assertion that 

it has made a mistake, without prejudicing the rights of the 

party making the assertion. And it encourages a party to do so 

in good faith, knowing that its right to appeal will not be lost 

because of continued running of the time for appeal. We look 

to the purpose of § 25-1329 and give it a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it.

[18] While we agree, as NSCS reminds us, that where a 

statute has been judicially construed and that construction 

has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the 

Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s determination of 

the Legislature’s intent,98 the presumption fails here for three 

reasons. First, and most important, we have not previously 

construed the application of § 25-1329 specifically to an error 

proceeding under §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908. Second, given the 

presumption that the Legislature is familiar with our case law 

regarding error proceedings, including our characterization of 

the clear distinction between a petition in error and an appeal 

97 See Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion, 302 Neb. 297, 923 N.W.2d 372 

(2019).

98 See State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018).
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and our repeated use of the term “judgment” to describe a 

district court’s decision disposing of a petition in error, the 

Legislature might well have not understood our decisions in 

Goodman, Timmerman, and Hausmann as bearing on petitions 

in error. Finally, NSCS’ argument in brief mainly relies on 

decisions that predate the enactment of § 25-1329. The only 

amendment to date, adopted in 2004, added a “springing” 

effect to the terminating motions identified in § 25-1912(3),99

and was no doubt prompted by our decision in Macke v. 

Pierce 100 regarding a motion for new trial.

[19,20] We conclude that a judgment entered by a district 

court at the conclusion of an error proceeding pursuant to 

§§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 is a “judgment” within the meaning of 

§ 25-1329. It naturally follows that a motion to alter or amend 

a judgment, which motion seeks a substantive alteration of a 

judgment entered by a district court disposing of a petition in 

error and which motion is filed within 10 days of the entry of 

the judgment, will terminate the time for running of appeal 

pursuant to § 25-1912(3). Consequently, we must reverse the 

Court of Appeals’ summary dismissal.

4. Clearing “Procedural Minefield”

We now turn to McEwen’s request that, to use his metaphor, 

we clear the “procedural minefield.”101 This is not something 

that we undertake lightly.

Prior to our decision today, an anomalous situation already 

existed. Where a district court acted as a trial court and entered 

a judgment, a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment 

terminated the time for taking an appeal.102 A similar statute 

99 See 2004 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1207, §§ 3 to 5.

100 Macke v. Pierce, 263 Neb. 868, 643 N.W.2d 673 (2002) (superseded by 

statute as stated in Despain v. Despain, 290 Neb. 32, 858 N.W.2d 566 

(2015)).

101 Supplemental brief for appellant at 7.

102 See § 25-1912(3) (Reissue 2016).
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accomplished the same result regarding a county court judgment.103 For both this court and the Court of Appeals, our 

appellate rules,104 which are consistent with statutory procedures governing such appeals,105 enabled us to entertain 

motions for rehearing without jeopardizing a party’s ability to 

pursue any subsequent appeals which might be available. Only 

where a district court acted as an intermediate appellate court 

did a party filing a motion to alter or amend a judgment do so 

at his or her peril.

But after today’s decision, without reassessing Goodman, 

Timmerman, and Hausmann, the procedural minefield would 

still exist, with boundaries less clear than before. In the generic 

or colloquial sense, some “appeals” to the district court would 

be subject to § 25-1329, while others would not. Not only is 

legislative acquiescence a legitimate concern, we must also 

consider the doctrine of stare decisis.

[21-23] We have said that while the doctrine of stare decisis 

is entitled to great weight, it is grounded in the public policy 

that the law should be stable, fostering both equality and 

predictability of treatment.106 And we have recognized that 

overruling precedent is justified when the purpose is to eliminate inconsistency.107 Thus, we said that remaining true to an 

intrinsically sounder doctrine better serves the values of stare 

decisis than following a more recently decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it.108 As the U.S. 

Supreme Court has identified, some of the relevant factors in 

deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis 

include workability, the antiquity of the precedent, whether the 

103 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2729(3) (Reissue 2016).

104 See § 2-102(F)(1) and Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-113 (rev. 2012).

105 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1924 and 25-1926 (Reissue 2016).

106 See Heckman, supra note 66.

107 See id.

108 Id.
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decision was well reasoned, whether experience has revealed 

the precedent’s shortcomings, and the reliance interests at 

stake.109 The Court explained that “reliance interests are important considerations in property and contract cases, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in 

order to conduct transactions.”110

Here, reconciling our case law with the purpose of the 

statute would eliminate the inconsistency in application of 

§ 25-1329 and best achieve the obvious purpose of the statute. Not only would we eliminate inconsistency in the treatment of appeals versus error proceedings, we would also 

harmonize the opportunity for “rehearing” at all levels of 

Nebraska’s court system. This would foster equality and 

enhance predictability.

Turning to the factors identified by the U.S. Supreme 

Court, we conclude that all weigh in favor of corrective 

action. Maintaining a single area carved out from the application of § 25-1329 has proved unworkable: It promoted a 

procedural trap for parties and their counsel and, in its area of 

operation, defeated the statutory purpose. Regarding antiquity 

of the precedent, the earliest decision, in Goodman, dates back 

only to 2007. While the rationale may have appeared sound 

at the time Goodman was decided, inconsistency with other 

statutory language quickly became apparent. The Timmerman

court acknowledged as much.111 And the language in Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 25-2733 (Reissue 2016) directly contradicts the 

core holding of Goodman in the context of appeals from 

county court to district court. Section 25-2733(1) specifies 

that on appeal from the county court, the district court shall 

“render a judgment which may affirm, affirm but modify, or 

reverse the judgment or final order of the county court” and 

109 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 

876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010).

110 Id., 558 U.S. at 365.

111 See Timmerman, supra note 5.
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that if the district court reverses, “it may enter judgment in 

accordance with its findings or remand the case . . . for further proceedings consistent with the judgment of the district 

court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 25-2733(3) specifies that 

the “judgment of the district court shall vacate the judgment 

in the county court” and that “interest on the amount of the 

judgment in the district court . . . shall run from the date 

of entry of the [county court] judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) This language already existed in § 25-2733 in 2000, 

when § 25-1329 was added to our statutes, and although 

§ 25-2733 was amended in the same legislation,112 the references to a “judgment” in the district court on appeal from 

the county court remained unchanged. An unspoken premise 

in Goodman was that a proceeding followed by an appeal 

(or a series of appeals) results in one, and only one, judgment. We conclude that the language of our appeals statutes, read together, refutes that premise. In short, experience 

has revealed our precedent’s shortcomings. And neither party 

identifies, nor can we discern, any reliance interests that 

would be affected.

[24] We therefore overrule our decision in Goodman113 and 

cases directly114 or inferentially115 relying upon it to the extent 

they hold that § 25-1329 does not apply to a judgment of a 

district court acting as an intermediate appellate court.

VI. CONCLUSION

[25] We conclude that McEwen’s alternative motion to 

vacate qualified as a motion to alter or amend a judgment 

within the meaning of § 25-1329. The summary dismissal of 

McEwen’s appeal must be reversed. We recognize that upon 

112 See 2000 Neb. Laws, L.B. 921, § 27.

113 Goodman, supra note 4.

114 See Timmerman, supra note 5.

115 See, Jacob, supra note 48; Capitol Construction, supra note 3; Hausmann, 

supra note 12.
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reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals, we may consider, as we deem appropriate, some or all of the assignments 

of error that the Court of Appeals did not reach.116 However, 

the Court of Appeals did not proceed past the initial jurisdictional issue presented, and neither this court nor the Court of 

Appeals has heard argument upon or meaningfully considered 

the underlying merits of the appeal. We conclude that those 

issues should be addressed by the Court of Appeals in the first 

instance. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 

and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

 Reversed and remanded for

further proceedings.

Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.

116 See Hausmann, supra note 12.