AFGHANISTAN

Improvements Needed 

to Strengthen 

Management of U.S. 

Civilian Presence

Report to Congressional Addressees

February 2012

GAO-12-285

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-285, a report to 

congressional addressees 

February 2012 

AFGHANISTAN 

Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of

U.S. Civilian Presence 

Why GAO Did This Study

In March 2009, the President called for 

an expanded U.S. civilian presence 

under Chief of Mission authority to 

build the capacity of the Afghan 

government to provide security, 

essential services, and economic 

development. In addition, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) deploys 

civilians under combatant commander 

authority to Afghanistan to support

both combat and capacity-building 

missions. DOD established the Civilian 

Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) in 

2009 to create a cadre of civilians 

trained, cleared, and equipped to 

respond urgently to expeditionary 

requirements. As the military draws 

down, U.S. civilians will remain crucial 

to achieving the goal of transferring 

lead security responsibility to the 

Afghan government in 2014. 

For this report, GAO (1) examined the

expansion of the U.S. civilian presence 

in Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DOD’s

implementation of its CEW policy, and 

(3) determined the extent to which U.S. 

agencies had provided required 

Afghanistan-specific training to their

personnel before deployment. GAO 

analyzed staffing data and training 

requirements, and interviewed 

cognizant officials from the Department 

of State (State), other U.S. agencies 

with personnel under Chief of Mission 

authority in Afghanistan, and DOD.

What GAO Recommends

GAO’s recommendations to DOD 

include developing key assumptions

and identifying the number and types 

of positions that should constitute the 

CEW, and establishing a process to 

identify and synchronize training

requirements. DOD concurred with 

GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense 

(DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took 

steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. 

agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian 

presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of 

Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in State’s 

data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location 

and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the 

reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian 

presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help 

assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DOD’s data is reliable is 

unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 

report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data 

concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and 

expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed 

in fiscal year 2012. 

DOD has taken preliminary steps to implement its Civilian Expeditionary 

Workforce (CEW) policy, including establishing a program office; however, nearly 

3 years after DOD’s directive established the CEW, the program has not been 

fully developed and implemented. Specifically, DOD components have not 

identified and designated the number and types of positions that should 

constitute the CEW because guidance for making such determinations has not 

been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Officials stated that 

once key assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have 

been finalized, implementing guidance will be issued. Until guidance that 

instructs the components on how to identify and designate the number and types 

of positions that will constitute the CEW is developed, DOD may not be able to 

(1) make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in 

DOD’s fiscal year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, (2) meet 

readiness goals for the CEW as required in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan 

for fiscal years 2012-2013, and (3) position itself to respond to future missions. 

U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and DOD provided Afghanistanspecific, predeployment training to their civilians, but DOD faced challenges. 

State offered predeployment training courses to address its requirements for 

Chief of Mission personnel and designated a centralized point of contact to help 

ensure that no personnel were deployed without taking required training, 

including the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course. While predeployment 

training requirements were established for Afghanistan by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commander, DOD relied on its various 

components to provide the training to its civilians. In some cases, DOD 

components offered duplicate training courses and did not address all theater 

requirements in their training because DOD did not have a process for identifying 

and synchronizing requirements and coordinating efforts to implement them, as 

called for in the Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the 

Department of Defense. Absent this process, DOD could not ensure that its 

civilians were fully prepared for deployment to Afghanistan and that training

resources were used efficiently. 

View GAO-12-285. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson 

Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Letter 1 

Background 4

U.S. Agencies Reported Expanding Their Civilian Presence in 

Afghanistan and Took Steps to Improve Their Ability to Track 

That Presence 11

DOD Took Preliminary Steps to Implement CEW Policy but Did 

Not Identify the Number and Types of Positions That Should 

Constitute the CEW 20

U.S. Agencies Established Afghanistan-Specific Predeployment 

Training Requirements, but DOD Faced Implementation 

Challenges 23

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 41

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Tables

Table 1: General Activities of U.S. Agencies under Chief of Mission 

Authority in Afghanistan 5

Table 2: Extent to Which Agencies Had Filled Chief of Mission 

Staffing Requirements in Afghanistan, December 2011 13

Table 3: Discrepancies between Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing 

Matrix and ACPTS 15

Table 4: Extent to Which DOD’s New Capacity-Building Programs 

Had Filled Staffing Requirements in Afghanistan, as of 

December 2011 18

Table 5: State-Required, Afghanistan-Specific Training for Chief of 

Mission Personnel 24

Table 6: Gaps and Duplication in Training Courses Provided to 

DOD Civilians Deployed to Afghanistan 30

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Figures

Figure 1: Staffing Processes Used by State, USAID, and USDA to 

Recruit and Identify Candidates for Positions in 

Afghanistan 8

Figure 2: Increase in U.S. Chief of Mission Presence in Afghanistan, 

January 2009 through December 2011 12

Figure 3: Reported Increase in DOD Overall Civilian Presence in 

Afghanistan, January 2009 through December 2011 17

Figure 4: Trainees React to Simulated Mortar Attack during 

Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise 25

Figure 5: Civilian Trainees Interact with Afghan Role Players in 

Scenario Involving Afghan Casualties Resulting from a 

NATO Airstrike 26

Abbreviations

ACPTS Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System 

CEW Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 

CONUS continental United States

DOD Department of Defense 

FACT Foreign Affairs Counter Threat 

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

State Department of State 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

February 27, 2012

Congressional Addressees

In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian 

presence to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide 

security, essential services, and economic development with limited 

international support. In this expansion, U.S. agencies were to deploy 

civilian experts under the authority of the Chief of Mission1 beyond the 

U.S. Embassy in Kabul to the provinces and districts to create more of an 

impact on Afghan lives by building the capacity of local government 

institutions. Housed with military personnel, these field-deployed civilians 

were to coordinate with their military and Afghan counterparts to integrate 

their capacity-building activities into the larger counterinsurgency 

campaign. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed 

civilians to Afghanistan under the authority of U.S. Central Command to 

support combat operations through equipment maintenance, logistical 

support, and intelligence gathering and analysis. Some DOD civilians also 

deploy to build the capacity of Afghan security institutions such as the 

Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. DOD established the Civilian 

Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) by directive in January 2009 to serve as 

a source for such deployable civilians.2

Current U.S. strategy calls for provinces and districts to be transitioned to 

greater Afghan government control as local capacity improves and 

conditions allow.3

 

1

Chiefs of Mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. diplomatic missions and 

have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government 

executive branch employees in that country, with some exceptions. The U.S. Ambassador 

to a foreign country is the Chief of Mission in that country.

The U.S. civilian expansion in Afghanistan and the 

deployment of those civilians into the field is crucial to these capacity2

Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 

23, 2009).

3

The U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan refers to the strategy announced in a March 2009 

speech by the President and reiterated in a December 2010 strategic review under the 

auspices of the National Security Council. Planning and implementation of this strategy is 

further detailed in the August 2009 U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign 

Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the February 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

building efforts, particularly as the United States, along with its North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, has committed to fully transferring 

lead security responsibility to the Afghan government by the end of 2014. 

Furthermore, a recent report from the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction found that the cost of sustaining the U.S. 

civilian presence would likely rise as the U.S. military presence decreases.

Because of broad congressional interest in Afghanistan, we performed our 

work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to 

conduct work on his own initiative. In this report, we examine issues related 

to the management of U.S. agency civilian personnel deployed to 

Afghanistan under both Chief of Mission and DOD authority. Specifically, 

we (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in 

Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DOD’s implementation of its CEW policy, and 

(3) determined the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required 

Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment.

For our first objective, to examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian 

presence in Afghanistan, we obtained and analyzed staffing data from the 

Department of State (State) and DOD regarding staffing requirements 

and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of Mission authority and 

key positions under combatant commander authority deployed in-country 

following the President’s March 2009 call to enhance support of Afghan 

national and subnational government institutions. To determine the 

reliability of the staffing data, we reviewed available documentation 

pertaining to the data systems and procedures used to develop staffing 

data, examined the data for outliers and missing observations, and 

conducted follow-up interviews to discuss questions that arose in our 

analysis of the data. Furthermore, we compared State data against 

staffing data obtained from other agencies under Chief of Mission 

authority, including the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 

Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury. We found 

State’s staffing data to be sufficiently reliable to provide an indication of 

the positions filled at the level of the agency but not sufficiently reliable to 

report on more-detailed staffing information, such as position type. For 

DOD, we compared program requirements and staffing data for the 

Ministry of Defense Advisors program and Afghanistan Pakistan Hands 

program with documentation obtained from the program office. Because 

DOD staffing data were based on daily submissions from combatant 

commands, we could not validate its accuracy; however, DOD officials 

identified the data as sufficiently reliable to illustrate the increase in 

DOD’s overall civilian presence, and we agree.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

For our second objective, to evaluate the implementation of DOD’s CEW 

policy, we reviewed relevant documents to identify the structure of the 

CEW, DOD’s plans for implementing the policy, and how the CEW related 

to departmentwide programs and goals. In addition, we interviewed officials 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CEW program office, the 

military services, and U.S. Central Command to further understand the 

current status of efforts to fully implement the CEW, the department’s plans 

for the CEW of the future, and how the CEW was currently supporting the 

department’s needs for deployable civilians.

For our third objective, to determine the extent to which U.S. agencies 

had provided required Afghanistan-specific and Foreign Affairs Counter 

Threat (FACT)4 training to their personnel before deployment, we first 

identified Chief of Mission and DOD training requirements. For personnel 

under Chief of Mission authority, we compared training requirements with 

waiver logs, State Foreign Service Institute attendance rosters, available 

staffing data, and State Diplomatic Security’s FACT Tracker to determine 

whether civilians deploying through the Chief of Mission had received the 

required training. For DOD, we compared the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and U.S. Central Command training requirements5

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to February 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for a more 

complete description of our scope and methodology.)

with training 

curricula contained in regulations, training websites, course schedules, 

and course handbooks offered by DOD organizations that deploy civilians 

to Afghanistan. In addition, we interviewed relevant officials from 

agencies under Chief of Mission Authority and DOD. Finally, we observed 

scenario-based training administered to Chief of Mission and DOD 

personnel held at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana.

 

4

This training addresses threats that U.S. personnel might face in a number of high-threat 

posts abroad.

5

Counterinsurgency Qualification Standards and the U.S. Central Command Fragmentary 

Order 09-1700.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

The United States and its international partners from over 40 nations 

have been engaged in efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan 

since 2001. U.S. civilians have been a vital part of the U.S. strategy. To 

implement the U.S. strategy, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan committed in 

April 2009 to expand its civilian personnel both in Kabul and in the field.

U.S. government civilians in Afghanistan generally fall under either the 

authority of the Chief of Mission (i.e., the U.S. Ambassador) or under 

DOD’s combatant commander authority. The Chief of Mission has 

authority over almost every U.S. executive branch employee there, 

except those under the command of a U.S. military commander or those 

on the staff of an international organization.6 Although typically stationed 

at the U.S. Embassy and consulates, U.S. Chief of Mission personnel in 

Afghanistan can also be deployed at a variety of military facilities outside 

of Kabul. These field-deployed civilians rely on the military for security, 

mobility, food, and lodging but remain under Chief of Mission authority.

The Chief of Mission presence in Afghanistan consists of personnel from 

several agencies performing a variety of activities, some of which are 

described in table 1.

 

6

Executive branch agencies under Chief of Mission authority must obtain Chief of Mission 

approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of their staffs and when 

assigning personnel to the mission or host country, regardless of the duration or purpose 

of the proposed position or assignment. National Security Decision Directive 38 governs 

proposals for the establishment of or changes in full-time, permanent, direct-hire positions. 

We did not gather data on U.S. civilians working for international organizations in 

Afghanistan.

Background
 

Page 5 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Table 1: General Activities of U.S. Agencies under Chief of Mission Authority in 

Afghanistan 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission 

authority General activities

State Executive management of civilian presence at 

post and in the field, personnel security, public 

diplomacy, counternarcotics, capacity building 

of governance sector, and other technical areas.

USAID Social sector development, infrastructure, 

stabilization, democracy and governance, 

economic growth, and agriculture.

USDA Agricultural expertise and capacity building of 

Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock. 

Department of the Treasury Mentoring and capacity building of financeoriented Ministries, as well as attaché function 

and involvement in the Afghan Threat Finance 

Cell.

Department of Justice (e.g., Federal 

Bureau of Investigation and Drug 

Enforcement Administration)

Combating corruption, disruption, and 

dismantling of drug trafficking, improving the 

security of courthouses, and capacity building of 

justice and governance sectors, as well as of 

counternarcotics institutions.

Department of Homeland Security 

(e.g., Customs and Border Protection 

and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement)

Capacity building for border management, 

security, and customs collection.

Sources: State, USAID, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security.

In addition, DOD estimates that, since 2001, over 41,000 civilians have 

deployed worldwide7

 

7

Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Medical Care for Department of Defense 

and Non-Department of Defense Federal Civilians Injured or Wounded in Support of 

Contingency Operations (Washington, D.C.). 

to support combat operations, contingencies, 

disaster relief, and stability operations, including ongoing operations in 

Afghanistan. DOD civilians in Afghanistan serve under the authority of the 

combatant commander responsible for operations in that area of the 

world—the U.S. Central Command—and support a wide range of DOD 

missions. These missions include combat support missions that have 

traditionally been performed by military personnel such as equipment 

maintenance, logistical support, and intelligence gathering and analysis; 

noncombat support missions such as administrative positions within the 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

joint task force headquarters; and capacity-building missions parallel to 

the Chief of Mission effort to improve Afghan security institutions.

To integrate the U.S. civilian expansion into the broader counterinsurgency 

and stabilization campaign outside of Kabul, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan, 

U.S. Forces—Afghanistan,8 and the International Security Assistance 

Force9

To enhance civilian-military coordination, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan 

has established a parallel civilian structure within each relevant military 

installation (i.e., regional command down to district support teams), with 

senior civilian representatives and civilian team leads managing and 

supervising Mission personnel at each level, as well as coordinating with 

their military and local Afghan government counterparts. Together, the 

senior civilians and military commanders at each level coordinate to 

perform stability, capacity-building, and development operations in their 

area of responsibility. Mission contingents at the field facilities typically 

contain State, USAID, and/or USDA personnel. U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration agents also deploy to some military facilities in the field but 

have established a framework for civilian-military activities. The U.S. 

and International Security Assistance Force civilian-military effort includes 

the use of provincial reconstruction teams and district support teams. 

Provincial reconstruction teams are combined civilian and military groups 

responsible for integrating the activities of all military and civilian elements 

in an assigned province. This integration includes harnessing both civilian 

and military resources to perform security, governance, and development 

activities to implement the U.S. counterinsurgency and stabilization 

strategy as well as to monitor and report on progress. District support 

teams are combined civilian and military groups responsible for integrating 

the security, governance, and development activities of all civilian and 

military elements in an assigned district.

 

8

U.S. Forces—Afghanistan is the operational arm of DOD in Afghanistan responsible for 

all missions not covered within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization mandate. The 

commander of U.S. Forces—Afghanistan also serves as the commander of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force.

9

Since 2001, the United States has worked with international partners under a United 

Nations mandate to assist Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment, in part 

through the International Security Assistance Force that oversees all coalition military 

operations in Afghanistan and is organized around six regional commands. U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan are deployed either as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led 

International Security Assistance Force or Operation Enduring Freedom.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

primarily conduct counternarcotics activities with U.S. military and Afghan 

counternarcotics forces.

U.S. Mission Afghanistan develops requests for Chief of Mission civilian 

positions in Afghanistan, and State Headquarters approves these 

requests after consulting with other agencies. In addition, representatives 

from State, other U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority, and 

U.S. Embassy Kabul participate in periodic interagency staffing reviews. 

During these staffing reviews, participants use strategic “lines of effort” to 

classify and prioritize all Chief of Mission positions in Afghanistan 

according to their priority and feasibility of staffing. Strategic lines of effort 

for Afghanistan comprise management operations, agriculture, public 

diplomacy, rule of law, economic growth, counternarcotics, infrastructure, 

border management, stabilization, governance, threat finance, and 

bilateral relationship. Approved requirements and their staffing progress 

are discussed among State, other agencies under Chief of Mission 

authority such as USAID and USDA, and U.S. Embassy Kabul at 

biweekly teleconferences. Agencies under Chief of Mission authority rely 

on both temporary, external hires and permanent employees to staff 

civilian requirements in Afghanistan. In particular, agencies are relying on 

special hiring authorities to meet their staffing needs.10

 

10Examples include State “3161 hires” (see 5 U.S.C. § 3161), USAID Foreign Service 

Limited Appointments (see 22 U.S.C. § 3949), and USDA use of “Schedule B” hiring 

authority (see 5. C.F.R. § 213.3201). 

Figure 1 illustrates 

how State, USAID, and USDA recruit and identify candidates for positions 

in Afghanistan.

Chief of Mission and DOD 

Processes for Fulfilling Civilian 

Staffing Requirements
 

Page 8 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Figure 1: Staffing Processes Used by State, USAID, and USDA to Recruit and Identify Candidates for Positions in Afghanistan
 

Page 9 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

DOD relies on an established process for filling civilian positions in 

Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, the department establishes 

civilian requirements and fills positions through an integrated military and 

civilian planning process. Civilian requirements begin at the Joint Task 

Force level, with commanders identifying military and civilian personnel 

needed to complete a mission. The commander specifies unit and 

individual needs in request for forces and joint manning documents, and 

sends these documents to the corresponding combatant commanders for 

validation and position designation. When the joint manning document is 

approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff record and designate the service 

responsible for filling positions. At that time, individual positions are 

designated as military or civilian, or acceptable for either to fill. Once all 

positions are validated and categorized, the request is sent to the Joint 

Force Coordinator within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.11

To enable the department to readily identify civilians to deploy in support 

of its missions, including those in Afghanistan, DOD established the CEW 

program in January 2009 within the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy—which is under the 

purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness.

A list of 

individual position requirements is then sent to the services for staffing.

Once the staffing source is identified, the requesting commander 

becomes responsible for tracking which positions have been filled.

12

As we previously reported, DOD’s use of civilian personnel to support 

military operations has long raised questions about its policies on 

compensation and medical benefits for such civilians.

The CEW is dedicated to creating a cadre of DOD civilians 

that are organized, ready, trained, cleared, and equipped in a manner that 

enhances their availability to mobilize and respond urgently to 

expeditionary requirements now and in the future.

13

 

11This function was previously performed by U.S. Joint Forces Command, which DOD 

disestablished in August 2011. 

Interest in issues 

12Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 

23, 2009).

13GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Medical Policies for Deployed DOD Federal Civilians and 

Associated Compensation for Those Deployed, GAO-07-1235T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

18, 2007); and DOD Civilian Personnel: Greater Oversight and Quality Assurance Needed 

to Ensure Force Health Protection and Surveillance for Those Deployed, GAO-06-1085

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

related to deployed civilians increased as executive agencies began 

deploying civilians to support efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, we 

issued a report that addressed issues related to whether agencies that 

deployed civilians had (1) comparable policies concerning compensation, 

(2) comparable policies concerning medical care, and (3) policies and 

procedures for identifying and tracking deployed civilians. The report 

contained 18 recommendations made to nine agencies concerning 

policies related to deployed civilians, including a recommendation to both 

the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to improve their 

capability to identify and track deployed civilians. We reported that this 

capability was critical, so that agencies could notify deployed civilians 

about emerging health concerns that might affect them.14

Both Chief of Mission and DOD civilians are to receive Afghanistanspecific training before deployment. According to State, in June 2009 

Afghanistan-specific training became mandatory for all Chief of Mission 

personnel deploying to Afghanistan after October 1, 2009. State’s Foreign 

Service Institute provides this training. In addition to this Afghanistanspecific training, since 2008 State has required that Chief of Mission 

personnel at high-threat posts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan take 

the FACT course provided by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security.15

This course is designed to address the threats that personnel might face 

in a number of high-threat posts and includes components on first aid, 

firearms, counterthreat driving techniques, and duck-and-cover exercises. 

In addition to these Chief of Mission courses, some U.S. agencies provide 

their own mission-specific training. Mandatory training requirements for 

DOD civilians deploying to Afghanistan have been established by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central Command.16

 

14GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate 

Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, 

DOD 

relies on a variety of organizations—including the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and each of the military services—to provide this locationspecific training to civilians prior to deployment to Afghanistan. In 

addition, there are some mission-specific training requirements that 

GAO-09-562

(Washington D.C.: June 26, 2009).

15Some law enforcement and other personnel with specialized training can be waived 

from this course.

16The U.S. Central Command is the combatant command that has operational authority 

for an area of the globe that consists of 20 countries, including Afghanistan.

Chief of Mission and DOD’s 

Training Requirements for 

Personnel Deploying to 

Afghanistan
 

Page 11 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

civilians must complete. For example, some DOD personnel must 

complete language and culture training beyond the normal requirement.

Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more 

than tripled their civilian presence and expanded outside Kabul in 

response to the President’s 2009 announcement. DOD both created new 

programs to build the security capacity of the Afghan government and 

reported expanding its overall civilian presence. U.S. agencies during the 

course of our review acknowledged data reliability problems with staffing 

data and have efforts under way to improve the reliability of that data.

According to State, from January 2009 through December 2011, the Chief 

of Mission civilian presence more than tripled from 320 to 1,142 civilians, 

an increase of 257 percent. Overall Chief of Mission staffing requirements 

also grew during this period from 531 to 1,261 positions, and, as of 

December 2011, about 91 percent (1,142 of 1,261) of those positions 

were filled. As of October 2011, State officials did not foresee further 

expansion of the U.S. civilian presence and planned to change their focus 

to reconfiguring staffing resources as needed within the existing 

presence. Figure 2 illustrates the increased U.S. Chief of Mission 

presence in Afghanistan since January 2009.

U.S. Agencies 

Reported Expanding 

Their Civilian 

Presence in 

Afghanistan and Took 

Steps to Improve 

Their Ability to Track 

That Presence

U.S. Chief of Mission 

Presence in Afghanistan 

More Than Tripled Since 

2009
 

Page 12 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Figure 2: Increase in U.S. Chief of Mission Presence in Afghanistan, January 2009 

through December 2011

Note: According to State officials, U.S. Embassy Kabul also utilized “other Chief of Mission 

civilians”—i.e., short-term deployments, key contractors, and eligible family members—to temporarily 

fill some high-priority staffing gaps. Temporary staff totals included 137 for January 2010, 135 for 

February 2011, and 97 for December 2011. State could not provide data on other Chief of Mission 

civilians for January 2009. We could not verify the extent to which these temporary staff substituted 

for official approved positions. 

Of the nine executive branch agencies under Chief of Mission authority, 

as of December 2011 State, USAID, Department of Justice, and USDA 

had filled most of the Chief of Mission position requirements, as illustrated 

in table 2.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Table 2: Extent to Which Agencies Had Filled Chief of Mission Staffing 

Requirements in Afghanistan, December 2011

Agency

Position 

requirements Positions filled

Percentage of 

position 

requirements 

filled

Mission 1,261 1,142 90.6

Kabul 732 686 93.7

Field 529 456 86.2

State 594 577 97.1

USAID 378 366 96.8

Department of Justice 154 116 75.3

USDA 77 55 71.4

Department of Homeland 

Security 

25 23 92.0

Department of the 

Treasurya 16 11 68.8

Department of 

Transportation

15 12 80.0

Health and Human 

Services 

1 1 100.0

Department of Commerce 1 1 100.0

Source: State Department Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix.

Notes: These numbers reflect State data on requirements and filled positions as of December 6, 

2011, and do not reflect any changes that have occurred since that time. 

a

The Department of the Treasury noted that State’s database had not been updated to reflect 13 total 

approved Treasury positions. Treasury further noted that two of its positions listed as “open” 

remained programmatically on hold, resulting in 11 active slots filled. 

Additionally, the Chief of Mission presence expanded outside Kabul—a 

response to the President’s call for greater U.S. civilian expertise at 

provincial and district levels. From January 2009 through December 

2011, field position requirements grew by approximately 260 percent 

(from 147 to 529), and over 85 percent of those requirements were filled.

These positions are assigned to locations throughout Afghanistan, 

including at military facilities such as provincial reconstruction and district 

support teams and at State’s regional consulates.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Comparing the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix17 numbers with 

the position requirements reported by individual agencies, we found that 

the data in the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix were sufficiently 

reliable for identifying high-level staffing information such as total number 

of positions filled by each agency under Chief of Mission authority.

According to State officials, the high-level staffing data identified in the 

Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix are updated weekly using data 

from U.S. agencies and are also validated through periodic 

teleconferences, including staff from State headquarters, other agencies, 

and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

The 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy 

emphasizes the need to match civilian personnel’s expertise to specific 

mission requirements on the ground. Furthermore, according to federal 

internal control standards, program managers need operational data to 

determine whether they are meeting the goals of their agencies’ strategic 

and annual performance plans and accounting for the effective and 

efficient use of resources.18

 

17According to State officials, this matrix serves as the authoritative record on Chief of 

Mission staffing requirements and positions filled in Afghanistan.

U.S. Embassy Kabul and State’s Office of 

Orientation and In-Processing (responsible for ensuring that interagency 

personnel meet all administrative, medical, and training requirements 

before deploying to Afghanistan) began using a data system called the 

Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System (ACPTS) in February 

2011 to track Chief of Mission personnel’s locations and movements 

(e.g., movement from Kabul to a district support team) and to identify 

position-specific information (e.g., location, position title, appointment type 

or grade, vacancy status, and the strategic line of effort to which a 

position belongs). State officials noted that they planned to use this 

information to optimize the U.S. presence in the next interagency staffing 

exercise, when they might need to be prepared to reconfigure the existing 

presence. However, when we examined this data system in March and 

July 2011, we found discrepancies that called into question the system’s 

reliability. For example, the ACPTS data we received were insufficiently 

reliable to determine which strategic line of effort contained the greatest 

staffing shortfall—crucial information for an interagency staffing exercise.

18GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington D.C.: November 1999).

State Took Steps to 

Enhance Its Ability to 

Track Its Civilian Presence
 

Page 15 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Over 60 percent of the ACPTS records for July 2011 (648 of 1,192) were 

missing data in at least 1 of 10 data fields. Our analysis revealed, for 

example, that 36 percent of the appointment grade fields and 30 percent 

of the line-of-effort fields were missing. We also found discrepancies 

between the ACPTS and Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix with 

regard to the overall position requirements and the number of positions 

filled. Table 3 lists the discrepancies we identified in State, USAID, and 

USDA totals.

Table 3: Discrepancies between Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix and ACPTS

 Position requirements Positions filled

Chief of Mission 

agency 

Chief of Mission 

Civilian Staffing Matrix ACPTS Delta

Chief of Mission Civilian 

Staffing Matrix ACPTS Delta

State Kabul 385 384 -1 360 317 -43

 Field 204 177 -27 149 134 -15

USAID Kabul 161 181 20 148 167 19

 Field 217 198 -19 153 179 26

USDA Kabul 17 19 2 10 10 0 

 Field 60 61 1 44 33 -11

Source: GAO analysis of State Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix (June 28, 2011) and ACPTS (July 7, 2011) datasets.

Our discussions with State, USAID, and USDA officials revealed 

additional discrepancies in the ACPTS data, including duplicate entries, 

position titles that did not match official position documentation, and 

inaccurate arrival dates and appointment grade information.

In June 2011, State officials acknowledged that these challenges 

prevented ACPTS from being used effectively to aggregate detailed, 

position-specific information regarding the overall U.S. civilian presence in 

Afghanistan. Although we could not verify the accuracy of the ACPTS 

system, during the course of our review and after several discussions with 

us regarding data reliability, in the fall of 2011 State began taking steps to 

improve the reliability of the ACPTS database. For example, according to 

State officials, the Office of Orientation and In-Processing recently 

completed a review of the ACPTS system that included correcting 

inaccuracies, revising data fields to better reflect actual information being 

entered, and deleting unnecessary data fields. State has also established 

standard operating procedures for updating the ACPTS system. For 

example, according to State officials, the U.S. Embassy’s Arrivals and 

Departure Unit will be responsible for completing the ACPTS records of 

newly deployed staff once they arrive in-country, and the Interagency 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Provincial Affairs Office will be responsible for updating their location 

information if their duty station changes in the field. Furthermore, in 

October 2011, U.S. Embassy Kabul issued a new policy for Mission 

staffing and accountability that established a notification and reporting 

system to conduct accountability checks of Chief of Mission staff and also 

outlined the responsibilities of supervisors and individuals in ensuring 

staffing accountability and tracking. According to State officials, Embassy 

Kabul conducts monthly data calls with all agencies present in Kabul in 

accordance with this policy, and the collected data is reconciled with 

ACPTS data.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Personnel Status Report, 

DOD increased its overall civilian presence in Afghanistan by 

approximately 643 percent from January 2009 through December 2011. 

While officials acknowledged that some inaccuracies existed in the data 

provided by this report, they believed that the data fairly depict the 

increase in the overall DOD civilian presence in Afghanistan. As shown in 

figure 3, DOD reported its civilian presence in Afghanistan grew from 394 

civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011.

DOD Reported Expanding 

Its Civilian Presence in 

Afghanistan
 

Page 17 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Figure 3: Reported Increase in DOD Overall Civilian Presence in Afghanistan, 

January 2009 through December 2011

Note: We could not validate the accuracy of the data provided by the Joint Personnel Status Report. 

DOD officials believe the data are sufficiently accurate to illustrate the increase in the civilian 

presence in Afghanistan, and we agree. 

These civilians serve in a variety of roles that support both DOD’s combat 

mission and its capacity-building efforts. However, it is difficult to specify 

the number of civilians within DOD’s overall civilian presence that 

supported the capacity-building efforts because these civilians frequently 

fill positions that support both combat support and capacity-building 

missions. For example, civilians that deploy with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers support multiple projects involving both Afghan National 

Security Forces and U.S. military forces, making it difficult to identify the 

number of civilians that support capacity-building efforts.

In addition, DOD established two programs to respond to the 

department’s mission to build the capacity of the Afghan government. The 

first program—Ministry of Defense Advisors, created in fiscal year 2010—

operates under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

and deploys senior DOD civilians for up to 2 years to serve as advisors to 

officials in the Afghan government’s Ministries of Defense and Interior to 

exchange knowledge concerning defense-related issues. The Ministry of 

Defense Advisor program was designed to forge long-term relationships 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

that strengthen Afghanistan’s security institutions.19

Table 4: Extent to Which DOD’s New Capacity-Building Programs Had Filled 

Staffing Requirements in Afghanistan, as of December 2011

The second 

program—Afghanistan Pakistan Hands, created in fiscal year 2009—

operates under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and deploys DOD 

civilians for 5 years to serve as experts on Afghanistan and Pakistan to 

support the counterinsurgency strategy. Specifically, these civilians 

engage directly with host country officials to enhance government, 

interagency, and multinational cooperation and fill related positions 

outside the region. As of December 2011, these programs had identified 

requirements for 156 civilian positions, and 106 of these positions were 

filled. At the time of our review, officials were unclear as to whether the 

requirements for these two programs would stabilize, increase, or 

decrease. In table 4, we show the extent to which each of these programs 

had filled the required positions.

Program

Position 

requirements Positions filled

Percentage of 

positions filled

Ministry of Defense 

Advisor program

102 60a 59

Afghanistan Pakistan 

Hands program

54 46 85

Total 156 106 68

Source: Offices of Ministry of Defense Advisor and Afghanistan Pakistan Hands programs.

a

Program officials indicated that an additional 11 advisors had been selected to fill positions in 

Afghanistan and would begin training in January 2012 for deployment in March 2012. Ministry of 

Defense Advisor program officials indicated, however, that the number of candidates scheduled to 

begin training was likely to change prior to the beginning of training. 

Although DOD has aggregate staffing data for deployed civilians within a 

country or geographical region, its current data system for tracking 

deployed civilians may not provide sufficiently reliable information to 

characterize the specific location and identity of deployed civilians within 

a country. DOD uses the Joint Personnel Status Report to track the 

number and location of military, civilian, and contractor personnel 

 

19For more information on DOD’s capacity-building efforts at the Afghan Ministries of 

Defense and Interior, see GAO, Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of 

U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government, GAO-11-710 (Washington D.C.: July 20, 

2011). 

DOD Took Steps to 

Improve Its Ability to 

Track Its Civilian Presence
 

Page 19 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

deployed worldwide. This report is manually created each day by the 

combatant commands to include the number and location of personnel 

within their area of responsibility.20 However, Joint Chiefs of Staff officials 

told us that the system contains inaccuracies. For example, the officials 

noted previous reports have omitted and double counted some personnel, 

as well as listed some personnel in the wrong locations. The officials 

stated they could not quantify the magnitude of these inaccuracies due to 

the system’s reliance on manual updates from the individual combatant 

commands and limited demographic data. We reported in 2009 that DOD 

issued guidance and established procedures for identifying and tracking 

deployed civilians in 2006 but concluded in 2008 that its guidance and 

procedures were not being consistently implemented across the 

department. In 2009, we found that these policies were still not being fully 

implemented and recommended that DOD establish mechanisms to 

ensure that these policies were implemented.21

At the time of our review, Joint Staff officials stated that in conjunction 

with the Defense Manpower Data Center, they had completed 

development and were fielding this automated tracking system that would 

access information from service specific personnel databases in 

conjunction with Common Access Card usage in theater to establish and 

record the specific location of employees.

In response to this 

recommendation, DOD stated that it would work with the Defense 

Manpower Data Center to develop a tracking system for deployed 

civilians and hoped to have the system completed by September 2009.

22

 

20DOD defines a combatant command as a unified or specified command with a broad 

continuing mission under a single commander that typically has geographic or functional 

responsibilities. Geographical commands include U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central 

Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, 

and U.S. Southern Command. Functional commands include U.S. Special Operations 

Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.

According to DOD officials, 

this new system will provide DOD with an automated system to track the 

21GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate 

Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, GAO-09-562

(Washington D.C.: June 26, 2009). This report examined a number of issues concerning 

deployed civilians, including compensation and benefits; medical care during and following 

deployment; and the ability of agencies to track the number and location of their deployed 

civilians.

22The Common Access Card is the standard identification badge for all DOD personnel, 

including military, reserve, guard, civilian, and contractors. The card is typically used to 

enter military installations.
 

Page 20 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

number, identity, and location of deployed civilians. As we reported in 

both 2005 and 2009, this type of information is critical for identifying 

potential exposures or other incidents related to a civilian’s deployment.23

DOD officials stated that, once operational within a combatant 

commander’s area of responsibility, this system will automatically create a 

report that fulfills Joint Personnel Status reporting requirements for 

identifying the number and location of military, civilian, and contractor 

personnel deployed globally. However, according to Joint Chiefs of Staff

officials, this system will not be ready to support these reporting 

requirements within the Central Command area of responsibility until the 

middle of fiscal year 2012.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is 

responsible for overseeing implementation of the 2009 CEW directive, 

including developing policy and implementing procedural guidance for the 

CEW. To implement the policies in this directive, the heads of the DOD 

components are to identify and designate positions as emergencyessential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteers as part 

of the CEW.24 Emergency-essential positions are those that support the 

success of combat operations or the availability of combat-essential 

systems. Non-combat essential positions support the expeditionary 

requirements in other than combat or combat support situations. 

Capability-based volunteers are employees who may be asked to 

volunteer for deployment, to remain behind after other civilians have 

evacuated, or to fill the positions of other DOD civilians who have 

deployed to meet expeditionary requirements in order to ensure that 

critical expeditionary requirements are fulfilled.25

 

23

Finally, according to the 

directive, the components are to plan, program, and budget for CEW 

requirements.

GAO-09-562 and GAO, Defense Health Care: Improvements Needed in Occupational

and Environmental Health Surveillance during Deployments to Address Immediate and 

Long-Term Health Issues, GAO-05-632 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005). 

24DOD officials noted that separate from the CEW, DOD components have some civilian 

positions designated as “emergency-essential” and deploy those personnel to support 

their specific missions.

25Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 

23, 2009). 

DOD Took 

Preliminary Steps to 

Implement CEW 

Policy but Did Not 

Identify the Number 

and Types of 

Positions That Should 

Constitute the CEW
 

Page 21 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

We found that DOD had taken preliminary steps to implement the CEW. 

Specifically, DOD had (1) established a CEW program office, (2) created 

a database containing resumes submitted by volunteers, (3) advertised 

expeditionary positions for civilians on a designated website, and (4) 

established predeployment training requirements for volunteers selected 

to fill CEW positions.26

However, the CEW program has not been fully developed and 

implemented. In particular, DOD components have not identified and 

designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the 

emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based 

volunteer segments of the CEW because guidance for making such 

determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated that once key 

assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been 

finalized, implementing guidance will be issued that will contain 

information on how the components are to identify and designate 

positions as emergency-essential, non-combat essential and capabilitybased volunteers. However, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials 

were not sure as to when this guidance would be issued.

According to CEW officials, approximately 10 

percent to 15 percent of the 2,929 filled civilian positions in Afghanistan 

were filled by CEW volunteers and the remaining positions were primarily 

filled by civilian personnel in the military services and other DOD 

components.

27

By not developing guidance that instructs the components on how to 

identify and designate the number and types of positions that will 

constitute the CEW, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a 

significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DOD’s Fiscal 

Year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,28

 

26Training requirements included generic training applicable to all CEW selectees as well 

as location-specific training. 

(2) meet readiness 

goals for the CEW as required in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan for 

27Office of the Secretary of Defense officials first indicated in June 2011 that this draft 

guidance was being coordinated, but the final guidance has not yet been finalized and 

issued.

28Department of Defense, Report on the Strategic Human Capital Plan for Civilian 

Employees of the Department of Defense 2006-2010.
 

Page 22 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Fiscal Years 2012-2013,29

First, in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 civilian human capital strategic plan, DOD 

identified the CEW as a significant segment of the overall DOD civilian 

workforce dedicated to supporting DOD operations, contingencies, 

emergencies, humanitarian missions, stability and reconstruction 

operations, and combat missions. Further, this plan noted the importance 

of conducting a gap analysis

and (3) position itself to respond to future 

missions.

30 to identify any differences between the 

current civilian workforce and the workforce that will be needed in the 

future for each of the department’s “mission critical occupations”—i.e., 

occupations that are essential to carrying out the department’s mission.31

In July 2011, we testified that identifying skills and capability gaps of the 

civilian workforce is critical for DOD’s strategic planning efforts and that 

DOD should conduct gap analyses to identify gaps in both the current and 

the future workforces.32

Second, as called for by the Department of Defense Strategic 

Management Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2013, DOD’s goal to get the 

right workforce mix should occur through several initiatives, including one 

to improve the readiness of the CEW by increasing the percentage of 

Completing a gap analysis is important for DOD 

to develop strategies to acquire and retain the needed workforce. Further, 

once workforce needs and strategies are identified, the DOD components 

will be better positioned to plan, program, and budget for CEW 

requirements as called for in the CEW directive.

 

29Department of Defense Strategic Management Plan FY 2012-2013 (Sept. 20, 2011).

30Our body of work has consistently defined a workforce gap analysis to include gaps in 

critical skills and competencies. See GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on 

Recent Progress to Strengthen DOD’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,

GAO-09-235 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2009); DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive 

Strategic Workforce Plans Needed, GAO-04-753 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004); 

Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the 

Federal Government, GAO-03-893G (Washington, D.C.: July 2003); and A Model of 

Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 

2002).

31DOD’s civilian human capital strategic plan is published by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

32GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Competency Gap Analyses and Other Actions Needed to 

Enhance DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plans, GAO-11-827T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 

2011). 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

emergency-essential and non-combat essential personnel who are 

qualified as ready. However, without an understanding of the number and 

types of positions in the emergency-essential and non-combat essential 

categories, the current CEW is not positioned to support this DOD priority.

Third, DOD officials told us that institutionalizing the CEW is critical to 

DOD efforts to best utilize its total workforce structure—military, civilian, 

and contractor personnel—because the difficulties associated with 

identifying and deploying civilians are not unique to the ongoing 

operations in Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, similar issues were 

experienced in Bosnia, but because the organization and processes that 

supported the deployment of civilians during that operation were not 

retained, DOD had to reconstitute the capability to identify and deploy 

civilians when the need arose for civilians to deploy to Iraq and 

Afghanistan.

State has established predeployment training requirements for all Chief of 

Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan, including courses offered by 

State’s Foreign Service Institute, as well as key security training provided 

by State’s Diplomatic Security Bureau—the FACT course. The Foreign 

Service Institute’s Afghanistan-specific training courses address State’s 

2009 training requirement for Chief of Mission personnel deploying to 

Afghanistan and focus on providing Chief of Mission personnel with basic 

professional skills and knowledge needed to participate in stabilization 

and reconstruction activities as members of the U.S. Embassy Kabul or 

its subordinate entities. Additionally, the training recognizes the 

requirements for effectively operating in a complex environment, including 

U.S. Agencies 

Established 

Afghanistan-Specific 

Predeployment 

Training 

Requirements, but 

DOD Faced 

Implementation 

Challenges

State Provided Required 

Training for Personnel 

Deploying to Afghanistan
 

Page 24 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

administrative, survival, and day-to-day functioning/life support. Table 5 

further describes the Foreign Service Institute’s training for Chief of 

Mission personnel.

Table 5: State-Required, Afghanistan-Specific Training for Chief of Mission Personnel

 Afghanistan Familiarization Afghanistan Field Orientation

Interagency Civilian-Military 

Integration Training Exercise

Course 

description

Overview of

• Afghanistan’s history, culture, 

and politics, including 

counterinsurgency and border 

issues; 

• U.S. political and military 

strategy in Afghanistan; and

• U.S. agency programs in 

Afghanistan.

• Specific topics include threat 

assessments, 

counterintelligence awareness, 

and deployment-related 

administrative and logistic 

information. 

For personnel assigned to provincial 

reconstruction teams:

• Basic professional skills and 

knowledge essential for 

functioning as a member of a 

civilian-military field team.

• Training on dealing with 

traumatic events, Afghan tribal 

dynamics and Taliban tactics, 

integration of civilian-military 

planning, and tools for 

assessing district stability.

Applying lessons learned from the 

Afghanistan Field Orientation course 

in a simulated environment by working 

with military colleagues,

• learning security procedures for 

travel by military convoy or 

helicopter, and

• using interpreters during scripted 

training events featuring Afghan 

role-players. 

• Scenarios include simulations of 

insurgent attacks.

Source: GAO summary of Foreign Service Institute’s course catalog and materials for fiscal year 2011.

All Chief of Mission personnel are required to take the Afghanistan 

Familiarization course, while all personnel deploying to locations outside 

of Kabul are also required to take the Afghanistan Field Orientation and 

the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise courses.

According to State officials, the Afghanistan Familiarization course covers 

subjects that contribute to employees’ success on the job, such as 

orientation issues and State support at high-threat posts. Additionally, the 

Afghanistan Field Orientation course covers subjects that State has 

identified as needed for the success of provincial reconstruction teams 

and other civilian-military entities at the regional and district levels.

According to State and contractor officials we interviewed during our 

observation of the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training 

Exercise at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Butlerville, Indiana, 

personnel who attend this training are able to practice working in 

situations they would likely encounter while deployed. The training 

includes working through an interpreter and heavily interacting with 

Afghan officials. In addition, because field-deployed civilians live and work 

alongside military colleagues, the exercises focus on the cultural (e.g., 

education about military ranks) and practical (e.g., participation in convoy 

security) aspects of working with the military, as shown in figure 4.
 

Page 25 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Figure 4: Trainees React to Simulated Mortar Attack during Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise

During the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise, 

students get the opportunity to simulate living with the military on a 

Forward Operating Base, and travel by convoy and helicopter to meetings 

with their Afghan counterparts, played by domestic role-players. There is 

also the opportunity to work through interpreters, negotiate sensitive 

situations, and solve problems with Afghan authorities, officials, religious 

leaders, and villagers, as shown in figure 5.
 

Page 26 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Figure 5: Civilian Trainees Interact with Afghan Role Players in Scenario Involving Afghan Casualties Resulting from a NATO 

Airstrike

State implemented internal controls to help ensure that Chief of Mission 

personnel took the required training before deployment. State’s Office of 

Orientation and In-Processing acts as a central processing point for all 

Chief of Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan and works with the 

Foreign Service Institute to ensure that all training requirements have 

been met. Examples of the Center’s training verification activities include 

accessing Foreign Service Institute online registration to determine the 

accuracy of enrollment records, tracking completion of personnel’s 

deployment checklists, and visiting classes to confirm enrolled personnel 

attended the course. According to State officials, in addition to these 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

controls, Embassy Kabul also checks to make sure that the training 

requirement is met before granting country clearance to individuals about 

to be deployed. The Office of Orientation and In-Processing also reviews 

these country clearances before allowing individuals to deploy.

To test the reliability of State’s internal controls, we compared State, 

USAID, and USDA names from a March 2011 run of ACPTS personnel 

data against Foreign Service Institute training records and State training 

waiver logs. The analysis yielded 134 names of personnel who could 

have potentially missed required Foreign Service Institute training. After 

the names were submitted to the Orientation and In-Processing Center, 

State stated it was able to account for all of the personnel, either by 

verifying that they had taken the training or possessed a valid reason for 

not having taken the training.33

According to State officials, the Office of Orientation and In-Processing 

and Embassy Kabul also check to verify that personnel have taken the 

FACT course before being deployed to Afghanistan. In June 2011, we 

reported that Diplomatic Security had difficulty verifying training taken by 

non-State personnel and made several recommendations.34

To test this internal control, we selected a random sample of 65 names 

from the July 2011 ACPTS personnel data and compared these names 

Diplomatic 

Security was aware of this problem and, in June 2011, was in the process 

of implementing the FACT Tracker to address it. This tracker could be 

checked by regional security officers at high-threat posts to confirm 

required training was taken before granting personnel country clearance.

At the time of our review, Diplomatic Security officials stated that the 

FACT Tracker was fully operational and could verify FACT training going 

back to 2005.

 

33Examples included equivalent training courses taken, as well as miscellaneous 

approved exceptions due to inaccuracies in the March 2011 ACPTS data, such as 

duplicate or misspelled names and inaccurate location information. Four USAID personnel 

did not take required training, three of whom deployed just as the training requirement was 

coming into effect.

34For example, we recommended that Diplomatic Security develop or improve the process 

to track its individual training requirements and completion of training more broadly. See 

GAO, Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical 

Challenges to Training Efforts, GAO-11-460 (Washington D.C.: June 1, 2011). As of 

October 2011, Diplomatic Security was taking steps to improve its tracking of training 

through collaboration with the Foreign Service Institute. 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

against data in the FACT Tracker. We and Diplomatic Security, through 

the use of the FACT Tracker, were able to account for all 65 names. As 

100 percent of our sample received FACT or other appropriate training, 

we believe that State has established an effective system of internal 

controls over its training.35

According to DOD guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness is to develop policies, plans, and programs for 

the training of DOD personnel, including civilians.36 In November 2010, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense established counterinsurgency 

standards and required training of individuals and units, including DOD 

civilians deploying to Afghanistan, on such things as language and 

cultural awareness. DOD guidance also requires U.S. Central Command 

to coordinate and approve training necessary to carry out missions 

assigned to the command and U.S. Central Command-established 

theater-training requirements that apply to DOD civilians deployed to the 

command’s area of responsibility.37

 

35In statistical terms, given that 100 percent of our sample took FACT or other equivalent 

training, we can state with 95 percent confidence that fewer than about 5 percent of State, 

USAID, and USDA personnel in Afghanistan during July 2011 did not receive FACT 

training. 

U.S. Central Command theatertraining requirements include general requirements such as anti-terrorism 

awareness training; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

personnel protective measures and survival skills; mine and unexploded 

ordnance awareness; and requirements specific to the country of 

deployment—for Afghanistan, the requirements include, for example, 

language and cultural awareness training, implementation of the 

Secretary of Defense-approved counterinsurgency qualification 

standards, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 

and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) egress training. Finally, 

DOD’s 2010 strategic plan calls for the establishment of a requirements 

36DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components (Dec. 21, 2010) and Department of Defense Directive 5124.02, Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) (June 23, 2008). The 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence retains oversight and policy responsibility for 

DOD intelligence and security components.

37DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components (Dec. 21, 2010).

DOD Provided 

Afghanistan-Specific 

Training to Civilians, but 

Some Training Contained 

Gaps or Duplication
 

Page 29 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

process that includes front-end analysis and synchronizing service 

training programs with combatant commander requirements.38

As shown in table 6, several DOD organizations deploying civilians to 

Afghanistan provide predeployment training to address Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and their own specific 

requirements. To address these requirements, each of DOD’s 

components independently developed its own training courses; however, 

we identified some gaps and duplication in this training. For example, Air 

Force civilians deploying to Afghanistan through the CEW were required 

to attend both Air Force and CEW predeployment training. The CEW 

predeployment training consists of an 11-day course that covers areas 

such as personal and family benefits and legal information; survival skills, 

including first aid; HMMWV rollover training and Counter-Improvised 

Explosive Device training; and language and cultural awareness skills. As 

a result, those Air Force civilians deploying through the CEW received 

training on some of the same material, such as Counter-Improvised 

Explosive Device training, twice prior to deployment. According to DOD 

officials, in November 2011, DOD began granting some waivers from the 

CEW training to Air Force civilians that completed Combat Airman Skills 

Training.39 However, DOD officials stated not all civilians deploying to 

Afghanistan are required to complete this training; therefore, Air Force 

civilians who do not receive Combat Airman Skills Training would still be 

required to complete both Air Force and CEW predeployment training.

Additionally, some Army civilian training did not meet the requirements 

established by U.S. Central Command. For example, Army civilian 

training at the CONUS (continental United States) Replacement Center40

 

38DOD, Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense

(Sept. 23, 2010).

did not cover either the U.S. Central Command-required HMMWV or 

MRAP vehicle rollover techniques. Table 6 lists the gaps and duplication 

we identified. 

39Combat Airman Skills Training is special training provided to personnel who will be 

going into a hostile and uncertain environment. 

40The CONUS Replacement Center’s mission is to receive and process individual nonunit 

related personnel and civilians for deployment to and redeployment from the theaters of 

operations.
 

Page 30 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan 

Table 6: Gaps and Duplication in Training Courses Provided to DOD Civilians Deployed to Afghanistan 

Ministry of 

Defense 

Advisors 

program 

Civilian 

Expeditionary 

Workforce 

Afghanistan 

Pakistan 

Hands 

Army Corps of 

Engineers 

Army CONUS 

Replacement 

Center 

Air Force 

Expeditionary Force 

training Navy 

Gap None identified None identified None 

identified 

Topics that 

should have 

been covered to 

address 

combatant 

commander 

theater 

requirements: 

 HMMWV 

and MRAP 

egress 

 Nonlethal 

weapons

Topics that 

should have 

been covered to 

address 

combatant 

commander 

theater 

requirements: 

 Chemical, 

biological, 

radiological, 

nuclear 

 HMMWV 

and MRAP 

egress 

 Nonlethal 

weapons

None identified None 

identified 

Duplication None identified Topics duplicated by 

Air Force training: 

 Chemical,

biological, 

radiological, 

nucleara

 Self-aid/buddy 

carea

 Cultural 

awarenessc

 Counter 

improvised 

explosive device 

traininga

 Unexploded 

Ordnance 

Awarenessa

 Survival, 

evasion, 

resistance, 

escapea

 Basic 

marksmanship, if 

requiredd

 Law of Armed 

Conflictc

None 

identified 

None identified None identified Topics duplicated by 

CEW training: 

 Chemical, 

biological, 

radiological, 

nucleara

 Self-aid/buddy 

carea 

 Cultural 

awarenessb

 Counter 

improvised 

explosive device 

traininga

 Unexploded 

Ordnance 

Awarenessb

 Survival, 

evasion, 

resistance, 

escapeb

 Basic 

marksmanship, 

if requiredd

 Law of Armed 

Conflictb

None 

identified 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD regulations, guidance, and training curricula. 

a

Denotes training that has hands-on or computer-based or classroom components. 

b

Denotes training that is computer-based. 

c

Denotes training that is classroom-based. 

d

Denotes training that is hands on. 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

DOD organizations have independently developed training courses 

leading to some gaps and duplication in the training provided because the 

Office of the Secretary Defense for Personnel and Readiness, which has 

primary responsibility for civilian personnel policy, did not have a process 

for identifying baseline civilian predeployment training requirements, 

synchronizing service-specific training programs with combatant 

commander and other Office of the Secretary of Defense predeployment 

training requirements, and coordinating the efforts of key stakeholders, 

such as the military services and subordinate commands. In May 2011, 

we recommended that DOD improve the planning and coordination of 

language and culture training—a component of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense’s counterinsurgency training.41

Without a process for identifying and synchronizing requirements and 

coordinating efforts to implement the requirements, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense cannot ensure that DOD is preparing its civilians for 

deployment to Afghanistan and is using training resources efficiently.

In addition, during our review, 

an official in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness stated that training standards should be established for 

the department and that the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness should require the services to incorporate 

these standards into the training the services provide.

The U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan and the deployment of civilians 

to Afghan provinces and districts remain crucial to U.S. efforts to build the 

capacity of the Afghan government to provide essential services to its 

people with limited international support. With the increased focus on 

deploying more U.S. civilians throughout Afghanistan comes the need for 

the U.S. Mission to be able to track and monitor the movement and 

location of its civilian staff, especially given the ongoing drawdown of U.S. 

troops and plans to transition lead security responsibility to the Afghan 

government in 2014. We are encouraged by State and DOD’s efforts to 

improve tracking of deployed civilian personnel. Additionally, as DOD has 

expanded its involvement in overseas military operations worldwide, it 

has grown increasingly reliant on its civilian workforce to provide support 

to these operations. While DOD’s efforts to institutionalize the CEW are 

 

41GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Coordination of Army 

and Marine Corps Language and Culture Training, GAO-11-456 (Washington, D.C.: May 

26, 2011).

Conclusions
 

Page 32 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

commendable, until DOD makes decisions regarding the size of the CEW 

and issues implementation guidance, the CEW may not be capable of 

supporting future overseas operations as well as departmentwide goals to 

strengthen and rightsize the DOD total workforce.

Furthermore, having policies and procedures in place to help ensure that 

U.S. civilians receive necessary training before they deploy to a highthreat working environment such as Afghanistan can enhance their safety 

as well as their ability to accomplish the mission. While agencies present 

under Chief of Mission authority benefit from a centralized set of training 

requirements and internal controls, DOD’s civilian training process does 

not have the same level of oversight or centralized control. Enhancing 

DOD’s civilian training process would provide greater synchronization of 

training requirements while still allowing the various components to tailor 

their training to mission-specific needs.

To enable DOD to make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian 

workforce, meet readiness goals for the CEW, and position itself to 

respond to future missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to take the following two actions: 

• Develop key assumptions concerning the size and composition of the 

emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based 

volunteer categories referred to in the 2009 CEW directive.

• Finalize the implementation guidance to DOD components on how to 

identify and designate the number and types of positions that constitute 

the emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based 

volunteer categories.

To provide a consistent approach for synchronizing predeployment 

training for DOD civilians, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to take the following two actions:

• Establish a process to identify and approve predeployment training 

requirements for all DOD civilians.

• Establish a process to coordinate with key stakeholders such as the 

military services and subordinate commands to ensure that 

requirements are synchronized among and within DOD components 

and with departmentwide guidance.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 33 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, USDA, as well 

as the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice and the Treasury.

DOD provided written comments, reprinted in their entirety in appendix II, 

and concurred with our four recommendations—characterizing them as 

supporting its current initiative to transform the CEW. Specifically,

• DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) develop key 

assumptions concerning the size and composition of the emergencyessential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteer 

categories referred to in the 2009 CEW directive and (2) finalize the 

implementation guidance to DOD components on how to identify and 

designate the number and types of positions for these categories. DOD 

did not specify how it would implement these recommendations.

• DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to 

identify and approve pre-deployment training requirements for all DOD 

civilians. DOD stated that through the process of identifying predeployment training requirements, DOD will establish a core set of 

training needs that are applicable under all circumstances under which 

DOD civilians may deploy. DOD also stated that it will develop policy that 

recognizes the agility necessary to prepare DOD civilians for unique 

mission requirements and conditions now and in the future.

• DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to 

coordinate with key stakeholders such as the military services and 

subordinate commands to ensure that training requirements are 

synchronized among and within DOD components and with departmentwide guidance. DOD stated the process it develops for identifying predeployment training requirements will account for the need to make the 

best use of resources using guiding principles and criteria from the 

Secretary of Defense and advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff as needed to ensure an agile and effective contingency workforce.

State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland 

Security provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into 

the report as appropriate. The Department of the Treasury noted that 

State’s database had not been updated to reflect 13 total approved 

Treasury positions. Treasury further noted that two of its positions listed 

as “open” remained programmatically on hold, resulting in 11 active slots 

filled. We incorporated this technical comment in our report.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 34 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, 

and State; the U.S. Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; and 

other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov or Charles 

Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Brenda S. Farrell

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Charles Michael Johnson Jr.

Director

International Affairs and Trade
 

Page 35 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

List of Addressees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John Kerry

Chairman

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Chairman

The Honorable Lindsey Graham

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on the Department of State, 

Foreign Operations and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate
 

Page 36 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chairman

The Honorable Howard L. Berman

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations 

and Related Programs

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz

Chairman

The Honorable John F. Tierney

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland 

Defense and Foreign Operations

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

To review the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, we obtained 

information from pertinent strategic planning, recruitment, staffing, and 

reporting documents and interviewed relevant officials from the 

Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, 

Justice, State (State), and the Treasury, as well as the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). We did not examine costs for the 

deployment or support of civilian personnel in Afghanistan due to a 

concurrent review by the Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction on this topic, published in September 2011.1

To examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, 

we obtained and analyzed staffing data from State and DOD regarding 

staffing requirements and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of 

Mission authority and key positions under combatant commander 

authority deployed in-country following the President’s March 2009 call to 

enhance support of Afghan national and subnational government 

institutions. Our scope was limited to U.S. direct hires and did not include 

locally engaged staff or contractors. Because, according to DOD officials, 

the majority of DOD civilians directly serve in combat support positions, 

we focused our request for staffing data on organizations or programs 

intended to enhance the capacity of the Afghan government, which 

included the Ministry of Defense Advisors and Afghanistan Pakistan 

Hands programs. We validated reports on Chief of Mission staffing 

progress through interviews with officials representing agencies that 

deployed staff to fill positions in Afghanistan since January 2009, 

including officials from Homeland Security, Justice, State, the Treasury, 

USAID, and USDA. We did not meet with officials from several agencies 

with fewer than five permanent staff deployed to Afghanistan, such as the 

Departments of Transportation and Health and Human Services.

To assess the reliability of the staffing data reported by State and DOD 

for civilians in Afghanistan, we reviewed available documentation, 

examined the data for outliers and missing observations, and conducted 

follow-up interviews to discuss questions that arose in our analysis of the 

data. Additionally, for Chief of Mission data, we compared complementary 

datasets from State’s Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System 

 

1

The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Should 

Continue to Strengthen Its Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other 

Agencies, Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Audit11-17 and Department of State Office of Inspector General AUD/SI-11-45 (Sept. 8, 2011).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

(ACPTS) and the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix to identify 

whether any reporting discrepancies existed. We requested datasets from 

State from each database over corresponding time periods; our first data 

run compared February 10, 2011, Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing data 

with March 16, 2011, ACPTS data; our second data run compared June 

28, 2011, Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix data with July 7, 2011, 

ACPTS data. We further met with State officials to identify the cause and 

effect of discrepancies that were found to exist, in order to assess 

whether the discrepancies limit the ability of U.S. agencies to evaluate 

their staffing progress. For DOD, we requested data from the Ministry of 

Defense Advisors program, the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, 

and the Joint Personnel Status Report to identify DOD’s civilian presence 

in Afghanistan. We also met with officials from the Ministry of Defense 

Advisors program, Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and Joint Chiefs 

of Staff to discuss the data sources, internal controls, and data reliability 

related to their respective staffing data. We found State civilian staffing 

data for Afghanistan to be sufficiently reliable to provide an indication of 

the positions filled at the level of the agency, but State ACPTS data were 

not sufficiently reliable to report on more-detailed staffing information, 

such as position type. For the Ministry of Defense Advisors program and 

the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, we found that program 

documents supported the requirements and the number of filled positions 

that the program offices provided and that the data from these programs 

were sufficiently reliable to illustrate the positions filled within these 

programs. However, the extent to which DOD staffing data in the Joint 

Personnel Status Report are reliable is unknown because previous 

reports have omitted or double counted personnel. DOD officials noted 

that while errors do occur in the daily submission of Joint Personnel 

Status Report data from the combatant commands, the reports are 

accurate enough to identify trends in DOD’s civilian presence over time, 

and we agree. As of late 2011, we could not fully verify the accuracy of 

the ACPTS system. However, during the course of our review and after 

several discussions with us regarding data reliability, State began taking 

steps to improve the reliability of the ACPTS database.

To evaluate the implementation of DOD’s Civilian Expeditionary 

Workforce (CEW) policy, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents.

Specifically, we reviewed the DOD directive that established the program 

to understand the structure of the CEW as presented in this document 

and reviewed the 2009 DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan to

identify the steps DOD had established as a road map for implementing 

the CEW directive. We also reviewed other documents such as DOD’s 

Strategic Management Plan Fiscal Years 2012-2013 to determine how 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

the CEW related to high-priority departmentwide programs. In addition, 

we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense and CEW program 

officials to further understand the current status of efforts to fully 

implement the CEW and the department’s plans for the CEW of the 

future. We also interviewed U.S. Central Command officials to determine 

how the CEW was being used to satisfy its needs for deployable civilians 

in Afghanistan and officials from the Air Force, Army, and Navy, to 

determine how these agencies coordinated efforts to identify deployable 

civilians.

To determine the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required 

Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment, we 

reviewed predeployment training requirements established by the 

Department of State for all Chief of Mission personnel and the 

requirements set by various programs and components within the DOD.

We did not analyze training provided by the Department of Justice or its 

components due to its specialized law-enforcement nature. For DOD 

training, we reviewed training programs for the CEW, Ministry of Defense 

Advisors program, Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers as well as civilian training for the Air Force, Army, and 

Navy. We focused on these DOD programs because of their capacitybuilding focus. On two separate occasions, we observed scenario-based 

training administered to Chief of Mission personnel and the Ministry of 

Defense Advisors program, both held at the Muscatatuck Urban Training 

Center in Indiana.

To assess the extent to which the agencies complied with predeployment 

training requirements for Chief of Mission personnel, we compared a 

March 2011 data run of State, USAID, and USDA personnel from State’s 

ACPTS system against Foreign Service Institute training rosters for the 

three Afghanistan-specific, mandatory training courses as well as against 

a State training waiver log. We focused on State, USAID, and USDA 

personnel due to the size of their respective civilian presence, as well as 

their primacy in deploying civilians to the field. This analysis yielded 134 

names that did not appear on the Foreign Service Institute rosters or in 

the waiver log, which we submitted to State’s Office of Orientation and InProcessing for explanation. Additionally, to test Diplomatic Security’s 

FACT Tracker, we selected a random sample of 65 State, USAID, and 

USDA names from July 2011 ACPTS personnel data and compared 

these names against data in the FACT Tracker. This sample was 

designed so that if we found that all sample cases received FACT or 

other appropriate training, we would be at least 95 percent confident that 

fewer than about 5 percent of State, USAID, and USDA personnel in 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Afghanistan during July 2011 did not receive FACT training. Although we 

note weaknesses in ACPTS’s data reliability, we judged the database 

sufficiently reliable to compare names against training rosters, waiver 

logs, and the FACT Tracker.

For DOD personnel, we compared the training curricula utilized by the 

military services, defense agencies, and the CEW to U.S. Central 

Command, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, and Office of the Secretary of 

Defense requirements and guidance to see whether the training 

addressed the requirements. In addition, we compared the various 

training received by deploying civilians to determine if there was any 

duplication or repetition in the training provided. Because training record 

keeping within DOD is decentralized, we did not verify individual training 

records to establish whether deployed civilians had received the required 

training. We did, however, review the procedures that the military services 

and defense agencies have in place to ensure that deploying civilians 

have taken required training. In addition, we interviewed officials with the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

CEW training office, Air Force, Army, Navy, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, and U.S. Central Command to discuss the predeployment 

training requirements for deployed civilians.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to February 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 41 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 42 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 43 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 44 GAO-12-285 Afghanistan

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov

Charles Michael Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contacts named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant 

Director; Kimberly Seay, Assistant Director; David Adams; Adam 

Bonnifield; Virginia Chanley; David Hancock; Mae Jones; Linda Keefer; 

Shakira O’Neil; and John Wren made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(320766)
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