J-A11007-24

2024 PA Super 178

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RYAN A. CASTANEIRA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1481 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-SA-0000107-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 12, 2024

Ryan A. Castaneira appeals from the $25 fine imposed following his 

conviction of one count of unlawful activities, a summary offense in violation 

of 75 Pa.C.S. § 4107(b)(2), relating to the window tint on his vehicle. We 

affirm.

The trial court recounted the factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows:

On January 10, 2023, Officer Jonathan Dudek of the 

Hampden Township Police Department was on patrol within the 

bounds of his jurisdiction in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, 

when he encountered a 2017 Honda Accord driving on the 

roadway. Officer Dudek observed that the vehicle in question had 

a window tint which appeared to be darker than that permitted by 

law, and he performed a traffic stop to further investigate the 

matter. [The degree of tint did not completely obscure his ability 

to see through the window.] After pulling over the Honda Accord, 

Officer Dudek identified the driver as Appellant.

As part of the stop [and without obtaining a search warrant 

or asking for permission], Officer Dudek performed a light 

transmittance test of the tinted passenger-side front window, 
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revealing that it allowed a light transmittance of 31%, which is 

below the 70% light transmittance required by statute and 

regulation. Officer Dudek informed Appellant of the nature of the 

violation, and provided him with both a warning and the 

opportunity to remove the offending window tint within five days 

in order to avoid being cited. After being allowed to leave the 

scene with the warning and grace period intact, Appellant called 

Officer Dudek to inform him that he was not interested in 

removing the window tint. That statement led to Officer Dudek 

citing Appellant for violation of § 4107(b)(2). 

The initial summary trial in this matter was held by the 

magisterial district court on May 15, 2023, following which 

Appellant was found guilty . . . . A timely summary appeal was 

filed by Appellant on June 8, 2023, and the trial de novo was heard 

by this court on September 18, 2023. . . . 

Relevant to this appeal, Appellant was found guilty of 

violating § 4107(b)(2) and sentenced to pay a $25 fine and the 

costs of prosecution. Following his conviction . . . , Appellant filed 

a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his conviction was 

improper. Because reconsideration was not expressly granted, 

there was no stay of the appeal period and Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal to the Superior Court on October 18, 2023.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/23, at 3-5 (internal footnotes omitted).

The trial court ordered Appellant to file a statement of errors pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he complied. The court thereafter issued a 

responsive opinion. Appellant presents the following six issues for our review, 

which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

I. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a sentence under 

[§ 4107(d)] when the Commonwealth failed to adduce any 

evidence that Appellant was operating a motor carrier vehicle 

or a bus?

II. Whether window tint that satisfies the exemption in 

[§ 4524(e)(1)] is a legally sufficient, sole reason to initiate a 

traffic stop? 
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III. Whether window tint that satisfies the exemption stated in 

[§ 4524(e)(1)] exempts one from prosecution under the theory 

that the same window tint can violate a window tint regulation 

promulgated by PennDOT under § 4524?

IV. Whether Table X referenced by 67 Pa.Code § 175.67 (Glazing), 

promulgated under the authority of, inter alia, [§ 4524(e)], can 

criminalize window tint that meets the exemption set forth 

under § 4524(e)(1)? 

V. Whether the charging instrument was insufficient as a matter 

of law by alleging a violation of [§ 4107(b)(2)] by alleging only

“(PF) 31% LIGHT TRANSMISSION – FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 

WARNING ISSUED ON 1/10/23”?

VI. Whether the lower court erred by holding that the 

Commonwealth was not required to obtain a search warrant 

prior to subjecting his window tint to an analysis using a light 

transmission meter that must be placed on the inside of the car 

if that same window tint meets the statutory exemption set 

forth in [§ 4524(e)(1)]?

Appellant’s brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).

In his first claim, Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence 

of guilt because he was not operating either a motor carrier vehicle or a bus

at the time of the offense, and that he therefore could not have been 

sentenced to pay a $25 fine. See Appellant’s brief at 13-16. We consider this

position mindful of the following well-settled standard of review:

When reviewing a [sufficiency] claim, we face a question of law. 

Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the 

verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom 

in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must 

ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements 

of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of 
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wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any 

doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the 

factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, 

as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2023)

(cleaned up). 

Appellant’s issue also requires us to interpret § 4107 and other 

provisions of the Vehicle Code. This likewise presents a question of law, and 

therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary. 

See Vellon v. Dep't of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 292 

A.3d 882, 890 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). Statutory interpretation is conducted 

in accordance with the Statutory Construction Act:

Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory interpretation 

and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When 

the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter 

of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of 

pursuing its spirit. Id. § 1921(b). When, however, the words of 

a statute are not explicit, a court may discern the General 

Assembly’s intent by examining considerations outside of the

words of the statute. Id. § 1921(c). In addition, when construing 

a statute, we must, if possible, give effect to all of its provisions. 

Id. § 1921(a).

The Statutory Construction Act also instructs that, in ascertaining 

the intention of the General Assembly in enacting a statute, 

several presumptions may be used. Id. § 1922. Among those 

presumptions is that “the General Assembly intends the entire 

statute to be effective and certain.” Id. § 1922(2). We also may 

presume that the General Assembly does not intend absurd or 

unreasonable results. Id. § 1922(1). As this Court wisely stated 

over sixty years ago, to avoid such results, we “must read 

[statutes] in the light of reason and common sense.” Ayers v. 
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Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1959). [Further], we may 

presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the 

Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth. 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1922(3).

Id. at 890 (citations altered). We additionally observe that our legislature has 

directed that statutes that are in pari materia, i.e., that “relate to the same 

persons or things or to the same class of persons or things[,]” must “be 

construed together, if possible, as one statute.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a), (b). 

Appellant was convicted of violating § 4107 of the Vehicle Code, which 

provides as follows in pertinent part:

(b) Other violations.--It is unlawful for any person to do any of 

the following:

. . . .

(2) Operate, or cause or permit another person to operate, 

on any highway in this Commonwealth any vehicle or 

combination which is not equipped as required under this 

part or under department regulations or when the driver is 

in violation of department regulations or the vehicle or 

combination is otherwise in an unsafe condition or in 

violation of department regulations.

. . . .

(d) Penalty.--

(1)(i) [With exceptions not relevant here], a person who 

operates a motor carrier vehicle or a bus in violation of 

subsection (b)(2) commits a summary offense and, upon 

conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $25 per 

violation, except that the minimum fine for a violation not 

related to driver’s hours of service which causes the driver 

or the vehicle to be placed out of service under section 

4704(c) (relating to inspection by police or Commonwealth 

personnel) shall be $50 per violation. The maximum fine 
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which may be levied on the basis of multiple charges filed 

together shall be $500.

. . . .

(2)(i) [With exceptions not relevant here], a person who 

causes, permits, requires or otherwise allows another 

person to operate a motor carrier vehicle or a bus in 

violation of subsection (b)(2) commits a summary offense 

and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $50 

per violation, except that the minimum fine for a violation 

not related to driver’s hours of service which causes the 

driver or the vehicle to be placed out of service under 

section 4704(c) shall be $100 per violation. The maximum 

fine which may be levied on the basis of multiple charges 

filed together shall be $1,000.

75 Pa.C.S. § 4107.

By its plain language, § 4107(b)(2) makes it a violation to operate any 

vehicle that is not in compliance with promulgated department regulations. A 

vehicle is defined as “[e]very device in, upon or by which any person or 

property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices 

used exclusively upon rails or tracks.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. As will be discussed 

infra, the references to motor carrier vehicles and buses in subsection (d) does 

not limit the applicability of subsection (b), but rather provides penalties 

specific to operators of those types of vehicles. 

Appellant’s citation arose due to the tint on his windows, which is 

addressed in the following regulation concerning glazing for passenger cars:

(d) Obstructions. A vehicle specified under this subchapter shall 

have glazing free from obstructions as described in § 175.80 

(relating to inspection procedure).

. . . .
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(4) A sun screening device or other material which 

does not permit a person to see or view the inside of 

the vehicle is prohibited, unless otherwise permitted 

by FMVSS No. 205, or a certificate of exemption has 

been issued in compliance with § 175.265 (relating to 

exemption provisions). See Table X for specific 

requirements for vehicles subject to this 

subchapter. Passenger car requirements 

relating to the rear window are delineated by 

vehicle model year in Table X.

67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d) (emphasis added).

In turn, Table X states that with respect to passenger cars year 1998 or 

newer, an acceptable light transmittance level for the front side 

windows/wings, rear side windows/wings, and rear windows are all 70%. See

67 Pa.Code 175, Table X. 

Also relevant to this issue is § 6502(b) of the Vehicle Code, which

provides for penalties and disposition of fines relating to summary offenses: 

(b) Violations of regulations.--It is a summary offense for a 

person to violate any provision of any regulation promulgated 

under the authority of this title. A person convicted of violating 

any provision of a regulation promulgated under the authority of 

this title shall pay the fine established in the section of this title 

on which the regulation is based or, if no fine is established in that 

section of this title, the fine shall be $25.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(b).

With this background in mind, we now turn to Appellant’s argument. He 

claims that he could not be sentenced for violating § 4107(b)(2) because he 

was not driving either a bus or motor carrier vehicle at the time he was issued 

the citation. See Appellant’s brief at 14. Appellant points to the penalty 

provision in subsection (d), noting that it applies only when a person operates 
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or causes another to operate one of those two types of vehicles. Id. 

Additionally, he interprets § 6502(b) as requiring that any penalty arising from 

a violation of § 4107 must be sentenced in accordance with § 4107(d), since 

it establishes a specific fine therein. Id. Appellant concludes that as the 

penalty provision does not apply to his conduct since he was driving a personal 

vehicle, he therefore could not be fined pursuant to either § 4107 or § 6502. 

Id. at 16. 

In addressing this issue, the trial court reviewed the language of 

§ 4107(b)(2), noting that it applies if a person operates “any vehicle . . . 

when the driver is in violation of department regulations[.]” Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/29/23, at 7 (emphasis in original). It reasoned that Appellant 

was driving a “vehicle” as defined within the Vehicle Code, and that a plain 

reading of the statute means that it would apply to Appellant while he was 

operating his Honda Accord. Id. at 10. For its part, the Commonwealth adds 

that the specific penalty provision found within § 4107(d) is not pertinent in 

this case, so that we must default to § 6502, which generally permits 

imposition of the $25 fine imposed upon Appellant for violating a promulgated 

regulation. See Commonwealth’s brief at 11-12. 

Upon review, we find that the evidence supports Appellant’s conviction 

of unlawful activities. It is clear that Appellant was in violation of § 4107(b)(2) 

because (1) he operated a vehicle and (2) the tint on his windows only 

permitted light transmittance of 31%. This is not compliant with the 

promulgated regulations, specifically 67 Pa.Code § 175.67, which incorporates 
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Table X and calls for a minimum level of 70% light transmittance. Thus, to 

the extent Appellant generally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain his conviction, he is not entitled to relief.

Additionally, we conclude that the trial court appropriately sentenced 

Appellant to pay a $25 fine for this violation. We reject Appellant’s claim that 

he may only be sentenced if he was driving a bus or motor carrier vehicle. 

Section 4107(b)(2) plainly prohibits a person driving any vehicle from doing 

so in a way that violates a regulation. The penalty provision found within 

subsection (d) is a targeted and enhanced penalty that applies in limited 

circumstances, such as if the operator was driving a bus or motor carrier 

vehicle. Were we to adopt Appellant’s interpretation of the statute, we would 

render ineffective the General Assembly’s decision to use the words “any 

vehicle” in § 4107(b)(2) and convert the offense into one that governs a 

narrow subsect of drivers. This is an “unreasonable result” that we will not 

endorse. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at 890.

Instead, we read § 4107 as a whole, enumerating a violation for conduct 

and providing an enhanced penalty under certain circumstances, such as when 

the conditions of subsection (d) are satisfied. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a), (b). 

As the Commonwealth suggests, when, as here, this penalty provision is not 

triggered, we must apply § 6502(b), which authorizes imposition of a $25 fine 

generally when a driver operates a vehicle in violation of a promulgated 

regulation. This interpretation of § 4107 satisfies our duty to read statutes 

“in the light of reason and common sense” and to give effect to the plain 
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language of all its parts. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at 890. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in either convicting Appellant of 

violating § 4107(b)(2) or imposing the instant fine based on this claim.

We address Appellant’s next three issues together. Therein, he asserts 

that Officer Dudek’s mere observation of a window tint did not give him an 

adequate basis upon which to perform a traffic stop, and that Appellant could 

not be convicted of § 4107 because he purportedly fulfilled exemptions 

contained within other provisions of the Vehicle Code. See Appellant’s brief 

at 16-25, 29-33. Although these claims involve different procedural postures, 

they are connected by a common thread in that they all concern the interplay

between § 4107, 67 Pa.Code § 175.67, the regulation discussed above, and 

§ 4524, a provision under which Appellant was neither charged nor convicted. 

Since these issues again require us to interpret statutes, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review plenary. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at

890.

The relevant portion of § 4524 states as follows: “No person shall drive 

any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does 

not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the 

windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e).

The thrust of Appellant’s argument in these claims is that this subsection 

specifically prohibits a window tint that does not permit a person to see into 

the vehicle, and accordingly it overrides the more general provision found at 

§ 4107, which relies upon a general reference to regulations. See Appellant’s 
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brief at 16-18. In the same vein, he highlights a portion of the regulation at 

67 Pa.Code § 175.67, noting that it “make[s] it clear that unless the threshold 

condition of not permitting one to see or view the interior of the vehicle is not 

met, the statutory proscription and regulation simply don’t apply, regardless 

of a Table X.” Id. at 18. As such, for police to stop a driver and cite him with 

respect to a window tint, it must be done in accordance with § 4524(e), or in 

other words, when the officer cannot see through the window. Id. at 21. 

Appellant correctly recounts that in this case, Officer Dudek’s testimony 

established that he could see into Appellant’s vehicle. Id. Based on this, 

Appellant concludes that the officer had no basis to stop him, and likewise that 

his conviction cannot stand since his conduct did not violate either the 

regulation found at 67 Pa.Code § 175.67 or § 4524(e). 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court noted that Appellant’s 

contentions appear to rely in part upon the principle of the “general/specific 

rule,” wherein a more specific statute trumps a more general one unless there 

is express indication to the contrary from the legislature. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/29/23, at 13. The court noted that this rule has been abrogated, 

and instead our case law delineates that a person may be charged with 

multiple violations of the Vehicle Code based upon a single act or series of 

acts. Id. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Kriegler, 127 A.3d 840 (Pa.Super. 

2015)). Therefore, it found that Appellant could be convicted of violating 

§ 4107(b)(2), despite engaging in conduct that does not run afoul of

§ 4524(e).
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Additionally, the trial court, Appellant, and the Commonwealth all 

discuss our decision of Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 5 A.3d 261 (Pa.Super. 

2010), with respect to these issues. There, the Commonwealth charged the 

defendant with violating § 4524(e) when the window tint measured 36.6% 

light transmittance. The trial court found the defendant guilty, holding that 

although the testifying officer could see into the vehicle, the level of tint 

nevertheless violated PennDOT’s regulation. This Court reversed, concluding 

that by its language, § 4524 did not make any reference to or otherwise 

incorporate any regulations identifying light transmittance requirements, 

including Table X. Accordingly, because the officer could see into the vehicle, 

the Commonwealth did not prove one of the required elements of § 4524(e). 

See Brubaker, 5 A.3d at 265-66. Although it did not expressly indicate so, 

the Brubaker Court suggested that in order to rely upon PennDOT’s glazing 

and window tint requirements, the Commonwealth would need to charge a 

person with violating § 4107(b)(2), as it did in this case, not § 4524(e).

After careful review, we conclude that Appellant’s conviction withstands 

his challenges herein. First, to the extent that Appellant’s claim asserts that 

he could not be convicted of § 4107 simply due to the existence of another 

provision addressing window tints, he is mistaken. As the trial court noted, 

the “general/specific rule” has been abrogated and the Commonwealth may 

charge Appellant with any and all applicable violations of the Vehicle Code, 

even if they arise from a single act. See Kriegler, 127 A.3d at 844. 
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Further, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s interpretation of 67 

Pa.Code § 175.67, namely that it allows invocation of Table X only in the event 

a person cannot see through a window tint. While that regulation does 

expressly make it a summary violation for a vehicle to have a window tint that 

does not permit visibility inside, just like § 4524(e), it does more. It 

additionally states, “[s]ee Table X for specific requirements for vehicles 

subject to this subchapter. Passenger car requirements relating to the rear 

window are delineated by vehicle model year in Table X.” 67 Pa.Code 

§ 175.67. Table X, in turn, articulates the specific light emittance 

requirements for passenger vehicles, such as Appellant’s.

By its plain language, this regulation prohibits tints that either prevent 

a person from seeing into the vehicle or do not comply with Table X. As this 

Court alluded to in Brubaker, since § 4107(b)(2) references regulations and 

thereby extends to Table X by incorporation, it is the appropriate mechanism 

for charging violations for window tints that do not allow adequate light 

transmittance. Thus, there was no error in the trial court finding Appellant

guilty of violating § 4107(b)(2), despite the officer being able to see through 

the windows. The trial court likewise did not err in concluding that Officer 

Dudek had sufficient justification to initiate a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle 
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based on a perceived window tint violation, as the officer had reasonable 

suspicion of the violation.1 No relief is due.

In his next issue, Appellant claims that “the charging instrument was 

insufficient as a matter of law” pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 403.2 See Appellant’s 

brief at 10. We have stated that “[t]he interpretation of and the application 

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure present questions of law for 

which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Kemick, 240 A.3d 214, 219 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted).

Rule 403 enumerates the requirements for citations issued as to

summary offenses. Pertinent to Appellant’s claim, the rule requires “a citation

of the specific section and subsection of the statute or ordinance allegedly 

____________________________________________

1 As part of this claim, Appellant compares this case to Commonwealth v. 

Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), wherein our High Court determined that “the 

odor of marijuana alone does not amount to probable cause to conduct a 

warrantless search of a vehicle, [but] rather, may be considered as a factor in 

examining the totality of the circumstances.” Appellant’s brief at 24 (citing 

Barr, 266 A.3d at 44). Appellant contends that similarly, “the presence of 

window tint alone cannot form the requisite probable cause to initiate a traffic 

stop.” Appellant’s brief at 25. We find Barr inapposite since it concerned the 

scope of performing a warrantless search of the interior of a vehicle after it 

was otherwise stopped for a Vehicle Code violation, not the adequacy of the 

basis for the initial stop. 

2 As noted supra, the citation in question identified that charge as 

§ 4107(b)(2) and stated within the confidential information section: “(PF) 

31% LIGHT TRANSMISSION – FAILED TO COMPLY WITH WARNING ISSUED 

ON 01-10-23.” Traffic Citation, Citation No. E0017978-2.
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violated, together with a summary of the facts sufficient to advise the 

defendant of the nature of the offense charged.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 403(a)(6). 

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did not satisfy that rule, 

particularly because:

Here, the citation alleges a light transmission value, without 

reference to any standard, and failure to comply with a warning.

Crucially, having a light transmission value of 31% or being 

noncompliant with a police warning notice are not manners in 

which § 4107(b)(2) can be violated, according to the plain 

language of the statute.

Without reference to Table X, or the regulatory language of 67 

Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) which references Table X, the citation 

failed to: (1) provide actual notice of what Appellant was on notice 

to defend, (2) protect him from further prosecution for the same 

offense, and (3) provide the Court of Common Pleas the

appropriate standard under which to determine the sufficiency of 

the prosecution’s case. For purposes of the intended charge, as 

elucidated at trial, the relevant regulatory section or specific

regulatory standard must be alleged.

Appellant’s brief at 11-12 (citation omitted, cleaned up).

In contrast, the trial court noted that “the citation issued to Appellant 

informed him that his vehicle’s windows did not meet the light transmittance

requirements necessary to safely operate the vehicle on Pennsylvania 

roadways, and properly cited . . . § 4107(b)(2) in that regard.” See Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/29/23, at 11. Further, the Commonwealth analyzed this 

claim thusly:

Here, Appellant was issued a police warning notice, number

W3H6Z2PJPH5, by Officer Dudek on January 10, 2023, as a result

of the traffic stop. The police warning notice specified in the

comments section that passenger front window of his vehicle had

thirty-one percent (31%) light transmission and directed
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Appellant to comply with “Penndot Pub. 45 Table X (all windows

including rear).” . . . Additionally, Officer Dudek informed 

Appellant that he needed to remove the window tint on his vehicle.

When Appellant failed to comply with the warning card, Officer 

Dudek filed citation number E0017978-2 against Appellant for 

Unlawful Activities, specifically citing [§ 4107(b)(2)], and listed in 

the confidential information section that the passenger front 

window had thirty-one percent (31%) light transmission and 

referenced the police warning notice.

Commonwealth’s brief at 16-17 (some capitalization altered).

We find that the citation at issue was “sufficient to advise [Appellant] of 

the nature of the offense charged.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 403(a)(6). It specifically 

enumerated a § 4107(b)(2) offense, asserting that Appellant’s vehicle was 

“not appropriately equipped.” Traffic Citation, Citation No. E0017978-2. It 

also listed the measurement of his light transmittance, and Appellant could 

then compare to the levels identified in Table X, which was referenced on the 

initial written warning notice provided by Officer Dudek. Together, with the 

description of the light transmittance percentage, this provided Appellant 

adequate notice of the specific subsection charged and an adequate summary 

of the facts to understand the nature of the violation.

Appellant’s belief that the citation was required to set forth every 

element required to be proven by the Commonwealth is unfounded, as neither 

Rule 403 nor any authority contains such a mandate. Further, while Appellant 

contends that he was not put on notice of the specific violations because of 

his belief that one cannot violate § 4107(b)(2) merely by not complying with 

Table X, this argument again evokes his erroneous interpretation of § 4524(e) 
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as overriding § 4107, which we have rejected above. Therefore, Appellant 

has not convinced us that the citation in this case was insufficient. 

Appellant’s remaining claim asserts that Officer Dudek violated his 

constitutional rights by conducting a window tint check without first obtaining 

a search warrant. See Appellant’s brief at 25-29. This appears to be an issue 

of first impression within the Commonwealth. Since it “implicates 

constitutional requirements and raises a pure question of law, our standard of 

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 209 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 

individuals the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa.Super. 2019). Likewise,

The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[t]he people shall be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches 

and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or 

things shall issue . . . without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation 

subscribed to by the affiant.” Pa. Const. art. 1, § 8. 

Further:

Our Supreme Court has explained that the twin aims of Article I, 

Section 8 are the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental 

requirement that warrants shall only be issued upon probable 

cause. Nonetheless, no right is absolute, and the focus of search 

and seizure law remains on the delicate balance of protecting the 

right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police 
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officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens 

while investigating crime.

Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 747 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) 

(citations omitted).

The Vehicle Code grants authority for police officers to gather certain 

information in furtherance of investigations as to any related violations:

Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of 

checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a 

violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a 

vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the 

vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle 

identification number [(“VIN”)] or engine number or the driver’s 

license, or to secure such other information as the officer may 

reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of 

this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).

As to this issue, Appellant relies upon the holding of our High Court in 

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), that “warrantless 

vehicle searches require both probable cause and exigent circumstances; one 

without the other is insufficient.” See Appellant’s brief at 27 (citing 

Alexander, 243 A.3d at 207). He contends that the Commonwealth offered 

no exigent circumstances in this case, and thus was not permitted to search 

his vehicle without a warrant, which it did when it utilized the window tint 

meter on his window. See Appellant’s brief at 28. Appellant laments that if 

the Commonwealth is free to conduct searches of every window with any level 

of tint, it would destroy citizens’ enjoyment of privacy rights. Id. 
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The trial court concluded that Alexander was inapplicable, instead 

citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), for the proposition 

that upon performing a lawful traffic stop, officers are “permitted to make 

inquiries related to the mission addressed by that stop; namely, addressing 

the underlying violation and attending to any related safety concerns.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/29/23, at 15-16 (cleaned up). It further found that no 

search was performed as the term is contemplated by our constitution, and 

that rather, the officer was merely advancing his statutory authority to 

investigate pursuant to § 6308(b). Id. at 16. 

Likewise, the Commonwealth purports that application of the window 

tint meter was “akin to securing a vehicle’s identification number or engine 

number[.]” Commonwealth’s brief at 26. It further distinguishes Alexander

from this case, contending that “unlike the officer in Alexander, who searched 

the interior of the vehicle, Officer Dudek merely applied a window tint meter 

to the already partially down front passenger side window[.]” Id. The 

Commonwealth posits additionally that Pennsylvania courts have not 

determined that “a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy extends to 

window tint, which is readily viewable to anyone in a public place, such as a 

highway.” Id. at 27.

Upon review, we find that Officer Dudek’s use of the light transmittance 

device, despite not being significantly intrusive, did constitute a search in this 

instance. Certainly, it is as much a search as examining a vehicle from the 

outside to obtain a VIN. See Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 452 A.2d 827, 
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833 (Pa.Super. 1982) (external examination of a vehicle to obtain the VIN was 

a reasonable search, and thus not in violation of the defendant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights). 

Nonetheless, application of the window tint meter here was not 

unreasonable in light of the authority granted to officers pursuant to 

§ 6308(b). It is true that performing this test may occasionally involve 

manipulation of the glass to be tested; however, that is not materially different 

than opening a car door in order to verify a VIN or raising a hatch to confirm 

an engine number. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 119 (1986) 

(concluding that opening a door to remove papers that were blocking a VIN 

did not constitute an unreasonable search, as drivers lack an expectation of 

privacy in the VIN). We find this search to be in the same class of others that 

may be conducted without a warrant, if supported by reasonable suspicion, 

such as canine sniffs. See Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 185 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (holding that a canine sniff is a “type of search [that] is 

inherently less intrusive upon an individual’s privacy than other searches,”

requiring that police only have “reasonable suspicion for believing that 

narcotics would be found in the place subject to the canine sniff.”). In short, 

the window tint verification process is a far cry from the internal search of a 

vehicle done by the officers in Alexander, and thus we agree with the trial 

court that Alexander is distinguishable. 

Moreover, despite Appellant having a privacy right to items within his 

vehicle, he has not persuaded us that this right extends to his windows 
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themselves. Indeed, in the same way that a person could not expect to have 

a privacy interest in either the VIN of their vehicle or items that are in plain 

view through windows, they should likewise not expect that the windows are 

exempt from examination. See Class, 475 U.S. at 119; Commonwealth v. 

Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 576 (Pa.Super. 2022) (“There can be no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in an object that is in plain view. There is no reason a 

police officer should be precluded from observing as an officer what would be 

entirely visible to him as a private citizen.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, 

Officer Dudek did not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights when he used 

the light transmittance meter in this case without first obtaining a warrant. 

He had reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 4107(b)(2), which gave him 

the authority pursuant to § 6308(b) to advance his investigation. 

Since Appellant has presented us with no issues warranting relief, we 

have no cause to disturb his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/12/2024