U.S. MARINES IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001–2002

FROM THE SEA

U.S. Marines in the

Global War on Terrorism

by

Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2011
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment,

2003–2006

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

PCN 106 0000 2500

eciffO gnitnirP tnemnrevoG .S.U ,stnemucoD fo tnednetnirepuS eht yb elas roF

0081-215 )202( aera CD ;0081-215 )668( eerf llot :enohP vog.opg.erotskoob :tenretnI

notgnihsaW ,CCDI potS :liaM 4012-215 )202( :xaF 1000-20402 CD ,

ISBN 978-0-16-089557-9
This monograph is more than the story of Marine expeditionary operations in Afghanistan. It

describes who our nation’s enemies are; how America became involved in the Global War on

Terrorism; and how the Marine Corps struggled to acquire a major role in Operation Enduring

Freedom, as well as the actions of Marines and sailors who helped prosecute the air and ground

campaigns against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. In the latter regard, we see the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit, already forward deployed on 11 September 2001, ready to conduct a

noncombatant evacuation operation, secure a forward operating base, or provide a quick reaction

force for joint special operating forces conducting the initial offensive action of the war. The 15th

Marine Expeditionary Unit then combined with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and quickly

maneuvered from the Mediterranean to form a provisional Marine expeditionary brigade known as

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58. Working simultaneously under the direction of U.S. Central

Command’s land and maritime component commanders and in association with joint special

operations forces, Brigadier General James N. Mattis and his force embarked on a sequence of

operations in southern Afghanistan. These included, but were not limited to, establishing Forward

Operating Base Rhino, interdicting enemy lines of communications along Highway 1, occupying

Kandahar International Airport, securing the American embassy in Kabul, detaining several hundred

prisoners of war, and supporting special operations forces during numerous sensitive site

exploitation and special reconnaissance missions. The monograph also describes the 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit’s rapid reinforcement of Coalition forces during Operation Anaconda, only

days after Task Force 58’s disbandment.

Although events did not afford the Marines an opportunity to engage the enemy in heavy

combat, their contribution in southern Afghanistan was nonetheless significant. From a strategic

perspective, the arrival of a sizable conventional force demonstrated America’s resolve to confront

the sponsors of terrorism directly and signaled an end to Taliban rule. From an operational

perspective, Task Force 58 successfully blocked the western escape route from Kandahar and

threatened the enemy’s last remaining urban stronghold. As Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold,

former director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later observed:

The insertion of Task Force 58 had a deep psychological impact on the Taliban and al-Qaeda—they

were confronted with a military situation which now unhinged any hope they had for a gradual

pullback from the north and a chance to hold from their area of greatest strength. . . . The insertion

of Task Force 58 fundamentally changed the equation for the enemy from one of grim hope to

hopelessness.1

The strategic agility and operational reach showcased by the Navy amphibious squadrons and

Marine expeditionary units validated the utility of task-organized expeditionary forces, particularly

in respect to the effectiveness of long-range, ship-to-objective maneuver. These combined

Foreword

iii
achievements contributed directly to the subsequent deployment of expeditionary strike groups in

2003. As a result, today’s naval services are now in a better position to address emerging crises

around the globe, regardless of whether they occur in littoral or landlocked regions of the world.

Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey began his military career as an infantry officer, serving first as a rifle

platoon commander in Panama during Operation Just Cause and then as a recruiting officer in

Portland, Oregon. After transferring to the Reserves to attend graduate school, he joined the History

Division’s Field Operations Branch in 1998 and subsequently deployed to document operations in

Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He joined the Histories Branch as a civilian writer in 2005 and later

served as head of the Field and Oral History Branch from 2008 to 2010. He holds a bachelor’s

degree in history from the University of Maine, a master’s degree in cultural anthropology from the

University of Wisconsin, and a doctorate in archaeology from American University.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History

iv
This project began almost 10 years ago, a month after the terrorist attacks on 11 September

2001. Drawn from a variety of sources, the account reflects the combined efforts of three related,

yet independent, endeavors to document Marine operations in Afghanistan during the opening days

of Operation Enduring Freedom. In November 2001, after it became apparent that a sizable Marine

force was about to be committed to the ongoing campaign, History and Museums Division began

to assemble a small field documentation team to accompany the operating forces as official

observers. The team—consisting of two field historians, a combat photographer, and a combat

artist—intended to collect documents, capture images, conduct interviews, and gather artifacts that

would help to preserve, present, and promote Marine Corps history.

In early December, shortly after Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58 seized Objective Rhino

in southern Afghanistan, Headquarters Marine Corps directed that the field history detachment join

a provisional Combat Assessment Team then forming in Quantico, Virginia. Modeled on the Battle

Assessment Team deployed during the Gulf War, the platoon-sized organization was a Marine

Corps Combat Development Center initiative to evaluate and improve the Marine Corps’

warfighting capabilities. After several iterations, this effort evolved into today’s Marine Corps Center

for Lessons Learned.

The assessment team deployed to Bahrain in early January 2002, where it made contact with U.S.

Naval Forces, Central Command; Marine Forces, Central Command (Forward); and Task Force 58

(Rear). During the next three months, Staff Sergeant Michael D. Fay and Major Christopher J.

Warnke accompanied assessment personnel during short trips to Camp Doha, Kuwait; Jacobabad,

Pakistan; and Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they spoke with Marines, sailors, and

soldiers involved in Operation Swift Freedom (the initial label for the Marine contribution to the

campaign). While in Bahrain, Warnke also interviewed pilots from Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons

251 and 314, while Fay captured images of the Marine Security Forces Company and facilities at

Shaikh Isa Air Base. Although I spent most of my time in Bahrain collecting historical information

from the Task Force 58 staff and helping them chronicle their experiences during the operation, I

also made a short trip to Kuwait to speak with members of Task Force Consequence Management

and visited the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit at sea following Operation Anaconda. Two other

researchers also contributed to the History and Museums Division’s documentation effort that

spring, accompanying units during their return voyages to the West Coast. Major Theodore R.

McKeldin collected data from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit on board the USS Peleliu (LHA

5), and Dr. Fred H. Allison interviewed pilots and aircrews from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

251 on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).

Preface

v
Following the operation, Task Force 58 produced a detailed multimedia account of its

experiences in Afghanistan. This chronicle, principally written by Majors Michael P. Mahaney and

Daniel B. Conley (the unit’s assistant operations and logistics officers), eventually became the

narrative portion of the organization’s command chronology and the foundation for my own history

of the operation. Captain Charles G. Grow, combat cameramen from the assessment team, and

both the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units collated Task Force 58’s impressive photo

collection, which became the main source of imagery for this volume. After its return to the United

States, the assessment team analyzed the wide range of data it had collected and published a

comprehensive report of its findings in 2003, which contributed greatly to this project.

During the spring of 2006, after History Division had relocated to Quantico and joined Marine

Corps University, Colonel Richard D. Camp, the acting director, asked that I begin work on a Task

Force 58 history. I originally intended to produce a short operational monograph based heavily on

the detailed narrative summary contained in Task Force 58’s command chronology. Once I began

my research, however, I quickly realized that a complete history would necessarily include a more

robust accounting of the three Marine expeditionary units who had fought in Afghanistan before,

during, and after Task Force 58’s tenure in theater. Several months later, after speaking with retired

Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold, who had helped shape the battle as a member of the Joint

Staff at the Pentagon, I learned that it would also be necessary to investigate the circumstances

surrounding U.S. Central Command’s delayed decision to employ Marines in Afghanistan. Not only

was Marine Corps participation in the joint operation intentionally limited from the earliest planning

stages onward, the rationale for assigning them a larger role at the final hour of the campaign

remained ambiguous. This prologue to the operational portion of the account speaks forcefully to

the doctrinal and institutional significance of Task Force 58’s achievement, which links directly to

the development of expeditionary maneuver warfare following the end of the Cold War in 1991 and

the establishment of expeditionary strike groups in 2003.

The research, writing, and publication of an official history is a collaborative affair. Behind the

author stand a cadre of individuals without whose support I would have been unable to bring this

project to completion. During the research phase, I was assisted by Mr. John Q. Smith at the U.S.

Central Command History Office, Dr. David B. Crist of the Joint History Office, Drs. Randy

Papadopoulos and Robert J. Schneller at the U.S. Naval Historical Center, Dr. Bradford Lee of the

Naval War College, Mr. Frank E. Jordan of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Dr. James A.

Ginther at the Marine Corps Archives, staff at both the Marine Corps Library and Marine Corps

Center for Lessons Learned, Dr. Fred Allison and Mr. Anthony R. Taglianetti of our Oral History

Branch, and Ms. Annette D. Amerman of our Reference Branch.

Several veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom provided additional information in the form

of documentary evidence or oral history interviews. These include General James N. Mattis;

Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser; retired Lieutenant Generals John G. Castellaw and

Gregory S. Newbold; Colonels Christopher M. Bourne, John J. Broadmeadow, John Jansen, Clark

R. Lethin, Jerome M. Lynes, James L. Stalnaker, and Michael D. Fitzgerald, USA; Lieutenant Colonel

vi
John B. Barranco; and Majors David R. Berke, Jack G. Bolton, Michael D. Bryan, Jay M. Holtermann,

Richard B. Lawson, Kevin M. McDonald, Jonathan R. Ohman, Joshua A. Riggs, Chad A. Vaughn,

and Richard W. Whitmer.

During the writing phase, Mr. Paul W. Westermeyer of our Histories Branch and Lieutenant

Colonel David A. Benhoff of our Field History Branch frequently served as sounding boards,

listening to my speculations and providing wise counsel in return. Mr. Charles R. Smith, senior

historian of the Histories Branch, and Mr. Charles D. Melson, chief historian of the Marine Corps,

reviewed several draft manuscripts, offering valuable advice on the style, organization, and content

of the developing history. After I produced a polished version of the manuscript, several veterans

of Operation Enduring Freedom reviewed my narrative and provided critical commentary that

enhanced both the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the account. These veterans include

Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser; retired Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold;

Brigadier Generals William M. Faulkner and Gregg A. Sturdevant; Colonels Christopher M. Bourne,

Robert J. Charette Jr., Christopher J. Gunther, Jerome M. Lynes, Michael P. Mahaney, and Carl D.

Matter; Lieutenant Colonels David B. Crist, Kevin M. DeVore, and Thomas J. Impellitteri; and

Master Sergeant John A. Dailey.

Our Editing and Design Branch, capably led by Mr. Kenneth H. Williams, was instrumental in

transforming the manuscript into a published product. Ms. Jeannie L. Riffe coordinated the

distribution and receipt of review drafts, Ms. Wanda J. Renfrow proofread the text, and Ms. Andrea

L. Connell and Mr. Shawn H. Vreeland edited the manuscript. Layout and design was provided by

Mr. Vincent J. Martinez. With so many individuals assisting in the development of this history, there

is always a danger of forgetting to note someone’s important contribution. If I have done so, please

accept my sincere apology and grateful thanks for your help.

As a final note to readers, please be aware that I have used both informational footnotes, identified

by symbols (*

, **, etc.), and reference endnotes, identified by Arabic numerals. Also, geographic names

have been standardized according to the U.S. Board of Geographic Names (http://geonames

.usgs.gov), and Afghan military and political figures’ names have been standardized according to the

U.S. Department of State website (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm).

Nathan S. Lowrey

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

vii

Table of Contents

Foreword ....................................................................................................................................................iii

Preface ..........................................................................................................................................................v

Prologue Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond ......................................................................................1

Chapter 1 The Global War on Terrorism ......................................................................................19

Chapter 2 Operation Enduring Freedom ......................................................................................33

Chapter 3 Striking Back ....................................................................................................................51

Chapter 4 Changing Plans ................................................................................................................65

Chapter 5 Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58 .............................................................................75

Chapter 6 Operational Maneuver from the Sea ............................................................................89

Chapter 7 Operation Swift Freedom ............................................................................................107

Chapter 8 Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino ......131

Chapter 9 Interdiction Operations ...............................................................................................151

Chapter 10 Occupation and Exploitation Operations .................................................................171

Chapter 11 Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar ............................................187

Chapter 12 Tora Bora ........................................................................................................................207

Chapter 13 Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions ....................................................221

Chapter 14 Winding Down ..............................................................................................................241

Chapter 15 Marines during Operation Anaconda ........................................................................257

Epilogue A New Beginning ..........................................................................................................287

Notes .........................................................................................................................................................305

Appendix A Command and Staff List .............................................................................................353

Appendix B Unit List ..........................................................................................................................359

Appendix C Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations .......................................................363

Appendix D Chronology of Events .................................................................................................369

Appendix E Unit Awards and Messages ..........................................................................................395

Index .........................................................................................................................................................399

ix

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez
Associated Press. Photo by Steve McCurry
Prologue

Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

Introduction

While the rationale for retaliating

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban

forces following the terrorist attacks

of 11 September 2001 is self-evident—to protect

the United States from further foreign aggression—

the reason the attacks occurred in the first place is

less clear. Only 15 years earlier, for example, the

United States supported many of the same freedom

fighters who became the Taliban and al-Qaeda as

they battled against the Soviet forces who were then

occupying Afghanistan. This chapter attempts to

shed light on this issue by examining certain events

that occurred during the last quarter of the 20th

century in order to set the stage for the rest of the

book. The account identifies many of the key

players involved in what was already a 20-year

conflict, discusses their motives and tactics, and

chronicles changing relationships in Afghanistan and

abroad. The personalities and events discussed also

provide insight into factors considered by key

leaders in the United States when outlining an initial

strategy for Operation Enduring Freedom.

The era of the Afghan monarchy ended in

1973, following more than two centuries of

tumultuous rule by the Abdali line of the Pashtun.

Former Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud,

supported by a wide base of conservative military

officers and leftist Communists, seized power from

King Mohammad Zahir Shah during a successful

coup and created the National Revolutionary Party

the following year. Although his ambitious plan for

Afghan economic growth went unfulfilled, Daoud

demonstrated substantial talent in consolidating

power and alienating supporters. Attempts to resolve

diplomatic conflicts with Pakistan angered groups

pursuing an independent Pashtunistan, the purge of

leftist government officials helped mobilize the

Communist movement, and efforts to acquire

military and economic aid from Iran and other

Middle Eastern nations infuriated the Soviets. While

attempting to squelch the riled dissidents, Daoud

instituted a new constitution in 1977 that established

a one-party presidential system of government.

Instead of eliminating resistance, his heavyhandedness strengthened the opposition’s resolve

and helped reunite competing factions of the

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.1

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Communists seized control in April 1978,

following a second military coup (known as the Sawr

Revolution) during which President Daoud and

most of his family were killed. Nur Muhammad

Taraki, head of the conservative Khalq (Masses)

faction of the People’s Democratic Party of

Afghanistan, became prime minister, while Babrak

Karmal, head of the moderate Parcham (Banner)

faction of the party, became senior deputy prime

minister. Hafizullah Amin became minister of

foreign affairs. Despite a brief image of party

solidarity, these men and their allies championed

different strategic perspectives, which ultimately

pitched the nation into civil war. The Khalq faction

wanted to proceed directly to developing a Leninist

working-class party, which appealed to its rural,

lower-class following of mostly disenfranchised

Ghilzai Pashtun. The Parcham faction, however,

wanted to lay a foundation by developing a “national

democratic front of patriotic and anti-imperial

forces,” which appealed to an urban, upper-middleclass constituency of Dari-speaking Pashtun and

other minority groups around Kabul.2

Shortly after taking office, Taraki began to

purge his government of the Parcham faction. He

sent some members, like Karmal, abroad on

diplomatic missions, while killing or imprisoning the

1
less fortunate. Without Parcham representation,

there was no moderating voice to temper Taraki’s

radical reforms, which he viewed as cleansing “Islam

in Afghanistan of the ballast and dirt of bad

traditions, superstition, and erroneous belief.”3 In

addition to symbolic changes to the Afghan flag,

which promoted Communism at the expense of

Islam, other decrees attempted to address issues of

rural inequity and poverty through debt reform, land

redistribution, and gender and ethnic equality.4

Like previous attempts at reform, the new

progressive policies quickly alienated rural villagers

by challenging their traditional ways of life and

religious practices. Civil uprisings began to occur

throughout the country and guerrilla camps sprang

up in Pakistan. In desperation, Taraki sought a

formal alliance with the Soviet Union, signing the

standard Treaty of Friendship, Good

Neighborliness, and Cooperation in December

1978. Bolstered by Soviet weapons and advisors, the

struggling regime retaliated forcefully against the

anti-Communist mujahideen (holy warriors). Yet

Taraki’s brutality only fueled popular dissent, and

following a particularly violent exchange in Herat

during March 1979, the Soviets shipped attack

helicopters to Afghanistan and sent a detachment of

KGB paramilitary officers to guard the Soviet

embassy in Kabul.5

At the same time, Hafizullah Amin, the foreign

affairs minister, remained protective of Afghan

independence and suspicious of Soviet involvement.

Although Amin attempted to maintain a positive

working relationship with the United States, it quickly

deteriorated following the death of American

Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February 1979. Amin

seized control of the government a month later,

reshuffled the cabinet, and stubbornly refused to

accept outside direction from the Soviets. In

response, the Soviets first engineered an unsuccessful

resurgence of the Parcham faction and then arranged

two failed assassination attempts during September.

After learning of his role in the plot, Amin had

Former Prime Minister Taraki killed.6

The Soviet-Afghan War

By October 1979, Afghanistan had plunged

headlong into yet another all-out civil war.

Ignoring warnings from the United States,

Soviet officials prepared for large-scale military

involvement in Afghanistan. At the same time,

additional advisors and combat aircraft deployed to

shore up the rapidly disintegrating Afghan National

Army, and a sizable invasion force assembled along

Afghanistan’s northwest border—this was designated

the Soviet 40th Army and headquartered in Termiz,

Uzbekistan. Although the Soviets would eventually

rationalize intervention by citing repeated Afghan

requests for supplementary support and their right

to aid friendly socialist countries under duress, their

real purpose may have been to repair perceived holes

in the Soviet “strategic arc” of influence.7

In mid-December, while operating under the

guise of protecting Soviet interests in Afghanistan,

brigade-sized units stationed themselves at key air

bases in Bagram, Kabul, and Shindand.8 This tactic

was similar to the deception used during the

invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in which the

deployment of Soviet troops was supposed to be

part of a training exercise.9 Beginning on 24

December, these garrisons and another at Kandahar

were strengthened by elements of two airborne

divisions during a massive two-day airlift.10 The

following evening, a battalion of motorized infantry

crossed the Amu Darya River.11 On 27 December,

operating with cooperation from the Afghan

General Staff, Soviet forces isolated the capital city,

seized its major command and control centers, and

killed President Amin during a violent assault on

Darulaman Palace.12 Two motorized rifle divisions

crossed into northern Afghanistan the next day: one

departing Termiz, Uzbekistan, for Bagram and

Kabul, and the other leaving Kushka,

Turkmenistan, for Herat and Kandahar.13

On 21 January 1980, shocked by the invasion,

President James E. Carter Jr. declared, “An attempt

by any outside force to gain control of the Persian

2

FROM THE SEA
Territorial Sovereignty

The Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89) was not the first conflict in which a foreign army

maneuvered to control or influence Afghan sovereignty. On the contrary, during the 19th

century the fledgling monarchy found itself serving as the playing field for the “Great Game.”

In this military-diplomatic contest between the Russian Empire to the north and the British

Empire to the east, rival superpowers struggled for control over Central Asia and the

positioning of Afghanistan’s borders.

From the British perspective, the principal issue was where to establish the western boundary

of its Indian colonies. While one political faction argued that the Indus River served as a natural

border and that Afghanistan should serve as a buffer zone between India and the Russian

Empire, a more aggressive faction argued that the defense of India required extending the

frontier westward to the Hindu Kush. While pursuing the more aggressive policy, British

expeditionary forces encountered strong Afghan resistance during the First (1839–42) and

Second (1878–80) Anglo-Afghan Wars. Although the conclusion of the second bloody conflict

left the Afghan monarchy intact, it agreed to submit to British authority.14

Fearful of further British encroachment from the east, the Afghan monarchy argued for a

permanent boundary with India, which became a reality in 1893 during negotiations with the

British Indian foreign secretary, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. Although Durand sought to

“engineer” tranquility by delineating between Pashtun tribes politically aligned with Kabul and

others affiliated with Peshawar, he inadvertently institutionalized a century of regional political

conflict with what has become known as the Durand Line. Historian Sally Ann Baynard

describes the Durand Line as having cut through tribes and villages with little relationship to

the topographic, demographic, or military strategic realities, resulting in bloodshed and laying

the foundation not for peace in the border regions, but for heated disagreements between the

governments of Afghanistan and British India, as well as later between the governments of

Afghanistan and Pakistan.15

After having settled its territorial dispute with Russia in 1907, and putting down yet another

insurrection during the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, Britain finally recognized Afghan

independence and ceased its colonial pursuits west of the Khyber Pass. Sovereignty issues

resurfaced during the dissolution of British India in 1947. In independence, British India split

into today’s predominantly Hindu and Sikh India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Since 1901, the British had maintained the North-West Frontier Province as a rural buffer

zone east of the Durand Line. Recognition of the Pashtun-dominated mountain region—

isolated from more developed provinces in southern and eastern Pakistan—at the time of

partitioning revived earlier arguments for either Afghan annexation or the creation of an

independent Pashtunistan. Rather than provide an opportunity to choose independence,

however, British authorities limited voting options in the frontier province to either joining

Pakistan or India. Although the Pakistani government adopted a conciliatory attitude toward

its Pashtun citizens following the vote, the ethnic issue remained unresolved and poisoned

future relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.16

3

Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond
FROM THE SEA

4

Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the

vital interests of the United States of America.” In

addition to initiating efforts to establish a “regional

security framework” that would capitalize on

enhanced relations with Pakistan,17 he levied

economic sanctions against the Soviet Union,

boycotted the 1980 Olympics, and refused to

forward the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II to

the Senate for ratification.18 Rather than withdraw,

Soviet reinforcements continued to flow into

Afghanistan during the following six months,

establishing additional garrisons at outlying

population centers. Estimates of the initial Soviet

deployment ran as high as five divisions and more

than 85,000 troops.19

The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, former

deputy premier and head of the Parcham faction, as

the new puppet leader of Afghanistan. Although he

pursued a path of conciliation, proclaiming the

preeminence of Islam and the loya jirga (traditional

meeting of tribal elders to solve problems) and

attempting to entice support from the mullahs

(religious leaders schooled in Islamic law) by

providing additional food and money, he proved

incapable of unifying the fractured nation under a

moderate socialist regime.20 The Soviets

subsequently found themselves in the

uncomfortable role of catalyst, transforming a

conglomeration of 10 competing resistance groups

into a loose Islamic-nationalist coalition bent on

expelling an invading army of foreign infidels. As

additional reinforcements arrived during 1981, the

number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan increased

to approximately 100,000.21

Initial military operations usually involved

division-level offensives, primarily in the east, often

along major transportation routes and with the goal

of establishing control over the Pakistani border

region. After several bloody encounters with the

rebels, the Soviets learned to appreciate the limitations

of employing large conventional forces against

guerrilla fighters in mountainous terrain and gradually

adapted to the unpredictable combat environment by

becoming more agile. They exchanged armor for

infantry, downsized to regiment- and battalion-sized

operations, relied heavily on helicopter and jet fighter

support, and employed special operations forces to

ambush the rebels.22

As the conflict spread throughout Afghanistan,

the Soviets realized that they could only maintain

operational control over any given area by

establishing a permanent presence in the region.

Reluctant to assume an occupying role, they chose

instead to pursue a measured strategy by establishing

large garrisons to control the urban infrastructure,

combat outposts to secure critical points along the

major supply routes, and fortified base camps from

which to launch attacks against the mujahideen. In

association with conducting direct combat

operations, they also attempted to eliminate logistical

support for the resistance groups by spoiling crops,

mining fields, destroying irrigation systems, and

evacuating villages. Besides creating a refugee

population of at least 5 million, the Soviets

significantly strengthened anti-Soviet sentiments

throughout the world through their use of these

brutal tactics.23 Many of the displaced Afghans

migrated to refugee camps along the Iranian and

Pakistani borders.24 Recruitment of mujahideen

from the camps was greatly facilitated by the

Assembly of Islamic Clergy (Jamiat Ulema-e Islam),

which established hundreds of madrassas (religious

schools) along the Pashtun belt in western Pakistan,

providing the recruits an opportunity for food,

shelter, education, and military training.25

Various estimates suggest that the mujahideen

were composed of approximately 90,000 regulars and

110,000 reserves. As an ad hoc army, it reflected the

geographic, ethnic, tribal, and religious diversity of

the country, with ranks filled by fighting men who

“ranged from preadolescent boys to grizzled veterans

of the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919.”26 The

mujahideen had various internal ideological divisions

as well, with most groups supporting either Afghan

traditionalist or Islamic fundamentalist perspectives

(Table 1), and then dividing still further to pursue

competing political agendas.27 The two largest and

most effective fundamentalist groups were Gulbuddin
Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

5

Hekmatyar’s radical Party of Islam, a Pashtun-based

organization of 30,000 situated to the south and east,

and Burhannudin Rabbani’s moderate Islamic Society

of Afghanistan, a minority-based organization of

25,000 situated to the north and west.28

The mujahideen received assistance from a wide

range of benefactors. During President Ronald W.

Reagan’s administration, the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) covertly funneled weapons,

equipment, technical support, and funding through

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate

(ISI), which also benefited materially and financially

from the partnership.29 Influenced by Pakistan’s own

Islamist leanings, Hekmatyar’s hard-liners received

the bulk of American aid.30 In addition to providing

additional funding, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and 42 other

Muslim nations also contributed from 10,000 to

35,000 foreign fighters to the war effort.* Although

the “Arab-Afghan” volunteers played only a limited

role in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan, and

their presence actually alienated non-Pashtun and

Shia Muslim groups located to the north, they would

boost the rise of Islamic terrorism and spearhead

the global jihad (holy war) following the war.31

The mujahideen pursued a tripartite strategy:

prove that the regime was not in control of the

countryside, undermine public support for the

government, and weaken the army.32 Although

resistance leaders sometimes conducted bold raids

against Soviet and Afghan national forces, they

usually employed less direct methods such as mining

roads, destroying bridges, ambushing supply

convoys, and severing communication lines. As the

conflict evolved, they adapted to changing Soviet

tactics by employing U.S.-supplied antiaircraft

missiles with devastating effect against Soviet helicopters and counterambushing special operations

forces. They also initiated an effective urban terror

campaign in 1981, which included kidnapping,

assassination, and bombing.33

Although the Soviets may have been willing to

orchestrate a quick regime change followed by

sustained stability and support operations, such as

they had orchestrated in Hungary during 1956 and

Czechoslovakia in 1968, they were reticent to enter

into a protracted conflict like the one the United

States had encountered in Vietnam.34 They began to

seek a political solution to the insurgency problem as

Islamic Fundamentalists Group Name

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Hizb-e Islami (Party of Islam)

Burhanuddin Rabbani Jami’at-e Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan)

Mawlawi Yonus Khalis Hizb-e Islami (Party of Islam—Khalis Faction)

Abd al-Rab al-Rassul Sayyaf Ittehad-e Islami (Islamic Unity)

Afghan Traditionalists

Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement)

Hazrat Sibghatullah Mojaddedi Jabha-e Nijat-e Milli (National Liberation Front)

Pir Sayyid Gailani Mahaz-e Milli Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan)

Table 1: Major Mujahideen Groups

*Although Iran and Saudi Arabia each contributed to the Afghan cause, the former supported the Hazara Shia Muslims, while the latter supported the

Pashtun Sunni Muslims. This was a bitter rivalry that survived the Soviet-Afghan War, with Iran supporting Rabbani and the Northern Alliance, and Saudi

Arabia supporting Mullah Omar and the Taliban. (Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia ([New Haven, CT: Yale

Nota Bene, 2001], 198–99, hereafter Rashid, Taliban)
FROM THE SEA

6

early as 1981, and by 1983, they were trying to

integrate more Afghan army units into combat

operations.35 Both attempts failed and a stalemate

ensued, with the mujahideen disrupting Soviet control

over 80 percent of the countryside by 1985.36 Perhaps

even more ominously, seven major resistance groups

combined that same year to form the Islamic Unity

of Afghan Mujahideen in Peshawar, with assent from

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, president and

military leader of Pakistan.37

During 1986, a year after taking office as the

general secretary of the Soviet Union’s Communist

Party, Mikhail S. Gorbachev frustratingly referred to

the continuing impasse and heavy losses in

Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound” and decreed that

the situation must be resolved within one or two

years.* In a decision that reversed the expansionist

policies of his predecessors, he chose to reduce

Soviet military involvement by transitioning it to a

supporting role. By 1987, the Soviets ceased

participating in major offensive operations, unless

provoked, and began to redeploy some of their

military forces. Early in 1988, Gorbachev announced

the general withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Afghanistan, effectively abandoning the failing

socialist regime and the almost 14,000 Soviet dead by

February 1989.38

President Karmal resigned in favor of

Muhammad Najibullah, chief of the Afghan secret

police, in 1987. Although Najibullah attempted to

initiate a national reconciliation program as part of

the changing Soviet strategy, he was unable to secure

popular support for the regime or extend its reach

into the rural areas.39 The mujahideen interpreted

the announcement of the Soviet withdrawal as a

clear sign of victory and formed an interim Afghan

Photo courtesy of the Reagan Library

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, left, meeting with President Ronald W. Reagan at Hofdi House during the

Reykjavik Summit in October 1986. Gorbachev chose to end Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan by announcing the

withdrawal of troops in early 1988.

*Although Soviet special operations forces had been initially successful in combating the mujahideen, U.S. armament of the Afghan resistance with Stinger

antiaircraft missiles limited the effectiveness of heliborne operations and ultimately turned the tide of war against the Soviets. (LtCol David B. Crist

comments on draft manuscript, 13Jan09, hereafter Crist comments)
Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

7

government, headed by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, in

anticipation of the eventual fall of the national

government. With victory now in sight, however,

intramural fighting intensified among the resistance

factions led by Ahmad Shah Masood and

Hekmatyar, prompting the latter to withdraw from

the alliance in 1988.40

While the national army had successfully

defended Jalalabad and Kabul from mujahideen

attacks in 1988, resistance groups captured

Kandahar, Herat, and Khost by 1990.41 Najibullah

was able to sustain a stalemate for two more years,

although the combined loss of Soviet military

assistance, Russian petroleum, and militia support

eventually proved too much for his struggling

regime to bear.42 The end appeared in early 1992

when General Abdul Rashid Dostam defected to the

resistance with the National Islamic Movement, a

previously progovernment Uzbek militia. He joined

Masood, the “Lion of Panjshir,” a highly respected

Tajik commander who had repeatedly thwarted the

Soviets and was aligned with Rabbani’s Islamic

Society of Afghanistan.43

The warlords took Mazar-e Sharif in February,

Bagram in April, and then headed south for Kabul.

Although lead elements of Hekmatyar’s faction

reached the capital first from the south, the

Masood-Dostam alliance forced them to relinquish

the city when they arrived. Mojaddedi temporarily

assumed control but quickly yielded to Rabbani in

June, which placed a member of the Tajik minority

in charge of the government. Hekmatyar contested

the new presidency by initiating a series of

devastating rocket attacks on Kabul, and the

country again descended into anarchy. During the

next two years, competing tribal leaders

reestablished their fiefdoms around several of the

traditional power centers. Ismail Khan (Tajik)

controlled Herat, Dostam (Uzbek) controlled

Bagram, and Hekmatyar (Pashtun) controlled

Kandahar. Confusing matters further, Dostam

turned on Masood (Tajik) in an unsuccessful bid for

Kunduz and realigned himself with Hekmatyar in a

failed attempt to seize the capital from Rabbani.44

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

The Taliban (religious students) militia emerged

from the chaos as an ultraconservative Sunni

Muslim reform movement in 1994.45 Genesis for

the organization reportedly occurred that spring

when Mullah Mohammad Omar, a 35-year-old

veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War, mobilized 30

other students to rescue two teenage girls that

mujahideen near Kandahar had kidnapped and

raped.46 Wielding the sharia (Islamic law) harshly in

an effort to restore civil order and end corruption

throughout Afghanistan, the movement initially

enjoyed widespread support from the war-weary

southern population, who envisioned a revival of

peace and Pashtun power. Six years later,

disillusioned by continuing hostilities, oppression,

Official Department of State photo

Although he is the leader of the Taliban and headed the

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the enigmatic Mullah

Mohammad Omar has avoided the limelight. This photograph

is allegedly of the elusive leader who formed the Taliban in

1994 and sheltered Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda

network in the years preceding 11 September 2001. Since

Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban from

power, Mullah Omar has remained at large and in hiding.
FROM THE SEA

8

corruption, and a devastating drought, the Pashtun

would begin to demonstrate growing resentment

against the Taliban.47

In addition to an ever-expanding opium trade,

Saudi and Pakistani support networks established

during the Soviet-Afghan War also sustained the

Taliban’s meteoric rise. While the Saudis continued

to promote the spread of Wahhabism (a

conservative Islamic reform movement)

throughout the Sunni Muslim world, Pakistan’s

strategic motives were more complex and

frequently exercised through both the ISI and

Assembly of Islamic Clergy. One goal was to

establish a direct land route for trade to the Central

Asian republics, while another was to promote a

domestically focused regime that would

simultaneously curb Pashtun nationalism in the

North-West Frontier Province and provide an

outlet for Pakistan’s own Islamic radicals.48

The United States also supported the Taliban

from 1994 to 1997, working indirectly through its

political allies in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In

addition to viewing the Taliban as an anti-Iranian,

anti-Shia, and pro-Western influence, America was

also interested in facilitating the development of a

pipeline linking the Caspian oil fields to Pakistan

and India without going through Iran. Regional

opposition to the Taliban primarily came from the

Central Asian republics and Soviet Union, reflecting

prior Cold War ties.49

In his book on the Taliban, Pakistani journalist

Ahmed Rashid sums up the regime’s radical

philosophy: “The Taliban are vehemently opposed

to modernism and have no desire to understand or

adopt modern ideas of progress or economic

development,” and their “new style of Islamic

extremism...rejects all accommodation with

Muslim moderation and the West.”50 From the

beginning, they banned entertainment and deemed

most forms of electronic mass media a source of

corruption. As the principal focus of Taliban

reform, women could not participate in normal

society. The religious fundamentalists ejected them

from the workplace, schools, and markets; required

them to wear burqas (an enveloping outer garment

designed to cloak the body) while moving about

the community; forced them to live behind

blackened windows within the home; and even

obliged them to choose their children’s names

from a sanctioned list.51

Likewise, the Taliban prohibited men from

wearing Western-style clothing, sporting stylish

haircuts, or trimming their beards. Violations of the

dress codes were punishable by jail sentences and

flogging, while amputation and public execution

were the penalties for more serious criminal

offenses, such as theft, adultery, rape, and murder.

When Western agencies began to question the

tyrannical regime, the Taliban responded by ordering

the United Nations (UN) to leave in 1997, followed

by nongovernmental organizations in 1998.52

The Taliban drew recruits from refugee camps

along the Pakistani border, where youths educated

in local madrassas had been “taught a strict

interpretation of Islam that required total

acceptance of the Koran and advocated eliminating

the corrupting influence of the West.”53 As Rashid

emphasizes, the Taliban perspective differed

significantly from that of their traditional

mujahideen predecessors:

These boys were from a generation who had

never seen their country at peace—an

Afghanistan not at war with invaders and itself.

They had no memories of their tribes, their

elders, or their neighborhoods.... Their simple

belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had

been drummed into them by the village mullahs

was the only prop they could hold on to and

which gave their lives some meaning.54

The Taliban quickly took control of the

southeastern third of Afghanistan, seizing control

of Spin Boldak in October, Kandahar in November,

and Ghazni in February 1995. Once they

encountered organized resistance to the north and

west, however, their offensive began to stall. Masood

repelled an attempt to take Kabul in March, and
Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

9

Ismail Kahn delivered a serious blow while

counterattacking near Shindand in May. After

receiving reinforcements from Pakistan, however,

the Taliban resumed their push toward the

northwest and captured Herat in September.55

Rabbani’s international standing and ability to

solicit foreign aid rose as the frontlines stabilized and

the future of Kabul appeared more secure. To

counter this development, the Taliban hosted a

massive gathering of southern religious leaders in

Kandahar in the spring of 1996. In a move to

solidify their movement, the leaders proclaimed

Mullah Omar “Commander of the Faithful” and

emir of Afghanistan on 3 April. Boldly appearing in

a relic cloak of the Prophet Mohammed the

following day, he claimed to be the new caliph

(leader of all Muslims) and declared a jihad against

Rabbani’s regime. In a surprise offensive that fall,

the Taliban captured Jalalabad, Bagram, and finally,

Kabul.56

While the fall of Kabul raised apprehensions

among Iran, Russia, and the four Central Asian

republics—each of whom pledged support for the

beleaguered alliance—Pakistan and Saudi Arabia

asked what assistance they might provide the

victorious Taliban. Shaken by the setbacks, Rabbani,

Masood, Dostam, and Abdul Karim Khalili joined

forces in the mutual defense of Afghanistan on 10

October, foreshadowing what would eventually

become the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.

Although Masood counterattacked successfully as

the Taliban forces began to thin, last minute

reinforcements from the Pakistani madrassas halted

his advance as he approached the capital.57

The Taliban resumed their northward push

during the spring of 1997. Aided by the defection

of General Abdul Malik from Dostam’s army, they

succeeded in temporarily capturing Mazar-e Sharif

in May.58 Although seizure of the northern city and

gateway into Uzbekistan convinced Pakistan, Saudi

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to recognize

Associated Press

Jubilant Taliban fighters greet each other in Kabul’s Aryana Square on 27 September 1996. The bodies of former Afghanistan

President Mohammed Najibullah, right, and his brother Shahpur Ahmedzai hang unceremoniously from a traffic post. The

Taliban said that their bodies would remain in place for three days.
FROM THE SEA

10

Taliban sovereignty, that decision proved premature.

Four days later, the city’s residents staged a bloody

revolt that resulted in the death or capture of

hundreds of Taliban, including 10 of their top

leaders.59 Exploiting the unexpected reversal,

Masood and Khalili inflicted heavy losses during a

counterattack that recaptured Bagram and forced

Taliban forces southward. However, as the antiTaliban alliance approached Kabul, Omar requested

additional reinforcements from the Pakistan madrassas and was again able stabilize his frontlines

and go on the offensive.60 Dostam subsequently

repelled yet another Taliban attempt to seize Mazare Sharif that September.61 During the bloody

summer campaigns of 1997, both sides participated

in ethnic cleansing and religious persecution,

effectively dividing the country along geographic

and cultural lines.62

Inspired by their successful defense of the

north, the warlords formed the United Islamic and

National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan

(usually referred to in the West as the Northern

Alliance). Establishing their capital in Mazar-e

Sharif, they reappointed Rabbani president and

made Masood his defense minister. Despite their

optimism, factional infighting stymied the Northern

Alliance’s effectiveness, and the Taliban eventually

succeeded in recapturing Mazar-e Sharif in August

1998. This led to another round of indiscriminate

killing as they took revenge on the city’s Hazara

population, attempted to exterminate the Shia

Muslims, and executed 10 Iranian diplomats.

Ultimately, the long-sought capture of Mazar-e

Sharif proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the Taliban.

The UN Security Council admonished them for

harboring international terrorists, violating human

rights, promoting drug trafficking, and refusing to

accept a cease-fire, while Saudi Arabia ceased

providing financial support. Pakistan, the only

country to oppose the UN’s sanctions, fell into

international isolation.63

In central Afghanistan, the ancient city of

Bamyan fell to the Taliban during October. This

prompted an already angry Iran to mobilize more

than 200,000 troops along its eastern border in an

effort to dissuade the Taliban from additional

indiscriminate killings. The prospect of invasion

temporarily diverted Taliban attention from Masood,

who used the opportunity to reorganize his forces,

refit them with Russian equipment, and launch a

counteroffensive that succeeded in recapturing

much of the lost territory. On 7 December,

following the collapse of the Hazara and Uzbek

factions, Masood was appointed supreme

commander of the Northern Alliance forces.64

Although the two combatants entered into

negotiations during the spring of 1999, each side

prepared for a continuation of hostilities. The

Northern Alliance recaptured Bamyan,

approximately 150 miles northwest of Kabul, in

April, while the Taliban recaptured Bagram to the

northeast in July. Masood then counterattacked

toward Kabul with some success, but as he

approached the capital, the Taliban employed brutal

scorched-earth tactics and once again halted the

alliance advance with reinforcements from the

madrassas.65 The Taliban launched three successive

offensives during the spring and summer of 2000,

and although the Northern Alliance repulsed the

first two attacks, the third succeeded in surrounding

Masood’s headquarters at Taloqan, forcing him to

retreat that September. By early 2001, the Taliban

had reduced the alliance’s area of influence to a tiny

corner of northeastern Afghanistan.66

The International Islamic Front for Jihad

against Jews and Crusaders

American tolerance for the Taliban began to

wane late in 1997 as the totalitarian regime refused

to endorse the pipeline project and their suppression

of the Afghan people drew increasing international

criticism.67 During a November visit to Pakistan,

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright declared,

“We are opposed to the Taliban because of the

opposition to human rights and their despicable

treatment of women and children and great lack of

respect for human dignity.”68 The final straw

occurred on 7 August 1998, when dissidents linked
Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

11

to Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist

network, situated in Afghanistan as guests of the

Taliban, bombed the United States embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania.69

Osama bin Laden*, a tall and lanky Sunni

Muslim, was described as being soft-spoken, mild

mannered, and well kempt, yet also vicious, vain, and

vindictive.70 He was born around 1957, the son of a

wealthy Yemeni businessman with ties to the Saudi

royal family. After attending an elite secondary

school in Jeddah, where teachers with ties to the

Muslim Brotherhood may have influenced him, he

enrolled in King Abdulaziz University.71 According

to conflicting accounts, he may have earned a

bachelor’s degree in civil engineering, a master’s

degree in public administration, and studied Islamic

law as a graduate student.72

In 1980, bin Laden joined the mujahideen with

his family’s consent. During the Soviet-Afghan War,

he worked for Abdullah Azam, a Jordanian

Palestinian and former professor from King

Abdulaziz University, who coordinated the World

Muslim League and Muslim Brotherhood offices in

Peshawar, Pakistan.73 They established the Maktab

al-Khidamat (Office of Order) in 1984 to channel

money, weapons, and fighters into Afghanistan. By

1988, however, bin Laden had broken with the

organization, arguing that Arab volunteers should

take an even more prominent role by leading their

own combat operations against the Communists.74

Following Azam’s assassination in 1989, bin Laden

assumed control of the Maktab al-Khidamat and

established al-Qaeda (The Base) as a logistical center

for the Arab-Afghan fighters and their families.75

Influenced by Egyptian extremist Ayman alZawahiri around that time, he gradually transformed

the center into a private mujahideen force for

prosecuting a global jihad.76

Although bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia

in 1990, the government forced him to leave after

he vigorously criticized the royal family for hosting

American troops during and after the Gulf War. He

subsequently joined Sudan’s ongoing Islamic

revolution in 1992 and continued to develop a

following of Arab-Afghan veterans who shared his

ideological frustration with the West.77 As his

movement gained momentum, al-Qaeda affiliates

bombed a hotel used to house transiting military

personnel in Yemen during 1992, trained Somali

militiamen to shoot down helicopters with rocketpropelled grenades in 1993, and conducted two

additional bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and

1996.78 By the mid-1990s, intelligence sources

estimated that bin Laden was training 1,000 militant

Islamic revolutionaries and financing terrorist camps

in Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, and Afghanistan.79

Associated Press

The son of a wealthy Yemeni businessman, Osama bin Laden

was the leader of the international terrorist organization alQaeda. In 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa (religious ruling)

under the banner of the International Islamic Front for Jihad

against Jews and Crusaders stating it was the duty of all

Muslims to kill Americans and their allies. He was the

mastermind behind the attacks on 11 September 2001 that

prompted the United States to launch the Global War on

Terrorism.

*Nearly a decade after the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden was shot and killed by U.S. Navy SEALs and CIA operatives on 2 May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
FROM THE SEA

12

President William J. Clinton signed the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in

April 1996 and pressured Sudanese officials to evict

the al-Qaeda leader from their country in an effort

to deter terrorism and provide justice for the victims

of terrorists.80 A month later, bin Laden arrived in

Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and that August issued his

first fatwa (religious ruling): “A Declaration of War

against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two

Holy Places (Mecca and Medina).” In a lengthy

discourse, he spoke of a global “Zion-Crusader

alliance” against Islam, chastised the House of Saud

for conspiring against the ummah (Muslim nation),

and called for a jihad “to expel the occupying

enemy.” He proclaimed, “There is no more

important duty than pushing the American enemy

out of the holy land” and “the mujahideen, your

brothers and sons, request that you support them in

every possible way by supplying them with the

necessary information, materials, and arms.”81

After meeting Mullah Omar following the fall

of Kabul in 1997, bin Laden moved to Kandahar

and gradually turned a developing friendship into a

firm partnership with the Taliban leaders. In

February 1998, during a meeting of al-Qaeda

affiliates at the original Arab-Afghan training camp

at Khost, bin Laden issued a manifesto under the

banner of the International Islamic Front for Jihad

against Jews and Crusaders that effectively expanded

al-Qaeda’s terror campaign to include liberating the

entire Muslim Middle East and attacking Americans

around the globe.82 The organization’s manifesto

presented three talking points and a second fatwa:

First, for more than seven years the U.S. has

been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest

of places—the Arabian peninsula—plundering

its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its

people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its

bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through

which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.

Second, despite the great devastation inflicted

upon the Iraqi people by the Crusader-Zionist

alliance ... the Americans are once again trying

to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they

are not content with the protracted blockade

imposed after the ferocious war or the

fragmentation and devastation.

Third, if the Americans’ aims behind these wars

are religious and economic, the aim is also to

serve the Jew’s petty state and divert attention

from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder

of Muslims there.

All these crimes and sins committed by the

Americans are a clear declaration of war on

God, his messenger, and Muslims .... On that

basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we

issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The

ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—

civilians and military—is an individual duty for

every Muslim who can do it in any country in

which is possible to.83

A Response from the White House

The August 1998 bombing of American

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania forced the Clinton

administration to confront the reality of a rising

terrorist threat. Two weeks after the attack, the

president retaliated by firing cruise missiles at

terrorist camps in Sudan and northeastern

Afghanistan, proclaiming to the world, “There will

be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our

people, our interests, and our values.”84 He amended

Executive Order 12947 two days later, enabling the

Department of Justice to freeze bin Laden’s assets,

and in November the Department of State posted a

five million dollar reward for his capture.85 During

the following year, the administration directed more

than six billion dollars toward America’s war against

terrorism and doubled the allocation of financial

and labor resources to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation’s (FBI’s) counterterrorism effort. Allied

nations arrested more than 80 Islamic militants in a

dozen countries around the globe, and the CIA

claimed to have thwarted at least seven attacks

planned against government facilities overseas.86

The Clinton administration also pursued several

ineffective diplomatic options. Although Pakistan

maintained close military and intelligence ties with

the United States, it was reluctant to jeopardize the
Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

13

funding and training of Kashmiri militants in

Afghanistan and refused to help arrest bin Laden.

While Saudi Arabia did approach Mullah Omar on

America’s behalf, he refused to extradite bin Laden

and so insulted the Saudi envoy that Saudi Arabia

withdrew its long-standing support of the Taliban

regime.87 State Department officials eventually

communicated directly with Omar, demanding that

he deliver bin Laden into the United States’ hands by

February 1999. In a telling turn of events, although

Omar refused to turn over bin Laden, even declaring

him a guest of the Afghan people, he did offer to

exchange the terrorist for official diplomatic

recognition of the Taliban regime. Whether bin

Laden felt personally threatened or believed the

Taliban considered him a growing liability, the

terrorist leader left Kandahar and went into hiding.

After bin Laden’s reappearance in Jalalabad, President

Clinton froze the Taliban’s financial assets in July.88

The United States solicited support from

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during

September 1999, lifting some of the trade sanctions

it had imposed the previous year to curb Pakistan’s

nuclear arms race with India.89 In return, his

government discretely informed several Persian

Gulf states of its intent to demand bin Laden’s

extradition from Afghanistan and insisted that the

Taliban stop training Pakistani dissidents.90 Just as

the situation appeared to be improving in October,

General Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a military

coup “as a last resort,” pledging to reduce tensions

along the Indian border and “achieve a just and

peaceful solution” to the Afghanistan issue.91 As a

frustrating consequence, the CIA had to abandon

covert plans to train Pakistani commandos to

capture bin Laden in Afghanistan and then turn him

over to legal authorities; an alternate option of

ordering Afghan trackers currently engaged in

following the terrorist leader to eliminate bin Laden

was not pursued either because of the presidential

ban on assassination.92

The situation continued to deteriorate during

2000. In February, CIA Director George J. Tenet

reported that bin Laden was still America’s principal

terrorist threat and he intended further aggression

against the United States.93 In March, President

Clinton urged President Musharraf to restore

democratic rule in Pakistan and reiterated his

opposition to regional terrorism.94 In April and May,

Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering

warned both the Pakistani chief of intelligence and

Mullah Omar not to side with America’s enemies.95

The Taliban, undeterred, attacked north in July and

captured Masood’s Taloqan headquarters in

September. This victory convinced President Islam

Karimov of Uzbekistan to acknowledge Taliban

sovereignty over Afghanistan in October, hoping to

garner influence over the rising Islamic

fundamentalist movement in his own country.96 AlQaeda also captured global headlines that month by

bombing the USS Cole (DDG 67) during a routine

refueling stop in Yemen.

In January 2001, the new year appeared to begin

on a more positive note with the trial of terrorists

accused of bombing the United States embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania. Yet only 4 of 17 indicted

suspects were available for trial. The others,

including bin Laden, remained at large, giving the

eventual May conviction a sense of hollow victory.97

As if to emphasize that point, the terrorist leader

released an al-Qaeda recruitment video during June,

stating, “It’s time to penetrate America and Israel

and hit them where it hurts.”98

A New Administration

After a hard-fought campaign and bitterly

contested election in November 2000, George W.

Bush followed in his father’s footsteps by being

elected the 43d president of the United States.99

Although Bush had fronted national missile defense

and Iraq as major concerns while on the campaign

trail, he was advised during a meeting with President

Clinton in December that his top priorities should

include “al-Qaeda, Middle East diplomacy, North

Korea, the nuclear competition in South Asia, and,

only then, Iraq.”100 A week before Bush’s

inauguration on 20 January 2001, CIA Director

Tenet also voiced his concern about terrorism.
FROM THE SEA

14

While briefing the president-elect, Vice President–

elect Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, and National

Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Director

Tenet and his deputy director for operations listed

the top three threats facing America as Osama bin

Laden, weapons of mass destruction, and Chinese

expansion. They warned that, although there was no

doubt that bin Laden was going to strike the United

States, it remained unclear how, when, or where that

attack might occur.101

In April, the National Security Council deputies’

committee recommended that one way to weaken

al-Qaeda in Afghanistan would be to arm the

Northern Alliance. Although the Clinton administration had previously rejected this option, the CIA was

already providing limited funding to the resistance

movement, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

thought that the impending threat provided

sufficient cause to change the direction of foreign

policy. The deputies’ committee ratcheted up its plan

two months later, recommending that, in addition

to arming the resistance, it support a Northern

Alliance offensive to destabilize the Taliban and

eliminate al-Qaeda. The National Security Council

agreed to fund the covert campaign in early

September, and Rice prepared National Security

Presidential Directive Number 9 for President

Bush’s signature by 10 September.102

During the campaign, President Bush and his

advisors had argued against American involvement

in lengthy peacekeeping operations and nationbuilding ventures like the Clinton administration had

pursued in the Balkans. Instead, they advocated a

leaner, more lethal military that harnessed new

technologies in the form of “advanced reconnaissance systems, command and control networks,

and precision weapons to strip away the fog of war

and strike the enemy with devastating effect.”103

They needed a strong ally at the Pentagon to

implement the plan—one who would challenge the

status quo within the military.

President Bush chose Donald H. Rumsfeld,

then 68 years of age, for his secretary of defense. In

addition to serving as a Navy fighter pilot, legislator,

ambassador, and head of a pharmaceutical company,

he had also been President Gerald R. Ford’s chief

of staff and secretary of defense, and then had led

commissions investigating ballistic missile threats

and space policy during the Reagan and Clinton

administrations.104 Given this range of experience,

Rumsfeld appeared to possess the necessary

qualifications to pursue the president’s strategy of

“bringing U.S. armed forces into the 21st Century,”

which he outlined for Congress on 11 January

during his confirmation hearing:

First, we must strengthen the bond of trust

with the American military.

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: DD-SP-01-04699

George W. Bush, 43d president of the United States. As

commander in chief he initiated the Global War on Terrorism

and launched Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. His

primary objective, in response to terrorist attacks conducted

against America on 11 September 2001, was to remove the

Taliban from power in Afghanistan and destroy al-Qaeda’s

global network.
Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

15

Second, we must develop the capabilities to

defend against missiles, terrorism, and newer

threats against our space assets and information

systems.

Third, we must take advantage of the new

possibilities that the ongoing technological

revolution offers to create the military of the

next century.105

Yet confrontation plagued the transformation

agenda from the very beginning. Rumsfeld

approached the Department of Defense as an

absolute authority, envisioning the Joint Chiefs of

Staff as a rival source of power. Although none

would question that he was an intelligent, energetic,

and supremely confident leader, some employees

might add that he was also an ambitious

micromanager, wary of subordinates, and not much

fun to work with. His tests of will ranged from

challenging the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff ’s right to brief the president to chastising

junior officers over minor typographical errors.106

Rumsfeld argued against the Pentagon’s

tendency to focus on a few traditional Cold War

threats rather than acknowledge the full range of

potential dangers, cautioning that such oversight

could lead to unwelcome surprises.107 Tying this to

transformation, he stated, “While much of the

existing defense establishment can be adapted to

21st-Century needs, a good deal cannot. We must

move forcefully to rationalize the costly burden of

force structures and practices that do not contribute

to current and future U.S. security needs.”108 In other

words, instead of continuing to maintain a force

capable of fighting in two theaters simultaneously,

the nation would now address dual antagonists in

succession, thus negating the need to maintain four

standing Army corps and the requisite transportation

assets to move them around the globe. This strategy

would allow for a subsequent reduction in both

military personnel and equipment and, adding to the

attractiveness of this concept, the resulting savings

could be used to fund the development of advanced

military technologies and address emerging threats.

Photo by Helen C. Stikkel. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 010627-D-2987S-072

Donald H. Rumsfeld opens a briefing on the Bush administration’s amended defense budget at the Pentagon on 27 June 2001. As

secretary of defense, he frequently challenged the status quo at the Pentagon.
FROM THE SEA

16

When the military balked at the changes,

Rumsfeld concluded that his principal battlefield

was the Pentagon, that his biggest obstacle was the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that the U.S. Army

leadership was “too old-fashioned, wedded to heavy

forces, and too slow to change.”109 Army General

Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, countered that Rumsfeld was not only partial

to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps because of his

prior naval service, he was also biased by the Army’s

heavy forces and its earlier involvement in the

Balkans.110 On 10 September, in a most telling

statement, Rumsfeld brought the controversy to the

forefront of public attention during a town meeting

at the Pentagon:

The topic today is an adversary that poses a

threat—a serious threat—to the security of the

United States of America.... From a single

capital, it attempts to impose its demands across

time zones, continents, oceans, and beyond.

With brutal consistency, it stifles free thought

and crushes new ideas. It disrupts the defense

of the United States and places the lives of men

and women in uniform at risk.... You may think

I’m describing one of the last decrepit dictators

of the world. But their day, too, is almost past,

and they cannot match the strength and size of

this adversary. The adversary’s closer to home.

It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy.... I have no

desire to attack the Pentagon; I want to liberate

it. We need to save it from itself.... If there’s to

be a struggle, so be it.111

General Tommy R. Franks, USA, was serving

as commander in chief of United States Central

Command at the time. Headquartered in Tampa,

Florida, he orchestrated one of the nation’s five

geographic joint commands and was responsible for

overseeing military affairs in 25 countries extending

from East Africa to Central Asia. Marine Lieutenant

General Michael P. DeLong, deputy commander of

U.S. Central Command, said of his boss:

Like so many brilliant men, Franks was

paradoxical. He was hard on the staff, but he

loved and respected them. He was a loner, yet

he rarely made a decision alone. He wasn’t

trusting, yet he delegated tremendously. Franks

was one of the few men I couldn’t figure out,

but then, nobody else could either.112

DeLong, who also told of being professionally

threatened, publicly chastised, and verbally affronted

by his senior, observed that members of the Central

Command staff who had previously worked for

“laid-back” Marine General Anthony C. Zinni

seemed “shell-shocked” by Franks’s abrasive

leadership style.

On the same day as Secretary Rumsfeld’s town

meeting at the Pentagon, General Franks met with

General Mahmoud Ahmed, head of the Pakistani

ISI, in Washington, DC. Franks later recalled his

“polite... but bare-knuckled” discussion with the

Photo by GySgt Charles Portman

Gen Tommy R. Franks, USA. As commander in chief of U.S.

Central Command, he was responsible for planning and

directing the Coalition’s initial military operations in both

Afghanistan and Iraq.
Pakistani intelligence officer on 10 September:

“With Secretary Rumsfeld’s blessing, and CIA

Director George Tenet’s encouragement, I had

informed General Mahmoud that cooperation was a

two-way street.” Pakistan needed parts for its

military aircraft and America needed targeting

information on al-Qaeda; Mahmoud “got the

message” and promised to brief President

Musharraf113. Before the National Security Council,

Department of Defense, or Central Command

could implement any of their developing plans,

however, al-Qaeda had already dealt each a serious

blow. Just a day earlier, terrorists masquerading as

journalists had assassinated Ahmad Shah Masood,

the famed “Lion of Panjshir” and one real leader

among the beleaguered Northern Alliance.114

17

Soviet-Afghan War and Beyond

19

Another Day of Infamy

For those living along the eastern

seaboard of the United States, 11

September 2001 began as an

uncommonly pleasant day. As parents headed to

work and children returned to the classroom that

Tuesday following a long summer vacation, each

welcomed the cool temperatures, low humidity, and

clear blue sky. Without warning, a series of

unprecedented terrorist attacks that President Bush

would later characterize as “the Pearl Harbor of the

21st Century” abruptly shattered the morning calm.1

In New York City, a fuel-laden Boeing 767

jetliner flew into one of the World Trade Center’s

famous Twin Towers at 0845. A second aircraft hit

the other tower at 0903, and a third aircraft slammed

into the west side of the Pentagon at 0943. The

passengers of United Airlines Flight 93, who

resisted their hijackers and crashed their aircraft into

a field near rural Somerset, Pennsylvania, around

1010, narrowly averted a final attack likely intended

for either the U.S. Capitol building or the White

House. By this time, back in New York, one of the

Twin Towers had dramatically collapsed at 1005,

followed by disintegration of the second at 1028.2

Alarmed by the possibility of further attacks, the

Department of Defense (DoD) raised the alert

status of all deployed military forces, the Federal

Aviation Administration closed U.S. airspace, and

President Bush granted permission to shoot down

commercial airliners.3 That evening, a third structure

of the World Trade Center complex collapsed from

ancillary damage at 1720. In the wake of three

devastating attacks and one air crash, approximately

3,000 people from 80 nations lay dead.4

In the immediate aftermath of the first attacks,

a shocked nation struggled to grasp the magnitude

of the events it watched on television. Citizens

across the country remained glued to cable news

networks for continued on-scene coverage, breaking

updates, and anticipated responses from their

government. Following the first two attacks, at 0930

President Bush spoke to the nation from an

elementary school in Florida. Echoing his father’s

famous statement preceding the Gulf War, he

proclaimed, “Terrorism against our nation will not

stand.”5 He amplified these remarks when speaking

from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana at 1230:

Chapter 1

The Global War on Terrorism

Photo by Jeff Christensen, courtesy of Reuters

A jagged hole indicates the point of impact where a plane

crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in

New York City on 11 September 2001. Three hijacked planes

crashed into major U.S. landmarks that day, destroying both

of New York’s Twin Towers and plunging the Pentagon in

Washington, DC, into flames.
I want to reassure the American people that the

full resources of the federal government are

working to assist local authorities to save lives

and help the victims of these attacks. Make no

mistake: The United States will hunt down and

punish those responsible for these cowardly

attacks.... We have taken all appropriate

security precautions to protect the American

people. Our military at home and around the

world is on high alert status, and we have taken

the necessary security precautions to continue

the functions of your government.6

At 1530 that afternoon, during a National

Security Council meeting at Offutt Air Force Base

in Nebraska, President Bush learned that Osama bin

Laden and al-Qaeda were almost certainly

responsible for the attacks. Director Tenet explained

that it was the only terrorist organization with the

ability to orchestrate such a large undertaking, that

officials had identified several of its operatives’

names on the airliners’ passenger manifests, and that

postattack communications chatter included the

exchange of congratulatory messages among

terrorists.7 Arriving back in Washington, DC, early

that evening, the president returned to the airwaves

for a third time that day. In what historians would

later call the “Bush Doctrine,” he not only

reaffirmed his promise to go after the perpetrators

of the surprise attacks, but announced his intent to

target those who supported the terrorists as well.8

The president chaired a second meeting of the

National Security Council following his speech, first

as a comprehensive gathering and then with only his

principal advisors. He set the tone of the smaller

group by stating that it was a great opportunity to

advance foreign policy. Tenet identified the need to

deny al-Qaeda sanctuary, Powell stated that it was

time for Afghanistan and Pakistan to take notice, and

Rumsfeld added that the problem included other

20

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Eric Draper, courtesy of Time magazine

President Bush speaks with key members of his National Security Council in the Oval Office during October 2001. From left to

right are George J. Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Vice President Richard B. “Dick” Cheney; Condoleezza Rice,

national security advisor; and President Bush.
countries that also supported terrorism. After

listening to the remaining comments, Bush decided

that he would force the offending countries to

choose sides and then pick off any resulting

adversaries one at a time.9

This type of exchange quickly became the

pattern for prosecuting the war on terror. As senior

advisor, Vice President Cheney would often ask the

hard questions or focus the discussion, while Rice

would chair the smaller meetings with the principals.

President Bush, who acknowledged that he was not

a “military tactician” and preferred to follow “gut”

feelings rather than “textbook” solutions, would

listen to the advice of his war council and then

render guidance.10 Douglas J. Feith, the undersecretary of defense for policy, later described the

dynamics among these key players in his memoir,

War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn

of the War on Terrorism:

President Bush often connected with

Rumsfeld—or bumped up against him—on the

level of ideas and strategy; the same was true

of Cheney and often of Rice. Disagreements

among the four of them, which were rarely

fundamental, had the effect of polishing or

refining their colliding ideas, as debates among

generally like-minded people often do. But

there was a ships-passing-in-the-dark quality to

disagreements between Powell and the

others—not just because they differed about

philosophy or policy, but because Powell chose

to confine his contributions to operational and

tactical thoughts.11

As Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold,

director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

later described, the environment at the Pentagon was

extremely tense—they truly thought another attack

might be imminent.12 United States military

commands around the globe reflected this unease by

instituting heightened force protection measures and

assessing the status of forces in each geographic

region.13 Lieutenant General DeLong had been

chairing the weekly staff meeting at U.S. Central

Command when the first plane hit the World Trade

Center. After the second attack, when it became

apparent that the crashes were not accidental, he

immediately raised security levels throughout the

Middle East and Central Asian theaters of operation,

stood up the headquarters’ crisis reaction team, and

told his assistant to contact General Franks in Crete.14

General Franks concurred with General

DeLong’s decisions, adding that they needed to

make contact with the Joint Staff ’s crisis action team.

Later in the day, during a conference call with his

deputy commander and the director for operations,

Air Force Lieutenant General Victor E. Renuart Jr.,

Franks charted a rudimentary course of action.

According to staff calculations, they would be able

to amass 80 Tomahawk land attack missiles in the

Arabian Sea within 24 hours and up to 200 in 48

hours.15 As Franks recalls, strike locations were

determined in the following manner:

Let’s build the target sets based on five

assumptions. . . . First, the attack on America was

delivered by an al-Qaeda operation out of

Afghanistan. Second, the people who planned

and ordered the strike are located in Afghanistan.

Third, there will be a national decision to strike.

Fourth, the reason for our action will be legally

undisputed, which means we will build a

coalition of cooperative nations. And fifth, we

will receive either acquiescence or cooperation

from all the regional leaders to hit Afghanistan.16

On Board the USS Peleliu Amphibious

Ready Group

General Franks also contacted Vice Admiral

Charles W. Moore Jr., commander of the Fifth Fleet

and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. He

ordered that all ships put to sea and cancel future

port visits to avoid the possibility of another

incident like the bombing of the USS Cole.

17 At the

time of the attack, the USS Peleliu (LHA 5)

Amphibious Ready Group (Peleliu ARG),

composed of approximately 5,000 Marines and

sailors, was in Darwin, Australia, for a port call en

route to the theater. Amphibious Squadron 1,

commanded by Captain William E. Jezierski, USN,

21

The Global War on Terrorism
provided the Navy component, and the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU), commanded by

Colonel Thomas D. Waldhauser, provided the

Marine component.

Prior to deploying, the 15th MEU had become

special operations qualified, undergoing six months

of intensive training oriented toward developing

both conventional and enhanced mission

capabilities. The more specialized skill sets focused

on close quarters battle, demolitions, reconnaissance

and surveillance, maritime interdiction, direct action,

gas and oil platform operations, tactical recovery of

aircraft and personnel, hostage recovery, and

clandestine operations.18

The Peleliu ARG had initially set sail as part of

the Seventh Fleet (Task Force 76) on 13 August,

transiting Hawaii on its way to Australia, where it

conducted routine field training from 7 to 11

September. The Marines learned of the terrorist

attacks around 2100 on their first night of liberty in

Darwin.19 Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Matter, the

commanding officer of MEU Service Support

Group 15, recalled that he had just walked into an

empty wardroom to fetch a glass of water when he

saw an airplane crash into a building on the

television:

At first, I thought it was some kind of a

mockup and then I realized that there was a

terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. I

immediately came over to the [executive

officer’s] room and I banged on his door. I said,

“You got to see this terrorist attack on the

World Trade Center.” We raced in there to look

at the TV and about that time here comes the

second... airplane slamming into the building.20

First Sergeant O’Neil O. Weilbacher of

Company B, Battalion Landing Team 1/1, was

calling his wife from the mainstay of the USS

Dubuque (LPD 8) when he learned of the attacks:

22

FROM THE SEA

Photo by PO G. Leech, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: DN-ST-84-06777

The helicopter assault ship USS Peleliu (LHA 5) underway in the Pacific Ocean. Commanded by Capt William E. Jezierski, USN, the

Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group transferred from the Seventh Fleet to the Fifth Fleet during the opening month of Operation

Enduring Freedom to support noncombatant evacuation operations, joint special operations forces, and Coalition air attacks in

Afghanistan.
The AT&T rep was, “Hey, look on the TV.

Look at that airplane, it went in the building.” I

looked up there, I see the smoke coming out of

the World Trade Center, and I was thinking,

“Oh, maybe it’s just an accident.” Everybody

was thinking it was an accident.... And as we’re

looking at it, that’s when the second airplane

came in.21

Shortly afterward, he remembered, news

coverage shifted to the attack on the Pentagon, and

the Marines began to recall their liberty parties.

Lieutenant Colonel Gregg P. Olson, 15th MEU’s

operations officer, elaborated on the command

element’s perspective:

My other recollection of that evening was the

uncertainty of what was going to happen next.

Was this an “around the world simultaneous

attack,” so that when the sun comes up the next

planes are going to come crashing out of the

sky? There was some anxiety over how

vulnerable we three warships in port might be.

Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed. We realized

that... those ships... were not exactly a target

of the magnitude that the people who dropped

the World Trade Center were looking for. While

we might have been a USS Cole-like target, in

the aftermath of 11 September, we were just

another group of Americans somewhere away

from home.22

Defining Military Options

During the president’s daily brief on the

morning of 12 September, Director Tenet

confirmed al-Qaeda’s involvement in the terrorist

attacks and then described his agency’s connections

in Afghanistan. He explained that it was funding the

Northern Alliance, possessed contacts with tribal

leaders in southern Afghanistan, and had been

running paramilitary teams in and out of the country

for years. During successive meetings later that day,

the National Security Council principals reaffirmed

the previous night’s discussion.

Vice President Cheney and Secretary Powell

agreed that, while al-Qaeda would serve as the initial

target and facilitate the formation of a multinational

alliance, a broader objective would be to highlight

state sponsors of terrorism and force them to

choose sides on a case-by-case basis.23 Although

Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized the need for the

DoD, rather than the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), to lead the military response, when President

Bush later asked what the military could contribute

to the developing campaign, he responded, “Very

little, effectively.”24

That afternoon, after returning to Central

Command headquarters following the National

23

The Global War on Terrorism

Diagram 1: USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group
Security Council meeting, General Franks spoke by

telephone with Secretary Rumsfeld and General

Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This

may have been the instance when Rumsfeld pointedly

informed Franks that he did not have months to draw

up plans and stage forces for a major military assault

in Afghanistan—that Franks should think in terms of

days and weeks, and that Rumsfeld wanted something

creative between “launching cruise missiles and an allout military operation.”25 When Shelton asked for a

full range of options for Afghanistan, Franks

responded that he would have a draft of conceptual

options ready the following day and a complete

course of action within a week to 10 days.26 But when

Rumsfeld pressed Franks for the criteria he would use

to select targets, the combatant commander asked the

secretary to trust him and let him run the war.27

Franks said, when reflecting on the exchange, that was

when he realized he would have to differentiate the

art (tactics) and science (logistics) of war for both

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld.28

General Franks assembled his senior staff after

the phone call and stated, “President Bush has

ordered the secretary to prepare a robust response

to yesterday’s attacks.” He said that the question was

“how and when,” adding that he had told General

Shelton it was “better to do nothing if we don’t

intend to respond forcefully.” As the discussion

continued into the early morning, he commented,

“No doubt about it guys—[Afghanistan] is definitely

landlocked. We can’t make use of the Marines’

amphibious capabilities. Whatever the final shape of

the operation, it’ll depend on airlift.”29 In reaching

this conclusion, General Franks may have been

acknowledging that that the doctrinal capability of

Marine expeditionary units limited amphibious

operations to within 200 miles of the Pakistani coast.

On 13 September, during the morning National

Security Council meeting, Director Tenet and his

counterterrorism chief elaborated on the CIA’s

developing plan for Afghanistan. They proposed

synthesizing intelligence, technology, CIA

paramilitary teams, and indigenous forces into a

covert action to defeat the Taliban, potentially

augmented by special operations forces. During the

afternoon meeting, President Bush announced his

24

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Eric Draper, White House photographer

President Bush outlines the new course for his administration while meeting with the National Security Council in the Cabinet

Room on 12 September 2001.
intent to approve the agency’s initiative. Except for

conventional cruise missile attacks, General Shelton

had little to offer in the way of complementary

military options. This limitation prompted both

Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush to demand

new tasks, targets, and options from the military.30

Back in Tampa, the Central Command staff

continued to plan. On the morning of 14

September,* General Franks reiterated, “The long

poles of this operation will be access and

sustainment. Any operation we conduct in

Afghanistan will be dependent on airlift . . .

thousands of tons a day.” He noted that rugged

terrain, extreme weather, and humanitarian aid

requirements would impede the task.31 A day earlier,

he had acknowledged that while basing rights at an

old Soviet air base at Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan,

would be crucial, President Islam A. Karimov would

be hesitant to provide access for fear of antagonizing

Islamic fundamentalists in his own country.32

The staff developed ideas and compiled possible

courses of action into four successive options. The

first option was for immediate action, ordering the

U.S. Navy to launch a massive Tomahawk missile

attack against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in

Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea. The second

option was to follow the missile attack with a 3- to

10-day air war, using the U.S. Air Force’s strategic

bombers to eliminate enemy camps and bases. The

third, which would become known as “boots on the

ground,” was to follow the missile and bombing

attacks with special operations forces from the Army,

Navy, Air Force, and CIA. These small, but lethal,

detachments would direct close air support in

conjunction with the Northern Alliance’s campaign

against the Taliban.33 If the Alliance proved incapable

of remedying the situation with the special forces’

assistance, a final option was “to run the first three

simultaneously, as the lead-in for the deployment of

conventional American ground combat forces.” In

this case, conventional forces meant “battalions and

brigades of American soldiers and Marines.”34 In his

account, General Delong indicates that Central

Command forwarded only the first three options to

the DoD, apparently choosing not to suggest the

possibility of deploying conventional ground forces.35

President Bush assembled his war cabinet at Camp

David, Maryland, on 15 September to review and

evaluate developing plans. Director Tenet presented a

multidimensional plan of global proportions: in

addition to creating a northern front, the CIA could

also solicit support from a dozen tribal leaders in

southern Afghanistan who opposed both the Taliban

and Northern Alliance. He also proposed attacking

the terrorists’ financial resources and tracking down

terrorist sympathizers in the United States, requested

“exceptional authorities” to conduct covert

operations and to detain al-Qaeda operatives, and

presented a “Worldwide Attack Matrix” listing 80

proposed or ongoing operations. President Bush

responded enthusiastically to the plan.36

When General Shelton’s turn came to speak, he

presented the first three options developed by the

Central Command planners, “noting that it would

take a minimum of 10 to 12 days just to get the

initial forces on the ground because bases and

overflight rights would be needed in the region for

search and rescue teams to bring out any downed

pilots.”37 President Bush later admitted that he found

Shelton’s suggestions unimaginative, and Secretary

Rumsfeld agreed that the military options were

outdated. He argued for unconventional

approaches—especially those employing special

operations forces—to gather intelligence on the

ground. He stated, “Get a group functioning fast.

Lift out of the conventional mind-set.”38

When President Bush asked his advisors to list

potential risks, they identified two worst-case

scenarios. Vice President Cheney pointed out that

escalating chaos in Afghanistan could convince

25

The Global War on Terrorism

*The chronology is muddled at this point, with Gen Franks indicating that it was either the morning of the 13th or 14th of September. The potential for a

missing day raises the question of whether Central Command was actually told to begin planning on the 12th or 13th and raises the possibility that the

option of an interim missile attack may have been forwarded to Gen Shelton on the 13th. (Shelton’s comments during the afternoon National Security

Council meeting)
extremists in Pakistan to challenge Musharraf ’s

government, which could provide Islamic

fundamentalists with access to nuclear weapons. Dr.

Rice warned that the United States could become

mired in Afghanistan like the British in the 19th

century and the Soviets in the 20th century. When

the president asked for recommendations, the

consensus was that the United States should

negotiate forcefully with the Taliban, attack alQaeda’s infrastructure, and then go after other state

sponsors of terrorism at a time of their choosing.39

Around this time, Pentagon officials issued a

warning order to the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne

Corps,* alerting it to prepare for a “possible

imminent combat mission.”40

Returning from Camp David the following

afternoon, President Bush told media

representatives that America faced a “new kind of

evil” and characterized the war on terrorism as a

“crusade” that was “going to take awhile.”41 This

was an unfortunate choice of words—not only did

it remind some in the Islamic world of invading

Christian armies a millennium earlier, but also

Osama bin Laden had used the term “crusader” to

demonize non-Muslims.42

President Bush reconvened the National

Security Council on the morning of 17 September,

stating, “The purpose of this meeting is to assign

tasks for the first wave of the war against

terrorism—it starts today.”43 He approved all of

Director Tenet’s previous proposals and said that he

wanted the CIA to be first on the ground. He also

directed Secretary Powell to send an ultimatum to

the Taliban, demanding that they turn over Osama

bin Laden or suffer the consequences. The

consequences would be “missiles, bombers, and

boots on the ground.”44 He continued, “Let’s hit

them hard. We want to signal this is a change from

the past. We want to cause other countries like Syria

and Iran to change their views. We want to hit as

soon as possible.”45

General Shelton responded that it would take

up to a week to establish the airlift to the

Afghanistan border and even longer to infiltrate the

special forces. To this, Secretary Rumsfeld retorted,

“This is chess, not checkers. We must be thinking

beyond the first move.”46 On the same day, the Joint

Staff issued its planning order for Operation Infinite

Justice, which was a play on retaliatory bombings

conducted against Osama bin Laden in 1998 as part

of Operation Infinite Reach.47 This, too, proved to

be an unfortunate choice of words, as some Islamic

leaders quickly pointed out that only Allah could

deliver infinite justice. Therefore, on 25 September,

Secretary Rumsfeld publicly changed the name to

Operation Enduring Freedom.48

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central

Command

During the 1990s, Central Command existed as

an “economy of force theater” that was primarily

tasked with enforcing operational restrictions levied

on Iraq following the Gulf War. Despite the presence

of several high-profile figures, before 11 September

2001, the Marine Corps maintained only a limited

force at Central Command headquarters in Tampa,

Florida, and its operational involvement in the

command’s area of responsibility was episodic.49 The

Marine component was one of three subsidiary

organizations that fell under U.S. Marine Corps

Forces Pacific, headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith

in Hawaii. Lieutenant General Earl B. Hailston, who

had taken charge of the Pacific post on 10 August

2001, had two corps-level units at his disposal.

Lieutenant General Michael W. Hagee commanded I

Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), located at

Camp Pendleton, California, and Lieutenant General

Wallace C. Gregson commanded III Marine

Expeditionary Force, located in Okinawa, Japan.

The small Marine headquarters at Tampa was

“housed in a tan building that looked something like

a double-wide trailer on cinder blocks. It stood almost

literally in the shadow of the imposing, and very

26

FROM THE SEA

*Headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps was composed of the 82d and 101st Airborne, 3d Infantry, and

10th Mountain Divisions.
permanent-looking, CentCom headquarters.”50 In lieu

of a general officer, the organization was initially run

by Colonel John A. Tempone, who served as the

chief of staff. If a situation arose that needed a

general officer’s attention, that role could be

temporarily filled by the senior Marine assigned to

Central Command, or a more permanent fill could be

sent from Marine Forces Pacific. The Tampa Marines

often worked in conjunction with an equally small

counterpart at Naval Support Activity, Bahrain.

Commanded by Colonel John B. Kiser, the U.S.

Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MarCent)

Coordination Element was situated to promote

liaison with the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

(NavCent).51 The underlying rationale for the skeleton

force, which ultimately proved to be a liability, was

that the Marine Corps could always surge if its

presence were required in the Middle East.52

Before the war, Lieutenant General Hailston’s

vision was focused toward the Pacific; therefore,

Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, who had been

the deputy commander since the spring of 2000,

spent much of his time dealing with people and

issues in the Middle East. He participated in exercises

in Kenya and Eritrea, attended meetings in Bahrain,

and helped establish a Marine presence at Camp

Commando in Kuwait. Castellaw later reflected that

neither of his two bosses—both three stars—went

over to the Middle East until after 9/11.53

In the immediate aftermath of the 11

September attacks, General Hailston stood up his

crisis action team, mobilized all of the reserves

assigned to his headquarters, and provided

additional security for a variety of organizations and

installations. Shortly thereafter, he was officially

designated commander of MarCent and divided his

attention among the tasks of providing forces for

antiterrorist operations in the Philippines,

countering conventional threats in North Korea, and

supporting developing contingencies in Central

Command’s theater. In order to best exploit the

additional assets provided by reserve augmentation,

he fashioned two distinct staffs to focus on each of

his geographic regions of responsibility.54

Brigadier General Castellaw was attending the

Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course at Maxwell

Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama, when the

terrorists struck. He returned to Hawaii once the

national airspace reopened on 13 September and

within 24 hours was headed nonstop to Tampa in a

Gulfstream Aerospace C-20 aircraft. After arriving

at MarCent around the 15th, he began to build a

functioning wartime staff and coordinate Marine

operations from eastern Africa to central Asia. The

27

The Global War on Terrorism

Diagram 2: U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command
staff, which grew to include approximately 60

Marines, was primarily composed of mobilized

reserves, a few regulars, and even retired personnel.

One of the retirees was Colonel Peter T. Miller, a

former British Army officer and commanding

officer of the 1st Marines, who became Castellaw’s

operations officer.55

Brigadier General Castellaw described his role

as “the senior Marine at Tampa. I represented

MarCent and the Marine Corps in day-to-day

matters, I went to meetings, I was involved in

planning, I ran the headquarters there.”56 In addition

to attending daily meetings with the Central

Command staff, he also maintained regular communications with I MEF and Marine Forces Pacific.

In his liaison role, Castellaw acknowledged minor

friction with the latter two commands. Lieutenant

General Hailston rightfully envisioned himself as the

senior Marine authority in theater and wanted the

forward Tampa liaison element to work through

Hawaii—a difficult task given their extended

separation in both time and space. At the same time,

General Hagee was “straining at the seams” to

become involved in any large operations occurring

overseas.57

An unofficial line of communications also ran

between Central Command and Headquarters

Marine Corps. General Franks reportedly wanted a

Marine general officer on duty in his command

center at all times, so Lieutenant General Emil R.

Bedard, then serving as deputy commandant for

plans, policy, and operations, first chose Brigadier

General Jerry C. McAbee and then Brigadier

General Emerson N. Gardner as “the night

watchman.”58 General Castellaw described that they

had to report to General Bedard every morning

about what was going on, and if he was not getting

the updates he wanted from MarCent, he received

direct feeds from the floor of the command center

in Tampa.59 General Bedard also pursued Marine

interests through his counterpart at the Pentagon,

Lieutenant General Newbold, who served as the

director for operations for the Joint Staff.60 Closing

the complicated information loop, Newbold

provided directions to and coordinated operations

with Major General Renuart, the director for

operations at Central Command.

East Timor

Responding to guidance received from higher

headquarters after the terrorist attacks, the Peleliu

ARG headed for open waters with due haste.

Seventh Fleet had intended to transfer tactical

control of the group to U.S. Support Group, East

Timor, as the ships approached Dili so the Marines

and sailors could provide humanitarian assistance to

the tiny island nation.61 Yet in the immediate

aftermath of 11 September, even routine humanitarian operations were subject to intense scrutiny

from a force protection perspective.

After assessing the risk associated with

operating in a developing country adjacent to the

Republic of Indonesia, which possessed the largest

Muslim-majority population in the world, the

commander of Task Force 76 decided to modify the

original plan but go ahead with the engagement

mission. Initially, the three ships were going to head

toward different parts of the island, maximizing the

scope of humanitarian support provided by the

Marines and sailors. Under the new concept of

operations, however, they would remain in closer

proximity to each other, enabling the ready group to

establish a defensive umbrella that included smallboat security patrols.62

While these restrictions precluded the support

originally planned for Suai, the ready group was still

able to conduct several days of productive

engagement and humanitarian operations in Dili and

Oecussi from 15 to 17 September.63 Colonel

Waldhauser noted in the expeditionary unit’s

command chronology that “the environment in Dili

was hospitable, and the population was very grateful

for our contributions and presence.”64 As if to

emphasize that point, Lieutenant Colonel

Christopher M. Bourne, commanding officer of

Battalion Landing Team 1/1, remarked that

28

FROM THE SEA
on the first night, several hundred people came

to the port facility that served as a base for the

operation. They held a candlelight vigil and sang

songs in solidarity with the United States and

to express their appreciation to the Marines and

sailors for conducting the humanitarian mission

despite the attacks that occurred on September

11. There weren’t many dry eyes on the beach

that night.65

By the end of its stay, the 15th MEU had

provided medical and dental treatment to more than

200 patients and airlifted over 100 tons of rice,

lumber, tractors, plumbing supplies, and construction

materials to remote locations that were inaccessible

by road.66 On 15 September, Colonel Waldhauser and

Captain Jezierski were also invited by the United

Nations transitional administrator to attend the

inauguration ceremony for East Timor’s new

constituent assembly. As Lieutenant Colonel Olson,

15th MEU’s operations officer, later reflected:

We had thumbed our noses at the terrorists and

said, “We’re going to continue doing the same

kinds of things we’ve been doing, and you’re

not going to stop us. You’re not going to cause

us to change our commitments to all of our

allies in nations around the world.”

What was good for the Marines and sailors, after

watching days and days of Cable News Network,

of “this is happening in America,” is that they

could turn to each other and say, “Well, regardless of what’s going on in America, we’ve at least

done something for the people of Timor.”

They’re a country that was emerging from a

United Nations mandate, headed for independence, and its progress in that direction was

uninterrupted by the events of September 11th.67

29

The Global War on Terrorism

Photo by AA Stephanie M. Bergman, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011030-N-9802B-003

Marines talk with children in Dili, East Timor. The Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

participated in many humanitarian and civic assistance projects to help the people of East Timor.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in

Pakistan

Seventh Fleet resumed tactical control of the

Peleliu ARG shortly after the conclusion of its

engagement mission in East Timor. Two days later,

as the Marines and sailors headed toward Singapore

for sustainment training and ship repairs on 19

September, they were ordered to head toward the

Fifth Fleet’s area of operations* and begin planning

for the possible evacuation of American citizens and

third-country nationals from Pakistan.68 Pakistan,

although on speaking terms with the United States,

was governed by a military strongman whose control

over the population appeared tenuous at best.69

Consequently, while the Department of State had

not yet requested military assistance, some thought

it might be prudent to prepare for the possibility of

an Islamic uprising in response to President Bush’s

demand that the Taliban hand over Osama bin

Laden. Assembling its crisis action team the

following day, the 15th MEU started to consider

how best to rescue noncombatants in the event of

an emergency.70

The planning team began to consider the

evacuation of four widely dispersed major population centers. Karachi, located on the southern coast

of Pakistan, contained a U.S. consulate and

approximately 10,000 American citizens. Islamabad,

situated 690 miles inland to the northeast, housed

the U.S. embassy and another 2,500 American

citizens. Two outlying sites—Peshawar, 95 miles

northwest of Islamabad, and Lahore, 130 miles

southeast of Islamabad—each contained a smaller,

but still significant, American presence.71

Although Karachi’s coastal location seemed well

suited to support ship-to-shore operations during an

evacuation operation, personnel at the U.S. embassy

recommended avoiding the city if possible. AntiAmerican sentiment was reportedly strong among

the local population, rumored to serve as a recruiting

source for the Taliban. Peshawar, at the opposite end

of the country, presented its own challenges.

Located near the mouth of the Khyber Pass into

Afghanistan, the city was situated in the heart of the

remote tribal territories, where drug trafficking

prevailed and the Pakistani government had only

marginal control over the population. Fortunately,

the situation in Islamabad was better—the consulate

there was situated in an isolated diplomatic enclave,

located away from the city’s center and international

airport, and could be cordoned off by Pakistani

security forces. Lahore, near the Indian border to the

east, provided the best operational environment.72

The number of flights that would be required to

evacuate the American citizens and the tremendous

distances the pilots would encounter while traveling

between the Pakistani coast and interior cities

30

FROM THE SEA

Associated Press

Pro-Taliban demonstrators hold a picture of Osama bin

Laden and a banner reading “Attention America Mujahideen

Are Coming,” during a rally following Friday prayers in

Karachi, Pakistan, on 28 September 2001.

*While negotiating the Strait of Malacca, the Peleliu ARG actually changed direction three times before finally heading toward the Indian Ocean and North

Arabian Sea. (LtCol Olson intvw, 4)
31

The Global War on Terrorism

compounded the degree of difficulty. To help

mitigate these obstacles, Colonel Waldhauser called

for his Lockheed KC-130 Hercules detachment

from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron

352 (VMGR-352), the “Raiders,” from whom he

requested two extra tankers to facilitate aerial

refueling of the helicopters involved in shuttling

citizens, in addition to the two aircraft normally

allocated to deployed Marine expeditionary units.73

The pilots, aircrews, and maintenance personnel

were more than ready to deploy. Not only had they

worked with the 15th MEU during their

predeployment training, but their officer-in-charge,

Major Brian L. Magnuson, was also a former student

of Colonel Olson’s.74 The four-plane detachment

departed* from Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar,

California, on 23 September.75

The Peleliu ARG stopped briefly in Kuwait on

25 September, transferred to the Fifth Fleet on the

28th, and was stationed off the coast of Pakistan by

the beginning of October. While underway, 15th

MEU’s crisis action team collaborated with NavCent

to develop the evacuation plan, eventually briefing

their concept of operations on 27 September.

Meanwhile, after encountering a minor delay while

waiting for diplomatic clearance at Naval Air Station

Sigonella, Italy, and then negotiating their position

within the increasing flow of forces into the theater,

the first refueler aircraft from VMGR-352 finally

reached Shaikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain around 5

October. Operating from a fighter strip where the

U.S. Air Force was already flying KC-130s, the

Marine crews received a small portion of the apron

from which to base their aircraft.76 As Lieutenant

Colonel Olson summed up the situation, “Now we

had a theme with which we could consider doing an

evacuation of the inland sites.”77

The next step toward making the evacuation

operation a tangible possibility was determining

which airfields in Pakistan were suitable for KC-130

operations. In addition to being long enough to land

the aircraft, the runway also needed to be strong

enough to bear the full weight of a loaded tanker.

Although the 15th MEU had overhead imagery and

U.S. Transportation Command classifications for

most of the airfields, it had to verify the capability

of potential sites by putting a senior Marine aviator

on the ground for a visual inspection or at least

ensuring that Pakistani forces had recently sustained

similar operations at the airfield. The expeditionary

unit’s forward command element, which had gone

ashore on 30 September, facilitated the ability to

arrange for the survey visits. Working through the

American embassy and Central Command’s liaison

cell in Islamabad, 15th MEU’s executive officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin P. Spillers, and nuclear,

biological, and chemical defense officer, Chief

Warrant Officer 2 Alexis M. Robinson, articulated

the unit’s operational concerns to the Pakistani

government, negotiating for overflight permissions

and landing rights.78

As events continued to unfold, the nature of

the Peleliu ARG’s mission began to change. On one

hand, President Musharraf had stabilized an

uncertain situation through the combined

application of sound leadership and internal security

measures, and it gradually became apparent that the

evacuation of American citizens from Pakistan was

unnecessary. The ready group’s initial three-pronged

evacuation of the northern cities was eventually

pared back to Islamabad, and ultimately canceled.

On the other hand, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in

Afghanistan had emerged as the first target in the

war on terrorism, and it was clear that Pakistani

assistance would be required to prosecute that

campaign. Airfields originally surveyed as evacuation

sites in places such as Shamsi and Dalbandin,

Pakistan, now became potential locations for

forward operating and logistical support bases for

the gathering Coalition special operations forces.

This, in turn, influenced the future employment of

the 15th MEU.79

*During oral history interviews with the squadron pilots, Maj Wayne M. Bunker and Capt K. Schmidt indicated that the detachment had departed on the

26th and 27th of September.

33

Developing a Concept of Operations

The relentless pace continued at Central

Command headquarters; while his staff

planned around the clock, General

Franks discussed their progress with senior officials

at the Department of Defense several times each

day.1 The first two months of the war, which the

staff referred to as the “dark days” of the operation,

were particularly difficult.2 Secure working space was

in short supply, the functional sections were

undermanned, staff augmentation was almost

transient, and the few available planners—unable to

go home for weeks at a time—took to sleeping in

shifts at the “McDill Inn.” At the same time, the

staff also had to incorporate an influx of foreign

liaison officers and assemble a “Coalition village”

out of trailers in the Central Command parking lot.

Fortunately, the situation began to sort itself out

around mid-November, as the execution phase

neared culmination and the augmentees transitioned

to longer rotations.

One obstacle, communicated upward by both

Central Command and the Joint Staff from the

beginning of the crisis, was that there was no stock

contingency “plan for conventional ground

operations in Afghanistan. Nor had diplomatic

arrangements for basing, staging, overflight, and

access been made with Afghanistan’s neighbors.”3

Regarding specific actions against al-Qaeda and

Taliban forces in Afghanistan, the closest alternative

was a series of proposed target sets and covert

operations that had been formulated following the

bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa

during 1998.4 Ranging from selective air attacks to

ground actions involving up to 2,000 U.S. Army

Rangers, the operations targeted bunker and cave

complexes, major airports, government buildings,

and Taliban residences in eastern Afghanistan.5

Although this provided a foundation for operational

planning, planners also realized that suitable airfields,

roads, communications systems, and power and

water sources were all in short supply.6

Planners were at least able to work from

Operations Plan 1003-98 when it came to the

assembly of a military force to operate in Central

Command’s area of responsibility. General Franks

and his predecessor, Marine General Anthony Zinni,

had developed the plan three years earlier as a

blueprint for fighting a protracted war with Iraq.

Although elements of the logistical framework were

relevant to operations in Afghanistan, the concept

was oriented toward gradually building up an

overwhelming force in the Middle East, invading

Iraq with 380,000 troops, and then occupying the

country for up to a decade.7 This was obviously not

what President Bush and the National Security

Council had in mind for Afghanistan; several

months later, for example, Secretary Rumsfeld

characterized the model as “the product of old

thinking and the embodiment of everything that was

wrong with the military.”8

Army Colonel Michael D. Fitzgerald, who

served as chief of plans in the Future Operations

Section at the time, described the ad hoc and

tentative nature of the initial planning process at

Central Command: “You start it in the traditional

way—what do you know, how do you go about

[accomplishing the assigned task], what are the

courses of action?”9 Although initial ideas tended to

follow conventional lines of reasoning, the staff

quickly departed its comfort zone and broadened

the scope of inquiry to explore the full range of

options. At the conventional end of the continuum

was the notion of sending in a large ground force,

establishing a forward position, and then expanding

to accomplish the desired objectives. At the

Chapter 2

Operation Enduring Freedom
unconventional end was the notion of letting “the

Afghans do the fighting; look[ing] to align ourselves

with people who will support our objectives and

then provid[ing] those things that we can provide

that they can’t, like precision fires and logistics.”10

Colonel Fitzgerald noted that although the

planning sessions involved “a lot of discussion

about the Russian experience in Afghanistan,”

logistics ultimately proved to be the determining

factor in choosing the unconventional option:

The logistics and strategic movement alone, of

driving a conventional force into there, with no

sea [lines of communication], access only by air

over Pakistan or Turkmenistan, really proved to

be a huge logistical challenge. As you start

looking at this . . . the only thing you can do is

go the path . . . that we did, which is embedding

the [special operating forces] with the Northern

Alliance, trying to undercut the Taliban, at least

initially, and then over time expanding your

presence in country and parallel building this

partner security force.11

As early as 12 September, only a day following

the terrorist attacks, General Franks had already

decided that the landlocked nation was untenable for

Marine amphibious forces and that ground

operations would require U.S. Army combat power

supported by U.S. Air Force logistics.12 He shared

this opinion with his staff several days later during

an initial planning session in Tampa, proclaiming

that the Marine Corps was more suited to small-scale

contingency operations than the large-scale ground

offensive they were facing in Afghanistan.13 When

General John Castellaw challenged that perspective,

advocating for a more active role in the impending

operation, he was forcefully rebuked by the

combatant commander, although Franks acknowledged that the Marines may possess additional

capabilities and consented to discuss the issue later.14

His decision may have had less to do with Service

parochialism than a limited appreciation for changes

in naval doctrine following the end of the Cold War.

As his Marine deputy remarked, “Franks was one of

the most joint-oriented commanders I have ever

met; he never once favored his Army background.”15

Colonel Fitzgerald, who confirmed that “the

Marines were not an element that we considered in

the initial development of [Operation Enduring

Freedom],” described the planners’ perspective of

Marine Corps capabilities at Central Command

during September 2001:

There was a push to get them recocked and

reloaded as the global 911 force and... there

was some additional concern about their ability

to sustain themselves that far inland for a longer

period of time.... We viewed the Marines as an

initial force that would go in and react and

respond, and that over time the Army would

come in and be the one that would sustain an

effort and allow the Marines to come back,

recock, go afloat, do the missions that they were

initially chartered to do. So, when you look at

that, we said, “Since... we don’t have basing or

access anyway, and it’s going to have to be

introduced by air, then let’s just introduce the

Army.”... So, quickly we went away from—at

least initially—consideration of the Marines as

that conventional force.16

The U.S. Army Special Forces Command, a

robust and varied command with a long history of

unconventional warfare operations, was more

successful in arguing its case for becoming the point

of main effort in Afghanistan. It presented its

successful bid for more than a support role during a

special briefing that occurred sometime after the

ultimatum to turn over Osama bin Laden had been

delivered to the Taliban on 17 September but before

the end of the month.17 As a result, the Army Green

Berets would be the ones to bear the brunt of the

war in Afghanistan.

Within several days after the 11 September

attacks, General Franks and his planners combined

each of the previously identified military options into

a four-phase concept of operations plan (ConPlan),*

34

FROM THE SEA

*A concept of operations plan (ConPlan) is an abbreviated operations plan that contains the combatant commander’s strategic concept and those annexes and

appendixes necessary to complete planning. With expansion or alteration, it could become an operations plan or operations order.
35

Operation Enduring Freedom

The Evolution of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare

With publication of From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century in 1992, the

Navy and Marine Corps shifted their operational focus from countering the Soviet global maritime

threat to projecting power across the sea and maneuvering to influence events occurring in the littoral

regions of the world.18 Forward . . . From the Sea restated tenets of the new approach two years later,

and, in succeeding years, a series of interrelated concept papers—Operational Maneuver From the

Sea: A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore (1996), The MAGTF in Sustained Operations

Ashore (1996), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (1997),

and Sea-Based Logistics (1998)—refined the

operational mechanics of the evolving strategy.19

Marine Corps Strategy 21 (2000), “the capstone

strategy” describing the Marine Corps’ “axis of

advance into the 21st Century,” and then

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (2001), the

“capstone concept” guiding “how the Marine

Corps will organize, deploy, and employ its forces”

later articulated these combined concepts.20

From an intellectual perspective, expeditionary

maneuver warfare encouraged Marines to

“outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight enemies by

embracing the chaotic nature of warfare.”21 From

an operational perspective, the Marines were to

accomplish this by exploiting the Navy’s seaborne

maneuverability to access trouble spots around

the globe, establishing offshore operating and

logistical bases, and then rapidly deploying selfsustaining assault forces directly from ship to

inland objectives as part of a joint force.22 From

an organizational perspective, the new approach

was supported by variably sized Marine airground task forces (MAGTFs), generically

composed of command, aviation combat, ground

combat, and combat service support elements

that could be appropriately tailored to address the

full range of potential crises around the globe.23

Three Marine expeditionary forces, each commanded by a lieutenant general, served as the Corps’

primary standing task forces and provided the principal warfighting organization for large-scale

conflicts in major theaters of war.24 Based in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton,

California; and Okinawa, Japan, these corps-level organizations were composed of an infantry

division, aircraft wing, and force service support group, and manned by approximately 50,000

Marines and sailors.25 Designed to deploy in echelon, the lead element, designated the Marine

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Diagram 3: The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF):

scalable, versatile expeditionary forces able to respond

to a broad spectrum of crises and conflict situations in

a timely fashion.
36

FROM THE SEA

expeditionary force (forward), was capable of reaching the theater within 30–45 days and then

conducting simultaneous amphibious operations along the coast or self-sustained operations ashore

for up to 60 days duration.26

At the next lower level, three Marine expeditionary brigades were derived from each of the standing

Marine expeditionary forces, for which they could serve as a forward echelon. Although post–Cold

War structural realignments had relegated them to a conceptual status in 1994, General James L.

Jones elevated them from a cadred capability in 2000 by embedding brigade command elements

within each of the expeditionary forces.27 Led by a brigadier general, usually the deputy

expeditionary force commander, the brigades were to serve “as the preferred midintensity Marine

air-ground task force . . . and supporting establishment in direct support of forward operations.”28

Notionally organized around an infantry regiment, aircraft group, and brigade service support group,

they could be tailored to “respond to a full range of crises, from forcible entry to humanitarian

assistance.”29 Containing approximately 17,500 personnel, the brigades were capable of reaching a

supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility within 7 to 30 days, penetrating up to

200 nautical miles inland, and then sustaining operations ashore for 30 days duration.30 Yet the

ability to operate 200 nautical miles inland for up to a month hinged on the future availability of

the Bell-Boeing MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, General Dynamics Advanced Amphibious Assault

Vehicle, and the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) class of amphibious landing ships.31

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Locations of U.S. component commands and the disposition of Marine forces.
adding a collateral effort to provide humanitarian

assistance to Afghan civilians displaced by the

impending conflict. After the operation, Franks

would write, “The campaign hinged on linking

special forces, Northern Alliance units, and air

power.... The plan involved considerable risk. But it

was not a reckless gamble.”34 According to aviation

historian Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Among the

strategies’ many premises and unifying themes, the

most crucial was the abiding importance of avoiding

noncombatant fatalities and collateral damage to

nonmilitary infrastructure to signal both to the

Afghan rank and file and to the Muslim world at

large that the war was against the Taliban and alQaeda, not against Afghanistan or Islam as a

whole.”35 In practice, this would manifest itself in

rules of engagement “that would allow only low

collateral damage. General Franks would have to

[request] permission to strike a target if moderate or

high collateral damage was expected.”36

During phase I of the evolving ConPlan,

Central Command would “set conditions and build

forces to provide the National Command Authority

credible military options.”37 As the Department of

State negotiated basing and staging agreements with

Afghanistan’s neighbors—Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

to the north and Pakistan to the east—Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers would liaise with

the anti-Taliban groups, provide them with

additional funding and equipment, and eventually

coordinate the arrival of U.S. Army Special Forces.

Preparations would also be made for incorporating

Coalition allies into the fight and forestalling the

anticipated humanitarian crisis.38

During phase II, the goal was to “conduct initial

combat operations and continue to set the conditions

for follow-on operations.”39 The air and maritime

component commanders would begin by attacking a

variety of targets with missiles, strategic bombers,

and strike fighters. By eliminating Taliban and alQaeda leaders, command and control facilities, early

warning radar, and air defense systems, they would

create as much confusion as possible. Once the

antiaircraft threat had been reduced, targeting would

become more opportunistic, focusing on enemy

troop concentrations, caves and bunker complexes,

training facilities, and logistical hubs.40 U.S. Army

Special Forces would insert during the second part

37

Operation Enduring Freedom

Seven standing Marine expeditionary units, three of which were continuously deployed to the

Mediterranean Sea or western Pacific and Indian Oceans, represented the smallest of the standard

air-ground task forces. Each commanded by a colonel, they contained approximately 2,200

personnel and were organized around an infantry battalion, aircraft squadron, and service support

group. Normally embarked on one of the Navy’s three-ship amphibious (now expeditionary)

squadrons, they represented the Marine Corps’ contribution to the seaborne amphibious ready

group and served as “the joint force commander’s immediately employable combined arms force

of choice.” Employable within six hours of reaching a specified joint operations area, the special

operations capable expeditionary units could serve as the forward echelon for a brigade-sized force

and were “prepared to fulfill missions ranging from disaster relief to evacuation of noncombatants

from dangerous areas.”32 Although able to “maneuver an infantry battalion from the sea, vertical

and surface assault over the horizon to the objective, 200 nm [nautical miles] within 24 hours,”

these units remained a marginal capability in 2001.33 Whether by design or default, the expeditionary

units’ forward presence, rapid response time, and demonstrated operational effectiveness not only

made them the hallmark of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary warfare capability but may also have

overshadowed the potential possessed by the larger expeditionary brigades and forces.
of the air campaign to direct air operations in

support of indigenous forces and carry out direct

action missions against high-value targets. In practice,

Central Command “would rely heavily on Navy and

Marine Corps carrier-based strike fighters, supported

by Air Force and [British Royal Air Force] tankers,

owing to the limited availability of accessible bases in

the region within easy reach of Afghanistan by landbased fighters.”41 Having diminished al-Qaeda and

the Taliban’s ability to react, Coalition ground forces

would then go on the offensive.42

During phase III, Central Command planned to

“conduct decisive combat operations in Afghanistan,

continue to build coalition, and conduct operations

[area of responsibility]-wide.”43 General Franks

described this mopping up in his memoir:

Once our indigenous allies, augmented by about

200 [special operations forces], had routed the

enemy, we would bring in Coalition troops—

including American soldiers and Marines—to

seek out and eliminate pockets of resistance. I

estimated we would need no more than ten to

twelve thousand American ground troops to

complete this phase.

Secretary Rumsfeld and I agreed that the U.S.

force should remain small. We wanted to avoid

a cumbersome Soviet-style occupation by

armored divisions. It hadn’t worked for the

Soviets, and it wouldn’t work for us. Flexibility

and rapid reaction—airborne and helicopterborne night assault by small, lethal, and

unpredictable units coupled with unprecedented

precision—would be the hallmarks of America’s

first war in the 21st Century.44

During phase IV, Central Command planned to

“establish capability of coalition partners to prevent

the reemergence of terrorism and provide support

for humanitarian assistance efforts.”45 For three to

five years following the initial conflict, the United

States and its Coalition partners would work to

rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan. Ominously, this

38

FROM THE SEA

Photo by PO Mark D. Faram, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 000927-n-6157f-002/dn-sd-03-11954

The Joint Chiefs of Staff testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2000. Seated from left to right are Gen

Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff; Adm Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs; Gen James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Gen Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff. Generals Ryan

and Shelton retired in October 2001.
task involved battling surviving Taliban and alQaeda guerrilla units through a combined

counterinsurgency and civil affairs campaign.46

General Franks headed to Washington, DC,

with his operations officer on 20 September, ready

to present Central Command’s concept plan to

President Bush and the National Security Council.

General Shelton informed him that the Joint Chiefs

had requested the customary prebriefing and asked

that Secretary Rumsfeld attend as well.47 As the

senior representatives of the Services who would

provide the actual forces for operations in

Afghanistan, the chiefs held a dual responsibility to

provide objective feedback on the war plans and to

look out for their organizations’ own best interests.48

The meeting quickly turned confrontational.

The chiefs apparently agreed that the unconventional plan was risky; there were too few ground

troops and insufficient air support on one hand, and

too much confidence placed in the abilities of the

Northern Alliance on the other.49 The remedies,

according to General Franks and his deputy, varied

according to Service advocate. The Air Force wanted

to be the focus of the air campaign, rather than the

Navy, while the Navy wanted additional aircraft

carriers. The Army wanted more ground troops but

noted the difficulty of sustaining them, while the

Marine Corps wanted to attack from the sea.50 After

arguing for some time, one of the chiefs remarked,

“What you’re proposing is completely unprecedented” and “we don’t think it will work.” To which

General Franks responded that it was his plan, that

he was responsible for its execution, and on this note

he exited the room.51

Although General Franks believed Secretary

Rumsfeld had been satisfied with the brief, the

secretary had his own concerns with the plan.

During a meeting with Douglas Feith later that

afternoon, he admitted that Franks’s proposal

39

Operation Enduring Freedom

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Diagram 4: Command relationships between forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom during September and October 2001.
disappointed him. While complimenting Central

Command’s efforts, ingenuity, and boldness and

acknowledging that time, scope, and intelligence

limitations made it difficult to develop an initial

course of action that would meet the president’s

desire for a sustained global effort, he cautioned that

focusing on limited objectives in Afghanistan could

produce mundane results that might actually inspire

confidence among the terrorists. They might achieve

a more spectacular demonstration, he speculated, by

teaming up with the Northern Alliance* in their

battle against the Taliban.52

While the offending critics of Franks’s Pentagon

brief remain anonymous and, according to General

DeLong, the Marine Corps was “basically

supportive,” it is interesting to note that the following

morning General James Jones, Commandant of the

Marine Corps, and Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief

of Naval Operations, met privately with General

Franks.53 They assured him of their support and

explained that the previous day’s comments were

meant to be constructive. He replied that he wanted

advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than

individual Service chiefs and pointed out that each

Service already had its own three-star component

commander to represent its interests at Central

Command. To emphasize his point, he concluded by

stating, “Yesterday in the tank, you guys came across

like a mob... not like the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”54

After the exchange, Franks apparently met with

Secretary Rumsfeld and advised, “We should not

allow narrow-minded four-stars to advance their

share of the budget at the expense of the mission.”55

This was not how General Jones remembered

the meeting. While noting that “Tom Franks’

performances gave us some humorous moments for

which we were grateful,” he said that the

commander’s recollections were “flawed, selfserving, and inaccurate.”56 He explained that Franks

“did not tolerate being questioned by the Joint

Chiefs, whose responsibility... is to critically

examine plans involving the use of the nation’s

combat forces. His complaints of turf battles and

parochialism are both inaccurate and absurd.”57

Jones continued, “Despite the absurdity of

[Franks’s] behavior toward us, the Joint Chiefs never

lost sight of their role of providing military advice

even as he was doing everything possible to

emasculate their influence.”58 At this critical time in

the mission, the Commandant also offered Franks

the use of two Marine expeditionary units to help

in the campaign in Afghanistan, which he reportedly

accepted with expressed appreciation.59 Four days

after the Pentagon briefing, General Jones and

Admiral Clark forwarded a memorandum to

Secretary Rumsfeld describing their ability to

provide “an integrated Navy-Marine Corps Maritime

Strike Force” composed of a carrier battle group

and an amphibious ready group.60

At the White House on the afternoon of 21

September, General Franks briefed President Bush;

Vice President Cheney; Secretary Rumsfeld;

Chairman Shelton; and his deputy, Air Force

General Richard B. Myers. Franks outlined his fourphase concept plan, recommending the

simultaneous execution of air, ground, and

humanitarian operations for maximum effect. He

also suggested that the operation be launched in

about two weeks, explaining that although Pakistan

had recently granted overflight permission and

agreed to basing and staging activities necessary for

operations in southern Afghanistan, the Department

of State had not yet acquired staging rights in

Uzbekistan. Army Major General Dell L. Dailey,

head of Joint Special Operations Command, was

also present to review special mission unit targets in

Afghanistan.61 After Dailey’s brief, Rumsfeld noted

that lots of lines were going to be crossed in the

upcoming conflict and proposed “that operational

control of the Central Intelligence Agency be given

to the Defense Department.”62

40

FROM THE SEA

*According to these reports, it appears that a conceptual disconnect existed between Central Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on

20Sep01. While General Franks clearly recalls proposing a plan that involved the eventual overthrow of the Taliban regime, Douglas Feith claims that the

notion of a collaborative campaign in support of the Northern Alliance was suggested by Secretary Rumsfeld to broaden the scope of military operations

in Afghanistan.
Colonel Fitzgerald described the nature of the

developing operations plan at Central Command: “It

took awhile to take the specific functional

directorates, which are stovepiped... vertically, and

drop them on a horizontal plane so that you can

move strategies to plans, plans to orders, orders to

execution and task products, and go though that

24/7.”63 “It wasn’t... well written, well documented,

describing every step. It evolved over time, based on

a fairly broad intent and strategy, and then individual

actions by key leaders on the ground, and then staffs

react and respond to requirements as they evolve.”64

He elaborated on the spiral planning and execution

process, necessitated by having to start from scratch

and work under extraordinary time constraints:

The first [step] was getting all the pieces in place

for the U.S. part of it, which was very challenging.

We had no basing in central Asia. We had no

access that we had... tested and exercised.... So,

the planners never knew what you could count

on.... You went in with a wish list to sort of drive

people to do things, but your whole plan was

based on this wish list, and as the thing appeared

and disappeared, then your plan would have to

change.... It was just real hard... to continually

turn and face the constant changes and readjust

your plan, then get written products out to the

components, who weren’t [in theater]. NavCent

[U.S. Naval Forces Central Command] [was] the

only one that was really forward. ArCent [U.S.

Army Forces Central Command] hadn’t been

officially established as the [Combined Forces

Land Component Command].... We went

through multiple iterations of “What’s the

command and control for Afghanistan? What are

the control measures as [the special operations

forces go] in and out? Who owns the land? How

do you balance freedom of action by air with the

protection of U.S. forces on the ground? How do

you know where the Northern Alliance is?” So,

all these things... trying to put squishy stuff into

a framework that you can articulate in an order

so that people can go out and execute, it was very

hard.65

As the plans section began to focus more on

future than current operations, it developed three

41

Operation Enduring Freedom

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Office

The former Soviet airfield at Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan, known as K-2. The Joint Special Operations Task Force North was

based at this airfield.
sequential options for the theater campaign plan.

The first option was to focus on Afghanistan and

then worry about the rest of the theater later. The

second was to fight in Afghanistan and develop a

theaterwide counterterrorism capability, and the

third was to fight in Afghanistan; develop a

theaterwide counterterrorism capability; and go after

state sponsors of terrorism such as Sudan, Iran, and

Iraq. After asking General Franks for guidance

several times, the planners were finally told to focus

on the second option. No sooner had the plan been

signed around the end of November, however, than

the planners’ focus switched to the third option and

they began to look at Iraq.66

Joint Special Operations Task Force North

From a doctrinal perspective, Central Command’s

special operations should establish a joint special

operations task force headquarters during times of

conflict to direct attached units contributed by the

Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, with the

component already leading the theaterwide

counterterrorism effort, Rear Admiral Albert M.

Calland III, USN, who was in charge of Central

Command’s Special Operations Command, decided

that it made more sense to create several subordinate

task forces to prosecute the war in different

geographic regions. He subsequently established

Joint Special Operations Task Force North (Task

Force Dagger) to handle operations in Afghanistan

occurring above the east-west highway running from

Herat to Kabul. Although a parallel effort was

tentatively envisioned for southern Afghanistan,

Joint Special Operations Task Force South (Task

Force K-Bar) was not formally established until

December 2001.67

Joint Special Operations Task Force North

would be based at the former Soviet airfield at

Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan, known as K-2.

Admiral Calland anticipated that although its

primary mission was to recover aircrews downed

42

FROM THE SEA

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Office

Air Force Col Frank J. Kisner, left, and Army Col John F. Mulholland. Col Kisner and elements of the 16th Special Operations Wing

established the operating base at K-2 in Uzbekistan and controlled airfield operations, while Col Mulholland and the 5th Special

Forces Group served as the Army special operations task force.
during the impending air campaign, it would become

increasingly involved in ground, humanitarian, and

unconventional warfare operations as the war

progressed. This involvement in different arenas

presented a confusing set of command

relationships, if not a potential conflict of purpose.

Without a clearly defined chain of command, it

could become difficult to prioritize missions and

allocate limited resources.

Air Force Colonel Frank J. Kisner and elements

of the 16th Special Operations Wing would establish

the operating base and control airfield operations,

while Army Colonel John F. Mulholland and the 5th

Special Forces Group (5th Group) would serve as the

Army special operations task force, providing the

unconventional warfare capability. In support, the U.S.

Army’s 2d Battalion, 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment, would serve as the joint special

operations air component, providing the combat

search and rescue capability. Lieutenant General Bryan

D. Brown, head of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations

Command, resolved the problem of command

relationships by convincing Admiral Calland to put

Colonel Mulholland in charge of the northern

campaign, although this created subsequent staffing

and logistical problems for the special forces group.68

While trained, equipped, and organized to fight

in the desert as a subordinate task force, 5th Group

was not designed for the unprecedented mission of

managing base operations at Karshi Khanabad or

coordinating special operations throughout northern

Afghanistan. This problem was partially minimized

by U.S. Joint Forces Command, which dispatched

training teams to instruct the 5th Group staff in

joint special operations task force operations and

enhance their organic communications capabilities.

Upon review of the situation, however, Army

Colonel Michael L. Findlay, the special operations

commander from Joint Forces Command,

recommended that Admiral Calland relieve 5th

Group’s overburdened staff by assembling a

separate task force headquarters. Yet the admiral

chose to continue the original command

arrangement. To help offset the deficit in experience,

several personnel from Joint Special Operations

Command joined 5th Group and assumed key staff

positions, including intelligence, operations, logistics,

and assistant communications officers and the chief

of joint planning.69 Once in theater, the U.S. Army’s

10th Mountain Division and 160th Special

Operations Aviation Regiment and the U.S. Air

Force’s 16th Special Operations Wing provided the

task force headquarters with additional fire support

and aviation planning expertise.70

Adjusting Expectations

On 25 September, General Franks warned that

it might be necessary to postpone aviation

operations in the north. None of the Central Asian

republics had yet provided basing rights or agreed

to allow Coalition forces to run combat search and

rescue missions from within their borders, which

was considered a prerequisite for bombing a narrow

set of targets identified in that region. Conversely,

although the United States had acquired permission

to operate from bases in Pakistan or conceivably off

carriers in the Arabian Sea, quality targets in the

south were in short supply.71

On 26 September, the CIA’s first paramilitary

team, codenamed Jawbreaker, arrived by helicopter

in northeastern Afghanistan. The 10-man northern

Afghanistan liaison team was led by Gary Berntsen,

a former station chief in Kabul and Islamabad who

had most recently served as the deputy chief of the

Near East and South Asia operations division.72 The

next day, Jawbreaker made contact with General

Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who had assumed

command of the Northern Alliance following

Ahmed Shah Masood’s assassination. Berntsen

asked for Fahim’s cooperation during the upcoming

conflict. Fahim welcomed the Americans and their

financial assistance, asking the question on

everyone’s mind, when would the operation begin?73

On the same day that Jawbreaker entered

northern Afghanistan, the CIA’s plan for a

nationwide covert campaign began to unravel. At the

daily National Security Council meeting, Director

Tenet admitted that although his agency was working

43

Operation Enduring Freedom
with resistance leaders and developing targets in the

north, it was still trying to mobilize anti-Taliban

forces in the south.74 Vice President Cheney, who

had recently visited CIA headquarters, already

realized that their southern contacts were weak at

best and that there was no real sign of an indigenous

resistance movement. He then suggested that the

operational focus shift toward supporting the

Northern Alliance campaign against the Taliban

rather than dividing the southern Pashtun into

opposing sides.75

President Bush had already revealed his

growing restlessness by tentatively asking members

of the war council if they would be ready to attack

by 1 October. After receiving tentative affirmatives

from several of his principal advisors, he reluctantly

acknowledged that he might be amenable to

running sequential, rather than simultaneous, air and

ground campaigns in Afghanistan. Although they

would not be as dramatic, the campaigns would still

send the appropriate message to nations harboring

terrorists.76 The following day, as restlessness gave

way to impatience, Dr. Rice explained the dilemma

they faced: because the United States had not yet

acquired host-nation basing rights, it could not yet

deploy the agents who would gather the ground

intelligence necessary to confirm the targets.77 Ten

days after intelligence gathering occurred, according

to General Franks, the special forces teams would

be ready to begin collecting information.78 When

the principals met by themselves that evening, Vice

President Cheney remarked, “The president wants

44

FROM THE SEA

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Led by General Mohammad Qasim Fahim (after the assassination of Ahmed Shah Masood on 9 September 2001), the Northern

Alliance was a loosely linked coalition of ethnic and religious groups, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Shiite Muslims, that opposed

the mostly Pashtun Taliban.
to avoid putting any artificial constraints or

timelines on our military action. Let’s do it right.

Let’s not do something stupid for PR [public

relations] purposes.”79

White House expectations continued to

undulate during the nine days between 28 September

and 7 October, when the Coalition began its

offensive operations against the Taliban. President

Bush wanted to attack on 6 October, but even if

Uzbekistan did finally acquiesce and provide

operational access to its territories, the military

would need 12 days to establish a forward operating

base at Karshi Khanabad and position the USS Kitty

Hawk (CV 63) off the Pakistani coast.80 As General

Franks had speculated, holes in the once grand

strategy began to appear now that it was caught

between the art and science of war.

When the principal advisors met on 30

September, General Myers, scheduled to succeed

General Shelton as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff the following day, discussed the “quarter loaf ”

alternative. Without a search and rescue capability in

the north, the initial air campaign would be limited to

southern Afghanistan, and there would be no special

operations activity. At the same meeting, Secretary

Powell summarized the tentative courses of action:

phase I involved continued diplomatic efforts, phase

II-A involved getting the CIA into Afghanistan,

phase II-B involved limited military action, and phase

III involved adjusting to targets of opportunity as

the situation developed. On 2 October, Secretary

Rumsfeld offered a partial solution, noting that

search and rescue capabilities would not be necessary

in the north if they limited initial air operations to

missiles and strategic bombers.81

During the same period, however, political and

logistical obstacles began to crumble when, on 28

September, Uzbekistan finally agreed to accept a

small assessment team to consider the feasibility of

running combat search and rescue missions from

within its borders.82 Over the next few days, this

opening gradually broadened to include private and

then public permission to run operations from the

Central Asian state. Largely through Herculean

efforts, Army and Air Force personnel shattered the

previous time estimates and established an

operational capability in time for D-Day on 7

October. As the operational estimates began to

improve, so did the war cabinet’s optimism. By 3

October, they had agreed that the goal was no longer

to simply destroy al-Qaeda and promote a more

compliant Taliban regime—it was now to eliminate

the Taliban and help the Afghans establish a new

democracy. Their remaining question was how

involved the United States would become in the

post-Taliban stabilization effort.83

Stronghold Freedom

On 29 September, an advance liaison team of

14 individuals arrived at Karshi Khanabad; their

mission was “to assess the logistics and operational

facilities of the base and to coordinate with local

officials to build an infrastructure that would

support approximately 3,500 people.”84 Within 24

hours, the team reported that the airstrip possessed

limited ramp and taxiway parking space and would

not be able to receive the large Lockheed C-5B

Galaxy transports currently loaded and waiting at

airports in Spain and Turkey. Moreover, because the

airfield could only handle one or two of the smaller

Boeing C-17 Globemaster III transports at a time,

and it would take approximately sixty-seven C-17

flights to ferry in the necessary personnel, equipment, and helicopters to become mission capable,

they estimated the buildup would now take from 5

to 12 days.85

A 50-person detachment from the Air Force’s

theater airlift control element arrived at Karshi

Khanabad on 3 October, shortly after Uzbekistan

privately agreed to allow the United States to operate

from its base. It was not until a press conference in

Tashkent on 5 October, however, that President

Karimov publicly granted Secretary Rumsfeld

permission to conduct humanitarian operations and

rescue missions from within Uzbekistan’s borders.86

European airfields immediately began to push aircraft

east, if only to clear their own runways. Personnel at

45

Operation Enduring Freedom
K-2 were soon working around the clock and

receiving twelve C-17s a day. Colonel Kisner and his

staff arrived shortly before the first C-17 landed and

quickly established the task force headquarters, and

elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation

Regiment began to arrive shortly thereafter. Within

48 hours, the soldiers had assembled four Boeing

MH-47E Chinook and two Sikorsky MH-60L Black

Hawk helicopters and were ready for the personnel

recovery mission on 7 October.87

The first elements of 5th Group arrived in

Uzbekistan on 7 October. As the advance echelon,

Company B, 3d Battalion, was responsible for force

protection at K-2 and for establishing an isolation

facility for 11 U.S. Army Special Forces A-teams

(Operational Detachments Alpha)* to prepare for

their unconventional warfare mission inside

Afghanistan. The group’s headquarters and main

body arrived on 10 October. The two Army and Air

Force staffs quickly merged, with Colonel

Mulholland assuming command and Colonel Kisner

becoming his deputy. The task force became known

as Task Force Dagger, and the camp was renamed

Stronghold Freedom. Later, soldiers from 1st

Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division,

assumed responsibility for base security and built

checkpoints, fighting positions, and an earthen

barrier around the camp’s perimeter.88

Combat Search and Rescue at Jacobabad,

Pakistan

Before the onset of hostilities, NavCent

forwarded the requirement for establishing a combat

search and rescue force to retrieve downed pilots

and aircrews in southern Afghanistan, adding that it

must be protected and situated to respond to calls

46

FROM THE SEA

Photo by TSgt Scott Reed, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011109-F-4884R-010

A KC-130 Hercules aircrew from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 performs a rapid ground refueling of two Navy

Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopters at Shahbaz Airbase in Jacobabad, Pakistan, on 9 November 2001.

*The U.S. Army Special Forces traditionally deploy in 12-man teams, each known as an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) or A-team. The special

forces company, known as an Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB), is composed of six A-teams plus a command element, while the special forces

battalion, known as an Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC), is composed of three B-teams plus a command element. Three battalions comprise the

special forces group.
for help. Another crisis action team formed on 2

October in response to this requirement. At first it

considered basing the rescue personnel on board

naval vessels off the southern coast of Pakistan, but

the USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group (Peleliu

ARG) possessed the only available landing platforms

at the time and they were already being employed.

After evaluating several inland locations, the team

recommended establishing a forward operating base

at Shahbaz Air Force Base.89 Located along the

western outskirts of Jacobabad, approximately 300

miles north of Karachi, Pakistan, and 300 miles

southwest of Kandahar, Afghanistan, the secondary

airfield possessed a single 10,000-foot runway with

hardened aircraft shelters. Although designed to

support jet fighter aircraft, the facilities were also

available for commercial use.90

On 5 October, the Peleliu ARG delivered its

confirmation brief and embarked pararescuemen

and three Sikorsky MH-53J Pave Low III helicopters

from the U.S. Air Force’s 20th Special Operations

Squadron.91 Two days later, following a day of

mission rehearsals, elements of Battalion Landing

Team 1/1, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Christopher Bourne, landed at Shahbaz Airfield and

linked up with Pakistani military forces. The initial

assault force and its interim fast-attack vehicles were

transported directly to the airfield in four Sikorsky

CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters from Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163),

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James K.

LaVine. The pilots departed from the amphibious

force positioned near Karachi and covered a

distance of more than 300 nautical miles. Follow-on

forces were then shuttled to the port city of Pasni,

Pakistan, in Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters,

where they boarded KC-130 transport aircraft from

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352

(VMGR-352) for the flight into Jacobabad.

Colonel Waldhauser, the expeditionary unit

commander, recalled that the exercise was not

without significant challenges:

We essentially had to take Peleliu, the LHA, and

position the ship as close to the beach as

possible near Karachi. Next, we had to strip off

any excess weight from the CH-46s. Finally, we

had to jam as much gas into the helos as we

could. Then we would put a handful of troops

into the back so the aircraft could make the

flight. By the time the helos arrived in

Jacobabad, they were pretty low on gas. This is

an example of how we had to figure out ways to

make all of this work.92

Lieutenant Colonel Olson, the expeditionary

unit’s operations officer, further elaborated on the

exercise:

While it certainly wasn’t an amphibious assault,

it had many characteristics of it. We wanted a

rapid combat [capability]. We wanted to make

sure we brought enough sustainment with us to

47

Operation Enduring Freedom

Photo by Sgt Joesph R. Chenelly

LtCol Christopher M. Bourne, left, commander of Battalion

Landing Team 1/1, discusses current operations with Col

Thomas D. Waldhauser, commander of the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit, on 16 October 2001. The Marines

provided security for Air Force combat search and rescue

personnel operating from Shahbaz Airbase in Jacobabad,

Pakistan, during the opening days of Operation Enduring

Freedom.
48

FROM THE SEA

keep it going, where the ship’s going to have to

go away from the coast or for some reason the

weather turned bad and we were unable to

sustain the Marines ashore. So, while it was not

[a defended beach]... we still had to worry

about all kinds of things you have to worry

about during an amphibious assault. We

inserted folks over the course of a couple days,

built up combat power rapidly, and then

immediately followed up with the combat

search and rescue [CSAR] force. By the end of

the first day, the CSAR forces were able to

conduct combat search and rescue from the

Jacobabad airfield into Afghanistan.93

Conditions at the air base were austere at best.

While living in fighting holes and dealing with an

ambiguous threat, the 90-degree temperatures, high

humidity, blowing dust, bacteria-ridden water, open

sewage, and ever-present smoke from local rubbish

fires all conspired to facilitate the rise in upper

respiratory and gastrointestinal infections among the

Marines and sailors.94 If that were not rough enough,

the airfield was surrounded by former rice fields with

poor drainage, an ideal environment for breeding

encephalitis-carrying mosquitoes.95 Basic resources

were also in short supply, requiring that the KC-130

aircrews fly two seven-hour shuttle runs between

Bahrain and Jacobabad each night to ensure that the

security forces had enough food, water, and fuel.96

The situation improved with time. Prepackaged

meals-ready-to-eat were brought ashore and stockpiled for the troops’ use. If not made palatable, the

contaminated water was at least made potable by

running it through a lightweight, mobile, tactical

water purification system. Basing several of the KC130s in Jacobabad and tapping into local Pakistani

fuel reserves lessened some logistical obstacles.97 As

the antiaircraft threat waned and the Air Force

intensified its airfield operations at Shahbaz,

including the arrival of civil engineers and support

personnel in late October, the base’s infrastructure

began to develop exponentially.98 Four months later,

a combat artist visiting Marines at Jacobabad noted

that “virtually all interviewees have been favorably

impressed by the creature comforts provided by the

Air Force in the form of showers, air conditioned

tents, and chow.”99

Photo by TSgt Scott Reed, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011022-f-4884r-004

Members of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrive at Shahbaz Airbase via a CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter on 22 October

2001. The Marines provided perimeter security for Air Force combat search and rescue personnel operating from the airbase

during the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Although initially directed to provide security at

Jacobabad for three to five days, the battalion ended

up remaining ashore for 43 days before soldiers

from the Army’s 101st Airborne Division relieved

them.100 During their stay, the three rifle companies;

artillery battery; and smaller communications,

intelligence, and logistics detachments were

periodically rotated at one to three week intervals.

Captain Eric A. Putman’s Company A, part of the

initial assault force, was replaced by Captain Richard

W. Whitmer’s Company B, which in turn was

replaced by Captain James P. Fallon’s Company C.101

Colonel Olson noted that these early experiences

helped ready the Marines for future operations:

We kind of had to set the conditions for success

at Jacobabad. And in doing that, learning how

to stage things in preparation for the next day,

learning how to move over long distances. And

bringing in bulk fuel and such helped set us up

for success in Afghanistan later on.102

While the battalion focused on security around

the airfield, Pakistani forces maintained a second

perimeter about five miles out, nearer to the local

villages.103 The squadron provided medical evacuation and logistical support, while air controllers from

Marine Aviation Control Group 38 (MACG-38)

conducted around-the-clock operations in both

Jacobabad and Pasni.104 In addition to its airfield

security mission, 15th MEU was also prepared to

provide a quick reaction force or execute the tactical

recovery of aircraft and personnel when required.105

VMGR-352 eventually began to maintain a twoplane presence at Jacobabad, cycling crews and

aircraft through Bahrain in order to support this

latter requirement.106

49

Operation Enduring Freedom

51

Chapter 3

Striking Back

Late in the morning on 7 October,

General Franks addressed senior

military and government officials via

video teleconference from his headquarters in

Tampa, Florida. He began by summarizing the

situation:

We have a force of 40,000 men and women

involved in this operation. There are 393

aircraft and 32 ships. A total of 31 nations are

involved. You have received the rules of

engagement. Command and control is in place.

I have the Execute Order from the Secretary

[of Defense].1

After confirming the readiness of his air and

maritime components, as well as that of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Joint Special

Operations Command, he concluded, “All right. I’m

satisfied. Kinetics begin at 1230 hours East Coast

time, 1630 Zulu, 2100 hours Afghanistan time....

My final point is this: Use adult common sense. This

is the beginning of tomorrow’s history. I want you to

focus on two things: accomplish the mission and

protect the force.”2

Air Operations

America retaliated against al-Qaeda at 2100,

striking military installations near five major

population centers in northern, western, and

southern Afghanistan. While the administration

intended to achieve several material goals through

its air campaign, Lieutenant General Newbold later

commented that there was one significant strategic

purpose: to inform America’s enemies that “there is

a dear price to be paid for actions like 9/11 that

strike at the United States.”3

The initial attack against 31 preplanned targets

involved 17 of the U.S. Air Force’s strategic

bombers, 25 of the U.S. Navy’s tactical fighters, and

50 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from

American and British vessels in the Arabian Sea. As

described by Air Force Lieutenant General Charles

F. Wald, Combined Force Air Component

commander, the main goals of the operation were to

establish uncontested control over Afghan airspace

by neutralizing Taliban air defenses, disrupt or

destroy terrorist activities, and shape the battlefield

for future military actions.4

Within minutes of the attack, two Air Force C17 transport aircraft dropped 34,000 packages of

food and medical supplies to the Afghan people.

Propaganda leaflets, transistor radios, and broadcasts

explaining America’s intent to the general population

soon followed.5 During an address to the nation at

1300, President Bush reiterated America’s position

on terrorism and outlined his reasons for attacking

the Taliban and al-Qaeda:

Good afternoon. On my orders, the United

States military has begun strikes against al-Qaeda

terrorist training camps and military installations

of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders

a series of clear and specific demands: close

terrorist training camps, hand over leaders of the

al-Qaeda network, and return all foreign nationals,

including American citizens, unjustly detained in

your country. None of these demands were met.

And now the Taliban will pay a price.

At the same time, the oppressed people of

Afghanistan will know the generosity of

America and our allies. As we strike military

targets, we'll also drop food, medicine, and

supplies to the starving and suffering men and

women and children of Afghanistan.

The United States of America is a friend to the

Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost

a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic
faith. The United States of America is an enemy

of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric

criminals who profane a great religion by

committing murder in its name.

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is

broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In

this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any

government sponsors the outlaws and killers of

innocents, they have become outlaws and

murderers themselves. And they will take that

lonely path at their own peril.6

During the first week and a half of the war, the

bombing campaign grew in depth, breadth, and

intensity. Approximately 85 percent of the targets hit

on the first day were damaged or destroyed,

contributing to the defection of 35–40 commanders

and 1,200 soldiers from Taliban forces in northern

Afghanistan the following day.7 The Coalition

achieved air supremacy by the third day of the

operation, enabling pilots to fly sorties during

daylight hours, and targets now included installations

in and around the capital city of Kabul.8 By the fifth

day, pilots conducted their first attacks against

mountain cave complexes harboring terrorist

personnel and equipment.9 By the ninth day, two

Lockheed AC-130 Specter gunships joined the fight,

engaging targets near the Taliban stronghold of

Kandahar.10 On day 10,* coordinated attacks involving 5 Tomahawk missiles, 10 Air Force bombers, and

90 Navy fighters from the USS Enterprise (CVN 65),

USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), and USS Kitty Hawk

(CV 63) were conducted against 12 target complexes

near Kandahar and Kabul.11 A similar effort

involving 85 aircraft, including Navy fighters from

the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), was launched

the following day.12 Encouraged by the growing

intensity of the air campaign, Lieutenant General

Newbold,** director of operations on the Joint Staff,

observed optimistically that opposing forces near

Herat had been “eviscerated.”13

In other regards, the effectiveness of the initial

air campaign had been disappointing. In a defensive

move that may have been initiated prior to 11

September, al-Qaeda had abandoned most of its

training camps, dispersing critical resources to safer

locations in anticipation of American retaliation.14

Some of the Taliban facilities and equipment hit

during the first two days of the operation remained

active and had to be reengaged several times before

they were neutralized.15 Central Command’s director

of intelligence, who insisted on stringent requirements for reporting battle damage assessments, may

have hindered progress in this regard, and “it was not

until October 25 that Pentagon officials finally

declared that the campaign had effectively taken out

the Taliban’s air defenses and severed most of their

communications.”16 As the initial target list was

gradually cleared, a subsequent shortage of approved

objectives emerged, which led to loitering attack

aircraft and the occasional cancellation of scheduled

fighter missions.17

52

FROM THE SEA

* The chronology and composition of the maximum effort air raids remain unclear. In Air Power Against Terror, aviation historian Benjamin Lambeth

identifies the first 100-plane effort on both 15 and 16 October and indicates that Navy and Marine aircraft from all four carriers were involved. Yet in

Naval Aviation News, historians William T. Baker and Mark L. Evans state that the Theodore Roosevelt did not participate until the 17th and that the Marines

were not involved until the 18th. LtCol Raymond C. Damm Jr., commanding officer of VMFA-251, recalled leading the first Marine mission from the

Theodore Roosevelt on 17 October.

**LtGen Newbold later recalled that intelligence reports at the time indicated that the unit in question had been reduced to 20 percent of its initial

strength. (Newbold comments)

Official Marine Corps photo

Ordnancemen on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)

arm a F/A-18 Hornet from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251

with an AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missile.
While commenting on the progress of the first

week of the war, one U.S. Air Force general

remarked pessimistically that the air campaign was

trapped at the tactical level, attacking targets as an

end in itself.18 Indeed, on 11 October a CIA

operations specialist informed President Bush’s war

council that the bombing was not dividing the

moderate Pashtun from the hard-core Taliban as

planned, and the next day the intelligence agency’s

special operations chief reported that approximately

100 Taliban recruits were crossing the Pakistani

border into Afghanistan each day.19

If the Taliban forces were unimpressed by the

repeated bombing of static targets, perhaps even

growing to believe they could withstand Coalition

air power, the Northern Alliance was becoming

equally disappointed.20 General Fahim asserted that

he could take Kunduz and Kabul if the United

States would only break the Taliban frontlines, but

this request essentially went unheeded. Although

Jawbreaker could provide limited on-scene guidance,

it was using Russian maps and lacked night-vision

equipment, direct communications to the tactical

aircraft, and laser target designators.21 On the other

hand, withholding close air support also provided

American leaders with a means of checking the

Northern Alliance’s advance until the Coalition had

aligned its political and military strategies.22

The air campaign transitioned to a more

aggressive phase of operations around 17 October,

following the gradual degradation of the Taliban’s

air defenses. Target lists expanded, engagement

zones were established, and emphasis shifted from

bombing preplanned static targets, such as military

installations, to attacking targets of opportunity,

such as troop concentrations and vehicles. In this

phase, airborne forward air controllers would first

validate identified targets and then direct loitering

tactical aircraft to attack opposing forces in

particular engagement zones. Once the U.S. Army

Special Forces teams inserted, ground-based combat

controllers from the U.S. Air Force would be able to

guide the fighters’ bombs onto the targets with laser

designators.23 Coincidental to the shift in tactics, Air

Force fighters from the 366th Wing arrived in

Kuwait and were now able to fill a four-hour gap in

the daily coverage provided by the Enterprise

(daytime) and Carl Vinson (nighttime).24

53

Striking Back

Photo by SSgt Michael D. Gaddis, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011107-f-5795g-017

Two F/A-18 Hornets from Navy Fighter Attack Squadron 97 patrol the skies over Afghanistan on 7 November 2001. Both carry

external fuel tanks and are armed with Paveway II laser guided bombs and Sidewinder missiles.
On 18 October, two pilots flying McDonnellDouglas F/A-18C Hornets from Marine Fighter

Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA-251) conducted the

Marine Corps’ first strike missions of the war.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond C.

Damm Jr., the “Thunderbolts” hailed from Beaufort,

South Carolina, but were currently serving with

Carrier Air Wing 1 on board the Theodore Roosevelt,

which had arrived to relieve the Enterprise.

25 Before

heading home on 3 March 2002, they would fly 682

combat sorties and drop 486 bombs in support of

Operation Enduring Freedom (Table 2).26

Less than a month later, on 12 November,

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)

joined the Thunderbolts. Lieutenant Colonel James

L. Stalnaker commanded the “Black Knights,” based

out of Miramar, California, who also flew F/A-18Cs.

While in theater, they served with Carrier Air Wing

9 on board the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), which

relieved the Carl Vinson.

27 By the time they headed

home in April 2002, they had flown 483 combat

sorties and dropped 69,000 pounds of ordnance on

Taliban and al-Qaeda positions (Table 3).28

Refining the Operational Strategy

As the first phase of the air war raged over

Afghanistan, President Bush and the members of the

National Security Council continued to develop their

strategy for toppling the Taliban regime and seizing

control of northern and eastern Afghanistan.29

Historian Benjamin Lambeth notes that

the decision-making process for Enduring

Freedom was very much the opposite of that of

54

FROM THE SEA

Official Marine Corps photo

LtCol Raymond C. Damm Jr., commander of Marine Fighter

Attack Squadron 251. During the opening months of

Operation Enduring Freedom, his “Thunderbolts” served with

Carrier Air Wing 1 on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt.

Month Sorties Flown GBU-31(v2) GBU-31(v4) GBU-16 GBU-12 AGM-65 Mk83 Total

Combat/Total Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Delivered

OCT 96/389 13 8 20 63 14 118

NOV 207/320 38 – 8 142 – 29 217

DEC 179/344 17 – – 98 2 18 135

JAN 128/365 4 – –––– 4

FEB 62/292 2 – –––– 2

MAR 10/** – –– 10 – – 10

Total 682/1,710 74 8 28 313 16 47 486

Table 2: VMFA-251 Sorties Flown and Ordnance Delivered in Support of

Operation Enduring Freedom
the Gulf War, in which General Norman

Schwarzkopf led from his forward headquarters

in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, issuing broad guidance

to his component commanders and expecting

them to develop and execute specific operational-level plans. Instead, decision making for

Afghanistan was closer in character to

Operation Allied Force [in Yugoslavia], in which

top civilians and the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff]

chairman in Washington kept General Wesley

Clark on a short leash.30

Although the war council’s discussions

sometimes seemed to go in circles, the general

consensus among the principal advisors (particularly

Secretary of State Colin Powell) was that the focus

of main effort should be on seizing Mazar-e Sharif

and securing the 40-mile overland supply route into

southern Uzbekistan. At the same time, the CIA

proposed that collateral operations to capture

Taloqan and Baghlan might succeed in trapping the

Taliban in the northern portion of the country. Yet

time was running out—an intelligence estimate

suggested that once unleashed, the Northern

Alliance would only be able to conduct offensive

operations in the mountains into early November

before adverse winter weather conditions halted its

advance, although it could continue to operate into

early December on the Shamali Plains. In Bush’s

opinion, this was another reason to prioritize

northern operations.31

A secondary objective, largely championed by

Director Tenet and the CIA, was to strike south and

seize Kabul. However, although the Northern

Alliance wanted to liberate the capital city, an Uzbekand Tajik-dominated government would not sit well

55

Striking Back

Official Marine Corps photo

LtCol James L. Stalnaker, commander of Marine Fighter Attack

Squadron 314. During the opening months of Operation

Enduring Freedom, his “Black Knights” served with Carrier

Air Wing 9 on board the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 76).

Month Sorties Flown GBU-12 GBU-31 BLU-111 Mk82 AGM-65 AIM-7 Total

Combat/Total Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Delivered

DEC **/** 5 – – 5 –– 10

JAN 286/351 6 5 – – –– 11

FEB 85/326 – – – – –– –

MAR 112/265 2 19 14 30 – – 65

APR **/258 1 – – – 11 3

Total 483/1,200 14 24 14 35 1 1 89

Table 3: VMFA-314 Sorties Flown and Ordnance Delivered in Support of

Operation Enduring Freedom
with either the southern Pashtun population or

Pakistan. At the National Security Council meeting

on 15 October, President Bush proposed that they

halt the Northern Alliance’s advance outside the city

but allow the resistance fighters limited access to

pursue their own agenda. John E. McLaughlin,

Tenet’s deputy, added that they could incorporate

Pashtuns into the force and arrange for control of

the capital. President Bush, however, had already

reiterated that he did not want the United States to

become mired in nation building and peacekeeping

activities once the Taliban had been defeated. The

tentative solution, proposed earlier by Secretary

Powell but also endorsed by Vice President Cheney

and President Bush, was to turn Kabul over to

Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations special

representative for Afghanistan, and hand over

responsibility for administering the new government

to the international community.32

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and

the others also acknowledged the need for a southern

operations strategy and a plan for dealing with the

Taliban stronghold at Kandahar.33 This third piece of

the ground campaign remained more difficult to

address than the other two. Although there was still no

southern corollary to the Northern Alliance,

intelligence officers were now in contact with Hamid

Karzai, a minor Pashtun leader who had returned to

Afghanistan from the United States on 8 October and

surfaced near the rural village of Tarin Kowt, situated

some 50 miles north of Kandahar.34 The CIA also

proposed building an airfield and establishing a forward

operating base in southern Afghanistan. In response,

on 16 October, Secretary Rumsfeld remarked that he

had “a candidate in Helmand Province” and would

“ask Franks to look at it.”35 He may have been referring

in this case either to the provincial capital at Lashkar

Gah, which was located on the main highway 78 miles

west of Kandahar and which possessed an operable

gravel-surfaced public runway, or to a more remote

desert airstrip farther to the southwest.

After several days of brainstorming, President

Bush apparently realized that the war council was

getting ahead of itself. During the National Security

Council meeting on 15 October, he announced that

“there’s been too much discussion of postconflict

Afghanistan.... A rush to conclusion on Afghanistan

after just one week is too premature.”36 Indeed, the

growing tension was palpable among members of the

war council as they sought solutions to obstacles

encountered during current operations while

simultaneously charting a strategy for the future. The

mounting frustration culminated during the following

day’s meeting when Secretary Rumsfeld complained

that the Department of Defense had been relegated

to executing the CIA’s strategy and following its

operatives into Afghanistan. McLaughlin, deputy

director of the agency, maintained that General

Franks was in charge and the CIA was merely

supporting Central Command, while Richard L.

Armitage, deputy secretary of state, interjected that

he did not know who was in charge, but the situation

was “FUBAR” (fouled up beyond all recognition).37

After the meeting, Dr. Rice separately advised

President Bush to become more of a coach than a

quarterback and counseled Secretary Rumsfeld to

take charge of the military operations. Several days

later, Rice’s deputy, Stephen J. Hadley, reiterated her

warning to Rumsfeld, explaining that “somebody

needs to pick this up and design a strategy” and “it’s

yours for the taking.”38 Secretary Powell also offered

his views around this time concerning the secretary

of defense’s responsibilities. In response to such

high-level criticism, Rumsfeld directed Under

Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith to outline an

overall strategy for Afghanistan and pressured

personnel throughout the chain to initiate ground

operations in Afghanistan.39

By this time in the campaign, Secretary Rumsfeld

and Generals Myers and Franks had begun to

conduct twice-daily video teleconferences. According

to Benjamin Lambeth, “Franks would present his

ideas and indicate his assessment of the campaign’s

progress and what he needed, and Rumsfeld and

Myers would then provide overall direction and

guidance.”40 General Franks reflected, “Throughout

those early days, the slow pace of our operations was

a constant source of frustration.”41 During the period

56

FROM THE SEA
between 7 and 18 October, which his staff referred to

as the “Ten Days from Hell,” Secretary Rumsfeld

would begin each conversation concerning the special

operations forces by asking, “When is something

going to happen, general?”42 Although Franks denied

that Rumsfeld had ever been personally abusive, he

did acknowledge that the “genetically impatient”

secretary was anything but “user-friendly” and noted

his tendency toward “relentless” questions.43

Deference toward authority defined the

relationship between General Franks and Secretary

Rumsfeld.44 In one instance, Franks told the

president, “Sir, I think exactly what my secretary

thinks, what he’s ever thought, what he will ever think,

or whatever he thought he might think.”45 Yet

“Franks and his staff found ways to circumvent

Rumsfeld’s rigid control,” and he was not afraid to

speak his mind when riled.46 On 15 October, after

learning of an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate a

special operations team into northern Afghanistan,

Rumsfeld had remarked, “General Franks, this isn’t

working. I want you to build options that will work.”47

When Franks called Rumsfeld back that evening,

advising him to select another commander if he had

lost confidence in the general’s ability to lead, the

secretary replied, “You have my complete confidence.

This operation will succeed.”48

Initial Ground Operations

Enabling a Surrogate Army

On 12 October, 2d Battalion, 120th Special

Operations Aviation Regiment, the aviation

component for Joint Special Operations Task Force

North, began planning for air insertions into

northern Afghanistan.49 Unfortunately, its first

attempt to ferry in a Special Forces A-team on the

14th had to be aborted after encountering extreme

weather conditions and opposing ground fire, the

former compelling one aircraft to conduct an

emergency landing onto snow-covered slopes.50 A

second attempt the following day was similarly

aborted due to adverse weather and hostile fire,

while a plan to insert another CIA liaison team was

postponed due to diplomatic considerations.51 On

the third try, launched on the moonless night of 16

October, the agency’s eight-man team finally reached

Northern Alliance forces, located approximately 50

miles south of Mazar-e Sharif, and linked up with

General Dostam’s militia the next morning.52

Following yet another aborted insertion on the

17th, the first two A-teams successfully infiltrated

into northern Afghanistan on the evening of 19–20

October. Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA)

555, led by Chief Warrant Officer David W. Diaz,

joined General Shariff in the Panjshir Valley, while

ODA 595, led by Captain Mark D. Nutch, joined

General Dostam in the Darya-ye Suf Valley. Within

days, the teams, sometimes split into smaller groups

to extend their coverage among the Northern

Alliance forces, had reached the frontlines and

begun to direct lethal aerial attacks against Taliban

defensive positions. During the next three weeks,

Task Force Dagger gradually fed additional A-teams

into Afghanistan as it identified allied resistance

groups who could benefit from the special forces’

technical and tactical expertise (Table 4).53

The need to balance the allocation of resources

among competing warlords complicated the buildup

of special forces in Afghanistan. This reality and a

brief conversation in which Secretary Rumsfeld

57

Striking Back

Official Department of Defense photo.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011112-d-0000x-001

Advisors from the U.S. Army Special Forces and Task Force

Dagger ride horseback alongside Northern Alliance cavalry

while battling al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in northern

Afghanistan on 12 November 2001.
asked General Franks about the ability of junior

special forces officers to liaise with senior Northern

Alliance leaders may have contributed to Colonel

Mulholland’s decision to assign two eight-man

battalion headquarters elements (C-teams) to help

manage command and control issues among the

principal faction leaders.55 One team, led by Army

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. Haas and

comprising several staff members, deployed on 24

October to advise General Burillah Kahn during the

Shamali Plains campaign.56 Another team, led by a

special forces battalion commander, deployed on 2

November to help General Dostam coordinate the

advance on Mazar-e Sharif.57

A Show of Force

On the same night that Task Force Dagger

infiltrated northern Afghanistan, other special

operating forces conducted a complex direct action

mission against several al-Qaeda and Taliban targets

in southern Afghanistan. The members of Task

Force Sword were part of a composite organization

composed of special mission units from U.S. Joint

Special Operations Command and attached special

operation forces from the United Kingdom.58 While

coordinating the interagency effort in Afghanistan

to include organizations like the CIA, Defense

Intelligence Agency, Special Operations Task Force

Delta, and Navy Special Warfare, Task Force Sword

would concentrate on gathering intelligence and

eliminating individual terrorist threats.

Although each objective was operationally

significant, compelling al-Qaeda and the Taliban to

retain combat forces in the south, the strategic

purpose of the raids was to demonstrate that

America could project its military power at will and

emphasize that there were no safe havens for

terrorists in Afghanistan.59 With the nation anxiously

awaiting the commitment of ground forces in

retaliation for the terrorist attacks, this message was

as meaningful for American’s citizens as it was for

its enemies. The domestic importance of such

information had been anticipated a month earlier,

and General Myers was now provided with video

clips of the operation that he presented during a

press briefing the following afternoon.60

58

FROM THE SEA

Detachment Date Location Northern Alliance Leader

ODA 555 19 Oct Panjshir Valley General Shariff

ODA 595 19 Oct Darya-ye Suf Valley General Dostam

ODA 585 23 Oct Kunduz General Burilla Kahn

ODA 553 2 Nov Bamyan General Karim Khalili

ODA 534 4 Nov Darya and Balkh Valleys General Atta Mohammad

ODA 586 8 Nov Farkhar General Daoud Khan

ODA 594 8 Nov Panjshir Valley General Shariff

ODA 554 11 Nov Herat General Ismail Khan

ODA 574 14 Nov Tarin Kowt Hamid Karzai

ODA 583 18 Nov Shin Narai Valley Gul Agha Sharzai

Table 4: Special Forces Units Inserted into Afghanistan to Assist Indigenous Militias54
The first phase of Task Force Sword’s raid

operation was to seize a dirt landing strip

(codenamed Objective Rhino) in the remote southcentral desert and then establish a temporary forward

arming and refueling point for a follow-on raid force

that would pass through Rhino on its way to the

primary target in Kandahar.61 Initially established as

a United Arab Emirates hunting camp, Objective

Rhino possessed several primitive outbuildings, and

a walled compound containing reinforced concrete

structures and guard towers was located at the

southern end of the 6,400-foot-long runway.

National intelligence agencies had monitored the

facility since the late 1990s, when Osama bin Laden

was reported to have resided nearby.62

The insertion of a small U.S. Army pathfinder

team, who provided reconnaissance of Objective

Rhino and confirmed that the airfield was clear of

Taliban forces, initiated the operation.63 This was

followed by preassault fires delivered by U.S. Air

Force pilots flying Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit

stealth bombers and AC-130 gunships.64 Then,

around 2315 local time, approximately 200 soldiers

from the 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment (Task

Force 3/75), conducted a night parachute jump from

four Lockheed MC-130 Hercules transports from the

U.S. Air Force 16th Special Operations Wing.65

As Ranger Company A secured the airfield

perimeter and established a blocking position to

repel a potential counterattack, Ranger Company C

cleared the walled compound and buildings. The

first support aircraft landed 14 minutes into the

operation, and 6 minutes later, the transient raid

force’s helicopters began to arrive. Although the

rangers sustained only two injuries during the

parachute drop, 11 enemy soldiers were reportedly

killed by preparatory fires, and another was shot

during the ground assault while orbiting gunships

engaged several vehicles and foot mobile

reinforcements as the operation progressed. Having

accomplished its mission, Task Force 3/75 boarded

MC-130 transports and withdrew from Objective

Rhino after a little over five hours on the ground.66

A month later, Marines and sailors from Naval

Expeditionary Task Force 58 would reoccupy

Objective Rhino. Although the expeditionary task

force had not yet been formally established when the

rangers seized the desert airfield, both General Franks

and his deputy later recalled that the two raids were

operationally linked. In the first account, Franks wrote

that “the goal of the rangers would be to secure the

field as a lodgment for U.S. Marines, our first

conventional forces in Afghanistan.”67 In the second,

Lieutenant General DeLong wrote that the rangers

had built the runway and enabled the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) to fly in from carriers

off the Pakistani coast.68 When questioned after the

fact, however, neither Lieutenant General Newbold,

director of operations for the Joint Staff, nor Colonel

Fitzgerald, chief of plans at Central Command, were

aware that such a relationship existed.69

While Ranger Companies A and C were

assaulting Objective Rhino, rangers from Company

B were conducting parachute and helicopter

insertions into another remote airfield in Dalbandin,

Pakistan. Their mission was to establish a support

site (codenamed Objective Honda) for contingency

operations related to Rhino. One MH-60 Black

Hawk helicopter, disoriented by adverse flying

conditions encountered while landing, hit hard, lost

a wheel, and rolled onto its side. Tragically, Specialist

John J. Edmunds, USA, and Private First Class

Kristofor T. Stonesifer, USA, died in the accident

and three others were injured.70

After refueling at Rhino, the primary raid force

continued on to Objective Gecko, a residential

compound belonging to Mullah Mohammed Omar,

on the outskirts of Kandahar.71 The complex

included a brick house used by the reclusive Taliban

leader and several thatched huts for a small security

force.72 The purpose of the raid was to capture key

personnel, gather intelligence, and disrupt the

Taliban’s command and control systems.73 Following

preparatory fires delivered by Specter gunships and

Black Hawk helicopters, 91 special operations

personnel disembarked from four Chinook

helicopters with their assault vehicles.74

59

Striking Back
Establishing security positions, the special

operations forces stormed the compound and

began clearing buildings. As the raiders exited the

buildings, they came under intense Taliban small

arms and either rocket-propelled grenade or mortar

fire. While several smaller groups remained behind

to cover their withdrawal and Black Hawk

helicopters provided close air support, the main

assault force worked its way back to the waiting

Chinook helicopters. Approximately an hour after

initiating the assault, the final ground elements

departed Kandahar.75

Although the mission was a strategic success as

a show of force, and, according to one account, may

have left as many as 30 Taliban dead in its wake,

Mullah Omar was not present, and subsequent

media reports about the quality of the intelligence

gathered during the operation varied.76 Furthermore, 12 soldiers had apparently been wounded

during the ensuing firefight, and one aircraft had

smashed its undercarriage while pulling away from

the compound during extraction; the Taliban would

later display part of the damaged landing gear as a

trophy.77

Problems encountered during the Kandahar

raid reportedly led to controversy among some of

the special operations forces who resented being

subordinate to General Franks and Central

Command and complained that the large-scale

operation had been too deliberate and provided the

Taliban with an opportunity to react.78 These

complaints subsequently “triggered a review of

commando tactics and procedures at Central

Command,” while “British military authorities

assigned to CentCom [U.S. Central Command] were

urging the Pentagon to forgo its airborne operations

inside Afghanistan and bring the war to the Taliban

by establishing a large fire base in Afghanistan.”79

Task Force Bald Eagle

During the week preceding Task Force Sword’s

raid, the 15th MEU had received an ambiguous

warning order to be prepared to provide a quick

reaction force or conduct the tactical recovery of

aircraft and personnel in support of the special

operating forces. At first the Marines did not know

who was conducting the operation, much less when

and where it would occur, and limited requests for

their helicopters and aerial refueling capability made

them feel like little more than a resource pool for

piecemeal exploitation.80 The situation became clearer

after the 15th MEU’s executive officer, Lieutenant

Colonel Kevin Spillers, and two captains from the air

and ground combat elements traveled to Masirah

Island, Oman, to personally liaise with Task Force

Sword. After linking up with two Marine officers

already assigned to the Joint Staff, they were able to

open secure communications with the amphibious

ready group and relay information necessary for

planning how to best support the operation.

The liaison team learned that the Marines were

needed to provide a tertiary quick reaction force to

reinforce the rangers’ primary and secondary

reserves, should they both become committed

during the raid on Mullah Omar’s residence in

Kandahar.81 The crisis action team assembled on 15

October, and Lieutenant Colonel James R.

Parrington, Battalion Landing Team 1/1’s (BLT

1/1’s) executive officer, informed Captain Richard

W. Whitmer that Company B was being assigned the

ground combat portion of the mission.82 According

to First Lieutenant Nathaniel C. Fick, who

commanded the company’s weapons platoon, their

mission statement read as follows:

On order, Task Force Bald Eagle launches from

PEL in 4 x CH-53 to OBJ RHINO, links up

with Task Force SWORD mobile reserve, and

conducts relief in place. Defend RHINO with

Bravo Company for up to twenty-four hours.

O/o turn over OBJ RHINO to Task Force

SWORD and withdraw to ARG shipping.83

On 18 October, the 15th MEU successfully

delivered the confirmation brief for its portion of

the operation to U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command (NavCent).84

As the operation unfolded, the expeditionary

unit commander, Colonel Waldhauser, and his

60

FROM THE SEA
operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Olson, were

allowed to monitor Task Force Sword’s progress on

a receive-only radio station that had been set to the

mission commander’s net. Although a U.S. Navy

SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) was on hand to help

translate some of the more obscure communications,

security requirements precluded anyone else’s

presence in the landing force operations center.*

Nearby, 16 infantrymen from BLT 1/1 and 4

aircrews from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

(HMM-163) stood by on a 120-minute strip alert,

ready to launch if necessary.85 Some of the Marines

anxiously monitored the mission’s progress from the

tactical logistics group’s compartment, presumably

on a different radio frequency, while others tried to

get a few minutes rest.86

Colonel Olson described the vicarious experience of listening in on another unit’s operation,

which was invaluable as a source of situational

awareness but gave rise to an uncomfortable sense

of voyeurism:

As we were following along with the mission,

in real time, we heard the helicopter go down

on the insert of the Dalbandin airfield in

western Pakistan. A helicopter “browned out”

and crashed, and two Army soldiers were killed.

As important, a helicopter saying “USA” on the

side was now down in western Pakistan.

Pakistanis didn’t want it there; we didn’t want it

there. We had shades of Desert One** with

crashed helicopters.... When we heard the

helicopter go down, Colonel Waldhauser and I

looked at each other, and it’s kind of significant

we were the only two who were listening to the

radio that night.87

NavCent contacted the Peleliu Amphibious

Ready Group around 0300 that morning, asking if it

could retrieve the special operations forces’ downed

61

Striking Back

*The U.S. Navy Special Warfare Command is composed of four groups; each group possesses two 300-man SEAL teams. Depending upon operational

requirements, the teams normally deploy as troops, platoons, squads, or fire teams.

**Desert One refers to the failed U.S. military rescue mission of Americans held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran.

Photo by Spec Jerry T. Combes, USA. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050622-a-0363c-019

A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter similar to the aircraft damaged during Task Force Sword’s October 2001 raid on Kandahar and

subsequently recovered from Pakistan by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
Black Hawk helicopter. Although initially prepared

to provide a quick reaction force, 15th MEU’s

mission had suddenly changed to the tactical

recovery of aircraft and personnel. Its crisis action

planning team convened 20 minutes later.88 Working

from generic contingency plans with predetermined

refueling procedures, communication networks, and

security strategies, they quickly devised a workable

course of action and delivered their confirmation

brief.89 One significant change, requested by the

special operations forces, was to leave the Marine

security element behind. The reasons for this request

were twofold: first, they were flying into a Pakistani

airfield already occupied by rangers, and second, they

wanted to use their own security personnel from the

Kitty Hawk, which was currently serving as a floating

forward operations base off the Pakistani coast.90

The recovery force, a section of two CH-53E

Super Stallion helicopters commanded by Captain

Jay M. Holtermann, launched from the USS Peleliu

around 0500. As the sun began to appear over the

horizon, they headed toward Dalbandin, 300 miles

to the north. They stopped briefly at an intermediate

staging base in Shamsi, Pakistan, (otherwise known

as Forward Operating Base Impala) to pick up

several Army aircraft mechanics to assist in

dismantling the damaged Black Hawk and slinging it

for an external extraction.

After taking on fuel from an airborne KC-130

Hercules tanker, they reached Dalbandin and

recovered the helicopter hulk, most of its

component parts, and the Army security forces

without incident.91 Corporal Jose M. Pazos, a landing

support specialist explained, “The Black Hawk is a

very heavy bird, and we needed to get it as light as

possible for the long haul back. We gathered up all

the debris from the accident and packed it into the

other birds with the panels and things being pulled

off. Everyone was moving fast. There wasn’t any

sense of fear, just a strong sense of purpose.”92

In order to lift the 10-ton Black Hawk, the

Marine helicopters had to jettison some of the fuel

needed for the flight to the Pakistani coast. While

this could normally have been replaced through inflight refueling as the mission progressed, the heavily

laden recovery aircraft were unable to maintain the

airspeed necessary to receive fuel from another

aircraft. The solution was to stop at a hastily

established forward arming and refueling point at an

auxiliary airfield in Panjgur, Pakistan, where they

would take on fuel from another section of the

expeditionary unit’s CH-53 helicopters.93

The recovery force was the first to reach

Panjgur. While waiting for their inbound fuel supply

to arrive, the pilots met with Pakistani officials in the

control tower, the aircrew started eating lunch, and

the landing support personnel began to inspect the

damaged Black Hawk and cargo harness for

serviceability. Approximately five minutes later, 12

men wearing black robes and carrying AK-47 assault

rifles suddenly appeared atop the surrounding dunes.

The gunmen opened fire and sporadic rounds

impacted within 20 feet of the landing support

team’s position, compelling them to seek cover in a

nearby ditch. Meanwhile, the aircrew and soldiers

had also received several incoming rounds. They

quickly repositioned an armored fuel tank, salvaged

from the Black Hawk, for cover and returned fire

with M16 assault rifles and the door-mounted .50-

caliber heavy machine gun. As the pilots hastened

to start the helicopter’s engines for an emergency

takeoff, one of the soldiers sprinted 200 meters to

cover the landing support team’s withdrawal and

conceal their movement with smoke.94

Captain Holtermann decided to abort the

recovery and temporarily abandoned the damaged

Black Hawk in Panjgur. The helicopters lifted off as

soon as he had accounted for all personnel, but they

were running out of fuel and unable to notify the

inbound aircraft of the change in plans. Fortunately,

the two flights crossed paths, and direct communication was finally established, enabling them to

designate an alternate refueling position along the

coast in Pasni, Pakistan. After refueling in record time

(approximately 20 minutes), the aircraft and crews

returned safely to the amphibious ready group.95

62

FROM THE SEA
Although the 15th MEU began immediate

preparations for a more robust, forcible recovery

effort the following day, there was some discussion

regarding whether the Marines or special operations

forces would retrieve the helicopter or if the effort

was even necessary at all.96 During the first attempt,

they had worried more about dangers presented by

adverse flying conditions than by opposing forces, as

the original crash had resulted from “brownout” and

they believed they were landing at a secure airfield.

This time, however, they were returning to a location

where they had already encountered small arms fire.

The 15th MEU briefed its concept to NavCent,

intending to go in under cover of darkness with a

security force from the ground combat element, and

the plan was approved.97 Yet the U.S. ambassador to

Pakistan, Wendy J. Chamberlin, was concerned that

another encounter with hostile tribesmen might

result in the death of Pakistani nationals, perhaps

threatening President Musharraf ’s tenuous political

position and endangering the fragile alliance between

the two countries.98 NavCent subsequently came up

with a plan to delay the mission until the Pakistani

security forces could cordon off the airfield from

the general populace.99

Colonel Waldhauser, the overall mission

commander, convened the final confirmation brief at

1600 hours on 23 October, during which each of the

participants repeated his previous role in the

impending operation.100 Major Peter D. Zoretic led

the aviation element, which included three CH-53E

transport helicopters and four Bell AH-1W Super

Cobra attack helicopters flying escort. Two of the

CH-53s would carry the security force, totaling 85

Marines from Company B, while the third transport

would retrieve the damaged Black Hawk. Several

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier jets would also

be on station, ready to provide close air support if

required, as well as one of the U.S. Navy’s Lockheed

P-3 Orion maritime patrol craft for overhead

observation, and even a KC-130 to relay radio

transmissions.101 Captain Richard Whitmer led the

ground element, a rifle platoon reinforced with the

machine gun and assault sections from his company’s

weapons platoon.102 Lieutenant Colonel Parrington,

the executive officer for BLT 1/1, was also on hand

to coordinate with Pakistani military officials.103

The recovery force launched early the following

morning, heading north to Panjgur.104 On landing,

the infantry spread out to secure the perimeter

around the Black Hawk, and the Pakistani security

forces surrounded them. After explosive ordnance

disposal personnel had inspected the aircraft hulk

for booby traps, the landing support personnel

rigged it for external transport and slung it beneath

Captain Holtermann’s hovering CH-53 helicopter.

At 0500 hours, after 42 minutes on the ground, the

security element boarded its aircraft and Task Force

Bald Eagle headed south toward the Pakistani

coast.105 They returned the Black Hawk to the Kitty

Hawk at around 0630 without further incident.106

Confirming the old adage of “no rest for the

weary,” the 15th MEU also retrieved its military

police and radio battalion detachments from the

Kitty Hawk; continued security operations in

Jacobabad, Pakistan; hosted a command visit from

General James Jones, 32d Commandant of the

Marine Corps, and Sergeant Major Alford L.

McMichael, 14th Sergeant Major of the Marine

Corps; and began planning for a bilateral training

exercise in Djibouti on the same day the they

recovered the downed Black Hawk.107 Little did they

know this was only the beginning of their

involvement in Afghanistan.

63

Striking Back

65

Despite reorientation of the bombing

campaign on 16 October and the

subsequent arrival of special forces

teams in Afghanistan on the 19th, the anticipated

Northern Alliance offensive was slow to materialize.

Meanwhile, the number of Taliban forces facing

General Mohammad Fahim Khan in the northeast

had continued to increase by up to 50 percent. This

apparent lack of progress continued to plague the

Bush administration’s plans for a late autumn victory

and added to the war council’s growing unease. On

23 October, amid continued debate concerning where

to focus the Coalition’s military resources, Vice

President Cheney asked if the United States should

wait for the Northern Alliance to advance or simply

go ahead with conventional forces. In some regards,

this was almost becoming a rhetorical question, as

Central Command was already developing contingency plans for deploying approximately 50,000

ground troops into Afghanistan.1

On 25 October, Dr. Rice privately asked

President Bush if he wanted to consider sending in

several Army or Marine divisions during the spring.

The president replied that it was too early in the

campaign to begin second-guessing their initial

strategy, and the following day he urged his advisors

to “be confident but patient.” Yet only a day later,

Secretary Rumsfeld checked with General Franks to

ensure that Central Command was preparing for the

possibility of a major land war. During a National

Security Council meeting on 2 November, Franks

acknowledged that he and the Joint Chiefs were

exploring options for a more direct U.S. role in

Afghanistan, and he committed to presenting

tentative courses of action the following week.2

The lack of discernable progress raised

concerns outside the White House as well.3 The

media, for one, had become increasingly skeptical of

the campaign strategy, with one reporter at the New

York Times comparing the developing stalemate to

the quagmire faced in Vietnam.4 Legislative officials

also started to criticize the intensity of the campaign,

with Senators John S. McCain III (R-AZ) and John F.

Kerry (D-MA), for example, calling for an escalation

of the air war and potential employment of ground

forces.5 Equally dismayed by the operational delays,

senior members of the military began to quietly

debate the prosecution of the war among

themselves.6 The central question within the halls of

the Pentagon was if the air attacks, commando raids,

and indigenous ground assault would ultimately

prove to be a decisive combination in defeating the

Taliban and al-Qaeda.7 On 1 November, Secretary

Rumsfeld responded to America’s growing

uncertainty with a reality check—he reiterated that

this was a different kind of war, that it would take

time to achieve America’s global objectives, and that

significant progress had been made in the three

weeks following the terrorist attacks.8

Spoiling for a Fight

MarCent-Tampa

Shortly after General Franks rejected U.S.

Marine Corps Forces Central Command’s

(MarCent’s) offer of assistance in mid-September,

General Castellaw and his staff began to consider

ways to better represent the case for Marine Corps

involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom. If

their efforts were driven by doctrine, they were

probably influenced more by the expeditionary

nature of the special purpose Marine air-ground task

forces than the formal constructs developed for the

expeditionary units, brigades, and forces. The

inherent utility of this ad hoc formation rested in

the ability to train, organize, and equip a temporary

task force to accomplish a specific mission at a

particular time and place.9 Although traditionally

Chapter 4

Changing Plans
smaller than the permanent Marine expeditionary

forces, brigades, and units, and usually oriented

toward addressing emerging civil emergencies, the

special purpose task force could involve larger

organizations focused on warfighting.10 Indeed, that

was the rationale behind the “scalable” and

“tailorable” aspects of the task force hierarchy, a

nuance of expeditionary maneuver warfare, that may

have been lost to General Franks and his Armyheavy staff at Central Command.11

Working with available forces, they devised a plan

for assembling a composite amphibious brigade that

Central Command could maneuver and employ as

necessary. Although they had not envisioned a specific

mission for the brigade, Castellaw later noted that

there was growing operational interest in both

Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa at the time. In

addition to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the

MarCent staff proposed incorporating vessels from

the British, Australian, and Dutch navies, which were

also seeking to play a role in the war. While Operation

Enduring Freedom would eventually take on a

cosmopolitan air, Castellaw reflected that Central

Command did not seem to be very interested in its

Coalition partners, perhaps because it would have been

much more difficult to coordinate a multinational

effort. The MarCent staff recorded details of their

plan on a white board and pitched the concept to

anyone who happened to stop by their office.12

1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade

During the same period, Brigadier General

James N. Mattis and more than 2,200 Marines from

the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (1st MEB)

were participating in Exercise Bright Star in Egypt.

Two years in the planning, this biannual,

multinational military exercise was the world’s largest

joint war game and involved 65,000 personnel from

25 different nations, including Egypt, France, Italy,

Greece, Spain, Kuwait, Germany, Great Britain, and

Jordan.13 Because the United States was currently

prosecuting its war against terrorism in Afghanistan,

carrying off an exercise of this scope and nature

held even greater strategic significance than it did

during previous years. In addition to providing cover

for the staging of additional personnel and

equipment in the Middle East, it also demonstrated

that America would not shy away from its

international commitments.14

As a case in point, during his predeployment

brief to brigade personnel at Twentynine Palms,

California, on 21 September, General Mattis had

emphasized that their individual professionalism

would convey a message to the world that there is

“no better friend, no worse enemy” than a U.S.

Marine.15 The troops took note. On 14 October,

following a live-fire breaching exercise during Bright

Star, Lieutenant General Delong commented, “This

is exactly what the chief of training wanted. He

wanted the Egyptian leadership to see that the U.S.

military can break through any obstacle, anywhere,

and how to do it.”16

66

FROM THE SEA

Photo by MSgt Buzz Farrell.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 030328-M-0049F-030

On 1 November 2001, while serving as the commanding

general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

(Forward), BGen James N. Mattis took charge of all

amphibious forces in theater and formed them into Naval

Expeditionary Task Force 58. His sailors and Marines

subsequently conducted the first major deployment of

conventional forces into Afghanistan, established Forward

Operating Base Rhino to the enemy’s rear, and then occupied

Kandahar International Airport.
Beyond the strategic realm, General Mattis had

also knowingly warned both his staff and brigade to

take Bright Star seriously, as it might serve as a

precursor to combat action in Central Command’s

theater of operations. At the beginning of August,

for example, Mattis had encountered Lieutenant

Colonel Clarke R. Lethin at Weapons Training

Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California. The two men

had served together a decade earlier as commanding

and executive officers at Recruiting Station Portland,

Oregon, and Mattis now predicted, “I don’t know

where it is, but we are going to do something, and I

want you to come along.”17

On 3 October, General Mattis and his small

personal staff settled in for the long flight to Egypt.

In addition to his aide, Lieutenant Warren C. Cook

Jr., the general was also accompanied by two

planners, Lieutenant Colonel Lethin and Major

Michael P. Mahaney. Mattis spread a variety of

documents on the floor of the aircraft and said,

“Okay, this is what we’re going to do. We’re going

to get over there and form a very small team... and

we’re going to start thinking about what we are

going to do to go kick some ass.”18

During the first three days following their arrival

on 5 October, the small operational planning team

began to explore contingency possibilities in earnest.

With the exception of Major Mahaney, who until

recently had been a I Marine Expeditionary Force (I

MEF) staff officer working on the Bright Star field

training exercise, the team’s members remained

divorced from the ongoing operation.19 Sequestered

in a partitioned portion of a canvas general-purpose

tent in the Mubarak Military City complex situated

outside Alexandria, they reviewed information

supplied by the I MEF intelligence section and

gleaned from Marine contacts at Central Command.20

One of these contacts was Brigadier General

Castellaw, who happened to be in Egypt with

members of his MarCent staff for the Bright Star

67

Changing Plans

Photo by SrA D. Myles Cullen, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011014-F-0193C-004

Elements of 1st Tank Battalion roll into position on a range outside of Mubarak Military City, Egypt, on 14 October 2001. The

Marines conducted an in-stride breech during Bright Star 01/02, a multinational training exercise designed to enhance regional

stability and cooperation between the United States and its allies.
exercise. Castellaw recalled that he and Mattis talked

frequently, visited, shot the breeze, drank coffee, and

e-mailed when they were apart. It was easy for him

to communicate with Mattis because of Mattis’s

personality and the fact that they were in the same

peer group.21 According to Mattis, it was during one

of these informal conversations, while sharing a soda

under a palm tree, that Castellaw first raised the

notion of a composite amphibious brigade.22

Castellaw recalled, “My grand scheme was, ‘Okay

Mattis, you can be the MEB commander... but I

want to be on the staff at... Bahrain and Fifth Fleet

headquarters, and I’ll be MarCent Forward.’” He

added with a hint of disappointment, “I don’t know

the reason why, but as we were transplanting

[MarCent headquarters in Bahrain] I was told to get

off the airplane and come back.”23 This was likely

related to the fact that on 25 October, U.S. Pacific

Command transferred operational control of its

Marine assets to Central Command for the duration

of Operation Enduring Freedom.24 In addition to

refocusing Lieutenant General Earl B. Hailston’s

attention on Central Asia and the Middle East,

Central Command eventually ordered MarCent to

deploy its headquarters to Bahrain in order to provide

in-theater component level command and control. It

accomplished this move on 17 January 2002.25

Working in close proximity forced Major

Mahaney, an artillery officer and graduate of both

the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff

College and the School of Advanced Military

Studies, and Colonel Lethin, an infantry officer and

graduate of the Marine Command and Staff

68

FROM THE SEA

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Diagram 5: Navy and Marine command relationships and the contribution of maritime forces comprising Naval Expeditionary

Task Force 58. Although Marine forces in Afghanistan came under operational control of the Combined Forces Land Component

Command during December 2001, the Maritime Component Command retained control over those forces remaining in Pakistan

or at sea.
College, to negotiate their working relationship.

Although minor tensions initially existed between

the two planners, they capitalized on shared

experiences and quickly defined complementary

roles for one another. Synthesizing form (Mahaney)

and function (Lethin), the two officers were able to

develop an abbreviated planning process* that would

serve them well during future operations. Although

they had begun to familiarize themselves with the

Taliban center of gravity near Kandahar, it was not

their main priority and no one had yet raised the idea

of conducting helicopter raids from Pakistan.26

By 9 October, the planning team had begun to

focus on two particular possibilities. The first,

Combined Joint Task Force Consequence Management, was a Central Command initiative to establish

an initial response force at Camp Doha, Kuwait, to

assess, secure, and assist host nations in dealing with

nuclear, chemical, or biological emergencies that

might occur in their area of responsibility. The

second, expeditionary unit-level amphibious

operations along the coast of Somalia, involved

speculations regarding possible missions, available

resources, and how they might influence action in the

region if given an opportunity to participate.** As the

contingency plans began to solidify, members of the

brigade staff occasionally augmented General Mattis’s

personal staff and the planning effort. Lieutenant

69

Changing Plans

Photo by Sgt Thomas Michael Corcoran

Sgt John D. Barto guides his assault vehicle to the beach during an amphibious capabilities demonstration conducted by

Battalion Landing Team 3/6 near Mubarak Military City, Egypt, on 24 October 2001. The Marines were participating in Bright

Star 01/02, a multinational exercise designed to develop cooperation and promote stability within the region.

*Col Lethin likened the abbreviated planning process developed by Task Force 58 to the rapid response planning process traditionally employed by the

Marine expeditionary units. (Lethin-Broadmeadow interview)

**Unbeknownst to the small planning team, staff officers at I MEF were developing a similar, but significantly larger, brigade-sized operation within

Central Command’s area of responsibility. (Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw)
Colonel Steven P. Martinson represented intelligence,

Lieutenant Colonel John J. Broadmeadow represented logistics, and Major Scott E. Stebbins represented

communications.27

On the same day as the Bright Star breaching

exercise, General Mattis, who was already serving in

a dual billet as commander of the 1st Marine

Brigade and deputy commanding general for I MEF,

was also designated as the commanding general for

Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (Forward),

and Combined Joint Task Force Consequence

Management. As the Service component

commander’s leading representative, Mattis was now

responsible for ensuring the proper employment of

all Marine forces in Central Command’s theater of

operations, as well as providing necessary administrative and logistical support.

In a roundabout way, the assignment of so many

responsibilities to one individual made sense. First

MEB was derived from I MEF, commanded by

Lieutenant General Michael W. Hagee; in turn, I MEF

was one of two subordinate elements assigned to

Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MarForPac),

commanded by Lieutenant General Earl B. Hailston,

who himself was dual billeted as the commander of

MarCent. As a collateral duty, I MEF was subsequently required to provide an on-call consequence

management capability to both U.S. Central and

Pacific Commands.28 Therefore, the responsibility for

overseeing MarCent forces, expeditionary or

otherwise, fell to General Mattis, as the senior Marine

in theater. Shortly after learning of his new

assignments, General Mattis sent a portion of the 1st

MEB staff home to prepare for an extended

deployment to Kuwait, while a 12-man quartering

party headed directly to Camp Doha to prepare for

follow-on forces at the conclusion of Bright Star.29

On 26 October, as 1st MEB’s role in Bright Star

ended, General Mattis and his personal staff traveled

through Cairo, Egypt, to Naval Support Activity,

Bahrain.30 After reaching the tiny island nation the

following day, Mattis made an in-call with Vice

Admiral Charles W. Moore. The admiral, in addition

to commanding the Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval

Forces Central Command (NavCent), was also the

region’s Combined Forces Maritime Component

commander. Mattis later recalled that Moore “was

very aggressive, very supportive. He’s a fighting

admiral. He was very comfortable with his authority

and power and not restrained in his thinking about

how we could get naval forces into Afghanistan. He

was a superb leader.”31

Mattis and his tiny entourage also introduced

themselves to the NavCent staff and MarCent

Coordination Element, headed by Colonel John B.

Kiser.32 In anticipation of future amphibious

operations, General Mattis offered to augment the

NavCent staff with his Marine planners. The

compartmentalized Navy staff was leery of

outsiders, so he advised his officers to maintain a

low profile until they could establish a working

relationship. Fortunately, they soon encountered

Lieutenant Colonel Jerry D. Howell, a I MEF liaison

officer assigned to NavCent’s Future Plans section,

who helped them build rapport and gain access to

the Navy community.33

On 30 October, NavCent hosted a nine-man

planning team to share information and begin mission

analysis for potential interdiction or noncombatant

evacuation operations along the Horn of Africa.34

From General Mattis’s staff were the two Bright Star

planners, Lethin and Mahaney. From NavCent’s

Future Plans section were Howell, the I MEF liaison

officer; Lieutenant Colonel John W. Carl, a MarCent

liaison officer; and three Navy officers—Captain

Richard Hascup, Commander Thomas J. Lafferty, and

Lieutenant Michael E. Prall. Lafferty and Lethin were

already familiar with one another, having attended

Command and Staff College together at Quantico,

Virginia. Captain Damien L. Spooner, a Marine

assigned to NavCent’s amphibious operations

intelligence staff, provided intelligence representation.

Major Brian L. Magnuson, officer-in-charge of the

15th MEU’s KC-130 aircraft detachment, drove an

hour from Shaik Isa Air Base to participate.35

70

FROM THE SEA
Of the initial questions faced by the planning

team, the primary concern was to identify the

availability of operational forces and any logistical

shortfalls that might inhibit their employment. The

planning team’s immediate need was to request a

second amphibious group from another theater of

operations, as they envisioned a task force consisting

of two amphibious ready groups. In addition to the

composite organization’s organic resources, the

planners also surmised that they would require four

additional CH-53 helicopters to transport the

landing force, two additional KC-130 aircraft to

sustain operations ashore, and enhanced medical

capabilities to treat the wounded. At this time, the

additional KC-130 aircraft that Colonel Waldhauser

had previously requested to support tentative

evacuation operations in Pakistan had not yet arrived

in theater due to force flow issues. Anticipating the

imminent formation of an amphibious task force,

the planners submitted a request to Fifth Fleet for

forces based on their initial assumptions.36

USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group

In addition to conducting security operations

at Jacobabad, the Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group

was directed on 28 October to prepare for the

possibility of augmenting security for the World

Trade Organization conference, which was scheduled for early November in Doha, Qatar. While

visiting the USS Peleliu two days later, Gordon R.

England, secretary of the Navy, hinted that the

group might assume a more offensive role in the

future. He emphasized to the crew that the war

against terrorism was going to be a protracted affair

and that it would require the deployment of

conventional forces ashore.37 The Marines and

sailors of the ready group were more than ready. As

Colonel Waldhauser later explained, after having

planned for or participated in such a wide range of

contingencies during the first half of its deployment, the 15th MEU had already encountered many

of the issues it would face while operating in

Afghanistan.38

USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

The USS Bataan* (LHD 5) Amphibious Ready

Group (Bataan ARG) was operating in the

Mediterranean as part of Sixth Fleet and U.S.

European Command. Although not yet committed

71

Changing Plans

*Capt Martin R. Allard, USN, whose father-in-law had participated in the infamous Bataan Death March during World War II, commanded the Bataan. LtCol

Kevin M. DeVore, 15th MEU’s aviation combat element commander, recalled, “In Captain Allard’s eyes, the Marines . . . were special and deserved anything

they asked for. . . . The Bataan was the most professional and most fun ship, crew, and support that I ever experienced in my career.” (DeVore comments)

Photo by PO3 Kleynia R. McKnight, USN.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 061203-N-WJ362-125 

The helicopter assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5). Commanded

by Captain Kenneth M. Rome, USN, the Bataan Amphibious

Ready Group transferred from the Sixth to the Fifth Fleets

during the opening months of Operation Enduring Freedom

to augment Task Force 58 in Afghanistan.
72

FROM THE SEA

to supporting operations in Afghanistan, General

Mattis had expressed an interest in the unit’s

capabilities while he was in Egypt, and the planning

team speculated that the ready group would

eventually transfer to Central Command’s theater of

operations. Amphibious Squadron 8, commanded

by Captain Kenneth M. Rome, provided the Navy

component and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(26th MEU), commanded by Colonel Andrew P.

Frick, provided the Marine component.

 When the terrorists attacked on 11 September,

Marines and sailors of the 26th MEU were

approaching the last day of their predeployment

leave period. After receiving a directive from U.S.

Joint Forces Command, all personnel were

immediately recalled, and the Bataan ARG stood by

to provide domestic support to New York City. The

call to steam north from Norfolk did not come,

however, and the ready group began its transatlantic

voyage on 20 September.39

On 1 October, the Bataan ARG joined Sixth

Fleet in Rota, Spain. Following a brief turnover with

the outgoing group, it continued east across the

Mediterranean to the Egyptian coast. Arriving on 10

October, the Marines and sailors participated in

Exercise Bright Star for the next two weeks. Their

role culminated in an amphibious capabilities

demonstration on 23 October that General Jones,

Commandant of the Marine Corps, observed.

General Jones was not the only senior officer to visit

the ready group during the exercise: Lieutenant

General Delong, Brigadier General Mattis, and

Egyptian General Amin visited the Bataan on 18

October.40 Occasions like this provided an

opportunity for General Mattis and Colonel Frick to

establish a working relationship that would facilitate

future operations.41

Although alluring rumors of a transfer to the

Fifth Fleet began to surface within the 26th MEU

during Exercise Bright Star, the command remained

focused on its European Command mission.42 After

completing its portion of the exercise on 24

October, the Bataan ARG headed north to conduct

port calls in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Members of

the staff attended a maritime interdiction

conference, conducted a Kosovo Forces leader’s

reconnaissance, and continued to plan for training

exercises in Albania and Israel and for the potential

evacuation of noncombatant personnel from U.S.

embassies in Syria and Lebanon.

Indications that the Bataan ARG’s situation

was about to change began to appear on 30

October, when it was asked to consider the

feasibility of replacing the USS Kitty Hawk battle

Diagram 6: USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group
group in the North Arabian Sea. At that time, the

aircraft carrier was serving as a floating forward

support base for the 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment (Airborne), which was then

serving in Afghanistan. If carried out, this

reassignment would involve an offload of the 26th

MEU at an undetermined port facility.43

73

Changing Plans

Official Marine Corps photo

Major subordinate element commanders of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit pose in front of the main terminal at Kandahar

International Airport. Standing from left to right are LtCol Jerome M. Lynes, commander of Battalion Landing Team 3/6; LtCol

Kevin M. DeVore, commander of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365; and LtCol William M. Faulkner, commander of MEU

Service Support Group 26.

75

By early November, Task Force Dagger

had been operating in Afghanistan for

several weeks, coordinating massive air

attacks that demoralized the Taliban and al-Qaeda

while simultaneously energizing the Northern

Alliance.1 Although Taliban and al-Qaeda forces had

initially responded to the attacks by reinforcing their

positions, they quickly learned that this only provided

additional targets for prowling Coalition aircraft.*

Once Coalition forces had tipped the scales in their

favor, the opposing strongholds began to fall like

dominoes. In the northwest, Taliban forces gradually

withdrew to Mazar-e Sharif, where they outnumbered

the attacking Northern Alliance fighters by eight to

one. This resulted in a stalemate that was resolved

through the use of Coalition air power, eventually

enabling General Dostam’s resistance fighters to seize

the city on 10 November.2 In the north-central area,

General Daoud Khan’s forces secured Taloqan on 11

November and Kunduz on 23 November. To the

northeast, General Fahim Kahn’s forces pushed

south from Bagram to liberate the Afghan capital city

of Kabul on 14 November.3 As each of these strongholds fell, retreating Taliban and al-Qaeda forces fled

in disarray toward either Kandahar to the south or

the cave-riddled mountains to the east.

Chapter 5

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

Courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History

Map of Major U.S. Special Forces Operations, October 2001–

March 2002.

Courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History

During November 2001, U.S. Army Special Forces from Task

Force Dagger direct close air support to facilitate Northern

Alliance attacks against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in

Kunduz, Afghanistan.

*Through late November, naval aviators provided the vast majority of tactical air support used in Afghanistan, operating from the aircraft carriers USS Enterprise,

Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, and John C Stennis. The Kitty Hawk served as a sea base for special operations forces working in southern Afghanistan.
This sudden change in the balance of power

created new concerns over ethnic conflict, security

for the capital city, and preventing the enemy’s

escape. On 12 November, as Kabul was about to

fall, Secretary Rumsfeld reminded other members

of the cabinet that U.S. Marines were stationed off

the Pakistani coast, and they could help stabilize the

situation in the capital city.4 A more international

appearance was apparently preferred, and three days

later American and British special operating forces

welcomed the arrival of 100 British Royal Marines to

the Bagram airfield.5

Sometime between late October and early

November, as the Northern Alliance gathered

momentum and the balance of power began to shift,

Lieutenant General Newbold, the Joint Staff ’s

director of operations, and Army Lieutenant

General John P. Abizaid, the Joint Staff ’s director of

plans and policy, approached Air Force General

Myers, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. They asked Myers to contact General Franks

and recommend that he open additional fronts in

southern and eastern Afghanistan.* Newbold had

already suggested the idea of a second front to his

counterpart at Central Command, Air Force Major

General Victor E. Renuart Jr., but had not yet

received any indication that they would pursue the

advised course of action.6

Although General Myers initially declined to

intervene in a combatant commander’s affairs,

Generals Newbold and Abizaid persisted. They felt

that the Coalition possessed a narrowing window of

opportunity in which to undermine the Taliban’s

command and control network and bring about an

early moral or mental collapse. Myers eventually

signed a message to General Franks that encouraged

him to consider opening a second front. Ultimately,

Franks ordered Admiral Moore to deploy his

Marines into southern Afghanistan.7

General Franks commented in his memoir that

Central Command “pushed strategy up” rather than

waited for Washington to “push tactics down.”8 He

76

FROM THE SEA

Associated Press

Northern Alliance militiamen cheer as they ride a tank

through Kabul, Afghanistan, on 13 November 2001. Taliban

troops had abandoned the capital city without a fight,

retreating to safety under the cover of darkness.

Official Marine Corps photo

LtGen Gregory S. Newbold, Director of Operations for the Joint

Staff (October 2000–October 2002). During the first month of

Operation Enduring Freedom, as Northern Alliance victories

against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces mounted, he championed

the opening of a second front in southern Afghanistan. A month

later, he also advocated the buildup of Marine forces ashore to

engage the enemy and block avenues of escape into Pakistan.

*This was not a unique position. Most members of the Joint Staff believed that Coalition forces needed to unhinge the Taliban’s defenses at Kandahar by

positioning a sizable force to their rear. Kandahar was the Taliban’s spiritual center, and they enjoyed much greater popular support there than they had

possessed in the occupied cities of northern Afghanistan. (Crist comments)
continued, “While Dick Myers and [Marine General]

Pete Pace, the vice chairman, were quick to provide

support and slow to critique, a number of officers

on the Joint Staff were on their own tactical

wavelengths, and it was these officers who were the

focus of my strategic ‘push’.”9 General Newbold,

who acknowledged that he was probably one of the

meddlesome staff officers criticized by Franks, held

a different opinion.10

Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (15th MEU) maintained an intense operational

tempo during the first half of November. At one

point, elements from each of the three subordinate

commands were operating simultaneously from

Jacobabad, Pakistan. A rifle company from Battalion

Landing Team 1/1 continued to provide airfield

security, logistics personnel from MEU Service

Support Group 15 (MSSG 15) and members of the

KC-130 detachment conducted sustainment

operations, and three CH-53 helicopters from

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM163) assisted with theater combat search and rescue

operations between 2 and 5 November. While on

station, the CH-53 crews also stood by as a quick

reaction force during a direct action mission

conducted by Task Force Sword on 4 November.11

Aviation operations were not restricted to those

originating from Jacobabad, Pakistan. On 3

November, four Harriers from the USS Peleliu

conducted their first bombing missions of the war.12

Although the expeditionary unit had experienced

initial resistance while attempting to get its aircraft

onto the Air Force–generated air tasking order, it

overcame that obstacle with the assistance of

Commandant Jones (who had visited the ready group

on 24 October).13 After twice receiving fuel from

airborne KC-130 tankers, the Harriers attacked a

Taliban and al-Qaeda training camp near Garmabak

Ghar with 500-pound Mk82 bombs, some of which

77

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

Photo by Scott Davis, courtesy of the Department of Defense.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: da-sc-07-24597

LtGen John P. Abizaid, USA, Director of Strategic Plans and

Policy for the Joint Staff. During the first month of Operation

Enduring Freedom, as the Northern Alliance confronted and

defeated al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, he campaigned for the

opening of a second front in southern Afghanistan.

Official Department of Defense photo

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (October 2001–October 2005). During the first month of

Operation Enduring Freedom, as the Northern Alliance

mounted victories against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, he

recommended that Central Command pursue a second front

in southern Afghanistan. A month later, he raised questions to

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld regarding a cap on Marine forces

in southern Afghanistan.
ordnance personnel had inscribed with messages

commemorating the victims of the terrorist attacks

on New York. The squadron flew two additional

missions against the camp on 5 November.14

The Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group (Peleliu

ARG) departed the North Arabian Sea on 6

November, reaching the Persian Gulf approximately

three days later. It remained on station off the coast

of Qatar through the 11th, with expeditionary unit

personnel standing by to evacuate American citizens

should terrorists strike the World Trade Organization conference. Fortunately, personnel were not

needed and the primary outcome was additional

training for the aircraft and crews on alert.15

Concurrently, a detachment of 70 Marines and

sailors from MSSG 15 participated in Exercise

Image Nautilus from 10 to 14 November. Held in

Djibouti, this humanitarian assistance operation

contributed to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

(NavCent) and Marine Forces Pacific engagement

objectives along the Horn of Africa by providing

expeditionary unit personnel an opportunity to

deliver medical and dental care to almost 1,400

patients and help repair a local clinic in Holhol

village.16 With its forces distributed between Djibouti

and Pakistan on 10 November, the 15th MEU’s area

of operations temporarily encompassed a distance

equaling the width of the United States.17

For their part, Marines of the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (26th MEU) initially remained

tied to the Sixth Fleet and European Command

missions: supporting North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) operations in Kosovo,

participating in a bilateral training exercise in

Albania, and planning for another training exercise

in Israel. From 3 to 10 November, their focus was

primarily on planning and preparing for the

engagement exercise involving live fire and

maneuver training and a naval surface fire support

shoot with Albanian military forces.18

Unified Command

On 29 October, Central Command released its

30-60-90 day plan for Operation Enduring Freedom,

as well as Operations Order 002-02 for the conduct

of phase II, stage 2 operations in Afghanistan.19

General Mattis traveled to Kuwait the following day

to assess conditions at Camp Doha. This was to be

the first of many visits, as he intended to commute

between Kuwait and Bahrain while juggling his dual

role as commanding general of Marine Corps

Forces Central Command (Forward) and Joint Task

Force Consequence Management. However,

Colonel Kiser called from the Marine Corps Forces

Central Command (MarCent) coordination element

that evening with a priority message from Admiral

Moore.20 Central Command had just notified

NavCent of a forthcoming warning order (issued

the following day) alerting them to the possibility of

conducting future amphibious raids into

Afghanistan, and Moore wanted Mattis back in

Bahrain to discuss the developments in person.21

That evening at Camp Doha, General Mattis and

a handful of Marine officers sat down together to

develop his initial commander’s estimate of the

situation. In attendance were Brigadier General

Emerson N. Gardner Jr., commanding general of

Combined Joint Task Force, Kuwait; Colonel Peter T.

Miller, then on assignment from MarCent

headquarters in Tampa, Florida; and Major Timothy

J. Oliver, who was in the midst of a six-month

deployment as deputy intelligence officer with Task

Force Kuwait.* General Mattis put Oliver on the spot

by asking for any available information on

Afghanistan. The briefing went well and Oliver

obviously impressed Mattis, for the general

announced that if he were heading to Afghanistan,

the young intelligence officer would accompany

him.22

The same evening, General Mattis conferred

with Lieutenant General Hagee at I Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and with Lieutenant

78

FROM THE SEA

*Task Force Kuwait was the precursor to what would shortly become the Combined Forces Land Component Command.
General Hailston at Marine Forces Pacific. Hailston,

who understood that Mattis would need to focus

his attention on planning and directing combat

operations in Afghanistan, gradually relieved him of

the Task Force Consequence Management

assignment and other additional duties.23 Mattis’s

small operational planning team subsequently

passed off its preliminary work on Consequence

Management to the larger 1st Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (1st MEB) staff for continued

development.24 A month later, when Consequence

Management formally stood up under the

command of Marine Brigadier General Christian B.

Cowdrey, the staff was primarily composed of

Marine Reserve officers supplemented by an ad hoc

joint technical augmentation cell, a platoon from the

U.S. Army’s 51st Chemical Company, a German

chemical reconnaissance company, and a Czech

medical company.

On 31 October, General Mattis met briefly with

Admiral Moore at NavCent headquarters in

Bahrain.25 In an unprecedented move that surprised

many in the naval community, Moore placed Mattis

in charge of all amphibious forces in theater and

designated him commander of Naval Expeditionary

Task Force 58.26 This decision may have been

partially influenced by the notion of combining

existing amphibious forces under a small

headquarters staff (given space constraints in

Bahrain) as opposed to pursuing a more traditional

configuration involving multiship brigades, large

support staffs, and command and control vessels,

which at the time, was a plan that was reportedly

being developed by I MEF in Camp Pendleton.27

Admiral Moore summed up the current

operational situation by explaining that the Taliban

could not hold Mazar-e Sharif or Kabul and that

79

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020109-N-2383B-513

VAdm Charles W. Moore, USN. During the opening months of Operation Enduring Freedom, he served as commander of the Fifth

Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and the theater’s Combined Forces Maritime Component. Eschewing controversy, he

ordered BGen James N. Mattis to take charge of all amphibious forces in theater and form Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58. In

this photo, taken on 9 January 2002, he is shown climbing into a light armored vehicle while visiting the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit in Kandahar.
they would likely consolidate around their spiritual

center in Kandahar. As the Taliban withdrew from

the north, General Mattis later explained, their ability

to reinforce remaining positions grew, raising the

potential for collateral damage during subsequent

military operations. The admiral wanted to move

against Kandahar before the following spring,

ostensibly denying the Taliban a chance to

strengthen their defenses, and asked Mattis if the

Marines could get into Afghanistan and what role

they might play once ashore.28

After confirming that the Marines could indeed

go ashore, Admiral Moore tasked General Mattis

with conducting three to five raids during a 30-day

period to disrupt Taliban command and control in

southern Afghanistan.29 Further conversation

between the two senior leaders was apparently short,

with Moore providing little more than the basic

intent to establish a foothold in southern

Afghanistan. Moore did not give detailed planning

orders or engage in lengthy discussions regarding

how to conduct the operation; instead, Moore simply

told Mattis to think about the mission, inviting him

to ask additional questions if necessary, and then

devise a plan based on what he wanted to do.30

Shortly following the meeting, based on preliminary

recommendations offered by Mattis during his

discussion with the admiral, Moore requested that

26th MEU be transferred to the Fifth Fleet and that

the 15th MEU security element in Jacobabad,

Pakistan, be relieved for future offensive operations.31

At this time, it remains unclear whether Central

Command expected the Peleliu ARG to conduct the

raids by itself or envisioned the impending

formation of a naval expeditionary task force

commanded by a flag officer. When Central

Command issued the planning directive, the Marines

and sailors had already been operating successfully in

theater for more than a month, and by midNovember, a detachment from the Army’s 101st

Airborne Division would relieve the 15th MEU

security force in Jacobabad for follow-on missions.

Reconstituting the ready group to support an

existing joint task force would have been consistent

with Commandant Jones’s guidance of 25

September 2001—to coordinate an expeditionary

unit program that would “ensure the continued

relevance of forward deployed Marine Forces for

the National Command Authority and Geographic

Combatant Commanders.”32

Although Admiral Moore had discussed the

matter with Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval

Operations, before making his decision, some Navy

officers were uneasy about the prospect of having a

Marine in charge.33 Not only did it fly in the face of

tradition, but to some officers it also appeared to

disregard doctrinal agreements ironed out between

the Navy and Marine Corps for decades.34 However,

viewed in light of evolving naval doctrine and

command relations, it is clear that Moore was

exercising his responsibility to ensure the unity of

command and effort by organizing the amphibious

force to best support his concept of operations. His

duty was to define the most logical command

relationship based on anticipated mission

requirements, which he did by drawing from a wide

range of potential configurations, some derived from

Service considerations and others from functional

requirements. In this particular case—inland raids

with no coastal threat—the preferred doctrinal

arrangement was for the amphibious task force

commander to support the landing force

commander.35 Moreover, because Moore intended to

combine two ready groups into a single amphibious

task force, putting a Marine flag officer in charge was

advantageous—particularly if the assignment involved coordinating ground combat operations with

special operations forces and the Northern Alliance.

Everyone Fills Sandbags

On 31 October, after receiving Admiral Moore’s

verbal warning order to establish Task Force 58,

General Mattis returned to the MarCent building and

announced, “We are going to invade Afghanistan...

and I’m going to need to know what else we’re going

to need.”36 At that time, his staff was limited to three

Marines from 1st MEB, two from MarCent, and one

from Consequence Management. Despite the

80

FROM THE SEA
81

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

Changing Amphibious Command Relationships

Toward the end of the Cold War, conventional naval operations were conducted in accordance with the

Composite Warfare Commander concept. Developed by proponents of the “blue water” Navy during the

early 1980s, this placed operational control of the carrier battle group in the hands of an overall commander,

who then delegated tactical control to subordinates responsible for the air, surface, subsurface, strike, space,

and electronic realms of the battlespace. According to this configuration, the forward Marine air-ground

task force commander would retain coequal status with the Navy amphibious ready group commander until

the publication of an initiating directive, usually released prior to deployment, that specified the former as

commander of the landing force (CLF) and the latter as commander of the amphibious task force (CATF)

during a particular operation.37

As the focus of America’s maritime forces switched to “green water” operations in littoral regions of the

world in the 1990s, command and control relations between the Navy and Marine Corps needed to be

reevaluated; almost a decade lapsed before they eventually reached a consensus.* While the Marine Corps had

shown no interest in continuing to operate under the composite warfare concept, the Navy was similarly

hesitant to accept the notion of a naval expeditionary task force commander.38 Under this concept, carrier

battle groups and amphibious ready groups could operate either independently as individual task groups or

together as a combined task force under a designated commander. Although experience suggested that

amphibious groups would more likely deploy under the cover of one or more carrier groups, multiple

amphibious groups could conceivably combine to form a task force in their own right. As Lieutenant

Commander Thomas J. Lafferty, assistant operations officer for Task Force 58, explained, the Navy “wasn’t

going to stand for [the possibility of] a Marine being [placed] in charge of the entire amphibious task force.”39

As a form of compromise, the Navy and Marine Corps gradually entered into an unofficial “supportingsupported” relationship. Accordingly, command authority would oscillate between the two ranking on-scene

service commanders, depending on the operational focus at the time. This arrangement fit well with the evolving

Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. On one hand, the command relationship “established among the

CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders of the amphibious force... should be based on mission, nature,

and duration of the operation, force capabilities, command and control (C2) capabilities, battlespace assigned,

and recommendations from subordinate commanders.”40 On the other hand, regardless of the relationships

designated in the initiating order, commanders would remain “coequal in planning matters decisions.”41

In January 2001, a number of senior Navy and Marine Corps flag officers participated in the Sea II Seminar

War Game, designed to address “critical issues with regard to naval command relations for amphibious

warfare.”42 The Chief of Naval Operations disseminated the outcome of the game a month later. In the results,

the participants echoed the developing joint doctrine by deciding that it was “not desirable to prescribe a

particular command authority” and that the supported commander should be determined by such factors as

“mission, threat, type/phase, and duration of operation, command and control capabilities, force capabilities,

battlespace assigned, and recommendations from subordinate commanders.”43 They also clearly established the

amphibious force as a hierarchical entity composed of “an amphibious task force and a landing force together

with supporting forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations,” noting that the

“command relationship among the CATF, CLF, and other supporting forces shall be specified in the initiating

order and/or establishing directive” issued by the shared senior commander.44

*While attending the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 1992, Col Waldhauser had written a research paper titled “Entering the Golden

Age with The Composite Warfare/Amphibious Doctrine Dilemma” that discussed the merits of employing the amphibious ready group as a

warfighting command within the larger naval architecture.
assistance being provided by the Marine liaison

officers and Navy amphibious planners at NavCent,

additional manpower was obviously required; yet

Moore had indicated that he did not want a standardsized brigade staff.45 Not only was NavCent already

approaching critical space constraints in Bahrain, but

without a command ship, space on board the

amphibious vessels would also be limited.

Fortunately, Moore’s indication matched General

Mattis’s staffing philosophy. Just weeks earlier, while

planning for potential amphibious operations off the

Horn of Africa, he had already considered 90-, 150-,

and 200-person staffs and concluded that

approximately 80 personnel were optimal.46 A small

staff focused on planning and populated with

forward-leaning officers would require less space and

could respond more quickly than a standard-sized

staff of 300 personnel.* Several weeks later, Mattis

even decreased his estimate for the small staff he had

envisioned for 1st MEB, calculating that 25 to 30

members would provide Task Force 58 with the

manpower necessary to plan several short-term raids

into southern Afghanistan. There was no need to

replicate medical, religious, legal, public affairs, or

troop handling capabilities that already resided in the

subordinate commands.47 Should the situation

change, he could always bring in a more robust staff

from Camp Pendleton, California. Task Force 58’s

staff, including liaison officers from other Services

and agencies, would temporarily peak at 40 before

settling at approximately 32 individuals.48

82

FROM THE SEA

Photo courtesy of Maj Michael P. Mahaney

Members of the Task Force 58 staff pose for a holiday photo while deployed to Forward Operating Base Rhino in southern

Afghanistan during December 2001. In the front row, from left to right, are LtCol Clarke R. Lethine (operations officer-ground),

Col Peter T. Miller (chief of staff), and LtCol John J. Broadmeadow (logistics officer). In the back row, from left to right, are Maj

Michael P. Mahaney (assistant operations officer, ground), Maj Daniel B. Conley (assistant logistics officer), Maj Scott F. Stebbins

(communications officer), Maj Robert J. Charette (air officer), Lt Clifford A. Smith, USN (Seabee liaison), and Maj Michael J.

Lindemann (assistant intelligence officer).

*The alternative figure of 135 personnel for a conventional brigade staff is based on notional numbers used by the Total Force Structure Division to

develop the maritime prepositioning force list and reflects only the brigade headquarters: 58 Marine and 6 Navy officers, and 69 Marines and 2 Navy

enlisted personnel. Including personnel from the communications, force reconnaissance, intelligence, Artillery and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, radio,

and liaison detachments would raise the figure to 723.
During the impromptu discussion that

evening, General Mattis defined key personnel

requirements for his staff, who then recommended

candidates for his immediate consideration. Mattis’s

guidance on growing the staff was simple:

regardless of rank, he wanted a small group of

staff officers who possessed operational

experience, initiative, and sound judgment.49 He

emphasized that there would be few enlisted

Marines to support the staff, so each member

would be required to “fill sandbags.”50 In addition

to Colonel Miller from MarCent headquarters, who

became the chief of staff, eight additional members

were identified at that time and ordered to depart

for Bahrain within 96 hours of notification.51

All of the requested individuals were affiliated

with I MEF, and many had worked together on the

initial operational planning team during Exercise

Bright Star.52 Several of the new officers included

Staff Sergeant Benny A. Rodriguez in

administration, Lieutenant Colonel Martinson and

Major Oliver in intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel

Broadmeadow and Captain Samson P. Avenetti in

logistics, Major Robert J. Charette Jr. in fixed-wing

aviation plans and operations, and Major Stebbins

in communications.

The three NavCent planners—Hascup,

Lafferty, and Prall—also volunteered to join Task

Force 58 after learning that Navy representation was

lacking.53 Assigned to the plans and operations

section, they proved a ready-made and welcome

addition to the team, contributing East and West

Coast amphibious experience. Aware of the need for

an integrated staff, General Mattis chose to employ

the traditional naval nomenclature (N),* rather than

the standard Marine general (G) or staff (S)

designators to delineate his staff sections.54

Setting Up Shop

According to Central Command’s chronology

of Operation Enduring Freedom, 1 November

marked the “end of Phase II–Stage 1, Initial Strike

Operations–Air Operations.” Admiral Moore

released two key messages on that day. In the first, he

officially established Task Force 58, designating

Captain Jezierski as the commander of subordinate

Task Group 58.1 and Colonel Waldhauser as the

commander of subordinate Task Group 58.2. In the

second, he reiterated his direction that the Marines

and sailors prepare to “conduct a minimum of three

to five raids into Afghanistan over a 30-day

period.”55 Task Force 58 physically stood up the

following day and temporarily occupied the MarCent

coordination element building: a narrow two-story

structure with a conference room, locker room, and

several small offices.

As the staff expanded, Task Force 58 quickly

outgrew the MarCent facilities. Despite aggressive

efforts by the chief of staff, Colonel Miller, and

logistics officer, Lieutenant Colonel Broadmeadow,

the only available space they could find was a sandy,

vacant lot outside NavCent’s mobile integrated

command facility. This was a sprawling single-story

building, surrounded by a chain-link fence, which

housed the regional maritime patrol force, Task

Force 57. Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction

Battalion 133, who built three concrete pads, set up

three tents, and surrounded the compound with

concertina wire within five days, alleviated the space

problem. The Navy’s quick response time and “cando” attitude impressed the Task Force 58 staff,

influencing their decision to request Seabee support

for ground operations in Afghanistan.56

Task Force 58 moved into its new quarters on 8

November. In Bahrain, the staff encountered a new

variety of tent made of vinyl-coated polyester duck

cloth, unlike the canvas tents used during Exercise

Bright Star. Supported by aluminum frames, the

structures (referred to as TEMPER [Tent,

Extendable, Modular, Personnel]) were modular in

form, and designed to grow into multiple

configurations, and they provided a controlled

83

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

*Traditional naval staff nomenclature included the N-1 (administration), N-2 (intelligence), N-3 (operations), N-4 (logistics), N-5 (planning), and N-6

(communications) sections.
environment to protect the wide range of electronic

equipment needed on the modern battlefield. In

addition to a conference room and office for

General Mattis, one tent housed administration,

intelligence, and operations sections, while the other

was home to the logistics and communications

sections. This time- and labor-intensive transition

validated Mattis’s prediction that everyone would be

required to “fill sandbags.”57 The staff borrowed

radios and computers, moved furniture, procured

office supplies, and reestablished e-mail accounts on

a new domain.

Anticipating a long campaign, General Mattis

attempted to influence the command’s battle rhythm

by emphasizing that the staff should approach the

upcoming operation as if it were a marathon, rather

than a sprint. Despite efforts to pace the staff by

establishing normal working hours, most officers

found it necessary to remain at headquarters from

between 14 to 16 hours each day. In addition to

planning for future operations, they also monitored

incoming information, participated in daily

meetings, and attended nightly video

teleconferences.58 Many of the staff members

contributed simultaneously to several functional

areas; for example, Major Charette, Task Force 58’s

air officer, was responsible for processing air

requests, obtaining maps, and contributing to both

current and future operations. He later recalled, “It

was a very electric time, a lot of long hours.... I

didn’t sleep for two days.”59 Colonel Lethin echoed

similar sentiments saying, “I don’t think I have ever

been so tired in my life.”60

As the augmentation personnel began to arrive,

veteran staff officers needed to remain cognizant of

changes and to take time to introduce new members

to the command’s battle rhythm.61 Yet a myriad of

daily tasks already consumed their time. The solution

was the creation of a “brain book,” which contained

pertinent references, briefs, orders, and intelligence.62

Arriving personnel were required to read the book,

ask for necessary clarifications, and then roll up their

sleeves and join in the fray. Sometimes, however,

there was not even enough time to peruse the brain

book, as illustrated by the experiences of Navy

Lieutenant Clifford A. Smith, the Seabee liaison

officer:

I showed up in one of these tents, and they were

planning follow-on attacks that they were going

to base out of FOB [forward operating base]

Rhino. They were coordinating that in the

morning and I just kind of walked in, sat down,

and started listening. About three hours later,

early in the afternoon, they started talking about

the needs at Rhino and Kandahar. I had been

doing a little bit of studying as they were talking,

trying to review what it would take to make it

C-130 and C-17 capable.... I hadn’t had a

chance to introduce myself and basically got

thrown right into the fire and started discussing

what it would take to repair the runway at

Kandahar with permanent repairs for concrete.

I started asking for a request for information

with the S-2: “Hey, is there a concrete match

plan? We’re going to need concrete, so we would

need that capability.” So he started researching

that and I started talking about, “Well we’d have

to contract that out to get the supplies” and the

Marines said, “Well, we’ll just go secure it. We’ll

just go attack it, take it over, you guys will run it,

and we’ll start using the concrete for repairs.” I

was the only one in the room who was laughing,

because I kind of got a chuckle out of that. I

looked around and everyone else was serious

and I was like, “Oh, okay, these guys mean

business, it’s good to go.”63

For the uninitiated, an introduction into Task

Force 58 could be more than a little intimidating, if

not downright painful. In addition to the intensity

and immediacy of operational planning, there was

also an informal “break-in” period where General

Mattis measured his new officers to determine their

strengths and weaknesses.64 Colonel Broadmeadow

reflected on his early days at 1st MEB during Bright

Star:

I was a pretty cocky guy. I was a boot lieutenant

colonel, went to a top-level school. I came to the

MEF staff and I thought I had things pretty

locked on. I was doing an MPF [maritime

prepositioning force] exercise and I know a little

84

FROM THE SEA
about MPFs, so I came in with a lot of

confidence. But after my first couple of meetings

with General Mattis, I went home and told my

wife, “You know, forget all of this confidence. I

think for the first time in my career, I don’t know

if I’m going to cut it with this guy.” It took

awhile; the first 30 days were rough.65

Remembering his own trial period while on

recruiting duty two decades earlier, Colonel Lethin

added that it was a really good feeling once he made

it—once he was in that circle of confidence.66

General Mattis’s goal was not necessarily to

identify the perfect officer or to build the perfect staff,

but to blend staff officers with complementary

capabilities into a unified team so they could respond

with speed and decisiveness to any situation. Although

he might provide the staff with general guidance, he

wanted his officers to think outside the box and was

always receptive to new ideas. Rank meant little when

compared to an individual’s capability, and large egos

were a definite disadvantage.67

Insight into some aspects of General Mattis’s

command philosophy were revealed in one

interview, where he confirmed his appreciation for

James C. “Jim” Collins’s Good to Great: Why Some

Companies Make the Leap... and Others Don’t. The

book emphasizes “getting the right people on the

bus, getting the right people into the key positions.

And also there is getting the right people off the bus,

the ones who are not primarily fitted for those jobs,

and recognizing the role that leaders play... the

animating spirits of the leaders.”68 From a more

pragmatic perspective, Colonel Lethin offered these

observations regarding the working relationship

between Mattis and his staff:

We’ll say, “Well, sir, we can’t do that.” He’ll say,

“Okay, let me handle that.” At which point in

time you go one of two ways. You go, “Well,

okay, got to walk away” or you... rush out and

try to get ahead of him. The winners get ahead.

What he expects is that you are going to go out

and look under all of the rocks to find the

solution, and he expects you to make decisions.

Sometimes there are decisions that he should

make, and if you have made one of his

decisions, he’ll tell you in a very tactful manner.

You definitely know where you stand, and if you

don’t get on board quickly, he will break you.69

Lethin also stated that General Mattis “is much

harder on his staff than he is on his commanders.”70

The staff meshed quickly, for the most part,

with each individual’s professional knowledge,

operational experience, dedication, and ability to

build from previous personal relationships

contributing toward a common purpose. As is often

the case, concentric bands of influence radiated

outward from the commanding general. Nearest the

center was the inner “staff within the staff.”71 This

included a few key players and trusted assistants,

mostly functional area experts who had proven their

mettle during Exercise Bright Star or others derived

from General Mattis’s personal staff.

The general staff, composed of recently arrived

augmentees from I MEF, NavCent, and MarCent,

occupied the middle ground. In each case, these

were capable Marines and sailors—some officers

and enlisted personnel—working diligently to meet

operational requirements related to their particular

functional specialties. On the periphery, some

individuals were not up to the task or unwilling to

commit themselves wholeheartedly to the common

enterprise. In these few cases, more dynamic

members of the staff tended to shoulder additional

responsibilities, while those found wanting were

marginalized and occasionally returned to their

parent units.72

Context and experience often mediated

collaboration between the two inner staff groups.

For example, according to the generic table of

organization, Captain Hascup served as the

operations officer and Lieutenant Colonel Lethin as

the future plans officer. Yet each possessed widely

different skill sets, so it made sense for Hascup and

Lieutenant Commander Lafferty to focus on

planning and conducting amphibious operations,

85

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58
while Lethin and Major Mahaney increasingly

asserted themselves in the planning and conduct of

operations ashore. There was also a nondoctrinal

division of labor along strategic and operational

lines between Lethin and the chief of staff. Colonel

Broadmeadow later recalled that Lethin always led

from the front, and his sense of purpose drove the

staff ’s planning cycle.73

The staff developed plans according to a

compressed timeline that imbued every action with

a sense of urgency. They briefed the plans, once

developed, at adjacent and higher levels in the chainof-command. Some concepts would survive the

process intact, while others would require

modification according to additional guidance—

usually verbal—provided by Central Command in

Tampa, Florida. To sustain the development of

multiple plans, the staff not only had to initiate

requests for forces and deployment orders in

advance, but also monitor the requests and adjust

tentative timelines as their arrival dates or the

concept of operations fluctuated. In this pressurecooker environment, leaders continually fostered

team building and trust throughout the command,

which remained a key ingredient to the Marines’

overall success.

Team Building

From the outset, General Mattis sought to

establish a supporting-supported relationship

between the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as

among the Marine commands.74 The challenge in

creating a unified task force along those lines lay in

developing internal relationships that would

synthesize the subordinate commands into a

common entity, while concurrently preserving their

individual strengths and character. To facilitate this

process, General Mattis released a personal message

to each of his four Navy and Marine commanders,

seeking their cooperation and support in defeating

the Taliban. He remarked during an interview

following the operation—while commenting on the

importance of maintaining a sense of humor and

friendly discipline among comrades—that there was

“no need for adversarial relationships when trying

to kill the enemy; the battlefields are not crowded.”75

After establishing the overall command climate,

the next challenge was to build an even closer

working rapport between the two expeditionary unit

commanders, Colonels Andrew Frick and Thomas

Waldhauser. Not only are expeditionary units

intentionally designed to operate independently, their

commanders are also specifically selected for their

aggressive initiative. Moreover, although Marines

share common doctrine, many expeditionary units

develop organizationally specific standard operating

procedures. General Mattis was aware of that and,

while developing his initial concept of operations,

chose not to composite the 15th and 26th MEUs

into a single expeditionary brigade.

By adopting a strategy of “centralized planning

and decentralized execution,” General Mattis

sidestepped the formation of a brigade staff,

regimental landing team, and aircraft group, which

was understandably agreeable to the two subordinate

ground commanders.76 Colonel Waldhauser

summed up the quasi-“joint” relationship from the

expeditionary unit perspective: We wanted “to

complement each other but... also... to... maintain

our own identity, if only for the reason of trying to

keep things simple.”77 Colonel Frick expanded on

this concept:

It worked... because you had two

organizations—15th MEU and 26th MEU—

that had trained together, worked up together

and were functioning as units, and were

postured for success in their own way. You have

the right personalities in the structure, both in

the command structure and also in the staff

structure. On top of that, you put in... a

general officer... who has a warfighter’s attitude

and tries to let the warfighter do his job.78

Task Force 58 would provide operational

support to the expeditionary units by developing

future plans, validating potential targets, and issuing

mission-type orders. For their part, the expeditionary

units retained their operational autonomy but entered

86

FROM THE SEA
87

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

into an alternating supporting-supported relationship

with one another. In this sense, while one

expeditionary unit executed a mission, the other

could be preparing for a second, and Task Force 58

could be planning a third. Although this increased

Task Force 58’s operational flexibility, it also required

that responsibilities and requirements for each

expeditionary unit be clearly established to avoid

redundancy or working at cross-purposes. For

example, General Mattis would eventually task the

15th MEU with seizing and securing a forward

operating base, from which the 26th MEU would

conduct follow-on raid, interdiction, and seizure

missions. In addition, the assignment of independent

missions to each expeditionary unit could facilitate

operations by creating a sense of healthy competition

between the two subordinate commands.79

89

Battle Rhythms and Intelligence-Driven

Operations

The first three weeks in November—the

planning phase—was a hectic time for

members of Task Force 58. Balancing a

myriad of overlapping and concurrent tasks, they

worked to develop their concept of operations and

scheme of maneuver, assemble their forces and lay

down the necessary supporting architecture, and

coordinate their plans with joint and Coalition

commands operating in the theater. The small

command group began each morning with a quick

meeting attended by both General Mattis and

Colonel Miller. Following the brief, the staff

continued its planning efforts into the evening, when

it halted briefly for a second meeting. Colonel Lethin

described this routine, highlighting the interaction

between Mattis and his staff:

If we needed his guidance, we would go up and

talk to him. I mean, “Sir, okay, what do we need

to do?” I think we all had that kind of access to

him. At the end of the day, we would come in

and we would brief him up on where we were

and what we [had] done so far. He would say,

“Yeah, okay, I like it, change this, go back.”

Then he would leave the room for the night

and... we would go back and work on those

things, and we would come back in the morning

and say, “Okay, here is where we are.” It was a

constant dialogue in his involvement in the

planning process about where we were going

and how we were shaping.1

Informed by U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command’s (NavCent’s) warning order and Central

Command’s 30-60-90 day planning guidance,

General Mattis continued to refine his initial

directions.2 Intelligence support, he emphasized,

would be critical to the operation’s success, driving

the types of operations developed and tactics

employed by Task Force 58.* He intended to begin

with small-scale helicopter raids, conducted against

strategic targets along the southern border of

Afghanistan. Exploiting the element of surprise,

assault forces would establish and defend temporary

tactical positions along the border, leveraging theater

aviation to destroy any attackers. By focusing on the

more accessible targets first, which Mattis referred to

as “low-hanging fruit,” the expeditionary units

would be able to further develop their fighting skills

and prepare for longer-range operations.3

During the first three weeks in November, Task

Force 58’s intelligence section gradually grew to

include four officers and three enlisted linguists.

Because this small staff was hard pressed to provide

the quality and quantity of information needed to

support the full range of operations being planned,

it focused instead on “facilitating intelligence reachback” capabilities to support information requests

from those units preparing to deploy.4 Initial

interests, which required target imagery, included

border camps, drug facilities, main lines of

communication extending from Kandahar, potential

landing zones and interdiction points, route studies,

enemy reaction assessments, and traffic pattern

analyses.5 Later in the month, as the mission

transitioned to establishing a forward operating base,

the intelligence focus shifted toward identifying

airfields that could support sustained operations

ashore.6

Working from the NavCent headquarters in

Bahrain, Task Force 58’s intelligence section situated

Chapter 6

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

*Although I MEF had provided a limited reach-back capability to Task Force 58 at the beginning of the operation, communications between the two

organizations declined sharply thereafter. Partially influenced by operational security issues, this change also reflected BGen Mattis’s new association with

Fifth Fleet—what one staff officer referred to as “atypical command relationships.” (Lindeman intvw; Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw)
itself to serve as a conduit between the intelligence

producers and intelligence consumers, as well as a

liaison among the myriad organizations. The

principal producers included the Marine Corps

Intelligence Activity in Quantico, Virginia; the

Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center in

Charlottesville, Virginia; the Joint Intelligence Center

at Central Command; and the two deployed Marine

expeditionary units.7 Daily video teleconferences

among these organizations, conducted via the Joint

Worldwide Intelligence Communications System,

became the primary means for identifying

information requirements and then disseminating

the information by e-mail throughout the

intelligence community for action. The operations

section at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, led by

Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Chandler, shouldered

much of this burden and “essentially became a 24-

hour intelligence support and production center

providing direct support to Task Force 58.”8 One of

their more innovative ideas was the creation of a

secure website repository, from which intelligence

personnel in Bahrain and Afghanistan could access

relevant information for planning purposes.9

Once ashore, General Mattis tended to interact

less with his own intelligence personnel in Bahrain

than with those from the two expeditionary units,

who were co-located with Task Force 58’s forward

headquarters. Although this taxed the organic

capabilities of the subordinate commands,

intelligence sections under the direction of Majors

James B. Higgins (15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

[15th MEU]) and Gregory G. Koziuk (26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit [26th MEU]) fulfilled most of

the task force’s daily intelligence requirements.10 As

one analyst observed,

While the intelligence sections of both MEUs

valued the support of the Marine Corps

Intelligence Activity, their own accomplishments and efforts cannot be understated. The

Marines of these two staffs supported not only

the requirements of their own organic units but

also the additional requirements of a higher

headquarters (Task Force 58) and adjacent U.S.

and coalition force units. The MEU intelligence

sections maintained the current intelligence

picture and produced hundreds of specialized

intelligence products in support of MEU,

special operations forces, and coalition force

mission planning. The MEU intelligence

sections possessed a significant forward

deployed analytical and production capability

utilizing both national technical means imagery

and geospatial data. Their products were in high

demand in both the joint and coalition

environment in which they operated.11

While working on their initial mission

statement, the staff realized that they needed a radio

call sign for communications with other units.

General Mattis preferred to choose a name that

symbolized the spirit of his command rather than

pull an arbitrary alphanumeric designation from a

list of unused call signs. Because his intent was to

inflict a sense of chaos on Taliban and al-Qaeda

forces operating in southern Afghanistan, the staff

suggested they use the term as their call sign. A

request to use “Chaos” as Mattis’s call sign was

subsequently forwarded up the chain-of-command

and eventually approved by Central Command.12

Task Force 58 had begun to collaborate with the

two expeditionary units immediately following the

release of General Mattis’s personal message. As

described by Colonel Lethin, the “iterative” planning

process was constantly “back and forth.”13 “We were

working the [concept of operations] and... we’re

sharing it through the MEUs... getting their

estimates of supportability, what they think they

might need or not need and have them start doing

their planning—giving it to them early, so that they

will do a lot of concurrent and parallel planning.”14

The staffs used video teleconferencing to enhance

real-time coordination and promote integration

among the commands, which was further facilitated

by the presence of a two-man liaison team from the

26th MEU.

While the two staffs remained in

communication throughout the planning process,

the expeditionary units conducted much of the

90

FROM THE SEA
detailed raid planning independently of Task Force

58.15 This included nominating potential targets as

well as evaluating the 15th MEU’s ability to

accomplish different types of missions at each site.16

“The big thing that 58 did for us,” commented

Colonel Waldhauser, “was to define our mission.”17

As might be expected, the division of labor and

differences of opinion between the operationally

oriented task force planners and tactically focused

expeditionary unit staff could become an occasional

source of frustration. This tendency became

increasingly apparent as changing command

relationships redefined their roles and reporting

responsibilities while serving in Afghanistan. Yet

each unit acknowledged that friction was the nature

of organizational hierarchy and fast-paced combat

operations, and everyone remained focused on the

desired end state.

Coalition Building

From the beginning, General Mattis emphasized

the importance of establishing solid working

relationships with other military Services, Coalition

forces, and allied countries participating in the

campaign. It came as no surprise, therefore, that one

of his first orders of business was to visit adjacent

and supporting commands, often exchanging liaison

officers with them. Underlying his interest in

coordination were Mattis’s views regarding operations

involving joint and Coalition forces: “there’s a job for

everyone,” “they must be interoperable,” and they

must possess “tactical mobility.”18

While in Bahrain, General Mattis was able to

renew an old friendship with Navy Captain Robert

S. Harward, with whom he shared several similar

experiences. Harward had grown up in Iran and

91

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Diagram 7: Command relationships among the principal forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom during November

2001 and January 2002.
hitchhiked from Tehran to New Delhi at the age of

16, while Mattis had hitchhiked across the United

States during his youth. Mattis and Harward had also

spent time together at the Naval Academy Prep

School, the former as a battalion officer and the

latter as a student.19 The two men had met briefly

again during 2001 at the Naval Amphibious Base in

Coronado, California.20 Late on the evening of 31

October, as Mattis walked home following his

meeting with Admiral Moore, their paths crossed a

third time in Bahrain.21

Captain Harward, commander of Naval Special

Warfare Group 1, was in the process of forming Joint

Special Operations Task Force South, also known as

Task Force K-Bar, and spoiling for action. When

General Mattis asked, “What... are you doing here,”

Harward responded, “I’m trying to get into the fight,

but I don’t have any helicopters.”22 To his dismay,

these assets had been redirected to support Task

Force Dagger’s operations in northern Afghanistan.23

Mattis quickly seized on the opportunity by extending

an invitation to Harward. Based solely on a

handshake, they agreed that the Navy SEALs would

provide a liaison officer to Task Force 58 and conduct

strategic reconnaissance for the Marines.24

Formally established on 15 November, Task

Force K-Bar served under tactical control of the

Combined Forces Land Component, but under

operational control of the Joint Forces Special

Operations Component. Gradually incorporating

other joint and Coalition forces from Australia,

Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand,

Norway, Turkey, and the U.S. Army and Air Force,

it carried out a wide variety of strategic

reconnaissance, maritime search and seizure, and

direct action missions.25 The latter included, to no

small extent, the exploitation of “sensitive” sites

located throughout southeastern Afghanistan that

were suspected of containing materials related to

al-Qaeda or the Taliban. In recognition of its

service during Operation Enduring Freedom, Task

Force K-Bar would later receive the Presidential

Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism and

outstanding performance of duty in action against

hostile forces.26

From the beginning, the relationship between

Task Forces 58 and K-Bar was mutually supporting.

By affiliating himself with Task Force K-Bar, General

Mattis not only gained access to the special operations

community then dominating Operation Enduring

Freedom, he also acquired a long-term support

mission to justify the Marines’ continued presence in

Afghanistan. At the same time, by affiliating himself

with Task Force 58, Captain Harward acquired a base

of operations as well as access to logistics,

communications, ground support, and aviation assets

that his command did not yet possess.27

During its time in Afghanistan, Task Force 58’s

ground combat element provided quick reaction and

security forces for many of K-Bar’s site exploitation

missions, while the aviation combat element fulfilled

92

FROM THE SEA

Photo by SSgt. Joe Laws USAF.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020109-N-2383B-513

VAdm Robert S. Harward, USN. As a captain, during the first

months of Operation Enduring Freedom, he commanded

Naval Special Warfare Group 1 and led Combined Joint

Special Operations Task Force South (Task Force K-Bar) in

Afghanistan. The sailors of Task Force K-Bar enjoyed a

symbiotic relationship with the Marines of Task Force 58,

providing reconnaissance and direct action support in return

for air support and security forces.
75 percent of the SEALs assault support requirements.28 Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Clark, one of

three Marines serving with Task Force K-Bar, greatly

facilitated coordination between the two organizations. Originally trained as a CH-53 pilot, Clark had

also flown MH-53 helicopters during an exchange

tour with the Air Force’s Special Operations

Command and could serve as a conduit* between

the conventional and unconventional forces.29

In addition to Task Force K-Bar, units from the

Australian Special Air Service (ASAS) were also

actively searching for an invitation to participate in

operations in Afghanistan. By happenstance,

Colonel Miller, Task Force 58’s chief of staff,

happened to be socializing with an Australian officer

in a bar in Bahrain. The Australian commented that

he wanted to send another officer over to Task

Force 58 to speak on the potential usefulness of the

ASAS. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Gilmore, Australian

Defence Force, arrived several days later and spent

30 minutes in conference with General Mattis. After

the Australian commander had outlined his unit’s

capabilities, Mattis offered, “Now this is what we’re

going to do... if you want to come along and work

with us, we’ll take you, and take care of you, and

employ you.”30 A day later, Gilmore notified Task

Force 58 that his government had consented to the

arrangement and the ASAS would be working for

the U.S. Marines. Their first mission as Task Force

64 would be to dislocate the Taliban in Kandahar.31

General Mattis also traveled to Islamabad,

Pakistan, with Lieutenant Colonels Broadmeadow

and Carl, where he paid a surprise courtesy call on

Wendy J. Chamberlin, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.

Situated to the south and east of Afghanistan,

Pakistan possessed a number of enabling seaport

93

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

Official Department of State photo

Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin. A veteran diplomat, she

was the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan from 2001 to 2002.

Official Army photo

LtGen Dell L. Dailey, USA. As a MajGen, during the opening

months of Operation Enduring Freedom, Dailey was in charge

of Joint Special Operations Command and directed Task Force

11 (Task Force Sword) operations in southern Afghanistan. He

advocated daily for the establishment of a Marine forward

operating base in southern Afghanistan as well as a major

offensive role for Task Force 58.

*The success of the symbiotic relationship between Task Forces 58 and K-Bar likely helped to quell anti-Marine sentiments within the special operations

community and facilitated the eventual establishment of a Marine component within Special Operations Command in 2004. (Crist comments)
and airfield facilities critical to Task Force 58’s future

logistics operations. When Chamberlin asked

forcefully what a Marine was doing in her embassy

in Pakistan, Mattis replied with a grin that he had

come with a thousand of his best friends to “go to

Afghanistan to kill some people.”32 Impressed by his

candor, she invited him to sit and talk.33 Mattis later

commented that Chamberlin, who had been born at

Camp Pendleton, California, was “magnificent” in

opening doors to the Pakistani joint headquarters

staff and helping to coordinate military details.34

“Frankly, we couldn’t have done the job without her

leadership and assistance and her guts in taking

risks,” he reflected. “I hid nothing from her, held

nothing back on the details of our coordination with

the Pakistanis and the ConOps [concept of

operations] for our attack.”35

On 7 November, while returning from Pakistan,

General Mattis stopped at the U.S. embassy in

Muscat, Oman, to meet with Major General Dell L.

Dailey, USA, and the commanding officer of the

British 22d Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment.*

Although the two American flag officers had

previously spoken, they had never met in person,

and this encounter marked the beginning of a

collaborative affair between the commanders of

Task Force 58 and Task Force Sword. While their

headquarters might be physically separated by the

Persian Gulf, the men would exchange occasional

phone calls, and Dailey sometimes provided support

during the nightly video teleconference or while

talking privately with Central Command.36

According to General Mattis, General Dailey

was a “great soldier, great advisor, one who rapidly

gained my total confidence.”37 He possessed

practical knowledge of the ongoing operations and

shared his opinions openly. Dailey described the

limits of basing his forces far to the south on board

the USS Kitty Hawk in the Arabian Sea and

suggested that establishing a forward operating base

in southern Afghanistan would benefit both

conventional and special operations forces. He also

believed that the presence of Marines ashore would

undermine the Taliban cause by contributing to the

loss of strategic power in their spiritual center of

Kandahar.38 General Mattis considered the notion,

figuring “there was nothing the enemy could do to

throw us out if we got sufficient combat power in,”

and decided to pursue it further.39 While Task Force

Sword conducted missions requiring surgical

precision, he thought Task Force 58 would introduce

brute force to the fight.40

Yet not all of General Dailey’s comments were

optimistic. He acknowledged that close coordination

would be required and that the identification and

development of targets would be difficult, and he

made it clear that the Marines and their aircraft

would be operating at the very edge of their

performance envelope. The dust in southern

Afghanistan was so thick, he described, that the

special operations helicopter pilots had to maintain

forward movement while taking off and landing to

retain ground visibility.** If this were not bad

enough, he added that the Taliban’s employment of

antiaircraft weapons was ingenious and the Marine

pilots might encounter rocket-propelled grenades as

they attempted to land. Dailey also emphasized that

the Taliban were not afraid to fight and that they

would probably “move to the sound of the guns.”41

When asked what he intended to do for targets,

General Mattis replied, “I’m just going to go in and

stick a Marine battle color out in the sand and say,

‘Bring it on.’”42 Dailey reflected, “If you establish a

forward operating base... the enemy may not come

because you are Marines.”43

In order to simplify coordination between the

two organizations, General Mattis decided to use the

same flight routes, boundaries, and control measures

previously employed by Task Force Sword. Unfortunately, only a few of Task Force 58’s planners were

94

FROM THE SEA

*This meeting led to the addition of a British 22d SAS liaison team to Task Force 58’s staff on 18 November.

**The special operations forces pilots were apparently flying horizontal flight paths while following terminal guidance systems to their objective, which

kicked up dust in their wake. To compensate for this, the Marine pilots later flew less direct routes with sharp vertical landings. (Crist comments)
granted full access to the information because the

special forces’ operations were highly classified and

details about their activities were closely safeguarded.

Although this constraint initially challenged the staff,

they developed new coordination procedures and

terminology to facilitate planning.44

General Mattis assigned Major Oliver, the

former intelligence officer from Kuwait, as a liaison

to Task Force Sword in Masira. His task was to assist

the special operations forces by providing situational

information, evaluating support requests, and

coordinating movements within the joint

battlespace. He also rotated with two other officers,

serving as the command’s representative on nightly

aerial reconnaissance missions conducted by Fifth

Fleet’s Coalition maritime patrol force.45

Known as Task Force 57, the patrol force

provided Task Force Sword with intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance support, and it

earned high praise from General Dailey. Its P-3C

Orion aircraft possessed a number of unique capabilities that General Mattis believed would enhance

Marine operations ashore. He later explained,

With its [Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement

Program] enhancements, my own intel... rep on

board, and the P-3 squadron’s total commitment

to our mission, I trusted those sailors more than

a brittle request system for the [General Atomics

MQ-1] Predator that did not provide feedback

or the downlink that I got with the P-3.46

General Mattis, Lieutenant Colonel Carl, and

Major Charette also traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet

with two Marine air request liaison officers and other

representatives of the Combined Air Operations

Center at Prince Sultan Airbase. The staff articulated

its needs, emphasizing concern about sufficient fire

support, and the center personnel assured them that

there would be around-the-clock close air support

when the operation began. This was key, because

only after establishing a robust fire support

capability would Task Force 58 be able to focus

organic assets on airlifting troops and rapidly

building combat power in Afghanistan.47

Mattis later recalled his discussion with General

T. Michael Moseley, USAF, who had recently

assumed command of the theater’s Combined

Forces Air Component Command:

95

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

Official Navy Photo. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 021101-N-0780F-005

A U.S. Navy P-3C Orion on patrol during Operation Enduring Freedom. The Orion aircrews provided Task Force 58 with overhead

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support on numerous occasions while operating in Afghanistan.
I walked in on him with [my] map, and it

showed some ships out on the ocean and a big

arrow going to Afghanistan. I wasn’t quite sure

where I was going to go, I hadn’t figured it out

yet. He took one look at it and thought, “Threeto four hundred nautical miles,” and immediately

he registered the danger, the risk we were going

to be taking. And General Moseley, at that point,

said, “I’m going to take your two Marine air

liaison officers out of the [sensitive

compartmented information facility]... and put

them up here on the [command] deck, and if

you get in any trouble, you just call them, and I’ll

turn every airframe in the air over your head.”...

And based on the trust I had in General

Moseley... I left my artillery behind for the first

time in an assault wave in my some 30-odd years

in the Marines.... [It] defined how many more

assault troops I could pack in on that critical first

and second day [of the assault].48

Task Organized and Scalable Raid

Options

General Mattis delivered his initial concept of

operations brief to Admiral Moore on 3 November,

limiting his presentation to eight key PowerPoint

slides.49 He offered three scalable options, reflecting

a range of potential objectives, force packages, and

mission lengths. The first option focused on a short

duration raid, 6–12 hours long, employing a

company-sized force. The second option utilized a

nearly simultaneous raid concept, 24–36 hours long,

with two companies operating on two different

objectives. The final option involved a long duration

raid, 48–72 hours long, employing a battalion

landing team ashore. In each case, Task Force 58

would be operating beyond doctrinal limitations, at

least 350 miles from the coast.50

Admiral Moore was pleased with the brief and

inquired about the task force’s ability to conduct an

indefinite-duration raid into southern Afghanistan,

asking how many men would be required and how

long the Marines would stay. General Mattis

responded enthusiastically, “Give me 1,000 men

ashore for 30 days and we could make the enemy’s

life hell on earth for raids.”51 This exchange was

important in two respects. First, although the staff

perceived this course of action as the least likely of

the three options they had presented to the admiral,

they ultimately received that assignment. Second, the

figure of 1,000 men was only a rough estimate,

although it mirrored the force cap eventually

employed to limit the scope of Marine involvement

in Afghanistan. As Mattis reflected after the

operation, “When [the mission changed from raids]

to sustained operations ashore, that 1,000 men

would come back to haunt me.”52 Before concluding

the meeting, Moore emphasized the importance of

bold action: the Marines, he said, were not to

conduct a “show of force,” they were to conduct

raids that would quickly and decisively defeat Taliban

and al-Qaeda forces.53 He continued, “Marines don’t

give themselves enough credit. A squad of Marines

running through Kandahar would turn the tide.”54

96

FROM THE SEA

Photo by A1C Nathan Doza, USAF.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 070204-F-0199D-025

Gen T. Michael Moseley, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff, at Balad

Air Base, Iraq, on 4 February 2007. As a LtGen, he commanded

Ninth Air Force and U.S. Central Command’s combined forces

air component from November 2001 to August 2003.
With Moore’s approval of the developing

concept of operations, General Mattis provided

additional guidance by issuing a formal planning

directive on 5 November.55 For the next three days,

in addition to the ongoing mission in Pakistan and

an impending mission in Qatar, the 15th MEU

conducted raid planning.56 As General Dailey had

forecast, while Task Force 58 had compiled a list of

more than 120 potential targets, the two staffs

discovered that definable hard targets were difficult

to come by. The objectives were ambiguous and

what limited information was available on specific

sites was often incomplete or obsolete. It took

considerable amounts of time and effort to build the

target folders, often requiring that the staffs request

current information from national intelligence

organizations based in the continental United States.

Even when Marines could identify solid targets,

competition for viable missions with Task Forces

Sword and Dagger clouded the issue. For its first

mission, Task Force 58 planned a 24-hour raid against

a drug-processing facility in Chuttu, located 40 miles

north of the Pakistani border. However, Task Force

Sword had also focused on that target and ultimately

ordered squadrons of the British 22d SAS regiment*

to conduct the raid.57

When the Marines’ initial targets were assigned

to the special operations forces, General Mattis

visited Task Force 57 with his aide, Lieutenant Cook,

and communications officer, Major Stebbins.58

While flying over southern Afghanistan on board a

P-3C, they inspected Rhino, Kandahar, and Route 1

to the west.59 After observing the collapse of

retreating Taliban and al-Qaeda forces around

Kandahar, the Taliban’s center of religious power,

Mattis was convinced that he could indeed accelerate

the enemy’s downfall by seizing a stronghold to their

rear and forcing a turning movement.60 Impressed

by this flight and its aircrew, Mattis established a

close working relationship between the two task

forces and involved Navy P-3 aircraft in the Marines’

future operations.61

Sustained Operations Ashore

On 9 November, General Mattis and Major

Mahaney visited briefly with the 15th MEU on

board the USS Peleliu off the coast of Qatar. After

meeting with Colonel Waldhauser and his staff, they

returned to Bahrain, and Mattis presented his formal

concept of operations** to Admiral Moore.62 A day

later, he briefed the plan to Central Command by

video teleconference from Bahrain,*** addressing

General DeLong, the deputy commander in chief;

General Victor Renuart, the operations officer; and

a third officer from the plans section. Staffs in

Hawaii, Doha, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Pentagon

also watched the brief, with several viewers openly

questioning the Marines’ ability to operate 350 miles

from the coast and avoid conflicting with the efforts

of special operations forces. General Dailey

observed the exchange and weighed in, stating that

he supported the Marines’ mission and that it had

already been coordinated with his organization.63

General Delong was pleased with what he heard

and told General Mattis to continue planning**** and

to include seizing and holding a forward operations

base in southern Afghanistan.64 Mattis’s staff had

anticipated this development and were already

assessing the suitability of a former United Arab

Emirates hunting camp in the southwestern desert

97

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

*The SAS raid may have been Operation Trent, an attack against an $85 million opium storage plant in Helmand Province that doubled as a local al-Qaeda

command center.

**Maj Mahaney later recalled that the staff cancelled its scheduled visit to the Peleliu in order to prepare the brief for VAdm Moore. (Mahaney comments,

10Dec08)

***BGen Mattis recalled that the brief was delivered from the Peleliu (12Jul06 interview), although Task Force 58’s command chronology indicates that it

took place in Bahrain.

****An informal chronology of significant events maintained by Task Force 58 indicates that Central Command had directed its land component to begin

planning for the establishment of a forward operating base in Afghanistan on 8 November 2001, although it does not specify if this was to be located in

the northern or southern region of the country. (TF 58 Informal Chronology, 2)
as a possible location for an operating base. Given its

austere operating environment, the site was particularly attractive because it possessed a limited

infrastructure, including buildings; the possibility of

fuel and power sources; and a 6,400-foot-long dirt

airstrip for building, sustaining, and projecting

combat power.65

Some Marines already knew of the site. During

September, the future operations section at I Marine

Expeditionary Force [I MEF] had considered the

hunting camp and a nearby lakebed, ambiguously

referred to as the “Desert Airstrip” and “Dry

Lakebed,” for conducting humanitarian operations

in southern Afghanistan.66 In October, 1st MEB’s

small operational planning team had also looked at

this and other locations while participating in

Exercise Bright Star and remained interested in the

site’s existing infrastructure.67 The same month, Task

Force Sword used the airstrip, codenamed Objective

Rhino, as a forward staging area during its raid into

Kandahar. It was based on this experience that

General Dailey recommended the site as a suitable

location for Task Force 58’s forward operating

base.68 Around the same time, General Mattis

telephoned Colonel Waldhauser on board the

Peleliu and indicated that there was still much

uncertainty as to where he would insert the 15th

MEU. Waldhauser recommended retaking Rhino, as

his Marines and sailors were already familiar with the

objective area and it would provide a location for the

task force to assemble its combat power and take the

fight to the enemy.69

Although the notion of establishing a forward

operating base remained relatively solid from this

point forward, planning efforts during the next six

days were complicated as the objective shifted from

the desert airstrip at Rhino to Kandahar airport,

then to airfields located near Herat, Shindand,

Lashkar Gah, and then back to Rhino. The target

selection process appears to have culminated one

evening as staff officers from the 15th MEU and

Task Force 58 acknowledged that, regardless of

which follow-on objective they eventually chose,

they would require a forward operating base in the

southern desert to overcome the logistical obstacles

presented by operating 460 miles north of the

Arabian Sea.70 As Colonel Waldhauser explained, his

staff argued their case:

We are kind of going around and around with

what the mission would actually be. We knew

we could take Rhino; whether we go to Herat,

whether we go to Kandahar, whatever the case

may be, we need to have that initial location.

So... let’s take Rhino and then we can move on

to other things from there.71

Situated in an isolated region 100 miles

southwest of Kandahar, Rhino was located outside

the scope of special operations occurring to the

north, and it provided a relatively secure operational

environment in which to mass combat power rapidly

before engaging the enemy.72 The sudden,

unexpected buildup of a substantial combat force

behind the collapsing Taliban and al-Qaeda forces

would in turn allow Task Force 58 to block their

westward retreat, if not force the decisive turning

engagement that Generals Mattis and Dailey had

discussed only a week earlier.

Meanwhile, a Newsweek release appearing on 11

November stated that differences over how to

follow up the Mazar-e Sharif victory had developed

between General Tommy Franks and Defense

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Franks, who questioned

the ability of indigenous forces to take Kandahar

and Jalalabad without U.S. support, wanted to exploit

the current momentum by launching “a series of

airborne assaults into southern Afghanistan in the

coming months, using U.S. Marines along with

special forces as raiding parties on Taliban

strongholds.” Rumsfeld, on the other hand, still

hoped that Afghans could accomplish most of the

ground fighting and wanted to delay Franks’s request

for a brigade from the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division.73

Portions of this news item were consistent with

the unsubstantiated rumor that, although planners

considered employing a significant number of

airborne forces in southern Afghanistan, this

98

FROM THE SEA
particular course of action had proved logistically

untenable in November 2001. As General Newbold

explained, efforts to support tactical aviation

consumed most of the strategic airlift capability, so

the assets necessary to move and then sustain heavy

ground forces in theater were unavailable.74 Colonel

Fitzgerald later confirmed that, although planners

had not considered the Marines when developing

their initial concept of operations (believing that

heavier airborne Army forces would eventually need

to replace the Marines), the provisional brigade

ultimately proved to be the only short-term

alternative for opening a southern front.75 Another

staff planner who was assigned to the land

component command at the time recalled that the

Marines were sent into Afghanistan because they

were willing to land their KC-130 aircraft at Camp

Rhino, while the Air Force would not land until a

12-mile security perimeter had been established

around the remote desert airstrip.76

On 16 November, while touring military

facilities in Pakistan with Lieutenant Colonel Lethin,

General Mattis issued a warning order to his

subordinate commanders.77 After special operating

forces had established surveillance over the two

main objective areas, 15th MEU would secure desert

airstrip Rhino (Task Force 58, Objective 1) on 21

November and support the rapid buildup of

Coalition forces at the newly established forward

operating base. The 26th MEU would subsequently

flow through Rhino to seize Kandahar airport (Task

Force 58, Objective 2) on 24 November, enabling

the 15th MEU to eventually close the desert airfield

and consolidate with other Task Force 58 elements

in the city. On order, the Marines would also

interdict opposing forces moving along Asian

Highway Route 1 (Task Force 58, Objective 3), the

principal two-lane paved road linking the major cities

in southern Afghanistan. As Lieutenant Colonel

Christopher Bourne later explained, the general

concept was for Battalion Landing Team 1/1 (BLT

1/1) to cut the road between Kandahar and Lashkar

Gah, while Battalion Landing Team 3/6 cut the road

between Kandahar and the Pakistani border.78

Efforts to deconflict special and conventional

operations influenced the tentative timeline

established for Task Force 58’s impending assault.

By mid-November, Task Force Sword had been

prosecuting the Afghan war nonstop for more than

a month, and it was now looking for a convenient

opportunity to refit and reorganize before

continuing the fight.* By the end of the month, the

level of lunar illumination would exceed the special

operations forces’ comfort zone, presenting an

opportunity for an operational pause between 20

November and 8 December.79 In a series of

undated, handwritten notes outlining the

“Commander’s Planning Guidance-Ph. III,”

Lieutenant Colonel Lethin indicated that the

operational intent was to retain the initiative or at

least maintain the shifting balance of power as Task

Force Sword prepared to withdraw from the

battlefield.80

Although he knew the Marines would be

operating at the “edge of [the] envelope” and against

tenacious fighters familiar with the terrain, General

Mattis told his staff, “If we can draw the enemy out

of prepared defenses by seizing something he

values, or by cutting him off, we may be able to

annihilate him as he moves against us. If he remains

on the offensive, we will exploit his vulnerability to

air attack. If we can dislodge him, our air forces can

hit him as he moves away.”81 In addition to ensuring

responsive fire support, success would require

“adroit handling of [close air support], quick

reaction forces, and maximum initiative and

aggressiveness of all hands.”82

99

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

*On 13 November, 32 soldiers from Company B, 75th Ranger Regiment, and an eight-man Air Force special tactics squadron element parachuted into a desert

landing strip southwest of Kandahar, codenamed “Bastogne.” After securing the airfield, two MC-130 aircraft delivered four attack helicopters, and two raids

were conducted before retrograding early the next morning. On 16 November, 48 soldiers from Company A, 75th Ranger Regiment, and elements from an Air

Force special tactics squadron inserted into desert landing strip Anzio with six desert mobility vehicles. The rangers then moved to secure desert landing strip

Bulge, enabling subsequent MC-130 operations, establishment of a forward arming and refueling point, and several helicopter raids. (Briscoe, 140–44)
The 15th MEU’s crisis action team completed its

preliminary mission analysis on 16 November, with

Colonel Waldhauser assuming the role of mission

commander. As part of his initial guidance, he

directed MEU Service Support Group 15 (MSSG 15)

to concern itself with conducting landing support

operations along the coast of Pakistan, BLT 1/1 with

seizing the desert airfield and establishing forward

operating base Rhino, and Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 163 (HMM-163) with providing mission

support throughout the operation. The team also

identified several areas in which the expeditionary unit

required assistance from Task Force 58.83

First, it needed help in selecting and then

arranging for the use of a suitable coastal offload

site. The staff emphasized that the offload site

needed to support both air cushioned and utility

landing craft, possess exits for both tracked and

wheeled vehicle movement off the beach, and be

located in close proximity to an airfield capable of

handling C-17 Globemasters. Based on these

requirements, they requested locations in Gwadar

and Pasni, Pakistan. Second, the expeditionary unit

needed help selecting and then arranging for the use

of a C-17 capable airfield near the Afghan border.

The staff recommended sites at Dalbandin and

Shamsi, Pakistan. Third, it required sufficient theater

airlift to transport forces that it could not move

efficiently over the required distances with organic

assets. The 15th MEU staff also questioned the rules

of engagement, which required that the enemy

demonstrate hostile intentions toward the Marines

before they could employ deadly force. Asking for

clarification of the current definition for “hostile,”

they requested permission to consider Taliban

encountered during the reconnaissance and assault

on Rhino as hostile forces.84

The Task Force 58 staff had already recognized

the need for intratheater assets to complete the initial

airlift into Afghanistan. Being concerned with the

100

FROM THE SEA

Photo by SSgt Manuel J. Martinez, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 100826-F-0856M-166

U.S. Marines and airmen spot a Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter as it is unloaded from a C-17A Globemaster III

aircraft. Air Force C-17s such as the one shown here were used to supply Marines at Forward Operating Base Rhino.
timely movement of combat forces (including more

than a company of light armored vehicles) into

Rhino, they were anxious to acquire C-17 support

from the Air Force for the initial buildup.85 Designed

to operate on 3,000-foot-long dirt airstrips, the

Globemaster could carry three times the number of

vehicles that the Marines’ venerable KC-130

Hercules could.

Task Force 58 began working the request

through NavCent headquarters in Bahrain and

Marine liaison officers at the air operations center in

Saudi Arabia on 17 November, asking for 20 sorties

during the first three days of the operation.86 They

also coordinated directly with the Air Force C-17

squadron. While the pilots expressed interest in

demonstrating the Globemasters’ capabilities in

combat for the first time, officials at U.S.

Transportation Command were reluctant to commit

the aircraft to southern Afghanistan because of the

antiaircraft threat.87 As the transportation situation

became increasingly critical, Lieutenant Colonel

Broadmeadow brought the matter to General

Mattis’s attention. He, in turn, approached the Joint

Forces Air Command and threatened that, unless

provided with the necessary airlift, he would inform

the press that the expensive new piece of military

hardware appeared to be incapable of accomplishing

its designed mission. Leveraging all of his resources,

Mattis finally acquired the necessary aircraft, fittingly

configured for special operations forces.88

General Mattis also agreed with the 15th MEU

that the rules of engagement were overly restrictive

for the assault force. He asked for a modification

allowing the ground force commander to treat any

personnel encountered during an assault on or

extraction from landing zones in enemy-held territory

as hostile. Although NavCent fully supported the

request, Central Command initially resisted the

change. Mattis’s persistent conviction that he required

the freedom to engage opposing forces proactively,

coupled with his trust and confidence in the abilities

of the young Marines carrying out the mission,

eventually led to a broadening of the criteria for

defining hostile forces.89

On 17 November, General Mattis returned to

Islamabad and met with Major General Farooq

Ahmed Khan, chief of plans of the Pakistani Joint

Headquarters Staff. Air Force Brigadier General

Ronald F. Sams’s Central Command liaison cell at

the American embassy greatly facilitated the Task

Force 58 staff ’s ability to communicate directly with

the Pakistani military officers—a capability the

Marines occasionally found necessary as the

operations continued into the winter months.90 Their

primary conduit at the embassy was Lieutenant

Colonel Asad A. Khan, a Marine Corps Forces

Central Command liaison officer assigned to

General Sams’s team. As a foreign area officer of

Pakistani descent, Khan was intimately familiar with

the local culture and language. Earning the trust of

the Pakistani staff, he turned years of political

disengagement into a supportive personal and

professional relationship.91

The purpose of General Mattis’s current visit

was to brief General Farooq on his concept of

operations and to obtain additional host nation

support for Task Force 58’s impending operation.

Although prepared for this diplomatic mission,

Mattis acknowledged afterward that it was more than

a little difficult.92 Before negotiating for access to the

critical seaport and airfield facilities, he had to

overcome a decade of neglected political relations

and ease Farooq’s concerns regarding the perceived

disconnect between Central Command’s original

intent to prosecute the war on terrorism using

indigenous Afghan freedom fighters and Coalition

special operations forces, and the planned

operations, which involved the use of conventional

military forces.93

After describing in detail Pakistani frustrations

with the United States to General Mattis, General

Farooq asked him how he was going to resolve the

situation. Mattis replied candidly that there was

nothing that he could do to rectify past injustices,

although he pledged his personal commitment to

open and honest communication with Farooq in the

future. The Marine general remained true to his word:

101

Operational Maneuver from the Sea
The Pakistanis knew the whole operation three

weeks before we went in, right down to HHour and D-Day and the objective; they never

revealed it. When I moved on to Kandahar, I

flew in first to them and talked with them. I also

asked their advice on each of these [operations]

and how to deal with the anti-Taliban forces

there. They gave me very good advice and we

were able to create very close working

relationships with the anti-Taliban and that sort

of thing. It was very, very helpful.

Something you have to remember is the

Marines and sailors would never have gotten

there... if we hadn’t had their help. That was

also important and a reminder that senior

officers... have got to be able to proactively go

in and work with the people, [who] at times are

legitimately going to have a problem with [our

intentions], and gain their support. It’s real

quantitative; if you don’t get it, then you don’t

pull off the operation.95

Having laid the groundwork for continued

discourse, Mattis and Farooq progressed toward a

discussion of increasing Marine access to Pakistani

military facilities and expanding the scope of

Coalition operations to include an active role for

Task Force 58 in Afghanistan. Although the

exchange was ultimately fruitful, the Pakistani

government had its own set of concerns regarding

the disclosure of its support.

General Pervez Musharraf, president of

Pakistan, was an ally in the war on terrorism and was

already contributing fuel, several forward operating

and logistical support bases, and security forces for

the campaign along the Afghan border. Yet he faced

tremendous political opposition and was struggling

to contain both Islamic extremists and Taliban and

al-Qaeda sympathizers in his own country.96 He

consequently sought to conceal or at least limit the

amount of information released to the public

concerning Pakistani support of U.S. military

operations, and he required discretion from

Coalition forces. Colonel Waldhauser recalled

watching a televised Pentagon press conference

from on board the Peleliu:

When... [reporters] there would ask directly,

“Are there U.S. forces on the ground in

Pakistan,” the answer was, “You’ll have to talk to

the Pakistani government about that, we don’t

discuss those things.”... They tried to keep a

very close hold on the fact that... we were there,

that we were supporting Enduring Freedom....

So, we never really could [acknowledge] what we

were doing or where we were.97

As a result, host nation support bases were

routinely cordoned off by 250–300 Pakistani

security forces, and airfield operations were limited

to search and rescue missions. This, in essence,

required that the Coalition launch its raids against

the Taliban from either the special forces base in

Uzbekistan or the Kitty Hawk in the Arabian Sea.

Against this backdrop of operational understatement, the Marines now proposed to move a brigadesized air-ground task force through western Pakistan,

seize a remote desert airstrip in southern Afghanistan,

and establish a semipermanent forward operating base

to sustain Coalition forces for at least a month. The

possibility of a decisive engagement with opposing

forces further threatened to broaden the scope of the

war in the region. Yet, from a strategic standpoint, an

explicit demonstration of American combat power, not

unlike Lieutenant Colonel (at the time) James H.

Doolittle’s defiant air raid against Tokyo during World

War II, would at once emphasize and strengthen

American resolve in the war on terrorism. As Lieutenant

Commander Lafferty explained, emphasizing America’s

role in a highly successful campaign—that had until

then been waged silently by special operating forces—

was a principal reason for creating Task Force 58 and

adding conventional forces to the mix:98

We were told to think “out of the box.” They

wanted something to happen now. The

American people wanted more, and more, and

more—something to happen fast. And they

weren’t getting enough information from the

Task Force Sword guys, [it was] as if nothing

was happening. So, this was a “put boots on the

ground” in Afghanistan and show the Marine

Corps and the U.S. troop concentration inside

the country [type of operation].99

102

FROM THE SEA
Captain Eric A. Putman, who commanded

Company A, BLT 1/1, spoke more bluntly while

reflecting on the experience after the operation. He

recalled, “For us to get that far into Afghanistan...,

put boots on the deck, and tell not only the Taliban

and al-Qaeda, but the rest of the world, that

America is not b–s–ing anymore, was awesome.”100

As the operation solidified, Task Force 58

logisticians spent an increasing amount of time

coordinating the mobility portion of the plan to

establish a forward operating base. Their principal

focus was on getting Marines and equipment ashore

in Pakistan for follow-on transportation to the

objective. While it was possible to send Marines

directly from the amphibious ships to Rhino, this

would require using CH-53E helicopters and

refueling en route, either in the air or on the ground.

Furthermore, employing the CH-53E as the

principal insertion platform limited the amount and

type of equipment that the Marines could transport

ashore. It quickly became clear that they would have

to establish intermediate support bases in Pakistan,

from which organic and intratheater fixed-wing

aircraft could transport personnel, equipment, and

supplies into Afghanistan.101

As Generals Mattis and Farooq spoke, the

Marine commander explained that he was

considering three potential seaport-airfield facilities

along the southern coast of Pakistan. During the

discussion, it was determined that one facility was

not suitable and another was located too close to

Karachi.102 This left the remote coastal fishing village

in Pasni, located approximately 186 miles west of

Karachi, which the 15th MEU had used a month

earlier while recovering the downed Black Hawk

helicopter. In addition to its proximity to the

Pakistani naval base at Ormara, it possessed suitable

beaches for an amphibious offload and was located

10 miles from a secluded commercial jetport

naturally camouflaged by the surrounding

mountains.103 Although this solved the immediate

problem of landing the Marines and their equipment

and then transporting each to the objective, political

constraints ironed out with Ambassador Chamberlin

complicated the process by restricting movement

operations to the hours of darkness and limiting the

number of forces allowed ashore at any given time.104

General Mattis next inquired about the

availability of intermediate support bases for staging

forces and refueling transiting aircraft. Although his

staff had assessed numerous airstrips during the

planning process, they rejected many due to aircraft

restrictions, terrain limitations, or proximity to

hostile populations. Mattis now wanted to use the

remote commercial airfield at Dalbandin that the

Army Rangers had employed during their October

raid on Kandahar. Situated among sand dunes near

the Chagai Hills, Dalbandin was located 255 miles

due north of Pasni, 23 miles south of the Afghan

border, and 117 miles southwest of Objective

Rhino. Instead, General Farooq offered access to a

small airstrip at Shamsi that special operations forces

were already using.105

Situated in a desolate area 46 miles south of the

Afghan border, Shamsi was located 212 miles

northeast of Pasni and 196 miles southeast of

Rhino. Although the route through Shamsi was less

direct than the one offered by Dalbandin—

extending helicopter flights into Rhino by 35

miles—General Mattis later concluded that Shamsi

was “isolated” and the “right choice” for an

intermediate support base in Pakistan. As Operation

Enduring Freedom matured and special operations

in southern Afghanistan were phased out, some of

the special operations equipment and facilities at

Shamsi were transferred to Task Force 58.

Approximately 80 Marines would eventually provide

security, refueling, and air traffic control capabilities

at the remote airfield. The Marines also continued

to use the airfield at Jacobabad. In addition to

offering a bed-down site for the four KC-130

aircraft from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadrons (VMGRs) 252 and 352, the airfield would

become a critical logistics hub and provide the single

source of bulk fuel and water for Coalition forces at

Rhino and Kandahar.

103

Operational Maneuver from the Sea
On 17 November, having coordinated his

plans with General Farooq, General Mattis issued

his official operations order, formalizing the efforts

of numerous staff planners during the previous

two and a half weeks. In the end, regardless of

whatever wrinkles needed to be ironed out, Mattis

emphasized that Pakistani military support was

never lacking and their staff “always came

through,” going “above and beyond every time.”106

Pakistan’s initial contribution to Operation

Enduring Freedom included the activation of two

navy bases, deployment of frontier battalions along

the Afghan border, and the employment of 42,000

army and air force personnel to support aviation

operations and provide base security.107

The tempo of activity continued to increase

during the next few days, as Marines throughout Task

Force 58 concurrently planned for, prepared for, and

conducted operations in support of the war in

Afghanistan. In addition to video teleconferences

between General Mattis and his commanders, staff

representatives from each of the subordinate

elements met at NavCent headquarters in Bahrain,

where they continued to refine the assault plan and

develop the logistics framework.108 The detachment

of four CH-53 helicopters that they had previously

asked for arrived, and the staff submitted another

request for the air detachment from Naval Mobile

Construction Battalion 133, commanded by

Commander Douglas G. Morton.109 Although

homeported in Gulfport, Mississippi, the Seabee

detachment was currently forward deployed to

Guam, mission capable, and ready to work.

Moreover, that very afternoon a Seabee liaison

officer assigned to Task Force 58, Lieutenant Clifford

Smith, had convinced the staff that it would require

construction teams to repair and maintain the dirt

runway at Rhino.110 On 18 November, General

Mattis briefed Admiral Moore regarding changes to

his continually evolving concept of operations, and

a liaison team from the British SAS joined his staff.111

By that time, the Peleliu ready group had

returned from Qatar, allowing Harriers from the

15th MEU to resume their close air support of

Coalition forces in Afghanistan. They conducted

three bombing missions during the third week in

104

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CWO-2 William D Crow

On a forward operating airstrip, Marines from VMGR-352 prepare their KC-130 for a flight into Kandahar while a KC-130 from

VMGR-252 taxis behind it for a flight into Kandahar during Operation Enduring Freedom.
November, attacking enemy troop concentrations

and vehicle convoys near Lashkar Gah and

Kandahar.112 At the same time, other Marines from

the MEU provided an on-call tactical recovery force

for Task Force Sword, and BLT 1/1 retrieved its

remaining security forces from Jacobabad, Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the Bataan ready group had ceased

operations in the Mediterranean, after being ordered

to Central Command’s area of responsibility. While

transiting the Suez Canal, it received its Operation

Enduring Freedom orientation brief and a draft

order to conduct raids in Afghanistan, and it

formally attached to the Fifth Fleet on 15

November.113 Captain Rome subsequently became

the commander of Task Group 58.3 and Colonel

Frick the commander of Task Group 58.4.114 Five

days later, the 26th MEU assumed the on-call tactical

recovery mission from the 15th MEU.115 During an

interview, Colonel Frick commented on this rapid

change in venue:

The biggest success was our ability to transition

from a rear MEU focus... a Sixth Fleet focus—

to sit down, do our mission analysis, and

prepare... for the Fifth Fleet AOR [area of

responsibility]. So that when we showed up...

we were able to say what we needed and why

we needed it, so that we could properly support

our Marines.116

105

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

Photo by PO Greg Messier USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011202-N-6520M-025

Seabees from Naval Mobile Constuction Battalion 133, homeported in Gulfport, Mississippi, help the Marines install a portable

helicopter landing pad system on desert landing strip Rhino, a forward base of operations strategically located outside

Kandahar, 2 December 2001. This pad will help keep the helicopter pilots from being temporarily blinded by the dust storm

created by the rotor wash while landing.

107

The Campaign Continues

After routing the enemy’s northern

forces, Task Force Dagger expanded

its scope of operations to include

developing the emerging alliance of southern

resistance fighters and pursuing the Taliban as they

collapsed toward their capital in Kandahar. On 14

November, Operational Detachment Alpha 574

inserted near Tarin Kowt, a rural mountain

settlement situated roughly 70 miles northwest of

Kandahar.1 Led by Captain Jason L. Amerine, USA,

the special forces team quickly linked up with

Hamid Karzai and his small band of approximately

200 soldiers. Karzai, a former deputy foreign

minister, one-time mujahideen diplomat, and

stalwart opponent of the Taliban, had recently

returned to Afghanistan, and the Central

Intelligence Agency considered him “the most

promising leader in the south.”2

Karzai considered Tarin Kowt, home to Mullah

Omar and several subordinate Taliban leaders, to be

the “heart” of the movement and believed that

capturing the town would motivate the local

Pashtuns to align with him. As a result, when the

town’s residents revolted against the Taliban on 16

November, he told Captain Amerine that they

needed to occupy the city immediately. When they

arrived that evening, the townspeople informed

them that a large convoy carrying 500 to 1,000

Taliban fighters was heading their way to recapture

the city. Approximately a quarter of the combined

force of American and Afghan soldiers quickly

established defensive positions along a ridgeline

south of the city, which overlooked the main road

from Kandahar, and a mountain pass guarding entry

into the valley.3

Shortly after dawn the following day, the lead

vehicles of the Taliban convoy began to clear the

pass. Although the special forces successfully

directed close air support against the first truck, the

resistance fighters broke and ran toward Tarin Kowt.

After urging Karzai to rally his troops, Captain

Amerine’s team occupied supplementary positions

and resumed directing the air attack. This time, when

dismounted Taliban attempted to flank the

Americans, the resistance drove them off. The battle

Chapter 7

Operation Swift Freedom

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Disposition of anti-Taliban militia moving against Taliban

forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan, during early December 2001.

Courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History

Future Afghan president Hamid Karzai (second row, third

from left) poses with Army Special Forces supporting his

small band of anti-Taliban militia north of Kandahar.
ended around 1030; the Taliban force retreated to

Kandahar, leaving the remains of 30 vehicles and

approximately 300 dead behind.4

On 18 November, a day after the success at

Tarin Kowt, Captain Smith and two other members

of Operational Detachment Alpha 583 inserted into

the Shin Narai Valley, southeast of Kandahar near

the Pakistani border. After linking up with Gul Agha

Sharzai and assessing the effectiveness of 650 to 800

resistance fighters, the remainder of the team joined

them three days later. The combined force began its

westward trek the following day, traveling in a

mismatched convoy of 100 vehicles.5

After sustaining heavy fire from AC-130 Specter

gunships during a running night battle on 23

November, Taliban forces quietly abandoned their

garrison at Tahk-te-pol and retreated north. Sharzai

subsequently established defensive positions along

a ridge north of the town the next day, effectively

blocking Highway 4, the main supply route between

Pakistan and Kandahar. From this location, the

Coalition force could see Kandahar airport in the

distance and the special forces team directed

devastating close air support against Taliban tanks,

trucks, troops, and artillery throughout the next

week. Although Taliban troops responded with

volleys of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and

antiaircraft artillery, they were unable to bring down

any of the attacking American aircraft.6

The decisive victory at Tarin Kowt, which

Karzai later called “the turning point” in the war,

raised his credibility among regional leaders, the

Northern Alliance, and the U.S. government.7 As if

to emphasize that point, on 24 November (also

reported as 29 November) one of 5th Special Forces

Group’s battalion commanders and two other

members of Special Operations Command and

Control Team 52 joined Operational Detachment

Alpha 574 to help advise the rising Pashtun

commander.8 Army Lieutenant Colonel David Fox,

Karzai, and Amerine “then began to plan the

advance on Kandahar in conjunction with Sharzai

from the south.”9

Staging for the Fight

Meanwhile, Task Force 58 maintained its hectic

pace during the fourth week of November, as

subordinate elements converged along the Pakistani

coast, established the logistical network necessary to

support operations ashore, and refined their assault

plan. Members of the command element and

reporters from the international press pool shipped

out from Bahrain, traveling first to Pasni, Pakistan,

by Marine KC-130 transport aircraft and then

transferring to helicopters for the flight out to the

USS Peleliu. Although they had begun to coordinate

for workspace and billeting on board ship through

Navy and Marine logistics officers during the

previous week, an advance party had not gone

forward to set up shop before their arrival. Once

again, the staff immersed itself in locating individual

berthing, reestablishing connectivity, and co-locating

with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th

MEU) staff in the joint intelligence center; as the

operation progressed, the task force staff eventually

established its operations center within the landing

force operations center, where Lieutenant

Commander Lafferty served as the senior watch

officer.10 Although the bulk of the task force staff,

19 personnel in all, would eventually join the

amphibious forces afloat, some members of the

administrative, intelligence, and logistics sections

remained in Bahrain to provide a reach-back

capability to the forward deployed forces.

On the same day that General Mattis and his

staff arrived, Marines and sailors of the Peleliu ready

group celebrated Thanksgiving two days early with a

traditional holiday meal. That evening in the ship’s

wardroom, the 15th MEU presented its formal

confirmation brief to the commander of Task Force

58. The meeting lasted more than three hours and

provided a comprehensive overview of the plan to

seize Objective Rhino and establish a forward

operating base. According to Colonel Waldhauser,

his aviation combat element commander, Lieutenant

Colonel James K. LaVine, “was directly responsible

for the detailed planning of the initial helo

movement.”11 Although the two staffs tentatively

108

FROM THE SEA
established H-Hour at 2130 on 23 November 2001,

it was clear that they needed additional planning to

organize the ship-to-shore movement and staging

of forces ashore.12

Below decks, now in a reversed sleep cycle to

prepare for the all-night mission, the Marines

readied themselves for the upcoming operation.

They gathered around terrain models and attended

mission briefs. They painted vehicles, weapons, and

equipment with desert camouflage, adding the date

9/11 and black silhouettes of the Twin Towers in

memory of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade

Center. They also loaded their packs onto pallets for

follow-on transport to the objective, thereby

reducing weight during the initial assault.13

By then, the USS Bataan had positioned itself

off the coast of Pakistan to support the impending

ship-to-shore operations, while the USS Shreveport

(LPD 12) and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)

proceeded to Masirah, Oman, to secure 104 pallets

of bottled water in preparation for future operations

ashore.14 Key personnel from Amphibious Squadron

8 and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26th

MEU) cross-decked to the Peleliu the day after

arriving to enhance integration within the task force

and facilitate coordination among the various

organizations. After General Mattis issued his

guidance to the assembled commands, they split by

task group and continued to refine their portion of

the plan. Meanwhile, Mattis conducted a separate

visit with Navy and Marine officers on board the

Bataan.

On Thanksgiving Day, three AV-8B Harriers

from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365

(HMM-365) flew the 26th MEU’s first combat

mission over Afghanistan,* attacking an enemy

convoy with laser-guided bombs and destroying four

vehicles.15 Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. DeVore, the

squadron’s commander, later commented, “This

group of aviators and mechanics were absolutely

109

Operation Swift Freedom

Photo by PO John Taucher, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011221-N-6610T-538

On board the USS Bataan, Chief Aviation Boatswain’s Mate Steve Guarjardo, USN, signals for the rolling launch of an AV-8B

Harrier from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 on 21 December 2001.

*According to the 26th MEU’s command chronology, Harrier pilots from HMM-365 flew the squadron’s first bombing missions on 20 November, while

in support of joint special operating forces. (26th MEU Command Chronology [ComdC], 31May02, Part 2, pp. 15–18)
phenomenal.... Their ability to surge and fly

routinely for over three months with near perfect

fidelity demonstrated the ability and effectiveness

of maintaining an inherent light attack ability with

the MEUs.”16

Earlier, members of the 15th MEU and Task

Force K-Bar had conducted a reconnaissance and

hydrographic survey of Chur Beach near Pasni,

Pakistan.17 After assessing the beach area and road

network leading to the airfield, they established two

beach landing sites: Blue One was used for aircushioned landing craft, while Blue Two was used

for utility landing craft. With nine air-cushioned and

four utility landing craft at its disposal, the task force

was now able to stage the assault forces and their

supplies ashore.18 To help track the ship-to-shore

and subsequent inland movement of its forces, Task

Force 58 developed a tactical logistics center.

Although the 15th MEU initially served as the

executive agent responsible for consolidating,

coordinating, and reporting the movement of

Marine forces ashore, the 26th MEU would pick up

that responsibility once the forward operating base

had been established.19

Due to Pakistani security concerns, all ship-toshore movement in Pasni occurred at night. After

reaching the beach, the Marines and sailors had to

make an hour-long cross-country trip over

improvised dirt roads to reach the airfield. Personnel

arriving early often encountered a long stay on the

beach while waiting for the convoys to assemble and

for permission to move inland. Only one or two

convoys ran per night, coordinated with

approximately 300 Pakistani Marines who provided

security during the offload, transport, and staging

110

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011222-N-2383B-501

Marines from MEU Service Support Group 26 unload a landing craft (air cushioned) from Assault Craft Unit Four in Pasni,

Pakistan, on 22 December 2001.

Photo by TSgt Efrain Gonzalez, USAF.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011129-F-2352G-002

Members of Task Force 58 relax outside a hangar in Pasni on 29

November 2001 while waiting to board an aircraft bound for

Forward Operating Base Rhino in southwestern Afghanistan.
operations. Because of its desire to maintain a low

profile, the Pakistani government limited the amount

of equipment allowed ashore at any given time, and

many of the task force’s personnel were initially

confined to hangers at the airfield during the day.

Additional security at the beach and airport sites was

provided by provisional infantry drawn from

Battalion Landing Team 3/6’s (BLT 3/6’s) tank

platoon, commanded by First Lieutenant Cornelius

D. Hickey, and amphibious assault platoon,

commanded by First Lieutenant J. P. Smith.20

Lead elements of the 15th MEU began to

deploy forward into Pakistan on 20 November. After

going ashore in air-cushioned landing craft at Pasni,

Captain Putman and Marines from Company A flew

on to the covert special operations base at Shamsi

in KC-130 aircraft, where they staged for the assault

on Objective Rhino. Although they had trained as

the battalion’s amphibious assault company, their

tracked assault vehicles would remain on ship for the

duration of the operation.21 A detachment from

Marine Air Control Group 38 (MACG-38) also

received the mission to establish and operate a

forward arming and refueling point in Shamsi to

support both the impending assault and any

subsequent combat operations in Afghanistan.22

Around the same time, Major Robert J. Smullen,

the operations officer for Battalion Landing Team

1/1 (BLT 1/1), and Marines from Weapons,

Headquarters and Service, and B Companies staged

at Jacobabad for movement to Rhino by KC-130.23

To support this stage of the operation, the 26th

MEU shifted its KC-130 detachment—Marine Aerial

Refueler Transport Squadron 234 (VMGR-234)—

from Souda Bay, Greece, to Jacobabad, Pakistan.24

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

The first phase of the actual assault into

Afghanistan began on 21 November, when a

detachment of approximately 20 SEALs from Task

Force K-Bar inserted into Objective Rhino.25

Although Colonel Waldhauser would have preferred

to use the 15th MEU’s own force reconnaissance

platoon to provide surveillance over the airfield and

collect intelligence, General Mattis decided to use

the sailors instead.26 He later explained that this was

a logistical decision, influenced by the requirement

to provide a primary, secondary, and tertiary

extraction capability in case of an emergency. While

using Marines would have tied up several CH-53

helicopters that he needed to conduct the assault, by

using the special operating forces to provide

surveillance, he was able to use aircraft from Task

Force Sword to meet the extraction requirement.27

Captain Philip J. Treglia, the reconnaissance platoon

commander, later acknowledged that he understood

the rationale behind Mattis’s decision, although it did

little to relieve his frustration over not receiving the

assignment himself.28

General Mattis chose to postpone D-Day for

24 hours on 22 November while waiting to receive

an order to execute the assault.29 After delaying for

another 24 hours the following day, he released his

own execute order on 24 November, directing that

the assault on Objective Rhino occur the next day

at 2000.30 Although minimal conditions had been set

for the Marines to launch as originally planned,

members of the Central Command staff and even

some senior critics within the Marine Corps

questioned whether Task Force 58 possessed

sufficient fuel stocks at Jacobabad to sustain combat

operations in Afghanistan. At Mattis’s direction,

Lieutenant Colonel John Broadmeadow diligently

rechecked his supply and consumption estimates

down to the last gallon. He assured the general that

(when considering multifuel vehicles) they possessed

the necessary reserves to proceed.31 Still, the extra

time did provide an opportunity for Task Force 58

to stockpile additional equipment and supplies

ashore. It obtained additional fuel bladders* from the

Air Force, enabling it to increase the storage capacity

at Jacobabad airfield before the operation and at

Objective Rhino following the assault.32

111

Operation Swift Freedom

*MajGen Waldhauser recalled that the extra fuel was initially for aviation, rather than ground, operations. (Waldhauser comments)
Operation Swift Freedom began late in the

afternoon on 25 November 2001. Task Force 58 had

assumed control of the Shamsi facility at 1200,

confirmed H-Hour at 1400, and readied to begin the

assault at 1600.33 As launch time approached,

Marines on the hanger deck of the Peleliu test fired

their weapons through the elevator well into sea,

then hauled their packs, weapons, and equipment—

often weighing in excess of 100 pounds—toward

awaiting transport helicopters on the flight deck. As

112

FROM THE SEA

Diagram by Col Nathan S. Lowrey

Map depicting the seizure of Forward Operating Base Rhino and subsequent TF-58 deployments in Afghanistan.
the straining troops boarded the aircraft with their

faces beaded with sweat, chaplain Lieutenant

Commander Donald P. Troast, USN, touched some

on the shoulder and “asked God to bless every one

of them,” regardless of their religion.34

The first flight of aircraft lifted from the Peleliu

around 1615 and headed inland. Led by Major

William T. Bufkin II,* the escort force included four

AH-1W Super Cobra and three Bell UH-1N

Iroquois (nicknamed the “Huey”) helicopters from

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM163). As Task Force 58 assumed control over its

designated area of operations in Afghanistan 45

minutes later, Captain Jay M. Holtermann led the

first half of the assault force north from the Peleliu.

Composed of three CH-53s, this wave carried

Captain James Fallon and Marines from Company

C, BLT 1/1.35 As the sun began to set, a third and

final flight of three CH-53s from HMM-365

touched down briefly on the Peleliu, embarked the

remainder of Company C, and headed toward

Afghanistan around 1745.

To help coordinate the operation, Captain Eric

J. Ropella flew overhead in a P-3 Orion from Task

Force 57, serving as the overall air mission

commander and providing an airborne relay among

the three flights and Task Force 58’s various

command elements.36 Four Harriers from each of

the two expeditionary units and numerous fixed-wing

Coalition aircraft were also on hand, ready to provide

close air support should the situation become

tenuous. If the plan went according to schedule, the

lead elements of the assault force would descend

upon the desert airfield precisely at 2100.37

The three aircraft flights flew north in series,

while unit commanders, staff personnel, and

members of the media anxiously monitored events

from on board the Peleliu. Colonel Waldhauser later

recalled the serenity of the unfolding situation in the

landing force operations center: “It was really...

awesome... one of those days where things go well

and you just have to savor it.” Although the operation

encountered minor glitches, the expeditionary unit’s

“detailed planning had paid off ” and “it just went like

clockwork.”38 Back at the joint operations center in

Tampa, General Franks also watched as the Marines

“reoccupied Objective Rhino,” noting that this was

the “beginning of the end.”39

The escort force headed toward Shamsi,

Pakistan, where they halted briefly to refuel and then

continued toward the objective area. The assault

force headed toward a 57-mile-long helicopter aerial

refueling track established just south of the Afghan

border. Each of these two divisions had 45 minutes

to link up with a KC-130 tanker from Marine Aerial

Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) and

refuel. While the first group from HMM-163

received fuel from Major Brian Magnuson’s tanker

with little difficulty, two aircraft in the second group

from HMM-365 were hindered by mechanical

problems with one of the two hoses on Major

Wayne M. Bunker’s KC-130; the pilots also

discovered that the “basket” at the end of the hose

flew at a different altitude than normal when the

aircraft was fully loaded with both fuel and troops.40

Fortunately, air planners had anticipated this

contingency, and the two helicopters carried enough

fuel to reach Objective Rhino, where they could shut

down until follow-on-forces established an

anticipated forward arming and refueling point.41

As the first assault division was exiting the

refueling track, just five miles south of the border,

the escort force began to cross into Afghanistan.

They flew in staggered waves—two Super Cobras,

three Hueys, and then two more Cobras clearing the

remaining 92-mile path into Objective Rhino. As the

assault force crossed the border behind them, the

moonlit terrain shifted from low mountains to flat

desert, and the speeding aircraft rose from 75 to 200

feet above sea level to compensate for the decrease

in visual contrast. The crews also conducted

113

Operation Swift Freedom

*The escort element flew in two staggered divisions. Because Maj Bufkin, in the lead AH-1W division, was completing his flight leader qualification during

the mission, Capt John B. Barranco technically served as the overall escort flight leader. The second UH-1N division was led by Capt Scott P. Suckow.
penetration checks, switching off unnecessary devices

that produced illumination or emitted an electronic

signature, to decrease the likelihood of premature

detection during the final leg of their journey.42

By this time, the SEALs had been providing

ground surveillance and reconnaissance over the

objective area for four days, sending intelligence

updates to personnel on board the Peleliu. During

the raid, the Orion from Task Force 57 watched

from the air, transmitting “real-time” images of the

developing situation to the Peleliu throughout the

night. The Orion proved to be such an effective

asset on this occasion that the Marines asked them

to continue providing overhead observation and an

early warning capability for the remainder of their

stay in Afghanistan.*

Before departing, the raid force had received

word that Objective Rhino was clear of enemy.43

Now, as the assault element approached the

abandoned airfield, visible two miles in the distance,

the escort flight leader relayed confirmation that the

runway remained clear of hostile forces by passing

the radio code word “Winter.” After more than four

hours in the air, the first flight of CH-53 helicopters

and their Cobra escorts began to descend toward the

landing zone at 10-minute intervals, guided toward

their destination by flashing infrared strobe lights

that the SEALs had placed in the middle of the dirt

runway. Due to severe brownout conditions—thick,

towering dust clouds stirred up by the aircraft’s

spinning rotor blades—several of the pilots were

forced to approach the runway several times before

successfully landing.44

114

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CWO-2 William D. Crow. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020310-M-1499F-372

A Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion is refueled in the air by a KC-130 Hercules in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in

Afghanistan on 15 November 2001. Given the extreme distances and altitudes encountered by Marines in Afghanistan, the Sea

Stallion’s range (540 miles), ceiling (16,750 feet), and payload (42,000 pounds) made the aircraft critical to Task Force 58.

*Capt David Hanley, an AH-1 Cobra pilot from HMM-365, was one of the Task Force 58 liaison officers who flew on board the P-3 during Operation

Enduring Freedom. (DeVore comments)
The assault force reached Rhino just 30 seconds

after its designated L-Hour, employing a configuration similar to the one used so successfully when

occupying the airfield at Jacobabad seven weeks

earlier. The first wave carried 66 passengers and 2

interim fast-attack vehicles armed with heavy machine

guns and man-portable Javelin antitank missiles.

Included among the passengers were Captain Fallon

and Company C’s headquarters staff, a reinforced rifle

platoon, and a SEAL liaison team to coordinate with

the surveillance and reconnaissance detachment.45

Fallon and his Marines had four intermediary

objectives, consecutively labeled A through D. The

first two prominent terrain features, situated 1,600

and 1,900 meters north of the runway, were oriented

toward likely avenues of approach. They were to

occupy these prior to the arrival of the second flight

of CH-53s, resulting in a “grueling cross-country

march under sustainment loads in excess of 130

pounds.”46 The intent was to get the Marines into

position as quickly as possible so they could delay

any approaching Taliban forces long enough for the

attack helicopters to engage. Even though the assault

force had received word that the objectives were clear

of Taliban, Fallon later acknowledged his concern

that they might encounter unanticipated opposition

during the forced march—either some troops that

the SEALs had overlooked or others who had

entered the objective area just prior to the insert.47

At the same time, a flurry of activity was

occurring on the airfield. The SEAL liaison team had

linked up with the surveillance and reconnaissance

detachment, initiating the handover with Task Force

K-Bar. The desert patrol vehicles were providing

transportation to the Marine air traffic control

squadron’s mobile team, covering them as they

hurried to set up runway lights for the introduction

of follow-on forces. The Huey and Cobra

helicopters began to land, taking up positions along

the airfield where they remained on a 15-minute strip

alert. In a classic case of understatement, Captain

Fallon later remarked, “It was a fairly busy 30, 40

minutes until the second wave hit the deck.”48

Forty-five minutes after the assault began, as the

first wave announced “clear” and exited the

objective area to the west, the second flight arrived.49

This flight carried 95 passengers, including

Lieutenant Colonel Bourne and BLT 1/1’s small

jump command post, Lieutenant Colonel Spillers

and a forward team from the 15th MEU staff,

detachments from MACG-38 and the Air Force’s

21st Special Tactics Squadron, and additional

Marines from Company C.50 Because they would be

physically isolated in the desert, the battalion staff

brought a suite of satellite, high-frequency, and

ultrahigh-frequency communications equipment

ashore, enabling them to talk directly to the fighter

cover as well as to orbiting Navy P-3 and Air Force

Boeing E-8C Joint Stars surveillance aircraft.51

Once Air Force Captain Michael J. Flatten and

personnel from his special tactics detachment had

declared the dirt runway KC-130 capable, the

buildup of combat forces at Forward Operating

Base Rhino (FOB Rhino) began in earnest. Marines

from MACG-38 managed the airspace over

southwestern Afghanistan and orchestrated the flow

of aircraft arriving and departing FOB Rhino. The

first KC-130, arriving from Shamsi, Pakistan, landed

only 90 minutes after the assault had begun. The

crew completed a combat offload of troops and

cargo in minimum time,* deplaning Captain Eric A.

Putman and Company A.52 By the end of the

evening, VMGR-352 had flown eight sorties into

FOB Rhino. Arriving at 20- to 30-minute intervals,

the C-130s enabled Task Force 58 to insert 403

troops, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of

supporting equipment into southern Afghanistan.53

Marines from BLT 1/1’s weapons company and

scout sniper platoon, the expeditionary unit’s force

reconnaissance platoon, and Marine Wing Support

Squadron 373 (MWSS-373) were among those units

115

Operation Swift Freedom

*Capt Fallon recalled that the first C-130 landed 15 minutes after the second wave arrived, carrying the last Marines from Company C, and that Company

A began to arrive on the second C-130. (Fallon interview, 7)
arriving during the first night of Operation Swift

Freedom. As the battalion reinforced its hasty

defense around the airfield with Company A situated

to the east and Company C to the west, the

squadron established a forward arming and refueling

point to support the stream of incoming aircraft and

future aviation operations at FOB Rhino.54 Inside

the perimeter, each of the forward elements set up

temporary command posts.55 At the same time, the

force reconnaissance team launched a long-range

mobile patrol to reconnoiter the surrounding area.56

Colonel Bourne, who had realized that there were

no hostile forces in the immediate area, later

commented that after completing the long-range

insert, he had believed that the riskiest part of the

operation was over. He recalled that he thought as

long as they got there and didn’t have a mishap along

the way—because of the sheer complexity of the

operation, refueling, and the distances that were

covered—they would be okay.57

As dawn approached, the increased threat from

man-portable air defense systems like the Soviet SA7 Grail and U.S. FIM-92 Stinger, as well as outlying

antiaircraft artillery, temporarily halted aviation

operations. Although rotary-wing aircraft would

eventually operate around the clock at FOB Rhino,

fixed-wing aircraft, with few exceptions, remained

restricted to night operations through the end of

December.58 This proscription was initially due to the

antiaircraft threat but later reflected the continuance

of previously established aircrew and aircraft

maintenance cycles, as well as the increasing amount

of time required to repair the degrading dirt runway.59

Establishing Forward Operating Base

Rhino

“One of the first platoons on the ground raised

an American flag high into the new dawn sky on a

makeshift pole proudly marking the Marines’

successful landing,” wrote Sergeant Joseph R.

116

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly

Under the weight of a full combat load and a machine gun, a Marine from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit moves to a

security position at Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, on 25 November 2001. An AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter

is visible in the background.
Chenelly, a combat photographer assigned to 15th

MEU.60 Staff Sergeant Norris, a platoon sergeant with

Company C and a native of Brooklyn, New York,

captured the spirit and significance of the event,

commenting, “This is for our great country, the

United States, and the great city of New York.

Marines take pride in raising the flag, and pride doesn’t

begin to describe the feelings today. I hope these

colors can be seen all the way across Afghanistan.”61

The Marines’ pride was only equaled by their

subsequent dismay when Central Command ordered

them to take the flag down several days later. The

rationale behind the order was a topic of widespread

speculation among Task Force 58 personnel, as well as

one of the most common and difficult questions that

General Mattis encountered while walking the lines

and speaking with junior Marines each day.62 Perhaps

senior officials in Tampa, Florida, or Washington, DC,

worried that the Afghan people would interpret the

American flag as a symbol of imperialism, undercutting the administration’s desire that the Coalition

be viewed as liberators rather than conquerors.

Adding to the Marines’ disappointment, within

a week of their arrival in southern Afghanistan,

General Franks banned the name Swift Freedom as

a means to distinguish the assault from other actions

occurring during Operation Enduring Freedom and

the overall Global War on Terrorism.63 A plausible

explanation for this action comes from a press

conference held at the Pentagon on 26 November

when reporters asked General Myers if the name

indicated that the operation would soon be over.

The general responded,

The operation... will not be over soon....

We've said this many times from right here that

this operation, on a worldwide basis, will go on

probably for years—in Afghanistan, for a

substantial amount of time. We do not think

that it's going to be over anytime soon, no

matter what we name the operation.64

117

Operation Swift Freedom

Photo by Sgt. Joseph R. Chenelly

Marines with Company C, Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) raise the

first American flag in Afghanistan on 26 November 2001, as Operation Enduring Freedom begins. To the dismay of Task Force 58

sailors and Marines, Central Command would later order the flag removed.
Back at FOB Rhino, Colonel Bourne described

the installation as a dirt runway, dirt apron, and

compound set in a “very flat, very shallow

depression... with a couple of key pieces of...

microterrain.”65 An elevated plateau paralleled the

airfield approximately two miles to the north,

gradually transitioning to a series of hills and

ridgelines six miles out.66 The two rifle companies

received indirect fire support from a section of BLT

1/1’s 81mm mortar platoon, while Marines from BLT

1/1’s scout-sniper platoon established observation

posts outside the defensive perimeter. The force

reconnaissance team, led by Gunnery Sergeant Blake

L. Smith, traveled several hundred miles during the

next day, observing local villages, planting seismic

sensors, monitoring highway traffic, and generally

screening the task force’s western flank.67

First Lieutenant Nathaniel Fick, who commanded Company B’s weapons platoon, described

the airfield facilities in his memoir:

Rhino was a short dirt runway and a complex

of buildings enclosed within a white block wall.

Guard towers studded the four corners. Inside

the wall stood a high-ceilinged warehouse, a

water tower, half a dozen smaller buildings, and

a mosque. All were impressively constructed,

with marble floors, granite countertops, new

118

FROM THE SEA

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

U.S. Marines established Forward Operating Base Rhino southwest of Kandahar in November 2001.
lighting fixtures, and white plaster walls. Paved

roads flanked by brick drainage ditches

connected the buildings.68

Although the assault force initially intended to

secure the compound the first night, reconnaissance

revealed signs that someone had entered the

compound following the rangers’ earlier raid, burying

enemy dead and scavenging surviving materials.69

Aware of the mine and booby trap threat that this

presented, the Marines decided to isolate the area and

clear the buildings the following morning when it

could be accomplished with adequate light and in

conjunction with the combat engineers and explosive

ordnance disposal technicians.70 Although the assault

force did not encounter mines, they did find

ordnance from the previous raid.71

Marines from the expeditionary unit’s service

support group focused on infrastructure and

sustainment concerns. Support personnel followed

closely behind the ordnance disposal technicians,

partitioning buildings and identifying spaces for the

command post, hospital, maintenance activity,

supply warehouse, sustainment storage, antenna

farm, and latrines. Major Henry M. Hymes III,

executive officer of MEU Service Support Group

15 (MSSG 15), also drew samples from the water

reservoir and tower that personnel on board ship

could test for potablility. Although the well system

was disconnected, the reservoir held approximately

30,000 gallons of stagnant water that the Marines

could purify and use to sustain forces ashore for

approximately 10 to 15 days.72

Meanwhile, in the hangar deck of the Peleliu,

other Marines from the 15th MEU prepared to go

ashore at Pasni for an evening flight into FOB

Rhino. Correspondents who witnessed the Marines

loading ammunition into their weapons, their faces

masked with camouflage paint, inquired about the

status of the continuing operation. Despite

reservations regarding the presence of media

representatives on board ship, General Mattis

explained that Task Force 58 had established a

foothold ashore and was “going to support the

Afghan people’s effort to free themselves of the

terrorists and the people who support terrorists.”73

119

Operation Swift Freedom

Photo courtesy of Maj Michael P. Mahaney

Buildings occupied by Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163, left, and Battalion Landing Team 1/1 at Forward Operating

Base Rhino.
Failing to note his intention to withdraw following

the operation, at least two reporters chose to focus

on the general’s assertion that “the Marines have

landed and we now own a piece of Afghanistan.”74

General Mattis obviously intended to play upon

the traditional and oft-quoted 19th-century news

report usually attributed to Richard Harding Davis:

“The Marines have landed and the situation is well in

hand.” Yet his ad-libbed claim worried senior leaders

who were already apprehensive about the growing

number of conventional forces ashore and the

potential for negative reactions from the Afghan

people. Just days prior to the Marines’ assault on

Rhino, a report in the Wall Street Journal noted,

“There also are serious questions about how the

U.S.’s allies in the Northern Alliance would respond

to a larger U.S. presence on the ground. Rebel leaders

already have complained about the stationing of 100

British troops at an air base near Kabul.”75

A day following the Marine landing, Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria C.

Clarke stated that 1,000 Marines would participate

in establishing the initial forward operating base,

and officials expected the number to rise in the

future.76 Yet during a press briefing with General

Myers later that day, Secretary Rumsfeld presented

a slightly different view. During his initial remarks,

without prompting, he emphasized that the

Marines were “not an occupying force. Their

purpose is to establish a forward base of operations

to help pressure the Taliban forces in Afghanistan

to prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists from

moving freely about the country.”77 When

questioned as to whether he envisioned the Marines

fulfilling a support role or serving as the vanguard

in the battle against terrorism in Afghanistan, he

responded, “We think of them as a—establishing a

forward operating base. And we don’t discuss

future plans or developments, so there’s really

nothing one would say beyond that, except that

that’s what the—these are hundreds, not thousands,

of Marines.” When again questioned about the

Marines’ intent during a press briefing with General

Franks at Central Command headquarters the next

day, Rumsfeld reiterated that he had pointed out on

a number of occasions that the United States

coveted no one else’s land, and certainly not

Afghanistan. He said the United States was there

to do a job—to root out terrorists and terrorist

networks and ensure that the Taliban government

that invited them and had been harboring them was

gone. Also, although he did not mention him by

name, Rumsfeld stated that General Mattis was a

“very fine officer,” was “clearly exuberant,” and was

“speaking figuratively, not literally.”78

Ironically, three weeks later, Hamid Karzai

confided that he had welcomed the Marine claim as

a clear indication of victory and enthusiastically

shared the information with his militiamen.79

Early on the moonlit evening of 26 November,

an E-8C monitoring enemy lines of communications detected an eastward moving convoy of 15

120

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Robert D. Ward, courtesy of the Department of

Defense. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011127-d-9880w-084

Gen Tommy R. Franks, USA, commander of U.S. Central

Command, and Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. secretary of defense,

brief reporters in Tampa, Florida, on 27 Nov 2001.
vehicles, including two Soviet-era BRDM-2 armored

personnel carriers.* The column was operating

approximately 50 miles northwest of FOB Rhino

near Lashkar Gah.80 Because it did not present an

immediate threat to the Marine outpost and it was

possible that the vehicles were transporting

humanitarian aid recently dropped by Coalition

aircraft, Central Command observed the convoy for

three and a half hours to verify its identity and

intent. Eventually, patrolling Grumman F-14B

Tomcats from Fighter Squadron 102 (VF-102) on

board the USS Carl Vinson spotted the column and

attacked the two personnel carriers with a laserguided GBU-12 bomb.81

At the same time, a section of two AH-1W

Super Cobra helicopters from HMM-163 were

conducting an armed reconnaissance flight forward

of FOB Rhino and heard the F-14 pilots over their

radios. The Marine aircrews included Captains John

B. Barranco and David M. Steele piloting the first

aircraft call sign “Evil Eye 34” and Captains Kristian

D. Pfeiffer and Richard B. Lawson piloting the

second “Evil Eye 35.”82 The Cobras headed toward

the convoy and—at the Joint Star’s request—helped

coordinate the attack and watched as the Tomcats

engaged the armored personnel carriers. After the

Navy fighters had completed their bombing run,

striking just in front of the lead armored personnel

carrier and disabling it, the Marines took their turn.83

Emerging from behind a nearby ridge, the

Cobras used their 20mm cannon and rockets to

engage the two armored vehicles and eight to ten

dismounted personnel. Captain Barranco later

described the attack:

At least some of the Taliban were out of the

vehicles. I’m guessing they thought they hit a

mine since the F-14s were so high. They heard

us and some of them started firing wildly in the

air toward the sound of the Cobras—the rest

started running. We made several passes

destroying the vehicles and killing the squad.84

Passing back over the convoy, the pilots used

their night-vision goggles and infrared sensors to

assess the battle damage but determined that

nothing of military value was left.85 Back at FOB

Rhino, Task Force 58 believed that this early

encounter with armored personnel vehicles could

foreshadow the appearance of enemy tanks,

emphasizing an immediate need for its own light

armored vehicles, as well as Air Force C-17 aircraft,

to transport support into Afghanistan.86

After reopening the airfield for operations

following the convoy attack, Task Force 58 resumed

the buildup of combat forces at Rhino. Arriving

units quickly took up residence in the

commandeered buildings of the former Taliban

compound, while some of the Marines sheltered in

the warehouse.87 General Mattis accompanied the

second day’s flow of forces into Afghanistan,

arriving at 1910 with a small jump command post

consisting of his aide, Lieutenant Cook; his

communications officer, Major Stebbins; and two

enlisted communicators.88 Lieutenant Smith, the

Seabee liaison officer, joined them the following

day.89 They established communications with Task

Force 58’s forward elements on board the Peleliu,

also poised to go ashore when called on by their

commander, who in turn maintained communication with the rear elements in Bahrain.90

Colonel Waldhauser also arrived during the

second night of the airlift with members of his staff

and the three subordinate units. They quickly

established their joint task force enabler communications suite, providing for the reception of

long-range visual communications at the base. In

addition to bringing another 170 troops forward, the

evening’s airlift also increased the force’s mobility

and firepower by adding 14 High Mobility

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs,

referred to hereafter as humvees) into the mix.91

Many of these belonged to the battalion’s weapons

company and were armed with either M2 .50-caliber

121

Operation Swift Freedom

*Barranco recalled that the convoy consisted of only two BRDM-2 armored personnel vehicles, and he is unaware of any concern that they might have

been distributing humanitarian aid. (LtCol John B. Barranco, TF 58 History, Taliban Convoy Attack, e-mail to author, 30May10)
heavy machine guns; MK19 40-mm automatic

grenade launchers; or tube-launched, optically

tracked, wire-guided antitank missiles.92 Other

vehicles sent to bolster the airfield defense belonged

to the 26th MEU’s low-altitude air defense

detachment.93

On 27 November, Captain Treglia sent out Task

Force 58’s second long-range deep reconnaissance

patrol. Operating under the command of Gunnery

Sergeant Smith, Team 2 headed approximately 50

miles north of FOB Rhino, within 5 miles of the

convoy that naval aviation had destroyed the

previous evening. At this time, small groups of

enemy occupied a series of villages along Highway

1, the east-west thoroughfare between Kandahar

and Lashkar Gah. Intelligence sources detected

movement near the latter location and suggested

that opposition might be encountered in that area.

The patrol remained in the field for approximately a

week before returning to FOB Rhino around 1

December. Although they had requested air

reconnaissance several times, the situation remained

calm and the Marines did not encounter any

opposition. In one case, however, several intimidated

civilians did surrender to a circling Cobra gunship,

but they presented no threat to the Marines and were

allowed, if not encouraged, to return to the desert.94

Company B arrived by KC-130 from Pasni on

27 November, comprising most of the 168 troops

and nine additional humvees inserted into Rhino

that evening.95 Although Captain Whitmer expected

to serve as the battalion’s reserve, he was assigned

responsibility the following morning for the

southeast corner of the J-shaped, 7,500-meter

defensive perimeter that would eventually enclose

the airfield, ammunition supply point, fuel dump,

helicopter park, and headquarters compound.96

Lieutenant Fick attached his M249G machine gun

and M136 AT4 antiarmor weapon assault teams to

the rifle platoons to put more fire forward, while

Staff Sergeant Keith A. Marine centered the 60mm

mortar section behind the company’s position. First

Sergeant O’Neil O. Weilbacher reflected that the

company was stretched as thin as he had ever

experienced, covering almost two miles of frontage;

it could take two hours to walk the line at a casual

pace, checking on the Marines and their fighting

positions. Fortunately, they were able to establish

wire lines between the platoon command posts, and

radio communications were solid over the flat

terrain. Company C, situated to the left of Company

B, was oriented toward the northwest, while

Company A, situated to the right, was oriented

toward the northeast.97

Captain Putman recalled that his Marines spent

the first few days ashore acclimating to the austere

desert environment, familiarizing themselves with

the local terrain, and establishing their defensive

positions.98 Temperatures varied greatly, rising to 80

degrees during the day and then plummeting to 30

degrees at night. As Sergeant Anthony A. Anguiano,

122

FROM THE SEA

Associated Press

Cpl Jamyn Williams, an automatic rifleman with Company A,

Battalion Landing Team 1/1, cleans his squad automatic

weapon at Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, on 30

November 2001. In the background, another Marine improves

his fighting position along the airfield’s defensive perimeter. 
one of his squad leaders, commented, “There is ice

in our canteens in the morning, and the parkas we

have practically save our lives.”99 Vegetation was

sparse, surrendering the ground cover to a mixture

of loose sand, scattered rocks, and intermittent

patches of protruding sticks. The sand, similar in

consistency to talcum powder, was a problem: when

disturbed, billowing dust clouds arose to linger in

the air for 15 minutes before dissipating, requiring

the Marines to continually brush the debris from

their weapons, equipment, and workspaces. Beneath

the sand, the Marines soon discovered a layer of

underlying limestone bedrock, which made digging

more than a simple chore.100

Establishing the defensive perimeter invariably

required entrenchment: “digging in, setting up the

machine guns, sinking the mortar base plates.”101

The latter task involved test firing the mortars to

calibrate the crew-served weapons, resulting in

“earthshaking blasts” and “plumes of dust” a mile

and a half into the desert.102 Once the defense was

established, the companies settled into a day-night

operations cycle. At 0500, about an hour before

sunrise, the Marines would “stand to” in their

fighting positions, raising the battalion’s security

posture to 100 percent alert. An hour after sunrise

they would “stand down,” dropping to 25 percent

alert (one man in four armed and ready for action).

Most days remained relatively quiet, allowing the

Marines to complete a host of “continuing actions”

necessary to maintain their combat effectiveness. As

Captain Putman remarked, “The Marines were not

suffering from boredom; we kept them focused.”103

The Marines cared for their weapons; improved

their fighting positions; slept on thin, foam ground

mats; and subsisted on two liters of bottled water

and two (later three) prepackaged field rations,

otherwise known as meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), per

day.104 They also attended to personal matters such

as washing, shaving, brushing their teeth, and

123

Operation Swift Freedom

Associated Press

Marines from Company C, Battalion Landing Team 1/1, attempt to stay warm while manning fighting positions along the

defensive perimeter at Forward Operating Base Rhino on 5 December 2001.
establishing field-expedient latrines.105 Knowledge

that 89 percent of the soldiers hospitalized during

the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan suffered from

contagious diseases like hepatitis, cholera, and

typhoid—avoidable through basic hygiene practices—drove home the need for cleanliness.106

The Marines also practiced reaction drills

designed to counter enemy offensive actions and

conducted foot-mobile local security patrols. During

the daytime, longer-range patrols usually deployed

by humvee, scouted the area two to three miles

north of the airfield. Sometimes the squads received

rides back to the perimeter following their patrol,

while other times they walked. Although the Marines

did not identify any hostile forces during these

patrols, they did occasionally encounter camelmounted Afghans, excavated positions, digging

equipment, and caves.107 Captain Whitmer reflected,

“There were things going on out there.”108

As darkness approached, the line companies

increased their security posture to 50 percent alert

and established night observation and listening

posts. Although dust storms, fog, or periods of low

illumination could seriously limit visibility, the

Marines were able to employ the night sights from

various missile systems to observe the perimeter.109

A reporter from Newsweek captured the mundane

existence along the frontlines in this way: “At night

the grunts did virtually anything to keep themselves

awake and entertained. Shivering in the 30-degree

cold, they sang lewd songs, talked about how ready

they were to kill, and pondered the discos and clubs

they would head out to when they returned home

as heroes.”110

The Marines also sent out short-range security

patrols to scout the area extending 3 miles north of

their positions. These patrols departed and returned

through friendly lines and could last 8 to 10 hours.

They investigated the area around assigned checkpoints; set up temporary en route “ambush” sites;

and generally tried to disrupt enemy attempts to

probe their lines, observe airfield operations, or

shoot down approaching aircraft.111 Although both

types of patrols were coordinated with the

observation and listening posts, line of sight

communications could be disrupted by the

increasingly rough terrain farther afield. Expedient

solutions involved establishing temporary retransmission sites or simply relaying messages through

adjacent patrols.112

Aviation Operations and Airfield

Maintenance

During the initial 48 hours of the operation,

Task Force 58’s air officers used radio, secure

telephone, e-mail, and Internet chat to maintain a

running dialogue with the liaison officers stationed

at the combined air operations center in Saudi

Arabia. The liaison officers provided an essential

link to Central Command’s air component,

becoming partners in procuring the aviation assets

necessary to support the Marines’ buildup of

combat power ashore.

The Marines from VMGR-252 and VMGR-352

continued to operate from Jacobabad, Pakistan, and

Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain. While fulfilling the

majority of Task Force 58’s intratheater lift

requirements, they would eventually fly more than

1,400 sorties and accumulate more than 2,500 flight

hours. In addition to validating the squadrons’

presence by carrying 8,400 passengers, delivering 9

million pounds of cargo and fuel, and completing

numerous refueling and casualty evacuation missions,

they also earned the respect and admiration of the

grateful forces they were supporting.

A series of obstacles faced by the aircrews and

mechanics made their accomplishments all the more

impressive. First, their aircraft frames ranged from

25 to 42 years in age; the oldest in VMGR-352 dated

back to 1960.113 Second, the aircrews flew the

majority of their tactical missions at night because

only three of the KC-130s possessed aircraft

survivability equipment, such as the infrared missile

countermeasure system. Third, pilots conducted

tactical approaches, landings, and departures without

the aid of night-vision goggles because the cockpits

124

FROM THE SEA
were not night-vision compatible.114 Finally, given

the aircrafts’ age, the squadrons’ high tempo of

operations, and the austere operating environment,

mechanics had to perform continuous aggressive

maintenance to keep the Marines flying.115

Despite the effectiveness of the Marine

transport squadrons, Task Force 58’s previously

defined need for additional airlift remained critical

to the timely buildup of sustainable combat forces at

FOB Rhino. Although Captain Flatten had already

assessed the dirt runway as C-17 capable, Air Force

officials were still reluctant to expose their larger

transport aircraft to airfield operations in southern

Afghanistan. After security patrols and observation

posts were established in the landing and take-off

zones, the antiaircraft threat assessment was

updated, and a phone call was made to Air Force

Major General Michael W. Wooley, then commander

of the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Air Mobility

Command, C-17s were finally authorized for

nighttime operations at Rhino. Thereafter, planners

routinely programmed two C-17 flights per day into

the air tasking order to fly sustainment into Rhino,

adjusting the loads to meet daily requirements.116

The first C-17 flight carried lead elements of

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133’s air

detachment, formally designated as Task Force 58.5.

Led by Lieutenant Commander Leonard W. Cooke

and Lieutenant Joel K. Sensenig—the unit’s

operations officer and his assistant—this advance

party had flown from Guam to Diego Garcia on

board Lockheed C-5 Galaxy transports before

boarding C-17s for the final leg of their journey into

southern Afghanistan.

Although Colonel Lethin wanted to continue

the buildup of combat forces unabated, Colonel

Broadmeadow and Lieutenant Smith had argued

persuasively that three nights of continuous aviation

operations had taken a heavy toll on the desert

airstrip and that it required repair if the buildup were

to continue.117 In addition to pulverizing the top 6

inches of the runway into dust, ruts up to 12 inches

deep had begun to appear where the C-130s were

landing and taking off.118 As Lieutenant Smith later

explained, the camp’s original owners had designed

the airfield to support occasional use by light, singleengine airplanes, not continual use by heavily laden

military transport aircraft.119

Given the limited number of aircraft at their

disposal, Task Force 58 decided to fly only a third

of the full complement of Seabees in at this time. In

the staff ’s view, this would provide the necessary

personnel, equipment, and materials to address the

immediate airfield maintenance issues at FOB

Rhino, leaving the remainder of the force to deploy

forward after completing the insertion of combat

forces and then seizing Kandahar airport. This plan,

reached with the input of U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command (NavCent) engineers, reduced the initial

number of Seabee personnel from 89 to 27, and the

subsequent airlift requirement for transporting their

equipment from 25 to 8 C-130 loads.120

The Seabee detachment arrived at FOB Rhino

ready to work. Although the initial complement was

primarily composed of construction mechanics and

heavy-equipment operators, it also included several

electricians, plumbers, steel workers, and carpenters

to complete rudimentary contingency construction at

125

Operation Swift Freedom

Photo by TSgt Efrain Gonzalez, USAF.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011129-f-2352g-013

A Marine rough terrain forklift unloads an Air Force C-17

Globemaster III aircraft at Pasni, Pakistan, on 29 November

2001. Given the airbase’s close proximity to the coast, it

served as an important transload site and intermediate

support base to Task Force 58 forces ashore in Afghanistan

and afloat in the Arabian Sea.
the base. In addition to bringing the equipment

necessary to complete small construction projects, the

sailors also brought a grader, roller, bulldozer, water

distribution truck, two humvees, and a generator.

While not necessarily part of the Seabee’s standard

deployment package, the water truck proved crucial

to maintaining the earthen runway. Grading the ruts

and rolling the dirt was not enough to keep it in place,

Lieutenant Smith explained, it was doing so while

spraying with water that enabled the soil to bond. The

Seabees began work the morning after their arrival,

and 12 hours later had the runway ready to receive

additional flights on the evening of 29 November.121

An Unanticipated Operational Pause

In addition to changing the status quo in

southern Afghanistan, the arrival of Task Force 58

at FOB Rhino may have also raised questions among

senior leaders about how best to employ the

Marines. Although initially assigned three sequential

objectives—to establish a forward operating base,

seize Kandahar airfield, and interdict enemy

movement—comments made by various officials

during news briefings foreshadowed a narrowing of

the Marines’ mission. On 26 November, Secretary

Rumsfeld had stated that the Marines’ “purpose is

to establish a forward base of operations to help

pressure the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, to

prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists from

moving freely about the country.”122 When reporters

asked how a base would contribute to that end, he

explained that “you could use it for humanitarian

purposes, you could use it for special operations, you

could use it... for the inflow of additional troops.”123

During the following day’s news briefing at Central

Command, General Franks provided a more detailed

rationale for establishing the forward operating base:

This is, in fact, a forward base of operations. I

think there have been several descriptions of

what that means.... I would anticipate that at

the end of the day, this installation, if you will,

this forward operating base... will have a

number between 800 and perhaps 1,100 people.

I mean, I think that's what it will be.

The purpose of the forward operating base is

to give us a capability to be an awful lot closer

to the core objectives we seek. Now, we all

know what those are. We’re interested in the

destruction of the al-Qaeda network, and we’re

interested in the destruction of an illegitimate

Taliban government, which has abused people

in this country for a long, long time—the

leadership of the Taliban.

Now we can either do that... by making seven-,

eight-, and nine-hour trips, or we can provide

ourselves a forward operating base. And so we

have provided a forward operating base to do

precisely what I just described. We may well use

assets from that to interdict the roads, to

continue the interdiction of the roads, to be

sure that elements in which we have an interest

are not permitted to go places where we don't

want them to go.

And I will also be telling you the truth if I say

I don't know how long that base will be there.

It is not an invasion of Afghanistan. As soon

as our work is finished, it certainly will be

removed. And yes, we may well use it to bring

humanitarian assistance in to the people in

Afghanistan.124

On 26 November, when asked whether the

Marines would go after the Taliban or hunt down

Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants,

Secretary Rumsfeld responded that the Marines were

in to do what he’d said, and that was to establish a

forward operating base.125 When reporters tried

another tack, asking why the Marines had been

committed to the Kandahar region, Rumsfeld

conceded,

The highways that connect the north and the

south and the east-west in the southern part,

going toward Iran, exits or entrances from Iran

and Pakistan, can be interdicted from those

locations. And it was decided... by the

combatant commander, Tommy Franks, that it

would be helpful to have a base there from

which a variety of things could be done, rather

than simply using people in and out of a special

operations nature.126

126

FROM THE SEA
On the same day, despite the potential for urban

combat in Kandahar, General Myers did not

mention the Marines when commenting on the

Taliban’s disposition and future Coalition military

operations. Instead, he stated that

Omar seems to be trying to organize the

fighting of the Taliban, and bin Laden, on the

other hand, seems to be concentrating on

hiding.... Again, in Kandahar it’s sort of the

last bastion, we think, of Taliban resistance.

You get mixed reports on whether they’re about

ready to leave and give up or not. I will go with

the secretary on this, in that, from Omar’s

standpoint, we think... they’ll dig in and fight,

and perhaps to the end.127

When asked similar questions on 27 November,

General Franks stated,

The Marines will be used exactly as the

secretary said yesterday and I said today.

They’re within about 70 or 80 miles of

Kandahar. Their very presence does in fact

provide pressure, but I will not characterize the

intent of them being there as a force to attack

Kandahar. That simply is not the case. That’s

not why we put them there.128

By 28 November, as 15th MEU was nearing

completion of its insertion into FOB Rhino, Task

Force 58 had begun its shift toward the second

phase of Operation Swift Freedom. Based on

coordination meetings that had taken place between

MSSG 15 and MSSG 26 personnel on board the

Peleliu on 21 November, the 26th MEU formed a

landing force support party and assumed control of

beach and airfield operations in Pasni, Pakistan.

From this point forward, they supported nightly

ship-to-shore movements and conducted throughput operations from both the Peleliu and Bataan

ready groups. A transportation support detachment

from the 15th MEU continued to operate from the

airfield until mid-December and assisted these

efforts.129 Captain B. J. O’Rothman, the detachment’s

commander, had developed a particularly effective

working relationship with the Pakistani military, who

requested that he remain at Pasni.130

On the same day, NavCent notified Task Force

58 that Central Command was limiting the number

of Marines and sailors serving at FOB Rhino to

1,000.131 At this time, however, a planeload of

Marines exceeding the new restriction was en route

from Pakistan.132 After Task Force 58 responded that

there were already 1,078 personnel on deck, Central

Command relaxed the threshold to reflect the

number currently ashore and then gradually raised

the limit to 1,100 personnel on 29 November and

1,400 on 1 December.133

The unexpected restriction caught General

Mattis by surprise. He later reflected that Central

Command “knew thoroughly that I wasn’t asking for

4,500 Marines with the idea of using only 1,000 of

them” and that the decision to scale back the

number of troops was “managerially incompetent.”134 Not only did the new constraint contrast

127

Operation Swift Freedom

Photo by Sgt Marshall Paull

LCpl David Reed of MEU Service Support Group 26 from

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, scans the horizon as he

guards materials and personnel during Operation Swift

Freedom.
sharply with his original concept of operations by

precluding the insertion of a second expeditionary

unit to conduct offensive operations, it also impeded

ongoing operations at the forward operating base by

forcing commanders to evaluate force composition

against competing sustainment and protection

requirements.135 Colonel Waldhauser, also mystified

by the decision to levy a force cap, speculated that

the rapid buildup at FOB Rhino had surprised some

officials unfamiliar with the size and speed of a

Marine expeditionary unit.136

From the force protection perspective, it was

important to have sufficient forces to defend the

base against potential threats because the closest

ground reinforcements would now be located

approximately 400 miles to the south and be unable

to respond to an attack in a timely fashion.

Moreover, the number of forces required to

maintain the defensive perimeter around the airfield

limited the Marines’ ability to counter offensively.

From a force sustainment perspective, Task Force

58 required sufficient support personnel to conduct

airfield operations, maintain the dirt runway, and

process the inflow of supplies and equipment. In

this regard, although the force cap did not directly

apply to the special operating forces co-located at

FOB Rhino, it did limit the number of Coalition

troops that the Marines could support at any given

time. Similarly, although the force cap did not

directly apply to naval forces situated in Pakistan, it

did require that Colonel Frick halt the flow of 26th

MEU forces into Pasni, develop an impromptu

retrograde plan, and return most of his personnel

and equipment to the Bataan.

An unanticipated operational pause resulted as

the buildup of forces suddenly ground to a halt and

commanders chose which personnel to keep in

country, in some cases swapping those sent back to

the ships for others possessing more urgently

required skills. The 15th MEU eventually returned

102 of its members to the Peleliu, including the

engineer platoon attached to BLT 1/1.137 This

enabled General Mattis to bring in additional Seabee

support, as well as Company B, 1st Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion. Commanded by Major

Thomas J. Impellitteri, Company B had initially

staged 2 humvees and 16 light armored vehicles

(LAV-25s) in Pasni, Pakistan, but there was

uncertainty if there would be sufficient airlift to get

them into Afghanistan. With the incorporation of

Air Force C-17 aircraft, which could carry up to six

vehicles at a time, they were able to deploy to FOB

Rhino on the evenings of 29 and 30 November.

General Newbold, a friend of General Mattis,

learned of the force cap through e-mail exchanges

with the commander of Task Force 58. Dismayed

by the development, he later explained, “The only

way that [Task Force] 58 or any other operation in

the south could have had an effect is if it threatened

the Taliban materially—if it were able to strike and

distract or defeat. And ultimately, it had to encircle

al-Qaeda and the Taliban in a way that could result

in their destruction.”138 He continued,

The hope from the original intent is that they

would have been able to strike at Kandahar, and

in subsequent buildup of additional ground

forces, would have been able to extend

operations to the east to try to cut off escape

avenues into Pakistan. Now we were all deeply,

acutely aware that you could not seal off the

border. But what you can do is you can catch a

lot of these people, and your opportunity or

your chances of destroying them go up

enormously. The better view of the situation is

do you do nothing or do you try to get as many

as you can? And our answer was you try to get

as many as you can, therefore, you need boots

on the ground. That was not possible because

of the constraints that General Franks

personally put on the introduction of forces

there, and it was only much, much later that we

moved other ground forces in there, as you

know, the 10th Mountain Division.139

Concerned by the force cap’s potential negative

effect on offensive operations in southern

Afghanistan, General Newbold queried the Central

Command staff about the constraint. Unable to

clarify the issue at that level, he asked General Myers

if the chairman was aware of the cap, arguing that

128

FROM THE SEA
129

Operation Swift Freedom

the Coalition was missing a limited opportunity to

put additional pressure on al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Myers replied that he knew of no one who had

imposed a restriction and contacted General Franks

at Central Command, who denied the cap’s

existence. Undeterred, Newbold reconfirmed the

force cap’s authenticity with General Mattis and

other Central Command personnel and approached

the chairman a second time. This time, Myers

brought the issue to the attention of Secretary

Rumsfeld, who not only denied that his office had

levied such a restriction but also indicated that he

was opposed to the notion of having one imposed.

Rumsfeld subsequently contacted Franks and

reiterated to him that Central Command could have

whatever resources and latitude it needed to conduct

the required operations.140

From a different perspective, Colonel Michael

D. Fitzgerald, Central Command’s chief of future

operations, explained that they had always been

aware of the eventual need to enter southern

Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaeda and undermine the

Taliban government.141 General Franks, he said, had

never lost sight of the fact that, once initial inroads

had been made, they would “have to go in with our

own forces who are trained in winter combat and

are a lot more capable on the ground and willing to

do what we need them to do.”142 However, despite

Franks’s desire to eventually “introduce a force into

the south to expand a base of operations,” it was

only after the Northern Alliance had begun its

advance toward Kabul in mid-November that he

could realistically ask what was next and how soon

they could get in.143 At that point, Central Command

planners who had initially assessed regional airfields

in support of the ranger raid began to look for

suitable locations to establish a forward operating

base, eventually choosing Kandahar.144 The Marines

were a logical choice for the mission because they

already had an expeditionary force in theater and

were ready to go ashore, whereas employing an

Army unit would have entailed submitting a request

for forces, waiting for them to arrive in theater, and

then arranging for an intermediate staging base

before they could enter Afghanistan. Moreover,

inserting a regular Army force would be more

noticeable than deploying Marine forces already

afloat off the coast of Pakistan.145

According to Colonel Fitzgerald, there were

always discussions at Central Command about force

levels in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Host nations drove some of the restrictions, trying

to limit the U.S. footprint over time, while the Office

of the Secretary of Defense drove others, trying to

limit the size of the force needed to execute the

mission. He explained, “Commanders will be

naturally risk adverse.”146 They “try to introduce

slack into the system” so they will have the resources

necessary to handle any contingency they might

encounter once they are on the ground.147 On the

other hand, Secretary Rumsfeld desired to keep

commitment levels down and take a bit more risk.148

As Colonel Fitzgerald explained,

There was a level at which you had to come and

[ask for additional forces], and it included

General Franks doing the “Mother may I”

routine.... It wasn’t that the SecDef [secretary

of defense] ever said no, but sometimes the

level of justification was so high that I think

some people balked along the way... until they

had all the information—absolutely airtight

reasons—and even then they knew it was going

to be a tough sell.149

Colonel Fitzgerald also noted that if General

Franks had already initiated plans to introduce Army

forces into southern Afghanistan, he might not have

wanted to deploy the 26th MEU only to have it leave

after a short period ashore. This would have been

particularly true if he had intended to retain it as a

mobile reserve, as there were a number of other

significant events occurring in theater at that time,

including rising tensions between India and Pakistan

in the Kashmir region.150

131

Changing Command Relationships

T wo days after going ashore with his small

jump command post, General Mattis

designated Captain William Jezierski,

USN, as deputy commander of Task Force 58. A

combination of tactical and operational concerns

likely influenced this midcourse decision to delegate

control over his seaborne forces to the commander

of Amphibious Squadron 1, which again ruffled

some feathers within the naval community.1 The new

division of labor ensured that a seasoned subordinate

commander was in place to oversee the continued

flow of supplies, equipment, and personnel across the

beach at Pasni, Pakistan. Also, placing a senior naval

officer in charge of the task force’s maritime

operations undercut the argument for subsuming the

two amphibious squadrons under the regional

combined warfare capability.2

As if to emphasize the later point, Task Force

50, the principal offensive arm of Fifth Fleet,

provided Task Force 58 with escort support during

the operation. The genesis of Task Force 50 had

occurred on 11 September 2001, when Admiral

Moore directed Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor,

USN, then commanding the USS Carl Vinson battle

group in the Indian Ocean, to form a multicarrier

battle force. As Operation Enduring Freedom

matured, Task Force 50 eventually grew to

encompass 59 ships from 7 nations, organized

around 6 aircraft carriers from 3 nations: the United

States’ Carl Vinson, Enterprise, and Theodore

Roosevelt; the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi (C551); and

the British Illustrious (R06).3 Three of Task Force

50’s support vessels served under Captain Jezierski’s

tactical control and arguably established a forerunner

of the current expeditionary strike group. Although

initially composed solely of U.S. ships, including an

Aegis guided missile cruiser or destroyer, Canadian

and Italian vessels joined the escort force during

December 2001 and January 2002.4

As originally planned, on 30 November, tactical

control of all Task Force 58 elements in Afghanistan

transferred from Admiral Moore to Army

Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, the new

combined forces land component commander.

Chapter 8

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward

Operating Base Rhino

Photo by Susan Norvick. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 010210-a2682n-034

LtGen Paul T. Mikolashek, USA, commander of Third Army

and Central Command’s Combined Forces Land Component,

addresses officers at a conference on 10 February 2001.
Mikolashek, also head of Third Army and U.S Army

Forces Central Command (ArCent), had redeployed

his command to Camp Doha, Kuwait, following the

conclusion of Exercise Bright Star. After assuming

the duties of land component commander in midNovember, he began to “direct and synchronize land

operations to destroy al-Qaeda and prevent the

reemergence of international terrorist activities in

Combined Joint Area-Afghanistan.”5 Meanwhile,

Moore and his staff at U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command (NavCent) retained operational control

of Task Force 58’s forces ashore and both

operational and tactical control* of its forces afloat.

Tactical control allowed General Mikolashek

and the ArCent staff to focus primarily on

campaign-level land combat operations, while

Admiral Moore and the NavCent staff addressed a

wider range of theater-level force requirements.

These included issues such as organizational

structure, force sustainment, asset realignment to

address concurrent missions, and the tactical

employment of his sea forces. Given the

underdeveloped state of both theater- and

campaign-level logistics in the region, the maritime

link between Task Force 58 and Fifth Fleet was

critical to operations ashore or afloat and

undoubtedly influenced the decision to maintain the

autonomy of Task Force 58’s naval forces under the

direction of Captain Jezierski.

As its mission evolved rapidly toward sustained

and more widely distributed operations ashore, Task

Force 58 now had to report to two adjacent

commands. The small planning staff soon

discovered the downside to going light—mainly,

having fewer resources to direct toward monitoring

current operations and fulfilling what General Mattis

referred to as the “insatiable need for information

from higher headquarters.”6 Nor was this frustration

limited to the command staff. Speaking from the

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (26th MEU’s)

perspective, Colonel Frick described higher

headquarters’ appetite for information as his

“biggest problem”:

I think we’re in an era of warfare where, since

I have lightning-speed capability in the

communication [realm], there is a thirst for

knowledge all the way up the chain-ofcommand.... Somebody on the next level says

they want to know “this, this, and this.” They

ask you a few questions and then they ask you

a question that you don’t know, so then you get

some more questions asked.... That is always

going to be a headache, and until somebody can

look over my shoulder inside the Pentagon to

see what I’m doing, they want to see real time

video.... Our mindset is like, “Let me do my

job and let me go.”... There is a dichotomy

between the mindset of the warrior and the

information age we live in.7

Admiral Moore and the NavCent staff had

tended to issue mission-type orders, providing

General Mattis with commander’s intent and

allowing him to develop the preferred course of

action. Although this was similar to the initial

relationship between Task Force 58 and General

Mikolashek, as the ArCent staff began to establish

itself in theater and assert control over ground

forces in Afghanistan, they requested more detailed

information on a broadening range of topics with

increasing frequency.8 The issue was not necessarily

one of micromanagement at the theater level.

Rather, the larger ArCent staff tended to rely more

heavily upon doctrine and formal planning processes

than the Marines. Moreover, as it grew in size, the

functional sections became increasingly compartmentalized. As Lieutenant Colonel Broadmeadow

explained, “The same guy that yesterday used to do

a range of things for you was now doing one thing

and one thing only. So, all of a sudden, that one

phone call that you could make to get things to

happen now became three or four and you had to

talk to different guys.”9

132

FROM THE SEA

*Tactical control involves directing combat and combat service support assets within the parameters of an assigned mission, while operational control

entails organizing commands and deploying forces to accomplish the assigned mission.
This change in procedures did not sit well with

some members of the staff, who saw themselves as

the point of main effort and resisted attempts to rein

them in, administratively or operationally. Each

morning, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Lethin

participated in a theaterwide briefing session, during

which the operating forces would report their daily

status to the land component’s operations section. On

one occasion, after higher headquarters had denied a

particular request, he declined to contribute until he

could talk privately with the operations officer.10 In

another example, the land component required that

Task Force 58 submit concept of operations briefs in

advance of even small-scale operations conducted

within their own area of responsibility, at least once

questioning General Mattis when his staff failed to

clear their plans through higher headquarters. In this

instance, Mattis recalled, “I explained I didn’t

generally ask permission to wipe my nose and that

my intentions messages laid out clearly what

operations I had coming up.”11

Given time, a solid working relationship

developed between the geographically separated

Task Force 58 and land component staffs. They

reached the collaborative arrangement through a

combination of adaptation and comprise, facilitated

by the efforts of two Marine liaison officers assigned

to the higher headquarters. Colonel Lethin

experienced a particularly meaningful exchange with

the land component’s operations officer addressing

the combined operations officers’ incessant

bombardment of Task Force 58 with e-mail

demands in which Colonel Lethin reminded him

that he was in the middle of combat and could not

respond to every one of them.12 He said,

Look, Sir, there is one of me and there are 800

of you. I’ll talk to you, your deputy, and your

current ops, but you guys really need to choose

your questions wisely, because I’m [working] 22,

23 hours a day, and I can’t answer all of your

action officer’s, all of your watch officer’s

questions. I can answer your questions, but I

can’t answer everyone else on your staff.... He

said, “Got it.”13

As the tempo and scope of operations ashore

increased, the Task Force 58 staff faced a series of

shrinking timelines, abbreviated planning processes,

additional reporting requirements, and an emerging

labor shortage. One solution to these problems was

for the Task Force 58 staff to focus on directing

current operations, while the two expeditionary unit

staffs conducted most of the detailed mission

planning for future operations. Another solution was

to increase staff representation. On some occasions,

Task Force 58 would commandeer functional area

experts from the expeditionary units, which could

raise the anxiety level for individuals who suddenly

found themselves working directly for the

commanding general. On other occasions, they

obtained personnel externally.14 One U.S. Marine

Corps Forces Central Command (MarCent) officer

commented during January 2002 that, although

augmentation requests to date would raise the table

of organization to 52, the desired staffing level was

65.15 The latter figure would represent a 116 percent

increase over the original staff estimate made in

Bahrain at the beginning of November.

Force Sustainment

As the operation progressed, Task Force 58’s

logistics section shifted its focus from planning for

future material and movement needs to performing

tasks normally assigned to the Marine logistics

command and force movement control center.

Colonel Broadmeadow summarized the experience

and their key to success:

It wasn’t like your normal logistics system,

where you drop a requisition and things start to

flow to you magically because of some supply

system. It was guys on the phone, people on email, working with their counterparts [in] the

other agencies and making things happen on a

personal level, as opposed to a systems

perspective. So that became a big work-around

right there—very, very dependent on personal

relations as opposed to systems.16

Although the logistics section had begun the

operation with only two officers, by mid-December

133

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino
it would grow to six officers supporting an

operating force spread among eight locations

throughout Central Command’s theater: Forward

Operating Base Rhino (FOB Rhino), Kandahar

airfield, and the American embassy in Kabul in

Afghanistan; Jacobabad, Shamsi, and Pasni in

Pakistan; and two amphibious ready groups in the

North Arabian Sea and Bahrain. By Christmas, the

forces serving ashore in Afghanistan and Pakistan

alone would total more than 4,500 Marines, soldiers,

sailors, and Coalition personnel.

By doctrine, each military Service component is

responsible for providing its own logistics support,

even if its forces are supporting a joint or Coalition

commander. For Task Force 58, that meant the 15th

Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) and 26th

MEU would each maintain existing supply chains

extending from the amphibious ready groups back to

their parent Marine expeditionary forces on the East

and West Coasts. These supply lines were critical, for

although each of the expeditionary units maintained

control over its own combat service support element

and accompanying landing force operational reserve

(ammunition, rations, fuel, and engineer materials),

each could sustain only 15 days of continuous

operations ashore without replenishment. At the

same time, as directed by the Combined Forces Land

Component commander, Task Force 58 would

provide common-item logistics support for all special

operating forces co-located at FOB Rhino. The

absence of a theater support command to manage intheater stocks of common-item support materials

and capabilities made this latter task more difficult

during the early days of Operation Swift Freedom.17

Bahrain served as the principal hub for Task

Force 58’s logistic support. Working out of a

borrowed tent, Captain Samson P. Avenetti, the

strategic mobility officer, developed and maintained

a complex logistics network that linked the forces in

Afghanistan and Pakistan to support organizations

located throughout the theater and in the United

States. He developed working relationships with

NavCent, the Seabees, and commercial vendors and

spent countless hours locating, negotiating, and

organizing logistical support for the forces ashore.

Undeterred by the urgency required by a dynamic

combat environment, he pushed supplies forward to

feed, fix, and arm the combat force, locating items

ranging from forklifts to offload pallets at FOB

Rhino to barrier materials with which to construct a

short-term holding facility at Kandahar.

Task Force 53, MarCent’s subordinate logistics

command, was responsible for the receipt,

warehousing, and throughput of cargo to all naval

forces operating throughout Central Command’s

theater of operations. In an effort to manage the

increase in cargo resulting from the arrival of the

amphibious ready groups and carrier battle groups

operating in the North Arabian Sea, it diverted much

of the incoming cargo for Operation Enduring

Freedom to an alternate cargo hub for transshipment to locations throughout the region.

Although this strategy helped to avert congestion at

the primary cargo hub, it also decreased handling,

tracking, and transportation efficiency.18

When distributing supplies throughout the theater,

Task Force 53 routinely employed fixed- and rotarywing aircraft, as well as U.S. naval ships and vessels

contracted by Military Sealift Command to provide atsea replenishment.19 During such routine missions, it

would eventually deliver more than 18 million gallons

of ships’ fuel, 2 million gallons of aviation fuel, and

10,000 pallets of supplies to forces attached to Task

Force 58.20 When size, volume, or distance precluded

shipment using organic assets, Task Force 53 submitted

requests to the Joint Movement Center, which

coordinated additional aircraft through Transportation

Command and the Air Mobility Division at Central

Command’s Air Component Command.21

The two amphibious ready groups maintained

an aggressive wet well (amphibious) and flight deck

(aviation) cycle to support the initial assault and

subsequent operations on the objective as well. The

Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group debarked more

than 1,700 personnel, 180 vehicles, and 267 short

tons of cargo, while the USS Bataan Amphibious

Ready Group (Bataan ARG) contributed over 1,800

134

FROM THE SEA
personnel, 70 vehicles, and 400 short tons of cargo.

Vessels assigned to the ready groups also picked up

and delivered four CH-53Es and an AH-1W

helicopter that arrived from the United States to

augment or replace aircraft damaged during

operations in Afghanistan.22

The logistics section at I Marine Expeditionary

Force (I MEF) was one of several reach-back

sources available to Task Force 58. It maintained a

24-hour watch and required little amplifying

information to process requests. The Navy regional

contracting center in Bahrain also played a crucial

role in the procurement of items through open

sources. It provided information on local vendors

and procedures, registered the task force’s

requirements, evaluated available resources, and

purchased the necessary items.

Once Captain Avenetti located the necessary

equipment and supplies, he worked multiple channels

to fly the resources from origin to destination. For

example, he coordinated with Danish C-130s to fly

fresh fruit, vegetables, and holiday packages from

Bahrain to Shamsi; Marine KC-130s to fly repair parts

from Pasni to FOB Rhino; and Air Force C-17s to fly

construction supplies and detainee handling equipment

from Bahrain to Kandahar.23 This was not a simple

process, but required the entry of time-phased force

and deployment data in the joint planning and

execution system as well as the preparation of advance

aircraft load plans and hazardous cargo certification

documents.24 To facilitate such movements, Avenetti

maintained constant contact with Air Force Captain

Ericka L. DeVos, officer-in-charge of the Joint

Movement Center. Located at the Coalition Air

Operations Center in Saudi Arabia, she ran the central

headquarters for movement requests throughout the

theater and helped Avenetti request, schedule, and track

aircraft flights. Committed to meeting the Marines’

sustainment needs, DeVos and her staff reprioritized

cargo loads on a regular basis to support the forward

units in Afghanistan.25

135

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011217-N-2383B-509

Sailors from Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 6 conduct a vertical replenishment at sea on 17 December 2001. They are

using CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters to ferry supplies from the USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194) to the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)

and USS Bataan (LHD 5).
Although Task Force 58 successfully exploited

routine military transport flights to avoid

constraints imposed by commercial carriers,

reliance on the “channel flights” proved to be a

mixed blessing and often delayed the shipment of

cargo beyond Task Force 58’s requested delivery

date. In some cases, passengers experienced

lengthened travel time due to numerous en route

stops. In others, shipping priorities or transport

limitations required that consolidated loads from

the United States be spread among several aircraft

before reaching their destination by alternate

routes.26 Adding yet another degree of difficulty,

although the joint planning and execution system

provided a means for Transportation and Air

Mobility Commands to orchestrate strategic

intertheater airlift operations, its use to manage

intratheater airlift assets had not been specified by

joint doctrine.27 Furthermore, the Air Force and

Navy–Marine Corps tracking systems, often

reflecting unique Service-specific logistics

terminology, made it difficult to follow the flow of

personnel, equipment, and supplies into theater.28

Shortcuts occasionally used to circumvent the joint

planning and execution system, resulting in the loss

of in-transit visibility and subsequent shipping

delays, actually increased the requirement for

intratheater lift.29

In one instance, I MEF logisticians shipped

cold-weather equipment to Germany on board Air

Force C-5 transports, expecting that it would be

transferred to C-17 aircraft for follow-on movement

into theater. Once the cargo was broken down into

separate loads, however, some continued on to FOB

Rhino through various aerial ports of departure,

some were delayed to make way for a rifle company

heading to Kabul, and some remained behind in

Germany. During the following weeks, the

combined effort of Task Force 58, I MEF, and the

Joint Movement Center finally located the stray

shipments for eventual transport into Afghanistan.30

To help alleviate this problem, Task Force 58

situated “expediters” sourced from the

expeditionary unit logistics sections at each of the

major theater entry points. While most of these

Marines possessed a background in supply, others

who did not had to develop the embarkation and

traffic management skills necessary to correct

problems on the spot and keep the material support

flowing forward to the operating forces. They

oversaw the arrival of incoming cargo at their

respective hubs, accounted for the equipment and

supplies received, and then tracked them until they

were loaded onto aircraft for follow-on

transportation. The logistics section at I MEF also

helped to solve the accountability issue by instituting

an informal system and posting status updates on

requested items on its web page.31

Airfield Maintenance and Camp

Construction

Airmen from the 21st Special Tactics Squadron

evaluated the runway’s condition each day, while

sailors from Navy Mobile Construction Battalion

133 continued to carry out necessary repairs. At first,

the Seabees operated in 12-hour shifts during

daylight hours; however, as the runway continued to

deteriorate, it became necessary to maintain a standby night crew to service the airfield between C-17

flights. Lieutenant Clifford Smith recalled that

occasionally only two aircraft would come in and the

extra work would not be required. On at least half

the evenings, however, the Air Force Combat

Control Team would receive a report of poor

conditions from the pilots and then radio “the

Seabees to... run their graders down the runway

and... knock down the ruts and do what they could

to stabilize the runway for the next C-17 coming

in.”32 To facilitate their airfield maintenance effort

and because some of their equipment was

experiencing problems burning the JP4 fuel, the

Seabees had two additional graders flown into FOB

Rhino during early December.33

Procuring enough bulk water to spray down the

runway on a regular basis proved to be the most

critical aspect of maintaining the airfield. Although

the cistern at FOB Rhino contained approximately

30,000 gallons, the Seabees estimated that they

136

FROM THE SEA
needed around 5,000 gallons per day to keep the

airfield operating. With approximately a six-day

supply on hand, the Seabees developed two

strategies for conserving water: first, they focused

their efforts on four soft spots that encompassed

approximately 1,600 feet of runway, rotating

coverage from one area to another on a four-day

cycle. Second, they excavated clay-bearing soils from

a trench located approximately 65 feet from the

runway to reinforce the roughest spots.34

Around 3 December, the Marines realized that

they had to locate an additional water source and

considered the prospect of employing a Seabee welldrilling team. Although practical, this required three

C-17 flights and approximately two weeks to

coordinate strategic airlift, assemble the drilling

apparatus, and then drill down 200 feet to hit water

(600 feet to reach potable water). These constraints

limited pumping operations to only 10 days before

the task force intended to close the desert base at

the end of the month.35

The 15th MEU’s logistics officer suggested that

the task force fly water into Rhino in 500-gallon

blivets (collapsible rubber storage systems). General

Mattis liked the timeliness of this option and

directed the expeditionary unit to coordinate the first

shipment to arrive the following day. Thereafter,

water resupply flights arrived almost every night

from Jacobabad on board C-17 transports. On

average, the Air Force flew in about 2,000 gallons

of water per day, but on several occasions the

Marines received up to 4,200 gallons.36

The Seabees also addressed the problem of

billowing dust clouds created by helicopter landings

and takeoffs. Referred to as “brownouts,” these

dense screens obscured the pilot’s observation and

raised the danger of aircraft accidents. Although

137

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

Associated Press

Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 run graders over the dirt runway at Forward Operating Base Rhino on 4

December 2001. They are redistributing dirt and filling ruts caused by the steady flow of heavy transport aircraft landing at the base.
Task Force 58 discussed the possibility of using AM2 aluminum matting to surface the helicopter pads,

the airlift required to fly in a sufficient quantity of

the 2-foot by 12-foot sheets—each weighing 144

pounds—precluded its employment.37 As an

expedient solution, the Seabees and aircrews

recovered a number of metal forms and rebar that

the previous occupants had left behind and staked

these over the landing pads. The sheets—3 feet by 5

feet or smaller and weighing 80 to 120 pounds—

helped to reduce the dust but did not eliminate it.38

Several aviators trained by Marine Aviation

Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1)

suggested another solution to the dust problem.

They recommended Envirotac II dust palliative, an

environmentally safe product nicknamed “gorilla

snot,” that Marines used at airfields in Twentynine

Palms, California, and Yuma, Arizona. Unfortunately, after procuring the product in the United

States, they encountered coordination problems and

a three-week shipping delay when attempting to

send the material into theater by Federal Express

and other commercial transportation providers.39

When the palliative finally arrived and Seabees

were able to apply the first treatment on 11

December, the Marines at Rhino were already

encountering a serious water shortage. This

presented two serious dilemmas. First, employment

of the concentrated substance, renamed “rhino

snot,” required that the Marines mix it with three

times the same amount of water. Second, the gluelike mixture continuously clogged the water truck’s

pump and lines, threatening to damage the

distribution system. The Seabees had no other

138

FROM THE SEA

Associated Press

A dust cloud billows beneath a Marine CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter as it lands at Forward Operating Base Rhino on 8

December 2001. Five-hundred-gallon blivets, used to transport bulk fuel and water, are shown in the foreground.
option but to balance their use of available water

between airfield maintenance and dust reduction and

keep a close watch on the water pump.40

The Seabees also assisted in numerous

construction projects around FOB Rhino. Although

their bulldozer was not necessarily meant for airfield

maintenance, Task Force 58 realized that this piece

of heavy earthmoving equipment would be

advantageous for numerous tasks. Running it from

dawn to dusk each day, they created earthen berms

around the refueling and ammunition supply points,

excavated trash pits, and built vehicle obstacles for

the Marines. Scrounging for materials around camp,

carpenters also built map and surgical tables and

even gun racks for the Australians.41

One of the Seabees’ most appreciated

contributions was the construction of an expedient

outhouse, affectionately known as a “4-hole

burnout.” The Marines and sailors had initially

relieved themselves in a series of shallow, 30-footlong slit trenches that they had excavated behind the

camp with a backhoe; some personnel would simply

lean over the opening, while others would climb into

the trench and lean back against the 3-foot-high wall.

The Seabees built a small shack with four holes

covered by toilet seats and separated by vertical

dividers. Then they placed cutoff 55-gallon drums

underneath the holes—made accessible by a small

door placed at the base of the shack—to collect the

waste. Periodically, the Marines would pull the drums

out, mix the contents with diesel fuel and gasoline,

and then burn it. The burnout precluded the need to

dig additional slit trenches, provided a degree of

comfort and privacy, and significantly enhanced the

sanitary conditions at Rhino.42

Ongoing Events

Forward Operating Base Impala

On 30 November, the same day its forward

control element and maritime special purpose force

began to return from Exercise Noble Shirley, the 26th

MEU began planning for the assumption of

continued operations at the forward refueling point

and transload site at Forward Operating Base Impala

(FOB Impala) in Shamsi, Pakistan. A small site survey

team went forward the next day to identify personnel

and equipment requirements at the airfield, followed

on 4 December by the main body. Composed of

personnel from each of the MEU’s four major

subordinate elements, this delegation raised the total

number of Marines and sailors at the base to 98.43

The largest contingent was provided by a

provisional rifle platoon from Battery K, 10th

Marines, Battalion Landing Team 3/6’s (BLT 3/6’s)

artillery attachment. Led by First Lieutenant Steven

M. Grimm, the battery’s executive officer, the

artillerymen were responsible for securing the

139

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

Photo by LCpl Derek Meitzer.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 080421-m-0252m-007

Members of the heavy equipment platoon from Marine Wing

Support Squadron 172 use “rhino snot” to harden the earth at

a construction site in al-Anbar Province, Iraq, on 21 April 2008.

Marines from Task Force 58 coined the moniker seven years

earlier when employing the chemical spray to dissipate dust

clouds at Forward Operating Base Rhino in southwestern

Afghanistan.
refueling facility and billeting area while the Pakistani

military manned two outer cordons around the

airfield itself. Within hours of arriving, the Marines

relieved the Army’s initial security force, began

improving their fortified fighting positions, and

settled into a four-phase daily routine: six hours

standing post, six hours on the reaction force, six

hours improving positions, and six hours of rest.

The same day, Marines from MEU Service Support

Group 26 (MSSG 26) began running throughput

operations into southern Afghanistan. With such a

hectic schedule, there was little time to enjoy the

cots, climate-controlled tents, exercise equipment,

and morale tent with television that the other

Services had imported.44 On 5 December, the

remaining Marines from Exercise Noble Shirley

rejoined the Bataan ARG at sea.

Australian Special Air Service

The advance party of the Australian Special Air

Service (ASAS) detachment (call sign “Task Force

64”) arrived at FOB Rhino in late November,

followed by its main body on 4 December.45

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Gilmore,

the Australians served under the tactical control of

Task Force 58 and enabled the Marines to bolster

their combat power while remaining within the

confines of Central Command’s force cap. One

small but significant advantage—particularly during

the early days of the operation—was that they

brought an initial supply of rations, ammunition,

and fuel for their 13 long-range patrol vehicles (Land

Rovers with extended beds).

When Colonel Gilmore met with General Mattis

the morning following his arrival, the Marine

commander provided a broad overview of what was

going on in southern Afghanistan and explained how

he intended to employ the Australians as a long-range

screening and reconnaissance force. Their first task

would be to conduct a patrol covering a 15-mile

swath around the forward operating base that would

help map and clear the Marines’ immediate operating

area.46 As described by author Ian McPhedran, who

chronicled the ASAS experience in Afghanistan,

once the Australians had proved themselves to

General Mattis and the Coalition forces,

The [A]SAS patrols began fanning out from

Rhino in search of Taliban and al-Qaeda

strongholds and training camps, weapons

caches, supply routes, and a myriad of other

tasks, which included getting to know the local

tribal people. They patrolled extensively around

Kandahar, which still lay in Taliban hands, and

across into the Helmand Valley close to the

Iranian border. The patrols were mostly covert,

and troops would establish a “hide” (another

name for an OP) and spend several days

observing and reporting.47

These missions were likely similar to those

conducted by the force reconnaissance Marines

toward the Helmand River to the northwest and the

British Special Air Service to the south. Lieutenant

Colonel Bourne described them as “small teams

moving around... looking for targets, watching the

general flow of the population, trying to sort out

who’s who.” The hardest part of the whole mission,

he said, was determining who were “the good guys,

the bad guys, or anything in between.”48

AH-1W Helicopter Mishap

Extreme operating conditions continued to

challenge the aircrews and aircraft operating in

Afghanistan, resulting in a series of aircraft mishaps

beginning in early December. During a 5 December

dawn patrol around 0620, an AH-1W Super Cobra

from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365

(HMM-365) experienced a hard landing in a dry lake

bed approximately 6 miles south of FOB Rhino.49

The aircraft remained in the field overnight,

surrounded by security forces from BLT 3/6’s

combined antiarmor platoon,* while mechanics

waited for spare parts to arrive. The next day, pilots

140

FROM THE SEA

*The combined antiarmor platoon is part of the weapons company of a Marine infantry battalion. It consists of humvees variously armed with M2 .50-

caliber heavy machine guns, MK19 40mm automatic grenade launchers, M240G 7.62mm medium machine guns, and tube-launched, optically tracked,

wire-guided (TOW) missiles. The vehicles deploy as combined antiarmor teams and sections to provide security and combat armored vehicles.
flew the damaged helicopter back to the forward

operating base and then on to the Bataan for more

substantial repairs.50

Special Operating Forces Medical

Evacuation

Around 0930 on 5 December,51 as members of

Operational Detachment Alpha 574 (code name

Texas 12) and Hamid Karzai’s small band of

southern Pashtun fighters were battling Taliban

forces approximately five miles north of Kandahar,

the attached tactical air control party requested

support from a circling Boeing B-52 Stratofortress

bomber as part of an ongoing air attack against

several Taliban seen outside a nearby cave complex.

Tragically, after an airman replaced the failed

batteries in his portable lightweight global

positioning system (GPS) receiver, the device

initialized to transmit its current location, rather than

the location of the designated target, and the Air

Force combat controller inadvertently directed a

2,000-pound GBU-31 bomb to the Coalition forces’

own position.52 Although Karzai was only slightly

injured by glass shards from a shattered window, the

errant bomb killed 3 American and 5 Afghan

soldiers and wounded another 20 Americans and 18

Afghans.53 Later, another American and at least one

additional Afghan soldier would die while receiving

medical treatment.54 This unfortunate friendly fire

incident produced the first American military

fatalities of the war.*

Army Lieutenant Colonel David Fox, with

Special Operations Command and Control Team 52

near Kandahar, and Army Colonel John Mulholland,

at Task Force Dagger’s headquarters in Uzbekistan,

each requested aerial medical evacuation support for

their injured soldiers.55 Task Force 58 was the closest

Coalition force with suitable aircraft in Afghanistan,

but conflicting initial reports indicated that the

special forces had received hostile mortar fire and

suffered between 4 and 40 casualties. Although

sensitive to the team’s plight, Marines were hesitant

to rush helicopters headlong into an ongoing

firefight occurring during daylight hours and located

approximately 100 miles from their forward

operating base without a confirmed report of the

tactical situation.56 “The delay in casualty

evacuation,” summarized several medical officers in

an unofficial after-action report, “was the result of

the loss of communications with the ground

personnel, the lack of security in the area, and

aircraft mechanical delays.”57

Two Navy MH-53J rescue helicopters attached

to the Joint Special Operations Task Force eventually

responded to the request from Pakistan, filled their

aircraft with dead and wounded soldiers, and headed

toward FOB Rhino. After taking on fuel from an

airborne Air Force Lockheed HC-130P/N combat

rescue tanker, the flight reached the Marine base

around 1400.58

Meanwhile, as more information became

available, it gradually became apparent that the

explosion had involved errant air support. Colonel

Waldhauser later remarked that there was initially a

great deal of confusion regarding the state of

friendly forces north of Kandahar. In order to find

out what had really happened, he spoke personally

with Colonel Mulholland on the telephone. After

learning of the casualties and augmentation

requirements around 1217, he consulted with

Lieutenant Colonel James LaVine, his air combat

element commander, and made the decision to land

a recovery force. He recalled, “This was difficult, but

we had to do something. We just could not say no to

this request.”59

Around 1315, Colonel LaVine launched two of

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163’s (HMM163’s) Super Stallions, escorted by a section of Super

Cobras.60 These Marine helicopters carried doctors,

Air Force pararescue medics, special forces

reinforcements from Operational Detachments 570

and 525, and Command and Control Element 540.61

141

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

*Soldiers killed during the incident included MSgt Jefferson D. Davis, SFC Daniel H. Petithory, and SSgt Brian C. Prosser, all members of 3d Battalion, 5th

Special Forces Group.
After arriving at helicopter landing zone Pelican

around 1445, aircraft crews evacuated seven

wounded Afghans to FOB Rhino, returning to the

base at approximately 1611 hours.62

Medical facilities at FOB Rhino were located in

an abandoned warehouse within the walled

compound at the south end of the runway. The

Health and Service Support Detachment from 15th

MEU operated the traditional battalion aid station,

manned by a medical officer, a medical service corps

officer, and 14 corpsmen. They were augmented by

the Shock Trauma Platoon from 1st Medical

Battalion, which provided resuscitation and

stabilization capabilities as well as an operating room

section. The operating room, situated in a floored

tent immediately adjacent to the warehouse,

contained tables for two 12-men surgical teams.63

Although the trauma platoon had just arrived the

preceding evening, they had already conducted a

mass casualty drill in preparation for the emergency

they were about to face.64

At the end of the day, Navy and Marine

helicopter crews had evacuated 41 patients to FOB

Rhino for triage and treatment.65 Shortly after their

arrival around 1430, members of the Joint Medical

Evacuation Aviation Unit immediately transferred

17 of the Americans to Air Force C-130s and flew

them to the Air Force hospital in Seeb, Oman, which

provided the theater’s major surgical capability.66

Due to the current political situation, theater

commanders decided that U.S. personnel would be

transported to Seeb and that Camp Rhino medical

personnel would treat the Afghan nationals. Marines

subsequently transported the remaining two

Americans—one killed in action and the other

mortally wounded—as well as the 20 Afghans to the

medical area for initial attention.67

Although reporters were eager to learn details

of the unfolding tragedy, Marines at FOB Rhino

kept an increasingly frustrated media contingent at

bay.68 This apparently resulted in complaints that

reached the highest echelons at the Pentagon, for

Secretary Rumsfeld addressed the issue at the

beginning of the following day’s news briefing:

I understand there is concern about the access

that was afforded journalists in the vicinity of

the incident. We are mindful of the sensitivities

of families back home who may not know that

an incident has occurred, and we prefer that

they not learn about something like that until

they have been advised by the department. We

do remain committed to the principle that the

media should have access to both the good and

the bad in this effort. The people on the

ground, in the Marine Corps, have acknowledged... that they have not handled the matter

perfectly, and they’re in the process of

reviewing their procedures.69

After medical personnel had stabilized the

patients, around 2115, Marine aircrews from HMM163 flew the Afghan fighters to amphibious ships off

the Pakistani coast for follow-on care.70 The transfer

took approximately five hours because the CH-53

helicopters needed to refuel en route and one of the

aircraft experienced mechanical problems.71 In the

latter case, quick-thinking pilots narrowly averted

another tragedy when one of the helicopters sucked

debris into its air intake shortly after takeoff. The

aircraft steadily lost engine power while hovering

over the airfield, compelling the pilots to jettison full

drop tanks before conducting an emergency landing.

Once safely back on the ground, the Marines quickly

loaded the patients on board another CH-53 that

departed immediately for the ships.72

Ground crews at FOB Rhino hastily cleaned up

the crash site, preparing for the evening’s continuing

airlift of supplies and equipment. Adding to the

confusion, at around 2124, an Air Force C-130

transport departing the apron at the Marine base

struck the rotor blade of a CH-53 helicopter parked

nearby.73 After inspecting their slightly damaged

wing, the C-130 crew determined that the aircraft

was still flyable and continued with their mission.

Unfortunately, the Marine helicopter sustained more

extensive damage and was grounded for several days

while mechanics completed the necessary repairs to

bring it back on line.74

142

FROM THE SEA
The USS Peleliu and Bataan each received 10

Afghan casualties. Both vessels functioned as

casualty and treatment ships, maintaining two

functional operating rooms augmented by a fleet

surgical team.75 Within 60 hours of the patients’

arrival, medical personnel logged more than 100

hours in the four operating rooms; surgeons on

board the Peleliu performed 36 limb-saving and

lifesaving procedures, while another group on board

the Bataan performed 29. After witnessing the

medical teams in action, Captain Jezierski remarked

that this was the “the best medical evolution I have

ever seen.”76 On 11 December, six of the Afghan

fighters were apparently transferred from the

Bataan to the hospital in Seeb, Oman, for continued

medical treatment, although other sources indicate

that three remained aboard the ship and five were

evacuated to Landstuhl, Germany.77

One unexpected issue developed due to crosscultural misunderstanding on the first night of the

evacuation. After one of the Afghan fighters died

while being treated at FOB Rhino, Colonel

Waldhauser made a pragmatic decision to transfer

his body to the morgue on board the Peleliu until

he could inquire how the Afghans wanted to handle

the remains. Only later that evening, after updating

General Mattis on the day’s events, did he realize that

the deceased were not supposed to leave Afghan

soil.78 At Mattis’s direction, Marines returned the

body to FOB Rhino on 8 December, interred the

soldier with military honors, and marked his grave

with an appropriate headstone. Special operating

forces subsequently informed the Afghan forces of

the grave’s location. On 1 February 2002, authorities

exhumed the fighter’s remains, which they flew to

Kandahar and returned to his family.79 Later,

143

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera. USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011206-N-2383B-521

Navy medical personnel treat anti-Taliban casualties on board the USS Bataan (LHD 5) on 6 December 2001. Marine aircrews

from Task Force 58 had evacuated the fighters earlier in the day after a misguided bomb struck their position north of

Kandahar.
Colonel Waldhauser remarked that evacuating the

wounded Afghan was probably the right decision

because medical facilities at the forward operating

base were already strained.80

Two of three linguists attached only days earlier

to Task Force 58 served as interpreters for medical

staff and their patients on board the Peleliu.

Corporal Kristapor Boodaghian, originally a

rifleman serving with the 1st Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion, was of Armenian descent

and spoke Dari. He had taken the language test prior

to the Global War on Terrorism to qualify for extra

monthly pay.81 Lance Corporal Athar Zulfiqar,

originally a rifleman serving with the 5th Marines,

was of Pakistani descent and spoke Urdu. He was

partially motivated to volunteer for the language

program by the backlash of anti-Muslim sentiment

he experienced following the terrorist attacks on 11

September.82 Neither of the young Marines was

ready for the shock he received when the wounded

were brought on board the ship, and both vividly

described the disturbing scene. Here is how

Corporal Zulfiqar remembered it:

We were waiting in the emergency room and I

was looking at... about 30 medical staff—just

standing around.... I was imagining one guy

walking in through the door or... maybe

somebody [with his hand] messed up.... The

next thing, the doors open and these 11 people

were brought in with amputated arms or legs. I

mean, a 16-year-old boy didn't even have an

arm no more. And an old guy, he was missing a

piece of the side of his head, there was [no]

skin.... And another old person who was

brought in, he was about 40 something, and he

had shrapnel toward his face, like when it blew

up. And he had no teeth; he had no teeth in his

mouth.... I mean, it was a shock. I didn't expect

that much. But [I told] myself, [to be] strong

and try to do the best I could.83

And here is Corporal Boodaghian’s account:

That was my first time seeing that kind of stuff.

I mean, the guy had a piece of bone on his

head, his ear was like falling down. Saw a lot of

flesh and blood and just people peeing on

themselves and sh——ing on their racks and

stuff like that. It smelled pretty bad. I just

wanted to help, so I didn’t really care.84

Although most of the Afghan fighters spoke

Pashto, several understood Dari, and there was

enough overlap with Urdu for Corporal Boodaghian

and Lance Corporal Zulfiqar to communicate with

them.85 They assisted the medical personnel by

reassuring the patients, asking questions, and

conveying requests: “Hey, you’re safe here,” “How

do you feel,” or “He wants to see your hand.”86 The

interpreters continued to visit with the Afghans

while they were recovering, striking up friendships,

and even praying with them on occasion. Zulfiqar

explained that the tribesmen had never seen a large

body of water before and constantly asked, “Why

does this house keep rocking?” They were both

amazed and intimidated when the Marines took

them up to the ship’s hanger bay and showed them

the ocean a week later.87 Although the fighters

enjoyed their experience on board ship, as they

recovered, each expressed a desire to return to

Afghanistan. On 20 December, nine of the soldiers

were repatriated at Kandahar airport during a

ceremony presided over by Commander Sharzai.88

Night of the Camel

On 5 December, the same night as the medical

evacuation and C-130 mishap, Marines at FOB

Rhino received an unwelcome caller. As Company

B staged its equipment and prepared to join a task

force then heading north toward Highway 1, Captain

Whitmer heard the sound of an M16 rifle being

fired at a lone camel that had wandered into their

perimeter. Although the animal presented no threat

on its own, the Marines had learned that Afghan

rebels had occasionally strapped explosives to

donkeys or camels during the Soviet-Afghan War

and sent them toward the Russian lines before

detonation. Frightened by the gunfire, the camel ran

toward Company C’s sector and received fire from

that unit before returning to Company B’s position.

The entire base was on full alert by this time,

with many trying to identify the source and nature

144

FROM THE SEA
of the threat. As the animal ran down the battalions’

frontage, the number of Marines firing at the beast

increased, raising the unwelcome possibility of a

friendly fire incident. Fortunately, the camel

eventually walked off into the desert and the firing

ceased. Several Marines watching the animal depart

through night-vision goggles and thermal sights

detected a heat signature and speculated that the

animal was lying wounded forward of the frontlines.

However, patrols conducted the following day failed

to discover anything but the animal’s tracks.89

Maritime Interdiction Operations

On 4 December, Admiral Moore issued his

planning guidance for operations designed to

interdict the movement of Taliban and al-Qaeda

leaders then believed to be operating in the north

Arabian Sea. On the same day, the commander of

Task Group 50.6 published his concept of

operations for a visit, board, search, and seizure

operation directed against the maritime vessel Kota

Sejarah, suspected of transporting al-Qaeda

terrorists and illegal weapons. The next day, Task

Group 50.6 assumed operational control of Navy

and Marine Corps personnel on board the USS

Shreveport, including members of BLT 3/6

(Companies L and Headquarters), MSSG 26, and

SEAL Team 8. The raid force seized the ship, which

was steaming off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan, the

following day, but subsequent searches failed to

locate the suspected fighters or weapons.90

A Night to Remember

Around 1925* on 6 December, the 81mm

mortar forward observer attached to Company C

approached Captain Fallon, who was then walking

the frontlines and checking on his Marines.91 He

informed the commander that he had seen lights

flashing west of the company’s position and north

of the forward operating base. Fallon turned in that

direction and saw the intermittent flashes, which

looked to him like someone using a white lens

flashlight to send signals every couple of minutes.

Company B noticed lights in their sector around the

same time that appeared to be communicating with

those seen in Company C’s area.92

After ordering his Marines to stand to, Captain

Fallon headed down to the company command post

and radioed a report of the sighting to battalion

headquarters, providing an approximate grid

coordinate for the potential enemy location. Because

Lieutenant Colonel Bourne was in the light armored

reconnaissance and combined antiarmor teams’

sectors at the time, Fallon spoke with Major James R.

Parrington, Battalion Landing Team 1/1’s executive

officer, who had control of the combat operations

center.93 Parrington put the battalion on full alert

while they attempted to determine the scope and

nature of the unfolding events.94

Although no lights had been seen in Company

A’s sector, the radio watch woke Captain Putman,

who listened intently to the dialogue between Captain

Fallon and Major Parrington. After ordering his own

unit to stand to and then waiting for the platoons to

inform him when all their Marines were at 100

percent alert, he passed on what information he had

gleaned from the conversation. “Here’s the situation.

We got [a] fire team–size force in front of Charlie

Company potentially scouting their lines or scouting

some sort of passage to get to the aircraft that are

parked at Camp Rhino.” Then he pulled in his

observation posts and had the 60mm mortar section

prepare to fire on targets in front of 3d platoon’s

position, which abutted Company C’s left flank.95

Captain Fallon was now in radio contact with

15th MEU headquarters, which asked what he

wanted to do. After explaining that he had

designated several preplanned targets over the

enemy’s positions, they gave him permission to fire.

Fallon then explained his intentions to the fire

145

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

*Task Force 58’s command chronology indicates that Marines observed the flashing lights around 1945.
support team leader, who replied, “No problem,

here’s the target.” The forward observer

subsequently placed the call for fire* with the 81mm

mortar platoon, situated behind 3d Platoon,

Company A, and followed that with a request for

additional support from the company’s organic

60mm mortar section.96

Adding to the confusion, at around 2330 a UH1N Huey helicopter then launching to support

interdiction operations to the north along Highway

1 crashed along the runway and burst into flames.97

By this time in the operation, Cobra and Huey crews

from both the 15th and 26th MEUs were flying daily

reconnaissance missions in support of FOB Rhino,

to include predawn and postdusk perimeter patrols.98

A combination of dust and darkness apparently

disoriented the pilots while pulling away from the

helipad.99 The accident was understandably

disconcerting to those at FOB Rhino, who

simultaneously worried about the safety of the

aircrew and wondered if hostile forces had

succeeded in downing one of their aircraft.100 Flames

quickly engulfed the helicopter and ammunition

began to explode as the hulk “burned down to a

lump of molten metal.”101 Fortunately, all four of

the crewmembers survived with only minor

injuries.102 This was due in no small part to the

efforts of quick-thinking support personnel, who

braved the fire to rescue their comrades and move a

parked fuel truck away from the crash site.

Back on the frontlines where the rifle

companies were facing a potential attack, Captain

Putman was concerned that the fire would distract

his Marines and ruin their night vision. He recalled

that he was constantly on the hook with his platoon

commanders, telling them to get their platoons up

and to make sure they were facing outboard. Once

they received word that the aircrew was safe, the

Marines’ curiosity passed.103

Forward of the perimeter, the night remained

pitch black. Although Captain Fallon was initially

concerned that the darkness would impede the

mortarmen’s accuracy, the illumination and high

explosive rounds** hit their target.104 Before long, an

orbiting Navy P-3 confirmed the enemy’s presence.

It provided a live video feed that enabled staff in the

15th MEU’s combat operations center to watch as

approximately 10 individuals dismounted from a

truck and began moving down a wash leading toward

the south end of the runway.105 Fallon again spoke

with Major Parrington, who said, “Hey, we’re sending

a section of CAAT [combined antiarmor] up to

you.”106 After breaking radio contact, Fallon called for

a second fire mission, directing the 81mm mortars to

fire on a grid coordinate provided by the P-3’s crew.

The section showed up at Company C’s

position shortly thereafter, led by First Lieutenant

Gary K. Koon, the combined antiarmor platoon

commander from Weapons Company, BLT 3/6.

Captain Fallon directed the vehicles to a position

along his perimeter and told the crews to observe

the target area with their antitank missile sights;

meanwhile, he had the Javelin gunners observing the

area with their weapons’ thermal sites from another

target reference point. With the antiarmor gunners

now in position, Fallon called for a third illumination

mission from the 81mm mortar platoon, this time

asking that they adjust their last shot. “Then,” he

said, “we launched the CAAT to go reconnoiter

what was out there.”107 First Lieutenant William M.

Lennon and BLT 3/6’s light armored

reconnaissance platoon, then refueling after

returning from a 30-hour patrol to retrieve several

disabled vehicles operating along Highway 1 to the

north, also sent three light armored vehicles

(carrying a 25mm cannon and both pintle- and

coaxially mounted 7.62mm machine guns) forward

that night to reconnoiter the area in front of the

battalion’s lines.108

146

FROM THE SEA

*During his interview, Capt Fallon recalled that the 81mm mortar forward observer had coordinated the high explosive fires. Task Force 58’s command

chronology indicates that the P-3 Orion aircraft had confirmed the presence of hostile forces before permission to fire was granted.

**In his interview, Capt Putman indicates that the combined antiarmor teams and 81mm mortars began firing at the same time.
Once the antiarmor teams were forward of the

frontlines with “eyes” on the area, Captain Fallon

asked Lieutenant Koon if he wanted additional

illumination from the company’s 60mm mortars. The

lieutenant responded affirmatively and radioed back

a grid coordinate to target. Fallon passed the location

to the 60mm crews and told them to fire for effect;

meanwhile, Company B requested 81mm mortar fire

to illuminate movement they were observing in their

sector. Koon called in two sequential adjust fire

missions, each time correcting to the right in an

effort to illuminate the opposing forces.109

At this point, Captain Fallon recalled, “I decided

that things weren’t working out; ‘let’s skip the mortars

and go with the direct fire weapons.’”110 The antiarmor

section subsequently drove down range and engaged

the hostile forces, located approximately 1,500 meters

outside friendly lines, with their MK19 automatic

grenade launcher.111 At this time, Fallon moved

forward to the antiarmor platoon’s position himself.

Lieutenant Koon was now in radio contact with

Weapons Company headquarters, who advised him to

pull back because the Marines could no longer see

anyone moving in the target area, and they were unable

to continue firing under that status level. Captain

Fallon requested that they check out the area one more

time before departing, which they did, going as far

forward as they felt comfortable before turning around

and returning to friendly lines.112

Task Force 58 remained at a heightened state of

alert throughout the night and cancelled all flights

scheduled into FOB Rhino.113 Events returned to

normal between 0400 and 0500 the next morning,

with the command standing down as the sun began

to rise over the horizon. It had been a long, cold

night for the Marines; some got into their sleeping

bags to catch up on sleep, while others attended an

after-action debrief at battalion headquarters.114 The

15th MEU responded to the probing by developing

a more coordinated “saturation” patrol plan, which

increased both the scope and intensity of coverage

within a 12-mile radius of the forward operating

147

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

Photo by Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011207-M-4912C-003

Members of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit conduct a patrol southwest of Kandahar on 7 December 2001. They are riding

in an M1043 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle armed with an M220 TOW (Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, WireGuided) missile system.
base. Beginning at 1400 that afternoon, they raised

the number of foot and mobile patrols at both ends

of the runway, pushed other patrols farther out for

longer periods, and forced the local inhabitants to

skirt the forward operating base by approximately

15–18 miles when traveling through the area.115

Patrols went out to search the area the next

morning. Although there was no physical sign of the

enemy other than footprints, sandals, a water bottle,

and an old blanket, days later the engineers

discovered a hidden AK-47 assault rifle while

assessing the area and emplacing obstacles.116 In the

aftermath of the evening’s events, Lieutenant

Colonel Olson recalled that the most remarkable

thing was the matter-of-fact manner in which the

Marines carried out their duties, as if these were

common everyday occurrences.117

The First Detainee

As one of their many subordinate missions,

both land and maritime component commands had

told the Marines to be prepared to provide

temporary holding facilities and receive prisoners

while they arranged for the detainees’ transfer to

more permanent facilities. On 6 December, Admiral

Moore issued his formal planning guidance for

detainee handling. John Walker Lindh, the

“American Taliban,” arrived at FOB Rhino a day

later, earning the notorious distinction of being the

first of many detainees eventually held by Task

Force 58.118

Northern Alliance forces had captured the 19-

year-old Californian at Kunduz with other al-Qaeda

and Taliban troops following the negotiated

surrender of the enemy’s last major stronghold in

northern Afghanistan on 23 November.119 After a

long convoy trip to Mazar-e Sharif the following day,

Northern Alliance soldiers confined Lindh and

other prisoners in the old fortress of Qala-e-Jangi,

situated seven miles west of the city.120 On 25

November, approximately 300 of the prisoners

revolted, seizing a large arsenal of weapons and

ammunition that included mortars and rocketpropelled grenade launchers.121 During the takeover,

they killed a Central Intelligence Agency officer and

former Marine named Johnny Michael Spann, who

had been interrogating the detainees, and a shot hit

Lindh in the upper right thigh.

Over the next four days, a Coalition force

composed of an infantry platoon from the 10th

Mountain Division,* British and American special

operating forces, and Afghan militia gradually recaptured the fortress. The last holdouts, including Lindh,

surrendered on 29 November, after their basement

sanctuary was flooded with freezing water.122

The Afghans trucked Lindh and the other

wounded prisoners to Sheberghan, where hospital

and prison facilities were located. Robert Y. Pelton,

a correspondent for Cable News Network (CNN),

was the first to learn of Lindh’s presence and

informed the special forces of his discovery on 1

December.123 When they encountered the young

terrorist, he “was shoeless, covered in dirt, and lying

in a hospital bed where he was recovering from

wounds received in the prison battle.”124 Concerned

by his poor condition, 5th Special Forces Group

personnel provided immediate medical attention.

The next day, they drove him to the Turkish School

House in Mazar-e Sharif, which served as the

headquarters for Forward Operating Base 53. On 7

December, after several days of interrogation, a

handcuffed Lindh, his eyes covered with a blindfold,

was flown to FOB Rhino.125

By this time, General Mattis had tasked his

communications officer, Major Scott Stebbins, with

overseeing Lindh’s confinement, including

conducting the initial transfer, providing necessary

medical attention, and satisfying the prisoner’s daily

requirements. A detachment from the force

reconnaissance platoon rehearsed what to do when

the prisoner arrived on 7 December, and later that

148

FROM THE SEA

*The infantry platoon had deployed from Karshi Khanabad, with another sent to Bagram. They were to serve as a quick reaction force for the special

operating forces and represented the first employment of conventional Army units in Afghanistan. (Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 141)
149

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Forward Operating Base Rhino

evening, Stebbins, his driver, and the reconnaissance

Marines drove their humvee to a predesignated

transfer point under blackout conditions, where they

waited for the arrival of a special operation forces’

C-130. Once the aircraft had landed, they quickly

assumed control of Lindh, further immobilized their

prisoner by taping him to a stretcher, and then

returned to the forward operating base.126

Upon reaching FOB Rhino, Task Force 58

personnel stripped Lindh of his clothes; searched him

for dangerous items that he could use to harm

himself or others; and then provided medical

treatment for the gunshot wound to his thigh,

shrapnel wound to his shoulder, and general

dehydration. Thereafter, Marines confined Lindh to a

metal shipping container located next to Task Force

K-Bar’s headquarters, where they placed him under a

24-hour guard.127 Military policeman from the 15th

MEU provided the prisoner with two meals-ready-to

eat per day (later raised to three) and all the water he

wanted, and looked after his personal sanitation

needs. Medical personnel also continued to evaluate

his condition twice each day. With the exception of

his guards and physicians, Lindh’s visitors were

limited to General Mattis; Colonel Waldhauser;

personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative

Service, who were brought in to collect photographs

and fingerprints; and personnel from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, who conducted several

interviews. Although these conditions might seem

harsh by some standards, Major Stebbins later

emphasized that not only did they provide Lindh with

all the rights and privileges due a prisoner of war, but

in some regards, his living conditions exceeded those

encountered by Marines in the field.128

On 11 December, after NavCent directed them

to develop a concept for handling the detainees at

sea, members of the Task Force 58 staff on board

the Peleliu prioritized the ability of Fifth Fleet’s

amphibious ships and aircraft carriers to house highvalue prisoners. The next day, the land component

commander issued a fragmentary order directing

Task Force 58 to transfer Lindh from FOB Rhino to

a U.S. Navy vessel.129 On 14 December, after binding

the prisoner to a stretcher for the second time, the

Marines first flew him to Pasni, Pakistan, on board

a C-130 and then on to the Peleliu on board a CH46 helicopter.130 A day after he arrived, Navy

surgeons operated on Lindh’s wounds, recovering a

bullet from his leg.131 They relocated him to the

Bataan on 31 December, then to the American

military base at Kandahar Airport on 22 January, and

he finally left for the United States on 23 January.132

At his trial, Lindh pleaded guilty to supplying

services to the Taliban and carrying weapons while

fighting against the Northern Alliance on 15 July

2002. A federal judge sentenced him to 20 years

without parole.133

151

Chapter 9

Interdiction Operations

The Campaign Continues into Southern

Afghanistan

After the earlier victory at Tarin Kowt,

Hamid Karzai and Lieutenant Colonel

David Fox led their combined AfghanAmerican force south. Following a three-day

engagement with the Taliban, they succeeded in

capturing the town of Sayd-Alim-Kalay on 4

December and occupying the north side of

Arghandab Bridge.1 Captain Clint C. Harris, an F/A18 Hornet pilot from Marine Fighter Attack

Squadron 251 (VMFA-251), provided Operational

Detachment Alpha 574 with close air support during

the battle. The special forces did not want the bridge

damaged by bombs, so he strafed the enemy forces

sheltered under the structure with his 20mm

cannon. He later recalled the satisfaction he received

when noting the blackened nose cowling after

returning to the USS Theodore Roosevelt.

2

Now within 15 miles of Kandahar, Karzai

learned that delegates meeting at a United Nations–

sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany, would

soon name him interim leader of the Afghan

government. On 5 December, he began to negotiate

the surrender of the Taliban’s stronghold over his

cellular phone.3 These efforts eventually resulted in

a meeting between the southern Pashtuns (referred

to as the Southern Alliance) and Taliban leaders on

7 December. Afterward, Karzai announced to

journalists that “the Taliban have decided to

surrender Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul

[Provinces] to me, and in exchange, we have offered

them amnesty and they can go home to their homes

without trouble.”4 This arrangement was not

acceptable to the Bush administration, which wanted

to dismantle the Taliban regime.

At the same time to the south, Gul Agha Sharzai

was also within striking distance of Kandahar.

Although Captain Smith and his special forces team

had favored enveloping the city from the west, Task

Force Dagger advised them not to go in that

direction because it would spread their forces too

thin. When Smith responded, “Well, let’s get the

Marines into the fight,” headquarters replied that the

Marines were not at Objective Rhino for “direct

combat.”5 Expressing concerns about the wisdom of

entering Kandahar at that time, it advised that a

better course of action would be to surround the city

and continue to develop the tactical situation. During

a press briefing that same day, Secretary Rumsfeld

and General Myers made similar comments

suggesting that the Marines were to play only a

subsidiary role in any forthcoming battle. They

explained to reporters that while the Marines had

begun to interdict lines of communication around

Kandahar, there were no plans for U.S. forces to join

in the final assault, and the job of seizing the city

would fall to the southern Pashtun forces then

encircling the stronghold.6 Two days later, as the

campaign to bring down the Taliban neared its

climax, Admiral Moore issued a planning order for

reconstitution of the Peleliu Amphibious Ready

Group, indicating that Marine participation would

not only be limited in scope, but also in duration.7

On 7 December, the same day that Karzai

announced his surrender agreement with the

Taliban, Sharzai’s younger brother called from inside

the city to say that Taliban forces had withdrawn

from Kandahar. The Afghan commander quickly

gathered 500 of his men, boarded trucks, and drove

to his former residence at the governor’s palace.

Although Colonel Mulholland had told Captain

Smith to remain outside the city limits, explaining

that there were reports of looting and intramural

fighting, the young team leader thought it best to

accept Sharzai’s invitation to join in the liberation of

Kandahar.8 Instead of encountering violence, as the
special forces “drove its vehicles along dusty streets

crowded with thousands of Afghans, the people

cheered, waved, and threw flowers.”9

Back in Washington, General Franks told media

representatives that although the Taliban forces were

surrendering inside Kandahar, U.S. forces continued

to engage them as they attempted to flee the city,

and added that additional troops might soon be

required in Afghanistan.10 Furthermore, Secretary

Rumsfeld “declared that the war effort had now

entered a new phase, with a principal focus on

finding bin Laden and his top lieutenants, stabilizing

post-Taliban Afghanistan, and addressing

humanitarian concerns in the war-ravaged

country.”11 The following day, Army General Paul

Mikolashek congratulated Task Force 58 for a job

well done and announced his intent to replace the

two Marine expeditionary units with an Army

brigade combat team.12

In Kandahar, Karzai was furious when he

learned that Sharzai had entered the city and

reoccupied his former residence in the governor’s

mansion. In exchange for surrendering the Taliban

military forces, Karzai had agreed to let Mullah

Naqibullah become the governor of Kandahar. As a

form of compromise, Naqibullah retained both the

title of “mullah” and his city home, while Sharzai

reclaimed his former position as the provincial

governor. Several days later, Karzai left for Kabul to

be sworn in as the interim president of Afghanistan.13

Highway Interdiction

Before returning to sea in mid-November,

General Mattis had warned his subordinate

commanders that they might be called on to

interdict Taliban and al-Qaeda troops moving along

Asian Highway Route 1, the principal two-lane

paved road linking the major cities in southern

Afghanistan. Roughly a week later, just after Task

Force 58 seized Objective Rhino, Secretary

Rumsfeld confirmed to press representatives that

one of the Marines’ primary missions was to

“prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from moving

freely about the country.”14 As the end of the month

approached, the possibility of such operations

taking place finally began to solidify when Central

Command told its land component to begin

planning for the isolation of Kandahar.15

On 30 November, the same day that Admiral

Moore transferred operational control of Task

Force 58 to General Mikolashek, the Marines

received planning and fragmentary orders from both

the land and maritime components, directing them

to plan for and be prepared to interdict enemy lines

of communication west of Kandahar.16 If

answering to two component commands were not

difficult enough, the Marines were issued contrary

guidance from Central Command: on the same day

Task Force 58 received a fragmentary order to raid

Route 1, it was also informed that its sole mission

was to seize a forward operating base (Forward

Operating Base Rhino [FOB Rhino]).17 General

Mattis later commented on the situation:

It just showed the inability of a displaced...

higher headquarters to coordinate mutually

supporting ops. Essential misunderstandings

reflected their lack of first-hand familiarity with

the ground and with the Pakistanis and with the

anti-Taliban force relationship. Had they

understood those things, they could have done

much better. There was a breakdown in the

intelligence operations interface; there was very

little awareness in Tampa that the enemy was

escaping every day because of their...

operational view.18

Although General Mattis and the members of

Task Force 58 wanted nothing more than an

opportunity to engage the enemy, the force limit—

levied two days earlier by Central

Command—seriously undercut their ability to

simultaneously defend the forward operating base

and launch a sizable ground combat force to the

north. Since the cap’s inception, Mattis and his staff

had continued to argue against the restriction as best

they could, forwarding requests for relief up both

the maritime and land component chains-ofcommand.19 On 1 December, with Army Major

General Warren C. Edwards, deputy commander of

152

FROM THE SEA
the land component, advocating on the task force’s

behalf, Central Command eventually conceded to

raising the ceiling from 1,100 to 1,400 Marines and

sailors in Afghanistan.20

This new figure allowed the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit to reinforce the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) already at FOB

Rhino. The aviation combat element, Lieutenant

Colonel Kevin DeVore’s Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 365 (HMM-365), deployed nine additional

helicopters (two UH1-Ns, three AH-1Ws, and four

CH-46Es) on 1 December, while the ground combat

element, Lieutenant Colonel Jerome M. Lynes’s

Battalion Landing Team 3/6 (BLT 3/6), inserted its

light armored reconnaissance and combined

antiarmor platoons the following day. The two

platoons, led by First Lieutenants William Lennon

and Gary Koon, respectively, had worked extensively

together during their predeployment training and now

combined to form Task Force Sledgehammer,* with

Lennon in command. Once ashore, both the air and

ground elements conducted security patrols around

the forward operating base through 6 December.21

The 15th MEU’s crisis action team began to

plan for the operation by considering the feasibility

of sending a mobile raid force north to attack

opposing positions along Highway 1. Over the next

12 to 24 hours, however, the mission evolved into

interdicting enemy lines of communication between

Kandahar and Lashkar Gah for three to five days.22

Lieutenant Colonel Olson explained that their job

was to “stop traffic, investigate who was there, seize

weapons or other contraband, take prisoners, and if

they resisted, kill them.”23

To retain the element of surprise and minimize

unnecessary risk, the interdiction force planned to

travel cross-country, covering over 80 miles of

desert, interspersed with sand dunes, streams, and

mountains. The condition of the vehicles added

another degree of difficulty: many of the battalion’s

humvees were more than a decade old and destined

for salvage following the unit’s return to Camp

Pendleton. Colonel Waldhauser later recalled talking

to one of his young Marines after he returned from

this mission. When the MEU commander asked

how it went, the Marine replied, “I wasn’t concerned

about getting shot at by the enemy—I was more

concerned whether my vehicle would start once we

had to exit the area.”24

On 2 December, both Central Command and

its land component headquarters issued execute

orders to interdict enemy lines of communication

and isolate the city of Kandahar.25 Although General

Mikolashek’s original intent had been merely to

block Taliban and al-Qaeda forces traveling along

Route 1, his refined guidance was to “prevent/deny

the escape” of the Taliban and al-Qaeda from

Afghanistan.26 General Mattis subsequently issued

Fragmentary Order 002 the following day, directing

elements of the 15th MEU to isolate Kandahar and

deny the Taliban forces a westward avenue of

escape.27 At this time, he later recalled, there were

approximately 6,000 enemy soldiers in Lashkar Gah

and another 20,000 in Kandahar.28

After speaking with the 15th MEU’s intelligence

officer on the same day that General Mattis released

his fragmentary order, an embedded reporter wrote,

“With Pashtun tribal militias intensifying pressure

on Taliban forces, Major [James B.] Higgins Jr. said

the war ‘seems to be reaching a culmination point

of some type’.”29 This prompted questions at a press

briefing in Washington, DC, later that day, when

another reporter asked Rear Admiral John D.

Stufflebeem if Pentagon officials “shared the view”

of “one of the Marine commanders at Forward

Operations Base Rhino... quoted as saying that it

appears that the U.S. military operation is reaching a

culmination.”30 Revealing the administration’s full

scope of operations and perhaps an impending

change in focus from Central Asia toward the

Middle East, Stufflebeem replied,

153

Interdiction Operations

*Task Force Sledgehammer was composed of seven light armored vehicles (one logistics and six light assault variants) and fourteen humvees (six heavy

machine gun and eight TOW missile variants). (BLT 3/6 History, 3)
I think you have to sort of put yourself in the

position of an individual who sees the world

from a different perspective. If I were a Marine

at... the forward operating base, surrounded by

a thousand of my red-blooded American

fighters, I probably would feel that I'm pretty

close to getting this thing to a conclusion.

However, from a perspective above that

altitude, and maybe even outside of

Afghanistan, the Central Command, and

certainly the National Command Authorities,

are prepared for... a longer duration. I'm not

sure that any of us have a sense or a feel for

how soon before we will know that we have the

senior leadership of the Taliban controlled or

suppressed or killed or in possession, or the

same for al-Qaeda. And so we're prepared to

stay for as long as we have to to do that, and

don't have a sense of time on that.31

North to the Arghandab River

Early on 3 December, Captain Treglia and his

force reconnaissance platoon departed friendly lines

and headed north toward the Arghandab River,

which parallels Highway 1. Composed of 11

154

FROM THE SEA

Diagram by Vincent J. Martinez

Map depicting the location of Marine operations in Afghanistan.
Marines and one Navy corpsman, the platoon rode

in two of their own interim fast-attack vehicles and

two hard-backed humvees that they had borrowed

from the infantry battalion and service support

group. One of the humvees carried a .50-caliber

machine gun, the other, a mounted MK19 automatic

grenade launcher.32 The patrol traveled throughout

the night, conducting route reconnaissance and

serving as an advance guard for the main force.

Unfortunately, several of their vehicles (one fastattack vehicle and one humvee) broke down during

the trip, forcing the group to split in the middle of

the desert. While Treglia and half the Marines stayed

behind to provide security for the vehicles, Gunnery

Sergeant John A. Dailey forged ahead with the

remainder of the platoon in search of a suitable

patrol base and possible fording sites for the

interdiction force.33

A day after the reconnaissance element had

headed into the desert, Lieutenant Colonel Bourne

(call sign “Shaka”) led the main body of the

interdiction force northward in column. With a call

sign of “Grim Reaper,” the force numbered

approximately 45 vehicles and included Bourne’s

jump command post, the combined antiarmor

platoon, and the light armored reconnaissance

company.34 While Major Impellitteri and First

Lieutenant Donald M. Faul had conducted a visual

reconnaissance flight in one of Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 163’s (HMM-163’s) UH-1N

helicopters over the area before departing, the

convoy leaders’ only charts were aerial photographs,

satellite imagery, and 1:100,000-scale maps that the

15th MEU’s topographic platoon had produced. The

photographs and imagery, however, were difficult to

interpret, while the maps were not always accurate.35

Planners had divided the tactical area of operations

along Highway 1 into three east-west zones, labeled

Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie, and two north-south

zones, labeled One and Two. This enabled the

Marines to coordinate operations quickly.36

Movement over the rough terrain was more

difficult and time consuming than originally

anticipated. One particularly frustrating obstacle was

an east-west sand belt running across the convoy’s

route. Although the Marines had tentatively

identified what appeared to be a six-mile-wide

stretch of hardpack suitable for traversing the

barrier, a number of crews had to winch each other’s

mired vehicles from the sand. Then, after regrouping

on the north side of the sand belt, they learned that

only one of several trails shown on the map still

existed; they located it only after sunrise. Making

matters worse, they also contended with mechanical

155

Interdiction Operations

Associated Press

An armored patrol from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Task Force Sledgehammer returns to Forward Operating Base

Rhino during a period of heightened alert on 7 December 2001.
problems and had to tow several disabled vehicles

during the advance.37

After laboring through the desert for

approximately 19 hours, the column finally linked up

with the reconnaissance team early on 5 December.

Their first patrol base, codenamed Pentagon, was

situated on a rocky rise cut by small draws, located

approximately 4 miles south of the Arghandab River

and 25 miles west of Kandahar.38 Lieutenant Colonel

James LaVine, commanding officer of HMM-163,

led six CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters into Pentagon

later that morning.39 In addition to bringing supplies

for the interdiction force, they also carried Captain

Whitmer and elements of Company B (3d Platoon

reinforced by mortar and machine gun sections) to

increase security around the patrol base.

Anxiety among the Marines on board rose

sharply when the helicopters descended toward the

landing zone, located approximately a mile from the

patrol base. Hearing the battalion’s unexpected test

firing of .50-caliber machine guns below, they

thought the aircraft were receiving hostile fire. Once

firmly on the ground, the infantry hiked to the patrol

base, positioned themselves among the vehicles, and

began to establish a standard 360-degree defensive

perimeter by digging fighting positions, developing

target lists, preparing fire plan sketches, and drafting

patrol overlays.40

Although the plan had initially called for the

Marines to establish their first roadblock along

Highway 1 that evening, winding their way through

the rugged terrain during the previous night had

used far more fuel than originally estimated. While

they had already halved the normal range of an

LAV-25 traveling on an unimproved road from 400

to 200 miles per tank, after accounting for multiple

vehicle recoveries, numerous route reversals,

decreasing tire pressure to increase traction, and

burning high-octane aviation fuel to simplify

logistical requirements, their effective range was

limited to around 140 miles. After arranging for a

fuel resupply, Colonel Bourne sent several vehicular

patrols out to reconnoiter the area.41

The same evening, one of Gunnery Sergeant

Dailey’s two reconnaissance teams moved down to

the river and evaluated tentative fording sites shown

on the aerial photographs and satellite imagery, while

the other investigated a possible Taliban radar site

that surveillance aircraft had reported.42 The site

apparently turned out to be a tree, while a multiple

launch rocket system also inspected proved

unserviceable.43 At the same time, armored vehicle

patrols scouted the area, locating roads, villages, and

the river and identifying potential helicopter landing

zones and future patrol bases. Although the Marines

attempted to send out a small mobile force to block

the highway and gain situational awareness later that

night, they quickly ended the mission when several

of the armored vehicles ran low on fuel within 4

kilometers of leaving the patrol base.44

The interdiction force pulled into a temporary

forward arming and refueling point early the next

morning to receive supplies and take on fuel from

500-gallon bladders flown in by HMM-163.45 Later

in the day, they shifted their patrol base to the

reverse slope of a ridge located slightly toward the

northwest, decreasing the length of the round trip

from patrol base Pentagon to Highway 1.46 By this

time, however, higher headquarters was growing

frustrated by the operational delays and more than a

little anxious to strike the enemy. Colonel

Waldhauser and several others flew north to meet

with Colonel Bourne and his commanders, and the

two groups confirmed the “game plan” for the

evening’s interdiction operation.47 The idea was to

go with a large force on the first mission and then

scale back subsequent operations. As Bourne

explained, “I wanted them to win the first time. I

wanted to be smoking—‘We won this one!’—and to

build their confidence.”48

Lieutenant Lennon and Task Force

Sledgehammer returned to Rhino that evening after

linking up with the interdiction force 80 miles north

of the forward operating base and recovering all but

one of their disabled vehicles.49 While the Marines

had predicted a 10-hour trip, the round-trip, crosscountry journey to patrol base Pentagon actually

156

FROM THE SEA
took 30 hours to complete. Staff Sergeant Schneider,

the detachment’s platoon sergeant, later commented

that the patrol was one of the toughest in his career.

In addition to retrieving three humvees and a fastattack vehicle, the 16-man force also had to tow one

of its own LAV-25s back across the desert after it

blew an engine while traversing the rugged

landscape.50 Although a helicopter flew the

remaining humvee back to Rhino, Task Force 58

eventually abandoned the dilapidated vehicle in a

shallow trench after mechanics determined that it

was beyond repair.

Checkpoint

Approximately two hours before sundown,

Gunnery Sergeant Dailey learned that his Marines

were to fulfill both reconnaissance and direct action

roles in the upcoming operation.51 Although Major

Thomas J. Impellitteri’s light armored

reconnaissance company would establish a wire

obstacle along the highway and provide mobile

security and support for the checkpoint, Colonel

Bourne decided that the force reconnaissance

Marines’ specialized training better prepared them

to halt traffic and search vehicles. The detachment’s

corpsman, Petty Officer Second Class Rodney C.

Talsma, had suggested the basic strategy for

engaging vehicles along the highway before

departing at FOB Rhino by asking lightheartedly,

“Hey, why don’t we just drop [in] and put a wire

behind them, and block them in, and just carjack

them?”52

As Gunnery Sergeant Dailey later explained,

while the concept may have sounded simple,

ambiguous rules of engagement made execution a

bit more complex.

The [rules of engagement] were clear, but how

we were going to apply them was rather unclear.

We could not shoot someone [possessing] a

157

Interdiction Operations

Photo by Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly

Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit extend a winch from a light armored vehicle to pull another vehicle out of

soft sand during a patrol east of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on 10 December 2001.
weapon unless they were threatening us.

Supposedly everyone here has weapons, so we

were basically required to wait until they were

getting ready to shoot at us before you shoot

back. We were also sort of led to believe that

the bulk of the traffic... traveling out of

Kandahar would be people fleeing. There’s

obviously issues with checking the women;

they’re not allowed to be touched. So, a man

dressed like a woman, who would know?53

Shortly after dusk, around 1900, two

reconnaissance teams of five Marines (call sign

“Centurion”) departed patrol base Pentagon for the

Arghandab River.54 Traveling in their one remaining

fast-attack vehicle and a borrowed humvee, Staff

Sergeant Jack A. Kelly led Team 1 and Staff Sergeant

Matthew A. Cole led Team 3 in search of suitable

fording sites. Progress slowed when their vehicles

became stuck and they encountered an unexpected

encampment of Afghan pastoralists on the south side

of the river. Meanwhile, Gunnery Sergeant Dailey,

who had remained behind, ironed out the final details

of the impending operation with Major Impellitteri.55

The main body of the interdiction force (call

sign “Cossack”) departed around 2130, shortly after

moonrise.56 It consisted of eight light armored

vehicles, including one command and control and

one logistics variant, and four gun-mounted

humvees. The armored reconnaissance company

quickly caught up with the force reconnaissance

teams and had little difficulty crossing the ankledeep water.57 When they emerged on the north side

of the river, however, they found themselves in the

midst of a small village surrounded by irrigation

ditches, dikes, and soggy paddies. Although the

158

FROM THE SEA

Photo courtesy of Maj Thomas J. Impellitteri

Members of Company B, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, pose in front of the terminal at Kandahar International

Airport, Afghanistan. From left to right are Capt Brian R. Griffing, executive officer; MSgt Michael L. Holguin, operations chief; and

Maj Thomas J. Impellitteri, company commander. While serving with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Company B played a

significant role in interdicting enemy movement along Highway 1, occupying Kandahar International Airport, and raiding the

enemy garrison in Maiwand.
humvees were capable of crossing the irrigation

ditches that measured approximately six feet deep

and eight feet wide, the armored vehicles could not

negotiate the obstacles.58

The convoy crept slowly forward, observing the

area through their night-vision sights and receiving

constant updates from an overhead surveillance

aircraft. Captain Michael D. Bryan, the force’s

forward air controller (call sign “Neck”) later listed

the various resources at his disposal to maintain the

Marines’ situational awareness. These included Navy

P-3 Orion and Air Force E8-C Joint Star surveillance

aircraft and a pair of Air Force General Dynamics F16 Fighting Falcon fighters with forward-looking

infrared devices.59

Despite the late hour, the Marines occasionally

encountered unsuspecting civilians, although most

of these were so surprised that they ran away in

fright. Colonel Bourne recounted one humorous

radio exchange that he overheard, in which the

vehicle crewmen described an Afghan man who had

literally run out of his shoes: “That guy looked like

he was on the Olympic track team.”60 At the same

time, anxieties were running high among the

Marines, who realized that any one of the civilians

could turn out to be a Taliban soldier with a rocketpropelled grenade launcher.61

For 30 minutes, the Marines searched

unsuccessfully for a route through town. Turning in

his seat, Major Impellitteri declared with

determination, “I am not going back; we are doing

this tonight!” He then asked a Central Intelligence

Agency liaison officer* riding in the vehicle, “What

do you think about dismounting the interpreter with

159

Interdiction Operations

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

Marines from Company A, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, conduct a mounted patrol near Kandahar, on 17

January 2002. Attached to Battalion Landing Team 3/6, they are riding in a Light Armored Vehicle-25 (LAV-25), armed with a

25mm chain gun and a 7.62mm machine gun.

*A liaison officer from the Central Intelligence Agency joined Task Force 58 on 28 November to assist them in planning operations in southern

Afghanistan. A former Marine officer, he was anxious for action and had volunteered to accompany the interdiction mission along Highway 1. He later

participated in the occupation of Kandahar International Airport and served as a link between the local Afghans and Marines. (TF 58 ComdC, 53)
some security and just start knocking on doors and

ask for help?” The intelligence officer responded

that it sounded like a good idea.62 Lance Corporal

Ajmal Achekzai, although a cook by military

occupational specialty, had been born in

Afghanistan, spoke both Pashto and Farsi, and was

now pressed into service.63

Just then, the surveillance aircraft warned

Captain Bryan that a civilian vehicle was

approaching the village. While the Marines waited

patiently (parked alongside a small house for cover

and concealment) for the situation to develop, the

truck continued moving toward them and eventually

halted on the opposite side of the building. Three

Afghan men climbed from their vehicle with AK-47

assault rifles in hand, rounded the structure, and

abruptly came face to face with the LAV-25’s heavy

armament. Captain Bryan recalled with some

humor, “As soon as they looked up and actually saw

us there—they hadn’t even realized we were in the

town until that point—they took off running, and I

don’t think they quit until they were four or five

miles away.”64 Comments from excited Marines

quickly filled the company’s tactical communications

net, but Major Impellitteri reassured his troops.

“We’re fine. We’re going to dismount the interpreter,

we’re going to find a way through here, and we’re

going to go up there and do this thing.”

“Miraculously,” he reflected, “everybody was quiet

on the net and... kind of calmed down.”65

Lance Corporal Achekzai climbed down from

his vehicle and started moving through town,

accompanied by Major Impellitteri, the intelligence

agency officer, and several Marines who provided

security. After knocking on several doors, they

arrived at the house of the village elder. The small

patrol explained that they were Americans hunting

al-Qaeda and Taliban soldiers, inquired if there were

any of those in the village, and asked how to cross

the man’s irrigation ditch. After learning how to

maneuver past the obstacle, Impellitteri asked what

the elder had said. Achekzai replied, “He said that

there weren’t any Taliban and al-Qaeda in their town,

that they were very poor people and hated the

Taliban. They have no food.” The company

commander then inquired if the villagers needed

anything, to which the interpreter responded, “They

could use some water, if we could spare some.”66

Thereafter, when each of the vehicles passed the

elder’s house, Marines tossed out two bottles of

water and, because they didn’t want to offend the

Muslims, several non-pork meals-ready-to eat.67

Before moving on, Major Impellitteri asked the

elder to point out the quickest route to Highway 1.

The old man reportedly “hated the Taliban so much

that he volunteered to... guide [the patrol] to

Kandahar to kill Omar himself ” and enthusiastically

directed the Marines to an unimproved road that the

locals used. The convoy was behind schedule by this

time, and imparting his order to proceed with a

sense of urgency, Impellitteri radioed, “Hey, we’re

moving, let’s go... we’ve got to fly out there!”68

Moving relatively quickly, the interdiction force

covered the few remaining kilometers along the

unimproved dirt road to Highway 1 and established

an objective rally point approximately 1,000 meters

south of the highway.69 Gunnery Sergeant Dailey,

who had been riding in the company commander’s

LAV, now linked up with his two reconnaissance

teams.70 The Marines quickly ran through the plan

one more time, and Major Impellitteri asked, “Does

everyone know what they need to do? Does anybody

have any last minute questions before we go and kick

this thing off ?” After the Marines responded, “No

sir, we’re all good to go,” he replied, “Roger,

execute.”71

The paved two-lane highway, extending

westward across the featureless desert floor, sat on a

six-foot-high earthen berm with steep banks.

Although the elevated aspect surprised the Marines,

who had used one-dimensional aerial photographs

to plan the operation, it actually contributed to their

goal by confining the flow of traffic to a main avenue

of approach. Major Impellitteri positioned his two

security teams along the eastern and western flanks

of Highway 1, approximately 500 meters from the

roadblock and adjacent to a small village to the east.

160

FROM THE SEA
Each of the teams consisted of two light armored

vehicles and two humvees, one commanded by First

Lieutenant Donald M. Faul from the armored

reconnaissance company’s 1st Platoon, the other by

Gunnery Sergeant Robert J. Sundstrom from the

weapons company’s antiarmor platoon.72

Once the security teams were in place and

surveillance aircraft had confirmed that the highway

was temporarily clear of traffic, Master Sergeant

Michael L. Holguin, the company’s operations chief,

led the support element forward from the rally point

to establish a roadblock. Traveling in a logistical

variant of the light armored vehicle, the 13-man

detachment included scout snipers to provide

covering fire, as well as combat cameramen to

record the event. Staking double-stranded

concertina wire to the macadam roadbed, they

designed the obstacle to funnel westward-traveling

traffic toward a single decision point. They also hung

chemical lights from the wire to ensure that

approaching drivers would spot the barrier and stop.

Once they had constructed the obstacle, which took

all of about five minutes to complete, Holguin

pulled the support element 500 meters back to a

position that allowed the snipers to observe the

objective area and engage targets.73

Gunnery Sergeant Dailey and the force

reconnaissance section, serving as the assault

element for the ambush, had also moved forward in

their two vehicles. The humvee carried seven

161

Interdiction Operations

Diagram by Col Nathan S. Lowrey

Map depicting the interdiction of a Taliban convoy on Highway 1 on 6–7 December 2001.
members of the section. Staff Sergeant Steven B.

Pope drove with Dailey in the assistant driver’s seat.

Behind them, Staff Sergeants David K. Lind and

Roman C. Nowicki occupied the left and right

passenger seats, followed by Staff Sergeants Kelly

and Travis Clark, and Petty Officer Talsma, who

rode in the cargo area. In addition to the Marines’

individual M4 carbines, the driver carried an M79

grenade launcher, and the vehicle had a mounted

M240G machine gun. The fast-attack vehicle carried

the remaining four members of the team: Staff

Sergeant Matthew A. Cole and Sergeants Clayton J.

Bell, Brian M. Lambert, and Glenn S. Cederholm.

In addition to their individual M4s, the driver’s M79,

and a .50-caliber sniper rifle, the vehicle had a

mounted MK19 automatic grenade launcher.74

Although the assault element experienced some

initial anxiety, wondering if their humvee could

climb the steep bank when required, they conducted

a quick test and the vehicle proved up to the

challenge. They then withdrew to a position

approximately 200 meters east of the obstacle and

just south of the highway and began the waiting

game. As Dailey explained, “We assumed that 90

percent of the people that we stopped were going to

be friendlies that we’d search, take a look at, send

them on their way.... We were going to approach

it... like a policeman at a speed trap, let them drive

past us... and give them a little lead-in time.” Given

the small size of the assault element, the Marines

had decided to allow only one vehicle into the

objective area at any given time, even if the security

element had to move forward and block the highway

to do it.75 According to the rules of engagement,

although personnel in voluntarily halted vehicles

would need to commit some type of hostile act

against the Marines before they could open fire,

drivers attempting to crash through the barrier

would be considered to have displayed hostile

intent.76 In the latter case, the small assault element

would allow hostile vehicles to pass unmolested,

allowing the security element to engage them with

their enhanced firepower.77

By this time, the interdiction force had been

away from patrol base Pentagon for more than six

hours. Waiting patiently in their assigned positions,

they relied on Major Timothy J. Oliver, Task Force

58’s assistant intelligence officer, in an orbiting P-3

to inform them of approaching traffic. They first

received reports of several vehicles traveling

approximately 15 miles down the highway in either

direction, but these turned off the road well before

reaching the Marines’ position.78

Around 0420 in the morning on 7 December,

the interdiction force finally learned that several

vehicles were heading toward their position from

both directions: one group was located 20 miles east

near Kandahar, the other, 12 miles west near Lashkar

Gah.79 This raised the troublesome questions of

which vehicles would arrive first and whether or not

the Marines should just open the barricade and let

the traffic pass. As the Marines prepared to turn

around and reorient the direction of their roadblock,

they received a subsequent update indicating that still

others were now approaching from the east. The

situation was fortunately resolved when the vehicles

from the west exited the highway, leaving a single

approaching target.80

Situated near the center of the objective where

he could observe the operation from his command

variant of the LAV-25, Major Impellitteri radioed,

“All right, this is what we’re going to take down,

everybody get set.”81 Before long, the vehicle passed

the flank security team, who radioed that they had

spotted a dual cab pickup with people in the back.

As the pickup sped past the assault element’s

position, Gunnery Sergeant Dailey told Staff

Sergeant Pope to “go ahead and punch it!” The

humvee quickly climbed the steep bank onto the

road, with the fast-attack vehicle following to the

side to provide fire support. The Marines observed

three individuals wrapped in blankets in the truck

bed. Although the middle passenger was clearly

carrying an AK-47 assault rifle, none of the Afghans

made any threatening gestures.82

The driver of the pickup—sitting on the right

side of the truck—apparently saw the chemical

162

FROM THE SEA
lights and began to slow his vehicle but then

attempted to accelerate through the roadblock. After

dragging the obstacle for 20 to 25 feet (and in the

process wrapping wire around the axel and body),

the tangled vehicle halted. As Staff Sergeant Pope

pulled to within 5 feet of the pickup’s tailgate,

Gunnery Sergeant Dailey leapt from the humvee.

Running as close as he could to the concertina wire,

perhaps 10 feet from the pickup, he shone his

flashlight on the Afghans and shouted in English for

them to “put your weapons down” and “put your

hands on your head.” Almost simultaneously, Staff

Sergeants Kelly and Nowicki moved to Dailey’s

right, while Staff Sergeants Lind and Clark moved to

his left. At this point, the Marines were still unsure

if they were dealing with friendly or hostile forces.

Although the man sitting in the middle of the truck

bed had his firing hand on his rifle, which was

pointed in the general direction of the team, his

second hand remained free and he did not appear

overly aggressive.83

A man suddenly jumped from the left rear side

door of the cab and began to raise his weapon at the

Marines. Staff Sergeants Clark and Lind immediately

opened fire on him, while Gunnery Sergeant Dailey

and Staff Sergeant Kelly engaged the three Afghans

riding in the bed of the truck, who had also begun

to raise their weapons menacingly. The men had

apparently covered themselves with blankets to ward

off the evening cold, and now those seated on the

left and right sides of the bed struggled to extricate

their rifles from beneath the covering. Because the

men were propped up against supplies and

equipment in the rear of the truck, they appeared to

remain active and the Marines continued to fire at

them; these rounds likely penetrated into the rear of

the cab and killed any passengers seeking cover

there. A fifth man had also emerged from the left

side of the cab, and one of the scout snipers

assigned to the support element had fired into the

vehicle’s windshield and side passenger door, killing

the driver and other occupants.84 One individual was

shot a second time as he attempted to flee.85

The brief engagement had lasted only 6 to 10

seconds, with each Marine firing 13 to 20 rounds.86

The assault element confirmed seven dead without

taking any casualties themselves.87 By this time, fuel

in the truck had started to burn and Gunnery

Sergeant Dailey ordered his team to pull back from

the rapidly spreading flames. Major Impellitteri

began to pull the interdiction force back to its

objective rally point by echelon: first assault, then

support, and finally the security element when

everyone else was safe.88 After stopping briefly to

change magazines, take a quick head count, and

check their equipment, the assault element

continued its withdrawal. As the Marines bounded

backward to cover each other and the team’s

humvee, AK-47 rounds began to cook off with

increasing rapidity, followed by several rocketpropelled grenades—one flying toward a flank

security team—and eventually larger explosions

believed to be mortar rounds.89

While the roadblock was taking place, the

orbiting P-3 aircraft and eastern security teams each

reported the approach of several more vehicles*

from the direction of Kandahar: a minibus and

truck followed by approximately four other vehicles

at a greater distance.90 Initially, only the lead vehicle

was running with headlights, but as they approached

the roadblock, the second driver turned his on as

well. While they likely intended to illuminate the

objective area to see what was taking place at the site,

they also revealed their position to the Marines.91

The drivers then turned off their lights, stopped

short of the objective area, and dismounted between

15–30 troops along both shoulders of the road.**

These actions led the Marines to conclude that they

had hit the advance guard of a Taliban column

163

Interdiction Operations

*In his autobiography, 1stLt Fick says the message was first reported to patrol base Pentagon and then relayed to assault force Cossack. He also gives the

number of vehicles as two, including a minibus and dump truck. (Fick, One Bullet Away, 127)

**The estimated number of dismounted troops varies significantly among several sources: MSSG 15’s command chronology says 15–20, Task Force 58’s

command chronology states 30, GySgt Dailey remembers 50–80, and Maj Impellitteri recalls 60–80.
moving west toward Lashkar Gah because the

drivers appeared to be in communication with each

other and shared standard operating procedures.92

As Colonel Bourne explained, “Their tactics were

very, very loose. They’d extend intervals for their

convoys so it would look like six single vehicles

spread out for 20 miles.”93

As the one-sided firefight ensued, the Afghan

convoy attempted to maneuver around the

roadblock, reinforcing the Marines’ suspicions that

they were facing the Taliban. While observing

through thermal sights and other night-vision

devices, they watched as the troops reboarded their

vehicles (now apparently joined by the four other

trucks), headed approximately a kilometer north

through the desert to a dirt road that paralleled the

highway, and dismounted a second time.94 Overhead

in the P-3, Major Oliver observed approximately 40

individuals form a skirmisher’s line and begin to

move slowly westward alongside their vehicles

toward the roadblock point.95 He later commented,

“They were maneuvering like infantry that was

reasonably well disciplined and drilled, and he at first

thought they might be another Marine element.96

Major Impellitteri continued to discretely pull his

force back from the highway while this was

occurring because the night’s limited objective had

been to stop and search one or two isolated vehicles

rather than attack an enemy convoy.97

As the returning interdiction forces regrouped

at their objective rally point, Captain Bryan asked

Major Impellitteri what he wanted to do. After the

company commander responded, “Let’s run some air

on them,” the forward air controller informed him

that it would take about 15 minutes to initiate the

attack. Sensitive to the fact that the burning vehicle

and exploding ammunition would have drawn the

attention of any other forces in the area, Impellitteri

responded, “Wait for what? I’m not sitting here, out

in the open, for 15 minutes!” Bryan explained, “I’ve

got to get approval [from higher headquarters].

Before we can engage targets... with close air

support, they need to be identified as hostile.” Until

this time, the company commander was unaware that

the combined air operations center in Saudi Arabia

had to approve all requests for the employment of

fixed-wing aviation assets in Afghanistan, raising the

Marines’ level of frustration.98

Major Impellitteri acknowledged the

requirement but commented, “Look, these guys all

have weapons [and] they’re acting like any kind of

military would.... These guys are definitely hostile;

there’s no way they’re not.”99 Bryan understood

Impellitteri’s frustration but later added that the

Marines had not yet completed their withdrawal and

explained, “I can’t start dropping bombs until I

know my people are clear.”100 Colonel Bourne later

described the complexity of the problem:

You can’t tell these guys apart. It’s a truckload

of guys with guns. Good guys, bad guys, don’t

know. Yet it could have been a convoy. It could

have been that we screwed up and hit friendlies

this time. It’s really tough to sort them out.

They couldn’t just drop bombs on them at that

point.101

As a Marine forward air controller, Captain

Bryan coordinated air operations over the immediate

area. Orbiting aircraft checked in with him on arrival,

reporting what type of ordnance they were carrying

and how long they could remain overhead. He, in

turn, “stacked” the aircraft according to which pilots

had the shortest time on station and assigned targets

as they became available.102 On this particular

occasion, the stack included two Navy F-14s, two

Air Force F-16s, and two Marine Corps F/A-18s.103

Captains Michael J. Coletta and Clint Harris piloted

the Hornet flights from VMFA-251 on board the

Theodore Roosevelt.

With the burning pickup truck serving as a

reference point, the pilots’ attention quickly focused

on the convoy moving toward the interdiction

force.104 Captain Coletta described radioing the

forward air controller, “Hey, I have vehicles moving

north here, do you have them?” When Captain

Bryan responded that he did, Coletta asked “Am I

clear to engage these guys?” According to Coletta,

164

FROM THE SEA
although Bryan wanted to give a verbal “thumbsup” to go ahead with the attack, he replied, “Just to

get further clarification, let’s try to get it from one

more agency.” Coletta subsequently changed his

radio frequency and contacted “Boss Man,” the Air

Force airborne warning and control system. Boss

Man then relayed the request to “K-Mart,” the

combined air operations center in Saudi Arabia, over

the Air Control-1 network.105 Bryan, conversely, says

that he submitted the request to the air operations

center through the orbiting E-8 JSTARs (Joint

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) aircraft.106

After higher headquarters checked with the

local Afghan militia to confirm that there were no

friendly vehicles traveling along that portion of

Highway 1, Captain Bryan received permission for

Captain Coletta and his wingman, Captain Clint

Harris, to begin the attack: “He’s cleared to engage.”

By this time, the interdicting force had consolidated

approximately a kilometer south of the objective

area, and while some Marines provided local security

around the rally point, others prepared to tow a

disabled LAV-25 that had limped back from the

roadblock. North of the highway, having walked

half a kilometer or more alongside their trucks, the

Taliban remounted their vehicles.107

Bryan released the aircraft after he obtained a

headcount from the ground forces and knew that

the Marines were safe.108 The first four fighters

descended from approximately 22,000 feet and

dropped six bombs at 30-second intervals, shattering

whatever sense of security the Taliban might have

gleaned from the surrounding darkness.109 Captain

Bryan later remembered that the F-14s came in first,

dropping two 1,000-pound laser guided bombs on

the two lead vehicles, each of which carried 20 to 30

personnel. Then the F-16s came in, dropping four

500-pound laser guided bombs.110 Major Impellitteri

reflected, “I literally sat back... just watching the

light show because those guys... didn’t have to rely

upon us specifically to mark targets for them.”111

Colonel Bourne recalled, “They struck all five or six

of [the vehicles] in a row—boom, boom, boom and

took them all out.”112

After a brief pause, during which the P-3C

surveyed the wreckage, the F-18s dropped two more

500-pound laser guided bombs on the burning

pickup truck.113 The last attack was intended to

disguise the roadblock as a random bombing so the

interdiction force could repeat the tactic the

following night.114 Conservative battle damage

estimates suggested that as many as 50 Taliban were

killed in the attack, although local Afghans later

claimed that they had recovered between 120–150

bodies from the wreckage for immediate burial as is

the Muslim custom.115

Captain Coletta thought that the forward air

controller’s voice sounded familiar—like that of a

fellow F/A-18 pilot he had met while attending a

Service school on the West Coast—as he was

listening to the sequence of radio exchanges

occurring that evening. Following the air attack, he

asked, “Is this Neck from the Red Devils?” Bryan

replied, “Sure is. Who’s this?” Coletta responded,

“Joey from the T-Bolts!” Coletta later recalled, “It

was almost like, ‘Hey, how’s it going?’ Just in that

quick five, six seconds: ‘I can’t believe it’s you’ [and]

‘I can’t believe it’s you down there.’ And we kind of

did our hellos.”116

As dawn approached, the interdiction force

headed south toward patrol base Pentagon.

Although they returned by the same route they had

taken the previous evening, crossing back over the

irrigation ditch proved more difficult this time

around as they were towing a disabled vehicle. After

positioning security around the village, it took

approximately 30–45 minutes to develop a workable

plan for passing the agricultural obstruction. By this

time, the sun had risen and the villagers had begun

to emerge from their homes to view the spectacle,

piquing both curiosity and concern for force

protection among the Marines. Major Impellitteri

later described the scene:

The chieftain came out and the people started

to come out. Kids are everywhere. People were

kind of nervous, but they were... curious.

They wanted to know what was going on. Kids

165

Interdiction Operations
were running all around the vehicles, people

coming out to say hello. “Americans are here!”

They were happy, they were waving [and] we

gave them more food, more water. Marines

were throwing candy out, articles of clothing.

It literally broke your heart to look at these

people walking around. It was freezing.... I’m

wearing warm gloves, got a hat on, and you

look at these kids, they’re walking around in

bare feet, and it just breaks your heart. People

were throwing articles of clothing. I had just

gotten a brand-new pair of warm wool socks,

like the dive socks. I gave those to... the old

guy that was there.... We like to think that

we’re all big, tough, unemotional individuals,

but they’re looking at these kids, and they’re

like, “This is [incredible]. How can they not

have... shoes?”117

Several nights later, to show their appreciation

for the villagers’ help, Task Force 58 arranged for

approximately 17,000 humanitarian assistance

rations to be air dropped in the area.118

After returning to the patrol base, the Marines

debriefed the previous night’s mission. Although

everyone wanted to go out again that evening, they

all agreed that it was not necessary to get into closequarter gunfights on the roadway. Major Impellitteri

reasoned that if they were going to travel in convoys,

they should set up observation posts or forward air

control teams about 1,000 meters from the road so

that they could safely identify everyone that was

hostile and run close air support.119 This idea fit with

Colonel Bourne’s original notion of scaling back the

size of the force after the first mission. That

evening, the battalion’s reconnaissance platoon

commander, Captain Eric C. Dill, a forward air

control team, and a platoon of four light armored

vehicles established two observation posts

approximately 1,000 meters south of Highway 1.120

To the Marines’ surprise, perhaps even

disappointment, not one vehicle passed their

position. It appeared that they had succeeded in

halting the flow of traffic between Kandahar and

Lashkar Gah with just one air-ground interdiction.

As Major Impellitteri succinctly phrased it, the

word had somehow spread through the local

population that the Americans were there, and if

you moved on Highway 1, you were going to die.121

Meanwhile, back at patrol base Pentagon, the

remainder of the force packed up their equipment

and supplies and relocated several miles away. Two

Afghan shepherds had stumbled upon the patrol

base earlier in the day, and they did not want to

expose themselves to unnecessary potshots from

enemy rocket-propelled grenades.122

Another patrol went forward on the evening of

8–9 December, while a platoon from the armored

reconnaissance company identified additional

fording sites and potential locations for future patrol

bases. Setting up near the previous roadblock, they

used the same force configuration that they had

successfully employed just two nights earlier.

Orbiting aircraft identified several vehicles traveling

farther down the highway, but these turned off the

road long before reaching the Marines’ location.123

Although their usual tactic was to head back

across the river before dawn, the patrol remained in

position until well after sunrise, hoping to engage

Mullah Omar and senior Taliban leaders reportedly

fleeing west following the surrender of Kandahar.

When the targets failed to materialize, Major

Impellitteri recommended that they pack up and

move, and the patrol headed south through a

different village with another disabled humvee in

tow. Not wanting to give the patrol base’s location

away, they first moved to a resupply point and then

made their way back to patrol base Pentagon.124

Meanwhile, back at FOB Rhino, Task Force 58

directed BLT 3/6’s light armored reconnaissance

platoon and elements of the Australian Special Air

Service detachment to conduct additional interdiction

patrols along the Helmand River, while Lieutenant

Koon’s combined antiarmor platoon remained at the

forward operating base to run local security patrols.125

Lieutenant Lennon recalled that when he received the

assignment from General Mattis, he and an Australian

officer were sitting in the office. Mattis looked at them

166

FROM THE SEA
and said, “I want to link you two gents up, send you

west. Go kill bad guys.” They responded, “Roger.”

He pointed at a spot on the map where he wanted

them to go, and that was the only guidance they

received.126 After linking up 40 miles west of Rhino

the following day, Lennon’s platoon and Task Force

64 continued to screen the Marine operating base

from hostile forces in the area until 12 December.

They stopped seven civilian vehicles during this

period and, on 11 December, Task Force 64

destroyed a refueling site located northwest of Rhino.

On the same day, other Special Air Service elements

destroyed a weapons cache discovered northeast of

the forward operating base.127

Shifting Priorities

A day prior to the surrender of Kandahar, Task

Force 58 had told the 15th MEU to plan to shift its

interdiction force closer to the Taliban spiritual

center. By increasing pressure against the Taliban,

Coalition leaders hoped to improve the patrol’s

chances for contact, demonstrate America’s

willingness to employ conventional ground forces,

and encourage the anti-Taliban militias to continue

their advance.128 By 9 December, as control of

Kandahar passed from Taliban to the Southern

Alliance, the interdiction force’s mission began to

move in that direction. Rather than continue to

operate discretely from isolated patrol bases south

of the Arghandab River, the new scheme was to

maintain a full-time presence along the highway and

engage opposing forces attempting to flee west

from the capital city.129 As they were preparing to

send out yet another patrol later that evening, they

learned that plans had changed once again and they

were no longer required to interdict the remote

section of highway, midway between Kandahar and

Lashkar Gah.130

167

Interdiction Operations

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

1stLt William A. Lennon, right, and Cpl David Easter watch for the blast of unexploded munitions about to be destroyed near

Kandahar International Airport on 17 January 2002. Both were members of Company A, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, attached to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Lennon led Task Force Sledgehammer, a composite unit comprising

light armored vehicles from his own platoon and antiarmor vehicles from Battalion Landing Team 3/6.
168

FROM THE SEA

*Maj Impellitteri recalled that he had received word of the mission change while en route to the blocking position, prior to occupying the hill. (Impellitteri

comments)

Colonel Bourne assembled his subordinate

commanders around 0530 the next morning. Major

Parrington, the battalion’s executive officer,

explained that Task Force 58 was going to conduct

a movement-to-contact toward the outskirts of

Kandahar where it would establish a blocking

position, interdict Taliban forces fleeing west, and

stand by to link up with anti-Taliban forces.

Departing just prior to sunrise, the vehicular portion

of the force crossed the river, passed through the

now familiar villages to reach Highway 1, and then

headed east toward Kandahar.131

Traffic packed the roadway, with some drivers

trying to pass the armed convoy. On several

occasions, the Marines fired their 25mm cannons

harmlessly into the desert as a warning for the

civilians to clear the road. On others, they directed

their Cobra helicopter escorts to chase down and

inspect several vehicles that fled when they spotted

the approaching convoy.132 While traveling through

two successive built-up areas near Maiwand

Garrison, they received a mixture of friendly waves,

indifferent glances, and hostile glares from the

Afghan villagers.133

Several miles east of the second town, the

convoy pulled off to the north side of the road and

occupied a small scree-covered hill that Major

Impellitteri had selected. The terrain was defensible,

with eastern and western flanks protected by Sovietera minefields, and had several suitable landing zones

nearby.134 As the Marines received critically needed

food, water, and fuel that the squadron had flown

in, Captain Whitmer and Company B arrived on two

CH-53 helicopters. Lieutenant Fick later wrote that

this spot was much more exposed than their

previous sites—it was in plain view of the highway

and dominated by a mountain towering above them

several miles to the north.135

The interdiction force positioned its vehicles

and infantry to overlook the highway, directing the

Marines to shoot everything driving by their

position.136 While conducting the resupply, however,

Colonel Bourne received word that they were no

longer required to block the highway.* The Marines

now watched passively as a variety of vehicles

streamed past their location without stopping. First

Sergeant Weilbacher described the scene, looking

down from trenches set along the hillside: it “wasn’t

Photo by Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly

Watched closely by curious Afghan villagers, light armored vehicles from Battalion Landing Team 1/1 travel east along Route 1

on 9 December 2001. They are part of a task force deployed by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit to block the escape of Taliban

and al-Qaeda forces from Kandahar.
just one vehicle every ten minutes, it was like [one]

vehicle [every] five seconds. Vehicle after vehicle just

kept running [by our position]. Large trucks, small

trucks, oil rigs, farm trucks, pickup trucks.”137 A

recently arrived reporter informed Major Impellitteri

that Kandahar had just fallen, and it now appeared

that Highway 1 was open to a wide range of

“civilian” traffic.138

Despite the turn of events, the interdiction

force was well aware that it remained in the midst of

hostile territory. Intelligence sources reported

Taliban in a town to the southeast and al-Qaeda

hiding to the northeast. The Marines also suspected

that there were hostile forces in the town they had

passed to west, which they dubbed “the evil village.”

In addition to the presence of an old Soviet ZSU23 antiaircraft gun, many of the men carried AK-47

rifles and wore black turbans characteristic of the

Taliban, and some possessed new Motorola radios.

Not only were the locals coming out to investigate,

the signals intelligence detachment could hear them

conversing about the Marines’ arrival over their

radios: “Hey, we see them. They’re at the base of

the mountains.” At the same time, the Marines

could not respond offensively because the Afghans

had not threatened them in any way. It was possible

that they were merely curious, that the weapons

were for local defense, and the turbans represented

seniority among the clan membership. In one case,

villagers had waved a homemade American flag

(albeit with too few stars and stripes) from a ridge

as the convoy passed, and their intent certainly did

not appear threatening.139

Approximately two hours after sundown,

Colonel Bourne decided to displace the patrol base

to a location around five miles away on the other

side of the highway.140 Although the Marines

experienced no overt signs of an impending attack,

Bourne realized that Taliban were mostly likely in

the area, the villagers knew where the convoy had

stopped, and they were now intercepting more

aggressive radio traffic.141 He also figured that any

Taliban attack would likely come from the direction

of what appeared to be a large refugee encampment

that was situated between the Marines and the

village. If they returned fire, he reasoned, the

Marines could endanger noncombatant civilians.142

While preparing for the move, Major Impellitteri

explained to several Marines that radio traffic

indicated “at least two groups of fighters know

where we are and are moving into position to

ambush us with [rocket-propelled grenades].”143

That was fine with the Marines; a small security force

would remain to counter any would-be attackers.144

After a three-hour march, the force

reestablished its 360-degree defensive perimeter on

flat ground where they could easily observe any

approaching enemy through their various nightvision devices. The move had been more than an

inconvenience, particularly for the foot-mobile rifle

company (some weapons crews labored beneath

200-pound packs) who struggled in the dark to

keep pace with the vehicles, but the night passed

without further incident.145 Adding to their

discomfort, once the sweating Marines halted, they

encountered winds blowing down from the

northern mountains and one of the coldest nights

they experienced in Afghanistan.146

The Marines waited for further orders for the

next two days, cleaning, zeroing, and test firing their

weapons in preparation for the possibility of entering

Kandahar. When word finally arrived on 12

December, Major Impellitteri and his light armored

reconnaissance company were told to remain in place

to execute the movement into the city, augmented by

Lieutenant Lennon and Task Force Sledgehammer

from BLT 3/6. Captain Whitmer and Company B

subsequently flew back to FOB Rhino that same day,

riding on board CH-53s. Departing before sunrise the

following day, Colonel Bourne led the small command

element, force reconnaissance detachment, and

antiarmor platoon back to the forward operating base.

This time, rather than conduct another cross-country

trip, they took the highway west through Lashkar Gah,

then south toward Saffar Kalay, and finally east across

30 miles of desert to reach FOB Rhino just after

sunset on 13 December.

169

Interdiction Operations

171

Chapter 10

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Securing the Kabul Embassy

The American embassy in Kabul had

closed on 30 January 1989 due to

growing security concerns following

the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Confronted by the imminent fall of Kandahar,

demise of the Taliban, and establishment of a

democracy in Afghanistan 12 years later, State

Department officials began hasty plans for

reopening the diplomatic compound and

normalizing relations with Hamid Karzai’s fledgling

administration. On 6 December, Army Lieutenant

General Paul Mikolashek, the theater’s land

component commander, warned Task Force 58 to

prepare to assist that effort.* A day later, General

Franks issued Fragmentary Order 02-027, formally

directing the Marines to support the State

Department’s mission to Kabul.1 While U.S. Marine

Forces Central Command immediately requested

support from the resurrected 4th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism), Task Force

58 prepared to deploy an interim force to secure the

embassy compound and reinforce a survey team

then heading to Kabul. Meanwhile, Colonel John F.

Mulholland, USA, commander of Task Force

Dagger, had entered Afghanistan following the

surrender of Kandahar. One of his first missions

was to assist Department of State personnel in

evaluating conditions at the U.S. embassy and

estimating when they could reopen the facility. Two

special forces teams, Operational Detachments

Alpha 550 and 575, escorted the survey team.2

On board the USS Bataan, the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (26th MEU) convened a crisis

action team around 0800 on 8 December after

receiving a fragmentary order** to reinforce the

American embassy.3 They quickly decided to send

Captain James P. McDonough III with a reinforced

platoon from Battery K, 10th Marines, to secure the

compound and explosive ordinance personnel from

MEU Service Support Group 26 (MSSG 26) to

sweep the buildings of mines and ordnance.4 On

one hand, this plan made sense because the battery

had worked with Department of State personnel

during the embassy reinforcement portion of their

predeployment training (the special operations

capable qualification exercise), and the Marines had

received instruction in the use of nonlethal force.

On the other hand, however, First Lieutenant

Stephen Grimm, the battery’s executive officer, and

half the Marines were already serving as provisional

infantry in Shamsi, Pakistan, where they had

assumed responsibility for guarding the airfield at

Forward Operating Base Impala on 4 December.

Adding a second mission would eliminate the

battery’s ability to provide artillery support to the

forces ashore at Forward Operating Base Rhino

(FOB Rhino).5

On board the USS Whidbey Island later that

morning, a page over the ship’s loudspeaker called

Captain McDonough to the tactical logistics center

where the expeditionary unit’s staff informed him

by radio of the impending mission. Approximately

15 minutes later, he summoned the battery’s officers

and staff noncommissioned officers to the center

and told them to begin preparations for their

immediate departure for Kabul. Two hours later,

while Lieutenant Charles J. Blume, the acting

*VAdm Moore had consented to allow the land component command to employ maritime forces ashore to secure the U.S. embassy in Kabul on 7Nov01.

(TF 58 Informal Chronology, 2)

**The Twenty-Sixth MEU Kabul Embassy Reinforcement History indicates that a fragmentary order for the mission was received on 7Dec01, but it does not

identify the sender or recipient.
executive officer, and senior enlisted personnel

continued to ready the battery for movement,

McDonough and First Lieutenant Eric V. Orient, his

fire direction officer, headed to the Bataan on board

a small boat for the confirmation brief. Although

McDonough remained behind to continue planning,

Orient returned to the Whidbey Island three hours

later with 22 members of the battery. By the time

McDonough rejoined his battery at around 2200

that evening, his Marines were ready to go.6

Arriving by air-cushioned landing craft from

three different vessels, the Marine security force

assembled in Pasni, Pakistan, late that evening.7

McDonough had identified specific force requirements—based on lessons learned during the

predeployment training exercise at Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina—but these were limited by another

externally imposed force cap.8 He planned to bring

20 others in addition to the battery’s approximately

67 personnel, including six explosive ordnance

disposal technicians, four scout snipers, three signals

intelligence specialists, two human intelligence

exploitation specialists, two radio operators, one

public affairs specialist, one linguist, and one

corpsman. Major Ray White, the senior Marine on the

expedition, served as 26th MEU’s liaison officer and

forward air controller. Although McDonough left 15

Marines behind to service equipment, they joined the

rest of the battery ashore approximately a week later

to reinforce the security detachment in preparation

for the opening ceremony at the embassy.9

Once ashore, Battery K drove to Pasni airfield

in five-ton trucks and then caught some welldeserved sleep on the floor of a concrete hangar.

After the staff noncommissioned officers sounded

reveille on the morning of 9 December, the battery’s

sergeants got to work building a detailed terrain

model of the American embassy in Kabul. When

they were finished, Captain McDonough and

Lieutenant Orient briefed the plan, focusing on the

elements that they expected to remain unchanged.

Orient emphasized, “No matter what happens,

EOD [explosive ordinance disposal] sweeps the

building, snipers get on the roof, and the squads set

up 360 degree security.”10 An hour later, after

receiving the operations order, the Marines ran

machine gun drills, conducted squad attacks, and

practiced room-clearing procedures. At that time,

the expeditionary unit recalled four of the six

explosive ordnance disposal technicians back to the

ship to support an impending occupation of

Kandahar airport.11

That afternoon, Battery K boarded three Air

Force C-130 transports and headed toward Bagram

Air Base.12 American and British special operations

forces and a small contingent of soldiers from the

U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division were working

in the area, and Air Force personnel had recently

opened the airfield to Coalition aircraft.13 After

arriving around 1800 that evening, the Marines were

introduced to a U.S. Army brigadier general in

charge of Task Force Bagram and then passed an

uneventful evening in a vacant hanger.14

Waking early the morning of 10 December,

Captain McDonough and the first two of three

squads loaded their gear onto a small truck and

boarded three “colorful, old Mercedes-Benz busses

with the curtains drawn for security.”15 Around 0600,

after Lieutenant Orient and Marines traveling on one

of the “Muppet vans” repaired an inopportune flat

tire and then push-started their vehicle, the convoy

began the 20-mile trip to Kabul. Although Task

Force Bagram considered the environment

permissive, Captain McDonough cautiously

delivered a convoy order that contained immediate

action drills in case they were attacked. His

apprehension was not eased when the special forces

escorts decided to take an alternate route not shown

on his map.16

The first load of Marines reached the embassy

around 0730, while the second, led by Lieutenant

Blume, arrived that afternoon.17 Although the local

Afghans initially showed little interest in their arrival,

Captain McDonough commented that the press had

known they were coming: the Chicago Tribune had

published a story about the Marines’ mission before

they went ashore, and Stars and Stripes reporters had

172

FROM THE SEA
preceded them at the embassy.18 The Marines quickly

established perimeter security around the compound,

emplacing automatic weapons and positioning

snipers on the four corners of the embassy building,

hardening defensive positions, laying concertina wire,

and linking the posts with phone lines.19

Master Sergeant Kelly and Staff Sergeant Cline,

the explosive ordnance disposal technicians from

MSSG 26, also began to sweep the 34-year-old

concrete, brick, and marble structure for booby traps

and unexploded ordnance.20 They inspected all of

the rooms, buildings, and even the sewer system

beneath the embassy; destroyed weapons; and

disposed of 750 ordnance items and 8,000 rounds

of ammunition.21 Frustratingly, the unexpected recall

of the four other technicians back in Pasni had

reduced manpower and extended the clearing

operations from 12 to 96 hours.22

Most of the battery took up residence inside the

embassy, the exception being four snipers who lived

on the roof but slept inside during the day. The

effects of time were evident:23 thick black dust

covered the buildings, water and electricity were

nonexistent, and anti-American protestors had

vandalized the premises. Vandals had removed the

national seal from the embassy entrance, burned the

guardhouse, shattered windows and doors, and fired

weapons indiscriminately through the buildings.24

Fortunately, the battery brought its own generators

and floodlights and was able to rewire the building

from 220 to 100 volts. Living without water in a

confined urban setting was more of a problem, and

the Marines had to establish heads in the compound

and do their own washing.25

In other ways, the offices remained untouched

and the passage of time seemed almost immaterial.

Although the State Department had vacated the

facility in 1989, approximately 45 foreign nationals

continued to work full time to secure the compound

during the Americans’ absence. “A State Department

flag was left standing in the ambassador’s office [and]

official papers and correspondence lie scattered on

173

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Photo by Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal

From within a sandbagged position atop the U.S. embassy building in Kabul, Afghanistan, Marine sniper Sgt John R. Crandall observes

the surrounding area for hostile activity and provides security for State Department personnel.
his desktop,”26 wrote Marine combat correspondent

Sergeant Andrew D. Pomykal. The special forces

soldiers noticed a “Super Bowl 1979” poster tacked to

the wall, copies of the old embassy phone directory

in desk drawers, and a fleet of well-preserved 1979

Volkswagen Jettas in the basement garage.27 Captain

McDonough recalled the standard Marine uniform

prints on the walls, old Sports Illustrated magazines

on the tables, and comments written on the Marine

security guard detachment’s desktop day planners.28

An entry for 30 January 1989, the day the security

detachment had planned to leave the embassy, read,

“History is made. We leave now. O.K. Ta ta.” On 31

January, the day the Marines actually departed,

someone had penned, “One more time”29 and “Hello

new detachment! From the old detachment.”30 Even

more sobering, they found a flag and letter that

Gunnery Sergeant James M. Blake had left for his

successor. Dated 31 January 1989, it read,

Marines: This was the last flag that flew over

the Charges d’Affaires’ residence prior to the

evacuation on 31 Jan 1989. It was taken down

and brought to the chancery by Cpl Johnny P.

Smith on 30 Jan 1989. Take care of it. For those

of us that were here it means a lot; for those of

you yet to enter Kabul it could mean a lot to

you to. Semper Fi. We Kabul Marines (12 July

88–31 Jan 89) endured as I’m sure you will.

Think of us as often as needed.31

By 12 December, the Marines had established a

sound defense and posted an interior guard. The

squad leaders—Sergeants Brenton T. Conover, Grady

L. Richardson, and Norman Perkins—organized a

three-phase watch rotation based on a six-hour tour

of duty. While one squad stood watch, a second

served as a quick reaction force, and the third took

care of personal needs or slept. When the shifts

changed, the new squad leader reported to the watch

officer in the battery’s combat operations center and

then proceeded to carry out his duties as sergeant of

the guard. The battery also maintained a one-man

logistics liaison cell in Bagram, alternately filled by

First Sergeant James L. Dalgarn and Staff Sergeants

William H. Kelly and William P. Gehrean III.32

The Marines remained armed and alert, wearing

helmets and flak jackets while on post. Corporal

Boodaghian, one of three interpreters who had been

helping to provide medical treatment to wounded

Afghans on board the Bataan and Peleliu only days

earlier, now bridged the gap between Battery K and

the residents of Kabul.33 Although the guards were

never targeted, the night of 15 December was

particularly nerve wracking, as local Afghans shot a

variety of different sized weapons into the air to

celebrate the end of Ramadan.34 Captain McDonough

reflected that the guards sometimes felt like “animals

in a zoo”—the Marines watching the Afghans, and the

Afghans watching the Marines. They enjoyed working

with the ever-helpful Northern Alliance, however, as

well as with the foreign national guards, once they

learned to trust each other. They also got along with

the diplomatic security forces, who were often former

Marines themselves. The Marines’ relationship with

the Foreign Service personnel was less predictable,

however. Some of the embassy staff made an effort to

be gracious and polite, while others simply ignored the

Marines’ presence. Regardless of the social climate,

the Marines endeavored to persevere. As Sergeant

David J. Wood remarked, "I think that this war, the

war on terrorism, is the first war since World War II

that truly is America's War. I am very proud to be here,

to represent my country, and to represent the people

in New York who paid so very much. We all share

their pain, and we're here for them.”35

The media remained a constant distraction and

were the biggest problem faced by the Marines. They

approached the guards repeatedly throughout the

day, asking for additional information, until the

Marines established a set time for releasing daily

updates to the press. Although a public affairs

sergeant and State Department media representative

helped McDonough handle the media, he added that

they were part of the establishment themselves and

had their own agendas to pursue. He recalled the

State Department representative occasionally

granting access to guests without notifying the

Marines in advance, and he reflected that a definitive

media plan would have been a big help.36

174

FROM THE SEA
State Department personnel held a ceremonial

reopening of the American embassy in Kabul on 17

December. James F. Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy

to Afghanistan, presided over the brief event that

was attended by more than 400 guests and media

representatives.37 In support of the event, Master

Sergeant Kelly and Staff Sergeant Kline screened

approximately 200 media personnel.38 A number of

government and military dignitaries were on hand,

including Karzai and his cabinet; General Fahim,

commander of the Northern Alliance; Colonel

Mulholland, head of Task Force Dagger; and several

German, British, and Spanish diplomats.39

Speaking to 26th MEU’s public affairs officer

prior to the event, Colonel Andrew Frick explained

the significance of the flag raising to Marines:

Unfortunately, when an embassy shuts down,

the Marine security guards and the U.S. ambassador are always among the last to leave because

they have the responsibility to lower the

American flag from sovereign U.S. soil before

the ambassador leaves. I think that it's only

fitting that the Marines, “America's 9-1-1 force,”

who arrived in this theater poised and ready to

support not only the assembled task force, but

also the U.S. Central Command and the will of

America, be the ones to stand with the new U.S.

ambassador as he raises the flag over sovereign

American soil. It is a fitting and poignant

moment and we're happy to be a part of it.40

As “first call” sounded, Lieutenant Orient

assumed the adjutant’s traditional post and called the

command to attention. Staff Sergeant Jon C.

Eatmon, bearing the Marine Corps colors, then

marched the four-man color guard down the front

steps of the embassy building, where they rested the

old American flag and Gunnery Sergeant Blake’s

letter on an easel for viewers to see. Members of the

color guard included Sergeant Vernon H. Pitts,

Corporal Christopher P. Broussard, and Lance

Corporals Daniel T. Dalin and David Vega.41 With

“The Star Spangled Banner” playing in the

background, the artillerymen then raised a new

American flag that Orient had carried to Kabul in his

pack.42 Dobbins read a portion of Blake’s letter and

remarked to the crowd, “The U.S. returns as part of

an international coalition committed to rooting out

terrorism and those who support it and assisting in

the reconstruction of Afghanistan.”43 At the end of

the ceremony, Mulholland, as the senior American

military officer present, remarked on the honor it had

been to fight alongside his Afghan comrades.

Yet the flag raised by the Marines during the

ceremony was not the first to fly over the embassy

since 1989. A week earlier, on 10 December 2001,

Colonel Mulholland had “assembled the survey

group and the A-teams in the crisp predawn air in

front of the embassy for a brief ceremony before

the U.S. Marines arrived to assume their traditional

mission.”44 Standing at attention, the soldiers saluted

as the 5th Special Forces Group’s battle pennant was

raised over the embassy grounds. Then they

observed a moment of silence for fallen comrades,

listened to a heartfelt eulogy delivered by the leader

of Task Force Dagger, and observed a final moment

175

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Photo by LtCol Jerome M. Lynes

A Marine color guard from Battery K, Battalion Landing

Team 3/6, raises the American flag during a ceremonial

reopening of the U.S. embassy in Kabul on 17 December 2001.
of silence for fallen comrades.45 Mulholland spoke

once again and then the flag was lowered so the

Marines could later raise the official embassy flag.46

The Marines continued to provide security at

the American embassy until the end of the month,

breaking up the monotony of guard duty as best

they could. Within days of arriving, they had learned

of an inbound advance party from 4th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade, which was tentatively

scheduled to take over the security mission by midDecember. This fit well with other rumors

suggesting that Battery K might support ongoing

operations in the nearby mountains of Tora Bora.

Yet the advance party’s arrival was delayed several

weeks and the possibility of combat action began to

wane as the Christmas holiday approached.47

Inauguration of the new Afghan government on

22 December was also cause for excitement. Before

the ceremony, General Franks’s pilot had dodged a

rocket-propelled grenade fired at the aircraft as he

descended toward a helicopter landing zone adjacent

to the embassy grounds. Following the historic

ceremony, which one of the Marine officers

characterized as “three hours of people talking in a

language I didn’t understand,” the head of Central

Command spoke to the Marines. He assured them that

they were making a difference and that America would

win its war against terrorism. In return, the Marines

gave Franks a flag that had flown over the embassy.48

Occupying Kandahar Airport

Task Force 58 had been considering the

feasibility of seizing Kandahar International Airport

since mid-November. As early as 10 December, staff

planners had been busy finalizing the concept of

operations, and by 11 December, Central Command

had issued a warning order directing them to

coordinate with local anti-Taliban forces and secure

the facility to prepare for the introduction of followon forces and humanitarian assets into southern

Afghanistan.49 Although Colonel Frick and the 26th

MEU would occupy the airport as originally

planned, the situation had evolved so rapidly that

General Mattis directed Colonel Waldhauser and the

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) to

execute the initial seizure instead.50

While Battalion Landing Team 1/1’s (BLT

1/1’s) interdiction force awaited further orders at

patrol base Pentagon on 12 December, Major

Impellitteri learned of the evolving plan to seize

Kandahar airfield and was ordered to FOB Rhino.

After arriving by helicopter, he headed to the 15th

MEU’s combat operations center, where Lieutenant

Colonel Gregg Olson, the unit’s operations officer,

and others briefed him on the developing situation.

They explained that although Lieutenant Colonel

Bourne would be returning to Rhino with the

remainder of the interdiction force, Impellitteri was

going to lead a mobile assault convoy to secure the

airfield for follow-on forces. In addition to his own

light armored reconnaissance company, he would

link up with a special forces detachment and Task

Force Sledgehammer, which contributed 6

additional light armored and 14 antiarmor vehicles

from the 26th MEU, to the convoy.51 Lieutenant

Lennon learned of the mission the same day, while

engaged in interdiction operations west of FOB

Rhino with Task Force 64.52

Planners had identified two ways to reach the

airport, approximately 12 miles southeast of

Kandahar. The main route passed east through the

built-up area on Highway 1 before turning south onto

Highway 4 toward the border city of Spin Boldak.

Because the tactical situation in Kandahar remained

uncertain, however, they decided it would be safer to

take a longer, less prominent secondary road that

skirted the city. After delivery of the confirmation

brief, Major Impellitteri flew back to the patrol base

to ready his Marines for the movement.53

He returned to Pentagon with a 12-man

detachment from Task Force Dagger (call sign

“Python”). The soldiers who had recently replaced the

Texas 12 team following the errant bomb strike outside

Kandahar a week earlier (see chapter 8) were now

working with Hamid Karzai and would facilitate

coordination between the Marine and Afghan forces.54

Gunnery Sergeant Edgar L. Marts, an explosive

176

FROM THE SEA
ordnance technician from MSSG 26, also accompanied

Impellitteri on the return flight. Arriving at Highway

1, Marts immediately linked up with technicians from

the 15th MEU, and they began discussing plans for

clearing Kandahar airport of munitions.55

Meanwhile, preceded by the deployment of his

forward control element, Colonel Frick arrived with

26th MEU’s tactical command post on 12 December

and began flowing the remainder of his forces into

FOB Rhino to support the occupation of Kandahar

airfield and establishment of a second forward

operating base.56 Although the force cap had

precluded the wholesale deployment of Frick’s unit

into Afghanistan, he was able to facilitate the rapid

expansion of Task Force 58’s combat power by

staging as many forces ashore in Pakistan as possible

once the restriction diminished.

Later that evening, General Mattis flew to

Kandahar to coordinate the impending operation

with opposition leaders Hamid Karzai and Gul Agha

Sharzai and their special forces counterparts.

Traveling on board three Air Force special operations

MH-53J helicopters, he was accompanied by Colonel

Olson, 15th MEU’s operations officer; Lieutenant

Colonel Garry R. Oles, 26th MEU’s executive officer;

Captain Robert Harward, USN, commander of Task

Force K-Bar; and an assortment of other interested

parties. The aircraft descended into a compound on

the outskirts of the city, unfortunately injuring a

British soldier when mistakenly landing atop a Land

Rover. While the soldier was immediately evacuated

for medical treatment, the travelers boarded vehicles

and drove quietly through darkened city streets to

Mullah Omar’s former residence. Colonel Olson

likened the compound to a motel with many small

rooms surrounding a courtyard.57

For approximately an hour before the meeting

began, General Mattis and his staff conversed with

Task Force Dagger personnel who had worked with

Karzai and Sharzai. After the Afghan commanders

arrived around 2230, the principal leaders discussed

the operation beneath the white light of a Coleman

lantern. The remainder of the special forces and

Marine staff officers stood on the veranda and

listened to the exchange through a window.*

Mattis later had the following thoughts on the

meeting:

There were tough hombres in that room.... I still

remember one guy talking about being tortured

and hearing the screams of the women being

tortured in the prison in Kandahar where he’d

been held for a year. The old man looked to be

about 90; I was told he was 40. We found that

even though we didn’t speak the same

language... we had... very much a common

cause, and that was to see how many Taliban and

Afghan al-Qaeda we could hunt down and kill.58

Watching the exchange as an observer, Colonel

Olson added his perspective of the meeting:

Karzai’s English was exceptional. He was a tall

guy, really bore himself quite well, although he

dressed in the same thing that everybody else

was in, a kind of Afghan blanket around his

177

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Photo by MSgt Arturo A. Prioletta

Gul Agha Shirzai, left, the governor of Kandahar, and his

interpreter at Kandahar airport.

*According to LtCol Olson, the principals included BGen Mattis, Karzai and Sharzai, two colonels, a special forces lieutenant colonel, and an interpreter.

(Olson intvw, 34)
shoulders. Significantly, he was not armed; most

of the folks traveling with him were. Sharzai

was shorter, [spoke] hardly any English. Karzai

would translate for Sharzai, and Sharzai would

nod in assent of pretty much everything that

Karzai said.... [Karzai] was extremely

gentlemanly, very decisive.... He was polite, but

very direct about what would pose the least

threat to U.S. forces and how to best

accomplish [the mission] with the least

likelihood of bumping into somebody by

accident and having a fight that we didn’t need

to have.... Sharzai, on the other hand, seemed

to be more military... oriented... a lot less

polished on the exterior than Karzai.59

This was General Mattis’s first encounter with

the new Afghan president, and Karzai was happy to

meet with the delegation from FOB Rhino. The

main issue was when and where the convoy would

pass through Kandahar. As Mattis later recalled,

The basic points were Karzai wanted to come

in during daytime, make a triumphant entry

through the city; we wanted to go at night and

go around the city and seize the airfield. And

once we built up combat power, about 10 miles

outside of town, then move against Kandahar

itself and the environs around it. Karzai agreed

with me and we had a very good talk.60

The Americans coordinated the routes,

timelines, link-up points, recognition signals, and

convoy procedures that they would use during the

movement and subsequent occupation of Kandahar

airport. The Afghans described where minefields

were located around the city, what infrastructure was

available at the airfield, and which buildings were

booby trapped. Those present agreed that the

Afghans would team up with the Marines. When the

Americans inquired about the number of Marines

that the Afghans would allow to operate from the

airport—because this seemed to be a constant

concern at higher headquarters—the local leaders

encouraged a large Coalition presence in the region.61

Before leaving Kandahar, General Mattis spoke

privately with Karzai in the remains of Mullah

Omar’s garden. When the general apologized for any

problems that his earlier statement to the media

about Marines owning a piece of Afghanistan might

have caused the future president, Karzai replied, “Oh

no, when I read that in my electronic version of the

New York Times... I went out and told my people,

‘We won, the Marines own southern Afghanistan.’”62

Karzai also confided, “Twice my country has needed

you—first against the Soviets and now against the

terrorists; both times you were there.”63

The Marines boarded the MH-53J helicopters

and returned to FOB Rhino late that evening.64 After

landing, they conducted a debrief and finalized their

plan. Senior leaders warned their subordinates of

possible dangers in Kandahar, including snipers and

suicide bombers. Colonel Frick advised that since it

was near the end of Ramadan, the Marines should

expect fireworks and to make sure the fire was

directed at them before returning it.65 General Mattis

explained that although half the men on the streets of

Kandahar may be armed, that did not necessarily

make them enemies: “A person on the road with a

weapon is not hostile. A person on the road with a

weapon who is shooting at you is hostile.... If it’s just

some young Taliban, take his gun, send him home,

and tell him the war’s over.”66 Afterward, the staff

transmitted highlights from the meetings and a

fragmentary order for the following day to Major

Impellitteri, then situated 90 miles north at patrol base

Pentagon. It described the link-up plan, specified

which special forces team he would meet west of the

city, and provided the recognition signals necessary

to pass through the opposition force’s roadblocks.67

The assault force gradually assembled near patrol

base Pentagon, located approximately 800 meters

south of Highway 1 and 40 miles west of Kandahar,

on 13 December.68 Task Force Sledgehammer was the

first to arrive after executing an en route resupply and

completing a 160-mile movement through Lashkar

Gah.69 General Mattis flew in shortly thereafter by

helicopter, accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant

Warren Cook. As evening approached, the Marines

linked up with soldiers from Texas 17, the special

forces detachment that had been working with

Sharzai’s opposition forces south of the city.70

178

FROM THE SEA
The Python team leader approached Major

Impellitteri with bad news. Texas 17 had reconnoitered the planned route and discovered that it was

littered with Soviet-era mines and unsafe to travel.

Impellitteri hastily reassembled his subordinate

leaders and told them during a 45-minute briefing

(only hours before departing) that they would now

be traveling directly through the city.71 After briefing

the new plan, he added a note of caution: “Look

guys, the only thing you can do to stop Johnny

Taliban that comes from around the corner with a

[rocket-propelled grenade] is to be vigilant, see him

first, and pull the trigger before he does.”72

Around 0300 in the morning, after Task Force

K-Bar had completed its reconnaissance of the

proposed route, 44 vehicles comprising the mobile

raid force pulled onto Highway 1 and began their

three-hour, 25-mile trip to the airport.73 Overhead,

surveillance aircraft monitored the route and

provided the convoy with advance warning of

potential danger areas, confirming the identity of

possible threats through the Afghan authorities.74

Several AH-1W Cobras and AV-8B Harriers from the

Bataan and other Coalition aircraft were also on

hand to provide immediate close air support if the

situation turned sour.75 Back at FOB Rhino, Major

James B. Higgins, 15th MEU’s intelligence officer,

explained the basic tactical concept to anxious

reporters: “Keep the convoy moving. We have

mobility on our side. We have firepower on our side.

We’ve got to keep the momentum going.”76 In

Kuwait, General Mikolashek and his land component

staff watched the operation unfold by a real-time

video feed from an unmanned Predator aircraft.77

The convoy slowed once it reached the city’s

limits. Guided by the Afghan fighters and special

forces, the Marines maneuvered around bomb

craters, over rubble, among burned out cars, and

through checkpoints. Sergeant Joseph Chenelly, a

combat correspondent accompanying the convoy,

later described the night passage:

A distinct aroma of Afghan cooking drifted past

the vigilant Marines who sat atop the vehicles

179

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Associated Press

On 12 December 2001, Col Thomas D. Waldhauser, commander of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (center, left), and LtCol

Gregg P. Olson, his operations officer, brief members of Task Force 58 on the plan to occupy Kandahar International Airport.
carefully watching for any sign of trouble.

Flashing neon signs lit their stern faces. A frigid

wind nipped at any exposed skin, swelling bare

fingers wrapped around their M16s.... The

Kandaharis who bothered to look up from the

fires in their yards and alongside the roads waved

their guns in the most cordial way possible. Shouts

of “welcome Americans” were heard from

crowds gathering on the corners.... Anti-Taliban

forces manned intersections waving the Marines

through. The American service members

exchanged salutes with the militias that flushed

out the terrorist organizations just days earlier.78

Noting that it was “the most eerie movement”

he had ever conducted, Major Impellitteri later

recalled that

it was zero illumination that night, Kandahar was

not very well lit, and everywhere you looked on

every side of the street, everybody was armed...

AK-47, AK-74, RPG [rocket-propelled grenade],

RPK [soviet light machine gun].... Not once did

anybody ever raise a rifle or point it at us... they

were Sharzai and Karzai’s guys. They had

established a curfew and nobody was allowed to

be carrying a weapon that was not part of the

“local police force.” But, how do you tell the

difference between these guys [and the Taliban]?

You can’t, so you’re pretty much on your toes the

whole time.79

The Marines eventually exited from the eastern

side of the city and headed south. Even after their

arrival at the airfield, the situation remained

tenuous—there was no illumination, the facility

contained numerous buildings, and Soviet-era mines

blanketed the surrounding countryside. Major

Impellitteri quickly linked up with the other half of

Texas 17 and began coordinating with the team’s

leader. He provided a rough sketch map of the area,

identifying known minefields, and advised which

locations the Marines should avoid. Impellitteri

adjusted his plan according to the mine threat,

deciding that although he would retain the same

basic configuration, he would not push his forces as

far forward as he had initially intended.80

180

FROM THE SEA

Associated Press

A U.S. Marine infantryman sits atop a humvee (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) at the American military compound

at Kandahar International Airport.Note the call sign “Texas 17” adorning the air control tower.
After Major Impellitteri briefed the new scheme

to his subordinate leaders, they occupied their

assigned positions, forming a defensive perimeter

around the airfield. As the sun began to rise,

Impellitteri passed the radio codeword indicating

that the Marines had secured Kandahar airport.81

Before departing, members of the special forces

detachment had painted “Texas 17” in bold letters

on the airport’s control tower so that subsequent

media images of the Marine base would discreetly

reveal the radio call sign of the Green Berets who

had fought their way north into Kandahar alongside

Sharzai’s anti-Taliban militia.

Major Wesley L. Feight and Marines from

Company I, Battalion Landing Team 3/6 (BLT 3/6),

landed on the eastern portion of the airfield around

0600, accompanied by First Lieutenant Kraig M.

Rauen and a squad of combat engineers from

MSSG 26.82 They arrived on three CH-53s, escorted

by two AH-1Ws, all from Lieutenant Colonel Kevin

DeVore’s “Blue Knights” (Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 365 [HMM-365]).83 Although

the helicopters had drawn ineffective small arms fire

while passing over their ingress point, the

reinforcements reached Kandahar unscathed.84

When Feight emerged from the aircraft and

approached Major Impellitteri, the men recognized

each other, as they had attended The Basic School

and Infantry Officer’s Course in Quantico, Virginia,

together as young second lieutenants.85

Lieutenant Colonel Jerome Lynes soon arrived

with BLT 3/6’s foot mobile jump command post,

flying on two CH-53s, escorted by two AH-1Ws, all

from Lieutenant Colonel James LaVine’s “Ridge

Runners” (Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

163 [HMM-163]).86 Once on the ground, he

assumed tactical command of the airfield

occupation, including operational control over

Major Impellitteri’s light armored reconnaissance

company and Task Force Sledgehammer. Lynes

181

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011230-N-2383B-503

At a forward operating base in Kandahar, a U.S. Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter of Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 365 (HMM-365) is "hot fueled," the act of refueling a helicopter while the engine is still running.
quickly arranged the initial defensive posture at

Kandahar by integrating the air and ground

maneuver elements in a perimeter around the

runway, receiving and positioning follow-on forces

and establishing communications between all U.S.

forces at the airfield and with higher headquarters at

FOB Rhino.87

Reinforcements arriving on the first waves of

aircraft into Kandahar also included a variety of

service support personnel: emergency medicine

physicians, an arrival-departure control group, and

four additional explosive ordnance disposal teams

from MSSG 26. Around 0730, the technicians began

operations to clear the main terminal building and a

narrow, 100-meter-wide strip of runway of

explosive hazards, preparing the way for the arrival

of follow-on forces from the 26th MEU.88 Back at

FOB Rhino, Major Christopher W. Hughes, Task

Force 58’s public affairs officer, made a point of

emphasizing to anxious media representatives that

they were there to return the country to the Afghan

people and were not a conquering army.89

On the same day Marines secured the airfield,

Steven L. Meyers, a reporter for the New York Times,

cited anonymous Pentagon officials who claimed to

have already begun plans for the deployment of

Army troops to guard FOB Rhino as the Marines

relocated most of their combat forces to Kandahar.

He summarized the subtle change in the Marine’s

mission:

The largest American ground force has now

shifted its focus from pressuring the Taliban’s

last political and military stronghold to

continuing the search for the Taliban’s leader,

Mullah Muhammad Omar, and helping to

restore civil order with the fledgling government there. Every Marine unit on patrol now

carries photographs of the most wanted.90

Meanwhile, the maritime special purpose force

from BLT 3/6 had deployed to the USS Shreveport.

Led by First Lieutenant Serge P. Morosoff, the

“Mike Platoon” was composed of fire teams drawn

from each of the battalion’s nine organic rifle

platoons, augmented by more experienced Marines

to fill leadership billets at the squad and platoon

182

FROM THE SEA

Official Marine Corps photo

LtCol Jerome M. Lynes, left, commander of Battalion Landing Team 3/6, and Capt Daniel Q. Greenwood, his operations officer,

discuss the placement of forces while establishing a defensive perimeter around Kandahar International Airport.
levels, and assigned to Headquarters and Service

Company. On 14 December, the same day Task

Force 58 seized Kandahar International Airport, the

special purpose force provided security for SEAL

Team 8 during a maritime interdiction operation,

where they were likely searching for fleeing Taliban

and al-Qaeda forces. After being relieved of this

mission near the end of the month, the platoon

would rejoin its battalion in Kandahar.91

Sensitive Site Exploitation: Tarnak

Farms and Dewalak

In anticipation of the Taliban’s impending

defeat at Kandahar, some special operations forces

began to shift their focus toward the identification

and elimination of future terrorist threats. General

Franks issued Fragmentary Order 02-023 on 2

December, alerting his component commands to

the need for gathering human intelligence and

assessing the potential for chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear weapons of mass

destruction. General Mikolashek subsequently

issued a directive for the planning of human

intelligence gathering operations the following day.

A week later, on 10 December, Franks issued

another planning order for the exploitation of

information from abandoned al-Qaeda and Taliban

camps. Mikolashek again followed this the next day

with Fragmentary Order 02-006 to Operations

Order 02-12, directing Coalition forces to begin

conducting special reconnaissance against sensitive

sites in the operations area. For its part, Task Force

58 was to support the exploitation of suspected

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear targets

near Kandahar.92

On 13 December, General Mikolashek directed

Task Force 58 to coordinate the assessment near

Dewalak, one of eight farming hamlets located

southwest of Lashkar Gah along a tributary of the

Helmand River.93 Intelligence analysts suspected that

183

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

Photo by Spec Patrick Tharpe, USA. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040319-A-6414T-020

Soldiers from the Romanian Army's 280th Infantry Battalion conduct a live fire exercise at Tarnak Farms Range near Kandahar

airport, Afghanistan. These soldiers trained at this range to familiarize themselves with their weapons in preparation for future

operations for Operation Enduring Freedom.
terrorists might have cached weapons of mass

destruction or chemical and biological research

materials in the area. This belief was likely

strengthened by the presence of a uranium mine

located approximately 20 miles south of the village

cluster. Given the potential presence of chemical

and biological materials, Central Command flew a

chemical biological intelligence support team into

FOB Rhino to assist with the search.94

On the night of the team’s arrival, Task Force

58 learned of another large site located only four

miles south of Kandahar airport.95 Engineers had

created this agricultural area—known as Tarnak

Farms—around 1960 by diverting water from the

Tarnak River to irrigate surrounding fields.

Following the Soviets’ arrival in 1979, the area was

turned into a military training base successively

occupied by the Afghan National Army, mujahideen,

Taliban and al-Qaeda, and now Coalition forces.96

The location was already familiar to some American

military and intelligence organizations, as President

William J. Clinton had launched cruise missiles at the

site in 1998 and Osama bin Laden had taped

portions of his notorious recruitment video at the

camp in 2001.97

Elements of the inspection support team

immediately left FOB Rhino and spent the next

several days exploring the camp, which contained

approximately 75 small buildings surrounded by a

10-foot wall constructed of mud brick and heavily

damaged by more than two decades of fighting.98

Weapons and information discovered on the day

Task Force 58 occupied the airport included 89

Aphid missiles, a Stinger missile tube, training

documents, and personal computers containing emails.99 Two days later, while traveling to meet with

American troops in Bagram, Secretary Rumsfeld

acknowledged that Tarnak Farms was one of 25 or

30 sensitive sites that the Coalition had “been

systematically reviewing” and told reporters that

searchers had “gathered up a good deal of material

and documentation and items to be tested for

chemical, biological, and radiation.”100

While the inspection team focused on Tarnak

Farms, Marines at FOB Rhino continued to plan for

their impending mission to Dewalak. Acknowledging the force reconnaissance platoon’s advance

training and experience in close quarters battle, 15th

MEU built the task force around its maritime special

purpose force, which included additional snipers and

security forces from BLT 1/1.101 Captain Philip J.

Treglia, the force reconnaissance platoon

commander, later recalled the satisfaction he felt

when Colonel Waldhauser pulled him aside and said,

“Phil, you’ve got this mission... whatever you

[need], you have it; you’re the focus.”102

Soldiers from Lieutenant Colonel Gilmore’s

Australian Special Air Service detachment also

played an important role in this mission. On 14

December, after the Australians had spent several

days familiarizing themselves with the expeditionary

unit’s standard operating procedures and

coordinating mission requirements, pilots from

HMM-163 inserted Task Force 64, its vehicles, and

its equipment into the Dewalak region.103 The

following day, as the chemical and biological

intelligence support team concluded operations at

Tarnak Farms, 15th MEU confirmed its plan to

exploit sites near Dewalak and began to consider

follow-on search missions in the region. After

receiving intelligence updates from Task Force 64

on 16 December, the expeditionary unit modified its

plan one final time and prepared to execute the

operation the next day.104

Shortly after sunrise on the morning of 17

December, pilots from HMM-163 inserted the

assault force into a landing zone located near one of

several villages in the objective area.105 It arrived in

four CH-53s, escorted by two AH-1Ws and two

UH-1Ns.106 Fixed-wing aircraft were also on station

overhead in case close air support was required

during the operation. The search force contained

most of the force reconnaissance platoon, several

members of the chemical and biological intelligence

support team, and two interpreters. One of the

interpreters was Lieutenant Colonel Asad A. Kahn,

a member of Central Command’s liaison cell at the

184

FROM THE SEA
185

Occupation and Exploitation Operations

American embassy in Pakistan, with whom Task

Force 58 had already worked on several occasions.107

Captain Treglia brought four fast attack vehicles

to Dewalak, providing enough transportation for the

force to ride between the villages, which were

scattered along a two-mile by five-mile objective

area.108 Although Gunnery Sergeant John Dailey

anticipated that they would be “kicking down doors

and throwing people out on the lawn,” Lieutenant

Colonel Olson described the situation as “uncertain,

but not likely to be unfriendly.”109 He explained,

“We’d had surveillance on the villages. There were

children playing. There were animals being [fed].

There were armed men, but of course there are

armed men everywhere in southern Afghanistan.”

He also added the caveat that although Dewalak may

have gone from “being a very uncertain threat to

being more of a benign environment... that didn’t

mean that we weren’t going to go in there with the

kind of force posture that indicated that we were

there for business.”110

Under the cover of ground security forces,

including fast attack vehicles and helicopter

gunships, Marine and Afghan forces approached the

village compound in a nonthreatening manner and

requested to speak to the village elder. While

conversing with the elder and handing out cigarettes,

candy, pens, pencils, and paper, the Marines

requested permission to conduct an escorted walkthrough of the village compound.111 Regardless of

any preconceived apprehensions, Gunnery Sergeant

Dailey noted that “the bulk of them were friendly

as can be.”112 Throughout the day, crowds of curious

onlookers followed the Marines and watched.113 As

Dailey recalled, “We ended up with... probably 200

to 300... kids, males, and then young men following

us as we trekked probably 8 kilometers through

these villages and stopped to check each one.”114

The children were so interested in the writing

materials that were being handed out that the patrol

ran short and had to request an emergency resupply

from FOB Rhino. Colonel Olson laughed as he

remembered that they rounded up ballpoint pens,

other writing instruments, pads of paper, yellow

sticky notes, bags of rubber bands—all kinds of

office and administrative supplies—and sent them

out in a helicopter-borne resupply. The Marines

distributed the items to the elders, who distributed

them to their people, and they then took a less

aggressive posture. People were happy and waving,

and it certainly diffused tensions.115

Although the Marines methodically inspected

every village, they failed to uncover any contraband

weapons or significant information and finished the

patrol earlier than originally expected.116 Still followed

by a throng of Afghan villagers, they had to direct

the rotor wash of the escort aircraft at the crowd and

encourage them to move back from the landing zone

before they could land the CH-53s and board them

for the return trip to FOB Rhino.117 Colonel Olson

later remarked that their biggest problem was exiting

the landing zone without accidentally landing a

helicopter on top of an eight-year-old Afghan who

simply wanted to see what was going on.118 The

following day, pilots from HMM-163 returned to

Dewalak and extracted Task Force 64.119

187

Establishing a Second Forward

Operating Base

On the evening of 14 December, less

than 24 hours following Task Force

58’s initial seizure of Kandahar

International Airport, elements of the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit’s (26th MEU’s) tactical

command post and MEU Service Support Group

26’s (MSSG 26’s) quartering party arrived at the

airfield.1 After falling in on Battalion Land Team

3/6’s (BLT 3/6’s) jump command post, located in

the terminal building, they commenced a two-week

build-up of combat forces at the forward operating

base.2 Meanwhile, back at Forward Operating Base

Rhino (FOB Rhino), Captain Todd S. Tomko and

Company K had arrived to augment security at the

base and provide a temporary quick reaction force.3

Before the Marines could occupy the airport

facilities in Kandahar or expand outward from the

airfield, they first had to clear the area of myriad

hazardous explosive materials. This was a difficult and

dangerous task, requiring that explosive ordnance

personnel from MSSG 26 search more than 50

buildings consisting of hundreds of individual rooms

as well as all open ground within the battalion’s

security perimeter. They recovered approximately

5,800 ordnance items during the next two and a half

weeks, including landmines; hand grenades; a variety

of shoulder-fired, barrage-type, and aircraft-launched

rockets; and a wide range of ammunition for rifles,

machine guns, antiaircraft cannons, mortars, and

artillery pieces.4 The technicians continued to clear

the area as the operation progressed, in one case

destroying landmines laid along a road used by

Coalition forces, and eventually removed more than

12,000 ordnance items.5

Although Central Command assigned yet

another force cap to Task Force 58, tentatively

limiting the number of Marines and sailors that

General Mattis could send north, he needed all of

the combat forces at his disposal and eventually

chose to ignore the limitation. While the cap was

never formally rescinded, higher headquarters

refrained from mentioning it again, and the 26th

MEU began flowing forces into Kandahar.6 As a

widening range of joint, Coalition, and Marine forces

began to arrive at the airport, the population quickly

rose to 2,700 personnel by the end of December

2001.7 Each of the organizations occupied assigned

administrative space in the terminal, securing their

respective areas with a variety of integrated rooftop

observation posts, blocked passageways, sandbagged

positions, and concrete roadblocks. Outside the

terminal, the infantry maintained positions along the

battalion’s oval-shaped defensive perimeter that

surrounded the airfield. Vaguely marked Soviet

minefields, located southwest of the terminal and

airfield, augmented the defenses but also presented

additional dangers to the Marines.8

The remainder of the forward command

element as well as the Marine air traffic control

Chapter 11

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

SSgt William A. Scott, a member of MEU Service Support

Group 26's Explosive Ordnance Disposal section, prepares to

destroy a Soviet surface-to-air missile at Kandahar

International Airport on 17 January 2002.
squadron mobile team, members of the Air Force

special tactics squadron, two squads of combat

engineers, and a detachment of military police arrived

on 15 December.9 This enhanced the expeditionary

unit’s ability to orchestrate sustained aviation

operations at the airport, clear the area of hazardous

materials, and begin construction of a short-term

detainment facility. The first Marine KC-130 aircraft

landed later that day, after Marines and sailors from

the 26th MEU had completed the onerous task of

clearing the runway of debris. Although small arms

fire had temporarily delayed the aircraft’s arrival,

operations quickly resumed once the Marines realized

the gunfire merely marked the end of Ramadan.10

The 26th MEU’s subordinate commands began

to arrive in earnest on 16 December. Reinforced by

the tail end of Company I and lead elements of

Company K, Lieutenant Colonel Lynes begin

expanding BLT 3/6’s perimeter beyond several

concealed avenues of approach that came alarmingly

near the airport facilities.11 During the next two

weeks, the battalion’s perimeter would eventually

grow to measure 2 kilometers in length, vary from

300 to 800 meters in width, and contain three

distinct battle positions.

The northern position was manned by two

provisional rifle platoons from Captain Jeffrey S.

McCormack’s Headquarters and Service Company,

and a third from Captain Lloyd D. Freeman’s

Company L. Interspersed sections of fast attack and

combined antiarmor vehicles armed with heavy

machine guns from Captain Brian M. Howlett’s

Weapons Company supported them, and a

provisional rifle platoon from Battery K was situated

to their southeast. Major Wesley Feight and Company

I manned the southern battle position, with a section

of 81mm mortars and the combat engineer platoon

occupying the space between it and Battery K to the

east. Captain Tomko and Company K manned the

southwestern battle position, with a second section

of 81mm mortars on its western flank.12

The majority of MSSG 26 personnel reached

Kandahar on 16 December after spending the

previous night transiting through Jacobabad,

Pakistan.13 They brought a variety of equipment

including an MRC-130 radio; expeditionary refueling

system; forward area water purification system;

reverse osmosis water purification unit; and two

floodlights, four pieces of heavy equipment, five

generators, and seven trucks.14 After linking up with

his quartering party, Lieutenant Colonel William M.

Faulkner quickly established a combat service

support operations center, and within 24 hours

MSSG 26 was supporting an increasing number of

Coalition forces at Kandahar. It provided a wide

range of services from its combat service support

area, which was divided into several sections

according to function. These included a water

purification and storage point; bulk fuel storage and

distribution point; supply storage and distribution

point; ammunition holding area; shower facilities;

and workspace for the engineers, medical shock

trauma platoon, and arrival and departure control

group. The engineers also constructed 55 heads and

52 urinals, each with a hand-washing station, which

improved hygiene and morale.15

Task Force 58 suffered its first three casualties

on 16 December, attesting to the fact that securing

the airport and expanding the perimeter was

dangerous business. As Captain Michael D. Bryan

remarked, “The whole place was a huge weapons

cache... there were just tons of munitions

everywhere. Had to be really careful where you

step.”16 He happened to be accompanying a small

detachment of MSSG 26 engineers on that fateful day

as they cleared a building near the end of the runway,

located approximately two miles from the airport

terminal. Although the engineers had visited the site

earlier in the day, they returned briefly to headquarters

to get Bryan’s help in identifying some surface-to-air

munitions they had discovered. Eight Marines from

Battalion Landing Team 1/1’s (BLT 1/1’s) armored

reconnaissance company provided security for the

patrol as well, because they had previously observed

unidentified personnel moving about the area.

The Marines proceeded down a dirt road that

led to the airport building, traveling carefully in a

188

FROM THE SEA
column of twos. It appeared that a vehicle had

recently driven down the road, so they made an

effort to walk within the visible tire tracks. Captain

Bryan remembered that he was on the right hand

side of the path, with Sergeant Feltcher walking

ahead of him and Sergeant Adrian Aranda, Corporal

Christopher T. Chandler, and Lance Corporal

Nicholas J. Sovereign behind him.17 Although

Feltcher and Bryan apparently stepped over the

aging explosive device, Chandler detonated a

landmine at around 1145.18

Captain Bryan recalled that Sergeant Aranda

was the first person they saw after the explosion,

lying on the ground with his left hand bleeding.

Approximately 30 seconds after that, they noticed

Chandler, lying silently under some nearby barbed

wire where he had been blown by the explosion.

Bryan remembered that he was neither talking nor

moving and did not respond to questions until they

had moved to his side—his hearing had been

impaired by the blast. Upon examination, they

realized that Chandler had lost his left foot from the

ankle down and received shrapnel wounds to his

other foot, both thighs, and left hand. Nearby, Lance

Corporal Sovereign was able to function but had

suffered a ruptured eardrum.19

Corporal Chandler remembered that the world

had moved in slow motion. He had first noticed a

puff of black smoke and then his ankle buckled

beneath him. Although he tried to crawl to Sergeant

Aranda, who was then lying face down in the dirt,

Chandler could not get up. Realizing that he had

injured his hand and lost a foot, he then rolled over

and called to the rest of his fire team.20

Uncertain of where the mines were located, the

Marines began to probe the ground and clear a path

to Corporal Chandler’s position, first using pocket

knives and then their K-Bar fighting knives.21 It was

a tedious procedure, taking almost an hour, but they

189

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

A member of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit uses a forklift to move a 500-gallon fuel pod to the forward aerial refueling

point at Kandahar International Airport on 19 January 2002.
eventually reached the wounded Marine and hastily

dragged him and his equipment to safety. They

radioed for a casualty evacuation and, after nearly

another hour, the three casualties flew to FOB

Rhino on board a Huey helicopter from Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (HMM-365) for

triage and medical care.22 Chandler was immediately

flown to the Air Force hospital in Oman, then to

Germany, and finally to Walter Reed hospital in

Washington, DC, for treatment, while Lance

Corporal Sovereign and Sergeant Aranda were

treated in Afghanistan before continuing on to

Oman. When the two less seriously injured Marines

reached FOB Rhino—Sovereign with a bandage on

his hand and Aranda with an intravenous bottle

attached to his arm—they “were met by dozens of

their comrades who stood shoulder to shoulder,

forming a cordon to the warehouse where the

doctors treated the two.”23 After the 26th MEU

opened a small arms range at the southern end of

the runway on New Year’s Day, Colonel Frick

dedicated it to Corporal Chandler during a small

ceremony on 3 January.24 Approximately a year later,

Sergeant Chandler not only became the first activeduty Service member to graduate from the U.S.

Army Basic Airborne Course with a prosthetic limb,

but the class also chose him as their noncommissioned officer honor graduate.25

As the 26th MEU staff transformed their

tactical command post into the organization’s main

headquarters, the remainder of Company K, 2d and

3d Platoon, respectively, reached Kandahar on 17

and 18 December. A squad-sized detachment of

Seabees also arrived on the 17th, while the

expeditionary unit’s maritime special purpose force

and a section of BLT 3/6’s 81mm mortar platoon

arrived on the 18th.26 Like the ground forces, HMM365 gradually increased its presence in Afghanistan

during the Marines’ first week at Kandahar,

190

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

A CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 sits at the end of the runway at Kandahar

International Airport on 18 January 2002. Three AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters are visible in the background, while a

UH-1N Iroquois flies overhead.
eventually reestablishing their headquarters at the

airport and bringing 1 Huey, 3 Super Cobras, 4 Super

Stallions, and 10 Sea Knights.27

A clear sign of the steady progress made by

Task Force 58 and other Coalition forces in

Afghanistan occurred at 1200 on 18 December,

when General Mattis and Colonel Frick presided

over the raising of an American flag* at the airport.28

The brief ceremony, intended to honor the country

and pay tribute to the victims of the 9/11 attacks,

was particularly meaningful to the Marines and

sailors: New York firefighters had previously flown

the ensign over the devastated landscape where the

former World Trade Center had once stood.29

Moreover, family and friends of the victims, as well

as rescue workers at the site, had signed the flag.30

On 23 December, while explosive ordnance

technicians continued to dispose of hazardous

materials around the airfield, Companies I and K

worked to harden their defensive positions. Captain

Tomko remembered the diversity of Company K’s

frontage, noting that 1st Platoon faced an urban

environment (“Alamo”), 2d Platoon faced an open

expanse of desert (“CAX”), and 3d Platoon faced

a stand of trees (“Belleau Wood”).31 Meanwhile,

Task Force Sledgehammer began to conduct

mounted combat patrols outside the base. Major

Impellitteri recalled that once BLT 3/6 had

established the perimeter, General Mattis decided

that they could leave the confines of the airfield

and that they would start running local security

patrols.32 He also remembered running daily,

191

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011228-N-2383B-523

A Marine from Battalion Landing Team 3/6 stands beside his fighting position at Kandahar International Airport on 28

December 2001. Three disposable Javelin antitank missiles are stacked to the left rear, while a reusable SMAW (shoulder-fired,

multipurpose assault weapon) rocket launcher and extra missiles are shown on the right.

*Marines from BLT 3/6 had already raised two flags over Kandahar International Airport the previous afternoon. In addition to the American flag, they

had flown a yellow ensign bearing a coiled rattlesnake and the words “Don’t Tread on Me” that CWO-5 Timothy Hoffmann’s son had sent to him. (This

yellow ensign is often referred to as the Gadsden flag.) (BLT 3/6 History, 9)
platoon-sized patrols in each cardinal direction,

working to develop an intelligence picture for the

area in and around the airfield.

Captain Lloyd D. Freeman arrived in Kandahar

with Company L on the 24th, following a five-day

stop at FOB Rhino where they had temporarily

served as a quick reaction force and facilitated the

15th MEU’s impending retrograde to the Peleliu

ready group off the Pakistani coast. On Christmas

Day, having familiarized themselves with the area,

they assumed their position in the southeastern

portion of the perimeter. Company I and Task Force

Sledgehammer assumed external quick reaction force

duties the next day, while the remainder of the joint,

Coalition, and Marine units conducted base defensive

drills at Kandahar airport.33

Sustainment at Kandahar

As Task Force 58 expanded its scope of

operations, Marines from MSSG 26 continued to

maintain the critical flow of supplies and equipment

from southern Pakistan to the forward deployed

units in Afghanistan. This was no small task,

requiring near-continuous logistics operations, often

conducted under blackout conditions due to the

ongoing surface-to-air threat. A typical daily resupply

began at sundown, with ground transportation, shore

party, and security personnel moving from the Pasni,

Pakistan, airfield to Chur Beach. After meeting

landing craft from the amphibious ships, Navy and

Marine Corps personnel unloaded the cargo onto

trucks and convoyed back to the airfield. Here the

supplies were put on pallets and transferred to

waiting KC-130s for flights into Kandahar and

several intermediate support bases. After landing,

other MSSG 26 Marines would unload the aircraft

and distribute the supplies and equipment to Task

Force 58 and Coalition forces.34

Food, water, and fuel were the three top

sustainment priorities at Kandahar. The 26th MEU

initially pulled meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) from their

landing force operational reserve material on board

the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, as well as

from exercise stocks staged in Sigonella, Italy, to

support the wide range of joint, Coalition, and

Marine Corps forces operating from the airfield.

After depleting their on-hand stores, the

expeditionary unit found it difficult to acquire

additional MREs because U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command (NavCent) was not structured to

replenish forces operating ashore. Moreover, Marine

Forces Pacific affirmed that business-as-usual

procedures remained in effect, and none of the four

component commands had initiated plans for

pushing additional meals forward. Left to their own

devices, the Marines subsisted on two meals per day

and the 26th MEU requisitioned additional supplies

from the United States.35

Although the land component began to push

combat rations toward Kandahar, its intent was to

stockpile a 15-day supply of meals to support Task

Force Rakkasan, the U.S. Army force scheduled to

relieve Task Force 58 in Afghanistan. Since the

Marines were not supposed to violate these supplies

unless absolutely necessary, Majors Daniel B. Conley

and Terry M. Dresbach from the Task Force 58 and

NavCent logistics staffs resolved the problem by

coordinating a loan through the air component for

supplies from the Air Force’s war reserve stocks.36

192

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CWO-2 William D. Crow

In Jacobabad, Pakistan, on 12 February 2002, Marines from

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 and MEU

Service Support Group 26 load a KC-130 Hercules bound for

Kandahar. As SSgt Craig Ramirez, left, climbs into the aircraft,

Sgt Jessica Lujick directs the forklift operator. Inside, Cpl

Matthew Rider uses a T-bar to align the pallet.
Regarding fuel supplies, despite being able to

use JP-4 jet propellant as a short-term multipurpose

fuel source, Task Force 58 soon realized that, over

the long term, the propellant would damage the

engines of most of the ground equipment it had

brought to Afghanistan. Although continuous KC130 flights provided enough diesel fuel to sustain

joint and Coalition forces at FOB Rhino and

Kandahar, transportation in 500-gallon blivets

precluded the buildup of fuel stocks beyond those

required to meet immediate operational needs.

Reliance on six Marine KC-130 transports as the

sole means for delivering fuel to the two forward

operating bases was cause for concern and required

the aviation and logistics planners to continuously

monitor fuel status and closely integrate airlift

schedules to support operational priorities.37 The

26th MEU’s logistics officer, Major Andrew N.

Killion, “coordinated daily air delivery of ground

and aviation fuel from Jacobabad Air Base, and in

the case of diesel fuel, from local civilian sources

through a U.S. Army contingency contractor.”38

Although arrival of the Army relief force in

Kandahar threatened to destabilize the tenuous

balance between operational requirements and

logistical resources, Task Force 58 convinced the air

component to draw from theater stocks to establish

a 100,000-gallon storage capability at Jacobabad,

facilitating the delivery of JP-4 fuel to Coalition

forces at Rhino, Kandahar, and Bagram. It also

coordinated with Central Command and the

Defense Logistics Agency for the ground delivery

of multipurpose fuel from Pakistan. By working

together, Task Force 58 and the other commands

established an increased supply in sufficient time to

support Task Force Rakkasan without maintaining

a KC-130 presence in Jacobabad.39

Airfield Maintenance at Kandahar

Now responsible for maintaining separate

airfields, Seabees from Navy Mobile Construction

Battalion 133 divided their detachment into two

sections. On 17 December, while Navy Lieutenants

Joel K. Sensenig and Clifford A. Smith remained

behind to continue operations at FOB Rhino,

Lieutenant Commander Cooke went north with 10

Seabees to evaluate and organize repair and

maintenance efforts at Kandahar International

Airport.40 Over the years, fighting had left 18 craters,

ranging from 6 to 18 feet in diameter and 6 to 8 feet

193

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by TSgt Efrain Gonzalez, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011231-F-2352G-008/df-sd-03-18042

Members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit conduct a foreign object debris walk along the runway at Kandahar

International Airport on 31 December 2001. They are collecting debris that could be harmful to aircraft engines.
in depth, scattered along the 10,000-foot runway and

taxiway. Although the Marine KC-130 detachments

were able to fly in and out of Kandahar, a

particularly troublesome crater at the 4,000-foot

mark reduced the amount of usable runway and

precluded the use of larger intratheater aircraft.41

Rubble, trash, and wreckage fragments also

littered the runway and impeded aviation operations

at Kandahar. If sucked into a jet engine’s intake,

debris could seriously damage the whirling turbine

blades, subsequently grounding the aircraft or even

worse, causing an accident during takeoff. At the

behest of Task Force 58, which had submitted its

request shortly after occupying the airfield, the Air

Force was pursuing a sweeper truck in Oman to

eliminate this danger.42 Unfortunately, contracting

difficulties and airlift constraints delayed the vehicle’s

arrival for almost two weeks. In the meantime,

Marines walked the runway each day picking up the

potentially deadly debris. The Seabees soon

alleviated this tedious requirement when, after

finding an abandoned Russian sweeper truck in the

airfield junkyard and cannibalizing parts from junk

vehicles and making field-expedient repairs to the

truck, their mechanics were able to get it running.43

According to an article in the Wall Street

Journal, “The Seabees’ first priority [was] to restore

the water system, both for sanitation and to mix

concrete to patch the runway.”44 Task Force 58

planned to hire local contractors to help repair the

airfield, both as a means to reduce its own labor

requirements and to build rapport within the

community by contributing to its struggling

economy.45 With Major Killion serving as the

executive agent, Army Master Sergeant Parry A.

Toomer, the contingency contractor assigned to the

26th MEU, was the point man in this portion of the

civil affairs campaign.46 His first purchase was two

Honda water pumps obtained from Commander

Gulay, a member of the anti-Taliban militia who led

the Seabees on a guided tour of the airport’s wells

and water distribution system. The Afghans installed

the pump in a rose garden in front of the airport

terminal the following day, where the Marines had

pragmatically established an open-air urinal.47

194

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CWO-2 William D. Crow

A U.S. Marine KC-130 assigned to the “Raiders” of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (VMGR-352) prepares for its

next mission, while another aircraft assigned to VMGR-252 takes off on a mission to transport Marines from the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit back to Kandahar airport.
By the third week in December, Master

Sergeant Toomer had begun hiring Afghan laborers,

paying each $6.50 a day plus transportation to and

from Kandahar and the cost of lunch.48 Although

General Mattis acknowledged that “they’re hardworking people if given the opportunity,” Lieutenant

Commander Cooke had already realized that local

contractors lacked the equipment needed to meet

Task Force 58’s fast-paced operational requirements.49 He now switched his attention to

identifying the types of equipment and numbers of

Seabees needed to affect expedient solutions and

then more permanent repairs. General Mattis

contacted Lieutenant Smith at Rhino, expressing the

need for additional Seabee support at Kandahar.50

Since the heavy equipment currently in Afghanistan

was necessary for maintaining the deteriorating

airfield at FOB Rhino, Smith coordinated with the

Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 133 detachment in Bahrain to procure an additional grader,

roller, and front-end loader for Task Force 58.51

The Seabees began repairs as soon as they hit

the deck at Kandahar, dumping fill into the craters

and then rolling a top layer of soil to provide

stability. They repaired the problem crater within six

hours of arriving and extended the usable runway

space by 2,000 feet. One of five Air Force survey

teams visiting the airport observed the construction

crews as they completed the work and reportedly

assessed the airfield as being ready for C-17 aircraft.

Task Force 58’s command chronology indicates that

the first Globemaster arrived in Kandahar on the

evening of 18 December, although other sources

indicate that the air component command had not

declared the airfield C-17 capable until a day or so

later.52 After the 26th MEU expanded the range and

frequency of its air and ground patrols around the

airfield, the first daylight C-17 landing* occurred

around 1015 on 30 December.53

The Seabees continued to make permanent

repairs to the airfield during the following three

weeks. Special Type III cement received early in

195

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011227-N-2383B-508

Seabees of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 fill bomb craters along the runway at Kandahar International Airport on

27 December 2001. The craters were created by Coalition forces during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.

*The Task Force 58 command chronology says daylight operations began on 6 January. (TF 58 ComdC, 60)
January greatly facilitated this effort. After capping

the craters with the new composite mixture, the Air

Force declared the runway capable of supporting

Lockheed C-141 Starlifters on 10 January, and the

first C-141 arrived the following day.54

Detention Operations

Concurrent with establishing a second forward

operating base at Kandahar, Task Force 58 also

constructed a detainment facility at the airport to

hold prisoners. This facility was urgently needed to

handle not only those captured during previous

operations but also future prisoners of an

anticipated Coalition victory over Taliban and alQaeda forces who had withdrawn to the mountains

of northeastern Afghanistan. On 9 December,

General Franks had issued Fragmentary Order 02-

029, providing guidance on detainment handling

requirements in the joint operations area. Admiral

Moore followed with his own guidance to the

maritime component the same day, addressing

detainee-handling procedures and the use of brig

space on board Fifth Fleet ships, while General

Mikolashek issued Fragmentary Order 6 to

Operations Order 02-006 on 10 December,

providing his guidance to the land component on

detainee-handling procedures and holding facilities.55

Task Force 58’s mission was to establish a

facility capable of temporarily holding up to 500

individuals. Although the 15th MEU had already

established a short-term detainment facility at FOB

Rhino using shipping containers and canvas tents,

the remote desert outpost ultimately proved too

austere for housing Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners.56

Higher headquarters’ concern for the detainees’

welfare was a source of both amusement and pride

for the Marines, who huddled against the cold in

shallow fighting holes and continued to subsist on

bottled water and reduced combat rations.

As Task Force Sledgehammer prepared to move

on Kandahar around 12 December, General Mattis

issued a draft order transferring responsibility for

detainee security from the 15th to the 26th MEU

and directed Colonel Frick to establish a short-term

detainment facility once his Marines had occupied

the airport.57 While officials at the highest levels

debated the detainees’ legal status, General Mattis

196

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020108-N-2383B-516

Working through the night, Seabees of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 smooth cement while repairing damage to the runway at Kandahar International Airport.
directed that the Marines would treat them in

accordance with the Geneva Convention’s rules for

the treatment of prisoners of war. He emphasized at

the same time that Task Force 58 would not provide

its prisoners with an opportunity to revolt and that

guards were to shoot those attempting to escape.58

While this order might seem harsh to some, it

was justified by two violent jailbreaks that had

recently taken place—one occurring in the prison

outside Mazar-e Sharif during late November and

another involving a four-bus convoy in Pakistan in

mid-December. In each case, Taliban and al-Qaeda

prisoners had overpowered their guards and initiated

deadly gun battles before Coalition forces killed or

recaptured the escapees.59 Events occurring in

Kandahar on 22 December would later justify

General Mattis’s caution, when the arrival of a

particular al-Qaeda detainee at the airport “sparked

a rebellion among wounded prisoners being treated

at a nearby hospital.” After a bloody firefight five

days later, “eight al-Qaeda members remained holed

up in the hospital... loaded with munitions, vowing

not to be taken alive or surrender to U.S. forces.”60

Anticipating the eventual arrival of up to 300

prisoners, engineers and infantry who had arrived

during BLT 3/6’s initial assault quickly got to work

and within 15 hours had established a rudimentary

100-person detention facility near the airport

terminal.61 They chose a junk-littered dirt yard

measuring 200 meters by 250 meters as the site.

Enclosed by a 6-foot adobe wall, the location

contained two dilapidated metal buildings near the

center of the compound and two smaller buildings

standing off in one corner. The engineers selected

one of the larger buildings, which measured 20

meters by 50 meters and retained its metal siding, to

house the detainees.62

After clearing the floor of debris, they divided

the shed into two sections by driving a line of metal

stakes across the middle and attaching metal

sheeting. One side would house the ordinary Taliban

prisoners, while the other could be used to confine

“hard cases” and members of al-Qaeda. Concertina

wire was then placed atop the divider and along the

inside walls to prevent climbing, while the outside

was reinforced with wire, steel beams, concrete

blocks, and more metal siding to prevent digging. As

a final measure, they placed mobile stairways for

deplaning aircraft at each end of the building,

enabling the guards to observe the detainees. They

also cleared the two smaller buildings for medical

screening or detainee interrogation, discovering

several booby-trapped grenades in the process, and

constructed a short-term holding pen of concertina

wire in the compound.63

197

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

A west-facing view of the south side of the detention facility at Kandahar International Airport. This facility, built by the 26th

Marine Expeditionary Unit, was used to temporarily house al-Qaeda and Taliban forces captured during Operation Enduring

Freedom.
Additional combat engineers and military

police from MSSG 26 arrived at the airfield on 15

December, the same day Admiral Moore issued an

execute order for the transfer of prisoners captured

at Tora Bora to Kandahar.64 Although the police

detachment had not received orders to build a

short-term detention facility until the previous day,

Sergeants D. E. Jones and J. T. Green had

anticipated the mission while on board ship and

presented the command with plans for establishing

a light (100 person), medium (250 person), or heavy

(500 person) capability. The expeditionary unit

chose to begin with the first option and, given the

space constraints presented by Soviet-era

minefields and potentially booby-trapped buildings,

decided to continue using the compound for

detention purposes.65

Sergeant Teeter and a squad of engineers began

establishing a more permanent facility on 18

December, assisted by members of the Seabee

detachment who were now beginning to arrive in

Kandahar.66 Lacking published manuals or practical

experience in building detention facilities, the

engineers questioned several intelligence

organizations about basic structural requirements and

took a commonsense approach toward the project

design.67 They decided to improve the facility in

sections, thus enabling the military police to receive

detainees within the existing structure at the same

time the engineers worked to expand it, gradually

increasing the capacity from 120 to 400 persons.68

They accomplished this by enclosing the frame

of the second large building, which locals had

previously stripped of its siding, with concertina

wire and then constructing compartments that

limited detainee interaction to groups of 20.69 The

initial building now became the maximum-security

area for holding suspected al-Qaeda members, while

the compound area housed the common Taliban

prisoners. The engineers compensated for material

shortages by scavenging items from around the

airport. In an impressive display of ingenuity, they

used an iron gate from a nearby storage lot to secure

the compound entrance, turned old Soviet rotor

blades into light poles, and even cut their own logs

to build guard towers.70

On 16 December, the land component

commander issued Operations Order 02-25, which

provided guidance concerning the transfer of

custody and transportation of detainees from

Sheberghan prison near Mazar-e Sharif to

Kandahar. The airport detainment facility was ready

for sustained operations the following day, and the

first 24 detainees arrived on 18 December.*

However, the main influx of prisoners did not begin

until a week later, after senior leaders and their staffs

198

FROM THE SEA

*Alternatively, military police from MSSG 26, augmented by Marines from Company K, BLT 3/6, reportedly processed the first 15 detainees on 16 Dec

01. (MSSG 26 ComdC, Part. 2, p. 37)

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011227-N-2383B-505

Marines guide a suspected member of al-Qaeda down the

ramp of an Air Force C-130 Hercules at Kandahar

International Airport on 27 December 2001. Suspects were

held in a temporary detention facility run by the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit.
ironed out movement and handling procedures.71

On 22 December, Central Command directed its

land component to begin the transfer of detainees

from Pakistan to Kandahar.

A steady flow of prisoners into the airport thus

began, with an average of 15 detainees arriving each

day until the prisoner population eventually swelled

to 351 individuals by 9 January 2002.72 While most

of the detainees residing at Kandahar were low-level

Taliban fighters from locations throughout

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Task Force 58 kept

several suspected Taliban leaders and/or potential

al-Qaeda terrorists on board ship for safekeeping.73

The Marines initially confined eight “high-value”

detainees on board the USS Peleliu—they were

eventually transferred to the USS Bataan as the 15th

MEU conducted its retrograde from Afghanistan to

Kuwait during January 2002.74

Augmented by infantry from Company K,

military police from the 15th and 26th MEUs worked

together to operate the detention facility. Sergeant

Jones was in charge of flight line operations, where

he received the detainees after their arrival on C-130

military transport aircraft.75 After ensuring their ankle

and wrist restraints were in place and blindfolding

them, he directed the new prisoners, lashed together,

across the runway apron to a large green receiving

tent. The prisoners were processed two at a time, and

as part of the process, guards removed the prisoners’

clothes with surgical scissors; searched them for

weapons; and then took fingerprints, photographs,

and blood and hair samples before affixing an

identification bracelet with a tracking number to each

detainee’s right wrist. Medical personnel evaluated

the prisoners’ physical condition and provided

immediate treatment for any injury or illness.76 The

Marines provided each detainee with a blue jumpsuit

and laceless shoes as well as a space blanket and

heavy comforter that Master Sergeant Toomer had

purchased off the local market.77

After accessioning the prisoners, guards placed

sandbags over their heads and marched them in

circles on the way to the detainment facility to ensure

their disorientation should they attempt to escape.

Concertina wire, green engineer stakes, and locks

separated the holding cells from one another. Inside,

hygiene and restroom amenities were located on

opposite sides of the cell, with a space blanket

covering the floor. Marines fed the prisoners bottled

water and MREs three times a day (providing

vegetarian meals for those prohibited from eating

certain types of meat), emptied their waste

containers (buckets) regularly, and allowed them to

pray uninterrupted.78

Overhead floodlights illuminated the detainment

facility 24 hours a day. While two guards stood watch

in each of the five towers situated around the

compound’s adobe walls, other Marines ran frequent

roving patrols throughout the area. For security

purposes, the detainees were not allowed to gather

in groups larger than two or afforded privacy while

relieving themselves. Enhanced security measures for

a handful of high-value detainees involved housing

them in a shed placed in the center of the

compound. In case unrest did break out, each guard

shift conducted drills to maintain their readiness,

military police practiced riot control procedures daily,

and a quick reaction force stood by at all times.79

Task Force 58 invited Mr. Roland Nobs, who

was leading a delegation from the International

Committee of the Red Cross, to inspect the short199

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by Sgt Thomas Michael Corcoran

The first battlefield prisoners arriving at Kandahar airport.
term holding facility and ensure that the Marines

were in full compliance with Geneva Convention

guidelines. Thereafter, Red Cross representatives

met routinely with General Mattis and visited the

prisoners frequently, providing additional blankets

and facilitating the delivery of mail.80 While the

conditions in Kandahar may have been primitive,

they were contrasted favorably with the prison at

Sheberghan by reporters from the New York Times:

The conditions at Sheberghan are harsh.

Prisoners are crammed 50 to a room, with only

room to sit. At night many have to sleep in the

cold, damp corridors, which are barred at the

end where they open on to a central outdoor

courtyard. Prisoners complained that they only

received one meal a day of bread and rice.

Some are without shoes and dressed in clothes

inadequate for winter.... The conditions at the

Marines’ prison camp are austere but evidently

an improvement on those at Sheberghan.81

General Mattis provided access to a variety of

U.S. government and Coalition agencies who were

interested in speaking with prisoners. Some of these

included Marine interrogation and translation teams,

personnel from the Army’s 202d Military

Intelligence Battalion, teams from the Central

Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and even members of the British

secret service.82 In return, he demanded that they

immediately share any actionable intelligence that

they might uncover regarding the enemy’s intent

toward Task Force 58, threatening to expel anyone

who chose to withhold such information.83

The interrogators continuously questioned the

detainees for information up to 10 times a day.84

Colonel Faulkner explained to reporters, “We have

experts here who want to know anything they can

about the affiliations of these individuals, who

they’re tied in with, what other information they may

know about training facilities—anything.”

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Saxton, commander of the

202d Military Intelligence Battalion, explained that

the information the battalion collected could be used

as evidence in a court trial.85 He continued,

We’ve had 300 major reports generated out

here. We’ve had over 400 detainees and the

stuff that we have captured will raise the hair

on any American—on the back of his neck—

because this place is full of bad guys. One day

the story will come out, who was here, who was

interviewed by a young specialist or a young

sergeant who sat in front of a Taliban or alQaeda guy, face-to-face, and got him to talk

about what it was that they did here and what

they did to the Americans. And a lot of things

didn’t happen and a lot of things aren’t going to

happen because of the efforts that are going on

with this task force.86

Following a foiled al-Qaeda prison break in

Pakistan during mid-December, a member of Central

Command’s Pakistan liaison team informed the Land

Component Commander’s provost marshal that a

secure holding facility needed to be established for

detainees. This was likely the impetus behind a flurry

of message traffic in mid-December discussing the

movement of prisoners from Pakistan to Kandahar.

At a Pentagon briefing on 27 December, after the

flow of prisoners into the Marine’s short-term facility

had begun, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that

captured Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters would be

transferred to Camp X-Ray, a long-term holding

facility established at the U.S. Navy base in

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.87

Approximately a week later, the Pentagon

directed Coalition forces to begin the transfer of

prisoners to Cuba. Central Command and its land

component relayed this order to Task Force 58,

which transferred the first 30 prisoners on 10

January. Ten of these were high-value detainees who

traveled from the Bataan, while another 20 boarded

a C-17 aircraft in Kandahar. Despite a temporary

interruption of the flights to permit Guantanamo

to better prepare for the detainees’ arrival, the

transfer would continue during the next week and a

half, during which time Task Force 58 also

repatriated some 60 detainees to Pakistan.88

Task Force 58 struggled with balancing a myriad

of mission requirements other than just operating

200

FROM THE SEA
the detainment facility, including supporting special

operations forces and providing airfield security.

Fortunately, back on 22 December, Central

Command had issued Deployment Order 98, which

provided additional forces to help administer the

short-term holding facility. Thirty-six soldiers from

the U.S Army’s 65th Military Police Company

arrived in Kandahar on New Year’s Day, followed

by the advance echelon of the 108th Military Police

Company the next day.89

Although Marines remained on hand to help the

Army for several weeks, by mid-January they had

turned the facility over to Lieutenant Colonel Paul K.

Warman and soldiers from the Army’s 519th Military

Police Battalion. Major Alvez Alveretti, the battalion

operations officer, praised the Marines, noting that

their “ability to maintain and deliver [security] with

the techniques and procedures that they are trained

in... was one of the keys of success in the operation

early on.” He also explained that “the Army military

police... brought with them the sufficient numbers

to pick up... where the Marines had left off ” and he

thought that the “Marines did a very good job going

from the role of superior to subordinate in that

function.”90 Sergeant Green agreed that the Army and

Marine military police had quickly established a good

working relationship but acknowledged minor

difficulties during the initial turnover, adding that he

believed the soldiers sacrificed control over the

prisoners to meet the detainees’ needs.91

Visitors, Holiday Celebrations, and

Continued Conflict

As combat operations subsided and the holiday

season approached, a number of personalities began

cycling their way through Task Force 58’s area of

operations. General James Jones, Commandant of

the Marines Corps, and Sergeant Major Alford

McMichael, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps,

visited with Marines and sailors at FOB Rhino and

201

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by Helen C. Stikkel. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020127-d-2987s-158/dd-sd-07-17536

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld checks on the condition of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees held at Camp X-Ray in

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on 27 January 2002.
Kandahar Airport on 19 December, accompanied

by General Hagee.92 Ignoring the cold and wind, the

Commandant and Sergeant Major toured both the

15th and 26th MEUs’ defensive perimeters,

“surprising Marines on watch with their unexpected

presence.”93 Jones said that he wanted a firsthand

account of the Marines’ condition and morale

before speaking with their families at Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina, during the next few days. He also

remarked, “This is very impressive.... We spend a

lot of time in Washington banging our heads off the

wall saying ‘We can do this.’ We are doing it.”94

Before departing the windswept field at Rhino, Jones

pulled a black fleece jacket from his bag and handed

it to Colonel Waldhauser, adding, “It looks like you

could use this.”95 The next day, the trio visited the

Peleliu and Bataan amphibious ready groups.96

On 21 December, after visiting with troops in

Jacobabad, General Franks arrived at FOB Rhino on

board an Air Force C-17. To Task Force 58’s delight,

he brought along a contingent from the United

Service Organization (USO). The Marines and

sailors gathered in the abandoned warehouse that

served as their billeting area, where Wayne Newton,

Drew Carey, Neil McCoy, and two Dallas Cowboy

cheerleaders regaled them for an hour. The Marines

and sailors were thrilled to see all the celebrities,

although the cheerleaders were most popular. One

Seabee gave his camouflage blouse with the

nametape “McCoy” on it to country singer Neil

McCoy. Mr. McCoy put the blouse on and wore it

throughout the evening. Franks and the entertainers

next traveled to Kandahar, Pasni, and finally the

amphibious ready groups on 22 December,

repeating their performance and raising spirits.97

Marines at Kandahar enthusiastically received

their first bulk mail delivery on Christmas Eve,

bringing a cornucopia of letters, cards, and gift

202

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Sgt Marshall Paull

Gen James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps (center left, holding flag); SgtMaj Alford L. McMichael, Sergeant Major of

the Marine Corps; Lt. Gen. Michael L. Hagee, Commanding General I Marine Expeditionary Force; and the sailors and Marines of

the USS Bataan (LHD 5),while afloat in the Arabian Sea during Operation Enduring Freedom, display a flag found in the rubble

of the World Trade Center.
boxes from home. Marines were afforded an

opportunity to send e-mail messages or make phone

calls to friends and family, and BLT 3/6 produced its

own holiday greeting card, modeled after an original

designed by the 6th Marines while stationed in

Reykjavik, Iceland, during 1941. Depicting a Marine

standing his post during inclement weather, it was a

thoroughly appropriate representation for those now

manning the perimeter at Kandahar.98

Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello, USN, Chaplain of

the Marine Corps, also spent time with Task Force 58

over the holidays. He visited the Peleliu ready group

on 22 December, FOB Rhino on the 24th, and

Kandahar International Airport on the 25th of

December.99 Navy chaplains from the 26th MEU and

BLT 3/6 led observations of Christmas Eve at

Kandahar, with Commander Joseph A. Scordo, USN,

holding Catholic services and Lieutenant Chuck

Hodges, USN, holding Protestant services. Not all

celebrations were that formal: Major Feight jokingly

remarked that on Christmas Day his Marines had

“erected an aluminum pole for a tree, opened gifts

sent from home, aired grievances, and demonstrated

feats of strength.”100 This referred to the mock

holiday of “Festivus” made famous by the popular

television comedy Seinfeld.

Although Central Command “reemphasized the

necessity for vigilance to all its forces on Christmas

Day” and Marines in Afghanistan raised their level of

security, the holiday proved relatively uneventful for

Task Force 58.101 Thanks to Admiral Moore’s

initiative, Navy Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

(MWR) in Bahrain prepared holiday care packages for

his forces ashore and afloat in Afghanistan, Pakistan,

and the North Arabian Sea. Although distance

prevented the delivery of hot meals, the ready groups

203

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011225-N-2383B-504

Navy hospital corpsmen Steven Weston and Jeremy Heveron happily share care packages from home at Kandahar International

Airport on Christmas Day 2001. In addition to breaking up the monotony of field duty, packages like these reassured members of

Task Force 58 that they hadn’t been forgotten and that their service was appreciated.
204

FROM THE SEA

prepared nonperishable food and treats, which the

joint and Coalition forces received with enthusiasm.102

Lieutenant Colonel Lynes also recalled a surprise visit

from Lieutenant Colonel Drew Watson: Watson was

an old friend, then serving as a liaison officer with the

special forces, who arrived with a pack full of chewing

tobacco and snuff to hand out to the Marines

positioned along the perimeter.103

Major Robert Charette Jr., Task Force 58’s air

officer, coordinated an air show for the Marines to

celebrate Christmas Day. Two F/A-18 Hornets and

two F-14 Tomcats from the USS Theodore Roosevelt

spent 20 minutes in the sky over FOB Rhino,

performing complex and impressive aerial

maneuvers. When the show was over, the aircraft

proceeded to their refueling rendezvous point and

then continued to their assigned target in northern

Afghanistan. Additionally, President Bush called

Marines and sailors serving in Afghanistan,* and

Sergeant Arturo E. Romero, from the 15th MEU,

was one of the lucky Marines to speak with the

commander in chief.104 The following day, General

Mikolashek visited Kandahar.105

In Kabul, the Marines of Battery K also

celebrated Christmas. They had a tree cut from the

embassy grounds that was topped with an angel

crafted from a toilet paper roll. Christopher J.

Chivers, a New York Times reporter who had

previously served as a Marine infantry officer,

brought local food to the embassy on Christmas Eve

and sponsored a brief party. Staff Sergeant John C.

Eatmon contributed to the event by mixing mashed

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 011224-N-2383B-517

Carolers from Task Force 58 make their rounds at Kandahar International Airport, on Christmas Eve 2001. By celebrating the

holiday with traditional activities they would have performed at home, the sailors and Marines were reminded of what they

were fighting for.

*Task Force 58’s command chronology indicates that President Bush spoke with Cpl Arellano at Kandahar. (TF 58 ComdC Part 3, p. 92)
banana, powered milk, water, and spice into a poor

substitute for eggnog. With 1980s-era rock music

blaring in the background, they reflected on their

experiences in Afghanistan and remembered better

times back home. After finishing the hot meal—the

first in three days—they returned to their posts.106

Battery K personnel in Shamsi also experienced a

Christmas to remember. As a sign of friendship, the

Pakistani military forces brought them three live goats

to roast in honor of the holiday. This required that

Captain Fred C. Galvin, as senior Marine, slaughter

one of the animals. Afterward, the Pakistanis skinned

and cooked the goats. Although the roasting meat

smelled good to the hungry Marines, who had been

subsisting solely on prepackaged combat rations since

their arrival, they remained wary of the local fare. On

New Year’s Day, the Pakistanis returned with chicken,

which the Marines found more appealing.107

By this time, Captain Farrell J. Sullivan had arrived

in Kabul with an advance party from Company L, 8th

Marines. After the rest of his Marines arrived, the two

units conducted a brief turnover and the rifle

company assumed responsibility for guarding the

embassy on 29 and 30 December.108 Battery K

subsequently flew from Bagram to Kandahar on

board an Air Force C-17 transport on New Year’s Eve,

and within several hours of landing, they incorporated

themselves within BLT 3/6’s defensive perimeter

around the airfield.109

Although the media’s thirst for information may

have occasionally aggravated Task Force 58

personnel, they were aware that the presence of

reporters was also beneficial. On one hand, media

coverage provided them with a means to inform the

public about the conditions they were facing, the

operations they were conducting, and the fact that

they were winning. Equally important, the individual

sailors and Marines interpreted the media’s presence

as an indication of America’s continued interest in

the campaign, that their efforts to fight terrorism

and liberate Afghanistan were important and

appreciated, and that they had not been forgotten.110

A crew from Cable News Network (CNN)

arrived in Kandahar on Christmas Eve. They

provided continuous coverage from the airport for

almost a month, extending their stay for several

weeks because broadcasts from Kandahar were

achieving such high ratings. CNN reporter William

G. Hemmer was particularly popular with the

command. He made a conscious effort to interview

individual service personnel about their experiences

and allowed many of them to use his equipment to

send greetings to their families and friends. A crowd

of 50 or more Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen

often gathered near the inner courtyard of the

airport at night, waiting anxiously to send a message

to loved ones at home with CNN’s help.111

205

Concurrent and Distributed Operations at Kandahar

207

As the Northern Alliance continued to

push south in mid-November, senior

U.S. officials acknowledged that they

suspected Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda

followers were hiding in one of three areas: “the

mountainous central Afghan province of Uruzgan, a

cave-riddled region east of Kandahar near Pakistan,

or caves in the Tora Bora region.”1 A week later,

intelligence reports indicated that the terrorist leader

had probably fled with as many as 1,200 followers

into the White Mountains near the town of Tora

Bora.2 Located 35 miles southwest of Jalalabad in the

Spin Ghar mountain range of Nangarhar Province,

the extensive complex was reported to encompass

more than 200 caves, some allegedly containing deep,

wide tunnels that were ventilated, heated, and

electrified.3 In addition to being heavily fortified and

situated on excellent defensive terrain, the location

offered numerous escape routes across the porous

border into Pakistan. While speaking with

Washington Post reporter Pamela Constable in

Jalalabad at the end of November, General Hazrat

Ali, the security chief in northeastern Afghanistan,

commented on al-Qaeda and Taliban morale: “They

are armed, experienced, disciplined, and suicidal....

If they wanted to leave or give up fighting, they

would have gone by now. But they have one slogan:

to keep Tora Bora or be killed.”4

As the fall of Kandahar became increasingly

imminent, “it was apparent to commanders at all

levels that the Tora Bora region was the next logical

military search objective.”5 According to Pamela

Constable, “Officials of the new Afghan regional

government, an alliance of three anti-Taliban militia

groups, say their men are experienced enough in

mountain warfare to attack Tora Bora but that they

need far more firepower to make a successful assault

against the desperate and dedicated Arab fighters.”6

General DeLong, the deputy commander in chief at

Central Command, later explained that the type and

quantity of such support proved highly controversial:

There was never any question that Tora Bora

would see combat; the only question was if we

would put troops on the ground or rely on an

extensive bombing campaign and the Northern

Alliance troops. We chose the latter—and have

since been criticized for that decision by many

pundits. But the simple fact is, we couldn’t put

a large number of our troops on the ground.

The mountains of Tora Bora are situated deep

in territory controlled by tribes hostile to the

United States and any outsiders. The reality was,

if we put our troops in there, we would

inevitably end up fighting the Afghan

villagers—creating bad will at a sensitive time—

which was the last thing we wanted to do. So,

instead, using the CIA [Central Intelligence

Agency], our special forces, and friendly

Pashtun generals, we created “Eastern Alliance”

forces. The plan was to force al-Qaeda and the

Taliban from the high ground of the mountains

and into the caves, and then bomb the hell out

of the caves.7

When the producers of PBS’s Frontline

questioned General Franks about the same matter,

he gave the following reply:

The Afghans themselves wanted to get into

Tora Bora. They wanted to do it very quickly.

At that time, our special forces troopers were

not yet in large numbers.... I made... a pretty

good determination to provide support to that

operation and to work with the Pakistanis along

the Pakistani border to bring it to conclusion.”8

A View from the Front

Gary Berntsen, the CIA’s regional operational

commander, played the opening gambit in the battle

for Tora Bora by deploying an eight-man Jawbreaker

team to Jalalabad on 18 November. Consisting of

Chapter 12

Tora Bora
four agency officers, three joint special operations

soldiers, and a special forces medic, the team’s job was

to support and encourage General Hazrat Ali and his

followers to pursue Osama bin Laden.9 Commanders

Haji Zaman and Haji Zahir also contributed their

militias to the fight, raising the total number of

participating southern Pashtun opposition group

fighters to around 1,500.10 Although opposition

groups to the north and south had been eager to drive

the Taliban and al-Qaeda from their cities and take

control, the eastern militia groups’ interests clearly

diverged from those of the United States. As Pamela

Constable reported, “Most regional officials are

opposed to having Western troops enter the area and

wish the Arabs would simply leave.”11

The Jawbreaker team redeployed to the base of

the White Mountains around the 26th of November

after the nonstop bombing of cave-related targets at

Tora Bora had begun.12 After splitting the team in

two, half went forward to “pin the enemy with their

backs against the mountains to the south.”13 Setting

up on a promontory overlooking an al-Qaeda camp

in Milawa three days later, the forward element began

directing repetitive air strikes against the

encampment. With bin Laden and his men retreating

further into the White Mountains, Berntsen asked

Colonel Mulholland for permission to employ special

forces—who were then in Kabul—at Tora Bora.14

On 3 December, Berntsen also asked General

Dell L. Dailey, USA, for a battalion of Army

Rangers to seal off the border and prevent the

enemy’s escape into Pakistan.15 Despite repeated

inquiries about the status of his request, the rangers

never arrived, although Dailey did send a six-man

joint special operations advance team to Tora Bora.

Later, according to Berntsen, “General Dailey said

that he was against introducing U.S. troops for fear

of alienating our Afghan allies.”16

While the request for a ranger battalion was not

acted on, there was no denying that “the Jawbreaker

element... was very small and the operatives needed

assistance.”17 Although Task Force Dagger had already

committed most of its forces elsewhere in Afghanistan,

and Colonel Mulholland had misgivings about sending

a lightly armed force against a strongly defended

stronghold, he ordered Operational Detachment Alpha

572 (ODA 572) to Tora Bora on 2 December. The

team linked up with General Ali two days later, and

shortly afterward, the Afghan leader surprised

American advisors by announcing his intent to begin

the attack. Intending to recycle the plan that had

worked so well in northern Afghanistan and was now

achieving similar results in the south, ODA 572 offered

to provide tactical advice and air support from the

safety of observation posts while the Eastern Alliance

advanced up a mountain canyon and assaulted the

fortified tunnel complex. General Ali did not favor this

idea, arguing that the close air support teams should

accompany his forward troops during the attack.18

Returning from a brief coordination trip to

Jalalabad, ODA 572 rejoined General Ali’s forces

near Pachir Wa Agam on 6 December and

established observation post Cobra 25A on the

eastern side of the canyon the following day.19 Now

supported by the special forces, the Afghan

militiamen began to work their way into the

mountains. However, the fighting halted

unexpectedly for eight hours as al-Qaeda

representatives attempted to negotiate with their

Afghan brethren. Although those efforts apparently

proved fruitless, the delay further convinced

Berntsen that soldiers were needed on the ground

to do the fighting and to block a possible al-Qaeda

escape into Pakistan.20 Adding to his frustration, an

Afghan delivering food and water to the al-Qaeda

forces had possibly spotted Osama bin Laden and

his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.

ODA 572 pushed forward on 8 December,

establishing observation post Cobra 25B on the

northwestern side of the canyon, while on the same

day,* Central Command deployed a 50-man

detachment from Task Force Sword to Tora Bora,

which assumed command and took control of the

208

FROM THE SEA

*According to Gary Berntsen, the 40-man main body of the Task Force Sword detachment arrived on the morning of 10 December. (Berntsen, Jawbreaker, 298)
A Plan from the Past

During the first week in December, around the time Hamid Karzai was negotiating the surrender

of Kandahar and Hazarat Ali was beginning his assault into the White Mountains, General Mattis

proposed deploying Marines along the Afghan border to prevent the escape of Taliban and alQaeda forces into Pakistan.21 He later explained that they were obviously tracking Osama bin Laden

and that as they focused more and more on Tora Bora, he believed they could pursue and capture

bin Laden. He didn’t think the Northern Alliance would fight well in what was basically a foreign

area for them.22

Although reticent to deploy forces directly from Forward Operating Base Rhino (FOB Rhino) while

the Taliban still controlled Kandahar, General Mattis believed that once the stronghold was secure,

seaborne elements from Task Force 58 could fly to Kandahar in KC-130 transports and then

continue on to Tora Bora in CH-53 helicopters, reaching their objective within two to four days.23

Inspired by the U.S. Army’s use of heliographs (devices that use mirrors to communicate over

distances by reflecting light from the sun in code) during its 1886 campaign to capture the renegade

Apache leader Geronimo, General Mattis wanted to airlift reinforced fire support teams onto ridgetop landing zones overlooking the mountain passes leading from Tora Bora into Pakistan that had

been identified by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity in Quantico, Virginia. “And on each of

these positions,” he later explained, “would be a platoon with a sniper team, a 60 or 81mm mortar,

a forward air controller, an artillery forward observer, an independent corpsman, and five days of

supplies.”24 Situated within sight of one another, “somewhat like the Crusader ports in Syria,” he

added, these positions would serve as the “anvil.” Then, using the Australian Special Air Service and

SEALs, the Marines from down below would bring in artillery from the two Marine expeditionary

units and start pushing up into the mountains. The forward observers, snipers, and mortar teams—

calling in close air and artillery support—would

flush the enemy toward the Pakistan border.25

Ultimately, someone in Task Force 58’s chainof-command dismissed the idea. Although

General Mattis did not know who rejected the

plan or why, he lamented the enemy’s escape at

Tora Bora several months after the operation:

We missed a lot of fleeting opportunities. In defense

of CentCom [U.S. Central Command], it may have

been they were willing to let a hundred enemy get

away so that one innocent person was not killed,

because if we lost the morale or the strategic high

ground... that might have been more costly than

allowing some of these people to get away. I had to

look at it through a narrower prism while respecting

that, because I knew we could have killed a lot more

enemy.... That’s not to be a criticism of them; it was

based on where I was at [and] what I saw.26

209

Tora Bora

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

BGen James N. Mattis, commander of Task Force 58, drafts

correspondence in his office at Kandahar International

Airport on 14 January 2002. During early December 2001,

he lobbied for a Marine role in preventing the escape of alQaeda and Taliban fighters into Pakistan.
210

FROM THE SEA

battle. Able to operate with greater freedom than the

Army Special Forces, the American and British joint

special operating forces intended to maintain a quick

reaction force at the Afghan headquarters, augment

the A-team’s two forward observation posts, and

then maneuver additional observation posts forward

in concert with Ali’s advancing frontlines. Yet during

his initial reconnaissance of the area, the task force

commander realized that the Afghans had split into

clusters of troops scattered randomly throughout

the Panjchir Wa Agam Valley.27 The next day, the Air

Force dropped a 15,000-pound BLU-52 “daisy

cutter” bomb—followed by several B-52 bomber

strikes—on the fortifications where bin Laden had

supposedly been spotted, hitting the target and

achieving effect.28

The day of 10 December almost proved to be

a serendipitous turning point in the battle for Tora

Bora. Around 1600, while Task Force Sword

prepared to deploy additional observation posts

farther forward, the Afghans reported that they had

surrounded Osama bin Laden and requested

immediate support. When the special operating

forces moved forward 90 minutes later, however,

General Ali’s forces were withdrawing to the rear for

the evening, empty-handed. Meanwhile, opposing

forces had engaged several soldiers who had initially

gone forward with Ali and now blocked their egress

routes. Special operating forces at Cobra 25A had,

fortunately, closely monitored the events and

identified several of the enemy’s crew-served

weapons positions, which the Air Force bombed for

11 hours that evening.

As the Eastern Alliance forces closed in on bin

Laden’s location, less positive news began to surface

at the Pentagon. During a press conference, Deputy

Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz admitted

that the enemy was already withdrawing to the

Diagram by Vincent J. Martinez

U.S. airstrikes on the Tora Bora and Milawa cave complexes in early December 2001 reportedly killed several senior al-Qaeda

lieutenants and forced their troops to withdraw from the area.
south. He added that Pakistan’s government was

working to catch forces attempting to cross its

borders, and Coalition naval vessels were ready to

search ships for fugitives who might have made it

past the soldiers to the coast.29 Secretary Rumsfeld

was even less optimistic during a news briefing the

following day. While reiterating that Pakistani

military forces were attempting to close the border

and thwart the enemy’s escape, he explained, “This

is a very difficult thing to do. It is a porous border.

It is a long border. It’s a very complicated area to try

to seal, and there’s just simply no way you can put a

perfect cork in the bottle.”30 At yet another press

briefing less than two hours later, Marine General

Peter Pace, deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, provided additional clarification:

We do not know who is escaping and who is

not. It is reasonable to expect that some could

get out of the mountain complex. I don’t know

if you’ve seen the relief maps of the area, but

it’s a very mountainous area. There are multiple

routes of ingress and egress, so it’s certainly

conceivable that groups of 2, 3, 15, 20 could,

walking out of there, in fact, get out.31

Although the prolonged bombing of their

positions had forced the al-Qaeda elements to

withdraw from the canyon, enabling the Afghan

militia to move forward and occupy key terrain

around bin Laden’s suspected location on 11

December, Commander Haji Mohammed Zaman

unexpectedly halted the advance that afternoon and

began to negotiate for the enemy’s conditional

surrender32 During a Pentagon briefing around the

same time, reporters asked Secretary Rumsfeld what

outcome he was working toward in Tora Bora and if

he was interested in reaching a negotiated settlement

of some kind. Rumsfeld responded,

As you understand, we’re not in control of

every aspect of this because the larger number

of forces are the Afghan forces themselves.

Our interest remains exactly the same. It is to

capture or kill all the al-Qaeda and prevent

them from escaping into other countries or

other locations in Afghanistan where they can

continue their terrorist activities. It is to capture

or kill the senior Taliban leadership. It is to

disarm—have the opposition forces disarm—

the remaining Taliban, and then they will decide

what will happen with the lower-level Taliban

Afghan forces who live in that country and

undoubtedly will stay.33

During anther press briefing two days later,

reporters again asked Secretary Rumsfeld if “in your

mind, perhaps the administration’s, that killing alQaeda is preferable to their surrender,” and “did the

United States in any way veto or nix some sort of

surrender arrangement?”34 Rumsfeld replied,

The first choice is clearly surrender. It ends

faster. It’s less expensive. And we can encourage

people to surrender. Now, there’s a lot of

misinformation floating around about

somebody that, “Gee, they’ll surrender if we’ll

let them turn themselves into the United

Nations, or if you’ll let us keep our weapons,

of if you’ll let us go back and become governor

of Kandahar or something.” I mean, this is not

a drill where we’re making deals. This is a—the

purpose of this activity, the reason we’re doing

this is to defend the United States of America

and our friends and allies. And that means you

have to go after the terrorists. And we want to

get the terrorists. Without question, we want to.

And the fastest way to do that is if they all

surrender, come in with a white flag, turn

themselves in, and we could just deal with them.

That would be wonderful.... To my knowledge,

the United States did not nix or stop or put the

kibosh on anything. I do not even know if

anything was really offered.35

During the same briefing, General Myers

clarified, “There has been no surrender by al-Qaeda,

offered or accepted. Nor has there been any ceasefire in this effort. Our mission to eliminate the

al-Qaeda, its network, and the Taliban in Afghanistan

remains the same as it has from the beginning.”36

Following the unintended operational pause on

11 December, Task Force Sword’s commander

decided to bring more of his forces forward, partly

to motivate the Afghans to continue the offensive

211

Tora Bora
and partly to compensate for the quick reaction

force’s inability to advance rapidly enough over the

rugged terrain to be useful during an emergency,

such as another sighting of Osama bin Laden. They

directed effective fire against the enemy’s positions

for three days, gradually moving two forward

observation posts up both sides of the canyon, each

backed up by a mission support site that followed

behind. The Afghan forces also continued to

advance slowly up the canyons, although they

stopped occasionally during the day to observe

Ramadan and then withdrew at night for food and

shelter. Task Force Sword maintained pressure on the

opposing forces during the militiamen’s absence by

observing their campfires through thermal imaging

devices and calling in additional close air support.37

Encouraged onward by the special operating

forces, the Afghan militias began to remain in the

field overnight and gradually reduce the remaining

pockets of resistance. Back in Tampa, General

Franks told reporters that Coalition forces were in

the “midst of pitched battle” against 300 to 1,000

enemy fighters.38 He described the terrain as two

north-south running valleys south of Jalalabad and

explained that while some opposition forces

occupied the eastern and western sides, others were

moving north and south in “a hammer and anvil”

formation.39 While speaking in Ireland on 14

December, Secretary Rumsfeld remarked

optimistically that Coalition forces had advanced

more than a mile closer to the cave complex and 50

al-Qaeda fighters had surrendered.40

Meanwhile, seven Pakistani battalions

(approximately 4,000 soldiers) blocked al-Qaeda and

Taliban routes of escape at the southern ends of the

valleys.41 Although Central Command would have

preferred to use army forces along the border,

restless tribes occupying this remote portion of

Pakistan were sympathetic to bin Laden’s cause and

would only abide the presence of local frontier

forces that were already stationed there.42 General

Franks nevertheless told reporters that the

opposition leaders believed they had the majority of

al-Qaeda contained.

On 15 December, members of the Jawbreaker

team who were listening to a captured al-Qaeda radio

apparently overheard Osama bin Laden’s farewell

speech, during which he apologized for leading his

men into a trap.43 Speaking to reporters while en route

to Afghanistan the next day, Secretary Rumsfeld

confirmed that fighting in the Tora Bora region had

subsided. He said that Coalition forces had captured

11 and killed 200 al-Qaeda fighters, while 2,000 others

continued to flee the area.44 Although General Ali

declared victory a day after that, back in Washington

Admiral John Stufflebeem cautioned that there were

still isolated pockets of al-Qaeda fighting in the area,

and that many of them were on the run. He had

reports of them leaving the area and some reports—

none of which had been confirmed—that they had

left the area.45 On 19 December, after reaching a

“general consensus that the surviving al-Qaeda forces

had either fled to Pakistan or melted into the local

population,” Task Force Sword withdrew from the

battlefield.46 During a news briefing that afternoon,

Secretary Rumsfeld told reporters,

The Pakistani army is doing a good job along

the border of Afghanistan. They have captured

a very large number—hundreds—of people

who were fleeing over the border. And we have

people that are communicating with them and

doing everything humanly possible to avoid

having the people that we’re pressing in

Afghanistan from moving into neighboring

countries, where they could cause damage and

terrorist acts there. Our goal is to stop them,

not to simply move the problem from one

nation to another.47

At the same time, other news sources reported

that General Franks had “proposed that United

States Marines or Army troops be deployed to comb

the wild terrain of Tora Bora to try to determine the

fate of al-Qaeda leaders.”48 Secretary Rumsfeld’s

summary of the current state of affairs in that

region helps to put Franks’s request into context:

The battle, the pitched battle that was going on

for some period of time, is not taking place at

the moment. That does not mean it will not start

up again. A good many of the caves and the

212

FROM THE SEA
tunnels have been closed, bombed, damaged,

blown up; a good many have not been. There are

an enormous number of caves and tunnels. So

what’s taking place is, since there is no longer a

large physical resistance, the people that are there

are moving into the open—still-open tunnels

and caves—and looking around, gathering

intelligence information, seeing who’s there and

proceeding kind of systematically with that.

There are still anti-Taliban forces in the area.

There are still U.S. forces in the area. There are

still airplanes that are available to do whatever

they are called upon to do. And at the moment,

it’s in just a slightly different phase than it had

been.49

On 20 December, Task Force Dagger deployed

Operational Detachment Alpha 561 (ODA 561) to

Tora Bora “to assist ODA 572 as it searched caves

and tunnels for intelligence documents, any

indication of bin Laden’s presence, and to take DNA

samples from dead enemy bodies.”50

A Base Too Far

While General Mattis’s suggestion of employing

Marines at Tora Bora may have been initially rejected,

as the battle neared conclusion, Task Force 58 found

itself serving in a quasi-reserve status to support

continued operations in the region. Mattis first learned

around 14 December that General Franks was

considering the possibility of using Marines to

“encourage” the opposition groups to continue

fighting, as special operating forces urged the Eastern

Alliance to complete its attack against the cave

complex. Three days later, as General Ali proclaimed

victory over al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Task Force 58

began to modify its three-part plan for collapsing the

Marine footprint in Afghanistan to a main operating

base. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26th

MEU) would close the intermediate operating base at

Shamsi while retaining forces at Pasni, FOB Rhino, and

Kandahar. Meanwhile, the 15th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (15th MEU) would shift to Kandahar, while

Company L subsequently closed FOB Rhino and

213

Tora Bora

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Coalition forces continued their southerly advance into the Tora Bora mountains of northeastern Afghanistan, forcing resistant

al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to retreat toward the Pakistan border on 17 December 2001.
eventually rejoined Battalion Landing Team 3/6 at the

airport. At the same time, Task Forces 64 (Australian

Special Air Service) and K-Bar (Navy SEALs) would

link up with the 15th MEU and establish a small,

temporary operating base near Tora Bora.51

That General Mattis issued Fragmentary Order

004 on 18 December—directing reconstitution of

the amphibious forces in time for the 15th MEU to

depart Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility one month

later—is evidence of the tentative nature of the

reinforcement mission. However, General

Mikolashek issued both warning and operations

orders (OpOrd 02-26) to Task Force 58 that same

day, directing Mattis to begin planning for an onorder attack to clear Tora Bora of hostile forces.52

During an 18 December news brief at the

Pentagon, General Pace explained the deliberate

nature of that mission:

This really is very, very difficult. First of all, you

have several valleys in the Tora Bora complex.

Each of them is several miles long. In each of

those valleys, you have several hundred caves.

And you want to go through very methodically,

one by one, and if it’s been closed by bombs,

determine whether or not you want to open it

up to see what’s in there. And if it’s not been

closed by bombs, you have to determine whether

or not it’s worth going in. So it’s going to be stepby-step, cave-by-cave, and to put a time limit on

that would be imprudent right now.53

Placing the issue of redeployment on hold,

General Mattis and his staff began to consider their

options in earnest. While the Marines would close

FOB Rhino as planned, 15th MEU would become

Task Force 58’s point of main effort,* deploying two

rifle companies and two artillery batteries to Jalalabad

by C-130.54 The advance party would go forward no

earlier than the evening of 20 December with the

intention of establishing a third forward operating

base at Jalalabad within five days of receiving an

execute order and conducting combat operations in

Tora Bora within six days.55 This would be no small

task. Although anti-Taliban forces held the airfield,

the Soviets had heavily mined the surrounding area,

and the runway was in poor condition. Moreover,

winter was rapidly closing in and flying conditions at

7,000 feet were hazardous at best.56

On 19 December, as Task Force Sword departed

Tora Bora, General Franks issued an execute order**

for operations in Tora Bora.57 General Mattis

subsequently issued a supplement to the previous

day’s redeployment order, directing the 15th MEU

to begin planning for a movement into northeastern

Afghanistan.58 Reflecting several years later on receipt

of the mission, Colonel Waldhauser explained,

After a while... we [were] almost like victims of

our [own] success: “You guys can do anything.”

Then they start talking about going to Tora

Bora, which was another 400 miles from [FOB

Rhino]. You go, “Wow.” I mean... at what point

do we kind of say, “Even we can’t do this.”59

Around this time, stories describing the

impending operation began to surface in the press.

An article appearing in the New York Times reported

that General Franks had proposed that the United

States deploy several hundred conventional forces

“to comb the wild terrain of Tora Bora to try to

determine the fate of al-Qaeda leaders.” It was less

clear, however, who would carry out the mission.

The article suggested that, in addition to the Marines

at Kandahar, troops might be drawn from the 10th

Mountain Division in Uzbekistan or even the 101st

Airborne Division back in the United States.60

Between 19 and 24 December, the 15th MEU

staff shifted slightly from planning for “combat ops

in the vicinity of Tora Bora” to planning for a

“movement to Jalalabad and combat operations in

the vicinity of Tora Bora.”61 Lieutenant Colonel

Olson, the expeditionary unit’s operations officer,

described the sequence from his perspective:

214

FROM THE SEA

*The 26th MEU came close to pulling Battery K from the U.S. embassy security mission in Kabul to provide fire support for the expedition. (McDonough

intvw)

**For some unknown reason, VAdm Charles Moore chose to readdress this order. (TF 58 Chronology, 11)
The initial taskers were to support the special

forces’ efforts up there with up to two rifle

companies to go and actually take cave

complexes that we thought were still occupied

by as many as 1,000 al-Qaeda, Chechen, Arab,

and hard-core Taliban fighters. Over the course

of three nights of planning, as we watched the

campfires move closer to the Pakistan border, it

was [clear] that people were leaving these cave

complexes and moving across these 12–14,000-

foot mountain passes in the dead of winter....

[General Mikolashek] decided it was time to put

boots on the ground and go exploit these other

sites.... So we made plans to move... enough

combat power to hold Jalalabad airfield... and

actually conduct movements to contact up

these valleys into this cave area.62

As Task Force 58’s planners began to identify

their logistical requirements, it became apparent that

while the Marines might be able to endure cold nights

at FOB Rhino wearing lightweight utilities and desert

boots, they were ill-equipped for winter warfare in the

mountains.63 Lieutenant Colonel Broadmeadow and

the logistics section developed an extensive list of

cold weather gear that they would need to fight in

Tora Bora. Some of these items included

polypropylene underwear, fleece undergarments,

socks, and vapor-barrier boots with thinsulate inserts,

gators, balaclavas, squad stoves, and cold-weather

lubricant for their weapons. They also considered the

possibility of locating mountain warfare instructors*

to help conduct cold-weather training.64

The 15th MEU had similar concerns. Colonel

Waldhauser and his staff emphasized the need to

build a logistics capability prior to establishing the

combat force, highlighting such issues as force

sustainment, fuel, cold-weather gear, aircraft and

airfield maintenance, and base security. Beyond that,

they envisioned being operational by 25 December,

with Battalion Landing Team 1/1 providing 800

Marines who could form 6 to10 interdiction teams

of 15 or 30 personnel. To this, the 26th MEU would

also contribute additional force reconnaissance

assets, mortars, artillery, forward air controllers, and

a tactical air control party.65

Rather than conducting an arduous road march

from FOB Rhino or Kandahar, Task Force 58

intended to fly its assault force to Bagram on four C130s (two Marine and two special operations

aircraft) and then move on Jalalabad. Cognizant that

the rough terrain would influence their tactics, once

on the ground they planned to form one aviation

combat element, fold Task Force 64 under the 15th

MEU, maintain multiple quick reaction forces, and

conduct “mutually supporting... combat patrols and

observation patrols.”66

Around 20 December, as potential courses of

action were starting to solidify into a concrete plan,

Task Force 58 received what must have been

disappointing insight into higher headquarters’ intent.**

From Central Command’s perspective, the main

purposes of the operation were to motivate General

Ali and the Afghan forces to continue fighting and to

check the caves for al-Qaeda and intelligence.

Moreover, General Franks did not want to employ the

Marines, but instead preferred to use Ali or deploy

additional special forces detachments to Tora Bora. Yet

just in case those options did not work, the Marines

needed to be ready to deploy a command group and

two rifle companies north to Bagram within 48 hours.67

Central Command also emphasized that it never

intended for Task Force 58 to operate independently

and there would be no blocking-force mission for the

Marines. While they could bring their mortars to

Bagram, the artillery batteries would have to remain

215

Tora Bora

*On 3 December 2001, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory sponsored a tabletop seminar in Quantico, Virginia. While addressing the possibility of

employing a winter warfare capability in northeastern Afghanistan, they estimated that the Marine Corps’ Mountain Warfare Training Center could develop

a cadre of 150 personnel trained in fire support and cold-weather mountaineering by mid-January 2002.

**LtCol Lethin listed the following 12 points in his personal notebook under the heading “CinC Guidance”: no blocking force mission; two companies with

command group; no artillery, mortars are okay; helicopter supporting gun—difficult; use Air Force for fire support; advance echelon in Bagram; purpose is to

push Ali (check caves for al-Qaeda and intelligence); never intended to work independently; on-order mission only (no earlier than 25 December); commander

in chief does not want to do; only if other options don’t work (money to Ali, more ODA); must be ready to execute within 48 hours. (Lethin Notebook)
behind, and the Air Force would provide necessary fire

support. General DeLong’s priorities were reiterated

as the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the

exploitation of cave sites near Khost.68

Adapting to the new guidance, Task Force 58

modified its original plan to reflect the scaled-back

mission. The abbreviated advance party would now

be limited to seven personnel: General Mattis and

his aide, the CIA liaison, two radio operators, and

two “shooters.” They would be followed by the main

assault force: an infantry battalion-minus, composed

of two rifle companies supported by 81mm mortars

and Cobra gunships.69 After analyzing the

commander’s intent, General Mattis concluded that

the force composition was poorly suited for the

mission at hand and that the Marines were intended

as a “demonstration force only.”70

Newspapers contained more stories about the

Tora Bora mission on 21 December, most reporting

on a news briefing that Secretary Rumsfeld and

General Pace had held at the Pentagon. While

denying that constrained rules of engagement had

allowed the enemy to escape, Rumsfeld emphasized,

The campaign to deal with the terrorist

problems in Afghanistan continues. It continues

without pause, although in a somewhat different

phase. There’s still much to do. There are still

pockets of resistance throughout the country.

The president intends to see the campaign

through until the al-Qaeda and the Taliban

forces have been rooted out and dealt with.71

Later he added,

What you have is a bunch of caves. They’re

being triaged and put in priority order. Then the

Afghan forces and coalition forces are going

into those caves and looking for information

and evidence and people and weapons and...

trying to determine what we can do to deal with

terrorists all across the globe.72

When one reporter inquired if the troops that

were being sent were U.S. Marines, Rumsfeld

responded, “We’re not going to get into it.”73

Another newspaper reported that Rumsfeld had

said that scores of American troops and British

special forces were already operating in the region,

and he had “approved the deployment of a

substantial number of American troops to search

the caves of Tora Bora for die-hard terrorists.”74

Perhaps most telling, one account said that, although

military officials were leaning toward the use of

Marines already acclimated to operations in

Afghanistan, they were concerned about the effect

the operation might have on security at the

Kandahar airfield and the detainment center. The

other option they were considering was the use of

soldiers trained in cold-weather combat already

stationed in Uzbekistan.75

General Mikolashek issued Fragmentary Order

01 to Operations Order 02-026, which addressed

216

FROM THE SEA

Official Department of Defense photo

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Peter Pace respond to

questions during a briefing at the Pentagon.
operations to “attack [and] clear Tora Bora,” on the

same day as this latest flurry of newspaper

accounts.76 While there is little indication what the

order specifically meant to the Marines, it apparently

remained unclear whether higher headquarters

intended to actually deploy the battalion landing

team or merely have it ready to go north on short

notice. Revealing his frustration over the abbreviated

time line, Lieutenant Colonel Lethin wrote in his

notebook, “CFACC [Combined Forces Air

Component Command] must deploy forces to

Jalalabad... it’s time to step up to the plate. Marines

need help now!”77 This likely referred to the fact that

the Marines, in the course of their planning,

determined that C-17 support for force movement

would require an air base far from the actual fight

and that in order to move all of the forces, KC-130

support would require a week.78

This was not the only source of frustration for

the Marines. Captain Treglia, who had recently

returned to FOB Rhino following a long-range

reconnaissance patrol, remembered hearing Colonel

Waldhauser state, “I’m not going to send someone

up to do something that doesn’t make sense. When

we get the gear, we’ll go.”79 Treglia observed that

General Mattis felt much the same way and had told

Waldhauser, “We don’t half jump into something....

If you want to go push through valleys in

Afghanistan, yeah we’ll go, but first we’ll make sure

that we have everything that we need to do it.”

These and other issues may have contributed to a

dispute reported to have occurred around this time,

which apparently lead to a memorandum of

understanding* stipulating that Central Command

would only employ Marine Corps forces in their

traditional air-ground task force configuration.80

As Task Force 58 continued to stand by for

orders, a sense of resolution was reached on 23

December. As Central Command granted conditional approval for Lieutenant General Mikolashek’s

concept of operations in Tora Bora and issued

Fragmentary order 02-045 to Lieutenant General T.

Michael Moseley, USAF, regarding airfield survey

operations at Jalalabad, it also issued an execute

order for reconstitution of both the 15th and 26th

MEUs.81 General Mikolashek subsequently issued

Operations Order 02-032 the following day.

Although it authorized the 15th MEU to begin

reconstituting itself on board vessels of the Peleliu

ready group, it also required that Task Force 58

remain ready to deploy a portion of its remaining

forces to Tora Bora if that became necessary.82

General Mattis thus ordered Colonel Waldhauser to

begin his retrograde as originally planned, and the

subordinate commands started their gradual

withdrawal to Pasni, Kuwait, and then the West

Coast of the United States.83

Before long, newspapers started carrying stories

that were increasingly pessimistic about the Tora

Bora campaign and bin Laden’s fate. One report on

Christmas Day quoted General Franks as stating that

there were really only three possibilities: he could be

dead in the area of Tora Bora, he could still be alive

somewhere else in Afghanistan, or he may have

gotten into Pakistan. He added, “Right now we don’t

know which of these three categories he’s in.”84 At

a news briefing the following day, Secretary

Rumsfeld explained that even if the United States

did capture bin Laden, the problem of global

terrorism would not go away because someone else

in the organization would take over.85 The same day,

reporting from Jalalabad, other journalists wrote that

the United States was now offering incentives to the

Afghan forces to search for Osama bin Laden and

foreign al-Qaeda fighters, and if that option did not

work, they would resort to employing additional

special operating forces rather than conventional

Army and Marine troops.86

When questioned about the development

during a Department of Defense news briefing on

27 December, General Myers responded,

217

Tora Bora

*The memorandum may have also provided Marines with enough leverage to extricate themselves from Operation Anaconda during March 2002, which

some perceived to be poorly planned. (Hersh, Chain of Command, 135–36)
We are using Afghan opposition groups to

assist us in the Tora Bora region. We also have

U.S. Special Forces with them. So, both those

factions are working. Obviously, there are many

ways to incentivize the opposition groups, and

it may be that cold-weather clothing is more

important than money and so forth. But, all

that is being worked to solicit their cooperation

in this endeavor.

As to the Marines... we reserve the right to use

any part of our military force as we see fit. And

right now they are not in the Tora Bora region.

That does not mean in the future they couldn’t

be.87

When asked if he and the secretary considered

it too dangerous for U.S. forces to go into the caves

in numbers, Secretary Rumsfeld interrupted,

Absolutely not.... Look, from the very

beginning, we said that we were going to have

the Afghan forces that were in that region work

the problem. To the extent they needed

additional help, we would try to get Afghan

forces from other regions of the country. And

to the extent they needed additional help, we

would use U.S. forces. There are U.S. forces

currently with the Afghan forces doing that job.

That is exactly the way it’s always been. The

stuff you’re reading about in the paper, that

there was a decision to send in 500 Marines and

a decision to not send in 400 Marines—that’s

all newspaper talk—just flat out. We have been

consistent from the very beginning that we

would have the number of people doing that

job that we felt was appropriate. And that is

exactly what we’ve been doing in the priority

order that I indicated.88

218

FROM THE SEA

Official Department of Defense photo

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (right) responds to a reporter's question. Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff Richard B. Myers, USAF, conducted the joint press briefing in the Pentagon.
Wrapping Up

By the end of the offensive portion of the

operation, Afghan and special operations forces had

killed roughly 250 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in

and around Tora Bora, while Pakistani military forces

captured another 90 or so on the opposite side of the

border.89 Osama bin Laden was likely present between

9 and 14 December, but the small contingent of

special operating forces proved insufficient to block

southern routes into Pakistan, and the Eastern

Alliance proved more interested in looting abandoned

caves or accepting bribes to let al-Qaeda escape than

in capturing them.90 According to Gary Berntsen,

“Bin Laden split his force in two. One group,

numbering 135 men, headed east into Pakistan.... A

number of al-Qaeda detainees later confirmed that

bin Laden escaped with another group of two

hundred Saudis and Yemenis by a more difficult

eastern route over difficult, snow-covered passes into

the Pashtun tribal area of Parachinar, Pakistan.”91

Following the battle, ODAs 561 and 572 began

searching the area for information. Although they

found ammunition, weapons, paper and electronic

documents, and videotapes, they soon realized that

local Afghans had already pillaged many of the caves

and that the likelihood of discovering intact

intelligence was limited.92 With the need to reinforce

search operations in the eastern mountains now

greatly diminished, Central Command finally

released the Marines from their on-call mission on 9

January.93 This action appears as almost an afterthought, for by this time Colonel Waldhauser and

the 15th MEU had already left the country, and

Colonel Frick and the 26th MEU had become

heavily engaged in a series of exploitation missions

elsewhere. Back at Tora Bora, after policing the

battlefield, Operational Detachment Alpha 527

departed on 17 January, followed by ODA 561 on

22 January.

In retrospect, there appear to be a number of

contributing factors that limited Marine participation

in the Tora Bora campaign to operational planning.

General Franks and Secretary Rumsfeld may have

preferred to use indigenous or special operating

forces, and the mission faded once the Afghan

militias returned to the battlefield. The lack of airlift

necessary to transport the Marines to Jalalabad in a

timely fashion, the absence of cold-weather

equipment necessary to outfit the infantry, or the

realization that Osama bin Laden was either dead or

hiding elsewhere could have played roles as well. It is

also possible that Central Command always intended

to use the threat of Marine involvement as a tool to

motivate the Eastern Alliance. Lieutenant Colonel

Daniel D. Yoo, 26th MEU’s operations officer, later

reflected that an information campaign was going

on—putting in conventional ground forces,

especially Marines, would be enough to change a lot

of people’s thinking or cause them to react.94

219

Tora Bora

221

Central Command established a list of

sensitive locations that required

assessment by Coalition forces in

Afghanistan, directing Task Force 58 to conduct or

support exploitation missions in the Kandahar

region. Often working in conjunction with Task

Force K-Bar, the Marines and sailors developed an

aggressive schedule in which the supporting and

supported relationship changed according to site

location, asset availability, and information sensitivity.

During many of the operations, Task Force 58

provided helicopter assault support or served as a

quick reaction force while exploitation teams

inspected the site. In addition to Army Special Forces

and Navy SEALs, these teams involved Canadian,

Dutch, German, and New Zealand special operating

forces who did not possess their own aviation assets.

Captain Robert Harward, USN, Task Force K-Bar’s

commander, acknowledged his reliance on the

flexibility and responsiveness provided by Task Force

58’s helicopter crews, commenting in his situation

report, “By all accounts, this Navy–Marine Corps

team swiftly jelled into a potent fighting force and

distinguished itself on the battlefield.”1

Garmabak Ghar Training Camp

One of the first exploitation missions

conducted by the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(26th MEU)—and one of the last to involve

elements of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(15th MEU)—took place in Garmabak Ghar.

Situated in mountainous terrain approximately 50

miles northwest of Kandahar, the site was rumored

to be a former Taliban training base and cave

complex. Task Force 58 had planned the operation

in conjunction with local anti-Taliban forces,

interagency assets, and special operating forces.2

On 28 December, a flight of four aircraft from

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (HMM365) flew members of Task Force 64, the Australian

Special Air Service (ASAS) unit attached to Task Force

58, into the mountains north of Garmabak Ghar to

establish surveillance and reconnaissance over the

target area. The flight included a Super Cobra, a Huey,

and two Sea Knight helicopters. Due to the rough

terrain, the Australians fast-roped onto a pinnacle

landing zone, “the first insert of its kind for Marine

aviation in Afghanistan.”3 The following evening,

another flight of 13 aircraft, including one Huey, three

Super Cobra, three Sea Stallion, and six Sea Knight

helicopters, airlifted Task Force 64’s assault force and

associated patrol vehicles onto the objective.

Unfortunately, one of the CH-53 Sea Stallions

experienced a hard landing during the insert,

damaging its front landing gear.4 Although no

personnel were hurt in the crash, the aircraft’s nose

gear was driven back into the cockpit and it was no

longer airworthy.5 While Lieutenant William Lennon

and a platoon of light armored vehicles (LAV-25s)

originally assigned to support Task Force 64 secured

the crash site, the chemical-biological intelligence

support team and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Chapter 13

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

Official Department of Defense photo.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: SR476510

Prestrike image of a terrorist training camp in Garmabak

Ghar, Afghanistan.
officers conducted a thorough search of the area.6

“There was no resistance,” Lennon recalled, “but

there was a lot of information.”7

Tactical recovery operations commenced that

same evening. First Lieutenant John S. DeForest

arrived with a squad of Marines from Battalion

Landing Team 3/6’s (BLT 3/6’s) 81mm mortar

platoon and five mechanics from HMM-365, while

First Lieutenant Michael J. Hendrickson brought

four vehicles from Battalion Landing Team 1/1’s

(BLT 1/1’s) light armored reconnaissance company.8

The next morning, the Marines discovered that the

helicopter pilots had landed their aircraft on top of

a finger with an 11-degree pitch. Working under the

supervision of Master Sergeant Michael L. Holguin,

they pivoted the fuselage to face down the long axis

of the slope and then used their retriever vehicle

(LAV-R) to tow the aircraft to flat ground at the base

of the hill.9

At this point, Second Lieutenant Jason D.

Roach arrived with a squad from 2d Platoon,

Company I, to relieve BLT 3/6’s mortarmen; the

222

FROM THE SEA

Diagram by Vincent J. Martinez

Marine Operations in Afghanistan December 2001–January 2002.
following day, they were augmented by a second

squad from 2d Platoon. The mechanics from HMM365 used a jack to raise the front fuselage and replace

the aircraft’s nose wheel, enabling it to be flown back

to Kandahar under its own power. After the

helicopter reached the airfield on 2 January,

mechanics then disassembled it for shipment to the

United States and further repair.10

Maiwand Garrison

At 2330 on the evening of 31 December, a

second raid force assembled near the tarmac at

Kandahar International Airport.11 Its target for the

following morning was an enemy military facility

(AQ-024) in the village of Maiwand, located

approximately 40 miles northwest of the airport and

3 miles north of Highway 1.12 The base had been a

training camp for Taliban and al-Qaeda forces

before the war, and intelligence sources now

indicated that 50 to 75 of their troops were still

operating near the objective.13 Some of the Marines

were familiar with the area since it was situated just

north of “the evil village” that BLT 1/1’s

interdiction force had passed through while moving

toward Kandahar three weeks earlier.14

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jerome

Lynes, the raid force consisted of BLT 3/6’s tactical

command group; 26th MEU’s force reconnaissance

platoon, led by First Lieutenant Waheed U. Khan;

BLT 1/1’s light armored reconnaissance company

and BLT 3/6’s light armored reconnaissance platoon,

led by Major Impellitteri; and elements of Company

K, led by Captain Todd S. Tomko.15 While operating

under tactical control of BLT 3/6 at the time,

Impellitteri was responsible for navigation during the

movement, and his company served as the raid

force’s security element. Due to the distances

involved in the operation, the raid force relied on

223

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

Photo by LtCol Jerome M. Lynes

LtCol Jerome M. Lynes, commander of Battalion Landing Team 3/6, uses a terrain model to explain the scheme of maneuver to

be employed while raiding a suspected al-Qaeda garrison in Maiwand. The rehearsal of concepts drill occurred at Kandahar

International Airport on 31 December 2001.
tactical satellite radios to maintain communication

with higher headquarters; Colonel Lynes later learned

that personnel as far away as the U.S. European

Command Center had monitored his progress.16

The Marines departed at 0030 on 1 January

2002, heading north on Highway 4 in a column of

8 humvees and 15 light armored vehicles. Upon

reaching the southern entrance to Kandahar, they

stopped at an Afghan military checkpoint and linked

up with 15 of Sharzai’s militiamen who would

accompany them on the raid. They also linked up

with a CIA officer and several special forces soldiers

from Operational Detachment Alpha 583.17

Major Impellitteri had met Siddiqullah, the

Afghan leader, earlier, remembering that he had

fought as a member of the mujahideen as a teenager

and “had the eyes of a stone-cold professional

soldier.”18 He also noted that the Afghans, lacking

tactical vehicles, rode in yellow Datsun station

wagon taxies. After tucking the civilian vehicles into

the military convoy, the Marines headed west on

Highway 1 for approximately an hour, toward an

objective rally point located approximately six miles

from the target.19 Meanwhile, Impellitteri contacted

the two armored reconnaissance platoon

commanders in Garmabak Ghar by radio, briefly

explained the concept of operations, and directed

them to join the raid force as it proceeded west. He

later recalled,

I told them the positions that I wanted them to

operate in, but by this time, you don’t have to

give a five-paragraph order anymore. It’s

actually a waste of time because everybody

knows what they need to do. They just need to

be given a specific task.20

The raid force reached its rally point and linked

up with the seven LAV-25s from Garmabak Ghar

early that morning. While maintaining blackout

224

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020101-N-2383B-502

Members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit raid a suspected al-Qaeda garrison in Maiwand, Afghanistan, on 1 January

2002. They were searching for weapons, ammunition, and intelligence sources to exploit.
conditions and remaining alert to any threat, the

Marines made final preparations for the assault.

Working under the low illumination of chemical

lights with maps and aerial photographs spread

across the front of his humvee, Colonel Lynes

explained the scheme of maneuver to an interpreter,

who then translated the information for Siddiqullah.

One last minute change was to have the militiamen

form the “assault element” rather than the force

reconnaissance platoon, as originally planned. The

advantage of having the Afghan fighters participate

in the search was that they could quickly differentiate

innocent civilians from the Taliban.21

The raid force stepped off at 0400, after

completing its back briefs, rehearsals, and weapons

checks. During its movement toward the objective,

it received reports from a Navy P-3 Orion flying

overhead that personnel were moving about the

complex. After coming within a kilometer of the

garrison, Major Impellitteri split off with his light

armored reconnaissance company to secure an outer

cordon around the garrison. As the armored vehicles

were pulling into position, the dismounted troops

approached the first of 14 separate walled

compounds.22 Flying overhead, a Huey and two

Cobra helicopters and two Harrier jets* stood ready

to provide close air support.23

By 0530, Captain Tomko and Company K had

established a second inner cordon, and the assault

force was poised to enter the compound at its

predesignated location. In the predawn light, as part

of a coordinated diversion, a Cobra helicopter flew

over the 14-foot adobe walls and confirmed activity

within the enclosure. Marines would later learn that

their raid had coincided with the villagers’ call to

prayer, perhaps contributing to their ability to

approach the objective undetected.24

225

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN

Smiling children wave at members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit following a raid on a suspected al-Qaeda military

garrison in Maiwand on 1 January 2002. Although prepared to engage hardened enemy fighters, the Marines attracted the

interest of curious Afghan villagers after their search was complete.

*The Harriers had been flown into Kandahar the previous evening and represented the first fixed-wing tactical aircraft to land and take off from

Afghanistan. (HMM-365 ComdC 2001, 8)
Colonel Lynes gave the command to begin the

assault, and the Coalition force quickly entered the

gated compound with their weapons raised. A loud

verbal exchange ensued between the Afghan

militiamen and village elders, although after several

minutes, the locals signaled their willingness to

cooperate. Assisted by an interpreter, Marines from

Company K escorted the male Afghans into a

temporary holding area outside the compound,

while a guarded elder sequestered the women and

children in an “enclosed location in order to adhere

to sensitivities of local customs.”25 Augmented by

explosive ordnance personnel, the raid force then

swept the compound, clearing each room.

During the next six hours, the combined

American-Afghan force repeated the process at each

of the remaining compounds. Major Impellitteri

recalled,

For a while, the main compound itself had been

empty, and then all of a sudden there were 30

people, then there were 40 people, then there

were 50 or 60 people.... What it turned out to

be was that the locals had taken control [of]...

the garrison because it was nice for them to

own, because they lived there.... And when the

Taliban were gone, they scavenged everything

that they possibly could, and they took

possession of whatever was there.26

After searching the last compound, the raid force

collapsed the outer cordon and retired to their

objective rally point, shifting its location several

kilometers to avoid revealing their position. The

Marines waited patiently until 2300 before starting

back to Kandahar, hoping to decrease the chance of

an inadvertent incident by passing through the city late

at night. They finally returned to the airport at 0500

on 2 January, just 36 hours after departing the Marine

base. Reports of the results varied from one account

that stated, “The mission was a total success with a

large weapons cache and countless intelligence

documents recovered” to another that said, “The site

was unmanned and no significant numbers of

weapons or communications equipment were

found.”27

For Central Command and Pentagon officials,

the mission was likely the source of unexpected

controversy. During a news briefing on 2 January,

for example, one reporter asked why the Marines

had required 200 personnel to accomplish the

mission. Although Admiral Stufflebeem was

admittedly unaware of the “specifics and numbers,”

he replied that doctrinally, Marines train to be selfcontained; they take a relatively heavy force for

perimeter security when they do a survey evaluation

or security operation, and they secure the facility

inside as well. This, he said, is the doctrinal

difference between how the Marines and how other

special operating forces train and do their work,

which may be lighter and with fewer forces.28

Even more problematic, while Hamid Karzai

implied that the Marines were involved in a massive

manhunt for the Taliban’s leader,29 Central

Command reportedly “stuck to its position that...

no Marines left the Kandahar base on Monday on a

mission related to the hunt for Mullah Omar, saying

that movements at the time may have been

misinterpreted by people who saw them.”30 Interestingly, Lieutenant Lennon, who had participated in

the raid, later recalled that Omar had been rumored

to have used the Maiwand facility as a hideout in the

past. Perhaps the fugitive’s absence during the raid

influenced his opinion regarding the outcome of the

operation: “Nothing significant came of it. Just a

good opportunity to get out there and go through

the planning steps and actually execute.”31

In addition to asking about the size and purpose

of the raid force, on 3 January members of the media

questioned General Myers during a news briefing

about the motive behind Central Command’s

apparent difference of opinion regarding Marine

involvement during the New Year’s Day operation:

Can you clarify then what it was that the Marine

helicopters that were seen taking off from

Kandahar on Monday, fully loaded in combat

gear—were those Marines part of that New

Year’s Day operation?... The reason that I ask

is because when photographers saw those

pictures, they then asked U.S. Central

226

FROM THE SEA
Command if in fact something—some

operation was underway. Central Command

very clearly said “No, there is nothing underway,

there is nothing planned.” And then it seemed

like just 12 or 14 hours later, that in fact an

operation was being talked about by Central

Command, and I’m just wondering how that

comports with the secretary’s statement early

on in this war that the Pentagon would never

lie, because that was the impression that some

people might have been left with.32

General Myers replied awkwardly, “I don’t know

the details.... I’m sure there is some confusion over

the details.” Secretary Rumsfeld then responded, “I was

on vacation... but my recollection was that at one

point there were some evidence gatherers from the

Army, and someone may have gone to provide force

protection for them. But does anyone know the facts?

I don’t.” Next, Assistant Defense Secretary Victoria

Clarke confirmed, “There’s some confusion,” while

Rumsfeld sarcastically asked, “Is there?” and Myers

added, “There still may be confusion.” Rumsfeld finally

ended the embarrassing exchange, which challenged

the military’s integrity, by clarifying that “any suggestion

that it’s intentional, I think, would be improper.”33

Marines may have come to mind—as a possible

ramification of the debate over the details of the

Maiwand mission—when, at a news briefing on 14

January, Admiral Stufflebeem cautiously replied to

reporters’ questions regarding U.S. forces conducting searches on their own or with Afghan assistance:

I’ll be careful to say that I just haven’t seen that

we have had forces that just go out on their

own, looking for caves, which is not to say that

there haven’t been. You’ve seen the Marines

mount up in their armored vehicles and go off

and do a surveillance and evaluation mission. I

don’t know that they had anti-Taliban forces

with them in every case that they did that. So

I’ll suspect that in the majority, we’re following

the leads and being assisted by anti-Taliban

forces to show us. And in cases where we may

develop intelligence that leads us to an area

where there aren’t anti-Taliban forces to take us

there, then I’m sure we’ve gone or will go.34

Islam Darreh Cave Complex

On 4 January, a flight of seven helicopters (an

AH-1W, a UH-1N, and six CH-46s) from HMM-365

inserted elements of Task Force 64 and the 26th

MEU into Islam Darreh, a cave complex located 37

miles northwest of Kandahar. The raid force

inspected the former al-Qaeda facility for evidence

of chemical and biological weapons and destroyed a

cache of land mines before being extracted five

hours after landing.35

Lashkar Gah Command and Control

Center

After monitoring a suspected enemy command

and control facility southwest of Lashkar Gah for

more than a week, Task Force 58 decided to exploit

the target by conducting a combined ground and air

assault.36 At Kandahar on 4 January, senior leaders

and staff from each of the 26th MEU’s major

commands began to organize a company-sized raid

for the following day. As the planners worked out

the details of the operation, radio and force

reconnaissance detachments headed to FOB Rhino,

now abandoned, and began conducting directional

finding and signal intelligence operations against

suspected opposing forces in the objective area.37

Major Wesley Feight would serve as the raid

force commander. First Lieutenant William L.

Lombardo would lead the support element,

including 1st Platoon, Company I, reinforced by

assault and machine gun squads from the company’s

weapons platoon. Captain Khan would lead the

assault element, composed of 26th MEU’s force

reconnaissance platoon, an explosive ordnance team

from MEU Service Support Group 26 (MSSG 26),

and five Afghan militiamen.38 Members of Task

Force 64, who had already been operating in the area

for several days, would also lend a hand. The

combined forces’ target was a cluster of structures

located approximately 50 miles southwest of

Kandahar. Objective 1, a large compound with 17-

foot walls, contained one building; Objective 2,

situated along to the northwest side of the

compound, was a large one-story complex

227

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions
consisting of many small rooms; and Objective 3,

an isolated building, was located to the southeast and

separated from the compound.39

The heliborne assault force departed Kandahar

around 1600 on 5 January, flying in two waves

escorted by one Huey and three Cobras from

HMM-365. An hour later, a detachment from the

New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) initiated

the attack by isolating the objective area. It

established two blocking positions along the main

road, situated several kilometers to the north and

south of the target.40

Following a quick aerial reconnaissance by one of

the Cobras, the first division of four Sea Knights

descended into Landing Zone Finch around 1700,

located 200 meters west of the central compound.41

This wave carried the raid force’s command and

support elements. Once on the ground, Lieutenant

Lombardo’s platoon established positions covering the

southern and western approaches to the compound.

The Marines spotted 4 Afghan men standing near the

gated entrance to Objective 1 and 15 to 20 Afghans

running from Objective 3; many in the latter group

dropped to their knees and began to pray.42

The second division of four Sea Knights landed

two minutes later. Captain Khan’s assault element

moved quickly past the infantry positions to

Objective 1 and made contact with the compound’s

inhabitants. The anti-Taliban forces advised the local

Afghans to disarm and cooperate, which they

immediately did. Although the men claimed to

support Governor Sharzai, Major Feight decided to

detain them as a precaution until he could verify

their identity. After the assault element had cleared

the building associated with Objective 1, searching

carefully from room to room, 1st Platoon assumed

responsibility for guarding the structure and

detainees. The reconnaissance platoon then cleared

Objectives 2 and 3. During a general search of the

228

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020105-N-2383B-521

Three CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 prepare to take off from Kandahar

International Airport on 5 January 2002. They are transporting members of the of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit during a

raid against a suspected al-Qaeda command and control facility in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan.
main compound, they recovered a radio, a machine

gun, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher with six

projectiles, four assault rifles, a large quantity of

small arms ammunition, and documents believed to

be of intelligence value. The Marines also recovered

quantities of Afghan and Pakistani cash and “a

powdery substance believed to be drugs.”43

As the inspection occurred, large numbers of

civilians approached the security forces on foot and

in vehicles. The Marines adjusted their positions

around the complex to better address the threat,

while the NZSAS trailed a car that had circumvented

their roadblock. Fortunately, neither of these

advances turned hostile, and the raid force was able

to complete its mission without incident.44

Extraction from the objective area involved two

waves of four CH-46 helicopters, which arrived

shortly after sunset. Unfortunately, one of the

aircraft in the first wave damaged its landing gear

while setting down.45 After shuffling manifests to

maintain accountability, Marines scheduled to travel

on the damaged helicopter redistributed themselves

among the remaining aircraft and the extraction

proceeded as planned.46 The Marines eventually

returned the damaged aircraft to Kandahar, where

they dismantled it and put it on a C-17 transport for

shipment back to the United States.47

Because the Marines had not yet verified the

identity of the four Afghan men seized at Objective

1, Major Feight decided to bring them back to

Kandahar for temporary detainment in the shortterm holding facility—it was later determined that

the detainees were drug runners rather than alQaeda or Taliban fighters. Colonel Frick reflected,

“Overall, the raid executed on the Lashkar Gah C2

node was a complete success with a large quantity

of weapons, ammunition, and radios recovered.”48

Ironically, although Task Force 58 had been

informing higher headquarters of its progress in

developing the target during daily intention

messages, the speed with which the Marines had

planned and conducted the operation* apparently

surprised Central Command.49

Zhawar Kili Cave Complex

While mopping-up operations progressed at

Tora Bora, Central Command shifted its efforts

toward other sites in the mountainous region of

eastern Afghanistan—potential havens where some

Pentagon officials indicated the Taliban were

attempting to regroup.50 As Admiral Stufflebeem

later summarized during a news briefing,

There is evidence that individuals who were

likely dispersed and ran away from whatever

uncomfortable circumstance they were previously in are trying to find security. Finding

security, of course, in this part of the country

traditionally is with numbers. So we are...

actively looking for and being very attentive to

any collection of al-Qaeda fighters or proTaliban people, whether singly or together. We’ll

go wherever they are to find them and to root

them out.

This entire part of the country is riddled with

hillsides and valleys of caves and above-ground

structures. And so, as we have been doing, we’ll

continue to look for where al-Qaeda forces are,

where pro-Taliban forces are, and the facilities

that they have used in the past. And when we

find them, we’ll search them. We’ll continue to

build intelligence. And then, if appropriate,

we’ll destroy them.

The Khost province, the Paktia province, have

been known to be recent havens where alQaeda last was. There are indicators there are

elements and pockets that are still in this area,

and therefore, our special operating forces and

the anti-Taliban forces are working

systematically to find these caves, take them

away, and, if they encounter anybody, to go

ahead and engage them.51

229

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

*This may have been the incident mentioned by BGen Mattis and Col Lethin, in which the Marines’ decision to conduct an operation without higher

headquarters-specific approval had irritated a watch officer on the land component. If so, it is interesting to speculate whether previous confusion over the

Maiwand raid had tainted Central Command’s enthusiasm to the Marines’ initiative.
One of these locations was Zhawar Kili, located

30 miles southwest of Khost and only 2.5 miles

from the Pakistani border. Encompassing a 3- by 3-

mile area, the massive cave complex was oriented

along a large canyon facing to the southwest.52 It

contained one surface facility with more than 60

structures and two separate subterranean facilities

with more than 50 caves. The site also possessed a

long history: mujahideen had first used it as a

support base during the Soviet-Afghan War, and the

United States had targeted the facility in retaliation

for terrorist attacks conducted against the American

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.53 Most recently,

Taliban and al-Qaeda forces had been using the site

as a headquarters, logistics base, and training camp.54

Coalition forces had already bombed the complex

in November and December 2001 and then hit it again

on the morning of 3 January 2002 after observing alQaeda forces attempting to regroup.55 The third attack

had included multiple strikes by four sea-based F-18

fighters as well as four land-based Rockwell B-1 Lancer

bombers and an AC-130 gunship.56 Following the third

bombing, Marines and sailors from Task Force K-Bar

and the 26th MEU would inspect the facility, which

turned out to be the largest of all exploited al-Qaeda

cave sites and resulted in the destruction of hundreds

of tons of ordnance.57 Because higher headquarters

had not realized the full extent of the tunnel complex

until the ground forces had examined it, the search

mission gradually extended from 12-hours to 8-days

duration.58 The Marines subsequently dubbed their

expedition “Gilligan’s Patrol” after the popular 1960sera television program.59

Task Force 58 began planning for the Zhawar

Kili exploitation mission on 4 January, preparing to

provide security—as well as quick reaction and

tactical recovery forces—to Task Force K-Bar.60

Around 0100 on 5 January, Captain Lloyd D.

Freeman received word that Company L, BLT 3/6,

was going to support Echo Platoon, SEAL Team 3,

which was organizing to inspect the al-Qaeda cave

complex. After discussing the mission with

Lieutenant Commander Todd J. Seniff, USN, and

Lieutenant Christopher J. Cassidy, USN, Freeman

and 50 Marines from 1st and 2d Platoons conducted

raid rehearsals with the 25 SEALs at around 1400.

They received a mission briefing, went over the load

plan, test-fired weapons, and were even issued 250

pounds of Composition 4 plastic explosives to

destroy the caves.61

230

FROM THE SEA

Official Department of Defense photo.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 980820-O-0000X-002

A Department of Defense photo used to illustrate missile

strikes against the Zhawar Kili al-Badr Camp on 20 August

1998. Three and a half years later, the vast cave complex was

found to have served as a sanctuary for retreating al-Qaeda

and Taliban forces, and it produced large amounts of

weapons, ammunition, and intelligence materials when

cleared by Marines and Navy SEALs.

Official Department of Defense photo.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020114-n-8242c-010/dn-sd-04-127700

Sailors of SEAL Team 3 inspect the entrance to an enemy cave

complex in Zhawar Kili, Afghanistan, on 14 January 2002.

This was only one of 70 caves discovered by sailors and

Marines during their two week search-and-destroy mission.
The raid force launched from Kandahar at 0430

on 6 January. Heading north on board four CH-53

aircraft from HMM-365, with Major Peter S. Gadd

serving as the air mission commander, they reached

Helicopter Landing Zone Rattler at 0625.62 The

insert was unopposed, although an overhead P-3

warned of activity in a village situated 500 meters

north of the landing zone.63

The raid force headed west, up the main wadi (a

dry desert riverbed that fills up during the rainy

season), bypassing an apparently unoccupied village

to the north and eventually reached the cave

complex around 0900. The Marines and sailors

discovered a Soviet T-54 tank, three armored

personnel carriers, and a variety of artillery and

antiaircraft cannon abandoned in front of the

facility’s entrance. With Lieutenant Ford and 1st

Platoon securing the area to the northeast, and

Lieutenant Solomon and 3d Platoon securing the

area to the southwest, the SEALs began inspecting

the first 15 caves, discovering ammunition,

explosives, and nine new AN/PRC-117 tactical

radios. At the same time, a Marine security patrol

from 3d Platoon discovered an old gravesite and

hastily camouflaged tent, although there was not

sufficient time to inspect the burial area before the

Marines’ scheduled extraction.64

After the SEALs had set explosive charges to

destroy the war material and collapse the caves at

approximately 1400, the raid force headed east

toward Helicopter Landing Zone Boa. The Marine

rifle platoons secured the north and south ends of

the zone and prepared to depart, but at 1520 they

learned that the extraction had been postponed.

While waiting, three armed civilians approached the

SEALs and claimed that several days earlier “a lot

231

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

Official Department of Defense photo. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020114-n-8242c-004/dn-sd-04-127768

Sailors from SEAL Team 3 inspect a munitions cache discovered in an enemy cave complex in Zhawar Kili on 14 January 2002.

After intelligence materials were recovered from sites such as this, Coalition aircraft were called in to destroy the facilities.
of bad people headed this way and crossed over

into Pakistan.”65 With the extraction delayed,

Lieutenant Commander Seniff decided to return to

the village near Landing Zone Rattler for the night

and, after a small SEAL patrol reconnoitered the

site to ensure that it was vacant, the raid force

occupied the village.66

The possibility of a quiet evening ended

abruptly around 1900 when the SEAL commander

received orders to return to the complex and inspect

the gravesite. He quickly assembled a 14-man patrol,

composed of 2 SEALs, 2 Air Force combat

controllers, and 10 Marines. After consolidating their

remaining water supplies, the patrol stepped off

around 0100 on the morning of 7 January. They

headed quietly back up the streambed and when they

were within 500 meters of the complex, an Air

Force AC-130 gunship suppressed the target with its

cannon. As the patrol attempted to approach the

caves once the firing had stopped, secondary

explosions from enemy munitions ignited during the

air attack halted their progress. Lieutenant Cassidy

determined that since current conditions were too

dangerous for the force to pass through the complex

area and they did not have enough time to find an

alternate route around the facility, they should

withdraw to the village and wait for the extraction.67

When extraction of the raid force was

postponed a second time, the SEAL commander

sent a patrol to assess battle damage to another

complex situated to the south, which had also been

struck by AC-130 gunships during the previous

evening. As the patrol approached the cave entrance,

it encountered five or six men with small arms. The

SEALs immediately requested close air support,

guiding a B-52 joint direct attack munitions strike

against the squad-sized force. This effectively

silenced the resistance, enabling the SEALs to search

the area. They recovered several weapons, although

there were no human remains.68

Lieutenant Ford led another joint patrol back

up the wadi at 0700 to inspect the gravesite, which

turned out to contain the remains of individuals

killed during the 1998 U.S. missile strike.69

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Solomon ran security patrols

along a ridge situated north of the camp to prevent

possible enemy infiltration from several villages

located on the reverse side of the high ground.70

After the combined force had identified additional

subterranean structures, F-14 and F-18 aircraft

dropped precision-guided bombs on the complex

during two sorties flown between 0330 and 0630 the

following morning.71

Around 0945 on 8 January, Marines at an

observation post near the base camp spotted a jeep

heading swiftly up the canyon toward the cave

complex. Sergeant Brown gathered his squad and

moved quickly to intercept the vehicle. They squad

encountered four individuals, with the driver armed

with a pistol and global positioning system device.

After learning of the incident, Lieutenant

Commander Seniff sent an interpreter and an agent

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the

location to identify the men’s affiliation.* Following a

rudimentary interrogation of the detainees, the

Americans decided to send the four men back to

Kandahar for further questioning that evening, on

board one of several CH-53s that were arriving with

supplies for the exploitation force.72 Corporal Hayes,

one of two Marines assigned to escort the detainees,

carried a note from Captain Freeman to Colonel

Lynes, the commander of BLT 3/6:

Things are going great out here. We have been

doing everything from digging graves to

clearing rooms of deserted villages. We are

presently ensconced in an abandoned

compound, which was hastily deserted. The

Marines found seven Pakistani passports, which

have turned out to be very valuable. Have sent

out four patrols over the past two days; Lt

Solomon discovered a bunker up about 500 feet

from where we are. The air guys got his grid

232

FROM THE SEA

*An agent from the FBI accompanied Task Force K-Bar on this mission. If the SEALs detained a suspected terrorist who might later be tried in a court

of law, the FBI agent would be able to establish a continuous chain of custody. (Crist comments)
233

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

and plan on JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack

Munitions] for it when we leave. I was on our

first night patrol the first night with an AC-130

prepping our objective—very impressive. The

air guys have been very busy with JDAMs and

bunker busters landing daily and nightly...

shakes our compound. This area is target rich.73

On the same day, the force began to focus on

three villages located west of the complex, rumored

to serve as residences for al-Qaeda and Taliban

troops not inhabiting the caves, and a Marine

reconnaissance patrol departed to observe the sites

for enemy activity.74 Around the same time that the

squad had halted the jeep, a SEAL team entering one

of the villages spotted five individuals attempting to

flee. Although the team asked for permission to

employ close air support against the group,

Lieutenant Commander Seniff decided that they had

not demonstrated hostile intent and denied the

request. The SEAL force continued to run local

security patrols and watch over the villages throughout the remainder of the day and into the next to

prevent enemy interference with the base camp.75

By 10 January, the Marines had started to use the

jeep commandeered two days earlier to insert patrols

closer to observation posts overlooking the western

village. After dismounting at the designated drop-off

point, one of the patrols climbed to the top of the

ridge and discovered an enemy bivouac site containing

a sniper rifle, grenade launcher, four rocket-propelled

grenades, and three sleeping bags. The patrol

speculated that, given the terrain and proximity to the

road, an unidentified force had occupied the site

during the night and intended to ambush the jeep

before departing hastily as the foot mobile patrol

approached. After linking up with a SEAL team, the

Marines brought the weapons and ammunition back

to their base camp.76 Coalition aircraft resumed

bombing of the caves and tunnels at Zhawar Kili at

around 1830 that evening, lasting for more than seven

hours and dropping 44 precision weapons.77

At 0500 the next day, 3d Platoon and the

SEALs headed back up the canyon to inspect the

three villages located west of the cave complex;

Lieutenant Solomon and 1st Platoon remained

behind to provide base security. With two infantry

squads occupying high ground on both sides of the

wadi, Lieutenant Ford’s third squad searched a

village to the north side and the SEALs searched

two others to the south. These inspections produced

additional weapons, ammunition, and enemy

propaganda, including posters of American

skyscrapers. Before leaving, the patrol set explosive

charges to collapse any caves that the bombers had

not destroyed.78

The Marines and sailors continued to run

security and reconnaissance patrols and exploit the

cave complexes for several more days. Around 0800

on the morning of 14 January, four CH-53

helicopters extracted the exploitation force and two

desert patrol vehicles from Landing Zone Rattler to

Bagram Airfield.79 Upon completion of the

exploitation phase, B-1, B-52, and F-18 aircraft

delivered more than 120 precision bombs against the

cave complexes, raising the total amount of ordnance

dropped on the facilities to around 406,000 pounds.80

Speaking during a Pentagon news briefing, Admiral

Photo by LCpl Nathan E. Eason

Explosions erupt from enemy tunnels destroyed by Marines of

Battalion Landing Team 3/6 on 15 January 2002. The tunnels

were part of the massive cave complex near Zhawar Kili,

which contained large quantities of weapons, ammunition,

and intelligence materials.
Stufflebeem confirmed that during the weekend they

had leveled the remaining surface structures and

closed all the caves they did not want reoccupied.81

After transferring to a Marine KC-130, the

exploitation force continued on to Kandahar,

arriving back at their base around 1250.82 During

their eight days on the ground, SEAL team 3-E “and

the supporting Marines found numerous documents

and other items of intelligence value, including one

poster of bin Laden complete with a plane crashing

into a building in the background... and killed an

estimated 10–15 Taliban.”83

Khost-Gardez Mission Planning and

Band-e Sardeh Airfield Survey

Concurrent with the Zhawhar Kili mission,

Task Force 58 received Fragmentary Order 06 to

Operations Order 02-021 from General Mikolashek

on 5 January.84 This document directed that the

Marines begin planning for operations in the rugged

Khost-Gardez region of eastern Afghanistan, where

numerous pockets of resistance remained active. For

the moment, it looked as if the 26th MEU might

now employ the cold-weather gear originally

procured for 15th MEU operations at Tora Bora.85

The Marines not only believed that a significant

force would be required to achieve General Franks’s

goal of preventing the enemy’s escape, but they also

anticipated that their ability to contribute combat

power to the fight would increase as the Army relief

force began to assume the security mission at

Kandahar airport, originally scheduled to start in five

days. The staff envisioned a joint-combined effort

involving elements from Task Forces 58, 64, and KBar. In addition to providing security for the special

operating forces, conventional Marine forces would

be available to serve as a “hammer” to smash any

opposition, if required. This plan, which appeared

more in line with Central Command’s concept for

continuing operations, represented a shift from the

one devised earlier for Tora Bora, where Marine fire

support outposts would have served as the “anvil.”86

Because the distance from Kandahar to Gardez

was almost 250 miles, General Mattis determined

that he would likely need to establish an intermediate

support base closer to the area if his Marines were

to facilitate the destruction of remaining al-Qaeda

forces, prevent their escape, and exploit intelligence

sources in a timely manner.87 This, in turn, required

Task Force 58 to find a suitable airfield from which

to operate its KC-130 transports for the delivery of

sustainment to additional forces. In addition to

Marine forces arriving by air, a platoon of light

armored vehicles could also convoy north from

Kandahar, reaching the Khost-Gardez region within

40 hours. Once in position, Task Force 58 “would be

able to ‘pounce’ on actionable intelligence in the area

as it developed and if tasked.”88

After considering the merits of two local airfields, Task Force 58 tentatively decided that an

airport near the Band-e Sardeh Dam would be the

best location for an intermediate support base.

234

FROM THE SEA

Official Department of Defense photo.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020114-n-8242c-005/dn-sd-04-12769

Al-Qaeda propaganda recovered from a cave complex in

Zhawar Kili. In addition to an image of Osama bin Laden,

the poster also depicts a U.S. missile and fighter jets as well as

a passenger airliner and the World Trade Center.
Located only 18 miles southeast of Ghazni,

Afghanistan, it possessed a nearly 7,000-foot runway

and would enable the Marines to deploy a quick

reaction force by air or land within an hour, rather

than the two and a half hours currently required to

reach the area from Kandahar.89 Busy planning for

the on-order assignment, Colonel Lynes and the

BLT 3/6 staff envisioned a coordinated air-ground

assault in which two rifle companies would arrive by

helicopter while Task Force Sledgehammer would

travel overland.90

The next step was to conduct a formal

assessment of the airfield capabilities. Elements

from Task Force 64 who had driven north from

Kandahar to exploit sensitive sites in the region

established surveillance and reconnaissance over the

airfield.91 After planning the operation for several

days, 26th MEU delivered its confirmation brief on

14 January. Shortly afterward, three CH-53s from

HMM-365 inserted Task Force K-Bar’s “Jaguar”

team into Band-e Sardeh, situated in a valley two

miles north of Lake Mota Khan.92 In addition to

explosive ordinance disposal technicians, members

of the joint special operations team included

Marines from HMM-365 and the force

reconnaissance platoon as well as personnel from

the Air Force special tactics squadron and Navy

SEAL teams. After extracting the survey team on 18

January, headquarters determined that the location

was unsuitable for aviation operations.93 In the end,

arrival of the Army relief force would be delayed by

competing strategic airlift priorities, and “the Khost

operation would never require a sizeable Task Force

58 presence and, eventually, became a series of

independent, yet linked, operations conducted by

many different organizations.”94

Tori Khel

On 19 January, two CH-53 helicopters from

HMM-365 inserted Norwegian special forces into

the Tori Khel compound, located near Ghazni in

eastern Afghanistan. Taliban leadership had

reportedly used the site in the past and B-52

bombers and AC-130 gunships had struck it during

December 2001.95 The special operations forces

team was reportedly searching for evidence of

terrorists who they suspected had been killed during

the bombing, but no remains were discovered.96

After spending a night in Bagram, the two aircraft

returned the next morning and extracted the

Norwegian ground forces.97

Hazar Qadam

On the evening of 23 January, Task Force K-Bar

exploited two compounds in Hazar Qadam, a village

located approximately 18 miles southwest of Tarin

Kowt in Uruzgan Province. Flying in support of the

mission, two CH-53s from HMM-365 inserted special

forces teams near the western target—labeled

Objective Kelly—while three Army Boeing CH-47

Chinooks inserted special forces near the eastern

target, labeled Brigid. Although the raid force

encountered only limited resistance at Kelly,

militiamen at Brigid fought tenaciously. When the

operation was complete, Coalition forces had detained

27 individuals, killed 16 others, and seized documents

and radios. At one point, a wounded fighter attacked

a Marine interpreter helping to search the area, but the

assault troops quickly killed the attacker.98 Although

the assault force would shortly realize that their

235

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

Official Department of Defense photo.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: RS537619

Prestrike image of a Taliban compound in Tori Khel,

Afghanistan. Aircrews from Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 365 inserted Norwegian special forces into the site

on 19 January 2002 to search for enemy fighters killed

during a previous bombing raid.
intelligence had been obsolete and that the

compound’s residents had recently proclaimed their

allegiance to the new Afghan government, Secretary

Rumsfeld later put the unfortunate incident in

perspective: “It is no mistake at all, if you’re fired on,

to fire back.”99 Privately, however, the miscalculation

agitated Rumsfeld, and higher headquarters soon

inquired as to whether the assault force had possessed

interpreters who spoke the local language; fortunately,

it had the two enlisted Marines from Task Force 58.100

Khost Security Mission

Toward mid-January, following the murder of

an American soldier and as the declining security

environment threatened to derail Coalition activities

in the Khost-Gardez region, 26th MEU received

orders to provide a small detachment to guard a joint

special operations forces (Task Force 11/Sword)

safe house in Khost for 30 days.101 The structure was

situated next to an airfield renamed in honor of

Sergeant First Class Nathan R. Chapman, who had

become the first American soldier killed by hostile

fire in Afghanistan when his special forces element

was ambushed in the area.102

Although Captain Jeffrey S. McCormack

subsequently deployed to the area with 77 Marines

from BLT 3/6’s Headquarters and Service Company

on 16 January, inclement weather encountered along

the way forced a delay at Bagram Air Base before

they finally arrived two days later.103 After arrival, they

provided security for the building and compound

and established a 300-meter security perimeter.

Although never physically engaged during their 13-

day mission, the Marines’ situation was nonetheless

tenuous.104 Their positions were essentially on open

ground, and in the months following their departure,

for example, hostile forces twice assaulted the camp

with rockets, mortars, and infantry.105

Tragedy struck Task Force 58 around 0730 on

the morning of 20 January during an air mission to

supply fuel to Marines operating in the region.106

After spending the night in Bagram, one of two

flights of Super Stallion helicopters departed the

airfield and headed south toward Khost.107 While

transiting the rugged terrain approximately 200 feet

above ground level, the number one engine on the

trailing CH-53E flamed out. The aircraft, piloted by

Captain Douglass V. Glasgow, lost power and

crashed into a 9,800-foot mountain 40 miles

southeast of Kabul.108

Looking rearward from the lead helicopter, the

crew chief realized that the second aircraft was no

longer visible and noticed a cloud of smoke

billowing from behind a ridgeline. He informed the

pilot, Captain Alison J. Thompson, who quickly

reversed course and flew toward the smoke.

Thompson circled the crash site several times after

locating the aircraft hulk at the base of a snowcovered valley surrounded by soaring ridgelines.

Although she made repeated attempts to contact the

crew of the downed helicopter, they failed to

answer, and there were no visible signs of

movement among the wreckage. She also tried

unsuccessfully to contact an orbiting Air Force

Boeing E-3 Sentry airborne warning control system

aircraft. Believing that the crew had died in the crash

and hesitant to land at such a high altitude,

particularly when the ground threat remained

uncertain, Thompson reluctantly headed toward

Bagram to notify authorities and acquire help.109

Although initially knocked unconscious during

the accident, Captain Glasgow awoke to find

himself inside a burning hulk. Disregarding his

broken wrist, he helped four other injured crew

members escape the helicopter, gathering them in a

tight circle, and then recovered the bodies of two

Marines before fire consumed the aircraft. The

surviving crew members were Captain William J.

Cody and Corporals David J. Lynn, Ivan A

Montanez, and Stephen A. Sullivan.110 The deceased

were Staff Sergeant Walter F. Cohee III, a 26-yearold communications navigation system technician

from Maryland, and Sergeant Dwight J. Morgan, a

24-year-old helicopter mechanic from California.111

After stomping an SOS signal in the snow, Glasgow

rendered what aid he could to the injured and waited

for help to arrive.112

236

FROM THE SEA
Coalition forces monitoring the area by an

unmanned Predator aircraft saw the SOS and

initiated the dispatch of rescue aircraft.113 Given the

variety of special and conventional forces operating

in the area, there was some confusion regarding who

had the authority to originate a rescue operation and

who would provide security. Although the joint

search and rescue center in Saudi Arabia launched

Air Force Sikorsky HH-60 Pave Hawk and MH-53

Pave Low helicopters from different bases toward

the crash site, the aircraft were several hours away,

and it was the height of winter in Afghanistan. Task

Force Dagger subsequently ordered crews from the

Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

to conduct the rescue mission, supported by an

operational detachment from 5th Special Forces

Group for security.114

At 0950, 90 minutes after the initial alert, two

MH-47E Chinook helicopters lifted off from

Bagram and quickly completed the 17-minute flight

to the crash site. The first helicopter landed 50 feet

left of the wrecked fuselage, while the other

remained overhead to coordinate with tankers,

fighters, and other rescue aircraft. The scene was

later described in the special forces history:

The crash site was horrible.... In stark contrast

to the snow were grotesque charred and

blackened chunks of cabin. The rotor blades

stuck up from the ground like obscene

memorials. About 30 feet beyond was an

unidentifiable section of the cockpit that had

broken off on impact and had not caught on

fire. Nothing in the wreckage was taller than 3

feet high.115

As the reaction force secured the area, the

rescue team approached the Marines, huddled off

to the side of the aircraft hulk—Captain Glasgow

was able to walk to the waiting helicopter, but the

four other surviving crew members required litter

transport. Once the survivors were safely loaded on

board, the second helicopter landed to recover the

two dead Marines and enhance security around the

site. The first helicopter then took off and evacuated

the wounded to Bagram, where elements of the

244th Forward Surgical Team provided medical

treatment before transferring them to Landstuhl,

Germany.116 Meanwhile, two of MSSG 26’s

engineers, Sergeant Raley and Lance Corporal

Player, were stranded at Band-e Sardeh with Task

Force 64, waiting three days for aerial extraction.117

Commenting on the crash during an appearance

on National Broadcasting Corporation’s (NBC’s)

Meet the Press, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented, “Your

heart just breaks every time something like this

happens.”118 On 22 January, Marines and soldiers at

Kandahar airport held a memorial service for their

fallen comrades. After asking that the dead be

granted “light, happiness, and peace,” Navy

Chaplain Joseph Scordo asked rhetorically, “What’s

it going to take, so the world is rid of terrorism? It’s

probably going to take some blood being spilled by

innocent people.”119 Citing President Bush’s warning

that the war would be long and require sacrifice,

Scordo continued, “Blood, sweat, and tears—we’ve

shed them and will probably continue to shed

them.... This is not a picnic, this is not a jamboree...

this is an ugly thing called war.”120

Staff Sergeant Larry J. Harrington and a squad

from BLT 3/6’s 81mm mortar platoon provided

security at the crash site on that same day, while an

investigator from the Naval Safety Center inspected

the wrecked Super Stallion and took photographs of

the scene for a mishap inquiry.121 After deeming the

helicopter unrecoverable, Captain Douglas W.

Glover, the team’s forward air controller, directed a

section of F-18s to drop precision guided munitions

on the remains of the aircraft to prevent pilfering

and the “compromise of sensitive equipment.”122

Back at Khost Airfield, the immediate threat

came from unexploded ordnance and surface-laid

landmines. When the Marines arrived, they

discovered unexploded ordnance in the safe house

and observed landmines scattered outside the

security perimeter, and intelligence reported that

antitank and antipersonnel mines covered the

runway. The security force had to contend with the

mine threat on several occasions: three encounters

237

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions
involved leaving the relative safety of the perimeter

to retrieve parachute-dropped supplies dropped

between 400 and 2,000 meters beyond the safe

house. In each case, explosive ordinance personnel

were able to clear a safe lane through the mines.123

As the only overt U.S. presence in the Khost area,

the safe house captured the attention of the region’s

local inhabitants and was constantly under

surveillance. In an effort to mitigate the risk of attacks

by those harboring ill will against the United States,

the Marines vigorously screened visitors, operated a

forward checkpoint to screen vehicles before they

entered the compound, and maintained local security

throughout the area. The concern about violence

intensified on 21 January, when an armed crowd

(chanting slogans that the Americans could not

understand) gathered along the road approximately 30

meters from the entry control point.124

The Marines quickly went to full alert and

reinforced the control point. Meanwhile, a group

of 30 protesters approached the compound and

demanded to speak with the senior American

representative. Tension remained high for the next

several hours, as the Afghans expressed their

frustration over the lack of governmental control

and security in Khost City, and the Americans

explained their role in Afghanistan. The size of the

crowd fluctuated from 150 to 300 people, with

isolated groups approaching the Marine checkpoint

throughout the day. As darkness approached,

approximately six hours after the protest had

begun, the crowd finally dispersed and calm

returned to the compound.125

Perhaps the most pressing threat came from

local militias competing for political control over the

region. The Marines frequently observed sporadic

exchanges of rifle fire among feuding factions at

night, and they witnessed firefights in proximity to

their position on two occasions. In the first case,

occurring around 1000 on 22 January, they watched

as militiamen traded rocket-propelled grenades and

238

FROM THE SEA

Photo by LCpl. Marcus L. Miller

U.S. Navy Cdr Joseph A. Scordo, a Catholic chaplain with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, delivers mass at Kandahar International Airport on 20 January 2002 in rememberance of the seven Marines who died in a KC-130 crash on 9 January 2002.
small arms fire only 400 meters from the safe house.

They repositioned themselves to defend the safe

house but otherwise withheld their fire in deference

to the established rules of engagement. In the

second case, occurring around 1820 on 24 January,

Marines guarding the entry control point, which was

100 meters from the safe house, witnessed a similar

exchange in which one militiaman died. The security

force went to full alert, while friendly Afghan forces

cleared the area and drove the hostiles away.126

The Marine security force was scheduled to begin

its withdrawal from Khost on 28 January.127 At 2000,

however, an Army CH-47 helicopter crashed short of

the southern end of the runway. The aircraft had been

carrying relief forces from the U.S. Army’s 3d Brigade

Combat Team. After clearing a hasty pathway through

the landmines, the Marines assisted in the evacuation

of 14 wounded soldiers from the aircraft.128

Although the initial security force returned to

the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group off the

Pakistani coast that evening, the 26th MEU

assembled a recovery force from BLT 3/6’s Mike

platoon (the security element for the expeditionary

unit’s maritime special purpose force) and returned

to the airfield. The recovery force guarded the crash

site throughout the night and into the next day,

retrieving a variety of documents, equipment, and

weapons from amid the scattered wreckage. They

also remained alert for the arrival of “unknown

extremists” (rumored to be planning a move against

the crash site) until formally relieved by Task Force

Rakkasan on 29 January.129

239

Sensitive Site Exploitation and Security Missions

Photo by SrA Latonia L. Brown, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020124-f-0362b-003/df-sd-04-12735

A Marine honor guard stands at attention as the remains of a comrade killed during a helicopter crash in Afghanistan are

offloaded from an Air Force C-5A Galaxy aircraft at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on 24 January 2002.

241

Reconstitution of the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit

Concurrent with conducting sensitive site

exploitation missions and planning to

establish a third forward operating base

in Jalalabad, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(15th MEU) had also begun preparing for its

reconstitution on board the USS Peleliu Amphibious

Ready Group (Peleliu ARG) off the Pakistani coast.

As Lieutenant Colonel Olson remarked, after

receiving the execute order on Christmas Eve, “The

challenges of getting out of Rhino were almost as

significant as getting in.”1 Although Forward

Operating Base Rhino (FOB Rhino) had played an

important role in the Marines’ success, the dirt

runway was rapidly approaching the end of its useful

life after 30 days of continuous operations.2

An Air Force assessment team had been

monitoring the airstrip on a daily basis, and it was

concerned that the growing deterioration would soon

become irreparable. Colonel Olson recalled, “It took

C-17s to move the heavy stuff.... I think the loadbearing rating... required a 9.0 for C-17 operations,

and by the time we were ready to leave Rhino, it was

all the way down to 9.2—a very small margin of

safety remaining before we would have to cease

operations. Task Force 58 evaluated a dry lakebed

approximately 10 kilometers from Rhino as an

alternate airfield just in case the runway did become

unusable.3 The 15th MEU’s site assessment team

determined that the location would likely work during

an emergency, but that, fortunately, was not necessary.

One of the 15th MEU’s most pressing

requirements was washing down its vehicles before

steaming back to California, a standard U.S. Customs

precaution to prevent agricultural contamination.

Colonel Olson explained that the Marines did not

want to go back to an intermediate site in Pakistan

where they would have to provide airfield security, as

they did at Jacobabad, or treat their own water, as in

Pasni. They were not welcome on Masirah Island,

Oman, and there was no room in Bahrain, but once

granted permission to use the U.S. Army facilities at

Camp Doha, Kuwait, the expeditionary unit’s

retrograde progressed rapidly. While some equipment

and most of the personnel flew to Pasni before

heading out to the ships, they flew 102 vehicles

directly from the two forward operating bases to

Kuwait on board KC-130 and C-17 transports.4

As the focus of Task Force 58’s operations shifted

toward Kandahar, airlift priorities alternated between

supporting 15th MEU’s withdrawal from FOB Rhino

and sustaining the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(26th MEU) and a growing number of Coalition

forces in Afghanistan and in Pasni, Shamsi, and

Jacobabad, Pakistan. Task force and expeditionary unit

planners monitored the fluctuating requirements

closely, holding daily meetings to assign priorities and

allocate both organic and intratheater airlift; Marine

Chapter 14

Winding Down

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

An Air Force C-17 Globemaster lands at Kandahar International Airport. Opening the airfield to daylight C-17 flights at

the end of December 2001 was not only an important milestone in establishing a sustainable forward operating base, it

also paved the way for a rapid exchange of Marine and Army

ground forces in southeastern Afghanistan.
liaison officers at the Combined Air Operations

Center in Saudi Arabia continued to assist them in

performing this task. Staff Sergeant Brian Koval, the

26th MEU’s embarkation chief, aptly characterized the

team-oriented atmosphere by nicknaming the

operation a “41st MEU” effort, derived by adding the

two unit designations. Transportation Command’s

director of mobility forces also played an important

role, adapting operations to provide continued support

to the Marines. One means of doubling the airlift

capability was to institute aggressive air and ground

patrols around the dirt airstrip, which enabled the first

daylight C-17 landing at FOB Rhino on the morning

of 30 December.5

As the New Year approached, the 15th MEU

had nearly completed its departure. The Marines

made every attempt to leave FOB Rhino in a

“prewar” state, filling in fighting holes, collecting

concertina wire, policing the buildings, and painting

over markings. General Mattis conducted a final

inspection of the forward operations base and

requested permission to close the desert airstrip.

After receiving approval, the last two C-130s

departed FOB Rhino early in the morning of 4

January, carrying Colonel Bourne, his jump

command post, and a small security force from

Battalion Landing Team 1/1.6

Although seven members of the Task Force 58

staff remained in Kandahar to coordinate ongoing

operations, others from FOB Rhino and the Peleliu

returned to their rear headquarters in Bahrain.7 Once

reestablished, they began to compile a historical

record of Task Force 58’s experiences: General

Mattis charged Major Michael P. Mahaney, the

primary author, with drafting a solid narrative—

complete with supporting documentation—that

would present the “good, bad, and ugly.”8

Back in Kuwait, after completing their

washdown and backload, Marines and sailors of the

Peleliu ARG anxiously set sail for Perth, Australia.9

As Captain Jezierski and the Peleliu ARG

helicoptered back to Fifth Fleet, Captain Kenneth M.

Rome, USN, became the new deputy commander of

Task Force 58 on 4 January.10 Two weeks later, the

Peleliu ready group transferred to Seventh Fleet and

their participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

ended.11 Although Colonel Olson noted that there

was a brief pickup in tempo over the escalation of

hostilities between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir

region* that required them to dust off the

noncombatant evacuation plan they had developed

back in September, “that never came to pass [and]

the tensions kind of diffused themselves.”12

As the Marines and sailors departed Central

Command’s theater of operations, they received

congratulatory messages from both General Tommy

Franks and General James Jones. While extending his

appreciation for a job well done, the combatant

commander acknowledged many of the Peleliu

ARG’s accomplishments and concluded, “Your ability

to rapidly plan and execute complex missions was

truly impressive and is indicative of the outstanding

training and the superb combat readiness of the U.S.

Navy/Marine Corps team.” Among Commandant

Jones’s words of praise, he noted,

By establishing an expeditionary base of

operations 400 miles from the sea in landlocked

Afghanistan, you demonstrated to the world

that the Marine Corps is far more than a “hit

the beach” organization and proved, once

again, that naval forces can rapidly deploy to

and operate out of an austere location for a

sustained period of time.13

Before departing Fifth Fleet’s area of operations,

Marines and sailors from the Peleliu ARG conducted

a turnover with the incoming USS Bonhomme

Richard (LHD 6) Amphibious Ready Group.

Amphibious Squadron 3 (CPR-3), commanded by

Captain Robert J. Connelly, USN, provided the naval

component for the newly arrived ready group, and the

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th MEU),

commanded by Colonel Christopher J. Gunther,

provided the Marine component.

242

FROM THE SEA

*By October 2002, India and Pakistan had begun to demobilize their forces along the border. They signed a cease-fire agreement in 2003.
They had set sail from San Diego on 1

December 2001, six weeks before their scheduled

departure date, and were anxious to get into the

fight. Task Force 58 also anticipated the group’s

arrival with great interest because the 13th MEU

would add eight CH-53E helicopters to the battle

roster. Admiral Moore assigned tactical control of

the Bonhomme Richard ready group to Task Force

58 on 14 January, with the amphibious squadron and

expeditionary unit becoming Task Groups 58.1 and

58.2, respectively.14

Continuing to Develop Kandahar

Meanwhile, back at Kandahar during a flagraising event on 1 January 2002, American and Afghan

service personnel flew their nations’ standards

simultaneously over the airport. General Mattis and

Governor Sharzai presided over the ceremony, which

served as a poignant display of strengthening relations

between the two countries. Referring to the high-flying

colors, Sharzai proclaimed, “Peace, unity, and

friendship,” while shaking the general’s hand.15 Mattis

in turn stated, “This symbolic gesture solidifies the

close working relationship we have established with

the Afghans here.”16 The staff later wrote, “This joint

effort was indicative of the Task Force’s efforts to

disassociate ourselves from the Soviet Army’s recent

occupation. We were not doing things to Afghanistan,

but with Afghanistan.”17

Local Security

With the special forces’ assistance, Task Force

58 effectively integrated local militiamen into its

perimeter defense. The local anti-Taliban leader was

a battle-hardened veteran—Commander Galaluy

had first fought against the Soviets when he was 14

years old, and then against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

He was reputed to have killed 15 of the enemy by

detonating a remote-controlled explosive device at

the “Arab House” in Kandahar. On another

occasion, he had reportedly walked across the desert

dressed like a shepherd, carrying a transponder to

mark the runway at Camp Rhino for Task Force

Sword’s October 2001 assault. More recently, he had

served alongside Sharzai in the battle for Kandahar

and established a close relationship with General

Mattis when Task Force 58 occupied the airport.18

In addition to helping the Marines screen local

laborers hired to help with numerous construction

and habitability projects around the airport, the antiTaliban forces also manned roadblocks and

outposts, and conducted joint patrols around the

airfield, significantly decreasing the enemy’s ability

to infiltrate the base. Commander Galaluy, who

possessed a keen eye for tactics, positioned his

outposts in areas with clear fields of fire, enabling

them to effectively cover the approach and takeoff

cones in the area around the airport. Air Force

Brigadier General Vern M. Findley, director,

Mobility Forces Command, visited Kandahar and

243

Winding Down

Photo by LCpl Marcus L. Miller

Members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit raise the

American flag alongside an Afghan flag during a flag-raising

ceremony at Kandahar International Airport on 1 January

2002. The flag detail included Sgt Eric L. Davis (left), LCpls Avias

T. Jones and Patrick Meyers, and PO3 Patrick O. Ebili.
acknowledged that the only reason he was willing to

fly airplanes into the airport during daylight hours

was because of his confidence in the security

provided by the Afghan militia and the Marine

snipers, ambushes, and patrols.19

An Afghan named Asad, rumored to have once

been a member of the Taliban, served as a translator

for Commander Galaluy and General Mattis. While

driving the two leaders to visit Afghan outposts

around the airfield, Asad pulled a handful of dried

dates out of the pocket of his leather jacket. Cleaning

dirt and lint off the questionable-looking fruit, he

offered some to General Mattis, who politely

declined. Asad continued to press the offer and

General Mattis relented. Asad then pulled out a

handful of stringy meat, which appeared to have

been stored there for some time. After going through

the same cleansing procedures, he offered the meat

to Mattis, who politely sampled this, too. During the

next 24 hours, however, the general required a hefty

dose of antibiotics. Mattis’s willingness to participate

in the Afghan culture, despite personal inconveniences, illustrated how he was able to bolster his

relationship and eventual friendship with Galaluy.

Mattis’s open mindedness also helped promote the

Marines’ acceptance in nearby villages. The Marines

also provided the fighters with money for tents,

blankets, motorcycles, and radios and conducted

medical and dental visits in the surrounding area.20

Coalition Forces

Coalition forces continued to flow into

Kandahar airport, with British, German, Jordanian,

and Norwegian forces joining those already on scene

from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the

Netherlands, and Turkey. This influx placed

additional stress on communications and logistics

capabilities as well as the small amount of available

space. Fortunately, Major Treeva Enger arrived at

the beginning of January with a 15-man contingent

of Norwegian soldiers and a mine flail. Shortly after

landing, they used the device to methodically proof

the entire airfield perimeter. They also helped equip

a Jordanian mine clearing detachment, enabling it to

contribute to the de-mining campaign.21

244

FROM THE SEA

Photo courtesy of Maj Michael P. Mahaney

Members of Task Force 58 share a meal with the local anti-Taliban militia commander at Kandahar International Airport during

January 2002. Seated from left rear to right are Cdr Galaluy; interpreter Asad; an unidentified U.S. Army Special Forces soldier; BGen

James N. Mattis, commander of Task Force 58; and Col Anthony P. Frick, commander of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit.
Relief in Place and Ongoing Operations

As part of their developing concept of

operations in Afghanistan, General Franks and the

Central Command staff had always intended to

replace Task Force 58 with a more permanent

presence.22 During early December, even before the

fall of Kandahar, General Mikolashek announced his

tentative plan to swap out the two Marine

expeditionary units for an Army brigade. Following

the battle for Tora Bora, both Franks and Mikolashek

issued orders for the Marines to turn over the

facilities at Shamsi, Pakistan, and reconstitute the two

expeditionary units at sea. Near the end of

December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued

Deployment Order 097, which provided an Army

brigade combat team for the relief of Task Force

58.23 Central Command subsequently announced that

soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division would

replace the 15th MEU in Afghanistan. At Central

Command, Commander Dave Cullen, USN, told

reporters, “The Marines are an expeditionary force.

They’ve done their job and now they’re leaving.”24

The news quickly spread throughout the media,

and one story appearing in the New York Times read,

“Airborne Troops Relieving Marines at Kandahar

Base.”25 The journalist went on to explain,

Although the 101st is a light, fast-moving force

similar to the Marines, it is typically used for

longer-term missions than the Marine

Expeditionary Units now in the region are

accustomed to. Those units are trained and

equipped for 30-day missions where they are

expected to conduct lightning assaults and secure

territory but not hold it for long periods. That,

historically, has been the job of the Army.26

The report also quoted Lieutenant Colonel

Martin B. Compton, USAF, a spokesman for Central

Command, as stating that “this frees up the Marines to

do other things.” Other Pentagon officials added that,

although the 15th and 26th MEUs were returning to

their amphibious assault ships, they were not

necessarily leaving the region and could be dispatched

“for other tasks in the campaign against terrorism.”27

During the relief-in-place, Task Force 58 was to

turn over the security mission and airfield operations

in Kandahar to Colonel Frank J. Wiercinski, USA,

commander of the U.S. Army’s 3d Brigade, 101st

Airborne Division.28 Task Force Rakkasan, as the

relief force was known, derived its call sign from the

nickname for the 187th Infantry Regiment, which had

earned the moniker—Japanese for falling umbrella—

while serving as part of the American occupation

force following World War II.29 The advance echelon

of the relief force arrived at Kandahar on 3 January,

followed by the initial elements of the main body on

the 7th, and Colonel Wiercinski on the 9th.30

Although the relief was originally scheduled to begin

the following day, the lack of strategic airlift would

delay the first exchange of forces.

KC-130 Hercules Mishap

A fatal aviation mishap tragically occurred on

the same day Colonel Wiercinski arrived in

Kandahar. Around 1845, a KC-130 transport from

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352

(VMGR-352) crashed into the Lundi Mountains

while attempting to land at Bandari airfield in

Shamsi, Pakistan.31 At the time of the accident, the

crew was making the first of four scheduled

refueling stops after departing Jacobabad, Pakistan,

245

Winding Down

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

A KC-130 Hercules from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 352 takes off from Bandari Airfield near Shamsi,

Pakistan, on 21 January 2002. Two weeks earlier, an aircraft

from the same squadron crashed into the mountains

surrounding the airfield while attempting an unassisted night

landing, instantly killing the crew of seven.
earlier that evening.32 Although the night was clear,

there was no moonlight,33 and landing was arguably

more difficult than necessary—the aircraft was not

equipped with night-vision equipment, terrainavoidance radar, or satellite navigation computers,

and the airfield was not equipped with a control

tower, air traffic control radar, or navigational

beacons.34 The aircrew of “Raider O4” made due

with conventional instrumentation and expeditionary lights set around the airfield as they had on

so many nights preceding the incident.35

Although the pilots had asked to land on a

runway normally used for departing flights, air traffic

control personnel denied the request, and the crash

occurred as the plane approached a runway for

incoming flights.36 One news source suggested that

the aircraft “was redirected to take a different

approach because the military wanted to reduce jet

noise over the town and helicopters were parked too

close to the airstrip.”37 Regardless of the

circumstances surrounding the mishap, the aircraft

was slightly off course and, according to one report,

200 feet below the crest of the surrounding

mountains when it attempted its third and final

approach into Shamsi.38 Colonel Randolph D. Alles,

commanding officer of Marine Aircraft Group 11

(MAG-11), speculated that the pilots may have been

flying at a lower altitude because they were

attempting a visual landing.39

When the loaded tanker struck the mountain, it

erupted into a fierce fireball that witnesses could see

20 miles from the airfield.40 Lance Corporal

Hollenbeck, one of the Battery K Marines providing

security at the base, recalled, “It wasn’t a normal

mushroom cloud explosion; it was a huge, nuclearlooking green and yellow fireball.”41 Although two

corpsmen and four artillerymen quickly climbed on

board a CH-46 helicopter and circled the crash site

for 30 minutes, the pilots were unable to find a

suitable landing zone and returned to the airfield.

Staff Sergeant William A. Toomey later described

the scene as the entire side of the mountain being on

fire. He stated that they saw a total of five secondary

explosions.42 Meanwhile, as Pakistani Army forces

headed toward the crash site on foot, another CH46 from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

(HMM-365) departed the USS Bataan and became

the on-scene commander for recovery operations at

Shamsi.43 Combat search and rescue aircraft from

Jacobabad also responded to the emergency.44

The crash site was located in steep, difficult

terrain, which complicated search and recovery

efforts. Operating with no illumination and with

secondary explosions occurring among the

wreckage, the Pakistani soldiers scaled the mountain

slope with little regard for their own safety. Major

Nasir Khan and Captain Omar Khan of the 11th

Balach Battalion, 11th Balach Regiment, of the

Pakistani Army, assisted in the search. Tragically,

despite their quick response to the accident scene,

rescue crews soon realized that all seven Marines on

board the aircraft had perished in the crash.45 A

squad of Marines from Battery K made a second

attempt to reach the crash site and secure the area

around 1600 the following afternoon; however,

without mountaineering equipment they were

unable to get closer than 1 kilometer south and

1,200 feet below the aircraft.46

A day after the crash, the 26th MEU’s air officer

led an eight-man investigation team from Kandahar

to Shamsi. Supported by two CH-46 aircrews from

HMM-365, the team also included five assault

climbers from Battalion Landing Team 3/6 (BLT

3/6), led by Corporal E. B. Yeven, an explosive

ordnance disposal technician from MEU Service

Support Group 26 (MSSG 26), and a photographer

from the USS Theodore Roosevelt. After reaching

Forward Operating Base Impala, the team linked up

with Marines from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 252 (VMGR-252), an Army mortuary

affairs team, and an Air Force chaplain. During the

next five days, the joint recovery team carried out

the task of retrieving the remains of their

comrades.47 Those killed were Captains Matthew W.

Bancroft and Daniel G. McCollum, Gunnery

Sergeant Stephen L. Bryson, Staff Sergeant Scott N.

Germosen, Sergeants Nathan P. Hays and Jeanette

L. Winters, and Lance Corporal Bryan P. Bertrand.48

246

FROM THE SEA
The remains were flown to Dover Air Force Base in

Delaware, and a common tombstone was later

erected at Arlington National Cemetery to honor

their memory.

The recovery team continued to examine the

accident scene until 16 January, when an air mishap

board from the Naval Safety Center assumed control

of the site* and investigation.49 The board released

its findings five months later. During a press

conference at Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar,

Colonel William D. Durrett, Staff Judge Advocate

for the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, stated, “The KC130 R crew perished as a result of controlled flight

into terrain. The cause of the crash was loss of

247

Winding Down

Official Marine Corps photo

Weary assault climbers from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit rest on a mountaintop southwest of Bandari Airfield in Shamsi,

Pakistan, on 12 January 2002. The Marines were instrumental in recovering the remains of an aircrew killed in the crash of a KC130 from Marine Aerial Transport Refueling Squadron 352. From left to right are LCpls Timothy R. Hall, Mike S. Brann, Jason R.

Eldridge, Bobby R. Threadgill, and Cpl Eric B. Yeuin.

Photo by LtCol Keith Whitehouse

Members of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352

erected this monument to memorialize seven comrades killed

in the tragic crash their KC-130 while attempting to land at

Bandari Airfield on the evening of 9 January 2002.

*News reports later told of clashes between local police and villagers

when authorities confiscated scrap metal salvaged from the crash site.

(DAWN, “Villagers Clash with Police for Plane Wreckage,” 30Mar02,

http://www.dawn.com/2002/03/30/nat17.htm)
situational awareness by the aircrew under difficult

conditions and due to lack of visibility. It was not

the result of mechanical failure or hostile fire.”50 The

board also faulted the aircrew for flying 3,000 feet

below the safe flight altitude when circling to

attempt the night landing.51

Lieutenant Colonel Carl T. Parker, commanding

officer of VMGR-352, said that “the finding of

human error was ‘a bitter pill’ for members of the

squadron and families of the victims.”52 By the time

of the report’s release, the Marine Corps had

retrofitted 3 of the aging KC-130 aircraft with nightvision equipment and had plans to update 10 more.

In addition, newer Model J versions of the aircraft,

which possess both night-vision and terrain

avoidance capabilities, were scheduled to be added to

the Marine air fleet within two years.53

Probing at Kandahar Airport

Back in Kandahar on 10 January, Vice Admiral

Moore visited with the Marines and sailors of Task

Force 58. He met with General Mattis and other

Coalition commanders, spoke with the Seabees,

toured the detainment facility and medical facilities,

and walked the defensive perimeter. Then, he

boarded a P-3 Orion and observed the abandoned

ruins of Camp Rhino from the air. Following the

maritime component commander’s visit, General

Mattis and Colonel Wiercinski traveled to Islamabad

to meet with Major General Farooq, chief of plans

at the Pakistani Joint Army Headquarters.54 During

their absence, while Colonel Frick was the senior onscene Marine commander, another crisis emerged.

That evening, only 15 minutes after the first

planeload of detainees had departed Kandahar

airport for Guantanamo Bay, between 8 and 14

armed intruders probed 26th MEU’s positions along

the northern end of the airfield. Moving deftly

through the darkness, the probing force used

meandering ravines for concealment while

approaching within 200 meters of BLT 3/6’s

frontlines, where they fired on the Marines from

three successive locations. The expeditionary unit

maneuvered armed vehicles and attack helicopters

through the area after returning fire, driving the

intruders from the battlefield.55

The first sign of trouble appeared around 2000,

when someone fired eight illumination flares over the

northern end of the airfield at 30- to 60-second

intervals. While this was occurring, Marines along the

northern perimeter began to notice movement 200

meters to their front, although they could not identify

the individuals or activity as hostile. At 2008, a

platoon from Company L spotted two individuals

running toward several adobe dwellings situated on a

knoll to their right front. In response to the rapidly

rising threat, BLT 3/6 went from 50 to 100 percent

alert, members of the staff assumed their battle

positions in the combat operations center, and flights

into Kandahar airport were temporarily suspended.56

Almost immediately, while illumination flares

continued to burst sporadically over the airfield,

hostile forces near the adobe structures began to

engage the battalion’s northern battle positions with

assault rifles and light machine guns. Situation

reports from Headquarters and Service and

Company L platoons at that location described a

steady stream of small arms fire impacting their

sandbagged fighting positions and kicking up dirt.

Captain James P. McDonough III and Battery K,

248

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Sgt Thomas Michael Corcoran

Marines from Battalion Landing Team 3/6 engage armed

intruders at Kandahar International Airport on the evening of

10 January 2002. The intruders fired on Marines from three

locations near the north end of the runway but were easily

repulsed with small arms and heavy machine guns.
situated along the southwest portion of the

defensive perimeter and opposite side of the runway,

turned in similar reports. Because of the flat terrain

and trajectory of the incoming fire, the artillery

battery and elements of the 81mm mortar and

engineer platoons also became targets.57

Lieutenant Colonel Jerome M. Lynes and

Captain Daniel Q. Greenwood, situated in the

battalion’s combat operations center, immediately

directed Captain Jeffrey S. McCormack’s

Headquarters and Service Company “to engage and

destroy the identified enemy targets.” As the

northern rifle platoons returned fire with their M16

rifles and M240G machine guns for approximately

eight minutes, Captain Brian M. Howlett, BLT 3/6’s

fire support officer, cleared the 81mm mortar

platoon to fire illumination rounds over the

battlefield to silhouette the enemy’s positions and

identify the targets.58

Meanwhile, other Marines deployed to enhance

security around the various combat operations

centers, ammunition supply point, detainment facility,

and other areas inside the perimeter.59 As this was

occurring, the northern units began to receive small

arms fire from a second location, approximately 900

meters west of the attacker’s initial position. They

responded in kind for another four to five minutes,

employing all available weapons systems, including

MK19 automatic grenade launchers.60

Around 2033, approximately 30 minutes

following initial contact and with the probe now

developing into a two-pronged attack, Colonel Lynes

activated BLT 3/6’s mobile quick reaction force to get

their thermal sites into play.61 Captain Greenwood,

BLT 3/6’s operations officer, subsequently directed

Lieutenant Lennon to reinforce the northern battle

positions with his light armored reconnaissance

platoon. After moving from their staging area near

the airport terminal and across the runway, Marines

from Headquarters and Service Company guided the

armored vehicles into position.62

Although the rifle platoon saw people moving

around the adobe buildings and heard the

characteristic snap of rounds passing overhead, the

reconnaissance platoon initially had difficulty

identifying targets through their thermal sights. At

the same time, the rifle platoon began to receive

additional fire, and two armored vehicles each fired

approximately a dozen 25mm cannon rounds into

the enemy position.63

After exchanging fire for more than 20 minutes,

a vehicle crew from the anti–air defense platoon, colocated with the Headquarters and Service Company

on the northwestern perimeter, reported that it was

receiving machine gun fire from a third position,

located approximately 100 meters west of the

second. As before, the trajectory of the fire carried

the rounds well down range, where they impacted

among another section of the 81mm mortar platoon

and Marines of Company K, who were guarding the

southwestern portion of the perimeter. Disregarding

the hostile fire descending on the southern sector,

Master Sergeant Fredie L. Sizemore II, the Weapons

Company operations chief, worked with battalion

logistics personnel to acquire additional illumination

rounds and resupply the two mortar positions. After

firing continuously since the firefight had begun,

they were running low on ammunition.64

Despite the heavy fires being delivered by BLT

3/6 Marines dug in along the perimeter, the intruders

continued to resist. Maneuvering in response, the

combined antiarmor platoon positioned its vehicles

along the left flank of the battalion’s centerline battle

position at 2049, reinforcing Headquarters and Service

Company and the armored reconnaissance platoon.65

At 2051, Captain Todd Tomko reported that

Company K had spotted 10 personnel on the roof of

a building approximately three kilometers south of

their position; five minutes later he added that the

company was receiving additional machine gun fire

from the north. At the same time, Headquarters and

Service Company reported that anti-Taliban forces

manning a nearby observation post had begun to

engage opposing forces near their location. This was

the first action by the Afghan militiamen that evening,

likely an attempt to interdict the enemy’s withdrawal,

and it continued for approximately 15 minutes.66

249

Winding Down
Amid this activity, Colonel Frick launched the

MEU’s rotary-wing close air support section,

consisting of two Cobra helicopters from HMM-365,

at 2100. Perimeter positions observed muzzle flashes

to the southwest and north shortly after takeoff.

These appeared to be surface-to-air fires directed

unsuccessfully against the aircraft, which continued

to patrol overhead for the next two hours.67

At 2110, with the Marines easily maintaining fire

superiority, Colonel Lynes directed Lieutenant

Lennon to reposition his armored reconnaissance

platoon near the airport’s entry control point in case

they were needed to counterattack or clear the area

north of the defensive perimeter. At the same time,

BLT 3/6’s combat operations center contacted

Python 31, a special forces operational detachment

at Kandahar, and directed them to join Lennon’s

platoon at the control point to clear the contested

area.68 Approximately 40 minutes after the probe

began, the intruder’s fire gradually subsided and the

perimeter grew still.69 This was likely good news to

soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division, who had

just arrived as part of the relief force and received a

rude welcome to Kandahar. Prohibited from flying

with loaded weapons on board Air Mobility

Command aircraft, they found themselves unarmed

in the midst of the firefight and were forced to take

cover while the exchange took place.70

At 2133, Python 31 and the anti-Taliban forces

departed the airport’s entry control point in an eightvehicle convoy, while Lieutenant Lennon’s armored

reconnaissance platoon stood by in reserve. Under

illumination provided by the 81mm mortar platoon,

the patrol searched four separate locations across a

2-kilometer frontage. They discovered numerous

footprints, shell casings, and rocket-propelled

grenades in the adobe buildings near the enemy’s

three firing positions, but they failed to recover any

al-Qaeda or Taliban dead. After sweeping the

northern area for another three hours to ensure that

the threat did not reappear, the mobile patrol

returned shortly after midnight.71 Meanwhile, at

2149, Companies I and K each observed several

individuals attempting to maneuver between their

positions in the southwestern sector of the

perimeter. Concerned that the enemy was trying to

breech the defense and reach the short-term

detainment facility, the two units coordinated

illumination fire from 60mm mortars and 40mm

M203 grenade launchers to identify the intruders

and discourage trespassing.72

The armored reconnaissance platoon returned

to its assembly area around 2241 and resumed the

mobile quick reaction force mission. Approximately

an hour later, at 2339, Captain Ryan Pike, BLT 3/6’s

intelligence officer, noted that Scorpion infrared

sensors placed along revetments southwest of

Company K’s position had registered two positive

readings. Captain Berry, the battalion’s air officer,

subsequently coordinated a P-3 flyover, which

confirmed the presence of three individuals

approximately 900 meters southwest of the

perimeter.73 After another positive sensor reading at

0028, Company K requested additional 81mm

mortar illumination and observed three dismounted

individuals through their thermal imagery systems.

Fortunately, the potential infiltrators continued

moving west and the night remained calm. Around

0100, the Marines resumed normal security

operations, standing half their force down for the

evening and reopening the airport to traffic.74

Several days later, 2d Platoon, Company L,

reported seven personnel placing a mortar tube and

rocket-propelled grenades inside one of the adobe

buildings. Lieutenant Lennon’s armored reconnaissance platoon subsequently conducted a second

sweep of the northern area, recovering a cache of

weapons and identifying several underground storage

areas. Gunnery Sergeant Tom McCloud, a combat

engineer assigned to the patrol, also destroyed one

building that possessed a fighting position

overlooking the airfield.75 Three days after that,

Marines from 26th MEU’s force reconnaissance

platoon and infantry from BLT 3/6 conducted a 48-

hour ambush operation in anticipation of additional

probing attacks, although no infiltration attempts

occurred during that period.76

250

FROM THE SEA
The Relief Continues

After a short delay, the exchange of forces at

Kandahar began on 13 January. At that time,

elements of Captain Frank Gasca’s Company B,

187th Infantry, replaced two rifle platoons from

Major Feight’s Company I at the airport’s entry

control point.77 The turnover between line units

continued for another week with designated

organizations exchanging positions every other day.

Adding a degree of difficulty to this transition,

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. “Chip” Preysler,

USA, commander of 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry,

possessed only half the number of personnel that

Colonel Lynes had and ultimately required

reinforcements to cover the same amount of space

as BLT 3/6. As Marine units came off the line, they

continued to conduct live-fire training at Tarnak

Farms, run ambush patrols around the airfield, and

serve as quick reaction forces.78

Meanwhile, Task Force 58 remained poised and

ready for combat operations in the Khost-Gardez

region as well as anywhere else in southeastern

251

Winding Down

Photo courtesy of Cpl Jemssy Alvarez Jr

Combat engineers from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit recover a cache of weapons and explore several underground storage

areas situated outside the defensive perimeter at Kandahar International Airport during January 2002.

Photo by Capt Charles G. Grow

Leaders from Task Forces 58 and Rakkasan discuss the ongoing

relief of Marines at Kandahar International Airport on 18

January 2002. Standing from left to right are LtCol Daniel D.

Yoo, operations officer for the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit;

LtCol Charles A. “Chip” Preysler, USA, commanding officer of 2d

Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment; and LtCol Jerome M. Lynes,

commanding officer of Battalion Landing Team 3/6.
Afghanistan that Central Command might need

them. Unfortunately, as poor weather, additional

analysis, and continued deliberation by “strategic

decision makers” delayed execution, “the tactical

situation... changed.”79 With the verdict to move

north apparently in limbo, General Mattis instructed

Colonel Frick to begin preparations for the 26th

MEU’s retrograde to the amphibious ships. Concurrently, Task Force 58 continued to support quick

reaction force and tactical recovery requirements for

special operating forces in Afghanistan.

After bringing additional Army forces into

Kandahar for approximately two weeks, Colonel

Frick and Colonel Wiercinski agreed that the soldiers

were ready to take charge of the airfield. At 0800 on

the morning of 19 January, command and control of

Kandahar formally shifted from Task Force 58 to

Task Force Rakkasan. On the same day, the land

component disestablished the Marines’ initial area of

operations and assigned them Area of Operation

Truman in its place.80 One news account noted, “No

formal ceremony marked the change of command at

the Kandahar airport, but soldiers now occupy many

of the bunkers and foxholes dug by the Marines.”81

The same story cited anonymous Pentagon officials

who claimed that Army occupation of the largest

base in Afghanistan signaled “the intention of

American forces to remain in the country

indefinitely” and that the base could serve “as a

staging area for military operations, including

continued searches for al-Qaeda hideouts.”82

Since the Army was still hampered by a lack of

strategic airlift, the Marines used their own KC-130s

to transfer a company of 101st Airborne

paratroopers from Jacobabad to Kandahar to

facilitate the relief.83 Moreover, due to 2d Battalion,

187th Infantry’s delayed arrival and establishment of

its tactical operations center, BLT 3/6’s combat

operations center remained in control of the

perimeter at Kandahar for approximately 24 hours

following the official transfer of authority. Colonel

Lynes reported directly to the commander of 3d

Brigade during this period and had the privilege of

exercising control over two Army infantry

companies manning the defense. During the next

nine days, the relief would expand to encompass the

entire perimeter, including the mortar firing

positions, entry control point, and quick reaction

force responsibilities.84

In a Stars and Stripes article, members of BLT

3/6 expressed their frustration about the lack of

offensive action seen in Afghanistan.85 Colonel

Lynes explained, “We’ve been here defending for

more than a month, but Marines are more culturally

disposed to the attack.” Staff Sergeant Grady N.

Brooks, an LAV-25 commander, commented, “Sure

we’re disappointed—everyone came here expecting

to have some fun, to go up against the Taliban or alQaeda.” Captain Tomko remarked, “If we could stay

here and go out and search caves and kill al-Qaeda,

we’d stick around for another three years. It’s not

really a matter of revenge; it’s more a matter of

principle—it’s what Marines do.” Attempting to put

the experience into perspective, Tomko added, “We

got to do just about everything a Marine dreams of

doing in real life, and the beauty of it is I get to bring

all of my Marines home alive.”

General Mattis met with Navy Captain Connelly

and Colonel Gunther in Kandahar on the day of the

relief and then visited the Marines and sailors of the

Bonhomme Richard ready group at sea the

following day. Despite the Marines’ unanimous

desire to become further involved in the destruction

of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan,

operational control of the group reverted back to

Fifth Fleet on 24 January, and the Bonhomme

Richard set sail for the Horn of Africa to participate

in Exercise Edged Mallet.86

Company L, BLT 3/6’s last line company along

the perimeter, completed its relief with 2d Battalion,

187th Infantry, on 20 January, the same day as the

26th MEU began its three-week retrograde and

reconstitution on board the USS Bataan

Amphibious Ready Group (Bataan ARG).

Helicopter crews from HMM-365 supported the

other elements throughout the operation, ferrying

Marines and sailors through Pasni to ships awaiting

252

FROM THE SEA
their arrival in the North Arabian Sea. The

withdrawal quickly picked up momentum: after

Company I boarded the Navy vessels, Company K

and the light anti–air defense detachment left

Kandahar for Pasni, followed by the light armored

reconnaissance platoon. Battery K also headed to

Pasni on the 26th but traveled south from Shamsi.87

MSSG 26 handed off all of its combat service

support functions at Kandahar to Task Force

Rakkasan and the forward arming and refueling

facility at Shamsi to the U.S. Army’s 561st Corps

Support Battalion, although 10 Marines remained to

provide air traffic control, airfield lighting, and

refueling capabilities for another week. Meanwhile,

the Seabee detachment completed its airfield repair

and essential projects mission and began its

withdrawal to Okinawa. On 28 January, Task Force

58 and Task Force Rakkasan completed a final

battlefield handover at Kandahar, and operational

control over Task Force 64, which had recently

pulled its forward deployed forces back to Kandahar,

transferred from the Marines to Task Force K-Bar.88

While the turnover and withdrawal took place,

253

Winding Down

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020205-N-2383B-509

During their retrograde from Afghanistan on 5 February 2002, fatigued Marines from Company L, Battalion Landing Team 3/6,

relax in Pasni, Pakistan, while awaiting transport back to the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group.

Photo by CPO Johnny Bivera, USN.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020206-N-2383B-522

Capt William D. Valentine, commander of the USS Shreveport

(LPD 12), welcomes aboard members of Company L, Battalion

Landing Team 3/6, on 6 February 2002. The Marines are returning from a two-month deployment to Afghanistan.
a suite of high-ranking personnel continued to pass

through Kandahar—a clear sign of the improving

security environment. These included Dr. Zalmay

M. Kalizad, U.S special envoy to Afghanistan;

Robert S. Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation; Lieutenant General Mikolashek,

Central Command’s land component commander;

Lieutenant General Earl B. Hailston, commander of

U.S. Marine Forces Central Command; and Major

General John F. Goodman, commander of the 2d

Marine Expeditionary Brigade.89

After General Mikolashek relinquished tactical

control over Task Force 58 on 3 February, Admiral

Moore reclaimed operational control over the small

staff and amphibious ready group. By the following

day, the only forces remaining in Kandahar were the

Task Force 58 and 26th MEU staffs and small

embarkation and aircraft maintenance detachments.

General Mattis and his staff soon returned to

Bahrain, while Colonel Frick and his Marines

rejoined the Bataan ARG. The expeditionary unit’s

remaining Marines withdrew from Shamsi—some

retrograded through Pasni, while VMGR-252

headed for Bahrain to support Operation Anaconda,

planned to occur during early March. By 9 February,

following a weather delay, the 26th MEU had

reconstituted on board the amphibious ships in the

North Arabian Sea.90

The Final Mission

On the same day that the 26th MEU completed

its reconstitution on board the Bataan ARG, Task

Force 58 received a follow-on mission from Central

Command, which required its quick return to

Afghanistan. According to Fragmentary Order 03-

037, Task Force K-Bar needed a tactical recovery

force and heavy lift capability to support ongoing

sensitive site exploitation operations approximately

35 miles north of Gardez. General Mattis

subsequently returned to Kandahar with a four-man

jump command post on 11 February.91 Colonel Frick

followed two days later, accompanied by a skeleton

staff and a rifle platoon from Company I, BLT 3/6.92

While General Mattis returned to Bahrain,

Colonel Frick and his staff continued to plan their

254

FROM THE SEA

Photo by CWO2 William D. Crow

Members of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit board a KC-130 Hercules aircraft in Jacobabad, Pakistan, on 12 February 2002.

They have been recalled to support Task Force K-Bar during a mission north of Gardez, Afghanistan.
255

Winding Down

portion of the mission with Task Force K-Bar.

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin DeVore, commanding

HMM-365, subsequently joined the Marines at

Kandahar with three of his squadron’s CH-53s. The

26th MEU’s forward headquarters deployed to

Bagram Airfield the next day, with Marine KC-130s

providing lift for elements of Task Forces Rakkasan

and K-Bar. On 18 February, the Marine helicopter

crews inserted Canadian, New Zealand, and

Norwegian special operation forces near the Tabu

Tanga cave complex, where they conducted two

simultaneous exploitation missions. The Marine

aircrews returned the following day and extracted

the special operating forces.93

A day following the extraction of the special

operating forces, General Mikolashek released tactical

control of the small Marine air-ground task force,

numbering approximately 90 individuals. This enabled

them to rejoin the rest of the 26th MEU later that

day and begin a long overdue maintenance stand

down and rest period. On the 26th, Vice Admiral

Timothy J. Keating, USN, who had recently replaced

Admiral Moore as the maritime component

commander at Fifth Fleet, disbanded Task Force 58.94

Among its successes, the provisional Marine

brigade had served ashore in Afghanistan for

approximately three months, operating from 400 to

700 miles from the Pakistani coast. This was well

outside the doctrinal parameters of 30 days and 200

miles previously envisioned for a similarly sized

Marine force. After the operation, Colonel

Waldhauser reflected on the expeditionary mind-set

necessary to accomplish missions that might initially

appear to be “off the wall”:

You have to take a couple of deep breaths and

say, “Okay, what is doable here? What is actually

possible?” Try to approach these things not

from the negative standpoint of what we can’t

do, but “Okay, that’s what you want me to do.

Let’s see how we can come close to achieving

the intent you want.”95

For their role in defeating al-Qaeda and the

Taliban, as part of the Fifth Fleet battle force, the

Marines and sailors of Task Force 58 later received

the Navy Unit Commendation.

257

Chapter 15

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Operation Anaconda, a bold attempt to

encircle and capture or kill Taliban

and al-Qaeda forces in the Shahi Kot

Valley south of Gardez, arose from intelligence

collected by a special forces detachment in

December 2001.1 As analysts evaluated the

information and additional reports gathered in

January 2002, they concluded that not only were

Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives regrouping in the

Gardez-Khost-Orgun triangle of rural Paktia

Province, they also surmised that these fugitives

believed U.S. forces were unwilling to pursue them

into their traditional mountain sanctuary during the

winter.2 In response, General Tommy Franks,

commander in chief at U.S. Central Command,

issued Fragmentary Order 03-007 to Army

Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, his land

component commander. The higher headquarters

estimated that 1,500 to 2,000 of the enemy were concentrated in the Gardez region and considered

them the most volatile pocket of remaining

resistance in Afghanistan.3

Once again, responsibility for planning the

enemy’s eradication fell to Colonel John Mulholland,

commander of the U.S Army’s 5th Special Forces

Group and Task Force Dagger, who was already

working at Central Command’s behest to

consolidate the Taliban rout.4 These efforts were

coordinated with Major General Franklin L.

Hagenbeck, USA, commander of the U.S. Army’s

10th Mountain Division, who was co-located at

Karshi Khanabad, Uzbekistan, as Mikolashek’s

deputy commander and forward representative in

the joint operating area. Although the land

component possessed tactical control over most

overt special operating forces in theater, operational

control over these assets “fell under a separate chainof-command emanating from the Joint Special

Operations Command... headquartered at Fort

Bragg, North Carolina.”5 Task Force Sword, another

Photo by Helen C. Stikkel, courtesy of the Department of Defense

Col John F. Mulholland, USA, commander of Task Force Dagger,

leads a procession through the base camp at Bagram Air Base,

Afghanistan, in January 2002. He is followed by MajGen

Franklin L. Hagenbeck, USA, commander of Task Force

Mountain, and Donald H. Rumsfeld, secretary of defense.

Official Army photo

Afghan Interim Chairman Hamid Karzai and U.S. Army

MajGen Franklin Hagenbeck talk to 10th Mountain Division

soldiers.
covert entity, “received direction straight from

CENTCOM’s [Central Command’s] director of

operations that was unknown to General

Mikolashek and to other SOF [special operations

force] components.”6 After the operation,

“Hagenbeck would later portray the disparate and

often highly compartmented pockets of U.S. activity

focused on the Shahi Kot Valley as a collection, in

effect, of individual component commanders

reporting directly to General Franks.”7

Task Forces Dagger (Joint Special Operations

Task Force–North) and K-Bar (Joint Special

Operation Task Force–South) began planning

sensitive site exploitation operations in the Shahi

Kot area in early January.8 Although Colonel

Mulholland’s initial thought was to attack Shahi Kot

with several hundred Afghan militiamen supported

by special forces, the indigenous fighters warned of

a sizable enemy presence in the valley following a

reconnaissance patrol conducted later in the month.9

Now realizing that a substantial number of

conventional forces would be required to clear the

area, he devised a new plan* in which one force

would flush the opposing forces out of the valley

and into the surrounding ridgelines, while another

blocked all known avenues of escape.10

By the middle of February, after additional

intelligence indicated that the Taliban and al-Qaeda

258

FROM THE SEA

Diagram by Vincent J. Martinez

Map depicting the location of Shahi Kot Valley in northeastern Afghanistan.

*This sounds much like the plan BGen James Mattis proposed for Tora Bora in December 2001.
troops were readying for battle, Colonel Mulholland

decided that planning and executing “a deliberate

attack against a well-entrenched enemy force exceeded

the capabilities of his task force.”11 After learning of

Mulholland’s concerns regarding the escalating scale

and scope of operations during a briefing at Bagram

(attended by “senior representatives from every joint

and conventional headquarters in theater”), General

Mikolashek directed that General Hagenbeck take

charge of the planning effort.12 Later that day,

Hagenbeck led elements of Combined Joint Task

Force Mountain (10th Mountain Division) from

Uzbekistan to Bagram Airfield, which became his

forward field headquarters during Operation

Anaconda.13 At this time, the Coalition order of battle

included six special forces A-teams, three special

forces command and control elements, three other

special operations task forces, a U.S. Army infantry

brigade containing three battalions from the 10th

Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions, and approximately 1,000 Afghan militiamen.14

The planning of operations now “shifted from

a geographically dispersed SOF-centric force with

decentralized planning to a large, concentrated

conventional force with operations requiring

detailed functional component planning.”15 One

lamentable oversight resulting from the bifurcated

command structure, “mission creep,” and eventual

change in planning responsibilities was that the land

component disseminated the Anaconda operations

order without considering preplanned support from

the air component. Because of several factors

influencing the conduct of air operations—

including lack of joint experience by the Task Force

Mountain staff, miscommunication between the

components and participating commands, and

unrealistic operational expectations established

earlier in the campaign—Central Command also

denied General Hagenbeck’s request to deploy his

division’s aviation squadron to Bagram.16

Hagenbeck experienced similar constraints that

Marines at Forward Operating Base Rhino faced two

months earlier, as higher headquarters reportedly

desired to minimize the personnel footprint in

Bagram and felt that Hagenbeck’s force-protection

mission did not require such support. Although Task

Force Mountain did eventually ask the air

component for a division-level air liaison officer, its

forward headquarters lacked ultrahigh frequency

radios to communicate with aircraft, robust

communications to contact the Combined Air

Operations Center in Saudi Arabia, and a holistic

appreciation for the impending operation. Although

Air Force Colonel Michael A. Longoria, the senior

of two air liaisons on Task Force Mountain’s staff,

recognized the deficiency and scoured the theater

for enough resources to establish a small close air

support cell at Bagram, the Combined Air

Operations Center was not able to staff a similar cell

as Operation Anaconda commenced.17

It was not until 21 February that the Army’s

battlefield coordination element briefed a copy of

the operations plan, signed a day earlier by General

Mikolashek, to Air Force Lieutenant General John

D. W. Corley, director of the Combined Air

Operations Center. By 24 February, with the largest

land battle of the Afghan campaign scheduled to

begin in only four days, Lieutenant General T.

Michael Moseley, USAF, the theater’s air component

commander, and his staff worked feverishly to

assemble sufficient aviation resources to support the

operation. Generals Moseley and Mikolashek

discussed the plan for the first time two days later,

during a video teleconference in which Anaconda

was briefed to General Franks and the Central

Command staff.18 Although “Moseley expressed

unease over what he felt to be the inadequacy of air

support provisions occasioned by the short notice..

.. Franks accepted the proposed command structure

and command relationships for Anaconda, approved

CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] Mountain’s plan,

and authorized an execute date of 28 February.”19

Into the Valley

Shahi Kot Valley lies along the eastern side of

an expansive plain running southwest from Gardez

City, located 15 miles to the north. Measuring

approximately six miles in length and three miles in

259

Marines during Operation Anaconda
width, it is contained by a 600-foot (8,860 feet above

sea level) ridgeline to the west and a 3,000-foot

(10,000 to 12,000 feet above sea level) mountain

range to the east. Although locals know the western

ridgeline as the Ter Gul Ghar, Army troops

nicknamed it the “Whale” because of its likeness to

a partially submerged whale’s back and similarity to

a terrain feature located at the National Training

Center in Fort Irwin, California. A smaller 475-foot

ridgeline directly to the northwest was similarly

nicknamed the “Little Whale.” Takur Ghar, another

significant terrain feature located southeast of the

valley, is among the first line of mountain peaks and

is approximately 2,200 feet high.20

There are two main avenues into the Shahi Kot

Valley, one from the northwest above the Whale and

the Little Whale, and another from the southwest

between the Whale and Takur Ghar. Suspecting that

opposing forces had occupied the villages of Shayr

Khan Khel, Babu Khel, and Marzek, planners

identified the valley as their operational focus and

labeled the three villages Objective Remington.21

From the Taliban’s perspective, “the mountainous

region was classic guerrilla terrain—easily

260

FROM THE SEA

Courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History

Operation Anaconda: The Plan.
defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of

escape, and near a sympathetic border.”22 From the

Coalition perspective, “the valley was surrounded by

formidable terrain, making the area difficult—nearly

impossible—to isolate.”23

The planners designed a complex operation to

isolate and encircle the valley, followed by

converging attacks to destroy the al-Qaeda and

Taliban forces within.24 Three days before the

assault, Task Forces 64—a detachment from the

Australian Special Air Service—and K-Bar, primarily

composed of Navy SEALs, were to establish

surveillance positions several miles from the

objective area. One day before the assault, Task

Force Anvil, a combined force of Afghan militia

groups supported by special forces, would move

west from Khost along Axis Iron and north from

Orgun along Axis Steel to establish an outer ring of

five blocking positions along main routes of retreat

from the objective area. Then, on the day of the

assault, Task Force Rakkasan, composed of troops

from the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne

Divisions, would conduct a helicopter assault to

establish an inner ring of seven blocking positions

along the eastern side of the valley. As the main

effort, another combined force of Afghan

militiamen and special forces (Task Force Hammer)

would travel south from Gardez along Axis Steel

toward Ter Gul Ghar. As they approached the

western hill mass, one group would then head west

along Axis Copper to establish a blocking position

near the Little Whale to the north, while another

would head west along Axis Brass to assault

Objective Remington from the south. According to

the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s U.S.

Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring

Freedom, October 2001–March 2002, “The goal was

to hit the enemy hard enough to kill or capture as

many al-Qaeda as possible and to squeeze the

survivors out of the valley into the blocking

positions where they would then be eliminated.”25

Task Force Mountain launched its offensive on

2 March, following a two-day weather delay. In a

risky maneuver apparently intended to maintain the

element of surprise, the staff planned for aerial

munitions to be dropped on only 13 of 62 known alQaeda firing positions and cave entrances prior to

the assault, and General Hagenbeck limited these

few preparatory fires to only 20 minutes duration.26

Although the special reconnaissance forces and

Task Force Anvil had been able to situate themselves

prior to D-Day with little or no resistance, the Afghan

forces associated with Task Force Hammer were less

fortunate. Commander Zia Lodin led his men south

from Gardez at 2400, reaching his first checkpoint

along Axis Steel without difficulty, but then mired,

broken, and overturned vehicles slowed the force’s

forward movement and required some militiamen to

continue toward Ter Gul Ghar on foot. Those who

swung north on Axis Copper were hit by friendly fire

from a circling AC-130 gunship, killing Army Chief

Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman and three

Afghan soldiers, while those who moved to the south

along Axis Brass received mortar and artillery fire,

261

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Plan Up Close: Into the Valley.
wounding 3 American and 14 Afghan soldiers.27

Subsequent air support was “poorly coordinated and

generally ineffective,” and after consultation with Task

Force Dagger, Commander Zia and his special forces

counterparts withdrew at dusk to regroup.28

On the opposite side of the valley, Task Force

Rakkasan fared even worse. Covert special

operations forces maneuvering in the area halted the

preplanned air strikes unexpectedly, forcing the task

force to begin its air assault before the air

component had finished preparing the battlefield.

Unfortunately, reconnaissance flights over the area

conducted by pilots flying Boeing AH-64 Apache

helicopters had failed to detect the enemy’s presence,

and after the first of two planned helicopter lifts

inserted the infantry into their assigned landing

zones, the soldiers immediately began to receive

fire.29 The fire was particularly effective near

Blocking Positions Ginger and Heather, located at

the south end of the valley below Takur Ghar, where

hostile forces engaged Company C, 87th Infantry

Regiment, with mortars, machine guns, and rocketpropelled grenade launchers. Although 1st Platoon

eventually occupied and held Heather, 2d Platoon

and the headquarters element pulled into a

company-strong point short of the blocking

position. Meanwhile, poor weather prevented Task

Force Mountain from launching the second

helicopter lift and reinforcing the beleaguered troops

until early the next morning.30

The air component answered more than 150

requests for immediate close air support and

dropped approximately 200 precision-guided bombs

on al-Qaeda positions during the first 24 hours of

Operation Anaconda.31 Navy and Marine pilots on

board the USS Theodore Roosevelt, then preparing

for its return voyage to the United States, were

among those air forces answering the call for

assistance. On their final day of combat operations

in theater and after supporting the Afghan campaign

262

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Spec David Marck, USA

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), scan a ridgeline for enemy forces near Sirkankel,

Afghanistan, during Operation Anaconda on 4 March 2002. The soldiers encountered heavy fire while landing along the eastern

slopes of the Shahi Kot Valley and then began the arduous job of clearing the terrain.
since mid-October 2001, Lieutenant Colonel

Raymond Damm Jr. led a division of four Hornets

from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA251) into the enemy-infested Shahi Kot Valley.

Captain Simon M. Doran, leading one of the two

aircraft sections, described his experience:

We didn’t know [the forward air controller’s]

position, but we had just gotten there after a B52 dropped a string of about 30 MK-82s

[unguided bombs] in the valley, so I knew that

he wasn’t in the valley where the B-52s just hit.

Then the fire started coming out of that same

valley where the B-52s had hit, so he asked us

not to drop our bombs, but to come in. We

made a total of five strafing passes here just into

the valley because he was taking so much fire he

couldn’t get out of his foxhole to see anything.

So we came in and made strafing passes. We got

them to stop shooting at him and then he got

his head up and we just dropped one 500-pound

laser-guided bomb to try and help him, but at

that point we reached a critical fuel state and had

to leave. We got more fighters over though and

they all eventually dropped six laser-guided

bombs for him.32

Back on the ground, the soldiers of Company C

held steadfast for 18 hours before being withdrawn

at nightfall, sustaining 25 casualties while successfully

thwarting al-Qaeda attempts to outflank and overrun

their positions.33 Their success, as well as that of the

soldiers occupying the other five blocking positions,

was facilitated by seven Apache helicopter crews who

repeatedly attacked al-Qaeda troop concentrations,

observation posts, and firing positions throughout the

day. All of the aircraft sustained battle damage; three

required substantial repairs at Bagram before they

could continue the fight, while two others needed to

be evacuated to the United States.34 General

Hagenbeck subsequently requested reinforcements in

the form of 24 additional Apache helicopters,

although these had to be flown into Bagram from the

United States on board Air Force C-17 transports.35

As Task Force Mountain regrouped in Afghanistan

that evening, Task Force Rakkasan began to develop

a new plan for isolating the Shahi Kot Valley and

seizing the high ground to the east.36

The Battle for Takur Ghar

On the morning of 4 March, elements of Task

Force Rakkasan initiated complementary thrusts into

the Shahi Kot Valley. While 2d Battalion, 187th

Infantry, attacked east of the valley and began to clear

the high ground of defenders, 1st Battalion, 187th

Infantry, air assaulted into the northernmost landing

zone and began to clear the ridgeline south, linking

263

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Official Marine Corps photo

Capt Simon M. Doran, an F/A-18 Hornet pilot with Marine

Fighter Attack Squadron 251, provided close air support to

beleaguered assault forces in Shahi Kot Valley, Afghanistan,

during the first day of Operation Anaconda.

Photo by Spec David Marck, USA

During Operation Anaconda on 4 March 2002, soldiers from

the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) prepare to dig in

to fighting positions after a day of heavy fighting in Shahi Kot

Valley, Afghanistan.
the various battle positions. Although hindered by

broken terrain and high-altitude conditions, they

succeeded in reaching Battle Position Diane, located

just north of Takur Ghar, by the end of the day.

Commander Zia also returned to the field on the 4th,

positioning a reconnaissance team on the north end

of the Little Whale to observe enemy movements in

response to renewed air strikes.37

Most of the fighting on this day—the bloodiest

encountered by American forces since the infamous

shootout in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993—occurred

southeast of the Shahi Kot Valley, where a series of

escalating firefights quickly drew national attention.38

The trouble began around 0300 hours, when

machine gun and rocket fire struck an Army MH47 Chinook helicopter from the 160th Special

Operations Aviation Regiment (call sign “Razor 03”)

attempting to insert a SEAL team (call sign “Mako

20”) onto a small saddle atop Takur Ghar (Objective

Siberia). Although the pilots were able to take

evasive action and land their damaged aircraft several

kilometers to the north, Petty Officer First Class

Neil C. Roberts, USN, had fallen from the back of

the helicopter as it abruptly pulled away. The SEAL

team contacted a nearby AC-130 gunship for

protection, and a short time later another MH-47

(call sign “Razor 04”), which had just inserted a

reconnaissance team further north on Objective

Ginger, evacuated them to Gardez.39

Although Petty Officer Roberts likely survived

the fall from the helicopter and attempted to fight

off the attackers, they overran his position and killed

him within minutes. Unaware of Roberts’s death, his

crewmates quickly formulated a rescue plan and, at

0455, the same MH-47 that had just extracted the

SEALs from the battlefield reinserted them into the

compromised landing zone. While hostile fire again

ripped through the descending aircraft’s fuselage, the

crew was able to disembark their passengers this

time and make their way back to base. Although the

six-man team had exited the aircraft unharmed, it

immediately came under intense small arms fire and

attempted to move toward more defensible high

ground. The team killed several al-Qaeda troops

during the ensuing firefight, but the firefight

wounded two SEALs and killed their Air Force

tactical air combat controller, Technical Sergeant

John A. Chapman. Under covering fire from an

orbiting AC-130, the team chose to disengage and

withdrew to the northeast.40

Meanwhile, around 0500 and in response to the

initial opposed insert, the special operations

headquarters at Bagram had launched Army Captain

Nathan E. Self and a small quick reaction force to

Gardez.41 After receiving a call for assistance

subsequent to the second opposed insert,

headquarters redirected the two en route ranger

teams to Takur Ghar.42 At 0610, plagued by

ineffective communications and largely unaware of

the deteriorating tactical situation atop the

mountain, the first of two MH-47 helicopters (call

sign “Razor 01”) descended rapidly into the landing

zone. As it approached the ground, it began

receiving small arms, machine gun, and rocket fire,

which destroyed one of its three engines and forced

the pilots to execute a controlled crash landing.43

With one dead and two wounded crewmen, and

now receiving heavy fire from three directions, the

soldiers exited the aircraft hulk and sought cover

among the rock outcrops. Three of the rangers died

in the process, although the team succeeded in killing

the same number of al-Qaeda.44 After an attempt to

assault enemy bunkers at the top of the hill failed,

the surviving troops hunkered down, while Navy

Tomcats from Strike Fighter Squadron 211 (VF-211)

on board the USS John C. Stennis provided

immediate close air support. The pilots remained on

station for three hours, conducting multiple bombing

runs, dropping 500-pound bombs within 50 meters

of friendly positions, and helping guide an Air Force

AC-130 gunship onto target.45 By 0700, the rangers

were no longer in danger of being overrun.

Marine F-18s from Marine Fighter Attack

Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) also provided close air

support to the beleaguered ranger force that day,

working with a soldier from the downed helicopter

(call sign “Slick 01”).46 Major Jack G. Bolton, who

264

FROM THE SEA
led the four-aircraft division (call sign “Stone 31”),

later recalled his experiences over Takur Ghar:

We arrived in the Operation Anaconda [area of

responsibility] and found that a CH-47 had

gone down. We were in comms with a

nonqualified controller on the ground who was

at the crash site and an [unmanned aerial vehicle

(UAV)] operator (call sign “Stiletto”). My

wingman and I worked for at least 20 minutes

to capture a laser “spot” from the UAV in order

to receive precise targeting information on

enemy troops that were engaging the downed

aircraft from across a draw just to the south of

the crash site. Stiletto informed us that once we

called “spot,” he would give us a “cleared hot.”

We tried multiple run-in headings to acquire the

laser spot but could not. My guess was that the

snow-covered terrain was preventing our LDTs

[laser target designators] from picking up the

laser energy. Stiletto stated on multiple

occasions that we could not drop until we

acquired the laser energy.

Based on the urgency in the ground controller's

voice (“We need a bomb now”), I decided to

transition to a visual delivery of a GBU-12

(Guided Bomb Unit-12) since I had the crash

site and the enemy troops across the draw in

sight. Post delivery, the ground controller

responded with, “Nice bombs, but no closer or

you are going to hit us.” Following the delivery,

Stiletto was extremely p——ed that I dropped

without a “cleared hot” and “no spot.” I was

skeptical to say the least about whether a UAV

could provide a FAC(A) [airborne forward air

controller] or was even qualified to be a

FAC(A). Regardless, Bossman (the airborne

warning control system aircraft) came on the

TAD [tactical air direction net] and instructed

us that K-Mart (the combined air operations

center) directed us to [return to base]

immediately. My section left with two GBU-12s

on my jet and three on my wingman’s jet.47

Captain Jonathan R. Ohman, following in the

second section, echoed Bolton’s comments: “It was

an extremely frustrating experience, and there was

some confusion over what authority the [unmanned

aerial vehicle operator] had, particularly when the guy

on the ground was not a trained [joint tactical air

controller]. Our section didn’t drop any ordnance.”48

After watching the first helicopter go down, the

second MH-47 (call sign “Razor 02”) disembarked

the second ranger team 800 meters east and 2,000

feet below the mountaintop. At 1030, following a

grueling climb at high altitude accomplished under

opposing mortar fire, they linked up with the rest of

the quick reaction force and together successfully

assaulted the bunkers. The battered force continued

to receive sporadic sniper and mortar fire—which

injured an Army medic and killed an Air Force

pararescueman who were aiding the wounded—as

265

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Name Service Organization Billet

Petty Officer Neil C. Roberts USN Recon Team SEAL

Technical Sergeant John A. Chapman USAF Recon Team Combat Control Team

Sergeant Philip J. Svitak USA Quick Reaction Force Aircrew

Sergeant Bradley S. Crose USA Quick Reaction Force Ranger

Corporal Matthew E. Commons USA Quick Reaction Force Ranger

Specialist Marc A. Anderson USA Quick Reaction Force Ranger

Senior Airman Jason D. Cunningham USAF Quick Reaction Force Pararescueman

Table 5: American Servicemen Killed during the Battle for Takur Ghar
it labored to consolidate its position atop the hill.

The force responded by requesting additional close

air support, while special operating forces on

surrounding hilltops also directed air support against

al-Qaeda forces attempting to reinforce Takur Ghar.

At around 2015, four helicopters from the 160th

Special Operations Aviation Regiment extracted

both the ranger quick reaction force and SEAL

team, including the body of Petty Officer Roberts

(Table 5).49 Although what began as a supporting

operation atop Takur Ghar had taken “public

interest away from the main effort by conventional

forces... the popular attention span drifted shortly

after the rescue was complete.”50

Building Air Power

Following the withdrawal of Task Force

Hammer and the Apache helicopters on the first day

of battle, and with only half of Task Force

Rakkasan remaining along the eastern slopes, the

nature of Anaconda changed “from an operation

focused primarily on land power to an operation

increasingly dependent on Air Force, Navy, and later

Marine air assets.”51 General Moseley focused on

pushing air power to the fight. During the first two

days of the operation, he tripled the number of

fighter sorties flying out of Al Jaber Air Base in

Kuwait and forward deployed Air Force FairchildRepublic A-10 Thunderbolt IIs to further increase

responsiveness. As the buildup of air power over

eastern Afghanistan grew, so did the variety of

participating fixed-wing aircraft, which eventually

included A-10s, AC-130s, and AV-8Bs; B-1s and B52s; F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s; and even 16 French

Dassault-Breguet Super Etendards and Dassault

Mirage 2000Ds. Navy pilots from Carrier Air Wing

7 (CVW-7), on board the USS John F. Kennedy (CV

67),* and Navy and Marine pilots from Carrier Air

Wing 9 (CVW-9), on board the John C. Stennis, flew

many of these aircraft and conducted more than 100

sorties each day.52 Aviation historian Benjamin

Lambeth later concluded that

in the end, the application of allied air power in

Anaconda was more responsive than in earlier

portions of Enduring Freedom, and its concentration of fire was unprecedented in the Afghan

campaign. Ten heavy bombers, more than 30

fighters, and 2 AC-130s continuously operated

within the 70-square-mile battle area.53

The sudden escalation of air operations

apparently came as a surprise to the Marine F-18

pilots on board the John C. Stennis, who would fly

combat missions around the clock in support of the

ground forces. According to Major John M. Jansen,

executive officer of VMFA-314, their first indication

that Operation Anaconda was taking place came

from an ambiguous disclosure by the ship’s

intelligence center, which indicated that “some

Army forces are being helo-lifted into a valley in

eastern Afghanistan.”54 Although the Marines

hopefully anticipated heading inland to support the

ground forces, their attempts to familiarize

themselves with the ongoing operation were

hindered when the ship’s intelligence personnel were

“kicked out” of Task Force Mountain Internet chat

rooms for asking questions without a “need to

know.”55 The Marines persevered, however, and were

soon conducting mock flights into the Shahi Kot

Valley on the ship’s Topscene simulator.56

Once they began flying actual missions, they

pushed to use 500-pound bombs with variable timed

fuses to engage enemy personnel with air bursts and

“to put out hard-hitting, real-time” after-action

reviews and situation reports that were propagated

throughout the theater.57 On 5 March, Major Jansen

described the basic problem “gleaned from debriefs

conducted with OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom]

element leads” in an e-mail report to Navy Captain

Donald P. Quinn, commander of CVW-9. He

emphasized, “The Joint Task Force commander must

understand that, while there are multiple maneuver

elements on the ground, there is ONLY ONE

OBJECTIVE/TARGET AREA.”58 Lambeth echoed

this sentiment in his history of the air campaign:

266

FROM THE SEA

*The John F. Kennedy battle group relieved the Theodore Roosevelt battle group on 6 March 2002 and flew its first mission in support of Operation Anaconda

that evening. (Baker and Evans, “Year in Review 2002,” 29)
From an air perspective, the biggest problem

presented by the initial planning of Anaconda

entailed coordinating the many concurrent strike

operations with too few prior preparations. That

problem occasioned serious concerns for both

the [Combined Air Operations Center] and on

board the participating aircraft carriers, since the

congested traffic operating within the tightly

confined airspace over the battlefield and the

ever-present danger of midair collision or other

fratricide incident meant that there was no margin

for error in managing the flow of aircraft through

the airspace.59

Years later, Major Jansen observed that the

after action reports were “not necessarily well

received” by the air component command, but they

served as the genesis for an emergency close air

support conference, convened by the Air Force A10 fighter wing in Kuwait following the operation.60

Major Chad A. Vaughn, another pilot from VMFA314, recalled that “CVW-9 never did have a

face-to-face with the Army or Air Force to

coordinate how we were going to conduct business

in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.”61

He explained that the purpose of the emergency

conference was “to try and standardize the

procedures among all the services that were

involved in operations in Afghanistan.”

As the representative for Carrier Task Force 50

(the joint-combined carrier forces operating in Fifth

Fleet’s area of responsibility), Major Jansen

presented a 12-slide PowerPoint brief arguing for

the implementation of joint close air support basics.

This included premission pilot orientation, check-in

briefs, discrete target descriptions from forward air

controllers, nine-line support requests, marking

rounds, unambiguous clearance to engage,

meaningful targets, accurate battle damage

assessments, clear use of fire control measures, and

adherence to joint doctrine.62 As Jansen later

commented, “You can infer from the brief ’s (almost

pleading) focus... how completely dysfunctional was

the operational construct for the aerial fire support

efforts [in support of Task Force] Mountain.”63

A Force in Readiness

More than a thousand miles from northeastern

Afghanistan, Fifth Fleet’s amphibious force waited

for a chance to engage the Taliban and al-Qaeda

with growing anticipation. After its brief and

uneventful assignment to Task Force 58 in midJanuary, the USS Bonhomme Richard Amphibious

Ready Group had departed the Arabian Sea and

steamed toward Kenya to participate in Exercise

Edged Mallet.

Throughout February, the 13th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (13th MEU) conducted both

humanitarian-civic assistance operations and sustainment training, contributing to Central Command’s

267

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Photo by Cpl Bryant V. Cox.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020215-m-1761c-046/dm-sd-02-07639

Cpl Robert D. Walkley, a computer systems specialist with 13th

Marine Expeditionary Unit, provides a local construction

worker with a bucket of cement. The Marines helped repair a

schoolhouse in Faza, Kenya, during Operation Edged Mallet

on 15 February 2002.
theater engagement plan.64 Lieutenant Colonel

Rodman A. Sansone and MEU Service Support

Group 13 fanned out to six different coastal areas

where they dug a well, repaired a footbridge,

completed carpentry work at a school for the deaf,

built a two-room schoolhouse, and provided medical

and dental treatment to more than 1,700 patients.65

At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Robert O.

Sinclair and Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (BLT 1/4)

participated in joint maneuvers with the Kenyan army,

which included heliborne operations and patrolling

coastal villages.66 Colonel Christopher J. Gunther, the

expeditionary unit’s commanding officer, commented

positively on the experience in the unit’s newsletter:

“This was a great opportunity to meet people who

genuinely needed our assistance.”67

In addition to providing aviation support to the

13th MEU’s other elements, Lieutenant Colonel

Gregg A. Sturdevant and crews from Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165)

conducted reconnaissance missions to collect

communication intercepts off the coast of Somalia

and flew terrain flights to refamiliarize themselves

with operating over land.68 The pilots were provided

an opportunity to reacquaint themselves with rapidly

changing terrain, elevation, and airspeed

requirements encountered while operating over land,

a change from encountering a uniform operating

environment day after day during two months at sea.

They also practiced transporting passengers,

executing helicopter raids, and delivering ordnance.69

This was particularly important for the Harrier

detachment from Marine Attack Squadron 211

(VMA-211). Major Michael J. Gough, the officer-incharge, recalled, “In anticipation of the mission

coming back to Afghanistan, we practiced some of

those profiles that we didn’t get to practice before

we got to the theater—the high-altitude deliveries,

high-altitude roll-ins—and practiced basically some

of the procedures we wanted to do.”70

Following the conclusion of Exercise Edged

Mallet, the Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready

Group headed north toward the Persian Gulf to

participate in Exercises Eastern Maverick in Qatar

and Sea Soldier in Oman.71 The 13th MEU also had

tentative plans to support special operating forces in

Yemen and along the Horn of Africa by supplying

its standard quick reaction and tactical recovery

force packages.72 En route, the ready group stopped

at Masirah Island to replenish its stores and take on

aircraft parts.

While they were in port on 2 March, Rear

Admiral Calland, Central Command’s special

operations component commander, visited the

Bonhomme Richard and received a capabilities brief

from Colonel Gunther, his staff, and the major

268

FROM THE SEA

Diagram 8: USS Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group
subordinate commanders.73 Although any association between the briefing and the delay in getting

helicopter reinforcements to Task Force Mountain

in Afghanistan remains speculative, the next

morning Colonel Gunther received an e-mail

inquiring how many Super Cobra helicopters he

could contribute to Operation Anaconda and how

long it would take them to reach Bagram.74

Colonel Sturdevant recalled that the

expeditionary unit’s staff had taken a Sunday break

from their usual morning meetings and he was

sleeping when the phone in his stateroom rang at

0911 to inform him of the request for information.

After discussing the situation briefly with Colonel

Gunther, he quickly assembled the squadron staff

and they began to look over maps, estimate distances,

figure fuel requirements, and identify potential

refueling sites. Drawing from their brief operating

experience with Task Force 58, they were able to

answer the immediate question of supportability and

then formulate a tentative concept of operations.

The Marines delivered their confirmation brief that

evening and approximately three hours later, around

2100, received Central Command’s execute order,

directing them to support Task Force Mountain.75

Meanwhile, the ready group had departed

Masirah around 1300, and by steaming north at 26

knots was able to reach the coast off Pasni, Pakistan,

around 0330 the following morning.76 After “an

overnight jam session” to work out the final details

of their plan, the crews of the five Cobra helicopters

from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369

(HMLA-369), led by Major Victor S. Stover, headed

inland at 0730, delaying their scheduled departure

time by approximately a half hour due to

communications problems.77

They were followed by a flight of three Super

Stallion helicopters around 1000, their departure

delayed an hour and a half in order to stow extra

equipment on board the aircraft. Two of these aircraft

carried cargo and personnel, while the third transported the tactical bulk fuel delivery system the Marines

referred to as Robertson Gear (after the manufacturing

company’s name). The Super Stallions were part of two

detachments from Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 361 (HMM-361) and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 (HMH-462), and were led by

Majors Marc A. Sehrt and Kevin G. Moss.78

Aircrews spent approximately nine and a half

hours completing the 730-mile journey to Bagram,

which they divided into four legs for refueling

purposes. Each flight flew the first two legs into Pasni,

Pakistan, and Kandahar, Afghanistan, independently.

Once both flights were ready to depart Kandahar,

they continued north with the Super Cobras flying

approximately 10 minutes ahead of the Super

Stallions.79 Halting briefly at a forward arming and

refueling point that the Army had established just

north of Kabul (call sign “Texaco”), the Super

Stallion crews used the Robertson Gear to refuel the

Cobras. After approximately 40 minutes on the

ground, the aircraft began their final leg and arrived in

Bagram at around 1700. Although the two cargoladen CH-53s remained overnight in Bagram, the

third helicopter with the refueling equipment returned

to Kandahar due to space constraints at the base.80

The Marines’ initial experience was surreal.

They had heard secondhand accounts of intense

fighting during the first two days of Anaconda and

then arrived at dusk with small arms fire going off

around the edge of the airfield as they unloaded the

aircraft. Major Stover recalled,

No one was there to meet us, we just showed

up [and] they told us where to park.... I hate to

use this term, but it was just like any other thirdworld ——hole... a lot of run-down places,

especially around Bagram. We’d been warned

about the mined areas, “Don’t walk here, don’t

walk there.” And it showed, because the Soviets

had left a lot of junk there. You could tell the

history from the battles between the Taliban

and Northern Alliance up there because there

was wreckage everywhere. It was kind of a

scenic-desolate place, if you will, because

[there] were beautiful mountains in the

background, yet in and around the airfield,

you’d trip over things left and right as you

walked around.81

269

Marines during Operation Anaconda
Colonel Sturdevant was fortunate enough to

run into Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Clark, an old

shipmate who was then fulfilling a joint special

operations role for Central Command. Clark

oriented Sturdevant toward Task Force Mountain’s

combat operations center, and the squadron

commander quickly introduced himself to General

Hagenbeck and his chief of staff. After checking in

with the command, Sturdevant met with the camp

commandant and acquired two general-purpose

tents for the 41 Marines who had accompanied him

into Afghanistan; unfortunately, they were located

on opposite corners of the tent city.82

Major Sehrt recalled that one of the first things

the Marines did was hang a sign announcing the

squadron’s presence at Bagram and erect an

American flag outside their tent. This was reportedly

the first flag to appear in the tent city and “all the

Army officers and enlisted would come by and want

to salute the flag, but also get their picture by the flag

because it symbolizes that... they’re in country

fighting the war and... they’re proud to do what

they’re doing.”83 He added that the flag became a rally

point for the Army, Marines, and media, because the

flag “was the centerpiece of what we represent.”84

The 13th MEU’s KC-130 detachment also

deployed forward on 4 March, basing itself out of

Jacobabad, Pakistan. Commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Bradley S. James, the unit was composed of

two aircraft from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 234 (VMGR-234), a reserve squadron

based in Fort Worth, Texas, and two others from

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352

(VMGR-352), an active squadron based in Miramar,

270

FROM THE SEA

Photo courtesy of LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant

Pilots from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 pose in front of the officers’ tent at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, during

Operation Anaconda in March 2002. The media often conducted interviews in front of the tent because the Marines possessed the

only American flag at the base camp. From left to right are Capt Bruce W. Laughlin, Capt Chad J. Comunale, Capt William D. Collier,

Capt Timothy R. Gabriel, LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant, and Capt Philip E. Eilertson.
California. Both Colonel Gunther and Lieutenant

Colonel Sturdevant emphasized their contribution to

sustaining operations ashore. Shortly after arriving,

they began flying two to four missions per day,

supporting the 13th MEU out of Pasni, Pakistan, and

resupplying Task Force Mountain in Bagram.85

In addition to transporting personnel, equipment,

and supplies into Bagram, the KC-130s regularly

replenished the Army’s fuel supply, which was critical

to sustaining air operations during Operation

Anaconda. Although they occasionally observed

muzzle flashes and rocket-propelled grenades while

flying into Afghanistan at night, they reduced the

threat by traveling around the higher elevations and

staying above the enemy’s range. Commenting on the

successful integration of active and reserve forces, and

overdue appreciation for the aircraft’s capabilities,

Marines in the detachment jokingly referred to their

deployment as the “Bastard to Beauty Tour.”86

Although Colonel Sturdevant and one of the

three CH-53 crews had initially intended to return

to the Bonhomme Richard after establishing the

Cobra detachment at Bagram, a fragmentary order

cut during the evening of 4 March amended the

initial request so that all eight aircraft could remain

in Afghanistan. This raised the number of HMM165 Marines operating from the forward operating

base to 46, although the total would eventually peak

at 83 after additional staff, maintenance, and flight

personnel came forward to support the deployment.

The Super Stallion crews lived out of their

helicopters for the first five days in country but

eventually erected a tent near the Marine aircraft

after Sturdevant had the area swept for mines. The

crews also constructed three sandbagged bunkers as

protection against potential indirect fire.87

Most of Colonel Sturdevant’s initial duties

involved coordinating squadron air operations and

serving as a liaison between the Marines and Task

Force Mountain.88 This was no small task, particularly

for Marines who were used to having mission requests

routed through the chain-of-command and assigned

to the squadron. As Major Sehrt described,

The missions were coming so fast to the Army

out there that they had more missions than they

had aviation assets.... They would prioritize

their missions... and they found... that the

Cobras and the [CH-]53s... could do more than

one mission at a time because we have the fuel

endurance or the legs to reach more than one

place.... The first list of missions would come

out sometime early in the morning, but that was

the first part of it, because the missions would

change because there were so many competing

units for Marine assets.... There were times they

would call us on the radio, “Hey, can you do

this? This is a different mission change.” We

said, “Sure, we can adapt to that. We can do it.”89

As Sturdevant later commented, “We didn’t do

a lot of deliberate [planning] because it was a fairly

fluid situation. We ended up doing more of a rapid

response planning evolution, and it was very easy

to do because of the training I’ve received over...

multiple MEU (SOC [Special Operations

Capable]) cycles.”90

Among others, the squadron’s small

headquarters staff—the “DASCateers”—included

Corporal Rickie G. Tucker Jr. from the operations

section, Corporal Brian M. Nabb and Sergeant

Kenneth A. Edwards from the intelligence section,

First Lieutenant Dennis C. Trogus from Marine Air

Control Group 38, and Captain Leaf H. Wade from

the 13th MEU staff. Colonel Sturdevant specifically

emphasized the hard work of Sergeant Edwards,

who would prepare weather reports and intelligence

updates for the premission briefings, record crew

manifests for all departing flights (reported to the

commanding general every four hours), and then

conduct postmission debriefings following the

crew’s return.91

Colonel Sturdevant also recalled the importance

of managing the expenditure of available flight hours

(crew days) to maintain the intense operational

tempo, noting that he would quickly brief returning

pilots on their next missions and then get them

asleep so they could fly the next day.92 This turned

out to be an around-the-clock proposition as pilot

271

Marines during Operation Anaconda
training and aircraft capabilities enabled the squadron

to absorb some of the night-flying requirements

from the Army.93 According to Captain Philip E.

Eilertson, while the Apache pilots were unable to fly

in conditions below 25 percent illumination, Cobra

helicopters possessed forward-looking infrared

thermal imaging devices, and the pilots were trained

to fly under low-light conditions with night-vision

goggles.94 Major Sehrt similarly remarked that the

Chinook pilots were surprised to learn the Super

Stallions were also equipped with forward-looking

infrared thermal imaging devices and capable of

conducting armed reconnaissance missions.95

Major Sehrt observed that the HMM-165

detachment required only about 15 percent of the

2,000 personnel that the Army had to support its 30

helicopters. Sehrt explained that one of the

organizational capabilities that enabled the detachment to remain small was that some Marine flight

crews helped perform routine aircraft maintenance,

whereas the Army had separate maintenance and

flight crews. Moreover, he noted, Army doctrine did

not provide for the same level of field maintenance

that the Marines were equipped to accomplish and

routinely practiced during combined arms training

exercises in Twentynine Palms, California.96

Several of the pilots commented on the hard

work of the Marine maintenance crews, crediting

their dedication to the squadron’s ability to keep two

of three CH-53s and four of five AH-1Ws mission

capable throughout the duration of their three-week

deployment.97 As Major Stover recalled, “My

maintenance guys never had a shed to work in, any

sort of cover or lights other than a flashlight.... The

dust was horrible up there, and if it wasn’t dusty it

was muddy.... Those guys pulled off some miracles

to keep us in the fight as well as they did.”98 Major

Sehrt echoed this praise:

It was amazing to see the young lance corporal

who might be out there at midnight by himself

or with another lance corporal and it’s raining

and it’s cold; the first couple of weeks, it was

miserably cold and... then the rain came down

and there was mud all over the place; it was

miserable. Young Marines, who were 18 and 19

years old, carrying toolboxes out to fix those

planes because they’ve got to meet a five

o’clock launch—it was motivating.99

He continued,

Our aircrew, who flew every single day, were also

the same individuals who mainly worked on the

planes every single night, so a lot of guys did

double duty. Again, they never complained. They

realized they had a mission at hand, which was to

keep the planes available for flying every day.100

AH-1W Super Cobras

Following a lull in the ground offensive as

commanders adjusted plans for the next attack, close

air support increased in intensity during Phase Two

of Operation Anaconda.101 Heavily armed with

Hellfire missiles, 2.75-inch rockets, and 20mm

cannons, Cobra helicopters were well equipped to

accomplish the pilot’s primary mission of providing

close air support to maneuvering ground forces.

Moreover, advanced avionics enabled the Cobras to

serve in a variety of supporting roles. They could

escort assault helicopters, covering their inbound

flight, reconnoitering the landing zone, and

suppressing hostile fire during the insert. They could

also conduct strike coordination armed reconnaissance flights to identify targets forward of

friendly lines. If they chose not to engage the enemy

themselves, they could pass a precise grid coordinate

on to the orbiting air control aircraft, perhaps

marking the target with their laser for fixed-wing

aircraft to hit or even directing the attack while

acting as an airborne forward air controller.102

The Cobras flew their first mission in support

of Operation Anaconda on 5 March, following

behind an Army Apache during an armed

reconnaissance from Bagram to Gardez, which

enabled the Cobra pilots to familiarize themselves

with the terrain.103 The Army had designated four

helicopter routes into the Shahi Kot Valley and

established a forward arming and refueling point

midway to decrease their response time. As Major

Stover recalled, “It was kind of disorganized because

272

FROM THE SEA
[the] helo traffic all did sort of their own thing going

down there—as far as we could tell—and there

didn’t seem to be a lot of integration between how

we would get down there and how the [CH-]47s and

Apaches and everybody were getting down there.”104

Unfortunately, after reaching the valley, they could

not get close enough to Objective Remington to

observe much detail as Coalition bombers were busy

striking targets within the engagement area.

The next day, HMM-165 dispatched two Cobra

sections to the Shahi Kot Valley. While one team of

two aircraft went after a suspected high-value target

south of the objective area, Major Stover’s section

escorted a Chinook and two Black Hawk helicopters

during a mission to resupply troops near Objective

Remington. After completing their primary mission,

they made several passes through the valley and

identified two enemy trench lines and a mortar

position. While the enemy fired small arms and

rocket-propelled grenades at the attack helicopters,

the Marine pilots engaged them with rockets,

cannon fire, and missiles. Once the target was

eliminated, they destroyed a second mortar position

that a nearby forward air controller had identified,

stopped briefly at a nearby refueling point, and then

returned to hit two more mortar positions that had

been harassing the ground troops for several days.105

Reflecting later on the tactical differences

between the two Services, Colonel Sturdevant

speculated that one reason the Cobras were so

effective was their employment of “running fire,”

while the Apaches appeared to be doing more

“hover-cover” from behind terrain features.106 He

explained that at high altitudes, the pilots needed to

maintain their momentum during an attack in order

to take evasive action quickly when receiving hostile

fire. Consequently, the Marines would fly over the

objective, identify the target, and then swing around

273

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Photo courtesy of LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant

Members of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 established this temporary forward arming and refueling point in

Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda. It is situated five miles west of the “Whale Back,” near Shahi Kot Valley. As the crew of a

CH-53E Super Stallion (foreground) resupplies one AH-1W Super Cobra, another attack helicopter circles overhead. U.S. Army and

Canadian infantry provided local security for the Marines.
to engage the enemy during subsequent passes.

Major Stover offered the following analogy:

Think of it—if you drive a pickup, you load

your truck down—how it’s slow to brake, it’s

slow to accelerate, at times really heavy. That’s

the same sort of thing—your aircraft’s heavy.

There’s less air up there for the blades to take a

bite out of, so then it doesn’t turn as quick as

you’re used to or it’s harder to slow down or you

don’t have as much excess power as you thought

you had to accelerate as quick as you can.107

CH-53E Super Stallions

Major Sehrt recalled that the CH-53 pilots would

fly between two and eight hours a day, conducting

two or three missions that varied from transporting

troops and cargo to bringing fuel and ordnance

forward to replenish other tactical aircraft.108 The

Marines also remained on standby to transport an

Army company that had been designated as the task

force’s quick reaction force, although that never

became necessary.109 To maintain this fast-paced

operational tempo, the four pilot sets established a

one-off, three-on rotation schedule.

Colonel Sturdevant described how the CH-53s’

presence on the battlefield greatly enhanced the

Cobras’ effectiveness. After taking the 160-mile roundtrip to the Shahi Kot Valley, the attack helicopters

could remain on station for only 20 minutes before

they had to return to Bagram for ammunition and fuel.

However, he could rearm the AH-1Ws quickly and

extend their time on station for up to two hours by

deploying the Super Stallions to establish forward

arming and refueling points near Objective

Remington.110 The Marine CH-53s could also

replenish their fuel supply and resume operations by

linking up with overhead KC-130 tankers, whereas the

Army CH-47s were required to return to base once

their fuel supply had been exhausted.111

The squadron planned its initial forward refueling

and rearming operations in detail, coordinating the

mission between the Cobra and Super Stallion pilots.

As Major Sehrt explained, they would work with the

intelligence community to identify secure locations

that would enable the AH-1Ws to remain in proximity

to Objective Remington and the CH-53s to remain on

station for several hours. He recalled that they often

used sites the Army Special Forces had previously

surveyed and over which they maintained observation,

noting that they alternated the location four or five

times during the operation to thwart enemy plans to

shoot down helicopters.112

The Super Stallion section would normally

depart Bagram in the early morning and fly 45

minutes south carrying more than 5,000 pounds of

fuel in each aircraft. After landing in the designated

zone—often an abandoned dirt airfield—at the

appointed time, they would deploy their own

security force, which was variously provided by the

squadron’s ordnancemen, paratroopers from the

101st Airborne Division, Army Rangers, Canadian

soldiers, and even British commandos.113 Major

Sehrt explained that one factor making the security

piece difficult “was that you could not tell a bad guy

from a local because they all dressed the same.”114

He continued,

We always landed near the village because all the

villages were real close to the Whale, so there’d

be a lot of foot traffic. The question is... is he

walking to attack you or is he walking to get to

his own village? A couple times we had

individuals with AK-47s who would come up

to the [forward arming refueling point], would

wave hello, and we would try to wave back and

try to shoo them away. A couple [of] times we

had to fire over their heads and they kindly

walked away and turned around.115

Once on the ground, the CH-53 crews would

unwind their hoses and rearm and refuel the first

Cobra while the wingman circled overhead, waiting

for his turn to land. Major Moss recalled that they

would generally distribute from 9,000 to 14,000

pounds of fuel for two to four Cobras. By the second

half of the deployment, the rearming and refueling

missions had become so routine that the CH-53 pilots

were essentially responding to on-call requests.116

Around 0230 on 7 March, CH-53 Number 22

(call sign “Lady Ace 21”) experienced a hard landing

274

FROM THE SEA
during a night mission.117 Gunnery Sergeant Andy D.

Hathcock, the helicopter crew chief, recalled that while

descending toward forward arming and refueling point

Texaco, the pilot encountered brownout conditions in

which thick, swirling dust obscured the landing zone.

Although he requested a wave-off, the aircraft was

heavily loaded with approximately 6,000 pounds of

fuel and another 5,000 pounds of ordnance and

personnel, and it had insufficient power to pull away.

After losing its tail rotor authority, the helicopter

started to rotate, slide through the air, hit the ground,

and bounce to a stop.118

During the crash, as Hathcock wondered

anxiously if the cargo would shift and crush him

against the frame, the aircraft suffered a broken left rear

landing gear, damaged left mini-wing, and a fuel leak.

Although the aircraft remained serviceable, the crew

left it in place due to deteriorating weather conditions.

During the delay, KC-130 crews operating out of

Jacobabad picked up additional aircraft parts and

troops in Pasni and flew them into Bagram. Marine

mechanics repaired the damaged helicopter on site the

following day, and the crew returned it to Bagram to

resume operations in support of Anaconda.119

AV-8B Harriers

On 5 March—the same day the Cobra and

Super Stallion pilots at Bagram flew their first

missions into the Shahi Kot Valley—HMM-165’s

Harrier pilots on board the Bonhomme Richard

flew their first mission in support of Operation

Anaconda. As was customary, after meeting the

amphibious ready group’s own operational needs,

Colonel Gunther had offered his excess aircraft

sorties to the air component command in Saudi

Arabia. After coordinating for hours with Marine

liaison officers at the air operations center (who

advocated forcefully for the integration of Marine

assets within the air campaign), the air component

added the 13th MEU’s six AV-8Bs to the armada

building over eastern Afghanistan. For the next 18

days, the Harrier detachment was locked into a

continuous 12-hour mission cycle: three hours of

planning and preparation; a two-hour flight into

Afghanistan; two hours on station; a two-hour

return flight; and three further hours of postmission

debriefings with the operations, intelligence, and

maintenance sections.120

275

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Photo courtesy of LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant

An AV-8B Harrier from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 takes on fuel from a Royal Air Force tanker while flying in support

of Coalition forces operating in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda.
Major Gough recalled that there was a different

feeling in the air on the morning of 6 March when he

and a younger pilot headed into harm’s way for their

first time. Although he had experienced antiaircraft

threats while flying over Iraq in support of Operation

Southern Watch and there had always been a

possibility of dropping bombs during the week of

flights over Afghanistan during January 2002, this

time they expected to engage an aggressive adversary

who would likely fight back. According to Gough,

“The best part about it was that we didn’t miss a beat.

We took off, launched, and followed procedures.”121

The two Harriers headed north from the

Bonhomme Richard, took on fuel from an orbiting

tanker, and held on station while waiting for an

assignment. After hearing their call sign over the

radio, they switched to a secure frequency, and the

airborne air control center directed them to contact

a particular forward air controller who had requested

support. As they were switching to the forward

controller’s tactical air direction frequency, however,

they spotted explosions in the distance and passed

an Air Force B-1 bomber exiting the area. The

forward controller subsequently apologized, “Well,

sorry about that, your targets are destroyed and we

don’t have anything for you now.”122

Major Gough and his wingman returned to the

tanker for more fuel, slipping in ahead of a section

of disappointed Navy F-14 pilots who subsequently

returned to their carrier. Before long, the control

center directed the Marines to contact another

forward air controller. Gough described the process:

He passed us the enemy position and his

distance from that position, and we organized

an attack so that we could roll in and hit the

position.... And what’s interesting is we’re

rolling in from altitudes we’re not too

accustomed [to], rolling in from about 28 to

30,000 feet because you’re still trying to stay

above the terrain and... out of the threat

envelope.... Unfortunately, the [forward air

controller] didn’t have a laser designator, so our

bombs had nothing to guide on, but we still can

drop “dumb.”... You see, basically, what [the

forward controller has] described and our...

“diamond” is sitting right on where those guys

are. So our “diamond” is what guides us, and we

fly down and drop our bombs on that spot.123

The section hit two targets that day, located just

south and east of the Whale, initially destroying an

occupied enemy fighting position and then attacking a

group of soldiers attempting to hide near a bridge.

Major Gough remembered that, although his first

bomb was a near miss, the second bomb went right

into the position on the next pass. With their ordnance

expended, the Marines topped their fuel tanks for a

third time and headed back to the ship. Gough flew six

more missions before the end of the operation,

dropping bombs on two other occasions.124

Captains Joshua L. Luck and Matthew J. Hafner

flew the squadron’s second mission into eastern

Afghanistan on the afternoon of 6 March. In Luck’s

case, the British airborne warning and control

system aircraft (call sign “Spartan”) directed them to

switch to secure communications and then change

to the forward air controller’s radio frequency.

Slipping ahead of two F-18s who were having

communications problems, the AV-8B pilots

received two complete nine-line target briefs from

the air controller (call sign “Playboy 90”). He

described Taliban troops near a cave entrance along

the Whale and recommended that they conduct their

attack from north to south. Luck, who took the high

cover position, recalled that the weather was bad that

day, with few holes in the cloud cover, making the

attack difficult, particularly with the high-altitude

delivery requirement. Hafner conducted his bomb

run first, achieving good effect on target while

dropping a 500-pound “smart bomb” without the

assistance of laser guidance. Luck then achieved

effect on a second target approximately 500 meters

west before the section headed back to the ship.125

During the 20-day operation, the six AV-8Bs

compiled 221.4 flight hours and delivered 34

munitions. Colonel Sturdevant noted that “the

Harrier missions were so effective that ground

forces in direct contact with the enemy specifically

asked for their support” by name.126 The Harriers’

276

FROM THE SEA
success was more than a source of pride for the

young pilots—it was a personal and emotional

vindication of their troubled aircraft. After spending

more than two years learning to fly the Harrier, they

were devastated when 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

grounded the airplane for 6 months due to problems

with its number three engine bearing and then took

10 months to replace the defective parts.127

Appreciative of the real-world training

opportunity for his nine pilots, seven of whom had

never deployed, possessed only limited flight time,

and had lost confidence in their aircraft, Major

Gough rotated his pilots so that each had an

opportunity to drop ordnance in support of a major

combat operation. Moreover, once his senior pilots

had been afforded an opportunity to lead their

sections during the first cycle of missions, he rotated

the assignments so some of the junior pilots could

also acquire combat leadership experience.128

Captain Luck captured the pilots’ pride and

enthusiasm after the operation by stating that while

the Army and Air Force might be impressed by what

the Cobras and Harriers did independently, “it

would blow their minds” if they saw what they could

accomplish when working together.129

Operation Anaconda: Phase II

During a press conference at the Pentagon on 6

March, Secretary Rumsfeld told reporters that

Coalition forces were turning up the pressure on alQaeda and Taliban troops in the mountains of

Gardez, explaining that, although the battle would

take time to play out, he expected the enemy to

surrender or be killed in the days ahead.130 Task

Force Rakkasan continued its southerly advance

down the eastern ridgeline from Battle Position

Diane over the next few days, methodically clearing

enemy caves, buildings, and heavy weapons

emplacements. Although al-Qaeda and Taliban

forces attempted to resist, showering the soldiers

with sporadic mortar fire, they proved unable to

reinforce their positions or mount a sizable attack.131

On the opposite side of the valley, Afghan

militiamen and elements of Task Force Dagger

established a small command post on 7 March—

dubbed Checkpoint Charley—and occupied

Observation Posts North and South, which

overlooked the Whale. With the main ridgeline now

declared a free-fire zone, Coalition aircraft bombed

the Whale incessantly for the next 48 hours.132

277

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Official Marine Corps photo

An F/A-18 Hornet from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314, call sign “Demon-41,” flies over Afghanistan during a mission in

support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
The Marine Cobra pilots provided close air

support to maneuver elements operating around the

valley. On the morning of 7 March, they first escorted

a mission to resupply Task Force 64 south of the

Whale and then screened the special forces

movement up the Little Whale toward Observation

Post North, firing rockets at cave entrances and

observing secondary explosions.133 They returned to

the valley later in the day and again the next afternoon,

continuing their attack on the Whale. Captain Philip

E. Eilertson recalled that the latter flight received fire

from a 12.7-millimeter heavy machine gun, which the

Cobras quickly suppressed with Hellfire missiles.134

He also noted that they engaged additional cave

entrances with their 20-millimeter cannon and more

missiles. The Marine F-18 pilots were also actively

engaged during this period, with Hornets from

VMFA-314 dropping bombs on multiple targets,

including a heavy machine gun struck by Lieutenant

Colonel James L. Stalnaker and Captain Chad A.

Vaughn and a suspected escape route struck by Major

Jansen and Captain Ohman.135

While the combined air forces were busy

whittling down resistance throughout the valley,

special forces leaders had decided that armor support

would facilitate Commander Zia’s eventual assault on

Objective Remington. This led to negotiations

between Task Force Dagger and the Afghan Interim

Authority, after which Defense Minister Fahim Khan

directed General Gul Haider to lead a battalion-sized

force from Kabul to Gardez. General Haider arrived

on the evening of 8 March, accompanied by 600 Tajik

fighters, 4 Russian T-54 tanks, and 6 Russian armored

personnel carriers. Despite Task Force Dagger’s initial

concerns over the fact that the Pashtun and Tajik

leaders were traditional enemies, they appeared willing

to cooperate, and the special forces planned a

coordinated attack in which Haider would assault into

the valley from the north and Zia would assault from

the south.136

Task Force Dagger found that controlling Gul

Haider’s advance proved near impossible, which

made it difficult to coordinate the attack with Zia

Lodin’s force. While moving toward their assault

position on 10 March, several of Haider’s

dismounted troops broke formation and secured the

northern half of the Whale. The following morning,

while lining up to secure the remainder of the hill,

the Tajik militia broke again, this time descending

the slope to loot the three abandoned villages in the

valley below. Later in the afternoon, a special forces

detachment and 20 of Zia’s Pashtun fighters, trailed

by 300 Tajiks, swept southward along the Whale

without encountering resistance.137 At the same time,

Marine Cobra pilots continued to hit enemy targets

along the Whale. In addition to engaging several cave

entrances, two mortar positions, a bunker, and a car,

they also collected videotape footage of possible

landing zones in anticipation of a future helicopter

assault.138 Meanwhile, on the eastern side of the

valley, Task Force Summit (1st Battalion, 87th

Infantry, 10th Mountain Division) had relieved

elements of the 101st Airborne Division as the

point of main effort and continued to push south.

While speaking on CNN’s (Cable News

Network’s) Late Edition and ABC’s (American

Broadcasting Corporation’s) This Week, respectively,

Generals Myers and Franks each denied that the

operation was nearing completion. Franks explained

that while he was satisfied with the operation’s

progress “up to this point... we will not stop until

each of the pockets that we’re able to identify has

been reduced.”139 He also defended the operation’s

prosecution, stating that he thought the planning

that went into this operation by General Hagenbeck

was very good and thorough and had been carried

out in a way that was absolutely terrific.140

On 12 March, with the Whale now secured, Gul

Haider’s armored column finally entered the valley

from the north, indiscriminately firing two tank

rounds toward the eastern ridgeline before Task Force

Rakkasan convinced them to cease firing. As the

procession advanced southward, an Air Force combat

controller attempted to coordinate a Cobra attack

against several cave entrances he observed along the

Whale, but a Tajik leader informed him that a

“watering party” was operating in the vicinity and he

aborted the mission. Upon reaching their objective,

278

FROM THE SEA
the Tajiks cleared the villages of Shayr Khan Kheyl

and Babu Khel, while Zia’s Pashtun force moved in

from the south and cleared Marzek. The enemy had

fled the three villages by this time, however, and they

captured only two prisoners. Journalists soon began

streaming into the Shahi Kot Valley with leaders of

the various Afghan militias arriving shortly thereafter

for photographs and interviews.141 Meanwhile, on the

eastern side of the valley, Task Force Summit had

continued to push south for two days. It met only

light resistance along the way and withdrew after

reaching Objective Ginger—located just west of

Takur Ghar—the next day.142

During a press conference back at the

Pentagon, Air Force Brigadier General John W. Rosa

Jr. told reporters, “As we speak, we are clearing the

Whale’s back.”143 Spokeswoman Victoria Clarke

added, “I think the characterizations we feel

comfortable with are ‘winding down.’ I think the

secretary used ‘mopping up.’ But there clearly is still

work to be done.”144 As if to emphasize the point,

multiple sections of Marine F-18 and AV-8B aircraft

continued to drop bombs on targets in the area.145

Operation Harpoon

As the intensity of Operation Anaconda began

to decline and the focus shifted from seizing terrain

to exploiting enemy positions for arms, ammunition,

and intelligence, the 101st Airborne Division’s

Apache and Chinook helicopters returned to

Kandahar. This reduced Task Force Mountain’s

rotary-wing capability to only 16 aircraft. These

included two Black Hawks, one each for medical

evacuation and command and control flights; six

Chinooks from Company B, 159th Aviation

Regiment (an 18th Airborne Corps asset

commanded by Army Major Terry J. Jamison); and

the three Sea Stallions and five Cobras from the 13th

MEU. In order to support secondary mop-up

operations, dubbed Operation Harpoon, Task Force

279

Marines during Operation Anaconda

Associated Press

Rockets fired by AH-1W Cobras from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 impact villages in Shahi Kot Valley on 10 March 2002.

Targeted as al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds, the three villages of Sherkhankheyl, Marzak, and Bobelkiel were cleared of enemy

forces during Operation Anaconda.
Mountain combined its remaining Army and Marine

aviation assets under Colonel Sturdevant’s command

as Task Force HMM-165.146 Sturdevant was quick to

praise the Army crew’s courage and capabilities:

These guys were flying Chinooks. They were

carrying 43 combat-loaded soldiers into

zones... as high as 10,200 feet. A lot of times

they were making two-wheel [pinnacle]

landings... on the edge of a cliff.... I tell you

what, I have nothing but respect for those

soldiers; they did a hell of a job.147

The small joint aviation task force remained in

general support of Task Force Mountain, with

priority of effort assigned to Task Force Commando

(2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division).148 The latter

organization, a combined force commanded by

Colonel Kevin V. Wilkerson, USA, was composed

of 2d Brigade Headquarters; 4th Battalion, 31st

Infantry Regiment; and 3d Battalion, Princess

Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. Their first task

was to conduct a series of sensitive site exploitation

missions to clear the Whale of enemy holdouts,

equipment, and supplies.149

The operation began with a battalion-level

helicopter assault into the valley during the early

morning hours of 13 March (although Task Force

Mountain had initially intended to employ the

Marines several days earlier). Colonel Sturdevant

recalled that “we’d done the initial planning, had

stood up, got all the briefs knocked out, and they

decided that they didn’t want to do it.”150 He

remembered that a national tasking of some sort had

come up and HMM-165 had stood down for three

days before being told that the mission was back on.

Colonel Sturdevant served as the air mission

commander during the operation, which involved

the insertion of approximately 500 soldiers from the

Canadian battalion, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Patrick B. Stogran, Princess Patricia’s Light

Infantry, and 100 soldiers from Company A, 4th

Battalion, 31st U.S. Army Infantry. This was a unique

280

FROM THE SEA

Photo courtesy of Nathan Hodges

A Canadian infantryman views the Shahi Kot Valley from atop the “Whale Back” during Operation Harpoon.
opportunity for the Canadians, as they were not only

the point of main effort, but they were also

conducting their first ever battalion-sized helicopter

assault.151 Sturdevant directed the airlift from one of

the Black Hawk helicopters, with Colonel Wilkerson

alongside as the overall commander, later noting that

they inserted two-thirds of the force on the first day

and the remainder on the second.152

On the morning of the operation, Task Force

HMM-165 launched 10 aircraft. These included four

Cobras to escort the assault force, four Chinooks to

carry the troops to the objective, and two Super

Stallions to establish a forward arming and refueling

point approximately 12 miles from the Whale. One

of the CH-53s was devoted to carrying the

Robertson Gear, while the other carried extra

ammunition.153 The CH-47s carried approximately

170 soldiers per assault wave, slinging extra

equipment and supplies beneath the helicopters from

cargo hooks.154 Although a special forces detachment

had identified and marked several landing zones atop

the ridge’s broken terrain, the aircraft flew over the

sites and descended at the base of the slope.155

Once the Chinooks had disembarked their

passengers and headed back to Bagram for another

load, one Cobra section worked with the infantry on

the Whale, while the other replenished its fuel supply

at the nearby refueling point. When the Super Stallions

had exhausted the 500-gallon bladders, the pilots

linked up with Marine KC-130 tankers flying overhead

to replenish their own fuel supply. Sturdevant recalled

that the buildup of forces continued for approximately

eight hours during the first day.156

For the next five days, the Canadian and

American infantry methodically searched the Whale,

clearing more than 30 caves and bunkers in the

process.157 While many of the positions were empty

and the soldiers encountered few al-Qaeda troops,

they succeeded in collecting weapons and ammunition; supplies and equipment; and a variety of

“valuable intelligence” materials, including DNA

samples for the potential identification of enemy

dead.158

Task Force HMM-165 continued to support

Task Force Commando throughout the operation,

conducting resupply missions, transporting troops,

and investigating cave locations along the ridgeline.

During one mission, CNN correspondent Martin

Savage accompanied the CH-53 crews to the

forward arming and refueling point to document

their role in the operation. Captain Eilertson recalled

that the anticipated Apache reinforcements from

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, arrived around 15 March,

but, he added, although they appeared over the

battlefield one day, they all flew back to Kandahar

the next day for some reason, which happily meant

more flight time for the Cobras.159

The next major mission occurred on 18 March,

the same day that Brigadier General Rosa

announced to reporters at the Pentagon, “Operation

Anaconda is over but Operation Enduring Freedom

continues.”160 Using the same force mix that he had

during Operation Harpoon, Colonel Sturdevant

inserted elements of Task Force Commando on and

around Takur Ghar. This included the deadly

promontory, codenamed Objective Siberia, where

hostile forces had shot down the MH-47 helicopter

two weeks earlier. Operating in this environment was

a challenging proposition; some of the landing

zones were at 10,200 feet and required the Chinook

pilots to perform two-wheeled pinnacle landings to

disembark their passengers.161

Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant and Colonel

Wilkerson landed atop Objective Siberia with the

soldiers to view the battlefield and consider the

possibility of retrieving components of the

abandoned $80 million MH-47 aircraft. As

Sturdevant recalled, “That was a pretty sobering

experience. When you sit there and you see this hunk

of metal and you realize that we lost seven American

lives—that was tough.”162 Unfortunately, the

helicopter was beyond salvaging, due in part to the

large number of bombs dropped on the enemy

positions during the battle, so the soldiers burned

the fuselage with a thermite grenade.163

281

Marines during Operation Anaconda
While the infantry searched enemy positions,

the two Cobra sections (consisting of two aircraft

each) took turns attacking targets—including a

truck, two tents, and four sets of bunkers—along

the southeastern slope of the mountain. They also

identified another bunker site to the north, which

the ground troops destroyed with satchel charges.

Task Force HMM-165 returned to Takur Ghar late

in the morning of 19 March and ferried Task Force

Commando back to Bagram. In the process, the

Cobras struck several additional bunkers that had

been spotted the previous day.164

General Franks declared Operation Anaconda

officially over that same day, stating that it had been

highly successful. Although the initial ground attack

had failed and a number of al-Qaeda likely escaped

to safe havens inside the Pakistani tribal regions,

Coalition forces had located al-Qaeda and Taliban

resistance, forced them into a losing battle, killed

many of their most experienced and aggressive

fighters, and forced the others to flee without their

heavy equipment and stockpiles of supplies. As

succinctly put by one U.S. Army historian, “In a

guerrilla war, that counts for much.”165

Although the conclusion of Operation

Anaconda effectively ended HMM-165’s operational

association with 2d Brigade and the Marines were

scheduled to rejoin the amphibious ready group

momentarily, General Hagenbeck apparently

lamented the loss of air support and requested that

Colonel Sturdevant’s squadron remain in Afghanistan

a while longer.166 For the rest of the 13th MEU,

trained and organized to operate as a combined airground task force, this was a bittersweet compliment.

While visiting Bagram midway through the

operation, Colonel Gunther had asked Hagenbeck

for an opportunity to employ his battalion landing

team and combat service support group ashore, only

282

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Spec. Eric E. Hughes, USA. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020824-A-3497H-038

Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, Gen Tommy R. Franks shakes hands and talks with U.S. enlisted soldiers gathered

around at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, on 24 August 2002. He spoke motivational and encouraging words to the deployed soldiers

about their involvement in the ongoing war on terrorism.
to learn that Task Force Mountain did not require

additional ground support.167

Reaction to this piecemeal employment varied

among the Marine pilots. Captain Eilertson

believed that “because of the great success the

Marine Corps had in the very beginning of the

war—taking Rhino and Kandahar and helping out

there—that now it was kind of the Army’s time to

shine.”168 Less philosophically, Colonel Sturdevant

wondered at the Army’s reluctance to place 101st

Airborne Division assets under Task Force

Mountain’s tactical control and noted the

cumulative gain that could have been achieved by

employing the 13th MEU as an articulated whole.

He later reflected, “I think there was plenty of

work for everybody and the MEU could have done

very well had they been invited in total.”169

Task Force HMM-165 continued to fly in

general support of Task Force Mountain. It

remained on standby to transport the quick reaction

force, conducted several armed reconnaissance

missions around Bagram, and flew a number of

resupply runs in support of special forces operating

from Khost Airfield. This remaining involvement

brought a chance for additional action on the

morning of 20 March, when Colonel Sturdevant was

awakened around 0115 and told that enemy fighters

had attacked the Khost outpost with small arms,

rocket-propelled grenades, and mortar fire,

wounding one American soldier.170 While the Marine

pilots initiated approximately 30 minutes of rapid

planning, Sturdevant visited the combined

operations center and learned that the task force

deputy commander had decided to use an orbiting

AC-130 gunship to discourage the enemy, rather

than deploy the Cobras at night in bad weather.171

The following afternoon, Task Force HMM-165

deployed a section of AH-1Ws and another of CH53s during a combined medical evacuation and

resupply mission to Khost.

The Marines planned to hook south and east

over the mountains. This was the shortest route,

although the CH-47 pilots referred to it as the

“Valley of Death” because of the propensity for

drawing opposing fire. Major Moss recalled that his

helicopter alone carried approximately 10,000

pounds of bottled water, meals-ready-to-eat,

ammunition, weapons, and miscellaneous equipment.

Unfortunately, Moss’s aircraft experienced engine

trouble and had to return to base, but before doing

so, he landed on a convenient highway and handed a

small hand pump—known as a “pig”—over to a

Cobra crew that was experiencing troubles with their

hydraulic system. The remaining aircraft continued

to Khost and retrieved the wounded soldier, while

Moss and two Cobras completed his portion of the

resupply mission the next morning.172

Task Force HMM-165 flew its final missions in

support of Task Force Mountain on 24 March. Early

in the morning, a combined force of Cobras,

Chinooks, and Sea Stallions headed south toward the

Whale. After dropping off a team of explosive

ordnance disposal technicians to certify several loads

of ordnance for pickup later in the day, they

returned to Bagram because of deteriorating

weather conditions. Once flying conditions had

improved at around 1100, a flight of two CH-47s

and three CH-53s returned to Khost one last time.

The Sea Stallion carried an eleven-man special forces

team and two Toyota Forerunner vehicles, while the

two Chinooks carried food, blankets, and other

humanitarian items to support an impending civil

affairs project. Then the Army and Marine

helicopters returned to Bagram, arriving at the air

base just as the sun was setting.173

As the squadron prepared to return to the ship

the following day, members of Task Force Mountain

surprised the Marines by organizing a ceremony to

recognize the 13th MEU’s contribution to

Operation Anaconda. With Fox News, Colonel

Gunther, Sergeant Major Jeffrey A. Morin, and

Lieutenant Colonel Sinclair in attendance, the Army

and Marine units exchanged plaques, and General

Hagenbeck awarded 14 decorations.174 In addition

to seven ground personnel who received Army

Commendation Medals and six Cobra pilots who

283

Marines during Operation Anaconda
received Air Medals, Colonel Sturdevant earned a

Bronze Star for leading Task Force HMM-165 and

serving as air mission commander on three

occasions during Operation Harpoon.*

At 0905 on 26 March, all eight Marine

helicopters lifted off from Bagram and headed for

the Pakistani coast and the amphibious ready group.

Once again, they completed the lengthy journey in

several legs: the first two Sea Stallions flew directly

to Kandahar, while the third stopped briefly in the

desert to refuel the five Cobras. After linking up in

Kandahar, the eight aircraft continued southward.

Although crossing into Pakistani air space should

have brought a sense of relief to the Marines, several

unexpected incidents only served to raise the

aircrew’s anxiety.175

The pilots began to gain altitude gradually after

crossing the border, observing Pakistani restrictions

against flights lower than 4,500 feet above ground

level. Shortly thereafter, Major Moss looked out the

right window of his aircraft, spotted several flashes

and puffs of smoke, and sent his aircraft into a steep

dive once he realized they were being shot at; another

aircraft observed a pickup truck with an unidentified

object in its bed. Next, although the lead CH-53,

piloted by Major Sehrt and Captain Eric D. Oliphant,

was supposed to take on fuel from an airborne KC130 tanker, it was running late and did not make the

scheduled connection. This would not normally have

been a problem (since they had enough fuel on board

to reach Pasni), but the aircraft began to experience

trouble with one of its three engines.176

The helicopter was flying about 3,000 feet

above ground level (6,000 feet above mean sea level)

and was 60 to 70 miles from Pasni when a “chip

light” came on, warning that the “engine’s starting

to chew itself up.”177 Two minutes later, Major Sehrt

radioed the other aircraft that his engine had begun

to fluctuate.178 Colonel Sturdevant, who was reading

a book in the back of the aircraft at the time, recalled

that the engine started making a loud whining noise

and began vibrating badly.179 The pilots pulled the

speed lever back—reducing the power to ground

idle to preserve the engine—and the vibrations

stopped. But they soon discovered that the two

remaining engines were not powerful enough to

keep the heavily laden aircraft flying level and that

they were losing altitude—a troubling situation as

they had to cross two major ridgelines before

descending to the coast.

Major Sehrt’s first solution was to begin

jettisoning some of his limited fuel supply, dumping

approximately 8,000 pounds overboard. When that

failed to halt their descent, the pilots reluctantly

engaged the third engine and the aircraft slowly

began to climb. Despite attempts to nurse the engine

along, it began to vibrate violently and emit a “really

loud whining noise” before quitting entirely.180

Fortunately, the pilots had gained just enough

altitude during their last push to slip through a

saddle as they crossed over the final ridgeline before

the coastal plain.181

Meanwhile, Major Moss had flown ahead and

obtained clearance for an emergency landing at

Pasni.182 Thirty-five minutes later, with only 1,800

pounds of fuel and approximately 15 minutes of

flight time remaining, Major Sehrt performed a

running landing into that facility. Captain Oliphant,

who acknowledged that the incident “was probably

the most exciting thing that happened to me the

entire time, as far as being in danger or in harm’s

way,” remarked that the landing was “probably the

smoothest... I’ve had in a [CH-]53.”183 Colonel

Sturdevant later joked that he was happy to be on

the ground—he was getting too old for this.184

The helicopter detachment returned to the

amphibious ready group that evening, leaving the

damaged CH-53 ashore overnight, secured by

members of Marine Air Control Group 38, who

had been conducting logistics operations at the

284

FROM THE SEA

*LtGen Earl B. Hailston later awarded 13 Marines their Combat Aircrew Wings for operations in Afghanistan. Sgt Jennifer Austin, one of the recipients,

was reported to be the first woman to earn the designation. (SSgt April D. Tuggle, “13th MEU (SOC) Aircrews Earn Combat Aircrew Wings for

Anaconda,” Marine Corps News, 2002)
285

Marines during Operation Anaconda

airfield throughout Anaconda. Mechanics from

HMM-165 returned to Pasni with a new aircraft

engine the following morning, which they replaced

in approximately six hours.185 Once repaired, the

pilots flew the helicopter out to the ship, and 13th

MEU brought in its shore party as the sun set over

the horizon. Although this effectively ended the

squadron’s support of military operations in

Afghanistan, the Marines had the satisfaction of

knowing their presence had influenced the

outcome of the battle. General Hagenbeck

reportedly mentioned them in dispatches, noting

that the departure of Marine aircraft would have a

significant impact on the command’s ability to

conduct operations.186

Concurrent with the participation in Operation

Anaconda, the 13th MEU supported bilateral

training exercises in the region, participating in

Eastern Maverick in Qatar during March and Sea

Soldier in Oman during April. The Marines were

extended in theater around this time, reflecting rising

tensions between the Israelis and Palestinians, and

told to prepare for a possible noncombat evacuation

operation if the situation continued to deteriorate.

Fortunately, that was not necessary and the

expeditionary unit headed home in early May. After

helicoptering from the Fifth to the Seventh and,

finally, to the Third Fleet, the Marines reached the

West Coast on 17 June 2002.187

287

Epilogue

A New Beginning

Almost from the onset of Operation

Enduring Freedom, the United

Nations (UN) had pursued concurrent

efforts to foster political change, restore order, and

promote reconstruction. These mutually supporting

efforts together composed a tripartite strategy for

ushering in a new era of security, prosperity, and

democracy in Afghanistan. In what would amount

to a sequential model for counterinsurgency

operations, American-led forces continued to do

much of the fighting in contested regions,

international security forces focused primarily on

policing actions in less-contested areas, and

nongovernment organizations endeavored to rebuild

the nation’s infrastructure in pacified provinces. One

of the first steps in this long process was the Bonn

Agreement.

The Bonn Agreement

On 12 November 2001, international

representatives from the United States, the Russian

Federation, and six countries neighboring

Afghanistan met in New York with UN Secretary

General Kofi Annan. They agreed on the need for a

broad-based and freely chosen Afghan government

and pledged to continue their support for the UN’s

humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and refugee

camps in neighboring states.1 Two days later,

immediately following the liberation of Kabul, the

UN Security Council unanimously adopted

Resolution 1378, in which they pledged to support

Afghan efforts to establish a transitional administration to form a new government.2 While urging

the Afghan forces to refrain from acts of reprisal,

they encouraged member states to ensure the safety

and security of areas no longer under Taliban

control and to respect Kabul as the capital of all the

Afghan people.

Less than a week later, as Coalition forces laid

siege to Kunduz, former President Burhannudin

Rabbani and other Northern Alliance leaders agreed

to recognize a Kabul-based transitional government

and informed the American ambassador, James F.

Dobbins, that they would participate in a UNsponsored conference in Bonn, Germany, to chart

the future of Afghanistan.3 On 4 December, after

nine days of heated negotiations, delegates from

four rival factions chose Hamid Karzai to lead the

new 30-member Afghan Interim Authority and

signed the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements

in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of

Permanent Government Institutions.4 The UN

Security Council endorsed the agreement the

following day, unanimously adopting Resolution

1383. The resolution, which “determined to end the

tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national

reconciliation, lasting peace, stability, and respect for

human rights in the country,” represented a

commitment to facilitate implementation of the

agreement and its three annexes.5

Under the general provisions of the agreement,

the Afghan Interim Authority would represent

Afghan sovereignty for only six months. During its

brief tenure, this administration was responsible for

establishing “a judicial commission to rebuild the

domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic

principles, international standards, the rule of law,

and Afghan legal traditions,” as well as a special

independent commission for the “Convening of the

Emergency Loya Jirga” (grand assembly) to “elect a

head of state for the transitional administration

and... approve proposals for the structure and key

personnel of the transitional administration.”6 The

succeeding Transitional Authority would have 18

months to convene a constitutional loya jirga to

establish a new Afghan constitution and 24 months

to hold “free and fair elections.”
Recognizing the magnitude of the Afghan

Interim Authority’s mission, Annex I of the

agreement specifically requested “the assistance of

the international community in helping the new

Afghan authorities in the establishment and training

of a new Afghan security and armed forces.” This

included “the early deployment to Afghanistan of a

UN mandate force [to] assist in the maintenance of

security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.”7

Annex II similarly directed that “the United Nations

shall advise the Interim Authority in establishing a

politically neutral environment conducive to the

holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga in free and fair

conditions.”8 Annex III contained a number of

miscellaneous requests, including assistance with

voter registration; rehabilitation, recovery, and

reconstruction of Afghanistan; reintegration of the

mujahideen; creation of a fund to assist the

dependents of fighters and victims of the war; and

the combating of international terrorism and the

cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs.

During an inauguration ceremony on 22

December, attended by approximately 2,000 Afghan

leaders and foreign diplomats, Chairman Karzai

accepted power from President Rabbani and swore

in the members of his new cabinet. Reflecting the

tenuous nature of the proceedings, Karzai spoke in

his native Pashto; read a poem in Dari; and stood

before a backdrop image of Ahmad Shah Masood,

the Northern Alliance’s slain Tajik leader and hero

of the Soviet-Afghan War.9 Addressing the audience,

288

FROM THE SEA

Illustration by Vincent J. Martinez

Diagram 9: The chronological development of the tripartite strategy employed in Afghanistan. This includes Coalition forces

combating insurgents, International Security Assistance Forces training national police and army units, and United Nations

personnel guiding reconstruction. Between 2003 and 2006, Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan served as a higher

headquarters directing both Combined Joint Task Force 180 (counterinsurgency) and the Offices of Military and Security

Cooperation (training). After the United States assumed control of Regional Command East, Task Force 76 was reestablished as

the senior division-level Coalition command in Afghanistan.
he stated, “Our country has had destruction in all

aspects of life. We need a new beginning and hard

work from all Afghans.”10 He also noted that first

among the new government’s duties was ensuring

security and peace. As if to punctuate the remark, a

combined force of police, soldiers, and British Royal

Marines remained alert outside the ministry.11

International Security Assistance Force

In accordance with the Bonn Agreement,

members of the international community established

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to

help the Afghan Interim Authority “create a secure

environment in and around Kabul and support the

reconstruction of Afghanistan.”12 Although

sanctioned by the UN Security Council under

Resolution 1386, the ISAF was a coalition of nations

rather than an actual UN security force. The vanguard

of the force, a small group led by British Major

General John C. McColl, left the United Kingdom in

mid-December, while the main body began deploying

to Kabul later in the month.13 Its principal tasks,

detailed in a Military Technical Agreement reached

with the Interim Authority in early January 2002,

included identifying reconstruction needs, training the

Afghan army and police forces, and conducting

stability and security operations, as well as supporting

disarmament, counternarcotic, and humanitarian

assistance operations.14

Command of the multinational force initially

rotated among the international community

members on a six-month basis, with the United

Kingdom leading ISAF I until July 2002, Turkey

leading ISAF II until January 2003, and Germany

and the Netherlands leading ISAF III until August

289

Epilogue: A New Beginning

Map courtesy of NATO International Security Assistance Force

Map depicting International Security Assistance Force regions and the location of Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

as of 3 April 2009. Between 2003 and 2006, responsibility for coordinating security operations was gradually transferred by region

to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2003. At that time, members of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) took over command

and coordination of the ISAF, appointing Minister

Hikmet Cetin of Turkey to the post of senior civilian

representative in Afghanistan.15 Working in coordination with Afghan authorities, the UN, and the

ISAF commander and with guidance from NATO’s

North Atlantic Council, the civilian representative

was responsible for advancing the political-military

aspects of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan.16

Two months following NATO’s assumption of

command, the UN Security Council authorized the

expansion of ISAF operations throughout

Afghanistan by adopting Resolution 1510.17 That

December the North Atlantic Council authorized

Marine General James Jones, its Supreme Allied

Commander, to initiate the expansion by assuming

control over the German-led provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Kunduz.18 Thereafter, during a

four-phase process, the NATO contingent gradually

extended its influence throughout northern

Afghanistan by October 2004, and then to the west

in February 2005, the south in July 2006, and finally

to eastern Afghanistan in October 2006.

The NATO expansion resulted in the

establishment of five regional commands, each to

coordinate civil-military activities in its area of

responsibility (Table 6). Every command, headed by

a lead nation, is composed of a headquarters, a

forward support base to address logistical requirements, and multiple PRTs.19 The latter are small

teams of civil and military personnel who work with

local authorities to spread stability across the country

by enhancing security and furthering reconstruction

efforts in designated provinces.20

United Nations Assistance Mission to

Afghanistan

During the first month of the conflict in

Afghanistan, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

appointed Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Algerian

foreign minister, as his special envoy. After arriving

in Kabul during December 2001, Brahimi and his

small team combined several existing UN staffs

from the Special Mission in Afghanistan, the Office

for the Coordination of Human Affairs, and a

technical survey team from the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations to facilitate control and

coordination. Annan outlined the organizational

structure and mandate for a proposed UN

Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in a report to the

Security Council three months later, that described

“the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for

international peace and security.”21

Directed and supported by the UN’s Department

of Peacekeeping Operations, the Assistance Mission

290

FROM THE SEA

Region Lead Nation Headquarters Forward Support PRT and National Teams

Location Base Location

Capital Italy Kabul (France) Kabul (Belgium)

North Germany Mazar-e Sharif Mazar-e Sharif Germany(2), Sweden, Hungary,

Norway

West Italy Herat (Italy) Herat (Spain) United States, Italy, Spain, Lithuania

South United Kingdom Kandahar Kandahar United States, Canada, United

Kingdom, Netherlands

East United States Bagram Bagram United States (10), New Zealand,

Turkey, Czech Republic

Table 6: ISAF Regional Command Structure and Provisional Reconstruction Teams as of

May 2008
would “integrate all the existing United Nations

elements in Afghanistan into a single mission”

designed to fulfill “the tasks and responsibilities...

entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn

Agreement... by promoting national reconciliation...

[and] managing all United Nations humanitarian,

relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities in

Afghanistan.”22 Working under Special Representative

Brahimi, Jean Arnault would serve as the deputy

special representative for Political Affairs (Pillar I),

while Nigel Fisher would serve as the deputy special

representative for Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction (Pillar II).23 Although based in Kabul, the

Assistance Mission intended to establish seven

regional offices throughout Afghanistan and several

liaison offices in neighboring countries. On 28 March

2002, the Security Council formally established the

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan by passing

Resolution 1401.24

The Special Independent Commission for the

Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga was

established early in 2002, and by April it had begun

the arduous task of selecting 1,500 delegates from

approximately 400 districts throughout Afghanistan.

When the loya jirga convened in Kabul during June,

it elected Chairman Karzai president of the

Transitional Authority in a landslide victory garnering

82 percent of the vote. Concurrently, the Afghan

Judicial Commission was established in May and

tasked with rebuilding the domestic justice system.25

During 2003, the assistance mission helped the

Afghan administration create a national development

framework and budget; begin forming the national

army and police forces; initiate a reformation of the

defense department; and engage the disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration process. It also

established a joint Afghan-UN committee to register

voters and organize elections. Despite these successes,

continued factional clashes, criminal activity, and

terrorist activities aimed at the UN limited progress.26

During January 2004, another specially

convened loya jirga ratified the country’s new

constitution, and by September the Joint Election

Management Body had registered 10.5 million

citizens to vote, with women comprising approximately 42 percent of these. On 9 October, over 8

million Afghans cast ballots in the country’s first

democratic-style presidential election. President

Karzai secured 55 percent of the vote and was

sworn in on 7 December, almost three years to the

day after the signing of the Bonn Agreement.27

Citizens returned to the polls the following

September to elect parliamentary and provincial

council representatives.

Operation Enduring Freedom–Phase III

As the UN Assistance Mission and the ISAF

initiated stability and support operations in and

around Kabul, the U.S.-led Coalition continued to

pursue renegade al-Qaeda and Taliban forces

throughout the country. In addition to continued

combat operations, the Coalition was also subject to

local and regional changes reflecting the transition

to a new phase in the Afghan conflict, as well as an

escalation of the Global War on Terrorism along the

Horn of Africa and eventually in Iraq.

While supporters defended General Franks’s

long-range leadership style during the initial round

of the Afghan campaign—arguing that modern

technology supported more decentralized

operations than those conducted in the past and

subsequently allowed for a new type of generalship—critics argued for a more hands-on approach.*

As Thomas E. Ricks reported in December 2001,

There is some disquiet in the military,

especially in the Air Force and Army, about

Army General Tommy R. Franks’s decision to

keep his headquarters... in Tampa.... Critics

say Franks should have followed the example

of his predecessor at Central Command,

Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who

291

Epilogue: A New Beginning

*According to LtGen Michael DeLong, the Central Command staff had actually begun to build a deployable command that they could maneuver to

hotspots throughout the region as early as January 2001. The mobile command eventually deployed to Qatar in February 2003, just prior to the invasion of

Iraq. (DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 91)
moved to Saudi Arabia to direct the 1991

Persian Gulf War.28

Taking a more neutral position during the spring

of 2002, one Central Command official explained to

reporters that “the operational command structure

put in place at the beginning of Operation Enduring

Freedom worked very well at the time, but as

conditions evolved, a new structure was required.”29

The solution was to establish a corps-level headquarters at Bagram Air Base on 31 May 2002.

Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeill, USA,

commander of the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne

Corps, led the newly formed Combined Joint Task

Force 180. Although he answered directly to General

Franks and was responsible for orchestrating

Coalition forces operating in Afghanistan and its

neighboring countries, his authority did not extend

over the ISAF.30 Task Force 180’s multidimensional

mission included eliminating armed resistance

against the new Afghan government as well as

training Afghan National Army units and

conducting civil-military, humanitarian assistance,

and information operations in coordination with the

Transitional Authority. Combat power was primarily

supplied by paratroopers from the U.S. Army’s 82d

Airborne Division (Task Force Panther), who

replaced the 101st Airborne Division (Task Force

Rakkasan) at Kandahar during June 2002.31

The trend toward change also affected the

various special operating forces that had been

fighting separate campaigns in Afghanistan since the

previous autumn. During late March 2002, special

operations Task Forces Dagger and K-Bar had

merged to form Combined Joint Special Operations

Task Force–Afghanistan, headquartered at Bagram

under Colonel Mark P. Phelan, USA, and the U.S.

292

FROM THE SEA

Photo by TSgt Mike Buytas, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020519-f-9085b-007/df-sd-04-06341

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group, instruct Afghan National Army recruits at the military academy in Kabul

on 19 May 2001. Foreign internal defense, one of the special operating forces’ doctrinal missions, remains a key component of

the International Security Assistance Force initiative.
Army’s 3d Special Forces Group. The centralized

special operations task force was initially placed

under operational control of Rear Admiral Albert

Calland, USN, the region’s special operations

component commander based in Oman, and tactical

control of Major General Franklin Hagenbeck,

USA, the deputy land component commander

situated in Bagram.32

Within months, as the likelihood of war in Iraq

increased, operational control shifted to Combined

Joint Task Force 180 and leadership transitioned to

the 20th Special Forces Group, a National Guard

unit headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama. Now

that the maneuver phase of the campaign was over,

the special forces’ overt mission switched from

unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense.

This involved training, advising, and assisting the

Afghan forces in their effort to stabilize and secure

the region, ostensibly conducted from small forward

operating “firebases” scattered throughout the

countryside, which served as the forerunner of the

ISAF’s PRTs.33

Small teams of Marine advisors, deployed by the

Marine Corps’ Coalition and Special Warfare Center

(part of the International Military Education and

Training Program, headquartered at Quantico,

Virginia), began to assist the special forces and ISAF

that spring.34 Marine advisory teams would continue

to support the training mission throughout the Afghan

conflict, although the Security Cooperation Education

and Training Center replaced the Coalition and Special

Warfare Center in 2004.35 The new designation

represented “a shift in focus based on the growing

demands of education and training related to security

cooperation,” resulting in a functional realignment of

expeditionary unit deployment training policy

oversight to the assistant chief of staff, G-3, Training

and Education Command.36

293

Epilogue: A New Beginning

Photo by SSgt Joshua T. Jasper, USAF. Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 071107-F-0451J-011

Members of the Afghan National Police pose for a photo in Nangarhar Province on 7 November 2007. Developing a competent

police force remains a key component in extending security throughout the nation.
The Afghan training mission (Task Force

Phoenix) passed to U.S. Army National Guard forces

in late 2003, with command responsibility rotating

through several brigade commands.37 As oversight

of the program shifted from the Office of Military

Cooperation–Afghanistan to the Office of Security

Cooperation–Afghanistan during the summer of

2005, the mission grew to include reforming the

Afghan National Police Force, which a German

contingent had previously led.38 The following

spring, after changing its name to Combined Security

Transition Command–Afghanistan, the task force’s

mission expanded to help “plan, program, and

implement structure, organizational, institutional,

and management reforms of the Afghanistan

National Security Forces in order to develop a stable

Afghanistan, strengthen the rule of law, and deter

and defeat terrorism within its borders.”39

Marine Security Forces, 2002–2005

The Marine Corps also supported Operation

Enduring Freedom by executing a number of its

traditional missions, including providing security for

the U.S. embassy in Kabul. The 4th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) (4th MEB),

activated at Commandant Jones’s direction in

October 2001 and commanded by Brigadier General

Douglas V. O’Dell Jr., provided the bulk of these

forces.40 Although the new antiterrorism brigade*

initially consisted of the Marine Corps’ Chemical

Biological Incident Response Force and a rotating

infantry (antiterrorism) battalion, it grew to include

the Marine Security Guard and Security Force

Battalions during June and October 2002.41 As the

Global War on Terrorism escalated, the 4th MEB

would deploy units to support operations in

Guantanamo Bay, Djibouti, and Iraq, in addition to

enhancing security in Afghanistan.42

Third Battalion, 8th Marines, served as the first

of four temporary antiterrorism battalions attached

to 4th MEB. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Stephen W. Davis, its three rifle companies rotated

through Kabul at 90-day intervals between January

and September 2002.43 A variety of personnel

augmented the security forces in Afghanistan during

this period, including a similar rotation of military

working dog teams from Marine installations in

California, Hawaii, and Okinawa.44 Following Davis’s

battalion in succession were 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines (September 2002 to November 2003); 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines (November 2003 to

September 2004); and 2d Battalion, 6th Marines**

(September 2004 to April 2005).45

Concurrent with 2d Battalion, 6th Marine’s tour

in Afghanistan—which included deploying

Company E to Bagram from September to

December 2004 in support of the national

elections—4th MEB activated a permanent, rather

than rotating, antiterrorism battalion under the

command of Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Killion

294

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Cpl. Matthew Roberson

Marines and sailors from the 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) board a C-5 Galaxy to deploy in

support of Operation Enduring Freedom. These Camp Lejeune

Marines are specially trained to deter, detect, defend, and

conduct initial incident response to combat terrorism

worldwide.

*At the time of 4th MEB’s activation, Col Thomas X. Hammes commanded the Chemical and Biological Response Force, Col Bruce A. Gandy

commanded the Marine Corps Security Forces, and Col Boyette S. Hasty commanded the Marine Security Guard Battalion. (4th MEB CmdC, 1Jan02–

30Jun02, Part 1)

**During this period, 3/6 was commanded by LtCol Jerome M. Lynes (5Sep02–11Dec02), Maj Edward T. Dewald (11Dec01–21Feb02), and LtCol Charles

S. Dunston (21Feb02–17Feb03); 3/2 was commanded by LtCol Paul B. Dunahoe (17Nov04–Sept04); and 2/6 was commanded by LtCol Scott D. Aiken

(1Oct04–1May05).
on 29 October.46 During March 2005, with

dissolution of the Kabul security mission rapidly

approaching, 4th MEB accepted responsibility for

training, equipping, and deploying military training

teams, border transition teams, and special police

transition teams in support of Operation Iraqi

Freedom.47 Killian subsequently reorganized the

new antiterrorism battalion to support a wide range

of training and security missions around the globe.48

The 4th MEB operated successfully until 24

February 2006, when it was deactivated and its major

subordinate units were assigned to other commands.

The Marine Corps formally established its Special

Operations Command, which assumed control over

4th MEB’s foreign military training unit, on the same

day.49 On 20 May 2007, after successful deployments

to Africa and South America, the training unit was

designated the Marine Special Operations Advisor

Group.50 The antiterrorism battalion continued to

operate under the auspices of II Marine

Expeditionary Force until 13 July 2007, when it was

designated 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, and assigned to

2d Marine Division.51

Marines in the Air, 2002–2006

Following the initial Coalition victory over alQaeda and Taliban forces during the spring of 2002,

the deployment of Marine units to Afghanistan

occurred sporadically and in relatively small numbers.

A detachment from Marine Wing Support Squadron

371 provided airfield lighting at Kandahar through

March 2003, when it relocated to Kuwait just prior to

the launching of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Marine

Air Control Squadron 2 deployed a tactical air

operations center detachment to Karshi Khanabad,

Uzbekistan, and an air traffic control detachment to

Manas, Kyrgyzstan, into the autumn of 2002, while

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 similarly deployed a

tactical air operations center detachment to

Kandahar, Afghanistan, and an air traffic control

detachment to Manas into February 2003.52

Concurrent with these air control operations was the

initiation of a three-year effort to provide tactical

close air support to forces serving in Afghanistan.

After receiving a request for forces issued on 27

November 2001, Marine All Weather Fighter Attack

Squadron 121 (VMFA[AW]-121), known as “The

Green Knights” and commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel David C. Myers, began preparing for the

deployment of a detachment of F/A-18s to Manas,

Kyrgyzstan. While remaining on a 96-hour tether

through March 2002, the pilots continued to develop

their skills in aerial refueling, air-to-ground tactics,

weapons employment, and forward air control

operations. After receiving the anticipated

deployment order, the six aircraft departed Marine

Corps Air Station Miramar on 10 April and arrived

at Peter J. Ganci Air Base approximately one week

later. Constructed by the U.S. Air Force, the base was

home to various Coalition forces and possessed a

multinational tone. More important to the Marine

pilots, however, Air Control Squadron 2 provided

the airfield with a precision approach capability.53

After folding into the Air Force’s 376th Air

Expeditionary Wing and familiarizing themselves

with the local area of operations, pilots from

VMFA(AW)-121 began flying combat missions on

24 April. Although they were initially tasked with

supplying four sorties per day, that requirement grew

to six following the arrival of six additional fighters

on 25 May. The intense operational tempo kept the

295

Epilogue: A New Beginning

Photo by SSgt James Arrowood, USAF.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 020417-F-2939A-001

Marine F/A-18D Hornets fly overhead during their arrival at

Manas International Airport, Kyrgyzstan, on 17 April 2002.

During its five months in theater, Marine Fighter Attack

Squadron 121 flew 900 combat sorties, conducting escort,

tactical reconnaissance, airborne air control, and close air

support missions.
maintenance crews busy around the clock with the

goal of maintaining at least 11 operational jets at any

given time and flights lasting six to eight hours.54

In addition to providing close air support,

serving as airborne air controllers, and escorting

convoys and heliborne assaults, VMFA (AW)-121

also conducted tactical reconnaissance missions in

support of both Task Force 180 and Joint Task

Force–Southwest Asia Coalition collections. Using

its advanced tactical air reconnaissance system while

executing the latter mission, it collected images of

approximately 400 targets; half of these were posted

on the imagery product library for exploitation by

other units. On 23 September, after five months in

theater, the squadron began its retrograde to

Miramar. During its tenure in Kyrgyzstan, the Green

Knights flew 900 combat sorties in support of eight

different operations, including Mountain Lion,

Buzzard, Condor, Snipe, Full Throttle, Cherokee

Sky, Mountain Sweep, and Iron Talon.55

During the latter half of October 2002,

following the departure of VMFA (AW)-121, a

detachment of six AV-8s from Marine Attack

Squadron 513 (VMA-513) deployed to Bagram in

support of Task Force 180. Lieutenant Colonel

James A. Dixon, the squadron’s commander, had

first learned of the unexpected six-month

deployment during July and spent the limited lead

time schooling his pilots in aerial refueling; rocket

employment; and the use of night-vision goggles,

forward looking infrared sensors, Litening II

targeting pods, and GAU-12 gun systems.

Meanwhile, First Lieutenant Flanagan led a small

advance party to Bagram in September and began

construction of a base camp in preparation for the

aircraft detachment’s impending arrival. This was no

small task, as it involved clearing mines, erecting

tents, building bunkers, and establishing entry

control points and basic utility services. The advance

party also began construction of an ammunition

296

FROM THE SEA

Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams

An AV-8b Harrier of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 513 takes off from Bagram Air Base on 9 August 2003. While serving in

Afghanistan from October 2002 to September 2003, the “Flying Nightmares” flew 1,250 combat sorties and employed the

Litening II targeting pod.
supply point and high power turn-up ramp for the

jet aircraft. The Marines would eventually designate

the squadron’s compound Camp Teufel Hunden

(Devil Dogs) on 18 December, naming it after the

moniker earned by their predecessors on the

battlefields of France during World War I.56

Colonel Dixon and Captain Michael D. Trapp

flew the squadron’s first combat missions over

Afghanistan on 18 October 2002. After the initiation

of flight operations, the detachment began flying a

wide range of missions. These flights, lasting

approximately two and a half to four hours, included

escort, aerial reconnaissance, and close air support

missions. The Litening II targeting pod, used for the

first time in combat by VMA-513, proved particularly

useful in capturing video imagery of target areas and

enabled the pilots to self-designate and mark targets

for the delivery of precision munitions. The Harriers

dropped their first ordnance on 14 November, after

joining Air Force A-10s in the defense of a special

forces safe house in Lwara, scoring a direct hit on an

enemy mortar position. They dropped again on 29

December, successfully bombing an enemy

compound near Shkin following a skirmish between

U.S. ground forces and al-Qaeda fighters.57

Given the squadron’s initial success, Central

Command requested, during February 2003, that

VMA-513 remain in theater for an additional six

months.58 The request was approved and the “Flying

Nightmares” continued to fly for Task Force 180,

dropping ordnance in support of ground forces on

10 more occasions. On 31 March and 8 April they

attacked enemy positions along the Pakistani border,

and on 2 April they hit others near Kandahar.59 On

19 July, the squadron suppressed hostile forces who

had ambushed a mobile patrol in the Gayan Valley,

enabling extraction of the Americans—some of

whom had been wounded—and on 23 July, it

attacked an enemy rocket position firing on

Asadabad fire base near the Pakistani border.60

The Marine pilots encountered their heaviest

fighting during August, engaging the enemy on five

separate occasions. On 11 August, at the behest of

U.S. Navy SEALs, they attacked an enemy force that

had withdrawn to a village compound. Two days

later, now supporting U.S. Army Special Forces, they

attacked a retreating force that had overrun an

Afghan National Army position near Khost and was

making contact with the American soldiers. On the

25th, they supported another special forces team

that had become pinned down, by attacking an

enemy force massing on a ridgeline near Deh

Chopan. Two days later, they attacked a hostile force

that had ambushed an American patrol outside the

Shkin fire base. Then, on 29 August, they delivered

preparatory fires against enemy positions in Deh

Chopan prior to a helicopter assault conducted by

U.S. Army troops.61

A day after flying their final mission over

Afghanistan on 15 September, the Nightmares

began their 10-day retrograde to Yuma, Arizona.

During their year in theater, with only six aircraft and

10 pilots on hand, VMA-513 had flown 1,250

combat sorties and supported numerous operations.

These included Dragon Fury, Unified Resolve,

Haven Denial, Warrior Sweep, Dragon Strike, Eagle

Claw I and II, and Mountain Viper.62 During the

same period, another six-plane detachment from the

squadron twice deployed with Marine expeditionary

units, flying missions in support of operations both

in Iraq and off the Horn of Africa.63

In October 2003, following the departure of

VMA-513, a detachment of six Super Cobras and

three Hueys from Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 773 (HMLA-773) arrived at Bagram to

continue support of Task Force 180.64 Unlike their

active duty predecessors, the “Red Dogs” were

members of a mobilized reserve unit based at

Naval Air Station Belle Chasses, Louisiana. During

three successive detachment rotations, they

performed escort, reconnaissance, and close air

support missions similar to those previously flown

by the Hornet and Harrier pilots. The squadron

forward deployed to Fire Base Salerno, located

north of Khost, to support ground operations near

the Pakistani border during their 18-month tenure

in theater.65

297

Epilogue: A New Beginning
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 769 (HMH769), a reserve unit based out of Edwards Air Force

Base in California, also supported Task Force 180.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard D.

Mullen, the “Road Hogs” deployed to Bagram in

May 2004 and ferried personnel, supplies,

equipment, and even mail to forward operating

bases throughout Afghanistan.66 During their sixmonth tenure in theater, HMH-769 flew 1,083

combat sorties, carried 9,193 passengers, and

transported 2,228,745 pounds of cargo.67 Marine

Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 (HMH-462), an

active duty unit from Marine Corps Air Station

Miramar, replaced the Road Hogs in October 2004.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Moss

(who had previously flown in Afghanistan as a

member of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit

during Operation Anaconda), the “Heavy Haulers”

provided a heavy lift capability to Coalition forces

until departing in May 2005.68

Marines on the Ground, 2003–2009

Marine ground combat forces did not return to

Afghanistan until November 2003, when 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Robert G. Petit, arrived in Bagram to

support Task Force 180’s stability and security

operations in northern Kabul Province.69 This

development, part of a troop surge following the rise

of insurgent activity during the previous year and

growing concern over security requirements for the

impending voter registration campaign, coincided

with both NATO’s decision to expand the ISAF’s

presence throughout the country and Central

Command’s establishment of Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan (commanded by Army

Lieutenant General David W. Barno). The added

layer of bureaucracy provided centralized leadership

over Task Force 180, which was now relegated to a

subordinate role, as well as the Office of Military

Cooperation–Afghanistan and Task Force Phoenix.70

298

FROM THE SEA

Photo by LCpl Justin M. Mason

Members of Company K, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, search a compound during Operation Lynx on 7 August 2004. The battalion was

working to secure Khost Province in northeastern Afghanistan, prior to national elections scheduled for October.
As part of its ongoing effort to quell resistance

in southern and eastern Afghanistan, Task Force 180

launched Operation Mountain Storm during early

March 2004.71 By this time, Colonel McKenzie and

the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (22d MEU) had

redeployed to Central Command’s theater of

operations. The Marines were part of Expeditionary

Strike Group 2, an innovative naval configuration

reflecting the earlier success of then–Brigadier

General James Mattis and Naval Expeditionary Task

Force 58. McKenzie was assigned the lead role in the

Coalition’s annual spring offensive and given tactical

responsibility for Uruzgan Province. This rural

mountain region located north of Kandahar was a

known safe haven for renegade Taliban and al-Qaeda

forces. Following a turnover between the 10th

Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions, Task Force

180 had been renamed Task Force 76 on 25 April to

emphasize the Coalition’s commitment to securing

the future of the fledgling Afghan democracy.

The 22d MEU’s mission was threefold: secure

the region’s major population centers, create a stable

environment for voter registration, and defeat the

anti-Coalition militia forces. It accomplished this

through a four-phase campaign conducted between

26 March and 10 July, which centered on establishing

Forward Operating Base Ripley* in the provincial

capital of Tarin Kowt, securing the surrounding

valleys, and then simultaneously engaging the

Afghan citizenry and insurgent forces in concurrent

civil and military operations.72 In a series of running

299

Epilogue: A New Beginning

Photo by LCpl Justin M. Mason

Members of Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, speak with villagers while patrolling near Khost on 19 September 2004.

The Marines are conducting local security assessments in support of the upcoming presidential election while maintaining an

offensive presence throughout the region.

*The 22d MEU named its forward operating base after Col John W. Ripley, USMC. While serving as a military advisor to South Vietnamese forces in 1972,

he received the Navy Cross for destroying the bridge at Dong Ha during the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive.
gun battles, principally fought by Lieutenant Colonel

Asad A. Khan and his 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

22d MEU was credited with eliminating more than

100 enemy fighters from an area previously avoided

by conventional forces. As the Marines prepared to

depart, having turned their forward operating base

over to a PRT, Major General Eric T. Olson, USA,

commander of the 25th Infantry Division,

remarked, “You’re the best this place has ever

seen.”73 He continued, quoting General Barno,

“Never in the history of Operation Enduring

Freedom has there been an offensive operation like

the one the 22d MEU conducted. Never have we

been this successful. You have made history here.”74

Following the successful completion of the

spring offensive, Task Force 76 began Operation

Lightning Resolve, an initiative to reinforce Coalition

forces, step up security, and support the UN’s effort to

register voters.75 Although the elections were twice

postponed (first from June to September and then

from September to October) due to security concerns

over the rising number of insurgent attacks, the

Taliban campaign to derail registration ultimately failed

to undermine the population’s enthusiasm.76 As one

report emphasized, “The desire to vote was so strong,

Afghans in the Panjab district began to line up four

hours before the polling center was scheduled to open,

with a foot of snow on the ground.”77

Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford and 3d

Battalion, 6th Marines, which had replaced

Lieutenant Colonel Petit’s battalion during May,

contributed to this success and continued to conduct

stability and support operations at various locations

into December 2004.78 They were in turn succeeded

by Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Cooling and 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines, from November 2004 to June

2005; Lieutenant Colonel James E. Donnellan and

2d Battalion, 3d Marines, from June 2005 to January

2006;79 and finally Lieutenant Colonel James W.

Bierman and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, from January

to June 2006.80

During the same period, the Italy-based

Southern European Task Force had replaced the

25th Infantry Division as head of Task Force 76 in

March 2005, in turn being replaced by the U.S.

Army’s 10th Mountain Division in February 2006.

Following NATO’s assumption of responsibility for

operations throughout the country late in 2006,

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan stood

down. This change resurrected Task Force 76 as the

senior U.S. command in Afghanistan, as well as the

lead for the ISAF in Regional Command East. In

March 2007, the 82d Airborne Division replaced the

10th Mountain Division as the senior command, and

Task Force 76 subsequently became Task Force 82.81

During January 2007, following another brief

hiatus in ground combat participation, Marine

Special Operations Command deployed its first

special operations company under the tactical

control of Colonel Gregory Sturdevant and the 26th

Marine Expeditionary Unit.82 A month later, Major

Fred C. Galvin led Company F, 2d Marine Corps

Special Operations Battalion, ashore in support of

Central Command. Unfortunately, reports of

indiscriminate killings by Marines after insurgents

ambushed a six-vehicle convoy as it approached a

bridge near Jalalabad on 4 March led Major General

Frank H. Kearney III, USA, chief of Central

Command’s Special Operations Command, to order

the company’s expulsion from Afghanistan and

direct that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service

begin an investigation of the incident.83 Around the

same time, Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Montanus,

commander of the Marines’ 2d Special Operations

Battalion, chose to relieve Galvin and his senior staff

noncommissioned officer.84

General Kearney’s controversial decision to

expel the special operations company from

Afghanistan raised questions among Marine Corps

leaders, Defense Department personnel, and

congressional representatives regarding the role

played by command influence in the Marines’

removal.85 Yet Lieutenant General James Mattis,

commander of Marine Forces Central Command,

ordered that a court of inquiry be conducted to

review the evidence collected during the previous

investigation.86 On 23 May 2008, after hearing from

300

FROM THE SEA
more than 45 witnesses and examining more than

12,000 pages of documents, the court determined

that the Marines of Company F, 2d Marine Special

Operations Battalion, had “acted appropriately” in

response to the ambush.87 Meanwhile, the 1st

Marine Special Operations Battalion had successfully

deployed its first special operations company to

southeastern Afghanistan during the spring and

summer of 2007 and to the Philippines in the

autumn of the same year.88

Continuing Operations

During conversations with members of the

Joint Staff and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates

in October 2007, Marine Commandant James T.

Conway suggested that the Marine Corps withdraw

from Iraq and assume primary responsibility for the

U.S. mission in Afghanistan. This proposal, which

followed a significant decline in violence in al-Anbar

Province, the Marine’s area of responsibility in Iraq,

raised the possibility that a growing surplus of

Marine forces in that region could gradually replace

Army soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. Proponents

of the plan emphasized that the Marine Corps’

integrated air, ground, and logistics units were ideally

suited for dispersed operations in rugged terrain,

particularly given the recent combat deployment of

their new Bell-Boeing MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor

aircraft. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that

the Marine’s traditional seven-month tours were too

short for long-term counterinsurgency operations

and that a single-Service approach would discourage

joint operations.89

Although Secretary Gates rejected the idea in

early December, desiring instead that the

international community increase its contribution to

the peacekeeping force,90 by mid-January 2008

President Bush had approved a one-time

“deployment of 3,200 Marines to help the NATOled security effort in the south and to increase the

number of trainers for the Afghan army and

police.”91 Colonel Peter Petronzio and the 24th

Marine Expeditionary Unit subsequently arrived in

Afghanistan during March, and within a month had

launched a massive operation into the volatile

Garmsir District of southern Helmand Province.92

At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Richard D.

Hall and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, deployed to

Regional Security Command South to help train

district police forces.93 Both of these units served in

support of Task Force 101 (101st Airborne

Division) into November. As they departed, Colonel

Duffy W. White arrived with Special Purpose Marine

Air-Ground Task Force–Afghanistan, continuing

Marine operations in support of the ISAF in

southwestern Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel

David L. Odom and his 3d Battalion, 8th Marines,

provided the ground component, while Lieutenant

Colonel Michael J. Jernigan and his Combat

Logistics Battalion 3 provided the support element.

Despite an escalation in Coalition operations

during 2008, the security situation in Afghanistan

continued to deteriorate. In December, the Parisbased International Council on Security and

301

Epilogue: A New Beginning

Photo by Sgt Christopher M. Tirado

Gen James T. Conway, 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps,

speaks with members of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in

Kandahar on 22 February 2008.
Development reported that Taliban influence had

spread to the north and west, and resistance forces

now operated in nearly three-quarters of the

country, threatening several highways leading into

Kabul.94 Although NATO officials questioned the

report’s accuracy, after encountering a series of

successful attacks against Coalition-bound convoys

in northwestern Pakistan, the Coalition began

negotiations to increase the flow of supplies into

Afghanistan from the north.95 Moreover, NATO’s

own data indicated that the number of insurgent

attacks had risen by 31 percent and the number of

Afghan civilian deaths had increased by 40 percent

during the year.96

In the same month that the International

Council on Security and Development released its

report, the Coalition’s top commander, Army

General David D. McKiernan, requested an

additional four brigades, and President-elect Barak

Obama committed to shifting the focus from Iraq

and significantly increasing the American presence

in Afghanistan.97 During a press interview,

McKiernan explained that an increase in force levels

was “needed until we get to this tipping point where

the Afghan army and Afghan police have both the

capacity and capability to provide security for their

people.... That is at least three or four more years

away.” He also clarified, “I don’t like to use the word

‘surge’ here because if we put these additional forces

in here, it’s going to be for the next few years. It’s

not a temporary increase of combat strength.”98

At the same time, retired General James Jones,

former military head of NATO and President-elect

Obama’s national security advisor, warned that a U.S.

troop surge would only work if other changes also

take hold. He commented, “You can always put more

troops into Afghanistan, but if that’s all you do, you

will just be prolonging the problem.”99 In addition to

training security forces and rebuilding Afghanistan’s

infrastructure, Coalition officials embarked on a twopronged strategy to reconcile with moderate Taliban

302

FROM THE SEA

Photo by Cpl Alex C. Guerra

Members of Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/6, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, conduct combat operations in Garmsir,

Afghanistan, on 4 May 2008. The Marines are attached to the International Security Assistance Force.
303

Epilogue: A New Beginning

and isolate remaining hardliners affiliated with alQaeda.100 One aspect of the plan, based on a similar

program successfully employed in Iraq, was to raise

local militias under the auspices of the Afghanistan

Social Outreach Program.101

In December 2008, Defense Secretary Gates

announced that the 3d Brigade of the 10th

Mountain Division was scheduled to arrive in

Afghanistan during January 2009, followed by two

additional brigades in the spring.102 Although the

first unit to deploy would occupy the region south

of Kabul, Canadian forces indicated that they were

ready to vacate Kandahar before the end of their

mandate in 2011, making way for a major U.S.

command in southern Afghanistan.103 When asked

whether Marines might contribute to the surge,

Gates told reporters that the decision had not been

made but added, “It’s clear that the Marines want to

be in the fight, that’s what you’d expect.... I don’t

have a problem with General Conway’s desire to

have a bigger part of the mission in Afghanistan for

the Marine Corps.”104 On the issue of transitioning

Marine forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, Conway

remarked that the secretary understood his “public

stance on the fact that we can be better used

elsewhere and he certainly hasn’t told me to pipe

down. So I think he understands the logic of it.”105

Conway also confided that Marine units tentatively

scheduled to go to Iraq during spring 2009 were

already incorporating some training for Afghanistan

into their preparations.

By the end of May, Brigadier General Lawrence

D. Nicholson’s Marine Expeditionary Brigade–

Afghanistan (Task Force Leatherneck; 2d Marine

Expeditionary Brigade) had superseded Special

Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–

Afghanistan. This change represented a major

increase in both the size and scope of Marine Corps

operations in southwestern Afghanistan. Based out

of Camp Leatherneck, northwest of Lashkar Gah,

the brigade totaled more than 10,000 Marines and

sailors from Regimental Combat Team 3,

commanded by Colonel Duffy W. White; Marine

Aircraft Group 40, commanded by Colonel Kevin S.

Vest; and Combat Logistics Regiment 2, commanded

by Colonel John W. Simmons. Distributed at

subsidiary battalion outposts and company patrol

bases along the Helmand River valley, their mission

was to conduct counterinsurgency operations—

which included securing the region—in partnership

with the Afghan National Security Forces.

Appropriately, the southernmost position was

situated west of Forward Operation Base Rhino,

where Marines and sailors from Task Force 58 had

landed almost eight years earlier.106
304

FROM THE SEA
305

Foreword

1. LtGen Gregory S. Newbold, comments on draft

manuscript, 26Nov08 (comment file, Marine Corps

History Division [MCHD], Quantico, VA), hereafter

Newbold comments. All comment file documents

cited in this work can be found at the MCHD,

Quantico, VA.

Prologue

1. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting,” in

Afghanistan: A Country Study, ed. Richard F.

Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (Washington, DC:

American University, 1986), 67–73, hereafter

Baynard, “Historical Setting.”

2. Donald M. Seekins, “Government and Politics,”

in Nyrop and Seekins, Afghanistan: A Country

Study, 211, 222–23, 226, 229, hereafter Seekins,

“Government and Politics.”

3. Ibid., 231, 239.

4. Ibid., 229–33.

5. Ibid., 233–37; Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of

Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New

York: W. W. Norton, 2010), 16, hereafter Jones,

Graveyard of Empires; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The

Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin

Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,

2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 45.

6. Seekins, “Government and Politics,” 237–39.

7. James Phillips, “The Soviet Invasion of

Afghanistan,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder,

no. 108 (1980): 240, hereafter Phillips, “Soviet

Invasion of Afghanistan”; Charles H. Briscoe and

others, Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special

Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,

2003), 10, hereafter Briscoe, Weapon of Choice.

8. Phillips, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” 20.

9. Samuel Hayfield, “National Security,” in Nyrop

and Seekins, Afghanistan: A Country Study, 305,

hereafter Hayfield, “National Security.”

10. Douglas J. MacEachin, Janne E. Nolan, and

Kristine Tockman, The Soviet Invasion of

Afghanistan in 1979: Failure of Intelligence or of

the Policy Process? (Georgetown University, Institute

for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group Report

No. 111, 2005), 6, hereafter MacEachin, Predicting

Soviet Invasion.

11. Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War:

How a Superpower Fought and Lost, trans. and ed.

Lester Grau and Michael Gress (Lawrence, KS:

University of Kansas Press, 2002), 12, hereafter

Russian General Staff, Soviet-Afghan War.

12. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 10.

13. Douglas J. MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet

Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence

Community’s Record (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2002), 6.

14. Baynard, “Historical Setting,” 22–33, 37–38, 40–

43, 54–56.

15. Ibid., 38.

16. Ibid., 51–56.

17. President James E. Carter Jr., “State of the Union

Address,” 21Jan80. (www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/

documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml); Briscoe, Weapon

of Choice, 11.

18. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 11.

19. Phillips, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” 2–3;

MacEachin, Predicting Soviet Invasion, 6–7;

Russian General Staff, Soviet-Afghan War, 12; Brian

Crozier, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire

(Rocklin, CA: Prima, 1999), 309.

20. Seekins, “Government and Politics,” 265–66.

21. Ibid., 244, 250, 306.

Notes
306

FROM THE SEA

22. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 12–14, 306, 308.

23. Ibid., 13, 15, 305, 308.

24. Seekins, “Government and Politics,” 253.

25. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil,

and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New

Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene, 2001), 89, hereafter

Rashid, Taliban.

26. Hayfield, “National Security,” 334.

27. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 11; Seekins,

“Government and Politics,” 275–78, 283; Hayfield,

“National Security,” 334–36.

28. Hayfield, “National Security,” 336–37.

29. Rashid, Taliban, 184; Ahmed Rashid, “Osama

bin Laden: How the U.S. Helped Midwife a

Terrorist,” Special Report, Institute for Public

Integrity, 13Sept01 (http://www.publicintegrity.org/

articles/entry/448/), hereafter Rashid, “Midwife.”

30. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret

World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press,

2001), 64–65, hereafter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.

31. Rashid, Taliban, 132; Rashid, “Midwife”; Peter

Bergen and Alec Reynolds, “Blowback Revisited,”

Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 2.

32. Imtiaz H. Bokhari, “The War in Afghanistan: A

Study of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency,”

Strategic Studies 5, no. 3 (1982): 19–47.

33. Hayfield, “National Security,” 310, 338; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 13–15.

34. Seekins, “Government and Politics,” 244, 250.

35. Hayfield, “National Security,” 309; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 14.

36. Hayfield, “National Security,” 316, 334.

37. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 16; Seekins,

“Government and Politics,” 209.

38. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 16; Russian General

Staff, Soviet-Afghan War, 13.

39. Jones, Graveyard of Empires, 43.

40. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 16–17.

41. Ibid., 17.

42. Ibid.; Jones, Graveyard of Empires, 43; United

States, Afghanistan Country Handbook: A FieldReady Reference Publication

(DOD-2630-AFG-018-03) (Washington, DC:

Department of Defense Intelligence Production

Program, 2003), 55.

43. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 14, 17.

44. Ibid., 17, 19.

45. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The

United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation

Enduring Freedom, October 2001–March 2002,

CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2004), 4, hereafter

CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan.

46. Rashid, Taliban, 24–25.

47. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 18; Rashid,

Taliban, 79.

48. Rashid, Taliban, 26, 124, 178, 184.

49. Ibid.,151–52, 176, 200.

50. Ibid., 93.

51. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 19, 21–22.

52. Ibid., 19, 21–22.

53. RAND, “Insurgencies and the Role of Refugees:

Focus on Afghanistan and the Taliban,” Fathom

online seminar, 2001 (http://www.fathom.com/

course/21701739/session4.html); Briscoe, Weapon

of Choice, 19.

54. Rashid, Taliban, 32.

55. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 19–20.

56. Rashid, Taliban, 41–44, 48.

57. Ibid., 52–54.

58. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 21.

59. Rashid, Taliban, 58–59.

60. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 21; Rashid,

Taliban, 59.

61. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 21.
62. Rashid, Taliban, 63–64.

63. Ibid., 61, 73–74, 77.

64. Ibid., 76–77.

65. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 25; Rashid,

Taliban, 78.

66. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 21.

67. Rashid, Taliban, 65, 176.

68. “Albright Focuses on Afghan Women,” Reuters,

18Nov98.

69. Rashid, Taliban, 75.

70. Robert Fisk, “I Met Osama bin Laden,” BBC

News Magazine, 26Mar04 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/

1/hi/magazine/3570751.stm), hereafter Fisk, “I Met

Osama.”

71. Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who

Declared War on America (Roseville, CA: Prima,

2001), 4.

72. Biography Resource Center, “Osama bin Laden,”

Biography Resource Center, Gale Group, undated

(http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ BioRC);

PBS, “A Biography of Osama bin Laden,” Frontline

(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/

binladen/who/bio.html); Rashid, Taliban, 131–32.

73. Rashid, Taliban, 130–31.

74. Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know:

An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (New York:

Free Press, 2006), 74–88.

75. Rashid, Taliban, 131.

76. Fisk, “I Met Osama.”

77. Rashid, Taliban, 133.

78. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 82.

79. Rashid, Taliban, 134.

80. Ibid.

81. PBS, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa,”Online NewsHour

(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/internati

onal/fatwa_1996.html).

82. Rashid, Taliban, 133–34, 139.

83. PBS, “Al-Qaeda’s Fatwa,” Online NewsHour

(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/internati

onal/fatwa_1998.html).

84. Jamie McIntyre, Andrea Koppel, and Reuters,

“U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan,”

CNN.com, 21Aug98 (http://www.cnn.com/us/

9808/20/us.strikes.02/).

85. Executive Order no. 13099, Code of Federal

Regulations, title 3, vol 3, 1998; U.S. Department of

State, Reward Offer: Osama bin Laden and

Mohammad Atef, 4Nov98 (http://www.fas.org/irp/

news/1998/11/98110401_nlt.html).

86. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 23; Rashid,

Taliban, 136–37.

87. Rashid, Taliban, 137–39.

88. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 24–25.

89. Bureau of Industry and Security, “India/Pakistan

Sanctions List Published by Commerce

Department,” press release, 13Nov98

(http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/archive98/indpak.html).

90. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 25.

91. “Army Chief: Pakistan Coup Launched as ‘Last

Resort’,” CNN.com, 12Oct99 (as of 30Mar07:

http://www-cgi.cnn.com/asianow/south/9910/

12/pakistan.06/).

92. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 2002), 5–6, hereafter

Woodward, Bush at War.

93. Dir George J. Tenet, “Worldwide Threat 2001:

National Security in a Changing World,” statement

before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

7Feb01 (https://www.cia.gov/news-information/

speeches-testimony/2001/UNCLASWWT

_02072001.html).

94. Graham Usher, “Musharraf ’s Opening to Israel,”

Middle East Report Online, 2Mar06

(http://www.merip.org/mero/mero030206.html).

95. Bloomberg News, “U.S. Envoy Met Top Taliban

Official, Sought bin Laden,” reported by Afghanistan

News Center, 30May00 (http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2000/may/may312000.html).

307

Notes
96. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 26.

97. “Embassy Bombing Trial Under Way in New

York,” CNN.com, 3Jan01 (as of 2Apr07:

www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/01/03/embassy.bombings);

“Four Embassy Bombers Get Life,” CNN.com

21Oct01 (as of 2Apr07: www.cnn.com/2001/law/10/

19/embassy.bombings/index.html).

98. “Video Shows bin Laden Urging Muslims to

Prepare for Fighting,” CNN.com, 21June01 (as of

2Apr07: http://archives.cnn.com/2001/world/

europe/06/21/video.binladen).

99. “Biography of President George W. Bush,” The

White House, undated (http://www.whitehouse.gov/

about/presidents/georgewbush).

100. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E.

Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion

and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon

Books, 2006), 13–14, hereafter Gordon and Trainor,

Cobra II.

101. Woodward, Bush at War, 34–35.

102. Ibid., 35–66.

103. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 5.

104. Ibid., 6, 8; Woodward, Bush at War, 21.

105. Sec Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Statement of the

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Prepared for the

Confirmation Hearing Before the U.S. Senate

Committee on Armed Services, January 11, 2001”

(http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001/

010111dr.pdf ), hereafter Rumsfeld, “Confirmation

Statement.”

106. Woodward, Bush at War, 23–24; Gordon and

Trainor, Cobra II, 6–7.

107. Woodward, Bush at War, 23.

108. Rumsfeld, “Confirmation Statement.”

109. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 8.

110. Ibid.

111. Sec Donald H. Rumsfeld, “DOD Acquisition and

Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff: Bureaucracy to

Battlefield,” 10Sep01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=430).

112. LtGen Michael Delong, USMC, and Noah

Lukeman, Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth

about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Washington,

DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004) 8–10.

113. Gen Tommy R. Franks, USA, and Malcolm

McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan

Books, 2004), 239, hereafter Franks and McConnell,

American Soldier.

114. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 26.

Chapter 1

1. Woodward, Bush at War, 37.

2. “September 11: Chronology of terror,”

CNN.com, 12Sep01 (http://edition.cnn.com/2001/

US/09/11/ chronology.attack/).

3. Woodward, Bush at War, 18.

4. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 39; President George

W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and

the American People,” 20Sep01 (http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001

0920-8.html).

5. Woodward, Bush at War, 15–16.

6. President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the

President upon arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base,”

11Sep01 (http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20

010911-1.html).

7. Woodward, Bush at War, 26.

8. President George W. Bush, “Statement by the

President in His Address to the Nation,” 11Sep01

(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/

news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html);

Woodward, Bush at War, 30–31.

9. Woodward, Bush at War, 32–33.

10. Ibid., 37–38, 137.

11. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the

Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism

(New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2008), 62.

12. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 15.

308

FROM THE SEA
13. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror:

America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom

(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2005), 13–14.

14. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 17–19.

15. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 245.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 241–43.

18. United States Marine Corps (USMC), Concepts

and Issues 2001: Forging the Future Marine Corps

(Washington DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps

[HQMC], Programs and Resources Department),

205, hereafter Concepts and Issues 2001.

19. LtCol Gregg P. Olson intvw with Theodore R.

McKeldin, 4Feb02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Olson

intvw. All oral history collection materials cited in

this work can be found at the Marine Corps History

Division (MCHD), Quantico, VA.

20. LtCol Carl D. Matter and Maj Henry M. Hyams

intvw with Theodore R. McKeldin, 19Feb02 (Oral

HistColl), 2, hereafter Matter-Hyams intvw.

21. Capt Richard W. Whitmer and 1st Sgt O’Neil O.

Weilbacher intvw with Dr. Fred Allison, 20Feb02

(Oral HistColl), transcript, 2, hereafter WhitmerWeilbacher intvw.

22. Olson intvw, 2.

23. Woodward, Bush at War, 40, 48–50.

24. Ibid., 43.

25. Ibid., 43–44.

26. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 250–51.

27. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 22.

28. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 252.

29. Ibid., 254–55.

30. Woodward, Bush at War, 50–51, 61–63.

31. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 257.

32. Ibid., 256.

33. Ibid., 258–60; DeLong and Lukeman, Inside

CentCom, 23.

34. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 261.

35. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 23.

36. Woodward, Bush at War, 77–78.

37. Ibid., 79–80.

38. Ibid., 84, 88.

39. Ibid., 82, 86–91.

40. Thomas E. Ricks, “Pentagon Issues Order to

Elite Units in Infantry,” Washington Post, 17Sep01.

41. President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the

President upon Arrival, the South Lawn,” 16Sep01

(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/

news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html).

42. “Infinite Justice, Out—Enduring Freedom, In,”

BBC News, 25Sep01, hereafter BBC News, “Infinite

Justice Out” (as of 7Mar06: http://news.bbc.co.uk/

1/hi/world/americas/1563722.stm).

43. Woodward, Bush at War, 97.

44. Ibid., 98.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 99.

47. Globalsecurity.org, “Operation Infinite Justice,”

undated (as of 20Apr07:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/infinitejustice.htm).

48. BBC News, “Infinite Justice Out.”

49. LtGen John G. Castellaw intvw with author,

25Oct06 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Castellaw intvw.

50. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, Basrah,

Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in

the Second Iraq War (Annapolis, MD: Naval

Institute Press, 2005), 1.

51. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond, 1, 4.

52. Castellaw intvw.

53. Ibid., 1–2.

54. LtGen Earl B. Hailston intvw with Jeffrey Acosta

and Philip Exner, 19May03 (Marine Corps Center for

Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA); MarForPac Command

309

Notes
310

FROM THE SEA

Chronology, 1Jul02–31Dec02, p. 6, hereafter MarForPac

ComdC. All command chronologies (ComdCs) cited in

this work can be found at the Gray Research Center

(GRC), Quantico, VA.

55. Castellaw intvw.

56. Ibid., 6.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. 15th MEU ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec01, Part 2, p.

3, hereafter 15th MEU ComdC.

62. Olson intvw.

63. 15th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 3; MSSG 15

ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec01, Part 2, p.1, hereafter

MSSG 15 ComdC; Olson intvw.

64. 15th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 8.

65. Col Christopher M. Bourne, comments on draft

manuscript, 25Dec08 (comment file), hereafter

Bourne comments.

66. HMM-163 ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec01, Part 2, p.

5, hereafter HMM-163 ComdC.

67. Olson intvw, 3.

68. Chronological Journal—Westpac 01-02, in

MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 4, Item I, hereafter MSSG 15

Chronological Journal.

69. Olson intvw.

70. 15th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 2–8.

71. Olson intvw.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. VMGR-352 ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec01, Part 2, p. 1.

76. Maj Wayne B. Bunker intvw with Christopher J.

Warnke, 24Jan02 (Oral HistColl), 1, hereafter Bunker

intvw; Capt K. Schmidt and CWO2 Michael Maxwell

intvw with Christopher J. Warnke, 23Jan02 (Oral

HistColl).

77. Olson intvw, 6.

78. Olson intvw.

79. Ibid.; Matter-Hyams intvw.

Chapter 2

1. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 23;

Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 263.

2. Col Michael D. Fitzgerald, USA, intvw with

author, 30Jan07 (Oral HistColl) 16–17, hereafter

Fitzgerald intvw.

3. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 251;

Woodward, Bush at War, 25.

4. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 49–50, 55.

5. Carla Anne Robbins, Greg Jaffee, and Robert

Greenberger, “Most Significant Moves by the

Military May Be Relatively Small and Secretive,” Wall

Street Journal, 17Sep01.

6. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 50.

7. William A. Arkin, “Building a War: As Some

Argue, Supply Lines Fill Up,” Los Angeles Times,

10Nov02; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 26–27.

8. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 4.

9. Fitzgerald intvw, 3.

10. Ibid., 4.

11. Ibid.

12. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 254–55.

13. Castellaw intvw.

14. Ibid.

15. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 28.

16. Fitzgerald intvw, 5.

17. U.S. Special Operations Command, United

States Special Operations Command History, 1987–

2007 (MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Special Operations

Command, 2007), 87, hereafter SOCOM History.
18. Department of the Navy (DON), From the Sea:

Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1992).

19. DON, Forward...From the Sea (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994); USMC,

Operational Maneuver From the Sea: A Concept

for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore

(Washington, DC: HQMC, 1996); USMC, The

MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore

(Washington, DC: HQMC, 1996); Marine Corps

Combat Development (MCCDC), Ship to Objective

Maneuver, (Quantico, VA: 1997); USMC, Sea-Based

Logistics (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1998).

20. United States, Marine Corps Strategy 21

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2000),

hereafter Marine Corps Strategy 21; USMC,

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (Quantico, VA:

MCCDC, 2001), hereafter Expeditionary Maneuver

Warfare; USMC, Marine Corps Concepts and

Programs 2005 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2005), 25.

21. Concepts and Issues 2001, 16.

22. Myra S. McKitrick, Marine Corps Transformation,

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Lexington

Institute, 1Jul03 (http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/

marine-corps -transformation—expeditionarymaneuver-warfare).

23. Concepts and Issues 2001, 19.

24. Ibid., 201.

25. Gen James L. Jones, “Statement of General

James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

United States Marine Corps, before the Senate

Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2000

Concerning Posture,” 11 (http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2000/000301gj.pdf),

hereafter Gen Jones 1Mar00 Statement.

26. Concepts and Issues 2001, 201–2; USMC,

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capability List

2003 (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 2003), 18, hereafter

EMW Capability List.

27. Concepts and Issues 2001, 101; GlobalSecurity.org,

“2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade Task Force Tarawa,”

undated (as of 9Oct07:

www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/2meb.ht

m); USMC, “Policy for the Organization of Fleet Marine

Forces for Combat,” MCO 3120.8A, SO-LIC, 26Jun92.

28. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, 9–10.

29. Marine Corps Strategy 21, 3; Concepts and

Issues 2001, 202.

30. Gen Jones 1Mar00 Statement, 11; EMW

Capability List, 18; Concepts and Issues 2001, 202.

31. Concepts and Issues 2001, 202–4; Gen Michael

W. Hagee, “Marine Corps Commandant Hagee:

Projecting Power Faster, Better,” interview in

SEAPOWER Magazine, Nov03, 25.

32. LtGen Earl B. Hailston, “Marine Forces Pacific:

The ‘9-1-1’ Force for the 21st Century,” undated (as

of 9Oct07: http://www.pacom.mil/forum/

summer2001/chapter05/summer2001_15.html),

hereafter Hailston, “The 911 Force.”

33. EMW Capability List, 20.

34. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 289.

35. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 60.

36. Woodward, Bush at War, 166.

37. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 269.

38. Ibid., 269–70.

39. Ibid, 270.

40. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 61.

41. Ibid., 60.

42. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 270–71.

43. Ibid., 271.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 272.

47. Ibid., 274.

48. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 27.

49. Ibid., 27–28.

50. Ibid., 28; Franks and McConnell, American

Soldier, 275.

311

Notes
312

FROM THE SEA

51. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 28.

52. Feith, War and Decision, 62–65.

53. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 28;

Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 227.

54. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 227.

55. Feith, War and Decision, 64.

56. Charles V. Jones, Boys of ’67: From Vietnam to

Iraq, the Extraordinary Story of a Few Good Men

(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006), 2.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. “CNO/CMC Memo to SECDEF 24Sep01,”

quoted in “Expeditionary Strike Force Concept,” Deep

Blue/ Strategic Actions Group draft brief, 9Aug02

(copy in author’s working file, MCHD, Quantico, VA).

All documents in the author’s working file cited in this

work can be found at the Marine Corps History

Division (MCHD), Quantico, VA.

61. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 273,

278–81.

62. Ibid., 280.

63. Fitzgerald intvw, 16.

64. Ibid., 10.

65. Ibid., 9–10.

66. Fitzgerald intvw.

67. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 52–54.

68. Ibid., 41, 53, 70–71.

69. Ibid., 52–55, 57.

70. Ibid., 79.

71. Woodward, Bush at War, 134.

72. Ibid., 141–43.

73. Ibid., 155.

74. Ibid., 147.

75. Ibid., 154–56.

76. Ibid., 146–53.

77. Ibid., 157.

78. Ibid., 160, 166.

79. Ibid., 158.

80. Ibid., 78–79.

81. Ibid., 178, 181, 187.

82. Ibid., 163.

83. Ibid., 191–93.

84. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 64.

85. Ibid., 66–67; Woodward, Bush at War, 163–64,

178, 185.

86. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 66–67; Woodward,

Bush at War, 191, 199.

87. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 67–68, 70–71.

88. Ibid., 74–75.

89. Olson intvw; 15th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 1.

90. Globalsecurity.org, “Shahbaz Airbase,” undated

(as of 1Jun06: http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/facility/jacobabad.htm).

91. Olson intvw; 15th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 1;

USS Peleliu ARG, “Confirmation Brief, Pakistani

Airfield Security, PowerPoint presentation, 5Oct01,”

hereafter Peleliu ARG, “Airfield Security.”

92. Col Thomas D. Waldhauser intvw with

Christopher J. Warnke, 8Jan02, p. 9 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Waldhauser 2002 intvw; Maj Gen Thomas

D. Waldhauser, comments on draft manuscript,

24Nov08 (comment file, MCHD), hereafter

Waldhauser comments.

93. Olson intvw, 9.

94. LCdr Dale R. Herman, USN, intvw with Michael

D. Fay, 16Mar02 (Oral HistColl); Olson intvw.

95. Forest L. Marrion, “Building USAF Expeditionary Bases for Operation Enduring Freedom–

Afghanistan, 2001–2002,” Chronicle Online

Journal, 18Nov05 (http://www.airpower.maxwell.

af.mil/airchronicles/ cc/marion.html) hereafter

Marrion, Building USAF Expeditionary Bases.
96. Olson intvw.

97. Waldhauser intvw; Olson intvw.

98. Marrion, Building USAF Expeditionary Bases.

99. Cpl Nicole G. Milojevich intvw with Michael D.

Fay, 10Mar02 (Oral HistColl).

100. 15th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 9.

101. Olson intvw; Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

102. Olson intvw, 11.

103. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

104. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

105. MSSG 15 Chronological Journal.

106 Bunker intvw, 1.

Chapter 3

1. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 284.

2. Ibid., 285.

3. Newbold comments.

4. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 78–80, 82–83.

5. Ibid., 81.

6. President George W. Bush, “Presidential Address

to the Nation,” 7Oct01 (http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20

011007-8.html).

7. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 88;

Woodward, Bush at War, 214.

8. Bradley Graham and Dan Balz, “U.S. Controls

Skies, Hunts New Targets and Encourages AntiTaliban Forces; Planners Focusing on Concentrations

of Enemy Troops,” Washington Post, 10Oct01.

9. Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “Cave

Complexes Smashed by Bombs,” Washington Post,

12Oct01.

10. Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S.

Sends in Special Plane with Heavy Guns,” New York

Times, 16Oct01.

11. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 90–91;

William T. Baker and Mark L. Evans, “The Year in

Review 2001,” Naval Aviation News (July–August

2002): 39–40, hereafter Baker and Evans, “Year in

Review, 2001.”

12. Baker and Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 40.

13. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 91;

Newbold comments.

14. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the

West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC:

Potomac Books, 2005), 25.

15. Woodward, Bush at War, 211; Lambeth, Air

Power Against Terror, 87–88.

16. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 86–88.

17. Ibid., 97.

18. William A. Arkin, “A Week of Air War,”

Washington Post, 14Oct01, hereafter Arkin, “Air War.”

19. Woodward, Bush at War, 234, 237.

20. Ibid., 239; Arkin, “Air War.”

21. Woodward, Bush at War, 238.

22. Ibid., 238–39; Lambeth, Air Power Against

Terror, 106, 114–15, 120.

23. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 93–96, 110.

24. Ibid., 91–92; Baker and Evans, “Year in Review,

2001,” 40.

25. MCCDC, OEF: Combat Assessment Team

Summary Report, (Quantico, VA, 2003), 51, hereafter

CAT Report; Capt Eric R. Dent, “T-Bolts First

Marines Engaged in War on Terrorism,” Marine

Corps News (HQMC, Washington, DC), 26Oct01;

Baker and Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 40.

26. VMFA-251 ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec 01, Part 2;

VMFA-251 ComdC, 1Jan02–3Mar02, Part 2.

27. Maj Christopher J. Warnke, “U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in Afghanistan During Operation

Enduring Freedom,” 2002 (copy in author’s working

file), 1; Baker and Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 46.

28. VMFA-314, “Operational Recap IDTC/Cruse

2001–2002” (copy of PowerPoint presentation in

author’s working file).

313

Notes
29. Woodward, Bush at War, 214, 229.

30. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 98.

31. Woodward, Bush at War, 221, 223, 230–31, 233,

236, 245.

32. Ibid., 223, 226, 231, 237, 240.

33. Ibid., 234, 244.

34. Ibid., 248; Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 106.

35. Woodward, Bush at War, 236, 243, 245.

36. Ibid., 241.

37. Ibid., 243–44.

38. Ibid., 245–46.

39. Ibid., 246.

40. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 75.

41. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 296.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 287, 296.

44. Woodward, Bush at War, 251.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 300.

48. Ibid.

49. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 82.

50. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 298–99.

51. Ibid., 300; Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 83;

Woodward, Bush at War, 242.

52. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 83; Woodward,

Bush at War, 239, 248.

53. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 96; Lambeth, Air

Power Against Terror, 110; SOCOM History, 88–91.

54. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 98–100, 155, 165–66.

55. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 309.

56. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 98; Gary Berntsen

with Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin

Laden and Al-Qaeda—A Personal Account by the

CIA’s Key Field Commander (New York: Crown,

2005), 131, 150–51, hereafter Berntsen and Pezzullo,

Jawbreaker.

57. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 98.

58. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 303.

59. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 304;

PBS, “Campaign Against Terror,” Frontline, broadcast

8Sep02 (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/Frontline/

shows/campaign/interviews/595.html), hereafter

Frontline, “Campaign Against Terror”; Fitzgerald intvw;

Woodward, Bush at War, 250.

60. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 115–16; U.S.

Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing:

Secretary Rumsfeld,” news transcript, 20Sep01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=1901).

61. Richard L. Kipper, “Into the Dark: The 3/75th

Ranger Regiment,” Special Warfare: The

Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy

Special Warfare Center and School, 15, no. 2

(2002): 1, hereafter Kipper, “Into the Dark.”

62. Associated Press, “9/11 Report Cited Possible bin

Laden, UAE ties,” MSNBC, 23Feb06 (as of 30Oct08:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11522484/).

63. Hersh, Chain of Command, 122.

64. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 109.

65. Kipper, “Into the Dark,” 6; 3d Bn, 75th Ranger

Rgt, “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions

on OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October

2001,” 25Oct01, cited in Kipper, “Into the Dark.”

66. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 97; Kipper, “Into

the Dark,” 7.

67. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 303.

68. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 53–54.

69. LtGen Gregory S. Newbold intvw with author,

7Jul06 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Newbold intvw;

Fitzgerald intvw.

70. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 113;

Globalsecurity.org, “Dalbandin, Pakistan,” undated

(as of 1May06: http://www.globalsecurity.org/

314

FROM THE SEA
315

Notes

military/facility/dalbandin.htm).

71. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 82; Franks

and McConnell, American Soldier, 303.

72. Hersh, Chain of Command, 122.

73. SOCOM History, 90.

74. Ibid.; Hersh, Chain of Command, 124.

75. SOCOM History, 90; Hersh, Chain of

Command, 124–25.

76. Hersh, Chain of Command, 124; Luke Harding,

Julian Borger, and Richard Norton-Taylor,

“Revealed: How Bungled U.S. Raid Came Close to

Disaster,” Guardian (Manchester), 6Nov01,

hereafter Harding, Borger, and Norton-Taylor,

“Revealed: Bungled Raid.”

77. Hersh, Chain of Command, 125–27; Harding,

Borger, and Norton-Taylor, “Revealed: Bungled Raid.”

78. Hersh, Chain of Command, 125–27; Harding,

Borger, and Norton-Taylor, “Revealed: Bungled Raid.”

79. Hersh, Chain of Command, 125–26.

80. Olson intvw.

81. Ibid.

82. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; Nathaniel Fick, One

Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (New

York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005) 86–87.

83. Fick, One Bullet Away, 86–87.

84. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

85. Olson intvw; HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

86. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; Fick, 88–89.

87. Olson intvw, 14.

88. Olson intvw.

89. Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly, “15th MEU (SOC)

Recovers Downed U.S. Army Helicopter in

Pakistan,” Marine Corps News, 9Nov01, hereafter

Chenelly, “MEU Recovers Helicopter.”

90. Olson intvw; BGen Thomas D. Waldhauser

intvw with author, 12Jun06 (Oral HistColl), hereafter

Waldhauser 2006 intvw.

91. Olson intvw; HMM-163 ComdC, Part. 2, p. 6;

26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 20.

92. Chenelly, “MEU Recovers Helicopter.”

93. Ibid.; HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 4; Olson intvw.

94. Chenelly, “MEU Recovers Helicopter”; HMM163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6; MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 4;

Olson intvw; Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

95. Chenelly, “MEU Recovers Helicopter”; HMM163 ComdC, Part 2, p.6; MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 4;

Olson intvw.

96. Olson intvw; Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

97. Olson intvw.

98. Fick, One Bullet Away, 91.

99. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

100. Maj Jay M. Holtermann, “TF Bald Eagle,” email message to author, 28Jun07, hereafter

Holtermann, 28Jun07; Fick, One Bullet Away, 91.

101. Fick, One Bullet Away, 96; HMM-163 ComdC,

Part 2, pp. 6, 17; Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw;

Holtermann, 28Jun07; Bunker intvw, 1.

102. Fick, One Bullet Away, 91.

103. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

104. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

105. Holtermann, 28Jun07; Fick, One Bullet Away,

97–99.

106. Olson intvw; Waldhauser 2002 intvw; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 3.

107. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

Chapter 4

1. Woodward, Bush at War, 251–54.

2. Ibid., 257, 262, 265–66, 291–92.

3. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 106–7.

4. R.W. Apple Jr., “A Military Quagmire

Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam,” The New

York Times, 31Oct01.
5. Ronald Brownstein, “New Sense of Impatience is

Emerging,” Los Angeles Times, 27Oct01.

6. Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Insiders Criticize

Tactics, Missed Opportunity,” Washington Times,

1Nov02; Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 107.

7. Michael R. Gordon, “A Vigorous Debate on U.S.

War Tactics, New York Times, 4Nov01.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement of the

Secretary of Defense,” news release, 1Nov01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?re

leaseid=3142).

9. Concepts and Issues 2001, 203.

10. Hailston, “The 911 Force,” 2.

11. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, 7.

12. Castellaw intvw.

13. Associated Press, “U.S. Marines in Egypt Ready,”

New York Times, 23Oct01; DeLong and Lukeman,

Inside CentCom, 42–43.

14. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 33;

Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 66.

15. LCpl A. Blanco, “1st Marine Expeditionary

Brigade Prepares for Bright Star Deployment,”

Marine Corps News, 21Sept01.

16. Cpl B. Walker, “Marine Air, Ground Elements

Tear Up Desert at Bright Star,” Marine Corps News,

14Oct01.

17. Col Clark R. Lethin and Col John J.

Broadmeadow intvw with author, 16Mar06 (Oral

HistColl), 2, hereafter Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

18. Ibid., 2.

19. Maj Michael P. Mahaney intvw with author,

10Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Mahaney intvw.

20. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

21. Castellaw intvw, 7.

22. LtGen James N. Mattis, “Castellaw Meeting,” email message to author, 18Nov06.

23. Castellaw intvw, 4.

24. TF 58, “Chronology of Events,” 25Oct01–

5Jan02 (copy in author’s working file), hereafter TF

58 Chronology.

25. MarForPac ComdC, Part 2, p. 6; US MarCent,

“Abbreviated History, Feb02–May03,” Timeline

section, hereafter MarCent History (copy in author’s

working file).

26. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

27. Mahaney intvw; Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

28. LtCol Michael M. Michalovich intvw with

author, 22Feb02 (Oral HistColl).

29. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw; BGen James N.

Mattis intvw with Capt Crossland, USN, 24Feb02

(NavHistCtr, Washington, DC), hereafter Mattis

24Feb02 intvw.

30. Mahaney intvw.

31. LtGen James N. Mattis intvw with Timothy

Crowley, 12Jul06 (Oral HistColl), 4, hereafter Mattis

12Jul06 intvw.

32. TF 58 ComdC, 27Oct01–26Feb02, Part 2, p. 6,

hereafter TF 58 ComdC.

33. Mahaney intvw.

34. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

35. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 6–7.

36. Cdr Thomas J. Lafferty, USN, intvw with author,

8Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Lafferty intvw.

37. Claudia Parsons, “U.S. Navy, Marines Told to

Prepare for a Long Fight,” Reuters, 30Oct01.

38. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

39. 26th MEU ComdC, 1Jul01–28Feb02, Part 2, pp.

9–10, hereafter 26th MEU ComdC.

40. Ibid., pp 11–12.

41. Mahaney intvw.

42. Maj C. J. Williams intvw with Christopher J.

Warnke, 14Jan02 (Oral HistColl).

43. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 14.

316

FROM THE SEA
317

Notes

Chapter 5

1. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 11–16.

2. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 33, 41–

47, 51.

3. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 8–18.

4. Woodward, Bush at War, 308.

5. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 103.

6. Newbold intvw; Newbold comments; Crist

comments.

7. Newbold intvw; Newbold comments.

8. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 313.

9. Ibid.

10. Newbold intvw.

11. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 3.

12. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

13. Waldhauser 2006 intvw.

14. MisReps 2074, 2311, 2313, and 2411 in HMM163 ComdC, Part 4; Claudia Parsons, “Marine

Harriers Join U.S. Bombing Campaign,” Reuters,

3Nov01; Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly, “Harrier Jets

Conduct Airstrikes in Afghanistan,” Marine Corps

News, 3Nov01.

15. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7.

16. 15th MEU ComdC, Section 2, p. 10; HMM-163

ComdC, Part 2, p. 7; MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

17. CAT Report, 45.

18. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 15–16.

19. TF 58 Chronology.

20. 26th MEU ComdC, 7–8.

21. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

22. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 8; Lethin-Broadmeadow

intvw.

23. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

24. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

25. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 8.

26. Peterson, Gordon, “Committed to victory:

Interview with Vice Adm. Charles W. Moore Jr.,

former commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command/Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet,” in

SEAPOWER Magazine, hereafter, “Moore intvw.”

27. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

28. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

29. BGen James N. Mattis intvw with Christopher J.

Warnke, 15Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Mattis

15Jan02 intvw.

30. Fitzgerald intvw.

31. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

32. USMC, “Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit

(MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC),” Marine

Corps Order 3120.9B, 25Sep02, Part 4a(1) (c).

33. LtCol John W. Carl intvw with author, 15Jan02

(Oral HistColl); LtCol Daniel D. Yoo intvw with

Christopher J. Warnke, 17Jan02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Yoo intvw; Mahaney intvw.

34. Lafferty intvw.

35. JCS, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious

Operations, Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington,

DC: 19Sep01), xi–xii, II-7, (http://www.dtic.mil/

doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm),

hereafter, Joint Amphibious Ops.

36. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 8.

37. USMC, “Organizational Structure of Marine

Air-Ground Task Forces,” Enclosure (1) in “Policy

for the Organization of Fleet Marine Forces for

Combat,” MCO 3120.8A, HQMC, Quantico, VA,

26Jun92. (http://www.marines.mil/news/

publications/Pages/MCO%203120.8A.aspx)

38. Lafferty intvw

39. Ibid., 7.

40. Joint Amphibious Ops, xii.

41. Ibid.

42. CNO, “Naval Command Relations,” NavOp
message 05/01, 23Feb01 (copy in author’s working

file), hereafter CNO, “Naval Command Relations.”

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Mattis 15Jan02 intvw.

46. Mahaney intvw.

47. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

48. MajGen James N. Mattis intvw with Dr. Gary D.

Solis, 23Jan04 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Mattis

23Jan04 intvw; CAT Report, 98.

49. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw; Col Clarke R. Lethin,

comments on draft manuscript of “Marines in

Afghanistan, TF 58,” 2007 (comment file).

50. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 5.

51. Ibid., 9.

52. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

53. Capt Richard Hascup, USN, intvw with author,

30Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Hascup intvw.

54. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 10.

55. Ibid., Part 2, p. 8 and Part 3, p. 1.

56. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 12–13.

57. Ibid., 8.

58. Ibid., 9.

59. Maj Robert J. Charette intvw with author, 26Feb02

(Oral HistColl), 2, hereafter Charette intvw.

60. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 24.

61. CAT Report, 98.

62. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 5.

63. Lt Clifford A. Smith, USN, intvw with author,

14Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Smith intvw.

64. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

65. Ibid., 9.

66. Ibid.

67. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

68. Mattis 23Jan04 intvw, 7.

69. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 10.

70. Ibid., 12.

71. Ibid., 13.

72. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

73. Ibid., 13.

74. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 11; Mattis 24Feb02

intvw.

75. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw, 17.

76. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 14; Waldhauser

2002 intvw.

77. Waldhauser 2002 intvw, 7.

78. Col Anthony P. Frick intvw with Christopher J.

Warnke, 15Jan02 (Oral HistColl), p. 4, hereafter Frick

intvw.

79. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

Chapter 6

1. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 16.

2. Mahaney intvw.

3. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 11.

4. Maj Christopher L.R. Fatheree, “Intelligence

Reachback Requires Analysts Forward” (research

paper, Naval War College, 2003), 3, hereafter

Fatheree, “Reachback.”

5. Ibid., 4.

6. Ibid., 7.

7. Ibid., 4–5.

8. CAT Report, 104.

9. Fatheree, “Reachback,” 12.

10. Ibid., 7.

11. Ibid., 13.

12. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 11.

13. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 31.

318

FROM THE SEA
319

Notes

14. Ibid., 21.

15. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

16. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

17. Waldhauser 2002 intvw, 4.

18. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw, 13–14.

19. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, 17.

20. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

21. Mattis 23Jan04 intvw.

22. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw, 4; Mattis 23Jan04 intvw.

23. LtCol David B. Crist comments, 13Jan09.

24. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

25. SOCOM History, 104; David Pugliese, “Bush

Honors Canada’s JTF-2 for Afghanistan Duty:

Presidential Unit Citation,” National Post (Ontario),

8Dec04; SOCOM History, 104.

26. SCPO Austin Mansfield, “Enduring Freedom Task

Force Earns Presidential Unit Citation,” Navy.mil,

8Dec04 (http://www.news.navy.mil/search/

display.asp?story_id=16216); Johann Price, “Terrorism

Project: Operation Enduring Freedom Chain of

Command,” Center for Defense Information, 26Jun02

(as of 15Feb06: www.cdi.org/terrorism/

oefcommand.cfm).

27. Crist comments.

28. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 17.

29. Crist comments.

30. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 27.

31. Ian McPhedran, The Amazing SAS (Australia:

Harper Collins, 2007), 151.

32. LtGen James N. Mattis, “RE: TF-58,” e-mail

message to Richard Camp, 3May06, hereafter Mattis

3May06; Richard D. Camp, personal communication

with author, 8May06.

33. Richard D. Camp, in Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

34. Mattis, 3May06.

35. Ibid.

36. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 14; LethinBroadmeadow intvw.

37. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 5.

38. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 14.

39. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 5.

40. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 15.

41. Ibid., 10.

42. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 5.

43. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 10; Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 5.

44. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 15.

45. Major Timothy P. Oliver intvw with author,

26Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Oliver intvw.

46. BGen James N. Mattis, “Re: Defense Science

Board Draft Briefing,” e-mail interview, 15Jun02,

cited in CAT Report, 106.

47. Charette intvw.

48. Gen James N. Mattis, MCHF Distinguished

Marine Lecture Series (lecture, National Museum of

the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 6Aug08) (Oral

HistColl).

49. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

50. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 18.

51. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 5.

52. Ibid.

53. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 12.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., Part 3, p. 85; LtCol Steven P. Martinson

intvw with author, 23Jan02 (Oral HistColl); MSSG

15 ComdC, Part 3.

56. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

57. Lafferty intvw; Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

58. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 15–16.

59. BGen James N. Mattis interview with Cdr Dan

Struble, 20Jan02 (Navy Historical Center,

Washington, DC), hereafter Mattis 20Jan02 intvw.
60. CAT Report, 52.

61. Mattis 20Jan02 intvw.

62. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 20.

63. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

64. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 20.

65. Mahaney intwv; Col Robert J. Charette Jr.,

comments on draft manuscript, Nov 08 (comment file).

66. Mahaney intvw, 17.

67. Mahaney intvw.

68. Mattis 20Jan02 intvw.

69. Waldhauser comments.

70. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

71. Ibid., 5; Waldhauser comments.

72. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw; Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

73. John Barry and Joshua Hammer, “U.S.

Commander Wants to Start Airborne Assaults into

Southern Afghanistan in Coming Months to Ride

Momentum of Taking Mazar-e Sharif; Rumsfeld says

to Wait; Wants Ground Fighting Done by Afghans,”

Newsweek news release, 11Nov01 (as of 27Jul07:

http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/

stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-

11-2001/0001612979&EDATE).

74. Newbold intvw.

75. Fitzgerald intvw.

76. LtCol Mack Hagen, USA, intvw with author,

30Jan07 (Oral HistColl).

77. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 86.

78. LtCol Christopher M. Bourne intvw with

Theodore R. McKeldin, 7Feb02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Bourne intvw.

79. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

80. TF 58, Commander’s Planning Guidance—Ph.

III, Nov01 (copy of handwritten notes in author’s

working file), hereafter “TF 58 Planning Guidance.”

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. 15th MEU Crisis Action Team—Seizure of

Objective Rhino, 16Nov01, in MSSG 15 ComdC,

Part 4, hereafter 15th MEU Seizure of Rhino.

84. Ibid.

85. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

86. Ibid., Part 3, p. 86; Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

87. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 17, sustainment chapter.

88. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

89. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 24.

90. Ibid., 19.

91. LtCol Asad A. Khan intvw with author, 6Sep04

(Oral HistColl).

92. Mattis 15Jan02 intvw.

93. Ibid.; Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

94. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

95. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw, 19–20.

96. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 30–32.

97. Waldhauser 2002 intvw, 11.

98. Lafferty intvw.

99. Ibid., 9.

100. Capt Eric A. Putman and 1st Sgt McClure

intvw with Theodore R. McKeldin, 15Feb02 (Oral

HistColl), 9, hereafter Putman-McClure intvw.

101. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

102. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

103. Globalsecurity.org, “Pasni, Pakistan,” undated

(1May06: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

facility/pasni.htm).

104. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

105. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw.

106. Ibid., 19.

107. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

108. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 17 and Part 3, p. 99.

320

FROM THE SEA
109. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 86.

110. Smith intvw.

111. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, pp. 86, 97.

112. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7; MisReps 2555,

2561, and 2575 in HMM-163 ComdC, Part 4.

113. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 15–18 and Part

3, p. 99.

114. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 86.

115. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 15–18.

116. Frick intvw, 1.

Chapter 7

1. SOCOM History, 92.

2. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 154, 156; Ahmed

Rashid, “Hamid Karzai Moves From Lightweight to

Heavyweight in Afghan Politics,” EurasiaNet.org,

12Dec01 (as of 4Nov08: http://www.eurasianet.org/

departments/insight/articles/eav121001.shtml);

Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 154.

3. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 156.

4. Ibid., 156–57.

5. Ibid., 165–69.

6. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 169–70.

7. Ibid.,157; Frontline, “Campaign Against Terror.”

8. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 171–73, 178.

9. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 173.

10. Mahaney intvw; Lafferty intvw.

11. Waldhauser comments.

12. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 23; Waldhauser

comments.

13. Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly, “Marines Land, Seize

Desert Strip,” Marine Corps News, Nov01, hereafter

Chenelly, “Marines Seize Strip”; Associated Press,

“Hundreds of Marines Land Near Kandahar,” USA

Today, 26Nov01, hereafter Associated Press,

“Marines Land Near Kandahar.”

14. MSSG 26 ComdC, 1Jul01–28Feb02, Part 2, p. 8,

hereafter MSSG 26 ComdC.

15. HMM-365 ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec01, Part 2, p.

6, hereafter HMM-365 2001 ComdC.

16. LtCol Keven M. DeVore, comments on draft

manuscript (comment file).

17. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part. 3.

18. Ibid.

19. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

20. BLT 3/6, “A History during OEF and OSF,”

(author’s working file), hereafter BLT 3/6 History.

21. Putman-McClure intvw.

22. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; HMM-163 ComdC,

Part 2., p. 7.

23. Bourne comments.

24. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p 18.

25. Capt James P. Fallon intvw with Christopher J.

Warnke, 8Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Fallon

intvw.

26. Waldhauser 2006 intvw.

27. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

28. Capt Philip J. Treglia intvw with Theodore R.

McKeldin, 3Feb 02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Treglia

intvw.

29. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 86.

30. Ibid.; TF 58 Chronology.

31. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw; TF 58 Chronology.

32. Waldhauser 2006 intvw.

33. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 87.

34. Doug Mellgren, “Marines Enter Combat in

Afghanistan,” Associated Press, 26Nov01.

35. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 87; TF 58 Chronology;

Capt Jay M. Holterman, “TF Bald Eagle,” e-mail

message to author, 7Jul07, hereafter Holtermann email, 7Jul07.

36. Holtermann e-mail, 7Jul07.

321

Notes
37. Capt Jay M. Holtermann, “The 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit’s Seizure of Camp Rhino,”

Marine Corps Gazette, Jun02, hereafter Holtermann,

“Seizure of Rhino”; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 17.

38. Waldhauser 2006 intvw, 28.

39. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 315.

40. Bunker intvw, 1.

41. Holtermann, “Seizure of Rhino,” 41–42.

42. Ibid.

43. Bourne intvw.

44. Holtermann, “Seizure of Rhino,” 41–42; Mattis

12Jul06 intvw.

45. Bourne intvw; Fallon intvw; Holtermann,

“Seizure of Rhino,” 41.

46. Maj James P. Fallon award recommendation,

approved 19Jun04 (MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico,

VA); Fallon intvw.

47. Fallon intvw.

48. Ibid., 7.

49. Bourne intvw, 2, 4; Fallon intvw; Holtermann,

“Seizure of Rhino,” 41.

50. Bourne intvw; Holtermann, “Seizure of Rhino,”

41; HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2. p.7; LtCol Kevin P.

Spillers award recommendation, approved 12Jun03

(MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA).

51. Bourne intvw.

52. Bunker intvw, 1.

53. CAT Report, 53; Matter-Hyams intvw.

54. Matter-Hyams intvw; Fallon intvw.

55. Matter-Hyams intvw.

56. GySgt John A. Dailey intvw with Theodore R.

McKeldin, 4 Feb 2002 (Oral HistColl), hereafter

Dailey intvw.

57. Bourne intvw, 3.

58. Ibid.

59. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

60. Chenelly, “Marines Seize Strip.”

61. Ibid.

62. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 28.

63. Ibid., 26.

64. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” news

transcript, 26Nov01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2460),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 26Nov01.

65. Bourne intvw, 2.

66. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

67. Dailey intvw.

68. Fick, One Bullet Away, 111–12.

69. Olson intvw.

70. Bourne intvw.

71. Olson intvw.

72. Matter-Hyams intvw.

73. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 10; 26th MEU Public

Affairs, “Preparing to Go,” Marine Corps News,

29Nov01.

74. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 10; Thom Shanker and

James Dao, “Vanguard of Marines Digs in and

Directs Air Attacks,” The New York Times, 27Nov01,

hereafter Shanker and Dao, “Vanguard Digs In.”

75. Chip Cummings, “U.S. May Send as Many as

1,500 Marines to Aid in Air War, Search for bin

Laden,” Wall Street Journal, 21Nov01.

76. Associated Press, “Marines Land Near

Kandahar”; SFC Class Kathleen T. Rhem, USA,

“Marines in Afghanistan to Set Up Forward Operating

Base,” American Forces Press Service, 26Nov01 (as

of 12Dec07: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=44414), hereafter Rhem,

“Marines Set Up FOB.”

77. Rhem, “Marines Set Up FOB.”

78. Sec Donald H. Rumsfeld,“DoD News Briefing:

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Franks,” news

transcript, 27Nov01 (as of 28Oct08:

322

FROM THE SEA
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.as

px?transcriptid=2465), hereafter DoD “News

Briefing,” 27Nov01.

79. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

80. Baker and Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 42;

Treglia intvw; CAT Report, 52; Steven Lee Myers,

“The Marines Dig Foxholes and Spoil for a Fight,”

The New York Times, 2Dec01; DoD “News

Briefing,” 27Nov01.

81. DoD “News Briefing,” 27Nov01; Baker and

Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 42; Maj Richard B

Lawson, e-mail message to author, 24May10.

82. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 3, p. 19.

83. LtCol John Barranco, “TF-58 History, Taliban

Convoy Attack,” e-mail messsage to author,

30May10, hereafter Barranco e-mail, 30May10.

84. Ibid.

85. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 140; HMM163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7; Baker and Evans, “Year in

Review, 2001,” 42; Shanker and Dao, “Vanguard Digs

In”; Walter Rogers, “U.S. Marines Lie in Striking

Distance of Kandahar,” CNN Saturday Morning News,

1Dec01 (as of 18Nov07: http://transcripts.cnn.com/

transcripts/0112/01/smn.15.html); Doug Mellgren,

“U.S. Marines Patrol Deserts Around Base in

Afghanistan,” Associated Press, 27Nov01, hereafter

Mellgren, “Marines Patrol Deserts.”

86. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 30; Barranco e-mail,

30May10.

87. Bourne intvw.

88. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 28; 1stLt Warren C.

Cook award recommendation, approved 11Jun02

(MilAwdBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA).

89. Smith intvw.

90. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 28.

91. CAT Report, 53.

92. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p 19.

93. Bourne intvw.

94. Treglia intvw.

95. Fick, One Bullet Away, 109–110.

96. LtCol Christopher M. Bourne award

recommendation, approved 14Jun02 (MilAwdBr,

HQMC, Quantico, VA).

97. Fick, One Bullet Away, 112; WhitmerWeilbacher intvw.

98. Putman-McClure intvw.

99. Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly, “15th MEU (SOC) Dig

in Afghanistan,” Marine Corps News, hereafter

Chenelly, “Dig in Afghanistan.”

100. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 31.

101. Putman-McClure intvw, 4.

102. Associated Press, “More U.S. Troops in

Afghanistan,” 28Nov01.

103. Putman-McClure intvw, 4.

104. Putman-McClure intvw; CAT Report, 130.

105. Putman-McClure intvw; CAT Report, 130.

106. Doug Mellgren, “U.S. Marines Note Basic

Lesson for Fighting in Afghanistan: Hygiene,”

Associated Press, 3Dec01.

107. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw; Putman-McClure

intvw.

108. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw, 7–8.

109. Putman-McClure intvw.

110. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 32.

111. Putman-McClure intvw.

112. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

113. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

114. CAT Report, 122.

115. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

116. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, 30.

117. Ibid.; Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

118. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

119. Smith intvw; USN Construction Force,

“NMCB 133 History Continued” (as of 3Dec07:

323

Notes
www.seabee.navy.mil/index.cfm/32566), hereafter

“NMBC 133 History.”

120. Smith intvw; “NMCB 133 History.”

121. Smith intvw.

122. DoD “News Briefing,” 26Nov01.

123. Ibid.

124. DoD “News Briefing,” 27Nov01.

125. DoD “News Briefing,” 26Nov01.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. DoD “News Briefing,” 27Nov01.

129. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 19; MSSG 26

ComdC, Part 2, pp. 8–9.

130. Matter-Hyams intvw.

131. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 32.

132. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

133. CAT Report, 53.

134. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw; Mattis 24 Feb 2002

intvw, 11.

135. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 32.

136. Waldhauser 2002 intvw.

137. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 32; Bourne intvw.

138. Newbold intvw, 6.

139. Ibid., 7.

140. Newbold intvw.

141. Fitzgerald intvw.

142. Ibid., 11.

143. Ibid, p. 8.

144. Fitzgerald intvw.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.,13.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.

150. Fitzgerald intvw.

Chapter 8

1. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

2. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 22; Hascup intvw;

Lafferty intwv.

3. John Garstka et al., “Network Centric Operations

(NCO) Case Study: Task Force 50 During Operation

Enduring Freedom.” (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical

Information Center, 2006), 1–4.

4. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 35.

5. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 19.

6. Mattis 24Feb02 intvw, 10.

7. Frick intvw, 3.

8. LtCol John J. Broadmeadow intvw with

Christopher J. Warnke, 16 Jan 2002 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Broadmeadow intvw.

9. Ibid., 5.

10. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw.

11. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 9.

12. Lethin-Broadmeadow intvw, 37.

13. Ibid.

14. Mattis 15Jan02 intvw; Mattis 24Feb02 intvw;

Frick intvw; CAT Report, 64.

15. CAT Report, 61.

16. Broadmeadow intvw, 2.

17. CAT Report, 130–33.

18. Ibid., 136.

19. Ibid.

20. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

21. CAT Report, 136.

22. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

324

FROM THE SEA
325

Notes

23. Ibid.

24. CAT Report, 135.

25. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter.

26. Ibid., Part 2, p. 78.

27. CAT Report, 135.

28. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 82.

29. Ibid., Part 2, sustainment chapter.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Smith intvw, 7.

33. Smith intvw.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 74; National Museum

of the USAF, “AM-2 Matting,” Fact Sheets (as of

5Dec07: www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/

factsheet.asp?id=1270.)

38. Smith intvw.

39. Ibid.; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 74–75; TF 58

Chronology.

40. Smith intvw; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 74; TF 58

Chronology.

41. Smith intvw; TF ComdC, Part 2, pp. 30–31, 75.

42. Smith intvw; TF ComdC, Part 2, pp. 31, 75.

43. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 21–22; MSSG 26

ComdC, Part 2, p. 9.

44. Btry K, BLT 3/6, “Command Chronology,”

(copy in author’s working file), 9–11, hereafter Btry

K ComdC.

45. McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, 3, 163; TF 58

ComdC, Part 3.

46. McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, 154–55, 159–60,

163.

47. Ibid., 158.

48. Bourne intvw, 5.

49. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; 15th MEU, “Rhino

Chronology, 5–7 Dec 2001” (copy of OpLog in

author’s working file), hereafter “Rhino Chronology.”

50. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 38; 26th MEU ComdC,

Part 2, p. 21; MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

51. Tracy R. Bilski et al, “Battlefield Casualties

Treated at Camp Rhino, Afghanistan: Lessons

Learned,” Journal of Trauma Injury, Infection,

and Critical Care, (May 2003): 816, hereafter Bilski,

“Casualties Treated at Rhino”; Briscoe, Weapon of

Choice, 180.

52. LtCol Eric E. Theisen, USAF, Ground-Aided

Precision Strike: Heavy Bomber Activity in

Operation Enduring Freedom. (Maxwell AFB, AL:

Air University Press, 2003), 11

(http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awcmxwl.htm).

53. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 179–81; Lambeth,

Air Power Against Terror, 143–44; Bilski,

“Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 816.

54. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Pace,” news

transcript, 6Dec01 (as of 28Oct08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.as

px?transcriptid=2604), hereafter DoD “News

Briefing,” 6Dec01; Rudi Williams, “DoD Identifies

Three Troops Killed; Can’t Confirm Results of

Afghan Talks,” American Forces Press Service,

6Dec01 (as of 6Nov08: http://www.defenselink.mil/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44391).

55. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 180.

56. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 36; Waldhauser 2006

intvw; Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 816.

57. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 816.

58. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 180; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 3; Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,”

816; “Rhino Chronology.”

59. Waldhauser comments.

60. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 21; HMM-163

ComdC, Part 2, pp. 8, 19; “Rhino Chronology.”
61. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 180.

62. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 21; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 3; “Rhino Chronology.”

63. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 814–15.

64. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 36.

65. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 815–16.

66. Steve Pivnick, “Special Forces Visit Medics Who

Treated Them,” USAF press release, 15Aug02 (as of

5Jan08: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_prfr/

is_200208/ai_1337028306); DoD “News Briefing,”

6Dec01; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 37; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 3.

67. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 815–16.

68. Ibid.; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 36.

69. DoD “News Briefing,” 6Dec01, 1.

70. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 21; MSSG 15

ComdC, Part 3.

71. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 817.

72. Baker and Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 45; TF

58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 37; TF 58 Chronology;

Waldhauser 2006 intvw.

73. “Rhino Chronology”; MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

74. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 37.

75. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 814, 817.

76. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 37.

77. Ibid.; TF 58 Chronology; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2.

78. Waldhauser 2006 intvw.

79. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 37–38 and Part 3, p.

91; TF 58 Chronology, 13; 26th MEU ComdC, Part

2, p. 21.

80. Waldhauser comments.

81. Cpl Kristapor Boodaghian intvw with author,

8Feb02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Boodaghian intvw.

82. LCpl Athar Zulfiqar intvw with author, 31Jan02

(Oral HistColl), hereafter Zulfiqar intvw.

83. Ibid., 4.

84. Boodaghian intvw, 3.

85. Boodaghian intvw; Zulfiqar intvw.

86. Zulfiqar intvw, 5.

87. Zulfiqar intvw.

88. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 37–38, Part 3, p. 91;

TF 58 Chronology.

89. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

90. TF 58 Chronology; TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 91;

26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 21–22; MSSG 26

ComdC, Part 2, p. 9.

91. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

92. Fallon intvw.

93. Ibid.

94. Putman-McClure intvw.

95. Ibid.

96. Fallon intvw; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 23 and

Part 3, p. 89.

97. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; Fick, One Bullet

Away, 127.

98. HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

99. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 38; Olson intvw.

100. LtCol James K. LaVine intvw with Theodore R.

McKeldin, 3Feb 02 (Oral HistColl).

101. Olson intvw, 26.

102. Bilski, “Casualties Treated at Rhino,” 817.

103. Putman-McClure intvw, 8.

104. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; Fallon intvw.

105. Baker and Evans, “Year in Review, 2001,” 45;

MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; Olson intvw.

106. Fallon intvw, 9.

107. Ibid.

108. 1stLt William Lennon and SSgt Schneider

interview with Christopher J. Warnke, 19Jan02 (Oral

HistColl), hereafter Lennon-Schneider intvw.

326

FROM THE SEA
327

Notes

109. Fallon intvw.

110. Ibid., 10.

111. BLT 3/6 History, 4.

112. Fallon intvw.

113. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 38; Col Jerome M.

Lynes, comments on draft manuscript, 3Nov08

(comment file), hereafter Lynes comments.

114. Putman-McClure intvw.

115. Olson intvw; “Rhino Chronology.”

116. Fallon intvw; Olson intvw; MSSG 15 ComdC,

Part 3.

117. Olson intvw.

118. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 40 and Part 3, p. 90;

TF 58 Chronology.

119. Anne E. Ashbury, “Affidavit in Support of a

Criminal Complaint and an Arrest Warrant,” United

States of America v. John Phillip Walker Lindh

(U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, Alexandria Division, 15Jan02), 2 (as of

8Jan08: http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/

criminalcomplaint1.htm).

120. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 159; Tony West,

“Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant’s

Suppression Motions,” United States of America v.

John Phillip Walker Lindh, Criminal Number 02-37-

A (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, Alexandria Division, 13June02), 4–7 (as of

7Jan07: news.findlaw.com), hereafter West, “Proffer

of Facts.”

121. Keith B. Richburg, “Taliban Prisoners Revolt,”

Washington Post, 26Nov01; Briscoe, Weapon of

Choice, 104.

122. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 158–65; CMH,

U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 18.

123. West, “Proffer of Facts,” 11–12.

124. “The Case of the Taliban American,”

CNN.com: People in the News, 2001 (as of 7Jan08:

http://www.cnn.com/cnn/programs/people/shows

/walker/profile.html).

125. West, “Proffer of Facts,” 12–13, 15, 17–18;

Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 105, 158.

126. Maj Scott F. Stebbins intvw with author,

16Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Stebbins intvw.

127. Crist comments.

128. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 40; Stebbins intvw.

129. TF 58 Chronology.

130. Ibid., Part 2, p. 40; Stebbins intvw.

131. West, “Proffer of Facts,” 21.

132. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 95.

133. “Walker Lindh Sentenced to 20 Years,”

CNN.com (04Oct02: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-

10-04/justice/lindh.statement_1_taliban-fighters-tali

ban-army-anti-americanism-or-terrorism?_s=

PM:LAW).

Chapter 9

1. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 173, 175–78, 182.

2. Capt Clint C. Harris and Capt Michael R. Coletta

intvw with Christopher J. Warnke, 11Jan02 (Oral

HistColl), hereafter Harris-Coletta intvw.

3. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 182.

4. Willis Witter, “Taliban Surrenders Stronghold,”

Washington Times, 7Dec01.

5. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 178.

6. DoD “News Briefing,” 4Dec01.

7. TF 58 Chronology.

8. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 178–79.

9. Ibid., 179.

10. Jim Garamone, “Taliban Surrendering Kandahar,

U.S. Forces in Firefights,” American Forces Press

Service, 7Dec01 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44387).

11. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 149; Bradley

Graham and Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld Says War

Far From Over,” Washington Post, 8Dec01.
328

FROM THE SEA

12. TF 58 Chronology.

13. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 182–83.

14. DoD “News Briefing,” 26Nov01.

15. TF 58 Chronology.

16. Ibid.

17. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 34.

18. Mattis 24 Feb 2002 intvw, 12.

19. Mattis 12 Jul 2006, intvw, 9.

20. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 34.

21. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 20 and Part 3, p.

100; HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6; LennonSchneider intvw; Lyons comments.

22. Maj Thomas J. Impellitteri interview with

Theodore R. McKeldin, 13Feb02:05 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Impellitteri intvw; Bourne intvw.

23. Olson intvw, 29.

24. Waldhauser 2006 intvw, 32–33.

25. TF 58 Chronology.

26. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 35.

27. TF 58 Chronology.

28. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw.

29. Steven L. Myers, “Marines Build Firepower in

South, Bolstering Their Patrols and Readiness,” New

York Times, 3Dec01.

30. U.S. Department of Defense, “Enduring

Freedom Operational Update: Rear Adm

Stufflebeem,” news transcript, 3Dec01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=2593), hereafter DoD “Operational

Update,” 3Dec01.

31. Ibid.

32. Treglia intvw.

33. Dailey intvw; Treglia intvw.

34. Bourne intvw; Fick, One Bullet Away, 122.

35. Impellitteri intvw; Maj Thomas J. Impellitteri,

comments on draft manuscript, 12Nov08 (comment

file), hereafter Impellitteri comments.

36. Impellitteri intvw.

37. Ibid.; Bourne intvw.

38. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw; Fick, One

Bullet Away, 122.

39. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 3, p. 19.

40. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw; Fick, One Bullet

Away, 122.

41. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw; Fick, One

Bullet Away, 125.

42. Dailey intvw; Bourne intvw.

43. Fick, One Bullet Away, 122–23.

44. Ibid., 125; Impellitteri intvw.

45. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw; “Rhino

Chronology.”

46. Fick, One Bullet Away, 125; Bourne intvw;

Impellitteri intvw.

47. Waldhauser 2006 intvw, 33–34.

48. Bourne intvw, 8.

49. “Rhino Chronology”; BLT 3/6 History, 4.

50. Lennon-Schneider intvw.

51. Dailey intvw.

52. Treglia intvw, 5.

53. Dailey intvw, 2–3.

54. Fick, One Bullet Away, 125.

55. Dailey intvw; MSgt John A. Dailey, personal

communication with author, 17Jan08.

56. Fick, One Bullet Away, 125.

57. Impellitteri comments.

58. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw; Dailey intvw.

59. Capt Michael D. Bryan interview with Theodore

R. McKeldin, 6Feb02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter

Bryan intvw.
60. Bourne intvw, 9.

61. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw.

62. Impellitteri intvw; Carol Morello, “Marines

Rebuilding Kandahar Airport; Afghans Hired to

Help in Cleanup Project, Washington Post,

21Dec01, 31.

63. Fick, One Bullet Away, 131.

64. Bryan intvw, 7.

65. Impellitteri intvw, 12.

66. Ibid.

67. Impellitteri intvw; Dailey intvw.

68. Impellitteri intvw, 12.

69. Impellitteri intvw; Dailey intvw.

70. MSgt John A. Dailey, comments on draft

manuscript, 24Nov08 (comment file).

71. Impellitteri intvw, 12.

72. Dailey intvw; Impellitteri intvw; LtCol Thomas J.

Impellitteri, “RE: TF 58 History,” e-mail message to

author, 18Jan08.

73. Impellitteri intvw; Dailey intvw; Bryan intvw, 7.

74. Dailey intvw; Dailey comments.

75. Dailey intvw.

76. Bourne intvw.

77. Dailey intvw.

78. GySgt John A. Daily, GySgt Blake L. Smith, SSgt

Matthew A. Cole, and SSgt Jack Kelly interview with

Christopher J. Warnke, 8Jan02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Dailey and others intvw.

79. Bryan intvw.

80. Dailey intvw; Bourne intvw.

81. Impellitteri intvw, 13.

82. Dailey intvw.

83. Ibid.; Bourne intvw.

84. Dailey intvw; Olson intvw; Steven L. Myers with

James Dao, “The Marines’ 21st Century Beachhead

Is Far Inland,” New York Times, 22Dec01, hereafter

Myers and Dao, “Twenty-First Century Beachhead.”

85. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 39; Dailey and others.

intvw.

86. Dailey intvw.

87. HQMC Media Pool, “Marines Kill Seven Taliban

Fighters in Fire Fight,” Marine Corps News, 7Dec01.

88. Impellitteri intvw.

89. Dailey intvw.

90. Ibid.; Bourne intvw.

91. Bryan intvw.

92. Dailey intvw; Bourne intvw.

93. Dailet intvw, 11.

94. Bourne intvw; Bryan intvw.

95. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 39.

96. Oliver intvw, 9.

97. Impellitteri intvw; Dailey intvw; TF 58 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 35.

98. Impellitteri comments.

99. Impellitteri intvw, 14.

100. Bryan intvw, 9.

101. Bourne intvw, 12–13.

102. Doran intvw.

103. Bryan intvw.

104. Harris-Coletta intvw.

105. Coletta intvw.

106. Bryan intvw.

107. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw; Capt Michael

R. Coletta intvw with Dr. Fred H. Allison, 22Mar02

(Oral HistColl), hereafter Coletta intvw.

108. Bryan intvw.

109. Impellitteri intvw; Baker and Evans, “Year in

Review, 2001,” 45; Meyers and Dao, “Twenty-First

Century Beachhead.”

329

Notes
110. Bryan intvw.

111. Impellitteri intvw, 15.

112. Bourne intvw, 13.

113. Bryan intvw; Meyers and Dao, “Twenty-First

Century Beachhead.”

114. Dailey intvw; Dailey and others intvw.

115. Impellitteri intvw; Dailey intvw; TF 58 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 39.

116. Coletta intvw.

117. Impellitteri intvw, 16.

118. Olson intvw.

119. Impellitteri intvw, 17.

120. Bourne intvw; Impellitteri intvw.

121. Impellitteri intvw, 17.

122. Bourne intvw.

123. Impellitteri intvw.

124. Ibid.; Impellitteri comments.

125. BLT 3/6 History, 4–6; MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

126. Lennon-Schneider intvw, 6.

127. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 90.

128. Impellitteri intvw; Olson intvw.

129. Impellitteri intvw.

130. Bourne intvw.

131. Impellitteri intvw; Fick, One Bullet Away, 129.

132. Bryan intvw.

133. Bourne intvw.

134. Ibid.; Impellitteri comments; Fick, One Bullet

Away, 129.

135. Fick, One Bullet Away, 130.

136. Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

137. Ibid., 14.

138. Impellitteri intvw; Bourne intvw.

139. Impellitteri intvw; Bourne intvw; Bryan intvw.

140. Bourne intvw; Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

141. Impellitteri intvw.

142. Bourne comments.

143. Fick, One Bullet Away, 132; Bourne

comments.

144. Ibid.

145. Fick, One Bullet Away, 132–33; Bourne intvw, 17.

146. Bourne intvw; Whitmer-Weilbacher intvw.

Chapter 10

1. TF 58 Chronology.

2. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 211.

3. TF 58 Chronology; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 39,

40 and Part 3, p. 89; Btry K, 10th Mar, “26th MEU

Kabul Embassy Reinforcement History,” 8–

30Dec01, (copy in author’s working file), 1, hereafter

Kabul history.

4. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 22.

5. Capt James P. McDonough intvw with

Christopher J. Warnke, 18Jan02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter McDonough intvw; 1stLt Stephen M.

Grimm interview with Christopher J. Warnke,

21Jan02 (Oral HistColl).

6. McDonough intvw; Kabul history, 1.

7. Ibid.

8. McDonough intvw; 1stLt James D. Jarvis, “Kabul,

Afghanistan Marines Return to Reclaim Their Post,”

Marine Corps News, 13Dec01, hereafter Jarvis,

“Marines Reclaim Post”; C.J. Chivers, “For Marines,

There’s Powder for Eggnog, Tunes on Vinyl,” New

York Times, 25Dec02, hereafter Chivers, “For

Marines There’s Eggnog.”

9. McDonough intvw; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p.

101; Kabul history, 1.

10. Ibid., 2.

11. McDonough intvw.

12. Kabul history, 2; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 22.

330

FROM THE SEA
331

Notes

13. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 40–41.

14. Kabul history, 2; McDonough intvw; Maj Ray

White intvw with Mark G. Schrecker, 11Jan02 (Oral

HistColl); 26th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 101.

15. Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal, “Marines from 26th

MEU Reestablish U.S. Embassy Kabul Guard

Detachment,” Marine Corps News, 26Dec01,

hereafter Pomykal, “Marines Reestablish Embassy

Guard”; Kabul history, 3.

16. McDonough intvw; Kabul history, 3.

17. Pomykal, “Marines Reestablish Embassy

Guard”; Kabul history, 3.

18. McDonough intvw; Pomykal, “Marines

Reestablish Embassy Guard.”

19. Sgt. Andrew D. Pomykal, “BLT 3/6 Snipers

Provide Cover, Surveillance for Embassy Guards,”

Marine Corps News, 26Dec01, hereafter Pomykal,

“Snipers Provide Cover”; McDonough intvw; Kabul

history, 3.

20. Pomykal, “Snipers Provide Cover”; 26th MEU

ComdC, Part 3, p. 101; MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 28.

21. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 38–39.

22. McDonough intvw.

23. Ibid.

24. Associated Press, “Marines Secure Grounds of

U.S. Embassy in Kabul,” USA Today, 10Dec01;

Pomykal, “Marines Reestablish Embassy Guard”;

McDonough intvw.

25. Ibid.

26. Pomykal, “Marines Reestablish Embassy Guard.”

27. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 211.

28. McDonough intvw.

29. Chivers, “For Marines, There’s Eggnog.”

30. McDonough intvw; Kabul history, 4.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 5–6.

33. Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal, “Twenty-Sixth MEU

Marine Serves as Ambassador to Afghanistan,”

Marine Corps News, 26Dec01.

34. Kabul history, 6.

35. Jarvis, “Marines Reclaim Post.”

36. McDonough intvw; Kabul history, 6.

37. Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal, “American Flag Raised

at U.S. Embassy in Kabul after 12-Year Absence,”

Marine Corps News, 25Dec01, hereafter Pomykal,

“Flag Raised”; Kabul history, 7.

38. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 39.

39. Pomykal, “Marines Reestablish Guard.”

40. Jarvis, “Marines Reclaim Post.”

41. BLT 3/6 History, 9; Pomykal, “Flag Raised.”

42. Kabul history, 7.

43. Pomykal, “Flag Raised.”

44. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 212.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Kabul history, pp. 5, 9.

48. Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal, “Marines from the 26th

MEU Receive Reassuring Words, Congratulations

from Four-Star General,” Marine Corps News,

25Dec01; Kabul history, 8.

49. Waldhauser comments; 26th MEU ComdC, Part

2, p. 23; MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 9; BLT 3/6,

Warning Order—Qandahar Intl Airport, PowerPoint

presentation, 14Dec01.

50. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 41.

51. Impellitteri intvw.

52. BLT 3/6 History, 6.

53. Impellitteri intvw, 22.

54. Impellitteri intvw.

55. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part. 2, p. 39.

56. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 22–23 and Part 3,

p. 101.
332

FROM THE SEA

57. Olson intvw; Mattis 12Jul06 intvw; TF 58

ComdC, Part 2, 41–42.

58. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 10–11.

59. Olson intvw, 34–35.

60. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 10.

61. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 42.

62. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 10.

63. Steven L. Myers, “Marines Move to Kandahar

and Secure Airport,” New York Times, 14Dec01,

hereafter Myers, “Marines Secure Airport.”

64. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 43.

65. Jeanette Steel, “Marines Sweep into Kandahar,

Early Morning Convoy Paves Way for Humanitarian

Efforts at Airport,” San Diego Union-Tribune,

14Dec01, hereafter Steel, “Early Morning Convoy.”

66. Steel, “Early Morning Convoy.”

67. Olson intvw.

68. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 26.

69. BLT 3/6 History, 6.

70. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 26.

71. Impellitteri intvw; Myers, “Marines Secure

Airport.”

72. Impellitteri intvw, 22.

73. Steel, “Early Morning Convoy”; Impellitteri

intvw; BLT 3/6 History, 7; Crist comments.

74. Bryan intvw.

75. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 26.

76. Carol Morello, “Marines Sweep into Airport at

Kandahar,” The Washington Post, 14Dec01,

hereafter Morello, “Marines Sweep into Kandahar.”

77. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 26.

78. Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly, “In Their Own Words:

U.S. Marines Reach Kandahar, Take Airport,”

Marine Corps News, 21Dec01 (HQMC, Washington,

DC), hereafter Chenelly, “Marines Reach Kandahar.”

79. Impellitteri intvw, 23.

80. Impellitteri intvw.

81. Ibid.; Chenelly, “Marines Reach Kandahar.”

82. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 24; BLT 3/6

ComdC, Part 2, p. 17; BLT 3/6 History, 7; Lynes

comments.

83. HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7.

84. Maj Mitchell D. Rios interview with Christopher

J. Warnke, 16Jan02 (Oral HistColl).

85. Impellitteri intvw.

86. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 3, p.19.

87. Waldhauser comments; Lynes comments; BLT

3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 17.

88. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 24; MSSG 26

ComdC, Part 2, pp. 10, 39, 40; Lynes comments.

89. Morello, “Marines Sweep into Kandahar.”

90. Myers, “Marines Secure Airport.”

91. 26th MEU ComdC, 23, 27–28; Lynes comments.

92. TF 58 Chronology.

93. Ibid.

94. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 44; Olson intvw.

95. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 44; Tomas Etzler, “US

Forces Train in al-Qaeda Terror Camp,” CNN.com,

29Sep02 (as of 13Feb08: http://edition.cnn.com/

2002/world/asiapcf/central/09/27/afghan.usforces.tr

aining/), hereafter, Etzler, “Al-Qaeda Terror Camp.”

96. PFC Vincent C. Fusco, USA, “Former al-Qaeda

Training Site Now a Ghost Town,” American Forces

Press Service, 28Oct05 (as of 13Feb08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/oct2005/

20051028_3182.html), hereafter Fusco, “Al-Qaeda

Ghost Town.”

97. Etzler, “Al-Qaeda Terror Camp.”

98. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 44; Etzler, “Al-Qaeda

Terror Camp”; Fusco, “Al-Qaeda Ghost Town.”

99. TF 58 Chronology, 10; TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 89.

100. U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary

Rumsfeld: Media Availability Enroute to Central
333

Notes

Asia” news transcript, 16Dec01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=2654).

101. Olson intvw.

102. Treglia intvw, 9.

103. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 46; Waldhauser 2006

intvw; Olson intvw.

104. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3; CAT Report, 56.

105. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 89; MSSG 15 ComdC,

Part 3.

106. HMM-163 ComdC, Part 2, p. 9.

107. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 46; Olson intvw.

108. Dailey intvw; Treglia intvw.

109. Dailey intvw; Olson intvw.

110. Olson intvw, 36.

111. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 46.

112. Dailey intvw, 10.

113. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 46.

114. Dailey intvw, 10.

115. Olson intvw, 37.

116. Treglia intvw.

117. Olson intvw.

118. Ibid., 37.

119. MSSG 15 ComdC, Part 3.

Chapter 11

1. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 10.

2. Lynes comments.

3. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 24.

4. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 39–40.

5. 26th MEU, Combat Action Summary of Action,

23Feb02 (MilAwdBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA), 9,

hereafter 26th MEU CAR.

6. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 45.

7. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 19.

8. TF 58, “Kandahar Airfield 011231” and “Main

Terminal Building.”

9. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 25; MSSG 26

ComdC, Part 2, pp. 24, 27, 37.

10. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 44 and Part 3, p. 75.

11. Bryan intvw; Capt Todd S. Tomko intvw with

Christopher J. Warnke, 20Jan02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Tomko intvw.

12. 26th MEU CAR, 10.

13. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 24.

14. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 10, 18.

15. Ibid., pp. 10–11, 18, 20.

16. Bryan intvw, 13.

17. Bryan intvw.

18. Erik Eckholm and Steven L. Myers, “Three

Marines Wounded by Land Mine at Kandahar

Airport,” New York Times, 17Dec01, hereafter

Eckholm and Myers, “Marines Wounded.”

19. Bryan intvw.

20. Robert Sanchez, “Marine Hurt in Kandahar

Recalls Blast,” Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO),

27Feb02, hereafter Sanchez, “Marine Recalls Blast.”

21. Bryan intvw.

22. Sanchez, “Marine Recalls Blast”; HMM-365

2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7.

23. Eckholm and Myers, “Marines Wounded”;

Sanchez, “Marine Recalls Blast.”

24. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p.102; BLT 3/6 History,

19; Leon Harris, “Army Specialists Sent to Interrogate

Detainees,” CNN: Mornings with Paula Zahn, 3Jan02

(as of 14Jan02: http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/

0201/03/ltm.17.html).

25. Cpl Isaac Pacheco, “U.S. Marine Corps Sgt.

Christopher Chandler, Marine With Prosthetic Limb,

Jumps into History Books,” DefendAmerica.mil,

19Dec03 (as of 14Feb08:
334

FROM THE SEA

http://www.defendamerica.mil/profiles/dec2003/pr

121903a.html).

26. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 24–25.

27. HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7.

28. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 25–26.

29. Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal, “Afghans, Marines Gather

for Dual Flag Raising,” Marine Corps News, 1Jan02.

30. USMC, Yearly Chronologies of the United States

Marine Corps: 2001 (RefBr, MCHD, Quantico, VA).

31. Tomko intvw.

32. Impellitteri intvw, 25–26.

33. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 24–25, 27.

34. BGen William M. Faulkner, comments on draft

manuscript, 11Nov08 (comment file).

35. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 79–80; Crist

comments.

36. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 80.

37. Ibid., p. 80–81.

38. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 90.

39. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 80–81.

40. Smith intvw; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 25.

41. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment chapter;

Smith intvw.

42. TF 58 Chronology.

43. Smith intvw; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, sustainment

chapter.

44. Michael M. Phillips, “Battlefield Business Deals Are

Cut in Afghanistan as Marines Find Willing Contractors

Among Locals,” Wall Street Journal, 19Dec01,

hereafter Phillips, “Battlefield Business Deals.”

45. Smith intvw.

46. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 91.

47. Phillips, “Battlefield Business Deals.”

48. Carol Morello, “Marines Rebuilding Kandahar

Airport, Afghans Hired to Help in Cleanup Project,”

Washington Post, 21Dec01, hereafter Morello,

“Marines Rebuilding Kandahar.”

49. Ibid.

50. Smith intvw.

51. Ibid.

52. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 44; TF 58 Chronology;

26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 25.

53. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 58.

54. Smith intvw; TF 58 Chronology, 9.

55. TF 58 Chronology, 8.

56. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 50; Doug Mellgren,

“Marines Plan POW Site in Kandahar,” Associated

Press, 15Dec01, hereafter Mellgren, “POW Site in

Kandahar.”

57. TF 58 Chronology, 9; TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 89.

58. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 51.

59. Paul Salopel and Lisa Anderson, “Al-Qaeda

Prisoners Seize Bus, Flee; Pakistan Shootout Leaves

13 Dead,” Chicago Tribune, 20Dec01.

60. Bill Hemmer, “More Suspects Detained as

Marines Prepare Move to Kandahar Airport,”

CNN.com, 27Dec01 (as of 28Dec01:

http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/ce

ntral/12/27/ret.afghanistan.marines/index.html),

hereafter Hemmer, “More Suspects Detained.”

61. Mellgren, “POW Site in Kandahar”; TF 58

ComdC, Part 3, p. 5; 1stLt Kraig M. Rauen intvw

with Christopher J. Warnke, 20Jan02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Rauen intvw.

62. BLT 3/6 Engineer Plt, “Situation Report for

Combat Operations in Afghanistan,” 23Feb02

(author’s working file), 7, hereafter BLT 3/6

Engineer Plt SitRep.

63. Ibid., 8.

64. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 24, 37; TF 58

Chronology, 10.

65. Sgt Joshua T. Green interview with Christopher J.

Warnke, 15Jan02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Green intvw.
335

Notes

66. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 24, 27, 37; TF 58

ComdC, 51.

67. Rauen intvw.

68. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 27.

69. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 51.

70. Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly, “Marines, Soldiers Work

Together Keeping Suspected Terrorists Locked Up,

Marine Corps News, 24Dec01, hereafter Chenelly,

“Keeping Terrorists Locked Up.”

71. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 25 and Part 3, p.

101; TF 58 Chronology, 10–13.

72. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 27.

73. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 50.

74. Ibid., Part 3, pp. 89, 91.

75. Green intvw.

76. Chenelly, “Keeping Terrorists Locked Up.”

77. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 91; BLT 3/6

History, 18.

78. Chenelly, “Keeping Terrorists Locked Up.”

79. Ibid.; BLT 3/6 History, 18; Crist comments.

80. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 51 and Part 3, p. 90.

81. Steven L. Myers et al., “Marines Accept 20 More

al-Qaeda as Afghans Speed Up Turnover,” New York

Times, 27Dec01, hereafter Myers, “Marines Accept

More al- Qaeda”; LtCol Mike Saxton, USA, intvw

with Christopher J. Warnke, 19Jan02 (Oral HistColl),

hereafter Saxton intvw.

82. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 52; Saxton intvw;

Myers, “Marines Accept More al-Qaeda.”

83. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 52.

84. Hemmer, “More Suspects Detained.”

85. Saxton intvw, 2.

86. Ibid., 2–3.

87. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 250.

88. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 52 and Part 3, pp. 93–

95.; TF 58 Chronology, 15.

89. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 8; TF 58 Chronology,

11; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 102.

90. LtCol Paul Warman, USA, and Maj Alvez

Alveretti, USA, interview with Christopher J.

Warnke, 19Jan02 (Oral HistColl), 5.

91. Green intvw.

92. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 47.

93. Sgt Thomas M. Corcoran, “Gen Jones Visits

Marines in Kandahar for the Holidays,” Marine

Corps News, 19Dec01, hereafter Corcoran, “Jones

Visits Marines.”

94. Ibid.

95. Waldhauser comments.

96. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 5.

97. Ibid., Part 2, p. 47 and Part 3, p. 90.

98. Lynes comments; BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 18.

99. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 102; TF 58

ComdC, Part 3, p. 90.

100. BLT 3/6 History, 12.

101. “Troops in Afghanistan on Heightened Watch,”

Washington Times, 26Dec01.

102. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 47.

103. Lynes comments.

104. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 48.

105. Ibid., Part 3, p. 90.

106. Chivers, “For Marines There’s Eggnog”; Kabul

history, 8.

107. Btry K ComdC, 12.

108. Capt Farrell J. Sullivan intvw with author,

9Apr02 (Oral HistColl).

109. Kabul history, 5, 9.

110. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 58–59.

111. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 58–59 and Part 3, p. 90.
Chapter 12

1. Jack Kelly and Jonathan Weisman, “Marines to

Join the Hunt: ‘Net is Getting Tighter’ in Pursuit of

bin Laden,” USA Today, 20Nov01.

2. Michael Wines, “Caves and Tunnels, Heavily

Fortified ‘Ant Farms’ Deter bin Laden’s Pursuers,”

New York Times, 26Nov01; Jawbreaker, 205, 235;

Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 213.

3. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 145;

Anthony Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan:

Warfighting, Intelligence, and Force

Transformation (Washington, DC: CSIS Press,

2002), 20; Chris Tomlinson, “Afghans Suspect bin

Laden Is Hiding in Huge Tunnel Fortress,”

Associated Press, 27Nov01.

4. Pamela Constable, “Afghan Fortress a Formidable

Target, Marines Pursuing bin Laden May Be

Targeting Bomb-Resistant Cave Complex,”

Washington Post, 28Nov01, hereafter Constable,

“Afghan Fortress.”

5. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 213.

6. Constable, “Afghan Fortress.”

7. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 55.

8. PBS, “Campaign Against Terror,” transcript of

Frontline interview with Gen Tommy Franks,

conducted 12Jun02 (as of 10Nov08:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/

campaign/interviews/franks.html).

9. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 215, 236,

254; SOCOM History, 94; Woodward, Bush at War,

315.

10. Mary Anne Weaver, “The War on Terror: Four

Years On, Lost at Tora Bora,” New York Times,

11Sep05, hereafter Weaver, “Lost at Tora Bora”;

Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 146.

11. Constable, “Afghan Fortress.

12. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 249;

Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 145, 150.

13. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 257.

14. Ibid., 267, 269–71.

15. Ibid., 277; MSNBC, Gary Berntsen interview with

Norah O’Donnell, Hardball with Chris Matthews,

28Dec05 (as of 25Feb08: http://www.msnbc.msn.com

/id/10639901/); Peter Spiegel, “Ex-CIA Agent Says

U.S. Missed bin Laden in Afghanistan,” Financial

Times (London), 3Jan06.

16. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 281, 307.

17. SOCOM History, 94.

18. Ibid.; Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 213–14.

19. SOCOM History, 95.

20. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 289–91.

21. Weaver, “Lost at Tora Bora.”

22. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 11.

23. Bradford Lee, “RE: TF 58,” e-mail message to

author, 16Aug06.

24. Mattis 12Jul06 intvw, 11.

25. Ibid., 12.

26. Mattis 24 Feb 2002 intvw, 16.

27. SOCOM History, 95–96.

28. U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News

Briefing: ASD PA Clark and Gen Pace,” news

transcript, 12Dec01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2634)

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 12Dec01; Berntsen

and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 295–96.

29. U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News

Briefing: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Rear Adm

Stufflebeem,” news transcript, 10Dec01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=2628), hereafter DoD “News

Briefing,” 10Dec01.

30. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” news

transcript,11Dec01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2632),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 11Dec01.

31. DoD “News Briefing,” 12Dec01.

32. SOCOM History, 96–97.

336

FROM THE SEA
33. DoD “News Briefing,” 11Dec01.

34. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” news

transcript, 13Dec01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2642),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 13Dec01.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. SOCOM History, 97.

38. Linda Kozaryn, “Franks: Pitched Battle Rages in

Tora Bora Valleys,” American Forces Press Service,

14Dec01 (as of 1Jan08: http://www.defenselink.mil/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44356), hereafter Kozary,

“Pitched Battle in Tora Bora.”

39. Ibid.

40. Jim Garamone, “Opposition Forces Advance

Two Kilometers in Tora Bora, American Forces

Press Service, 14Dec01 (as of 11Jan08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44354).

41. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 305; U.S.

Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing:

Secretary Rumsfeld,” news transcript, 19Dec01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=2677), hereafter DoD “News

Briefing,” 19Dec01.

42. DeLong and Lukeman, Inside CentCom, 56–57.

43. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 307.

44. Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Provides Update on

Tora Bora Fighting,” American Forces Press Service,

16Dec01 (as of 11Jan08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44349); John Kifner and Eric Schmitt, “U.S.

Officials Say al-Qaeda Routed from Afghanistan,”

New York Times, 17Dec01.

45. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Rear Adm Stufflebeem,” news transcript,

17Dec01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/

transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2657 ).

46. SOCOM History, 97.

47. DoD “News Briefing,” 19Dec01.

48. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Troops

May Scour Caves for al-Qaeda, U.S. General Says,”

New York Times, 20Dec01, hereafter Gordon and

Schmidt, “Troops May Scour Caves.”

49. DoD “News Briefing,” 19Dec01.

50. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 215.

51. LtCol Clarke R. Lethin, Personal Working

Notebook, 5Dec01–17Jan02 (copy in author’s

working file), 34, hereafter Lethin Notebook.

52. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 49 and Part 3, p. 89; TF

58 Chronology, 10–11.

53. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Gen

Pace,” news transcript, 18Dec01

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=2665).

54. Lethin Notebook, 37–38.

55. Ibid., 37–39.

56. Olson intvw, 37–38.

57. TF 58 Chronology, 11.

58. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 89.

59. Waldhauser 2006 intvw, 33.

60. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 155;

Gordon and Schmidt, “Troops May Scour Caves.”

61. MSSG 15 Chronological Journal.

62. Olson intvw, 37–38.

63. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 45.

64. Lethin Notebook, 39–42.

65. Ibid., 41.

66. Ibid., 42.

67. Ibid., 43.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 44–45.

71. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

337

Notes
Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Pace,” news

transcript, 21Dec01 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2686),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 21Dec01.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. David Stout, “U.S. to Send More Troops to Search

Caves of Tora Bora,” New York Times, 21Dec01.

75. Thom Shanker, “More American Troops Are

Ordered to Join Cave-to-Cave Search for al-Qaeda,”

New York Times, 22Dec01.

76. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 90; TF 58 Chronology, 11.

77. Lethin Notebook, 51.

78. Thomas Bowditch et al., Marine Corps

Operations in Afghanistan: Key Themes and

Implications for Transformation, CRM

D0007253.A1/Final (Alexandria, VA: Center for

Naval Analysies) Nov02.

79. Treglia intvw.

80. Hersh, Chain of Command, 135–36.

81. TF 58 Chronology, 12.

82. Ibid.

83. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 90; MSSG 15

Chronological Journal.

84. Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Sees bin Laden

Leaving by Sea,” Washington Times, 25Dec01.

85. Jim Garamone, “Search Continues for Taliban,

Al Qaeda Terrorists,” American Forces Press Service,

27Dec01. (as of 31 May10: http://osd.dtic.mil/

news/Dec2001/n12272001_200112274.html).

86. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “U.S.

Putting Off Plan to Use GIs in Afghan Caves,” New

York Times, 27Dec01.

87. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” news

transcript, 27Dec01 (http://www.defense.gov/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2696),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 27Dec01.

88. Ibid.

89. SOCOM History, 98; Briscoe, Weapon of Choice,

250.

90. SOCOM History, 98; Lambeth, Air Power

Against Terror, 146, 176.

91. Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, 37–38.

92. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 215.

93. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 46.

94. Yoo intvw, 11.

Chapter 13

1. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 66.

2. Ibid., p. 55; HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 7;

BLT 3/6 ComdC, 19.

3. HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 7–8.

4. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 28.

5. Impellitteri intvw.

6. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 56 and Part 3, p. 91.

7. Lennon-Schneider intvw, 7.

8. Impellitteri intvw; Impellitteri comments; BLT

3/6 History, 16.

9. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 29; TF 58 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 55.

10. Ibid.

11. 26th MEU CAR, 2.

12. HMM-365 2001 ComdC, Part 2, p. 2; Impellitteri

intvw.

13. 26th MEU CAR, 2.

14. Impellitteri intvw.

15. BLT 3/6 History, 16.

16. Lynes comments.

17. 26th MEU CAR, 2–3; BLT 3/6 ComdC, 20;

Impellitteri intvw; Impellitteri comments.

18. Impellitteri intvw, 28.

19. 26th MEU CAR, 3; BLT 3/6 ComdC, 20.

338

FROM THE SEA
20. Impellitteri intvw, 27.

21. Impellitteri intvw; 26th MEU CAR, 3.

22. 26th MEU CAR, 3.

23. HMM-365 ComdC 1Jan02–30Jun02, Part 2, p. 2,

hereafter HMM-365 2002 ComdC.

24. 26th MEU CAR, 3–4.

25. Ibid., 4.

26. Impellitteri intvw, 29.

27. 26th MEU CAR, 4; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2,

p. 29.

28. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: ASD PA Clarke and Rear Adm

Stufflebeem,” news transcript, 2Jan02

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=1041) hereafter DoD “News

Briefing,” 2Jan02.

29. Ibid.

30. Jim Wolf, “U.S. Marines Scour Southern Afghan

Site for Clues,” Reuters, 1Jan02.

31. Lennon-Schneider intvw, 7.

32. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” news

transcript, 3Jan02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1046),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 3Jan02.

33. Ibid.

34. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: ASD PA Clark and Rear Adm Stufflebeem,”

news transcript, 14Jan02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2085), hereafter

DoD “News Briefing,” 14Jan02.

35. TF 58 Chronology, 15; TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p.

93; HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

36. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 55.

37. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 29.

38. BLT 3/6 History, 20.

39. 26th MEU CAR, 4–5; 26th MEU ComdC, Part

2, p. 45.

40. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 45,

41. BLT 3/6 History, 20.

42. 26th MEU CAR, 5.

43. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 46; BLT 3/6

History, 20.

44. 26th MEU CAR, 4–5.

45. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

46. 26th MEU CAR, 4–5.

47. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 55.

48. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 30; 26th MEU

CAR, 5–6.

49. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 55.

50. U.S. Department of Defense, “ASD PA Clarke

News Briefing at Foreign Press Center,” news

transcript, 4Jan02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1050); U.S.

Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing: ASD

PA Clarke and Rear Adm Stufflebeem,” news

transcript, 7Jan02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1073),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 7Jan02; Jim

Garamone, “Ops Around Zawhar Kili Winding

Down, DoD Says,” American Forces Press Service,

14Jan02, (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=43859).

51. DoD “News Briefing” 14Jan02.

52. Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “The

Campaign for the Caves: The Battles for Zhawar in

the Soviet-Afghan War,” The Journal of Slavic

Military Studies, 14, no. 3 (2001), hereafter Grau and

Jalali, “Campaign for the Caves”; DoD “News

Briefing,” 14Jan02.

53. Grau and Jalali, “Campaign for the Caves”;

William T. Baker and Mark L. Evans, “The Year in

Review, 2002,” Naval Aviation News (July–August

2003): 28, hereafter Baker and Evans, “Year in

Review 2002”; DoD “News Briefing,” 3Jan02.

54. DoD “News Briefing,” 3Jan02; DoD “News

Briefing,” 7Jan02.

339

Notes
55. Pamela Hess, “Terrorist Caves Blocked, Camp

Leveled,” United Press International, 14Jan02; DoD

“News Briefing,” 2Jan02; DoD “News Briefing,”

3Jan02; DoD “News Briefing,” 7Jan02.

56. DoD “News Briefing,” 3Jan02; Baker and Evans,

“Year in Review 2002,” 28.

57. LtCol David B. Crist, “SOF Operations in

Enduring Freedom.”

58. DoD “News Briefing,” 14Jan02.

59. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 59.

60. Ibid.

61. 26th MEU CAR, 7; BLT 3/6, Zhawar Kili Joint

Marine/Seal Exploitation Mission After Action

Summary, 1, hereafter BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action.

62. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3; 26th MEU

CAR, 7.

63. 26th MEU CAR, 7; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 1; HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

64. 26th MEU CAR, 7; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 1.

65. BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After Action, 2.

66. 26th MEU CAR, 7; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 2.

67. 26th MEU CAR, 8; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 2.

68. 26th MEU CAR, 8; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 2.

69. Crist comments; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 2.

70. 26th MEU CAR, 8.

71. U. S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: Gen Myers,” news transcript, 8Jan02

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=1082).

72. 26th MEU CAR, 8.

73. BLT 3/6 History, 22.

74. Crist comments.

75. 26th MEU CAR, 8; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 3.

76. 26th MEU CAR, 8.

77. BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After Action, 5; U.S.

Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing:

Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” news transcript,

11Jan02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/

transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031).

78. 26th MEU CAR, 9; BLT 3/6 Zhawar Kili After

Action, 5.

79. 26th MEU CAR, 9; TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 94;

HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

80. DoD “News Briefing,” 14Jan02; TF 58 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 59; SOCOM History, 104.

81. DoD “News Briefing,” 14Jan02.

82. 26 MEU CAR, 9

83. SOCOM History, 104.

84. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 8.

85. Ibid., Part 2, p. 61.

86. Ibid., pp. 60–61.

87. Lynes comments.

88. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 62.

89. Ibid.; World Index, “Sardeh Band, Paktika,

Afghanistan” undated (as of 08Feb11:

http://travelingluck.com/Asia/Afghanistan/Pakt%C

4%ABk%C4%81/_1127289_Sardeh%20Band.html#

local_map), hereafter World Index, “Sardeh Band.”

90. Lynes comments.

91. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 62 and Part 3, p. 93.

92. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3; 26th MEU

ComdC, Part 2, p. 33; World Index, “Sardeh Band.”

93. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 103; HMM-365

2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

94. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 60, 62.

95. Jim Garamone, “Search Continues for Taliban,

al-Qaeda Terrorists,” American Forces Press Service,

27Dec01 (as of 6Nov08:

340

FROM THE SEA
341

Notes

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44315).

96. Crist comments.

97. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

98. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 237–41.

99. SOCOM History, 105; U.S. Department of

Defense, “DoD News Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld

and Gen Myers,” news transcript, 21Feb02

(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.a

spx?transcriptid=2728).

100. Crist comments.

101. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 62; 26th MEU CAR,

15; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 34; BLT 3/6

ComdC, Part 2, p. 31; BLT 3/6 History, 24.

102. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 206.

103. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 94; 26th MEU

ComdC, Part 2, p. 34; BLT 3/6 Comd C, Part 2, p

31; BLT 3/6 History, 24.

104. 26th MEU CAR, 15–17.

105. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 206.

106. Richard Tomkins, “U.S. Troops Honor Dead

Marines,” United Press International, 22Jan02,

hereafter Tomkins, “Troops Honor Marines”; HMM365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3: MSSG 26 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 28.

107. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3.

108. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 67 and Part 3, p.95;

Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 229.

109. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 229.

110. Steve Vogel and Marc Kaufman, “Helicopter

Accident Kills Two Marines in Afghanistan,”

Washington Post, 21Jan02, hereafter Vogel and

Kaufman, “Helicopter Accident.”

111. Ibid., Tomkins, “Troops Honor Marines.”

112. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 67; Briscoe, Weapon

of Choice, 231.

113. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 67.

114. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 230–31.

115. Ibid., 231.

116. Ibid., 231–32; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 34.

117. MSSG 26 ComdC, Part 2, p. 29.

118. Vogel and Kaufman, “Helicopter Accident.”

119. Tomkins, “Troops Honor Marines.”

120. Ibid.

121. Lynes comments.

122. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 34; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 232.

123. 26th MEU CAR, 16.

124. Ibid., 17.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., 15–16.

127. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 96.

128. 26th MEU CAR, 17.

129. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 35; 26th MEU

CAR, 17; TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 96.

Chapter 14

1. Olson intvw, 38.

2. Olson intvw; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 49.

3. Olson intvw, 38.

4. Olson intvw; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 50.

5. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 58, 79.

6. Ibid., 58; TF 58 Chronology, 15; Bourne comments.

7. TF 58 Chronology, 15.

8. Lethin Notebook, 74.

9. 15th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 2–12.

10. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 92.

11. 15th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 12.

12. Olson intvw, 40.
13. Commandant of the Marine Corps, 15TH MEU

and PHIBRON-1 BRAVO ZULU, 15Jan02

14. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 67 and Part 3, p. 10.

15. Sgt Andrew D. Pomykal, “Afghans, Marines

Gather for Dual Flag Raising,” Marine Corps News,

1Jan02, hereafter Pomykal, “Dual Flag Raising.”

16. Ibid.

17. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 48.

18. Ibid., 56.

19. Ibid., 57.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., Part 2, p. 64 and Part 3, p. 91; TF 58

Chronology, 15.

22. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 60; Fitzgerald intvw.

23. TF 58 Chronology, 8, 12–14.

24. Jim Garamone, “101st Division Soldiers to

Relieve 15th MEU in Afghanistan,” American Forces

Press Service, 31Dec01 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44313).

25. James Dao, “Airborne Troops Relieving Marines

at Kandahar Base,” New York Times, 31Dec01,

hereafter Dao, “Airborne Relieving Marines.”

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 29; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 277.

29. “187th Infantry Regiment Unit History,”

ArmyStudyGuide.com (as of 17Mar08:

http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/Unit_histor

y/regiment_history/187th-infantry-regiment-u.shtml).

30. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 92–93.

31. Ibid., 93; SSgt Bill Lisbon, “Findings Released on

KC-130 Crash in Pakistan,” Marine Corps News,

27Jun02, hereafter Lisbon, “Findings Released.”

32. Jeanette Steele, “No Distress Calls Heard from

Plane,” San Diego Union Tribune, 11Jan02,

hereafter Steel, “No Distress Call.”

33. Ben Fox, “Human Error Cited in Military

Crash,” Associated Press, 19Jun02, hereafter Fox,

“Human Error Cited.”

34. James W. Crawley and Jeanette Steele, “KC-130

Crash Fueling Debate over Military’s Procurement

Priorities,” Copley News Service, 24Jun02, hereafter

Crawley and Steele, “KC-130 Crash”; Fox, “Human

Error Cited.”

35. Lisbon, “Findings Released.”

36. Ibid.; Steel, “No Distress Call.”

37. Fox, “Human Error Cited.”

38. Crawley and Steele, “KC-130 Crash”; Fox,

“Human Error Cited.”

39. Fox, “Human Error Cited.”

40. Steel, “No Distress Call”; U.S. Department of

Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Media

Availability with Australian Defense Minister,” news

transcript, 10Jan02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2024).

41. Btry K ComdC, 13.

42. Ibid.

43. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 3 and Part 3,

p. 97.

44. TF 58 ComdC, pt. 2, p. 63.

45. Ibid.

46. Btry K ComdC, 13; BLT 3/6 History, 22.

47. Task Force 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 98; 26th MEU

ComdC, Part 2, pp. 30–31; BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2,

p. 27.

48. Pamela Hess, “Pentagon Identifies Dead

Marines,” United Press International, 10Jan02.

49. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 31.

50. Sgt A. C. Strong, “Investigation Findings

Released,” Marine Corps News, 19Jun02.

51. Lisbon, “Findings Released.”

52. Fox, “Human Error Cited.”

53. Crawley and Steele, “KC-130 Crash.”

342

FROM THE SEA
343

Notes

54. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 64 and Part 3, p. 93.

55. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 31–33; 26th

MEU CAR, 10–15; Lynes comments.

56. BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 23; TF 58 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 65.

57. BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 23.

58. Ibid.

59. 26th MEU CAR, 11; 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2,

p. 32.

60. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 32; 26th MEU

CAR, 12.

61. Lynes comments.

62. BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 23.

63. Lennon-Schneider intvw; 26th MEU CAR, 12.

64. 26th MEU CAR, 13; BLT 3/6 History, 25; Lynes

comments.

65. 26th MEU CAR, 13.

66. BLT 3/6 History, 25–26; Lynes comments.

67. 26th MEU CAR, 13; HMM-365 2002 ComdC,

Part 2, p. 3; BLT 3/6 History, 26.

68. Lynes comments.

69. 26th MEU CAR, 14.

70. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 65.

71. 26th MEU CAR, 14.

72. Ibid.; BLT 3/6 History, 26.

73. BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 24; BLT 3/6

History, 27.

74. 26th MEU CAR, 14–15; TF 58 ComdC, Part 2,

p. 65.

75. BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 24, 31.

76. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 33–34.

77. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 60; 26th MEU ComdC,

Part 2, p. 33; BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 30.

78. Lynes comments.

79. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 66.

80. Ibid., Part 3, p. 95.

81. Steve Vogel, “Marines Vacate Kandahar Airport,

Turnover to Army Signals Long Stay,” Washington

Post, 20Jan02, hereafter Vogel, “Marines Vacate

Kandahar.”

82. Vogel, “Marines Vacate Kandahar.”

83. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 60 and Part 3, p. 95.

84. BLT 3/6 ComdC, Part 2, p. 25; Lynes comments.

85. Jon R. Anderson, “Marines Saw Little Combat in

Their Time at Kandahar,” Stars and Stripes,

24Jan02.

86. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 67 and Part 3, pp. 95–96.

87. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 35 and Part 3, p.

103; HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, pp. 14–15.

88. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 68 and Part 3, p. 96;

26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, pp. 35–36.

89. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 103; TF 58

ComdC, Part 3, pp. 94–95.

90. TF 58 ComdC, Part 3, p. 97; 26th MEU ComdC,

Part 2, pp. 36–37.

91. 26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 68 and Part 3, p. 13.

92. Ibid., Part 2, p. 37 and Part 3, p.104.

93. HMM-365 2002 ComdC, Part 2, p. 4; TF 58

ComdC, Part 2, p. 68.

94. TF 58 ComdC, Part 2, p. 68 and Part 3, p. 97;

26th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 37.

95. Col Thomas D. Waldhauser intvw with

Christopher J. Warnke, 8Jan02 (Oral HistColl), 10.

Note: although records attribute the interview to Col

Waldhauser, the interview recording did not possess

an introduction and the identity of the interviewee

cannot be verified.

Chapter 15

1. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 210.

2. David A. Fulghum, “U.S. Troops Confront al-Qaeda

in Vicious Mountain Battle,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology, 11Mar02, 24–25; Lambeth, Air Power

Against Terror, 164; Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 280.
3. Maj Mark Davis, USA, “Operation Anaconda:

Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare,” (master’s

thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies,

2004), 70, hereafter Davis, “Operation Anaconda.”

4. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 165.

5. Ibid., 167.

6. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 165, 167;

Davis, “Operation Anaconda,” 21–23.

7. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 166.

8. Ibid., 165.

9. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 32; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 279.

10. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 166.

11. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 280; Lambeth, Air

Power Against Terror, 167.

12. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 32; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 280–81.

13. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 168.

14. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 32.

15. Davis, “Operation Anaconda,” 70.

16. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 168, 171,

173, 175.

17. Ibid., 173–74, 182.

18. Ibid., 172, 174–75.

19. Ibid., 175.

20. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 280; CMH, U.S.

Army in Afghanistan, 31.

21. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 30–31.

22. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 280.

23. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 31.

24. SOCOM History, 98.

25. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 32–33.

26. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 186.

27. Jim Garamone, “Eight American Soldiers Dead

in Gardez Fighting,” American Forces Press Service,

5Mar02 (as of 6Nov08: http://www.defenselink.mil/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44287); CMH, U.S. Army

in Afghanistan, 37–38; Lambeth, Air Power

Against Terror, 179.

28. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 38, 41.

29. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 179–80.

30. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 38–39, 41.

31. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 186.

32. Capt Simon M. Doran intvw with Dr. Fred. H.

Allison, 18Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Doran

intvw.

33. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 40.

34. Ibid., 41; Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 181.

35. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 182; Erin Q.

Winograd, “Additional Apaches Arrive in Afghanistan

for Anti-Terror Campaign,” Inside the Army, 18Mar02,

1; Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 182).

36. Richard W. Stewart, “Special Forces in

Afghanistan: Oct 01–Mar 02” (http://wwwcgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/armed_dipl/a

rmed_2.pdf) 239, hereafter Stewart, Special Forces

in Afghanistan.

37. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 41.

38. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 191.

39. SOCOM History, 100–101; Briscoe, Weapon of

Choice, 296–97.

40. SOCOM History, 101.

41. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 30, 303.

42. SOCOM History, 101.

43. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 305.

44. SOCOM History, 102.

45. Baker and Evans “Year in Review 2002,” 24.

46. Maj Jonathan R. Ohman, “RE: Black Knights in

Anaconda,” e-mail message to author, 7May08,

hereafter Ohman, 7May08.

47. Maj Jack G. Bolton, “RE: Black Knights in

Anaconda,” e-mail message to author, 5May08.

344

FROM THE SEA
345

Notes

48. Ohman, 7May08.

49. SOCOM History, 102–3.

50. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 319.

51. Davis, “Operation Anaconda,” 113; Lambeth,

Air Power Against Terror, 182.

52. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 192–93;

Baker and Evans, “Year in Review 2002,” 26.

53. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 195.

54. Col John Jansen, “RE: Anaconda,” e-mail to Dr.

Fred H. Allison, 21Apr08, hereafter Jansen, 21Apr08.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Maj John M. Jansen, “Debrief Items from

Operation Anaconda—4 March,” e-mail message to

Capt Don Quinn, USN, 5Mar02.

59. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 194.

60. Jansen, 21Apr08; Maj Chad A. Vaughn, “Black

Knights in Anaconda,” e-mail message to author,

6May08, hereafter Vaughn, 6May08.

61. Vaughn, 6May08.

62. CTF—50, “What we would like to see,”

PowerPoint presentation given at close air support

conference, al Jaber, Kuwait, 2002 (copy in author’s

working file).

63. Col John Jansen, “RE: Anaconda,” e-mail

message to Dr. Fred H. Allison, 23Apr08.

64. 13 MEU ComdC, 1Jan02–30Jun02, Part 2, p. 6

and Part 3, p. 10, hereafter 13th MEU ComdC.

65. Sgt Nathan J. Ferbert, “Marines, Sailors Assist

Kenyans during Exercise Edged Mallet ’02,”

Letterneck, 13th MEU’s Family Gram, 6Mar02

(copy in author’s working file), 1–2.

66. HMM-165 ComdC, 1Jan02–30Jun02, Part 2, p. 5,

hereafter HMM-165 ComdC; Globalsecurity.org,

“Exercise Edged Mallet,” undated (as of 9Apr08:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/edgedmallet.htm); 13th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 1; “Bush:

Al-Qaeda linked to Kenya Attacks,” CNN.com,

4Dec02, (as of 9Apr08: http://archives.cnn.com/

2002/WORLD/africa/12/04/kenya.bush/index.html).

67. Col Christopher J. Gunther, “From the 13th

MEU (SOC) Commanding Officer,” Letterneck,

13th MEU’s Family Gram, 6Mar02 (copy in author’s

working file), 2.

68. HMM-165 ComdC, Part 2, p. 5.

69. Maj Shane Victor S. Stover intvw with author,

28Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Stover intvw.

70. Maj Michael J. Gough intvw with author, 26Mar02,

p. 6 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Gough intvw.

71. Maj Kevin G. Moss interview with author,

27Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Moss intvw; 13th

MEU ComdC, Part 3, p. 25.

72. LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant interview with

author, 28Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter

Sturdevant intvw; Gough intvw.

73. 13th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

74. Sturdevant intvw; Gough intvw.

75. 1stLt. Jeffrey A. Landis, “13th MEU (SOC)’s

ACE Provides Punch in Operation Anaconda,”

Letterneck, 13th MEU’s Family Gram, 9Apr02 (copy

in author’s working file), 1; Stover intvw; HMM-165

ComdC, Part 2, p. 15.

76. Moss intvw; Sturdevant intvw.

77. Gough intvw; HMM-165, “Significant Events

Involving Marine Aircraft—March 2002” (copy in

author’s working file), 1, hereafter HMM-165,

“Events Involving MarAir.”

78. Ibid., 1; Moss intvw; Sturdevant intvw.

79. HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 1.

80. Sturdevant intvw.

81. Stover intvw, 4.

82. Sturdevant intvw.

83. Maj Marc A. Sehrt intvw with author, 27Mar02

(Oral HistColl), 2, hereafter Sehrt intvw.

84. Ibid., 2.
346

FROM THE SEA

85. Gunther comments; LtCol Bradley S. James intvw

with author, 25Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter James

intvw; Maj William Lacey intvw with author, 25Mar02

(Oral HistColl), hereafter Lacey intvw.

86. James intvw; Lacey intvw.

87. Sturdevant intvw.

88. Ibid., 9

89. Sehrt intvw, 5.

90. Sturdevant intvw, 13.

91. Sturdevant intvw; HMM-165 ComdC, Part 2, p. 23.

92. Sturdevant intvw.

93. Sehrt intvw.

94. Capt Philip E. Eilertson intvw with author,

26Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Eilertson intvw.

95. Sehrt intvw.

96. Ibid.

97. HMM-165 ComdC, Part 2, p. 15.

98. Stover intvw, 9.

99. Sehrt intvw, 3.

100. Ibid., 4.

101. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 319; Lambeth, Air

Power Against Terror, 195.

102. Eilertson intvw.

103. Stover intvw; Moss intvw.

104. Stover intvw, 4.

105. Stover intvw; HMM-165, “Events Involving

MarAir,” 1–2.

106. Sturdevant intvw.

107. Stover intvw, 7.

108. Sehrt intvw.

109. Moss intvw.

110. Sturdevant intvw.

111. Sehrt intvw.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.; Moss intvw.

114. Sehrt intvw, 7.

115. Ibid.

116. Moss intvw; Sehrt intvw.

117. HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 1–2.

118. GySgt Andy D. Hathcock intvw with author,

29Mar02 (Oral HistColl).

119. HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 2–3;

Moss intvw.

120. Capt Joshua L. Luck interview with author,

27Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Luck intvw;

Gough intvw.

121. Gough intvw, 6–7.

122. Ibid., 7.

123. Ibid., 8.

124. Gough intvw.

125. Luck intvw.

126. HMM-165 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

127. Luck intvw.

128. Gough intvw.

129. Luck intvw, 2.

130. SFC Class Kathleen T. Rhem, USA, “Coalition

‘Turning Up the Pressure,’ but Battle Not Over,”

American Forces Press Service, 6Mar02 (as of

6Nov08: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=44281).

131. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 43; Stewart,

Special Forces in Afghanistan, 244.

132. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 321.

133. Ibid.; HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 2.

134. Eilertson intvw, 4.

135. HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 1–3;

Vaughn, 6Mar08; Ohman, 7May08; Col James L.

Stalnaker, “RE: Black Knights in Anaconda,” e-mail

message to author and squadron pilots, 5May08,

hereafter Stalnaker, 5May08.
347

Notes

136. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 319, 322.

137. Ibid., 322–25; CMH, U.S. Army in

Afghanistan, 43.

138. HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 3;

Eilertson intvw; Col Gregg A. Sturdevant, comments

on draft manuscript, 12Dec08 (comment file).

139. SFC Class Kathleen T. Rhem, “Myers, Franks:

Operation Anaconda Not Yet Over,” American

Forces Press Service, 10Mar02 (as of 6Nov01:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44268), hereafter Rhem, “Anaconda Not Over.”

140. Ibid.

141. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 43; Briscoe,

Weapon of Choice, 325–27.

142. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 43; Stewart,

Special Forces in Afghanistan, 244.

143. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News

Briefing: ASD PA Clarke and Brig Gen Rosa,” news

transcript, 12Mar02 (http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3092),

hereafter DoD “News Briefing,” 12Mar02.

144. Ibid.

145. HMM-165, “Events Involving MarAir,” 3;

Stalnaker, 5May08.

146. Sturdevant intvw.

147. Ibid., 12.

148. Sturdevant intvw.

149. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 43–44.

150. Sturdevant intvw, 12.

151. Canadian War Museum, “Afghanistan, A

Glimpse of War,” undated (as of 30Apr08:

http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/afgha

nistan/afghanistane.shtml); Canadian Department of

National Defense, “Commodore Jean-Pierre

Thiffault, Commander of the Canadian Joint Task

Force South-West Asia, Provides a Briefing on

Operation Harpoon,” Canadian Forces News,

18Mar02 (as of 30Apr08: http://www.forces.gc.ca/

site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=391), hereafter

Thiffault, “Operation Harpoon.”

152. Sturdevant intvw.

153. Eilertson intvw.

154. Sturdevant intvw.

155. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 326.

156. Eilertson intvw; Sturdevant intvw.

157. Thiffault, “Operation Harpoon.”

158. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 237; CMH, U.S.

Army in Afghanistan, 44; Eilertson intvw

159. Eilertson intvw.

160. Jim Garamone, “Anaconda Over, But

Operations Continue in Afghanistan,” American

Forces Press Service, 18Mar02 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44239).

161. Sturdevant intvw; Eilertson intvw.

162. Sturdevant intvw, 15.

163. Ibid.

164. Eilertson intvw; Sturdevant intvw.

165. CMH, U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 44.

166. Sturdevant intvw; Eilertson intvw.

167. Eilertson intvw; Col Christopher J. Gunther,

comments on draft manuscript, 13Nov08 (comment

file).

168. Eilertson intvw, 25.

169. Sturdevant intvw, 29.

170. Sturdevant intvw; Linda D. Kozaryn, “U.S.

Troops Engage in Afghan Firefight,” American

Forces Press Service, 20Mar02 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=44232).

171. Sturdevant intvw; Moss intvw.

172. Moss intvw; Eilertson intvw.

173. Capt Eric D. Oliphant interview with author,

30Mar02 (Oral HistColl), hereafter Oliphant intvw;

Sturdevant intvw.

174. Sgt Nathan J. Ferbert, “ACE CO Earns Bronze
348

FROM THE SEA

Star in Anaconda,” Letterneck, 13th MEU’s Family

Gram, 9Apr02 (copy in author’s working file), 5;

Eilertson intvw.

175. Sturdevant intvw.

176. Ibid.; Oliphant intvw; Moss intvw.

177. Oliphant intvw, 5.

178. Moss intvw.

179. Sturdevant intvw, 25.

180. Ibid.

181. Moss intvw; Oliphant intvw; Sturdevant intvw.

182. Moss intvw.

183. Oliphant intvw, 5.

184. Sturdevant intvw, 25.

185. Oliphant intvw.

186. Sturdevant intvw.

187. 13th MEU ComdC, Part 2, p. 7 and Part 3, p.

10; HMM-165 ComdC, Part 2, p. 6.

Epilogue

1. UNAMA, “The United Nations in Afghanistan,

11 September 2001–11 September 2002” (Kabul,

Afghanistan: 2002), 2, hereafter UNAMA, “UN in

Afghanistan.”

2. UNSC, “Security Council Sets United Nation’s

Course for Supporting New Government in

Afghanistan; Urges No Reprisals,” UN Information

Service press release SC/7212, 15Nov01 (as of

7Nov08: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/

2001/sc7212.doc.htm).

3. John F. Burns, “Alliance in Kabul Will Share Power,

U.S. Envoy Reports,” New York Times, 20Nov01.

4. UNSC, “Security Council Endorses Afghanistan

Agreement on Interim Arrangements Signed

Yesterday in Bonn, Unanimously Adopting

Resolution 1383 (2001),” UN Information Service

press release SC/7234, 6Dec01 (as of 7Nov08:

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7234

.doc.htm).

5. UNSC, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements

in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of

Permanent Government Institutions,” undated (as of

12May08: http://www.afghangovernment.com/

AfghanAgreementBonn.htm), hereafter UNAMA,

“Provisional Arrangements.”

6. Ibid., 2, 4.

7. Ibid., 5–6.

8. Ibid., 7.

9. “Karzai Takes Power in Kabul,” BBC News,

22Dec01 (as of 12May08: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/

hi/world/south_asia/1724641.stm), hereafter BBC,

“Karzai Takes Power.”

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. NATO, “ISAF History,” undated (as of 8May08:

http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/history/index.html),

hereafter NATO, “ISAF History.”

13. UNAMA, “UN in Afghanistan,” 3.

14. NATO, “ISAF Mandate,” undated (as of

8May08: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/

index.html).

15. NATO, “Chronology,” undated (as of 8May08:

http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/chronology/index.

html), hereafter NATO, “Chronology.”

16. NATO, “ISAF History.”

17. NATO, “Chronology.”

18. NATO, “Expansion,” undated (as of 8May08:

http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/expansion/index.

html).

19. NATO, “ISAF Regional Command Structure,”

undated (as of 13May08: http://www.nato.int/isaf/

structure/regional_command/index.html) .

20. NATO, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),”

undated (as of 14May08: http://www.nato.int/isaf/

topics/recon_dev/prts.html).

21. Koffi Annan, Report of the Secretary General on

“The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for

International Peace and Security” (New York: UN,

18Mar02), 21, hereafter Annan, “Situation in

Afghanistan.”
349

Notes

22. Ibid., 15.

23. Ibid., 16.

24. UNAMA, “UN in Afghanistan,” 3.

25. Ibid., 4–5, 7.

26. UNAMA, “Afghanistan and UN, A Historical

Perspective” (as of 8May08: http://www.unamaafg.org/about/info.htm), 8, hereafter UNAMA,

“Historical Perspective”; Kenneth Katzman,

“Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary

Elections,” Congressional Research Service Report

RS21922, 8Apr05, 3, hereafter Katzman, “Elections.”

27. UNAMA, “Historical Perspective,” 9; Katzman,

“Elections,” 3.

28. Thomas E. Ricks, “A War That’s Commanded at

a Distance,” Washington Post, 27Dec01.

29. SSgt Marcia Triggs, USA, “Bragg Troops to

Replace 101st in Afghanistan,” Army News Service,

5Jun02, hereafter Triggs, “Bragg Troops Replace

101st.”

30. Jim Garamone, “Operation Mountain Lion

Continues, Task Force Assumes Control,” American

Forces Press Service, 6Jun02 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=43779).

31. Triggs, “Bragg Troops Replace 101st.”

32. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 335–37, 346.

33. SOCOM History, 105–06.

34. Capt Brian G. Cillessen, “Marine Advisors: Can

the Marine Corps Better Prepare Them,” Marine

Corps Gazette, Dec07 (as of 23May08:

http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/

webarticle1Feb07.asp); Paul W. Askins, “Marine

Corps International Education and Training,”

Marine Corps Gazette, Dec02.

35. CMC, “Activation of Security Cooperation

Education and Training Center (SCETC),” MarAdmin

Msg 066/04, 18Feb04 (HQMC, Quantico, VA).

36. CMC, “Transfer of Responsibility for Managing

the Marine Corps; Foreign Professional Military

Education (FPME) Program and USMC;

Participation in the Olmstead Scholarship Program,”

MarAdminMsg 252/05, 31May05 (HQMC,

Quantico, VA).

37. MSgt Bob Haskell, USA, “Oklahoma Guard

Ready to Train Afghan National Army,” Army News

Service, 6Nov03 (as of 22May08:

http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key

=5392).

38. LtCol Frederick Rice, USA, “Afghanistan Unit

Takes on New Mission, Name,” American Forces

Press Service, 13Jul05 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=16650).

39. Combined Security Transition Command–

Afghanistan, “CSTC: A Fact Sheet, 21May08” (as of

21May08: http://www.cstc-a.com/CSTCAFactSheet.html).

40. 4th MEB ComdC, 1Jul01–31Dec01, Part 2,

hereafter 4th MEB 2001ComdC.

41. Ibid., Parts 2 and 3; 4th MEB, ComdC, 1Jan02–

30Jun02, Part 3, hereafter 4th MEB 2002a ComdC.

42. 4th MEB ComdC, 1Jul02–31Dec 02, Parts 2 and

3, hereafter 4th MEB 2002b ComdC; 4th MEB

ComdC, 1Jul04–31Dec04, Parts 2 and 3, hereafter

4th MEB 2004b ComdC.

43. 4th MEB 2002a ComdC, Part 2; 4th MEB 2002b

ComdC, Part 2.

44. MarCent History, timeline section.

45. 4th MEB 2002a and 2002b ComdCs, Part 2; 4th

MEB ComdCs, 1Jan03–30Jun03 and 1Jul03–

31Dec03; 4th MEB ComdC, 1Jan04–30Jun04, Part 2,

hereafter 4th MEB 2004a ComdC; 4th MEB

ComdC, 1Jan05–30Jun05, Part 2, hereafter 4th MEB

2005 ComdC.

46. 4th MEB 2004b ComdC, Part 2.

47. 4th MEB 2005 ComdC, Part 2.

48. Antiterrorism Battalion ComdC, 1Jan05–

30Jun05, Part 2, pp. 3–4.

49. Marine Parents, “4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade,” undated (as of 20May08:

http://www.marineparents.com/units/Print.asp?id

=97).
350

FROM THE SEA

50. USMC SOC, “MarSoc Milestones” (as of

28May08: http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil.stories.html).

51. Chrissy Vick, “‘Hell in a Helmet,’ 2nd Battalion,

9th Marines Back in the Fight,” Jacksonville Daily

News (North Carolina), 13Jul07.

52. MarCent History, timeline section.

53. VMFA-121 ComdC, 1Jan02–30Jun02, Part 2, pp.

1–4, hereafter VMFA-121 2002a ComdC.

54. VMFA-121 2002a ComdC, Part 2, pp. 4–6, 9;

VMFA-121 ComdC, 1Jul02–31Dec02, Part 2, p. 4,

hereafter VMFA-121 2002b ComdC.

55. VMFA-121 2002a ComdC, Part 2, p. 6; VMFA121 2002b ComdC, Part 2, pp. 4–5.

56. VMFA-513 ComdC, 1Jul02–31Dec02, Part 2, pp.

3–4, 7, hereafter VMFA-513 2002 ComdC.

57. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 6–7.

58. MarCent History, SigEvts

59. VMFA-513 ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03, Part 2, p. 4.

60. VMFA-513 ComdC, 1Jul03–31Dec03, Part 2, p.

3, hereafter VMFA-513 2003b ComdC.

61. Ibid., 4.

62. Ibid., 4–5.

63. VMA-513, “VMA-513 History,” Marine Attack

Squadron 513 official website, undated (as of

9May05: http://www.3maw.usmc.mil/MAG13/

VMA513/history.asp).

64. Sgt Nicola Y. McCuin, “HMLA-773 Marines

Return to Hero’s Welcome,” MFR, Mar03 (as of

30May08: http://www.mfr.usmc.mil.archive/

2004.03/hmla773home.html).

65. HMLA-773, “HMLA-773 Red Dogs Fit Via Vi,”

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 733

official website, undated (as of 20May08:

http://www.mfr.usmc.mil/4thmaw/mag42/hmla773

/hmla773/history.html); Spec Chris Stump, USMC,

“Marine Mechanics Keep Helos Flying,” Defend

America, Nov04, (as of 30May08:

http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2004/a1

11404a.html).

66. Sgt Frank Magni, USA, “Marines Do Heavy

Lifting for Coalition in Afghanistan,” American

Forces Press Service, 8Nov04 (as of 6Nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=24898).

67. Sikorsky, “HMH-769 Earns ‘Heavy’ Award,”

Sikorsky Frontlines, A Military Customer

Newsletter, 4thQtr05, (as of 31May10:

http://www.pratt-whitney.com/StaticFiles/Sikorsky/

Assets/Attachments/NEWSLETTER/military/mil_

2005_q4.pdf) 2.

68. Ranger.com, “Marine Heavy Helicopter

Squadron 462,” undated (as of 31Jan11:

http://ranger95.com/marines/aviation_squadrons/h

mh/hmh462.htm).

69. SSgt Johnny A. Thompson, “2/8 Marines Join

the Bagram Team,” Marine Corps News, 18Mar04;

LCpl John E. Lawson, “Marines, Afghanistan Police

Team Up,” Marine Corps News, 11May04.

70. PFC Vincent C. Fusco, USA, “Eikenberry Takes

Command of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan,”

American Forces Press Service, 4May05 (as of

6Nov08: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=31741).

71. Terry Boyd, “Troops in Afghanistan Preparing

Spring Offensive in Pursuit of Insurgents,” Stars

and Stripes, European Edition, 10Mar04.

72. 22d MEU, Recommendation for the Navy Unit

Commendation Award, 19Jul04 (MilAwdsBr,

HQMC, Quantico, VA).

73. Jon R. Anderson, “Marine Offensive in

Afghanistan Called Unprecedented, A Shock to

Taliban,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition,

27Jul04, hereafter Anderson, “Marine Offensive

Unprecedented.”

74. Anderson, “Marine Offensive Unprecedented.”

75. Jon R. Anderson, “Hunt For Militants Takes Back

Seat To Security As Afghanistan Readies For Vote,”

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 18Jul04; John D.

Banusiewicz, “ ‘Lightening Resolve’ to Protect Afghan

Election Process,” American Forces Press Service,

14Jul04 (as of 31May10: http://osd.dtic.mil/news/

Jul2004/n07142004_2004071407.html).
76. Eric Schmitt and David Rohde, “Taliban Fighters

Increase Attacks,” New York Times, 1Aug04.

77. MSgt Terry Anderson, USA, “Millions Vote in

Afghan Elections,” Army News Service, 12Oct04 (as

of 1Jun08: http://www4.army.mil/news/

article.pho?story=6444).

78. LCpl John E. Lawson, “Wusbin Patrol

Announces ‘New Sheriff ’ in Town,” Marine Corps

News, 29Jun04.

79. Gregg K. Kakesako, “Schfield’s Division Headed

Back to Iraq,” Star Bulletin (Honolulu, HI), 8Nov05.

80. Capt Dan Huvane, USMC, “‘Lava Dogs’ Hand

Off Afghan Ops to ‘Chosen Few,’” Defend America,

1Jun06 (as of 16May08:

http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/june2006/a0

60106ms3.html).

81. Global Security.org, “Combined Joint Task Force

82,” 12Oct09 (as of 31Jan11:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod

/cjtf-180.htm).

82. Trista Talton, “First Marine Spec Ops Company

Deploys,” Marine Corps Times, 11Jan07.

83. Gidget Fuentes, “Army General Kicks Marines

Out of Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Times,

28Mar07.

84. Trista Talton, “Spec Ops Commander Relieved,”

Marine Corps Times, 11Apr07.

85. Lolita C. Baldor, “Marine General: Special

Forces Unit Should Have Stayed in Afghanistan

After Shooting,” North County Times (Escondido,

CA), 1Dec07; Lolita C. Baldor, “General Investigated

After Shootings,” USA Today, 14Dec07.

86. Trista Talton, “Court of Inquiry Ordered in

Spec Ops Case,” Marine Corps Times, 12Oct07.

87. David Zucchino, “Marine Corps Unit Cleared in

Afghan Shootout,” Los Angeles Times, 24May08.

88. LCpl Stephen C. Benson, “MARSOC Warriors

Return from the Fight,” Marine Corps News,

4Dec07 (HQMC, Washington, DC).

89. Ann Scott Tyson, “Marines’ Afghanistan Plan

Sparks Debate,” Washington Post, 12Oct07, p. A-14.

90. Gordon Lubold, “Gates: Marines Will Stay Put in

Iraq, For Now,” The Christian Science Monitor,

7Dec07.

91. Al Pessin, “Bush Decides to Send 3,200 Marines

to Afghanistan,” VOA News.com, 15Jan08 (as of

6Nov08: http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/

a-13-2008-01-15-voa69.html).

92. Associated Press, “Marines Launch Massive

Assault in Afghanistan,” 29Apr08.

93. Kristen Noel, “Marines Emphasize Character

Building in Afghan Police Mission,” American Forces

Press Service, 19May08, (as of 6nov08:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?i

d=49925).

94. Jason Motlagh, “Report: Taliban’s Influence

Again Spreading Fast,” Washington Times, 9Dec08.

95. “Supply Route Sought That Avoids Pakistan,”

Washington Times, 15Dec08.

96. Yochi J. Dreazen, “Afghan Roadside Bombings

Rise Sharply,” Wall Street Journal, 30Dec08.

97. John T. Bennett, “JFCOM Studies Way to Get

4th Brigade to Afghanistan,” Defense News,

16Dec08.

98. Tom Vanden Brook, “Commander Sees ‘Tough

Fight’ in Afghan War,” USA Today, 8Dec08.

99. Neil King, “Jones Urges Broad Afghanistan

Approach,” Wall Street Journal, 3Dec08.

100. Anand Gopal, “Bid To Split Taliban, al-Qaeda,”

Christian Science Monitor, 16Dec08.

101. Anna Mulrine, “U.S. Military To Launch Pilot

Program To Recruit New Local Afghan Militias,”

U.S. News & World Report, 16Dec08.

102. Andrew Gray, “U.S. Aims for More Troops In

Afghanistan, Gates Says,” Reuters, 11Dec09.

103. Graeme Smith and Steven Chase, “Canada

Poised to Cede Command in Kandahar,” Toronto

Globe and Mail, 12Dec09.

104. Lolita C. Baldor, “Gates: More Brigades To

Afghanistan By Summer,” Washington Post,

11Dec09.

351

Notes
352

FROM THE SEA

105. Lolita C. Baldor, “Moving Marines to Afghanistan

Gains Support,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 9Dec09.

106. MEB-A, “Marine Expeditionary Brigade–

Afghanistan Information Packet,” 2d Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (copy in author’s working file

or field history branch’s Afghanistan background

files, MCHD).
Appendix A

Command and Staff List

National Security Council

President

George W. Bush

Vice President

Richard B. Cheney

Secretary of State: Colin L. Powell

Secretary of the Treasury: Paul H. O’Neill

Secretary of Defense: Donald H. Rumsfeld

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs: Condoleezza Rice

Director of National Intelligence: George J. Tenet

Joint Staff

Chairman

Gen Henry H. Shelton, USA (October 1997–September 2001)

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF (from October 2001)

Vice Chairman

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF (March 2000–September 2001)

Gen Peter Pace, USMC (from October 2001)

Chief of Staff of the Army: Gen Eric K. Shinseki

Chief of Staff of the Air Force: Gen John P. Jumper

Chief of Naval Operations: Adm Vernon E. Clark

Commandant of the Marine Corps: Gen James L. Jones

Director, Joint Staff

VAdm Scott A. Fry, USN (through October 2001)

LtGen John P. Abizaid, USA (from November 2001)

353
J-2, Director for Intelligence: RAdm Lowell E. Jacoby, USN

J-3, Director for Operations: LtGen Gregory S. Newbold, USMC

J-4, Director for Logistics: VAdm Gordon S. Holder, USN

J-5, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy: LtGen John P. Abizaid, USA (through October 2001)

LtGen George W. Casey Jr., USA (from November 2001)

U.S. Central Command

Commander in Chief: Gen Tommy R. Franks, USA

Deputy: LtGen Michael P. DeLong, USMC

J-2, Director for Intelligence: BGen John F. Kimmons, USA

J-3, Director for Operations: LtGen Victor E. Renuart Jr., USAF

J-4, Director for Logistics: MajGen Dennis K. Jackson, USA

J-5, Director for Political-Military Affairs: RAdm Jay Campbell, USN

Special Operations (SOCCent): VAdm Albert M. Calland III, USN

Army Forces (Third Army): LtGen Paul T. Mikolashek

Air Forces (Ninth Air Force): LtGen T. Michael Mosley

Naval Forces (Fifth Fleet): VAdm Charles W. Moore Jr.

Marine Forces (MarForPac): LtGen Earl B. Hailston

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

Commanding General: LtGen Earl B. Hailston

Deputy: BGen John G. Castellaw

I Marine Expeditionary Force

Commanding General: LtGen Michael W. Hagee

Deputy/Commanding General 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade: BGen James N. Mattis

Commanding General 1st Marine Division: MajGen James T. Conway

Commanding General 3d Marine Aircraft Wing: MajGen Charles F. Bolden Jr.

Commanding General 1st Force Service Support Group: BGen (Sel) Edward G. Usher III

354

FROM THE SEA
Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

(1 November 2001–26 February 2002)

Commanding General: BGen James N. Mattis

Deputy: Capt William E. Jezierski, USN (28 November–13 January 2002)

Capt Kenneth M. Rome, USN (4 January–26 February 2002)

Chief of Staff: Col Peter T. Miller (1 November 2001–17 January 2002)

Col Ronald R. McFarland (18 January 2002–26 February 2002)

N-1: SSgt Benny A. Rodriguez

N-2: LtCol Steven P. Martinson (05 November 2001–04 February 2002)

Maj Timothy J. Oliver (05 February 2002–26 February 2002)

N-3/5: Capt Richard Hascup, USN (01 November 2001–13 February 2002)

LtCol Clark R. Lethin (14 February 2002–26 February 2002)

N-4: LtCol John J. Broadmeadow

N-6: Maj Scott F. Stebbins

Attachments (partial list)

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 Air Detachment: LCdr Leonard W. Cooke, USN

Task Force 64 (Australian Special Air Service): LtCol Peter Gilmore, ADF

Task Force K-Bar (Naval Special Warfare): Capt Robert S. Harward, USN

I Marine Expeditionary Force Shock Trauma Platoon: Cdrs Bruce C. Baker, Burgess, Peter M. Rhee, USN

II Marine Expeditionary Force Shock Trauma Platoon: Cdrs Robert P. Hinks and Ritchie, USN

21st Special Tactics Squadron Detachment: Capt Michael J. Flatten, USAF

355

Appendix A: Command and Staff List
USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group

(U.S. Central Command Area of Operations 28 September 2001–18 January 2002)

Amphibious Squadron 1

Commodore: Capt William E. Jezierski, USN

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

Commanding Officer: Col Thomas D. Waldhauser

Executive Officer: LtCol Kevin P. Spillers

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Hubert O. Caloud

S-1: Capt James A. McLaughlin

S-2: Maj James B. Higgins

S-3: LtCol Gregg P. Olson

S-4: Maj Michel E. Stroud

S-6: Maj Stephen O. Vidaurri

Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 1st Marines: LtCol Christopher M. Bourne

Commanding Officer, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163: LtCol James K. LaVine

Commanding Officer, MEU Service Support Group 15: LtCol Carl D. Matter

USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

(U.S. Central Command Area of Operations 14 November 2001–20 March 2002)

Amphibious Squadron 8

Commodore: Capt Kenneth M. Rome, USN

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

Commanding Officer: Col Andrew P. Frick

Executive Officer: LtCol Gary R. Oles

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj William McKnight Jr.

S-1: Capt Darren S. Boyd

S-2: Maj Gregory G. Koziuk

S-3: LtCol Daniel D. Yoo

S-4: LtCol Andrew N. Killion

S-6: Maj David B. Parks

Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 6th Marines: LtCol Jerome M. Lynes

Commanding Officer, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365: LtCol Kevin M. DeVore

Commanding Officer, MEU Service Support Group 26: LtCol William M. Faulkner

356

FROM THE SEA
USS Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group

(U.S. Central Command Area of Operations 10 January–2 May 2002)

Amphibious Squadron 3

Commodore: Capt Robert J. Connelly, USN

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

Commanding Officer: Col Christopher J. Gunther

Executive Officer: LtCol Timothy W. Fitzgerald

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Jeffrey A. Morin

S-1: Capt Heather J. Cotoia

S-2: Maj Joseph D. Sinicrop Jr.

S-3: LtCol Richard C. McMonagle

S-4: Maj Joseph N. Raftery

S-6: Maj Robert M. Flowers

Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines: LtCol Robert O. Sinclair

Commanding Officer, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165: LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant

Commanding Officer, MEU Service Support Group 13: LtCol Rodman D. Sansone

357

Appendix A: Command and Staff List
358

FROM THE SEA
Appendix B

Unit List

Major Marine Deployments to Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freedom (Phase II)

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)

Carrier Air Wing 1 [CVW-1] Oct 2001 Mar 2002

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-251]

USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74)

Carrier Air Wing 9 [CVW-9] Nov 2001 Apr 2002

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 [VMFA-314]

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58

USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group [Peleliu ARG] Oct 2001 Jan 2002 Forward Operating Base

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Rhino (FOB Rhino),

Special Operations Capable [15th MEU SOC] Kandahar

Battalion Landing Team 1/1 [BLT 1/1]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-163]

MEU Service Support Group 15 [MSSG 15]

USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group [Bataan ARG] Nov 2001 Feb 2002 FOB Rhino, Kandahar,

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit Kabul, Khost

Special Operations Capable [26th MEU SOC]

Battalion Landing Team 3/6 [BLT 3/6]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 [HMM-365]

MEU Service Support Group 26 [MSSG 26]

Combined Joint Task Force Mountain

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit Mar 2002 Mar 2002 Bagram

Special Operations Capable [13th MEU SOC]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 [HMM-165]

359
Operation Enduring Freedom (Continuing Operations)

Embassy Security

3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Anti-terrorism) Dec 2001 Sep 2002 Kabul

[3d Bn, 8th Mar (AT)]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Anti-terrorism) Sep 2002 Nov 2003 Kabul

[3d Bn, 6th Mar (AT)]

3d Battalion, 2d Marines (Anti-terrorism) Nov 2003 Sep 2004 Kabul

[3d Bn, 2d Mar (AT)]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Anti-terrorism) Sep 2004 Apr 2005 Kabul, Bagram

[2d Bn, 6th Mar (AT)]

Training Teams

Coalition and Special Warfare Center Jun 2002 Jun 2005

Security Cooperation Education Training Center Jun 2005 Present

Aviation Operations

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 Apr 2002 Sep 2002 Manas, Kyrgyzstan

[VMFA (AW)-121]

Marine Attack Squadron 513 [VMA-513] Oct 2002 Sep 2003 Bagram

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 773 [HMLA-773] Oct 2003 Feb 2005 Bagram

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 769 [HMH-769] May 2004 Nov 2004 Bagram

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462] Oct 2004 Apr 2005 Bagram

Ground and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar] Nov 2003 May 2004

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit Feb 2004 Jul 2004

Special Operations Capable [22d MEU SOC]

Battalion Landing Team 1/6 [BLT 1/6]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 [HMM-266]

MEU Service Support Group 22 [MSSG 22]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines/6th Marines Headquarters Apr 2004 Dec 2004

[3d Bn, 6th Mar/6th Mar Hq]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar] Nov 2004 Jun 2005

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar] Jun 2005 Jan 2006

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar] Jan 2006 Jun 2006

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar] Mar 2008 Nov 2008

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit May 2008 Nov 2008

360

FROM THE SEA
Special Operations Capable [24th MEU SOC]

Battalion Landing Team 1/6 [BLT 1/6]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 [HMM-365]

Combat Logistics Battalion 24 [CLB 24]

Special Purpose MAGTF–Afghanistan Nov 2008 May 2009 Helmand & Farah

8th Marines Headquarters [8th Mar Hq] Provinces

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB 3]

Marine Expeditionary Brigade–Afghanistan May 2009 Helmand Province

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Headquarters Group [2d MEB HqGru]

Regimental Combat Team 3 [RCT 3]

Marine Aircraft Group 40 [MAG 40]

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR 2]

Special Operations

Company F, 2d Marines Special Operations Battalion Feb 2007 Mar 2007

[Co F, 2d MSOB]

Company, 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion Apr 2007 Sep 2007

[Co, 1st MSOB]

Company, 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion 2007 2008

[Co, 1st MSOB]

361

Appendix B: Unit List
362

FROM THE SEA
Appendix C

Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

5th Group 5th Special Forces Group

ABC American Broadcasting Corporation

al-Qaeda “The base”; an international militant Islamic terrorist organization

AOR Area of Responsibility

ArCent U.S. Army Forces Central Command

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ASAS Australian Special Air Service

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense

AT Anti-terrorism

BLT Battalion Landing Team

burqa An loose enveloping garment worn by some Muslim women to cloak their faces

and bodies in public places

CAAT Combined Antiarmor Team

caliph Leader of all Muslims

CATF Commander of the Amphibious Task Force

CBIST Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team

CentCom U.S. Central Command

CFLCC Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command

CFMCC Combined Forces Maritime Component Command

CFSOCC Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command

CG Commanding General

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CinC Commander in Chief

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

363
CLF Commander of the Landing Force

CMH U.S. Army Center of Military History

CNN Cable News Network

CO Commanding Officer

ComdC Command Chronology

ConPlan Concept of Operations Plan

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CV Aircraft Carrier (Fixed-Wing Aircraft)

CVN Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (Fixed-Wing Aircraft)

CVW Carrier Air Wing

DCG Deputy Commanding General

DCinC Deputy Commander in Chief

D-Day Day on which operations are scheduled to commence

DoD Department of Defense

DON Department of the Navy

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAC Forward Air Controller

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FARP Forward Arming and Refueling Point

fatwa Islamic religious ruling

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FOB Forward Operating Base

GPO U.S. Government Printing Office

GPS Global Positioning System

GRC Gray Research Center

H-Hour Hour when operation is scheduled to commence

HMH Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

364

FROM THE SEA
HMMWV, humvee High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munitions

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

jihad Holy war waged as an Islamic religious duty

LAV Light Armored Vehicle

LDT Laser Target Designator

LHA Landing Helicopter Assault (general purpose amphibious assault ship)

LHD Landing Helicopter Dock (multipurpose amphibious assault ship)

loya jirga Traditional meeting of Afghan tribal elders to solve problems

LPD Landing Platform Dock (amphibious transport dock)

LPH Landing Platform Helicopter (amphibious assault ship)

LSD Dock Landing Ship (amphibious assault ship)

madrassa Islamic religious school

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MarCent U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

MarForPac U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCHD Marine Corps History Division

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force

MRE Meal, Ready-to-Eat

MSSG Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group

mujahideen Those who wage a jihad; holy warriors

365

Appendix C: Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
mullah Male religious teacher or leader who is schooled in Islamic law

MWR Navy Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NavCent U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

NBC National Broadcasting Corporation

nm Nautical Mile

NMCB Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

NSA Naval Support Activity

NSC National Security Council

NZSAS New Zealand Special Air Service

ODA Operational Detachment Alpha

ODB Operational Detachment Bravo

ODD Operational Detachment Delta

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OP Observation Post

PA Public Affairs

PR Public Relations

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

SAS British Special Air Service

SeaBee U.S. Navy Construction Battalion

SEAL Sea, Air, and Land (U.S. Navy special operations force)

sharia Islamic law

SOC Special Operations Capable

SOF Special Operations Forces (generic)

TAD Tactical Air Direction Net

Taliban “Seekers, religious students”; an Islamic-based, Afghan political-military

organization that emerged during 1994 and that ruled large parts of

Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001

TEMPER Tent, Extendable, Modular, Personnel

366

FROM THE SEA
TF Task Force

TOW Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided Missile

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

ummah Muslim nation

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNS United States Naval Ship

USO United Service Organizations

USS United States Ship

VMFA (AW) Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron

VMFA Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron

Wahhabism A conservative Islamic reform movement

367

Appendix C: Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
368

FROM THE SEA
Appendix D

Chronology of Events

1992

29 December Al-Qaeda affiliates target U.S. Marines during hotel bombing in Aden, Yemen.

1993

26 February Al-Qaeda affiliates bomb the World Trade Center in New York City.

1994

Spring Mullah Mohammed Omar mobilizes a small group of Taliban (religious

students) against regional warlords in Kandahar.

1995

13 November Al-Qaeda affiliates attack an American-run military training facility in Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia.

1996

3 April Mullah Omar proclaims himself “Commander of the Faithful” and “Emir of

Afghanistan” during a gathering of the nation’s religious leaders in Kandahar,

declaring a jihad against Burhanuddin Rabbani’s regime.

May Osama bin Laden relocates to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after Sudanese authorities

ask him to leave their country.

25 June Al-Qaeda terrorists bomb Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The

barracks housed U.S. Air Force personnel.

23 August Osama bin Laden issues a “Declaration of War Against Americans Occupying

the Land of the Two Holy Places (Mecca and Medina).”

26 September Taliban forces capture the Afghan capital city of Kabul.

1997

13 June Northern anti-Taliban alliance establishes the United Islamic and National

Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan in Mazar-e Sharif, reappointing

Burhanuddin Rabbani as president and Ahmad Shah Masood as defense

minister. This group is known in the West as the Northern Alliance.

1998

23 February Osama bin Laden issues a manifesto under the banner of the International

Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, expanding his terror

campaign to include liberating the Muslim Middle East and attacking Americans

around the globe.

369
7 August Al-Qaeda terrorists bomb U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,

Tanzania.

20 August President William J. Clinton retaliates against the embassy bombings by

launching cruise missiles against terrorist training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan and ordering the Justice Department to freeze bin Laden’s financial assets.

1999

5 July President Clinton orders the Justice Department to freeze Taliban financial

assets after they refuse to extradite bin Laden.

2000

12 October Al-Qaeda terrorists bomb the USS Cole (DDG 67) during a routine refueling

stop in Yemen

2001

11 January During his Senate confirmation hearing, incoming Defense Secretary Donald

H. Rumsfeld outlines the need to defend against missiles, terrorism, and threats

against America’s space assets and information systems, as well as the need to

use new technologies to create a military for the 21st Century.

January George J. Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), informs

President-elect George W. Bush and senior members of the new

administration that Osama bin Laden is one of the top three threats facing

America. He emphasizes that the question is not whether al-Qaeda will attack,

but when and where.

April The National Security Council Deputies Committee recommends arming the

Northern Alliance and supporting an offensive to eliminate al-Qaeda and

destabilize the Taliban in Afghanistan.

June Osama bin Laden releases a recruitment video stating, “It’s time to penetrate

America and Israel and hit them where it hurts.”

June The National Security Council Deputies Committee recommends supporting an

offensive to eliminate al-Qaeda and destabilize the Taliban in Afghanistan.

September The National Security Council (NSC) approves a covert campaign to arm the

Northern Alliance and support an offensive to eliminate al-Qaeda and

destabilize the Taliban in Afghanistan.

9 September Al-Qaeda agents assassinate Ahmad Shah Masood, defense minister for the

Northern Alliance.

10 September During a town meeting at the Pentagon, Secretary Rumsfeld characterizes

military bureaucracy as a serious threat to national security and commits to

transforming it.

370

FROM THE SEA
2001

11 September Al-Qaeda terrorists fly two hijacked airliners into the World Trade Center in

New York City, while another hits the Pentagon in Washington, DC. A fourth

aircraft, targeting the Capitol or the White House, crashes in rural Pennsylvania

after passengers attempt to retake control of United Airlines Flight 93. The

unprecedented attacks result in approximately 3,000 dead from 80 nations.

13 September CIA Director Tenet briefs the NSC on a concept to synthesize intelligence,

technology, and paramilitary and indigenous forces into a covert action against

al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, potentially augmented by military

power and special operating forces.

Gen Tommy R. Franks, USA, commander in chief of U.S. Central Command

(CentCom), informs his staff that access to the region and sustainment of

forces will rely heavily upon intertheater airlift, and that the landlocked nature

of any Afghan campaign will preclude the use of Marine amphibious forces.

14 September Gen Franks presents a sequence of related options to the Pentagon: immediate

retaliation with Navy cruise missiles, followed by a 10-day air war employing Air

Force and Navy bombers, and further followed by the deployment of joint

special operating forces.

15 September President Bush convenes a war cabinet meeting at Camp David, Maryland, to

review national security developments. The consensus is to negotiate with the

Taliban, attack al-Qaeda, and then address other state sponsors of terrorism at

a time of the administration’s choosing. The president and Secretary Rumsfeld

agree that military options presented by Gen Henry H. Shelton, USA, chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are obsolete and that the Pentagon needs to pursue

unconventional approaches.

BGen John G. Castellaw, deputy commanding general (DCG) of U.S. Marine

Forces Pacific (MarForPac), arrives in Tampa, Florida, and begins assembling a

wartime staff at U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (MarCent) headquarters.

15–17 September After departing the West Coast on 13 August, the USS Peleliu Amphibious

Ready Group (Peleliu ARG) conducts humanitarian operations in East Timor.

Col Thomas D. Waldhauser (Commanding Officer [CO], 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit [15th MEU]) and Navy Capt William E. Jezierski (CO,

Amphibious Squadron 1 [CPR-1]) attend the inauguration of the country’s new

constitutional assembly.

17 September The State Department delivers an ultimatum to the Taliban, demanding they

extradite Osama bin Laden.

19 September Peleliu ARG receives orders to report to CentCom’s Area of Responsibility

(AOR) and begins planning for possible noncombatant evacuation operations

in Pakistan.

371

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
20 September Gen Franks presents his four-phase concept of operations to Secretary Rumsfeld

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reactions from the service chiefs are lukewarm.

USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (Bataan ARG) (26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit [26th MEU]/Amphibious Squadron 8 [CPR-8]) departs the

East Coast for U.S. European Command’s EuCom’s AOR.

21 September Gen James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Adm Vernon E.

Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, meet with Gen Franks and assure him

of their support.

Gen Franks presents his concept of operations to President Bush and senior

administration officials.

While addressing members of 1st Marine Brigade at Twentynine Palms,

California, BGen James N. Mattis, serving concurrently as brigade commander

and Deputy/Commanding General for I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),

emphasizes that their professional conduct will convey a message to the world

that there is “no better friend, no worse enemy” than a U.S. Marine.

24 September Gen Jones and Adm Clark forward a memorandum to Secretary Rumsfeld,

describing their ability to provide an integrated maritime strike force consisting

of a carrier battle group and amphibious ready group.

26 September The CIA’s first paramilitary team arrives in northeastern Afghanistan.

28 September Peleliu ARG arrives in CentCom’s AOR and reports to the Fifth Fleet.

1 October Bataan ARG arrives in EuCom’s AOR and reports to the Sixth Fleet.

3 October A detachment from the Air Force’s theater airlift command arrives at Karshi

Khanabad Air Base after Uzbekistan agrees to allow U.S. forces to operate

within its borders.

5 October BGen Mattis and his personal staff arrive at King Khalid Military Complex in

Egypt for Exercise Bright Star and begin concurrent planning for potential

amphibious operations off the coast of Somalia.

7 October CentCom commences Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by launching

missile and air strikes against preplanned targets in Afghanistan and dropping

humanitarian aid packages to the Afghan people.

The 5th Special Forces Group arrives at Karshi Khanabad Air Base and

establishes Joint Special Operating Task Force North (TF Dagger).

The 15th MEU deploys airfield security and tactical recovery forces (Force

Recon and Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/1 [BLT 1/1]) to Jacobabad,

Pakistan, in support of U.S. Air Force combat search and rescue teams.

11–25 October The 26th MEU participates in Exercise Bright Star.

372

FROM THE SEA
14 October BGen Mattis is designated Commanding General (CG), MarCent (Forward) and

Combined Joint Task Force Consequence Management. The latter organization

is a CentCom initiative to establish an initial response force at Camp Doha,

Kuwait, to assist nations dealing with a nuclear, chemical, or biological incident.

16 October During the daily NSC meeting, CIA officials propose building an airfield and

establishing a forward operating base (FOB) in southern Afghanistan to facilitate

developing a southern corollary to the Northern Alliance. Secretary Rumsfeld

states that he has a candidate in Helmand Province, situated west of Kandahar.

18 October LtGen Michael P. DeLong, Deputy Commander in Chief (DCinC), CentCom;

BGen Mattis; and Egyptian Gen Amin visit the Bataan ARG.

A section of F/A-18 Hornets from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251

(VMFA-251), serving with Carrier Air Wing 1 (CVW-1) on board the USS

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), conducts the Marine Corps’ first strike mission

of the war.

16 October The CIA’s first pilot team arrives in northeastern Afghanistan.

19 October TF Dagger inserts its first two operational detachments into northeastern

Afghanistan.

Task Force Sword (TF 11) temporarily seizes an auxiliary airstrip in the

southwestern desert (Objective Rhino) to support a follow-on raid against

Mullah Omar’s Kandahar residence.

The 15th MEU’s Bald Eagle Force (Company B, BLT 1/1) stands by on board

the USS Peleliu (LHA 5), ready to reinforce rangers at Objective Rhino.

20 October U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NavCent) orders 15th MEU to recover a

MH-60 Black Hawk helicopter that crashed during the raid at an auxiliary

airfield in Dalbandin, Pakistan. Although the small recovery team retrieves the

aircraft, they temporarily abandon it during the return flight after receiving

small arms fire while refueling at an auxiliary airfield in Panjgur, Pakistan.

23 October Vice President Richard B. “Dick” Cheney asks other members of the

administration if they should wait for the Northern Alliance to begin its

advance or go ahead with conventional forces. By this time, CentCom is already

developing contingency plans for the deployment of 50,000 U.S. ground troops

to Afghanistan.

Gen Jones, 32d Commandant of the Marine Corps, and SgtMaj Alford L.

McMichael, 14th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, visit the Bataan ARG.

24 October Gen Jones and SgtMaj McMichaels visit the Peleliu ARG. Col Waldhauser

expresses difficulty getting 15th MEU’s AV-8B Harriers onto the air tasking

order for Afghanistan.

373

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
The 15th MEU launches a reinforced tactical recovery force to Panjgur,

Pakistan. Working in conjunction with Pakistani security forces, they retrieve the

previously abandoned Black Hawk helicopter and return it to the USS Kitty

Hawk (CV 63).

25 October National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asks President Bush if he wants

to consider deploying several Army or Marine divisions to Afghanistan during

the spring. He responds that it is too early to begin second-guessing their

initial strategy.

CentCom assumes operational control of MarForPac, as Marine Corps Forces

Central Command (MarForCent), for the duration of OEF.

26 October Secretary Rumsfeld inquires if CentCom is preparing for the possibility of a

major land war in Afghanistan.

27 October Arriving at Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NSA Bahrain) with his personal

staff, BGen Mattis introduces himself to VAdm Charles W. Moore, USN,

commander of Fifth Fleet, NavCent, and CentCom’s Combined Forces

Maritime Component Command (CFMCC).

28 October Peleliu ARG receives a warning order regarding security operations in support

of World Trade Organization conference in Doha, Qatar.

29 October CentCom releases its 30-60-90 day plan for OEF and Operations Order 002-02,

execution of Phase II operations in Afghanistan.

30 October While visiting the USS Peleliu, Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England

states that the war on terror will require the deployment of conventional forces

ashore and hints that the 15th MEU might play an offensive role in the future.

CentCom notifies NavCent of a forthcoming warning order for the conduct of

amphibious raids into southern Afghanistan. VAdm Moore recalls BGen Mattis

from Kuwait, where he is evaluating the requirements for establishing Task

Force Consequence Management. BGen Mattis confers with LtGen Earl B.

Hailston, CG of MarForPac, and LtGen Michael W. Hagee, CG of I MEF.

NavCent and MarCent (Forward) planners begin mission analysis for potential

interdiction or noncombatant operations along the Horn of Africa. They

envision a combined force involving two ARGs reinforced with additional CH53 Sea Stallion helicopters and KC-130 Hercules transports.

Bataan ARG is directed to consider the feasibility of replacing the USS Kitty

Hawk as a floating forward support base for the 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment in the north Arabian Sea. This option, which would require

off-loading the Marine contingent, is not exercised.

31 October CentCom issues a warning order for amphibious raids into Afghanistan;

NavCent reissues the order.

374

FROM THE SEA
BGen Mattis meets privately with VAdm Moore in Bahrain. Moore anticipates

that the Taliban will eventually withdraw to Kandahar and wants to strike

before spring, thus denying the enemy an opportunity to strengthen their

defenses. He places Mattis in charge of all amphibious forces in theater,

designating him commander of Naval Expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF 58),

and tasks him with conducting three to five raids during a 30-day period to

destabilize the enemy’s command and control.

BGen Mattis and his personal staff, augmented by liaison officers from the

MarCent Coordination Element, assemble to identify personnel requirements

for TF 58’s staff. Mattis chooses not to duplicate existing MEU capabilities and

estimates that he will require 25 to 30 personnel.

BGen Mattis encounters Navy Capt Robert S. Harward at NSA Bahrain.

Harward, an old acquaintance and commander of the SEAL component of the

Naval Special Warfare Detachment, is assembling Joint Special Operations Task

Force South (Task Force K-Bar) and looking for an avenue into Afghanistan.

The two men conspire to work together on the amphibious raids.

1 November VAdm Moore establishes TF 58. CPR-1 is designated Task Group 58.1, and

15th MEU is designated Task Group 58.2.

NavCent issues a written warning order directing TF 58 to begin planning for

amphibious raids into southern Afghanistan.

NavCent requests transfer of the Bataan ARG to CentCom’s AOR and

sufficient forces to relieve 15th MEU security forces in Jacobabad, Pakistan.

3 November BGen Mattis presents three scalable options to VAdm Moore: a 6–12 hour

company raid, two simultaneous 24–36 hour company raids, and a 48–72 hour

battalion raid. When Moore asks if TF 58 could conduct an indefinite duration

raid and how many personnel it would require, Mattis responds that he would

need 1,000 Marines.

Four AV-8Bs from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163) (15th

MEU) conduct their first bombing missions of the war, attacking enemy forces

near Garmabak Gar.

4 November BGen Mattis releases a personal (P-4) message to the commanders of CPR-1

and 15th MEU, expressing his thoughts for future operations.

TF 58 issues Planning Directive 001, regarding raid planning.

5 November NavCent issues its concept of operations for raids into southern Afghanistan.

TF 58 issues planning directives for raids into southern Afghanistan and

interdiction of main supply routes.

6 November TF 58 requests the deployment of additional CH-53 helicopters to CentCom’s

AOR.

375

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
7 November CentCom alerts its operational components to the possibility of providing

military support to the World Trade Organization meetings in Doha, Qatar.

NavCent consents to Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command’s

(CFLCC’s) request to use CFMCC forces to support the opening of the U.S.

embassy in Kabul.

BGen Mattis meets privately with Army MajGen Dell L. Dailey, CG, TF 11, at

the U.S. embassy in Muscat, Oman. Dailey believes that an FOB in Afghanistan

would benefit conventional and special operating forces and suggests the

auxiliary airfield used during the 19 October raid (Objective Rhino) as a

possible location.

8 November CentCom issues a Combined Joint Forces Command planning order to CFLCC,

directing that it establish an FOB in Afghanistan.

9 November BGen Mattis delivers his formal concept of operations brief to VAdm Moore.

9–13 November Peleliu ARG provides security for the World Trade Organization meetings in

Doha, Qatar.

9–17 November Peleliu ARG participates in Exercise Image Nautilus in Djibouti.

10 November Mazar-e Sharif falls to the Northern Alliance.

BGen Mattis delivers his formal concept of operations brief to LtGen Michael

DeLong and LtGen Victor E. Renuart Jr., USAF, CentCom’s DCinC and

Director of Operations, respectively. Other commands in Bahrain, Kuwait,

Hawaii, and Washington also view the presentation. DeLong tells Mattis to

proceed with his planning, including the possibility of seizing and holding an

FOB in southern Afghanistan.

11 November Taloqan falls to the Northern Alliance.

CentCom issues Fragmentary Order 02-004, directing CFLCC to be prepared

to assume land operations in Afghanistan.

Bataan ARG is ordered to report to CentCom’s AOR.

12 November As Northern Alliance forces approach Kabul, senior administration officials

discuss strategies to secure the capital city after its capture. As a stopgap

measure, until the United Nations (UN) can assemble and deploy a

multinational force to Afghanistan, officials consider sending in American and

British special operating forces or elements of the 10th Mountain Division

based in Uzbekistan. Secretary Rumsfeld reminds the group that they also have

Marines stationed off the Pakistan coast.

Kofi Annan, UN secretary general, chairs a meeting with representatives from

the United States, Russia, and the six nations neighboring Afghanistan. They

agree on the need for a broad-based and freely chosen Afghan government and

pledge to support continued humanitarian operations.

376

FROM THE SEA
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314), serving with Carrier Air

Wing 9 (CVW-9) on board the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), arrives in

CentCom’s AOR.

13 November CentCom issues a planning order for CFMCC amphibious raids into

Afghanistan; NavCent readdresses.

14 November Kabul falls to the Northern Alliance.

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1378, pledging to support Afghan

efforts to both establish a transitional government and form a new government.

Bataan ARG receives a draft order to prepare to conduct raids in southern

Afghanistan.

15 November NavCent issues Modification 01 to the planning order for amphibious raids,

approving TF 58 Course of Action C, including the establishment of an FOB

at Kandahar International Airport.

Fifth Fleet assumes operational control of the Bataan ARG. CPR-8, commanded by Capt Kenneth M. Rome, USN, is designated Task Group 58.3 and

26th MEU, commanded by Col Andrew P. Frick, is designated Task Group 58.4.

BGen Mattis releases a P-4 message to the commanders of CPR-8 and 26th

MEU welcoming them on board.

Approximately 100 British Royal Marines arrive at Bagram Airfield.

16 November BGen Mattis refines his concept of operations in a fragmentary order to

subordinate commanders. After Navy SEALs establish surveillance over the

main objectives, 15th MEU will secure the desert airstrip (Objective 1) on 21

November. The 26th MEU will subsequently flow through Rhino and seize

Kandahar airport (Objective 2) on 24 November. On order, the Marines will

also interdict enemy movement along Asian Highway Route 1 (Objective 3).

17 November BGen Mattis briefs his concept of operations to MajGen Farooq, chief of

plans for the Pakistani Joint Staff, in Islamabad, Pakistan. Although Farooq

denies access to Dalbandin airfield, he offers another facility in Shamsi, Pakistan.

TF 58 issues its official operations order to establish an FOB in southern

Afghanistan and seize Kandahar International Airport.

TF 58 requests twenty C-17 Globemaster sorties during the first three days of

operations to support the buildup of forces in southern Afghanistan. Officials

at Transportation Command are reluctant to expose the aircraft to potential

enemy antiaircraft fire, although the pilots are enthusiastic to fly missions.

A detachment of four additional CH-53 helicopters from Marine Heavy

Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361) arrives in theater.

17–18 November TF 58 elements (SEALs, Force Recon, MEU Service Support Group 15 [MSSG

15]) conduct hydrographic survey of Chur Beach in Pasni, Pakistan.

377

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
18 November BGen Mattis briefs VAdm Moore on TF 58’s developing concept of operations.

TF 58 requests a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Air Detachment

(NMCB) to conduct anticipated runway repairs at FOB Rhino.

19 November CentCom approves TF 58’s request to use “Chaos” as its official call sign.

The staff select the moniker based on BGen Mattis’s intent to inflict chaos

on the enemy.

NavCent requests special operations forces for reconnaissance and terminal

guidance at the desert airstrip and FOB.

20 November LtGen Paul T. Mikolashek, USA, commander of Third Army and Army Forces

Central Command (ArCent), assumes the duties of CFLCC. Headquartered at

Camp Doha, Kuwait, he is tasked with directing land operations in Combined

Joint Area–Afghanistan.

TF 58 embarks on board USS Peleliu.

Col Waldhauser and the 15th MEU staff deliver their “Confirmation Brief for

Seizure of Desert Airfield and Combat Power Buildup” to BGen Mattis and the

TF 58 staff. H-Hour is tentatively established at 1700Z on 23 November.

Relieved by soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division, 15th MEU recovers its

remaining security forces from Jacobabad, Pakistan.

MSSG 15 deploys a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) detachment to

Shamsi, Pakistan, and fills fuel bladders in support of the future operations.

Capt Jezierski issues OpTask Amphib in support of surface landings at Chur

Beach in Pasni, Pakistan.

The 26th MEU delivers its confirmation brief for assuming the on-call tactical

recovery mission from the 15th MEU.

21 November TF 58 issues its amphibious operations air control plan, while air officers

coordinate close air support requirements with pilots on board the USS Carl

Vinson (CVN 70).

The 15th MEU begins staging forces (Company A, BLT 1/1) ashore in Pasni,

Pakistan, for follow-on movement to Afghanistan.

A SEAL detachment from Task Force K-Bar (TF K-Bar) inserts into

southern Afghanistan to provide surveillance and special reconnaissance over

Objective Rhino.

22 November BGen Mattis postpones D-Day for 24 hours while waiting for an execute order.

Three AV-8Bs from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (HMM-365)

(26th MEU) fly their first combat mission over Afghanistan, attacking an enemy

convoy and destroying four vehicles.

378

FROM THE SEA
23 November Kunduz falls to the Northern Alliance.

CentCom issues an execute order for Operation Swift Freedom.

BGen Mattis postpones the assault for another 24 hours to ensure sufficient

fuel stocks are available, establishing H-Hour at 1700Z on 25 November.

24 November BGen Mattis issues his execute order for Operation Swift Freedom, seizure of

the desert airstrip, and establishment of an FOB.

25 November Task Force 58 requests additional air traffic control assets for FOB Rhino and

the use of TF K-Bar forces for surveillance and reconnaissance operations in

Afghanistan.

0900Z: TF 58 assumes operational control of the Shamsi FARP from TF 11.

1100Z: TF 58 confirms H-Hour.

1215Z: An aviation escort from HMM-163 (four AH-1W Super Cobra

helicopters and three UH-1N Iroquois “Huey” helicopters) departs the USS

Peleliu. During their flight north they will stop briefly at Shamsi to refuel.

1300Z: TF 58 assumes operational control of the operations area. The first half

of the assault force departs the USS Peleliu on board three CH-53E Super

Stallion helicopters from HMM-163. During their flight north they will receive

fuel from airborne KC-130 tankers.

1345Z: The second half of the assault force departs the USS Peleliu on board

three CH-53 helicopters from HMM-365 (26th MEU).

1700Z: The first assault wave lands in Afghanistan; Capt James P. Fallon and

Company C, BLT 1/1, seize the desert airstrip.

1745Z: The second assault wave lands, including LtCol Christopher M. Bourne

and BLT 1/1’s jump command post.

1830Z: The first Marine KC-130 transport lands at FOB Rhino. Aircrews from

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadrons 252 and 352 (VMGR-252 and

VMGR-352) support TF 58 throughout its tenure in Afghanistan, flying more

that 1,400 sorties and accumulating over 2,500 flight hours.

25 November Taliban prisoners held in Qala-e-Jangi fortress outside Mazar-e Sharif stage a

bloody three-day revolt.

26 November BGen Mattis, Col Waldhauser, and members of their staffs arrive at FOB Rhino.

Multiple news agencies quote BGen Mattis’s claim that “the Marines have

landed and we now own a piece of Afghanistan.” Mattis later remarks that that

media has taken his statement out of context and that they failed to report that

the Marines were liberating the country for the Afghan people.

379

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
During a Pentagon press conference, Secretary Rumsfeld emphasizes that the

Marines are not an occupying force—they are there to establish an FOB and

interdict enemy movement about the country. During the same conference,

when asked if the operation’s title indicated that the conflict was nearly over,

Air Force Gen Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),

indicates that the Global War on Terrorism would continue for years. Within a

week of landing, CentCom states that the Marine operation falls under the

general purview of OEF and they will no longer refer to it as Operation Swift

Freedom.

Marines from Company C, BLT 1/1, raise the first American flag over Camp

Rhino; CentCom tells them to take it down several days later.

While conducting an armed reconnaissance flight north of FOB Rhino, two

AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters from HMM-163 help coordinate an attack on

an eastward moving convoy of 15 enemy vehicles. After patrolling F-14B

Tomcats from Fighter Squadron 102 (VF-102) on board the USS Carl Vinson

bomb the column, the helicopter pilots attack several armored personnel

carriers and strafe dismounted troops fleeing the damaged vehicles.

27 November Secretary Rumsfeld informs Gen Franks that President Bush would like the

Defense Department to review options for Iraq. When asked about the state of

operational plans for that country, Franks replies that they are out of date and

under revision.

CentCom issues Fragmentary Order 02-029, delegating tactical control over

Australian special operating forces (Task Force 64 [TF 64]) to TF 58.

28 November CentCom limits the number of naval forces operating in Afghanistan to 1,000

personnel; this is later adjusted to 1,078 to reflect the number of forces already

ashore. Marine commanders reconfigure their force structures to meet security

and operational requirements.

BGen Mattis designates Capt Jezierski, commodore of CPR-1, as the deputy

commander of TF 58.

The first Air Force C-17 aircraft lands at FOB Rhino, carrying the lead elements

of NMCB 133’s Air Detachment. The Navy Seabees are subsequently

designated Task Group 58.5.

29 November CentCom raises its limitation on the number of naval forces operating in

Afghanistan to 1,100 personnel.

CentCom directs CFLCC to begin planning for the isolation of Kandahar.

30 November CentCom informs TF 58 that its sole mission is to establish an FOB in

southwestern Afghanistan. TF 58 receives planning and fragmentary orders

from CFLCC and CFMCC the same day, directing the Marines to plan for the

interdiction of enemy lines of communication west of Kandahar.

380

FROM THE SEA
CFMCC transfers tactical control of TF 58 elements (15th MEU, 26th MEU,

and NMCB 133) operating ashore in Afghanistan and Pakistan to CFLCC.

CPR-1 and CPR-8 remain under NavCent control.

1 December With the CFLCC advocating on the Marines’ behalf, CentCom raises its

limitation on the number of naval forces operating in Afghanistan to 1,400

personnel. This enables TF 58 to land 26th MEU combat forces, including Task

Force Sledgehammer (TF Sledgehammer), who are necessary for securing the

FOB and conducting interdiction operations.

2 December CentCom and CFLCC issue execute orders, directing TF 58 to isolate Kandahar

and prevent the escape of enemy forces from Afghanistan.

3 December TF 58 issues Fragmentary Order 002, directing 15th MEU to isolate Kandahar

and block escape routes west of the city along Highway 1. Capt Philip J. Treglia

leads his force reconnaissance platoon, as the vanguard of BLT 1/1’s

interdiction force, north to the Arghandab River.

4 December While participating in a UN-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany, rival

militia factions choose Hamid Karzai to lead the new Afghan Interim Authority

and sign the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending

the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions.

During a Pentagon press conference, Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers state

that there are no plans to involve American forces in the assault on Kandahar,

that the job will fall to Southern Alliance forces currently encircling the city.

LtCol Bourne leads the main body of BLT 1/1’s interdiction force (Grim

Reaper) north to the Arghandab River. It is composed of his jump command

post, the battalion’s combined antiarmor platoon, and Company B, 1st Light

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion.

MEU Service Support Group 26 [MSSG 26] assumes airfield operations at

FOB Impala in Shamsi, Pakistan. A provisional rifle platoon from Battery K,

10th Marines, provides security.

TF 64, an Australian Special Air Service squadron commanded by LtCol Peter

Gilmore, arrives at FOB Rhino.

5 December The UN endorses the Bonn Agreement by adopting Security Council

Resolution 1388.

Hamid Karzai, leading Southern Alliance forces north of Kandahar, begins

negotiating the surrender of Kandahar with Taliban leaders via cell phone.

BLT 1/1’s interdiction force establishes Patrol Base Pentagon four miles south

of the Arghandab River and 25 miles west of Kandahar. HMM-163 inserts a

reinforced rifle platoon from Company B to enhance security.

381

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
Due to technical problems, a B-52 Stratofortress drops a GBU-31 bomb on

Afghan and special forces operating north of Kandahar. At TF Dagger’s

request, TF 58 helicopter crews insert reinforcements and help evacuate

casualties to FOB Rhino for triage. The American soldiers are immediately

flown to an Air Force hospital in Seeb, Oman, for medical treatment. After

receiving initial medical care from the Navy’s Shock Trauma Platoon at FOB

Rhino, the Afghan fighters are flown to the USS Peleliu and USS Bataan

(LHD 5) for continued treatment. During the transfer of patients, a CH-53

helicopter experiences engine problems, compelling the pilots to drop their

external fuel tanks and execute an emergency landing at FOB Rhino.

An AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter from HMM-365 experiences a hard landing

in a dry lake bed 6 miles south of FOB Rhino. The 26th MEU’s combined

antiarmor platoon secures the aircraft for the night and pilots fly it back to base

the following day.

The wing of a taxiing C-17 aircraft strikes a parked CH-53 helicopter. Although

the transport remains serviceable, the helicopter sustains damage requiring

several days’ worth of repairs.

Sporadic small arms fire erupts along the defensive perimeter at FOB Rhino as

Marines engage a camel wandering through their frontlines. Prior to their

deployment, they had learned that guerrilla forces sometimes used transport

animals to deliver explosives against Russians troops during the Soviet-Afghan

War. The camel apparently escaped unharmed.

6 December Afghan Eastern Alliance forces, supported by TF Dagger, begin their assault

against al-Qaeda and Taliban positions in the mountains of Tora Bora. TF 11

reinforces them two days later.

VAdm Moore issues planning orders for detainee handling and reconstitution

of the Peleliu ARG and a warning order to support the reopening of the U.S.

embassy in Kabul.

TF 58 requests additional fuel storage and distribution assets to support

operations at Shamsi and FOB Rhino.

Maj Thomas J. Impellitteri leads an interdiction force of fast attack, antiarmor,

and light armored vehicles across the Arghandab River, establishing a roadblock

along Highway 1. Early the following morning, a reconnaissance team halts the

lead vehicle in a Taliban convoy traveling west toward Lashkar Gah. During an

ensuing firefight with the occupants, they kill seven enemy soldiers. After

withdrawing to their objective rally point, the forward air controller directs two

sections of Navy F-14 Tomcats and Air Force F-16 Falcons against several

loaded troop transports attempting to bypass the roadblock. He then directs a

section of Marine F-18 Hornets from VMFA-251 against the first vehicle,

attempting to disguise the fact that it has been destroyed by ground fire.

382

FROM THE SEA
A Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (SEAL Team 6, supported by members of

MSSG 26 and Company L, Battalion Landing Team 3/6 [BLT 3/6]), embarked

on board USS Shreveport (LPD 12), boards the maritime vessel Kota Sejarah

off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan, in an effort to thwart the escape of al-Qaeda

and Taliban leaders. Subsequent searches fail to locate contraband weapons or

fleeing fugitives.

A squad-sized enemy force probes Company C’s sector of the defensive

perimeter, situated along the north side of FOB Rhino. BLT 1/1 initially

responds with illumination and high explosive rounds from their 60mm and

81mm mortars. After reinforcing Company C’s position, a section of vehicles

from BLT 3/6’s combined antiarmor platoon moves forward of friendly lines

and briefly fires upon the enemy with MK19 automatic grenade launchers.

After the antiarmor section withdraws, three vehicles from BLT 3/6’s Light

Armored Reconnaissance platoon go forward to reconnoiter the area, although

by this time the enemy has withdrawn. Foot mobile patrols recover a water

bottle, blanket, and sandals the following day; several days later, engineers

discover a discarded AK-47 assault rifle in the same area.

John Walker Lindh, an American Taliban captured while fighting against

Northern Alliance forces outside Kunduz and then held captive in the Qala-eJangi fortress, arrives at FOB Rhino. He earns the dubious distinction of being

the first of several hundred detainees held by TF 58. Marines subsequently

transfer Lindh to the USS Peleliu on 14 December, the USS Bataan on 31

December, and Kandahar International Airport on 22 January. On 23 January,

he departs for the United States.

7 December Hamid Karzai announces that he has reached a surrender agreement with

Taliban forces inside Kandahar. Meanwhile, finding the city vacant, Gul Agha

Sharzai moves in from the south and reoccupies the governor’s mansion.

Eastern Alliance forces at Tora Bora unexpectedly halt their advance into the

mountains to negotiate with al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.

CentCom issues Fragmentary Order 02-027, regarding support for reopening

the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

MarCent requests 4th Marine Brigade (4th MEB) forces to provide security at

the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

TF Sledgehammer (26th MEU Combined Antiarmor Team and Light Armored

Reconnaissance platoons) returns to FOB Rhino after recovering disabled

vehicles belonging to the BLT 1/1 interdiction force.

8 December LtGen Mikolashek, CG, CFLCC, congratulates TF 58 on a job well done but

announces his intent to replace 15th and 26th MEUs with an Army brigade

combat team.

383

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
TF 58 issues a fragmentary order directing 26th MEU to provide a security

detachment to support a survey team at the U.S. embassy in Kabul. They

subsequently assign the mission to Capt James P. McDonough and Battery K,

10th Marines. After staging ashore in Pasni, the battery flies to Bagram Air Base

the following day.

10 December CentCom issues a planning order for the intelligence exploitation of abandoned

al-Qaeda and Taliban camps.

Battery K, 10th Marines, arrives in Kabul, establishes security posts around the

U.S. embassy, and begins sweeping the facility for explosives.

11 December Eastern Alliance forces at Tora Bora unexpectedly halt their advance into the

mountains to negotiate with al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. During a Pentagon

news briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld acknowledges that some of the enemy are

likely escaping across the border into Pakistan.

CentCom issues Fragmentary Order 02-006 to Operations Order 02-012

regarding the reconnaissance of sensitive sites. TF 58 is to support Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear inspection teams around Kandahar.

TF 58 drops 17,400 humanitarian rations to thank Afghan civilians who assisted

the Highway 1 interdiction force on 6–7 December.

TF 64 discovers and destroys enemy weapons cache and refueling sites located

northeast and northwest of FOB Rhino.

12 December BGen Mattis travels to Kandahar and discusses the impending operation with

Southern Alliance commanders Hamid Karzai and Gul Agha Sharzai and their

TF Dagger advisors.

TF 58 issues a fragmentary order transferring responsibility for detainee

handling from the 15th to 26th MEU; 26th MEU is subsequently directed to

establish a short-term handling facility at Kandahar International Airport.

Col Andrew Frick arrives at FOB Rhino and begins directing the remainder of

his forces ashore to support the occupation of Kandahar International Airport

and establishment of a second FOB.

13 December CFLCC directs TF 58 to assess sensitive sites near Dewalak.

Assault forces from the 15th MEU (Company B, 1st Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion) and 26th MEU (TF Sledgehammer) assemble at

Patrol Base Pentagon, now situated 40 miles west of Kandahar on Highway 1.

Meanwhile, LtCol Bourne leads the remainder of his interdiction force west on

Highway 1 to Lashkar Gah and then south to FOB Rhino.

384

FROM THE SEA
14 December BGen Mattis accompanies a convoy of 44 antiarmor and light armored vehicles

east on Highway 1 to Kandahar City, and then south to the airport. After

linking up with special forces already occupying the facility, the Marines

establish security positions around the airfield. Company I, BLT 3/6,

subsequently arrives via CH-53 helicopters to reinforce their positions. The

26th MEU’s tactical command post is in place in the terminal building by the

end of the day, and MSSG 26 begins sweeping the area for explosives.

14–15 December TF 58 supports a Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team (CBIST)

searching Tarnak Farms military training facility near Kandahar International

Airport. The team recovers a variety of ammunition, weapons, and documents.

14–23 December BLT 3/6 deploys its Mike platoon to the USS Shreveport to support SEAL

Team 8 during maritime interdiction operations.

15 December VAdm Moore issues an execute order for the transfer of prisoners captured at

Tora Bora to Kandahar International Airport. The 26th MEU establishes a

preliminary 100-person short-term detainment facility in a hanger at the airfield.

The facility will eventually be capable of holding 400 detainees.

The first Marine KC-130 aircraft lands at Kandahar after the 26th MEU has

cleared the runway of debris.

16 December The 26th MEU’s subordinate commands begin to arrive in Kandahar, and BLT

3/6 extends its perimeter to cover enemy avenues of approach.

Cpl Christopher T. Chandler detonates a landmine while providing security for

an explosive ordnance disposal team at Kandahar International Airport.

Shrapnel from the explosion injures Chandler, PFC Nicholas J. Sovereign, and

Sgt Adrian Aranda. Chandler Small Arms Range at Kandahar airport is

dedicated on 1 January 2002. A year later, Chandler graduates from the Basic

Airborne Course with a prosthetic limb.

The first 15 detainees arrive at Kandahar International Airport (other sources

indicate this occurred on 18 December). By 11 January 2002, the Marines would

be guarding 391 prisoners.

17 December Eastern Alliance forces at Tora Bora declare victory over al-Qaeda and the

Taliban. During a Pentagon news briefing, however, RAdm John D.

Stufflebeem, USN, states that isolated pockets of the enemy remain in the area,

and the operation continues. At this time, TF 58 is considering the possibility

of establishing a third FOB to support operations at Tora Bora.

Marines raise the American flag over the U.S. embassy compound in Kabul

during a ceremonial reopening of the facility held by State Department officials.

They are unaware that Army Col John F. Mulholland Jr. and special forces

soldiers had briefly raised a flag over the site on 10 December, before the

Marine security force arrived.

385

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
HMM-163 inserts a sensitive site exploitation team near Dewalak, located west

of FOB Rhino near the Helmand River. The team is composed of 15th MEU’s

force reconnaissance platoon, several members of the CBIST team, and two

interpreters. TF 64 has been providing surveillance over the area for two days

and continues to provide security. While inspecting several compounds in the

area, the team attracts a large number of curious Afghans and eventually

requests an emergency resupply of office supplies to distribute among the

villagers. The mission, however, fails to locate contraband weapons or

intelligence materials.

18 December CFLCC issues Operations Order 02-06, directing TF 58 to begin plans to clear

Tora Bora of enemy forces.

BGen Mattis and Col Frick preside over the raising of an American flag over

Kandahar International Airport. New York firefighters had previously flown

this national ensign over the site of the World Trade Center bombing.

TF 58 issues Fragmentary Order 004, directing reconstitution of the 15th MEU

in time for it to detach from Fifth Fleet by 18 January 2002.

The first Air Force C-17 lands at Kandahar International Airport (several

sources indicate this occurred on 19–20 December).

19 December News sources report that Gen Franks has proposed sending conventional Army

or Marine forces into the mountains of Tora Bora to search for al-Qaeda and

Taliban. CentCom issues an execute order for continued operations in the

region; NavCent readdresses.

TF 58 issues a supplement to Fragmentary Order 004, delaying reconstitution

of the 15th MEU until further notice. It subsequently directs 15th MEU to

begin planning for deployment into northeastern Afghanistan. The operation is

apparently to commence no later than 25 December.

Gen Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and LtGen Hagee, CG, I MEF,

visit TF 58 forces ashore. The following day they visit the USS Peleliu and

USS Bataan.

20 December UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1386, sanctioning the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

TF 58 learns that CentCom would prefer employing indigenous or special

operating forces at Tora Bora, rather than deploying conventional ground

forces, and that there is no intention of the Marines operating independently in

the region. The goal is to spur the Eastern Alliance to search the area for alQaeda, rather than to establish blocking positions along the Pakistani border

(this may have occurred on 19 December).

21 December Gen Franks and USO entertainers (Wayne Newton, Drew Carey, Neil McCoy,

and two Dallas Cowboy cheerleaders) visit TF 58 forces ashore. The following

day they visit the USS Peleliu and USS Bataan.

386

FROM THE SEA
CFLCC issues Fragmentary Order 01 to Operations Order 02-026, addressing

operations to attack and clear Tora Bora.

TF 64 relocates from FOB Rhino to Kandahar International Airport.

22 December During an inauguration ceremony held in Kabul, Hamid Karzai accepts power

from former President Rabbani and swears in his new cabinet.

CentCom issues Operations Order 03 regarding Phase III and IV operations in

Afghanistan.

23 December CentCom approves the CFLCC’s concept of operations for Tora Bora and

issues Fragmentary Order 02-045 to its air component regarding airfield survey

operations at Jalalabad. It also issues an execute order for reconstitution of the

15th and 26th MEUs.

24 December CFLCC issues Operations Order 02-032. TF 58 is to remain prepared for the

possible deployment of Marine forces to Tora Bora.

CFLCC reiterates execute order for reconstitution of the 15th MEU. TF 58

issues an execute order for Fragmentary Order 004, directing the 15th MEU to

begin retrograde operations and reconstitute on board the Peleliu ARG.

25 December TF 58 receives holiday care packages, courtesy of VAdm Moore. Two sections

of F-14s and F/A-18s from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) perform

aerial maneuvers over FOB Rhino. President Bush speaks to Cpl Arellano at

Kandahar International Airport and wishes him a Merry Christmas.

26 December LtGen Mikolashek, CG, CFLCC, visits Kandahar airport.

27 December During a Pentagon news briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld tells reporters that

captured al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters will be transferred to Camp X-Ray in

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Marines will transfer the first 30 prisoners on 10 January.

28 December CJCS issue Deployment Order 097, providing for a brigade combat team to

relieve TF 58.

30 December HMM-365 inserts a sensitive site exploitation team into Garmabak Ghar (CB

003) to search a military training camp. TF 64 has been observing the area for

two days and continues to provide security. Meanwhile, aircraft mechanics

supported by 26th MEU’s light armored reconnaissance and 81mm mortar

platoons begin to repair a CH-53 helicopter damaged while inserting additional

TF 64 assets near the site the previous evening. On 2 January, pilots fly the

aircraft back to Kandahar for disassembly and shipment to the United States.

Company L, 8th Marines, 4th MEB (Anti-terrorism), relieves Battery K, 10th

Marines, 26th MEU, of its security mission at the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

First daylight C-17 flight into FOB Rhino.

31 December TF 58 staff at FOB Rhino redeploy to NSA Bahrain.

387

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
2002

1 January BGen Mattis and Governor Sharzai preside over a dual American and Afghan

flag raising at Kandahar airport.

The 26th MEU conducts a vehicular raid against Maiwand military complex

(AQ 024), situated 40 miles west of Kandahar and 3 miles north of Highway 1.

LtCol Jerome M. Lynes leads the force, composed of several Afghan militiamen

and special forces soldiers; light armored reconnaissance assets from the 15th

and 26th MEUs; and Company K, BLT 3/6. HMM-365 provides air cover

during the operation, including a section of recently arrived Harriers,

representing the first fixed-wing tactical aircraft to operate from Afghanistan.

After searching 14 walled compounds for six hours, the raid force withdraws

and returns to Kandahar the following day.

TF 64 completes a sensitive site exploitation mission near Lashkar Gah (AQ

019) that began on 28 Dec.

3 January Marine KC-130s extract BLT 1/1’s remaining security forces from FOB Rhino,

permanently closing the base.

Advance echelon of 101st Airborne Division relief force arrives at Kandahar

International Airport.

4 January Fifth Fleet resumes tactical control of the Peleliu ARG, and Capt Kenneth Rome

(CPR-8) succeeds Capt William Jezierski (CPR-1) as deputy commander, TF 58.

Elements of TF 64 and the 26th MEU conduct a sensitive site exploitation

mission at Islam Darreh (AQ 032), an al-Qaeda cave complex located 37 miles

northwest of Kandahar. 

LtGen Peter J. Cosgrove, chief of the Australian Army, visits TF 64 at

Kandahar airport.

4–6 January RAdm Charles R. Kubic, USN, commander of 3d Naval Construction Brigade,

visits Kandahar International Airport.

5 January CentCom issues Fragmentary Order 03-007 regarding CFLCC operations in the

Khost-Gardez region.

CFLCC issues Fragmentary Order 06 to Operations Order 02-021, directing TF

58 to begin planning for potential combat operations in the Khost-Gardez

region. BGen Mattis envisions establishing an intermediate support base at

Band-e-Sarde Airport to sustain TF 64 and TF K-Bar operations and tentatively

employs conventional Marine forces.

The 26th MEU conducts a heliborne raid against an enemy command and

control center, situated 50 miles west of Kandahar near Lashkar Gah. LtCol

Lynes leads the force, consisting of several Afghan militiamen; the MEU’s force

388

FROM THE SEA
reconnaissance platoon; and 1st Platoon, Company I, BLT 3/6. After TF 64

isolates the objective area, HMM 365 inserts the raid force in two waves. A

search of the area produces small arms, ammunition, and intelligence

documents. At Kandahar, Marines detain four men for questioning, which

reveals that they are likely drug runners.

MajGen Farooq, chief of plans of the Pakistani Joint Headquarters Staff, visits

Kandahar airport.

6 January Kandahar International Airport opens to daylight flights.

6–14 January The 26th MEU supports TF K-Bar during the inspection of Zhawar Kili alBadar military complex, situated 30 miles southwest of Khost. HMM-365

inserts the raid force, consisting of SEAL platoon 3E and 50 Marines from

Company L, BLT 3/6, with the intent of extracting them by nightfall.

Following the discovery of a mass grave, huge weapons caches, and massive

amounts of data, the mission is extended for another eight days to exploit the

site. During this period, the force directs multiple strategic bombing missions

against one surface and two underground facilities, engages a squad of enemy

soldiers, and captures a jeep with two occupants.

7 January Third Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, begins to arrive at Kandahar

International Airport, followed by Col Frank J. Wiercinski, commander of Task

Force Rakkasan (TF Rakkasan), two days later.

8 January After detaining four individuals possessing communications equipment at a

suspected al-Qaeda site near Khost, TF 58 forces transport the suspects to

Kandahar airport.

9 January CentCom releases TF 58 of its on-call mission to supply forces for operations

in Tora Bora.

Raider 04, a KC-130 aircraft from VMGR-352, crashes into a mountain and

bursts into flames while attempting an unassisted night landing at Bandari

airfield in Shamsi, Pakistan. U.S. Marines and Pakistani Army forces stationed at

the base, as well as combat search and rescue aircraft from Jacobabad and 26th

MEU personnel on board the USS Bataan, respond to the accident scene. All

eight crewmembers perished in the crash: Capts Matthew W. Bancroft and

Daniel G. McCollum, GySgt Stephen L. Bryson, SSgt Scott N. Germosen, Sgts

Nathan P. Hayes and Jeanette L. Winters, and LCpl Bryan P. Bertrand. Recovery

operations continue through 16 January.

10 January Two fire team-sized patrols probe BLT 3/6 positions along the northern end of

Kandahar International Airport for approximately 40 minutes, sporadically

firing flairs overhead and engaging Headquarters and Service and L Company

sectors with small arms fire from three separate locations. The Marines

illuminate the area with 81mm mortars and return fire with M16 rifles, M240G

light machine guns, M19 automatic grenade launchers, and 25mm cannon from

389

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
the light armored reconnaissance vehicles. While a section of Cobra helicopters

launch to provide close air support to the north, Companies I and K observe

enemy personnel in their sectors to the southwest. After the enemy fire

subsides, a combined Afghan and special forces mobile patrol searches the twokilometer frontage, recovering shell casings and rocket-propelled grenades from

the enemy’s firing positions.

Afghan security forces detonate a landmine near Kandahar International

Airport, resulting in a foot amputation and two eye injuries. Wounded are

treated by field surgical team.

VAdm Moore visits Kandahar International Airport.

10–25 January TF 64 conducts a long-range mobile patrol in support of TF K-Bar, providing

surveillance and reconnaissance of a suspected al-Qaeda site and the

surrounding area south of Gardez.

11 January HMM-365 inserts/extracts TF K-Bar teams south of Gardez, near a suspected

al-Qaeda safe house.

12 January HMM-365 inserts TF K-Bar reconnaissance teams 93 miles NNE of Kandahar,

near a suspected al-Qaeda/Taliban site.

13 January USS Shreveport conducts visit, board and search, and seizure of maritime

vessel El Obeid.

14 January TF 58 assumes tactical control of USS Bonhomme Richard Amphibious

Ready Group (Bonhomme Richard ARG). Amphibious Squadron 3 (CPR-3),

commanded by Capt Robert J. Connelly, is designated TG 58.1, and 13th

Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th MEU), commanded by Col Christopher J.

Gunther, is designated TG 58.2.

14–18 January HMM-365 inserts an airfield survey team from TF-K-Bar into Band-e Sardeh,

located 18 miles south of Gardez. After evaluating data collected by the team,

higher headquarters determines that the site is not suitable for supporting

combat operations in the region.

15 January HMM-365 extracts TF 58 forces from suspected terrorist camp in the vicinity

of Khost.

Dr. Zalmay Kalizad, U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan, meets with BGen Mattis

at Kandahar airfield.

16–28 January Headquarters and Service Company, BLT 3/6, deploys an 18-man detachment

to provide security for a special forces safe house near Khost airfield. They

witness a civil protest outside the base camp on 21 January and firefights

between competing Afghan factions on 22 and 24 January. On the evening of

28 January, they assist Army soldiers when a CH-47 Chinook helicopter

carrying their relief crashes while landing at the airfield.

390

FROM THE SEA
17 January MarCent headquarters begins its forward deployment to NSA Bahrain.

TF 64 soldier detonates an antipersonnel land mine at suspected terrorist

facility south of Gardez. He is treated by the field surgical team at Kandahar

International Airport before being evacuated to Landstuhl, Germany, for

additional medical care.

18 January Fifth Fleet relinquishes control of the Peleliu ARG to Seventh Fleet.

19 January TF Rakkasan assumes command and control of Kandahar airport; CFLCC

disestablishes Area of Operations TF 58, establishing Area of Operations

Truman.

HMM-365 inserts Norwegian special operation forces into Tori Khel, a suspected

Taliban site located near Ghazni. They extract the force the following day.

20 January After BLT 3/6 completes its relief in place with TF Rakkasan, 26th MEU

begins retrograde operations and reconstitution on board the Bataan ARG.

After experiencing engine failure during a routine resupply mission, a CH-53E

helicopter from HMM-365 crashes into mountains located 40 miles southeast

of Kabul. SSgt Walter F. Cohee III and Sgt Dwight J. Morgan are killed by the

impact, and five other Marines are injured. TF 58 holds a memorial service at

Kandahar International Airport on 22 January.

22 January Task Force 50 relinquishes tactical control of the USS Shreveport to the

Bataan ARG, after completing maritime interdiction operations.

23 January LtGen Mikolashek, CG, CFLCC, visits TF Rakkasan and TF 58 at Kandahar

International Airport.

HMM-365 inserts/extracts TF K-Bar forces near Hazar Qadam, a suspected alQaeda/Taliban site situated 93 miles northeast of Kandahar.

23–29 January Lead elements of 561st Corps Support Battalion arrive in Shamsi, Pakistan. After

relieving 26th MEU forces, they assume control of the FARP on 29 January.

24 January Fifth Fleet resumes tactical control of the Bonhomme Richard ARG in

preparation for Exercise Edged Mallet.

LtGen Earl Hailston, CG, MarCent, and Army MajGen Franklin L. Hagenbeck,

DCG, CFLCC, visit Kandahar International Airport.

25 January HMM-365 supports Task Force Sword, evacuating six Afghan personnel from

Tarin Kowt to Kandahar airport for medical treatment provided by the field

surgical team.

MSSG 26 relinquishes the remainder of its combat service support functions at

Kandahar International Airport to TF Rakkasan. NMCB 133 Air Detachment

completes airfield repairs and essential projects and begins its retrograde to

Guam, completed on 31 January.

391

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
27 January HMM-365 provides casualty evacuation support to special forces operating in

Kandahar.

28 January TF 58 and TF Rakkasan complete battle handover at Kandahar International

Airport. Tactical control of TF 64 transfers from TF 58 to TF K-Bar.

28–29 January The 26th MEU deploys its Mike platoon to Khost on the evening of 28

January, after an Army CH-47 helicopter carrying relief forces crashes while

landing at the airfield. They secure the crash site and turn over the ongoing

security mission to TF Rakkasan the following day.

30 January MajGen John F. Goodman, DCG, II Marine Expeditionary Force, visits

Kandahar airfield.

1 February CFLCC issues Fragmentary Order 11 to Operations Order 02-024, directing TF

58 to support TF K-Bar operations northeast of Gardez. The following day,

26th MEU stages forces in Bagram to support the mission.

3 February CFLCC relinquishes tactical control over TF 58, and Fifth Fleet reassumes

operational control over all amphibious forces.

5 February BGen Mattis and TF 58 personnel redeploy from Kandahar International

Airport to NSA Bahrain.

9 February CFLCC issues Fragmentary Order 03-037, directing TF 58 to provide

helicopter support to TF K-Bar.

The 26th MEU completes its backload and reconstitutes on board the

Bataan ARG.

11 February BGen Mattis deploys to Kandahar with a four-man staff, returning to Bahrain

on the 14th.

13 February Col Frick deploys to Kandahar with skeleton staff and reinforced platoon from

Company I, BLT 3/6.

14–15 February HMM-365 deploys two CH-53 helicopters to Kandahar, followed the next day

by LtCol Kevin M. DeVore and a third aircraft.

16 February The 26th MEU’s forward headquarters shifts from Kandahar to Bagram;

Marine KC-130 aircraft transport elements of TF Rakkasan and TF K-Bar

from Kandahar to Bagram.

18–19 February Operating from Bagram, HMM-365 inserts Canadian, Norwegian, and New

Zealand special operating forces into Tabu Tanga cave complex, retrieving them

the following day.

20 February CFLCC relinquishes tactical control over the 26th MEU’s small air-ground task

force, enabling it to return to the Bataan ARG.

26 February Navy VAdm Timothy J. Keating, having replaced VAdm Moore as commander

of Fifth Fleet, stands down TF 58.

392

FROM THE SEA
2 March Task Force Mountain (TF Mountain) launches Operation Anaconda in an

attempt to encircle and eliminate enemy forces in the Shahi Kot valley south of

Gardez. TF Rakkasan encounters heavy resistance after landing on the eastern

side of the valley, resulting in battle damage to the Army’s seven AH-64 Apache

helicopters. LtCol Raymond C. Damm, leading a division of F/A-18 aircraft

from VMFA-251 on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt, provides close air

support to the beleaguered troops.

While visiting Masirah Island, Col Gunther briefs RAdm Albert M. Calland,

USN, head of CentCom’s Combined Forces Special Operations Component

Command (CFSOCC), on the 13th MEU’s capabilities.

3 March Col Gunther receives an e-mail inquiry, asking how many AH-1Ws 13th MEU

can contribute to Operation Anaconda and how long it will take them to arrive

at Bagram.

4 March The Bonhomme Richard ARG reaches Pasni, Pakistan, just before dawn.

After sunrise, LtCol Gregg A. Sturdevant leads three CH-53 heavy-lift

helicopters and five AH-1W attack helicopters to Bagram, located 730 miles

north of the coast.

Special operating forces encounter withering enemy fire during three successive

attempts to insert teams onto Takur Ghar (Objective Siberia), resulting in the

loss of two MH-47 helicopters and seven American servicemen. Marine F/A18 pilots from VMFA-314 on board the USS John C. Stennis provide close air

support to the beleaguered troops and continue to support TF Mountain for

the duration of the operation.

5 March Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM-161) begins flying combat

missions in support of TF Mountain. Harriers provide close air support and

Super Stallions transport equipment, supplies, and personnel and establish

FARP’s near Objective Remington. Cobras fly reconnaissance, escort, close air

support, and strike missions.

10 March Task Force Summit (1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division)

relieves TF Rakkasan on the east side of valley. Around this time, 101st

Airborne Division aviation assets return to Kandahar.

11 March TF Mountain places its organic aviation assets under LtCol Sturdevant’s

command. Dubbed Task Force HMM-165 and comprised of assets from

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165) and the Army’s 159th

Aviation Regiment, this task force consists of two Black Hawks, three Super

Stallions, five Cobras, and six Chinooks. Their priority of effort is toward Col

Kevin V. Wilkerson, USA, and Task Force Commando (TF Commando) (2d

Brigade, 10th Mountain Division).

11–13 March Coalition forces secure their primary objectives (Whale 11, Remington 12,

Ginger 13).

393

Appendix D: Chronology of Events
13–4 March Operation Anaconda transitions to Operation Harpoon and the exploitation of

enemy sites.

Task Force HMM-165 inserts TF Commando elements (3d Battalion, Princess

Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and Company A, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry

Regiment) onto the “Whaleback” (Ter Gul Ghar).

14 March USS Wasp Amphibious Ready Group reports to Fifth Fleet, replacing 26th MEU.

18 March Task Force HMM-165 inserts TF Commando elements onto Objectives Ginger

and Siberia, extracting them the following day.

19 March Gen Franks declares Operation Anaconda over. Around this time, CFLCC

requests that HMM-165 remain in Afghanistan.

21 March Bataan ARG returns to the Mediterranean Sea and rejoins Sixth Fleet.

24 March HMM-165 flies its final mission in support of TF Mountain.

25 March MajGen Hagenbeck decorates 14 members of HMM-165, awarding a Bronze

Star medal to LtCol Sturdevant for his service as air mission commander during

Operation Harpoon.

26 March HMM-165 departs Bagram for the Bonhomme Richard ARG. One CH-53

helicopters loses an engine and conducts an emergency landing at Pasni,

Pakistan.

27 March The 13th MEU recovers all remaining shore parties.

28 March UN Security Council passes Resolution 1401, establishing the UN Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan. Based in Kabul, the mission has separate political

affairs and relief, recovery, and reconstruction pillars.

16 April The first of 12 F/A-18 Hornets from Marine All Weather Fighter Attack

Squadron 121 (VMFA [AW]-121) arrive at Peter J. Ganci Air Base in Manas,

Kyrgyzstan. The Marine pilots will fly 900 combat sorties in support of

Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) before departing on 23 September.

31 May CentCom establishes CJTF-180 in Bagram. The new command, led by Army

LtGen Dan K. McNeil, CG of XVIII Airborne Corps, is responsible for

coordinating Coalition operations in Afghanistan and it neighboring countries;

its authority does not extend to the ISAF.

12–19 June Emergency Loya Jirga convenes in Kabul, electing Chairman Hamid Karzai

president of the Transitional Authority.

394

FROM THE SEA
Appendix E

Unit Awards and Messages

Fifth Fleet Navy Unit Commendation:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20350-1000

2 October 2002

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION to

UNITED STATES FIFTH FLEET BATTLE FORCE for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service during assigned missions from 11 September 2001

to 3 March 2002. The Sailors and Marines of the United States FIFTH Fleet Battle Force

consistently demonstrated unparalleled success executing their missions of providing

presence, power projection, and deterrence for the United States and Coalition forces in

the Central Command Area of Responsibility. The United States FIFTH Fleet Battle Force

met or exceeded all operational requirements while supporting Operation Enduring

Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism. The FIFTH Fleet Battle Force executed over

7,840 strike missions in the skies over Afghanistan, effectively destroying the Al-Qaeda

network and toppling the oppressive Taliban Regime. The superlative efforts of the Battle

Force were instrumental in bringing stability to a nation perpetually at war for over 20

years. The Battle Force’s successful engagement exercises in Afghanistan, Kenya, and

Djibouti brought military cooperation and humanitarian relief and played a significant

role in improving relations with numerous allies throughout the Central Command Area

of Responsibility. By their truly distinctive accomplishments, unrelenting perseverance,

and unfailing devotion to duty, the Sailors and Marines of the United States FIFTH Fleet

Battle Force reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the

United States Naval Service.

Gordon R. England

Secretary of the Navy

395
From Commandant of the Marine Corps

to the USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group:

RAAUZYUW RUEACMC0457 0171500-UUUU—RUFRPEL.

ZNR UUUUU

R 171500Z JAN 02 ZYB PSN 273738T30

FM CMC WASHINGTON DC//CMC//

TO RUWICAC/FIFTEENTH MEU

RHMFIUU/FIFTEENTH MEU

RUHPPEL/COMPHIBRON ONE

BT

UNCLAS //N00001//

MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC/CMC//

SUBJ/15TH MEU AND PHIBRON-1 BRAVO ZULU//

POC/SGT WOODS/ADMIN CHIEF/CSG/-/TEL:(703) 614-2326

/EMAIL:WOODSJPOHQMC.USMC.MIL//

RMKS/

1. TO THE MARINES AND SAILORS OF 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CAPABLE) AND AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON-1, CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS! YOUR EFFORTS DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM ENGENDERED PRIDE IN ALL

AMERICANS AND STRUCK A BLOW FOR ALL FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE.

2. WHEN TERRORISTS ATTACKED OUR HOMELAND, YOU WERE FORWARD DEPLOYED AND POISED

TO DELIVER OUR NATION’S RESPONSE TO THOSE WHO WOULD CHALLENGE OUR BORDERS AND

OUR WAY OF LIFE, DEMONSTRATING THE CAPABILITIES OF SEA BASED POWER PROJECTION IN THE

PROCESS. AFTER RENDERING THREE DAYS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN EAST TIMOR—PROVIDING MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND TREATMENT, DENTAL CARE, FOODSTUFFS, CLOTHING AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS—YOU SAILED TO THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA AND IMMEDIATELY MADE AN

IMPACT IN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST TERRORISM. MARINE HARRIERS FROM THE 15TH MEU FLEW

BOMBING MISSIONS AGAINST TALIBAN AND AL-QAEDA TARGETS. OTHER MARINES PERFORMED

TASKS RANGING FROM HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY OPERATIONS TO THE TACTICAL RECOVERY

OF AIRCRAFT. MOREOVER, BY ESTABLISHING AN EXPEDITIONARY BASE OF OPERATIONS 400 MILES

FROM THE SEA IN LAND-LOCKED AFGHANISTAN, YOU DEMONSTRATED TO THE WORLD THAT THE

MARINE CORPS IS FAR MORE THAN A “HIT THE BEACH” ORGANIZATION AND PROVED, ONCE AGAIN,

THAT NAVAL FORCES CAN RAPIDLY DEPLOY TO AND OPERATE OUT OF AN AUSTERE LOCATION FOR

A SUSTAINED PERIOD OF TIME.

3. AS A GRATEFUL NATION AWAITS YOUR RETURN, KNOW THAT YOUR EFFORTS CONTRIBUTED

GREATLY TO THE OVERWHELMING SUCCESS OF TASK FORCE-58, THE DEFEAT OF TALIBAN AND ALQAEDA FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THE PROUD LEGACY OF AMERICA’S NAVAL FORCES.

4. SEMPER FIDELIS, J. L. JONES, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS,

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.//

BT#0457

396

FROM THE SEA
From Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

to USS Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group:

FM USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCCC//

TO RULYSCC/COMPHIBRON ONE

RULYSCC/FIFTEENTH MEU

RULYSCC/USS PELELIU

RULYSCC/USS DUBUQUE

RULYSCC/USS COMSTOCK

INFO RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//00//

RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//00//

RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT//0 0//

RUHBANA/COMUSMARCENT

RUWICBE/CG I MEF

RULYSCC/COMPHIBGRU THREE

RUCJNAV/DEPCOMUSNAVCENT MACDILL AFB FL

RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//SUPR//

BT

UNCLAS

MSGID/GENADMIN/CENTCOM/JAN//

SUBJ/BRAVO ZULU PELELIU ARG-15TH MEU(SOC)//

RMKS/

1. I WISH TO EXTEND MY SINCERE APPRECIATION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE PELELIU AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP/15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL FORCE CAPABLE) FOR

YOUR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE DURING OPERATIONS WHILE DEPLOYED TO THE USCENTCOM AOR.

2. DURING YOUR DEPLOYMENT, THE WELL-TRAINED CREWS OF USS PELELIU, USS DUBUQUE, AND

USS COMSTOCK PROVIDED A POTENT CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCE AND SERVED AS A SHINING

EXAMPLE OF AMERICA’S MILITARY MIGHT AND THE NATION’S UNSWERVING COMMITMENT TO RID

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF TERRORISM. POISED TO STRIKE AT THE HEART OF THOSE

WHO CHALLENGED OUR LIBERTIES AND BROUGHT TERROR AGAINST THE US HOMELAND, YOUR SUPERB TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAYED A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE OPENING MILITARY OFFENSIVE. YOUR FLEXIBILITY, TENACITY, AND THE OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP OF YOUR

CREWS CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE DEEPEST AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

IN HISTORY WHEN YOU SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED FOB RHINO. YOUR CAPABILITIES AS A TRAP

AND CSAR QUICK REACTION FORCE, AS WELL AS YOUR CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH FORWARD OUTPOSTS SUPPORTING THESE MISSIONS, WERE CRUCIAL TO ESTABLISHING THE BASELINE NECESSARY

TO COMMENCE THE AIR CAMPAIGN. YOUR POTENTIAL AS A POWER PROJECTION STRIKE FORCE WAS

SUPERBLY DEMONSTRATED AS A BLOCKING FORCE AND THE FLAWLESS SEIZURE OF QANDAHAR

AIRPORT. IN ACHIEVING THESE REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, YOUR COMBINED AIR ELEMENT,

INCLUDING DEPLOYED KC-130S, SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED MORE THAN 1371 SORTIES. YOUR SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF EVERY ASSIGNED MISSION IS TESTAMENT TO THE UNPARALLELED ALLEGIANCE AND STEADFAST DEVOTION OF YOUR CREWS.

3. AS YOU PREPARE TO RETURN HOME, PLEASE TAKE PLEASURE IN KNOWING THAT THE MEN AND

WOMEN OF THE PELELIU ARG-15TH MEU STRUCK THE FIRST BLOW IN WHAT WILL BE A LONG AND

ARDUOUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM. YOUR ABILITY TO RAPIDLY PLAN AND EXECUTE COMPLEX MISSIONS WAS TRULY IMPRESSIVE AND IS INDICATIVE OF OUTSTANDING TRAINING AND THE

SUPERB COMBAT READINESS OF THE U.S. NAVY/MARINE CORPS TEAM. CONGRATULATIONS ON A

JOB WELL DONE. WE ARE PROUD OF YOUR EFFORTS!

GEN FRANKS SENDS.//BT #8150

397

Appendix E: Unit Awards and Messages
398

FROM THE SEA
A

Abizaid, Lieutenant General John P. (USA), 76

Afghanistan, U.S. military operations in

towns and villages

Babu Khel, 260, 279

Chuttu, 97

Dewalak, 183–85

Garmabak Ghar, 77, 221, 224

Hazar Qadam, 235

Holhol, 78

Islamabad, 30–31

Jalalabad, 12–13, 98, 207–19,

Kabul, 52–53, 55–56, 75–76, 171–76,

204–5, 208, 223, 251, 287–91, 294–95

Kandahar, 52, 56, 60, 84, 89, 93, 96,

98–99, 105, 107–8, 126–127, 143,

151–53, 158, 167–68, 176–78, 180–83,

187–205, 209, 213, 229, 234, 243, 245,

248–50, 252–55

Airport (Airfield), 99, 144,

187–95, 237, 244, 248–50

Detention operations at,

196–201

Kunduz, 53, 75, 287, 290

Lashkar Gah, 56, 95, 99, 105, 121–22,

153, 162–63, 166–67, 169, 178, 183,

227–29, 303

Mazar-e Sharif, 55, 57–58, 75, 79, 98,

148, 197–98

Maiwand, 223–27

Marzek, 260, 279

Pachir Wa Agam, 208

Shayr Khan Khel, 260, 279

Tahk-te-pol, 108

Taloqan, 55, 75

Tarin Kowt, 107–8

Tora Bora, 207–19

valleys

Darya-ye Suf, 57

Helmand, 140

Shahi Kot, 257–80

Shin Narai, 108

Pachir Wa Agam, 208

Panjshir, 57

Aircraft

Bell AH-1W Super Cobra, 63, 113, 121, 140–41,

191, 221, 250, 269, 271–74, 281, 297

Bell UH-1N Iroquois (“Huey”), 113, 115, 146,

190–91, 221, 225, 228

Bell-Boeing MV-22 Osprey, 36, 301

Boeing AH-64 Apache, 262–63, 266, 272, 279,

281

Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, 141–42, 232–33,

235, 210, 263

Boeing C-17 Globemaster III, 45, 46, 84, 100–1,

121, 125, 128, 135–37, 195, 200, 202, 205, 217,

229, 241–42, 263

Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight, 47, 153, 156, 221,

227–29, 246

Boeing E-3 Sentry, 236

Boeing E-8C Joint Star, 129, 159

Boeing MH-47E Chinook, 46, 237

General Atomics MQ-1 Predator, 95

Grumman F-14 Tomcat, 121, 164–65, 204, 232,

276

Gulfstream Aerospace C-20 Gulfstream III, 27

Lockheed AC-130 Specter, 52, 58–59, 108, 230,

232–33, 235, 261, 264, 266, 283

Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, 45, 125, 136

Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, 196

Lockheed HC-130P/N, 141

399

Index
Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 31, 47, 48, 63, 62,

70, 71, 77, 99, 101, 103–4, 108, 111, 113, 115,

122, 124, 135, 188, 192–94, 209, 217, 234, 241,

245, 248, 252, 255, 270–71, 274–75, 281

Lockheed MC-130 Hercules, 55, 99

Lockheed P-3 Orion, 63, 95, 97, 113, 115, 146,

159, 162–65, 225, 231, 248, 250

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier, 63, 109,

179, 266, 275–77, 279

McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18C Hornet, 54, 165,

204, 230, 232–33, 237, 264, 266, 276, 278–79,

295

Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, 59

Rockwell B-1 Lancer, 230, 233, 266, 276

Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion, 47, 62, 63, 71,

77, 103, 104, 111, 113–15, 135, 142, 156, 168–

69, 181, 184–85, 209, 221, 231–33, 235–36, 243,

255, 260, 269, 271–72, 274, 281, 283–84

Sikorsky HH-60 Pave Hawk, 237

Sikorsky MH-53 Pave Low, 47, 237

Sikorsky MH-53J Pave Low III, 47, 141, 177–78

Sikorsky MH-60 Black Hawk (special operations

modification), 46, 59

Sikorsky Black Hawk, 60, 62–63, 103, 273, 279,

281

Airfields

Bagram (Air Base), 75–76, 172, 174, 184, 193,

205, 215, 233, 235–37, 255, 259, 263–64, 269–

72, 274–75, 281–84, 293–94, 296–98

Bandari, 245

Band-e Sardeh, 234–35, 237

Kandahar, 187–92

Karshi Khanabad Air Base (K-2), 25, 42–43, 45,

257, 295

Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, 31

Shahbaz (Jacobabad), 46–49

Air Force, U.S.

Air Force Theater Airlift Control Element, 45

16th Special Operations Wing, 43, 59

20th Special Operations Squadron, 47

21st Special Tactics Squadron, 115

366th Wing, 53

Ali, General Hazrat, 207–8

Alles, Colonel Randolph D., 246

Alveretti, Major Alvez (USA), 201

American Embassy

Kabul, 1334, 171–76

Muscat, Oman, 94

bombing, East Africa, 1998, 33

Pakistan, 185

Amerine, Captain Jason L. (USA), 107

Amin, General, 72

Anguiano, Sergeant Anthony A., 122

Aranda, Sergeant Adrian, 189

Arghandab

Bridge, 151

River, 154, 156, 158, 167

Army, U.S.

Third Army, 132

XVIII Airborne Corps, 26, 292

1st Cavalry Division, 98

10th Mountain Division, 43, 46, 128, 148, 172,

214, 257, 259, 261, 278, 280, 299–300, 303

2d Brigade, see Task Force

Commando, 280

1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, see Task

Force Summit, 46, 278

25th Infantry Division, 299–300

82d Airborne Division, see also Task Force

Panther, 26, 292, 300

101st Airborne Division, see also Task Force

Rakkasan, 26, 49, 80, 214, 245, 250, 259, 261,

274, 278–79, 283, 292, 301

2d Brigade Headquarters, 280

3d Brigade Combat Team, 239

Special Operations Command and Control Team

52, 108

31st Infantry Regiment, 280

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, 59

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,

128, 144

400

FROM THE SEA
2d Battalion, 120th Special Operations Aviation

Regiment, 57

2d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation

Regiment, 43

2d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 251, 252 262–63

5th Special Forces Group, 43, 257

3d Battalion, 108th Military Police Company, 201

202d Military Intelligence Battalion, 200

561st Corps Support Battalion, 253

51st Chemical Company, 79

65th Military Police Company, 251

244th Forward Surgical Team, 237

Special Forces A Teams, chart, 58

Operational Detachment

Alpha 527, 219

Alpha 555, 57

Alpha 561, 213

Alpha 572, 208

Alpha 574, 107–8, 141, 151

Alpha 583, 108, 224

Alpha 595, 57

1st Medical Battalion, Shock and Trauma

Platoon, 142

Asad (Afghan interpreter), 244

Australian Special Air Service (ASAS), 93, 140, 166, 184,

209, 214, 221, 261

Avenetti, Captain Samson P., 83, 134

B

Bancroft, Captain Matthew W., 246

Barranco, Captain John B., 121

Battle Position Diane, 264, 277

Bedard, General Emil R., 28

Berntsen, Gary, 43, 207–8, 219

Bertrand, Lance Corporal Bryan P., 246

Blake, Gunnery Sergeant James M., 174–75

Blume, Lieutenant Charles J., 171

Bolton, Major Jack G., 264–65

Boodaghian, Corporal Kristapor, 144

Bourne, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M., 28, 47, 99,

115–16, 118, 140, 145, 155–57, 159, 164–66, 168–69, 176,

242 

Brahimi, Lakhdar, 56, 290

British forces

Royal Air Force, 38

Royal Marines, 76, 289 

Special Air Service, 94, 97

22d Special Air Service (SAD) Regiment, 94, 97

British secret service, 200

Broadmeadow, Lieutenant Colonel John J., 83–84, 86, 70,

93, 101, 111, 125, 132–33, 215

Brooks, Staff Sergeant Grady N., 252

Broussard, Corporal Christopher P., 175

Brown, Lieutenant General Bryan D. (USA), 43

Bryan, Captain Michael D., 159, 164, 188

Bryson, Gunnery Sergeant Stephen L., 246

Bufkin, Major William T., II, 113

Bunker, Major Wayne M., 113

C

Calland, Rear Admiral Albert M., III (USN), 42–43, 268,

293 

Camps

Doha, Kuwait, 69–70, 78, 97, 132, 241

H. M. Smith, 26

Lejeune, 35, 172, 202 

Stronghold Freedom, 45–46

X-Ray, 200

Canadian army, 

3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light

Infantry, 280

Carl, Lieutenant Colonel John W., 70

Cassidy, Lieutenant Christopher J. (USN), 230

Castellaw, Brigadier General John. G., 27, 28, 34, 65–68

Casualties, U.S. military, 141, 188, 190, 263

“CAX,” 191

Chamberlin, Ambassador Wendy J., 63, 93

Chandler, Corporal Christopher T., 189

401

Index
Chandler, Lieutenant Colonel Mark S., 90

Chapman, Sergeant First Class Nathan R. (USA), 236, 264

Charette, Major Robert J., 83, 204

Chenelly, Sergeant Joseph R., 116–17, 179

Chivers, Christopher J., 204

Chur Beach, 110, 192

Clark, Admiral Vernon E. (USN), 40, 80

Clark, General Wesley (USA), 55

Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Mark A., 93, 270

Clark, Victoria, 120, 227, 279

Clark, Sergeant Travis, 162

Cline, Staff Sergeant, 173

Cody, Captain William J., 236

Cohee, Staff Sergeant Walter F., III, 236

Combined Joint Task Force Consequence Management,

69–70, 78–80

Commands

Joint Special Operations, 40, 43, 51, 257

Marine Corps Forces Central, 26–31

Evacuation Operations, Pakistan, 30–31

East Timor, 28–29

Marine Corps Forces Central (Forward), 70, 78

Marine Corps Forces Central (MarCent), 27, 28,

65–71, 78, 80, 83, 85, 134

Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MarForPac), 70,

78, 133

Naval Forces Central (NavCent), 27, 31, 41, 46,

60–61, 63, 70, 78–79, 82–83, 85, 89, 101, 104,

125, 127, 132, 134, 149, 192

Military Sealift, 134

U.S. European, 71–72, 78, 224

U.S. Joint Forces, 43, 72

Composite amphibious brigade, 66, 68

Composite Warfare Commander concept, 81

Compton, Lieutenant Colonel Martin B. (USAF), 245

Conley, Major Daniel B., 192

Connelly, Captain Robert J. (USN), 242

Conover, Sergeant Brenton T., 174

Cook, Lieutenant Warren C., Jr., 67

Cooke, Lieutenant Commander Leonard W. (USN), 125

Constable, Pamela, 207–8

Corley, Lieutenant General John D.W. (USAF), 259

Cowdrey, Brigadier General Christian B., 79

D

Dailey, Gunnery Sergeant John A., 156, 158, 163, 166, 185

Dailey, Major General Dell L. (USA), 93–94

Dalgarn, First Sergeant James L., 174

Dalin, Lance Corporal Daniel T., 175

Damm, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond C., Jr., 54, 263

DeForest, First Lieutenant John S., 222

DeLong, General Michael P., 16, 21, 25, 40, 59, 66, 72, 97,

207, 216

Deployment Order 97, 245

“Desert Airstrip,” 98

Desert One, 61

DeVore, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M., 109, 114, 153, 181,

255

DeVos, Captain Ericka L. (USAF), 135

Diaz, Chief Warrant Officer David W. (USAF), 57

Djibouti, 63, 78, 294

Dobbins, James F., 175, 287

Doran, Captain Simon M., 263

Dostam, General Abdul Rashid, 7, 9–10, 57–58, 75

Dresbach, Terry M., 192

“Dry Lakebed,” 98

Durrett, Colonel William D., 247

E

Eastern Alliance, 207–8, 210, 213, 219

East Timur, U.S. military operations in

Oecussi, 28

Dili, 28

Eatmon, Staff Sergeant Jon C., 175, 204

Edmunds, Specialist John J. (USA), 59

Edwards, Kenneth A., 271

Edwards, Major General Warren C. (USA), 152

402

FROM THE SEA
Eilertson, Captain Philip E., 272, 278, 281–83

Enger, Major Treeva (Norwegian Army), 244

England, George R., 71

Envirotac II dust palliative, 138

Exercises

Bright Star 2001–2, 67, 70, 72

Edged Mallet, 252, 267–68

Image Nautilus, 78

Noble Shirley, 139–40

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (capstone concept), 35

F

Fahim, General Mohammad Qasim, 43, 53, 65, 75, 175

Fallon, Captain James P., 49, 113, 115, 145–47

Farooq, Major General, 101–4, 248

Faulkner, Lieutenant Colonel William M., 188, 200

Feight, Major Wesley L., 181, 188, 203, 227–29, 251

Feith, Douglas J., 21, 39, 56

Fick, First Lieutenant Nathaniel C., 60, 118, 122, 168

Findlay, Colonel Michael L. (USA), 43

Fitzgerald, Colonel Michael D. (USA), 33–35, 41, 59, 99,

129

Flatten, Captain Michael J. (USAF), 115, 129

Forward Operating Base 

Impala (Shamsi), 62, 139, 171

Rhino, 84, 97–100, 103, 110, 116–19, 122, 131–

49, 153, 209, 214

Freeman, Captain Lloyd D., 188, 192, 230, 232

Frick, Colonel Andrew P., 72, 86, 105, 128, 132, 175–78,

190–91, 196, 219, 229, 248, 250, 252, 254

Fox, Lieutenant Colonel David (USA), 108, 141, 151

G

Gadd, Major Peter S., 231

Galaluy, Commander, 243–44

Galvin, Captain Fred C., 205, 300

Gardner, Brigadier General Emerson N., Jr., 28, 78

Garmabak Ghar training camp, 77, 221, 224

Gasca, Captain Frank (USA), 251

Gehrean, Staff Sergeant William P., III, 174

Germosen, Staff Sergeant Scott N., 246

Gilmore, Lieutenant Colonel Peter (Australian Defence

Force), 93, 140, 184

Giuseppe Garibaldi (C551), 131

Glasgow, Captain Douglass V., 236–37

Glover, Captain Douglas W., 237

Gough, Major Michael J., 268, 276–77

Green, Sergeant J. T., 201

Greenwood, Captain Daniel Q., 249

Gregson, Lieutenant General Wallace C., 26

Grimm, First Lieutenant Steven M., 139, 171

Gulf War, 55, 292

Gunther, Colonel Christopher J., 242, 246, 252, 268–71,

275, 282–83

H

Haas, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. (USA), 58

Hadley, Steven J., 56

Hafner, Matthew J, 276

Hagee, Lieutenant General Michael W., 26, 28, 70, 78, 202

Haider, General Gul, 278

Hailston, Lieutenant General Earl B., 26, 28, 68, 70, 79,

254

Harriman, Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. (USA), 261

Harrington, Staff Sergeant Larry J., 237

Harris, Captain Clint C., 151, 164–65

Hascup, Captain Richard (USN), 70, 83, 85

Hathcock, Gunnery Sergeant Andy D., 275

Hays, Sergeant Nathan P., 246

Harward, Captain Robert S. (USN), 91–92, 177, 221

Helmand River, 140, 166, 183

Hemmer, William G., 205

Hendrickson, First Lieutenant Michael J., 222

Hickey, First Lieutenant Cornelius D., 111

Higgins, Major James B., 90, 153, 179

Highway

403

Index
Asian Highway Route 1, 99, 152

Highway 4, 108, 178, 224

HMS Illustrious (R06), 131

Hodges, Lieutenant Chuck (USN), 203

Holguin, Master Sergeant Michael L., 161, 222

Hollenbeck, Lance Corporal, 246

Holtermann, Captain Jay M., 62–63, 113

Howell, Lieutenant General Jerry D., 70

Howlett, Captain Brian M., 188, 249

Hughes, Major Christopher W., 182

Humanitarian assistance efforts, 38, 267, 292

Hymes, Major Henry M., III, 119

I

Iasiello, Rear Admiral Louis V. (USN), 203

Impellitteri, Major Thomas J., 128, 155, 157–70, 176–81,

191, 223–26

Indonesia, Republic of, 28

Islam Darreh cave complex, 227

Islamic fundamentalists, 25–26

J

James, Lieutenant Bradley S., 270

Jansen, Major John M., 266–67, 278

Jezierski, Captain William E. (USN), 21, 29, 83, 131–32,

143, 242

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15–16, 20, 38, 45, 76–77

Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 81

Joint Forces Special Operations Component, 42–43, 92

Joint Medical Evacuation Aviation Unit, 141–42

Jones, General James L., 36, 40, 63, 201, 242, 290, 302

Jones, Sergeant D. E., 198–99

K

Kalizad, Zalmay M., 254

Kandahar international airport, 122, 176

Karimov, Islam A., 13, 25, 45

Karzai, Hamid, 56, 58, 107–8, 120, 141, 151–52, 171, 175–

78, 180, 183, 209, 226, 257, 287–88, 291

Keating, Vice Admiral Timothy J. (USN), 255

Kelly, Staff Sergeant Jack A., 158

Kelly, Staff Sergeant William H., 174

Kerry, Senator John E., 65

Khan, Captain Omar, 228–29, 246

Khan, First Lieutenant Waheed U., 223

Kahn, General Daoud, 58, 75

Khan, General Mohammad Fahim, 43, 65

Khan, Lieutenant Colonel Asad A., 101, 300

Khan, Major General Farooq Ahmed, 101

Khan, Major Nasir, 246

Khost-Gardez, 234, 236, 251

Khyber Pass, 30

Killion, Lieutenant Colonel Michael P., 294

Killion, Major Andrew N., 193–94

Kiser, Colonel John B., 27, 70, 78

Kisner, Colonel Frank J. (USAF), 43, 46

Koon, First Lieutenant Gary K., 146–47, 153, 166

Kota Sejarah, 145

Koval, Staff Sergeant Brian, 242

Koziuk, Major Gregory G., 90

L

Lake Mota Khan, 235

Lafferty, Commander Thomas J. (USN), 70, 81, 83, 85,

102, 108

Lambeth, Benjamin S., 37, 52, 54, 266

Landing zone

Boa, 231

Finch, 228

Pelican, 142

Rattler, 231–33

Landstuhl, Germany, 143, 237

LaVine, Lieutenant Colonel James K., 47, 108, 141, 156,

181

Lawson, Captain Richard B., 121

404

FROM THE SEA
Lennon, First Lieutenant William M., 146, 153, 156, 166,

169, 176, 221–22, 226, 249–50

Lethin, Lieutenant Colonel Clarke R., 67–70, 84–86, 89–90,

98–99, 125, 133, 215

Lindh, John Walker, 148–49

“Little whale,” 260–61, 264, 278

Lodin, Commander Zia, 261, 278

Lombardo, First Lieutenant William L., 227–28

Longoria, Colonel Michael A. (USAF), 259

Luck, Captain Joshua L., 276–77

Lynes, Lieutenant Colonel Jerome M., 153, 181, 188, 204,

223, 226, 232, 235, 249–52

Lynn, Corporal David J., 236

M

Magnuson, Major Brian L., 31, 70, 113

Mahaney, Major Michael P., 67–70, 86, 97, 242

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), 35–36, 65, 81, 255

Marine Command and Staff College, 70

Marine Corps

Aviation Units

Marine Air Control Group 38

(MACG-38), 49, 111, 115, 271, 284

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 234 (VMGR-234), 111, 270

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 252 (VMGR-252), 103, 124,

246, 254

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 352 (VMGR-352), 31, 47,

49, 103, 113, 115, 124, 245, 248, 270

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA211), 264, 268

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics

Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), 138

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251

(VMFA-251), 54, 151, 164, 263

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314

(VMFA-314), 54, 264, 266–67, 278

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

462 (HMH-462), 269, 298

Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 369 (HMLA-369), 269

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

163 (HMM-163), 47, 61, 77, 100, 113,

121, 141–42, 155–56, 181, 184–85

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

165 (HMM-165), 268, 271–73, 275,

280–85

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

361 (HMM-361), 269

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

365 (HMM-365), 109, 113, 140, 153,

181, 190, 221–23, 227–28, 231, 235,

246, 250, 252, 255

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373

(MWSS-373), 115

Ground Units

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 28

I Marine Expeditionary Force (I

MEF), 26, 28, 67, 70, 78–79, 83, 85,

98, 135–36

II Marine Expeditionary Force (II

MEF), 295

III Marine Expeditionary Force

(Okinawa), 26

1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (1st

MEB), 66, 70, 79–80, 82, 84, 98

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d

MEB), 254, 303

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(Anti-Terrorism), 171, 176, 294–95

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th

MEU), 242–43, 267–68, 270–71, 275,

279, 282–83, 285

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th

MEU), 22–23, 29–31, 49, 59–60, 62–

63, 70–71, 77–78, 80, 86–87, 90–91,

97–101, 103–5, 108, 110–11, 115, 117,

119, 127–28, 134, 137, 142, 145–47,

149, 153, 155, 167, 176–77, 179, 184,

192, 196, 199, 202, 204, 213–15, 217,

219, 221, 234, 241–42, 245

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (22d

MEU), 299–300

405

Index
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26th

MEU), 72–73, 78, 80, 86–87, 90, 99,

105, 109–11, 122, 127–29, 132, 134,

139, 146, 153, 171–72, 175–77, 182,

187–88, 190, 192–96, 199, 202–3, 213,

215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 227, 230,

234–36, 239, 241–42, 245–46, 248,

250, 252, 254–55

MEU Service Support Group 13

(MSSG 13), 268

MEU Service Support Group 15

(MSSG 15), 22, 77–78, 100, 119, 127

MEU Service Support Group 26

(MSSG 26), 127, 140, 145, 171, 173,

177, 181–82, 187–88, 192, 198, 227,

237, 246, 253

Battalion Landing Team 1/1 (BLT

1/1), 22, 28, 47, 60–61, 63, 77, 99,

100, 103, 105, 111, 113, 115, 118, 128,

145, 176, 184, 188, 215, 222–23, 242

Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (BLT

1/4), 268

Battalion Landing Team 3/6 (BLT

3/6), 99, 111, 139–40, 145–46, 153,

166, 169, 181–82, 187–88, 190–91,

197, 203, 205, 214, 222–23, 230, 232,

235–37, 239, 246, 248–50, 254

15th MEU Health and Service

Support Detachment, 142

Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, California, 31, 247,

295, 298

Marine Corps Strategy 21 (capstone strategy), 35

Marine, Staff Sergeant Keith A., 122

Martinson, Lieutenant Colonel Steven P., 70, 83

Masirah (Island), Oman, 60, 109, 241, 268–69

Marts, Gunnery Sergeant Edgar L., 176–77

Matter, Lieutenant Colonel Carl D., 22

Mattis, Brigadier General James N., 66–70, 72, 78–80, 82–

87, 89–99, 101–4, 108–9, 111, 117, 119–21, 127–29,

131–33, 137, 140, 143, 148–49, 152–53, 166, 176–78, 187,

191, 195–97, 200, 209, 213–14, 216–17, 229, 234, 242–24,

248, 252, 254, 299–300

Miller, Colonel Peter T., 28, 78, 83, 89, 93

McAbee, Brigadier General Jerry C., 28

McCain, Senator John S., III, 65

McCollum, Captain Daniel G., 246

McCormack, Captain Jeffrey S., 188, 236, 249

McDonough, Captain James P., III, 171–72, 174, 248

McLaughlin, John E., 56

McMichael, Sergeant Major Alford L., 63, 201

McPhedran, Ian, 140

Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE), 48, 123, 192, 199

Meyers, Steven L., 182

Mikolashek, Lieutenant General Paul T. (USA), 131–32,

152–53, 171, 179, 183, 196, 204, 214–17, 234, 245, 254–55,

257–59

Montanez, Corporal Ivan A., 236

Moore, Vice Admiral Charles W., Jr. (USN), 21, 70, 76, 78–

80, 82–83, 92, 96–97, 104, 131–32, 145, 148, 151–52, 171,

196, 198, 203, 243, 248, 254–55

Morgan, Sergeant Dwight J., 236

Morosoff, First Lieutenant Serge P., 182

Moss, Major Kevin G., 269, 274, 283–84, 298

Mubarak Military City complex, Egypt, 67

Mueller, Robert S., 254

Mulholland, Colonel John F. (USA), 43, 46, 58, 141, 151,

171, 175–76, 208, 257–59

Mullen, Lieutenant Colonel Richard D., 298

Musharraf, General Pervez, 13, 17, 26, 31, 63, 102

Myers, Lieutenant Colonel David C., 295

Myers, General Richard B. (USAF), 40, 45, 56, 58, 76–77,

117, 120, 127–29, 151, 211, 217, 226–27, 278

N

Nabb, Corporal Brian M., 271

Naqibullah, Mullah, 152

National Ground Intelligence Center (Army), 90

National Security Council, 14, 17, 20, 23–24, 26, 33, 39, 43,

54, 56, 65

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), 149, 300

Naval Support Activity, Bahrain, 27, 70

Navy

Fifth Fleet, 21, 30–31, 68, 70–72, 80, 95, 105,

131–32, 149, 196, 214, 242, 252, 255, 267

406

FROM THE SEA
Sixth Fleet, 71–72, 78, 105

Seventh Fleet, 22, 28, 30, 242

Amphibious Squadron 1 (CPR-1), 21, 131

Amphibious Squadron 3 (CPR-3), 242

Amphibious Squadron 8 (CPR-8), 72, 109

Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1), 54

Carrier Air Wing Seven (CVW-7), 266

Carrier Air Wing Nine (CVW-9), 266–67

Fighter Squadron 102 (VF-102), 121

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133, 83,

104, 125, 136, 193, 195

SEAL Team 3, 230

SEAL Team 3E, 234

SEAL Team 8, 145, 183

USS Bataan (LHD 5), 72, 109, 128, 141, 143,

149, 171–72, 174, 179, 199–200, 246

Amphibious Ready Group, 71–72,

105, 109, 127, 134, 140, 192, 202, 239,

252, 254

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), 268, 271, 275–76

Amphibious Ready Group, 242–43,

252, 267–68

USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), 52–54, 121, 131

USS Dubuque (LPD 8), 22

USS Enterprise (CVN 65), 52–54, 131

USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), 54, 264, 266

USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), 266

USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), 45, 52, 62–63, 72, 94,

102

USS Peleliu (LHA 5), 62, 71, 77, 97–98, 102, 108–

9, 112–14, 119, 121, 127, 143–44, 149, 174, 199,

202, 242

Amphibious Ready Group, 21–22, 28,

30–31, 47, 61, 71, 78, 80, 104, 108,

134, 151, 192, 203, 217, 241–42

USS Shreveport (LPD 12), 109, 145, 182

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), 52, 54, 131,

151, 164, 204, 246, 262

USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), 109, 171–72

Navy Unit Commendation, 255

Newbold, Lieutenant General Gregory S., 21, 28, 51–52,

59, 76–77, 99, 128–29

Northern Alliance, 9–10, 14, 17, 23, 25, 34, 37, 39, 40–41,

43–44, 53, 55–58, 65, 75–76, 80, 108, 120, 129, 148–49,

174–75, 207, 209, 269, 287–88

New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS), 228, 244, 255

Nobs, Roland, 199

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 78, 290, 298,

300–302

Nutch, Captain Mark D. (USA), 57

O

Objective

1 (Lashkar Gah command and control), 227–29

1, Task Force 58 (Rhino), 99

2 (Lashkar Gah command and control), 227–28

2, Task Force 58 (Kandahar airport), 99

3 (Lashkar Gah command and control), 228

3, Task Force 58 (Asian Highway Route 1), 99

Gecko, 59

Ginger, 264, 279

Honda, 59

Kelly, 235

Remington, 260–61, 273–74, 278

Rhino, 59, 98, 103, 108, 111, 113–14, 151–52

Siberia, 264, 281

Observation Post

Cobra 25A, 208, 210

Cobra 25B, 208

North, 277–78

South, 277

Ohman, Captain Jonathan R., 265, 278

Oles, Lieutenant Colonel Garry R., 177

Oliphant, Captain Eric D., 284

Oliver, Major Timothy J., 78, 83, 95, 162, 164

Olson, General Eric T. (USA), 300

Olson, Lieutenant Colonel Gregg P., 23, 29, 31, 47, 49, 61,

148, 153, 176–77, 185, 214, 241–42

407

Index
Omar, Mullah Mohammed, 7, 9–10, 12–13, 59–60, 107,

127, 160, 166, 177–78, 182, 226

Operation

Allied Force (in Yugoslavia), 55

Anaconda, 254, 257–85, 298

Enduring Freedom, 1, 26, 33–49, 54, 65–66, 68,

78, 83, 92, 102–5, 117, 131, 134, 242, 266, 281,

287, 291–92, 294, 300

Harpoon, 279–85

Infinite Justice, 26

Infinite Reach, 26

Swift Freedom, 107–29, 134

Operations Order

002-02, 78

02-006, 196

02-021, 234

02-026, 214, 216

02-032, 217

02-12, 183

02-25, 198

Operations Plan 1003-98, 33

Orient, First Lieutenant Eric V., 172, 175

Ormara (Pakistani naval base), 103

O’Rothman, Captain B. J., 127

Osama bin Laden, 11–14, 20, 26, 30, 34, 59, 126–27, 152,

184, 207–13, 217, 219, 234

P

Pakistan, U.S. military in

Dalbandin, 31, 59, 61–62, 100, 103

Gwadar, 100

Garmabak Ghar, 77, 221–24

Ghazni, 8, 235

Jacobabad, 46–49, 63, 71, 77, 80, 103, 105, 111,

115, 124, 134, 137, 188, 193, 202, 241, 245–46,

252, 270, 275

Khost-Gardez-Orgun triangle, 257

Lahore, 30

Panjgur, 62–63

Parachinar, 219

Pasni, 47, 49, 62, 100, 103, 108, 110–11, 119,

122, 127–28, 131, 134–35, 149, 172–73, 192,

202, 213, 217, 241, 252–54, 269, 271, 275, 284,

285

Peshawar, 3, 6, 11, 30

Tori Khel, 235

Pakistani Army, 11th Balach Battalion, 11th Balach

Regiment, 246

Parker, Lieutenant Colonel Carl T., 248

Parrington, Lieutenant Colonel James R., 60, 63, 145–46, 168

Patrol Base Pentagon, 156, 158, 162, 165–66, 176, 178

Pazos, Corporal Jose M., 62

Pelton , Robert Y., 148

Pentagon, 14–16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 40, 52, 60, 65, 97, 102,

117, 132, 142, 153, 182, 200, 210–11, 214, 216, 226–27,

229, 233, 245, 252, 277, 279, 281

Perkins, Sergeant Norman, 174

Pfeiffer, Captain Kristian D., 121

Philippines, antiterrorist operations in, 27

Pike, Captain Ryan, 250

Pitts, Sergeant Vernon H., 175

Player, Lance Corporal, 237

Pomykal, Sergeant Andrew D., 174

Post-Taliban stabilization effort, 45, 152

Prall, Lieutenant Michael E. (USN), 70, 83

Presidential Unit Citation for Task Force K-Bar, 92

Preysler, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. “Chip” (USA), 251

Putman, Captain Eric A., 49, 103, 111, 115, 122–23, 145–46

Python 31, 250

Q

Qala-e-Jangi, 148

“Quarter loaf ” alternative, 45

R

Raley, Sergeant, 237

Rauen, First Lieutenant Kraig M., 181

Renuart, Major General Victor E., Jr. (USAF), 21, 28, 76, 97

408

FROM THE SEA
Richardson, Sergeant Grady L., 174

Roach, Second Lieutenant Jason D., 222–23

Roberts, Petty Officer First Class Neil C. (USN), 264, 265,

266

Robinson, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Alexis M., 31

Rodriguez, Staff Sergeant Benny A., 83

Rome, Captain Kenneth M. (USN), 72, 105, 242

Romero Sergeant Arturo E., 204

Ropella, Captain Eric J., 113

Rosa, Brigadier General John W. (USAF), 279, 281

S

Sams, Brigadier General Ronald F. (USAF), 101

Sansone, Lieutenant Colonel Rodman A., 268

Saxton, Lieutenant Colonel Mike (USA), 206

Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman, Jr. (USA), 55

Scordo, Commander Joseph A. (USN), 203, 237–38

Sea II Seminar War Game (2001), 81

Sehrt, Major Marc A., 269–74, 284

Self, Captain Nathan E. (USA), 264

Seniff, Lieutenant Commander Todd J. (USN), 230, 232, 233

Sensenig, Lieutenant Joel K. (USN), 125, 193

Shamali Plains, Afghanistan, 55, 58

Shelton, General Henry H. (USA), 16, 24–26, 38, 39, 40, 45

Shariff, General, 57, 58

Sharzai, Gul Agha, 58, 108, 144, 151–52, 177–80, 224, 228,

243

Sheberghan prison, 148, 198, 200

Sinclair, Lieutenant Colonel Robert O., 268, 283

Sizemore, Master Sergeant Fredie L., II, 249

Smith, Captain (USA), 108, 151

Smith, Corporal Johnny P., 174

Smith, First Lieutenant J. P., 111

Smith, Gunnery Sergeant Blake L., 118, 122

Smith, Lieutenant Clifford A. (USN), 82, 84, 104, 121,

125–26, 136, 193, 195

Smullen, Major Robert J., 111

Southern Alliance, 151, 167

Sovereign, Lance Corporal Nicholas J., 189–90

Soviet–Afghan War, 2–7

Spann, Johnny Michael, 148 

Spillers, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin P., 31, 60, 115

Spin Ghar mountain range, 207

Spooner, Captain Damien L., 70

Stalnaker, Lieutenant Colonel James L., 54, 55, 278

Stebbins, Major Scott E., 70, 82, 83, 97, 121, 148–49

Stogran, Lieutenant Patrick B. (Canadian Army), 280

Stonesifer, Private First Class Kristofor T. (USA), 59

Stover, Major Victor S., 269, 272–74

Stufflebeem, Rear Admiral John D. (USN), 153, 212, 226–

27, 229, 233–34

Sullivan, Captain Farrell J., 205

Sullivan, Corporal Stephen A., 242

Sturdevant, Lieutenant Colonel Gregg A., 268–71, 273–76,

300

T

30–60–90 Day Plan, Operation Enduring Freedom, 78, 89

Tabu Tanga cave complex, 255

Tarnak Farms, 183–85, 251

Task Force

11 (Sword), 58–61, 77, 94–95, 97–99, 102, 105,

111, 208–12, 214, 236, 243, 257–58

50: 131, 267

57: 83, 95, 97, 113

64: 93, 140, 167, 176, 184–85, 215, 221–22, 227,

235, 237, 253, 278

76 (Seventh Fleet): 22, 28, 30, 242

Anvil, 261

Bagram, 172

Bald Eagle, 60, 63

Commando, 280–82

Dagger (Joint Special Operations Task Force

North), 42, 46, 57–58, 75, 92, 97, 107, 141, 151,

171, 175–77, 208, 213, 237, 257, 262, 277–78,

292

Delta, Special Operations, 58

409

Index
K–Bar (Joint Special Operations Task Force

South), 42, 92–93, 110–11, 115, 149, 177, 179,

214, 221, 230, 232, 235–36, 253–55, 261, 258,

292

Kuwait, 78

Mountain, 257, 259, 261–63, 266–67, 269–71,

279, 280, 283

Panther, 292

Rakkasan, 192–93, 235, 239, 245, 251–53, 261–

63, 266, 277–78, 292

Sledgehammer, 153, 155–56, 167, 169, 176, 178,

181, 191–92, 196, 235

Summit, 278–79

Tas Hammer, 261, 266

Task Group

50.6: 145

58.1: 83

58.2: 83

58.3: 105

58.4: 105

Tempone, Colonel John A., 27

Ter Gul Ghar, 260–61

Thompson, Captain Alison J., 236

Tomko, Captain Todd S., 187, 188, 191, 223, 225, 249, 252

Toomer, Master Sergeant Parry A. (USA), 194–95, 199

Toomey, Staff Sergeant William A., 246

Tora Bora, Afghanistan, 176, 198, 207–19, 229, 234, 245,

258

Treglia, Captain Philip J., 111, 122, 154–55, 184–85, 217

Troast, Lieutenant Commander Donald P. (USN), 117

Trogus, First Lieutenant Dennis C., 271

Tucker, Corporal Richie G., Jr., 271

V

Vaughn, Major Chad A., 267, 278

Vega, Lance Corporal David, 175

W

Wade, Captain Leaf H., 271

Wald, Lieutenant General Charles F. (USAF), 51

Waldhauser, Colonel Thomas D., 22, 28–29, 31, 47, 60–61,

63, 71, 83, 86, 91, 97–98, 100, 102, 108, 111, 113, 121, 128,

141, 143–44, 149, 153, 156, 176, 184, 202, 214–15, 217,

219, 255

Warman, Lieutenant Colonel Paul K. (USA), 201

Watson, Lieutenant Colonel Drew, 204

Weilbacher, First Sergeant O’Neil O., 22, 122, 168

White, Colonel Duffy W., 301, 303

White, Major Ray, 172

Whitmer, Captain Richard W., 49, 60, 63, 122, 124, 144,

156, 168–69

Wiercinski, Colonel Frank J. (USA), 245, 248, 252

Wilkerson, Colonel Kevin V. (USA), 280–81

Winters, Sergeant Jeanette L., 246

Wolfowitz, Paul D., 210

Wood, Sergeant David J., 174

Wooley, Major General Michael W. (USAF), 125

World Trade Center, 19, 21–23, 109, 191, 202

World Trade Organization conference, 71, 78

“Worldwide Attack Matrix,” 25

Y

Yeven, Corporal E. B., 246

Yoo, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel D., 219

Z

Zahir, Commander Haji, 208

Zaman, Commander Haji Mohammed, 208, 211

Zelibor, Rear Admiral Thomas E. (USN), 131

Zhawar Khili cave complex, 229–34

Zinni, General Anthony C., 16, 33

Zoretic, Major Peter D., 63

Zulfiqar, Lance Corporal Athar, 144

410

FROM THE SEA


Back Cover: The device reproduced on the back

cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use

in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here,

on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the

stars changed to five points, the device has continued

on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.