Joshua Tree National Park:

A History of Preserving the Desert

Prepared for

National Park Service

Joshua Tree National Park

Twentynine Palms, California

Task Agreement # P11AC90959

March 2015
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Table of Contents

List of Figures 3

List of Maps 5

Acronyms 7

Preface and Acknowledgements 9 

Introduction: Coping with the Desert 12

Chapter 1: The Nature of Joshua Tree's Land and People 16

Chapter 2: A Monument at Any Price 45

Chapter 3: Can this Monument Survive? 79

Chapter 4: Land Acquisition, 1936 to 1956 105

Plates 124

Chapter 5: Early Management of Joshua Tree 130

Chapter 6: Joshua Tree Matures, 1957-1976 173

Chapter 7: Joshua Tree Enhanced, 1977-1996 209

Chapter 8: New Threats to a New National Park 248

Epilogue: Seventy-Five Years and Growing in Popularity 296

Appendix A: List of Park Superintendents 299 

Appendix B: Visitation to the Park, 1941 to 2014 300 

Appendix C: Relevant Legislation 301

Notes 308
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List of Figures

Introduction An NPS inspector beneath a Joshua tree 11 

Figure 1-1 The Coachella Valley from Keys View 18

Figure 1-2 Jointing, fracturing, and weathering of rock 20

Figure 1-3 Diagram of jointing and erosion of rock 21

Figure 1-4 Skull Rock marked by tafoni 22

Figure 1-5 High mountains to the west create a rain shadow effect 23

Figure 1-6 A tall Joshua tree in Queen Valley in 1936 24

Figure 1-7 The palms of the Oasis of Mara in 1934 27

Figure 1-8 Chemehuevi basket makers 30

Figure 1-9 The Gold Crown Mine in 1936 35

Figure 1-10 The Wall Street Mill 36

Figure 1-11 The Colorado River Aqueduct 43

Figure 2-1 Minerva Hamilton Hoyt 46

Figure 2-2 Roger Toll 54

Figure 2-3 Interior Secretary Harold Ickes and President F. D. Roosevelt 58

Figure 2-4 Harold C. Bryant 67

Figure 3-1 Superintendent James Cole 81

Figure 3-2 An NPS employee surveys the Salton Sea from Keys View in 1957 83 

Figure 3-3 The Pinto Basin from the Cholla Cactus Garden 87 

Figure 3-4 A 1936 view of the Pinto Basin 89

Figure 3-5 The Charles Stokes home near Lost Horse Valley 92

Figure 4-1 The Ryan homestead occupied a scenic area of the park 106

Figure 4-2 Movie studios enjoyed filming westerns in the Joshua Tree area 110

Figure 5-1 Barker Dam 137 

Figure 5-2 The reservoir behind Barker Dam in 1936 138
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Figure 5-3 William and Francis Keys 139 

Figure 5-4 The Oasis of Mara area in 1941 147

Figure 5-5 Aerial view of the Oasis of Mara area in 1952 153

Figure 5-6 Dusty wheel ruts formed the "roads" of Joshua Tree in 1936 154

Figure 5-7 The entrance to the "Blue Cut" route in Pleasant Valley 157

Figure 5-8 Monument headquarters upon completion in 1954 162

Figure 5-9 Camping in Joshua Tree National Monument 163

Figure 5-10 A 1949 fire burned most of the palms at Fortynine Palms 166

Figure 5-11 Desert bighorn sheep near Barker Dam 167

Figure 6-1 Pinto Well #1 183

Figure 6-2 The Mission-66 vintage visitor center at the Oasis of Mara 186 

Figure 6-3 Cap Rock 188

Figure 6-4 Two rangers repairing a "guzzler" 195

Figure 6-5 Mesquite and mistletoe among the palms at the Oasis of Mara 198

Figure 6-6 A garage bay holding part of the Campbell Collection 201 

Figure 6-7 The Lost Horse Mine in 1967 203

Figure 6-8 Keys Ranch in 1969 205

Figure 7-1 Robert Moon 218 

Figure 7-2 Propagation of desert plants at the park nursery 221 

Figure 7-3 A desert tortoise 228

Figure 7-4 New storage for the Campbell Collection 234

Figure 8-1 A rock climber at Cap Rock 260

Figure 8-2 Aerial view of the Eagle Mountain Mine 279

Figure 8-3 A raven at the Cholla Cactus Garden 280

Figure 8-4 Donna and Larry Charpied 282 

Figure 8-5 Superintendent Ernest Quintana 285

Figure 8-6 Indian Cove 295 
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List of Maps

Map 1-1 Joshua Tree National Park 2014 17

Map 1-2 Mountain ranges and faults of Joshua Tree National Park 19

Map 1-3 Mining Districts of the Joshua Tree area 37

Map 1-4 Real estate plans for the Joshua Tree area 42

Map 2-1 Map of Joshua tree distribution 53

Map 2-2 The Roger Toll proposal for Joshua Tree National Monument 64 

Map 2-3 Southern Pacific Railroad land around the monument in 1936 65

Map 2-4 Joshua Tree National Monument as proclaimed in 1936 78

Map 3-1 Major mines in Joshua Tree in 1936 85

Map 3-2 The proposed deletion of NPS land east of Range 10 East 86

Map 3-3 Areas deleted and added by the 1950 boundary change 99

Map 3-4 Major mines after the 1950 boundary change 101

Map 4-1 Land acquisition between 1936 and 1960 120

Map 5-1 Traditional water sources in the Joshua Tree area 132

Map 5-2 Proposed sites for the monument headquarters 148

Map 5-3 The Oasis of Mara acquisition 152

Map 5-4 Roads and campgrounds proposed in the 1940s 155

Map 5-5 Options for the "Blue Cut" Road 156

Map 6-1 Sites nominated for the National Register of Historic Places 202 

Map 7-1 Whispering Pines and Pine Valley 211

Map 7-2 The proposed "Loop Road" in the Queen and Hidden valleys 215

Map 7-3 Fire history of Joshua Tree National Park 226

Map 7-4 Land ownership outside Joshua Tree National Monument in the early 1990s 242

Map 7-5 Lands added to Joshua Tree National Park in 1994 243

Map 8-1 Boundary changes on the northwestern boundary of the park 252
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Map 8-2 Abandoned mines in Joshua Tree National Park 254

Map 8-3 Major rock climbing areas 263

Map 8-4 Existing and proposed military flight routes over the park 276 

Plate 1 Vegetation of Joshua Tree National Park 208

Plate 2 Land ownership in the area proposed by Minerva Hoyt 209

Plate 3 Land acquisition between 1960 and 2010 210

Plate 4 Sales of land in the Pinto Basin before the monument proclamation 211

Plate 5 Designated wilderness additions through time 212

Plate 6 External threats to the park including insets of the Eagle Mountain Landfill 

and the Eagle Crest Pump Storage Project 213 
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Acronyms

AQD Air Quality Division (of the NPS)

BLM Bureau of Land Management

BOR Bureau of Reclamation

CDPA California Desert Protection Act

CDPL California Desert Protection League

CEQA California Environmental Protection Act

CESU Cooperating Ecosystem Studies Unit 

CSLC California State Lands Commission

CSP California State Parks

DSC Denver Service Center (of the NPS)

EIR Environmental Impact Report

EIS Environmental Impact Statement

EMEC Eagle Mountain Energy Company 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FLPMA Federal Land Policy and Management Act

FWS United States Fish and Wildlife Service

GLO General Land Office

IDCL International Desert Conservation League

I & M Inventory and Monitoring

LCS List of Classified Structures

LWCFA Land and Water Conservation Fund Act

MRC Mine Reclamation Corporation

MDLT Mojave Desert Land Trust
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NPS National Park Service

NPCA National Parks [and] Conservation Association

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

SPRR Southern Pacific Railroad Company

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USFS United States Forest Service
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Preface and Acknowledgements

In January 1986, I camped in Joshua Tree National Monument for the first time. My 

perception of the desert was not a positive one. During an earlier trip to Death Valley we had 

been trapped there by a sand storm for more than two days. The gritty material clogged meals, 

cameras, and eventually our vehicle. But the trip to Joshua Tree was idyllic. The desert offers a 

straightforward view of both geologic processes and the forces that determine biogeography. 

And few places can match the night sky. These experiences introduced me to the dichotomy of 

cultural attitudes that Americans have for the desert. Later, National Park Service Historian 

David Louter offered me the opportunity to research and write the administrative history of 

Joshua Tree. An administrative history of a national park explains the natural and cultural 

resources of the place, the campaign and legislation that established the unit, the resource 

management history, and visitor actions and policies that shape its use. It primarily serves as a 

document that informs a park's management staff on how the unit evolved and offers data and 

perspective on the issues they face. Many conundrums affect what is, in the end, a political 

creation of congress which can be eliminated by a simple majority vote on a bill to delist it. How 

does the National Park Service (NPS) provide use and recreation for today's public while 

preserving the resources "unimpaired" for future generations? How does it deal with private 

property and previous land-use rights in a new park? A web of laws and policies exist that order 

the NPS to let natural ecological processes shape the habitat, preserve the historic imprint of 

earlier generations, provide for current recreation and education, and enforce stringent 

wilderness regulation. Which take precedence when they all apply to the same place? At what 

point do visitors, their vehicles, and their recreational activities endanger a park that is being 

"loved to death?" How does the undersized agency keep up with scientific advances, adapt to 

new constituencies, maintain the tourism infrastructure, and cope with threats and demands from 

politicians and the public? Each park unit is a laboratory of legal, ecological, political, and 

cultural processes, and no two are managed exactly the same way. Each is the product of 

compromises made during its creation and reaction to the environment and human designs that 

surround it. 

The NPS covered my travel and research expenses for the project. I carried out the 

research inductively, relying on lessons learned from previous administrative history projects and 

on the reports, plans, interviews, and correspondence files in the park and in archives from 

California to Maryland. The result is a history of Joshua Tree National Park, first and foremost, 

but much can be learned about how conservation works in America, how the agency operates 

under its legal and organizational constraints, and how American culture shapes every action or 

process. In Joshua Tree's case, a legacy of disinterest in arid lands has shaped its history, but

recollection of the educational and spiritual benefits of the desert has grown to challenge that 

negative perception.

Many people helped with my research and production of this book. The staffs at the 

National Archives and Records Center in Maryland, its regional branch in San Bruno, 

California, the Huntington Archives in San Marino, California, and the Denver Service Center of 

the NPS were very helpful. Chief Historian Robert Sutton at the agency's Washington, D. C. 

headquarters, Timothy Babalis, Vida Germano, and Greg Gress of the Pacific West Regional 

Office in San Francisco, and Robert Bryson at Mojave National Preserve also lent their expertise
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and encouragement. I thank the University of South Alabama, particularly Charlene Lamonte,

who coordinated the distribution of agency funds for my project expenses, and Sam Stutsman, 

whose consulting firm, Delta Cartography, drafted the maps used in the book. 

Critical to the success of this park history were staff members of Joshua Tree National 

Park, both past and present. Former superintendents Mark Butler, David Moore, Ernest Quintana 

and Curt Sauer contributed interview time and data resources as well as enthusiastic support. 

Resource management staff including Andrea Compton, Jerry Freilich, Josh Hoines, Robert 

Moon, Luke Sabala, and Michael Vamstad helped me overcome a dearth of natural resource files 

in the park archives. Management Assistant Karin Messaros, maintenance officers Kirk Diamond 

and Scott Tremblay, interpretation rangers David Denslow, William Truesdell, and Joe Zarki, 

and GIS specialist Sean Murphy also provided welcome information. Members of the local 

communities provided maps, data, and interviews including Donna and Larry Charpied,

Elizabeth Meyer, and Paul F. Smith. Professional editorial support came from George F. 

Thompson Publishing, in the persons of George himself and his assistant editor Mikki Soroczak. 

The Joshua Tree National Park Association, particularly Meg Foley and its publication 

committee consisting of the aforementioned Messrs. Smith and Truesdell provided substantial 

financial support as well as another review of the manuscript. Thanks also go to National Park 

Service Historian Tim Babalis and two anonymous academic peer reviewers who made worthy 

suggestions for the final draft. 

Finally, two people stand out for their hard work and generous advice provided 

throughout the research and writing phases of the project. Melanie Spoo, the librarian/archivist/ 

museum curator of the park, had the additional task of supervising my research and reading the 

first draft of the manuscript. Chief Ranger Jeff Ohlfs, an excellent local historian in his own 

right, provided field trips, reviewed each chapter as I wrote it, and made suggestions and 

corrections where needed. This was not part of his job description, but was most helpful and 

much appreciated. 
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A lone National Park Service inspector, sitting beneath a Joshua tree in Hidden Valley, 

contemplates the problems facing the new monument. Photo by Ralph Anderson, December 

1939, Harpers Ferry Center, Anderson Collection, JOTR #052A.
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Introduction: Coping with the Desert

The National Parks Conservation Association repeatedly lists Joshua Tree National Park as one 

of the ten most threatened units in the entire national park system. The dangers include 

industrialization at a defunct mine less than one mile from the park's boundary, the worst ozone 

pollution in the system, energy developments planned around the park, subdivisions under 

construction near its northern and southern boundaries, plus all the issues that come from 

overcrowding and crime in popular destinations. Damage from vandalism and the ominous 

prospect of climate change add to worries for the future of the park. Yet Joshua Tree is hardly 

new to problems and controversy. Even before its proclamation by President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt in 1936, many people opposed the idea of an environmental preserve in California's 

deserts. Fourteen years after the monument’s inception, the National Park Service (NPS)

sacrificed a third of the unit's territory to prevent new mining claims throughout the remaining 

land. The public disinterest and active opposition faced from 1936 through the 1950s, although 

muted today, are but one aspect of the difficulty Joshua Tree has faced throughout its existence.

Much of its trouble stems from a long-standing negative perception of deserts held by Americans 

and derived in turn from European and Middle Eastern civilizations. 

The most widely read book during nineteenth-century America was the Holy Bible. 

Indeed, for most households it was the only reading material available. In Isaiah, 30:6 God refers 

to the Egyptian desert as a land of "trouble and distress" where fierce animals and other dangers 

abide. Other passages refer to the deserts of Israel as "wilderness," a pejorative term until the late 

nineteenth century, when the modern conservation movement took hold. To be "cast into the 

wilderness" was virtually a death sentence. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has noted that some 

Europeans even went so far as to deny that God had deliberately designed such places. Perhaps 

stemming from the human destruction of forests in the Mediterranean region during the classical 

Greek and Roman eras, they believed that deserts were ruined landscapes. Once, they had been 

useful, even kind, to people. After gross misuse they remained forlorn, disfigured, and 

debilitated. Hence, desert people were regarded as descendents of an abusive culture that had 

destroyed its own habitat. Later Europeans carried these ideas to the New World. No Native 

American tribes received the level of contempt shown by white Americans as did those of the 

Great Basin and southwestern deserts.

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The initial failure of Americans to cope with arid areas added anger to the pessimism and 

fear spurred by their apparent hopelessness. Historian Patricia Nelson Limerick has described the 

attitude:

Faced with aridity, the problem of mastering the continent seemed to have reached a nonnegotiable limit. By all conventional standards for value and habitability, the desert was 

an irrational environment, a betrayal of the promise of abundance fulfilled elsewhere in 

North America.2

Thus, when Major Stephen Long encountered the southern Great Plains in 1820, he called it "an 

insufferable obstacle to settlement." John C. Frémont's description of his exploration of the 

American southwest during the mid-1840s featured terms such as "inhospitable," "desolate," 

"dismal," and "revolting" as adjectives for the desert. Both Long and Frémont saw the desert as 

an area of hardship to be crossed at considerable risk to the lives of travelers and their animals.3
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The reaction to California's two deserts, the Mojave and the Colorado, was no different. 

In November 1853, Lieutenant J.G. Parke, a topographical engineer scouting for a railroad route 

from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, left the tiny Mormon settlement of San 

Bernardino and crossed San Gorgonio Pass into the Colorado Desert. He noted the declining 

elevation to the south toward the Salton Basin and continued east for some days before turning 

back to rejoin his main survey party. He reported his findings to trip leader Lieutenant R. S. 

Williamson, who dutifully recorded them in his report:

A mountain range extends from San Bernardino Mountain in a southeasterly direction 

nearly, if not quite, to the Colorado [River]. Between these mountains and the mountains 

of the Mohave nothing is known of the country. I have never heard of a white man who 

had penetrated it. I am inclined to the belief that it is barren, mountainous desert 

composed of a system of basins and mountain ranges. It would be an exceedingly 

difficult country to explore on account of the absence of water and there is no rainy 

season of any consequence.4

Williamson's report reinforced the worry that the desert would be difficult for a railroad to cross 

and useless for anything else.

After initial shock and hesitation, some optimistic and pragmatic Americans adopted the 

idea that deserts might be reclaimed through scientific research and transformation. Major John 

Wesley Powell proposed a comprehensive irrigation plan "by which these lands may be rescued 

from their present worthless state." Much later, that hopeful attitude spawned a large-scale drive 

by the United Nations, at the urging of the United States, to bring "development" to the world's 

arid zones. Irrigation schemes of sometimes dubious benefit followed during the decades after 

World War II. Concomitant with this approach was the idea that humans were at war with the 

environment. The desert became a villain as well as a forbidding place.5

 

Ultimately, Americans found two uses for the desert. First, after discovering minerals 

during the 1860s, the desert suddenly became a place to extract wealth rather than simply 

struggle through. Gold and silver drew the earliest miners, but other metals eventually 

commanded attention. To the miners it was unfortunate that these resources existed in such an 

inhospitable environment, but there was no help for it. People went into the "forbidden land"

hoping to find a fortune and quickly move on. Their presence drew transport in proportion to the 

richness of the discoveries. The desert still threatened, but the lure of wealth conquered cultural 

resistance. Later, deserts drew another aspect of intermittent human activity. For centuries, they 

harbored outcasts and activities unacceptable in settled society. Deserts were sacrifice zones 

where unwanted people and materials could be dumped. Doctors told people suffering from 

tuberculosis to move to the arid zones not only to improve their chances of survival, but also to 

get them away from others whom they might infect. As towns and cities grew, the desert became 

a place for dumping trash and unwanted, even dangerous, materials. And why not? With few 

people living or even visiting such places, it made sense to isolate toxic waste or unsightly 

detritus there. Manuals for waste disposal highlighted the benefits of arid areas for any form of 

waste disposal, be it hazardous or simply obnoxious. In a society where economic value 

superseded all other considerations, any use of the desert became a justifiable option.6
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The Holy Bible also described another aspect of the desert, as a retreat for various 

prophets seeking prayer, meditation, and renewal away from the confusion and temptations of 

civilization. This planted the seed of an idea that the desert could serve as a place to embrace

solitude and purification. That seed bore fruit by the end of the nineteenth century. Some miners 

grew to appreciate the desert and stayed after abandoning their hunt for minerals. Other people 

moved into the desert to escape convention, crowding, or, in some cases, prosecution. Desert 

land owned by the federal government remained available there decades longer than it did in the 

hospitable agrarian parts of the country. By the 1890s, tourists such as John Van Dyke, Edna 

Brush Perkins, and George Wharton James felt the lure of simplicity, solitude, and a different 

kind of beauty as did the ascetics and prophets millennia earlier.7 A trickle of visitors became a 

stream with the invention of the automobile. In the California deserts, it enabled middle-class 

weekenders to explore the interior desert land in mini-adventures that exhilarated and refreshed. 

As the sprawl of the urban littoral breached the Coast Range, settlers moved into the edges of the 

desert, and it became ever less threatening. More and more people found recreation in rugged 

areas previously inhabited only by Native American hunter-gatherers and traversed by itinerant 

prospectors. 

As this most recent perception of the desert evolved, American attitudes toward the 

natural world also changed. The twin movements of conservation and preservation began in the 

United States during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Conservation, the careful use of 

resources in a sustainable fashion, became the mantra of the U. S. Forest Service and later the 

Bureau of Land Management (formerly the General Land Office). But in the desert it had little 

resonance until the 1930s, because, except for water, no sustainable resources were recognized. 

The preservation movement, which sought to preserve unimpaired scenes of stunning sublimity 

and grandeur, arose largely from artists such as Thomas Moran and writers such as John Muir. 

Yosemite Valley, the Mariposa Grove of giant sequoias, Yellowstone's thermal features and the 

Grand Canyon's gaping chasm became showpieces of natural America, an answer to the historic 

legacy of Europe. For the first half century after Yellowstone's establishment as the first national 

park in 1872, preservationists promoted magnificent places with epic or highly unusual features. 

Prior to the 1930s, the young NPS largely ignored the desert except for historic or archaeological 

sites or examples of profoundly unusual geologic activity. Then the federal agency began 

hunting for representative examples of all the nation's natural regions and resources. From this 

new concept came the agency's attention to desert environments. The confluence of the 

preservation movement with a growing familiarity and appreciation of arid lands led to the 

establishment of Joshua Tree National Monument in 1936. Yet cultural tradition and 

environmental perception persisted and some within the NPS dismissed the idea of a desert 

national park. After the proclamation of Joshua Tree became a reality, irate miners refused to 

accept that any use of the desert other than their own was justified.8

And now, a decade and a half into the twenty-first century, has the American perception 

of the desert changed? Recently Chevrolet promoted a television commercial for one of its 

products. A pickup truck sits on a dirt road amid a scattering of Joshua trees and other desert

vegetation, as the narrator warns that drivers need a reliable vehicle when they have to get 

through such a "no man's land."9 And there it is. Abandoned by God, useless for humanity except 

as a source of removable minerals and a place to dump garbage, populated by a higher than 

average percentage of eccentrics, and still called a wasteland by those speeding through on the 
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interstates, the desert remains an uncertain and potentially dangerous place. The rush to place 

solar and wind energy farms in California's deserts is not just a function of sunshine days per 

year. Why not put them in the desert? After all, there's nothing there! A battle is just beginning 

over the propriety of sacrificing fragile desert habitats for their use when urban roofs could 

supply energy without hundreds of miles of transmission lines. 

The history of Joshua Tree National Park must be seen in the context of these conflicting 

cultural attitudes. American culture traditionally has disdained the desert, affecting the way both 

the general public and the NPS have viewed the park for most of its existence. It has made every 

aspect of Joshua Tree's management difficult since its proclamation as a monument. The irony of 

this story is that because of this historic contempt for the desert, the NPS in Joshua Tree has had 

to fight those who would take its land to dig for minerals, create sacrifice zones, and carve out 

personal retreats. The general belief that the desert is a ruined or empty place makes it hard for 

so many in the public to accept that it is unavailable for consumptive use or worthy of 

preservation. 

Nonetheless, the qualities of arid land that drew ancient prophets seeking isolation, 

serenity, and freedom from convention counteract that tradition of disdain. Adventurous tourists 

challenged the harsh lands and came to appreciate their stark beauty. One wealthy widow 

became so entranced that she generated and financed a campaign that led to Joshua Tree's 

proclamation as a monument. Facilitated by the automobile, more than 1.4 million visitors per 

year now seek the scenery, solitude, and adventure offered by the park. Indeed, problems of 

overcrowding plague its most popular areas. The park enjoys vigorous support from most locals 

and millions of Americans across the country. A common solution to many spatial problems is to 

divide the land into zones of useful habitat and unworthy emptiness. In southern California, the 

tug of war between these positive and negative perceptions continues to evolve as society 

subdivides its arid space into "crown jewels" surrounded by "wasteland." 
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Chapter One: The Nature of Joshua Tree's Land and People

The area that is today's Joshua Tree National Park is a stark and unforgiving place. Yet it is also 

a wondrous landscape that draws approximately 1,400,000 visitors per year. Sprawled across the 

ecotone between the Mojave and Colorado deserts, it has witnessed a variety of people adapt to 

its harsh habitat and pursue its varied forms of wealth. Throughout its history as a national 

monument and later as a national park people have contested its purpose and use. Millennia of 

occupancy and decades of mineral and grazing exploitation shaped a landscape damaged but of 

intense historical interest. In 1936, the federal government elected to protect the land and its 

resources to inspire, educate, and provide recreation for the benefit of future generations. It has 

not been an easy task. This chapter introduces the region, its physical and biological patterns and 

its long history of human use. To understand the story of Joshua Tree National Park one must 

begin by surveying the origins and development of the resources it is designated to protect. 

The Land

The most striking thing about the landforms of Joshua Tree National Park is the fact that, in a 

state, region, and country dominated by mountain ranges running north to south, most features in 

the park are oriented east to west. Five of the six mountain systems in the park are part of the 

Transverse Ranges that seal off southern California from the longitudinal-trending Coast Range, 

Central Valley, and Sierra Nevada. The Little San Bernardino, Hexie, Pinto, Cottonwood, and 

Eagle mountains all stretch along lines of latitude (Map 1-1). Only the easternmost Coxcomb 

Mountains, an extension of the Basin and Range topography, follow the north-to-south pattern 

that dominates the entire West. In between lie canyons and basins that reflect differential tectonic 

uplift or other faulting processes. Eroded material from the highlands blankets the lowlands,

reaching a depth of thousands of feet in the Pinto Basin. The tectonic forces and erosion continue 

to shape the mountains and basins that form the park's landscape.

The story of Joshua Tree's formation began at least 1.7 billion years ago when a mix of 

igneous and metamorphic rocks, including Pinto gneiss, developed deep under a massive 

mountain system that geologists call Rodinia. It stretched across a supercontinent from what is 

now Scandinavia through North America to Australia and Antarctica. That type of metamorphic 

rock is extremely resistant to erosion, and a combination of faulting, volcanic intrusions, and 

erosion of softer material above it has exposed pockets of it in the Cottonwood, Pinto, and Eagle 

Mountains. During the Mesozoic era from 250 to 75 million years ago there was active 

subduction of the Pacific Plate under the North American Plate leading to more upwelling of 

intrusive volcanic material that formed several types of granite. Monzogranite, a fractured and 

jointed type that weathered into the extraordinary climbing formations of the park, is one of the 

most common types. It composes the Wonderland of Rocks area as well as large portions of the 

Pinto, Eagle, and Coxcomb mountains.1

The modern uplands of the Transverse Ranges result from tectonic forces along the San 

Andreas Fault system, which runs from the Gulf of California to a point off the coast at Cape 

Mendocino. The 800-mile fault first formed along the California coast, as the plates shifted from 

a direct collision to a pattern where the Pacific Plate moves in a northwesterly direction as the

North American plate moves west. The crust atop the Pacific Plate south of the park consists of

material that was originally part of the North American Plate. Rifting of the Gulf of California
17

separated it from the rest of the continent. It is thick and dense, and, as the plates ground against 

each other, it compressed and lifted the Transverse Ranges from the Eagle Mountains to the 

northern Channel Islands west of Santa Barbara.2

Map 1-1. Joshua Tree National Park 2014. Data source: NPS. 2012. "Official Map of Joshua 

Tree National Park." Harpers Ferry Center. Delta Cartography.

The San Andreas Fault is actually a system of roughly parallel faults that appear around 

and in Joshua Tree National Park. The actual San Andreas Fault lies just southwest of the park 

and can be seen from Keys View as a line of hills at the northern end of the Coachella Valley 

(Figure 1-1; Map 1-2). The San Andreas along with the parallel Dillon Fault have formed the 

Little San Bernardino Mountains. North of them lies the Blue Cut Fault that boosted the ranges 

south of Pinto Basin. Along the northern park boundary lies the Pinto Fault, which formed the 

mountains of the same name, sealed the northern edge of the Pinto Basin, and now lies directly 

beneath the park headquarters in Twentynine Palms. Other smaller fractures, including a few that 

trend north-south have also helped shape the jumbled landscape of the park. Significant 

earthquakes occur when crustal material shifts along the major faults of the park area. They are 

unpredictable but certain to occur in the future. Several recent tremors have taken place on the 

Pinto Fault, leading to worries about the future of the park headquarters complex.
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Figure 1-1. The Coachella Valley from Keys View. The dark line of low hills marks the path of 

the San Andreas Fault. Photo by the author.

The six mountain ranges in the park surround several valleys and basins that have 

received the weathered material from the uplifting terrain adjacent to them. As that sedimentary 

material eroded away, several processes contributed to the popular geomorphic features of today. 

First, isostatic uplift occurred. Earth's crust rests on a liquid layer of subsurface rock that is 

weighed down by the burden. Like a waterbed mattress rebounding back after a person leaves, 

the land rises as erosion reduces the weight of the crustal material above it. This is what is partly 

responsible for bringing deep intrusive rocks such as Pinto gneiss and monzogranite up from 

miles below the surface. Eventually, the erosion exposes these rocks which are far harder than 

the material that covered them. The monzogranite, in particular, undergoes a second process of 

jointing or cracking along vertical and horizontal fissures while still under the surface. When 

exposed to the atmosphere, the fissures widen and create blocks of rock. Physical weathering 

then erodes the fractured blocks into rounded boulder-like pieces that make up the distinctive 

piles of stone so popular with rock climbers (Figures 1-2 and 1-3). Another process that happens 

is called exfoliation. When erosion removes the heavy overburden, intrusive igneous rock like 

granite can actually swell slightly, causing outer layers to peel away like the layers of an onion. 

These sheets of weathered rock can range from fingernail-thin pieces on a small boulder to 

several feet thick as occurs in the domes of the Sierra Nevada. Finally, a third process sculpts 
19

exposed rock at the surface of the surrounding soil. Acid and water collect against the rock base 

and erode pockets into it. Later, erosion may leave these features called tafoni above the ground 

level like indents in the rock face. Skull Rock is one example of this curious modifying process

(Figure 1-4).

3

Map 1-2. Mountain ranges and faults of Joshua Tree National Park. Delta Cartography.

The massive amount of rock and soil eroded over millions of years from the rising 

mountains has filled the basins of Joshua Tree to great depths. Along the edges of the uplands, it 

creates another type of distinctive desert landform, the alluvial fan. Water coursing through a 

narrow canyon moves quickly and can carry a significant amount of eroded debris. Once the 

water exits a stone-walled canyon, it spreads out and immediately slows down. Without the 

speed caused by the narrow defile, it drops much of the load of alluvium beginning with the 

heavier pieces. What results is a fan-shaped slope of debris, with the finest material near the 

bottom. Along a mountain front one can see these fans formed at the mouth of each outlet 

between individual peaks. In many areas, the fans will coalesce over time into a broad apron of 

material at the foot of the mountains called a "bajada." These long steady slopes such as the one 

leading from the park to the Oasis of Mara make for interesting driving and enjoyable views. 

The Desert Climates

Three factors dominate Joshua Tree's weather and climate. First, the southwestern portion of the 

contiguous United States falls under the Hawaiian High Pressure Cell. Air that lost its moisture
20

Figure 1-2. Jointing, fracturing and exposure to weathering have shaped the popular climbing 

landscape of Joshua Tree National Park. Photo by the author.

as it rose at the equatorial and subpolar low pressure latitudes, flows toward this area in the upper 

atmosphere and warms as it descends toward the surface. It arrives parched of moisture and 

inhibits surface air from rising to elevations sufficient for condensation and precipitation. 

Although the cell moves north and south with the seasons, it extends over southern California for 

much of the year. Along the Pacific coast the cell is the major factor in creating a Mediterraneanlike climate featuring dry summers and winter cyclonic storms carried on westerly winds. In 

Joshua Tree during the late summer and early fall, it weakens enough to allow a "monsoon" 

effect of moist air flowing from the Gulf of Mexico and bringing much of the region's rainfall. 

Forty-one percent of the park's precipitation falls between July and September. The San Jacinto, 

Santa Rosa and San Gabriel mountain ranges to the west and southwest of the park form a 

second factor that determines the park's climate (Figure 1-5). While winter winds bring some 

rain to the coast, the mountains create a rainshadow effect by leaching the eastward moving air 

of moisture as it rises over them. Once across the mountains, much of the air descends, drying 

out and bringing further aridity to the park. A third climate factor is elevation, which influences 

both temperature and precipitation. The eastern, lower portion of the park below 2,000 feet is 

known as the Colorado Desert, a subregion of the Sonoran Desert that also dominates Arizona 

and adjacent portions of northwestern Mexico. It is warmer and drier than the Mojave Desert in 
21

the western part of the park. This "high" desert extends north and east into Nevada and Utah. The 

higher elevation of the mountains in the Mojave portion of the park, especially the area around 

Covington Flat, has a better chance to intercept what moisture does get by the wall of mountains 

to the west.4

Figure 1-3. Diagram showing the process of jointing and erosion that formed the rocky landscape 

of Joshua Tree National Park. Source: JTNP. 2014. “Geologic Formations.” 

http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/geologicformations.htm Accessed May 2, 2014.

The combination of these factors results in a climate that averages forty-nine degrees 

Fahrenheit in January and nearly eighty-nine degrees in July. Twentynine Palms receives 4.33 

inches of precipitation per year, while the southeastern part of the park gets considerably less.5

The limiting impact of descending high-pressure air means that most of it comes in convection 

storms riding powerful updrafts and accompanied by lightning and thunder. These bursts of rain 

can quickly deposit a lot of water in a very short time, leading to flash floods that can destroy 

roads and other infrastructure. One dangerous characteristic of desert thunderstorms is that a 

mass of water can rush through canyons and gullies, carrying tons of sediment and debris. The 

flood may flow through washes miles away from the area where the rain fell and threaten anyone 

camping or wandering along a normally dry pathway. Cold temperatures in the winter can result 

in snow on the upland of the park, but it usually does not stay on the ground very long. By 

contrast, the much higher peaks to the west such as Mt. San Jacinto may have a snowcap for six 

or more months of the year, providing a scenic backdrop to the desert foreground of the park. 
22

Figure 1-4. Erosion at the former soil surface formed the indentations called tafoni that mark 

Skull Rock. Photo by the author.
23

Figure 1-5. High mountains west of Joshua Tree National Park intercept moist westerly winds 

and create a rainshadow effect that reinforces the park’s desert climate. Photo by the author.

The stark, sometimes dangerous climate of Joshua Tree has not always dominated the 

area. Throughout the Pleistocene era (2,588,000 to 11,700 years ago) the area was dry but not as 

arid as it is today. During the time of the Pinto culture, some 5,000 years ago, more moisture fell 

in the region and probably supported a larger biomass of vegetation. For several decades, 

archaeologists and other scientists speculated that the Pinto Basin was the site of a Pleistoceneera lake or major river. Recent investigations suggest that the area might have been an ephemeral 

or permanent wetland with higher rainfall that contributed to the large aquifer under the basin 

today.6

Flora and Fauna

Two important characteristics of the vegetation in Joshua Tree National Park led to its 

establishment and continued protection. First, the aridity of the area means that most of the 

species are xerophytes, plants with adaptations to low precipitation and high evaporation rates. 

Among the adaptations are the ability to store water, woody stems and leathery or waxy leaves to 

minimize water loss, and either deep tap roots or roots radiating widely from the plant to capture 
24

water quickly in a rare precipitation event. Increasing distance from one plant to another is often 

a sign of decreasing rainfall, although other factors can contribute to this spatial pattern. 

Generally, trees are scarce except in higher elevations and cooler, wetter sites. 

The second characteristic of the park is that it is the meeting ground for the Colorado and 

Sonoran deserts. The ecotone between the two deserts winds through the park, marking the 

increase in elevation toward the northwest (Plate 1). It includes the southern extent of the Joshua 

tree (Yucca brevifolia), the indicator species for the Mojave Desert (Figure 1-6), and the northern 

extent of ocotillo (Fouquieria splendens). The indicator species for the Colorado Desert, the 

creosote bush (Larrea tridentata), occurs in both parts of the park. In a region that many 

travelers regard as barren, the mixing of these two groups of species and the substantial variation 

in elevation mean that nearly 800 species of plants grow in park. A recent study suggests that 

despite climate change during the Holocene (the last 10,000 years), the assemblage of species in 

the park has remained relatively stable, although certain species have expanded or contracted 

their distribution.7 

Figure 1-6. Many tall Joshua trees such as this one in Queen Valley greeted monument 

inspectors in 1936. Photo by George A. Grant. Harpers Ferry Center, Grant Collection JOTR

#32.
25

With so many species present in the park, a wide variety of vegetation associations exist. 

For ease of understanding, park interpreters have divided the plants into tree-dominated, shrubdominated, herbaceous-dominated, and sparse/non-vegetated associations, the first three named 

after the most conspicuous type of plant. Tree-dominated plant associations in Joshua Tree 

include the Joshua tree, California juniper (Juniperus californica), singleleaf pinyon pine (Pinus

monophylla), desert willow (Chilopsis linearis), ironwood (Olneya tesota), California fan palm 

(Washingtonia filifera), blue palo verde (Parkinsonia florida), smoketree (Psorothamnus 

spinosus), Fremont cottonwood (Populus fremontii), and mesquite (Prosopis juliflora). Fortynine shrub-dominated associations exist, demonstrating their spatial prevalence. They include the 

creosote bush, ocotillo, blackbrush (Coleogyne ramosissima), brittlebush (Encelia farinosa), 

Mojave yucca (Yucca schidigera), and teddy-bear cholla (Cylindropuntia bigelovii). Herbaceousdominated associations (grasslands) include two primary associations, big galleta grass 

(Pleuraphis rigida) and the exotic European cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum). The non-vegetated 

association is characterized by desert pavement, rocky outcrops, dunes, playas, washes and areas 

with less than two percent vegetative cover. Patrick Leary in his 1977 survey of Joshua Tree's 

vegetation claimed that no true chaparral existed in monument, but several notable species from 

that community can be found in the northwestern part of the park including Sonoran scrub oak 

(Quercus turbinella), manzanita (Arctostaphylos glauca), and desert ceanothus (Ceanothus 

greggii). 8

The distribution of major vegetation communities in Joshua Tree appears in Plate 1. Due 

to its greater elevation, the western part of the park includes most of the tree and herbaceous 

associations, divided into the pinyon-juniper woodland, the Mojave mid-elevation scrubland, the 

chaparral-scrubland, and the annual-perennial grassland. The remainder of the park consists 

primarily of the creosote bush-mixed scrub association. Finally, most of the exposed rock and 

scree occur in aprons around the Pinto and Coxcomb mountains. It is important to remember that 

a particular vegetation community represents an overlapping of the ranges of all its species. 

Hence, borders between them are rarely as clear as delineated on a map. In addition to these 

"higher" plants, dozens of species of mosses and lichens thrive on the park's rock and soil 

surfaces. 

Three species of plants are worthy of closer attention because of their dominance in 

several communities and their importance to humans ranging from Paleo-Indians to today's 

sightseers, the Joshua tree, creosote bush, and California fan palm. The Joshua tree is a member 

of the agave family. Older books and pamphlets describe it as a member of the lily family, but 

recent studies have divided that group into forty separate plant families. It is related to the 

Mojave yucca (Yucca schidigera), which can be distinguished by its longer and wider leaves and 

hair-like filaments. Both types of yuccas often grow together in the park. Legend has it that 

Mormon pioneers named the tree after Joshua, the biblical figure, seeing the branches of the tree 

reaching up in prayer. Settlers and ranchers used the Joshua tree’s limbs and trunks for fencing 

and corrals, while miners burned them to power steam engines for processing ore. Botanists 

remain uncertain about what exact conditions lead to flowering on the Joshua tree, but 

reproduction usually depends on the yucca moth. In a textbook example of symbiosis, the moth 

collects pollen while laying eggs inside the flower's ovary. The tree relies on the moth for 

pollination, and the moth's larvae rely on the tree's seeds for food. The Joshua tree is also capable 

of sprouting from roots and branches.9
26

The creosote bush has the largest range of any species in the park. A pungent smell and 

small yellow flowers in spring and summer are notable features of this plant which dominates 

arid lands all the way to central Texas. Genetic and fossil evidence indicate that the creosote 

bush is a relative newcomer to the California deserts arriving some 12,000 years ago at the end 

of the most recent Ice Age. Formerly, a juniper woodland and grasses dominated the area, but 

these plant communities retreated to the western mountains as the climate warmed. The creosote 

bush successfully competed for scarce water and now dominates two thirds of the park. Although 

the plant produces seeds at each flowering, most of its slow growth and persistence in a location 

comes from a cloning process whereby new branches from the original seed replace the earlier 

and older ones above ground. Hence, the modern plant may be the end result of generations of 

branches growing and dying only to be replaced by genetic copies. One study has shown that the 

original of a creosote bush known as King Clone, located near Lucerne Valley, California, may 

have sprouted more than 11,000 years ago.10

The third noteworthy species, the California fan palm, grows in oases created in an 

otherwise hot and dry environment by water seeping to the surface through faults (Figure 1-7). 

Joshua Tree National Park contains five of the 158 palm oases located in North America. The 

desert fan palm is native to the low, hot deserts of southern California where it can live for up to 

eighty years. A mature desert fan palm may reach seventy-five feet in height and a weight of 

three tons. It has fan-shaped leaves that continue to cling to the bottom of the trunk after dying 

until fire clears them away. Fire kills young palms but removes competitors and opens up space 

for as many as 350,000 palm seeds from one mature tree to germinate. A number of other species 

crowd into the relatively moist micro-environment of the palm oasis including mesquite, 

tamarisk (Tamarix ramosissima, Tamarix chinensis, or Tamarix aphylla), and various grasses. 

The five palm oases in the park shown on Plate 1 include the Oasis of Mara and Fortynine Palms 

Oasis along the northern edge of the park and the Cottonwood, Lost Palms and Munsen oases 

near the southern boundary.

11

The surprising richness of floral species in Joshua Tree is matched by its fauna. The 

environment is demanding, but the park's animals have adapted to its constraints. Living in the 

desert means an animal must cope with great heat, a high diurnal temperature range, a lack of 

water, and a scarcity of food. To combat high temperature, many species are active only at night

and retreat to burrows or other protected places during the day. Primarily nocturnal animals

include mammals such as kangaroo rats (Dipodomys deserti), coyotes (Canis latrans mearnsi),

and black-tailed jack rabbits (Lepus californicus deserticola). Water is a necessity for mammals,

but many of the smaller species of rodents gain moisture from the food they eat. Reptiles need 

little water and also gain some from what they eat. The low biomass of vegetation means the 

carrying capacity for animals is lower than in wetter habitats, but nearly every species of plant 

serves some of the desert wildlife.

Joshua Tree National Park is home to fifty-two species of mammals including twentyfour small rodents. A few desert mammals such as the round-tailed ground squirrel

(Spermophilus tereticaudus tereticaudus), a diurnal rodent, enter a state of aestivation when the 

days become too hot and the vegetation too dry. They sleep during the hottest part of the summer 

and also hibernate in winter to avoid the cold. Unlike the rodents, larger mammals, such as 
27

Figure 1-7. Roger Toll took this picture of the fan palms at the Oasis of Mara in Twentynine 

Palms on March 10, 1934 during his inspection. He did not find the area worthy of national park 

status. Harpers Ferry Center, JOTR Collection, Negative #WASO-H-707.

bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis) (Figure 5-11) and mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus fuliginatus)

must drink water during the hot summer days from the springs and seeps in the park. Joshua Tree 

is home to many reptiles including eighteen species of lizards, twenty-five species of snakes, the

and the desert tortoise (Gopherus agassizii agassizii). The latter has become the most important 

species in the park from a political standpoint due to its listing as a threatened species. The 

California treefrog (Pseudacris cadaverina) and the Red-spotted toad (Bufo punctatus) are 

amphibians that inhabit the park. Other than myriad types of insects and arthropods, the most 

numerous set of species in Joshua Tree are birds. Their high metabolism and need for a lot of 

food and water would be a hindrance to survival in the desert, but their mobility means they can 

access resources over larger areas than other types of animals. Ornithologists have recorded more 

than 250 species of birds in Joshua Tree but only seventy-eight that nest in the park. Most of the 

rest are migratory species traveling the Pacific Flyway from Alaska to South America, especially 

during the winter. They appear at the reservoir behind Barker Dam when it has water, and many 

stop at the Salton Sea after passing through the park.12

The First Peoples

Scholars from archaeology, linguistics, and genetics argue continually about the origin of the 

first people to occupy the western hemisphere in general, and California, specifically. For several 

decades most accepted the comfortable "Clovis Theory," which posited that big-game hunters 
28

entered the hemisphere between 11,000 and 12,000 years ago over a land bridge from Asia to 

North America. That they were first has been challenged by linguistic theory on the rate of 

divergence of languages, by recent archaeological finds such as the 13,000-year-old Arlington 

Man site on the Channel Islands, and by evidence that suggests a coastal route in addition to the 

mainland one. This period coincided with the last glacial stage of the Pleistocene epoch. An 

increasing number of scholars accept the idea that California was inhabited by people at 

least15,000 years ago. Archaeological evidence in and around the region of Joshua Tree National 

Park confirms that people lived and hunted in a cooler and more moist grassland environment 

between 10,000 and 4,000 years ago. Archaeologists Elizabeth and William Campbell studied 

transitory campsites in the Pinto Basin during the 1920s and 1930s. They described a culture of 

adept hunter-gatherers called the Pinto Culture. Although their hypothesis that a lake or 

permanent stream existed in the basin has proven incorrect, their work on reconstructing the 

human ecology of these semi-nomadic people was groundbreaking. The Campbells collected 

relatively large, triangular spear points that Pinto hunters attached to a wooden shaft and 

propelled with an atlatl. Archaeologists believe the early Pinto Culture was a mobile population 

dependent upon large game hunting and seasonal plant gathering. Eventually, there was a 

decrease in moisture during the period of Pinto Culture leading to a climate similar to the present 

one. People gradually adapted by hunting smaller game and processing small seeds.13

When Europeans settlers entered California in the late eighteenth century, three groups of 

Native Americans occupied the Joshua Tree area, the Cahuilla, Chemehuevi and Serrano tribes. 

All three groups spoke Uto-Aztecan languages, parts of a language family that included Paiute, 

Comanche, Hopi, and Aztec. The Mojave Indians, a Hokan language family tribe from the 

Colorado River area, also regularly used the resources as they traveled through on long trading 

and social visits to the coast. The Chemehuevi were the most recent arrivals, having moved 

southwest from the Great Basin by 1500. All four groups interacted through shared resource 

extraction, ceremonial activities, and intermarriage. The Serrano inhabited the San Bernardino 

Mountains and the desert eastward to the Oasis of Mara. They practiced a hunting and gathering 

regime that exploited different elevations, depending on the availability of seasonal resources. As 

the closest group to the Spanish settlements along the Pacific Coast, they became targets for 

capture and conversion by Franciscan missionaries. Forced removal, disease, and persecution by 

Euro-Americans impacted their population to the degree that they abandoned their semipermanent camp at the Oasis of Mara by the mid-nineteenth century.14

Most of the Chemehuevi lived along the Colorado River in close association with the 

much larger Mojave Indian tribe. The agricultural Mojave people tolerated the Chemehuevi 

because they exploited different resources. The latter group used the resources of the Mojave 

Desert more extensively, including the area now included within the national park. After decades 

of living in proximity to each other pressure from white settlers led to a war between the 

Chemehuevi and the Mojave from 1864 to 1867. At that time, the outnumbered Chemehuevi 

temporarily retreated into the desert, and some moved to the abandoned Oasis of Mara. Later, 

after peace returned, many moved back to the Colorado River, but some families stayed at the 

oasis. The descendents of those who remained form the Twentynine Palms Band of Mission 

Indians. They own a reservation in the city close to the park headquarters as well as other 

lands.

15
29

The Cahuilla are closely related to the Serrano and lived south of them from the San 

Jacinto Mountains eastward to the Coachella Valley and beyond. Like the Serrano, they followed 

a seasonal pattern of resource exploitation that utilized different altitudinal zones. In many cases 

both the Cahuilla and the Serrano gathered food in the mountains and transported it to semipermanent camps at oases in the desert. The Cahuilla occupied semi-permanent camps at 

different elevations and differentiated themselves into mountain, Morongo Pass, and desert 

subgroups. The desert Cahuilla used Cottonwood Spring in the southern part of the park as well 

as Palm Springs and Thousand Palms further west. The latter was a major ceremonial site that 

drew participants from all four tribes at different times. Today, the descendents of the Cahuilla 

occupy a number of the tiny reservations scattered across southern California south of the park.16

The only truly agricultural people prior to European contact were the Mojave, who had 

permanent settlements and a sizeable population, but they traveled more widely than the others. 

Several routes, both north and south of Joshua Tree, became "salt trails," regular pathways to the 

coast that utilized water and food resources along the way. Later these trails served Spanish and 

American travelers. The Mojave claimed much of California's desert land as part of their 

traditional territory, but they did not begrudge the other tribes. Thus the Serrano, Cahuilla, and 

Chemehuevi not only accepted their passage and transitory use of food resources, but usually 

welcomed them as purveyors of information, trade goods, and social interchange. The Mojave 

even established food caches along their paths near sources of water, which the other groups 

apparently respected. One of their salt trails passed through the Oasis of Mara, and, later, a few 

Mojave Indians moved into the area with the Chemehuevi.17

This pattern of residence and resource use illustrates important characteristics of the 

Native American experience in southern California. First, each group had traditional areas they 

occupied and exploited, but they also shared abundant resources. Boundaries were approximate 

and changed through time. In some cases, a subsequent group might replace the pictographs of 

an earlier one by scouring petroglyphs over them to identify their claim. Much of the Joshua 

Tree area served all four groups, occasionally two or more at the same time in the same place. 

No band of any tribe would wipe out a source of food. Instead, they would leave enough for 

others and for future natural production. Second, tribal groups interacted regularly for social and 

ceremonial purposes. The population density was low, and the onslaught of Euro-American 

activities forced them to rely on each other. After that pressure limited them to the small 

reservations, many individuals from different tribes chose to live together. Though their numbers 

are small and their languages are deeply threatened, the Cahuilla, Chemehuevi, Mojave, and 

Serrano people still live around Joshua Tree National Park.18

The Native Americans who lived around the park found plenty of food in the 

environment, belying the initial European belief that the place was uninhabitable (Figure 1-8). 

An intimate knowledge of the plant resources and their seasonal patterns of growth and 

reproduction afforded a varied diet, medicinal remedies and materials for clothing, tools and 

shelter. Particularly important were nuts from pinyon pines, acorns, mesquite pods, and fruit 

from cactus and palms. Joshua trees provided flower buds and raw or roasted seeds as well as 

leaves that could be worked into baskets and sandals. Creosote bushes provided leaves for 

medicinal or honey-sweetened tea as well as remedies for bruises, wounds, and illnesses. Fan 

palms supplied fronds, used for making huts, as well as food. The Cahuilla burned the palm 
30

groves to increase the yield of fruit and moved palm seeds to auspicious locations, suggesting

that California's Indians who lived away from the Colorado River had a pre-agricultural 

adaptation. Many animals provided protein including bighorn sheep, deer, rabbits, lizards and 

even insects and their larvae.19

Figure 1-8. Chemehuevi basket-makers and their children at the Oasis of Mara shortly before the 

turn of the twentieth century. They found plentiful resources within the area that is now Joshua 

Tree National Park. Photographer unknown. JTNP photo archives, general collection.
31

The environment also supplied material for weapons, tools, and cooking implements. 

Hunters used wooden traps, nets, arrows, and sinew-backed bows to procure animals. The skins 

of rabbits and other wildlife could then be used for clothing and blankets. Craftsmen modified 

horns and bones for spoons and stirring utensils, and they used the copious monzogranite for 

manos and metates (grinding stones and bowls). Because of their composition, these are the most 

widely found relics in the park's archaeological sites. Some metates are actually ground into rock 

faces and can be seen by the discerning visitor. Natives also used stone from Joshua Tree to flake 

or carve arrowheads, scrapers, knives, and other tools. Fibers from the agave, yucca, and other 

plants supplied material for cording, bags, and mats.20

After Anglo-Americans moved into the region for good during the late nineteenth 

century, the Native American population quickly dwindled. The United States government 

established "trust areas" in the vicinity of the future national park beginning with the Cabazon, 

Morongo, and Torres-Martinez reservations in the mid-1870s. All were designated for the 

Cahuilla, although Serrano people also moved to the Morongo Reservation. In the 1890s, the 

government established another clutch of reservations including the Augustine and Agua 

Caliente sites for the Cahuilla, the Twentynine Palms unit for the Chemehuevi, and, well to the 

west, the San Manuel Reservation for the Serrano. Most of the Mojave stayed on reservations

along the Colorado, although a few moved in with the Chemehuevi and the Cahuilla. By 1913,

the Chemehuevi abandoned the Oasis of Mara ending centuries of intermittent use and 

occupancy. By that time, Anglo-Americans had usurped the native descendants' opportunities to 

live at the oasis and hunt and gather in the surrounding desert. This new culture had different 

ideas about the desert and what livelihood and wealth it could provide.21 

Arrival of the Europeans and Americans

The first Europeans to explore any part of California's deserts came from Spain. Alta California 

did not particularly appeal to the Spanish, but religious and political considerations drew them to 

the region. Missionaries' desire to save Indian souls led them to urge expansion of Spain's 

colonial empire. Then, Russian, British, or American incursions into the area galvanized the 

Spanish government to protect its claim by in the 1770s. The most successful and famous of 

these moves brought Franciscan friars, led by Father Junipero Serra, up the coast to the future 

San Francisco in 1769. Ultimately, the Spanish established twenty-one missions from San Diego 

to Sonoma. Supplying them by ship was expensive and difficult and so from the beginning the 

Spanish sought a land route from its northwestern base in Sonora via the Colorado River area to 

the coastal missions. Unfortunately for them, harsh desert conditions and the hostility of the 

Yuma Indians rendered the trip dangerous and costly. In 1772, the future governor of Alta 

California, Pedro Fages, led an expedition from the coast eastward into the San Bernardino area 

hunting for escapees from the mission at San Diego. This episode did not establish a route but 

did introduce the Europeans to the Joshua tree which they called a date palm. During the years 

1774 to 1776, Juan Bautista de Anza led two expeditions specifically to open a route from 

Sonora to the southern coastal missions. The route he chose passed through the Imperial Valley 

but did not approach the modern Joshua Tree area. On his second expedition Father Francisco 

Garces followed the Colorado River north and crossed the desert along the Mojave Trail, a 

popular Native American trade route that passes through Mojave National Preserve. Neither of 

these routes proved easy or safe, and the Spanish authorities essentially abandoned them.22
32

The principal problem the Spanish missions had was holding onto its "neophytes," as 

they called the baptized Indians. Runaways established contacts with interior groups, including 

the Cahuilla, and encouraged them to raid the sheep and cattle of the missions, but they also 

inadvertently spread European diseases. Meanwhile, Spanish officials planned to build another 

north-south axis of missions in the interior to protect the coastal ones while expanding their 

programs of settlement and proselytism. They could not, however, find the funds or personnel to 

carry this plan forward. In 1823, Mexico gained its independence from Spain and revived the 

effort to find a land route from the southern California coast to Sonora. That same year Captain 

Jose Romero traveled from the San Gabriel Mission in Los Angeles to find a Native American 

path called the Cocomaricopa Trail. The two year expedition failed, but its sojourners probably 

reached the Eagle Mountains.23

Not long after the Romero expedition, to the consternation of the new republic's political 

authorities, American fur trappers appeared in southern California having come overland from 

the east. Jedediah Smith of the Rocky Mountain Fur Company led the first group along the 

Mojave Trail in November 1826. Soon, other trappers and guides, including Ewing Young and 

Christopher "Kit" Carson, followed. By the 1830s, some Americans stayed in California, usually 

with the encouragement of the local Mexican settlers. Although the Mexican government 

opposed this practice, skilled sailors from the American whaling ships would abandon their 

harsh, shipboard life to practice blacksmithing and other trades, which the far-flung Alta 

California province needed. Marriage to local senoritas contributed to the appeal of this practice 

by sailors who, if caught by their captains, were subject to severe punishment or even execution. 

Communications from these "new" Mexican citizens and reports from traders and whalers 

returning to the East Coast ignited a strong desire by the American government and people to 

acquire California. After Mexico rebuffed American efforts to buy the future state, a short and 

one-sided war (1846-1848) resulted in the United States acquisition of nearly half of Mexico's 

land, including California.24

The U. S. and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848. Nine 

days earlier, a work crew building a sawmill on the American River far to the north found gold. 

Over the next five years, nearly a half-million people made their way to the state in search of 

instant wealth. Most failed. Many retreated from the Sierra Nevada to look for other goldfields, 

take up farming or ranching, or find jobs in the coastal cities like Los Angeles. Compared to San 

Francisco, the southern metropolis grew slowly during the middle of the nineteenth century, but 

later in the century it began its meteoric rise to become the second largest urban area in the 

country. Many of the people drawn to southern California began exploring the adjacent deserts. 

Others deliberately sought the "frontier" qualities of the desert, including its possible mineral 

resources, its meager but untapped grazing potential, and a lifestyle removed from the 

conventions and legalities of the city.25

Economic Exploitation 

For Euro-Americans, the two initial means of making a living in California's deserts were 

ranching and mining. Both were hardscrabble occupations that supported a relatively dispersed 

population and made nobody truly wealthy. The first Americans to use the Joshua Tree area 

consistently were cattlemen during the 1870s. At the time, the western, higher-elevation part of 

the future park received more rainfall than it presently does and supported a variety of native 
33

grasses, cactus, and other desert vegetation suitable for cattle. One of the earliest was William 

"Bill" McHaney, who drove Texas longhorns into the Lost Horse, Queen, and Pleasant valleys in 

1879. His brother Jim McHaney soon established an operation that brought cattle his gang 

rustled from Mexico and Arizona and returned stolen horses to those areas. They headquartered 

in an area called Cow Camp on the western end of the Wonderland of Rocks and kept their herds 

penned in Hidden Valley. The gang operated successfully for more than a decade. The attraction 

of this desert locale was its isolation. The nearest law enforcement officials were based in 

Banning, nearly fifty miles to the west. The establishment of Riverside County in 1893, 

immigration by miners into the area, and better law enforcement curtailed the illegal cattle 

operation during the last years of the nineteenth century.26

Legitimate cattle businesses moved into lands of the future park from the Morongo Basin 

and took advantage of the infrastructure developed by McHaney and others. One of the key 

figures was part-time miner C. O. Barker. A resident of Banning, he and his partner Will Shay, 

who served many years as Sheriff of San Bernardino County, ran both cattle and horses in the 

higher elevation valleys near modern Yucca Valley and Joshua Tree village. Barker began a dam 

that bears his name and which William "Bill" Keys later improved. Barker and Shay ran the 

cattle operation until 1923, after which several short-term operators took over. In 1929, 

Katherine Barry and Harry Stacey acquired the interests but sold off their cattle upon 

establishment of the national monument in 1936. Nevertheless, grazing continued beyond the 

proclamation of Joshua Tree National Monument and did not officially end until the conclusion 

of World War II. South of the future park, a pair of brothers named Cram used Cottonwood 

Spring to water their herds. In addition to these professional ranchers, three of the miners who 

lived in the monument, Bill Keys who moved to the area in 1910, and Tom and Jepp Ryan who 

arrived shortly thereafter, began running cattle. Bill Keys clashed with the Barker-Shay operation 

when he filed homestead claims that eventually blocked the cowboys and their herds from the 

reservoir behind Barker Dam. The ensuing struggle resulted in at least one episode of non-fatal 

gunplay and a bristling enmity between Keys and Sheriff Shay. It set the stage for a major 

altercation three decades later that sent Keys to prison for manslaughter.27

The impact of the grazing business on the future park primarily affected the water 

resources. Ranchers and settlers built small dams to amass water in low places among the many 

rocks and boulders. These "tanks" added to springs that the cattlemen adapted and natural 

catchment sites available after precipitation. Most of the structures associated with the cattle 

business are gone but remnants exist, particularly at Cow Camp where water troughs and the 

foundation and chimney of a cabin remain. The impact of the cattle on Joshua Tree's vegetation 

and on animals such as the bighorn sheep that depended on it is uncertain. If the number of cattle 

reached nearly 900, as some old-timers suggested, it surely diminished the vegetation and water 

at the time. Grazing may have hurt bighorns in the long run by decimating the forage or it may 

have helped by providing water sources that would not otherwise exist.28

The discovery of gold in the Sierra Nevada foothills made mining the leading economic 

function in California for several decades after 1848. Although it came much later to the deserts, 

it dominated the region prior to World War I. Gold and silver attracted miners initially, but other 

minerals including lead, zinc, and iron also proved worthy of attention. Mining for gold began 

during the late 1860s in the Twentynine Palms area. The presence of water at the Oasis of Mara 
34

made it a natural headquarters for the brief flurry of mining that ensued. The town would come 

later, but the oasis immediately established its importance.29

When gold mining came to a new area, several needs had to be met. First, the 

infrastructure for mining had to be assembled. In many parts of the West, the initial technique 

was placer mining. This involved using a pan, rocker, or sluice to separate alluvial gold from the 

rest of a slurry of water and sedimentary material. Running water was scarce in the desert and 

had been for a long time. In the Joshua Tree area, "dry placering," a technique that used gravity 

and the wind to separate heavy gold particles from lighter material, did not produce much gold 

because its alluvial form was scarce. Commercial concentrations of minerals developed when 

they precipitated out of liquid magma solidifying into igneous or metamorphic rock. When gold 

separated from the other material, it tended to collect together. Virtually all the gold and other 

minerals in Joshua Tree lay unexposed in solid rock. Thus, the miner needed tools and machines 

to dig out the rock, crush it into a fine powder, and separate the gold from the rest of the 

"tailings." Digging initially was by hand and later with the use of power drills and earth moving 

machines. All the precious metal mining in Joshua Tree was pit mining, where the workers dug 

vertical shafts and horizontal tunnels called "stopes" to access the gold-bearing ores (Figure 1-9). 

This required plenty of wood from surrounding higher-elevation forests to brace the tunnels and 

provide shelter on the surface for miners and their machinery.30 

After removing ore by tram or conveyor belt, a miner had to pulverize it. The earliest 

miners used a device called an arrastra, which was nothing more than heavy stones attached to a 

turnstile pulled by horse, oxen, or humans. The stones dragged over and crushed the ore. If the 

mine promised a good return, the claimants could use a California stamp mill, which raised and 

smashed down a series of heavy iron "stamps" or drums attached to a camshaft. These machines 

required power by steam engine or electricity. They made a dreadful racket, as the stamps 

pounded down on the iron base and the partially broken ore. After reduction by the stamp mill 

toa powder, the gold in it could be separated by two processes. The first, dating back centuries, 

was called amalgamation, and it required "quicksilver" (mercury). Millworkers washed the ore 

across a mercury-covered plate, and the gold adhered to the mercury forming an alloy. The rest 

of the material washed away. In Joshua Tree, mining companies located mills near a water

source or piped water to the mine from a well or spring. Once the mercury/gold amalgam was 

separated it could be heated to burn off the mercury. Amalgamation was also used for silver ore. 

During the late 1880s, three Scots in Glasgow invented a more efficient method of separating the 

gold in a process known as cyanidation. Gold had an affinity for cyanide, as did silver, lead, and 

zinc, and it dissolved into a solution with the poisonous chemical. Millworkers mixed low-grade 

ore with the cyanide and water and stored it in large vats beside the mine or mill. The auriferous 

fluid could then be tapped and further treated to secure the gold. Cyanidation extracted a much 

higher percentage of the gold from the ore than amalgamation. Hence, when the process came to 

the mines of Joshua Tree it allowed miners to re-work tailings from the earlier amalgamation. 

This process became important with the renewal of mining during the 1930s. In some cases,

miners only partially processed their ore before shipping it to another millsite where the gold 

could be better refined for a fee. One such location was the Wall Street Mill operated 

sporadically by Bill Keys from 1932 through the early 1950s (Figure 1-10). Keys made most of 

his money during the depression years processing ore brought by other miners.31
35

Figure 1-9. The Gold Crown Mine in 1936. Mining still employed many men in the new 

monument during the Great Depression. Photo by George A. Grant. Harpers Ferry Center, Grant 

Collection JOTR #16

The distance of the Joshua Tree mines from major settlements and suppliers of industrial 

machinery and tools required transportation over land that only a few Native American trails 

crossed. Thus, miners had to scrape out wagon roads to and from every mine and mill to connect 

with the railroads and rudimentary highways that passed by to the north and southwest. Miners in

the rugged slopes and canyons between the Little San Bernardino, Pinto, and Eagle mountains 

also demanded food, clothing, and daily necessities. A rudimentary supply system created nodes 

of commercial activity, especially around Twentynine Palms. As occurred all over the western 

United States, when miners flocked to an area, transportation and service workers followed. In 

this case, people intimately explored and established settlements of varying duration in a region 

previously regarded as useless and threatening. 

In the early California gold camps, miners invented a legal system whereby an individual 

or group could lay claim to an area for mining purposes. The land technically was federal 

property, but a miner could hold his claim as long as he (or she) continued working it. Mining 

districts formed to hammer out the rules and enforce them. This home-grown system became law 

with the federal Mining Acts of 1866 and 1872. Mining districts continued to be established, but
36

Figure 1-10. The Wall Street Mill erected by Bill Keys. Park Service plans to develop the mill as 

a working interpretive site had to be dropped due to vandalism and theft of the equipment. Photo 

by the author.

registering a claim became a function of the General Land Office (later the Bureau of Land 

Management). In the mountains of Joshua Tree, the sparse population and distance from law 

enforcement meant holding a claim for the first several decades was by no means assured. 

Individuals who found likely sources of gold or silver usually had to sell the claim or take on 

partners to defend the mine against outlaws and claim jumpers. When production and work 

crews increased and settlements grew larger, the danger from outlaws waned, as did rustling and 

horse thievery in the grazing business. Eventually, seven major mining districts formed within or 

adjacent to the area now encompassed by the national park (Map 1-3). The small strikes around 

Twentynine Palms led to formation of the first district with the same name in the early 1880s. 

The Gold Park District just to the south soon followed. During the 1890s, miners organized the 

Dale District around much richer ground to the east of Twentynine Palms. During the same 

period, they explored the ranges to the south and east in the Hexie, Cottonwood, and Eagle 

mountains and organized four more districts called Piñon, Cottonwood, Eagle Mountain, and 

Monte Negras.32
37

Map 1-3. Important mining districts before in the Joshua Tree National Monument area. Data 

source: Linda Greene. 1983. "A History of Land Use Joshua Tree National Monument, 

California," 89. Delta Cartography.

The most productive period for mining gold lasted from the 1890s until just before World 

War I. Prospectors sank hundreds of exploratory shafts, frequently finding nothing of value. 

They filed scores of claims and set up dozens of mines, most of which returned meager to

modest profits. Several, however, handsomely repaid their investors. The most successful was 

the Lost Horse Mine on the mountain of the same name, approximately one mile east of the road 

to Keys View. Frank Diebold discovered the promising quartz vein but, fearing the McHaney 

gang, sold it in 1893 to Johnny Lang, another recent arrival to the area. Lang understood 

Diebold's concern for he too had met Jim McHaney. Earlier he had lost a horse and while

searching for it wandered into the McHaney camp. He was fortunate to escape with a warning. 

After this episode he supposedly named the area Lost Horse Valley. Lang took on three partners 

for protection, filed the claim in December 1893, and began working the new mine to which he 

gave the same name. Despite their success, Lang's partners sold their rights to the mine in 1895 

to Thomas and Jepp Ryan. In a later interview, Bill Keys insisted that Lang retained an interest 

in the mine but was forced to give it up when he was caught stealing some of the gold. The Ryan

group, including wealthy Montana rancher Matthew Ryan, Jr. and several others, patented the 

mine two years later. Financial backing from Matthew allowed them to replace the old twostamp mill set up by Lang and company with a ten-stamp mill. They also ran a water pipeline 

three miles from the Lost Horse Spring to facilitate the milling. Ultimately the Ryans 
38

encountered a fault running through the mine and lost the ore-bearing seam of quartz. By 1907,

the mine played out, although it continued to receive periodic investigation and reworking of its 

tailings as late as the1930s. In 1982 geologists E. J. and D. L. Fife estimated that through the life 

of the mine it produced 10,500 ounces of gold and 16,000 ounces of silver which would be worth 

more than $4,300,000 today.33 

The Desert Queen Mine was another early successful venture although it reinforced the 

fears of early miners about holding their claims. Frank L. James, an employee at the Lost Horse 

Mine, discovered the rich vein in 1894 while prospecting on his day off in the northern Queen 

Valley east of the McHaney homestead. Jim McHaney and his gang learned of the discovery,

and one gang member, Charles Martin, subsequently shot and killed James. Somehow he was 

acquitted on a self-defense plea, and McHaney took over the mine. The McHaneys were 

cattlemen and lacked the experience and finances to fully develop the mine. They brought in 

outside investors, who ultimately extracted more than 3,700 ounces of gold during the next five 

years. After the turn of the twentieth century, however, the yield steeply declined. Bill Keys 

bought an interest in the mine in 1911 and, not long after, took over Bill McHaney's old 

homestead, which he renamed the Desert Queen Ranch. Keys worked the mine himself and also 

leased it to other miners on a yearly basis. Work continued well beyond the establishment of 

Joshua Tree National Monument, although it only produced 144 ounces of gold during the 

twentieth century.34

Precious metal mining lagged in the region after World War I, but the Great Depression 

and adoption of cyanidation brought desperate people back to prospect for new mines or scour 

the old pits and tailings for anything they could find. Many came from Los Angeles, forging a 

relationship between the city and Joshua Tree's mines that would later bedevil the early 

managers of the monument. With improved technology, a number of new operations began 

including the Gold Crown, Mastodon, and Silver Bell mines. Most of these latter-day miners 

struggled to eke out a living while trying to supplement their incomes with other jobs. Many 

dispirited mine owners eventually quit, at which point the always opportunistic Bill Keys 

purchased or simply took over their abandoned claims.

By 1936, miners paid more attention to the less-precious minerals in the area. One of the 

most significant finds was a substantial body of iron ore in the Eagle Mountains. Initially, miners 

looked for gold and silver, and later they excavated some copper and zinc. Iron was not as 

valuable, but it was present in large quantity. William Stevens and Thomas Doffelmeyer located 

the Iron Chief Mine around 1892, sold it in 1897, but quickly reacquired and operated it until 

1902. During that decade, the mine produced approximately $150,000 in gold at the prices of the 

time. They piped water eighteen miles from Cottonwood Spring for milling the ore. They 

continued to file claims on parcels adjacent to their original mine until they controlled a strip of 

land eight miles long and up to two miles wide. The gold-mining operation was essentially 

moribund in 1909 when L. S. Barnes purchased it and other nearby claims. He sold them to the 

Southern Pacific Railroad for $300,000. Everyone knew about the iron ore, but the mine 

remained underdeveloped until decades later when the country needed iron and steel to wage 

World War II in the Pacific.35

The impacts of mining and milling on the landscape and resources of Joshua Tree 

National Park are both obvious and potentially dangerous. Recent studies have located more than 
39

300 abandoned mines within the park's current boundary. Many have multiple entrances, called 

adits, airshafts, and other openings. Abandoned infrastructure lies rusting in many parts of the 

park. Hazard investigators have identified tailings laced with mercury or cyanide. During the 

boom era and again during the Great Depression, miners cut much of the arboreal vegetation for 

fuel, mine timbers, and building construction. The National Park Service (NPS) has attempted to 

rehabilitate much of the dense network of wagon roads and trails, but many routes remain 

visible, especially in the backcountry. Nevertheless, the history and artifacts of mining attract 

visitors and serve as the primary historic fabric for park interpreters. The chief cultural resource 

sites that draw tourists include the Lost Horse and Desert Queen mines and the Wall Street Mill. 

Indeed, the primary interpretive site in the park, the Desert Queen Ranch of Bill Keys, also 

narrates the mining story, for that was his primary activity during his productive years in the 

deserts of Joshua Tree.36 

The Desert for Tourism, Health, and Escape

Miners and ranchers sought to exploit the deserts of the future Joshua Tree National Park for 

financial benefit. Other Americans came to the deserts for land, health, and recreation. Available 

land always generated enthusiasm for a new region, even one as forbidding as the deserts of 

California. Two laws passed by congress in 1862 dramatically facilitated land acquisition in the 

western United States and encouraged people to move to the deserts east of San Bernardino and 

Riverside. The Homestead Act was enacted after frontier settlement bogged down in the Great 

Plains. During the nineteenth century, one important function of the federal government was 

transferring its land to private ownership. The General Land Office (GLO) used a grid system 

designed by Thomas Jefferson and others in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to facilitate land 

disposal. The "Rectangular Land Division System" or "Township and Range" uses lines of 

latitude and longitude to start a grid that delineates thirty-six-square-mile segments called 

townships. These townships are divided into one-square-mile units called sections, each of which 

contains 640 acres of land. Early in American history, the government decided 160 acres was a 

proper amount to sell or grant to prospective agricultural settlers. The Homestead Act gave 160 

acres for only a ten-dollar filing fee to any head of household who would settle there for five 

years.

37

 

The second law was the Pacific Railroad Act which awarded land to railroad companies 

to encourage construction of the transcontinental railroad through the empty western states and 

territories. The Central Pacific Railroad was one of the companies that built the first 

transcontinental railroad, and it subsequently became the Southern Pacific Railroad. In 1873, the 

Southern Pacific began constructing a line through the Colorado Desert. By May 1877, it

connected Los Angeles with the west bank of the Colorado River opposite Yuma, Arizona. Not 

only did it provide easy transportation into the desert, but it caused the GLO to survey much of 

the land surrounding the rail line. The Pacific Railroad Act promised the company alternate 

sections of land totaling ten square miles for every mile of track that it built. These lands were to 

be located within a strip of territory ten miles wide on each side of the tracks. If such land was 

already settled or allocated for another purpose, then the railroad would receive "in-lieu" or 

"indemnity" lands somewhere else. These lands could then be sold to settlers, reimbursing the 

railroad for its construction costs and providing future clientele for its trains. The Homestead Act 
40

plus cheap railroad property provided ample opportunities for people wishing to acquire desert 

land well into the twentieth century.38

Miners and cattlemen such as Bill Keys used the Homestead Act and mining laws to 

develop homes and bases for their economic activities. Others settled to work for the railroad or 

serve travelers on the evolving transportation system. These service activities boosted the 

populations of the settlements around the future national park. The city of Indio began when the 

Southern Pacific Company opened a depot and hotel at the halfway point between Yuma and Los 

Angeles in order to supply well water to passing trains. The company worked hard to develop a 

town that would satisfy its employees and railroad tourists in such a hot and desolate area. Those 

efforts soon drew other people to the town. Among the travelers riding those trains at the turn of 

the twentieth century were men and women seeking adventure and excitement in the exotic 

environment of the desert. Some wrote newspaper articles, books, or guides, highlighting their 

experiences and explaining the attractions and perils of the area. John C. Van Dyke, in particular,

caught the attention of readers in both California and the eastern states. Born in New Jersey, he 

became an art historian and critic. His urge to study and describe California's deserts stemmed 

from his aesthetic appreciation of the landscape and its natural history. Scientists too came to 

explore the region's geology, botany and archaeology.39

 

Sites with adequate water became early favorites among the explorers and new residents 

of the deserts. One was Palm Springs, an oasis lying at the base of Mount San Jacinto. Another 

was the site of a well dug by cattleman Chuck Warren and his sons. Known as Warren"s Well or 

Lone Star (after the local Lone Star Ranch), it is now within the town of Yucca Valley. A third 

location was the Oasis of Mara, site of the city of Twentynine Palms. All three benefitted from 

the realization by late nineteenth-century doctors that dry desert air could help patients with 

respiratory problems. Judge John Guthrie McCallum of San Francisco came to Palm Springs in 

1884 seeking health for his son who suffered from tuberculosis. He was the first permanent nonIndian settler. He purchased land from the Southern Pacific and built an aqueduct to supply 

water. It was the first step in the irrigation that would make the town and the Coachella Valley 

into a rich agricultural center producing crops such as alfalfa, apricots, dates, figs, grapefruit, 

grapes, and oranges. Two years later, the tiny community had its first hotel. In 1887, the town 

became official with platted lots and an expanding irrigation network. Shortly after the turn of 

the century, hotels and other tourism businesses proliferated, convincing the owners of some 

sanitariums to convert them into tourist inns. By the late 1920s, the town had become famous as 

a winter resort for movie stars and other wealthy patrons.40

Warren’s Well was an important stop for ranchers, miners, and horse-drawn supply trains

traveling to Twentynine Palms and the Coachella Valley. Several wet years, beginning in 1912,

drew some homesteaders to the area hoping to develop farms and ranches. Many failed when dry 

years returned. However, during the 1920s, World War I veterans suffering from the effects of 

mustard gas sought the hot, dry desert climate for its healing properties. The dawn of automobile 

travel brought roadside businesses and residents that formed the town of Yucca Valley during the 

years from 1923 through the 1940s.41

Dr. James B. Luckie, of Pasadena, California, treated many war veterans who had 

suffered from inhalation of toxic gases and people afflicted with respiratory or heart ailments. 
41

During the 1920s, many doctors still sent people with breathing problems to Santa Monica. 

According to Frank Bagley, a veteran who suffered from asthma, Luckie began exploring the 

desert in search of a place with clean, dry air plus an elevation of at least 2,000 feet, making it 

cooler than Palm Springs. He settled in Twentynine Palms and began attracting veterans and 

other health seekers to his clinic. Bagley was one of the first veterans to relocate to the town and 

acquire land. He opened one of the first stores in the new town, which became a center for the 

growing but dispersed population. By the mid-1920s, Twentynine Palms widely advertized its 

salubrious climate and available land in regional newspapers. Although they did not achieve the 

success of Palm Springs as resort destinations, both Yucca Valley and Twentynine Palms drew 

permanent residents and seasonal visitors seeking their own desert properties and experiences. 

Many maintained primary residences in the coastal cities, but enjoyed the contrast offered by 

vacation properties in the desert.42

It did not take long for real-estate dealers and assorted speculators to move in and take 

advantage of the emerging positive image of the desert and its financial promise (Map 1-4). As 

interest in the Morongo Valley and Twentynine Palms areas grew, Los Angeles developers saw 

opportunities for quick profits. They promoted a number of exurban subdivision schemes with 

ads and short articles in local newspapers. They also produced flyers and mailers, urging people 

to buy property not only for a residence or vacation home but also as an investment. Every ad 

promised that land prices would soar in the future and those who bought lots for speculation 

would reap great rewards. One ad, promoting a subdivision near Twentynine Palms, featured 

blurbs about the rich mines and booming tourism of the area plus a "report" about the huge 

profits made by an investor wise enough to buy desert land near Tucson, Arizona, before the 

town expanded in that direction. All the promotional literature assured potential buyers that 

development of water systems and transportation was imminent. Most of the settlement focused 

on the dirt track that would become California 62 from Yucca Valley to Twentynine Palms, but 

by the mid-1920s, speculators turned their attention to several valleys and basins that would 

become parts of Joshua Tree National Park.43

The principal areas that developers coveted were the Hidden, Lost Horse, and Pleasant 

valleys and Pinto Basin. Half the land belonged to the Southern Pacific Railroad and the rest to 

the federal government in a checkerboard pattern. Real-estate companies purchased land from 

the railroad because federal laws made acquisition of government tracts by a commercial entity 

problematic. The price for Southern Pacific land in the Hidden and Lost Horse valleys was

comparatively high, so most sales there went to individuals. One development company 

investigated Pleasant Valley but did not carry out its plan. However, the Pinto Basin, by far the 

largest area between the Coachella Valley and CA 62, seemed ripe for development. Los 

Angeles speculator LeRoy Harrod purchased land in the basin as well as in Twentynine Palms.

When Lake County Development Syndicate, Inc. bought large tracts there in 1928, he urged 

them to raise their lot prices, which he called "ridiculously small," hoping to see his own 

property rise in value. The company soon changed its name to the Security Land Corporation, 

hired an engineer to determine the water status in the basin, and began advertizing its lots with an 

order form that urged urban customers to "Speculate! This is Your Chance at California Real 

Estate Profits."44
42

The ads worked, and scores of people bought more than 300 lots, most of them ranging in 

size from five to twenty acres. But, problems soon surfaced. Security Land Corporation fired its

president, Jay J. MacSweeney, in October 1931, alleging misappropriation of funds. A company 

called Pinto Basin Mutual Water Company that formed to find and deliver water to the new

landholders had to sue Security Land to secure payment for work already accomplished. 

Meanwhile, land purchasers did not receive deeds for their property, and land taxes were not 

paid in 1931 and 1932. Soon, the state court appointed a receiver who then had to contact all the 

landholders and straighten out the financial mess. It took until December 1932 for many property 

owners to receive official deeds. In the interim, they found out that water in the Pinto Basin was 

too deep to be economically accessible. Thousands of acres of land were now in private hands 

with no prospect of development or resale. Most were also tax delinquent.45

Map 1-4. Beginning in the 1920s real estate agents widely advertized property and subdivision 

opportunities in the Joshua Tree area. The map shows the land division grid for the region. 

Source: Huntington Archives, HM 68366. 

One other development project significantly affected the Joshua Tree area during the 

campaign to establish the unit and throughout its subsequent history. The city of Los Angeles 

had secured water from the Owens River east of the Sierra Nevada in 1913, but many local 

officials and leading citizens worried that it might prove inadequate for the population growth 

they foresaw. One likely source for more water was the Colorado River. Already the Imperial 

Irrigation District, which formed in 1911 and received approval for an All-American Canal seven 
43

years later, had a major diversion of water from the river. In 1923, Chief Engineer William 

Mulholland of the Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works began surveying a possible route for an 

aqueduct from the distant river to the rising metropolitan area. The price tag for such a project 

would be so large that the city organized a consortium of regional towns to justify it. After 

receiving approval from the state legislature and Governor Clement C. Young, the Metropolitan 

Water District of Southern California officially incorporated on December 6, 1928. 

For the next several years, the water district pursued legal and financial support for the 

enormous project. Two key events occurred in June 1932 that enabled the project to go forward. 

First, on June 6, the California Supreme Court confirmed the legality of a $220,000,000 bond 

issue to finance the aqueduct. Twelve days later, on June 18, congress granted a right-of-way 

through federal land to construct it. The aqueduct was an enormous project that would take 

almost seven years to complete (Figure 1-11). Its route began at Lake Havasu behind the Bureau 

of Reclamation's Parker Dam, tunneled under portions of the Coxcomb, Eagle, and Cottonwood 

mountains, and then hugged the base of the Little San Bernardino Mountains. The right-of-way 

included not only the actual aqueduct path, but also parcels of nearby land for work camps, 

borrow pits, and areas to hold spoils from digging the waterway. Many of the parcels would later 

be included in Joshua Tree National Park.46

Figure1-11. The Colorado River Aqueduct near the Coxcomb Mountains. The 242-mile project 

began in 1932 and took seven years to complete. Photo by the author. 
44

The Joshua Tree Area in 1936

The natural environment of Joshua Tree National Park is a complex and difficult one. Six 

mountain ranges surround dry, desert basins and valleys with limited water and sparse 

vegetation. Yet people have lived in the area for millennia. The Native American imprint was 

light and has been all but eliminated by subsequent Euro-American activities. Spanish 

exploration and American surveys left equally shallow footprints. Only during the late 1860s did 

people begin to alter the environment and landscape in noticeable ways. Grazing and mining left

infrastructure and waste and seriously impacted the natural vegetation. Later, people from Los 

Angeles and other southern California towns began to see the place as something other than a 

wasteland with only mineral resources. The automobile opened the area to exploration and

adventure. Early asthma and gas warfare victims moved in, seeking health and comfort in the 

arid atmosphere. Recreationalists came, too, and some filed for homesteads. Eventually, tendrils 

of semi-urban development stretched along highways, ranches and water projects north and

south of the future park. Real-estate speculators followed with schemes of variable merit. This 

last wave brought more people than all the previous activities combined. In early 1936,

Twentynine Palms was a booming health resort while Palm Springs and the Coachella Valley 

were on their way to world fame. Then came the National Park Service. 
45

Chapter Two: A Monument at Any Price

On August 10, 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Proclamation 2193 establishing 

Joshua Tree National Monument on 825,340 acres of land east of Riverside and north of Palm 

Springs, California. It capped a complex and problem-riddled campaign to protect a broad swath 

of desert flora including the Mojave Desert's signature species, the Joshua tree. However, the 

proclamation ignored problems that would plague the unit's managers for decades to come. Tens 

of thousands of acres of railroad lands, state school lands, private holdings, and mining claims 

lay widely-scattered throughout the monument. In an effort to minimize these problems, the 

acreage of the proposed monument was reduced by twenty-seven percent omitting a variety of 

recommended resource sites and angering its most enthusiastic proponents. The story of Joshua 

Tree National Park's initial establishment as a national monument is one of ambition, idealism, 

reality checks, and compromise brought through negotiations and political maneuvering.1

Three factors led to the establishment of Joshua Tree National Monument despite 

significant local problems and the previous establishment of a much larger national monument in 

California's Death Valley. First, scientists, conservationists, gardening enthusiasts, and desert 

aficionados sought protection for the fragile flora of the desert, especially the iconic Joshua tree. 

Second, Los Angeles officials and residents craved a major recreation area to cope with the 

demands of its rapidly-growing automotive public. Third, the National Park Service (NPS) and 

the occasionally competing California state park system looked for ways to fill out their systems 

with quality examples of the natural and cultural heritage of the region, as well as geographical 

representation of the state.

Minerva Hoyt and Protecting Desert Flora

In 1926, wealthy South Pasadena resident O. W. Howard staged an exhibition of desert plants in 

Los Angeles to a curious and appreciative public. Among those in attendance was his friend and 

neighbor, Minerva Hamilton Hoyt, another ardent supporter of protecting and displaying the 

desert's extraordinary flora. Born on a Mississippi cotton plantation, she married a wealthy New 

York surgeon, Dr. Albert Sherman Hoyt, and the couple moved to California during the late 

1890s (Figure 2-1). While traveling westward, she was captivated by the desert vegetation as the 

train carrying her to Los Angeles passed through the unfamiliar and often desolate territory she 

would later work so hard to protect. She settled in South Pasadena and quickly became a leader 

in southern California's artistic, social service, and gardening organizations. After the death of 

her husband in 1918, she increasingly turned to the desert for exploration, peace, and solace. She 

later wrote, "the desert with its elusive beauty...possessed me, and I constantly wished that I 

might find some way to preserve its natural beauty."2

In 1927, when Howard again arranged a desert display, this time for the Pasadena 

Horticultural Association, Hoyt convinced him to help her develop a desert conservation exhibit 

for the Garden Club of America show in New York the following spring. Over the next two 

years, she created elaborate displays including live flora and fauna in New York, Boston and,

finally, London, England. She had multiple railroad cars and a ship loaded with plants and 

animals for ever-larger display areas, plus up to eight airplanes to provide fresh blossoms each 

day. She stressed the fragility and eerie beauty of the scenes and emphasized the dangers faced 

by this and other desert biomes. Her magnificent exhibits easily won top honors at all three 
46

Figure 2-1. Minerva Hamilton Hoyt from Mississippi became a leading socialite in Pasadena, 

California and the prime reason that Joshua Tree National Park exists today. Photographer 

unknown. Hoyt family photo donated to the park. JTNP photo archives, Cat. 20575, Image 065.

shows as well as personal awards and recognition from scientists and political figures around the

world. Based on this platform of renown and internationally recognized authority, she turned her 

attention to her adopted desert with the idea of permanently protecting it.3

In California's deserts things were not going well for the biotic resources. Ironically 

encouraged by Howard's and Hoyt's lavish exhibits, southern Californians enjoyed surrounding 

their urban and suburban homes with transplanted desert vegetation, especially cactus. 
47

Particularly alarming was the fate of a broad alluvial fan near Morongo Pass called the Devil's 

Garden. Desert traveler and author George Wharton James described it in his 1906 book, The 

Wonders of the Colorado Desert:

It is simply a vast native, forcing ground for a thousand varieties of cactus. They thrive 

here as if specially guarded...Delightfully interspersed with these various cactuses are 

flowering creosote bushes, the whole forming a singularly strange and grotesque piece of 

landscape gardening. As far as I know it is unique in the United States.4

Unfortunately, its proximity to the road from Los Angeles to Palm Springs, as well as the ease of 

removing mature desert plants like the barrel cacti, led to its denudation and destruction by 

commercial florists and amateur gardeners.

As the Colorado Desert gave up its cacti and native palms, the Mojave Desert's most 

famous species also suffered destruction. While smaller Joshua trees were uprooted to later adorn 

urban lots, larger specimens also attracted unwanted attention due to the qualities of their wood. 

Reporter Harry Carr explained:

Nobody paid much attention to the Joshua until lately. As soon as they began to realize 

its beauty and unique character there began the wholesale foray into the desert to dig 

them up. A Joshua tree means absolutely nothing except in the desert. What gives it 

interest and charm is the setting...There is no use kidding ourselves about it. At the 

present rate of destruction the cactus of the desert and the Joshua trees will be gone 

within two years. That is the opinion of experts; not my opinion. There are also the 

manufacturers. Yuccas and Joshua trees are used in various manufacturing businesses. 

They are made into artificial limbs; into shields for young, growing trees and into 

furniture for the movies. The chairs that comedians slam each other over the head with 

are usually made of yucca or Joshua trees. The third marauder is the idiot child who goes 

out with his girl on an automobile ride and sets Joshua trees on fire to see them blaze. 

They have a habit of signaling to each other--auto parties--with these blazing torches.5

Botanists and conservationists throughout the region and the country decried the wanton burning 

of Joshua trees by motor-tourists whom they called ignorant and short-sighted. The mindless 

destruction reached a crisis point in June 1930 when someone set fire to the largest and possibly 

oldest of the Joshua trees. At eighty feet high and nine feet in diameter many estimated the tree, 

eighteen miles east of Lancaster, to be more than 1,000 years old.6

Flushed with success from her popular desert exhibits, Minerva Hoyt was enraged by 

rampant destruction of desert environments nearby and throughout the world. On March 15, 

1930, she announced the formation of the International Desert Conservation League (IDCL). As 

its founder and president, she immediately began a campaign to protect California's deserts in 

some type of government reserve, preferably as a unit of the national park system. Ironically her 

initial success at convincing a government to save a plot of desert flora took place in Mexico. 

With her vigorous encouragement, the Mexican government established a 10,000-acres cactus 

forest reserve near La Paz, Baja California in May 1931. At the same time, the National 

University of Mexico conferred on her the honorary title of Professor Extraordinary of Botany, 

the fourth person and first woman in the world to receive the award.7
48

The IDCL quickly established a large board of honorary vice presidents including a 

cross-section of the world's famous and expert botanists as well as important university 

presidents, museum directors, and a few significant government figures like Gifford Pinchot, 

founder of the U.S. Forest Service, and Horace Albright, director of the NPS. Dr. N. L. Britton of 

the New York Botanical Garden explained the league and its purposes, "the necessity for 

withdrawing from private ownership, selected desert areas, with characteristic, often endemic 

plants and animals and prohibiting the removal of floral and faunal elements, has become 

apparent, and this is given emphasis as a major purpose of the League."8 Soon Minerva Hoyt 

would use the prestige of her honorary vice presidents, and her own personal funds, to direct the 

local campaign for a national park or monument for her beloved desert. She also offered a $100 

reward for the apprehension of the vandals who had destroyed the huge Joshua tree near 

Lancaster.9

The Recreation Imperative

While conservation-minded, southern Californians fretted about the destruction of desert flora,

the protection of other striking desert wonders and provision of a large, nearby recreation area

consumed many government and civic leaders. As early as 1927, a Los Angeles group of 

scientists, conservationists, and educators calling itself the "Joint Parks Committee" wrote to the 

commissioner of the General Land Office (GLO) requesting that he withdraw from the public 

domain specific sections of land containing important attractions in the deserts of California. 

Included among them were Red Rock Canyon, Morongo Pass (and Devil's Garden), Painted 

Canyon near Mecca, and Thousand Palm Canyon near Edom.10

Once Minerva Hoyt's campaign for a desert national park became known, letters of 

support poured in to NPS officials. According to a state funded study, Californians owned eight 

percent of the nation's automobiles, well above the per capita rate for the country as a whole.11

Organizations such as the Automobile Club of Southern California urged the government to 

recognize the need for a large, protected recreation area for its growing membership. Yet 

Stephen Mather, the idealistic first director of the NPS, believed national parks should foster 

inspiration, the study of nature, and passive enjoyment of America's heritage and natural 

wonders. Many forms of outdoor recreation were not appropriate in the national parks as Mather 

envisioned them.12

Nevertheless, many southern Californians preferred the mantle of national park status due 

to the financial benefits of having a park supported by the taxes of the entire country, as well as 

the prestige it brought to the region and, presumably, its inhabitants. Leading Los Angeles 

attorney and businessman, W. H. Anderson, wrote to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes:

Southern California feels that it has not been duly recognized in the matter of our great 

national monuments. None such, unless I am very much mistaken, has been created in 

our part of the State. Northern California has its many National Parks and monuments, 

which have been recognized and are under the fostering care of the nation. Central 

California has its wonderful Yosemite Park and Death Valley. There are other like 

preserves scattered through other parts of California. Southern California alone is without 

any such. Therefore, all of us feel that the time is ripe for recognizing our section of the 
49

state in this behalf, and there could be no more distinctive recognition than the selection 

of her rarely beautiful and unique desert to that end.13

Eventually, the NPS had to warn locals about this provincial approach, explaining that by itself it 

was not an acceptable rationale to justify a new park or monument. Assistant Director Harold C. 

Bryant responded to another urging from C. K. Edmunds, president of Pomona College, that "no 

emphasis [should] be placed on the fact that there is no national park in southern California. If it 

is a purely southern California matter it must eventually become a state park rather than a 

national one."14

Designing Two Park Systems

The third motivation for founding a desert park stemmed from the desire by both the state and 

national park agencies to expand their systems, somewhat belying Bryant's comment above. 

Both the NPS and California State Parks (CSP) were shaped by a progressive philosophy that 

government should engage in conservation and provide recreation opportunities for the public, 

and they cooperated to an extent in assuring protection for quality sites in California.15 Congress 

had established the NPS on August 25, 1916 to manage the collection of parks and monuments 

haphazardly run by a few Department of the Interior officials. Stephen Mather and his assistant 

and ultimate successor, Horace Albright, came to their tasks with missionary zeal. They had 

good reason to pursue their tasks with vigor. The U. S. Forest Service, a part of the Department 

of Agriculture, loudly argued that it should run the parks and that this division of land 

management between multiple agencies was unnecessary and improper. Hence, the very survival 

of the new NPS was at stake.16 Mather and Albright sought to popularize the park system by 

expanding its distribution to all parts of the country and establishing their agency as chief 

protector of important natural and historical sites. In response, a variety of public officials, 

academics and ordinary citizens nominated hundreds of sites across the country. Provincial pride 

and economic hopes led many to propose any and all areas in their regions. Many of them were 

either too small, inaccessible, or of dubious quality. The NPS wanted only the very best 

examples of ecosystems and historic places, yet it was loath to dismiss these proposals outright. 

Director Mather proposed one solution in 1921 by co-hosting a meeting of state officials aimed 

at fostering park systems in each state to absorb less significant sites and provide for more 

common recreational pursuits.17

The NPS’s drive to expand a representative system and the public's enthusiasm for 

nominating potential parks brought the agency to the deserts of southern California. NPS leaders 

came with specific rules and "traditions" in their hunt for new parks. In 1929, the Camp Fire 

Club of America, with editorial approval from NPS Director Horace Albright, published a small 

brochure entitled "National Park Standards" which described what steps should be taken to 

identify, evaluate, nominate, and eventually manage a proposed site. First, it explained two 

considerations to guide park proposals: (1) the park areas must be of national significance to 

warrant their commitment to national care, and (2) the area of each unit should be large enough 

to ensure proper management of its resources. After a discussion of correct management 

guidelines, the brochure's author elaborated specific NPS and legislative steps necessary to 

ensure adherence to the above standards. Chief among them was complete control of the 

assessment of proposed areas by the NPS. The brochure warned that "Congress should not 

empower individuals, committees, or commissions to choose new National Parks or to determine 
50

their contents and boundaries, but it should depend on the government's one permanent expert 

park organization, the National Park Service, which alone possesses the requisite knowledge, 

tradition, and experience, united with responsibility to the people."18 The NPS would seek input 

from experts and be cognizant of local support or opposition, but it would make the final 

decision on whether to recommend a new proposal to congress. This would become a significant 

factor in the campaign to establish Joshua Tree National Monument, as agency personnel could 

not agree on the worthiness of the area for national park system status.

During the 1920s and early 1930s, a curious assortment of southern California places 

ranging from the pristine and beautiful to the bizarre and unexpected were brought to the 

attention of the NPS. Among them were Borrego Palm Canyon, Giant Pictograph, Inscription 

Canyon, Kokoweef and several other caves near Valley Wells, Morongo Pass and Devils 

Garden, Mystic Maze, Painted Canyon, Red Rock Canyon, Salton Basin (and Sea), and 

Thousand Palms. Congress authorized a national monument for Indian Palm Canyon adjacent to 

the city of Palm Springs in 1922, but the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians refused to 

voluntarily give up the land which the act required. Despite its legislative mandate, the proposed 

national monument never became a reality. Today the Agua Caliente Band still manages and 

protects the canyons for both tourism and its own non-consumptive uses. Eventually, on 

February 11, 1933, President Herbert Hoover proclaimed Death Valley National Monument. It 

was clearly a worthy scenic and scientific addition to the park system, but it lay far east of the 

main population center in Los Angeles. To the weekend tourists of the nearer desert realms, it 

was welcome but still inadequate for their needs. In addition, many maintained that its vegetation 

poorly represented the ecological variety of California’s deserts.19

Meanwhile the state also pursued a vigorous search for new sites to add to its own park 

system. The earliest state park in California was Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove of 

Giant Sequoias granted by congress in 1864. Poorly managed by the state, it reverted to the 

federal government in 1906 to add to the rest of what today is Yosemite National Park. Despite 

this embarrassing setback, the state had established another park, Big Basin Redwoods, in 1902. 

By the 1920s, however, California's leading citizens strongly pushed for a full-fledged park 

system. The California legislature passed, and Governor Clement C. Young signed, a bill for that 

purpose in 1927. They followed a year later with an act that promised $6,000,000 from the state 

if the public passed a bond initiative for an equal amount. The combined funds were to acquire 

lands that represented the richness of California's natural and historical heritage and met the 

recreation needs of its widely-distributed population.20

With money in hand, the new California State Park Commission hired eminent landscape 

architect, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., to study the state's resources and to identify and prioritize 

specific areas for acquisition. The resulting study set goals for the state that still resonate today. 

With $15,000 in funding from the state legislature, Olmsted relied on a primarily volunteer staff 

to gather an immense amount of data on more than 330 areas in the state. He and his core staff of 

professional landscape architects, including former NPS employee Daniel Hull, divided the state 

into twelve districts, one of which included Riverside and San Bernardino counties. Three other 

districts included the remaining parts of California's desert in Imperial, Inyo, Los Angeles, 

Mono, and San Diego counties. Each district had one or more advisory councils as well as 
51

volunteer field inspectors. Unsurprisingly, Minerva Hoyt was heavily involved in the Riverside 

and San Bernardino part of the study and assisted in the Inyo and Mono counties district.21

Olmsted submitted his report to the California legislature during the final days of 1928 

and the state published it the following year. The survey team recommended 125 areas to be 

seriously considered for state park status. In the desert region it proposed Indian Palm Canyon,

which the NPS had failed to secure, Painted Canyon, Red Rock Canyon, Borrego Palm Canyon 

in San Diego County, the Santa Rosa Mountains, and the Salton Sea region. It also included the 

Joshua trees at Victorville, the Morongo Pass area, and two parcels that would eventually be 

proposed as Joshua Tree National Monument, the Lost Horse Valley and a broad stretch from 

Edom Palm Canyon near Mecca up to Twentynine Palms. Olmsted admitted that funding 

limitations would preclude immediate acquisition of many of the 125 areas, but strongly 

recommended an even geographic distribution of what could be acquired over time.22

When discussing California's desert, Olmsted eloquently highlighted the reasons why the 

state should establish parks in the region:

Certain desert areas have distinctive and subtle charm, in part dependent on spaciousness, 

solitude, and escape from the evidence of human control and manipulation of the earth, a 

charm of constantly growing value as the rest of the earth becomes more completely 

dominated by man's activities. This quality is a very vulnerable one. Its bloom is easily 

destroyed by comparatively slight changes made by man. The very conditions which 

make a desert what it is leave every man-made scar upon its surface so completely 

unsoftened by natural processes as to produce a rapidly cumulative deterioration of its 

precious wildness.

The desert is in general worth so little for any other purpose than occasional enjoyment of 

its untamed character, and so much of it in southeastern California is within easy reach by 

automobile of so large a population, that it seems a clear duty of the state to acquire and 

preserve inviolate several desert areas large enough for future generations to enjoy in 

perfection the essential desert qualities. As in the case of the ancient redwood forests, 

only such public action by the present generation on an adequate scale can preserve this 

heritage for the people of centuries to come. Nowhere else are casual thoughtless human 

changes in the landscape so irreparable, and nowhere else is it so important to control and 

completely protect wide areas.23

The report came six weeks after California voters approved the $6,000,000 bond issue that 

matched the state's appropriation. The Olmsted report gave direction not only to the state, but 

also simplified the NPS's mission to find quality parks in California, especially in the desert. The 

extraordinary abilities and fame of both Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. and of the director of state 

parks, Newton Drury (a future NPS director), were more than enough to qualify them as experts 

whom the federal agency should consult.24

In the meantime, the NPS was developing a master plan with a classification system for 

future parks to direct the system's expansion. New Director Horace Albright wanted

representative examples of geological and biological diversity of the nation, as well as historic 

sites in order to create parks in the East. As the NPS investigated these various potential parks 
52

and monuments, its planners and leaders came to recognize four distinctive plants in the deserts 

of the American Southwest that deserved protection in the park system. The first of these was the 

saguaro cactus (Carnegiea gigantea), a signature species of the Sonoran Desert found in Arizona, 

primarily between Tucson and Phoenix. On March 1, 1933, two days before he left office, 

President Hoover proclaimed Saguaro National Monument (now a national park). The second 

was the organ pipe cactus (Stenocereus thurberi), also in the Sonoran Desert but near the 

Arizona-Mexico border. President Franklin Roosevelt assured its protection when he proclaimed 

a monument with that name on April 13, 1937. The third species was the California fan palm

which occurred in washes throughout much of the Colorado Desert and south into Baja 

California. Aside from the unsuccessful Indian Palm Canyon preserve, small groves of these 

trees were subsequently protected in both federal and state parks.25

Finding the Best Joshua Trees

The fourth unique and impressive desert species was the Joshua tree. Both the CSP and the NPS

sought to protect this indicator species of the Mojave Desert. Various scientists, local citizens, 

and government officials offered a variety of locations. Rimo Bacigalupi of the U. S. Forest 

Service Experiment Station at Berkeley, California sent a map to the NPS that showed the 

distribution of the species across the southwestern states (Map 2-1). Based largely on herbaria 

specimens and research by eminent desert botanist C. Hart Merriam, it identified sixty-seven 

groves including thirty-eight in California, twenty-five in Nevada and four in Arizona.26 Walter 

P. Taylor, senior biologist for the Department of Agriculture's Biological Survey, informed the 

NPS that the Joshua trees in Nevada were probably a different species simplifying the search. In 

California, the largest area stretched some 150 miles from Lost Horse Valley to west of the 

Antelope Valley and included major groves at Victorville, Palmdale and Lancaster. From the 

beginning of the serious search for a park or monument in southern California, the NPS focused 

on protecting biotic resources. Other resources were important and could help distinguish 

between similar stands of Joshua trees, but they were absolutely secondary.27

The man charged with surveying the various Joshua tree sites and evaluating their 

qualifications for inclusion in the national park system was Roger Toll, the superintendent of 

Yellowstone National Park (Figure 2-2). He occupied the position that Horace Albright formerly 

held before his promotion to director in 1929. As such, Toll was the agency's senior field man 

and the recognized expert in evaluating proposed park sites. When presented with the task of

identifying an area for a desert vegetation park or monument, he relied on his biologist at 

Yellowstone, W. B. McDougall, who was author of a series of botanical circulars about that 

park. During the ensuing inspections and political campaign these two men would play important 

roles.28 

Although the NPS considered many Joshua tree locations, the choices basically came 

down to five areas. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. favored a large grove south of Victorville. 

However, Newton Drury wrote to Roger Toll that he had personally inspected the site as well as 

one at Palmdale and found that the state park system faced "insurmountable obstacles to the 

acquisition of a consolidated block of land, because of intervening private holdings and because 

of mining claims that had been filed.29 A second area of interest was the nearby Antelope Valley. 

At Toll's suggestion, McDougall wrote to Pomona College botanist Philip Munz asking for his 

advice on choosing the best Joshua tree site. Munz, who would later write a massive and 
53

Map 2-1. Distribution of Joshua trees according to Rimo Bacigalupi. Source: Roger Toll. 1934.

"Report on the Proposed Desert Plant National Park," JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, Cat. 25175, 

Folder 13.

definitive volume entitled A California Flora, responded that the country west of Palmdale and 

Lancaster have "veritable forests of Joshua trees" but are located in "rather flat open country." 

He preferred the "Keyes Ranch" [sic] area which "has a good development of Joshua trees and 

other interesting plants, with a striking rock formation of red granite."30
54

Figure 2-2. Roger Toll served as both superintendent of Yellowstone National Park and the 

primary inspector of proposed additions to the park system. Somehow Toll set up this selfportrait while holding a bobcat at Carlsbad Caverns on November 18, 1931. Harpers Ferry 

Center, JOTR Collection, Negative WASO-H-165.

Prominent University of California, Berkeley botanist Willis Jepson recommended to the 

Save-the-Redwoods-League and later to Newton Drury of CSP a site twenty-seven miles north 

of Barstow known as Coolgardie Yucca Mesa. Munz also mentioned the area and even offered to 

accompany Roger Toll there to survey it. Once again, however, Drury had already checked the 
55

site and in a letter to McDougall explained that the area, while interesting, was "pretty well 

riddled with mining claims, the working of which involves the destruction of the flora on the 

surface." It was for this reason and because of inadequate funding, he added, that his agency 

abandoned the site as a potential state park.31 

The most serious contender for a national monument to protect Joshua trees was the Cima 

Dome area in what is now Mojave National Preserve. This was recognized as one of the largest 

stands of the species, although opinions differed on its quality compared to the groves south of 

Twentynine Palms. NPS Chief Landscape Architect Thomas Vint reported a conversation with 

engineer T. R. Goodwin, who had studied Joshua tree stands for the state and would later 

become superintendent of Death Valley National Monument. Goodwin told Vint that in his 

opinion the Cima Dome group was the most impressive stand. Vint immediately wrote to Toll 

indicating that Goodwin was "well informed on this particular section of the State," and should 

be contacted for further information. Later a number of people in the eastern Mojave 

enthusiastically sought protection for the Cima Dome grove, even offering to drive Roger Toll 

around the area during his inspection trip.32

The fifth area was the Lost Horse Valley region southwest of Twentynine Palms. In 

January 1932, Clinton G. Abbott, director of the Natural History Museum in San Diego, wrote to 

Newton Drury in favor of this area which he had inspected. Although locals were already talking 

about a planned state park in the area, he saw "few persons with energy enough to push it." He 

noted that "it provides an unparalleled combination of fantastic rock formations, primitive Joshua 

forest, Indian pictographs, natural water 'tanks,' etc." He warned that miners were already in the 

area and that it would be ruined within five years.33

Minerva Hoyt's work for the Olmsted Report had convinced her of the superiority of a 

huge area lying east of Palm Springs from Twentynine Palms to the Salton Sea. Others on the 

state survey favored the area west of the Salton Sea (modern Anza-Borrego Desert State Park), 

but those tracts had no Joshua trees. The area Hoyt proposed had four advantages. First, it 

spanned both the Colorado and Mojave deserts promising a wide variety of floral species in 

addition to the Joshua trees. In this idea she was ably supported by Phillip Munz, desert expert 

and author Dr. Edmund C. Jaeger, and other academic and scientific authorities. Second, the area 

contained five of the nine desert sites recommended in the Olmsted study, specifically Lost 

Horse Valley, Morongo Pass (Devil's Garden), Painted Canyon, the Edom Palm Canyon area,

and the northern tip of the Salton Sea region. Third, it lay close to Los Angeles and its nearly two 

million inhabitants which meant it was readily accessible to recreation seekers, but also deeply 

threatened by vandals and cactus thieves. Finally, it still boasted relatively undamaged biotic 

resources unlike the areas near Victorville and Lancaster. The area Hoyt proposed contained 

more than 1,100,000 acres, admittedly well interspersed with private land, mining claims, roads 

and a utility corridor, but she believed it offered the best chance for a monument to protect

biological resources (Plate 2).34

Ironically, in April 1935, more than two years after Hoyt's proposal became the focus of 

the NPS attention, another recommendation for a park or monument to protect and display 

Joshua trees surfaced in western Arizona. University of Arizona entomologist Charles Vorhies 

belatedly urged the agency to reconsider an unidentified site where he reported that "sahuaros 

[sic], junipers, and Joshua trees are growing all together and in profusion." Assistant Director 
56

Bryant responded that the plans for a monument at the site proposed by Minerva Hoyt were too 

advanced to consider any other candidate.35

The Campaign Begins

As Minerva Hoyt and her widely-publicized IDCL pushed for a park to protect desert flora and 

southern Californians clamored for a reserve to enjoy on day and weekend excursions, the 

complicated process of creating a park or monument began. Three considerations had to be taken 

into account. First, everyone wanted a unit that would protect the very best array of vegetation, 

especially the Joshua trees. Second, the government should seek the largest area possible in order 

to encompass the diversity of flora, fauna and landscapes offered by the more than 25,000,000 

acres of California desert. Finally, past land alienation and consumptive land uses had impacted 

resources in ways that would have to be solved eventually.

Minerva Hoyt and her IDCL allies clearly felt that the NPS would provide the best 

protection at the least cost to Californians. Stephen Mather's incessant message that his agency 

preserved the finest sites with the greatest degree of legal and managerial protection had 

resonated with Californians as well as other Americans. As early as 1930 Hoyt wrote to NPS 

Director Albright to offer her proposal. Unfortunately the agency was embroiled in complicated 

negotiations to create Death Valley and Saguaro national monuments. Both areas were troubled 

by private land ownership and mining claims. These presaged the issues that would also 

complicate Joshua Tree's establishment and shape its management for decades thereafter.36

For a time Hoyt occupied herself with other desert protection activities including the 

cactus park in Mexico. However, when her attention returned to the California desert campaign, 

she was shocked to find that a Twentynine Palms faction had convinced state assemblyman John 

Phillips to introduce a state bill for a much smaller "California Desert Park" in the Lost Horse 

Valley area. Phillips introduced Assembly Bill 1292 on January 26, 1933 while the NPS was 

busy fielding recommendations for the best stands of Joshua trees. The bill focused primarily on 

the iconic trees as justification for its proposed reserve, but Hoyt and others suspected that real 

estate speculators were behind the effort to highlight the region in order to inflate land prices. 

Furthermore, a disheartening letter came from Horace Albright suggesting that a large national 

park in the area she wanted would be difficult to justify after the recent establishment of Death 

Valley National Monument in California's eastern Mojave Desert.37

Minerva Hoyt now faced two challenges. First, she had to find a way to block the state 

proposal which would cut the heart out of her more ambitious plan. Second, she would have to 

convince NPS leaders of the worthiness of her project. She acted immediately to forestall the 

state action. Rather than trying to combat Assembly Bill 1292 in the state legislature, she went 

directly to Governor James Rolph, Jr. and asked him to veto it so that the campaign for a national 

unit could proceed. After the bill passed the state legislature on May 12, 1933, Governor Rolph 

acceded to her request by returning it unsigned with an explanation of his pocket veto. As it 

turned out, there were procedural and legal problems with the bill as well because the California 

State Park Commission had not approved it and the state owned only a fraction of the land in the 

proposed area.38
57

Governor Rolph's veto sent proponents of a California Desert State Park into confused 

reevaluation. Most members of the state park commission had favored a desert park in the AnzaBorrego area of eastern San Diego County. On March 3, 1933 the federal congress passed Public 

Law 72- 425 which transferred to the state much of the land that now forms the state's principal 

desert park. Nevertheless, upon hearing of the proposed federal land withdrawal, Assemblyman 

Phillips hurriedly contacted Harold Ickes on July 18, 1933 asking whether the area had already 

been declared a national monument. Apparently the state legislature was still considering the 

area despite Governor Rolph's veto. Public Law 72-425 had the desired effect, however, since it 

allowed the establishment of Anza Desert State Park that year, temporarily derailing the state's 

pursuit of a park specifically for Joshua trees. Ultimately, California did create a Joshua Tree 

State Park in Antelope Valley on land acquired in 1957. Six years later it officially opened, and 

in 1972 the name was changed to Saddleback Butte State Park. The state added another unit with 

Joshua trees called Arthur B. Ripley Desert Woodland State Park west of Saddleback Butte in 

1998.39 

Minerva Hoyt Visits Washington, D.C.

In spite of Albright's discouraging response, the NPS continued to evaluate California's deserts. 

Roger Toll visited the region from December 1932 through January 1933 in order to inspect a 

number of sites suggested by the Olmsted Report or local citizens and officials. Among the sites 

he viewed were Indian Palm Canyon, Thousand Palms, the Morongo Pass-Devil's Garden area,

and Joshua tree stands near Palmdale and Lancaster. With the exception of Indian Palm Canyon,

he was uniformly unimpressed. He found the palm groves in private ownership and, in some 

cases, burned by movie studios to make them look more appropriate for films about Arabia. 

Although he did not visit Cima Dome or the Lost Horse Valley areas, he was disappointed with 

the Joshua trees he did see, writing in his later report, "I have not as yet seen any area of Joshua 

trees that seems desirable for a national monument. In some cases private holdings interfere and 

in other cases the stand of Joshua trees is not exceptionally heavy and would not be of 

outstanding public interest."40

His evaluation of Morongo Pass and Devil's Garden was similarly negative. In his report 

he noted that the area was reputed to have a larger number of desert plants than any other, but it 

did not contain any of the four desirable desert species that the Park Service was seeking. After 

adding that Death Valley and Borrego Palm Canyon in the proposed state park also had 

extensive vegetation, Toll delivered a negative verdict, "It does not seem that this area has 

outstanding interest of a national character to justify its consideration as a national monument." 

Although Toll did not visit the area that would become Joshua Tree National Park, he reported 

that D. F. Geil of the Morongo Valley Inn described the Lost Horse and Queen valleys as filled 

with many Joshua trees as well as huge granite boulders. Toll did find out, however, that "the 

area is about half Southern Pacific land and about half Government land, with some 

homesteaders now making entries."41

With the immediate threat of a smaller state park removed, Hoyt decided it was time to 

tackle the NPS and the new administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt head-on. First, she 

secured a letter from Governor Rolph to Roosevelt introducing her and explaining the worth of 

her project. Critical to success was getting new Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes on board

(Figure 2-3). Fortunately, Ickes, a famously irascible but progressive-minded conservationist, 
58

was well disposed to the project. Furthermore, he was a determined individual not troubled by

such difficulties as extensive private lands and mining claims. The primary purpose of Hoyt's 

June 1933 visit was to convince the president to withdraw the area in her proposal from the 

public domain in order to halt any further alienation of land to private interests. She convinced 

Ickes that it was necessary to allow the NPS to properly study the region and make a decision 

based on the expertise of its inspectors. While in Washington, D.C. she met with a number of 

NPS officials including future director Conrad Wirth who was heavily involved in the 

identification of potential new parks. During the meetings, the proposed unit took on the working 

title of "Desert Plant National Park."42 

Figure 2-3. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes addresses a crowd in Chicago during October 

1937. Sitting behind him and wearing a top hat is President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Photographer 

unknown. This is a still picture from a film held by the Library of Congress. The picture is at the 

Harpers Ferry Center, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Collection, Negative number LC-USZ62-

96485.
59

As the summer of 1933 wore on, concern mounted over the fate of the proposed land 

withdrawal. An impatient Minerva Hoyt chafed at the delays. She wrote to Conrad Wirth 

reminding him that Ickes had told her that in the case of the withdrawal, "the President is for it, 

and I am for it." She pleaded with Wirth, "Don't fail us." She wrote a similar letter to Assistant 

Director Arthur Demaray mistakenly addressing him as "Mr. A. E. Dunaray" which may not 

have helped her cause. When Director Arno Cammerer planned a trip to California, she wrote 

encouraging him to visit the area and personally inspect the proposed park. Finally, Ickes 

responded with a telegram explaining that the executive order was in the process of execution. 

He also reminded her that even with the temporary withdrawal, the area would still have to 

undergo a rigorous examination by the NPS to determine if it qualified as a park of national 

interest.43

One of the factors delaying the president's executive action was the bureaucratic necessity 

of checking with the GLO, which actually administered the federal lands in question. In response 

to a request from outgoing director Horace Albright, GLO Commissioner Fred W. Johnson 

provided a series of maps showing all or parts of 62 townships to be included in the withdrawal 

and indicating which parcels belonged to the Southern Pacific Railroad (SPRR), the state, the 

Bureau of Reclamation, and private individuals. On July 28, 1933 the commissioner sent another 

letter suggesting text for the president's executive order that assured that existing rights and the 

provisions of existing withdrawals for the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) of Los Angeles

and several other water projects would be protected.44 

Finally, on October 25, 1933, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6361 

temporarily removing "approximately 1,136,000 acres" from the public domain (Plate 2). 

Significantly, it included most of the language suggested by Commissioner Johnson. Also of 

interest was the fact that, although Hoyt's proposal included the northeastern shoreline of the 

Salton Sea, the land legally described in the proclamation ended more than a mile short of it. But 

with most of the land she had recommended now unavailable for alienation to private interests, 

Minerva Hoyt and her allies in the IDCL felt that the primary hurdle had been crossed. They 

settled down to await the inspection trip by Roger Toll scheduled for March 1934.45

Choosing a Name

In the months leading up to Toll's inspection, correspondence supporting the park proposal 

increased and took two forms. First, came letters and resolutions supporting the establishment of 

a national park or monument. In late November 1933, both the mayor and the chamber of 

commerce of Los Angeles appealed to Secretary Ickes to save the area for its extraordinary 

vegetation, unusual rock formations, striking Indian "hieroglyphics," and proximity to the big 

metropolis. A few weeks later, Congressman John Dockweiler and the U. S. Chamber of 

Commerce also urged the secretary to preserve the area.46

At the same time, a more complicated issue arose as many of the letters suggested that 

the eventual park or monument should be named for Minerva Hoyt. One of the earliest was a 

letter to Harold Ickes from William Simpson, president of the Los Angeles Chamber of 

Commerce, who reasoned, "Mrs. Hoyt is internationally known as an authority upon desert life, 

and no more fitting name could be chosen for the great monument, the establishment of which is 

respectfully urged."47 For the rest of the campaign to establish the national monument, a steady 
60

drumbeat of letters, telegrams and resolutions followed from increasingly wide-ranging groups 

of scientists, conservationists and supporters of Hoyt and her work. The response from Secretary 

Ickes disappointed Simpson, but did nothing to slow the groundswell of support for the Hoyt 

name.

I agree with you that Mrs. Minerva Hoyt is entitled to much credit for her conservation 

work, but it is established policy of the Department to refrain from naming national parks 

and monuments after individuals. Our leading conservationists are of the opinion that it is 

far more fitting to choose a name that bears a direct relation to the area's natural features 

or early history. However, if the monument is established, it might be possible to 

acknowledge Mrs. Hoyt's work by placing a plaque in the area. In none but exceptional 

cases does the Department permit even this memorialization [sic] of individuals, but it 

would seem that Mrs. Hoyt has earned such consideration.48

However, even as the secretary mailed this response, more correspondence arrived 

backing the Hoyt name. In early March 1934, Governor Rolfe wrote directly to President 

Roosevelt to thank him for withdrawing the land in southern California from the public domain 

and to support Californians who wanted the reserve to be named for Hoyt. Meanwhile a host of 

women's clubs, civic organizations, and local officials continued to exhort Secretary Ickes and 

Director Cammerer. Cammerer finally responded that the NPS never named parks or monuments 

after living persons, that only four of the sixty-seven existing national monuments were named 

for any persons at all, and that "these are named for long dead historic characters who have been 

intimately involved in the historic background of the area." He listed George Washington 

Birthplace National Monument and Cabrillo National Monument as appropriate examples and 

added that naming the proposed monument after Minerva Hoyt "would establish an undesirable 

precedent."49

This explanation had no effect. Letters to Roosevelt, Ickes, Cammerer, and various 

members of congress continued to arrive from around the country. A native of Mississippi, 

Joshua Green, who lived at the time in Seattle, wrote to the southern state’s senators urging them 

to back the Hoyt name in order to honor one of their own. Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi 

forwarded the letter to Cammerer with his full support. Mrs. Edwin S. Fuller, noting that 

Minerva Hoyt herself favored the name "Joshua Tree Reservation," nevertheless called for the 

Hoyt name as a well-deserved honor for her great work.50

On June 16, 1934, Benjamin Fenton of Pasadena wrote to Cammerer reminding him that 

Muir Woods National Monument, established in 1908, was named for the famous conservationist 

and founder of the Sierra Club, John Muir, while he was still alive. An embarrassed Cammerer 

responded to this "delightful note" by acknowledging the Muir exception, but reiterating his 

unwillingness to establish such a precedent. "If such a policy were not followed we might have 

had a George Stewart National Park instead of a Sequoia National Park, a Steel National Park 

instead of Crater Lake National Park, and going farther back a Vest-Pettengill or Cornelius 

Hedge National Park instead of Yellowstone National Park."51

Through the rest of 1934 and 1935, correspondence favoring Minerva Hoyt National 

Monument continued to come in, some from as far away as London, England. As these 

broadened into organizational resolutions, the NPS developed a form letter to respond. It blithely 
61

ignored the Muir Woods case and continued to refuse, citing its fear of setting a bad precedent. 

The public correspondence was not entirely one-sided. Former miner Chester A. Pinkham wrote, 

"I am interceding for all the old prospectors who wish the desert kept perfectly natural in both 

structure and name...it is their policy to give a name suitable to the natural grandeur alone, one 

suitable to the makeup of the territory." This would not be the last time mining interests 

challenged aspects and policies of the future Joshua Tree National Monument.52

Finally, Minerva Hoyt herself weighed in on the name issue. In September 1935, she 

informed the Altadena Historical and Beautification Society that she preferred the name "Joshua 

Tree National Monument." The society immediately passed a resolution of support and its 

secretary, Rachel Vordermark, notified Harold Ickes. Hoyt's decision and its communication to 

the secretary of the interior seemed to calm the frenzy surrounding the name even as the overall 

campaign to establish a monument, including all the lands withdrawn by President Roosevelt in 

1933, intensified. In March 1936, southern California's Congressman John McGroarty again 

suggested the Joshua Tree National Monument name to Harold Ickes, no doubt at the behest of 

Minerva Hoyt. This spurred a flurry of correspondence between the secretary and the senior NPS 

officials that led to a general agreement that this was an appropriate replacement for the working 

title of Desert Plant National Monument. Ickes allowed that this name seemed a good one in 

spite of the fact that he detested Congressman McGroarty. A month later, a pleased Minerva 

Hoyt telegraphed her congratulations to Ickes and predicted that the new name would help the 

campaign to create the monument.53 

The Roger Toll Inspection and Report

As news reports circulated about the withdrawn acreage and proposed national monument, 

Minerva Hoyt and her allies prepared for Roger Toll's all important visit. Senator Hiram Johnson 

of California wrote to Ickes urging him to have Toll meet Hoyt and be led by her during his 

inspection. Meanwhile Toll, as the NPS's senior judge of proposed additions to the system, 

planned an elaborate winter inspection tour of thirteen areas including several in southern 

California. One of the latter was the Cima Dome area which he felt still deserved an inspection in 

spite of its location well outside President Roosevelt's land withdrawal. As for the inspections 

themselves, Toll would use the three criteria he largely had developed and which are still used 

today to evaluate proposed areas. The first is national significance. Although he admitted in a 

1930 letter that its quantification was impossible, it has always been the first and foremost filter

through which any proposed unit must pass.54 Is the resource important to the entire nation? This 

includes both its level of magnificence and whether it is the best representation of an historic or 

natural resource theme. To this day, field investigation teams are staffed with experienced NPS

specialists to reduce subjectivity as much as possible. Years later, when ordered to evaluate a 

potential national seashore, one field team member asked for further explanation of the concept. 

His supervisor responded that he would know it when he saw it. A second criterion is feasibility. 

Regardless of its significance, a proposed park that would cost too much for land acquisition or 

meet intense local opposition is not considered feasible. This would ultimately become the 

primary obstacle to the creation of Joshua Tree National Monument. The third criterion is 

suitability. The agency does not want areas that duplicate resources already in the park system. 

This is what motivated Director Albright to suggest earlier that the existence of Death Valley 

National Monument might preclude the establishment of a Joshua tree unit.55
62

On March 8, 1934, Roger Toll arrived in Southern California for a four day inspection to 

evaluate the withdrawn area's worth as a national park. The first three days consisted of an 

automobile tour of the region with Minerva Hoyt, her chauffer, and Pomona College botanist 

Philip Munz. Toll kept a detailed minute-to-minute log of the tour identifying every stop, every 

road traveled, every site surveyed, and everyone with whom he spoke, The quartet left San 

Bernardino on Friday, March 9 and journeyed through Morongo Pass before inspecting the 

Coyote Holes, Quail Springs, Inspiration Point (Keys View) and the Lost Horse Well areas,

ending the day at Twentynine Palms. Day two began with a visit to the palm grove after which 

the town was named and then meetings with store owner and representative of the local 

American Legion chapter Frank Bagley, Hesmel Earenfight of the town's chamber of commerce 

(and future national monument employee), and archaeologists Elizabeth and William Campbell. 

Thereafter, the group visited the White Tanks area, some prominent mines, Cottonwood Spring,

and the Lost Palms Canyon in the Eagle Mountains. On the third day, the travelers left their hotel 

in Blythe and visited the Chuckwalla Mountains, Hidden Springs, and Painted Canyon before 

returning to San Bernardino. On Monday, March 12, Hoyt brought Toll to visit monument 

supporters in the Los Angeles area including some who had previously supplied data to Toll as 

he prepared for the inspection tour. He left the following day to begin compiling his reports on 

all the winter inspections he had conducted.56

The inspection tour was a hurried one and it must have frustrated Minerva Hoyt to have 

so little time to show an area of more than one million acres. The schedule was tight and 

nowhere in his detailed log of the visit did Roger Toll mention lunch. At least one result of this 

harried itinerary was a very negative reaction by some people in Twentynine Palms, especially 

the Campbells, who had been proponents of the state park bill that Hoyt convinced Governor 

Rolfe to veto. Later Mrs. Campbell wrote to Park Service archaeologist Jesse Nusbaum:

By the time your good letter had reached us Mr. Toll had been here and gone. We found 

him a perfectly delightful person and wished with all our hearts that we could have 

sneaked him into a corner and had a good talk with him and said all that we would have 

liked to. Unfortunately Mrs. Minerva Sherman-Hoyt had him in tow (she is the one who 

is sponsoring this Park idea on condition that it be dubbed ‘The Minerva Sherman-Hoyt 

Memorial Desert National Park’) and she wouldn't let us get a word in edgewise with Mr. 

Toll for fear we would say something about the name! She dragged him off by the elbow 

just when he and Bill were having a lovely time talking about all the things that are of 

interest in this district so our very few minutes with him were sort of sad! and he was 

such a lovely person and we so wanted to talk to him that day. You see our park was to 

be a state park and this woman went to Gov. Rolph and begged him not to sign the bill as 

it was not named for her in the state idea. People are already calling the proposed park 

'the nerva-hoyt park' and really such a name is enough to blast all the desert growth and I 

don't suppose that there is much that we can do about it. Isn't it a mess? but funny!57

It is uncertain where Mrs. Campbell got the idea that Hoyt's opposition to the state park stemmed 

from a preference for a unit in her own name. California's park agency has always been far 

likelier to name its units after people, living or dead. In all likelihood, this spiteful conclusion 

resulted from the earlier foiled plans for the state park, as well as Hoyt's frenzied schedule and 
63

single-minded drive to convince Toll of the worthiness of a much larger, federally protected 

park. 

With a mass of data and a personal inspection behind him, Roger Toll began compiling 

his report to the director. Due to the high profile campaign and the president's withdrawal of the 

land for the potential monument, it needed to be as complete and detailed as possible. The final 

report ultimately contained more than 170 pages of site descriptions, analysis, correspondence, 

news reports, maps, photographs and other explanatory data. It began with a cover letter in which 

Toll dropped the bombshell:

It is believed that the area is not suitable for a national park, for the following reasons: [1] 

It is not the outstanding desert area of the United States. Death Valley National 

Monument is far superior to it in scenic quality and has many important features of 

interest not possessed by the area under consideration. [2] The area is interesting and of 

great value for local and state use, but is lacking in any distinctive, superlative, 

outstanding feature that would give it sufficient importance to justify its establishment as 

a national park.58

Instead, Toll suggested that the Lost Horse Valley area might be appropriate for a much 

smaller national monument of some 138,240 acres which would feature a lesser quality group of 

Joshua trees but one surrounded by interesting geological formations (Map 2-2). He then 

proceeded to justify his recommendation with a series of photographs and a discussion of his 

proposed boundaries. He explained that Hoyt's proposed area contained the MWD aqueduct, that 

the state park system wanted the Salton Sea area, and that numerous mining claims existed in the 

larger region. He reported that although there were few grazing or other non-mining uses in the 

area, much of the land was not in federal ownership. Citing county assessors for Riverside and 

San Bernardino counties, Toll claimed that the Hoyt's area included 227,130 acres owned by the 

Southern Pacific Railroad, 22,275 held by the state and 95,319 in other private hands for a total

of 344,724 acres the NPS would have to acquire (Map 2-3). On the other hand, in the monument

area he recommended the railroad would have only 48,960 acres, the state 4,800 acres anprivate 

interests 4,548 acres for a total of 53,016. Although he admitted that in his proposed area the 

status of another 26,880 acres was unknown, this presented a much more realistic goal of land 

acquisition for the NPS. As a postscript, Toll attached a letter from the city engineer of San 

Bernardino requesting that if the monument were to be proclaimed it should remain open to new 

mining claims.59 

Toll bolstered his argument for a smaller monument on April 16, 1934 by forwarding a 

letter and data from the MWD citing the city's 250-foot right-of-way along its aqueduct as

further evidence that the larger proposed area was not feasible. This seemed to resonate with the 

NPS's Chief of Lands Conrad Wirth who supported Toll's position.60 Director Cammerer agreed 

and sent a letter to Minerva Hoyt on July 2 asking for her response to the idea of a smaller unit. 

The long delay between Toll's report and follow-up and Cammerer's letter stemmed from the 

delicacy of the situation. Hoyt was a respected international desert expert and she had spent great 

effort and quite a lot of money pursuing her dream of a large desert preserve in California. The 

first draft of the director's letter to her, written by NPS employee Donald Alexander, flatly stated 

that the only plant of concern in the area was the Joshua tree and then cited land acquisition 
64

concerns, the water district's aqueduct, poor road conditions, and uncertainty that the Antiquities 

Act, the 

Map 2-2. Roger Toll's proposed national monument within President Roosevelt’s 1933 land 

withdrawal. Source: Roger Toll. 1934. "Report on the Proposed Desert Plant National Park," 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, Cat. 25175, Folder 13.

principle mechanism for establishing monuments, could be used for such a large area as reasons 

to support a smaller unit. Evidently the director decided that this was too insensitive because the 

letter he finally sent only mentioned the land and aqueduct concerns and simply asked Hoyt to 

study the map and information about Toll's smaller proposal. At the same time, he ordered Toll 

to begin studying the road approaches to the smaller area.61

Roger Toll apparently foresaw the reaction his report would cause among the backers of 

the Hoyt proposal, or perhaps his colleagues suggested that he strengthen his argument with 

some scientific support. On April 10, just three days after sending his initial report to the 

director, Toll wrote to Forrest Shreve, the eminent desert ecologist and director of the Carnegie 

Institution's desert laboratory, asking him to evaluate the botanical merits of the Hoyt proposal. 

Shreve responded on April 19 that the area north of Indio was certainly worthy of preservation 

although he feared that the public attention it would draw could be detrimental to the vegetation. 

He ridiculed the notion publicized by the IDCL that the Joshua tree was the oldest type of plant 

in the desert, but supported the idea of a monument in the area because it held species from both 

the Mojave and Colorado deserts. He concluded that the Joshua tree area was equal in value to 
65

the proposed Big Bend National Park in Texas. Toll's appeal to an eminent scientist had 

backfired.62 

Map 2-3. Land owned by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the sections it sold to 

private owners forcing the National Park Service to exclude them from Joshua Tree National 

Monument. Data source: JTNP Map Archives, Map Drawer 5, No. 20100806-0002.

Hoyt Fights Back

During the delay between Toll's report and Cammerer's letter to her, Minerva Hoyt had been 

busy. Letters from her friends and supporters of the project continued to pour in to Secretary 

Ickes and the NPS. On June 5, 1934, Congressman J. H. Hoeppel sent a letter signed by fifteen 

of the twenty California members of the U. S. House of Representatives to Ickes endorsing her 

proposal. The next day, Henry I. Harriman, president of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 

presented President Roosevelt with two books she had designed containing pictures and 

information about her proposed monument. Harriman reported that the president was both 

delighted and deeply interested.63

The letter and reduced proposal from Cammerer shocked Hoyt and in response she turned 

to her vast network of scientists, friends and politicians. Soon the NPS began to get letters from 

scientists, educators, civic officials and leading local citizens decrying the smaller monument 

proposal and seeking to justify the larger one. Typical was one from Dr. Frederick A. Speik of 

Los Angeles ridiculing Toll's proposal as too small for the recreation needs of Southern 

California, lacking in the diversity of the larger proposal by eliminating Painted Canyon, Hidden 

Springs, and "open, more desolate places," and ignoring the ocotillos, smoke trees, and native 
66

palms that also deserved protection. It turns out that the letter was based on a draft prepared by 

Philip Munz.64 

Faced with this aggressive reaction, the NPS scheduled a second inspection, this time by 

Assistant Director Dr. Harold C. Bryant, a trained zoologist who had earned degrees at Pomona 

College and the University of California, Berkeley (Figure 2-4). As a scientist and a native of 

Pasadena, he knew many of the people who had been writing to the agency. It was hoped that his 

biological training and senior position in the agency's Washington, D.C. office would provide a 

more definitive evaluation that would placate the locals. When Minerva Hoyt found that he 

would be coming in late August 1934, she immediately set to work organizing another inspection 

tour as well as an extravagant series of events and meetings. She knew that the success of her 

proposal hinged on this highly unusual second inspection.65

Bryant arrived at Hoyt's home on the evening of August 10 where he was welcomed by 

more than 100 eager supporters of the desert monument including state legislators, local 

businessmen, and the social elite of the area. After a buffet supper, Bryant addressed the crowd 

noting that as a biologist he was interested in "seeing such monuments well-rounded and of 

larger areas so as to give full protection to the fauna and flora that desert lovers seek to 

perpetuate and protect." The next morning he left with Hoyt, desert authority Edmund Jaeger,

and a group of supporters. They breakfasted at Inspiration Point (Keys View) overlooking the 

Salton Sea and then proceeded with an inspection tour that emphasized many of the areas Roger 

Toll sought to omit.66

The entire inspection tour went well and Bryant seemed quite impressed with the larger 

area. However, he warned Hoyt that the presence of so much private land and the intersection of 

the MWD aqueduct, various roads and other infrastructure still made it difficult to foresee a 

monument of the size she desired. He suggested that she gather data and especially scientific 

justification for including the Pinto Basin and areas south of the aqueduct with which he could 

bolster his recommendation to the director.67

Meanwhile, the newspaper notoriety accompanying Bryant's visit and the sheer size of 

the monument proposal drew the attention of many who lived in and around the region. Some 

landowners and homesteaders were simply curious about what would happen to them and their 

land if the monument were to be established. Others were afraid of losing their homes and 

wondered what compensation, if any, they might receive. Still others were anxious to sell and 

wanted some assurance that the money would be forthcoming soon. Miners too worried about 

their claims, both patented and unpatented. Even before the two inspections by Toll and Bryant, 

Gordon Stewart, the city engineer of San Bernardino and a United States mineral surveyor, 

implored the Department of the Interior to protect the rights to claim and mine this "richly 

mineralized" area. The NPS responded to landowners that the boundaries of the monument were 

uncertain, but that if it were to include their land they would be fairly compensated.68

At the same time, self-proclaimed "old desert prospector," Chester Pinkham of Eagle 

Rock, California wrote to Director of the U. S. Geological Survey W. C. Mendenhall to comment 

on what should and should not be included in the proposed monument and to complain about the 

idea of naming it after Minerva Hoyt. Mendenhall forwarded the letter to Arno Cammerer and 

soon a correspondence developed between the NPS and the former prospector. Pinkham, in his 
67

explained that his fellow miners wanted to name Painted Canyon after him, but he rejected the 

idea as inappropriate. He added that he personally knew "Bill Keyes [sic], Shorty Harris and that 

blowhard Scotty [of Death Valley fame] who never really was a genuine prospector." He 

recommended the Cottonwood area for preservation, but claimed it was too far from the Keys 

Ranch area to be included in the same unit. He commended Minerva Hoyt for trying to protect 

the desert scenery, but absolutely opposed naming a park after her. Perhaps, he mused, the park 

should be named "Desert Wonderland." Arno Cammerer responded that the area had just been 

inspected by Bryant, that his information was welcome, and that he should contact Hoyt in order 

to help the campaign.69 

Figure 2-4. Harold C. Bryant, a native of southern California and a high official in the National 

Park Service. He carried out an unusual second evaluation of the Joshua Tree area and disagreed 

with Roger Toll's pessimistic conclusion. Photographer unknown. National Park Service. 

http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/sontag/bryant.htm
68

Three weeks later, Pinkham wrote to Cammerer stating that he had been unsuccessful in 

getting a response from her, but that he would accept the director's invitation to offer his views 

on the proposal. He recommended a park that would include Fortynine Palms, White Tanks, 

Keys Ranch, and Pinon Mountain. He added that Cottonwood Spring should be a secondary unit,

while Hidden Springs and Painted Canyon should be preserved as completely separate attractions 

due to their distance from the main area. Harold Bryant then wrote to Hoyt to recommend that 

she contact Pinkham because of his familiarity with the region. The two desert advocates 

discussed their proposals over the phone and immediately disagreed. Pinkham later wrote, "I am 

thoroughly convinced she does not care to work with anyone who will not readily agree with her 

ideas."70 Minerva Hoyt, on the other hand, began gathering information about Pinkham. She later 

informed Bryant that he was listed as private secretary to capitalist F. F. Stetson and had spent 

many years in the U. S. Secret Service. She wondered if he might be a part of the "selfish 

interests set" opposing any national park or monument in southern California’s deserts. Pinkham 

then decided that he would not participate in the movement for fear that his efforts might be 

perceived as an obstacle to a successful monument campaign. As a parting shot he strongly 

recommended that any thoughts of including the northeastern Salton Sea waterfront be 

abandoned because of extensive private landholdings and the fact that the area was "one of the 

most uninviting sites of the entire Salton Sea."71

In the meantime, Hoyt and the IDCL continued to urge its members and others to write to 

the NPS opposing any reduction in the size of the monument. Following Harold Bryant's 

recommendation, she sought letters from botanists and other scientists to justify preserving all 

the area in her proposal. Among the first to respond were the two desert scientists most closely 

associated with Hoyt's proposal. Edmund Jaeger and Philip Munz composed a lengthy 

memorandum to the NPS by way of the IDCL that listed a variety of reasons to oppose any 

diminution of Hoyt's suggested area. Jaeger pointed out that inclusion of the full area would 

allow adequate protection for the desert bighorn sheep and provide an opportunity to reintroduce 

antelope which had been eradicated from the region. The lower elevations, he continued, had 

most of the reptiles and many birds adapted to the vegetation of those niches. He added that a 

large monument would offer recreation space for many people during the winter when other 

popular areas were inaccessible. Munz insisted that floral species from both the Mojave and 

Colorado deserts be included as well as the array of geological and anthropological features 

scattered throughout the proposed monument. Soon, other letters to the NPS followed. Loye 

Miller, a biologist at the University of California, Los Angeles, wrote to Harold Bryant to urge 

the preservation of ironwood trees in the southern part of Hoyt's proposed area which locals were 

cutting for firewood. Munz penned another letter to Bryant in which he admitted that the flora 

south of the aqueduct was relatively sparse, but argued that it contained species not found further 

north. He stressed that the areas around Painted Canyon and Hidden Springs included scenic 

features that were "utterly different" from anything north of the aqueduct. Finally, he added that 

the southern area held interesting spots such as the old Butterfield stage station and Monson 

Canyon. In fact, he said, the monument should be enlarged even further to include the 

Chuckwalla Mountains.72

Unexpectedly, letters of support also appeared from sources more likely to oppose the 

entire monument concept. Minerva Hoyt forwarded a letter she had received from E. Avery 

McCarthy whom she identified as "the head of Real Estate matters in Los Angeles" 
69

enthusiastically suggesting that the monument would be one of the world's greatest nature 

preserves in another sixty years. James H. Howard, general counsel for the MWD, also backed 

the larger area which would include the aqueduct. He noted that "while the proposed monument 

includes several highly interesting but widely scattered points, and it may be suggested that there 

are extensive areas of no particular interest, I am told that these intervening areas support many 

rare desert plants which should be preserved."73 

Harold Bryant already favored a much larger area than that proposed by Roger Toll 

when, on February 8, 1935, Minerva Hoyt again appeared at the Washington, D.C. offices of the 

NPS. A bill had recently been introduced to transfer more federal land to the California park 

system and she was terrified that it was the portent of another attempt to create a small state park 

in the heart of the area she wanted for the national monument. She met with Bryant, Arthur 

Demaray, and other senior officials who assured her that the bill referred to land west of the 

Salton Sea, land that would ultimately expand Anza Desert State Park. After this reassurance, the 

group discussed the problems inherent in trying to create and manage a monument of the size 

Hoyt wanted. One significant outcome was an agreement by everyone that the northern boundary 

should be moved to the road leading to Twentynine Palms (modern California Highway 62). The 

southern boundary, however, was a different matter. She vehemently defended her plan's 

inclusion of the southern slope of the Little San Bernardino Mountains south of the aqueduct. 

She flatly refused to consider excluding the vegetation there which, she claimed, was so different 

from that north of the mountains. She insisted that the presence of the MWD's aqueduct within 

the boundaries of the monument would have no significant impact on the unit's purpose or 

character. At the conclusion of the meeting, NPS official J. Lee Brown noted in a memo to 

Conrad Wirth, "I believe Mr. Demaray and Dr. Bryant were practically persuaded to overlook 

the presence of the aqueduct and to include all of the withdrawn area."74 A few days later Bryant 

informed the director that Hoyt and Harriman were assiduously working to solve the most 

pressing problem, acquisition of the vast tracts of private and state land within the area 

withdrawn by President Roosevelt two and one-half years earlier.75

Land Acquisition Problems

In spite of Minerva Hoyt's persuasive skills and the barrage of correspondence and scientific 

testimony in support of her plan, huge obstacles faced the agency as it studied the large area she 

proposed. Most of the problems arose from the clash of the NPS’s policy of fee simple land 

ownership with the reality that an appalling amount of the land was in private or state hands. The 

agency faced three types of land owners. The biggest, in terms of acreage, was the Southern 

Pacific Railroad (SPRR) which owned alternate sections of land through the heart of the 

proposed monument. Second, was the state of California which also had many sections scattered 

widely throughout the region. Finally, there were so many small parcels held by private 

individuals that neither of the counties could provide accurate data on the total acreage or its 

distribution. The SPRR lands had always presented a foreboding picture to the NPS, but Minerva 

Hoyt and her allies did not hesitate to plunge ahead trying to convince the company to donate its 

acreage and, if not, to exchange it for other government lands.76

Henry Harriman, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce and a member of 

the IDCL, opened the negotiations with the company on March 26, 1935. He approached New 

York-based business acquaintance Paul Shoup, vice president of the Southern Pacific Company, 
70

and asked if the railroad would donate the desert acreage. Shoup replied that he and the rest of 

the management of the public corporation could not justify such a giveaway to their 

stockholders. He added that he was familiar with the area from childhood and thought that a 

much smaller monument, perhaps ten percent of the Hoyt proposal, might satisfy the 

conservation purpose. If not, he recommended that the NPS contact their land agent in San 

Francisco, a Mr. C. F. Impey, to try to effect an exchange of some sort.77

Before Director Cammerer could contact Impey, however, another land complication 

arose. On June 28, 1934, Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act in order to control widespread 

overgrazing on public lands. President Roosevelt then issued Executive Order 6910 on 

November 25, 1934 banning homestead claims and grazing applications on more than 

12,000,000 acres in California and many more in other western states. This temporary 

withdrawal was designed to allow the formation of grazing districts based on sound studies of 

the carrying capacity of the forage. A report issued in early summer 1935 specified that 

1,043,205 acres in Riverside County and 4,222,528 in San Bernardino County were among the 

affected areas. The upshot of this was that it would take an act of congress to allow an exchange 

of these lands for the railroad's parcels. The NPS was not particularly bothered by this extra 

requirement, but it did further complicate an already difficult process. Cammerer wrote to Impey 

arguing that the biological and recreational benefits of the proposed monument far outweighed 

any other type of land use. He acknowledged that special legislation or a presidential revocation 

of part of Executive Order 6910 would be required for an exchange, but suggested that an 

arrangement might be possible based on the land values of the respective parcels rather than an 

acre-for-acre swap.78

Impey cautiously answered by asking what lands the government planned to offer for 

exchange and frankly expressing doubt that the company would agree. Cammerer then sent a 

package of materials including copies of President Roosevelt's land withdrawal order, a draft of a 

bill to allow the exchange based on a successful one used at Petrified Forest National Monument 

(now Park), and an explanation of how the president could revoke Executive Order 6910 for the 

areas chosen by the company. Meanwhile Minerva Hoyt promised that she would travel to San 

Francisco to see President McDonald of SPRR as well as Impey. She urged the NPS to redouble 

its efforts telegraphing, "We are working everywhere and every way we can, but need you. 

Won't you splendid Park men put your shoulder to the wheel with us and let's go over the top 

with [a] million-acre reservation."79

Soon the NPS did just that, sending Harold Bryant to San Francisco to negotiate with 

Impey and the SPRR. What company officials told Bryant, however, was disheartening. Their 

preliminary survey of President Roosevelt’s 1,136,000-acre withdrawal showed only 836,000 

acres still in the public domain. The railroad held approximately 148,000 acres, many within the 

heart of the most desirable part of the proposed monument. Furthermore, the company held 

rights to choose at least 72,000 indemnity acres from the remaining government land. Even more 

distressing was that the railroad recently had sold many acres increasing the total of land owned 

by private individuals to 92,000 acres. The railroad’s survey also confirmed that the state 

controlled at least 42,000 acres. Impey told Bryant that the lands desired by the NPS were the 

best selling parcels that the company had in the entire desert region and were going for as much 

as $1.80 per acre. Nevertheless, he offered to "cut the price to the bone" if the government would 
71

make a block purchase. In his summary to Director Cammerer, Bryant wrote that the company 

wanted to be helpful and the NPS probably could buy the land for one dollar per acre. 

Unfortunately, the agency had neither the funds nor the legal ability to directly purchase land.80

After Bryant's California trip, direct negotiations with the railroad bogged down as the 

NPS doggedly sought government land in California of sufficient value to exchange. In October 

1935, a frustrated Bryant penned a letter to Minerva Hoyt, with copies to Philip Munz, Edmund 

Jaeger, and Loye Miller, starkly presenting the options, "We are now faced with the decision as 

to whether to attempt an almost impossible thing or to compromise on size sufficiently to make a 

trade and thus consolidate a part of the area hoping that the years will bring eventually the 

opportunity to enlarge it." He explained that the NPS could probably trade for land the railroad 

had just sold or still owned around the Lost Horse Valley, but would have to leave out 

Cottonwood Springs and other areas south and east of it. This left a park or monument that 

almost matched the area originally proposed by Roger Toll. Bryant suggested that Hoyt and her 

friends "decide whether you wish to push the matter along rapidly by urging [this] initial area or 

whether you prefer to take the time to work out so major a land problem as is involved with the 

present boundaries." He concluded with an apology for even suggesting a change in the original 

plan for a larger monument.81 

By December 1935, Minerva Hoyt and Philip Munz had opened a new front in the battle 

to secure railroad lands. It involved a series of letters between elite members of the New York 

and Boston social sets and was a roundabout way to seek influence on the SPRR. Both Munz and 

Hoyt decided to contact Boston socialite and fellow desert botanist Susan Delano McKelvey, an 

important figure at Harvard's Arnold Arboretum. She had come to Boston and the arboretum 

years earlier fleeing a broken marriage and soon published a large volume on lilacs as well as a 

number of works on vegetation of the southwestern United States. She was a cousin of President 

Roosevelt, the sister of famous architect William Delano, and a wealthy woman in her own right. 

Her circle of acquaintances included Henry W. de Forest a member of the board of the SPRR. 

Frederic Delano, another relative, was another railroad owner as well as a member of the 

National Capital Park and Planning commission and the uncle of President Roosevelt. She had 

spent many months in Indio and La Quinta during the 1930s and was soon enmeshed in a 

campaign to influence de Forest and through him the rest of the railroad board. 

More than three months passed before de Forest responded to McKelvey's initial letter. 

He apologized for the delay and explained that he had suffered from an illness and temporarily 

misplaced her letter. He had discussed the matter with the "proper Southern Pacific people" and 

felt that some misunderstanding was interfering with the exchange. He reiterated that the railroad 

could not donate the land but hoped that "our people" would find a way to effect an exchange. It 

is hard to tell what influence this flanking movement had on the managers of the railroad, but 

certainly it added to the chorus of encouragement they received to find a way to get their land to 

the NPS. A little over three weeks before President Roosevelt signed the proclamation 

establishing Joshua Tree National Monument, NPS Acting Director Demaray wrote to the 

agency's chief engineer, Frank Kittredge, reporting that William Delano and Henry de Forest 

were still trying to work out a last minute exchange.82

As the pro-monument movement drew in ever more advocates, the NPS continued to 

search for lands to exchange. In answer to a request from Cammerer, Commissioner of the 
72

General Land Office Fred W. Johnson reported that 9,599,616 acres of public domain lands were 

available in Imperial, Riverside, San Diego and San Bernardino counties with more than 

seventy-eight percent of it in the latter. Demaray sent these figures to Impey asking if the 

railroad would be interested in exchanging its holdings. Impey answered simply that the offered 

lands were of inferior quality, that the company already had three million acres of that type, and 

that company officials were quite satisfied with its current holdings in the proposed monument 

area which were selling very well. With this response senior NPS officials sensed the 

inevitability of sacrificing part of the proposed monument in order to have quality withdrawn 

lands to exchange for the railroad's holdings in the remainder.83

Although the negotiations with the railroad were agonizingly slow and disheartening, the 

situation with the state lands appeared much easier. The Land Ordinance of 1785 had directed 

the federal government to allocate section sixteen of each township in a newly surveyed area to 

its state to support education. In 1848, the federal government doubled that by adding section 

thirty-six to the lands available to each state upon admission to the union for a total of 1,280 

acres per township. If those specific sections were unavailable due to physical conditions or 

previous settlement, then the state could choose an equivalent amount of land in the same 

township. The latter were called indemnity lands. In March 1853, three years after admission, 

California received almost 5,500,000 acres of land spread throughout the state.. Unfortunately,

notoriously incompetent or dishonest agents managed those lands to profit from their inside 

knowledge and control of land sales. By the 1930s, most of the land was gone except the less 

desirable desert sections. The California State Lands Commission (CSLC), founded in 1938, 

today controls approximately 469,000 acres outright and the mineral rights of another 790,000. 

Much of this land is granted to oil and mining companies to generate money for the state's 

teacher retirement system. 84

Minerva Hoyt took the lead in negotiating with the state for its 42,000 acres in the 

withdrawn area. On June 5, 1935, she excitedly reported that the state was willing to donate 

22,000 acres of its school lands to the NPS for the national monument. Bogged down with the 

railroad negotiations, it took several weeks for Secretary Ickes to respond with a short 

congratulatory note. Meanwhile, on June 11, the state legislature took up Assembly Bill 1344 to 

legally transfer the lands to the federal government. It passed immediately and the director of the 

California Division of State Lands mailed copies of the new act to the NPS two days later.85

For once it seemed that a land acquisition problem could be solved without the turmoil 

and difficulty that the federal agency typically faced. However, it was not to be. A concerted

effort in California to overcome its sordid history of misuse and squandering of its school lands 

was underway, a movement that led to the formation of the CSLC three years later. The act 

donating the acreage to the NPS specifically excluded the mineral rights which were withheld for 

future revenue. It did not take long for NPS solicitors to spot that and block the donation. 

Cammerer wrote to Chief of the California Division of State Lands Carl Sturzenacker explaining 

that the federal government could not accept lands which it did not control in fee simple. The 

reason, he stated, was "the possibility of mining and oil drilling operations [which] would be 

incompatible with the administration of the area as a national monument, inasmuch as it is 

desirable to eliminate all commercial developments in the area."86 A few weeks later 

Sturzenacker acknowledged the position of the NPS and offered to exchange California's land in 
73

the monument area for other federal lands in the state. This was acceptable to NPS officials who 

managed to get an amendment allowing such an exchange inserted in a bill to provide federal 

land to California for the expansion of Anza Desert State Park. When it passed, Public Law 74-

838 enabled the eventual exchange of the state's 42,000 acres in the monument area for other 

federal land. What it did not do is provide the agency with fee simple lands immediately as 

Joshua Tree National Monument moved closer to reality. Hence, the method was approved but 

its execution delayed.87

The situation with lands owned by private individuals or entities was dramatically 

complicated by the SPRR's sale of 89,600 acres. Some of the land was located in the defunct 

subdivision in Pinto Basin, but more lay in the area south of the MWD aqueduct. The presence 

of California Highway 60 made these lands very attractive, especially for Los Angeles residents. 

A popular movement to secure plots for recreation cabins was well underway and would lead 

eventually to the Small Tract Act of 1938 which provided five-acre parcels for recreation homes 

by lease or free of charge. Thereafter, these “jackrabbit homesteads” would crowd the 

monument’s northern boundary. However, in 1936 the total acreage of the land owned by private 

individuals in Roosevelt's withdrawn area was uncertain and both Riverside and San Bernardino 

counties maintained that they could not spare employees to assess the records and come up with 

reliable figures. The probability that many of the lands were tax delinquent somewhat alleviated 

the situation because they might be obtainable later, perhaps through county donations. 

Nevertheless, as NPS officials pondered the cumulative total of lands held by the SPRR, the state 

of California and an indeterminate number of others, they knew they would have to disappoint 

Minerva Hoyt in spite of all she had done to save California's desert flora.88

Threats to the Monument Continue

As that unhappy realization dawned on senior NPS officials, threats to the viability of a 

monument of any size appeared. The long delay had left the land in limbo while development 

pressures built up, especially along the southern flank of the Little San Bernardino Mountains 

and southward. The most significant issue by far was the MWD aqueduct still under construction 

through the middle of Roosevelt's withdrawn area. In early 1935, the aqueduct builders officially 

applied to the GLO for permission to build a camp and aggregate deposit sites along its right-ofway northeast of Chiriaco Summit. Initially the NPS cited President Roosevelt's withdrawal 

order and balked. However, an investigation by the agency's Regional Inspector P. T. Primm in 

May, and correspondence with the MWD and the GLO, soon established that the district's rights 

preceded Roosevelt's withdrawal and, hence, were immune to its stipulations. Primm visited the 

camp, which in fact had already been built, and found that "the only significant damage which 

has been done has been the denuding of the area from all plant life." Two months later, the water 

district notified Primm that it would require four additional aggregate deposit sites amounting to 

182 total acres in the proposed monument area, but that they would not be operated by 

contractors on whom it blamed the destruction.89

In August, NPS officials sent Yellowstone biologist W. B. McDougall to assess the 

aqueduct's impact on the vegetation and wildlife. He found that one of the camps in Wide 

Canyon was much larger than it needed to be, but the others were of reasonable size. The 

principal damage came from the dumping of excavated material on the existing plant cover. With 

the on-site reports of Primm and McDougall in hand, NPS officials pondered the potential 
74

destruction of resources that might continue from ongoing construction and the long-term 

maintenance of the aqueduct. Again, Minerva's Hoyt's plan for a huge monument stretching 

nearly to the Salton Sea faced a disturbing land-use problem.90

As the NPS grappled with the aqueduct issue, two more requests came for infrastructural 

improvements in the withdrawn area. In April 1935, the Southern California Telephone 

Company applied to the GLO to alter its rights-of-way in two areas south of the aqueduct and 

near California 60. Because the two sites were so near an existing highway, the NPS did not 

contest this application. The other request concerned the road itself, or rather a cutoff from it at 

Indio stretching across the desert to Blythe. In February 1935, the GLO sent a letter with maps to 

the NPS disclosing an application by the California Department of Public Works to build such a 

road. In a memorandum to Conrad Wirth, NPS official J. Lee Brown explained that the road 

would ascend the southern slope of the Little San Bernardino Mountains "invading a portion of 

the desert which Mrs. Hoyt seems particularly desirous of preserving." The agency did not 

approve the project and suggested that the state engineers should continue to follow the route of 

California 60 further south before turning eastward. Then came surprising news that the state had 

been building the road for nearly a year and it was nearly finished. It seems that the state 

forwarded to the GLO a map of the proposed road on March 2, 1934 and that an unnamed 

official there certified that only unpatented lands were involved. With this assurance and an act 

passed by the California legislature in 1931 to support the project, the state commenced 

construction. State highway Engineer C. H. Purcell reasoned that it was the fault of the GLO that 

they had proceeded without realizing that President Roosevelt had withdrawn the lands in 

question. He added that the state law to build the highway had preceded the federal withdrawal 

by two years and that the road was nearly done anyway. The NPS had no choice but to withdraw 

its disapproval. Somehow, in the midst of all the controversy over the monument's boundary, 

nobody seemed to notice state highway crews building a road through the middle of the proposed 

monument.91

The NPS faced increasing pressure as these land negotiations and threats unfolded. 

Proponents of the monument grew frustrated and private landowners clamored for information 

about the future of their holdings. As early as February 14, 1934, California Assemblyman John 

Phillips demanded to know what was happening with the monument project after President 

Roosevelt's land withdrawal. A year later, Arno Cammerer ordered Harold Bryant "put on some 

speed on the Joshua Tree National Monument...we are losing friends by not putting it across 

swifter." More and more landowners wrote, concerned that they might lose their land or simply 

anxious to know what was happening. Miners and their lawyers also wondered if they could keep 

their claims and whether mining would continue in the monument. Even ranchers sought 

assurance that they would be allowed to graze their cattle in the monument.92

As the drama of the monument campaign unfolded, ever greater numbers of settlers, 

tourists, and thieves visited the area with predictably unfortunate effects. By January 1935,

Minerva Hoyt had watched her beloved desert suffer from inaction and a lack of protection. She 

fired a letter to Cammerer asking:

Why not declare this a Monument and put to work these unemployed men and boys for 

whom the Government is earnestly seeking valuable work such as road and trail 

building? A recent 'show' and sale of cacti and succulents, staged in Los Angeles, sold 
75

truck loads of valuable plants from this area. Those who disposed of this immense 

collection said 'all raised in Gardens.' Desert League informed plants over a hundred 

years old were represented to an ignorant public as four or five years of age.93

The following September she appeared at the Los Angeles branch of the GLO and pleaded with 

its agents to erect signs warning the public not to remove desert plants and to guard the area 

against any further depredations. She previously had asked the NPS to take action only to be told 

that it was not that agency's responsibility. The special agent in charge of investigating the 

situation did agree to erect signs, but admitted that it was far beyond the capability of his small 

force to patrol such a huge region. Apparently the signs did little to stop the removal or 

destruction of vegetation. William "Bill" Keys sent a letter in March 1936 complaining that 

residents of Twentynine Palms, fence-building neighbors, and vandalizing picnickers were all 

ruining what had been a wonderland of desert flora. He suggested that perhaps the government 

should pay him to "look after things" until someone else could be appointed to protect the area.94 

A Grudging Compromise and the Final Proclamation

By the early days of 1936, the NPS finally accepted that it would have to settle for a smaller 

monument than the one Minerva Hoyt desired. The cumulative problems of acquiring the 

checkerboard array of railroad lands, as well as those in state and private hands, and the broad 

swath of infrastructure containing the MWD aqueduct, the Indio to Blythe Highway, and various 

transmission lines forced the agency to compromise. The immense amount of correspondence 

backing a monument covering the entire withdrawn area was difficult to ignore. The testimony 

of scientists and experts in the region who hailed the biotic resources south of the Little San 

Bernardino Mountains meant that a monument established specifically to protect flora for study 

and enjoyment would be incomplete. NPS officials dreaded telling Minerva Hoyt who would be 

grievously disappointed after so much hard work and expense. 

On February 5, 1936, Arno Cammerer wrote to Hoyt with the bad news. The NPS

leadership had met to consider how to make Joshua Tree National Monument a reality as soon as 

possible. Everyone agreed that the aqueduct should be the southern boundary primarily because 

this removed much of the land owned by the railroad company. Furthermore, approximately 

three townships north of the aqueduct in and around the Cottonwood Mountains were also 

dropped because half of the land had been sold by the railroad company to private individuals 

(Map 2-3). The director expressed his sorrow that the areas to the south were so hard to acquire 

and hoped that the land could be obtained in the future. He reasoned that getting some land into 

the system was better than continuing to negotiate which would risk losing the entire area to 

development.95

Minerva Hoyt's response was quick and predictable. She had earlier explained her desert 

park project to her friend William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury under Woodrow Wilson,

and one of California's two federal senators from 1933 to 1938. Upon receiving Cammerer's 

letter, she wired the senator to express her outrage. She claimed that the new boundary 

"withdraws all scenic beauty and our most valuable plants...[this] means absolute defeat." She 

added that this solution would cut out most of the land in Riverside County and leave a 

monument mostly in San Bernardino County which was an "undesirable land of no beauty and 
76

little scientific value." She concluded by asking McAdoo to ignore the NPS and introduce a bill 

in congress for the full acreage that the president had withdrawn.96 

Senator McAdoo contacted Cammerer which led to a flurry of correspondence and a 

hurried meeting between the senator and Harold Bryant on February 12. After the meeting,

Bryant reported to the director that Senator McAdoo was very cooperative and readily 

understood the problems of acquiring land. The senator offered to introduce a bill to get funds 

from congress for the purchase of the railroad land at one dollar per acre. Strangely, Bryant 

quashed the idea explaining that congress had always opposed such a solution and that it 

somehow would establish a bad precedent. McAdoo also asked about securing tax-delinquent 

private land and Bryant told him that a Riverside County official thought the matter "could be 

worked out, but just at present all counties are avoiding the forcing of tax sales." The meeting 

concluded with McAdoo promising to explain the difficulties to Hoyt and hopefully secure her 

support.97

A few days later, McAdoo wrote to Hoyt urging her to be satisfied with the new 

boundary lines. At the same time, a hopeful Harold Bryant also wrote to her cautiously asking if 

she had had a chance to study the new proposal and repeating the rationale that the railroad lands 

made a bigger unit impossible. He thought it would be better to create the smaller area giving the 

vegetation immediate protection and try to add other lands in the future. The combination of 

Senator McAdoo's persuasion and the very real threat to the entire project from vandalism and 

commercial raiding of the desert flora finally convinced Hoyt. On March 9, Senator McAdoo 

phoned Bryant to report that she was satisfied with the new boundary, but only if a later attempt 

would be made to enlarge the area by exchanging privately owned sections. The most delicate of 

the agency's responsibilities finally could be laid to rest.98 

As Spring 1936 wore on, the NPS continued to negotiate with the railroad still hoping for 

a solution to enable a larger monument. But it was not to be. By late March pressure from 

Senator McAdoo and Harold Ickes forced agency planners to come up with a definitive proposal 

that would include the final boundary. A few weeks later Cammerer wrote to Secretary Ickes that 

the NPS proposed a unit of 843, 690 acres. He suggested that the remainder of the land 

withdrawn by President Roosevelt in 1933 be retained in that status for possible exchange with 

the railroad as well as potential expansion of the monument. He promised that a draft 

proclamation for the president's signature would be forthcoming shortly.99

In order to compose the proclamation NPS officials needed to consult the GLO. They 

sent a draft to Commissioner Fred W. Johnson and he replied in early June. He corrected some 

legal and textual inconsistencies and then got to the heart of the proposal. The area would in fact 

consist of 825,340 acres, nearly half of which had not been surveyed. Within the new boundary,

the federal government controlled approximately 650,000 acres. Meanwhile the SPRR held some 

149,300 acres, the state 21,650 acres, and 3,420 acres had been patented under various 

agricultural and mineral land laws. Another 3,878 acres of the public domain were under pending 

homestead entries and 1,200 acres in public water reserves. Furthermore, some lands might 

require approval from the Bureau of Reclamation before they could be completely reserved for 

monument purposes. He added that the final southern boundary would be the northern boundary 

of the right of way for the MWD's aqueduct. His report provided the legal description of the 

lands that would be part of the final proclamation. The statistics supplied by Fred W. Johnson 
77

apparently did not count more than 100,000 acres of indemnity lands that the railroad held in the 

unsurveyed portion of the proposed monument which accounts for the difference between this 

report and the figure calculated by investigators after the monument's proclamation.100

Finally, it appeared that the proclamation would go forward and a smaller Joshua Tree 

National Monument would exist. Yet one last procedural snag remained. Prior to the president's 

issuance of the proclamation, it had to be reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget and the 

Department of Justice. Representatives of both offices questioned the legality of using the 

Antiquities Act in this particular case, just as the NPS's Donald Alexander had earlier. Congress 

had passed the "Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities" on June 8, 1906. One of the 

most important building blocks of the national park system, it gave unilateral power to the 

President to proclaim monuments on federal lands to protect not only archaeological remains but 

also "objects of historic or scientific interest." However, reflecting legislators' response to 

vandalism and theft at Native American archaeological sites, it stipulated that these reserves 

should be "confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the 

objects to be protected." A lawyer named Carr from the Budget Office phoned J. Lee Brown of 

the NPS and suggested that a monument of 825,340 acres might not fit that prescription. Brown

explained that his agency needed to protect a large area of vegetation to satisfy the purpose of 

this monument and that the agency already had monuments created with the Antiquities Act that 

were much larger. Thereupon Carr wondered if the existing rights of landowners could be 

protected in such an expansive unit. Again Brown stated that the language in the draft 

proclamation had been used in previous cases and no problems had surfaced. A doubtful Carr 

rang off stating that he would discuss the matter with his supervisor.101

In early July, M. O. Burtner, an attorney in the Department of Justice, questioned the use 

of the Antiquities Act because he doubted that trees could be considered objects of scientific 

interest. He recommended a smaller unit to be named "Mohave Desert National Monument" in 

order to better fit the location of the monument. Cammerer explained to Ickes that Burtner was 

holding a new proclamation he had composed for secretarial approval. The director argued that 

this new name ignored the fact that the monument would encompass both of California's deserts. 

Ickes did nothing to change the original proclamation and on August 7, 1936, just three days 

before Roosevelt proclaimed Joshua Tree National Monument, NPS Assistant Director G. A. 

Moskey put this challenge to rest. He reminded the director that they had faced this problem 

before and that following Burtner's advice would cripple the agency's plans for future 

monuments. Moskey had located a Dr. T. S. Palmer who had known Congressman John F. 

Lacey, chairman of the committee that wrote the Antiquities Act. Palmer stated that the 

committee had in mind a broad act which would not warrant the narrow interpretation of the 

Department of Justice. Palmer was willing to work with a historian to prove that this was the 

case. With such assurance the agency ignored the Justice Department lawyer.102

With this last pernicious hurdle out of the way, President Franklin Roosevelt issued 

Proclamation 2193 on August 10, 1936, establishing Joshua Tree with 825,340 acres of land, a 

third of it in private or state hands (Map 2-4). It was the end of a tortured process and a bitter 

compromise. It is uncertain whether Minerva Hoyt believed that the NPS would really try to add 

the lands south of the aqueduct later. Nevertheless, she sent an effusive telegram to Roosevelt 

thanking him for finally saving a large part of the desert she so loved. As the NPS prepared to 
78

Map 2-4. The monument boundary in 1936. Source: JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, Cat. 25175, 

Folder 040.

fully inspect the lands it had been given and organize their management, Minerva Hoyt could at 

least be satisfied that she, almost single-handedly, had driven a campaign that resulted in a 

monument almost six times the size of the one recommended by Roger Toll.

103 
79

Chapter Three: Can This Monument Survive?

People reacted to the proclamation establishing Joshua Tree National Monument in a variety of

ways depending on their personal beliefs and interests. Scientists, environmentalists, and urban 

public officials celebrated the success of their campaign and the protection of such a huge swath 

of desert scenery. Citizens in Twentynine Palms and the area that would become the village of 

Joshua Tree happily envisioned a boom in tourism that would bolster their communities and 

economies. William "Bill" Keys and others who lived inside the new monument warily 

wondered what it would mean for their traditional livelihoods and ways of life. Miners angrily 

protested the prohibition on future mining claims and plotted to overturn that standard national 

park policy as they had in Death Valley National Monument. Finally, National Park Service

(NPS) officials faced the daunting task of determining what resources the nearly 1,300-squaremile preserve contained and how to protect and develop its harsh environment amid more than 

280,000 acres of non-federal land and untold thousands of mining claims. 

The first twenty years of Joshua Tree National Monument continued many of the 

controversies and difficulties that had characterized the political campaign to create it. People 

held widely different attitudes toward the desert environment. Monument proponents saw the 

desert as a welcome retreat from urban modernity, a place where people celebrated individualism 

and self-reliance. Miners saw it as a bizarre and alien landscape to be explored or plundered. 

Many others saw it as a fearful wasteland, a place to be avoided, and into which unwelcome 

people and materials could be dumped. NPS officials were just as divided in their opinions, as 

shown by the contrasting reports of Roger Toll and Harold Bryant. The early years of Joshua 

Tree were marked by investigations of the unit to determine what was worthwhile and what was 

expendable, a glacially slow pace of development, exacerbated by World War II, a protracted 

and highly complex progress of acquiring private lands and validating mining claims, and a bitter 

excision of a third of the unit. Through these years, agency planners struggled to adapt NPS

policy and infrastructure to an unfamiliar habitat and interpret enigmatic resources. The next 

three chapters explain the complexity and controversy of Joshua Tree's first two formative

decades.

 Rarely had the agency received a new unit with so many basic land problems. Indeed, 

the very existence of the monument was still challenged. In a little over five years between the 

establishment of the monument and the start of World War II, the NPS carried out or 

commissioned nearly thirty separate inspections of its new unit. Senior regional office 

administrators, service-wide specialists, and General Land Office (GLO) investigators studied 

the area and recommended policies and actions that would shape the future of the new 

monument. Each inspection resulted in a report which ultimately came before the NPS director.1

As it typically did, the Washington headquarters appointed a superintendent of a nearby 

large park to manage the infant unit. Colonel Charles G. Thomson of Yosemite National Park 

assumed the responsibility and conducted the first fact-finding inspection. Thomson waited two 

months after the monument was established to visit in late October 1936 when the temperature 

had cooled. He first interviewed many of the supporters who had fought to save the area 

including Minerva Hoyt, Dr. Philip Munz, and groups from Palm Springs, Indio, and Twentynine 
80

Palms. He was pleasantly surprised by the landscape and the rich desert flora. He reported that 

building roads would be easy and passed along a local recommendation that one be constructed 

from Twentynine Palms through the Little San Bernardino Mountains to the cities in the 

Coachella Valley. He did not expect fire to be much of an issue, but warned that the water supply 

was scant and might seriously hinder development for visitors. The Yosemite superintendent also 

recommended that no visitor facilities be constructed in the monument because Twentynine 

Palms and other nearby communities could provide necessary tourist services. Thomson urged 

his bosses to develop the monument soon because subdivision developers and individuals 

attracted to the desert lifestyle were rapidly moving into the region: 

"No longer is the desert there a waste; it is a resource into which men and money are 

going with an amazing speed. The use and development of the monument are going to be 

colored by this extraordinary thing that is happening southwest, west, and north of it."2

He recommended intensive study of natural and archaeological resources, survey and 

mapping of the monument, and preparation of interpretive materials for future visitors. 

Unfortunately, Thomson did not live to see his prescience confirmed because he died on April 6, 

1937, leaving Joshua Tree temporarily leaderless. Officially, his task fell to his replacement at 

Yosemite, Lawrence Merriam, who later would become director of the regional office in San 

Francisco.

3

In addition to his initial inspection of the new unit, Thomson accomplished another

important task during his brief tenure as superintendent of Joshua Tree. He appointed a Yosemite 

park naturalist, James E. Cole, to oversee the new monument (Figure 3-1). Cole was born to 

American parents in Alberta, Canada on September 10, 1902 and later moved with his family to 

Spokane, Washington. He studied natural history at the University of California, Los Angeles 

and began working at Yosemite first as a seasonal employee in 1933 and, two years later, as fulltime ranger-naturalist. Cole's initial involvement with Joshua Tree required him to handle 

specific monument issues for Thomson and Merriam. However, he soon became the de facto 

manager of the unit. His official title changed during this time from junior park naturalist to 

custodian and, when the NPS opened an office in Twentynine Palms on September 19, 1940, to 

superintendent. Although World War II interrupted his management of Joshua Tree, Cole spent 

more than five years at the monument where he found himself in charge of a highly controversial

unit and under personal attack by enemies of the NPS.4

Cole advised or participated in most of the inspections during these critical early years,

and initiated or contributed to complex debates about what the monument should be and how it 

should be managed. The inspections focused on five types of issues: (1) mining, both extant 

claims and heavy pressure from miners to reopen the monument to new claims, (2) land 

acquisition, especially the tracts belonging to the Southern Pacific Railroad, (3) development, 

including a road system and a headquarters facility, (4) resource management, particularly the 

all-important location of water supplies, as well as baseline studies of flora and fauna, and (5) 

public use, both coping with traditional uses by monument residents and planning for visitation 

and interpretation. The decisions made and actions taken during the first two decades would 

shape much of Joshua Tree's history and administration. This chapter focuses on continuing 

threats first to the primary values of the monument and then to its very survival. 
81

Figure 3-1. Superintendent James Cole who shaped the boundaries and layout of Joshua Tree 

National Park. Chief of Planning Thomas Vint wrote: "He has what the National Park Service 

grew up on." Photographer unknown. JTNP photo archives, reference files.

Mining and the Boundary Question

During the campaign to establish Joshua Tree National Monument, miners wondered and 

worried whether their business could continue as usual in the unit. A few years earlier, President 

Herbert Hoover had proclaimed Death Valley National Monument with the normal stipulation 

against new claims. However, a few months later congress passed legislation that restored the

right to explore and claim new mining sites in the huge monument. The NPS and Secretary of the 
82

Interior Harold Ickes did not dispute this action, admitting that mining was an integral part of 

Death Valley's heritage. The proclamation establishing Joshua Tree held that existing mines and 

claims could continue as long as miners actively worked them. However, it adhered to NPS

policy by banning any new claims. Once this became known, the miners erupted into a shocked 

rage and attacked not only the ban on mining but the existence of the monument itself.5

The opening shot came in December 1936 when California State Mineralogist Walter W. 

Bradley wrote to local congressman Harry Sheppard decrying the prohibition and insisting that 

the legislator introduce a bill similar to the pro-mining act at Death Valley. The Mining 

Association of the Southwest immediately organized "an advisory committee of eighty" to 

challenge the mining ban. Most of the agitation came from mining enthusiasts living in Los 

Angeles area rather than within or near the monument. However, in their eagerness to overturn 

the ban in Joshua Tree, they discussed widening the organization to include miners throughout 

southern California.6

After the Los Angeles Times printed a story about miners’ opposition, monument allies 

tried to rebut it, arguing that the economic future of the desert area lay in recreation and tourism, 

not in the haphazard mining that had always characterized the region (Figure 3-2). One 

correspondent supported the ban on mining:

The Joshua Tree National Monument is to become either a haven for tourists and lovers 

of the desert and the out-of-doors, or a mecca for prospectors, who if the regulations are 

amended, may under the mining laws go to Inspiration Point [Keys View], stake out a 

claim, blast a hole in the ground and exclude the public from the premises within the 

confines of the claim. He might even build a shack there, and charge admission to take a 

look at the Coachella Valley. Likewise a prospector could stake a claim to include Split 

Rock, put some powder under it, touch it off, scrape around in the gravel, and finding no 

gold could say; "Excuse me, I thought that would make a good mine."7

During Colonel Thomson's inspection, he placed the mining issue at the top of his 

agenda. His quiet discussions with locals led him to believe that most of the twenty-three mines 

he identified in his subsequent letter to the director were either abandoned or producing very 

little ore. After describing local support for recreation and for the monument, Thomson offered a 

possible solution:

This mining situation revives the question of final boundaries for this monument. It may 

well be that a practical solution rests in removing from the monument the northeast area 

which contains the Dale, Gold Crown, and possibly some other mining areas which are 

reported to be the good properties...My recommendation would be that you ask 

Congressmen Sheppard and Scrugham to go along patiently with us for a few months 

until the real facts concerning mining can be secured; that we then move energetically to 

secure the facts; and that in the meantime we encourage other interests in Congressman 

Sheppard's district to make themselves heard in behalf of the development of the Joshua 

area as a tourist asset to the surrounding communities.8

Together with the dire land acquisition problem, this mining issue led the NPS to 

organize several inspections, including one by investigators from the GLO. In March 1937,
83

Samuel E. Guthrey from that office conducted a lengthy survey of the mines in the young 

monument and reported that minerals with economic potential existed over most of the 

monument, but the only ones producing were in the eastern two-thirds of its area. He then 

Figure 3-2. An unidentified Park Service employee surveys the Coachella Valley and the Salton 

Sea from Keys View in 1957. Photo by Donald Black. JTNP photo archives, Cat. 20575, Image 

277.

described actively operating mines in more than thirty locations, and estimated that they 

employed 250 men with a payroll of $40,000 per month. Guthrey concluded that, since all of the 

mines were of the deep or lode type, they would not detract from such a "distinctly desert area, 

with no particular scenic features."9 At the same time NPS engineer Frank Kittredge and 

landscape architect Ernest Davidson also inspected the monument and each submitted a report in 

April 1937. Davidson suggested that mining was so dispersed that the idea of eliminating it was 
84

out of the question. He added that in desert country it should be part of the "local color." 

Kittredge bluntly stated that the closure of mining would throw 200 men out of work and cause 

much resentment. He reiterated that mining would not seriously affect park values and that it 

should be allowed under the same rules as those applying in Death Valley (Map 3-1).10 

On June 17, 1937, Congressman Sheppard introduced H. R. 7558 to the U. S. House of 

Representatives where it was referred to the Committee on the Public Lands. The short, eightline paragraph simply extended the mining laws to the entire monument. A month later, NPS 

Director Arno Cammerer wrote to Sheppard reminding him of the agency's request that he not 

submit legislation until the facts were known about the state of mining. He explained to the 

congressman that the first superintendent, Colonel Thomson, had unexpectedly died and that was 

why the NPS had not been in contact for some weeks. He restated why the agency opposed open 

mining and noted that rather than allow it, park leaders would "recommend that approximately 

the eastern two-thirds of the monument, which contains the larger portion of the mineral 

deposits, be eliminated and that no prospecting or mining, except upon valid existing claims, or 

grazing, be permitted within the smaller remaining area."11 Cammerer added that this would 

certainly be opposed by the people in California who had worked so hard to convince President 

Roosevelt to proclaim the unit.

Sheppard responded that he had asked to be kept informed about the agency's study of the 

mining issue, but that whenever he inquired NPS officials would only tell him that Colonel 

Thomson was heading the investigation. The last time he received this response was three days 

after the superintendent had died. Clearly affronted, he introduced the bill. He added that his own 

knowledge of the mining business, particularly in light of the ongoing economic depression, did

not persuade him to change it. This, in turn, spurred the NPS to quickly organize and conduct 

another investigation. In August, Cammerer met with Frank Kittredge, now regional director, 

and assigned Ben Thompson and Merel Sager from the Washington, D.C. office to gather 

information that would undermine the bill. Apparently, Kittredge, always the good soldier, 

followed orders regardless of his personal opinion. Cammerer also contacted Senator McAdoo 

who reassured him that he opposed opening the monument to new mining. H. R. 7558 died in 

committee later that year.12

In September, Sager submitted a report on his inspection of the monument which covered 

many planning and development issues, but highlighted mining. He suggested that Guthrey had 

painted a rosy picture of mining based on a few mines that had produced well in the past. He 

quoted Sam Ryan, owner of the Lost Horse Mine, as saying, "the area might as well be a national 

monument as it is no good for anything else." Sager added that both he and Ryan believed that a 

major investment might produce worthwhile mines, but that it would be risky because lode 

mining is unpredictable. Sager added:

The eastern segment of the monument, being lower in elevation than the central part, is 

decidedly lacking in recreational value, and undoubtedly is more valuable for mining. 

Therefore the writer heartedly concurs with the decision of the staff that should pressure 

be sufficient to pass the Sheppard bill, the eastern two-thirds of the monument [should] 

be eliminated. Indeed there is much to be said for eliminating the eastern section whether 

the Sheppard bill passes or not.13 
85

Sager’s report showed clearly that some in the NPS still regarded most of the desert as 

unworthy of inclusion in the system. Soon, people in Twentynine Palms started criticizing the 

agency for its unwillingness to establish a local office or develop the tourism infrastructure 

which it had promised. NPS officials answered that they could do nothing until they solved the 

monument's twin problems of determining a final boundary and acquiring non-federal land. Over 

the next year, the NPS discussed the idea of cutting out part of the monument with local

supporters. In September 1938, business leaders from Twentynine Palms met independently with

Map 3-1. Major mines in Joshua Tree National Monument, 1936. Data source: JTNP Natural 

Resource Division files. Delta Cartography.

the Mining Association of the Southwest to seek a compromise. After the meeting, the Los 

Angeles Times reported that a deal was close which would eliminate three-fifths of the 

monument, a total of 500,000 acres, so that mining could return there. The article implied that 

the miners hoped that prospecting would surge and force the agency to open the remaining land 

to new claims. Meanwhile, Congressman Sheppard reintroduced a second bill, H. R. 3827, which

again proposed opening the entire monument to mining. Subsequently, the NPS and local allies 

convinced Sheppard that opening the core area of the monument, in and around Lost Horse 

Valley, would destroy the entire purpose of the unit. Sheppard grudgingly agreed to reverse his 

position and the second bill died in committee.14

By 1939, the NPS decided that the only way to prevent mining throughout the monument 

was to eliminate most of its eastern part. At the same time, land problems both within the unit 
86

and along its boundaries suggested that a complete reevaluation of the boundaries should occur. 

After another inspection in December 1938, agency officials P. T. Primm and James Cole 

recommended that all land east of Range 10 East of the land system grid be eliminated (Map 3-

2). Yet some senior agency officials worried that eliminating a large part of the monument might 

harm wildlife and set a bad precedent for the future of the entire system. They determined to 

investigate all the ramifications of such an action. Victor Cahalane, acting chief of the wildlife 

division, consulted biologist Loye Miller and the two agreed that loss of the Pinto Basin and its 

surrounding mountains would not detract from the monument (Figure 3-3). In early April 1939,

Regional Director Kittredge agreed, but suggested that the southwestern boundary should be 

extended to the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) aqueduct. During the campaign to establish 

the monument, a boundary was chosen that lay along the right-of-way for the aqueduct. After the 

proclamation, aqueduct workers built it south of its originally planned location. The resulting gap 

opened the area between the aqueduct and the monument boundary to settlement, enabled 

poachers to easily enter canyons within the monument, and cut off part of the slope of the Little 

San Bernardino Mountains. The wildlife experts who agreed to shrink the monument worried 

about the survival of bighorn sheep, especially with the loss of all the mountain areas in its 

eastern section.15

 

Map 3-2. Many Park Service planners in the early 1940s believed the area east of the vertical line 

(between Rectangular Land Division Ranges 10 and 11) should be eliminated from the 

monument to placate miners. Delta Cartography.
87

Figure 3-3. The western edge of the Pinto Basin from the Cholla Cactus Garden. Photo by the 

author.

While the NPS struggled to defend its botanical unit against new claims, the GLO

gathered data about the mines that already existed. Its records showed 3,782 claims in the 

western section and 5,000 in the eastern section. For a claim to be considered valid it had to have 

evidence of ore and of active production. Most of the claims had been abandoned, some since the 

late nineteenth century. In 1941, Superintendent Cole reported that the GLO considered twentyeight mines in the western section and 405 in the eastern section to be valid. Miners actually 

worked only a fraction of those claims. This strongly supported the agency's position that 

mining, in addition to being destructive, was fading as an economic function.16

 

In the spring of 1940, the NPS sent yet another senior official to study the proposed 

boundary change. This time it was C. Marshall Finnan, superintendent of the national capital 

parks. Minerva Hoyt had heard about the efforts to identify parts of the monument to eliminate 

and she was extremely upset. Soon letters began pouring in from botanists, community 
88

organizations, and her other allies. She demanded that Finnan consult with her while in 

California which he did. Nevertheless, Finnan also agreed that the eastern section would have to 

go. This prompted the NPS Director Newton Drury to call for a special evening meeting at 

Yosemite National Park where he and other senior officials would be attending a conference of 

the agency's advisory board. Joining Drury at the July 21, 1941 meeting were Regional Director 

Owen Tomlinson, Assistant Regional Director Herbert Maier, Superintendent Lawrence 

Merriam of Yosemite, and James Cole. Drury brought up the intense opposition to a boundary 

change by Hoyt and her allies. He urged Tomlinson to communicate to her that the alternative 

might be elimination of the entire unit. He added that the NPS did not want a repetition of what 

had happened at Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. At that unit, proclaimed a year after 

Joshua Tree, miners drew national attention to their efforts to overturn a ban on new mining 

claims, embarrassing the NPS and ultimately succeeding.17 

In fact, Director Drury had decided already to have a special committee of agency 

specialists make a final determination of whether the boundary should be changed and, if so, 

exactly where. Four days before the Yosemite meeting, Tomlinson suggested a committee 

consisting of Maier as chairman, biologist Lowell Sumner, geologist J. Volney Lewis, planning 

chief Ernest Davidson, and James Cole. Later, the committee would also include Assistant 

Director Ben Thompson and Guy Flemming of California's state park system. Before their 

serious work even began, Congressman Sheppard told Cole that recent evaluation of the old Iron 

Chief Mine in the Eagle Mountains had revealed a substantial amount of ore worthy of largescale exploitation. He did not mince words, telling the superintendent that he would make sure 

that area was deleted from the monument. With this warning in mind, the committee conducted 

its inspection during September 1941. On the last day of the month, Maier wrote Tomlinson to 

say the final report would be forthcoming, but that the committee agreed that the area east of 

Range 10 East should be deleted. On the bottom of the memorandum he penned that it was 

unfortunate that this would remove the Cottonwood Springs area as the southern entrance and 

could force the agency to build a more difficult and expensive north-to-south road through the 

Little San Bernardino Mountains as suggested by people in the Coachella Valley.18

 

While Maier prepared the official report, each of the committee members sent individual 

opinions to Tomlinson. The comments by biologist Sumner were particularly important. At the 

time, many in the NPS, as well as in the public, believed that bighorn sheep were close to 

extinction in the monument. Cutting out all the mountains in the eastern section would open 

them to exploitation and the probable elimination in those areas. Sumner warned that this was a 

catastrophe. He alone among the committee members felt that the eastern section was worthy of 

retention for its botanical diversity. However, he admitted that biological concerns were only 

part of the evaluation and that other management considerations might warrant the exclusion of 

the Pinto Basin and its surrounding mountains. Landscape architect Davidson regretted losing 

the great vistas available in the east, but admitted that the Dale Mining District probably should 

be removed and that cutting out all of the eastern section would simplify administration (Figure 

3-4). State park superintendent Flemming agreed that the eastern area should be cut, the 

southwestern boundary should be moved to the aqueduct, and that the Indian Cove area in the 

north should be eliminated because of the presence of private lands. James Cole favored the 

elimination of the Dale Mining District, the Eagle Mountains, and two small pieces of land on 

the western side of the road from Twentynine Palms to the monument. Private lands dominated 
89

the two small tracts and Cole recommended their deletion to simplify administration. This 

proposal, like Flemming's, showed how desperate the NPS was to solve disputes with private 

landholders and threats of incompatible development in the monument.19

Figure 3-4. Another view of the Pinto Basin taken in 1936. Photo by George A. Grant. Harpers 

Ferry Center, Grant Collection JOTR #19.

Finally on October 13, 1941, Maier submitted his official report for the committee. He began 

with a clear statement regarding the relative values of different parts of the monument:

In general I feel very strongly that every unit in the National Park System should be able 

to justify itself and should be in a position to defend its boundaries on the basis of the 

intrinsic and superlative values contained therein. It does not follow, however, that all 

portions of land within a unit must necessarily possess superlative scenery or outstanding 

natural phenomena. Frequently quite "ordinary" land is included in order to encompass or 

complete a wildlife range or a watershed, or to serve as a buffer strip along a boundary to 

facilitate protection and simplify administration. Such portions of land serve to round out 

the unit and their inclusion can easily be justified along with the whole.20
90

Having established that he did not favor elimination of any part of the monument unless there 

were compelling reasons to do so, Maier suggested that one option might be to remove the 

mountains in the eastern section, but not the Pinto Basin itself. He admitted that this could force 

the NPS to maintain expensive roads in the area, but argued that mining would not severely 

impact the visual appearance of the mountains and the basin itself would remain protected. In his 

conclusion, Maier stated that he agreed with the rest of the committee that, if necessary, the 

eastern edge of Range 10 East should be the boundary.21

Director Drury and other NPS leaders decided to forego changing the eastern boundary 

until pressure forced some action, but the idea of extending the boundary south to the aqueduct 

was sufficiently appealing that most wanted to pursue it independently. In November, Tomlinson 

ordered engineering draftsman G. E. Lavezzola and Cole to inspect the land between the current 

boundary and the aqueduct. The basic question was whether the benefits to wildlife from 

including the base of the mountains offset the fact that much of the land was in private hands. 

Lavezzola and Cole found that most of the land was tax delinquent and might be available for a 

low price set by Riverside County. They recommended that the agency go ahead and ask for a 

presidential proclamation to change the boundary. Meanwhile, Superintendent Cole learned from 

a state fish and game warden that a species of burro deer used the eastern part of Pinto Basin as 

part of its range. Cole suggested that Sumner return to study the situation and its implications for 

changing the eastern boundary. These questions and many more became moot with the onset of 

World War II a few weeks later. The War Production Board issued Limitation Order L-208 in

October 1942 which suspended gold mining for the duration of the war. The purpose of the order 

was to focus on basic and strategic mineral production. The Eagle Mountain iron mine was 

insufficiently developed to become an integral part of that effort. For a time Joshua Tree was 

safe from mining and any thoughts of diminishing its size.22

The Battle Over Mining Resumes

On May 6, 1944, James Cole returned from military service to his position as superintendent of 

Joshua Tree National Monument. He immediately raised the issue of adjusting the boundary and 

spent much of the summer studying maps and aerial photos in an effort to fine tune his 

recommendations. Perhaps spurred by Cole’s renewed interest, Director Newton Drury urged all 

the units in the park system to evaluate their boundaries to make sure that they were defensible 

against criticism and potential invasion. In September, Cole submitted a "preliminary" report 

with his new proposals. He called for elimination of the Gold Park and Old Dale mining districts, 

the Iron Chief Mine area, 480 privately-owned acres just inside the boundary near Twentynine 

Palms, most of the Cottonwood Mountains, and a small area near the head of Berdoo Canyon 

which had been subdivided. He recommended that a corridor including Cottonwood Spring and 

the road to it from the north be retained and an area south of the Hexie Mountains be added. The 

latter had been dropped from the original monument proposal due to the sale of alternate sections 

of land by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company (SPRR). Cole determined that all but 200 

acres in that area were tax delinquent and under the control of the state.23 

Superintendent Cole clearly wanted the boundary question solved as soon as possible, but 

it was not to be. The agency was still understaffed and nobody but the superintendent wanted to 

draw attention to the problem. However, while the miners remained quiet for the rest of the war, 

others did not. Paul Witmer of the GLO wrote in early 1945 to inquire whether the NPS would 
91

give up a tract of 162 acres immediately south of Twentynine Palms and west of the Chemehuevi

reservation for small tract homesteads. Cole passed along the request, but Regional Director 

Tomlinson refused because it would draw attention to possible boundary revisions. In midFebruary, Witmer visited the monument and proposed that the NPS exclude five sections of land 

along the northern border, including a portion of Indian Cove and a block of territory adjacent to 

the western access road, from Joshua Tree village. A portion of the latter was already in private 

hands and promised to pose a difficult management situation. This time Herbert Maier answered

that bringing up the subject would expose the agency to criticism for having "over-reached" itself 

during the campaign to establish the monument.24 

On June 30, 1945, the government revoked Limitation Order L-208 and it did not take 

long for the mining lobby to restart their campaign to overturn the ban on new claims in the 

monument. Superintendent Cole pleaded with the regional office to speed up action on setting a 

final boundary while Congressman Sheppard pondered introducing a new bill to quiet the 

controversy. On November 15, 1945, Sheppard introduced H. R. 4703 to congress which 

proposed the boundary changes Cole suggested and included an authorization of $215,000 to 

acquire the remaining private land in the rump monument. The congressman hoped that cutting 

more than 310,000 acres from the eastern part of the monument might satisfy the mining 

faction.25

 

Unfortunately for Sheppard, the miners refused to accept anything less than complete 

access to the entire monument. They were joined in opposing his bill by hunters, who rejected 

the NPS prohibition on their activities, and landholders in the monument who feared expulsion if 

congress approved the land acquisition fund. An inholder named Charles L. Stokes spearheaded 

the resistance by landowners and soon proved to be extremely active and aggressive. Late in 

1945, Stokes and several others had purchased a section of former railroad land in Hidden 

Valley, the heart of the monument's most scenic area (Figure 3-5). Later, James Cole speculated 

that Stokes knew the land was in the monument and hoped to financially benefit from the deal. In 

opposing H. R. 4703, Stokes lost no opportunity to accuse monument personnel of duplicity, 

corruption, and intimidation. He challenged every aspect of NPS management, especially 

anything having to do with the boundary change and efforts to acquire non-federal land. He 

accused Superintendent Cole of designing the new boundaries to personally enrich himself. He 

attempted to disrupt an exchange between SPRR, the NPS, and a company interested in 

obtaining government land north of the monument. He complained about the agency at every 

conference and hearing and finally sent a letter accusing Cole of exceeding his authority for 

"political" reasons by getting SPRR to halt sales to private individuals. He directed the letter to 

the secretary of the interior but also sent copies to every member of the congressional committee 

reviewing the Sheppard bill.26

After consultation up and down the hierarchy of the NPS, from Cole to the director, 

Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug answered Stokes. He explained the policies of the agency 

regarding land acquisition and then dismissed the accusation against the superintendent:

Your criticisms of Custodian Cole are believed to be without basis. I am informed by 

Director Drury of the National Park Service that Mr. Cole at all times has acted in 

compliance with official instructions and that he has not exceeded his authority or taken 

any action that might be construed as being in his personal interest. It is true that Mr. 
92

Cole, pursuant to instructions, followed up with the Southern Pacific Railroad Company a 

request previously made by Director Drury that the Company suspend further sales of its 

properties within Joshua Tree National Monument pending the possible appropriation of 

Federal funds to acquire them. This request was reasonable and, I believe, in the public 

interest since it conceivably could prevent unwarranted development and exploitation of 

the properties by third parties in contemplation of their sale to the Government.27 

Even this response to Stokes, with its final statement aimed directly at him, did not stop him, but 

it frustrated his attempt to get Cole and other monument employees fired.

Meanwhile, miners in the region, now organized as the Mining Congress of Southern 

California, assessed H. R. 4703. Several sections of the bill troubled them. First, they opposed 

the prohibition against mining in the remaining monument. Second, the bill did not explicitly 

restore the mining laws to the areas removed from the monument. It merely said that the land 

Figure 3-5. Charles Stokes built his home on land he purchased from the Southern Pacific 

Railroad near the Lost Horse Valley. He vigorously opposed any effort to remove landowners 

from Joshua Tree National Monument. Eventually the Park Service acquired the land and 

structures, added to the house and converted it into a ranger station. Photo by the author. 

would return to the public domain. Third, it stipulated that the president could unilaterally add 

lands to the monument in the future. The mining lobby and its allies, including the Southern 

California Council of the State Chamber of Commerce, saw the latter as an additional threat 

which could expand the monument and its restrictive policies. Arrayed against these forces were 

conservationists, local town councils, especially in San Bernardino County, most newspapers and 

the NPS. Unfortunately for the anti-mining contingent, Minerva Hoyt passed away on December 
93

15, 1945 removing the most powerful organizer for protecting the monument. Yet, her death

simplified the solution the NPS had chosen because, to the end of her life, Hoyt furiously 

opposed diminution of her prized achievement.28

 

In March 1946, the Southern California Council announced that it would hold a forum at 

their next meeting to discuss Sheppard's bill and the future of mining in the region. Over the 

previous several months, the NPS had worked hard to explain why the bill cutting more than a 

third of the unit was the best solution. Many in the environmental community were disturbed at 

this compromise, but understood that the alternative might be elimination of the monument. An 

increasingly stressed James Cole sent dozens of long letters to conservation, recreation, tourism,

and academic organizations begging them to attend and speak on behalf of the monument. He 

also tried to communicate with the miners, finally expressing his frustration to Victor Hayek, 

secretary of the Mining Association of the Southwest:

It is obvious from your map that the bill proposes to give to the mining interests the 

mining districts they want and anyone would naturally think the miners and mining 

groups would not only be satisfied but would actively support the bill...The mining 

interests have not been able to obtain passage of a bill to open the monument to mining 

and now they are opposing a bill which without question gives them the only areas where 

there is any mining activity. Frankly, I cannot understand the psychology of miners and 

the groups you represent.29

In spite of, or perhaps because of, his efforts, pro-mining forces sought to discredit Cole by 

insisting that he had told them 115,000 acres was sufficient for the monument. Acting Director 

Hillory Tolson responded that it was "inconceivable" that Cole would say such a thing because 

he had proposed the boundaries that were in H. R. 4703.30

A Forum on Mining and the Monument

The meeting took place on April 17, 1946 at the San Bernardino County Courthouse. The 

audience of approximately 100 consisted primarily of miners, land developers, and others who 

opposed the bill. James Cole, Herbert Maier, and several others from the NPS attended. The 

format was scheduled to allow Cole to speak for the agency, a limited number of others to speak 

for and against the bill, and then a period in which the NPS could answer questions and rebut any 

false claims. The first speaker was Frank Bagley, president of the Twentynine Palms Chamber of 

Commerce. He spoke in favor of the bill noting that recreation and resorts seemed to be immune 

to economic downturns and should be the economic focus rather than mining. Next to speak was 

Congressman Sheppard who carefully explained how he supported miners and why his bill 

would help them. Then Cole took the podium and explained how the bill would return 310,000 

acres to the public domain while providing funds to acquire 30,000 acres of private inholdings. 

He argued that the compromise bill was a logical solution even if it diminished the national 

monument. He particularly stressed the rapid settlement of the desert by five-acre “jackrabbit 

homesteads” as well as larger and more permanent settlements and the need for a large protected 

area to cope with future demands for recreation.31 

Next on the agenda came opponents of the Sheppard bill. First Charles Stokes leveled 

numerous charges against the agency and Superintendent Cole. Then G. A. Joslin, a miner and 
94

chair of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, compared federal land agencies to Adolf Hitler 

and Benito Mussolini, insisting that they had become lawmakers themselves. He complained 

about the tight regulations on government reserves and argued that "the state is becoming more 

important than the individual." Several more sedate mining enthusiasts expressed shock that 

Joshua Tree was not open to new claims like Death Valley. These arguments against federal 

regulation, prohibition of economic exploitation, and loss of traditional livelihoods had been 

encountered many times by the NPS and continue to be emotional responses to land preservation 

today.32 

Edmund Yeager followed and defended the purpose of the monument. He explained the 

scientific and educational benefits of a unit devoted not just to saving Joshua trees, but entire 

complex ecosystems. Several of the opposition had ridiculed Minerva Hoyt and the concept of 

protecting areas for future generations. He lashed out at them:

I noticed that some have been filled with snickers and laughter when five hundred years 

is mentioned. Gentlemen, it is time this community in Southern California and the people 

of the United States look a little bit to the future and not simply down the end of our 

noses and our own immediate living. The people of other countries have found that time 

does pass and that things they did not preserve are gone forever. We must preserve some 

areas or samples of wilderness, if you please, and when I say wilderness I do not merely 

mean barren places, but samples of unspoiled places for the men and women who must 

come in the future.33

Will Held of the Sierra Club stressed that southern California would benefit economically 

far more if Joshua Tree became a world class attraction rather than another unknown province of 

mining. He stated that the reason why the monument was not developed for tourism was that 

NPS was afraid to invest there with a threat of losing the unit to mining. Then a Riverside 

County resident, Randal Henderson, attacked one of the points made earlier by the pro-mining 

faction about personal freedom. He explained that he enjoyed camping in Joshua Tree but miners 

had put up no trespassing signs curbing his right to explore the desert and camp where he 

wanted. This, he warned, was an abridgement of freedom.34

Undaunted, the miners and their allies fought back. W. B. Clemenger offered one of the 

leading arguments of the mining faction:

There has been a lot said about our posterity--what they are going to enjoy, and our 

immediate future, and the millions that are going to enjoy the desert, and the rest of that. 

We have just got through one war and almost got caught short, and now the Federal 

Government has grabbed off millions of other acres of land and tells us that we can't 

prospect on it. Who found all these areas? Was it the wealthy companies? No! It was the 

little prospectors, like those who are here today. Who is taking the land? The Federal 

Government. If we can't prospect and we are caught in another war, where are we going 

to get our strategic minerals?35

Thereafter Hal Boyce, representing the Sportsmen's Club in Banning, reasoned that his group 

was interested in conservation, especially of quail, and that the dearth of water in the monument 

was forcing the birds to congregate in large numbers near the few available springs. This 
95

exposed them to predators which the hunters could help control. He added that his group wanted 

to enjoy the monument "to the fullest."36

The hours passed as a few more miners spoke and Maier began to wonder if the NPS

would have the promised time to answer its opponents. When the rebuttal time did come, the first 

speaker again was Frank Bagley. He first expressed surprise that the National Park Service was 

so widely hated in the region. He sarcastically speculated on whether the parks at Yosemite and 

the Grand Canyon were mistakes and whether it might be dangerous to visit them. Then he 

challenged the miners to show any year since the Civil War when mining made more money than 

tourism. At this point Stokes began shouting at Bagley and had to be silenced by moderator 

Henry Mulryan.37 With only minutes left, Maier took the podium to try once more to answer 

critics of the NPS. He explained that Death Valley was set aside for its landscapes and its 

historical uses which included mining. Joshua Tree, on the other hand, was established as a

botanical preserve. He stated:

You cannot have a biological preserve, and I'm speaking now from an ecological 

standpoint which involves all biology--that is, animal life, plant life, insect life, bird life: 

the entire habitat--you simply can't have an ecological area and preserve of that kind and 

still have hunting and mining in it. There is no such thing in the world as a biological or 

ecological preserve in which mining and hunting and killing of wildlife is permitted... So 

I don't think--and I don't mean this is [in] an unkind spirit at all [--] I don't think this 

compromise which has been offered that we could settle this thing by opening up the area 

to mining and everything would be all right. I am sure it can't be done.38

Maier's impassioned defense received an immediate response as S. T. Schrieber of the Mining 

Congress of Southern California blurted out that the only solution then was to abolish the 

monument entirely. The moderator then thanked everyone for attending and helping to "get all 

these facts down." Nobody's position had budged. If anything, the debate had became even more 

acrimonious. In his report to the regional director, Maier lamented that he and Cole had not been 

allowed time to fully rebut the many errors and misstatements they had heard. He pessimistically 

added that "speculation in desert land is the spirit of the day and every owner has several 

nibbles."39

After the April 17 forum, attention turned to the Committee on Public Lands which 

would decide whether to recommend passage of H. R. 4703 to the full house of representatives. 

On May 22, Director Drury appeared before the committee to defend the bill. After he outlined 

its purpose, several congressmen grilled him about two points that disturbed them. They focused 

first on the provision that the president could unilaterally add lands in the future. Although the 

Antiquities Act gave the president the right to proclaim a monument on federal land, several 

thought it was unclear about his authority to add to it. The committee decided to address that 

question later in executive session. Then they took up the appropriation of $215,000 for land 

acquisition. Here matters got difficult as Drury tried to explain the difficulties in working out 

exchanges and the imminent threats of railroad lands being sold to private developers. The entire 

exchange took only a few minutes, but the outlook for the bill darkened.40

In the meantime, members of the Mining Association of the Southwest evaluated their 

position and offered a compromise amendment for the Sheppard bill to the committee. First, they 
96

recommended that the area to be deleted from Joshua Tree in the bill remain the same. However, 

they proposed that the remaining monument be divided into a core area of no more than 50,000 

acres surrounding the Lost Horse Valley where all commercial activities would be banned, and a 

buffer zone where mining could take place. The miners offered to back this type of bill to the 

fullest. They made no mention of the fund to buy private lands or the matter of hunting. 

Superintendent Cole politely requested copies of the letter to forward to his superiors. Victor 

Hayek of the mining association responded "cordially," promising to send them and thanking 

Cole for attending the forum in April. It is uncertain whether the NPS would have accepted such 

a solution because the House Committee on Public Lands killed H. R. 4703 in early August. 

Charles Stokes gloated in the Joshua Tree village newspaper Desert Views that it died because of 

its "demerits." This accompanied his four page article blasting the NPS and the bill, echoing

many of his statements and letters over the previous year. Gone was the plan to cut out 

mineralized areas. Gone too was the appropriation to buy inholdings. The miners still did not 

have open access to mine, but they had defeated a reviled compromise. And, a month earlier, the 

NPS learned that Henry Kaiser and his company had bought all rights to the Eagle Mountain iron 

ore deposits within the monument. This would become a much greater threat to the agency's 

mission than all of the gold prospectors put together.41 

Never Give Up

Congressman Harry Sheppard, showing the irrepressibility of a politician, immediately began 

planning to reintroduce his legislation after consulting with the NPS and his constituents. He 

urged the agency to study again the mining situation and the boundaries to see if any adjustments 

might be made to improve his next bill. James Cole returned to his maps and aerial photos and,

in January 1947, conducted another field investigation with biologist Lowell Sumner and 

regional land officer Raymond Hoyt [no relation to Minerva]. A month later, Hoyt submitted 

their report proposing several adjustments from the boundaries in the previous Sheppard bill. 

One new change was a proposal to eliminate three tiers of sections from the monument's western 

end at Morongo Canyon. The existing boundary ran in and out of the canyon and some of the 

land was listed as a Native American reservation. Cole initially wanted to add the rest of the 

canyon to the monument, but Hoyt disagreed. Too many private holdings he said. The team also 

recommended keeping the Gold Park Mining district in the Pinto Mountains because there were 

only three moribund claims in the area and bighorn sheep used it for winter habitat. Other 

recommendations included adding the eastern portion of the Coxcomb Mountains and extending 

the southeastern boundary to include more of the Pinto Basin. Ironically, the failure of H. R. 

4703 prompted NPS officials to try to retain more of the original monument than they had been 

willing to settle for a year earlier. However, Conrad Wirth, the chief of lands for the agency, 

disagreed. He readily accepted the exclusion of the western sections, but balked at the other 

changes. He suggested to Sheppard that he make the acceptable change, modify the language a 

bit and submit a new bill to alter Joshua Tree's boundaries. He also encouraged him to repeat the 

proposed appropriation for $215,000 for land acquisition.42 

On March 26, 1947 Sheppard introduced H. R. 2795 with two changes from his previous 

bill, the elimination of fifteen sections of land at Morongo Canyon and the addition of four 

sections in the western part of the Eagle Mountains that had been excluded from the original 

monument because of sales of railroad land in the area. The latter would provide additional range 
97

for bighorn sheep. Interior Secretary Julius Krug submitted a short letter to the Committee on 

Public Lands repeating all of the justifications for the boundary changes and land acquisition 

funds. He added that the monument could not be developed for public use until these problems 

were solved. New superintendent Frank R. Givens suggested that this time the NPS should not 

broadcast its desire for support in the hopes that by being quiet the miners and their allies might 

not notice. This seemed to work for a while, but then the congressional committee announced its 

plan to hold a public hearing on the bill. After that the agency lost no time in contacting its 

traditional allies and asking them to appear at the hearing. NPS officials were more optimistic 

about this hearing which would be held by legislators instead of an organization that had 

opposed their bill from the start.43 

Shortly after submitting his recommendations for the latest boundary bill, James Cole

transferred to the NPS office in Omaha, Nebraska, and to a less stressful position as regional 

biologist. However, he did not escape the latest round of Joshua Tree boundary disputes. As the 

date for the hearing approached, Cole agreed to defend, once again, the boundaries he had 

recommended. Meanwhile, environmental organizations prepared to participate more actively in 

the debate. Herbert Maier encouraged Givens to secure as many speakers as possible to support 

the bill, especially local chamber of commerce members. Maier also warned that Charles Stokes 

undoubtedly would level "ill-founded" charges against agency personnel and that he should be 

answered "graciously and straightforwardly."44

 

The hearing took place on October 1, 1947. It began with a series of protests against a 

land exchange that would secure acreage in Joshua Tree National Monument by exchanging it 

for government land to the north of the monument. A group of would-be homesteaders wanted 

the same land for five-acre small tracts. Present was Congressman John Phillips in whose district 

part of the national monument lay after a recent adjustment to congressional boundaries. He 

defended the Sheppard bill in general, but opposed a provision granting the secretary of the 

interior the right to set prices for private inholdings in any park system unit. The next speaker 

was Stokes who, between his presentation and answers to questions from the committee, took up 

a large amount of the available time. Once again, he accused Cole and other personnel of 

designing the bill for political reasons and personal profit. As he continued to berate the NPS, 

California Congressman Clair Engle asked him what specifically he wanted with regard to the 

future of the monument. Stokes answered:

I would use the Park Service's threats in that case. They repeatedly threatened--and I have 

the official record taken by a State reporter--that, "if we don't get the land, we will 

abolish the Monument." I say, if that is all you will do, okay. Does that answer you? 45

 

The rest of the hearing showed that the brief cordiality offered in the exchange between Victor 

Hayek and James Cole was long gone. Each side held to its position. Lloyd Mason Smith, 

director of the Palm Springs Desert Museum fired back: 

The whole matter, as it appears to our Museum, is not merely the saving in the wild state 

of a few acres of land, but it is a policy which is being jeopardized. Should the dictates of 

a few selfish short-sighted men deprive our future generations of their natural heritage? It 

has happened too often in the past. If it happens here, what's to stop other groups from 

taking slices out of Yosemite and Yellowstone as well? If the minerals mentioned were 
98

vitally needed in the National Defense, or the land urgently needed for settlement, that 

would be something quite different. But are these miners and land-seekers interested in 

abolishing the Monument purely because of a patriotic nationalistic motivation? I rather 

think not.46 

During the course of the hearing another minor boundary adjustment became a focus of 

Stokes and other inholders in their efforts to discredit the NPS. Agency planners had decided to 

remove three parcels of private land south of Twentynine Palms to simplify administration. Two 

of the parcels lay along the western edge of the main road into the monument immediately south 

of the Oasis of Mara. By deleting these two parcels, the NPS could avoid responsibility for 

nearly two miles of road maintenance. A third parcel owned by a man named Beech consisted of 

an apron of land north of the mountains and immediately northwest of the other two. Cole 

believed that moving the boundary back to the mountains would establish a more obvious 

boundary. Stokes seized upon the fact that Joshua Tree Ranger Hesmel Earenfight owned the 

parcel north of Beech and accused him of benefitting financially from the boundary adjustment. 

Cole answered that Earenfight owned that land before there was a monument, that he had been in 

the army in Europe when the decision was made to exclude Beech's property, and that it was 

uncertain whether the ranger's land value would go up or down after having the monument 

boundary move away from the edge of his property. Cole also denied new assertions by Stokes 

and several of his allies that he had intimidated them and told them he "would have them out of 

[the monument] one day or know why."47 

Despite the spirited defense of H. R. 2795 by environmentalists, local chambers of 

commerce, and the NPS, it too died in committee. In February 1949, a frustrated Representative 

Harry Sheppard told the Desert Trail that he would not introduce the bill again. This left the task 

to Representative John Phillips who introduced H. R. 4116 on April 8, 1949. The NPS had 

studied again the boundary situation including a new field survey by biologist Lowell Sumner. 

The new bill would add the eastern slope of the Coxcomb Mountains to give more range to 

bighorn sheep and delete six sections of land along the western entrance road from Joshua Tree 

village. Two of the sections contained subdivisions and park planners believed they would be 

impossible to acquire. The bill still included an appropriation of $215,000 for land acquisition 

and a stipulation that the president could proclaim further boundary revisions. Once again, it was 

referred to the House Committee on Public Lands.48

By this time, many in the house of representatives were familiar with the efforts to amend 

Joshua Tree's boundaries. H. R. 4116 still contained sections that some congressmen opposed 

and the outlook for its passage again looked dim. However, this time Phillips and the NPS were 

ready. Director Drury advised Phillips to drop the provisions for presidential power to amend the 

boundaries in the future and the appropriation of funds for land acquisition. After his first bill 

faltered in the first session of the 81st congress, Phillips reintroduced a revised bill, H. R. 7934, 

without those sections, in the second session on March 30, 1950. It also included a provision that 

answered a major concern of miners by explicitly stating that the land removed from the 

monument would be open to mining exploration and claims immediately. Now it just boiled 

down to boundary changes. The bill proposed a deletion of 289,500 acres including the 

mountains around the Pinto Basin, fifteen sections of land at Morongo Canyon, six sections near 

the western entrance road, and three parcels near Twentynine Palms. The areas to be added 
99

brought the southwestern boundary to the MWD aqueduct and added sections in the western 

Eagle Mountains and the eastern slope of the Coxcomb Mountains (Map 3-3). The additions 

meant that the monument would suffer a net loss of nearly 267,000 acres.4

Map 3-3. Areas deleted and added in the 1950 boundary change of Joshua Tree National 

Monument. Source: JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 029B

With the unpopular portions removed and growing support from environmental groups, 

H. R. 7934 seemed poised to finally address the monument's problems with mining. The House 

of Representatives passed the bill on June 20, 1950. It then went to the senate where members of 

its Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs saw it for the first time. After some debate, the 

senate committee added another section that ordered the NPS, the United States Geological 

Survey (USGS) and the Bureau of Mines to restudy the mineral resources of the land that would 

remain in the monument. The NPS unsuccessfully tried to convince the senators that enough 

study had already been done. As the bill went to a joint house-senate committee to hammer out 

the differences, it ordered the agency to report the results of the new study by February 1, 1951. 

Members of the lower house agreed to the senate amendment and the bill passed on September 

25, 1950. As Public Law 81-837 it removed more than one-third of the monument's land 

including the Iron Chief Mine, the Dale Mining District, most mountains east of Range 9 East 

and several troubling areas of private land along the northern boundary. It also deleted nearly all 
100

of the more than 5,000 claims that existed in the eastern part of the original monument. A later 

land survey determined that the revised monument contained 558,550 acres.50

Angry after their defeat, members of the Western Mining Council bitterly complained in 

late November 1950 that the Park Service was stalling on the three-agency mineral study due to 

be submitted to congress in two months. Agency officials hurriedly formed a study team with the 

other agencies and surveyed the remaining monument over the following month. One week 

before the February 1, 1951 deadline Assistant Secretary of the Interior Dale Doty submitted to 

the president his report based on the required study. Doty stated that the gold mines still in the 

monument were both small and inactive. He wrote that, by contrast, "there is clear proof that 

what now remains under the reduced Monument boundaries contains a variety and wealth of 

physical, geological, and archaeological features, as well as exceptional desert flora, and scenery, 

and interesting and rare wildlife, such as cannot be equalled [sic] in any of our national 

monuments within the United States."51 Doty reminded the president that these findings 

corroborated those by the GLO and the NPS prior to the passage of the act and that any claims 

within the monument that existed prior to 1936 retained their rights to operate. 

The Miners' Last Effort

After the boundary change and completion of the resurvey required by Public Law 81-837, NPS

officials hoped that miners would be satisfied (Map 3-4). However, their hopes proved 

premature. Several newspapers reporting on the boundary change implied that the entire 

monument was open to mining. This led to dozens of inquiries at the monument office about 

available land, including many from uninformed people who innocently wanted land for 

recreation homes, airstrips and other purposes. In addition, Superintendent Givens informed 

Tomlinson that some unscrupulous individuals would sell a claim in the monument for $100 cash 

with the remainder of the purchase price to be paid from the proceeds of the mine. They would 

then offer to assess the mine, declare it worthless, and reacquire it after the disappointed new 

owner abandoned it. The seller would then repeat the entire process with a new would-be miner. 

Meanwhile, the traditional foes of the monument acting through another association, the 

Riverside County Chamber of Mines, turned to the California State Senate to see if it could open 

the monument to mining. Givens characterized their effort:

This recent action by the miners is merely another step in a nibbling process to do away 

with the monument. A few individuals are antagonistic to the monument for personal 

reasons but the agitation is due to the necessity for an organization to agitate to justify its 

existence. That they represent a non-existent public and a non-existent demand is 

evidenced by the almost total absence of any new activity after the "highly mineralized" 

areas were deleted and opened to mining.52 

One of the most compelling arguments used by miners was the need for minerals 

for the country's defense. With World War II a recent memory and the Korean conflict 

underway, the mining associations reiterated their argument that the nation's security 

depended on free access to strategic resources throughout the desert. The onset of the 

nuclear era focused attention on new types of resources, especially uranium. On May 6, 

1952, the Indio News reported on a meeting of the Western Mining Council at which 

amateur mineralogist Ray Hetherington asserted that he had found uranium and other 
101

"rare earth" materials within Joshua Tree National Monument. He added that the USGS

planned to conduct an aerial survey to confirm the presence of these resources. This 

revelation tremendously excited those who criticized the monument and the federal 

government. Secretary of the mining organization, Howard D. Clark, commented that 

"the remaining part of the monument is not non-mineral by a mere act of Congress."53 He 

added that Congressman Phillips had promised to introduce a bill to open the monument 

if there was proof that strategic metals existed there. Charles Stokes reiterated his 

accusations of NPS malfeasance and duplicity. Bill Keys, ignoring the fact that the Kaiser 

Corporation was actively working its Eagle Mountain Mine, blamed the NPS for holding 

up iron mining by refusing to build roads in that area. He also declared that mines were 

attractions for tourists and that the agency’s argument that mining destroyed Joshua trees 

was baseless propaganda. County supervisor Homer Varner complained that the agency 

refused to build the road from Thousand Palms to Twentynine Palms. After everyone 

expressed their frustration to a sympathetic audience, the group drafted a letter opposing 

government "land grabs" in the West.54 

Map 3-4. Major mines in Joshua Tree National Monument after the 1950 boundary change. Data 

source: JTNP Natural Resource Division files. Delta Cartography.
102

Hetherington's mention of a USGS study startled monument officials and Assistant Director 

Ronald F. Lee requested more information from the science agency. Dr. John C. Reed reported 

that a May1952 airborne scintillometer study showed some "interesting anomalies" within the 

monument. However, they were not significant enough to justify an immediate ground check. He 

promised to notify the NPS if his agency planned further investigation. At the same time, Joshua 

Tree officials coped with an upsurge in illegal mining in the monument. In one case, Alford 

Maxwell of Los Angeles requested permission to use a monument road to work a mine that he 

hoped was in the land eliminated by the 1950 boundary revision. It turned out his claim lay 

within the monument. In another case, K. B. Tillman of Desert Hot Springs had staked two 

claims many years before on land that was owned by the SPRR. The NPS had purchased that 

land and had to explain to Tillman that his claims were invalid originally, invalid at the present 

time, and that his letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower still would not secure any right to 

mine.55 

In August 1953, Maurice Nordstrom of the Riverside County Chamber of Mines 

launched a new campaign to open Joshua Tree National Monument to mining. In a letter to 

Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay and copied to President Eisenhower, Nordstrom 

described the 1950 act as one that benefitted only the Kaiser Steel Company and the NPS itself, 

the latter by straightening a few boundaries for easier administration. He admitted that 

Congressman Phillips told him that his colleagues would not pass a bill to enable mining in the 

monument. Nordstrom blamed this on NPS opposition. Then he got to the heart of his argument:

Prior to 1936 the area embraced within the Joshua Tree Monument was prospected and 

mined principally for gold. There was no prospecting for uranium, cobalt and the many 

other strategic metals for which a national demand has been created in the last fifteen 

years. Permission to prospect that area for the many essential minerals needed by this 

country, many of which must now be imported from foreign sources which could easily 

be cut off in the event of an emergency, is vitally important and cannot be brushed aside 

by a statement that this restricted region must be kept intact for the benefit of botanists, 

entomologists, etc. As an attraction for tourists the Monument is a failure. It is devoid of 

beautiful scenery and of any comfort for the tourist, an area most of them are glad to get 

out---never to return. Why then, should the government continue to operate the 

monument as an expense to the American Taxpayer? 56

 

This time Nordstrom and the miners he represented meant to gain access to the monument or do 

away with it entirely.

As the latest mining threat escalated, environmental organizations took greater interest.

The National Parks Association, a local group from Banning called The Trailfinders, and local 

chapters of the Sierra Club and the Audubon Society asked the NPS to notify them of any 

developments affecting the monument. A new organization formed in 1954 with important 

implications for future conservation action in the American Southwest. Randall Henderson, 

publisher of Desert Magazine since 1937, Edmund Jaeger, and some 100 others formed the 

Desert Protective Council specifically to combat the designs of the mining faction at Joshua 

Tree. The organization would later grow to become a major force in promoting environmental 

causes throughout all the deserts of the United States.57

 
103

Assistant Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis explained the same legal and economic 

points in a rebuttal of Nordstrom's arguments which he copied to Congressman Phillips and 

Senator Thomas Kuchel. The miners then decided to approach San Bernardino County's Board 

of Supervisors. Their complaints led the supervisors to schedule a hearing on the issue for July 

19, 1954. To counter the miners' efforts, Joe Momyer and several others from the local Sierra 

Club chapter met with the supervisors and with the miners themselves. They listened to the 

arguments of the miners, but then defended the monument and urged the supervisors to pass a 

resolution supporting it. Although the meeting was amicable, the two sides’ opinions remained 

fixed. As the hearing approached, the NPS decided to attend and offer information if asked, but 

not make a formal presentation. Environmentalists and other monument allies would argue to 

save the monument.58

The hearing opened at 2:00 P.M. at the San Bernardino County Health Building and 

Maurice Nordstrom spoke first. He acknowledged that the miners needed official approval by 

San Bernardino to match that which they already had from Riverside County. He reviewed the 

history of mining in the area, explained that just one of the mining organizations had over 600 

members who could have attended, reiterated their desire to have the same opportunities that

were available in Death Valley, and then introduced several other representatives of mining 

organizations. His allies took different approaches in bolstering the mining position. A Mr. 

Peters of the Western Mining Council ridiculed conservationists, denied that mining negatively 

affected bighorn sheep, stressed the economic importance of mining to the county, and dismissed 

claims that mining brought substandard roads and shacks into the area. He added that he

personally had built 110 roads and none of them were substandard. Tom Quinn, from the same 

organization, wondered why Kaiser could mine in the monument and not the average man. 

Apparently he was unaware that the iron mine was no longer in the monument. Les Spell of 

Twentynine Palms focused on the strategic values of the resources and concluded "I would rather 

give our boys material for fighting than a hayload full of flowers."59

 

Joe Momyer of the Sierra Club led the speakers who opposed additional mining,

including geologist and conservationist John P. Buwalda, Edmund Jaeger, and several other 

scientists and teachers. They answered Nordstrom's 600 local miners by stating that they 

represented 8,000 Sierra Club members, 2,000 boy scouts, 3,000 women in twenty-six clubs that 

supported national parks, and a woman who trained teachers, each of whom would have 1,500 

elementary school students in her career. In addition, upon Momyer's request, Superintendent 

Samuel King presented detailed visitor statistics from 1941 through June 1954. The figure for 

1953 was 172,423 persons in 48,468 cars. He explained that the NPS had counters at the 

entrances and multiplied the number of cars by 3.5 to get the number of persons. This caused 

Nordstrom to comment that he visited the monument two or three times a month and every time 

he was 3.5 persons. Later, he would use this to dispute NPS attendance figures which he claimed 

were inflated to bolster the agency's position. The anti-mining group then offered the standard 

arguments about the recreational, educational, and economic benefits of the unit in its protected 

state. Thereupon, Charles Stokes offered the novel contention that tourists rather than miners 

caused most of the damage in the monument. By this time, however, the miners must have 

known they had failed. Immediately after Stokes, the supervisors voted unanimously to oppose 

eliminating the monument or opening it to new mine claims.

60 
104

This blow to the miners' campaign still did not stop them. They next approached the 

California State Senate, and here they succeeded. In early 1955, the state senators passed 

Resolution No. 5 which urged the president and congress "to permit, with proper provision to 

prevent damage to the scenic desert growth, prospecting and mining within the Joshua Tree 

National Monument."61 NPS and interior officials pondered this latest step and, after some delay, 

Assistant Secretary of the Interior Lewis responded that they had no legal authority to change 

policy that was part of the Antiquities Act. Lewis did offer one consolation to the miners, 

however. The department had given permission to the Atomic Energy Commission to investigate 

the monument for "fissionable material." When this news reached the environmental groups,

they were not happy. Harry C. James of the Desert Protective Council warned the regional 

director that he would have to allocate a much larger staff of rangers to Joshua Tree in order to 

cope with "a regular fever of prospecting." Numerous conservation and outdoor recreation 

groups and individuals embarked on a letter writing campaign to the president, congress and the 

NPS decrying the idea of mining and even the survey to investigate its possibilities. It soon 

became clear that the public attitude was evolving toward protection rather than exploitation.62 

During the next year, mining enthusiasts explored within the monument and filed claims 

that monument officials subsequently found and negated. Correspondence for and against 

opening the monument to new claims continued to flow and editorials argued both sides. The 

Atomic Energy Commission did not inform the NPS about any radioactive materials, which 

agency officials took to mean that none of economic quality existed. The last organized attempt 

by miners came with a letter from the secretary of the Riverside County Chamber of Mines to 

Senator Thomas Kuchel in July 1956. Helen Bixel cited the recently publicized Mission 66 plan 

for Joshua Tree including its provision to acquire the remaining private lands. She challenged all 

the data and studies supplied by the NPS indicating a lack of significant mineral resources and 

appealed to the senator for help in opening the monument to mining for strategic minerals which, 

she stated, occurred in proximity to iron ore. Kuchel dutifully forwarded the letter to the NPS

with a request that they answer the charges. By now the agency had a form letter to respond 

which cited all the laws, studies, and hearings that had come over the previous two decades. 

However, Acting Director E. T. Scoyen also added a new justification for ignoring the miners' 

insistence. Two years earlier, congress had passed Public Law 83-703, the "Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954," which included a stipulation that exploration and operations on lands in national parks, 

monuments and wildlife areas were prohibited unless "the President by Executive Order declares 

that the requirements of the common defense and security make such action necessary." This, it 

seemed, was an insurmountable impediment to the mining organizations.63

Problems with mining in Joshua Tree continued, of course, but the organized campaign to 

change the monument's policy was over. Many miners continued to ask for permission to mine 

and illegal prospecting occurred occasionally, but these efforts were scattered and sporadic. 

Dealing with mining became a law enforcement issue and a bureaucratic process of determining 

the validity of the remaining pre-1936 claims. The threat of mining had cost the monument more 

than one-third of its acreage and untold hours of staff time. The long battle brought deep 

animosity to the agency from some neighbors, but also a growing group of allies. Geographic 

and demographic patterns emerged as well. Officials in San Bernardino County were friendlier to 

the monument than those in Riverside County. Twentynine Palms was more supportive than the 
105

village of Joshua Tree. Old timers were divided on the relative merits of the monument while the 

most vicious criticism came from miners and developers in and near Los Angeles.

Chapter Four: Land Acquisition 1936-1956

The issue that most worried Roger Toll and other National Park Service (NPS) officials during 

the campaign to establish Joshua Tree National Monument was the amount of non-federal land

within it. All the NPS and General Land Office (GLO) inspections confirmed this troubling 

reality. In 1941, almost five years after its establishment, Chief of Planning Thomas Vint, the 

agency's lead landscape architect, flatly stated, "One look at a map showing the private lands in 

the area is frightening."1 Indeed, during that period the NPS had not acquired a single acre of 

surveyed non-federal land. Nor would it do so for another seven years. In addition, thousands of 

mineral claims meant that even tracts of undisputed federal land were potentially blocked from 

recreation development and visitor access (Figure 4-1). The land situation hindered every other 

aspect of planning and developing the young monument. Over Joshua Tree’s first twenty years, 

the NPS worked out ways to acquire valuable property through purchase, exchange, 

condemnation, and invalidation of mining claims. 

After their March 1937 inspection, Regional Engineer Frank Kittredge and Regional

Landscape Architect Ernest Davidson summarized the status of land ownership within the new 

monument. They reported that the Southern Pacific Railroad (SPRR) owned 187 sections and 

held rights to an uncertain number of others within its twenty-mile indemnity strip. Private 

individuals or groups owned thirty-four sections, the state held thirty-five sections of school 

lands, and no information could be found for another sixty-two sections. They also 

recommended, “that no developments whatever be undertaken in the Monument until such time 

as the private holdings, or at least the key property be acquired by the Government."2 The two 

senior officials commented that the only positive in the land acquisition situation was that some 

locals offered to help the agency purchase land through which their proposed north-south road

from Twentynine Palms to Indio would pass. Thirteen months later Superintendent Merriam and 

Naturalist Cole added:

The most difficult and important problem confronting the administration and 

development of Joshua Tree National Monument hinges upon the private land situation. 

There is little that can be, or should be done, in developing the area until the private land 

holdings are diminished or abolished...Certainly, the monument cannot be successfully 

administered when every other section is privately owned.3

In September 1939, Merriam and Cole accompanied landscape architect R. L. McKown 

on another inspection as the monument began its fourth year of existence. McKown elaborated 

on why the NPS needed to delay development until it could acquire enough land to assure the 

monument's survival:
106

There are three factors to be kept in mind which will develop as soon as any work is 

started in the monument. (1) Land values will increase, resulting in a greater cost to the 

Government to acquire private holdings; (2) Landscape values will be destroyed which 

are important to the monument. If work is started on the roads, private land which 

heretofore may have been inaccessible may have connecting roads brushed out by private 

owners, whereas if the Government acquires these lands no additional roads may be 

necessary; (3) If work is once started local pressure to continue the work is sure to 

develop.4

In addition to delaying development, agency officials decided to maintain secrecy about any 

planning for the future. Thomas Vint worried that any leaks to the local public from the 

numerous inspection reports would "aggravate the already serious problem of land acquisition."

5

Figure 4-1. The stabilized ruins of the Ryan Homestead near Hidden Valley are located at one of 

the premier settlement sites with both scenery and a water source. Photo by the author.

Acquiring Railroad Lands

The non-federal land in Joshua Tree consisted of two types, surveyed and unsurveyed. Most of 

the privately-owned parcels had been surveyed by the GLO, in some cases decades earlier. This 

was the case for the western half of the monument where the most important scenic resources 
107

were. The eastern part of the monument held most of the unsurveyed land. GLO research showed 

that the SPRR held the rights to more than 100,000 acres of unsurveyed land as part of its 

indemnity option. Because this vast acreage remained largely unthreatened by intrusion, NPS

land specialists focused on securing the surveyed land to forestall subdivision or development 

"contrary to park purposes."6 

Despite this logical preference, the first transfer of land to Joshua Tree National 

Monument unexpectedly came from the railroad’s unsurveyed indemnity strip. Congress worked 

out a deal with the railroads that became part of the Transportation Act of 1940. Prior to this act,

the federal government did not pay for its employees and materials to ride the trains of railroad 

companies that had received extensive land grants to build their lines. Those companies now 

sought to change that by returning unclaimed lands so that they could begin charging the 

government for transport as they did everyone else. The Transportation Act legislated that deal 

and the SPRR relinquished its unclaimed lands in the indemnity strip that slashed diagonally 

across the monument. In one bold stroke the NPS suddenly gained 105,240 acres, which reduced

the railroad's remaining holdings to approximately 135,000 acres.7

The NPS fruitlessly negotiated for surveyed land for almost twelve years after the 

monument’s proclamation. When the agency finally did secure some surveyed land in 1948, it 

came as a result of highly convoluted negotiations involving the railroad, a private company 

seeking a location for filming movies, and a number of real-estate speculators. The Southern 

Pacific Land Company, a subsidiary of the railroad corporation, remained the primary target 

during these frustrating years. The company steadily refused to exchange its land for other

federal desert land. Its executives believed that they already held the highest quality land in the 

desert and that selling it was the only reasonable option that would satisfy their stockholders.

They offered to sell all their remaining land in the monument to the government for ninety-three 

cents per acre, but regional officials replied that the federal government had no money for 

outright land purchases. 

In April 1938, at the request of the NPS, GLO inspector Samuel E. Guthrey returned to 

the monument with two assistants and spent three weeks gaining an overview of its land and 

water resources with specific attention to the railroad’s land. Their report took the form of an 

appraisal, first describing the geography and resources of the region, its history of ownership and 

human use, and then calculating the potential worth for agriculture, mining, and grazing of each 

of the SPRR’s sections of land. Although Guthrie mistakenly surveyed the entire area formerly 

proposed by Minerva Hoyt, he carefully analyzed each piece of railroad property. He reported

that (1) the area was largely barren with only two sites feasible for camping, Quail Springs and 

Cottonwood Springs, (2) all the significant mineral resources lay east of Range 8 East and all the 

scenic areas west of it, and (3) the railroad had recently sold 18,000 acres of their best land in the 

monument for slightly over $1.37 per acre. In spite of that sale, he concluded that the NPS

should pay $24,286 for the estimated 242,860 acres of land "reputed to be in railroad 

ownership." This amounted to barely ten cents per acre. Needless to say, the railroad company

was not interested.8

Despite SPRR's offer to sell its land under the appraised value, the NPS saw no real 

option other than a land exchange. Congress continued to refuse allocations for direct purchase 

of private lands in the park system. However, the federal government still controlled more than 
108

nine million acres of public domain in California. Section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act enabled 

federal land agencies to exchange those lands outside grazing districts for lands it desired in its 

"reservations or withdrawals." Frustrated NPS officials hoped they could find land somewhere 

that the railroad would accept in trade. James Cole worried that the sale of railroad land to 

private individuals would destroy any prospect of protecting the monument's most scenic and 

popular resources. He commented that the only positive in the situation was that most buyers had 

been unable to develop their purchases because of the scarcity of water.

9

 

By January 1941, a desperate NPS asked the railroad company to hold off selling their 

land until such time as congress might relent and provide money to acquire its monument 

inholdings. Company land commissioner D. G. Christen, although sympathetic, offered little 

hope. The company still owned much of the land in the Lost Horse Valley and other critical parts 

of the monument. When World War II started a few months later, the NPS found itself with a 

skeleton staff and even less money to spend. A 1942 offer by the railroad to sell its Joshua Tree 

acreage to the agency remained well out of reach. Meanwhile, threats of private purchase and 

development increased. In May 1945, Superintendent Cole reported that developer James F. 

Whitehorn, who already owned land inside the monument near the western entrance, was 

interested in buying land around Hidden Valley and other key parts of the monument. He also 

suspected that Minerva Hoyt had put Whitehorn up to it. While it is true that Hoyt was deeply 

frustrated with the endless delays in developing the monument for public use, it seems highly 

unlikely that she would suggest or even condone private acquisition of its land for development. 

Regional Director Owen Tomlinson did not offer comment on Cole's speculation, but did write 

to Whitehorn about his proposal to build a hotel and other resort facilities in the monument. He 

issued the agency's regular warning about scarce water resources, and then informed the

developer that the NPS did not want any lodging facilities in Joshua Tree and that the 

surrounding communities were quite capable of handling any visitors. Finally, he suggested that 

Whitehorn come and see the land and the minimal water resources for himself before buying 

anything from the railroad.10 

Meanwhile, Land Commissioner Christen of the SPRR offered again to sell 4,846 acres 

around the monument's main road and Pinto Wye to the NPS with no success. He reiterated that 

the company would not exchange land with the government and, furthermore, it would proceed 

to sell the land to anyone who would pay. Christen's letter alarmed agency officials. Director 

Newton Drury wrote:

If officials of the Southern Pacific are successful in disposing of their holdings within 

Joshua Tree to private individuals, as indicated in previous correspondence and by Mr. 

Christen, there is little hope for the national monument. It is hard for us to reconcile 

ourselves to their attitude, particularly since any large company such as Southern Pacific 

is somewhat of a public trust, and in this case derives considerable revenue from rail 

travel to western parks and monuments. It would seem that the least they could do would 

be to reserve their lands for the United States until such time as they can be purchased or 

exchanged.11

 

Drury decided to appeal to those who had helped establish the monument nine years 

earlier, hoping to use the Minerva Hoyt connection again. At his urging, Joshua Green, a former 

Mississippian and confidant of Hoyt, wrote letters to Congressman William Whittington of 
109

Mississippi and President Harry Truman urging them to honor both Hoyt and former president 

Franklin Roosevelt by finding money to buy the railroad lands in Joshua Tree. Green even went 

so far as to suggest to the president that the monument could be renamed "The Franklin D. 

Roosevelt Joshua Tree National Monument." On July 9, 1945, Drury sent a dense, three-page, 

single-spaced letter to Whittington explaining all the details of the monument's land problems, 

particularly the threatened sale of the railroad's Lost Horse Valley lands to developers who 

wanted to subdivide the area into ranch estates of twenty to forty acres. He reiterated Green's 

hope that Congress would find a way to provide "legislative relief" before the monument was 

"irreparably damaged." At the same time the SPRR sold some of their acreage to James 

Whitehorn further threatening the future of Joshua Tree National Monument.12

While the NPS struggled to prevent private development from destroying the heart of the 

monument, the potential boundary change aimed at placating the miners became part of the land 

acquisition equation. At first, some Washington D. C. office leaders hoped that part of the 

railroad land might lie within the area to be returned to the public domain. However, Regional 

Director Tomlinson soon discovered that relatively little of the railroad's land would be removed 

by the pending legislation. NPS officials then speculated on whether they could tempt the 

railroad company to exchange Lost Horse Valley land for some of the mineralized land to be 

eliminated from the monument. Finally, they decided that the best approach would be to attach a 

rider to any boundary change bill that would provide $215,000 for the purchase of all the 

remaining railroad land in the monument. Presumably they hoped congress would see it as 

recompense for losing a third of the unit's land. However, as explained earlier, when 

Congressman Sheppard's H. R. 4703 bill went to the Committee on Public Lands that provision 

caused his colleagues to kill it.13

As 1945 drew to a close, Superintendent Cole complained that the railroad officials 

"should be embarrassed" at what their subsidiary land company was doing. Then on December 

17, he received a phone call from developer Dick Curtis who blithely informed him that he 

planned to purchase 3,447 acres of Lost Horse Valley land from the railroad. Cole immediately 

informed Tomlinson that if this purchase occurred, the NPS would control a mere twenty-six 

percent of the Lost Horse Valley and lose part of the road connecting it to Keys View. He 

concluded, "If all these lands are not acquired by the Government, it is the opinion of this office 

that the Park Service has lost Joshua Tree National Monument and might better delete the entire 

area from the National Park system."14

 

Initially, Cole believed that Curtis wanted to establish a dude ranch in the valley, but it 

turned out that he actually represented a company that planned to build a permanent set for 

filming western movies, plus accommodations for 200 people. It seems that the San Fernando 

Valley was no longer acceptable for making these films because of frequent air traffic and the 

boring familiarity that audiences had with that location. In 1940, filmmakers had shot "Buck 

Benny Rides Again" in the monument and it seemed a perfect place to acquire for future films

(Figure 4-2). Curtis, and the company he represented, envisioned a full scale western town to be 

called "Pioneertown." It needed a dramatic backdrop and plenty of space for chase scenes. 

Company executives had investigated the Alabama Hills near Owens Valley, but considered it 

too far from Hollywood. Pioneertown, Inc. had plenty of money and this time it looked like the 

monument was doomed.15
110

Director Newton Drury immediately launched a campaign to either raise money for land 

acquisition or divert the attention of Pioneertown, Inc. to another location. He again appealed to 

Joshua Green, but the Mississippi native could not find any serious donors. Then Drury 

contacted the Garden Society of America pleading for assistance in averting the purchase. This 

led to a complicated process that allowed the NPS to acquire much of the railroad’s land in the 

heart of the monument. Mrs. Robert Wright of the Garden Society contacted several leading 

members of the organization for help. One of them was Alma Chickering, the wife of the lead 

attorney for the SPRR. Allen L. Chickering, a member of both the Sierra Club and the Save-theRedwoods League, was already well-known for his conservation work. He was a botanist of 

sufficient merit to have a species of hybrid sage named after him, and later he became a pillar of

the California Historical Society. He was not on the railroad's board, but his influence was

substantial. In late February, monument officials received the welcome news that he had 

convinced the board not to sell its Lost Horse Valley land to Dick Curtis and his company. 

Instead, they sold 12,000 acres of land northwest of the town of Yucca Valley. Like its property 

in the monument, the railroad only owned alternate sections there and this created an opportunity 

for the NPS.

16

Figure 4-2. Movie producers found the scenery of Joshua Tree National Monument perfect for 

western film-making. Photo by Ralph Anderson taken near Lost Horse Well on December 17, 

1939. Harpers Ferry Center, JOTR Collection. Only a contact print is available. 
111

A few months earlier, the Kaiser Corporation asked for more land to carry on expanded 

production at its Eagle Mountain Mine. The agency saw an opportunity to carry out what it 

called a tripartite exchange. In this case Kaiser would buy railroad land in the Lost Horse Valley 

and then trade it with the NPS for the land it needed at the mine site. The deal fell through, but 

the tripartite arrangement remained a good idea. Because the federal government still owned the 

alternate sections northwest of the park that now interested Dick Curtis and his partners, there 

might be an opportunity to work such an agreement there. Negotiations proceeded and, by April 

1946, both the SPRR and Curtis supported the idea. The railroad offered even more land and 

Pioneertown, Inc. was a willing buyer. The deal would be a win for all parties. The railroad 

would sell its land and not be stuck with even more desert acreage that it did not want. Curtis's 

group would have a huge block of contiguous territory to host western film makers. Finally, the 

federal government would get thousands of acres of inholdings in the monument by exchange 

with Curtis.17

By April 1946, it seemed that a solution to the railroad inholdings was at hand. Indeed, an 

optimistic NPS began courting other private individuals, as well as local governments, for 

similar deals. Early in 1947, the City of Los Angeles offered to purchase 24,000 acres of railroad 

land in Joshua Tree and trade them for equivalent acreage in the Owens Valley and Mono 

County. Four decades earlier, the city had purchased much of the land in the distant mountain 

valley and built a highly controversial aqueduct from the Owens River to the city. With its 

insatiable demand for water unfulfilled by both the existing Owens Valley Aqueduct and the 

Colorado River Aqueduct that passed just south of Joshua Tree, the city sought more land and 

water rights in Mono County north of its previous purchases. Some NPS officials were wary of 

such an exchange. Frank Kittredge, superintendent of Yosemite National Park, warned that "any 

exchange which would involve the turning over to the City of Los Angeles of public lands in the 

Mono Basin is a hornet's nest and the answer should be definitely - no." In addition to a sense of 

fair play and a reticence to get in the middle of a bitter controversy, Kittredge also did not want 

to "jeopardize any future relationships [with Mono County citizens] in case there should be a 

desire for rounding out the boundaries of Yosemite National Park or Devil [sic] Postpile National 

Monument."18

At the same time, a developer named Seth Brady made an extraordinary request for a 

tripartite exchange. Like most speculators, he bristled with optimism and ambition. He 

announced his intention to buy up to 60,000 acres of railroad land in the monument which he 

would exchange for a similar amount of public domain just west of the Colorado River. Brady 

told Superintendent Cole he had made arrangements to buy the alternate railroad sections already 

and wanted to gain complete control of the land for grazing purposes. Unfortunately, the Bureau 

of Reclamation (BOR) had withdrawn much of the land to build facilities for controlling 

"flowage and seepage" from the Colorado River. The GLO and its successor, the Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM), generally cooperated with the NPS. However, the BOR absolutely would 

not alter its classification or its plans. Negotiations wore on for nearly two years, with Brady first 

suggesting that the flood control facilities would not interfere with his grazing scheme, and then 

offering to take land further west near the Chocolate Mountains. By February 1948, however, a 

BLM investigator found that Brady had not paid any money to the SPRR and, in fact, had no 

connection to them at all. It seems that a Mr. L. S. Estle had bought the railroad lands and Brady 

had taken an option for that property two years earlier, but had paid nothing. It also turned out 
112

that a grazing lease was held by yet another individual. When contacted, Estle promised to file a 

written protest against any attempt by Brady to secure adjacent public land. NPS land specialist 

Bernard Manbey dismissed Brady as a "typical Los Angeles promoter." Thus ended what seemed 

for a while to be an outstanding opportunity to rid the monument of railroad inholdings.19

One side effect of the Brady fiasco was that it further dissuaded the NPS from making an 

exchange with Los Angeles. Hopeful agency land officials thought that there would not be 

enough land left after the Curtis and Brady exchanges, plus other recent tripartite applications, to 

satisfy the needs of Los Angeles. But suddenly Brady and Los Angeles were both out of the 

picture. The Curtis exchange became even more important. The major step remaining for this 

tripartite exchange was to execute all the procedures and forms with the BLM. Initially, the land 

agency asked the NPS to exchange acreage that was part of President Franklin Roosevelt's 1933 

withdrawal, but park officials refused. Then another problem arose. The BLM had classified 

most of the land that Pioneertown, Inc. wanted as open to small tract claims. At the urging of the 

NPS, the BLM had forestalled these claims, but pressure grew as war veterans demanded that the 

bureau follow its own land classification.20

Twelve years after the establishment of Joshua Tree National Monument, the NPS had 

not acquired any land other than that given up by the SPRR under the Transportation Act of 

1940. The most hopeful initiative was the Curtis exchange, made possible by the railroad 

company's willingness to hold the lands from any other sale until this exchange could be 

executed. In 1948, Joshua Tree contained nearly a quarter of all the non-federal land in the entire 

park system. The war was over and quiet promises to help from congress and the Truman 

administration seemed to be wishful thinking. Then, suddenly, Charles A. Richey, the NPS's 

Acting Chief of Lands, sent a letter on August 11, 1947 to Regional Director Tomlinson 

authorizing him to purchase $10,000 worth of land from the railroad in order to "show our good 

faith as a result of their cooperativeness in withholding them from sale." Richey reminded 

Tomlinson that the land to be purchased should not include any parcels that were part of the 

evolving Curtis exchange.21

 

Joshua Tree officials hurriedly identified the sections of land they wanted, but BLM

investigators appraised them at $25,554. Amazingly SPRR officials agreed to sell them for only 

$10,324. Later, it became known that Allen Chickering had convinced the railroad board to 

accept the lesser amount. On April 15, 1948, the NPS bought 12,826 acres from the railroad 

company. The SPRR, pleased that the government finally had done something, relented a little 

on its refusal to exchange land directly with the agency. The company did have some specific 

pieces of land through which its tracks ran that would facilitate its operations. One 80-acre parcel 

lay along its tracks near the northeastern shore of the Salton Sea. Its value was sufficient that the 

government was able to trade for 2,240 acres of land in the monument. Later another exchange 

took place in December 1949 that netted 640 acres of land in the monument for 7.36 acres near 

Yuma, Arizona where the company wanted to develop a switching yard.22 

Word of the pending Curtis exchange brought other individuals and groups who wanted 

to work out similar tripartite arrangements with the NPS and SPRR. In June 1948,

Superintendent Frank Givens identified six others in the works in addition to the one with Curtis. 

However, the BLM had to delay completion of the Curtis exchange in order to reappraise the

land. People who had filed small tract claims on the government land that the movie company 
113

was supposed to receive had filed a legal challenge. By this time, Curtis and his associates were

beyond impatient and relinquished parts of several sections of land they desired to placate the 

small tract applicants. However, others continued to file on exchange lands threatening the entire 

deal. Finally, on October 20, 1948, BLM officials rejected the remaining small claims and 

approved the exchange. The NPS received 18,234 acres primarily in and around the Lost Horse

Valley. Pioneertown, Inc. consolidated its holdings around the western town it had already begun 

to construct. Forty-five small claim applicants from Los Angeles challenged the decision, but the 

secretary of the interior upheld his bureau's decisions. The tripartite exchange had finally 

worked. Over the next nine months, the NPS completed three more exchanges with Joseph 

Trottier, Carl Allen, and the City of Needles, adding another 7,500 acres of railroad land to the 

monument. And a little to the north, Pioneertown began hosting television shows and movies 

with Roy Rogers, Gene Autry, and the Cisco Kid.23 

The 1950 boundary change gave the NPS greater incentive to acquire railroad lands 

within the monument. Nobody in the agency was happy about losing a third of the unit's territory 

and perhaps senior officials in Washington, D. C. felt a little guilty. A new urgency seemed to 

grip park officials, and this first appeared in the form of another allocation for the outright 

purchase of railroad land in the western part of the monument. Regional lands specialist Bernard 

Manbey negotiated a purchase that took place on June 6, 1951. The NPS received 11,819 acres 

of land for $10,785. Once again the railroad company sold the land for well under the appraised 

price of $13,685.24

Meanwhile, agency officials completed several more tripartite exchanges for railroad 

lands, including one with Emil Ritter for more 14,506 acres on August 13, 1951. The Desert 

Trail reported that over the previous three years the monument had secured 53,110 acres of 

railroad land by exchange. That land, added to the big purchases in 1948 and 1951, meant the 

Park Service obtained nearly 78,000 acres of railroad land in just three years. Then, in June 

1952, the SPRR announced that it would not undertake any more tripartite exchanges. 

Fortunately for the NPS, the railroad board agreed to honor the exchanges already underway. 

Between March 1952 and August 1956, the government completed six more tripartite exchanges 

adding another 20,658 acres of former railroad land to the monument.25 However, a side effect of 

all these exchanges was a strained relationship between the NPS and the BLM. Marion Clawson, 

former director of the latter agency later wrote:

The Joshua Tree National Monument in southern California included within its 

boundaries a considerable acreage of land, originally public domain that had been 

included in a land grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad. Eventually, a number of 

exchanges with the railroad were made so that the company obtained public domain 

outside the Monument. This case was complicated by the fact that many individuals, 

some of whom were World War II veterans, had applied for the land that went to the 

railroad in exchange, and they protested their loss vociferously. The Bureau had to permit 

the claimants to file for other public lands, a solution that placated but did not really 

please, those involved. In such exchanges, the Bureau of Land Management bears the 

headaches and the expenses, while the real benefits accrue to the National Park Service.26 
114

State Exchanges

Six weeks before the proclamation that established Joshua Tree National Monument, congress 

passed a bill that transferred more than 300,000 acres to the California state parks department 

enabling it to expand what is today Anza-Borrego Desert State Park.27 Had the order of 

legislation been reversed, the NPS might have been able to exchange the state lands in Joshua 

Tree for some of the acreage that congress gave to the state. After being rebuffed in its efforts to 

donate state lands without mineral rights to the federal government, the California State Lands 

Commission (CSLC) had reevaluated its position. On March 24, 1937, the acting secretary of the 

interior wrote to California's Senator William McAdoo suggesting that he get the state to repeal 

its law withholding mineral rights from land donated to the federal government.28 Instead, the 

state enacted a new law ordering its lands commission to exchange property with the federal 

government only on an equal acreage or value basis. Henceforth, the NPS would have to work 

out either direct exchanges with the state or try for tripartite agreements with parties interested in 

acquiring federal lands outside the monument, as they had with the railroad company. Both the 

CSLC and the NPS hoped to complete a deal for all the state school lands in the monument. The 

state commission asked for acreage north of the All-American Canal, but that land was 

unavailable due to a BOR withdrawal which the secretary of the interior refused to revoke. This 

seemed to quash any immediate opportunity for a direct exchange. At a meeting in December 

1941, a frustrated state officer, A. P. Ireland, suggested that the NPS had been "asleep at the 

switch" because other federal agencies including the U. S. Forest Service had been using this 

method to clear their reserves. A few days later World War II halted all efforts to acquire land 

for the monument.29 

When the war ended, Superintendent Cole raised the issue again. He warned that while 

the state was not likely to sell its land in the monument to private citizens, hunting could take 

place on its sections. In addition, one of the state sections was just inside the boundary along the 

road from Twentynine Palms, which the NPS considered as a site for the monument's 

headquarters. The coming boundary change would eliminate some state holdings, but not those 

in the most desirable part of the monument.30 In 1947, Regional Director Tomlinson proposed 

using lands that the military no longer needed to exchange with the state for its property in 

Joshua Tree and Death Valley national monuments. The CSLC enthusiastically agreed and both 

agencies focused on the Barstow Anti-Aircraft Reserve, also known as Camp Irwin, which the 

U.S. Army might declassify and return to the public domain. The CSLC soon identified enough 

plots it wanted in the base to eliminate state holdings in both national monuments. On December 

5, 1947, the U. S. Army declared Camp Irwin surplus and expectations rose. The NPS even went 

so far as to ask the state to acquire tax-deeded, private lands in the monument to also exchange 

for former military land. The state was unenthusiastic about that option, but quite pleased about 

shedding the school lands in the monuments. Then the bottom fell out. Although Army officials 

had declared the base surplus, they had not officially transferred the land back to the BLM. By 

September, they reconsidered their decision causing Herbert Maier of the NPS regional office to 

complain to the director that this was the first time in twelve years the agency and the CSLC had 

been able to agree, and it now appeared to be unraveling. And, indeed, the Army did reverse its 

decision and eventually developed the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. Another 

opportunity for land acquisition in Joshua Tree came to naught.31
115

Another opportunity appeared while the ill-fated exchange of military land was under 

consideration. Retired army colonel Robert A. Ellsworth approached the CSLC seeking a 

tripartite exchange for about 10,000 acres. He had purchased from the railroad their alternate 

sections immediately west of the Salton Sea with the intent of a developing a large tourist resort. 

However, he needed the intervening sections which were still in federal control. He sought to 

have the federal government trade the Salton Sea land with the state for some of its holdings in 

Joshua Tree. He then would buy them from the state giving him ownership of most of what is 

today Salton City. Once again, complications immediately appeared. The state already owned 

some of the land near Salton Sea, but it was reserved for the expansion of Anza State Park. In 

addition, the BOR had withdrawn some sections to cope with Salton Sea overflow and for an 

irrigation canal to benefit the Imperial Irrigation District. State Lands Commissioner Ireland 

managed to convince the state parks agency to relinquish its withdrawal. His office was as 

anxious as the NPS to successfully complete an exchange of Joshua Tree inholdings. On March 

26, 1948, Ireland applied for 9,624.47 acres of federal land to be exchanged for 9,600 acres of 

unsurveyed school lands in Joshua Tree National Monument.32

Unfortunately for Colonel Ellsworth, the NPS, and CSLC, the reclamation agency

remained obstinate. As time passed, Colonel Ellsworth increased the amount of land he wanted 

by another 4,481.67 acres which pleased the CSLC and the NPS, but did nothing to encourage 

cooperation from the BOR. Wesley Nelson of the water agency informed the BLM that six of the 

sections Colonel Ellsworth wanted were not available due their importance for reclamation 

purposes. Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) withdrew some of the same land 

for a test base. Colonel Ellsworth responded by agreeing to drop four of the sections, but he 

maintained that two of them, currently containing the northern edge of Salton City, were the 

heart of his development plan. He added that the Coachella [actually Imperial] Irrigation District 

officials had informed him that their canal would not go to the sections that he wanted. He 

accused the BOR field inspector of making an error in his report. In February 1949, NPS 

Associate Regional Director Maier wrote to Director Drury bemoaning the twelve long years of 

failed efforts to complete an exchange with the state, the unexpected reversal of the Camp Irwin 

deal, and the impasse that threatened to collapse the Salton Sea exchange. He urged the director 

to appeal to the AEC and the BOR to release their withdrawals so this relatively small exchange 

could break the gridlock. Six weeks later the reclamation agency flatly refused.33

At that point the situation rapidly deteriorated. In August 1949, Colonel Ellsworth urged 

the secretary of the interior to overrule the BOR. A month later, reclamation officials again 

refused to change their decision. In October, the NPS appealed to the CSLC to get Ellsworth to 

drop his requirement for the two controversial sections. He refused. In November, the NPS

informed Ellsworth that it could do nothing more about the situation. By December, Maier 

contacted the state office about a completely separate part of the Salton Sea shoreline that might 

be available for a direct interagency exchange. Finally, on June 15, 1950, after much more effort 

and correspondence, L. T. Hoffman of the BLM bluntly informed Ellsworth that the withdrawals 

would not be revoked, that his agency was therefore no longer involved, and that there was no 

reason to have another meeting about the subject.34 

After receiving that letter, Colonel Robert Ellsworth realized that to salvage any portion 

of his development plan he would have to drop his applications for the sections withdrawn by the 
116

BOR and the AEC. In late June, he told Superintendent Givens that he would trade for 

government land in San Diego County. But on July 7, he met with BLM and NPS officials and 

verbally agreed to amend his original application and remove the sections that he could not 

acquire. In fact, he had new plans to take any available land around the Salton Sea, up to 100,000 

acres if possible. He submitted a list of the desired lands and all parties agreed that it would have 

to go to the BOR to see if any more sections were under water withdrawal. Ellsworth agreed to 

make these new lands a separate application and to proceed with the original one minus the 

reclamation and atomic energy sections. As H. R. 7934, the Phillips boundary revision bill, 

appeared likely to pass, Herbert Maier warned that the state could only make available for 

exchange those sections that would remain in the monument after the boundary changed. The 

CSLC dutifully amended the application for exchange and another year of tedious paperwork 

followed. Finally, on July 3, 1951, the Park Service acquired 5,496 acres of surveyed state land 

in the western part of Joshua Tree National Monument almost fifteen years after it was 

proclaimed.35

As in the case of the Curtis-SPRR-NPS exchange, the success of this tripartite deal 

finally seemed to break the logjam and allow the agency and the CSLC to negotiate direct 

exchanges. The state, like the railroad, held two types of land--identified sections and indemnity 

lands. In January 1952, Regional Director Lawrence Merriam reported that the CSLC still held 

25,455 acres, approximately half of it indemnity lands. Bernard Manbey urged the state agency

to identify the indemnity sections it wanted in order to clarify Joshua Tree's land status. This led 

to a direct exchange in February 1955 that secured 1,280 acres for the monument. Negotiations 

commenced for far more state property, and the land acquisition picture looked truly promising 

for the first time in nearly two decades.36

Tax Deeded Private Lands

Land owned by private citizens composed the third group of properties the NPS needed to 

acquire. The Security Land Corporation had sold numerous tracts in the Pinto Basin, but 

development of these properties failed because of a dearth of water. However, former railroad 

land in the western part of the monument had better hydrologic prospects and parcels were

scattered through the most scenic areas, as well as along the main road from Twentynine Palms 

to Cottonwood Spring. Even if the NPS decided to risk increasing land values by paving the 

road, it could not do so without permission from the landowners of parcels through which it 

passed. This was one reason why the agency refused to improve the roads in the monument 

despite constant urgings from local citizens. Another reason was that the agency used the 

promise of paved roads and vastly increased tourism to try to convince Riverside County to 

donate many of the tax delinquent parcels it held to the monument.

Of all the complicated land acquisition problems that the NPS faced in Joshua Tree 

National Monument, the so-called tax deeded lands were the last to be solved (Plate 4). The 

Security Land Corporation had defaulted on the taxes on much of its land in the Pinto Basin. The 

buyers of more than a thousand parcels of its land then did the same. The lack of water sank their 

appraised value below the amount of taxes due. Many small owners asked the NPS to buy their 

land, but the agency had railroad and state lands as higher priorities. In addition, the federal 

government might have to pay the back taxes if it acquired such property. In December 1936, A. 

W. Burney of the NPS contacted the auditor of Riverside County asking for information about
117

the tax deeded lands within the monument. Deputy Auditor H. H. Hoffman responded that the 

federal government could probably clear the back taxes for $12,000. Most of the land had been 

delinquent since 1931, some of it even longer. He also noted that the bulk of the lands within the 

national monument would be deeded to the state in another six months and that a moratorium on 

tax sales would be in place until January 1938.37

In 1941 the issue of tax deeded lands arose again when NPS officials learned that 

California's Revenue and Taxation Code provided that non-productive land that was tax 

delinquent would be classified as "of recreational value only." This meant that it could return to 

the county which could then donate it to or exchange it with the federal government. Legally, the 

state could not donate it directly to the federal agency. NPS lands specialist Bernard Manbey 

speculated on whether the state could hold the land and let the federal government develop it. 

Agency officials knew that the state would be much more cooperative than Riverside County. 

However, this hopeful line of inquiry halted with the onset of World War II.38 

After the war, NPS attention returned to the problem of tax deeded private land. In 

August 1946, Manbey and agency attorney Sidney McClellan met with representatives of the 

California Office of the Controller. They agreed that Joshua Tree National Monument would 

become the test case for dealing with similar problems in other national park units and federal 

areas. Uncertainty about title and whether the original owners could reclaim the lands by paying 

their back taxes complicated the procedure. State Controller C. F. Proctor concluded that the best 

solution would be to have the county board of supervisors buy the land back from the state,

giving them clear title and cutting off the redemption right of any former owner. The cost to the 

county would be a nominal one dollar per deed. After this procedure the negotiations between 

the NPS and the county could proceed.39

Three days later, one of Proctor's agents wrote to inform the NPS that in reviewing their 

newly legislated duties they found a regulation that allowed the state to donate land directly to 

the federal government for military "or other public purposes." He asked if the national 

monument qualified as a public purpose. This looked much more promising than dealing with 

the county, but it was the first of a series of disappointments to bedevil acquisition of tax deeded 

lands. Apparently, the state ceded jurisdiction to the federal government in California’s national 

parks. It did not do so in national monuments. Hence, the NPS could not accept the Joshua Tree 

land from the state without a cession of jurisdiction. This seemed to eliminate an easy solution to 

the problem. The state could declare the land for recreation purposes, but the NPS would still 

have to go through Riverside County.40 

In February 1947, Director Drury quizzed Acting Regional Director Herbert Maier about 

progress and was informed that Superintendent Cole was too busy with the railroad land 

negotiations to deal with this problem. A recent election had installed new people on the 

Riverside County Board of Supervisors and Cole argued that he would have to start negotiations 

all over again. By the time Maier replied, however, Frank Givens had replaced Cole as 

superintendent and restarted the negotiations. What he found was disheartening. County officials 

and citizens were highly antagonistic toward the monument. He reported:
118

"Not only are they swayed by the miners, hunters and other groups, but they feel that San 

Bernardino County has reaped all the benefits of the Monument which is mainly in 

Riverside County. Some of their grievances are real - others are imaginary."41

Givens met with several county officials and confirmed that they fully supported the 

miners trying to open the monument to new claims. Givens explained the benefits that Riverside 

County would enjoy if it donated the tax deeded lands: (1) the NPS would oil the main road, 

sixty-five miles of which lay within Riverside County; (2) visitors would be encouraged to take a 

loop through the monument entering at Twentynine Palms and exiting by Cottonwood Spring 

whereupon they would continue their vacations in the Coachella Valley; (3) the agency would 

probably build a utility area, a ranger station, a campground, and park residences in the southern 

part of the monument; (4) it would extend the southern boundary of the unit to the Metropolitan 

Water Department aqueduct as proposed in the boundary change bill; and (5) it would establish a 

separate monument or extend Joshua Tree's boundary south to include land near Chiriaco 

Summit for a unit honoring General George Patton. Givens also pointed out that the Sheppard's 

boundary revision bill would delete five townships around Kaiser’s iron mine allowing it to 

expand and hire more workers. The superintendent reported that the county officials were less 

combative after hearing this pitch, but still wanted to wait to see the outcome of the bill. For a 

short time it looked hopeful, but three months later Givens dolefully reported that the county 

supervisors summarily rejected the donation idea.42 

In May 1948, the Park Service tried another approach, asking the CSLC to buy the tax 

deeded land from the State Office of the Controller as mentioned earlier. The CSLC would be 

reticent to sell the land to private individuals or companies, and would hopefully exchange those 

lands for federal property along with the school sections it already held. Initially, A. P. Ireland 

was agreeable, but soon problems arose. In some cases title to the tax deeded lands would not be 

fully vested in the state for a period of at least five years. Then it appeared that Riverside County 

might insist that the CSLC should choose only federal land in that county to exchange with the 

NPS. That threat did not materialize and hopeful Joshua Tree officials identified 963 parcels of 

land totaling 8,411 acres that they hoped to secure from the state. However, in December 1949 

Ireland informed the NPS that state legislators would have to pass a law to allow this 

complicated exchange. He sorrowfully concluded that "it is doubtful that the Commission would 

wish to foster such legislation."43

Ireland's letter forced federal officials to negotiate again with the Riverside County Board 

of Supervisors. In response, NPS leaders set aside $12,000, the same amount that the county had 

proposed in 1937. Unfortunately, the 1950 boundary change had added 11,000 more private 

acres, many of them tax delinquent, to the monument between the old southwestern border and 

the new one at the Metropolitan Water District's aqueduct. In addition, more than thirteen years 

had passed which meant that both land costs and tax burdens had risen. In early 1951, Bernard 

Manbey again contacted C. F. Proctor to ask his advice. Proctor outlined several approaches that 

might work, but strongly recommended that the NPS simply condemn all the tax-deeded land in 

the monument in a single action. This would avoid a public auction by the county which would 

force the NPS to bid against all other parties. Through the summer Superintendent Givens and 

his staff investigated the various property records and discussed their proposed condemnation 

with county officials.44
119

Initially, county supervisors seemed receptive to the idea of a friendly condemnation. The 

tax-deeded land was a burden on local taxpayers and several believed Superintendent Givens 

when he listed the long-term advantages to the county that full development of the monument 

would bring. However, the NPS had enemies who found some supervisors receptive to their 

ideas. Three types of opponents wanted to scuttle any deal that added land to the monument. 

First, miners remained unsatisfied with the boundary change and pressed even harder to have the 

monument opened to new mining claims. Led by the Western Mining Council, they tried to 

block any and all efforts to support Joshua Tree National Monument. Second, proponents of a 

road connecting Indio to Twentynine Palms through the Little San Bernardino Mountains were 

angered by the agency's tepid response to their idea. Third, many local business and political 

groups did not want the federal government to control any more land in the county. They argued 

that the federal government already held forty-seven percent of the land in California from which 

counties could not derive any taxes. This attitude presaged an argument that became a hallmark 

of the "sagebrush rebellion" several decades later.45

In August 1951, Givens tried again to get county supervisors to donate 7,588 acres of taxdeeded land in the Pinto Basin. He explained that the NPS sought a smaller amount of acreage 

because much of the rest was either not tax delinquent or required a period of five years before it 

could be so classified. On October 8, the supervisors again refused. Many of the NPS's critics 

were present at the board meeting. Colonel Nordstrum of the Riverside County Chamber of 

Mines thanked the board for not allowing an increase in the monument's territory. Indio resident 

Ole Nordland wrote to the supervisors wondering why the only roads improved in the monument 

led from Twentynine Palms to the Lost Horse Valley in San Bernardino County. This seemed to 

resonate with several board members despite Givens's explanation that the NPS could not 

improve roads across the private land so prevalent in Riverside County.46

After this rebuff, agency officials speculated on whether the county would be willing to 

exchange land with the monument or, failing that, would accept a tripartite exchange if another 

buyer could be found. In an effort to simplify the procedure, they decided to separate the Pinto 

Basin lands from those in the Hexie Mountains region where Joseph Wachowski held an option 

on more than 10,000 acres. One NPS ally on the board was its chairman, Irwin Hayden. He 

began meeting quietly with Givens during spring 1952. He reported that the board's vote against 

the donation had been closer than it might appear and the NPS should condemn the land in order 

to "take the heat off" the supervisors. He also intimated that the action should come as a 

"surprise" to the county thus heading off any political outfall from such an action.47

By 1953, the NPS stopped looking for alternate solutions and prepared to file for 

condemnation. A few months earlier, regional officials reversed themselves and told Givens to 

include the Hexie Mountains area in the condemnation because the mining lobby had no legal 

rights in such a judicial procedure. That would bring the total land in the suit to 17,083 acres. 

Chief of Lands Conrad Wirth notified the regional director that the agency had $10,000 from 

land acquisition funds available for Joshua Tree. In June 1953, new superintendent Samuel A. 

King learned that the Wachowski lands and those of the Coachella Irrigation District were not 

tax-deeded. NPS land officials amended the condemnation application to 10, 921 acres. Then 

King reported that the county valued each acre at twenty dollars, but would accept fifty percent 

of its worth, equal to approximately $12,434. In October 1953, after a hasty adjustment to the 
120

new funding requirement, NPS Solicitor Clarence Davis formally requested that Attorney 

General Herbert Brownell, Jr. initiate condemnation proceedings.48

Immediately, another problem arose when Department of Justice lawyers ordered the 

NPS to track down and notify the former owners, an expensive process fraught with peril 

because some owners could still pay the back taxes and reclaim their land. Riverside County 

officials answered that they had neither the personnel nor the money to undertake such a search. 

More than a year passed while the agency conducted title research and hired a former county 

clerk to locate the owners and notify them. Finally, on April 1, 1955, federal lawyers filed for 

condemnation. After a few final adjustments, the government claimed 1,013 parcels totaling 

10,838.50 acres. A month later, government lawyers amended the action to a "declaration of 

taking." This meant that the NPS would immediately control the land, preventing any sales or 

development while the case proceeded. Finally, on May 4, 1956, the court ruled in favor of the 

taking. Two years later, a ruling on an appeal revested a small amount of the land to its previous 

owners, but it was a fraction of the total action. The NPS had cleared a huge hurdle by an 

unpopular but necessary process. As in the cases of the tripartite exchanges with Curtis for 

railroad land and Ellsworth for state land, this condemnation and the funds from Washington to 

complete it broke a deadlock and allowed Joshua Tree National Monument to further its critical 

land acquisition program (Map 4-1).

49

Map 4-1. Land acquisition at Joshua Tree National Monument between 1936 and 1960. Data 

source: JTNP GIS files. Delta Cartography.
121

Another type of private land existed in Joshua Tree National Monument which proved 

troublesome to the NPS in later years. The Colorado River Aqueduct passed through the 

southeastern part of the unit and, after the 1950 boundary change, abutted the monument's 

southwestern boundary. The June 18, 1932 act that authorized the aqueduct across federal land 

included not only a substantial right-of-way for the canal itself, but also parcels of nearby land 

for work camps, borrow pits, and areas to hold spoils from digging the waterway. The 

Metropolitan Water District (MWD) held dozens of parcels of land along the southern and 

eastern edges of the monument. Significantly, the act ordered that any parcels not needed for 

purposes of the aqueduct revert to the federal government. Superintendent Cole and his 

successors repeatedly tried to acquire these scattered non-federal tracts. Two factors influenced 

the progress. First, these areas were a very low priority because incompatible development 

seemed highly unlikely, if not illegal. Second, the MWD remained loath to part with any land 

until its engineers were certain that it would no longer be needed. Some of the dozens of parcels 

of MWD lands, ranging from a few to more than 200 acres, would later present the NPS with 

difficult management problems.50 

Mining Claims: The Other Private Lands 

Joshua Tree National Monument began its existence in the middle of the Great Depression. 

Many men who lost their jobs in that difficult era moved to the deserts to file gold mining claims

and try to eke out a living. In 1929, the government set the price of gold at less than twenty-one 

dollars per ounce. In order to support mining, the fixed rate rose to thirty-five dollars per ounce 

by 1935. Small operators worked many mines, but larger companies quickly moved in on 

promising claims. These businesses hired dozens of men, revived old stamp mills, and reclaimed 

old pits while occasionally working the tailings from earlier operations. In 1941, the GLO

estimated that the monument had nearly 8,800 claims.

51 The presidential proclamation that 

established Joshua Tree stipulated that existing claims filed properly under the Mining Act of 

1872 would continue within the new reserve. However, GLO inspectors undertook validity 

studies of the existing ones at the request of the NPS. Miners had to follow specific rules to 

maintain a mining claim including continuous mining activity and an annual production of 

minerals amounting to at least $100. Claims could be lost if either of these conditions were 

unmet or if the land was being used for a non-mining purpose such as a recreation home site. If 

an individual patented a mining claim, the tract became private property and could not be 

challenged. However, to patent a claim a miner had to have the site properly surveyed and show 

evidence of sufficient ore to encourage a "prudent man" to invest at least $500 in improvements 

on the claim. The GLO typically did not examine claims on public domain land until the owner 

applied for a patent. The vast majority of claims in Joshua Tree were unpatented, but conversion 

of the area to national monument warranted closer inspection of these unproven operations. 

Because of the long lapse between the original mining boom and the depression era revival,

many claims had been abandoned or forgotten. However, nobody bothered to cancel them unless 

a new claimant filed on the same area. The NPS hoped that proper investigation would simply 

eliminate the vast majority of these de facto inholdings.52

Two problems complicated the voidance of mining claims. First, miners had frequently 

avoided tedious paperwork and trips to the county recorder's office by vaguely describing the 

locations of their claims. Then, if they located a deposit somewhere relatively nearby, they could 
122

move to it and argue that it was the original site. This was illegal, but commonly practiced 

throughout the desert. It added to the confusion already created by multiple claims worked by the 

same individuals and the use of the same mine names by different parties. The second problem 

related to the legal proceedings necessary to invalidate a claim. For each claim the GLO had to 

either contact the claimant or publish an official notice in an area newspaper. In the case of a few 

negative declarations the cost of this procedure was small, but here the land office faced 

thousands of potential adverse decisions. It simply did not have the manpower to process all the 

claims, nor the money to publish notices. Furthermore, if the land office "adversed" a claim, its 

owner could appeal the decision which then required a hearing. All of these issues delayed the 

final cancellation of some mining claims despite determined work by the inspectors.53 

GLO inspectors led by Samuel Guthrey began examining mines and mining claims early

in 1937. They quickly learned that a very big job lay ahead. In his multi-purpose investigation in 

March 1937, Guthrey reported that there were more than forty groups of mining claims being 

worked in 150 locations, employing 250 men and paying $40,000 per month in wages. Virtually 

all this activity was occurring in the eastern portion of the monument.54 Vigorous work by the 

inspectors allowed a satisfied Superintendent Cole to announce in his 1941 annual report that the 

GLO had adversely reported 3,170 claims and another 600 investigations were nearing

completion. Notices had been sent to 2,170 claimants and only nine had led to appeals. As the 

investigators continued, they were particularly successful in the western part of the monument 

where they found only twenty-eight of 3,782 claims valid. In the much more active eastern 

region they declared 405 claims valid out of 5,000. Records kept by the GLO and its successor 

the BLM show that most claims were adversely ruled after letters to the claimants went 

unanswered. Inspectors rejected others because they were filed after the establishment of the 

monument. Progress stopped, however, with the advent of World War II. The federal 

government issued order L-208 which stopped all gold mining and shortages of money and 

personnel canceled field examinations.55 

Among the mining claims invalidated by the GLO were a number owned by William

“Bill” Keys. Over the years Keys had claimed, bought, inherited, and otherwise possessed a 

variety of mines and mills which he occasionally leased to others for different lengths of time. 

Most were in the western part of the monument and largely inactive. In April 1941, mineral 

investigators filed adverse reports on eight of them including the Desert Queen, Lang, and Key 

mills and the Mountain View, Pine Cove, Pine Springs, and Pleasant Valley lodes. A year later,

the commissioner of the GLO declared his Big Chief Millsite null and void. The latter was 

significant because it included the Barker Dam and reservoir, a public water reserve that Keys 

fenced for his own use. The Desert Queen Mine #1 also received an adverse ruling, but a 

supplemental inspection reversed that decision. As for the rest, Keys immediately filed appeals. 

J. H. Favorite, the regional field examiner, later wrote "we found that Keys was claiming 

numerous mining claims that had been located under different names at different times, and we 

had considerable difficulty in working out with him the question of just what ground was 

covered by these different locations."56

Several factors delayed the hearing on the eight adversed claims, not the least of which 

was the arrest of Bill Keys on a murder charge. He secured a continuance of the case citing the 

difficulty of defending his claims from jail, and the attention of the land office case shifted to its 
123

many other appeals. It wasn't until years after his release from San Quentin, that Keys himself 

brought attention to his dubious mineral rights. In August 1956, the NPS learned that Keys 

intended to patent several mines in the monument. By this time he and his wife owned nearly 

880 acres of land, a fact that caused the San Bernardino Welfare Department to question his right 

to collect public funds for "old age security." Subsequent investigation showed that most of the 

pre-1936 lodes that Keys claimed had been filed on land belonging to the SPRR. Hence, they 

were invalid from the beginning. Two of the veins extended into what had been public domain, 

however, and the commissioner declared those portions valid.57 

While Keys battled to keep his many mining and milling claims, GLO/BLM inspectors 

resumed investigations after the end of World War II. But on November 16, 1945 the NPS told 

them to stop their evaluation of the eastern part of the monument because Congressman 

Sheppard's H. R. 4703 might remove most of the remaining active mines. This was perhaps 

fortunate since the land office had run into trouble processing the cases it had already decided. 

BLM regional administrator Marion Clawson complained to his director that his inspectors had 

reported adversely on 4,385 claims. The commissioner had declared 2,450 of them officially null 

and void. There remained 3,620 claims in the eastern part of Joshua Tree to be examined. The 

numbers of claims reported favorably remained the same as 1941, twenty-eight in the western 

portion and 405 in the eastern portion. The compelling number in Clawson's report was 1,050 

cases held in the district land office in Los Angeles pending publication of notices. Clawson 

believed that it would cost $30,000 to publish them and require two additional clerks to do the 

work. He told the NPS that it would have to pay for both. He did not receive a response, hence 

the complaint to his boss. As long as the notices remained unpublished, the claims were still 

valid. The 1950 boundary change removed many of the unexamined claims and thereafter the 

NPS grudgingly began paying to have the adversed ones in the shrunken monument finalized.58

After two decades of worry and desperate work, the National Park Service could look at 

the remaining monument land with some pride and satisfaction. The agency had secured 

thousands of acres of private, railroad and school lands with procedures that gave promise of 

similar success in the future. Tedious and expensive work also eliminated thousands of mining 

claims. After excising most of the remaining mineralized areas in 1950, and defeating the last 

organized attempt to open the entire unit to new claims, Joshua Tree officials could move 

forward with confidence that the monument would survive and hopefully become the important 

preserve and popular attraction that Minerva Hoyt predicted it would be. 
124

Plates

Plate 1. Vegetation of Joshua Tree National Park including palm oases: 1 Fortynine Palms Oasis; 

2. Oasis of Mara; 3 Cottonwood Spring; 4, Munsen Oasis; 5 Lost Palms Oasis. Delta 

Cartography.
125

Plate 2. Land ownership in area proposed by Minerva Hoyt and withdrawn from the public 

domain by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Data Source: “Proposed Joshua Tree National 

Monument.” April 6, 1936. JTNP Map Archives, No. 20130116-014845. Delta Cartography. 
126

Plate 3. Land acquisition by the National Park Service between 1960 and 2010. Data source: 

JTNP GIS files. Delta Cartography.
127

Plate 4. Sales of Pinto Basin land by the Security Land Corporation in the late 1920s left

alternating sections with hundreds of five- to twenty-acre parcels for the Park Service to acquire.

Each number is assigned to a different tract purchased at the time. Data source: JTNP GIS files. 

Delta Cartography.
128

Plate 5. Wilderness additions from 1976 through 2009. Delta Cartography. 
129

 

Plate 6. Energy and landfill threats to Joshua Tree National Park after 1989. Inset A on the 

bottom left shows the plan for the Eagle Mountain Landfill while Inset B on the bottom right 

shows the proposed pump storage project of Eagle Crest. Data source: JTNP GIS files. Delta 

Cartography. 
130

Chapter Five: Early Management of Joshua Tree National Monument

Threats posed by mining, the 1950 boundary adjustment, and the tortuous land acquisition 

process delayed but did not stop planning for Joshua Tree National Monument. National Park 

Service (NPS) policy and management experience highlighted opportunities as well as 

limitations within the monument. The original inspections by Roger Toll and Harold Bryant were 

cursory at best. Even before the agency opened its first office in Twentynine Palms, regional 

officials had to assess the situation on the ground and seek answers to many questions. What was 

the water situation, so critical to any development? What roads existed and which should be 

improved for visitor use? Which traditional land use activities could continue and which should 

be stopped in a new national park unit? Related to this was the need for basic research and 

resource management. What was the status of bighorn sheep and other fauna? How much 

damage had years of vandalism and theft done to the flora of the monument? How significant 

and widespread were the traces of Native American inhabitance? In addition, the agency had to 

plan and develop the area to be a proper unit of the park system. Where should the Park Service 

establish its permanent headquarters? Where should it put trails, campgrounds, and other 

infrastructure? Finally, what should rangers emphasize when interpreting the monument for the 

visiting public? After opening the business office on September 19, 1940, the pace of these 

activities increased in spite of all the time consumed in battling miners and negotiating with 

landowners. After the 1950 boundary settlement, it dramatically accelerated just in time to 

absorb the service-wide building bonanza that accompanied the Mission 66 program.

The staff at Joshua Tree remained small during this time, starting with just James Cole 

and reaching only thirteen full and part time employees by 1954. During the war years, the 

monument had several acting superintendents, but seldom more than three other employees at 

one time. Harold S. Hildreth became the first ranger in January 1941, but lasted only six months. 

He had a family and could not support them in Twentynine Palms on a park ranger's salary. John 

W. Stratton transferred from Lassen Volcanic National Park and Cole hired a local man, Hesmel 

Earenfight, to replace Hildreth, but both soon disappeared into the military. They returned after 

the war, and Earenfight stayed on for many years thereafter. Several maintenance employees also 

worked in the monument in between stints in the military. During Cole's military service, he was 

replaced by acting custodians Walter G. Attwell, Duane D. Jacobs, Walter Ketcham, and Frank 

R. Givens. On March 4, 1947, Givens reassumed leadership of the monument when Cole left for 

a regional office position. Samuel A. King replaced Givens in April 1953 and served until 1957. 

Meanwhile, a cavalcade of regional and national officials helped with evaluative inspections and 

planning.1

Securing Water in Joshua Tree

The key to development in Joshua Tree National Monument, once land and boundaries were 

secure, was water. In 1936, the NPS had some experience with arid units, but few matched the 

paucity of water in Joshua Tree. No permanent streams flowed through the monument. The few 

settlers within its boundaries had no commercial agriculture and the only irrigation supported a 

small subsistence orchard and vegetable garden owned by Bill Keys. Available water came from 

three sources. The major aquifers lay relatively deep and resulted from precipitation millennia 

earlier. The springs that supported early cattle herds and mining operations stemmed from water 

that entered mountainous terrain, percolated through the rock and soil layers, and appeared at the 
131

surface at the base of the uplands. After irregular rain events, water also collected in natural or 

human-made rock depressions called "tanks" or flowed briefly in short ephemeral streams. 

However, high evaporation rates made these sources sporadic at best. NPS officials knew that 

any hope of drawing visitors to the monument lay in finding more water, securing the legal right 

to tap it, and constructing the infrastructure to deliver it. In addition, more water would be 

necessary to protect and increase the signature fauna of the unit, particularly the bighorn sheep. 

Many of the early inspectors of the new unit gave pessimistic evaluations of the existing 

water sources. After his March 1937 visit, landscape architect Ernest Davidson wrote, "owing to 

this extremely difficult water question, it may very likely be impossible to develop camp sites, or 

other sites, for over-night use within the boundaries, even were such a development desirable."2

He added that the Lost Horse Mine shaft reached a depth of 500 feet without finding water. A 

year later, James Cole carried out a more careful survey and listed twenty-two sources including 

Cottonwood, Quail, and Stubbe springs, and Barker Dam. However, the remainder consisted of 

private wells and ephemeral tanks. He lamented that Twentynine Palms had plenty of ground 

water but it did not flow into the monument.3

Clearly the NPS needed a specialized study by a competent hydrologist not only for long 

term development planning, but for locating a headquarters facility. Regional Geologist J. 

Volney Lewis conducted the study in 1941 with special attention to possible headquarters sites. 

In his report, Lewis described the underlying water basins, the influence of faults, and the 

significant points where water occurred or relatively shallow wells could be dug. He identified 

twenty-three springs, nine tanks, and seventeen wells inside the monument's boundaries (Map 5-

1). More than 100 wells and the Oasis of Mara existed just outside the boundaries, primarily in 

and around Twentynine Palms. Lewis evaluated seven potential sites for a headquarters office 

and, although he did not make a specific recommendation, he clearly thought the Oasis of Mara 

was superior to the others. He recommended a more detailed study including an evaluation of 

water quality by a sanitary engineer.4

World War II derailed any further investigation of water sources, but Superintendent 

Cole's return in May 1944 renewed the search for water and the legal rights to use it. Chester 

Pinkham accompanied Cole on several trips into the southern part of the monument to find tanks 

and other sources that he remembered from his mining trips decades earlier. Cole suggested that 

wells be dug on government land and windmills used to bring the water to the surface for the 

benefit of wildlife. Acting Director Hillory Tolson rejected that idea claiming that such intrusive 

structures had no place in a national park unit. Although the NPS found additional tanks and 

drilled a few experimental wells, it became obvious that the future of the monument depended on 

accessing the known water sources. Unfortunately, the uncertainty of water rights doctrine in 

California, coupled with Joshua Tree's bizarre land ownership patterns, confused agency officials 

and resulted in still more lengthy legal procedures.5

The Confusing Case of California Water Rights 

The rights to water in the western United States are very complicated. One significant 

characteristic of American water rights is that state law is generally preeminent, although there 

has been much tension and judiciary wrangling over federal rights since settlement of the West 

began. California is particularly difficult because state law recognizes three separate systems for 
132

Map 5-1. Traditional water sources in Joshua Tree National Monument, 1983. Data source: 

Linda Greene. 1983. "A History of Land Use Joshua Tree National Monument, California," 305.

Delta Cartography.

water rights: pueblo rights, riparian rights, and appropriative rights. Pueblo rights date from the 

Spanish and Mexican periods and do not apply in the Joshua Tree area. Riparian rights derive

from English common law and apply over most of the United States. In this system, a landowner 

may divert and use water running through or alongside his or her property. California adopted 

this system upon achieving statehood. However, the third system, sometimes called the "doctrine 

of prior appropriation," already existed in California prior to statehood. Gold seekers worked it 

out in the Sierra Nevada foothills where inadequate water for mining demanded a different 

approach. In this case, the first person to divert water for a beneficial use has a prior right against 

all other users. This "first in time, first in right" system prioritized users, but outlawed wasteful 

or unfair use. By using both the riparian and appropriative systems throughout most of the state, 

California assured that its lawyers would have plenty of work. Over the years, court cases and 

subsequent legislation sought to address and clarify the inconsistencies.6

One result was the creation of what became the California State Water Board in the 

Water Commission Act of 1913. Legally, those who wish to appropriate water must apply to the 

board which then holds a hearing. A person can argue that he or she has priority or that another 

applicant is requesting an amount beyond what is considered "reasonable use." All prior 

appropriations established before 1914 remained unchallenged, but those subsequent to it fell 

under more scrutiny. In most cases, the federal government is just another claimant. The U. S. 
133

Supreme Court affirmed this arrangement in a 1935 case that emphasized the separation of 

federal land rights from state water rights. Congress also reinforced this with the McCarran 

Amendment passed in 1952. One important caveat in this arrangement is that the federal 

government can overrule the state's water allocation if it threatens downstream navigation. 

Significantly, the California Supreme Court ruled in1903 that the "reasonable use" criterion also 

applies to ground water.7

Despite this apparent nod to state's rights, the federal government did secure priority 

rights for any reserve it established. In a 1908 U. S. Supreme Court decision, the federal 

government established an appropriation right to supply the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation 

with enough water for the residents to carry out irrigated agriculture. It did not affect prior 

appropriations, but curbed excessive claims by subsequent applicants. Further court action 

extended the "reserved rights doctrine" to national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges. Thus, the 

NPS could argue that Joshua Tree's purposes of preservation and recreation entitled it to water on 

and under monument land that was not already appropriated in 1936. If prior claims existed, 

however, the agency would have to negotiate with the owners and, quite possibly, have to buy 

them out. This was particularly bothersome in cases where springs or wells within the monument 

had already been tapped to supply users outside the boundaries.8

 

Another type of federal water reservation, the public water reserve, also exists in arid 

portions of the American West. Grazing in the region relied entirely on the availability of water 

for free range livestock. As long as it remained part of the commons, wealthier ranchers could 

file land claims on tracts of land that had springs or waterholes and then keep out competing 

cattlemen or sheepherders. This led to conflict and occasionally violence. The General Land 

Office (GLO) took note and on March 29, 1912 began removing public lands with water sources 

from alienation in order to keep them open to homesteaders and small operations. The U. S. 

Geological Survey (USGS) recommended specific sites and the president approved their 

withdrawal and chronological enumeration. Public Water Reserve 14 included the water 

impounded by Bill Keys at the Barker Dam. President Calvin Coolidge simplified the process in 

1926 when he issued the "Executive Order of April 17, 1926" setting aside what is called "Public 

Water Reserve No. 107." This sweeping order removed from "settlement, location, sale or entry" 

all springs and waterholes, as well as the surrounding land for a distance of one-quarter mile, on 

unappropriated and unreserved public land. In 1945, Superintendent Cole identified seven public 

water reserves in the monument including Barker Dam, Quail, Stubbe, Cottonwood, and Lost 

Horse springs, Stirrup Tanks, and two other unnamed sources.9

Later developments in water law have highlighted the difficulties inherent in operating 

under dual legal doctrines. One controversial situation involves water on federal land that has not 

been set aside as any type of reserve. The federal government has contested state primacy in 

controlling "non-reserved" water on the public domain in a number of controversial cases. The 

courts have tended to cite the "reasonable use" precedent to decide individual cases meaning that 

both states and the federal government have won and lost. Yet, congress enacted a "nonreserved" water right in the bill that upgraded Great Sand Dunes from a monument to a park in 

2000. The law enables the park to claim ground water outside its immediate boundaries, but 

within its hydrologic basin, to preserve the ecological diversity in the unit. In some cases, the rise 

of environmentalism in American society has led to increasing federal success, particularly in the 
134

contest between consumptive and "instream" uses. The former refer to all the uses for human 

purposes that have been the traditional bases of appropriative claims. However, beginning with 

environmental organizations' defense of Mono Lake against removal of its tributary waters by 

the City of Los Angeles, courts have confirmed that biological health, recreation, and scenic 

qualities are also reasonable uses. For Joshua Tree National Park, these changes in water law 

may enable the NPS to draw water from the public domain outside the unit while protecting 

water that originates within it. One further amendment to Joshua Tree's water rights came in 

1996 when the California Water Resources Control Board ruled that "all surface water on 

unappropriated land at the time of reservation, [is] the minimum amount necessary to fulfill the 

primary purpose" of the park.10 

Sources within the Monument

The problem of securing adequate water in Joshua Tree National Monument stemmed from more 

than just aridity. Three issues worried monument officials. First, several businesses tapped 

springs inside the monument to supply their activities outside its boundaries. Second, residents in 

the monument had claimed most known sources decades earlier. Finally, rapid settlement around 

the monument drew heavily on local aquifers which, in turn, increased ground water outflow 

from the monument. The first two meant that complex and expensive solutions had to be found 

within the framework of California's water regulation system either by legal challenge or 

purchase. The latter meant that the fight evolved over a diminishing resource. The first two 

decades of the monument saw a desperate attempt to find and secure the rights to the few water 

sources and vigorous resistance from those who owned or had developed them. Superintendent 

James Cole and his successors faced yet another combative situation as they sought to insure the 

monument's survival.

Four important water sources in Joshua Tree posed complex and prolonged management 

problems, Lost Palms Spring, the Pinto Wells, the Lost Horse Wells, and reservoir behind Barker 

Dam. Several neighboring businesses took water from the monument, a reality that particularly 

aggravated agency planners. One irksome case in the southern part of the unit was a pipeline that 

drew water from Lost Palms Canyon and conveyed it to a roadside tourism development beside 

U. S. Highway 60 (Interstate 10) south of the monument. Joseph Chiriaco owned a gas stationgift shop operation at Shaver Summit and a water right dating back to 1900 which he purchased 

in 1933. In July 1946, he told Superintendent Cole that he would like to enlarge his water 

diversion system in order to expand his business. Cole immediately asked the regional director to 

initiate a study of Chiriaco's water rights to the oasis at Lost Palms Canyon. Chiriaco's 

predecessors had installed a pipeline that crossed more than five miles of government and 

Southern Pacific Railroad (SPRR) land and Cole suspected that this was a case of trespass.11

 

After a two-year delay, Chiriaco officially applied to expand the system and showed 

paperwork indicating he had rights to take more water. This would relieve him from having to 

buy water outside the monument and truck it to his site. New superintendent Frank Givens 

reiterated his predecessor's recommendation to investigate the businessman's water rights and 

legal permission to maintain a pipeline crossing government and railroad property. Givens feared 

that any increase in water diversion from the oasis would kill the native palms. During a 

subsequent inspection and further legal research, questions arose concerning conflicting dates of 

both land acquisition and water appropriation. Monument officials learned that Chiriaco did have 
135

an appropriative right to the water, but speculated that they could block his application to 

increase his diversion based on the riparian rights that should accompany federal ownership of 

the land. The NPS could claim that maintaining the health of the palm oasis was a reasonable 

use. Trespass by Chiriaco's pipeline was another matter. Givens and other agency officials 

figured they could block enlargement of the pipeline on this basis, but they were not sure they 

could force him to remove the existing one. In any event other issues and duties distracted 

monument staff and Chiriaco decided to bide his time for another decade.12 

A much larger and more important source of water known as the Pinto Wells existed 

further east, near a major dry wash leading from the Pinto Basin to the Chuckwalla Valley. The 

Metropolitan Water District (MWD) acquired the land and an appropriation to drill a well here in 

1933 to supply one of its construction camps for the Colorado River Aqueduct. The federal law 

authorizing the aqueduct stipulated that the land and the water right would return to the 

government when the district no longer had any use for them. Yet, on January 1, 1947, the Los 

Angeles utility leased the well to the Kaiser Steel Corporation for twenty-five years. The utility 

argued that its rights remained in force because the old construction camp still hosted a 

maintenance crew. When Kaiser secured the lease, it applied to the NPS for permission to pipe a 

much larger amount of water to its Eagle Mountain Mine for milling ore and supplying its 

growing work camp. A Kaiser sponsored study showed that the existing well could produce 

5,000 gallons per hour, much more than what the NPS would need in that remote corner of the 

monument. Congressman Sheppard's H. R. 4703 bill would remove the mine from the monument 

but not the well. Associate Director Arthur Demaray saw no reason to disapprove a larger 

extraction from the well. He reasoned that Congressman Sheppard also would have the land 

under the well removed from the monument if the agency blocked Kaiser's plans.13

After the 1950 boundary revision, the mine lay outside the monument but still drew most 

of its water from the Pinto Well. Then, late in December, 1954, Superintendent Samuel King 

discovered that Kaiser had quietly drilled a second well to a depth of 575 feet on monument land. 

Kaiser executives blithely informed King that they needed more water for the town developing 

alongside the mine and would submit an application soon. The initial reactions from King and 

his superiors were both concern and outrage. When King inspected the new well, now called

Pinto Well #2, Kaiser officials admitted that they had made a mistake. They confessed that they 

thought the boundary of the monument was one-half mile further north. They added that Pinto 

Well #1 was sufficient for the mine, but that more water was needed for the "lawns, trees, shrubs, 

sanitation, and other domestic use" for 625 people living at the mine site. They asked for advice 

from the superintendent on what they should do next.14

The NPS faced an uncomfortable dilemma. The well was a fait accompli, the region's 

miners still sought to reopen the monument to new claims or eliminate it, Kaiser was the biggest 

employer in an economically depressed area, and local legislators favored expansion of its 

operations. Superintendent King recommended that the company be given a three-year special 

use permit to use water from the sixteen-inch well, renewable thereafter by further application. 

According to Kaiser's hydrologists, Pinto #2 would produce 1,500 gallons per minute without 

affecting the water table. However, Regional Director Lawrence Merriam warned that the well 

sat at the bottom of the basin and could draw enough water to ruin any opportunity for the NPS

to drill on surrounding higher ground. Nevertheless, he speculated that a revocable permit might 
136

be unavoidable. Regional Solicitor Jackson E. Price agreed and reasoned that the agency should 

approve the new application because Kaiser could just drill more wells on the ten acres it leased 

from the water district for Pinto Well #1. Price thought that the NPS could control how much 

water Kaiser took from its new well, but would be powerless if the company drilled more wells 

on MWD land. He proposed that if the agency did issue a permit, it should prohibit use of any of 

the new water for mining. The company could only use it to supply the town where its workers 

lived.15

Ultimately, NPS officials decided to deny a permit. Instead, they forced Kaiser to cap 

Pinto Well # 2 and brought a trespass charge against the company. They continued to negotiate 

with the company, but the two parties disagreed about several basic provisions. Kaiser asked for 

three times the per capita water requirement generally allowed by the government. NPS

negotiators remained leery of the impact the water withdrawal would have on Pinto Basin 

wildlife and any future development plans. They challenged Kaiser to obtain water from wells 

outside the monument, especially in the Chuckwalla Valley. Hydrologists reported that some 

monument ground water flowed into that valley, but did not agree on whether drawing water 

from wells there might ultimately drain the Pinto Basin. Kaiser representatives offered to drill 

horizontally from the new well to the old one and proposed a variety of tripartite and direct 

exchanges for land, mines, or whatever they thought the NPS might want. Kaiser wanted a 

permit for at least twenty years to justify the enormous investment it would make in further 

development of the mine and its town. The NPS refused to consider any more than five years,

and preferred two or three. Some agency officials worried about how the public would react to a 

huge allocation of water to Kaiser while they rejected small applications like Chiriaco’s. In 1956, 

as the monument's second decade drew to a close, Pinto #2 remained capped. Kaiser started 

negotiating directly with the senior NPS officials in Washington, D.C., and then surprised the 

agency by drilling a third well on its leased MWD property very close to Pinto #1. Once again,

Joshua Tree officials knew nothing about Pinto Well #3 until it began pumping. The company 

continued to negotiate for Pinto #2 water, but demonstrated that it would not be denied the 

resources necessary for its economic growth.16 

The Chiriaco and Kaiser withdrawals bothered Joshua Tree officials, but their greatest 

concerns lay in the western half of the monument. The Lost Horse Wells on the Ryan homestead 

formed one obvious source in the area most suitable for visitor use. Ranchers Tom and Jepp

Ryan used the water to support their grazing and mining operations. In 1941, Superintendent 

Cole suggested that one of the water rights still held by Jepp Ryan was invalid because the land 

had been patented to the SPRR in 1912 when the area was first surveyed. Furthermore, Ryan had 

not patented the mill along with the mine. A three-mile pipeline carried water from the old mill 

site to the mine across both railroad and government land. Cole found that Ryan had not sought 

permission from either landholder and technically was in trespass. However, the superintendent 

cautioned against taking action to deprive Ryan of his water because it would benefit the railroad 

and make acquisition of its land more difficult. Subsequently, the NPS dug its own wells on 

nearby government land. However, Ryan's Lost Horse Well #1 on his patented homestead 

remained the primary producer in the area.17
137

Two Visions: Water, Grazing, Park Policy and Bill Keys 

Barker Dam and the cattle that used its water proved to be the most contentious issue for James 

Cole and several succeeding superintendents. When Bill Keys moved to the area, he identified all 

the possible sources of subsistence and acquired them as they became available. By 1936, he ran 

one of the last herds of cattle in the new monument, held title to multiple mineral claims, mill 

sites, and water sources, and threatened anyone who trespassed or challenged his perceived 

rights. Keys claimed nine separate water sources including Barker Dam, Cow Camp Reservoir,

and Split Rock Reservoir. Most had small dams to augment the pools of spring water or rainfall 

he used to supply his cattle and mill ore. Barker Dam was the most reliable source and one of the 

closest to his Desert Queen Ranch (Figures 5-1 and 5-2). Through a variety of traditional 

homestead entries, stock-raising entries, and acquisitions by relatives and friends, Keys and his 

wife, the former Frances Lawton, procured enough land to effectively block all but the northern 

and eastern sides of the reservoir, which were too rugged to allow access (Figure 5-3). Certain 

that he alone owned the water, Keys built a fence to deny its use by other cattlemen and,

ultimately, by the monument that surrounded it. He then focused on increasing his herd to a size 

necessary to support himself and his family.18

Figure 5-1. Barker Dam showing the original portion built by cattleman C. O. Barker and the 

upper portion added by Bill Keys. Photo by the author. 
138

Figure 5-2. The reservoir behind Barker Dam on November 2, 1936. The reservoir is empty in 

2014. Photo by George A. Grant. Harpers Ferry Center, Grant Collection JOTR #56. 

James Cole later reported that Joshua Tree National Monument supported grazing in only 

two areas. James Cram’s operation included Cottonwood Spring, but primarily used a large 

range outside the monument. World War II and General George Patton's desert tank training shut 

down that operation when the army took over most of the public domain he used. The other 

centered on the Lost Horse and Pleasant valleys, which Keys used in summer and winter 

respectively. C. O. Barker and Will Shay had used these valleys until 1923. Emmett Shay who,

like his father, served as sheriff of San Bernardino County, and James W. Stocker represented 

the type of big cattle business that had formerly monopolized the range and water holes. Cole 

suspected that they had not purchased proper permits or established water rights for the original 

operation but simply moved into the area. They too wanted access to graze their livestock in the

monument. Interestingly, Stocker was the under-sheriff of San Bernardino County. They used 

their prominent positions to the advantage of their cattle business. Bill Keys was the only man 

who still grazed cattle in the area they coveted. He had clashed previously with Barker and Shay 

and even wounded one of their employees. As a miner and homesteader, he represented an 

intrusion and a threat to big-time cattle operators and a virulent enmity built up between them. 

Keys maintained throughout his life that most of his woes were caused by the Shay faction

including his later shootout with a neighbor and problems with the NPS in general and James 

Cole in particular.19
139

Figure 5-3. William “Bill” and Frances Keys. The Keys couple clashed with the National Park 

Service over its attempt to curtail their mining and grazing businesses. Later Bill Keys became 

the primary figure in the park's interpretation program. Photographer unknown. JTNP photo 

archives, general collection.

The first sign of trouble in this grazing and water rights feud came in October 1936 

during Colonel Thomson's inspection. Keys mentioned that he expected 150 additional cattle to 

be delivered in the next few days. An appalled Superintendent Thomson told Keys that grazing 

would not be permitted on government land in the monument. Keys later wrote that he 

immediately canceled his order for the cattle. Thomson also recommended to his superiors that

grazing never be permitted in Joshua Tree. Director Arno Cammerer agreed, but cautioned that 

Keys had every right to graze cattle on his own land, much of which he had obtained with stockraising homestead grants. Meanwhile, Keys believed that cattleman H. W. Stacey convinced the 

new superintendent to deny him grazing rights on government land so he could gain the range for 

his herd. His suspicion was reinforced when Stacey applied to the NPS for a grazing permit on 

land that Keys used. The old prospector then applied for a permit for the same land. Shortly 

thereafter, he entered a partnership with a Mr. Lawrence who brought eighty head to the 

monument from the coast. However, the two soon had a falling out and Lawrence later removed 

his cattle after Cole informed him they could not stay because he had no grazing rights. The NPS

decided not to issue a permit to anyone.20
140

Real trouble began when James Cole arrived in September 1940 with instructions to 

develop the monument. As the last of the active cowboy-prospectors in the monument, Keys 

represented a way of life already gone from most of the West. He was a jack-of-all-trades and a 

master of many. He was also extraordinarily independent, self-sufficient, and willing to defend 

his perceived rights, violently if necessary. He also proved amazingly opportunistic as he turned 

much of the Lost Horse and Pleasant Valleys into a near-fiefdom. He clashed with the 

bureaucracy of the NPS on many issues including mine claims, water rights, property rights, and 

grazing rights. He understood and used the legal procedures to acquire rights and titles, but 

ignored the law if he thought he could.21 Superintendent Cole expressed sympathy for Keys as 

an old timer who should be treated well and, if possible, given leeway to continue his grazing, 

mining, and other economic pursuits. However, he also had to enforce the law and NPS policy 

on a monument that was in grave danger of failing. When he contacted Keys about controlling 

his cattle and allowing government employees and visitors access to the public water reserve at 

Barker Dam, he met stiff resistance.22

Grazing is one of the more difficult issues a new park or monument faces. Secretary of 

the Interior Franklin Lane's 1918 letter to Director Stephen Mather, based on the latter's own 

ideas, specified that grazing could only take place in areas where visitors seldom traveled, and in 

cases where no harm would come to the natural resources. However, widespread grazing in parks 

and monuments during World War I caused unacceptable damage. In 1925, Secretary Hubert 

Work ordered that grazing should be phased out of the parks as soon as possible. During World 

War II, the NPS resisted grazing far more stringently and successfully, but it still took place in 

some units including Joshua Tree. Grazing can persist in a park unit under several circumstances. 

First, a person can maintain herd of animals on his or her own property within a park. Second,

and far more common, grazing permits issued before a unit is established can be maintained 

through the life of the permit or if lawmakers so order. During the world wars, the government 

encouraged more meat production by opening some parks to temporary grazing. A third factor 

that helped those who wanted to run livestock in the parks is a reticence among NPS officials to 

aggressively suspend traditional activities by residents who lived in the area before the unit's 

establishment. Many campaigns to create parks, like the one for Joshua Tree, are controversial. 

The long-term damage to the agency's reputation, if it is high-handed, will complicate further 

management across the system. All three of these circumstances prevailed in Joshua Tree with 

Bill Keys and his cattle operation.22

Keys also refused to accept the NPS's contention that the reservoir at Barker Dam was a 

public water reserve. He argued that he personally had done so much hard work to augment its 

storage capacity and had used it for such a long time that it rightfully belonged to him. At the 

same time, every action the NPS took threatened the lifestyle Keys had built over the previous 

three decades. He saw his mining claims adversed until he had little left but Desert Queen #1. 

Most of the water rights and wells he claimed were found to be on public water reserves, on 

SPRR land or, in one case, homesteaded by his most visible antagonist, Worth Bagley. He 

struggled throughout his life to patch together enough economic activities to subsist and raise a 

family. He even briefly worked on a road crew for the NPS before finding that work 

unrewarding. Grazing was the core of a diminishing opportunity to continue his livelihood. 

When the NPS ordered him to keep his cattle on his own land, he realized that this too faced 
141

closure. According to a later range study, the land Keys owned might support three or four cattle, 

hardly enough to carry on a business.23

During the first year of Cole's tenure as superintendent, he tried to convince Keys that he 

would have to allow others to use Barker Dam water and confine his cattle to his own land. 

Then, after consulting with the regional director, he offered to work out a permit for Keys that 

would restrict his cattle to Pleasant Valley, an area that would not be frequented by visitors and, 

hence, would not overtly challenge agency directives. Cole maintained that he always treated 

Keys and his wife with courtesy and their conversations were calm and forthright. Conversely, 

Keys harbored a growing dislike for Cole because of his interference with the prospector's 

property and livelihood. Despite superficial courtesy when they met, Keys fired letters to senior 

NPS officials, the governor of California, and the secretary of the interior bitterly complaining 

about every aspect of monument management. In July 1941, Keys and his wife wrote to 

Secretary Ickes and complained about the elimination of most of their mining claims, the 

destruction of vegetation and natural beauty that visitors and a movie company brought to the 

monument, and their belief that Minerva Hoyt and local realtors engineered the monument's 

proclamation for their own financial benefit. Keys added that the NPS had cut down "hundreds 

of truckloads of Joshuas and other yuccas and growth" in order to build an unnecessary road.24

On July 4, 1942, as the Barker Dam and grazing issues grew bitter, a fire started in 

Joshua Tree that further incensed Keys. Two weeks later he sent a letter to Lawrence Merriam of 

Yosemite National Park and Regional Director Owen Tomlinson, and this time he focused 

specifically on Cole. He accused the superintendent of harassing him about his cattle and argued 

that grazing had prevented fires before the area became a monument. He reiterated that Cole had 

a road built that caused his workers to remove truckloads of plants and dump them down 

mineshafts. He insisted that he owned Barker Dam and its reservoir and accused Cole of 

deliberately and repeatedly trespassing, in one instance driving across a field of grain. He added 

"if this keeps up my property will be as trampled down as some other places that he and his 

friends like to picnic at." Keys went on to complain about destruction caused by the Paramount 

Motion Picture Company, and the fact that Cole did nothing to stop it, that the superintendent 

had used 200 tons of valuable ore from a mine dump to line his new road, that he told his men to 

take pipe and other equipment from a mine to use for some purpose, and that he was simply 

currying favor from Minerva Hoyt who was busy selling railroad land. Keys also accused Cole 

of personal malfeasance:

When the fire of July 4th started Mr. Coles [sic] was up at the view with a car full of 

women and coming back saw the fire soon after it started, but usually when he is wanted 

he is either nowhere to be found or sitting in his office at Twentynine Palms. All this area 

needs is enough cattle on the range and one good ranger ON THE JOB [emphasis in the 

original].25

In addition to the fire, what spurred Keys' angry letter was the intensifying conflict over 

the water behind Barker Dam. Cole and Hesmel Earenfight went to the Keys home and, not 

finding William, spoke to Frances about using the water there to fight any future fires in the area. 

Apparently she agreed, but during the course of the conversation the superintendent mentioned 

that the NPS had every right to cut the fence blocking access to it and, in fact, the agency could 

put up a fence and deny use of the water to the Keys. Cole was technically and legally correct,
142

but it was not a tactful approach to solving the problem. Frances Keys apparently was the more 

volatile one of the couple and the monument officials drove away with her enraged voice ringing 

in their ears.26

By this time officials at all levels of the NPS were well aware of Bill Keys and the 

difficult problems he posed at Joshua Tree. Nevertheless, Cole's immediate supervisors pressed 

him for a response to the charges in this most recent letter. On August 10, 1942, the 

superintendent submitted his eight-page, single-spaced answer to each point Keys had made. He 

began with a general assessment:

As you know, Mr. Keys or rather Mrs. Keys, who wrote this letter is my pet problem. I 

have always been very sympathetic with them and have withheld judgment and action 

against them for over two years, hoping all the time that in some manner we could work 

out these problems without adverse consequences to the Keys. Such an attitude, I realize 

now, was a mistake. These people do not understand kindness and assume such actions 

are a sign of weakness. Accordingly, they take advantage of every situation possible. 

They not only will not cooperate, but of late have become quite defiant. I am glad that 

they wrote this letter because it is evident now that this office henceforth has no 

alternative but to see that they obey all Park Service regulations regardless of the 

consequences. There is a small element of truth in practically all the statements and 

accusations the Keys made in their letter. But in almost every case they either omit part 

of the facts or twist the truth so that it appears very unfavorable. If we were dealing with 

respectable people some of their statements would be serious, but the Keys have a very 

poor record in this area.27

Cole then answered the specific charges. He admitted that his road crew cut between fifty 

and seventy-five truckloads of yuccas and other low vegetation after approval from the regional 

engineer, but argued that this was a small amount for sixty-six miles of road. He added that all of 

the mine shafts claimed by Keys were timbered with Joshua trees and that the prospector still 

ignored regulations that forbid gathering firewood in the monument. He explained that he asked 

Keys to keep his cattle in Pleasant Valley as per regulations, but he would not do so. Keys 

instead insisted that he receive a permit to graze hundreds of cattle in the Lost Horse Valley. The 

superintendent also investigated the common ranchers' claim that grazing suppressed fire and 

found it to be false because the cattle did not actually eat the grass, they ate the brush. He 

admitted that he had crossed the Keys grain field, but explained that it had just been planted and 

was unrecognizable. He again explained the situation with Barker Dam, a public water reserve 

near a mill that was probably illegal. He suggested that Minerva Hoyt should be warned about 

the Keys accusation that she was personally profiting from railroad land sales. He categorically 

denied that he had sanctioned destruction by the movie company or that his men took pipe and 

equipment from mines in the area. Finally, he expressed outrage at the implication in the charge 

that he was with a "car full of women" when the recent fire started. In fact it was his wife and 

two of her relatives and his wife had dropped him off to start fighting the fire while she drove to 

Twentynine Palms for assistance.28

Understandably, things went downhill from there. Within a week, Cole sent two terse and 

formal letters to Keys warning him that he was in violation of monument regulations by allowing 

his cattle to roam over government property and posting signs that those lands were official 
143

cattle grazing areas. He threatened prosecution for both infractions. Keys answered the letters but 

did not address the specific charges. He stated that he would take the matter up with Washington, 

D. C. "to see if the Bill of Rights is still in effect." Keys added "regarding a swimming hole for 

your friends at Twentynine Palms it seems to me that in all this 800,000 acres you could find a 

place to make them one without interfering with individuals living in the area." He then

"notified" Cole to keep off his property including his ranch and mining claims.29

At this point, Acting Regional Director Herbert Maier wrote to Cole about the escalating 

conflict. He asked the superintendent to soften his language in any further correspondence with 

Keys and warned that "should the matter come to trial I think you know the kind of verdict a 

local jury might hand down in the case of an 'old timer' claiming that the government is trying to 

run him out." Maier cautioned against starting a court case during the war when funds were so 

tight. He also ordered Cole to fulfill a regional office request from ten months earlier to prepare a 

grazing permit for Keys.30 The superintendent sent back a proposed permit but let his feelings be 

known: 

It is with reluctance that we recommend any type of grazing permit for Mr. Keys. All our 

better judgment and intuition tells us that to do so will only prolong this problem and 

make administering the monument just that much more difficult. This belief is held 

because we know that Mr. Keys cannot be trusted to live up to his agreements and it will 

be necessary for this office to constantly check to be sure no violations occur.31

The permit specified that Keys could only have twenty cattle, the same number he had when the 

monument was proclaimed, he had to keep them in Pleasant Valley, and the permit would end in 

five years. 

On October 23, 1942, Maier, Cole, and four other monument employees met in 

Twentynine Palms to discuss the Barker Dam-Keys-grazing situation. They still awaited a final 

ruling from the General Land Office (GLO) on both the dam and the millsite. They expected a 

favorable decision and speculated on whether to erect a fence that would block Keys from 

accessing the water. Thereafter, the discussion turned to where and how Keys should be arrested 

and tried after he violated the regulations. Then Maier, soon-to-be acting superintendent Duane 

Jacobs, and two others visited Keys at his home. Cole, who was preparing to leave for military 

service, did not attend. The NPS men tried to discuss the Barker Dam problem and the grazing 

permit they had offered, but had considerable trouble getting Keys to stop complaining about 

Cole. He did respond that the useful land in Pleasant Valley consisted of only 6,000 acres and 

that he needed more than 52,000 acres for the seventy-five head of livestock he claimed to own. 

The officials explained that they could not allow cattle in the Lost Horse Valley either legally or 

from a visitor use standpoint. Keys answered that he had to have that area to keep his cattle 

operation going. The conversation remained polite but Maier later wrote: 

The impression carried away of Mr. Keys was that he is conscious of his nuisance value 

and, while probably desirous of selling his holdings to the government according to his 

own statement, believes he will obtain a higher price by laying great stress on his work 

over the past 32 years in homesteading and pioneering than if his property were to be 

appraised purely on land value.32
144

After leaving Keys, the group returned to Twentynine Palms where Maier talked to Frank 

Bagley. The latter described Keys as a "dangerous individual" who had shot several men in the 

past and would not hesitate to shoot an NPS officer. Bagley added that Keys was calm and 

pleasant most of the time, but was "capable of violent outbursts resulting from emotional 

instability." He further stated that Keys wanted to be the "Death Valley Scotty" of the area. After 

this interview, Maier recommended that the NPS ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 

review Keys' past. Maier then traveled to Death Valley to interview the famous conman. Scotty 

described Keys as a "tough customer" who should not be trusted.33

Keys continued his personal battle with the NPS by complaining to federal officials on 

December 3, 1942 that monument employees were squandering gasoline and rubber tires by 

aimlessly driving around the monument in multiple vehicles during the wartime emergency. 

Monument officials conducted research and reported all vehicle use over the previous few 

months and justified each trip. Maier sent the figures to the director adding that two men from 

the Automobile Club of Southern California were checking maps for the army and that some of 

the 80,000 troops stationed nearby also traversed the monument. He suggested that Keys was 

perhaps confused and thought those vehicles belonged to the monument.34

On January 9, 1943 Acting Superintendent Jacobs documented a relatively amicable 

meeting he had with Keys earlier that day:

Our general discussion of about an hour was along more reasonable lines than heretofore. 

Apparently our former rebuttals, if somewhat blunt, of his accusations against former 

Superintendent Cole have had their effect and he has "soft-pedalled"[sic] this line of talk, 

at least for the time being. It now appears that there is a better chance of working out a 

satisfactory grazing permit if favorable advice is received from the Director. Our stand on 

Barker Dam was reaffirmed, that is, as far as the Service is concerned the decision of the 

G. L. O. is final. While Keys is still touchy on this point it is evident that his former 

positive assertions are somewhat shaken, evidence that his protests have been answered 

unfavorably or ignored.35 

At this point Bill Keys was desperate. He claimed to have seventy-five cattle but Jacobs 

thought he might actually have only forty-five or fifty. At sixty-three years old, his way of life 

was almost at an end. But he would go on fighting through every legal means. He appealed the 

adverse rulings on his mines and on his Big Chief Mill near Barker Dam. He stubbornly 

negotiated for a grazing permit that would allow up to 400 cattle in the monument. He continued 

to monopolize the reservoir behind Barker Dam and chafed at the loss of all his other water 

claims. Particularly galling was the fact that a well he had traditionally used lay on property now 

owned by his most bitter enemy, Worth Bagley (no relation to Frank). Keys believed that the 

Shay group had convinced the former Los Angeles lawman to buy SPRR land that included the 

well. That property also cut off the direct route Keys used to travel from his ranch to one of his 

mines. Jacobs, in the above memorandum for the files, wrote "an interesting and potentially 

explosive situation has developed from the bitter feeling between Keys and his closest neighbor, 

Mr. Worth Bagley, and has resulted in at least one instance of rifle shots being fired at Keys in 

warning by Bagley."36
145

On May 11, 1943, life suddenly changed for Bill Keys. He crossed Bagley's property to 

water his cattle and repair a pump. After discerning the cause of the problem with the pump, he 

began the drive back to his ranch by the same route. He soon encountered Bagley who fired a 

pistol at him and then began angling for a better shot. Keys explained later that he returned to his 

vehicle, grabbed his rifle, and shot back killing Bagley. After finishing a few mundane tasks, he 

drove to Twentynine Palms and surrendered to the constable. During the subsequent 

investigation, lawmen found that the killing had occurred just inside Riverside County and that 

any trial would be held there. Because there were no witnesses, the case depended on how much 

the authorities believed Keys when he claimed self-defense. Most people in the area knew the 

reputation of Keys, but also knew that Worth Bagley was a dangerous and unstable person. It 

turned out that the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department laid off Bagley upon learning that 

his erratic behavior might be due to a brain tumor. Bagley's wife later admitted that he harbored a

monomaniacal hatred for Keys and obsessed about killing him. The trial began on July7 and the

official charge changed to manslaughter. Unfortunately for Keys, his lawyers were unable to 

introduce evidence of Bagley's mental problems. The jury found him guilty and Judge George R. 

Freeman recommended that he serve nine years at San Quentin Prison. His lawyers appealed but 

to no avail. During the appeal, Frances sold all of their cattle to pay lawyers' fees. Because of 

wartime exigencies and the advanced stage of the grazing permit offered to Keys, the NPS issued 

it instead to James Stocker one of the prisoner's perennial enemies.

37

Bill Keys spent more than five years in jail and prison. Frances had to move back to Los 

Angeles to get a job and care for their four children while friends checked on the abandoned 

ranch. One friend of Keys did much more. Erle Stanley Gardner, a former lawyer and author of 

the Perry Mason series and many other novels, believed that Keys had been unfairly convicted 

and began legal inquiries and appeals that led to his release on October 25, 1948. Gardner 

continued his pursuit of exoneration until Governor Goodwin Knight pardoned Keys on July 12, 

1956.38 In the meantime, Keys tried to put his life back together at his Desert Queen Ranch. He 

reapplied for grazing rights which the NPS ignored. He added height to Barker Dam although he 

had no right to do so. He tried to patent his mine claims as described earlier, only to lose most of 

his long-delayed appeals against the 1941 adverse rulings. He even contemplated turning his 

property into a dude ranch or resort for a time. In 1961, more adverse rulings came from the 

Bureau of Land Management (BLM) eliminating several of his Desert Queen claims. Frances 

died in 1963 and Keys blamed the federal government for causing the worry and stress that killed 

her. A year later, he sold his property with the retained right to live the rest of his life at his home

(see chapter 6). During his later years, he became much friendlier to the monument staff and a 

source of important historical information. Bill Keys died in 1969 at the age of eighty-nine. He 

remained independent to the end and, ironically, became the primary interpretive figure for 

Joshua Tree National Park.39

Developing the Monument for Visitors

In order to develop the monument, NPS officials needed to evaluate its resources and design an 

overall plan. They found a landscape crisscrossed by a maze of narrow wagon trails and rutted 

automobile tracks, with active and abandoned mines, rudimentary dams, and some ranching 

infrastructure, but relatively few homesteads. Some sites such as Indian Cove, Cottonwood 

Spring, and the Oasis of Mara showed traces of camping and picnicking stretching back many 
146

years. Although in better shape than Devils Garden, the monument's vegetation showed the 

effects of cutting for mine timbers and firewood. Land ownership, scarce water, the threat of 

losing the eastern part of the monument, and the geographical distribution of the monument's 

tourist attractions shaped the agency’s planning. Early inspectors identified the Oasis of Mara, 

Indian Cove, Hidden Valley, Keys View, Split Rock, Lost Horse Valley, Fortynine Palms, and 

Cottonwood Spring as sites of special interest. They rated Covington Flat, Pleasant Valley, 

Cholla Cactus Garden, Lost Horse Mine, and the Lost Palms Oasis as secondary sites. Bill Keys 

owned much of the land surrounding his homestead which precluded any development there. 

Had he sold his holdings immediately to the government, the NPS might have located the 

headquarters there. 

The establishment of a headquarters complex including an office, a maintenance facility, 

park residences, and a museum was critical to the unit’s development for visitors. Unfortunately,

the monument's many problems prevented the agency from even assigning personnel to it for the 

first four years. James Cole began operations in an office rented in a county building in 

Twentynine Palms. NPS leaders hoped this would be a short-term solution and ordered 

inspectors and monument officials to place a high priority on finding a proper site for a

permanent headquarters. Nevertheless, a combination of factors delayed a final solution to this 

important issue for nearly twenty years.

Initially, it appeared that the headquarters problem might be uncharacteristically easy to 

solve. The raison d'etre for Twentynine Palms was the Oasis of Mara, the spring that had drawn 

both Native American and pioneer settlers to the area (Figure 5-4). A development company 

called the Twentynine Palms Corporation offered to donate the oasis to the NPS during the final 

stages of the campaign to establish the monument. After the proclamation, the corporation 

reiterated its offer to donate acreage. The corporation's board of directors had several motives for 

making this magnanimous offer. David Fairies of the board explained that the oasis was 

biologically and historically significant and should be protected, but the company could not 

maintain it. Earlier, he had failed to get Twentynine Palms to take it over as a city park. Now he 

saw the NPS as the logical custodians of this important resource, despite the fact that it was well 

north of the monument boundary. Also development of the corporation's hotel and other property 

would benefit from proximity to a nationally protected park preserve. Indeed, realtors from 

Twentynine Palms enthusiastically backed the idea, even as they planned to subdivide the land 

surrounding the oasis tract.40

The NPS reacted favorably to the offer, but some of its officials expressed doubts that 

complicated the situation. During their March 1937 inspection, Frank Kittredge and Ernest 

Davidson told Faries that the company would have to donate a considerable amount of acreage to 

the government plus a right-of-way for a parkway connecting the tract to the monument. 

Davidson described other offers from Yucca Valley and the village of Joshua Tree, but favored 

the oasis site if the water quality proved acceptable. In July, David Faries traveled to 

Washington, D. C. and urged Chief of Planning Thomas Vint to accept the donation. Vint replied 

that a study would be needed before the agency could commit to accepting a donation. Merel 

Sager and P. T. Primm conducted that study in September and concluded that the oasis was the 

best site, although the company's offer of a 200-foot right-of-way for the parkway was 

inadequate.41
147

Figure 5-4. The Oasis of Mara from the northwest taken on October 5, 1941. After the 

Chemehuevi and miners moved out much of the lower vegetation reappeared. Photo by George 

A. Grant. Harpers Ferry Center, Grant Collection JOTR #306. 

Over the next two years, the NPS continued to negotiate with the corporation while 

studying a variety of other options for its monument headquarters. Kittredge advised the director 

that the agency should hold out for a 700-foot right-of-way, but accept one of 400. The 

corporation asked that the agency move the southern boundary of the tract north to avoid 

encroaching on a planned residential development. Monument officials wanted enough acreage 

to house a maintenance complex, two or more residences and other buildings, as well as the 

headquarters office itself. After an April 1938 inspection, Yosemite superintendent Lawrence 

Merriam and James Cole recommended building the facility inside the monument where the 

agency could develop it however it wanted and not be placed "at a disadvantage" by accepting a 

gift from a private company. They identified two possibilities, the northern end of the Lost Horse 

Valley, where Bill Keys had his home, mines, and water sources, and immediately inside the 

monument boundary south of Twentynine Palms. The latter, referred to as the "monument site," 

was already federal land and along the main road, but would require the agency to purchase 

water and power from the town.42

By summer 1940, NPS planners considered seven other potential sites in addition to the 

Oasis of Mara and the two described above. These included 160 acres of the Chemehuevi 

reservation southwest of the oasis, Indian Cove, Quail Spring, an unspecified tract in Twentynine 

Palms north of the oasis, a BLM site north of Fortynine Palms, Cottonwood Spring, and a site by

Warren's Well in Yucca Valley (Map 5-2). Several of these involved donations of land to the 
148

Map 5-2. Locations considered for the headquarters complex during the 1940s. 1. Quail Spring; 

2. Lost Horse Valley (near Keys Ranch); 3. Indian Cove; 4. BLM land north of Fortynine Palms; 

5. Twentynine Palms North; 6. Oasis of Mara; 7. Native American reservation; 8. Monument 

Site; 9. Cottonwood Spring; 10. Warren’s Well (Yucca Valley). Delta Cartography.

monument by private owners who saw lucrative development opportunities on the land they 

would retain around the headquarters tract. However, after another survey by landscape architect 

Ernest Davidson, the agency narrowed the choices down to four favorites, the Oasis of Mara, the 

Chemehuevi reservation, the monument site, and the public domain area north of Fortynine 

Palms. Superintendent Cole summarized the advantages and disadvantages of the four candidates 

in May 1941. The monument site would not be threatened by adjacent development, would avoid 

flood damage, and afford scenic views, but would require expensive transmission of water and 

power and be some distance from amenities in the town. The public domain site had water and 

access to power, but was limited in size, not on either the Twentynine Palms Highway or the 

park entrance road, and included some state land. The Chemehuevi site had plenty of water, was 

close to the town for services and amenities, but susceptible to high winds, flooding, and 

adjacent private development. In addition, it was by no means clear that the NPS could acquire 

the land. The Bureau of Indian Affairs initially refused to transfer the land to the agency despite 

the fact that no members of the tribe actually lived there. Finally, the Oasis of Mara site sat 

alongside the monument's entrance road, had easy access to municipal water, services, and 

amenities, and was itself an area of relatively luxuriant vegetation and many birds.43
149

On June 3, 1941, Chief Planner Thomas Vint chaired a meeting at the regional office to 

review plans for Joshua Tree and make a number of decisions including where the headquarters 

should be placed and whether to accept the Twentynine Palms Corporation's offer to donate the 

oasis. The group, including Ernest Davidson, lands specialist Bernard Manbey, and several 

others, unanimously decided that the oasis site was the best choice. However, they agreed that 

the donation had to include at least eighty acres and be free of any restrictions or conditions. If 

the corporation would not agree to these stipulations, the NPS would build at the monument site 

as its second choice.44

Four days later, H. G. Johansing and C. G. Fitzgerald of the corporation asked 

Superintendent Cole if the NPS still wanted the donation because the company planned to build 

more structures and also donate acreage for a Catholic church at the northeast end of the tract. 

Cole admitted that the agency planned to accept the donation and would adjust the boundary of 

the tract it wanted to allow for the church. After learning this, Herbert Maier opined that park 

planners should help the diocese design the church so that its architecture would be appropriate 

to the region and the monument. Two months later, Twentynine Palms realtor F. R. Whyers,

representing the corporation, visited the Washington office of the NPS. He was in town to pursue 

his own agenda which included getting an army aviation training base established near the town. 

He assured Vint that he would try to get the corporation board to approve an eighty-acre 

donation. He admitted that he owned land near the oasis and was anxious to develop it once the 

government accepted the corporation's oasis donation.45

On August 7, 1941, David Faries informed Maier that the corporation had approved the 

donation and that he wanted to meet with agency officers to work out the details. For a while it 

appeared that everything would work out just as the NPS wanted. Yet, problems surfaced once 

detailed negotiations began. Regional officials had a plan ready for the complex that spread the 

headquarters office, a maintenance facility, and a number of park residences along the southern 

edge of the oasis tract. However, the corporation had its own plans for that area and forced the 

NPS to adjust its southern boundary of the tract. This meant that the entire headquarters complex 

would have to be east of the oasis, on fewer acres, and very close to the future church. Agency 

planners retreated to their offices to design an entirely new development scheme. Months passed, 

World War II began, and NPS planning and development halted. On January 17, 1942, David 

Faries visited the monument office to complain about the lack of progress in finalizing the 

donation. Cole explained that accepting the area at that time would require that he or his only 

remaining employee would have to patrol and maintain the area. He argued that two men could 

not handle the delicate and deteriorating oasis tract as well as the 1,200-square-mile monument. 

Three weeks later the Pasadena Star-News released a story about the imminent transfer of the 

oasis to the monument. After that optimistic report, both parties stepped back to reconsider the 

deal. The few NPS planners not yet drafted by the military worked on details of a master plan 

which included a headquarters at the oasis while the corporation mulled over its own plans and 

the agency's request for a minimum of eighty acres.46

On January 14, 1943 Faries sent a new oasis offer to NPS Director Newton Drury. The 

Twentynine Palms Corporation offered a tract of fifty-eight acres with five conditions: (1) the 

property would only be used as a public park and headquarters site, (2) it would not be used for 

camping, stabling horses, or to store maintenance equipment and supplies, (3) the NPS would 
150

immediately assume possession and maintenance of the area, (4) the agency would build its 

office within five years or one year after the end of the war, whichever came first, and (5) that it 

would use adobe or similar materials appropriate to the desert region for the structure. On 

January 27, Acting Director Hillory Tolson responded that the NPS needed at least eighty acres, 

that a maintenance area was part of the complex it planned to put at the site, that it would not 

officially own and patrol the site until the president issued an official proclamation adding it to 

the monument, and that construction of the complex awaited congressional appropriation which 

was unlikely to come any time soon. Tolson thanked the corporation for the offer "whether or not 

an agreement can be reached."47

As the war proceeded, no further planning for a headquarters site took place. In June 

1943, the Oasis of Mara opportunity briefly reappeared when John Baker, executive secretary of 

the National Audubon Society, told Acting Superintendent Duane Jacobs that the conservation 

group might accept a donation of ten acres there for a bird reserve and museum. He wondered if 

the NPS might want to collaborate on the museum and later take it over permanently. The 

agency remained non-committal and Director Drury ordered monument officials to continue 

renting office space in Twentynine Palms. More time passed, the war ended, and still the NPS

did nothing to solve its headquarters problem. Finally, in May 1946, Culbert W. Faries, brother 

of the now deceased David, asked Superintendent Cole if the agency was still interested in the 

oasis. Cole, after consultations with landscape architect Sanford Hill, informed the regional 

director that the disadvantages of the oasis site outweighed the advantages. He admitted that its 

convenience was hard to ignore, but feared it would become an expensive burden on the agency, 

that private development would encroach on it while potentially drawing enough water to cut off 

the flow of the spring, and that it would be difficult to protect from overuse by townsfolk.48

Another year passed and the NPS decided to construct a maintenance and utility complex 

within the monument. In April 1947, Frank Givens recommended a site adjacent to the junction 

known as Pinto Wye where roads diverged westward toward Lost Horse Valley and 

southeastward toward Cottonwood Spring. Many advantages including complete government 

land ownership, close proximity to projects within the monument, and easy road access 

overcame the need to import water and power. In addition, the area could be hidden from visitors 

which agency landscape architects argued was necessary to avoid detracting from the scenery 

and ambience of the monument. The maintenance area would include sheds for large vehicles, 

two huge tanks for road oil, one or more borrow pits, and a variety of workshop and office 

structures. Significantly, elimination of the utility function from the headquarters area meant that 

fifty-eight acres would be a reasonable option for the remaining development.49

Still the NPS did not act. Another year passed before Arthur Blake of the Sierra Club 

contacted Superintendent Givens with news that the Twentynine Palms Corporation was still 

willing to donate the oasis and up to thirty acres around it if the agency would protect it. Shortly

thereafter, the Pasadena Audubon Society encouraged the agency to preserve the oasis as a bird 

sanctuary. Then, on June 4, 1948, the San Bernardino Board of Supervisors told Givens that it 

needed the space it rented to the NPS for its own office. The agency would have to move within 

a year. In September, Acting Director Arthur Demaray ordered regional officials to reopen 

negotiations with the corporation. On October 4, Givens met Culbert Faries in Los Angeles to 

discuss aspects of planning and developing the tract should the NPS accept a donation of twenty-
151

five to thirty acres. Faries mentioned that the board of directors would insist that the government 

begin construction of its office within one year. Givens replied that immediate congressional 

funding was uncertain and perhaps the corporation would like to construct the building and 

amortize the cost through monthly rentals to the agency. Faries seemed agreeable and further 

suggested that the southern and western boundaries of the tract be curved in such a way that 

would allow the corporation's residential development, but still give the monument almost sixty 

acres. Givens met with the corporation board of directors on October 13 and found that they 

insisted on only one condition, the NPS would not use water from the spring for purposes outside 

the oasis tract. Both parties agreed, pending approval by Director Drury, and also decided to 

keep quiet about the deal until finalized.50

The Twentynine Palms Corporation wanted to settle the contract before the end of 1948,

but underestimated the complexities that dogged any decisions by the NPS. Regional Naturalist 

Dorr Yeager and Regional Counselor Sidney McClellan independently suggested that legal 

acquisition of the tract by proclamation under the Antiquities Act would not work because the 

area did not possess any "objects of historic or scientific interest." This meant that congress 

would have to pass an act to accept the donation. Everyone in the NPS knew what sorts of 

pitfalls could come from that approach. Several weeks of debate followed as agency officials 

sought a way to receive the donation without having to involve congress. They consulted 

Edmund Jaeger and other experts, considered archaeological and historic evidence, and tried to 

gauge what level of significance would be needed to use the Antiquities Act. Regional Director 

Tomlinson finally appealed to Director Drury for advice, adding that he would take no further 

action concerning the donation until he received a response. Associate Director Demaray 

answered on November 22 and confirmed that the agency would use the Antiquities Act to 

accept the donation. Senior officials reasoned that the act "contemplates that there may be 

reserved and included in the monument for purposes of administration, care, and management 

areas of land which do not contain such objects but are needed for administrative and 

management purposes."51

Despite this good news, 1949 began with several further complications. Tomlinson 

arranged for a surveyor to map the exact coordinates of the potential land donation. Engineer H. 

F. Cameron, Jr. completed the survey, but offered a grimly pessimistic evaluation of the area. He 

described it as dirty and degraded and believed it would require considerable cost to clean and 

maintain while townspeople would insist on using it as a public park. He proposed that the NPS

accept ten or twelve acres for its headquarters buildings and forget about the rest. Nevertheless, 

regional officials told Givens to ask the corporation for a draft deed that included a certified 

resolution to donate the land and a statement by the California secretary of state that the 

corporation was in good standing. Some of the detail in the agency's request confused 

corporation officials and, ultimately, the NPS prepared the final form for the deed. Then 

corporation officers informed the agency that they had drawn the boundary on the section line 

which happened to be the middle of the monument entrance road, now named Utah Trail. The 

NPS dropped the parkway idea and its fifty feet of roadway so the county would maintain the 

entire road. By October 1949, Drury approved the final plat and final deed only to have the 

corporation demand a final requirement. Board members insisted that the agency add a clause 

specifying that the land would return to the corporation if the NPS did not use it for a 

headquarters facility. They feared that if the monument did not develop the land, it would return 
152

to the public domain and be available for small tract homesteads. Agency officials agreed to add 

that condition. On January 10, 1950, more than fourteen years after their first offer, the 

Twentynine Palms Corporation officially deeded a 57.8-acre tract with oasis to the NPS (Map 5-

3; Figure 5-5). The agency successfully used the Antiquities Act, but final processing and filing 

of the deed came too late to be included in the act that changed the monument's boundaries. 

Hence, the Oasis of Mara and the headquarters remained outside the legal boundary of the 

monument. On June 30, 1961, congress passed Public Law 87-80 which added the exclave to the 

monument.52 

Map 5-3. The Oasis of Mara acquisition in Twentynine Palms. Source: JTNP. 1996.

“Headquarters Landscape and Oasis of Mara Action Plan.” 23. JTNP Library.

Establishing a Road Network

Yosemite superintendent Charles Thomson offered the first evaluation of the road situation in

Joshua Tree and belied the problems that would later surface in designing a workable road plan:

It would require a comparatively small expenditure for roads even if it were to be 

thoroughly opened up. Except in the northeast section, it is a road builder's dream. The 

great alluvial fans not only repose in almost absolutely constant gradients of two to four 

percent, for miles and miles; but they are composed of disintegrated granite, which only 

requires to be bladed into road sections and treated with oil.5
153

Figure 5-5. A 1952 air photo of the tree-lined Oasis of Mara showing the linear orientation along 

the Pinto Fault between the park headquarters on the right and the Twentynine Palms Inn on the 

left. Photo from the collection of early surveyor Bill Hatch maintained by Elizabeth Meyer, 

Twentynine Palms. 

At the same time, GLO inspector Samuel Guthrie dismissed the road situation with a brief 

comment that the only road in the monument was a rough wagon trail from Twentynine Palms to 

Cottonwood Spring. Both missed the more obvious problem, choosing which roads to improve

from among the plethora of unsuitable tracks across the desert. Regional Engineer Frank 

Kittredge and Regional Landscape Architect Ernest Davidson conducted the first serious 

appraisal of the roads in March 1937. They commented on the situation:

The Auto Club of Southern California has placed many directional and informational 

signs, however, there are so many auto trails crisscrossing through the area that there 

should be a general resigning by the Park Service. It would be almost impossible for a 

stranger at the present time to follow through to objectives without losing himself and 

having to retrace his way.54

They identified three northern entrance roads from Quail Springs, Twentynine Palms, and the 

Old Dale mines that coalesced to exit through a southern entrance at Cottonwood. They noted an 

abandoned route from Twentynine Palms to Indio through a washed out canyon, but believed 

that the cost of construction would preclude its development. Kittredge and Davidson described 

the roads themselves as "little more than two ruts crossing the sand through the rocks" (Figure 5-

6). Despite this condition they preferred primitive roads for economic reasons, but admitted that 

the public would probably demand improvements. They also accurately predicted that a fight 

would ensue over the north-south route through the monument. 
154

Figure 5-6. In 1936 most of the roads in Joshua Tree National Monument consisted of two dusty 

wheel ruts. Superintendent Cole chose which of the scores of these rudimentary "roads" would 

form the transportation infrastructure of Joshua Tree. Photo by George A. Grant. Harpers Ferry 

Center, Grant Collection JOTR #45.

A host of other recommendations followed over the next three years. Regional Planner 

Merel Sager agreed that the roads should remain primitive until a master plan was complete and 

suggested that any additional north-south road "should be discouraged." Superintendent 

Lawrence Merriam recommended that no roads be built in the eastern part of the monument until 

the boundary issue was settled. Regional Landscape Architect Sanford Hill noted that many in 

the NPS opposed having an entrance near Quail Spring but would have a hard time eliminating 

the existing road. He also suggested that the agency improve an old track accessing the Lost 

Palms Oasis. Another regional landscape architect, R. L. McKown, identified a circular route

from Twentynine Palms via the Lost Horse Valley and Quail Spring and back to Highway 62 as 

the top priority for improvement followed by a road to Keys View. He further suggested that the 

roads to Indian Cove and Covington Flat should be improved later, but the NPS should not 

develop any road from the south or one from Indian Cove to the Lost Horse Valley. Regional 

Engineer R. D. Waterhouse studied several canyon routes from Twentynine Palms to Indio and 

dismissed them all as too expensive to build and difficult to maintain. He added that neither of 

the counties claimed any roads within the monument except a short one through its eastern 

edge.55

 
155

Two main issues surfaced during these early road inspections, identifying a planned 

system from among the myriad options, and deciding if an improved road from the south should 

enter the monument and, if so, where. Ultimately, Superintendent Cole designed the initial road 

plan. He had accompanied most of the regional officials on their inspections and laboriously 

studied the options as part of his duties. Cole sought advice from engineer and Death Valley 

Superintendent Theodore Goodwin and then chose which of the myriad tracks would be graded 

to the quality necessary for visitor travel. During his first nine months at Twentynine Palms, he 

used the monument's tiny budget to grade a rough system of roads. In May 1941, Chief of 

Planning Thomas Vint inspected the network the young superintendent had selected and 

incorporated it into the monument's 1941 master plan. The plan certified all of the 117.6 miles of 

roads Cole had graded as part of the official “National Park Road System.” The network 

included the three northern entrance roads plus a spur into Indian Cove, the existing roads from 

Twentynine Palms and Old Dale which met on the edge of the Pinto Basin and continued 

through Cottonwood Spring to Highway 60, and spur roads to Keys View, Pleasant Valley, Split 

Rock, and Stubbe Spring (Map 5-4). The plan also included unimproved roads to Lost Horse 

Map 5-4. The road and campground systems for Joshua Tree National Monument as planned in 

the 1940s. Delta Cartography.

Mine and past Stubbe Spring to Covington Flat. Ultimately, the NPS did not improve the latter 

and turned the road to Pleasant Valley into the Geology Road Tour which is still unpaved. Most 

of Cole's design exists today as paved roads or jeep trails in the park. Later realignment of some 
156

Map 5-5. Options for a Twentynine Palms to Indio road over the "Blue Cut" in Joshua Tree 

National Monument. Source: E. E. Erhart. 1955. “Map to Accompany Reconnaissance Report of 

the Proposed Blue Cut Route in Joshua Tree National Monument. Bureau of Public Roads, JTNP 

Map Archives. 

road segments does not detract from his accomplishment. Vint’s master plan recommended that 

more than 200 miles of other "desert auto trails" be obliterated.56

James Cole and Thomas Vint quickly sorted out the primary road system, but the 

decision on a north to south road would take much longer and cause considerable controversy. 

Several rough wagon roads snaked through the Little San Bernardino Mountains to link

Twentynine Palms with the Coachella Valley. Routes included Berdoo Canyon, Thermal 

Canyon, Pushawalla Canyon, and a westernmost one called the Blue Cut (Map 5-5; Figure 5-7). 

The 1941 master plan showed only the low-elevation road through Cottonwood and Vint 

strongly opposed any other route. Cole had inspected the various mountain routes and decided

that if the NPS had to develop one, it should be through Blue Cut. Although somewhat longer, it 

contained the shortest stretch of extremely rugged terrain.57 Superintendent Goodwin explained 

the core issue:

Agitation is continual in Riverside County for a road connecting Palm Springs with 29 

Palms via Berdoo Canyon, Blue Cut or some other of the canyons tributary to the head of 

the Salton Basin. The advisability of this road is largely a question of Service policy. It 

would undoubtedly bring in a large increase in visitors by completing a loop from 
157

Whitewater to 29 Palms to Palm Springs, but a road of reasonably high standard would 

involve heavy construction costs in reaching the summit of the Little San Bernardino 

Range from the Salton Basin and it is a question as to whether or not it would not serve 

as well to improve the existing Indio Road bringing traffic in via Pinto Basin, although 

this distance would be considerately greater.58 

Figure 5-7. In the center of the picture is the northern entrance to the “Blue Cut” from Pleasant 

Valley. It was one of several routes proposed by Coachella Valley residents for a north-south 

route through the monument west of the one that passes by Cottonwood Springs. Photo by the 

author.

Unquestionably, the financial and political aspects of the situation figured prominently in 

this debate. Joshua Tree was deeply threatened by the mining lobby, potential private land 

developments, and a probable boundary change of unknown extent. It had a small staff 

considering its size and a miniscule budget. It desperately needed local support to survive all the 

threats. However, in 1941 it was unquestionably a second level unit of the system. First, it was 

desert and suffered from the stigma that the dominant American culture attached to such lands. 

Second, it was a monument, not a park. Third, the NPS had only begun establishing units based 

on representation of biological or historical resources a decade earlier. Most senior officials in
158

the agency began their careers when the criterion for a park was unparalleled magnificence. The 

cost of building a road through the Blue Cut was small compared to those entailed in engineering 

feats like the Going-to-the-Sun Road in Glacier National Park or Tioga Pass Road in Yosemite

National Park, units often described as the "crown jewels" of the country. But to agency leaders, 

Joshua Tree was no Glacier or Yosemite.59

NPS officials decided that the only north to south road should be the existing one through 

the Cottonwood Spring area regardless of the appeals of Coachella Valley residents and their 

politicians. However, they did not anticipate the lengths to which first Indio, then Riverside 

County, and finally the California legislature would go to demand a shorter and more scenic 

route. More than a decade passed between the 1941 master plan and the next shot in this war of

wills. During that time, Joshua Tree's boundary changed, but not enough to eliminate the road 

via Cottonwood Spring. This cemented the NPS's decision to make it the only north to south 

route. In 1952 the U. S. Marine Corps opened a base in Twentynine Palms that promised a surge 

in population north of the monument. Meanwhile, the more developed towns in the Coachella 

Valley built approach roads near the monument's boundary to encourage federal support for this 

route. In January 1954, the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the Coachella Valley 

Advisory Planning Committee passed resolutions requesting that the NPS survey the Blue Cut 

route for the road.60 Director Conrad Wirth bluntly responded:

It is believed that such a road would not benefit the operation or administration of the 

Monument in any respect and that its construction, and subsequent maintenance and 

administration, would impose an unwarranted burden of cost upon the general public. It 

is believed, too, that such a road would be detrimental to the unusual natural values of the 

area, would be unfair to the general public to whom these values are to bring pleasure, 

and at variance to a responsibility with which the Service is charged, namely, to regulate 

the development and use of the areas it administers in such manner and by such means as 

will preserve and protect the scenic and other values of the areas for the enjoyment of 

present and future generations.61

In using some of the language from the NPS's own 1916 organic act, Wirth signaled the 

hardened opposition of the agency to this much desired road. Six weeks later, the California 

Assembly passed a resolution requesting its construction. This moved the controversy to another 

level and the NPS soon realized that it faced yet another divisive issue. Allies, including 

conservationist Bertha Fuller, an old friend of Minerva Hoyt, and the Twentynine Palms 

Chamber of Commerce, opposed the Blue Cut Road and soon letters to Congressman Harry 

Sheppard and other legislators brought the fight to national attention. By June 1954, the NPS

ordered its highway engineer H. S. Shilko to survey the Blue Cut route and estimate the cost of 

building the road. He carefully analyzed two possible paths through the rugged canyon and 

estimated the costs of construction and maintenance. He then calculated the probable level of use 

and what entrance fee should be charged to visitors if the agency tried to amortize the 

construction cost. His figures reinforced the agency's decision. Shilko claimed that either route 

would push the cost of the road to more than $1,500,000. He suggested that perhaps 6,300 

vehicles, principally from Indio, would travel the road necessitating an entrance fee of $12.80 

per vehicle. He believed that no one would pay that much. Reduction of the entrance fee to a 

more reasonable $2.00 per vehicle would require 40,215 vehicles per year through the new 
159

entrance, a figure completely impossible to manage on such a slow and difficult road. Once

again the NPS refused to build the road.62

Coachella Valley boosters and their supporters remained unfazed. Through the summer 

of 1954, correspondence flew back and forth between members of the public who favored or 

opposed the Blue Cut route, federal officials, and legislators. Superintendent Samuel King asked 

the commander of the marine base to comment on the Blue Cut Road and received a welcome 

response that it would not be adequate for military use. However, Regional Director Lawrence 

Merriam criticized King for implying that the military could traverse the monument at all. On 

July 30, the NPS requested a survey of the route by the federal Bureau of Public Roads. In March 

1955, the bureau released its careful evaluation of the Blue Cut options, as well as the rest of the 

road system in the monument. The conclusion again was stark. Lead engineer E. E. Erhart 

calculated the cost of the cheapest route via the Blue Cut at $1,642,000 compared to a modest 

$100,000 to significantly improve the monument’s entire existing road system. With this 

nominally independent evaluation, the NPS justified its continued opposition to any route 

through the canyons of the Little San Bernardino Mountains.63

Coachella Valley denizens took this rebuff in stride as its commercial and political 

leaders passed more resolutions in support of a shorter route to Twentynine Palms. This time 

they focused on an old wagon road through Berdoo Canyon, hoping that perhaps this would not 

be as objectionable as the Blue Cut route. The NPS responded that this road was, if anything, 

worse than the Blue Cut because it suffered periodic flooding. Soon promoters raised Pushawalla 

Canyon again as a possibility. At the same time, most visitors and residents of San Bernardino 

County insisted that the agency pave the existing monument roads, especially the heavily used 

one from Twentynine Palms to Hidden Valley. In answer to an inquiry from Senator Thomas 

Kuchel, Director Wirth pointed out that the limited construction budget for Joshua Tree should 

be used for that more worthy purpose. After a pause, the Riverside County Board of Supervisors 

tried to revive the Blue Cut option in late 1957 by proposing that it be part of a route to connect 

its 260,000 people to Las Vegas. However, a separate initiative to develop a freeway through the 

Morongo Basin diverted attention away from the twenty-year campaign for a road through the 

Little San Bernardino Mountains. By 1958, environmentalists actively opposed any route that 

opened a new mountain pass in the monument. Soon Senator Kuchel wrote a well-publicized 

letter to the Indio City Council flatly refusing to back any additional roads in Joshua Tree. 

Influential editor Randall Henderson wrote editorials in his popular Desert Magazine

condemning any new mountain road. 64

In response, the road's proponents turned to California's other senator, William 

Knowland, and to local congressman Dalip Saund for support. The latter wrote to Director Wirth 

requesting a public hearing on the matter to be held in or near the monument. On June 17, 1958 

Assistant Director Eivind Scoyen held a hearing at Joshua Tree as requested. About sixty-five 

people attended primarily from Riverside County or conservation organizations. Among the 

former were several prominent members of the Western Mining Council who still sought to open 

the unit to unregulated mining. Scoyen pointedly announced that the hearing was to enable the 

public to present any "new" data on this old issue. Riverside County administrative official 

Robert T. Anderson first explained that by 1980 the population of the Coachella Valley would 

outnumber that of Twentynine Palms at least eight to one. He then made a pitch for the Berdoo 
160

Canyon route promising that the county would build a road up to the boundary to connect with 

the proposed monument road. He added that both the Berdoo Canyon and Pushawalla Canyon

routes dated from decades earlier, should be considered public roads, and that if the NPS had 

opened its first road to the monument from the south it would now be the main entrance rather 

than the one at Twentynine Palms. Members of the Sierra Club and the Desert Protective Council 

countered that the monument's resources were more important to the American people than the 

convenience of a few Coachella Valley towns. Scoyen added that the overwhelming 

preponderance of correspondence on the issue opposed any new roads in the monument. After 

the hearing, in which nobody's mind changed, Scoyen and several monument officials drove 

south of the monument and approached the boundary near Berdoo Canyon. They found limited,

but unmistakable, evidence of recent attempts to drive through the old passageway.65

Following the hearing, Indio, Palm Springs, and Riverside County passed new resolutions 

demanding further study and eventual construction of road through one of the canyons into the 

monument. As late as April 3, 1959, the Riverside Daily Press reported that a new study would 

soon take place. Riverside County developed the road into Berdoo Canyon past the border of the 

monument onto land formerly owned by the Coachella Valley Water District. The NPS protested 

this incursion and erected signs clarifying that this was federal government land. At the same 

time, the agency significantly upgraded the road via Cottonwood Springs and broadcast its plans 

to build a visitor center and new campground for that area. Once again the agency stonewalled 

and eventually outlasted its opponents. They owed much to officials in Twentynine Palms, who 

passed a resolution against the road that would terminate in their town, and to environmentalists 

who succeeded in portraying the Coachella Valley people as selfish elites who would destroy a 

wild section of the monument to shorten their drive by thirty miles.66

 

Joshua Tree planners elected to leave most of the roads and trails in the Pinto Basin 

unimproved. Only the road from Old Dale received occasional grading. Nevertheless, the NPS

struggled to resist an expansion of illegal roads there during World War II. General George 

Patton decided to train American tank forces in California's desert and he established one of the 

major bases, Camp Young, on land surrounding Joseph Chiriaco's roadside tourist center. The 

Desert Training Center officially opened on April 30, 1942. Later the army built a second camp 

just east of the Coxcomb Mountains. Political pressure to open the parks to military use began 

even before the United States entered the war. Congressman Estes Kefauver introduced a bill to 

turn over national parks and forests to the military, suspending the laws and policies of the land 

agencies. Conservation organizations tentatively supported legitimate use of the forests, but 

strongly opposed transfer of the national parklands. Although the parks escaped outright 

takeover by the military, local commanders requested permission to conduct training exercises in 

Pinto Basin. NPS regional officials took a political risk and refused. Nevertheless, it soon 

became apparent that tanks and other heavy vehicles used some of the monument's rough roads 

and occasionally conducted off-road maneuvers. Complaints to senior military officers met 

sympathetic words but little action to stop the incursions.

In February 1943, Regional Director Owen Tomlinson and several other agency officials 

inspected the area and found that the army had graded a road across part of the Pinto Basin. 

What had been a pair of tire ruts now appeared as a twelve-foot wide swath through the desert 

with deep tank tracks ground into it. Occasional departures from the road for maneuvers 
161

exacerbated the damage. Two problems occurred with this blatant intrusion. First, military traffic 

had eliminated or severely damaged the vegetation and compacted the soil to a degree that made 

plant regeneration uncertain. Second, the transformation of this rough track into a wide road 

invited further use by new military recruits and civilian miners. Over the next several months, 

the NPS repeatedly asked the army to repair the damage it had done. Superintendent Jacobs met 

Colonel R. H. Elliott who explained that he could not spare enough soldiers to rehabilitate the 

entire road, but would order them to obliterate evidence of it just inside the monument 

boundaries. Thereafter, military officers posted signs and even ran patrols near the monument 

boundary to stop their troops from entering the monument.67 

Staff and Visitor Facilities 

In November 1950, the NPS began construction of its new headquarters complex at the Oasis of 

Mara with walkways around the oasis. They completed the office building, which included a 

visitor contact desk and a small museum display, a little over three years later (Figure 5-8). On 

April 3, 1954, a large crowd gathered for the dedication during which Edmund Jaeger recalled 

the hard work of Minerva Hoyt, the immense effort underway to acquire private lands, and the 

woeful loss of one-third of the monument. He celebrated the original purpose of the unit, to 

protect its vegetation, and hoped that the lands taken away could be restored some day. A 

jubilant crowd of more than 500 applauded the botanist and the long-delayed achievement the 

NPS reached that day. Finally Joshua Tree National Monument had a permanent headquarters 

complex where its rangers, planners, and resource managers could direct the development of a 

stable and increasingly popular unit. Two years later, the agency added a small operations and 

maintenance building to help protect the monument's new management center.68

A lack of funding limited construction within the national monument itself. By the end of 

Joshua Tree’s second decade, the maintenance operation at Pinto Wye consisted of a surplus 

Quonset hut, another small building, and some storage tanks. Other elements of the 1941 master 

plan such as employee housing and a museum remained aspirations. The NPS had more success 

opening campgrounds. Once the boundary change and acquisition of a headquarters area seemed

certain, the agency opened seven campgrounds by the end of 1950 (Figure 5-9). Ryan 

Campground followed in 1954 anticipating the development of a long-distance equestrian trail. 

In choosing the campground areas, agency planners sought appropriate terrain, enough space to 

expand in the future, and visual seclusion from the road. Later, officials would expand and better 

organize most of them. The dense network of existing trails and auto-tracks simplified 

development of recreation trails, but planners also designed interpretive nature trails at Cap 

Rock, Indian Cove, and the Cholla Cactus Garden, as well as at the headquarters. By 1956, as 

agency officials explored routes for a California Riding and Hiking Trail, the nucleus of visitor 

infrastructure within the monument was in place for the anticipated boom in tourism.69

Natural Resource Evaluation and Management

Congress established Joshua Tree primarily to protect its vegetation and other natural resources. 

The monument's first superintendent, James Cole, was a trained naturalist, but the small, 

underfunded staff at Joshua Tree barely paid any attention to the vegetation and wildlife in the 

capacious unit. The heavy workload of defending against mining and acquiring private land

limited NPS resource management activity. In addition, George Wright, who formed the 
162

Figure 5-8.The recently completed monument headquarters at the Oasis of Mara at the time of its 

completion in November 1954. Today six other buildings, a mobile structure and a nursery 

surround it. Photographer unknown. JTNP archival files, accession no. 651, catalog no. 19430, 

D3423, folder 61. 

agency's biology program and personally funded much of its work, died in an automobile 

accident in 1936. His death led to a decline in the natural resource office and reinforced a lack of 

attention to the science of ecology by agency leaders just as academic research in it increased 

dramatically. During the monument's first twenty years, local officials carried out rudimentary 

inspections and censuses but four problems demanded greater attention: (1) the impact of the

boundary change which would affect all the flora and fauna, (2) the presence of a mistletoe 

infestation at the Oasis of Mara, (3) a human-caused burn at Fortynine Palms which showed that 

managing fire would be necessary in the desert, and (4) the fate of bighorn sheep as the unit's 

water resources dwindled. Regional officials and visiting scholars conducted the bulk of this 

research due to the small monument staff and the low priority given to Joshua Tree by some 

senior agency officials. 
163

Figure 5-9. Camping in Joshua Tree National Monument was haphazard before the Park Service 

paved the roads and organized a pattern of campground loops. Photographer unknown. JTNP 

photo archives, Cat. 20575, Image 2176. 

The flurry of inspections that followed the monument's establishment focused primarily 

on planning infrastructure and surveying the private land situation. The first to comment on the 

new monument's natural resources was Yosemite superintendent Charles G. Thomson who 

expressed surprise and admiration at the richness of vegetation in the western part of the 

monument. He strongly recommended that "university experts" in biology, geology and 

archaeology be invited to "learn the story" of the new unit. In April 1938, Lawrence Merriam 

and James Cole found evidence of illegal hunting, concluded that it had wiped out the deer in the 

area, and warned that it must be stopped to protect the few remaining bighorn sheep.

70 Regional 

Biologist Lowell Sumner was the first to undertake a specific natural resource inspection. He 

visited Joshua Tree during January 1940 to assess its wildlife as the threat of renewed mining 

intensified and a boundary change seemed inevitable. Sumner was the only voice to propose 

retention of Pinto Basin. He also favored extending the southern boundary to close off the 

canyon entrances and deter poaching. However, Sumner was a realist about the impact of his 

scientific advice:

As mentioned previously, the need of the bighorn for a spacious range would also be 

filled if the Pinto Basin were retained. We realize, however, that these considerations 

must be balanced against the fact that the area would not be very attractive recreationally 

and that steps might have to be taken to definitely discourage tourists from traveling 
164

through it in the summer. The Wildlife Section is not making specific recommendations 

regarding boundary changes because it is realized that many considerations other than 

wildlife are involved.71

The significance of the forthcoming boundary change drew other agency scientists to 

Joshua Tree during these critical prewar years. In late March 1941, Field Biologist Joseph S. 

Dixon visited the monument and considered the question of reintroducing antelope. He 

suggested that water would be the determining factor and that the agency would have to drill 

deep wells to sustain a population of the animals. He added that illegal hunting in the 

Cottonwood Spring area needed immediate attention from the monument staff.72 In October

1941, Lowell Sumner returned as part of the official team developing specific recommendations 

for the boundary change. He again suggested that the Pinto Basin should be retained and the 

southern boundary extended, but repeated that other considerations might outweigh those of the 

wildlife. This time he argued in a letter to Chief Biologist Victor Cahalane that scenic and 

recreation qualities should justify keeping the Pinto Basin:

In answer to your request for data on Pinto Basin and possible boundary change, fauna 

would be reduced if the eastern part is cut out including bighorn and antelope, which 

would be a gamble in any event. The vegetation is much more interesting than an initial 

survey would show. From the standpoint of wildlife alone, it might not justify keeping 

the eastern part, but [with] the prospect of five-acre homesteads littering the basin we 

recommend maintaining the area as part of the monument.73

The fact that the boundary change in 1950 did not eliminate the floor of Pinto Basin reflects 

Lowell Sumner's modest but persistent voice in favor of wildlife. 

Through the 1940s attention to the vegetation, wildlife, air quality, and fire preparedness 

languished. Most of the attention to vegetation, the raison d'etre of the monument, focused on

stopping the plunder and destruction of high profile plants. Cactus theft continued because so 

few rangers patrolled the 825,000-acre unit. Miners continued to illegally take juniper and pine 

for firewood or stabilization of mineshafts. The assault on Joshua trees decreased, but periodic 

requests for their use in boxes and as surgical splints during World War II demanded continued 

vigilance. Joshua Tree officials wanted much more research on the monument's namesake 

species, but had little time to do any themselves. Ranger Hesmel Earenfight, on his own 

initiative, began a simple long term study on a grove of Joshua trees near Hidden Valley. 

Earenfight was a trained engineer who had come to Twentynine Palms to escape asthma. He 

worked in Joshua Tree National Monument from 1942 until 1965. During those years, he 

measured the height of all the Joshua trees in the stand to chart growth through time. His study 

provided interesting data, but little of scientific value because he did not record precipitation, soil 

quality or other environmental conditions. His work is noteworthy because so little else was 

being done to understand the unit's flora.75

When the NPS accepted title to the Oasis of Mara, an unexpected problem came with the 

palm grove. The drier eastern part of the oasis upon which the agency built its new headquarters 

had an extensive growth of mesquite (Prosopis juliflora) as well as the palms. A species of 

parasitic mistletoe (Phoradendrum californicum) infested many of the mesquite trees and the 

dissemination of its seeds by Phainopepla nitens, a type of silky flycatcher, promised to impact 
165

the rest. All three species are native to the California deserts. The owners of the Twentynine 

Palms Inn and visitors to the oasis complained about the infestation and urged the monument 

officials to eradicate the mistletoe. Pathologist Willis Wagener, from the Department of 

Agriculture, studied the situation in September 1953 and reported that it could lead to the deaths 

of most of the older mesquite trees. He explained that the isolated location of the oasis with 

respect to other groves of mesquite resulted in a concentrated and heavy growth of mistletoe that 

destroyed branches and left disfigured trees. He showed surprising sensitivity to NPS policies, 

however, by warning that elimination of the native mistletoe would challenge the agency's core 

mission and lead to the virtual elimination of the silky flycatchers that subsist on mistletoe 

berries. Nevertheless, he recommended testing different chemical blends of herbicide to find one 

that could be applied during the short dormant season of the host mesquite and would kill the 

mistletoe. Over the next three years, the pathologist tried different varieties of herbicide with 

poor results. The mistletoe proved more resistant to the herbicide than the host mesquite trees. 

Pruning the dead branches was too expensive. NPS officials continued to search for another 

solution to stop the disfiguration of oasis vegetation.76

Fire management at Joshua Tree was initially considered unnecessary. In his 1936 

inspection, Charles G. Thomson dismissed fire as a concern reflecting the common perception 

that a desert has insufficient vegetation to burn. This complacency ended on July 4, 1942 when a 

man named Randolph burned debris on his inholding in Hidden Valley only to have it escape and 

char 165 acres. During the fire Peter Mahrt, a road foreman for the monument, climbed a tree to 

put out a burning branch, suffered smoke inhalation and died. This isolated tragedy added 

gravitas to the issue of potential fire in the monument. Seven years later, two teenagers managed 

to set fire to the grove at Fortynine Palms Oasis (Figure 5-10). Of the fifty-three large palms 

growing there, forty-four burned completely except for their trunks, six suffered partial burning,

and three remained unharmed. Monument officials soon realized that low levels of moisture in 

the air, soil, and vegetation, plus occasional lightning storms and human foibles, disproved 

Thomson’s optimistic evaluation.77

In 1941, Superintendent Cole began an annual wildlife census that continued under his 

successors. In most years, the lists included badgers, coyotes, mule deer, two species of fox, 

mountain lions, bighorn sheep, bobcats, quail, eagles, and jackrabbits. The reports included 

estimated numbers of each species, but these were highly conjectural because they were derived 

either from spot observations by rangers and visitors or the tracks and scat of larger mammals. In 

an early case of wildlife manipulation in Joshua Tree, the California Fish and Game Commission 

released exotic Chukar partridge at Lost Horse Well and Stubbe Spring in 1937. Most died out 

by 1944, but a few remain near Pinto Wye. The cessation of hunting over much of the monument 

led to fairly rapid increases in the populations of kit fox, Gambel's quail, and coyote, while mule 

deer numbers exploded from 1941 when none were actually seen to an improbable estimate of 

300 three years later. Thereafter, estimates of the deer population declined as census techniques

improved and bighorn sheep numbers increased.74 

When congress established Joshua Tree, the NPS had little understanding of the complex 

interrelationships that shape a biological community. Instead, it sought to protect and, if 

necessary, reintroduce glamorous mammal species including desert bighorn sheep and pronghorn 

antelope (Antilocapra americana). The latter once occupied much of California's desert country,
166

Figure 5-10. Two teenagers started a fire that damaged nearly all the mature fan palms in

Fortynine Palms Canyon in 1949. Forty-four of the palms lost all their foliage in the fire. 

Photographer unknown. JTNP photo archives, Cat. 20575, Image 702. 

but widespread hunting eliminated then from the monument area decades earlier. Biologists like 

Edmund Jaeger and early NPS inspectors thought they should be reintroduced to the newly 

preserved land. During his January 1940 inspection, Lowell Sumner studied the issue and 

concluded that too many of the water rights lay outside NPS control for the antelope to survive. 

A decade later Sumner returned after Superintendent Givens suggested that the agency had 

obtained enough water sources. The visit did not change Sumner's mind or recommendation. 

These conclusions by no means stopped the periodic calls for bringing back pronghorn antelope, 

but they quelled any competition for resource management funding.78 

The fate of the bighorn sheep was the only natural resource issue to receive serious 

attention during this time (Figure 5-11). Not only was it a significant factor in the boundary 

revision, but it also shaped land acquisition, grazing policy, and interpretive planning for visitors. 

Despite these conditions, research on managing the species arose only after the agency 

encountered problems at Lake Mead National Recreation Area and Death Valley National 

Monument. Unlike most national parks and monuments, Lake Mead allowed hunting. Bighorn 

sheep avoid people, but the huge reservoir allowed hunters in boats to approach sheep areas that 

they would not normally access. The NPS did not have full jurisdiction and found the fish and 

game departments of Arizona and Nevada unwilling to change their policies of allowing sixty 

sheep to be taken from the area annually. The Lake Mead staff briefly pondered artificially 
167

Figure 5-11. Desert bighorn sheep near Barker Dam. Photo by Michael Vamstad. JTNP Natural 

Resource Division files. 

enhancing springs to draw the bighorn sheep away from the reservoir itself, but postponed the 

idea until research on the species could show that the animals would use them.79

At Death Valley, the problem stemmed from competition for forage and water by feral 

burros left over from the heyday of mining. The non-native burros reproduced at a vigorous rate 

and displaced native bighorns at a number of water holes. In May 1954, Lowell Sumner warned 

that the burros could eventually eliminate bighorn sheep in the monument. One obvious solution 

would be direct culling of the burro herds by shooting. However, the public associated burros 

with the history of mining and desert settlement. Like horses they represented a link with the 

romantic past as well as potential pets. Sumner suggested a major research program that would 

test the feasibility of letting hunters capture "wild burros alive for subsequent disposal as circus 

animals, mountain pack animals, etc." At the end of his report, he suggested that Joshua Tree 

also should have a major bighorn sheep study even though no burros were present because of 

drought conditions that threatened water availability for the smaller monument's herd.80 

On June 17, 1954, Dr. Helmut K. Buechner of the State College of Washington (now 

Washington State University) contacted the NPS requesting information about bighorn sheep in 

the parks and monuments. Assistant Regional Director Herbert Maier responded with 

information about the problems at Death Valley and Joshua Tree focusing on the suspected 
168

reasons for their decline in both monuments. After summarizing Death Valley's feral burro 

problem, he noted unexplained deaths among the bighorns in Joshua Tree and Superintendent 

Samuel King's speculation that a species of lung worm might be infecting them. Maier concluded 

with a comment that "the availability of funds and manpower necessarily will determine the rate 

of progress in the required investigations."81 This proved fortuitous because Dr. Buechner was 

engaged in a study of bighorn sheep problems across the United States under the auspices of the 

Conservation Foundation of the New York Zoological Society. He offered to help with the 

studies and to pay for certain expenses including five hours of flying time to advance the bighorn 

censuses at both Joshua Tree and Death Valley.82

As it turned out, the bigger monument took the bulk of the money, but Joshua Tree 

received enough to fund a five day survey of its bighorns by Sumner in September 1955. He

surveyed eleven springs used by bighorn sheep and determined that only Stubbe Spring and 

Fortynine Palms Oasis proved reliable throughout the year. Four other springs provided water 

except during summer. He conservatively estimated only fifty-five bighorn lived in the

monument after the loss of the mountains surrounding Pinto Basin in the 1950 boundary change. 

Sumner then discussed the mule deer which traveled singly or in smaller groups. He speculated 

about competition between the two species, but concluded that the NPS needed to protect both 

since they were both native. He recommended that the agency rehabilitate several of the springs 

to conserve water, minimize public use at important sites like Stubbe Spring and Cottonwood 

Spring, and carry out a intensive study of bighorn sheep during the dry season. Finally, he asked 

the agency to allocate $500.00 for more research during fiscal years 1956 and 1957. 

Surprisingly, the NPS provided half the money Sumner requested enabling the study of Joshua 

Tree bighorn sheep to continue.83

By 1957, the plight of bighorn sheep across the national park system had drawn more 

attention from the federal government as well as academics and resource managers from the 

western states. It became a high profile issue and led to multiple conferences and research 

studies. John D. Goodman of the University of Redlands brought students on field trips and 

conducted research in Joshua Tree over a span of three years. In March 1957, he reported that 

water was the determining factor in bighorn numbers and distribution, and that tourist activity at 

Stubbe Spring was sufficiently disturbing to justify closing the area to the public. However, he 

could find no evidence of a lungworm infestation. Superintendent Elmer Fladmark agreed with 

Goodman's analysis and forwarded a copy to Lowell Sumner.84

 

At the same time the drought in Joshua Tree threatened many species in addition to the 

bighorn sheep. Naturalist Donald Black recommended removing a large willow tree near Stubbe 

Spring to save water, but Regional Chief Naturalist Dorr G.Yeager overruled him citing the tree's 

importance for smaller wildlife. Lowell Sumner then argued that Black's recommendation was 

based on data from California Fish and Game that showed removal of one willow tree could 

double or triple a spring's flow. He suggested that piping additional water to the spring might 

help, but if it did not, "we may have to weigh one willow against 20 bighorn." Ultimately rangers

removed the tree, but it not stop the decline in the spring's flow.85

As the first two decades of Joshua Tree passed, the natural resources of the monument 

still received limited attention except for its signature animal species. Bighorn sheep had 

achieved star status, but that did not solve the problems that threatened their survival in the 
169

monument. The relative lack of aggressive natural resource management at Joshua Tree National 

Monument was not an isolated case. University based scientists continued to advance ecology 

and wildlife management while the NPS focused on other matters. Chief of Interpretation Ronald 

F. Lee highlighted the problem as Director Conrad Wirth inaugurated his massive Mission 66 

development program: 

The biological resources in the national parks and monuments require a greater measure 

of attention than our present staff and facilities allow. These resources are subject to 

adverse forces resulting from increased visitation, construction of new area facilities, and 

the continuing pressure of intensive land-use on adjacent areas. The special role of the 

national parks and monuments, particularly the natural areas, to provide the public with 

opportunities to see, enjoy, and learn about wild animals in their natural environments 

presents a challenge we have only begun to meet.86 

After two decades, natural resources at Joshua Tree National Monument remained poorly 

understood and negligently managed. Soon problems would arise that threatened the viability of 

the unit as a biotic preserve.

Cultural Resources

Cultural resources initially received little attention throughout the park system in spite of the 

Antiquities Act. However, two laws passed just before President Roosevelt proclaimed Joshua 

Tree National Monument improved the preservation of archaeological and historical resources. 

The first law enabled a 1933 reorganization of the executive branch of the federal government. 

That reorganization brought archaeological national monuments from the U. S. Forest Service 

and battlefields, memorial and historic forts from the War Department into the park system. 

These joined specific historical units established at the urging of second director Horace 

Albright. The first two from that group were George Washington Birthplace National Monument 

and Colonial National Monument (now a national historical park) established in 1930. The 

second law was the Historic Sites Act of 1935. It ordered the secretary of the interior, through 

the NPS, to carry out a survey of the country to record and, if feasible, preserve historic 

buildings, sites, and objects. The law also ordered the agency to cooperate with state, local, and 

private organizations in this effort. Finally, the act established an Advisory Board on National 

Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments. This panel assumed a major role not only in 

deciding the fate of historic resources, but also in reviewing new sites proposed for addition to 

the park system.87

Despite these laws, archaeological and historical features at Joshua Tree received 

minimal attention during the hectic two decades after the unit’s proclamation. The early 

inspections described some of these resources, but did not engender substantial research or 

preservation. Archaeologists had brought attention to the monument area in publications such as

a 1929 monograph by Julian Steward on petroglyphs that described those near Keys Ranch and a 

major article on the Pinto Basin culture published by the Campbells in 1935.88 The first mention 

of archaeological resources at Joshua Tree by the NPS came in a report of an April 1938 

inspection by Superintendent Merriam and James Cole. The latter wrote:
170

E.W.C. Campbell and W.H. Campbell have done much work in the area and many 

artifacts they collected are in the Southwest Museum in LA. Evidence of human 

habitations dated as 15,000 to 20,000 years old have been found in the Pinto Basin by the 

Campbells.89

Oddly, during his inspection a year later, C. Marshall Finnan reported that the Campbells told 

him that there was nothing of value in the monument and it should never have been proclaimed. 

Perhaps they still smarted from Minerva Hoyt’s sabotage of their efforts to create a state park in 

the area.90

In 1941, Joseph Dixon stumbled onto a rock shelter one-quarter of a mile from 

Cottonwood Spring while assessing the wildlife of the young monument. He found numerous 

artifacts and pieces of broken pottery. He subsequently reported, “It is hoped that this material, 

which merits study by the anthropologists at the University of California, may shed important 

light on the culture of the Indian tribes which formerly inhabited this region.” This led 

Superintendent Cole to request a full archaeological survey of the monument for both 

interpretation and development planning. Unfortunately his request yielded nothing for another 

decade.91

Research and planning for cultural resources did receive some meager attention after the 

boundary change assured survival of the monument. Louis R. Laywood conducted a very brief 

survey of the Pinto Basin on his way to a more extensive survey of Death Valley National 

Monument. He found numerous projectile points which he gave to Superintendent Givens for the 

unit’s museum collection. He insisted that a major survey of the basin should be undertaken 

immediately and suggested that artifact-rich caves with possible human remains could exist. 

Unfortunately, his suggestion garnered no further action by the NPS although university scholars 

and private collectors took notice. Two years later, Superintendent Samuel King had to warn the 

wife of a worker at Kaiser’s iron mine that her husband would not be allowed to remove relics on 

the surface even if he promised to turn them over to the agency.92

Another problem that surfaced quickly and grew to be a major source of controversy was 

the way in which the monument staff stored what artifacts it did have. The administration 

building at the Oasis of Mara had no room for additional employees let alone storage and display 

of cultural relics. The answer, always meant to be temporary, was to place the materials as well 

as library and archives in one of the garage bays in the adjacent maintenance facility (Figure 5-

9). Most items wound up in cardboard boxes with no climate control. As the collection grew, it 

spread to a second bay in the garage. In 1949, Regional Museum Curator Walter Rivers 

submitted a lengthy plan for a proper museum structure that would benefit interpretation and 

properly store fragile materials. At the time, NPS officials coveted the collection of materials 

donated by the Campbells to the Southwest Museum in Los Angeles. A brief inquiry about 

transferring it to Joshua Tree brought an immediate and resounding no from the urban museum. 

In 1957, as the agency pondered construction of the visitor center, Superintendent Elmer 

Fladmark submitted a wildly optimistic museum prospectus that raised the necessary square 

footage from 1,000 to 6,000.93

Compliance with historic preservation policy was straightforward during this period. The 

monument had little to protect. Former owners could still remove most of their mining 
171

equipment if their claims were nullified. The Ryan and Keys families still owned their 

homesteads. The only structure at the Oasis of Mara, a ramshackle adobe home, was torn down 

in 1947, three years before the property passed to the NPS. Unfortunately many of the larger 

mine structures deteriorated due to disuse and harsh climatic conditions. In any event, what funds 

were available for historic preservation went either to major parks like Yosemite or to Death 

Valley which had historic mining as one of its primary purposes. Cultural resource protection at

Joshua Tree remained a secondary program pursued only enough to allow minimal interpretation 

for visitors. It would take another set of federal laws and the country’s bicentennial to move it 

into the spotlight.94 

Visitors and Interpretation

During the monument's first full year of operation in 1941, 23,964 persons entered Joshua Tree. 

The majority came from adjacent communities. The following year a similar number visited in 

spite of World War II. For the next three years, however, wartime shortages drastically reduced 

tourism. After the war, visitation slowly increased, reaching 93,615 by 1950. Thereafter, road 

improvements, installation of campgrounds, and construction of the Oasis of Mara headquarters 

office increased tourism until in 1956 monument officials recorded 312,889 visitors, a 

respectable number for a desert unit. Yet all was not well at the monument. Twentynine Palms 

had expected the NPS to develop the unit much more quickly. Business leaders chafed at the 

tourism revenues they claimed were lost due to the agency's dawdling development program. At 

the same time the small Joshua Tree staff faced problems with illegal entry, vandalism, woodcutting, and even arson committed by neighbors and some visitors. James Cole and his 

successors hoped that through education they could convince visitors to follow the regulations 

and appreciate the resources contained in the young monument.95

Interpretation is the name given by the NPS for providing visitor information and 

education. Interpretive rangers are the personnel most often met by visitors. Any function or 

object that provides information including signs, guided walks, campfire programs, public 

relations, community outreach, and education programs for schools are their responsibility. For 

many years at Joshua Tree, the interpretation division also conducted research and managed 

natural and cultural resources. Development of visitor programs at Joshua Tree languished 

through most of the monument's first two decades. Shortly after James Cole became the 

monument's first employee he asked Director Drury for a camera with which he could take slides 

of the vegetation. Acting National Park Service Chief Naturalist R. E. Rothrock responded that 

the NPS only had two cameras with close-up lenses, one for reproducing slides at headquarters 

and another on loan in the Virgin Islands. In 1947, Superintendent Givens reported that the 

monument had no interpretation program other than talks to occasional groups of visitors. He 

added: 

What the visitor does not now see or understand is more important than what he does see, 

i.e., the scientific aspects would be of greater interest to many visitors, if properly 

presented, than the scenic attractions. The flora, fauna and geology of the desert are far 

less known than in other types of areas.96
172

Givens outlined personnel and development needs to properly carry out the educational mission 

including two ranger-naturalists, a program of campfire presentations, a museum and laboratory 

in Twentynine Palms, a smaller museum at Pinto Wye, and roadside exhibits at key scenic areas. 

In 1951, tentative efforts to provide information began with the installation of 

viewfinders and signs at Keys View and development of an outline for a natural history guide. 

Three years later, Joshua Tree opened its headquarters office at the Oasis of Mara and signed an 

agreement with the Southwest National Monuments Association to sell books and other 

monument-related goods. Visitor contacts significantly increased, but not to the extent 

monument officials had hoped. Many visitors still entered the unit by way of its west entrance 

and either departed the same way or through the Cottonwood Springs area. Elsewhere in the 

monument, officials erected signs and issued brochures that gave information about specific 

trails and features while encouraging visitors to refrain from vandalism and inadvertent 

destruction. Yet these tangible objects themselves suffered from mischief and theft. Vandals 

destroyed glass covered exhibit signs at the Oasis of Mara Nature Trail, forcing the monument to 

issue printed brochures. Rangers addressed large groups of boy scouts, marines, and recreation 

clubs, but did not have a regular schedule of nature walks and campfire talks for the average 

visitor. Finally, as the monument celebrated its twentieth anniversary, Ranger Bruce Black 

prepared the first formal interpretation program. It signaled that the unit finally had matured 

enough to carry out one of the NPS’s primary functions.97 

Joshua Tree National Monument improbably survived its first twenty years of existence. 

It had staved off threats from mining interests, established a successful land acquisition program,

and developed a headquarters complex, campgrounds, and a road network. Yet it remained 

understaffed, underfunded, and often ignored by the upper echelons of the NPS. Visitation 

steadily increased, but found little guidance in understanding the science and history of the unit. 

Natural resource management was haphazard and focused on a single species of wildlife. 

Programs for the study and preservation of cultural resources did not exist. Visitors, neighbors 

and residents alike, gave up their perceptions and traditional uses grudgingly. Survival of the 

monument owed a great deal to its first superintendent, James Cole. In the midst of vicious 

personal attacks, he made the decisions that established the patterns of development for the 

future and shaped the boundary change that defeated the miners. He reached his lowest ebb when 

his superiors demanded explanations in response to the letters from Bill Keys. But, in the midst 

of it, Chief of Planning Thomas Vint wrote to the director:

"Superintendent Cole is doing a fine job. He knows the area, gets out and around it, 

explains the desert flora and fauna with ease and simplicity. He can roll a rock out of the 

road in the desert sun and peck at a typewriter by lamplight. He has what the National 

Park Service grew up on.98

The first twenty-years of Joshua Tree National Monument brought almost continuous tension 

and considerable frustration. The very survival of the unit was an achievement. Regional and 

monument officials desperately hoped to build on that and enjoy greater success in the future. 

 
173

Chapter Six: Joshua Tree Matures 1957-1976

The third and fourth decades of Joshua Tree's existence saw the monument gain popularity and a 

more secure status while completing most of the development necessary for visitor enjoyment 

and safety. At the same time, a revolution in environmental legislation rewrote the rules for 

planning and managing the park system. Joshua Tree National Monument began the period with 

the system-wide Mission 66 program which provided funding at a level that James Cole could 

only have imagined. It ended with the designation of the majority of the monument's land as 

legal wilderness. During that time, the National Park Service (NPS) continued land acquisition, 

finalized the geographical framework of infrastructure, benefitted from increased external 

research on its natural and cultural resources, and coped with a 133 percent rise in annual visitor 

numbers to 728,900. Threats to the monument's land, water, flora, and fauna continued, and an 

increasingly powerful conservation movement provided both support and criticism in the 

struggle to combat them. 

This period also saw a major shift in American culture as environmentalism spread 

among the broader public and led to legislation that transformed resource management 

throughout the country. During the 1950s, scientists and environmental organizations pressed the 

government to take more responsibility for protecting the air, water, and land resources of the 

country. During the decade from 1964 through 1973, congress enacted four major laws that 

reshaped the way the NPS and every other federal land agency operate. Passage of the 

Wilderness Act in 1964, the Clean Air Act in 1967, the National Environmental Policy Act in 

1969, and the Endangered Species Act in 1973 dramatically redesigned natural resource 

management while narrowing the options the NPS could select in its planning and 

administration. Though modified by succeeding congresses and tested in court many times, these 

laws strongly reinforce the NPS’s 1916 organic act. 

The Wilderness Act allows congress to give strict protection to tracts of federal land by 

forbidding motorized and mechanical vehicles and tools, construction of buildings or other 

structures, and any large-scale environmental alteration. The bill itself states that a wilderness 

area is:

an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, 

without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed 

so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been 

affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially 

unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined 

type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size to 

make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also 

contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or 

historical value.1

The wilderness concept stemmed from a U.S. Forest Service (USFS) classification of "primitive 

areas" that resulted in part from a response to the establishment of the NPS and its noisy 

promotion by Stephen Mather as the only agency qualified to protect natural values. USFS

veterans Aldo Leopold and Bob Marshall plus Wilderness Society director Howard Zahniser 

developed the idea and the latter wrote the final bill. When it passed, it immediately created fifty-
174

four wilderness areas on 9,100,000 acres of national forest land. During the late 1950s, the NPS

opposed the idea because it removed planning options for the agency on any land designated as 

legal wilderness. However, after its passage the agency had no choice but to evaluate its lands for 

designation. In 2014, the national park system accounts for 44 million of the nearly 110 million 

acres of wilderness in the United States. The 1964 act also created wilderness study areas which 

are managed like wilderness until their suitability for the wilderness system is determined.2

Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1963 and has amended it repeatedly. The purpose 

of the act is to protect and enhance the nation's air quality. Among its provisions the act 

established a classification system of air quality standards for different land use areas in the 

country. Units of the national park system are designated Class I which means they should have 

the highest level of air purity. This has proven to be a problem for Joshua Tree, located as it is 

downwind of Los Angeles, but the law demands continued monitoring and a search for a solution

to chronic pollution levels higher than appropriate for a national park.3

On the last day of 1969, congress passed the law that most impacted the way the NPS 

operates. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) established the Environmental 

Protection Agency but also set policy and planning procedures that powerfully challenged 

traditional land management. First, it ordered all federal agencies to carry out their duties with 

the minimum possible impact on the environment. Second, it forced the agencies to use 

interdisciplinary planning, list and evaluate the expected impacts of each action, and compare it 

to a "no change" option. Finally, all planning and environmental impact analysis had to involve 

the public. No longer could park or forest managers contact a few "experts" of their own 

choosing and design master plans or management decisions behind closed doors. These rules 

enabled environmentalists and others to participate in all phases of resource management and to 

sue the government to stop plans if they deemed the planning or environmental review processes 

inadequate. The early master plans for Joshua Tree National Monument were artifacts of the 

past. NEPA allowed anyone to participate and potentially challenge monument planning and 

administration.4 

The fourth of these transformative acts was the Endangered Species Act. It requires 

federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not harm endangered and threatened species of 

plants and animals or result in loss of their habitat. The law tremendously increased the duties of 

the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service by ordering it to maintain lists of species in danger of

extinction or threatened with falling into that category. Significantly, the law can affect the 

activities of private individuals as well as federal employees. Once a species is listed as 

endangered, land managers must take extraordinary steps to protect it and its habitat. Joshua Tree 

has both faunal and floral endangered or threatened species that dramatically influence all land 

use decisions. Every aspect of management at Joshua Tree changed as these four laws and others 

stemming from enhanced American environmentalism took effect.5 

The Land Acquisition Program Improves

In May 1957, the NPS reported that the state and private owners still held nearly 80,000 of the 

557,934 acres in the monument despite the hard-won successes with railroad and state exchanges 

and condemnation of tax deeded land. These non-federal lands remained a threat to the 

monument's future because of their wide range and scattered distribution. Particularly troubling 
175

were the parcels that remained in the western half of the monument and along the main road. Yet 

monument officials had reason to be optimistic. Congress and NPS leaders seemed to recognize 

the problem and allocated some annual funds for purchases and exchanges. After the agency

completed the last tripartite land exchange with Carl Allen, the Southern Pacific Railroad 

Company (SPRR) announced that it might be willing to negotiate some more exchanges. The 

California State Lands Commission (CSLC) also looked for more direct exchanges for some of 

the 24,000 acres it still held in the monument.6 

Over the next twenty years, the NPS reduced the non-federal land in Joshua Tree by 

seventy-five percent to less than 20,000 acres (Plate 3). By the end of this period, the prospect of 

wilderness designation for much of the monument's acreage lent urgency to the process. The 

agency used every means at its disposal to acquire properties including condemnation. Director 

Conrad Wirth's Mission 66 program brought some funds for land acquisition during its early 

years. In 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower supported a proposal to allocate $1,500,000 for 

acquiring all the remaining private property in Joshua Tree National Monument, but congress 

refused to provide the funds.7

Passage of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (LWCFA) in 1964 proved more 

useful. It provided much needed funding for land acquisition in the park system. A vigorous 

environmental movement began changing the nation's land policies during the activist era of the 

1960s. Groups such as the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and myriad grass-roots 

organizations rejected the consumptive use prescriptions of the USFS and the Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM), as well as the Mission 66 drive to build more structures in the national 

parks. Environmentalists accused the government of misusing the last dwindling resources and 

wild regions of the country. In addition, studies by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review 

Commission documented a woeful lack of recreation opportunities for most Americans. The

LWCFA created a fund to purchase land for recreation purposes. The money is drawn from 

admission charges to federal recreation areas, sales of surplus properties, and taxes on motorboat 

fuel. Congress directed that some of the money go to the national park system, some to other 

federal agencies, and some to match state expenditures for their systems. Although later 

administrations diverted much of the money to other purposes, the immediate effect on the 

national park system was a surge in land acquisition.8

 

During the period 1957 to 1976, the NPS continued land exchanges and used money from 

these programs to acquire many of the remaining properties in a systematic fashion. It began 

auspiciously in 1957 when the CSLC exchanged 12,381 acres in the monument for parcels of 

federal land all over the state. Another round of exchanges with the state commission between 

1961 and 1963 brought another 1,888 acres under federal control. At the same time the SPRR

again offered to exchange its property in the monument for land of equal value near Barstow. 

Unfortunately for the Park Service, the deal for 13,000 monument acres failed due to problems 

with the land that the railroad wanted. In 1961, another opportunity to gain SPRR land appeared 

when the Kaiser Corporation offered to buy all the remaining railroad property and exchange it 

for three townships adjacent to its Eagle Mountain Mine. Company mining engineers suspected 

that the iron-bearing seams extended into the monument and, in any case, they would welcome 

the use of the water from that area in the existing mine. The problem was that Kaiser needed feesimple title to the land which would require an act of congress to change the monument's 
176

boundary. NPS officials carefully considered the offer before finally declining on the basis that 

the monument had already lost enough land in 1950.9

In 1958, two important bilateral exchanges highlighted efforts by the NPS to control 

areas that had been sold by the railroad and were now threatened by development. First, the 

agency bought 451 acres plus a home in Hidden Valley from longtime foe Charles Stokes. Today 

a ranger station sits on that property. A few months later, monument officials worked out 

exchanges with Stanley Broxmeyer for important parcels in Lower Covington Flat near the 

entrance road from Joshua Tree village. He traded 3,207 acres in the monument for 160 acres 

near Palm Springs. The latter were appraised at more than $1,000 per acre.10

The Broxmeyer exchange was significant because it addressed a growing fear among 

monument officials about residential development within the boundaries, especially along the 

rapidly suburbanizing northwestern edge of the unit. One troubling threat to that part of the 

monument came from George Willett who applied to the San Bernardino Board of Supervisors to 

subdivide his inholding near the road from Joshua Tree village. To his dismay, the supervisors 

rejected his plan claiming that the area's location prevented it from conforming to county 

standards for a subdivision. He vowed to sell all the Joshua trees on his land if he could not 

develop his property. On May 16, 1960, he gathered media and local officials to witness the 

cutting of a large Joshua tree on his property. Visitors stopped to see what would happen and 

some argued with Willett as he explained his reasons for the cutting. Superintendent William 

Supernaugh soon arrived and convinced him to delay cutting the tree until they could meet that 

evening. Willett wanted to trade his 1,080 acres in the monument for 19,000 acres in the 

Chuckwalla Valley, but he ultimately settled for fewer but more valuable acres along the 

southern California coast. Another proposed subdivision by Desert Cove Properties near the 

western entrance road drew more than 600 letters of protest before the county supervisors 

rejected it on similar technicalities. These threats led San Bernardino County's supervisors to 

pass a resolution requesting the federal government to take immediate steps to eliminate 

inholdings. The resolution stated that the board expected other development proposals and that 

"local subdivision and zoning ordinances cannot legally be so restrictive that they prevent the use 

of private land."11

After the failure of the Kaiser-SPRR-NPS deal and the flurry of exchanges with the 

CSLC, action with the big landholders subsided. For the remainder of the 1960s, NPS officials 

carried out a steady stream of purchases, exchanges, and takings from small landholders. A new 

source of support began in 1962 with the establishment of the Joshua Tree Natural History 

Association. The cooperating association immediately set up a fund for donations to help with 

land acquisition. At the same time, the Desert Protective Council took a more aggressive 

approach, demanding that the NPS do more to defend against threats of development within the 

monument. Between September 1963 and August 1969, the agency acquired dozens of parcels 

totaling nearly 7,500 acres from twenty-nine different parties.12

One significant purchase in 1966 was the property of Bill Keys which would become the 

premier site for interpreting the region's history. As his health began to fail, Keys knew he would 

have to sell his property for money to survive. He offered it to the NPS for $25,000 with the 

stipulation that he could remain there for the rest of his life and be buried there beside his wife. 

Once again, funding problems meant the agency did not have the money to act. Former racecar 
177

driver, sometime actor, and businessman Henry E. Tubman from Los Angles bought all 879 

acres in October 1964, with the exception of the family cemetery, and agreed to let Keys stay. 

Tubman planned to either exchange the property for federal land outside the monument or 

develop a dude ranch on it. He lined up financial backers for the dude ranch, but negotiating with 

the NPS, BLM, and Government Services Administration was so slow and complicated that they 

finally backed out. After an appraisal showed Tubman's land in Joshua Tree was worth 

$345,000, he exchanged it for surplus military land at the former Camp Elliott near San Diego on 

June 28, 1966. Bill Keys lived on the property exactly three more years before dying on June 28, 

1969. 13

In the late 1960s, Joshua Tree officials began to study the possibility of asking congress 

to designate a large portion of the monument as wilderness. This meant that any development 

and any mechanized access or use would be prohibited by law. The Wilderness Act allowed for 

some exceptions in cases of private lands within designated wilderness. This reality galvanized 

NPS officials to try to acquire private holdings in the areas they wanted established as

wilderness. After years of delay stretching back to 1953, agency officials rushed through a 

purchase of 7,411 acres from Joseph Wachowski in September 1969 and an exchange with the 

Coachella Valley Irrigation District for another 3,596 acres in January 1970.14 NPS planners 

released their wilderness proposal for Joshua Tree in 1971 and held a hearing as required by 

NEPA. Inadvertently, everyone forgot to invite SPRR representatives to comment. Eventually,

the railroad's executives noticed the ongoing wilderness planning, the fact that their company 

still owned considerable land in those areas, and the apparent snub at the hearing. In response to 

a draft environmental statement issued by the monument, SPRR land manager W. F. Herbert 

wrote to Joshua Tree Superintendent Peter Parry on June 28, 1973:

The Southern Pacific Land Company has been negotiating for the sale or exchange of its 

remaining property within the monument since April 1957...I am disturbed to find that we 

were not included in the list of interested parties consulted or coordinated with prior to 

the announcement of a public hearing on December 10, 1971. I believe it is also 

necessary that a comment be made somewhere in your Environmental Statement to the 

effect that no further Environmental Statements, Impact Reports or other such studies are 

necessary before granting reasonable road access across federal lands to owners of 

private land inside the monument.15

During the time between the wilderness hearing and Herbert's letter, NPS officials had 

purchased nearly seventy more small tracts of land, but this got their immediate attention. 

Comfortable with the railroad's apparent willingness to withhold sales to private parties, they had 

largely ignored the biggest private landholder. Disgruntled SPRR land officials sold 544 acres of 

land within the monument's southwestern boundary to a company called the Oasis Valley 

Corporation. Superintendent Parry hastily apologized for the oversight and explained that the 

announcement had gone to the Federal Register and most regional newspapers. He asked if the 

company had any more plans to sell its acreage in the monument. Serious negotiations started 

immediately, and, on November 14 and 15, 1974, the agency bought 12,458 acres from the 

SPRR. Three months later a final purchase brought another 505 acres from the company.16

As planning and legislation for wilderness at Joshua Tree proceeded, NPS land officers 

concluded ever costlier purchases. Agency records show that between September 1970 and 
178

passage of the Joshua Tree wilderness bill in late October 1976, the agency bought more than 

450 tracts of land, not including the railroad purchases. During 1975 alone, the NPS worked out 

a four-way exchange with Riverside County, the Nature Conservancy, and private owners that 

allowed it to acquire one-third of that county’s private acreage in the monument in seventy-five 

tracts for $787,677. Unfortunately, NPS leaders suspended further acquisitions that year leaving 

twenty more tracts offered by owners in limbo. The high price of an April 1976 purchase of 

Jellystone Park, a commercial recreation facility on the northwestern corner of the monument, 

depleted the land acquisition budget. Over the previous decade, the once popular 80-acre park 

suffered a decline in attendance and its three corporate owners, Jellystone Campground, Ltd., 

Yucca Valley Recreational Association, Inc. and Hi-Desert Memorial Hospital, Inc. searched for 

a way to recoup some of their investment. The NPS paid $457,500 for the land and structures in 

what is today known as Black Rock Canyon.17 

Joshua Tree planners suggested one further land opportunity which senior officials 

promptly rejected. The 1964 update of the monument’s Mission 66 plan included a proposal to 

change the unit’s southern boundary. The 1950 adjustment had brought the southwestern 

boundary to the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) aqueduct. However, the south central 

boundary, from Pushawalla Canyon through the Cottonwood Mountains, still lay well north of 

the aqueduct. Nearly half of the 96,000 acres necessary to reach the aqueduct in that area had 

been in the original monument, but were eliminated in 1950. Acting Regional Director Leo J. 

Diederich explained that all that land had been returned to the public domain because more than 

half of it was privately owned: 

It is acknowledged that extension of the southern boundary would be desirable. This has 

always been recognized. However, as will be seen from the Master Plan, more than half 

of the proposed addition consists of privately-owned and State-owned lands arranged in a 

huge checkerboard pattern. More than 10,000 acres of these lands are owned by the 

Southern Pacific Railroad Company, and we feel sure that the Company would object 

strenuously to having these lands included in the Monument again. Our relations with the 

Company are excellent at the present time and it would be most unwise to jeopardize 

these relations. The possibility of acquiring these lands, either by purchase or exchange, 

seems remote. This situation led to the elimination of Monument lands in this area now 

proposed for addition to the Monument. 18 

The NPS would have to wait another thirty years before Joshua Tree gained this important 

addition.

Validating Mines and Coping with their Legacy

While the land acquisition program advanced, the BLM continued to evaluate unpatented mining 

claims in Joshua Tree in response to NPS requests. Early in 1963, the bureau declared a number 

of old claims, including twelve held by Bill Keys, null and void after their claimants lost appeals 

to the secretary of the interior. At the same time, the widow of Chester Pinkham relinquished 

another eleven lodes claims and millsites without contest. These actions, plus acquisition of the 

Mastodon Lode Mine and Winona Placer Claim at Cottonwood Springs, further diminished the 

threat of mining during the 1960s, especially in the western half of the monument. In 1971,

geologist Thomas Clements surveyed twenty-two sections of land in Joshua Tree for potential 
179

mineral value. The request for this survey did not originate from the mining lobby seeking to 

reopen the monument to new claims, but rather from real estate appraiser Albert L. Johnson who 

wanted information on any mineral deposits that might affect the price of the property and the 

validity of various claims. It is uncertain why he thought land in the monument might be 

saleable. Clements reported that all but one of the sections had no significant resources. The one 

exception on the northern flank of the Little San Bernardino Mountains had "titaniferous 

magnetite" in quantity, but Clements believed the difficulty of extracting the titanium rendered it 

uneconomical. In 1973 investigators conducted a validation study and found that miners were 

actively working only three claims in the entire monument.19

In 1976, congress dealt a serious blow to mining as an economic activity in the national 

parks system. For many years environmentalists challenged the Mining Act of 1872 and failed 

miserably. The laws that stemmed from the California gold rush, and still allow claims to be filed 

on most federal land, have proven immune to the onslaught of increased environmental concern 

and concomitant legislation across the country. Most national park units had always been offlimits to new claims, but those filed before congress created a park could continue. Mining 

existed in relatively few park units, mainly Death Valley, Joshua Tree, and Organ Pipe Cactus 

national monuments, Whiskeytown-Shasta National Recreation Area, and several Alaska parks, 

but the agency considered it inappropriate in reserves dedicated to preserving ecological systems 

and scenery. The NPS finally scored a victory with the Mining in the National Parks Act of 

1976. The law requires mine owners to file work plans that include how they will mitigate 

damage at the mines and avoid impacting other areas when transporting ore over park roads. The 

costs of developing and filing the plan, rehabilitating damaged landscapes, and careful transport 

through parks simply made many mines too expensive to work. In short order, the few working 

mines in Joshua Tree ceased production. The NPS opportunistically pursued the moribund mines 

to further its goal of fee simple ownership. By 1984, a brief survey found only twelve patented 

and nine unpatented mining claims in the monument, none of them active.20

Although mining was no longer a serious threat to the monument, its physical legacy still 

posed hazards for visitors. As early as 1949, Superintendent Frank Givens worried about the 

government's liability in cases of invalid mines: 

It appears that we might be liable if a visitor fell into the shaft located on a claim which 

had been invalidated. This is based on the assumption that an invalidated mining claim 

automatically becomes Monument land. However, it is believed that we cannot lay claim 

to structures on invalidated claims until the former claimants have been served notice to 

remove or demolish their improvements...In the Monument no assessment is required to 

hold a claim and we cannot correct a hazard that might exist even though the mine might 

be abandoned--or claimed to have been abandoned by a claimant who might become 

involved in a damage suit.21

Regional Director Owen Tomlinson responded that "the Service would owe a duty to the public 

if hazardous conditions were known to exist" on any unpatented claim. He ordered Givens to 

post warning signs, give claimants ninety days to remove their improvements, and cover any 

open shafts.22 
180

Although the orders were clear, the magnitude of the task delayed their implementation. 

During the mid-1960s, Joshua Tree personnel finally began identifying and listing hazardous 

mines. In 1968, ranger John Wise reported thirty open mines or cisterns in the Lost Horse 

District alone. Five years later, maintenance supervisor Roy O. Curbow requested funds to close 

just ten of the eighty most dangerous mineshafts near areas of heavy visitor use. He estimated 

that costs would range from $300 to $8,000 per mine. Regional Director Howard Chapman 

denied the request. Rangers then covered some open shafts with simple chain link fencing only 

to have visitors cut or pry them open to explore the old mines. As the United States became ever 

more litigious, the NPS sought more permanent barriers. Yet two considerations influenced the 

steps the agency could take. First, officials wanted to keep the grates or other structures over 

mine openings as visibly unobtrusive as possible. Second, the cost of such barriers remained well 

beyond the operating budgets of most parks and monuments. Finally, in May 1978, Regional 

Director Stanley Albright approved the expenditure of $101,000 to close just ten of the 

mineshafts at Joshua Tree.23 

Struggling with Diminishing Water

By the late 1950s, the supply of water in the monument showed a troubling pattern. Quail Spring 

went dry in 1957, to nobody's surprise given the amount of settlement nearby. Pine Spring also 

failed the same year. In 1961, Covington Well went dry for the second time. Finally, in 1968,

Stubbe Spring ran out of water. The latter was particularly worrisome because of its implications 

for the monument's wildlife. Across the monument further drops in ground water aquifers and 

increasingly common shortfalls at visitor facilities spelled trouble for the NPS. In 1966, the 

agency purchased the Ryan property in the Lost Horse Valley, including the rights to Lost Horse 

Well #1. Monument officials ranked this as their top acquisition priority. After the land purchase,

a regional office employee cleaned out and rehabilitated the well. Along with government-drilled 

wells nearby, it supplied a roadside facility known as the Ryan Water Station which served six 

campgrounds with 265 campsites plus other visitors and staff. Yet, even that source failed in 

1974 ostensibly due to a minor earthquake that shifted the fault and blocked water rising to the 

surface. A year later, monument officials temporarily closed the restrooms at Cottonwood due to 

insufficient water. Both closures aggravated visitors and made travel in the monument more 

difficult.24 

At the same time, the NPS sought to control or terminate water removals by Joseph 

Chiriaco and Kaiser's Eagle Mountain Mine. On June 19, 1957, Chiriaco renewed his application 

for a larger pipeline across both NPS and BLM property to his roadside business south of the 

monument. This action set off a complex correspondence that illustrated why these matters take 

so long to complete. NPS solicitors, regional office specialists, and Superintendent William 

Supernaugh of Joshua Tree wrote back and forth to get information and agree on a response. At 

the same time, they had to deal with BLM agents, Joseph Chiriaco, and his attorney. Each step 

required a series of questions, replies, and further debate. This time Chiriaco also wanted to 

develop a reservoir near his property and perhaps acquire public domain land immediately west 

of his facility where he could drill a well. He gave monument officials conflicting information 

about his desire to donate, sell, or exchange his water right in the monument for that land. 

Agency officials again investigated his right and again concluded that it was cloudy at best, but 

could probably be perfected on the basis of his long history of use. Finally, they recommended 
181

that the monument should issue a revocable permit and see if the BLM would issue one allowing 

the pipeline to cross its land. In the meantime, the name Shaver Summit was changed to Chiriaco 

Summit to honor the pioneer businessman.25

Months and then years elapsed. More problems surfaced including a spatial conflict

between Chiriaco's reservoir and the Metropolitan Water District's (MWD) right-of-way. Finally, 

on July 1, 1966, Chiriaco received a twenty-year special permit to continue using the existing 

pipeline. By 1969, however, the permit gave him little solace. Precipitation declined during the 

rest of the decade and the oasis at Lost Palms dried up for months at a time. The flow from the 

spring in nearby Munsen Canyon shrank to less than one gallon per hour. Both increased 

dramatically after rainfall, but Chiriaco increasingly depended on water he purchased from a 

utility-owned well outside the monument. The following year, an NPS appraiser evaluated the 

water right, including the pipeline, and concluded it was worth $1,500. More time passed. In 

1974, monument officials offered to buy the water right but Chiriaco refused. Then, in 1976, a 

new generation of agency solicitors decided to investigate whether his appropriative water right 

had lapsed due to lack of use for more than five years. The old pipeline lay broken in places, 

jammed with debris in others, and had clearly been abandoned. Forty years after the monument's 

birth it looked like there might be a chance to eliminate a legal intrusion that had already become 

pointless.26

The Kaiser Corporation meanwhile broadened its attempts to gain access to Pinto Well 

#2 on monument property while simultaneously digging several new wells in the Chuckwalla 

Valley. In 1957, the company negotiated with NPS officials in Washington, D.C., and for a brief 

time it looked like they might sidestep monument and regional office opposition. Senior agency 

officials learned that the Kaiser Corporation held title to sixty acres of land in the Chalmette 

Battlefield in what is today Jean Lafitte National Historical Park. An exchange of that land for 

the rights to water from Pinto Well #2 appealed to the agency's leaders. In this case, however, it 

was the complex structure of the corporation that doomed the agreement. The Kaiser Aluminum 

Company owned the land at Chalmette and contemplated industrial development there. Kaiser's 

Eagle Mountain Mine was controlled by a separate company under the umbrella corporation. 

Kaiser Aluminum refused to give up its land for the benefit of Kaiser Steel. The deserts of 

Joshua Tree narrowly escaped agency preference for another resource in another part of the 

country. Ironically, Kaiser Aluminum later donated some acreage at Chalmette, perhaps seeking 

to appear reasonable and supportive.27

Later in 1957, the Kaiser Corporation settled the trespass action, but then faced NPS

questions about the legality of drilling a new well on land belonging to the MWD. Monument

and regional officials wondered how a single well on a temporary withdrawal to supply the 

aqueduct construction crew had turned into a two wells pouring water into a huge mine and 

town. Did Kaiser, as lessee, have the right to drill what became Pinto Well #3? Did the water 

district have the right to allocate so much more water to a separate, unrelated operation? In the 

face of these questions, Kaiser continued to press for access to Pinto Well #2. Between 1957 and 

1962, the NPS offered several special permit options which the company would not accept. In 

December 1957, Kaiser turned down a two-year permit arguing that the investment was too great 

to settle for such a short time. Company executives also turned down a modified permit on the 

basis that the right of renewal was not specified and the amount to be charged was too high. In 
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December 1962, the Park Service offered another two-year permit for a lower price but Kaiser 

did not even respond.28 

While these negotiations proceeded, Fred Kunkel of the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS)

completed a study of the water resources in the Pinto Basin. In his 1960 report, he estimated that 

the water table at Kaiser's Pinto Well #1 had declined about twelve feet in the previous three 

years (Figure 6-1). He added that Pinto Well #3 also had declined to a similar level despite the 

fact that no water had been taken directly from it. However, he concluded that the large amount 

of water available under the basin made this insignificant. Kunkel believed the aquifer was too 

deep to be used by native vegetation. He concluded, "because the effect of pumping from the 

existing wells in Pinto Basin cannot upset the ecological balance within the Monument, because 

the quantity of stored water in Pinto Basin is very great, and because the natural subsurface 

ground-water outflow is relatively small, any attempt to limit pumping to an estimate of 

perennial yield will not allow full utilization of this important natural resource of stored water."29

Three years later, another study by J. E. Weir, Jr. and J. S. Bader corroborated Kunkel's findings. 

Kaiser meanwhile drilled three wells in the Chuckwalla Valley which it, ironically, did not use to 

capacity.30

After five quiet years, Kaiser again approached the NPS seeking to access Pinto Well #2. 

The company was engaged in long term planning for the Eagle Mountain Mine and wanted to 

secure permission to use the well under emergency conditions. Plans called for increasing the 

population at the company town to more than 3,500 residents. Kaiser had tried to work out an 

arrangement with the MWD to tap the aqueduct and replace the supply to the southern California 

cities with water from the state's Feather River Project. However, the state insisted on a seventyfive year contract which Kaiser refused to accept. The company revived its request for a 

perennial agreement to use monument water in unusual circumstances when its existing wells 

proved inadequate. 

Over two days in late June 1967, Kaiser and NPS officials met in San Francisco and 

debated the request. Manuel Morris of the NPS posed several questions to Joseph M. Trihey, the 

lawyer for Kaiser, including why the company did not wait until it had an emergency to make the 

request, and why it was not using its Chuckwalla Valley wells to their capacity. Trihey answered 

that the expensive development planned for the mine required absolute assurance of water before 

the company could commit funds, and that ground water users south of the Chuckwalla Valley 

complained that Kaiser already was using too much of the aquifer. Morris answered that the NPS

was not a public utility in the business of supplying water, that Kaiser's current pumping was 

lowering the water table at nearly one foot per year, but if the company could show it had 

exhausted all other possible sources and the water would only go to support the residents of the 

town, then the government might consider a two-year special permit with a fee equal to that 

charged by the region's utilities. During the following year, the NPS formally offered these 

stipulations in writing and also reassured the company that it would not withhold water from the 

town's residents in a true emergency. In September 1968, Kaiser Steel replied that it could not 

definitively show it had exhausted all other water sources and, therefore, could not sign a permit 

under the government's conditions. Again the issue subsided and Pinto Well #2 remained 

unused.31 
183

Figure 6-1. Pinto Well # 1 sits on land held by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 

California. For decades the Kaiser Corporation drew water from it for its Eagle Mountain Mine 

community. Photo by the author. 

NPS officials wanted to control the amount of water that Kaiser took from Joshua Tree 

and this drove its solicitors to consider a lawsuit against the MWD seeking revestment of the tenacre property and water right to the federal government. The Los Angeles utility had granted 

another lease to Kaiser in 1963, this time for twenty-five years. On July 12, 1968, six NPS

officials, including field solicitor W. J. Costello and Joshua Tree superintendent William 

Supernaugh, met at the water district's headquarters with eleven of its senior officers and 

lawyers, including general manager H. J. Mills. The latter opened the meeting by asking why the 

NPS wanted to take away land from the water district. A lengthy discussion ensued which 

brought both information and emotion to the table. District officers reminded the park men that 

they had acquired a number of land parcels under the 1932 congressional act that authorized the 

aqueduct for water diversion and repair crew staging in case of damage. The believed that the 

federal effort to reclaim the Pinto Wells tract would endanger their rights on all the emergency 

parcels. There followed an intense debate about the propriety of allocating the water to Kaiser 

and the ebbing water table in Pinto Basin. Eventually someone from the water district accused 

the NPS of "governmental confiscation of privately owned water rights." The agency 
184

representatives retaliated that this appeared to be a case of "exploitation of publicly owned assets 

by private concerns." Eventually cooler heads prevailed and everyone agreed that legal action 

should be a last resort. Nevertheless, the water authority followed the meeting with a letter flatly 

refusing in to relinquish its water holding. Agency solicitors briefly contemplated filing for 

condemnation, but reasoned that their chance of success was relatively small. By late 1969, they 

decided to table the issue for a more propitious time.32

After failing to work out deals with Kaiser and the MWD, the NPS let the Pinto Wells 

situation subside again. However, as monument officials worked on their wilderness proposal, 

the presence of wells, pipelines, and other infrastructure in the lonely Pinto Basin was 

obnoxious. Furthermore, miners from Eagle Mountain frequently used the parcel as a recreation 

site which gave them easy access to the rest of the basin. The NPS wondered yet again whether it 

could challenge the water district's "temporary" land claim and remove the "donut hole" of 

development from Joshua Tree's least humanized territory. 

Filling Out the Infrastructure in Joshua Tree

During the twenty years from 1957 through 1976 the NPS initiated or completed construction of 

much of the infrastructure that visitors to the park see today. At the same time, agency officials 

pondered and then dropped an elaborate plan for additional structures. Harsh weather conditions, 

ever increasing use by visitors, vandalism, and even arson led inspectors from the regional office 

to conclude that the monument was both understaffed and underfunded. 

Joshua Tree National Monument received minimal funds for development during its first 

two decades. That abruptly changed with the inauguration of Mission 66. At the end of World 

War II, the annual budget for the entire national park system was a mere $5,000,000. After the 

war, congress focused on numerous international and domestic issues while funding for the 

national park system inched up to a level similar to that of the pre-war years. During the same 

period, visitation in the parks shot up by more than 460 percent over its 1941 level. NPS Director 

Conrad Wirth reported that between 1950 and 1955 visitation soared from 33,200,000 to 

56,500,000 while the agency's budget only increased from $30,100,000 to $32,900,000. The 

virtual abandonment of maintenance during the war, followed by a decade of underfunding, had 

left park facilities in dismal condition.33 Nationally-renowned author Bernard De Voto in a 

widely-read 1953 article entitled "Let's Close the National Parks," succinctly described the 

problem:

Congress did not provide money to rehabilitate the parks at the end of the war, it has not 

provided the money to meet the enormously increased demand. So much of the priceless 

heritage which the Service must safeguard for the United States is beginning to go to 

hell.34 

The deterioration of infrastructure in the parks consumed Director Wirth. He focused so much on 

establishing or improving facilities that many environmentalists later accused him of fostering 

overdevelopment and ignoring natural resource protection. He revealed his preoccupation with 

the physical improvements of the park system in a Reader's Digest article:

It is not possible to provide essential services. Visitor concentration points can't be kept 

in sanitary condition. Comfort stations can't be kept clean and serviced. Water, sewer and 
185

electrical systems are taxed to the utmost. Protective services to safeguard the public and 

preserve park values are far short of requirements. Physical facilities are deteriorating or 

are inadequate to meet public needs. Some of the camps are approaching rural slums. We 

actually get scared when we think of the bad health conditions.35

Mission 66 was Wirth’s answer. The program was a master stroke of organization, promotion,

and publicity worthy of the agency's first director, Stephen Mather. Wirth presented it as a 

comprehensive renewal of America's valuable heritage, focusing primarily on infrastructure for 

visitors and staff. It would last a decade and end in 1966, the fiftieth anniversary of the NPS. 

Wirth's preoccupation with material improvements for people and the park system's wide 

distribution sold well to congress. Ultimately, legislators allocated $1,000,000,000 for the 

program while more than quadrupling the agency's annual budget.

When Mission 66 began at Joshua Tree, the monument had a headquarters building, an 

incomplete maintenance complex, eight campgrounds, four nature trails, and a basic pattern of 

roads. Except for the roads, most dated from the previous eight years. Mission 66 planners 

identified a variety of options to round out necessary infrastructure including a visitor building 

with exhibit space and several ranger residences at the Oasis of Mara headquarters, additional 

maintenance structures at Pinto Wye, a relocated campground plus a ranger station and 

residences at Cottonwood Spring, improved facilities at other campgrounds and picnic areas,

including amphitheaters and better comfort stations, ranger stations and residences at Lost Horse 

Valley and Indian Cove, and entrance stations at Pinto Wye, Joshua Tree Village, and 

Cottonwood Spring. They also planned to significantly upgrade the road system with 

realignments of the Pinto Wye and Cap Rock intersections, add more miles of trail for hikers,

and design a lengthy equestrian trail with another campground specifically for horse riders. 

Planners also considered a "View-Overlook Building" at Keys View, an entrance station at 

Indian Cove, and a road connecting Covington Flat to the Lost Horse Valley, but dropped those 

ideas as sentiment for additional development waned.36 

Monument officials celebrated the completion of the headquarters office at the Oasis of 

Mara in 1954 as a turning point for the eighteen-year-old unit. However, it remained one 

component of a complex as yet unfinished. As early as 1941, plans called for multiple employee 

housing units. In addition, the office building itself quickly proved too small for the staff and 

entirely inadequate for a museum and exhibit space. Furthermore, problems with the building 

surfaced within a few years. Sunshine and high temperatures warped some of the wood and 

destroyed paint on the building's exterior, while inside portions of the flooring cracked and 

shifted, probably due to creep along the Pinto Fault. A lovely reflecting pool gathered dust, 

leaves, and waste, while rambunctious children occasionally fell into it. Much needed to be done 

to finalize the complex and repair or adapt various details.37 

One hallmark achievement of Mission 66 across the country was the establishment of 

visitor centers, buildings that housed visitor contact desks, exhibit space, and offices for rangerinterpreters. In many cases, they also provided office space for resource management specialists. 

The typical Mission 66 visitor center eschewed rustic architecture and used modern materials 

and techniques to maximize space, efficiency, and utility. Cecil Doty at the Western Office of 

Design and Construction was the premier agency architect during the modernizing Mission 66 

period, and he designed the visitor center at Joshua Tree. Landscape architect Ethan Carr later 
186

described Doty's attention to cost limits and efficiency in his visitor centers, "Their flat roofs, 

stark geometric massing, and contemporary materials confirmed that the architect's transition to 

modernist design was complete."38 Completed in 1963, Joshua Tree's visitor center proved an 

immediate success with visitors and nearly quadrupled the space available for staff offices and 

visitor reception (Figure 6-2). 

Figure 6-2. One of the Park Service's most influential architects, Cecil Doty, designed the Joshua 

Tree National Park Visitor Center, a classic example of Mission 66 architecture completed in 

1963. The author took this photo from the nature trail through the Oasis of Mara.

Throughout the Mission 66 decade, Joshua Tree's plans included residences for rangers at 

the Oasis of Mara, yet they were never built. As late as January 1962, a Mission 66 planning 

update showed seven residential structures for the area including an apartment building. Yet a 

draft master plan issued in 1971 showed none. Several factors contributed to the change in plans. 

First, construction of housing at Cottonwood Spring and Indian Cove ameliorated the housing 

crisis, while improvement of the western entrance road allowed more employees to live in 

Joshua Tree village where rental and house prices were lower than in Twentynine Palms. 

Second, flooding and poor drainage made the area immediately south of the oasis suspect. 

Finally, monument officials recognized that even with a headquarters office, maintenance 

building, and visitor center already in place, they probably would need the space in the future for 

additional administrative structures.39

The NPS continued to adjust and improve the Oasis of Mara area, at least partially in 

response to criticism from residents of Twentynine Palms. Planners extended and realigned the 

path around the oasis while blocking all entrances except the one through the administrative 

complex. They built larger restrooms at the visitor center, converted the reflecting pool to a 

garden display, and repaired the ugly deterioration of the main office's exterior. They also 

undertook extensive study of how to salvage the badly damaged oasis ecosystem in order to 

improve the most accessible public showplace in the monument.40
187

Cottonwood Spring at the southern edge of Joshua Tree presented another problem and 

opportunity. Local hydrology supported the oasis there and provided the unit's most reliable 

source of water for visitors. Miners, hunters, picnickers, and squatters had operated there for 

decades. The campground established in 1949 proved immensely popular, and that was the 

problem. Campers crowded the oasis and removed vegetation for campfires. Monument officials 

realized that they would need to move and expand the campground. With Mission 66 funds they 

decided to build a ranger station and residence complex in order to protect the area and firmly 

establish the site as the only southern entrance to the unit. Planners from the agency's Western 

Office of Design and Construction evaluated a variety of locations for both the new campground 

and the official structures during 1959. They considered, but then dropped, the idea of building 

on the site of the recently invalidated Winona Mine. Instead, they selected an area one-half mile 

northwest of the oasis and close to the road for a combination ranger station-entrance facility, 

several employee residences, and a campground that would eventually hold 150 sites. Between 

1964 and 1965, the NPS built the ranger contact station, three residences, and a campground 

consisting of sixty-two sites. The planned expansion of the campground never occurred. The 

oasis itself became a day-use area and trailhead.

41

During the rest of Mission 66, the NPS added more durable tables and comfort stations to 

campgrounds and picnic areas, upgraded and realigned some of the roads, and converted the 

Charles Stokes homestead into a ranger station and residence near the monument's primary 

visitor zone. For a while, monument officials debated whether to construct a building at Keys 

View to provide shelter and a rooftop platform for sightseers. Ultimately, they abandoned that 

idea fearing that it would create more congestion at the site. An early effort to improve visitor 

recreation was the development and dedication of a section of the California Riding and Hiking 

Trail which traverses the coast ranges, loops over to the Pacific Coast Trail in the Sierra Nevada,

and then proceeds southeast through the desert to the border with Mexico. It enters the 

monument near Black Rock Canyon and runs thirty-six miles through Covington Flat, Lost 

Horse Valley, and the White Tank area before exiting close to the Twentynine Palms entrance 

station. Linked with Ryan Campground, it provides horseback riders with a variety of park 

scenery while keeping them well-removed from automobile traffic. Development began in July 

1957. On May 30 and 31, 1958, Equestrian Trails Incorporated held its annual ride on the new 

trail and participated in its official dedication. The trail was the first project completed in Joshua 

Tree funded entirely by Mission 66.42

Although 1966 ended Conrad Wirth's heralded program, increased funding enabled 

Joshua Tree officials to build or plan more structures at popular visitor use areas. One site that 

needed immediate attention was Indian Cove. As an area easily accessed from Twentynine 

Palms, it suffered uncontrolled crowding and occasional vandalism. Monument officials 

realigned some of the campgrounds and built a ranger station and residence in 1970 to help 

control the popular area. Meanwhile, heavy use of the Hidden Valley area led agency planners to 

consider building a full visitor center near Cap Rock (Figure 6-3). Recent completion of the 

Oasis of Mara visitor center notwithstanding, many believed a new center amidst the primary 

tourist attractions was needed. Over the next five years, plans for the facility expanded to include 

offices, a display area, restrooms, a visitor contact desk, and a 200-seat auditorium. These 

ambitious ideas led NPS officials to begin research for a new master plan to accompany a 
188

Figure 6-3. Park Service planners proposed Cap Rock as a site for a second visitor center in 

1971. Today it is the site of a nature trail and is popular for informal instruction in basic rock 

climbing. Photo by the author. 

wilderness study and backcountry plan. A planning team appointed by the regional director 

debated every aspect of the monument including the road system, entirely new 

development areas, additional visitor centers, new trails, and even the location of the 

headquarters. It may seem unusual that, after so much effort and expense to construct roads, 

buildings, and other facilities over the previous sixteen years, the agency would reevaluate the 

entire operation and infrastructural design of the monument. Yet nearly 643,000 visitors arrived 

in 1970, an increase of 106 percent over the number at the start of Mission 66. Popular areas like 

Keys View and Cottonwood Springs, as well as Indian Cove and Hidden Valley, became 

increasingly overcrowded. With southern California projected to nearly double its population by 

the late 1980s, the NPS believed that a total rethinking of the monument's facilities was 

appropriate.43 

The planning team released its draft master plan and wilderness proposal on December 

22, 1971. It contained nine ambitious proposals divided into two groups. The four "primary" 
189

proposals included development of the Wonderland of Rocks area as a major day-use zone, 

construction of a road linking Covington Flat to the main transport grid, closure and 

rehabilitation of seventy-one miles of old mining roads, and establishment of ten "primitive"

areas totaling 538,000 acres or ninety-six percent of the monument. Five "secondary" proposals 

consisted of relocating campgrounds from the day-use area around Hidden Valley, designing a 

motor nature trail through the Wonderland of Rocks, restoring several historic mining properties 

as visitor attractions, constructing the Cap Rock facility visitor center, and developing a ranger 

station, employee housing, and a campground at Pinto Wells.44 Although theoretically separate, 

the monument's wilderness proposal affected the goals of the master plan. As early as 1967,

some agency officials had expressed doubts about building the road to Covington Flat. During a 

wilderness hearing in February 1972, Larry Moss, representing the Sierra Club and several other 

organizations, argued that the existing rough dirt road should be closed and the area added to 

wilderness.45

As occurred at other units of the national park system at this time, such as Sequoia 

National Park and Cumberland Island National Seashore, the public rejected almost all the 

development concepts. The reaction was severe enough that a chagrined NPS first separated the 

master plan from the effort to craft a wilderness proposal, and then dropped it entirely. The 

ambitious Cap Rock Visitor Center idea had been abandoned already due to the decline of the 

Ryan Water Station and funding cutbacks. However, NPS officials did complete a few specific 

goals from the disgraced plan. They converted the Wonderland of Rocks to a day-use area and 

enlarged, but did not relocate, several campgrounds. They also rehabilitated the Lost Horse 

Mine, improved trails to it and to the Wall Street Mill and Barker Dam, closed dozens of old 

mining roads, and converted the old wagon trail to Pleasant Valley into the Geology Tour Road. 

Meanwhile, acquisition of Jellystone led the agency to modify its buildings, redesign its 

campground by eliminating sixty percent of the sites, and replace the swimming pool, mini-golf 

course, rodeo yard, and tennis, basketball and shuffleboard courts of the commercial resort with 

several fire control structures, a ranger station, picnic tables, and trailheads appropriate for the 

newly renamed Black Rock Canyon.

46

One further development proposal arose among members of the public and surprised 

Joshua Tree officials. During a visit to the monument by Congressman Jerry Pettis, several locals 

mentioned the imminent closure of a national cemetery in San Bruno, California. They 

commented that Joshua Tree had a vast amount of unused acreage and that a new national 

cemetery could be established there. Superintendent William Supernaugh thought they were 

joking. However, on January 10, 1967 the San Bernardino Sun reported that the American 

Legion Post in Yucca Valley would soon ask the congressman to sponsor a bill to establish a 

cemetery on 112,000 acres of the monument. Pettis introduced the bill on February 15 and 

welcomed support from the San Bernardino County Economic Development Commission. 

American Legion member Harold A. Bahr, originator of the idea, dismissed opposition from 

Superintendent Supernaugh and from Equestrian Trails Incorporated which faced the closure of 

part of the young riding and hiking trail. He suggested that the latter should not object to giving 

up their "once-a-year" ride to support patriotism. NPS Biologist James K. Baker responded with 

a lengthy editorial in the Desert Trail highlighting the purposes of national parks, the importance 

of wilderness for future generations, and the need to prevent inappropriate "invasions." He 

admitted that the cemetery would not be like the many profit-seeking ventures whose promoters 
190

tried to set up in the parks, but it would violate park principles including, "(1) that the activity 

results in no impairment of significant natural or scenic values, (2) that it does not itself become 

a primary attraction, and (3) that it does not lessen the opportunity for others to enjoy a Park for 

the purposes for which the Park was established." By March environmental organizations 

answered the idea with a flood of opposing letters and editorials. This, in turn, brought a letter 

demonstrating the misinformation that often attends these controversies. Los Angeles attorney 

George Nilsson wrote to House Interior Committee Chairman Wayne Aspinall angrily criticizing 

the BLM for asserting that a military cemetery was incompatible with park purposes. Nilsson 

added "I should think four townships should be enough to include all the Joshua Trees. Certainly 

5,000 acres out of half a million would not be missed." Somewhere he lost the facts that the NPS

ran the monument and the American Legion wanted 112,000 acres. Aspinall forwarded the letter 

to the NPS and Deputy Director Harthon L. Bill responded that the agency already managed 

thirteen national cemeteries, and that in 1962 the Bureau of the Budget studied the national 

cemetery issue and concluded that there should be no further expansion except at Arlington 

National Cemetery. Congressman Pettis's bill soon died quietly.47

Wilderness in Joshua Tree National Monument

Separation of wilderness planning from the ill-fated master plan allowed the NPS to proceed 

with a process its employees initially greeted with either indifference or outright opposition. 

Director Conrad Wirth followed earlier traditions that favored parks as scenic creations for the 

ultimate benefit of current and future visitors. During its early days the NPS justified automobile 

access for visitors as necessary to survive threats from the USFS, but in the mid-1930s 

environmentalists began criticizing the agency for opening primitive areas with grand road 

projects. Three decades later, environmental organizations sought to legally restrict the agency

from building any more roads. That wilderness was coming to the parks was a certainty. As early 

as 1968, the NPS created a hypothetical "Arroyo National Park" in order to demonstrate to field 

employees what types of issues could affect planning for wilderness areas in their own units. In 

August 1970, an official request for lists of "important issues" arrived at each natural park unit. 

Two months later, congress designated the first two national park system wilderness areas in 

Petrified Forest National Park and Craters of the Moon National Monument.48

Superintendent Supernaugh reported five issues that he thought would affect designation 

of a wilderness area in Joshua Tree: inholdings, mining claims, Joseph Chiriaco’s water right, the 

old road in Pushawalla Canyon, and a power line that crossed the southeastern part of the 

monument. During subsequent development of the wilderness proposal this list would expand 

considerably. Planning for the proposal began immediately with Washington Office wilderness 

specialists taking the lead. In August 1971, senior officials met with Congressman Jerry Pettis 

who surprised them with a host of complaints about management at Joshua Tree including

inactivity on programs he and others supported, a lack of cooperation in law enforcement, and 

poor communication with his office. Over the next two months, Superintendent Peter Parry and 

staff from the monument and the regional office hurried to address the legislator's concerns. In 

the meantime, planners released a "Wilderness Study" in August 1971 that proposed ten separate 

wilderness areas totaling 325,200 acres, fifty-eight percent of the total monument area. The 

planners took the spirit of the wilderness act literally and left out unimproved roads, areas in the 

Little San Bernardino Mountains and Pinto Basin with inholdings, a one-eighth-mile buffer 
191

inside the entire boundary and around campgrounds, existing mines and water installations, and a 

huge area around Covington Flat where the master plan called for a new road and interpretive 

facilities.

49

On February 2, 1972, Park Service planners held a public hearing on the proposal in 

Twentynine Palms. John Henneberger, a wilderness coordinator from the Denver Service Center,

presented an outline of the proposals to a crowd primarily composed of environmentalists and 

four-wheel-drive enthusiasts. A few locals and scientists rounded out the audience. Twenty-five 

individuals spoke, occasionally mixing in comments about the controversial master plan. First up 

were representatives of the National Parks and Conservation Association, the Sierra Club, and 

the Wilderness Society. All three organizations complimented the NPS for its effort but found 

glaring omissions in the plan. Professor Edward Beveridge suggested all private land should be 

included in wilderness as well as the Covington Flat area. Larry Moss of the Sierra Club offered 

nine specific suggestions to close roads including the one to Covington, eliminate buffer zones, 

include additional lands near Indian Cove and Keys View, and bring the wilderness boundaries

closer to the remaining roads. The net effect of these suggested changes would be eight larger 

wilderness areas with 58,200 more acres, another ten percent of the monument.50 

D. H. Stephens, president of the Twentynine Palms Chamber of Commerce, spoke next. 

He assured the audience that he believed in preserving the national parks and generally favored 

the NPS plan, but then asked that part of the area be excluded for a state road to be built from 

Berdoo Canyon via Split Rock to the monument headquarters. He added, "now, before we get 

upset about this proposed route polluting the Monument with smog caused by automobiles, let's 

remember that by the time this route would be constructed, sometime around 1985, the 

automobile industry will have the auto pollution problem solved." This optimistic 

pronouncement caused Dr. Henry Weber of the California Garden Clubs Federation to accuse 

Stephens of reviving the Blue Cut Road controversy. The NPS's development designs for the 

Covington area also drew much criticism. Dr. Sylvia Broadbent, an anthropologist from the 

University of California, Riverside warned that the area should be closed for a minimum of ten 

years to allow full archaeological investigation. George Anderson went further by proposing that 

the entire monument be closed for a decade until scientists, social scientists, and even 

theologians could properly evaluate it. Many speakers decried jeep and off-road vehicle use even 

on old, unimproved roads.51

Of course motor enthusiasts did not remain mute. Wendell Ford stated that the problem 

was not law-abiding drivers but lackadaisical NPS law enforcement against irresponsible ones. 

Jack Edwards from the California Association of Four-Wheel-Drive Clubs argued that every 

citizen has a right to access the nation's parks. Jerry Wendt from the same group added that 

without the roads visitors could not access many areas during one day. Harold Huffman 

explained that he was a lifelong photographer of Joshua Tree landscapes, and he needed 

vehicular access to all the existing roads. Ron Crandall, a high school teacher, opposed closure of 

the roads because it would deny his students the opportunity to take field trips and do research in 

the monument. He explained that his groups would volunteer to pick up litter left by other 

drivers. These comments did not go unchallenged by wilderness advocates. L. B. Graff quoted a 

disabled professor Garrett Hardin who stated "the beauty and value of wilderness is knowing that 

it is there." Don Black, speaking off the record as an individual rather than in his role as a Joshua 
192

Tree naturalist, rebuffed Crandall stating that the monument was not a learning reservoir for 

schools.52 

After the hearing, NPS planners resumed work to create an official wilderness 

recommendation. In June, they added portions of the Little San Bernardino Mountains, 

Covington Flat, and Stubbe Spring and released a draft proposing 350,800 acres. Two months 

later they reissued the recommendation after shrinking some of the buffers and classifying much 

of the privately-owned portions of Pinto Basin and the Old Dale Mining District as "potential 

wilderness." The new proposal recommended 372,700 acres for wilderness and 66,800 acres for 

proposed wilderness. The additional parcels reduced the number of discrete wilderness areas to 

eight as the Sierra Club had suggested. However, the agency still resisted adding the Covington 

area.53

Over the next two years, the NPS combined the Joshua Tree proposal with those from 

nine other park units located primarily in southwestern states. President Richard Nixon endorsed 

the wilderness recommendation in November 1973. The House of Representatives held a hearing 

on March 25 and 26, 1974 at which Park Service Director Ronald H. Walker explained that 

Joshua Tree would adjust its recommendation if it could buy a large amount of land from the 

SPRR. The agency completed that purchase on November 4, 1974. On May 21, 1975,

Representative Keith Sebelius introduced H. R. 7190, an omnibus wilderness bill that included 

the monument’s August 1972 wilderness recommendation. However, the acquisition of 12,800 

acres of railroad land enabled the NPS to combine them with intervening sections of government 

land and shift 33,100 acres from proposed wilderness to the bloc intended for immediate 

designation. That raised the total to 405,800 acres. The following November, the house 

committee held another hearing at which Director Walker explained why the NPS believed the 

new additions should be included. Still unsatisfied, Ms. Raye-Page of the Wilderness Society 

recommended that congress designate the 33,700 "potential" acres as full wilderness. Sierra Club 

member Lyle Gaston urged the committee to go beyond that and add 62,000 more acres.54 

Pressure continued to come from environmental groups forcing the NPS's wilderness 

studies chief to quiz Superintendent Rouse about the areas left out of the earlier bills. Rouse 

explained the reasons why each had been excluded but agreed that most could be added because 

some inholdings and mining claims were no longer valid. He still opposed adding MWD parcels, 

several roads which Riverside County claimed, Covington Flat, and the recently acquired Black 

Rock Canyon. In March 1976, Congressman Sebelius notified Director Gary Everhardt that his 

bill now included acreage available for wilderness after the railroad purchase. However, three 

weeks later Representative Shirley N. Pettis, who replaced her husband in congress, cosponsored an alternate omnibus bill which added even more land desired by the environmental 

organizations. Under H. R. 13160, Joshua Tree would have 429,690 acres in seven wilderness 

areas and 37,550 acres of potential wilderness (Plate 5). Rouse reviewed the bill and wondered 

why Pettis ignored all the agency's explanations for excluding areas. His greatest concern was 

the elimination of his idea to build an interpretive center at Covington Flat and develop an 

internal access road from Hidden Valley to it. The new bill would include 10,880 acres in and 

around the scenic forest as wilderness. Rouse bemoaned the fact that visitors still would have to 

exit the monument and drive fifteen miles outside its boundary to reach the area. He also

regretted that the NPS would no longer have any planning options there. It bothered him that 
193

wilderness and potential wilderness composed almost eighty-five percent of the monument’s 

land under the Pettis bill. His concerns had no effect. Omnibus bills often succeed because they 

have something to offer to many legislative constituencies. H. R. 13160 was no exception. On 

October 20, 1976, President Lyndon Johnson signed Public Law 94-567 establishing wilderness 

in ten parks and monuments including Joshua Tree. Although the total of wilderness and 

proposed wilderness acreage in Joshua Tree National Monument still fell short of what some 

environmental groups wanted, it was 142,040 acres more than the agency had proposed in 

1971.55

Natural Resource Management Evolves

The staff at Joshua Tree National Monument understood that it legally existed to protect its 

botanical resources. The geological wonders and wildlife reinforced its status as nationally 

significant. But management of natural resources lacked attention, scientific inquiry, and data not 

only in Joshua Tree but across the entire park system. Despite George Wright and Lowell 

Sumner, the naturalists’ voices in park management were often lost in the cacophony of 

engineers, landscape architects, and recreation-focused planners. Yet ecology and 

environmentalism grew to challenge the status quo during the 1960s and 1970s. Criticism of 

Director Wirth's preoccupation with infrastructure during Mission 66 mounted as researchers 

raised one issue of natural resource mismanagement after another. In 1959, Dr. Stanley Cain of 

the University of Michigan told a wilderness conference audience that the NPS had virtually no 

program of basic ecological research, and that meant that the agency’s resource management was 

a failure. He concluded that “the Service is missing a bet by not having an adequate natural 

history research program."56 Following the election of John F. Kennedy as president and his 

appointment of Stewart Udall as secretary of the interior, Cain served on an advisory board that 

eventually turned the situation around. Chaired by renowned ecologist A. Starker Leopold, the 

board met in 1963 to consider elk overgrazing in Yellowstone National Park. However, the 

scientists seized the opportunity to go much further. They called for the agency to adapt its 

management philosophy to one based on science, even if it meant sacrificing popular scenery. 

They urged the NPS to maintain or recreate "a vignette of primitive America," meaning as the 

Europeans found it (later research would refute the concept of naturalness after millennia of 

Native American habitation). Among the specific recommendations were reintroduction of 

predators that had been eliminated by early park managers and the return of fire to appropriate 

ecosystems. Secretary Udall ordered the NPS to follow these proposals in all its units. That same 

year another panel of experts, chaired by William J. Robbins released a report on research in the 

national park system starkly stating:

Research by the National Park Service has lacked continuity, coordination, and depth. It 

has been marked by expediency rather than by long-term considerations. It has in general 

lacked direction, has been fragmented between divisions and branches, has been applied 

piecemeal, has suffered because of a failure to recognize the distinctions between 

research and administrative decision-making, and has failed to insure the implementation 

of the results of research in operational management.

In spite of these high profile reports, many senior agency officials stubbornly clung to the older 

policies they had used for decades. It would take several more critical reports and the 
194

replacement of those officials as they retired by scientifically-trained employees to effect the 

necessary changes.57

At Joshua Tree the message of the "Leopold Report" led to more scientific research, but 

little change in administration. A 1974 natural resource management plan listed twenty-nine 

projects, all of them basic research proposals. The list included four on bighorn sheep, four on 

other fauna, two on palm oases, ten on other vegetation, three on geology, and one each on air 

quality, weather, water, soil, fire, and the overall impact of humans. A 1977 update called for the 

development of specific plans for baseline data, fire management, and the Oasis of Mara. 

Bighorn sheep, however, continued to draw the most research and management attention. 

Waning springs and human intrusion stressed the flagship species of the monument. Differences 

of opinion on biology and policy contributed to conflict and inaction that further threatened the 

species. In August 1958, Chief Ranger Hesmel Earenfight recommended that the NPS copy a 

program initiated by Richard Weaver of California Fish and Game in the Coxcomb Mountains 

outside the monument boundary. Weaver had constructed "an oversize guzzler" to provide water 

for the band of bighorns that frequented the area (Figure 6-4). In 1960, monument ranger Robert 

Palmer installed a similar device near Lost Palms Oasis but it soon became clogged with debris 

and then buried. A year later, Robert D. Powell stated in his bighorn census report that forty or 

more natural water sources had gone dry, and the NPS should replace them with artificial 

sources. Censuses over the next two years showed a continuing decline in bighorn sheep 

numbers. Stubbe Spring remained the most important source for the animals, and some blamed 

their dwindling population there on humans visiting the site. However, in 1964, independent

researchers Ralph and Florence Welles argued that a lack of water was the culprit. They noted 

that the bighorn sheep quickly accommodated themselves to the quiet hikers and readily 

approached them at the spring. Soon, the monument began bringing any dead sheep carcasses to 

the Public Health Service in Las Vegas for study. That office performed autopsies on bighorn

sheep as part of a program to assess the danger from nuclear testing in Nevada. Most of the 

sheep sent by the monument proved to be old and apparently had died from natural causes.

Nevertheless, the "mystery" of falling sheep numbers drew public attention and soon 

controversy.58

Superintendent William Supernaugh began his thirteen-year tenure at Joshua tree two 

months after Earenfight recommended adding guzzlers to the monument. Despite the Lost Palms 

Oasis device, he generally rejected the idea of artificial water sources. That policy soon drew 

anger and condemnation from the scientific community and his own staff of naturalists. Resource 

management ranger James K. Baker later wrote that Supernaugh would not budge from his 

opinion that the sheep could "take care of themselves." When the press reported Ralph Welles's 

criticism of Supernaugh's position, the superintendent tried to revoke NPS funding of his bighorn 

sheep research. The regional office in San Francisco had a new biologist, none other than former 

superintendent James Cole, who ignored Supernaugh and renewed the contract with Welles in 

June 1965. Two years later Supernaugh rejected another study by the Welles couple claiming 

that it was based on erroneous data from his own staff members, William Dengler and James 

Baker. A year later, Supernaugh's resistance to "artificial features in a national park" brought him 

into conflict with a group of wildlife experts that included eminent biologist A. Starker Leopold, 

Robert M. Linn, the director of the NPS’s new Office of Natural Science Studies, and the dean of 

Park Service wildlife ecologists, Lowell Sumner. A few weeks later Regional Director John A. 
195

Figure 6-4. A guzzler consists of a broad rock face or piece of sheet metal that directs 

precipitation or piped water to a tank or trough. Downhill from the metal sheet two Park Service 

employees conduct repairs. Photographer unknown. JTNP Natural Resource Division files.

Rutter summarily ordered Supernaugh to take the $3,000 allocated and build a guzzler at Stubbe 

Spring.59

As this policy conflict unfolded, the superintendent defended himself against rising 

criticism. The California Department of Fish and Game tried to take control of all bighorn sheep 

management in the monument only to be told bluntly that federal officials would ignore them. 

Supernaugh subsequently criticized another report by the Welles duo and warned the regional 

director that "since the new officers of the Desert Protective Council are of the rabid 

conservationist type, it may be that your office, or the Director's office will be hearing from 

them."60 In 1970, no rain fell on the catchment apron feeding the guzzler at Stubbe Spring and it 

went dry. The superintendent delayed allowing his rangers to carry water to the guzzler in the 

hopes that a storm might accomplish the task naturally. Many birds died and rangers found a 

dead bighorn sheep nearby. Thereafter Dr. Martin Prochnik, a science advisor to the secretary of 

the interior, demanded answers. Supernaugh humbly assured him that Joshua Tree would do 

everything necessary to protect the bighorn sheep. The following summer rangers built a 1.5-

mile pipeline to the Stubbe Spring tank, erected two more guzzlers at historic but dry water sites,
196

and programmed five more for the following fiscal year. At the same time Charles G. Hansen of 

the Office of Natural Science Studies recommended the construction of twenty-one guzzlers or 

adits (horizontal tunnels at the bottom of a slope or wash) throughout the monument. Any 

thought of leaving the bighorn sheep to fend for themselves was finished.61 

The one thing that became abundantly clear through all the attention and conflict was the 

need for much more research on bighorn sheep to understand their water and forage needs, 

patterns of movement, and tolerance of drought and disturbance. The 1974 resource management 

plan listed research projects on the species as four of its top five priorities. The document 

proposed eight installations for water. A year later, Dr. Charles Douglas, an NPS scientist based 

at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, issued several reports that highlighted bighorn 

management problems and the need to coordinate research on the species. He noted that rainfall 

had decreased from 4.5 inches per year to barely one inch over the previous two decades, and the 

flow of water at Stubbe Spring had dropped from 222 gallons per day in 1948 to nil in 1968. 

Douglas recommended a program of trapping, marking, and placing radio collars on sheep in the 

monument and supported Superintendent Homer Rouse's decision to close the road to Fortynine 

Palms that summer to dissuade noisy visitors from driving off sheep at its oasis.62 

Research on other monument fauna contributed some basic information, but no specific

management recommendations. A 1961 animal census noted that burros lived in the mountains 

just outside the monument, but none appeared within its borders. By 1976, the situation remained 

the same although monument officials worried about their proximity. Wildlife biologists 

generated lists or brief reports on insects, tarantulas, snakes, birds, ground squirrels, and mule 

deer. Coyotes drew some attention because they begged for food at the campgrounds. Armand 

Sansum of the monument's maintenance staff complained that employees at the Cottonwood 

Spring residences surreptitiously fed coyotes and badgers leading to aggressive behavior by both 

species. Surprisingly, one of the culprits he tattled on was naturalist William Dengler. The 

inoffensive desert tortoise also fell under official review because people who adopted them as 

pets kept dropping them off in Joshua Tree regardless of where they had found them. In 1971, a 

desert tortoise club brought forty to the monument. Officials worried that the new additions 

might be a different subspecies, could carry diseases, and that dumping them in bunches would 

disrupt the tortoise-forage balance in easily accessible areas.63

The vegetation of Joshua Tree fared about the same as the fauna, with grand research 

goals, modest accomplishments, and a compelling focus on one management issue. The agenda 

set by the 1974 resource management plan included basic studies on paleoecology, energy 

exchange, and plant succession, plus specific proposals for the ecology of pinyon-juniper, Joshua 

tree, and creosote bush communities. After nearly forty years, monument officials wanted to 

better understand what had been the primary raison d'etre for the unit. Lynn Loetterle listed 

twenty-four rare and endangered plants in 1975, a number that would fall in subsequent studies. 

Finally, in 1977, University of Nevada, Las Vegas graduate student Patrick J. Leary completed a 

thesis entitled, "Investigation of the Vegetational Communities of Joshua Tree National 

Monument, California." It proved to be the most comprehensive botanical study ever done at the 

unit and installed Leary as an important consultant on floral issues at the monument.64 

The fate of the fan palms at the Oasis of Mara continued to be the primary vegetation 

management issue. Mistletoe-infested mesquite with deep taproots choked the palms and drew 
197

water from the diminishing aquifer (Figure 6-5). A 1964 fire at the western end of the oasis near 

the Twentynine Palms Inn forced monument officials to scramble for answers to four practical 

questions, how to clear the mesquite, whether or not to use prescribed burns, how to restore 

water, and how to treat periodic flooding. In 1966, William Dengler recommended increased 

manual removal of mesquite, a time consuming and expensive option already sporadically 

underway. This also required chemicals to prevent recurrent growth by stump sprouting. One 

controversial solution was the deliberate use of fire in controlled burns. A "prescribed burn" was 

fast, cheap, and might be historically appropriate.65 The ultimate question behind this was later 

voiced by the regional plant ecologist:

The oasis of Mara, which was visited Wednesday morning along with Superintendent 

Anderson, is by far the most complex and sensitive piece of real estate that I have 

encountered while working with the government...To fully understand the problem, one 

must ask, what is natural? Since Indian and European man have inhabited the oasis for an 

estimated 10,000 years, are man's influences on the current system natural? Or is that 

state, prior to man's intervention natural, a period so long ago that it is hard to 

comprehend? 66 

The influence of humans bedeviled decision-making regarding the oasis. When 

the NPS developed the layout for the headquarters area they built a low wall around it to 

emphasize its separation from the surrounding town. Later the agency built a berm near 

the wall and a drainage ditch to resist destructive flooding which they perceived to be 

caused by urbanization. However, subsequent studies showed that palm oases traditionally 

experience occasional flooding by "sheet flow," a shallow movement of water covering a large 

area. This kind of flood did not harm the palms and carried away debris that added to the fuel 

load for fire. Agency experts blamed the fall in the water table on nearby urban wells, although 

they admitted that the decline in annual rainfall and competition from the understory vegetation 

contributed to the problem.

In 1972, the monument released a rough draft "Management Plan for Oasis of Mara" 

which proposed manual removal of mesquite and application of chemicals to the stumps. The 

highly detailed proposal identified a step-by-step procedure for cutting and clearing understory 

vegetation and debris, and using a careful "burn-a-bush" technique on the mesquite. The 

proponents of this laborious project predicted that it would take 172 "man-days" and cost $7,500. 

The NPS remained hesitant about implementing the proposal. Uncertainty about the history and 

ecology of the oasis, and the glaring public spotlight focused on it, made resource managers 

cautious. In August 1973, the USGS agreed to conduct a hydrological survey of the oasis to 

inform a final management plan. This required approval from regional archaeological experts 

due to the area's cultural significance. Seven months later, regional official Jim Agee submitted 

data from his historical analysis of the oasis that seemed to show mesquite prominent during the 

Native American period, but subsequently cleared by Euro-Americans. Hence, he suggested, the 

famous picture of the palms standing virtually alone presented an unnatural scene (Figure 1-7). 

He warned against any use of prescribed burns until ecologists completed further research.67 

A few other natural resource topics received passing attention during the period from 

1957 through 1976. Fire management away from the Oasis of Mara continued on a total 
198

Figure 6-5. Mesquite clogs the grove of California Fan Palms at the Oasis of Mara. The dark 

areas in the understory vegetation are mistletoe. All three species are native to the region. Photo 

by the author. 

suppression basis, and no major fires occurred during the two decades. A 1963 survey of the unit 

reported 208,500 acres susceptible to fire, 29,000 of them on non-federal land. The 1974 natural 

resource management plan proposed a study of fire ecology throughout the varied vegetation 

communities of the monument citing the 1948 Randolph Fire to justify it. The monument's 

outline of planning requirements suggested that a fire management plan be developed, but

complacency and an agreement to allow the California Division of Forestry to suppress all fires 

gave it a low priority. Monument officials also noticed that smog occasionally obscured the vista 

at Keys View. As early as 1956, the Public Health Service announced it would monitor air 

quality in eleven park units. The closest one to Joshua Tree was Grand Canyon National Park. 

No true desert areas received monitors despite the fact that Joshua Tree’s 1974 resource 

management plan recommended a four year study by university scientists to evaluate the effect 

of smog, particularly ozone, on vegetation in the monument.

68 

Keys Ranch and Other Cultural Resources

A heightened focus on historical and cultural resources accompanied the sweeping 

environmental legislation during this period. Two important laws significantly changed the rules 

for the NPS and other federal agencies--the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and 
199

President Richard Nixon's Executive Order 11593 in 1971. The first of these strengthened 

protection of historic and archaeological resources in four ways. First, it established the National 

Register of Historic Places, a list of structures and sites nominated and approved for legal 

protection. Second, it created an Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to approve any 

nomination to the register and monitor plans that might affect them. Third, it authorized and 

funded state offices of historic preservation to similarly monitor sites within their boundaries. 

Fourth, and perhaps most significant, section 106 of the act ordered the federal government to 

evaluate any action’s impact on a federal historic property or site receiving federal preservation 

funds and minimize that impact. So-called “106 compliance” does not mean a structure on the 

register or listed as eligible for it cannot be affected or even removed. However, it requires 

consultation by the advisory council and the state historic preservation officer and then a careful 

recording of all construction and design details. The NPS administers the national register 

program.

69

Five years later, historic preservation advocates convinced President Richard Nixon to 

issue Executive Order 11593. This policy moved federal historic preservation to a proactive 

stance by ordering agencies to take stock of all buildings, structures, and sites under their control 

and assess their suitability for nomination to the national register of historic places. Specifically,

each agency, including each national park system unit, had to provide a list of eligible sites by 

July 1, 1973. At Joshua Tree, this order shook the staff out of its historic preservation lethargy 

and forced it to analyze the monument’s cultural resources. Once the monument officials began 

their survey, they had to follow the tight regulations embodied in the National Historic 

Preservation Act.70

The story of cultural resource preservation at Joshua Tree between 1957 and 1976 

includes five separate but related elements: archaeology, museum storage, identification of sites 

for the national register, the fate of the Lost Horse Mine, and the controversy surrounding the 

future of Keys Ranch. In the mid-1950s, the NPS finally addressed the requests for an 

archaeological survey made by James Cole and Louis Laywood. In November 1956,

Superintendent Elmer Fladmark submitted an archaeological base map derived from piecemeal 

private explorations and Laywood’s survey and requested funds for more work. At the time,

Professor William J. Wallace of the University of Southern California was busy surveying the 

archaeology of Death Valley National Monument. A few months later, the agency’s chief of 

interpretation, Ronald Lee, recommended that a small portion of the $2,500 set aside for the 

larger monument be used for a cursory inspection of Joshua Tree. In November 1957, Wallace 

and several others spent three days looking over Squaw Tank, Deep Tank, and the Pinto Basin. 

Curiously he dismissed the latter as “disappointing,” but also recommended much more 

research.71

While NPS officials discussed a memorandum of agreement for Wallace to conduct a 

full survey of the monument, two former graduate students from the University of California, 

Berkeley requested permission to identify sites for proper treatment by archaeologists at their 

alma mater. NPS officials told Francis and Patricia Johnston they would have to coordinate with 

William Wallace. During the next several years, the Johnstons identified a number of sites with 

petroglyphs or artifacts which they dutifully reported to the monument officials. Meanwhile,

Wallace and his students excavated sites near Squaw Tank and at Sheep Pass (between Lost 
200

Horse Valley and Queen Valley). Ultimately, Wallace surveyed approximately two and one-half 

percent of the monument, primarily in the western half where the dangers of vandalism and theft 

were greater. Later in the decade, Joshua Tree contracted for two more site-specific surveys with 

George Kritzman at Indian Cove and Dennis O’Neil at Barker Dam.72

By 1969, enough archaeological work had occurred at Joshua Tree to warrant an 

overview and a plan for further research. This resulted in part from the heralded acquisition of 

much of the material still in the possession of Elizabeth Campbell on July 15. Regional 

Archaeologist Leslie E. Wildesen prepared the research plan which she began by formally

acknowledging that Joshua Tree had been established to preserve biological elements from both 

the Mojave and Colorado Deserts. She followed with a statement of archaeological significance 

that enumerated three themes, the early man period from 9000 to 2000 BCE found mostly in the 

Pinto Basin, the proto-historic period from 1000 AD to the mid-nineteenth century, and the 

contact period thereafter. Wildesen then suggested several research proposals including a 

complete survey of the entire monument, a comparison of its findings to other desert areas of 

California, test excavations at Stirrup Tank and Conejo Well, and a detailed study of the road to 

Cholla Cactus Garden.73

Six years later, Thomas King, who later became the senior archaeologist for the Advisory 

Council on Historic Preservation, wrote an archaeological overview of Joshua Tree in which he 

summarized past research, criticized several elements in Wildesen’s report, and offered his own 

recommendations in the form of four questions that needed answers: (1) What brings people to 

occupy deserts? (2) How do desert people conceptualize space? (3) What are the reasons for and 

the effects of small group size and mobility? and (4) What are the effects of “marginal” living? 

He concluded with yet another call for a systematic survey of the entire monument starting with 

developed areas and roads. Superintendent Homer Rouse admired the expertise King brought to 

the study, but posed a question that often follows research at national parks, of what use is the 

study for managers? He found little that could be translated to an agency form requesting funds 

for a specific project.74

Another aspect in the reports of both Wildesen and King concerned the storage and 

cataloguing of museum materials, especially the Campbell Collection. The collection included 

many very old artifacts as well as human remains from the early man period. Placement of these 

materials in the maintenance garage bays outraged the archaeologists. Superintendent Rouse 

bristled at the criticism and accused King of ignoring the new security system and plans to add a 

proper storage and display room to the visitor center. Nevertheless, every cultural resource 

inspection or plan decried the situation (Figure 6-6). Decisions about the extensive array of 

materials at the Keys Ranch heightened the criticism. In 1974, Donald J. Colville, acting as 

superintendent, answered a demand from the regional office to explain the location and condition 

of all cultural resource items. Although the visitor center had twenty-four cabinets devoted to 

artifact and specimens, the bulk of the resources were stuffed into the maintenance garage bays 

at headquarters plus part of the Quonset hut at Pinto Wye. Furthermore, the staff took the 

amazing step of burying a “truckload” of metates and other stone relics behind the garage bays. 

In February 1975, a visiting preservation specialist suggested that the monument buy a modular 

climate-controlled structure called a “Bally building” for the Campbell Collection, but 

Superintendent Rouse insisted that modification of the garage bay would suffice.75
201

Figure 6-6. One of the garage bays that held Native American artifacts from the Campbell 

Collection and other museum materials until 1993. Photographer unknown. JTNP photo 

archives, general collection. 

Historic Preservation

Establishment of the national register and Executive Order 11593 forced the NPS to locate and 

nominate qualified historic features. As it did with most resource management tasks, the agency

sent officials from regional offices or other task-directed centers to carry out most of the work. A 

1969 inspection by agency historian Benjamin Levy found the monument staff enthusiastic about 
202

historic preservation, but he cautioned that Superintendent Supernaugh opposed listing some 

sites like Ryan Ranch. Nevertheless, in February 1972, historian F. Ross Holland from the 

Denver Service Center proposed nine sites for listing including: (1) Keys Ranch, (2) the Ryan 

House, (3) Lost Horse Mine, (4) Cottonwood Oasis, (5) the Oasis of Mara, (6) Cow Camp, (7) 

Desert Queen Mine, (8) Wall Street Mill, and (9) Barker Dam (Map 6-1). Over the next two 

years, monument and regional officials collected photographs and added more data on each site 

to the forms as requested by the Washington Office. Regional Historian Gordon Chappell 

submitted the final forms in June 1975. One of the requirements on each form is classification of 

the structure or site as national, regional or local in significance. Chappell’s forms identified all 

nine as local in significance, the lowest ranking. After submission of the forms, all nine became

eligible for the register and, hence, legally protected by the National Historic Preservation Act. 

Over the next seven months, the Advisory Council added six of the sites to the register but left 

Lost Horse Mine, the Oasis of Mara, and Cottonwood Oasis as eligible because of issues that 

might be solved in the future.76

 

Map 6-1. Joshua Tree National Monument sites nominated for the National Register of Historic 

Places in the 1970s. Source: Linda Greene. 1983. "A History of Land Use Joshua Tree National 

Monument, California," 471.

The Lost Horse Mine and its mill presented Joshua Tree with problems that often plague 

historic mines including subsidence due to collapsed shafts and stopes beneath the surface and 

disintegration of above-ground structures due to weathering, wind, and gravity. In the early 

1960s, the mine and mill still looked as if operations had ceased recently (Figure 6-7). The mine 
203

Figure 6-7. The Lost Horse Mine in 1967 before the headframe collapsed. The mine has suffered 

dangerous deterioration below the surface as well. Photo by Donald Black. JTNP photo archives, 

Cat. 20575, Image 1370.
204

hoist still stood, the ten-stamp mill was intact, and equipment and debris littered the site. It 

offered a fine opportunity for interpretation if it could be cleaned up and stabilized. Then, in 

1964, Ranger Alsen Inman found nine sticks of dynamite at the 200-foot level with tracks of 

both adult and child visitors nearby. The dynamite appeared to be at least twenty-five years old. 

Inman reported that the mine’s timbers seemed to be in fair condition but the ladders were not. 

Three years later, another ranger, James Lynch, inspected the surface features and found more

serious problems. In particular, he noted that the prominent headframe might soon collapse. At 

the time, visitors could still drive to the mine. Lynch suggested that the road be closed and the 

entire mine fenced “to prevent someone from falling onto the sunken grate, breaking through the 

rotten floor or getting hit by the tower falling.”77 Benjamin Levy and other historians considered 

the mine a worthy site for interpretation of the mining era and perhaps the premier historic

structure in the monument. However, a storm knocked over the headframe in early 1970 

diminishing their enthusiasm for the site as a prime visitor attraction.78

The most controversial site for preservation and interpretation at Joshua Tree was Keys 

Ranch (Figure 6-8). The decision to preserve it and its addition to the national register made it 

the largest display of cultural artifacts in the monument. In 1973, Joshua Tree officials chose Bill 

Keys' multi-faceted subsistence complex to be the monument's Bicentennial Celebration site. 

Officials in the NPS were by no means unified in this decision. During the years after his wife’s 

death in 1963, Keys collected ever more castoff tools and equipment including one entire 

junkyard according to a later NPS report. After the old miner’s demise, his heirs removed some 

artifacts and papers of personal value, but the bulk of the material belonging to the estate 

remained onsite. The agency failed to provide funds to protect the ranch, but Warner Brothers

Studio rescued it with a $15,000 donation in 1970. A year earlier, the movie company had 

constructed a life-size replica of the Yuma Territorial Prison in the Pinto Basin and filmed 

"There Was a Crooked Man" starring Kirk Douglas, Henry Fonda, and Burgess Meredith.

Warner Brothers made the donation to thank the agency for allowing it to film in the monument. 

The NPS used that money to buy the mining equipment and other materials from the Keys heirs. 

With the purchase, Superintendent Supernaugh solemnly promised one of Keys’s daughters that 

the agency would protect the ranch and interpret it for visitors.79

The NPS sent a team of historic preservation officials to Joshua Tree in July 1971 to 

inspect several of the potential register sites identified by Benjamin Levy. Team member Dave 

Clary described Keys Ranch, “If this were any place else, it would be declared a public nuisance 

and the guy would be made to clean it up; but since it’s in a National Monument, we’re going to 

preserve and interpret it.” Team leader Glennie Murray added, “any way you cut it, it’s a mess—

cleaned up there would be nothing to interpret.”80 They called the ranch house a “shack” and 

predicted its imminent collapse, but admitted that Keys had been an exceptional stone-mason as 

evinced by a formidable chimney. In spite of this evaluation, the Washington Office ordered that 

every unit in the park system should develop a site to commemorate the nation’s bicentennial. As 

the largest collection of historic structures in Joshua Tree, the ranch was the only realistic option. 

In January 1975, as monument interpreters prepared the program for the bicentennial, another 

team of historical specialists led by Gordon Chappell visited the ranch to decide its long term 

fate. They recommended that the buildings be removed or allowed to disintegrate. This 

supported the monument’s own leaders who proposed a policy of “benign neglect.”81 
205

Figure 6-8. Keys Ranch in 1969. Today the ranch serves as the primary interpretive feature in the 

park. Photo by F. Ross. Holland. JTNP photo archives, Cat. 20575, Image 2237. 

As the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation pondered the ranch’s nomination to the 

national register, Superintendent Rouse asked for a study to determine its archaeological 

significance. Keith Anderson of the agency's Western Archaeological Center in Tucson, Arizona 

recommended Patricia Hickman. Her 1976 report on the Desert Queen Ranch elevated Keys to 

the status of a regional entrepreneur competing with nearby towns, operating far-reaching 

financial links, and shaping the destiny of the desert country. She called for extensive future 

research to learn the full story of how Keys manipulated the environment and society to gain 

economic and social control. She also strongly recommended that the site's status be raised to the 

level of regional significance.

82

Historians Gordon Chappell and Thomas Mulhern of the regional office vigorously 

disputed Hickman's conclusions, especially one that called for much more pure research in order 

to understand the Bill Keys story. What ensued was a debate between historians and 

anthropologists over the place of academic versus applied research to satisfy the management 

needs of the NPS. Chappell challenged the integrity of the materials at the ranch and the purpose 

of Hickman's report: 

We have Region-wide, historic structures which are falling apart for which we cannot 

obtain adequate funding merely for structural preservation. Now here we have a proposal 
206

for 'long term research' on a property of strictly local significance, research which in the 

end has no practical application to the Service, research which will lead to conclusions 

that are of questionable validity due to the lack of integrity of the resource being studied, 

which can only be funded by the Service at the cost of historic structures elsewhere in the 

Region, including some of regional significance whereas Keys' Ranch is strictly of local 

significance.83

Regional Research Archaeologist Anderson answered that Hickman's study was well 

done and exactly what NPS policy required: 

The determination that historical properties contain archaeological (anthropological) 

information does not require a mindless insistence on preservation of properties as sacred 

shrines. The value of these resources lies in the information to be gained by their study. 

In most cases this value can be maintained by leaving the properties alone. Where man or 

nature is unavoidably destroying them, their values can be preserved by professionally 

adequate recovery of data. However, policy and law require that such decisions be made 

after clear and open discussion, not on the basis of snap judgments, and that they be 

founded on agreement by professionals and management, not on inflexible resistance by 

either side.84

Ultimately, Anderson's view prevailed. The NPS embarked on a program that included further 

research, compilation of a list of artifacts, and development of techniques for their preservation 

and presentation to the public. It is uncertain what impact the diversion of funds to Keys Ranch 

had on other historic preservation programs in the region. Hickman also urged the agency to halt 

public tours at the ranch fearing that they might displace or damage artifacts. Nobody at the 

monument paid any attention to that idea.85

Visitors, Crime, and Interpretation

During the years 1957 through 1976 annual visitation to Joshua Tree National Monument rose 

sporadically from 320,267 to 748,441. Wet years produced more flowers and drew more visitors 

than dry years. Interpretive activities increased in number and scope, although restricted 

primarily to weekends and holidays. Monument officials developed more venues for visitor 

contact and new programs to extend their outreach. Vandalism and other illegal activities 

continued to stress the need for more communication. But insufficient personnel, low funding,

and inadequate space limited what the staff could accomplish. The Joshua Tree National 

Monument [Park] Association, established in 1962, helped by providing funds for programs and 

employees to assume some visitor contact duties. Completion of the visitor center the following 

year gave them and the monument's interpreters somewhere to work and to meet the public.86 

Over the next decade, Joshua Tree's few interpretation employees started most of the 

traditional programs used at other parks in the system. Rangers erected natural history signs, 

provided brochures for four nature trails, conducted winter and spring walks on holidays and 

weekends, gave campfire talks to groups, spoke to school classes and other groups outside the 

monument, taught desert survival programs for the marines at the Twentynine Palms base, and 

manned the visitor center daily. When available, they also staffed the new Cottonwood Entrance 
207

Station and the Lost Horse Ranger Station. However, some popular activities like ranger-led auto 

tours had to be cancelled because of insufficient personnel.87

Like most units of the national park system, Joshua Tree boasted a select number of 

popular attractions that drew almost every visitor, while large expanses like the Pinto Basin 

remained little traveled. Most of the popular features clustered between the entrances at 

Twentynine Palms and Joshua Tree village. Overnight stays in that area's five campgrounds 

increased much faster than overall visitation, boosting the numbers of cars and people at those 

select attractions. The 1971 draft master plan was an attempt to solve the problem with its

proposed Cap Rock Visitor Center. An "Interpretive Prospectus" accompanied the ill-fated plan 

and described five themes for interpretation of Joshua Tree, including early Native American 

life, desert ecology, the region's mining and ranching history, geology, and desert animals. 

Although the NPS dropped both the 1971 draft management plan and the concomitant 

interpretive prospectus, the latter gave direction to the interpretation program during the 

remainder of the decade.88

The incidence of non-compatible land uses by monument neighbors, including grazing, 

wood-collecting, and poaching, decreased during the monument's third and fourth decades. 

Unfortunately, vandalism and crime did not. In 1971, the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner carried a 

story documenting multiple problems at the monument caused by overcrowding, widespread 

crime, and the lack of sufficient law enforcement personnel. The report specifically mentioned 

defacement of rocks, theft of native vegetation, and an attempt to establish a marijuana farm as 

recent issues. Five years later, monument officials reported substantial damage at Fortynine 

Palms Oasis stemming from periodic overcrowding and vandalism. The NPS blamed young 

marines at the Twentynine Palms base for some of the trouble. Base commanders strictly 

enforced laws and regulations, but could not stop ill-conceived activities by off-duty troops. A 

riot at Stoneman Meadow in Yosemite National Park on July 4, 1970 highlighted the growing 

need for NPS law enforcement to become more like urban police work. At Joshua Tree theft,

vandalism, and drug infractions demanded law enforcement by rangers with police training. The 

shift of personnel and funds to law enforcement ultimately drew from the interpretation program. 

Visitors to Joshua Tree and other units across the nation keenly missed contacts with traditional 

rangers and the programs they presented. Congress anticipated the problem by passing the 

Volunteers in the Parks Act in 1970 which enabled parks across the country to enroll unpaid 

members of the public who wish to help. Volunteers soon manned visitor centers and entrance 

stations allowing the interpretation staff to focus on in-park programs and educational outreach.89

In 1973 one of the more bizarre episodes in NPS law enforcement history occurred at 

Joshua Tree. The coincident rise of the 1960s counter-culture movement and drug use, expressed 

volubly in rock music, led many people including musicians to seek places of retreat. With the 

enormous entertainment industry in Los Angeles, it followed that some found Joshua Tree 

National Monument and its assortment of geological and botanical wonders. Gram Parsons, a 

member of several bands, including the Byrds and the Flying Burrito Brothers, particularly 

enjoyed the Cap Rock and Wonderland of Rocks areas. He visited the monument with Chris 

Hillman, another former member of the Byrds, Keith Richards of the Rolling Stones, Michelle 

Phillips of the Mamas and the Papas, and others from the contemporary music scene. He 

reportedly said: 
208

I spend a lot of time up at Joshua Tree in the desert, just looking at the San Andreas 

Fault. And I say to myself, "I wish I was a bird drifting up above it."90 

Unfortunately on September 19, while staying at the Joshua Tree Inn, he died from a drug 

overdose at the age of twenty-six. Two days later, maintenance employees at Joshua Tree noticed 

smoke in the air near Cap Rock. What they found burning was the body of Gram Parsons still 

inside his casket. For several days news reports speculated on how the body had gotten from the 

Los Angeles Airport, where it was due to be flown to New Orleans, to the national monument 

100 miles to the east. 

As it turned out, the singer's road manager Philip Kaufman and personal friend Michael 

Martin had convinced airport authorities to release the body to them. They hurried to fulfill a 

death wish made by Parsons a few weeks earlier. He had told Kaufman that he wanted to be 

cremated and have his ashes scattered at Cap Rock. Although the court fined Kaufman and 

Martin $300 each, many in the music world congratulated the singer's manager for honoring his 

friend's wish. Subsequently, the NPS downplayed the incident and refused to acknowledge it in 

the interpretation program. In recent years, former Chief of Interpretation Joseph Zarki and 

consultants reviewing the unit's history program have urged officials to add the story to its 

interpretation. The NPS continues to resist, although it has allowed occasional ad hoc concerts at 

Indian Cove to honor the park's musical heritage. The concerts have raised public awareness of 

both the singer-songwriter and Joshua Tree National Park.91 

A Bad Report Card

During the final weeks of the successful campaign to establish wilderness in the monument, the 

Western Regional Office sent a team of experts to perform a “management assessment” of the 

unit and its staff. The survey team, headed by Regional Chief of Operations Gustav W. 

Muehlenhaupt, tried to be diplomatic and offered effusive praise whenever possible, but overall 

its 1976 report was a damning document. The team offered seventy-three recommendations, 

sixty-four of them the sole responsibility of Superintendent Rouse. Team members did not blame 

Rouse for all the problems, but rather identified budget and staffing shortfalls and the cumulative 

effect of many years of inadequate operations. At the time, Joshua Tree had five divisions 

reporting to the superintendent: administration, maintenance, interpretation, protection, and 

lands. The worst situation concerned natural resources which the protection division managed in 

addition to its responsibilities for law enforcement, visitor safety, search and rescue, and fire 

protection. The management team repeatedly stressed the need for a separate resource 

management division with its own budget and attached letters in the appendices further arguing 

for immediate action. Other problems included the lack of a master plan since the Mission 66 

update in 1964, serious road deterioration, poor trail signage, inadequate staffing in the 

protection and interpretation divisions, and the absence of safety and orientation information at 

Joshua Tree village where more than half the visitors entered the unit. Joshua Tree National 

Monument had weathered intense opposition, enormous land acquisition needs, a major loss of 

territory, and minimal attention from senior agency officials. It had survived for forty years. But 

those problems had taken their toll.92
209

Chapter Seven: Joshua Tree Enhanced, 1977-1996

Joshua Tree National Monument began its fifth decade faced with multiple problems in addition 

to those identified in the 1976 management report. A 1978 Statement for Management identified

suburban encroachment, danger from abandoned mines, disruption and crime by marines 

stationed at the nearby base, deteriorating roads, air pollution, and potential development on 

remaining private inholdings as major concerns. A year later, in response to a system-wide 

survey request by the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Insular Affairs, 

Superintendent Rick Anderson added trespass by off-road vehicles, vandalism, invasion of exotic 

plants, and noise pollution from artillery at the marine base and low flying military jets. Five 

major problems needed research, reevaluation, and action. Control of the land and water sources 

remained insecure in many areas of the monument. A lack of overall vision and coordination 

hampered planning and development. Natural resources faced growing threats without an 

organized staff to study, much less manage, them. Cultural resources received little attention 

from an overworked and understaffed interpretation division. Finally, as visitation dramatically 

soared, physical damage from crowding at popular attractions and vandalism increased. 

Unfortunately, adequate funding to correct these problems seemed unattainable.

1

In spite of these problems, the staff at Joshua Tree accomplished much between 1977 and 

1996 to correct deficiencies and put Joshua Tree on a solid management footing. In these efforts,

they continued to receive grudging attention and periodic criticism from some officials in the 

regional office and Washington, D.C. Yet by the 1990s, the Joshua Tree enjoyed leadership by 

particularly capable superintendents. Key additions to the natural and cultural resource 

management staff established new programs that finally brought respect and more funding from 

regional officials. At the same time, changing public perception of the desert by 

environmentalists and legislators led to a campaign that upgraded the unit to a national park and 

added land that brought the total acreage back to ninety-six percent of its original 1936 total.

From a somewhat disgraced national monument in 1977 to a popular national park in 1996, 

Joshua Tree began to resemble the vision Minerva Hoyt had for her beloved desert.

The Long Campaign: Land Acquisition 

After the establishment of the Joshua Tree Wilderness, agency land officials continued to pursue 

the remaining non-federal lands in the monument. A 1977 National Park Service (NPS) survey

showed that the agency controlled all but 11,470 acres in the monument, more than 7,000 of 

them in low risk state ownership. The highly critical management consultation report had 

virtually nothing to say about land acquisition program.

2 Furthermore, the remaining years of 

national monument status began auspiciously with the purchase of forty-five tax-delinquent 

properties from a more cooperative Riverside County on October 20, 1977. Most of the parcels 

were located in the Pinto Basin and ranged from five to twenty acres in size.3 Nevertheless, a 

follow-up inspection by the regional office found problems with monument-based realty 

specialist David C. Hemstreet's program. Review team leader William E. Weidenhamer found 

Hemstreet too rigid or timid in pursuing some possible purchases. Several property owners 

offered to sell their land but held firm to prices higher than Hemstreet believed the parcels were 

worth. In some cases, the difference was only five or ten percent higher than what the NPS

offered. Weidenhamer reported that one owner offered sixty acres for $54,000, but for three 

years Hemstreet refused to go above $49,500:
210

I thought we should have purchased it. I don't believe we are buying many 60-acre tracts 

at Joshua Tree nor do I think it would set a precedent. Even if it did, if we could buy the 

whole project for only 9 percent over our appraised amounts, it would be a good deal the 

way land is escalating in California.4

Superintendent Rick Anderson vigorously defended Hemstreet claiming that the property was 

located in a subdivision within the monument's boundary and that he, rather than the land officer, 

should be blamed for the slow progress there. Nevertheless, three months later the regional 

director transferred all further land acquisition responsibilities for Joshua Tree to his office in 

San Francisco.5 

Over the next fifteen years land acquisition in the monument continued at a slow and 

sporadic pace. The major achievement of the period concerned the same subdivision where 

Hemstreet balked at paying more than the government price. In the late 1950s, a group of 

investors purchased a section of land they named “Whispering Pines” just inside the northern 

boundary of the monument and accessible from the unpaved road to Covington Flat. In 1960,

they signed a legal agreement to distribute the cost of maintaining a mile of road from the 

Covington Flat Road to their development. In order to prevent trespass and protect their 

properties, they erected fences and a locked gate on their road as well. The agreement could only 

be rescinded by a vote of the owners of the majority of the acreage in the subdivision. The NPS

did not initially react to this intrusion into the monument as it did with those proposed for areas 

near the main road to Hidden Valley. Some of the owners in Whispering Pines built recreation 

homes, but problems arose by the late 1970s. Access to the Whispering Pines area proved more 

expensive than the owners had predicted. Heavy storms washed out not only the private road, but 

occasionally the Covington Flat Road as well. While the agency struggled to grade and repair its 

road with limited funds, the subdivision owners found their property inaccessible from time to 

time. Many of them, particularly the ones who had not yet built on their lots, decided that their 

best course was to sell to the NPS. Even those who had homes in the area were not averse to 

selling to the government if they could retain rights to use the property after the sale.6 

At the same time another group calling itself the Pine Valley Association bought the 

section of land immediately north of Whispering Pines (Map 7-1). The Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM) sold this land outside the monument to association members. However, 

access to Pine Valley was more difficult. The area lay to the east of Nolina Peak and also faced 

rugged terrain on the east and north. The only feasible vehicle access routes to the area were over 

the private road from Whispering Pines or from a maintenance road to a radio tower on Nolina 

Peak and then through private property. The owners at Whispering Pines and a lawyer named 

Parker who held the eastern flank of the mountain steadfastly refused to allow access. For more 

than twenty years, the Pine Valley Association sought a solution appealing to both state and 

federal legislators for relief. One owner even graded an illegal road from government property in 

Whispering Pines, only to have the NPS force him to remove it and rehabilitate the route. For 

years the group tried to convince the agency to allow an access road through the monument to 

their private land outside its boundary. NPS solicitors argued that allowing such access would set 

a bad precedent for the entire system and refused. Superintendent Anderson met with its 

representatives in October 1978 and encouraged them to execute an exchange with the BLM for 
211

Map 7-1. Whispering Pines and Pine Valley developments inside and outside Joshua Tree 

National Park respectively. Data source: Pacific West Region (WRO) Land Resource Program 

Center. October 20, 2009. “Revised Joshua Tree National Park Land Status, Segment 104.” 

accessible land closer to Joshua Tree village. Yet, eight years later, nothing had changed, perhaps 

due to the inferior scenic quality of the government land.7

At Whispering Pines the 1960 agreement held up NPS acquisition of the tracts from 

willing sellers. The government could not acquire land with legal caveats such as the fencing and 

road maintenance fees. Hence, on April 25, 1979, the court approved a declaration of taking 

whereby the agency acquired 475 acres of the subdivision. A number of the owners received 

retained rights agreements allowing them to stay for periods of eight to twenty-five years. 

Although registered as a condemnation, the action allowed the government, as the new majority 

owner, to dispense with the agreement's requirements as they acquired property from willing 

sellers. The plight of the Pine Valley owners remained a problem, even after Joshua Tree 

expanded to include Nolina Peak immediately to the west. Elsewhere in the monument, the NPS

purchased a scattered batch of properties, including a few from the Metropolitan Water District

(MWD), but these added fewer than 600 acres from private individuals and another 480 from an 

April 1980 exchange with the California State Lands Commission. Once again, a lack of funding 

stymied agreements between regional land officials and willing sellers. Under the presidential 

administrations of the 1980s, the NPS could only purchase land from owners who could 

demonstrate a financial need to sell. Otherwise, the agency apologized to willing sellers and 

offered hope that more funds might appear in the future. As proponents of the California Desert 
212

Protection Act that would vastly expand Joshua Tree gathered support in early 1994, more than 

10,000 acres of non-federal land still existed in the monument.8 

Water Rights Again

Diminishing water resources continued to be a problem in Joshua Tree despite the expiration of 

several historic water rights. At Black Rock Canyon, the NPS signed a water conservation 

agreement with the Hi Desert Water District which supplied the town of Yucca Valley. In the 

rest of the monument, only the well near Cottonwood Campground provided a reliable source of 

water for visitors. The establishment of wilderness over most of the Pinto Basin highlighted a 

growing problem connected to Kaiser Steel's use of the MWD land around Pinto Well #1. 

Residents of the Eagle Mountain town used the property as a staging area for illegal off-road 

vehicle use within the wilderness. The monument had too few rangers to patrol the huge roadless 

area and blamed mine employees for ignoring the law. The issue prompted agency officials to 

reconsider the company's water rights as well as the validity of the water district's inholding. 

Superintendent Rick Anderson raised the oft-asked question of whether the district had the legal 

right to sell water to Kaiser. He wanted closure on the Pinto Wells problem, and he wanted that 

doorway to illegal off-road vehicle use absolutely eliminated. Demonstrating a remarkably 

resilient optimism, regional office solicitor John McMunn suggested that the water district might 

wish to donate the parcel to the monument subject to a special use permit guaranteeing water in 

the case of an emergency. Anderson dismissed that idea as unrealistic and focused on

condemning or buying the land and water right. McMunn answered that the NPS would probably 

lose a condemnation case but a purchase might work.9

A few weeks later, in January 1977, Kaiser Steel drew attention back to Pinto Well #2 on 

monument land. Senior Eagle Mountain Mine Supervisors Bob Dale and Dave Wicks explained 

to Superintendent Anderson that they expected operations to last at least another twenty-five 

years, and they still needed its water to exploit additional ore resources that the company owned 

immediately outside the Joshua Tree National Monument. Kaiser also held eleven claims inside 

the monument on the northern slope of the Eagle Mountains, but a 1974 appraisal rated the 

chances of profit from them as nil. Monument officials nevertheless wanted those claims 

eliminated and the company saw an opportunity. Eagle Mountain Mine manager John Englund 

offered to trade the 193 acres encompassed in the claims for permission to use Pinto Well #2 

water. In 1971, congress had passed Public Law 91-383 establishing a policy whereby water and 

other resources within a national park unit could be secured by outside users under a set of strict 

conditions. The user had to prove (1) that the resource would be available to the general public,

(2) that no other viable source existed, (3) that it was essential to his or her operation, and (4) 

that it would not lead to a future dependency or increased demand. Legislators extended the law 

in 1976, and it became a permanent part of NPS management. Unfortunately for Kaiser Steel, the 

law prevented Joshua Tree from agreeing to the deal because the company could not show that 

its use would benefit the general public, and that it had no alternate sources of water.10 

During the 1970s, Kaiser Steel tried and tried to get more water from Joshua Tree 

National Monument while keeping its own financial condition secret from the NPS. During that 

time, it began shifting employees and their families away from Eagle Mountain to Desert Center,

thirteen miles away. In order to support resettlement, the company increased its procurement of 

water from wells in the Chuckwalla Valley. But, at the same time, the international iron and steel 
213

business evolved in ways that hit the company hard. Demand for steel from its Fontana plant 

steadily dropped due to competition from foreign countries. In 1981, Kaiser Steel announced that 

its operations at Fontana and Eagle Mountain would close. The company subsequently laid off 

its workers and closed down the town of Eagle Mountain. And there it was. Suddenly the 

problem of the Pinto Wells appeared to be over. However, Kaiser held on to its mining claims,

water infrastructure, and access roads while the MWD still refused to return its property and 

water right to the monument.11

Planning and Building a Better Monument

With so many operational and resource protection problems before them, the staff at Joshua Tree 

National Monument needed to generate a series of carefully wrought plans. The monument

needed transportation and development programs, natural and cultural resource plans, an 

interpretation prospectus, and visitor use studies to address its many shortcomings. The 1976 

management consultation report had much to say about the infrastructure at Joshua Tree National 

Monument. Although the investigators found most of the Mission 66-era buildings in good 

condition, their assessment of the roads was grim:

The park has eighty-three miles of paved roads, of which seventy miles are deplorable. 

Thirteen miles of park road have been, or are in the process of being, reconstructed. The 

remaining seventy miles of road were never constructed but evolved over the years from 

graded roads to the present state by a matrix of surface treatments and patches on top of 

patches. Generally road surfaces are rough with raveled edges in many sections.12

The inspection team recommended that the superintendent apply for regional funds to completely 

reconstruct the seventy miles of bad road. By 1978, the monument had a plan to rehabilitate

several roads but accomplished little. Over the next six years, monument crews repaired specific 

problem spots on the recently recalculated eighty-four miles of paved roads, but still considered 

only thirteen miles to be adequate. The remainder averaged eighteen feet in width with soft, 

sandy shoulders and occasional sharp curves. Erosion breached sections whenever storms 

occurred. Funding remained scarce, and the project promised to be an expensive one.

A reprieve came in 1982 when congress passed the “Surface Transportation Assistance 

Act,” which provided money for upgrading national park system roads.13 Two years later, the 

NPS completed a transportation study at Joshua Tree with help from the Federal Highway 

Administration. The transportation study team recommended that the two agencies widen most 

of the roads to between twenty and twenty-six feet adding paved shoulders, apply three inches of 

asphalt to all the substandard areas, improve drainage, realign some sections to halt erosion and 

ease sharp curves, and add or expand parking areas. They recommended a program of steps 

through fiscal years 1985 to 1990 to accomplish all the work. Many of the components of the 

plan would be expensive, especially the control of erosion and damage from flash floods. The 

study also identified seventy-six miles of unimproved roads, but offered no recommendations. A 

few years earlier, Riverside County had notified the NPS that it would no longer maintain the 

Gold Crown Road (Old Dale Road) in the monument or the Berdoo Canyon Road outside the 

monument boundary. Agency officials happily accepted this news and agreed to keep the former 

for four-wheel-drive vehicles only.14
214

For the rest of the 1980s, work proceeded on the roads, though not at the pace hoped for 

in 1984. During that time, monument and Denver Service Center (DSC) officials continued to 

study traffic patterns, parking needs, automobile accident statistics, and other data. By 1989, they 

decided to completely redesign the transportation system through the Hidden and Lost Horse

valleys. Several problems were apparent along the route. Large recreational vehicles bogged 

down traffic as they tried to negotiate sharp turns, and more than thirty accidents per year 

endangered visitors and resources. In addition, congestion and other problems beset all of the 

intersections with spur roads to campgrounds or attractions like Keys View and Barker Dam. 

Agency planners proposed several options to redress the situation. One option would further 

widen the existing east-west road, which would heavily impact the area’s Joshua trees. Another 

would convert the existing road to one-way traffic and pave two dirt tracks to the north known as 

the Queen Valley and Barker Dam roads to handle the vehicles going the other direction. This 

option soon became known as the Loop Road (Map 7-2). A third option was a combination of 

the two which kept more of the existing paved road designated for travel in both directions.15

Over the next three years, the NPS conducted multiple onsite inspections and brought in a 

variety of consultants to assess potential damage to vegetation, desert tortoises, archaeological 

resources, and visitor safety in an intense effort to identify the best solution. Initially the agency 

preferred the one-way loop, even though this meant extra mileage and driving time for visitors 

who would want to access a site a short distance away but in the wrong road direction. The

obvious benefit of this option was that none of the roads would have to be widened, which would 

save on maintenance, speed up traffic, and protect the Joshua trees. However, both 

environmental groups and rock climbers opposed this. Local environmentalists preferred the 

Queen Valley and Barker Dam segments as quiet, slow, dirt roads with relatively little traffic. 

Rock climbers, who congregated at the nearby Wonderland of Rocks, feared congestion, parking 

problems, and threats to their activity if the northern route became a major park highway.16

In August 1991, the DSC released an environmental assessment of the new preferred 

option for Joshua Tree. This time NPS planners offered to pave the northern roads but keep them

narrow and one-way while creating a mix of one-way and two-way segments for the rest of the 

loop. They also proposed to widen the road to Keys View and add a number of new parking lots. 

In November, monument officials held two public hearings on the plan and met substantial 

opposition. At the same time, letters of opposition began appearing, some channeled through 

members of congress. Eventually, the monument recorded 251 letters which corresponded with 

public statements at the two hearings. Seventy-five percent of the respondents opposed the

preferred option primarily because it meant paving and realignment of the Queen Valley and 

Barker Dam roads. Only five percent favored that option. Most people wanted more parking but 

opposed large intrusive parking areas. To cope with large recreational vehicles some suggested 

banning them from certain roads including the one to Keys View. Almost everyone professed 

alarm at the idea of removing nearly 500 Joshua trees, which might be necessary under some 

options.17

After this reaction, monument planners initiated another round of inspections and studies 

to modify all the roads west of Pinto Wye. A consulting firm, Traffic Engineers, Inc., released a

report in June 1992 that supplied important new information. First, traffic had increased over the 

previous year by almost ten percent. A solution would have to be found soon. Second, traffic on 

the northeastern part of the loop, Queen Valley Road, was one-sixth of that on Barker Dam Road 
215

Map 7-2. The Park Service first proposed a counterclockwise one-way Loop Road in the main 

visitor part of the park. After public rejection the agency only paved the road from Hidden 

Valley to Barker Dam. Delta Cartography. 

on the northwestern part. It might not be necessary to pave all of it. Third, large vehicles made 

up a much smaller percent of the total traffic than originally estimated. This favored the idea of 

limiting vehicles on certain roads rather than widening the roadbeds. Fourth, the parking lots had 

reached capacity and more would be needed. Finally, and most telling, a one-way loop road 

would not improve the situation. After digesting this information and pondering the public 

reaction, the NPS chose to pave the road to Barker Dam, keep the rest of the northern half of the 

loop unpaved, and reconstruct most of the other roads at the same width. Monument workers 

also paved some of the rough parking lots. They still had to remove Joshua trees, but replanted 

some of them in other locations.18

The 1976 management report also criticized a few aspects of the trail system in Joshua 

Tree National Monument, but the tone was less severe and the recommendations less daunting. 

The inspectors merely suggested a few route adjustments to combat erosion and better signage,

especially on the California Riding and Hiking Trail. However, the public wanted more 

designated trails and monument officials tried to comply. An organization called the Desert Trail 

Association, supported by the California Recreational Trails Committee, proposed an all-desert 

trail from Canada to Mexico which would pass through Joshua Tree. Superintendent Anderson 

informed the group that he would approve the planned route across Pinto Basin, Smoke Tree 
216

Wash, and Pinkham Canyon because it would be entirely cross-country. The Desert Trail 

Association subsequently established segments of the long distance trail in Oregon and northern 

Nevada. However, the route through Joshua Tree remained a vague plan through the rest of the 

period leading to the 1994 boundary change. The NPS added one significant hiking route during 

this period called Lost Horse Trail. It covers a four and one-half mile loop from the site of the 

mine of the same name. The town of Desert Hot Springs proposed a combination hiking and 

horse-riding trail through the western edge of the monument and various other suggestions came 

from the Coachella Valley and the town of Yucca Valley, but the agency postponed any further 

action until completion of a general management plan.19 

During the years 1977 through 1996, the NPS added three significant structures to the 

aggregate of buildings in Joshua Tree as well as several offices and quarters at Black Rock 

Canyon, Cottonwood, and Pinto Wye. The agency finally built an entrance station on the road 

from Joshua Tree village, answering another criticism in the 1976 report. In 1985, it constructed 

a native plant nursery at headquarters to supply vegetation for rehabilitating disturbed areas. 

Finally, after a widely-publicized threat to remove the monument’s archaeological treasures 

including the Campbell Collection, the monument built a museum storage building and library 

with up-to-date technology to preserve objects, documents, and appropriate resource literature in 

1993.20 

Bob Moon and the Rise of Resource Management

Completion of the Leopold Report thirteen years earlier, and Secretary Stewart Udall’s 

subsequent order to manage the parks and monuments accordingly, began the transition to more 

professionalism in both resource management and law enforcement throughout the national park 

system. High profile parks such as Yosemite and Sequoia reorganized and hired resource 

specialists and on-site scientists fairly quickly. However, other units lagged behind, continuing 

programs with law enforcement rangers, some scientifically untrained, responsible for natural

resources. The 1980 "State of the Parks Report" to congress reiterated the problems that stemmed

from the grudging implementation of scientific management including insufficient funding to 

hire trained professionals, inertia, intransigence among senior park or monument officials facing

changes to traditional procedures, and unwillingness among division chiefs to relinquish control 

of programs and the funding they brought. All four impacted Joshua Tree National Monument.

The 1976 management consultation team’s report on resource management began with a 

flat statement:

Of the many Natural Resource concerns at the Monument there are some that are critical. 

Man has impacted the natural environment here by competing for water, protecting the 

area from natural fire, introducing exotic species, and simply by being present which 

affects animal behavior and damages fragile native vegetation. Under these current 

unnatural circumstances which cannot be avoided, irreparable damage could occur in the 

next few years unless enough management effort is made.21

The inspectors then listed some of the most critical research needs including provision of 

wildlife guzzlers, bighorn ecology and management, mule deer ecology, the flow from the 

springs and its relationship to vegetation, fan palm oasis management, fire ecology, and the 

overall impact of humans. 
217

In the document’s appendix, Regional Resource Specialist Francis H. Jacot blamed senior 

NPS officials steeped in a tradition of landscape protection rather than ecosystem protection, and 

he suggested the report did not go far enough. After pointing out five more shortcomings at 

Joshua Tree, he summarized two elements of the problem:

(1) Research and related efforts are proceeding at a commendable rate at [Joshua Tree 

National Monument], yet implementation and corrective actions at the park level are not 

receiving as great an emphasis as is warranted. To a degree I recognize the 

Superintendent does not have the wherewithal to do this and the basis for this situation 

rests above and beyond the park level; (2) Statements such as to “consider” seeking 

additional funds and placement of resource management above other park priorities and 

the funneling of existing park capabilities to management needs other than natural 

resources are examples which reflect a prevalent mental attitude which is far too 

widespread in the National Park Service. That is—changes continue to be needed which 

will unequivocally recognize the basic relationship of natural resources to natural parks 

by all levels of management. Only then can we attack the many problems which exist in 

practically every park within the System through more than active vocalization.22

Superintendent Rouse tried to defend himself and his staff, claiming that a number of specific 

problems resulted from delays caused by historic preservation laws and all the effort being 

poured into planning backcountry management. At the time of the report, Donald J. Colville 

headed the protection division at Joshua Tree and Herbert D. Cornell served as resource 

management specialist. Robert “Bob” Moon later stated that Colville reserved the resource 

management task for the person he considered the least competent law enforcement ranger. 

Cornell had no scientific training and personal problems that eventually caused him to quit the

NPS. Moon added that resource management officials at the regional office regarded the staff at 

Joshua Tree as incompetent and unworthy of significant support.23

Although Joshua Tree had a resource management plan, ecologist Charles Douglas of the 

University of Nevada, Las Vegas and his students conducted virtually all natural resource 

research. The NPS technically employed Douglas and based him at the university through a 

formal program in which it qualified as a “Cooperating Park Studies Unit.” This program 

evolved from an agreement between one or more parks and a university to one that is now called 

a Cooperation Ecosystem Studies Unit (CESU) between several federal land management 

agencies and universities to support research on many aspects of resource management. Douglas 

conducted or coordinated a number of important studies at Joshua Tree, but he had other 

responsibilities including a portfolio of projects at Death Valley National Monument. At the 

smaller monument, Cornell suffered from a lack of respect, training, and funds as he tried to 

address recommendations by the outside scientists. Three problems hampered funding for 

resource management. First, according to ecologist Jerome “Jerry” Freilich, most regional 

research funds never went past the “Sierra Curtain” by which he meant the glamorous Yosemite 

and Sequoia national parks. Second, the monument’s poor reputation at the regional office meant 

low funding anyway. Third, Chief Ranger Colville diverted some of what money did come for 

resource management to other programs.24

Regional Director Howard Chapman soon appointed Rick Anderson, to replace the 

departing Homer Rouse as superintendent. He served fourteen years marked by more criticism of 
218

Joshua Tree operations, but did execute the transition to a full resource management division 

reporting directly to the superintendent as recommended in the management report. The change 

centered on the monument’s first fully trained ecologist, Bob Moon (Figure 7-1). When Cornell

resigned, Moon was working as a seasonal interpreter, but Anderson asked him to act as liaison 

to the BLM as it developed its California desert management plan. He promised Moon that he 

would create an official natural resource position and encouraged him to apply. In February 

1980, Moon accepted the offer for a part-time ecologist still under the control of the chief ranger. 

Colville initially refused to have a biologist on his staff, forcing Anderson to complete the hiring 

process. When the young biologist complained about the diversion of funds away from resource 

management, Anderson told Moon to report directly to him henceforth, but left control of 

funding for resources with Colville. In early 1981, a new regional office inspection reported that 

the antagonistic situation between Colville and Moon prevented progress in resource 

management. Soon Anderson received orders to create a proper resource management division. 

Moon was given a major promotion and became a one-man resource management division with 

his own budget.25 

Figure 7-1. Robert “Bob” Moon became the first chief of natural resources for Joshua Tree in the 

1980s. Photographer unknown. Photo courtesy of Bob Moon. 
219

Under Bob Moon, both natural and cultural resource management improved rapidly. 

Regional officials recognized his ability and rewarded him with enhanced funding. After decades 

of meager appropriations, Joshua Tree suddenly could get money for almost any natural resource 

project. Moon hired permanent and seasonal employees, including the first position entirely 

devoted to cultural resource management. It was time to get to work on long neglected programs. 

Ten issues dominated the natural resource agenda: (1) more basic research and a monitoring 

program for all natural resources, (2) saving the palms at the Oasis of Mara, (3) a huge demand 

for native plants to rehabilitate old roads and inholdings (4) a large scale invasion of the park by 

exotic grasses and brush, (5) worsening air quality, (6) increasingly large wild fires, (7) 

management of bighorn sheep and maintenance of the guzzlers, (8) protection of the desert 

tortoise, a newly listed threatened species, (9) coping with exotic animals, and (10) cooperation 

with other agencies and international programs for environmental protection. As the years 

passed, extraordinary external threats heightened the complexity and gravity of these programs.

The most obvious need was baseline information about the natural resources of 

the monument. After more than four decades, the staff had minimal data on all of the above 

issues. As quickly as he could Moon established contacts with university and other NPS

scientists, sought research funds and grants for many of the issues identified in the 1974 resource 

management plan, and hired trained scientists like Jerry Freilich to fill permanent or seasonal 

positions in his expanding division. At the same time, ecologists and wildlife specialists across 

the country urged the agency to create an official inventory and monitoring (I & M) program at 

all the natural resource parks to help gauge large scale environmental change. In fiscal year 

1992, the NPS initiated a programmatic I & M plan in approximately 250 parks spanning ten 

major biomes. The expensive program required each unit's staff to prioritize its resources so that 

the limited funds could be distributed around the system according to greatest need. A revision of 

the natural resource management plan the following year listed thirty-two projects at Joshua Tree 

to collect data and monitor resources. Top priorities included the desert tortoise, a basic 

vegetation map, endangered plants, bighorn sheep, and a geographic information system.26

Back to the Oasis

During the late 1970s, the NPS continued to wrangle with the two critical problems at the Oasis 

of Mara, an overabundance of infected and dying mesquite and a lack of adequate water for the 

palms. However, new data and a couple of hard decisions helped. First, in 1977, graduate student 

Karen Frazier submitted a thesis entitled, "An Ecological Study of the Fan Palm Oases of Joshua 

Tree National Monument," which provided welcome geographical, hydrological, and ecological 

data on the five palm oases, Mara, Fortynine Palms, Lost Palms, Munsen Palms, and 

Cottonwood Spring. At the same time, Regional Director Howard Chapman approved a revised 

proposal for the Oasis of Mara to manually remove mesquite over several years until conditions 

would allow prescribed burns. Monument employees laboriously removed two-thirds of the 

mesquite over the next three summers. In spring 1978, a maintenance crew converted a small 

wildlife drinker at the eastern end of the oasis into a concrete-lined pond. Finally, after a visit 

from regional resource management official Bruce Kilgore the following year, Joshua Tree 

officials proposed a major redesign of the hydrologic system to include a 1,425-foot pipeline 

from the city water line to the oasis with smaller feeder lines to each cluster of palms. They also 

breached a few areas in the wall around the oasis and dug drainage ditches to circulate natural 
220

runoff to the palms. Archaeological studies determined where the digging necessary to install 

this system would not impact cultural resources.27

After Bob Moon's appointment, the program to develop a full oasis management plan 

accelerated. In winter 1982, the resource staff tried two small test burns to gauge the results on 

the vegetation. An arson fire followed a few months later giving the scientists a larger area to 

collect data. Moon and fire-ecologist Sue Husari from Pinnacles National Monument (now Park)

submitted an "Oasis of Mara Action Plan" in the final days of 1983. The plan called for 

restoration of the oasis to its appearance in the 1920s, well after Euro-American influence began. 

In addition to more research, the plan proposed most of the actions contemplated over the 

previous decade including additional manual removal of mesquite, application of herbicide to the 

stumps, prescribed burning to maintain an open understory, supplemental watering if the water 

table sank below the reach of palm roots, and removal of barriers to sheet flooding. It proposed 

to allow natural processes to take over after these restorative steps.28

Over the next decade, Joshua Tree officials installed the irrigation system, finished 

clearing mesquite from the vicinity of the surviving palms, planted native species grown in the 

park nursery, redesigned a paved trail to minimize social trails, and planted a demonstration 

garden between the visitor center and the maintenance facility. After 1986, the monument

executed several prescribed burns up to one acre in size, while a pair of sizeable earthquakes in 

1992 further corrupted the natural water flow and led to greater reliance on the pipeline bringing 

city water. In 1996, Joshua Tree issued a second "Oasis of Mara Action Plan" which approved 

scheduled application of irrigation, pruning of mesquite, reestablishment of native understory 

vegetation, and further human manipulation of the ecosystem necessary to maintain the 1920s

tableau.29 

Other Places, Other Plants

In 1980, the NPS compiled assessments of natural resources for its "State of the Parks" report. At 

Joshua Tree, Bob Moon investigated damage to the vegetation communities in the monument 

and found those systems to be in "disrepair." Decades of mining, 200 miles of old roads, visitor 

impacts, and invasive exotics disrupted the landscape, much of it in wilderness. Research showed 

that regeneration of desert plants and their colonization of disturbed areas was extremely slow. 

Moon and his staff searched the monument for native vegetation to transplant in the damaged 

zones, but had little success. Most of the native transplants died within a year due to compacted 

soil, which inhibited water absorption, and competition from invasive exotics. Plants grown from 

seed failed because their roots developed too slowly to access water while suffering browsing by 

rabbits and other herbivores. Moon checked commercial nurseries for more mature native plants 

but found few due to a lack of public demand. Finally, he secured a $5,000 allocation from the 

regional office to set up a small nursery at the monument headquarters.30

After considerable trial and error, the Joshua Tree staff worked out methods for raising 

more mature plants that could survive. One key advance came in the form of pots six inches in 

diameter and thirty inches deep that allowed the fledgling plants to develop deeper tap roots in a 

stable soil column. Experimentation with a variety of local plants led to adaptation of pot sizes to 

fit the requirements of sixty different species (Figure 7-2). During the springs of 1990 and 1991,

the staff planted 1,509 nursery-grown plants along park roads. A year later, seventy-seven 
221

Figure 7-2. The Center for Arid Lands Restoration begun by Bob Moon developed deep pots to 

grow desert plants for Joshua Tree and other government desert lands. Photo by the author. 
222

percent survived. By that time, the nursery had expanded to 12,500 square feet including two 

greenhouses and could grow 10,000 plants. The success of this program soon caught the 

attention of other parks and agencies. In 1992, the Bureau of Mines approached the monument’s 

newly named Center for Arid Lands Restoration seeking help to revegetate abandoned mines and 

millsites. Eventually Joshua Tree began supplying Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the 

marine base in Twentynine Palms, and even the huge U.S. Army base at Fort Irwin. At Joshua 

Tree, the addition of new wilderness lands and Superintendent Ernest Quintana's program to 

revegetate former inholdings and construction borrow pits made the nursery program a very high 

priority.31

Many of the proposals listed in the 1974 Resource Management Plan dealt with 

vegetation around the remainder of the monument, and it all focused on basic research. The 

projects that followed contributed much to understanding the unit's biota including a 

reassessment of the threatened species that reduced the number on the list from twenty-four to 

ten. Active management of the plant communities remained an expensive future task. Yet the 

intense work at the Oasis of Mara highlighted a problem affecting not only the other oases, but 

most water sources in the monument. Three species of tamarisk (Tamarix ramosissima, Tamarix 

chinensis, and Tamarix aphylla), invasive shrubs from Asia, had moved into the monument and 

were outcompeting the native vegetation for water. The story is a familiar one. Gardeners and 

landscapers imported tamarisk species to the United States for ornamental purposes as well as 

erosion prevention in arid regions. By 1960, the plants spread along major southwestern rivers to 

interior desert springs, streams, and washes. Today it dominates many arid habitats and nearly 

every drainage system in the Southwest. Tamarisk does not exhibit weedy characteristics in its 

native habitat, but is an aggressive invader in the United States. Its tap roots can grow more than 

eight feet in one year, and the plants exude salt which inhibits survival by nearby native species. 

Joshua Tree rangers began manually removing tamarisk in 1975, but stump sprouting and 

efficient seed dispersal meant each effort was a temporary solution. A year later, officials started 

using herbicides to poison the stumps. Nevertheless, a 1985 survey of the Cottonwood Spring 

area by George San Miguel found that cutting away eighty percent of the trees still left thousands 

of seeds on the ground. Sporadic removal and application of herbicides continued through the 

1980s and, in 1992, became a steady annual program.32

By 1986, other exotic plants raised eradication of invasive species to seventh on the 

priority list of natural resource projects. Another unwelcome invader was Russian thistle (Salsola

tragus), widely known as tumbleweed throughout the West. This hearty plant spreads its seeds 

by rolling across the landscape with the wind. It rapidly colonizes any disturbed ground such as 

roadsides. Invasive grasses pose a more widespread threat because of the fuel they provide for 

fires. By the early 1990s, crimson fountain grass (Pennisetum setaceum), a popular ornamental in 

neighborhoods around Joshua Tree, red brome grass (Bromus madritensis subsp. rubens), and 

cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum) invaded much of the western part of the monument. Unlike native 

bunchgrasses, they form dense ground coverage and fill the intershrub spaces which are typically 

devoid of native plants making the surface much more fire prone. All these invasive species are 

aggressive competitors for water and some are unpalatable to native fauna. They present a major 

problem for all land agencies in the southwestern deserts and are the foci of vigorous interagency 

eradication efforts.33
223

Air Quality Fails Legal Standards

In 1978, Ranger Don Cornell completed a survey of visibility at Joshua Tree National 

Monument, answering a request from the Environmental Protection Agency for a national 

assessment of Class I values. In his sketchy outline, he identified four sources of pollution, Los 

Angeles, Coachella Valley agriculture, Kaiser's Eagle Mountain Mine, and a proposed fossil-fuel 

generating plant in Lucerne Valley forty miles away. Cornell also added dust, smoke from fires, 

fog, and various activities by monument visitors as visibility inhibitors. He surveyed ten areas 

and found seven suffered "undesirable visibility impairment," including Keys View. The 

following year, Regional Director Howard Chapman officially protested a proposal before the 

San Bernardino Board of Supervisors to lower the nitrous oxide standard to benefit a chemical 

plant in Trona. Shortly thereafter, Bob Moon submitted a report that identified "integral vistas" 

in the monument and noted a steady decline in visibility over the previous three years. The smog 

increase in Joshua Tree was obvious, but its effect on vegetation remained uncertain.34 

During the summer of 1983, state and NPS specialists recommended a system of air 

quality monitors for the monument and research on the effects of pollutants, especially ozone, on 

vegetation. In September, James Bennett of the NPS's Air Quality Division (AQD) in Denver 

contacted the Southern California Edison Company to see if it would cooperate in monitoring air 

quality in the monument. He drily commented that," there is some evidence that air quality at 

Joshua Tree National Monument may not be pristine." The following spring, the AQD proposed 

a study by Dr. Patrick J. Temple of the University of California Riverside to bio-monitor areas in 

the monument. At each site Temple planned to collect foliage and soil samples over one summer 

to evaluate the effects of pollution. He submitted his report at the end of 1985 which showed that 

ozone levels occasionally reached potentially lethal levels, and that squaw bush (Rhus trilobata) 

could be a useful indicator of ozone damage.35

A few months later, the AQD informed monument officials that a contractor would install 

an automated air quality monitoring system at the Lost Horse Ranger Station. Apparently, the 

program suffered from inadequate supervision because the agency installed a new monitoring 

system in July 1987 and warned that any data from before that time was "questionable." Every 

year thereafter, Joshua Tree requested funds for monitoring and research on the biotic damage 

from air pollution. In 1991, it appeared that funding for the air monitoring program at Joshua 

Tree might end. Superintendent David Moore protested and argued that it should be upgraded to 

include particulate matter. The looming possibility of a giant landfill adjacent to the monument 

justified expanded resources for monitoring and studying air quality. The 1993 addendum to the 

resource management plan requested $60,000 for monitoring for the next two years, plus another 

$4,500 to evaluate damage to the squaw bushes. Each year, the deterioration of visibility and 

measurable amount of biotic damage from pollution increased until by 1994 Joshua Tree 

administrators routinely reported that the unit had the worst air quality in the entire national park 

system.36 

Fire Becomes a Problem

The invasion of Joshua Tree by exotic grasses and deposition of nitrogen from air pollution 

created a crisis in fire management during this twenty-year period. Native desert plants evolved 

in nitrogen-poor soils with low-density dispersal. Fires were traditionally small in area, usually 
224

less than one acre, and slow to spread. The invasive grasses came from areas with soils richer in 

nitrogen and its deposition by air pollution helped them advance into the deserts of the 

monument. The first sign of trouble came one year after the staff admitted that they should 

develop a fire management plan, despite the fact that state foresters had responsibility for fire 

control. On Sunday, August 13, 1978, a park technician discovered a lightening-ignited fire 

burning five acres near Covington Spring. California Division of Forestry (CDF) fire officials 

with a tanker truck arrived within thirty minutes but could not access the fire because of rough 

terrain. After two hours, air tankers began dropping fire retardant on the blaze. Shortly thereafter,

ground crews arrived and their numbers swelled to more than 200 by the end of the day. At that 

point, the fire had consumed 900 acres. In the morning, state fire authorities diverted the air 

tankers to other fires but quickly returned them in the afternoon when the fire broke through the 

retardant lines. That day the fire grew to 2,000 acres. Later a monument official wrote, "the now 

disproved myth that fires won't burn in the desert was still holding sway."37

As day three began, the fire spread to 3,300 acres and headed toward the Lost Horse 

Ranger Station and several inholdings with structures. That evening, bulldozers began clearing 

lines along the advancing front of the fire. Air tankers dropped more than 72,000 gallons of 

retardant some of which contained colorful dyes. The fire lines held on the fourth day, but a few 

hot spots still burned. The fire boss declared the fire out on August 18 after five days. It had 

burned 6,142 acres of prime bighorn sheep habitat in an area university biologists had declared 

one of the most important in the monument. The CDF used fifteen air tankers and six helicopters 

to drop over 206,000 gallons of fire retardant. Ultimately 617 people participated in the 

suppression effort. Much of the burned area had contained a pinyon pine-juniper woodland. The 

"Joshua Fire" brought immediate analysis and some recrimination. NPS botanist Thomas Gavin 

inspected the area five years after the fire and reported:

At Quail Springs, I saw a 10-15-foot fire line that was constructed next to and parallel to 

a dirt road...Retardant that has been dropped in the past and apparently did very little to 

stop the advance of fire, now stains much of the landscape around Lost Horse Ranger 

Station. No one will debate the loss of "wilderness area values" as a result of past 

suppression and therefore the need to minimize these losses through planning is critical.38 

The NPS rejects the use of these visually offensive methods unless absolutely necessary. 

Firefighters, including those working for the CDF, focus on the quickest and safest means to 

suppress a wildfire. Bob Moon later told a reporter, "I'd rather have a few more acres burn than 

live with a (bulldozer) trail for 200 or 300 years."39

NPS management guidelines stated that each park unit with vegetation must have a fire 

management plan. At Joshua Tree the need was now obvious. Between 1979 and May 30, 1984,

Joshua Tree experienced thirty-nine more lightning-caused fires, four of them more than 100 

acres in size, plus nineteen smaller, human-caused blazes. Virtually all of them occurred in the 

scenic and well-vegetated western part of the monument. On May 31, 1984, a big fire broke out 

in Lost Horse Canyon and consumed 4,120 acres. Seven firefighters were injured, one seriously. 

By that time fire management was a top priority. Moon hired Sue Husari in 1982 to help develop 

the necessary plan. In February of that year, she submitted a program for pre-suppression 

responsibilities including acquisition and storage of fire-fighting materials, employee training in 

fire suppression, increased aerial reconnaissance after lightning storms, and a station to monitor 
225

humidity, wind, and other weather conditions. Although Husari later transferred to Pinnacles 

National Monument, she continued to participate in fire management planning at Joshua Tree. In 

December 1982, Superintendent Anderson forwarded four fire management "objectives" to the 

regional director. They reflected the years of fire ecology research and the expertise of Husari 

and Moon, (1) allow fire to burn where it has traditionally shaped wilderness ecosystems, (2) 

eliminate unacceptable environmental damage due to suppression efforts, especially in 

wilderness, (3) establish fire management zones based on natural fire regimes, land tenure and 

public safety, and (4) provide for rapid and aggressive suppression of all fires that do not meet 

planned objectives.40 

Three months later, the regional office approved a program of "modified suppression" for 

naturally-occurring fires at Joshua Tree. Crews should continue to suppress fires but use 

outcrops, washes, and existing roads to limit their spread rather than creating fire lines. They 

should also keep the suppression efforts to the smallest area possible and constantly monitor 

weather conditions to determine when they can let a fire burn itself out. In spite of these 

advances, it took another nine years for the monument to produce a complete fire management 

plan. During that period Regional Forester Tom Gavin, fire ecologist Tom Nichols, and an interagency fire management team visited to help design a plan that followed national policy but 

specifically addressed Joshua Tree's complex assemblage of sensitive resources. Between 1983 

and 1992, prescribed fire crews carried out sixteen burns, including one planned for 1,250 acres 

in 1987 that escaped to burn 1,615 acres. From 1985 to that year, the monument recorded fifty 

wildfires including the escapee. The 1992 final plan, a revision of the management objectives set 

out a decade earlier, established a fire-management decision scheme and divided the monument 

into three zones. Zone one covered the main tourist area in Hidden and Lost Horse valleys plus 

campgrounds and historic structures where complete suppression was the policy. Zone three lay 

near the boundary in the upper elevations above Covington Flat, the most fire-susceptible area, 

and targeted it for annual ten-acre prescribed burns but strict suppression of all wildfires. Zone 

two covered the rest of the unit. There NPS would continue to research fire behavior and impacts 

in order to develop a habitat-sensitive framework of responses including suppression near visitor 

areas, key resources, and boundaries, and a let-burn policy with occasional prescribed fires under 

close supervision in the rest of the zone. The mandatory public hearing and other publicity drew

no opposition, and the regional office issued a "Finding of No Significant Impact" approving the 

plan on October 26, 1992.41

 

In early spring 1995, the NPS's fire management officer for the desert region predicted a 

grim fire season in the upcoming summer. Seven years of drought followed by unusually high 

rainfall the previous year left a great buildup of fire fuel across the entire region. At Joshua Tree 

the trouble started on July 31, once again in the Covington area. This time it spread into adjacent 

BLM and San Bernardino County lands and ultimately reached 5,521 acres in size. Proximity to 

the boundary brought swift and extensive suppression efforts including twenty-eight ground 

crews. Multiple air tankers and helicopters dropped nearly 300,000 gallons of water and 

retardant. By 6:00 p.m. August 3, when the incident commander certified that they controlled the 

fire, it had already cost nearly $1,500,000. The only benefit to come from the Covington Fire 

was the opportunity to monitor the area's recovery and gain new data for future management 

(Map 7-3).42
226

Map 7-3. The fire history of Joshua Tree National Park. Data source: JTNP GIS files. Delta 

Cartography. 

The Pros and Cons of Bighorn Guzzlers

After the establishment of wilderness over most of Joshua Tree, management of bighorn sheep at 

Joshua Tree became more complicated. Mounting but still insufficient scientific data suggested 

that guzzlers might not work after all, while maintaining them in the wilderness was difficult and 

time consuming. The hard-won program for guzzlers did not fit the legal word or spirit of the 

Wilderness Act, nor did it follow NPS policy which ordered minimum interference in natural 

processes. In late 1978, Charles Douglas recommended construction of four more guzzlers,

including one barely a mile west of Stubbe Spring, but urged more research on the bighorns to 

determine how much water they actually need. Some studies indicated that a bighorn could go 

months without water, subsisting on moisture from barrel cacti and other vegetation. Other data 

suggested that water from guzzlers might inflate the population and deleteriously affect local 

forage. Periodic checkups on the existing guzzlers found that many soon stopped functioning due 

to clogging debris, washouts, or leakage. Monument officials had used dynamite to blast out the 

adit in the Coxcomb Mountains which severely cracked the surrounding rock and rendered it all 

but useless. Furthermore, bighorn sheep apparently ignored several of the guzzlers.43

Although other resource issues crowded the bighorn's place as the dominant animal 

subject, research and censuses intensified during the 1980s and early 1990s. Charles Douglas and 

other scientists tagged and collared sheep and conducted aerial and camera censuses, while 
227

pathologists examined any sheep carcasses found in the monument. Rangers monitored working 

guzzlers with cameras to see if sheep or any other animals used them. During the early 1990s,

the Mine Reclamation Corporation, a subsidiary of Kaiser, provided thousands of dollars for 

bighorn research in an effort to placate the NPS which opposed its plan to turn the Eagle 

Mountain Mine into a landfill. Years of collected data by different scientists with different 

methods of measurement left unclear how the bighorns survived long, hot drought periods when 

the few remaining permanent and ephemeral seeps, springs, and guzzlers dried up. A June 1992 

inspection of artificial water structures in the monument found the guzzler at Stubbe Spring in 

disrepair, the Pine City guzzler overgrown with vegetation, and the Coxcomb Adit holding 

minimal water.

44

The California Desert Protection Act added more than 234,000 acres of land to the 

upgraded Joshua Tree National Park with three more guzzlers in wilderness or proposed 

wilderness. This coupled with finalization of a general management plan forced the NPS to 

revisit the question of placing or maintaining artificial features in designated wilderness. The 

1994 act specified that the BLM could access guzzlers in its wilderness areas by vehicle, but did 

not explicitly give the NPS equal permission. Investigation showed that the three new guzzlers 

were ineffective as water sources for bighorn sheep and most other animals. As the agency began 

research for a backcountry/wilderness management plan, the days of artificially supplied water 

for bighorns appeared close to an end.45

Endangered and Exotic Fauna

Bighorn sheep dominated wildlife research and management until April 2, 1990. On that date the 

U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) listed the Mojave Desert populations of the desert tortoise 

(Gopherus agassizii) as a threatened species (Figure 7-3). The tortoise immediately became the 

Joshua Tree animal with the strictest legal protection, something the desert bighorn sheep never 

enjoyed. The desert tortoise is a medium-sized terrestrial reptile that occurs in most of the 

Mojave and Colorado deserts. Despite its wide range, wildlife experts noticed a decline in 

populations throughout the Southwest by the late 1970s. The BLM listed it as a species of 

concern in its 1980 plan for the California Desert Conservation Area. A variety of direct and 

indirect threats seemed to cause the fall in numbers. Direct threats included collisions with 

motorized vehicles, vandalism, illegal collecting, and disease, possibly contracted from pet 

tortoises released by their former owners. Habitat loss from construction and agricultural 

development, recreational activities, atmospheric pollution, and invasion of exotic plants posed 

indirect threats. Although they will eat exotic plants, tortoises prefer native forbs which contain 

more nutrients than the invaders. Several native predators prey on tortoise eggs, hatchlings, and 

juveniles including coyotes, kit foxes, badgers, skunks, and ravens. Fire can kill tortoises either 

by direct burning or indirect impacts such as loss of forage and shade plants, encouragement of 

low value exotic plants, decreased soil stability, and increased erosion.46

John Barrow began serious research in the Pinto Basin in 1978 and estimated tortoise 

density at seventy-five to eighty per square mile. He concluded that the animal was endangered. 

In 1987, Alice Karl, a graduate student at the University of California, Davis, began a population 

study of the entire monument. She estimated that approximately 12,700 tortoises occupied some 

250,000 acres of the unit. At that time, a substantial drought was underway and it may have 

depressed the number. In 1990, Moon hired Jerry Freilich to carry out a long-term research and 
228

Figure 7-3. The threatened desert tortoise has become rationale for environmental policy 

throughout the California deserts. Photographer unknown. JTNP Natural Resource Division files. 

monitoring program. Soon a controversy arose over the sampling methodology between Freilich

and BLM scientist Kristen Berry. The latter had dominated the field of desert tortoise research 

for nearly twenty years. Her study of a one-square-mile plot led to the listing of the tortoise as a 

threatened species. Her survey method involved daily counts derived from walking through the 

plot over a lengthy period. Because this method cost so much, Freilich adopted a technique that 

used multiple volunteers to inspect four-kilometer-long lines forming a box with teams to count 

the tortoises and measure their distances from the nearest line. Using many volunteers, even 

though they were not necessarily trained in wildlife biology, turned up considerably higher 

numbers than Berry had estimated. A bitter debate over the accuracy of the two survey methods

ensued.

47

In the meantime, the NPS adapted its management to match the requirements of the 

Endangered Species Act. On February 8, 1994, the FWS classified six million acres of Mojave 

Desert land as critical habitat for the tortoise, including a large area adjacent to the monument.

Joshua Tree then joined the interagency Desert Tortoise Management Oversight Group, founded 

in 1988, along with other desert national parks and monuments. The impact on desert tortoises 
229

became a prime issue in all forms of planning at Joshua Tree including land acquisition, the 

revegetation program, fire management, and all construction and road repair projects. A major 

tortoise recovery plan issued by the FWS and the BLM identified fifteen human activities that 

were incompatible with preservation of the species. The NPS in general, and Joshua Tree in 

particular, already banned fourteen of them. The only exception was "competitive organized 

events on designated roads" and speed limit signs in the monument took care of that.48

As scientific interest and targeted resource management funds at Joshua Tree grew, 

research studies identified other rare or endangered animal species that lived within or passed 

through its boundaries. A 1994 survey by the staff ecologist listed three reptiles, thirteen birds,

and seven mammals in decline. Four of the mammal species were bats, a group of animals that 

had received little attention at the monument before 1992. That year contract-historian Pat 

Brown received funds for a two-year study of bats in the mountains around Pinto Basin. The 

1993 natural resource management plan listed bat research on its project agenda for the first 

time, but, despite the fact that Joshua Tree contained at least 2,000 abandoned mine shafts which 

it sought to close, no further research took place for the rest of the decade. Other rare Joshua 

Tree animals on the list included several predatory birds, the badger, and the Colorado Desert 

fringe-toed lizard (Uma notata notata).

49

Animals are important resources in Joshua Tree requiring much attention and research. 

Unfortunately, exotic animals and misbehaving natives demanded much of the resource 

management staff’s time and effort. Coyotes continued to beg at campgrounds and wherever else 

people congregated. Lacing human food with nauseating lithium chloride failed to discourage 

them. The keen-sniffing relative of dogs simply ignored the bait. In 1987, Santa Monica National 

Recreation Area reported that one coyote had attacked some people. Joshua Tree focused on 

educating visitors while searching for ways to discourage the beggars. Nothing seemed to work. 

In 1997, a ranger finally shot one aggressive animal, an action not widely publicized. In 1982,

Bob Moon warned that visitor feeding, plus a mild, wet winter, resulted in a population of native 

ground squirrels at Black Rock Canyon that was ten times the hypothesized carrying capacity. 

He worried that the huge numbers and the rodents’ familiarity with humans as a food source 

could spread the bubonic plague they carried to visitors.50

Four exotic animals also required management attention. For years Joshua Tree officials 

had worried about feral burros that inhabited areas surrounding the monument. Starting in 1980,

rangers noticed small groups occasionally feeding inside the boundary. In 1982, at least one 

small herd moved in to stay. Concern for bighorn sheep galvanized resource managers to draw 

up a burro management plan and take action. This brought Joshua Tree face to face with an issue 

that bedeviled other parks in the western United States. Public sentiment and consequent 

legislation insisted on non-lethal methods to control horses and burros. The scientific and 

environmental communities solidly backed any solution that would keep out these prolific 

breeders. Most of the public rejected the most obvious solution, shoot them. In 1984, monument 

officials sent a proposal to the regional office to initiate live capture and removal of the burros. 

They received a reply cautioning them not to publicize any actions they might take. Finding and 

capturing the wily animals proved to be far more expensive and time consuming than resource 

managers hoped. Soon, they petitioned the regional director for funds to track them by plane or 

helicopter. In 1985, rangers captured five burros near a guzzler and sent them to the BLM's 
230

Adopt-a-Burro Program. Ironically, that program had redistributed hundreds of burros to pet 

enthusiasts, including some living next to Joshua Tree. Thereafter, "due to owner negligence or 

design" some had escaped into the monument, primarily across the northwestern boundary near 

Joshua Tree village and Yucca Valley. In August 1994, Joshua Tree adopted a "Burro 

Management Action Plan" proposing several capture methods and, if they proved impossible in 

individual cases, "direct reduction" (shooting). The list of conditions for adopting the latter 

method assured that rangers would rarely use it.51

Among the hazardous animals in Joshua Tree are recent invaders from the south. Brazil 

imported honey bees from Africa in the 1950s hoping to breed a bee better adapted to the 

tropical climate. These African honey bees interbred with European bees then spread north until 

they officially reached the United States on October 19, 1990. Africanized bees are fiercely

protective of their hive and much more aggressive than European bees. In August 1993, Jerry 

Freilich reported a large swarm of unfamiliar bees in Twentynine Palms. He determined that 

despite efforts by some communities to control them, their eradication probably would be 

impossible. From a resource management viewpoint their appearance did not change policy 

because the European honey bee was also exotic to Joshua Tree. On the other hand, they posed a 

threat to visitors and especially to rock climbers. Soon, frightening stories of climbers who 

disturbed nests in the rock crevasses, and suffered an immediate and painful attack, circulated on 

the internet and in guide books. Most of the latter sought to comfort readers by explaining that 

the bees would only follow a fleeing person for half a mile.52

Two unexpected exotic animals appeared in Joshua Tree that illustrated the difficulty of 

managing a national park unit amid rapid suburbanization. Several dams built by early settlers 

still held water except during severe drought conditions. Local neighbors and a few tourists felt 

that goldfish and domesticated ducks might enhance these ephemeral reservoirs, particularly the 

one behind Barker Dam. If enough water collected, it allowed the fish to reproduce and grow to 

considerable size. Ducks meanwhile learned how to avoid coyotes and bobcats and displaced 

native waterfowl. During the 1960s, a run of dry years lowered the water behind Barker Dam to 

a level where rangers could capture or shoot the ducks and poison the goldfish with a chemical 

called rotenone. By 1989, more precipitation and more illegal fish stocking recreated the goldfish 

problem. During the first week of December, rangers pumped out much of the water and 

supervised visitors capturing the fish, presumably to take home as pets. Thereafter, resource 

management officials again poisoned the water. They established a policy of waiting one week to 

see if predators remove any domestic ducks before taking action. At this time Barker Dam is dry 

and these management programs are unnecessary, but easy access has allowed vandals to deface 

the dam itself.53

For most of its history Joshua Tree National Monument operated under a chain of NPS

command with little input from state and other federal agencies in the desert other than 

reciprocal reviews of proposed plans. Yet Joshua Tree operated in a region, country, and world 

focusing more and more on coordinated conservation. The chaos that attended the BLM's 1980 

California Desert Conservation Plan, plus a campaign to increase protected areas in the desert,

required interagency management and recognition of the monument's place in the world 

ecosystem. Interagency cooperation initially focused on specific issues like those addressed by 

the Desert Tortoise Management Oversight Group. By 1994, it appeared likely that a major 
231

transfer of land from the BLM to the NPS would take place. Despite considerable animosity, the 

two agencies began cooperating on resource management issues. This cooperation led to the 

1994 establishment of a major working group called the Desert Managers Group (DMG) which 

also included the FWS, California State Parks and all four branches of the Department of 

Defense. Subsequently the U. S. Forest Service, U. S. Geological Survey, Bureau of Indian 

Affairs, the California State Lands Commission, California Department of Fish and Wildlife, 

California Department of Transportation and three counties joined. San Bernardino County is a 

member, but as of September 2014 Riverside County is not. Working groups within the 

organization tackle many of the resource issues that plague Joshua Tree on a regional basis. 

Major projects include the desert tortoise, exotic weeds, climate change, illegal dumping, habitat 

restoration, and even land acquisition. Each agency retains individual authority over its territories 

but benefits from vastly increased communication and expertise.54

Prior to these important interagency projects the international conservation community

recognized the importance of California's desert including Joshua Tree National Monument. 

Scientists and diplomats gathered at a 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization (UNESCO) conference organized a "Man and the Biosphere" program to 

coordinate research and management of representative terrestrial and marine ecosystems of the 

world. Each biosphere reserve contains one or more core areas of strict legal preservation such as

a national park, a buffer zone of compatible land use, and a transition area of agriculture and 

other uses. The system is meant to eventually include examples of all the world's biomes and 

spread the knowledge and practice of sustainable use everywhere. An international committee 

reviews applications submitted by chapters in each country to assure that the proposed areas 

meet historical, ecological, and land management criteria. In 1975, the U. S. committee 

unilaterally accepted a proposal for the "Mojave and Colorado Deserts Biosphere Reserve" to 

include four core areas, Death Valley National Monument, Joshua Tree National Monument, 

Anza-Borrego Desert State Park, and the Santa Rosa Mountains Wildlife Management Area. In 

1983, an ad hoc group of scientists submitted the proposal to the international committee which 

approved its official designation the following year. Recognition of the region's significance was 

pleasing but in no way influenced management at Joshua Tree. Although the NPS has a sign 

noting its status, the designation received little additional attention.

55

Cultural Resource Management Improves

In the years between 1977 and 1996, several new laws and better financial support helped 

archaeology and historic preservation advance at Joshua Tree. Chief of Interpretation William 

“Bill” Truesdell hired full-time museum curator Rosalie Pepito to handle increasingly numerous 

and complex responsibilities. Later she became the full-time cultural resource specialist in the 

Resource Management Division. Archaeological work increased while protection for its artifacts 

benefitted from Native American participation. The Campbell Collection narrowly escaped 

removal to a facility in Arizona. Several additional sites became eligible for the National 

Register of Historic Places. Both the Lost Horse Mine and Keys Ranch presented problems 

which took technology and extra funding to forestall. By the end of the two decades, Joshua Tree 

had a cultural resource plan, a small but professional staff, and more funding. Like the natural 

resource program, cultural resources evolved from a minor component of the Interpretation 

Division to a significant program of a large national park.
232

One of the most important changes affecting archaeology in Joshua Tree National 

Monument was a dramatic increase in participation by Native Americans living in the area. The 

archaeological remains and rock art of Native Americans in the monument fascinated many NPS

officials. However, for much of the unit’s existence they ignored the descendents of the people 

who left those artifacts. Nobody in the agency thought about their presence unless it affected 

land acquisition or the proposed location of the headquarters. In 1957, U. S. Marine Corps 

Sergeant Leonard A. Webber, a member of the Shoshone Tribe from the Fort Hall Reservation in 

Oregon, briefly drew attention by insisting that he had the right to hunt in Joshua Tree. His claim 

stemmed from the government’s 1868 treaty with his tribe. It stated that a member of the tribe 

can hunt on any “unclaimed land” in the country which he interpreted to include national parks. 

In that case, the acting regional solicitor in Portland denied Webber’s claim on various technical 

grounds including the semantics of the 1868 treaty. In the early 1970s, Native Americans across 

the country demanded that human remains and other grave objects be returned only to have the 

NPS warn its employees about potential “theft” by protest groups. However, in later years the 

activism of the American Indian Movement and other civil rights groups, plus legal challenges to 

the government’s haphazard interpretation of its treaties, led to laws and court rulings that 

afforded Native Americans a voice in their own affairs including their cultural traditions. 56

Two laws affect the way the NPS interacts with various tribes and protected 

archaeological resources associated with their ancestors. First, congress passed the 

Archaeological Resources Protection Act in 1979. This law included three provisions, (1) it gave 

teeth to the enforcement of the Antiquities Act of 1906 by establishing penalties for the removal 

or destruction of archaeological sites or artifacts, (2) it mandated a permit and agency oversight 

process for archaeological research on federal property, and (3) it ordered federal agencies to 

cooperate with museums, groups or individuals who possessed such artifacts. The purpose 

clearly was to benefit archaeological science, but its effect was initiation of dialogues with 

Native Americans who had long claimed that their graves and materials were under siege for 

profit. A second law, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990,

specifically addressed those issues by ordering federal agencies and any museum or university 

that receives federal funding to return human remains and associated funerary items to the 

descendents of the tribe to which the deceased belonged. Across the country every archaeology 

collection had to contact local tribes and investigate the origins of any human remains. If the 

claim by a modern tribe proved valid the remains were returned for reburial with appropriate 

ceremony.57

Passage of these two laws highlighted an increasing legal respect for the remaining 

Native American tribes and their religious and treaty rights. Amendments to the National 

Historic Preservation Act in 1992 led the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation a year later 

to order the NPS to consult with Native American and Native Hawaiian groups and compile a list 

of their important cultural sites eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. This meant 

those areas would have Section 106 compliance protection and tribes could halt random 

development or destruction of their culturally significant places. The NPS saw the handwriting 

on the wall even before passage of the amended act and issuance of the advisory council policy. 

At Joshua Tree, the condition of the Campbell Collection caused serious concern among the 

Cahuilla, Chemehuevi, Mojave, and Serrano tribes. Assisted by sympathetic anthropologists such 

as Lowell Bean, they were the first to strongly oppose a transfer of the collection to a safer 
233

storage facility out of state. Later, the Chemehuevi, with the support of the other local tribes,

claimed the human remains in the collection and reinterred them with accompanying funerary 

objects.58

Progress in surveying the archaeology of the monument continued to fall well short of 

what its practitioners wanted. Late in 1977, Superintendent Anderson submitted a draft cultural 

resource management plan to the regional office. The plan’s authors admitted that the monument 

had been remiss in following the dictates of Executive Order 11593 by not working on an 

archeological survey of the unit. They recommended compilation of data from existing research

and initiation of a field survey. Seventeen months later, regional official John H. Davis finally 

responded. He described the plan as “incomplete” and suggested that Joshua Tree continue to 

carry out surveys “as needed” prior to any road work or other project. In the interim, Anderson 

had requested funding to expand the archaeologically surveyed acreage of the monument from 

two percent to fifteen percent. Davis could only answer that he hoped congress would allocate 

more money for cultural resource programs across the park system.59

By 1981, most of the money available for archaeology at Joshua Tree was tied up in 

surveying the Oasis of Mara before its modification. Two years later, another cultural resource 

plan reiterated the same need for a survey citing the monument’s non-compliance with the 

agency’s own management policies. Between 1985 and 1989, specialists from the Western 

Archaeological and Conservation Center in Tucson, Arizona conducted a number of surveys 

prior to realignments of the road system in the western part of the monument. In 1987, Carol 

Martin of the Tucson center reported that more than 250 sites had been identified in the two 

percent of the monument already surveyed. She asked for $56,920 to do sample studies of 150 

plots in order to develop a predictive model of where to look for other sites. However, virtually 

all archaeological research over the next several years stemmed from rehabilitation of seventyfive miles of roads in the monument. In October, 1990, the chief ranger reported 719 

archaeological sites had been investigated and a volunteer had documented the location of 604 

more. They occurred on five percent of the monument’s land. He also noted that funds from the 

Archaeological Resources Protection Act made more work by contract specialists possible and 

resulted in a rapid rise in citations for illegal damage by visitors at some sites including rock art 

displays. Some of those cited were rock climbers who defaced the ancient drawings by accident 

or design. Through the first half of the 1990s, archaeological surveys continued to accompany 

construction projects, but research on the environmental adaptations by Paleo-Indians and 

historic tribes, a focus pioneered by the Campbells, also helped clarify the unit’s human 

history.60

The 1990 report by the chief ranger also noted that the monument held more than 

120,000 artifacts from archaeological sites and historical structures. By that time, the collection 

had expanded to three bays in the old maintenance facility behind the headquarters. Over the 

previous decade, complaints about storage of the Campbell Collection had risen to a crescendo. 

In 1987, Thomas Mulhern of the regional office strongly recommended that all the cultural 

material at Joshua Tree be moved to the Western Archaeological and Conservation Center. With 

little hope of getting funds for a storage addition to the visitor center, most of the Joshua Tree 

staff agreed. However, once word of the move leaked to the public, the NPS found itself in an 

unexpected controversy. Not only did the local tribes express outrage, but universities, museums, 
234

local towns, and many members of the public in southern California also blasted the agency for 

planning to move the materials out of state. Soon Congressman Jerry Lewis got involved and 

secured $187,000 from congress to build a storage building behind the maintenance garage. The 

climate-controlled building opened in 1993 and is still crowded, but the Campbell materials and 

other archaeological and historical artifacts are finally protected (Figure 7-4). During this 

controversy, Joshua Tree secured a position for a museum curator and archivist. Melanie Spoo 

filled that position and again manages the facility in 2014.61

Figure 7-4. The new museum building completed in 1993 provides excellent protection for the 

Campbell collection, other material artifacts and the park archives. Photo by the author. 

In 1977, the history program at Joshua Tree also needed more baseline research and 

preservation, despite the six sites added to the National Register of Historic Places over the 

preceding twelve months. One conspicuous gap was a historic resource study to identify and 

provide background information on extant structures, roads, and other artifacts from the years 

following the arrival of Euro-Americans. The purposes of such a study include identification of 

any sites worthy of evaluation for the National Register and provision of a general context for 

preservation and interpretation. Initially, Superintendant Anderson put the study fifteenth on its 

funding priority list, but in 1981 the regional director ordered him to move it to the top of the list. 

NPS Historian Linda Greene completed the study in 1983 and proposed four more sites for 

nomination to the National Register, El Dorado Mine and Mill, the Pinto Wye Arrastra, Eagle 

Cliff Mine, and the Pinon Mountain Historic Mining District. It took another decade for final 
235

approval of eligibility for the four new sites due to sporadic attention by the staff and recurrent

editing of incomplete paperwork. In 1992, the DSC sent senior historian Harlan Unrau to 

evaluate the road system for the register. Ironically, he found none of the paved roads eligible 

because of the realignments undertaken over the previous decade. Unrau suggested that a few of 

the dirt tracks like Old Dale Road, Covington Flat Road and the Geology Tour Road might be 

eligible but no nominations followed.62

In addition to the National Register of Historic Places, each unit in the park system 

maintains another “List of Classified Structures.” This list includes each individual building or

constructed feature of importance. Hence, while Keys Ranch is a single national register site, 

every building in it is a separate structure on the more detailed list. Each structure is classified 

for preservation, restoration, or documentation and removal. A 1976 list included thirty-four 

structures just at Keys Ranch including outhouses, storage sheds, walls, fences, and pieces of 

mining equipment. In spite of this substantial number, the following year Superintendent 

Anderson submitted a list of only twenty-two structures classified for preservation and one, the 

Ryan Ranch House, for restoration. The latter was dropped a year later after an arson fire 

destroyed most of it. The NPS occasionally acquired private land with structures. Anderson 

ordered the buildings razed in order to return the areas to a natural environment. He also 

proposed that preservation meant protection from damage by humans, not normal deterioration 

from age and weather. This policy of “benign neglect” angered regional cultural resource official 

Thomas Mulhern who wrote:

JOTR [Joshua Tree] is a very complicated area and one which we feel has not received 

all the attention it should have over the years. The move from a seasonal park to year 

round and the increasing visitation leaves the area with inadequate facilities and staffing. 

The California desert is the environmental and management challenge of the near future 

and JOTR is in the center. 63

He followed this with several dozen comments on the need for specific cultural resource needs. 

Shortly thereafter, experts from two national historic preservation programs, the Historic 

American Buildings Survey and the Historic American Engineering Record, visited the 

monument. They came specifically to assess and record data on Keys Ranch, the Lost Horse 

Mine, and the Wall Street Mill. Attention from these national programs further stressed the 

significance of historic structures in Joshua Tree. 

Nevertheless, the three premier historical sites continued to draw most of the preservation 

attention and funds. In spite of the rehabilitation of Keys Ranch as the bicentennial project for 

Joshua Tree, the complex still required numerous repairs. In February 1982, The Desert Trail

urged the NPS to allow interest groups and volunteers from the local communities to help record, 

display, and interpret the site. However, agency leaders refused to turn over control of the site to 

the public. More serious trouble came at the Lost Horse Mine complex which had already lost 

the headframe and other surface features. In 1989, Mulhern reported the collapse of a stope that 

created a massive erosion trench twenty-six feet long, nine feet wide, and fifty feet deep. It 

extended toward the historic ten-stamp mill, the principal interpretive feature left at the site. Six 

years of worry and correspondence ensued before the agency provided funds to solve the 

problem. In 1992, the Lost Horse complex became one of the first places to try out a remote 

camera system that sent images of the underground timbers supporting the mine and mill to 
236

inspectors on the surface. Most of the timbers appeared to be in fair condition. However, three 

years later agency engineers injected polyurethane foam under the mill to stabilize it in spite of 

concern that it might eliminate habitat for endangered bats. The site is still considered unsafe. 

The Wall Street Mill, one of the best preserved structures in the monument, initially drew 

attention because the NPS considered restoring it to working condition for an interpretive 

display. However, as years of inaction passed, the structure suffered from theft, vandalism, and 

simple decay until that plan was no longer feasible. Easily accessible in the primary visitor area,

it required much work just to save part of the building and the larger machine components.64 

Over a Million: Visitors and Interpretation

During 1977, the year following the bicentennial, 748,441 people visited Joshua Tree National 

Monument. Visitation did not reach that level again until 1986. Thereafter it increased rapidly,

passing one million in 1992 and reaching 1,239,982 in 1996. A huge population increase in the 

towns surrounding Joshua Tree, more troops stationed or training at the marine base, a surge of 

interest in rock climbing, publicity from the rock group U2’s “The Joshua Tree” album released 

in 1987, and elevation of Joshua Tree to national park status in 1994 helped stimulate popularity. 

By 1991, the relative paucity of campsites and parking spaces led to press reports about 

overcrowding, danger to resources, and the assertion that Joshua Tree was another park unit 

being “loved to death.” The Riverside Press-Enterprise reported that during cooler seasons some 

coastal residents drove to the monument on a Thursday, set up a campsite for the weekend, and 

then drove back to work on Friday before returning for the weekend.65

In April 1991, Margaret Littlejohn, an NPS employee based at the University of Idaho, 

conducted a survey of visitors in Joshua Tree. She found that foreign travelers made up thirteen 

percent of the total, while Californians accounted for seventy-six percent of American visitors. A 

slight majority were repeat visitors. They primarily visited the major attractions in the western 

part of the unit. Only a bare majority stopped at the main visitor center because most entered and 

exited the monument at the west entrance. Interestingly, seventy-one percent watched rock 

climbing and four-fifths claimed to enjoy it. This would have implications for both general 

management and backcountry planning. Generally the visitors were satisfied with the quality and 

cleanliness of the roads, campgrounds, and other facilities in the unit, somewhat belying the 

alarmist news reports. According to the survey, the per capita expenditure was $31.00 which, if 

extrapolated to the 851,239 visitors that year, equaled $26,388,409 spent at the monument. This 

unsophisticated formula does not take into account the economic multiplier effect. By 1999, the 

NPS applied a proper statistical model that showed Joshua Tree contributed nearly ten times that 

amount to the local communities.66

Prior to the establishment of wilderness in Joshua Tree, the NPS developed a rudimentary 

draft plan for backcountry management. The 1975 document banned camping within 500 feet of 

a trail, limited hiking parties to ten persons, and restricted stock use except on the California 

Riding and Hiking Trail. It also proposed a backcountry registration system to monitor 

wilderness use. The agency already used these rules and procedures at the more popular Sierra 

Nevada parks. Two months after passage of the 1976 Joshua Tree wilderness act, 

Superintendent Rick Anderson ordered his staff to barricade access by off-road vehicles to any 

old roads within the wilderness. This first and most obvious step set a strict tone for 

backcountry/wilderness management at the monument.67 
237

A dozen years later, monument officials released another draft backcountry and 

wilderness management plan. The 1988 plan reflected lessons learned at the monument as well 

as elsewhere in the park system. Although only 3,369 visitors camped in the backcountry during 

the previous year, that number was a 300 percent higher than 1975 total. Overall visitation to 

Joshua Tree had increased by only twenty-five percent. Programs such as Outward Bound 

regularly used Joshua Tree as a site to train their people. Federal law and NPS policy still banned 

off-road vehicles in the designated wilderness, but offenders bypassed or climbed over barriers to 

drive cross-country or on old roads targeted for rehabilitation. It did not help that rangers 

averaged only four backcountry patrol days per month. The draft plan summed up monument 

policies for visitor use at that time. Hikers could travel anywhere, but still had to camp 500 feet 

from a trail and could only stay four days at one site. Up to fifteen people could camp together,

although any group with six or more people had to find a site with no vegetation. Climbing 

policy allowed manually-installed bolts, but asked climbers "to be ethical, considerate and 

restrained" in their use. It also urged rock climbers to use chalk that would blend in with the rock 

faces. Horses, mules, burros, and llamas could be used as riding stock or pack animals on nonwilderness trails and between them and appropriate campsites. The people who brought them 

were responsible for bringing in feed pellets and carrying out the animals’ waste.68

The interpretation program continued to suffer from understaffing and inadequate 

funding despite the rapid increase of visitors. Throughout this period the Interpretation Division 

had only three permanent, full-time employees. Full-time and part-time seasonal employees 

varied in number from ten to fourteen, but the annual budget for the entire division dropped from 

more than $180,000 to $154,000 when the Reagan Administration commenced. At the same 

time, the pressing need for law enforcement rangers to patrol and carry out search and rescue 

continued to sap funds and personnel. In 1988, the Interpretation Division budget had only 

climbed back to $164,089. During the 1990s, funding improved, but increasingly the interpreters 

had to look for outside funding from special agency programs or private industry grants. In 1991,

Joshua Tree received $5,000 as part of a Columbus Quincentennial grant with the Death Valley 

and Lake Mead units. Once again Joshua Tree used the money at Keys Ranch.69

The following year Linda Finn, a planner from the agency’s interpretation center at 

Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, compiled a task directive for a Joshua Tree interpretive 

prospectus, a basic plan for the visitor and education programs. She noted that the monument 

was a difficult place to interpret:

Not only were park facilities not designed for the current and projected future visitor 

load, but they are not optimally located for the circulation patterns. To further hinder 

efforts to provide a good park experience, staffing has not kept pace with demand. In 

some cases visitor contact facilities have been closed; amphitheater programs have 

dwindled in number.70

This high level report, coupled with better funding under the Clinton Administration, helped the 

Interpretation Division, but its employees relied more and more on external funding. In 1995, the 

park received $15,000 from Canon USA to train volunteers to help with a survey of water 

sources and a bighorn sheep census. The following year the National Park Foundation awarded 

$24,160 to support the “Parks as Classrooms” project in Joshua Tree.71 
238

As the spotlight on Joshua Tree grew brighter, requests for special activities and law 

enforcement problems multiplied. Veteran superintendent David Moore replaced Rick Anderson 

in 1992 and immediately had to tell the BLM that a motorcycle trip it approved would not be 

allowed to pass through the monument and exit via Berdoo Canyon or Pinkham Canyon. The 

NPS planned to close both dirt roads. The BLM did not seem bothered that the proposed route 

would pass through one of its wilderness study areas. The following year, an editorial with a 

cartoon appeared in The Desert Trail blasting the NPS for banning so many activities and 

providing so little for recreationalists. Moore wrote a rebuttal citing visitor numbers, the unit’s 

obvious popularity, and the reasons why national parks exist. He quoted the agency’s 1916 

Organic Act and took a swipe at the newspaper’s editors for printing such a piece when they 

should know better. When Ernest Quintana took over in 1994 he routinely rejected requests for 

large scale wedding ceremonies, loudspeaker-broadcast church meetings, and rifle-shooting in 

the Coxcomb Mountains.72

 

As the area around Joshua Tree grew into a distant exurb of Los Angeles, the duties of 

the Protection Division increased exponentially. Search and rescue required large efforts drawing 

in other employees, law enforcement from adjacent communities, and many volunteers. 

However, only two or three rangers patrolled the huge area most of the time. Young male visitors 

often drove too fast, drank alcohol, and loudly celebrated in the campgrounds requiring tiresome 

warnings from rangers. Many were marines from the nearby base blowing off steam. Joshua Tree 

had an excellent relationship with the commanders at the base who never refused requests for 

help, but throughout the years a steady percentage of the troops engaged in antisocial or criminal

activities. As the number of troops increased so did the number of troublemakers. Vandalism that 

defaced historic structures, rock art, and exposed boulders in the heavily visited areas was 

particularly annoying. 

More serious crimes also occurred. One of the more bizarre episodes happened in July 

1987. A man named Leslie Marr camped illegally near Phantom Ranch in Grand Canyon 

National Park and received a citation from a ranger. At this he turned abusive and then violent 

leading to his arrest. Marr subsequently skipped the hearing for his offense and phoned a bomb 

threat to the Grand Canyon headquarters. On July 12, two California Highway Patrol officers 

tried to stop Marr for a traffic violation but he sped away. The officers chased him to the Joshua 

Tree headquarters where he crashed through a retaining wall. The officers took cover and pulled 

their weapons when they heard a shotgun or rifle being loaded. Then, to their amazement, Marr 

lit a flare and apparently fired several shots which caused a fire to erupt and engulf him. An 

investigation showed that he had loaded his vehicle with ammunition, propane, gasoline, and 

matches and planned to use it as a car bomb at the Grand Canyon. His death was ruled a suicide 

and, although Joshua Tree rangers were not involved, the episode demonstrated how futile is the 

effort to separate a national park from society’s ills.73 

Enforcement of drug laws was the most consistent and potentially serious law 

enforcement problem at Joshua Tree. Rangers will enforce laws against marijuana use if it is 

blatant, but the real problem comes from stronger drugs, especially methamphetamine. In 1987,

Chief Ranger D. Paul Henry suggested that half of the marines at the nearby base had driven or 

hiked into the monument to use or sell drugs. At the same time, the Morongo Basin became a 

landing area for drug smuggling by aircraft. Over the previous year, authorities had raided 
239

twenty-two labs in the area. Joshua Tree offered hundreds of square miles of rarely patrolled land 

and access for vehicles at sixteen locations. With only seven full-time rangers, Henry worried 

that this pernicious criminal activity might spread into the monument. His concern proved 

prophetic. In May 1991, The Desert Trail reported that Joshua Tree had the highest number of 

drug arrests in the entire park system. The rangers worked with local police, military police, and 

the Drug Enforcement Agency to combat the problem.74

Other crimes occurred that recalled those that plagued Joshua Tree during its first few 

years. In October 1996, one hapless poacher had the misfortune of taking a reptile from the park 

under the watchful eyes of personnel from five federal and state agencies meeting to discuss 

surveillance operations aimed at stopping that very crime. After years of protection, all the parks 

and monuments in the southwestern deserts reported a steep rise in reptile and amphibian 

poaching during this time. One other unusual crime from this period occurred in Joshua Tree and 

has never been solved. On January 28, 1994, someone dug up the grave of Johnny Lang and stole 

his skull and other bones. Bill Keys and others had buried the old miner in 1926, and for sixtyeight years he rested in peace. NPS rangers and many others wondered why anyone would 

commit such a ghoulish crime, but no trace of the missing bones has ever been found. The 

irreverence of this act along with vandalism, antisocial behavior, and serious crime have become 

unfortunate byproducts of higher visitation and the weakened role of interpreters as they try to 

communicate the purpose of the national parks.75 

The California Desert Protection Act

One impact of the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s was a new appreciation for 

the desert among California's population. Yet, despite the establishment of wilderness in both 

Death Valley and Joshua Tree, the NPS remained unenthusiastic about its arid land units. Senior 

agency officials stubbornly resisted adding another unit in the eastern Mojave Desert and 

routinely opposed expansion of the two existing national monuments or promotion of them to 

national park status. Instead, environmental organizations including the Sierra Club and the 

Desert Protection Council convinced Senator Alan Cranston and his successor, Dianne Feinstein, 

to carry out one of the most significant preservation campaigns in American history. With the 

California Desert Protection Act of 1994 congress preserved the second largest amount of land in 

United States history after the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. The law 

established Joshua Tree and Death Valley as national parks and added land to both, created 

Mojave National Preserve, and converted sixty-nine BLM wilderness study areas to official 

wilderness among other provisions. The story of the campaign and its narrow passage by 

congress is well told in other venues, but the specific part Joshua Tree and its staff played is not 

well known.76

By the mid-1960s, California’s desert had its supporters among environmentalists and 

regional residents, but most Americans and even most Californians still regarded it as a difficult 

and unfriendly place at best and a wasteland at worst. Hence, they allowed or ignored almost any 

use of the space and resources of the desert. One of the more popular annual events in the 

Mojave Desert was a motorcycle race from Barstow to Las Vegas. Hundreds of riders fanned out 

over a wide swath of land, roaring over and through any landscape or biotic feature they 

encountered. As it grew in fame, the number of machines multiplied and the damage 

exponentially increased. This began to change in June 1967 when the BLM appointed J. Russell 
240

Penny as its state director for California. He was appalled by pictures of the race area and 

appealed to the Washington, D.C. headquarters for money to study the impacts of the race and 

how they should be mitigated. He set up an administrative committee to address the issue and, in 

January 1970, released a report stating that the California Desert would soon be an 

environmental disaster. Penny's concern and his committee's reports drew the attention of 

environmental organizations like the Sierra Club as well as federal lawmakers. The latter 

proposed bills demanding a sensible California desert plan and a detailed mission statement for 

the BLM.

77 At that time, the successor to the General Land Office operated under nearly 200 

years of land laws aimed primarily at dispensing federal land to the public. Meanwhile,

environmentalists led by Peter and Joyce Burk began calling for a Mojave National Park to 

transfer management of much of California's portion of the Mojave to the NPS. In 1975, the 

BLM banned the Barstow-to-Las Vegas race because of its environmental damage. This met 

furious opposition from off-road vehicle enthusiasts many of whom simply could not understand 

why the government blocked their activities in such a barren and unsettled place.78

In 1976, congress passed the Federal Land Management and Policy Act (FLPMA) which 

became the organic act for the BLM. It repealed nearly all previous land laws except for the 

Mining Act of 1872, ordered the bureau to manage its lands rather than simply distribute them,

and included an earlier bill introduced by Congressman Jerry L. Pettis to establish a California 

Desert Conservation Area encompassing twenty-five million acres, one-fourth of the state. The 

law required the BLM to prepare a comprehensive plan for the new conservation area and study 

5,700,000 acres of its desert land to identify areas suitable for wilderness designation.79 In 

December 1980, after intensive study and work, the BLM issued its California Desert Plan. It 

proposed an Eastern Mojave National Scenic Area for the region where the race formerly took 

place but only recommended 2,100,000 acres as suitable for wilderness. Both environmentalists 

and off-road vehicle organizations attacked the plan for diametrically opposed reasons. The 

former found the plan weak and well short of the desert's need for protection. The latter rejected 

government intrusion into the freedom of the desert, its principal attraction for many. Shortly 

thereafter, Secretary of the Interior James Watt stated his opposition to the California Desert Plan

and to environmental regulation in general. Soon the BLM reopened the Barstow-to-Las Vegas 

race while Watt called for elimination of many of the proposed wilderness study areas.80 

The Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and other environmental organizations reacted 

to these setbacks by forming the California Desert Protection League (CDPL) with its mission to 

seek a bill that would create Mojave National Park, expand and upgrade Joshua Tree and Death 

Valley, and rescue the many wilderness study areas identified by the BLM before Watt had 

eliminated them. Led by Jim Dodson, Judy Anderson, Peter and Joyce Burk, and Elden Hughes, 

the group met with Senator Alan Cranston in December 1984 and urged him to submit a bill 

which they would develop. Anderson, Hughes, and others then consulted other 

environmentalists, scientists, and NPS personnel to map boundaries for the proposed parks and 

wilderness areas, and design a draft bill. At a February 1985 meeting, the CDPL confirmed that 

the bill should include upgrades for Joshua Tree and Death Valley to highlight existing desert 

resources and justify adding more lands to improve their environmental management. A year 

later, on February 6, 1986, Senator Cranston introduced S. 2061 as drafted by the environmental 

coalition. Far and away the most controversial portion of the bill was the proposal for a 

1,500,000-acre Mojave National Park. Although less incendiary, the proposals to upgrade Joshua 
241

Tree and Death Valley also met swift opposition from the Reagan Administration, the BLM, and 

many who lived, mined, or recreated in areas proposed for addition to the monuments.81

In his book on the California Desert Protection Act, California Desert Miracle, activist 

and author Frank Wheat uses many pages to explain the ups and downs of the campaign, the 

intense conflicts over Mojave National Preserve, and the expansion and conversion of Death 

Valley National Park. The Joshua Tree National Park story is almost an afterthought. Yet it too 

generated conflict, not only between those who favored or opposed the bill, but within the NPS

itself. Congressman Jerry Lewis, whose district included much of San Bernardino County, 

strongly opposed NPS control of any more of the desert. In an effort to undermine any campaign 

by environmentalists, he announced his intention to introduce a bill in 1984 to reclassify Joshua 

Tree and Death Valley as national parks but with no additional land. Joshua Tree Superintendent 

Rick Anderson publicly supported the idea which drew the immediate and apparently unexpected 

wrath of Regional Director Howard Chapman. He arrived at the monument's headquarters and 

summoned Anderson, Bob Moon, and several others to a mandatory meeting. Later Moon 

described the meeting as a severe dressing down of the monument staff. Chapman explained the 

traditional differences between a park and a monument and why Joshua Tree did not deserve 

park status. The agency had long avoided publicly ranking its units, but within the agency 

everyone knew that the "crown jewels" of the park system did not include desert areas. Indeed, 

Chapman berated Anderson and his staff for even thinking that a "kitty-litter park" could qualify 

for such status. Years later he encountered Moon and apologized for that statement. Ironically, as 

the campaign unfolded, he came to strongly support the California desert protection bill and it 

cost him his job.82

As the CDPL planned its draft bill, Elden Hughes of the Sierra Club visited Joshua Tree 

in 1985 to learn what boundary changes the staff thought appropriate for the future park. He and 

Bob Moon spread out a map of the original 1936 monument and, relying on Moon's intimate 

knowledge of the area’s physical and biotic resources and the ownership of the surrounding land, 

chose four areas to add (Maps 7-4 and 7-5). They sought to complete biological ranges,

especially for bighorn sheep, improve management by incorporating external access points used 

by poachers and off-road vehicles, and reacquire land lost in 1950. The four additions totaled 

more than 246,000 acres and consisted primarily of federal land with scattered state and private 

inholdings and various mining claims of unknown validity. Most of them were federal lands in 

the mountainous zones excised by the 1950 boundary change. The smallest parcel lay in the 

Pinto Mountains north of the monument and near the entrance road from Twentynine Palms It 

consisted of approximately 7,500 acres of which 600 belonged to the state lands commission. A 

1987 assessment by the regional office estimated that it included 160 mining claims. The NPS

later admitted the area had no particular outstanding resources but merely facilitated 

management by having the boundary follow mountainous topography rather than invisible 

section lines of the land division system.83 The second proposed addition included the remainder 

of the scenic Coxcomb Mountains on the eastern flank of the monument. Every wildlife 

specialist from Lowell Sumner to Bob Moon recognized that only having the western half of 

these mountains limited the water available to bighorn sheep and exposed them to hunting and 

other threats in their natural range. The addition of 82,550 acres to the portion of the Coxcombs 

already in the monument also offered to hikers the best opportunity for a true wilderness

experience. Furthermore, the NPS had already proposed an eighteen square mile portion of the 
242

Map 7-4. Land ownership around the national monument was an important factor in deciding 

what areas to seek for an expanded Joshua Tree National Park. Data source: Denver Service 

Center. May 1994. Map 156/20.017A. Delta Cartography. 

addition as a national natural landmark. The area included 2,240 acres of private land, 2,720 

acres of state land, and 107 mining claims. The MWD aqueduct tunneled under a corner of the 

addition, but all these intrusions did not detract from the extraordinary wilderness character of 

the mountains. The Coxcomb addition would automatically become wilderness in the proposal 

by Moon and Hughes.

The third segment to be added lay in the Eagle Mountains south of the existing 

monument. A substantial portion of those mountains was already in the unit, but a larger portion 

had been removed in 1950. The 80,400-acre parcel included most of the remainder of that range 

except for a broad cherry-stem of private and public domain land under and around Kaiser's 

Eagle Mountain Mine. The proposed Eagle Mountain addition had 2,560 acres of private land, 

3,200 acres of state land, and 475 unpatented mines and millsites. Most of the mining claims 

occurred near the giant Kaiser operation. The area was visible to hikers inside the monument and 

drivers on Interstate 10 to the south of it. Section line boundaries were unclear and led to offroad vehicle use and recreational mining on monument land. Adoption of topographic 

boundaries promised to ease these problems and improve management of the resident bighorn 

sheep.
243

Map 7-5. Lands added by the California Desert Protection Act in 1994. Source: JTNP GIS files.

The final proposal for addition consisted of the southern slopes of the Cottonwood and 

Little San Bernardino Mountains. This 76,000-acre tract promised to be the most difficult to 

acquire and manage. It included 36,000 acres of railroad and other private lands in a 

checkerboard pattern that had been dropped from the original 1936 monument proclamation. On 

the plus side, only twelve mining claims existed despite the ample evidence of earlier 

prospecting. Adding such a complex land ownership problem to the monument demanded a 

strong set of benefits to outweigh the disadvantages. This proposed addition revealed a 

fundamental motive that shaped the Joshua Tree section of the California Desert Protection Act

(CDPA) as well as later actions of the NPS in the park. The area includes the access points for 

Thermal, Fargo, Berdoo, and Pinkham canyons leading into the park. The monument's tiny staff 

could not control illegal off-road vehicle use and vandalism. Poaching of wildlife and the 

prospect of major subdivisions on the existing southern boundary also worried monument 

managers. The area had visible scars from all these activities that could be seen from Keys View. 

The threat of incompatible development led the agency to seek buffers around Joshua Tree in 

order to protect not only biotic resources, but also the night sky and wilderness silence. The 

agency sought this land simply to prevent other uses. Later, as the renewable energy boom 

swamped the California deserts with solar and wind farms, this motive would spawn aggressive 

attempts to add more land to Joshua Tree.84
244

The BLM joined many locals, legislators, and Reagan Administration officials in 

vigorously opposing nearly every aspect of the Cranston bill. The bureau took seriously its new 

responsibility to permanently manage its land and strongly promoted the multiple-use 

management prescription it shared with the USFS. The prospect of losing nearly three million 

acres to the NPS appalled the BLM's California Director Ed Hastey and its desert district director 

Gerald Hillier. They saw it as a blatant repudiation of their management philosophy, which it 

was. After all their work on the 1980 desert plan and the subsequent amendments forced by 

Secretary Watt and his allies, BLM leaders did not want to sacrifice any land, in spite of the fact 

that one of their own earlier reports described much of the Eastern Mojave as worthy of national 

park status. Ed Hastey toured the state convincing local politicians that their areas were better 

served by his agency. Inyo County became the first to pass a resolution opposing the bill. Soon 

San Bernardino and other counties followed. Even the Twentynine Palms Chamber of 

Commerce, a traditional ally of the monument, opposed the bill. Meanwhile the Washington 

Office of the NPS ordered Regional Director Howard Chapman to have his staff study the 

proposal encompassed in Cranston's bill. In January 1987, Chapman approved a report which 

supported all of the purposes of the bill. This was more than Secretary of the Interior Donald 

Hodel was prepared to accept, and he ordered the NPS Director William Penn Mott to reject the 

report. Shortly thereafter, Howard Chapman retired under a cloud of antagonism from the 

secretary's office.85

After Hodel rejected its report, the NPS agreed to work with the BLM to reach some type 

of compromise. The acting director wrote a memorandum stating that the NPS was prepared to 

scale back the lands it wanted to 1,162,080 for Death Valley and 156,500 for Joshua Tree. At the 

same time, off-road vehicle organizations, hunters, and mining groups sensed victory and 

intensified their well-funded legal and publicity campaigns against any transfer that would "lock 

Californians out of their public lands." The BLM studied the new NPS proposals but then, as the 

"lead agency" in this planning effort, unilaterally issued an environmental impact statement 

entitled "The Monuments" in April 1989. It spelled out the bureau's preferred option to transfer a 

total of 108,574 acres to the NPS, almost entirely around Death Valley. The only addition to 

Joshua Tree would be a 4,480-acre fragment of the Eagle Mountains proposal that held a small 

portion of the Pinto Basin. That land had been proposed in a failed 1983 bill to transfer BLM

land adjacent to parks and monuments to the NPS. As ordered by the Reagan and George H. W. 

Bush administrations, there was no mention of a Mojave National Park. Gerald Hillier and his 

staff curtly dismissed the remaining segments proposed for Joshua Tree calling them 

"alternatives considered but rejected from detailed consideration." According to the report, the 

Pinto Mountains parcel had too many mines which meant there must be enough minerals to offer 

future mining opportunities, the rest of the Eagle Mountains parcel should remain a wilderness 

area under BLM management, and the Cottonwood Mountains area contained too many private 

lands. Bureau planners added that their Palm Springs Office could better manage the Coxcomb 

Mountains from the east. Elsewhere in the report Hillier's planners justified their dismissal of an 

addition of land in the Funeral Mountains to Death Valley because it would split management of 

a herd of bighorn sheep. They conveniently ignored the NPS rationale that it needed the eastern 

flank of the Coxcombs to avoid a similar split in bighorn management.86

Reaction from environmentalists was swift and scathing. Upon viewing a draft of the 

environmental impact report, Elden Hughes told the San Bernardino Sun that "to say this 
245

document has fully addressed the situation is like erecting a pup tent in downtown Los Angeles 

and saying we have fully addressed the homeless situation."87 The NPS might have reacted in the 

same way except that political forces intervened. First, the Republican administrations deeply 

opposed the bill introduced by Cranston, which had broad support from Democrats. Successive 

secretaries of the interior ordered the agency to officially support a countering bill introduced by 

Congressman Jerry Lewis to enact the changes suggested by the BLM. Bob Moon later described 

the frustration local NPS officials felt as the bureau repeatedly ignored their opinions and data. In 

addition to top-level opposition, Joshua Tree and Death Valley faced unexpected criticism from 

their own regional director, Stanley Albright. In later interviews, both Moon and former 

superintendent David Moore reported that Albright and the BLM’s Ed Hastey were old friends 

and former classmates. Albright was sympathetic to his friend's plight as environmental 

organizations pilloried the bureau over its desert management.88

Senator Cranston's original bill never made it out of the senate interior committee, but he 

continued to fight for desert protection. Joined by Congressman Mel Levine, he reintroduced the 

same basic bill in 1987 and 1989 only to have them meet similar fates. Each time, however, the 

bills picked up more co-sponsors. In 1991, Congressmen George Miller, Rick Lehman and 

Levine introduced H. R. 2929. It reflected efforts to placate some opponents by reducing the 

amount of wilderness and changing the designation of the Mojave unit to national monument 

which would allow hunting. Congressman Lewis submitted his BLM-sanctioned bill and the two 

political parties quickly lined up behind their preferred versions. Senator Cranston in his final 

days in government aligned with his democratic colleagues, while California's other senator, 

Republican John Seymour, vowed to do all he could to defeat the larger bill. Democrats who 

dominated the lower house defeated the Lewis bill and passed H. R. 2929. Seymour's opposition 

killed it in the senate. However, in the election of 1992 the democrats gained the White House 

under President William J. Clinton and both senate seats in California as Dianne Feinstein 

defeated Seymour and Barbara Boxer replaced Cranston.89

On January 21, 1993, Feinstein introduced S. 21 to establish Mojave National Park, 

vastly expand Death Valley, convert seventy-four BLM wilderness study units to designated 

wilderness, upgrade the two monuments to park status, and add approximately 234,000 acres to 

Joshua Tree. During the ensuing twenty-one months that negotiations continued, vitriol flew 

back and forth between environmental groups and "wise-use" advocates, and various other 

stipulations became part of the growing bill, some of them completely unrelated to the California

deserts. Congress held hearings, both chambers submitted reports and slowly the complicated bill 

evolved into an act that barely garnered enough support in both the house and senate. On 

October 31, 1994, President Clinton signed the bill enacting a law that protects 9.4 million acres 

of desert habitat. A petulant Congressman Lewis tried to limit the NPS's budget at Mojave 

National Preserve to one dollar the following year, but he harbored no apparent ill will toward 

the two enlarged and upgraded national monuments. Joshua Tree became a national park of 

nearly 790,000 acres with the addition of all four of the parcels Bob Moon and Elden Hughes 

proposed. Complex issues with delimiting the boundaries, acquiring private land, and adapting 

the new areas to park purposes lay ahead, but Joshua Tree had passed a huge threshold in its long 

struggle to be recognized as a major unit of the national park system.90
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The General Management Plan

Planning was always a difficult issue for Joshua Tree. The variety and severity of threats plus

understaffing and contention between senior agency officials and park managers dragged out 

every planning procedure. Over and over, the regional office rejected plans outright or sent them 

back for extensive modification. One important document that Joshua Tree needed was a general 

management plan (GMP) laying out policy and development goals for all aspects of the unit over 

the ensuing ten to fifteen years. The last document of that type for Joshua Tree was a Mission 66 

update written in 1964. A general management plan would incorporate existing knowledge and 

coordinate or modify more specific plans. The public would have considerable input, as 

mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act, and it would become a legal policy

document ranked fourth in importance behind the presidential and congressional acts that 

established and amended the unit, the 1916 Organic Act of the NPS, and the agency’s systemwide management policies.

Throughout the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, the agency thought about, discussed,

and debated the need for a general management plan at Joshua Tree without accomplishing 

much. In 1977, Superintendent Anderson submitted an outline of planning requirements listing 

issues and goals with the simple comment, “I certainly hope we are on the right track.”91 In 1980,

he sent another package of information to the planners at DSC who would actually develop the 

plan. On September 15, 1989, nearly a decade later after a series of delays and other planning 

projects, the DSC finally issued a task directive for a general management plan/development 

concept plan with an environmental assessment for Joshua Tree. The directive named Mary 

Magee as team leader and predicted two years to complete the plan. After inspection trips, her

team met with monument officials in December to review its progress. During the few months of 

work, the budget for phase one of the plan dropped from $50,000 to nil and then crawled back to 

$12,000, certainly a troubling sign. The planning team pondered a wide variety of topics,

including even the introduction of private concessions into the monument. Prominent issues for 

debate and decision included the monument's visitor carrying capacity, the impact of rock 

climbing, Native American input into planning and management, ongoing problems with roads 

and parking lots, and inadequate office and housing space.92

Despite this promising work, four major problems bogged down general management 

planning at Joshua Tree (1) repeated personnel changes on the planning team with consequent 

delays, (2) interruptions in funding, (3) public debate over proper use of the backcountry, and (4) 

the need to incorporate new lands added to the unit by the CDPA. In October 1990, the DSC

issued a second task directive modified slightly to account for the previous year’s information. A 

year later, it issued another one after Don Tiernan became team captain for the project. In March 

1992, the center released a fourth iteration. Each of these was essentially a brand new start.93 On 

January 27, 1992, Superintendent David Moore complained about the low priority given to 

Joshua Tree by DSC officials:

I have cooled off considerably since last week in regards to the progress of the General 

Management Plan for Joshua Tree National Monument. It seems that each time we try to 

get this plan on track and set some timetables for completion of tasks, another roadblock 

seems to come out of the Denver Service Center... I thought that after the comments 

made concerning GMP needs by the Operations Evaluation team in October 1991, Joshua 
247

Tree National Monument would receive some special consideration. We also felt there 

would be some stable goals toward accomplishing the GMP in the next two years. Now I 

am informed that since Joshua Tree is 10th priority for a GMP in the Western Region, and 

16th overall by the Denver team, [and] that members of our team are pulled to satisfy 

goals of other higher priority GMPs.94

Plodding progress continued. In April 1993, Moore wrote another angry letter about the 

Denver team. The cost of the plan had ballooned to $427,000. He had just received a call 

indicating that the team leader would be changed again. Moore had used monument funds to 

send staff members from the monument and specialists from the regional office to Denver in an 

effort to get the planners moving. He wrote to the regional director expressing outrage at the 

miserable progress they had made, particularly given the amount of money they had already 

spent:

Each time the park has been requested to do our share or meet our deadlines, we have 

100% met these objectives. The team from Denver switched members often, and when 

they sent new people to JOTR, we gave them a park overview and tried to bring them up 

to speed...You have heard me complain, and I have discussed our problems with other 

members of your staff, and they report that this is not an unusual case.95

Moore attached the latest agenda issued by the Denver team that predicted completion of the 

plan in another fifteen months.

In July 1994, the planning team and its new captain, Elaine Riddout, finally released a 

draft general management plan with an environmental assessment for public review. It included 

three alternatives, the Park Service’s preferred option, a minimum requirements option, and no 

action. The public had seen earlier concept-drafts, attended hearings, and reacted according to 

their ideas and preferences. The regional office and other specialists had reviewed the draft 

repeatedly through its formation and offered many comments and suggestions. This draft 

incorporated compromises and new information gathered during the long planning process. 

Shortly after the latest round of public input began, the CDPA passed expanding Joshua Tree’s 

size and making it a national park. The NPS quickly revised the draft to include a record of 

public input and a strategy for managing the new lands. Rock climbing and other uses of the 

recently enlarged wilderness created enough heated debate to initiate work on a completely 

separate backcountry plan. The final GMP without the backcountry portion appeared in May 

1995. Four months later, Regional Director Stanley Albright issued a record of decision 

officially adopting the plan. Thirty-one years had passed since the last master plan, fifteen since 

the agency began collecting data, and six since the first task directive.

96

The two decades from 1977 to 1996 saw improvement in every aspect of Joshua Tree’s 

management. As the new century approached, Joshua Tree National Park continued to improve 

its planning, resource management, and visitor services. Yet, old problems and new threats 

within the park demanded ever more money, more personnel, and greater attention. At the same 

time, park officials faced grave threats from external development, threats that again challenged 

the very purposes of the unit.
248

Chapter Eight: New Threats to a New National Park 

After passage of the California Desert Protection Act (CDPA) in 1994, the staff at Joshua Tree 

National Park has faced new lands, new responsibilities, and growing threats. Since that time, 

Joshua Tree has evolved in four distinct ways. First, the sources of funding, including 

operational base budgets, National Park Service (NPS) project allocations, external grants, and 

recreation fees charged to park visitors have all increased improving operations. In addition, 

several land trusts have acquired many of the inholdings, both old and new, and donated them to 

the park. Second, the NPS made significant and long overdue advances in natural resource 

management in response to internal and external criticism and resulting legislative and policy 

changes. Joshua Tree and other units across the national park system finally seem to have 

elevated science to the primacy the Leopold report called for decades earlier. However, in 

pursuing a model developed by businesses, NPS leaders demand ever more accountability 

reporting and compliance documentation as well as foundation reports, management projections, 

and mission statements. This has caused the work load to expand faster than the incremental 

increase in park personnel. Third, tourists have increased in number and their profile has altered. 

These changes require enhanced resource protection, improved public communication, and more 

law enforcement while increasing the economic impact of the park on surrounding communities. 

Finally, internal and external threats have placed the park in the greatest danger it has seen since 

the boundary change of 1950. Park officials have adopted radical new ways to combat them, in 

some cases jeopardizing their careers. As the park approaches its eightieth anniversary, it is a 

lonely island of preservation facing seemingly unsolvable threats like adjacent incompatible land 

use, worsening air pollution, and climate change. The future of Joshua Tree hinges on the ability 

of a small staff and its allies in the public to resist these myriad threats.

Land Acquisition: New Needs and New Tools

The staff at Joshua Tree National Park realized the magnitude of the CDPA when they reviewed 

land status in 1996 (Plates 3 and 4). Prior to the act, decades of effort had reduced non-federal 

acreage to less than two percent of the 561,000-acre monument, two-thirds of it in low risk state 

holdings. The CDPA brought the amount of non-federal acreage to 57,281 acres, more than 

seven percent of the much larger park, with most of it located in proposed wilderness. The 

amount of non-federal land in the park could have been even larger if the NPS had not acted 

quickly following passage of the act. The Metropolitan Water District (MWD), sensing its 

imminent passage, applied to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 1993 to gain control of 

2,200 acres of land near the Coxcomb Mountains. Half of the land subsequently became part of 

the park. The BLM rejected the application for that reason, but the utility appealed in March 

1995. At the time, surveyors were still determining the final boundaries dictated by the CDPA. 

According to former Assistant Superintendent Frank Buono, the water district convinced the 

BLM boundary surveyors to exclude the area it wanted hoping to have that boundary accepted as 

the legal document required by the act. In fact, the MWD had already built aqueduct-related 

facilities nearby. The BLM's preliminary map, as influenced by the MWD, incorrectly showed 

those facilities within the park portion justifying a boundary that gave the water district land that 

was supposed to be in the park. Buono urged the BLM to redraw that portion of the map

according to the CDPA and submit it before the preliminary version became official. Eventually,

the two interior agencies adjusted the final boundary map to correct the mistake. Although the 
249

water district later quitclaimed three parcels containing 106 acres to the park in 1997, it remains 

a major landholder in the park. In 2009, the MWD still held sixty-six parcels of land totaling 

2,560 acres within the eastern and southern boundaries of the park.1

Fortunately for the NPS, three programs allowed vigorous acquisition of many new 

inholdings. First, the CDPA provided substantial congressional funds for land acquisition in the 

three park units and the new BLM wilderness areas. Second, Section 707 of the act ordered the 

NPS and the BLM to prepare lists of land in the parks and wilderness areas held by the 

California State Lands Commission (CSLC) and public domain land in California that could be 

exchanged for it. Joshua Tree dutifully prioritized thirty-seven parcels totaling more than 15,080 

acres on April 12, 1995. Superintendent Ernest Quintana listed wilderness sections in the Pinto 

Basin as most desirable followed by those in the Coxcomb Mountains and Eagle Mountains. 

More than two years of intense negotiations followed as the CSLC slowly identified the federal 

holdings it wanted and the department of the interior integrated Joshua Tree's land requests with 

those from Death Valley National Park, Mojave National Preserve, and the BLM's many new 

wilderness areas. On December 23, 1997, Joshua Tree received title to 12,914 acres. Although 

the exchange did not eliminate all the state land from the park, it was the biggest land acquisition 

in almost forty years.2

Finally, three land trusts organized to donate funds to the NPS for land acquisition or to 

directly buy inholdings and donate them to the park. These programs have been so successful 

that recent Joshua Tree superintendents have tried to reclaim some of the land in San Bernardino 

County lost back in 1950. The first to help was the Wildlands Conservancy, founded in 

California in 1995. The organization purchases land to add to parks and wilderness areas, 

donates money for park educational and administrative purposes, and manages its own system of 

reserves. The conservancy primarily focused on negotiating with Catellus, the successor to the 

Southern Pacific Railroad Lands Company (SPRR), for its vast holdings in and around Mojave 

National Preserve. But Catellus also held land in Eagle and Cottonwood mountain additions to 

Joshua Tree. On October 29, 1999, The Wildlands Conservancy donated 14,239 acres of 

alternate sections to the park. Then, on June 18, 2002, it gave another 5,440 acres to the park in 

the same areas. Across both of the southern California deserts, the Wildlands Conservancy 

purchased and donated more than 560,000 acres, the largest conservation land donation in United 

States history.3

The National Park Foundation was the second organization to add land to Joshua Tree 

National Park. Congress established the foundation in 1967 to "encourage private gifts of real 

and personal property or any income therefrom or other interest therein for the benefit of, or in 

connection with, the National Park Service, its activities, or its services, and thereby to further 

the conservation of natural, scenic, historic, scientific, educational, inspirational, or recreational 

resources for future generations of Americans." Over a fifteen month period from September 

2006 through December 2007, the foundation bought twenty-five parcels of land totaling 1,784 

acres from eighteen willing sellers. Although many of the parcels lay in the Thermal and Berdoo 

canyons area, the foundation also acquired a few long-held parcels in the Pinto Basin.4 

One notable characteristic of these land trust programs is that they are content to let each 

other step up to a particular issue or area while they focus their efforts elsewhere. The Wildlands 

Conservancy donated land to Joshua Tree National Park during the period from 1999 to 2002. 
250

Then the National Park Foundation stepped in from 2006 through 2007. At that point, a new 

group, the Mojave Desert Land Trust (MDLT) began aggressively pursuing inholdings in the 

three desert national park units. Established in Twentynine Palms in 2005, it has been the 

primary source of land acquisition for Joshua Tree from April 2009 through 2014. The mission 

of the MDLT is to acquire land, protect it, and, when feasible, donate it to the national parks. By 

March 2013, it had acquired 532 parcels within the three parks totaling over 23,000 acres. Once 

again, most of the 4,400 acres donated to Joshua Tree lay in the recently-added area west of 

Cottonwood Spring. 5

The MDLT also helped acquire land in Whispering Pines. The subdivision is no longer a 

major problem, although one private owner still has a structure in the area. A fire destroyed 

several houses and trailers, and the NPS condemned and removed another house for health and 

safety reasons. Their owners have sold to the trust or are not interested in rebuilding. The owner 

of the only remaining structure seems untroubled by the agency's lack of maintenance on the 

road into the subdivision. Meanwhile, the residents of Pine Valley outside the park continue to 

search for a way to access their holdings. In 2000, they mounted a challenge to restore what they 

claimed was once a public road linking their property to the Covington Flat Road in the park. 

They tried to use Revised Statute 2477 which congress passed in 1866 to encourage the

settlement of the West by developing highways. The statute granted to counties and states a 

right-of-way across federal land when a highway was built. Building a road could mean as little 

as repeated use of a route or filling in the odd pothole along the way. Although the Federal Land 

Policy and Management Act of 1976 repealed the statute, it allowed "existing rights" to continue. 

Later, opponents of wilderness and preserved lands convinced some counties or states to claim 

the right to reopen roads they once "maintained," despite later laws that precluded vehicular 

access. Unfortunately for the Pine Valley people, who had ignored local regulations and codes to 

build their structures, San Bernardino County refuted their R.S. 2477 claim leaving them once 

again at the mercy of NPS regulations. In late 2014, they are no closer to gaining legal access to 

their property.6 

Rapid development along Highway 62 from Yucca Valley to Twentynine Palms led 

Joshua Tree officials to seek more land north of the park. One threat was the type of subdivision 

exemplified by Pine Valley. Another stemmed from energy companies that purchased small 

tracts of private land around scattered parcels of BLM property. When a company achieved 

enough territory, it would seek a permit to use the BLM land and develop a solar or wind facility 

spanning the entire area. Many of these plans included wind towers or other obtrusive structures 

within the park's viewshed. In contrast to its furious opposition to the CDPA, the BLM is willing 

to part with the many small, oddly-shaped bits of property between the park and the marine base. 

In a conversation with Joshua Tree Superintendent Curt Sauer, BLM California Desert Associate 

District Manager Jack Hamby offered to help transfer all these holdings to Joshua Tree. 

Managing and patrolling these myriad little parcels was very difficult and expensive. Sauer 

politely refused this superficially magnanimous offer.7

Instead, the NPS focused on acquiring larger tracts adjacent to the park. Susan Luckie 

Reilly, a descendent of one of the founders of Twentynine Palms and a former Joshua Tree 

employee, offered to donate thirty-five acres of land east of Indian Cove. Although it involved a 

boundary adjustment, a 1996 amendment to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act allows
251

the NPS to accept donated lands without an act of congress if the acreage does not exceed two 

percent of the existing unit. Simultaneously, the park acquired BLM acreage abutting the Reilly 

tract to increase the total addition to sixty acres. On August 28, 2003, the park published notice 

in the Federal Register of boundary changes incorporating the Reilly donation, the BLM

transfer, plus a ten-acre parcel in Pine Valley purchased and donated by the Wildlands 

Conservancy.8

Joshua Tree National Park also seeks land outside its northwestern boundary to help 

establish wildlife corridors to the Twentynine Palms marine base. In November 2000, a coalition 

of scientists, land managers, and environmental organizations met to plan a system of wildlife 

corridors in southern California linking both government and private protected areas. These 

corridors enable fauna to migrate safely and avoid isolation that can bring inbreeding and 

susceptibility to disease. One group called South Coast Wildlands formed to identify links from 

the southern Sierra Nevada to Baja California. In December 2008, the group produced a report 

that identified eight major links for animals between the park and the military base. Although the 

marines use the latter for military exercises, their activities affect a small percentage of the land,

and the absolute closure to the public makes it a de facto wildlife reserve. The MDLT strongly 

supports the goals outlined in the report and purchased Nolina Peak just west of the Pine Valley 

subdivision on October 3, 2008. It is part of a planned wildlife corridor to the base as well as an 

extension of uplands used by bighorn sheep and a viewpoint for visitors who access it from the 

road to Covington Flat. At the same time the U. S. Navy used funds from a program called the 

"Readiness Environmental Protection Initiative" to acquire land southward from the base for 

flight paths that also serve as wildlife corridors (Map 8-1).

9

In recent years, the park also has sought legislative action to gain additional adjacent

BLM land north of its boundary. In December 2009, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced S. 

2921, a complex bill to create two new national monuments and new wilderness areas on BLM

land, and transfer other parcels to the NPS. The Joshua Tree portion of the bill proposed adding 

four BLM parcels totaling 2,879 acres, more than two percent of the park's acreage and, hence,

requiring congressional action. The bill did not pass nor did its reintroduction as S. 138 in 2011. 

In the meantime, the NPS sought to acquire 114,660 acres in the Pinto Mountains east of

Twentynine Palms and south of Highway 62, land that was removed from the original monument 

in 1950. Initially called "the saddle" by the park officials, the "Old Dale Historic District" 

includes the 24,374-acre Pinto Mountains Wilderness Area in its southwestern portion. Local 

residents and off-road vehicle enthusiasts use the rest of the area for mining and vehicular

recreation. In May 2012, the agency released an economic analysis of the proposed transfer that 

predicted it would bring a minimum of 42,000 more visitors, $5,300,000 more money spent 

locally by those visitors, and at least 101 new jobs. It optimistically suggested that 314,000 new 

visitors, more than $40,000,000 in new revenue, and 650 jobs might result. In spite of these 

numbers, the reaction of the public in the local area was noisily negative. Very little private land 

exists in the "Saddle" but many mining claims are scattered in and around the former Dale 

Mining District. By late 2013, the park staff had tabled the proposal, although addition of the 

BLM wilderness area may be renewed in the future.10
252

Map 8-1. The addition of Nolina Peak and several other small parcels changed the northern 

boundary of the park in the new century. Delta Cartography. 

Mining Ends in Joshua Tree...Or Does It?

During the 1980s, active mining in Joshua Tree National Monument ceased. Twelve patented 

claims, eleven of which belonged to the Kaiser Corporation, and nine unpatented claims existed. 

In 1987, the BLM eliminated the unpatented claims. The CDPA brought sixty-eight unpatented 

mines and one millsite into the park, but most of the claims have proven invalid. Art Parker held 

forty-six claims but lost them by failing to pay annual fees. Byron Walls held fifteen claims in 

Music Valley and filed one operation plan, but quitclaimed all his mines when it appeared that a 

validity exam would declare that one null and void. Four other claim-holders also failed to pay 

the annual fees. That left just Stephen Dwyer who held three claims in the Eagle Mountains. 

Before the CDPA passed, Dwyer applied to the BLM to reopen an underground andradite garnet 

operation at his Storm Jade #1 claim next to the Eagle Mountain Wilderness Study Area. He 

concurrently applied to develop a quarry and storage area within the potential wilderness. BLM

officials rejected the quarry application because of their legal obligation to manage the surface 

land as wilderness. However, they approved the underground mine in April 1992. When that 

land became part of Joshua Tree National Park, Dwyer filed a plan of operations with the NPS. 

The agency initiated a validity examination conducted by American Geological Services and an 

NPS geologist. They concluded that the price of garnet was too low for a "prudent person" to 

carry out mining and expect to make a profit.11
253

Stephen Dwyer appealed to Congressman Sonny Bono for help and challenged the 

existing regulations. He did not pay the annual $100 fees from 1995 through 1997 and argued 

that he had conducted assessment work which excused him from paying. The NPS responded 

that the assessment work he conducted was itself illegal without approval from the 

superintendent. Dwyer met with two park officials and asked for a number of copies of files 

which they insisted that they sent. He claimed that they sent only a few pages. He asked for a 

map of the area showing the new park boundary to which they replied that none existed at that 

time. On February 5, 1997, Assistant Superintendent Frank Buono called Dwyer to discuss the 

increasingly tense situation. Buono later wrote that the miner accused the NPS of committing 

felonies by denying his civil rights. He also insisted that the agency was enforcing imaginary 

laws, that his claims were outside the park, and that NPS regulations did not apply to him. Buono 

responded that each of those statements was wrong. He later wrote that Dwyer was shouting by 

this point and announced that Joshua Tree officials were making a big mistake and would pay for 

it personally. During the same month, validity inspectors declared his other two claims null and 

void. He immediately launched appeals.12

By May 1997, Dwyer calmed down enough to submit a new operation plan for mining at 

Storm Jade #1 to the park. One month later, Superintendent Quintana informed him that it lacked 

necessary information on the scale of operations, compliance with state and local regulations, the 

types of vehicles and equipment he planned to use, an exact description of his proposed mining 

procedures, the anticipated impacts to resources, and how hazardous substances and tailings 

would be contained and reclaimed.13 This infuriated Dwyer who again complained to 

congressmen and editorialized in the Desert Sun:

As a longtime resident and Earth Scientist, I can assure your readers that the park policies 

are what has [sic] led to the serious degradation of the park, not funding. Park policies 

have created this Wasteland National Park.14 

Park officials continued to communicate with Dwyer in an effort to defuse the angry 

conflict. The disgruntled miner submitted another proposed plan of operations on May 1, 1998,

which again failed to meet all requirement of the Mining in the National Parks Act. This time the 

NPS gave much more information on why various conditions were not met as well as 

suggestions how to correct the plan. Meanwhile, Dwyer lost his appeals for Storm Jade #4 and 

Little Storm Jade Mine. Two other parties submitted proposed plans of operation the following 

year with one success. Superintendent Quintana approved a proposal to access mines outside the 

park from a road within it submitted by the First Class Miners Club of Twentynine Palms. In 

2002, Joshua Tree launched another legal challenge to Dwyer's last claim arguing that it had 

insufficient minerals to justify a prudent person's operation. Six years later, Dwyer exhausted his 

last appeal and mining in Joshua Tree National Park ended. He had appealed every contrary 

ruling from the initial quarry proposal through the 2008 adverse opinion on Storm Jade Mine #1,

no doubt at considerable cost. Within the park, conformity with the tight regulations of the 

Mining in the National Parks Act and detailed plans required for an operation truly spelled an 

end to laissez-faire mining so long associated with the desert. Patented claims still exist in Joshua 

Tree, but none are financially feasible under NPS regulations.15

The apparent end of mining at Joshua Tree did not solve the problems it caused. Park 

officials faced four basic issues. First, they had to make the mines safe for visitors. This meant 
254

covering the open shafts, removing or stabilizing structures, and eliminating dangerous 

equipment and explosives. Second, they had to determine if those structures were eligible for the 

National Register of Historic Places. If so, the options for removal or cleanup were limited. 

Third, some of the mining operations had used cyanide or mercury to process ore, leaving toxic

waste at the millsites. Finally, some of the mines harbored native species of bats which meant 

filling the opening with polyurethane was not an option. All four problems dramatically raised 

the cost of treatment. During the 1980s, park rangers studied the many mines in the monument to 

identify which needed approval from the historic preservation officials and which posed the 

greatest danger to visitors (Map 8-2). As the NPS began to prepare a backcountry management 

plan, its chief of the mining and minerals branch, David Shaver, warned that topographic maps 

alone showed some 140 shafts and tunnels in Joshua Tree. Those were a fraction of the total. He 

urged the staff to establish a systematic program for identifying threatening sites and prioritizing 

their remediation. This would legally establish that the agency was addressing the problem and 

Map 8-2. Abandoned mines in Joshua Tree National Park. Source: JTNP Natural Resource 

Division files. Delta Cartography. 

deflect lawsuits by injured parties, as it had in a BLM case. Superintendent Rick Anderson 

ordered physical scientist Mark Heuston to devote one day per week to develop the program. 

However, he informed the regional director that with more than 2,000 "shafts, inclines, adits and 

prospector test holes" the job would not be completed within two months as requested.16 
255

Over the next two decades Heuston and others collected data on the abandoned mines and 

closed some openings with polyurethane foam plugs or gates. New technology helped solve 

some problems. At the Lost Horse Mine, a national register historic site, subsidence threatened 

its stamp mill. Joshua Tree used the Borehole Video System to scan the tunnels and shafts and 

determine exactly how to stabilize the mine. That success ignited a debate about whether they 

could use the machine in a designated wilderness area. Many officials argued that the temporary 

disruption of wilderness regulations could be excused if the purpose was to rehabilitate an 

existing human intrusion.17

During the late 1990s, park rangers carefully investigated the history of claims and 

determined that they actually represented about 300 mines. Of those, 120 had large or hazardous 

openings. In 1999, Joshua Tree announced an ambitious five-year program to close the 

dangerous openings. However, the process continues at this time. Some of the mine sites are 

substantial enough to require environmental assessments before treatment. Historic preservation 

officials will only approve a plan to fill a shaft with polyurethane if the hardened foam will be 

covered with soil and the area's natural appearance restored. In 2001, the NPS signed an 

agreement with Bat Conservation International, Inc. to allow their members to inspect sites 

proposed for filling. If they find bats, the agency must use grates that allow passage by the 

animals while preventing access by humans. In 2003, Tetra Tech EM Inc. collected samples 

from fourteen historic millsites to test for hazardous chemicals and metals. Twelve of the sites 

contained at least one substance higher than the Environmental Protection Agency's safety level. 

The company recommended further testing and eventual removal of the hazardous tailings. 

Between 2001 and 2009, Joshua Tree officials closed a few mine openings each year as funds 

allowed. Then congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to assist 

recovery from a national economic and employment crisis. It provided funds for environmental 

projects including abandoned mine rehabilitation. The unexpected boost in funding allowed the 

park to close forty openings at twenty-two mines in 2010. Work continues to improve visitor 

safety while turning the park's mining past into a museum display.18 

In an odd postscript to the story of mining, the hunt for strategic rare earth minerals has 

renewed attempts to gain access to Joshua Tree National Park although they are doomed to fail. 

One person filed claims north of the park and tried to file more within the park boundary despite 

the law against new claims dating from 1936. The NPS reminded the BLM that the claims on 

park property were illegal, and the sister agency voided them. Instead of admitting his mistake, 

the individual has petitioned the Interior Board of Land Appeals. He has no chance of winning,

but this means a year or more in delays during which the NPS cannot remove his claim signs and 

other markers. The same individual has filed a claim on a piece of state school land within the 

park. The CSLC still depends on fees from mining and oil drilling operations to fund the 

teachers' retirement program. The commissioners are unwilling to take the obvious step of 

denying the claim because that challenges their core mission. In order to work on the mine, the 

prospective miner needs to conduct a major drilling operation to ascertain whether the resource is 

adequate to justify the mine as a paying prospect for a reasonable investor. To do that he must 

bring in a major rig from outside the park over a tiny dirt road that crosses a significant 

ephemeral watercourse. This would require realignment and expansion of the road which the 

park will not allow. Protection of watersheds is a fundamental component of the general 
256

management plan and agency policy. It is uncertain what the prospective miner intends to do in 

this case.19

Water, the Perennial Problem

Water resources at Joshua Tree continued to worry park officials as drought years became more 

common. A water quality study in 1998 identified 266 "aquatic ecosystems" in the park 

including ninety-five wells, eighty-six tanks, and eighty-five springs. Only 110 tanks and springs 

were natural. Many were dry part of each year or for years at a time. Control of its water 

resources remained critical to all park purposes. In the CDPA congress specified that all 

previously unappropriated water in the parks and wilderness areas belonged to the federal 

government and no future claims would be allowed. The California Water Resources Control 

Board restated its legal jurisdiction and agreed with the federal law stating, "no persons hold any 

appropriative rights under California state law to use water from any source within Joshua Tree 

National Park." However, both decrees did not affect rights established prior to the issuance of 

those documents. Hence, the heirs of Joseph Chiriaco, the Metropolitan Water District (MWD),

and the Kaiser Corporation continue to hold rights within the park. Superintendent Quintana 

challenged the Chiriaco water claims at Lost Palms and Munsen Canyons on the legal basis that 

the rights had not been continually used. Although Margit Chiriaco-Rusche admitted that the 

roadside complex had not used water for some years, she worried that a serious drought might 

necessitate repairs to the pipelines and future use. Park records are unclear about the status of the 

old water right which continues to be moribund.

20

Even before MWD officials built the Colorado River Aqueduct in the 1930s, they 

envisioned using desert valleys for underground water storage. The Hayfield Valley, just south 

of Joshua Tree, seemed a likely prospect. The utility proposed to pump water from the aqueduct 

into the dwindling aquifer during wet years and retrieve it during dry years. In the 1990s, water 

district hydrologists studied nine basins to test the feasibility of the idea and dismissed six of 

them including the Pinto Basin for various physical and legal reasons. However, they deemed 

Hayfield, Cadiz, and Chuckwalla valleys as feasible, along with the heavily populated Coachella 

Valley. Development of the project in the Chuckwalla Valley worries the NPS because recent 

studies show that ground water from the park's Pinto Basin aquifer flows into its aquifer. During 

dry years the potential exists for water withdrawal from Chuckwalla Valley to affect the water 

table in the park.21

More Money for Infrastructure

Through the remainder of the 1990s and into the next century, Joshua Tree continued to repair 

and rehabilitate its roads and trails with a few notable changes. A comprehensive 1999 survey by 

ranger and park historian Jeff Ohlfs found eighteen open paved roads totaling 82.51 miles, fiftythree open unpaved roads totaling 150.56 miles, twenty-six service or restricted roads running

33.97 miles and 170 closed roads or jeep trails that once covered 411.1 miles in the park. Many 

of the latter had already undergone rehabilitation and revegetation. The open unpaved roads

included 37.7 miles along nine routes added in the 1994 boundary change and classified by the 

NPS as suitable only for “street-legal” four-wheel-drive vehicles. None of the new roads pass

through wilderness or private ownership. At the same time, the park closed more than sixty miles 

of similar dirt roads that did not fit the criteria.22
257

In June 1998, President William Clinton signed the “Intermodal Surface Transportation 

Efficiency Act” which brought $6,000,000 to Joshua Tree for road work. The park spent most of 

the money overhauling the road to Keys View and the parking and viewing areas at its end. The 

most popular viewpoint in the park suffered from serious overuse. Both off-pavement parking 

and social trails around the viewpoint compacted soil and damaged vegetation. Beginning in 

2005, the NPS widened the road to twenty-four feet, the standard chosen for all paved public 

roads, and reorganized and expanded parking at the viewpoint. Park crews also resurfaced other 

paved roads to prolong their service and decrease the cost of maintenance. A notable addition to 

the reconstructed roads was a series of “tortoise trots,” which are cuts in the curbs to allow the 

animals to easily exit the road. Park crews put these roughly every 100 feet along roads in Lost 

Horse, Queen, and Hidden valleys, and to Keys View.23

The park has also added new trails named Bigfoot, Bajada All Access, Fault, and Fan 

Canyon View, plus a number of new structures to the park. Indeed, the building boom from 1996 

through 2007 surpassed that of the Mission 66 decade. During those twelve years, the park added 

three campground amphitheaters, all new comfort stations, four trailer pads or trailers, an 

entrance station at the park's west entrance, and seven major buildings. The Joshua Tree National 

Park Association purchased the first of these buildings for a new visitor center in Joshua Tree 

village in 2006. The NPS currently rents the space from the association, but it will pass to the 

agency when the property payments are complete. This arrangement has placed a financial strain 

on the association, but has allowed the park to avoid the need for government funds while 

solving the problem of communicating with visitors who come through the most popular 

entrance.24

Several areas of the park received new structures as the agency finally addressed long 

overdue needs identified in the general management plan. Between 1998 and 2002, the NPS

added a fire station and a dorm for firefighters and other seasonal employees at Black Rock 

Canyon. The increased fire danger in the nearby Covington Flat area made the location 

appropriate despite its distance from the park's main road network. At Pinto Wye, site of the 

earliest government structure in the park, the agency added a new maintenance office building. 

The headquarters area at the Oasis of Mara used funds provided by the Federal Lands 

Recreational Enhancement Act to add three large buildings for the Protection, Maintenance, and 

Natural Resource Management divisions between 2005 and 2007. Two years later, the Center for 

Arid Lands Restoration added a new greenhouse. The most ambitious plan came as a result of a 

1992 earthquake, and subsequent discovery of fault shears under the Oasis of Mara Visitor 

Center. More than a decade of research culminated in the design of a plan to build a new visitor

center west of the Catholic Church on property the government would have to acquire. The city 

of Twentynine Palms supported the concept. However, members of several tribes historically 

associated with the oasis opposed any additional construction. As the compliance processes 

dragged on, the complexity and cost of acquiring land and building a much larger visitor center 

soon became infeasible. For the time being, the park's administration has opted to retrofit and 

strengthen the current visitor center.25

Wilderness and Backcountry

The CDPA designated 131,780 acres of the new lands in the park as wilderness bringing the 

official total at that time to 561,470 acres. In 1997, the park found and corrected some errors in 
258

the 1976 wilderness boundary survey and converted 3,502 acres from potential wilderness to full 

wilderness. After these changes, Joshua Tree managed a total of 557,802 acres of designated 

wilderness and 27,238 acres of potential wilderness, a total of 585,040 acres, according to the 

stipulations of the Wilderness Act of 1964. Most of the potential wilderness areas included 

private inholdings in the eastern and south-central parts of the park. Both NPS employees and 

environmental groups did not pause long before urging legislators to convert more of the 

potential wilderness to fully designated wilderness. On May 21, 2002, Senator Barbara Boxer 

introduced S. 2535, the "California Wild Heritage Act." This massive statewide effort included a 

proposal to convert six parcels of land in Joshua Tree, totaling 36,672 acres, to wilderness. The 

majority of this acreage was located in the portion of the Cottonwood Mountains added in 1994. 

The bill failed to pass, as did several subsequent attempts over the next three years. In 2006, a 

new bill entitled, "The Northern California Coastal Wild Heritage Wilderness Act," sponsored by 

Boxer, Senator Dianne Feinstein and Representative Mike Thompson did pass. It established 

seven new wilderness areas and expanded four more, but all in the northern part of the state. 

Joshua Tree was unaffected.26

Despite these setbacks, California legislators repeatedly reintroduced wilderness bills 

affecting southern California which steadily gathered supporters. Eventually Representative 

Rush Holt of New Jersey introduced H.R. 146, "The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 

2009," on January 6, 2009 which included a proposal for additional wilderness in Joshua Tree. 

This bill passed easily, and President Barack Obama signed it on March 30. It was the largest 

land conservation law since 1994 and affected multiple states. Section 1851 added 36,700 acres 

of wilderness and 43,300 acres of potential wilderness to Joshua Tree. The additions 

incorporated the areas long sponsored by Senators Feinstein and Boxer, as well as several other 

small parcels. As of December 2014, Joshua Tree contains 595,400 acres of wilderness and 

70,600 acres of potential wilderness totaling more than eighty percent of the park (Plate 5).

27

Following completion of the general management plan, the NPS turned its attention to 

developing a backcountry management plan. Earlier management plans prescribed general rules 

for backcountry camping, hiking, rock climbing, stock use, and commercial operations, but did 

not differentiate zones for these activities. Increased use and pressure from recreation groups, 

especially rock climbers, plus the need to address the new land added by the CDPA required a 

much more thoughtful and nuanced approach. The planning team led by Tom Gavin divided the 

area into two zones--wilderness, including potential wilderness, and what it called the 

"backcountry transition area." The latter could absorb far more human use and impact despite 

continuing to be a part of what previously had been categorized as the "natural zone." Some of 

the land added in 1994 included dirt roads in Berdoo, Pinkham, and Thermal canyons and 

elsewhere. Planners classified areas near roads or aqueduct infrastructure as part of the transition 

zone. They proposed that the remainder be managed as wilderness. During the planning process, 

the agency held several public meetings and issued a draft plan in November 1997. The park 

then hosted three public workshops, and the public submitted 1,122 written comments dominated 

by concern over three contentious issues. More than 900 of the comments focused on rock 

climbing, another 100-plus on wildlife guzzlers in designated wilderness, and fifty-eight on 

equestrian use of backcountry trails. After analyzing the public response, the NPS adjusted the 

draft plan, issued a final plan in November 1999, and officially adopted it on January 4, 2000. 

Each of the three issues forced a deviation from the original draft plan.28 
259

Rock Climbing

Rock climbing is a difficult visitor management issue because the NPS has always identified it as 

a proper activity in its parks and monuments (Figure 8-1). "Bouldering" and rock climbing 

became truly popular in the United States after World War II. Climbers began appearing at 

Joshua Tree in the 1950s, and by the following decade they recognized the monument as a 

worthy alternative to Yosemite National Park. By 1970, a guide to climbing routes in Joshua 

Tree drew national and even international attention, although it only identified eighty routes, 

most of them in Hidden Valley. Up to this time, climbers usually drove pitons or "bolts" into the 

rock faces and connected ropes to them for safety. However, during the 1970s a new generation 

of climbers preferred so-called "clean climbs" because they were more challenging and less 

intrusive on the environment. Nevertheless, bolting continued, especially by less experienced 

participants. During the early 1980s, most climbers pursued routes originating in Hidden Valley 

Campground and some came into conflict with campers at promising sites who were not there 

for rock climbing. This conflict is what drew NPS attention to what would become its most 

controversial planning and management issue. By 1991, climbing was the reason more than a 

third of the visitors came to Joshua Tree, and most of the rest were spectators who enjoyed 

watching. Climbers spread throughout the monument finding new areas to scale while the fame 

of Joshua Tree continued to increase.29 

The frequency of camper-climber conflicts became serious enough to cause Rick 

Anderson to enact rules in the superintendent's compendium in 1983 making it a misdemeanor to 

initiate a climb in a campsite without the registered camper's permission. Anderson also banned

the use of motorized drills to place bolts. Nevertheless, during 1989 the staff still received 

multiple letters of complaint about rock climbers claiming an unwritten right to occupy someone 

else's campsite all day. Accusations that climbers used battery-powered drills in the wilderness,

where all motorized implements are banned, also increased. These problems at Joshua Tree, as 

well as Yosemite, Grand Teton, and other national parks, led NPS leaders in Washington, D. C.

in July 1991 to order that all units with recreational rock climbing develop specific plans for 

monitoring and managing the activity. Word quickly spread among the rock climbers and they 

formed several advocacy groups to fight against any reduction of their privileges. Two 

organizations became active in Joshua Tree's planning. The American Alpine Club Access 

Committee, later simply known as "The Access Fund," not only brought pressure against 

potential curbs on climbing, but offered to pay for a new walk-in campground to relieve 

congestion at the established ones. The monument waffled on accepting this donation for a 

campground near Sheep Pass until the offer lapsed. At the same time a local, non-profit group 

calling itself the "Friends of Joshua Tree" (the monument) formed in Joshua Tree (the village) 

specifically to oppose any restrictions.30

Joshua Tree officials immediately began working on a draft plan and conducting research 

to assess the impact of bolting in the monument. By October 1992, rangers ascertained that more 

than 4,000 climbing routes existed throughout the monument, with at least 475 routes and 1,383 

bolts in the wilderness area. By that time, the staff had already produced five drafts of a climbing 

plan and received comments from the various organizations claiming to have a stake in the 

outcome. Climbers' groups opposed restrictions, environmental groups demanded them. In 

January 1993, Superintendent David Moore met with his staff to decide on a final plan. The only 
260

Figure 8-1. A climber at Cap Rock demonstrates technique. Photo by the author. 
261

unanimous decision among the participants was that all forms of bolting should be banned in 

wilderness. In February, Randy Vogel, a renowned climber, publisher of the most popular guide 

to climbing in Joshua Tree, and a leader of the Access Fund, threatened to take the monument to 

court if the superintendent enacted the bolting-in-wilderness ban. Vogel and other climbers 

claimed that monument officials had betrayed them after their cooperation in the planning 

effort.31

Moore signed the final draft of the Climbing Management Plan anyway on February 19, 

1993. Vogel and fellow Access Fund member Paul Minault protested that Moore did not have 

the legal right to establish such a policy. Regional Director Stan Albright assured them that 

Moore had every right according to the U. S. Code of Federal Regulations. Meanwhile, Solicitor 

Wendy Dinner from the regional office warned Moore to be ready for a lawsuit. It was at this 

point the NPS removed backcountry/wilderness planning from the general management planning 

process in order to simplify the latter. The Access Fund also brought pressure on the National 

Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA) for supporting the climbing plan by threatening to 

have a commercial company, Hi Tech Boots, remove its advertising from the association's 

magazine.32 

Joshua Tree officials took three steps after issuing the Climbing Management Plan. First, 

they placed a moratorium on bolting in the wilderness until further research could demonstrate 

its environmental and social impacts. Second, they initiated research contracts with outside 

experts. The widespread occurrence of this conflict in parks and other protected areas drew a 

great deal of national public attention and proved a minor bonanza in funding for scientists. 

Finally, at a meeting held on February 25, 1994, they formed an advisory committee on rock 

climbing that included representatives of four climbing organizations as well as independent 

climbers and the Desert Protective Council. Oddly, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and 

the NPCA did not send representatives despite invitations. The Climbing Management Plan and 

these three actions became core components of the backcountry/wilderness planning effort that 

followed.33 

Over the next several years, researchers provided the NPS with biological and 

sociological data on the impacts of rock climbing. Colorado State University took the lead in 

these studies despite its distance from Joshua Tree. In September 1995, graduate student Richard 

Camp completed a master's thesis on the impact of climbing on vegetation and bird diversity in 

the park. Unsurprisingly, he found that rock climbing was deleterious to cliff-side vegetation and 

bird-nesting. Basically, more climbing brought more damage. Of greater significance, Camp 

found that certain species of plants and birds were affected more than others. In addition, popular 

routes tended to collect litter at the cliff bases. A year later George E. Wallace and Kesia Trench 

completed a study of rock climbers themselves using a NPS planning and management 

framework known as "Visitor Experience and Resource Protection" or VERP. They made four 

basic recommendations for the agency to follow: (1) develop a zoning strategy that provides 

different degrees of climbing restriction and resource protection even in designated wilderness. 

This spatial division and gradation of protection has been used elsewhere in the park system,

particularly with conflict between hikers and horseback riders in the backcountry; (2) establish a 

permit system that would control the numbers of climbers at each route and allow replacement 

bolts to be used outside wilderness; (3) communicate more effectively with rock climbers 
262

through the advisory committee and incorporation of rock climbing into the interpretive message 

of the park; and (4) monitor climbing areas to take protective measures where damage occurs.34 

As backcountry/wilderness management planning continued, the issue of using bolts in 

the park, especially the wilderness portion, became a heated national debate. By the late 1990s 

Joshua Tree drew a quarter of a million climbers each year to try out more than 8,000 routes

(Map 8-3). The park was one of the most popular climbing areas in the world and it became the 

policy testing ground for the NPS and other federal land management agencies. Superintendent 

Ernest Quintana favored a ban on bolting in the wilderness and a permit system for new bolts in 

the rest of the park. Climbing groups, led by the Access Fund, vociferously protested what they 

saw as overregulation of one of the last expressions of "adventurous freedom" in the country. 

They also decried the peril faced by climbers forced to operate without bolts as safety equipment. 

Some even carried out demonstrations in the park that taxed the small ranger force. They angrily 

rejected draft plans released in October 1996 and November 1997. A decision by the Forest 

Service to ban bolting in all its many wilderness areas further inflamed the debate.35 

The rock climbing and wilderness bolting controversy demonstrates one of the 

fundamental philosophical and administrative conundrums of the NPS. Even before the agency's 

1916 organic act, which mandated both resource preservation for future generations and public 

recreation, park managers walked a fine line between the two. Through the nearly 100 

subsequent years, the NPS has edged closer to resource protection in the face of greater use than 

anyone could have predicted in the early years of the system. The key constituency in the

triangle of current park users, administrators, and future generations is the latter. The NPS

legally must take into account the cumulative effects of past and current activities to prevent 

damage to park resources that will render them unavailable to future generations. On the other 

hand, parks are created in the political arena and massive public opposition to restrictive policies 

can have political consequences. 

At Joshua Tree, the clamor of climbing groups and their sheer numbers forced a 

reevaluation of the draft backcountry/management plan. On July 7, 1998, Superintendent 

Quintana met with representatives of the Access Fund, the Friends of Joshua Tree, the 

Wilderness Society, and the NPCA. The group hammered out a compromise in which the NPS

would (1) create a climbing committee to function as a subcommittee of the Joshua Tree 

National Park Advisory Commission (established by the CDPA for a ten-year period), (2)

formalize a process to inventory social trails, designate the minimum number of trails needed to 

access climbing areas, and place physical barriers and signs to protect sensitive resources, (3) 

evaluate any restoration, protection, or additional management actions that may be needed, (4) 

allow, but monitor, replacement of existing bolts throughout the park, (5) ban motorized drills in 

the wilderness area, (6) allow climbers who have received prior approval from the superintendent 

to place new bolts there manually, as long as they do not exceed the number existing in 1998 

and, (7) permit use of a motorized drills and placement of new bolts outside the wilderness. 

Constant communication between the advisory committee climbing organizations and the NPS,

plus monitoring of sites, would ensure temporary or permanent closures of damaged areas. In 

January 2000, the agency released its record of decision approving the final 

backcountry/wilderness plan and environmental impact statement with this set of policies.

36
263

Map 8-3. Major rock climbing areas in the Joshua Tree transition zone and wilderness. Data 

source: JTNP GIS files. Delta Cartography.

Rock climbing remained a serious issue at Joshua Tree in spite of this compromise. The 

California/Nevada Regional Conservation Desert Committee of the Sierra Club and other 

environmental groups opposed the final plan after hearing that climber groups refused to meet 

with the NPS if Sierra Club members attended, but to no avail. In 2002, Joshua Tree, with the 

cooperation of the Access Fund, hired Eric Murdock to conduct a new study of rock climbing in 

the park. Two years later, he submitted a report in which he analyzed the spatial patterns of 

climbing and various impacts it had. He found that less than two percent of the climbers operated 

in the wilderness area. Principal determinants in climbing choice were location and the quality 

and difficulty of a route. Presence of bolts did not seem significant in preference for climbing 

routes. Murdock did point out that the problem of social trails to the bases of climbing routes had 

worsened. His conclusion echoed that of the studies done a decade earlier. In 2009, further 

research determined that more than ninety percent of climbers operated within 2,700 meters (1.2 

miles) of a paved road. The park's Climbing Committee addresses the social trails and vertical 

vegetation protection issues, while periodic "Climbers Coffees" at Hidden Valley Campground 

during the peak climbing season, and the establishment of a "climbing ranger" position, have

further improved communication. Moreover, in 2013, with guidance from an updated Director's 

Order 41 on wilderness stewardship, input from the Climbing Committee, and new data from a 

thorough environmental review, Superintendent Mark Butler authorized Joshua Tree's first 

installation of a fixed bolt in designated wilderness. He stated that he approved the installation 
264

because it would have a net ecological benefit on the park's resources and provide enhanced 

climber safety.37 

Bighorn Sheep and Guzzlers

After dominating the resource management agenda for fifty-five years, bighorn sheep began to 

slip down Joshua Tree's project priority list in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1994, only cursory 

census activity occurred. However, not everyone ignored the park's most glamorous species. 

From 1995 to 1996, the National Park Foundation and Canon U. S. A. funded a two-year study 

of bighorns that focused on finding better census techniques, identifying disturbed areas for 

revegetation, and eradicating tamarisk. During the same period, the Mine Reclamation 

Corporation funded a study of seasonal movement of bighorn sheep and the effect that a loss of 

water drawn by its proposed landfill might have. Darren Divine and Charles Douglas concluded 

that the company should install one or more temporary water sources to direct the bighorn sheep 

away from Eagle Mountain landfill area. They proposed that after completion of the construction 

phase, the sheep should be monitored to see if new, permanent guzzlers might be needed.38 

Meanwhile, the NPS debated whether it should maintain guzzlers in the wilderness at all. 

At various times, up to eight water installations existed in the wilderness or proposed wilderness 

portions of the park. The 1997 Draft Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan focused on 

three of them, the Coxcomb and Russi's Rocks guzzlers in the new Coxcomb Mountains land 

addition and the Pushawalla guzzler near the old road through that canyon. During the 

mandatory public review, the Society for the Conservation of Bighorn Sheep and many 

individuals protested the decision to close vehicular access to the guzzlers, claiming that 

difficulty in maintaining them, coupled with disturbance from increased visitor numbers, spelled 

doom for the park herds. The NPS offered to bring water to the sheep on foot if a major drought 

occurred. The agency's favored alternative proposed further monitoring of the guzzlers for three 

years to determine their use by the bighorns. In 1999, Joshua Tree decided to continue that 

program and extended it to four guzzlers and the Coxcomb Adit. Both bighorn sheep studies and 

NPS debate over the propriety of wilderness guzzlers continued in the new century spurred on by 

evidence that several species of park fauna, including bighorn sheep, had drowned in them when 

they were full. A 2004 study commissioned by the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration added fuel to the debate by predicting that climate change could eliminate 

bighorn sheep over much of their remaining range including Joshua Tree National Park. In 2014

the NPS still conducted or sanctioned studies of the bighorn sheep and sporadically maintained a 

few guzzlers equipped with remote cameras to record their use. The issue remains controversial 

at all desert parks because some wildlife biologists believe they are not necessary and lead to 

deaths by drowning of other species. Other scientists and interest groups dedicated to saving the 

bighorns dispute these ideas. The NPS awaits completion of a "water management plan" at 

Mojave National Preserve where the bighorn guzzler issue has led to lawsuits. Thereafter, the 

Joshua Tree will initiate its own similar planning process which is sure to bring acute attention 

and conflict.39
265

Horses and Other Stock Animals

Planning for stock use in the backcountry led to debate about five specific issues: (1) 

development of a trail system to coordinate access by hikers and equestrians; (2) coping with the 

needs of horses, particularly on overnight trips; (3) group size; (4) the impact of horses on the 

endangered desert tortoise; and (5) the use of llamas and other non-traditional pack stock. Like

other parks with large backcountry areas, as Joshua Tree's popularity increased so did conflict 

between hikers and horseback riders. In addition, bicycling adherents, although legally banned in 

wilderness, want to access trails in the backcountry transition area. This user conflict, plus 

pressure to develop a regional trail system surrounding and including the park, forced Joshua 

Tree officials to assess all of its trails and organize them by user group and level of maintenance.

Cross-country hiking is permitted throughout the park, but horse riding must follow the 

designated routes.

The Final Backcountry Management Plan provided for 253 miles of equestrian trails and

corridors that traversed canyon bottoms and dry washes. The two most heavily used routes are 

the California Riding and Hiking Trail and the Boy Scout Trail, which runs from Indian Cove 

southward past the Wonderland of Rocks. It also allowed equestrian access to corridors running 

along canyon bottoms including Long Canyon and Pushawalla Canyon. However, park officials 

later eliminated routes that do not follow designated trails. The plan also suggested portions of 

five trails totaling slightly more than twenty-seven miles for off-road bicycling including, 

ironically, part of the California Riding and Hiking Trail. However, the park has never developed 

the bicycle trails. In 2012, Superintendent Butler asked Chief Ranger Jeff Ohlfs to initiate a 

"Bicycle Management Directive" that will clarify their use on park roads and trails. In the 

meantime, Joshua Tree is increasingly linking its trails with those of Yucca Valley and several 

communities south of the park in order to integrate the park's system with the regional trail plans 

developed by local counties and other land agencies.40 

Early in the planning process for backcountry and wilderness management, equestrians 

feared that they would be excluded from Joshua Tree altogether because of complaints by hikers, 

animal-rights advocates, and some environmental organizations. However, the NPS has listed 

horseback riding as a proper park activity since its origin. On June 17, 1994, Joshua Tree hosted 

a meeting between staff members and horseback riding enthusiasts to address their concerns. 

The participants formed a "Horse Users Advisory Group" to facilitate park-user group 

communications similar to the one established for rock climbers. Over the ensuing five years, the 

group brought several issues to the attention of the park personnel. One issue that threatened 

equestrian use was the fate of the desert tortoise. Horseback riders feared that environmental 

groups would claim that horses trample tortoises and their burrows. They vehemently argued that 

horses look where they step and will avoid anything like another animal. However, they agreed 

in principal to travel single file to minimize the impact on trails or roadsides.41

The Horse Users Advisory Group also sought improvements in equestrian recreation 

opportunities and in established rules that protect park resources. Improved opportunities for 

overnight camping by horseback riders depended on two campgrounds, Black Rock Canyon, the 

most popular departure point for riders, and Ryan Campground, which had fallen into disuse and 
266

disrepair. At the urging of the advisory group, the park staff conducted cleanups and repairs of

both. Riders also sought more access points to bring their horse trailers and additional artificial 

water sources because carrying water for the horses was not feasible. However, park officials 

rejected these options as inconsistent with the park's purposes. They also refused to allow a 

horseback riding concession to set up in the park because so many areas in neighboring 

communities could host them. The matter of group size also arose and NPS planners surveyed 

other units plus some of the country's national forests. They found no consistency with group 

sizes ranging from five to twenty-five in various areas and situations. Ultimately, Joshua Tree 

officials adopted a flexible limit between twelve and twenty-five depending on characteristics of 

the planned ride.42 

One final backcountry issue was the use of llamas and other non-equine animals as pack 

stock in the backcountry. Horse enthusiasts argued that llamas should be denied access to the 

park because they are not a native or "traditional" animal in American history, they "spook" the 

horses when they meet on the trail, presenting a danger to them and their riders, and they would 

pass diseases to horses and bighorn sheep. For a while Superintendent Quintana wavered on this 

policy as letters from llama enthusiasts came in praising the animal's quiet and gentle nature. 

However, he ultimately followed the lead of Canyonlands National Park and banned all pack 

animals except horses and mules.43

Natural Resources in the New Century

Over the last two decades, significant changes in NPS natural resource policy have occurred. In a 

report released in 1987, the General Accounting Office found the agency had not implemented 

the management changes recommended in the State of the Parks report seven years earlier. In 

1992, three more events focused attention on the continuing relegation of scientific research on 

the park system's natural resources to secondary status in decision-making. First the National 

Academy of Sciences issued yet another report that called for an "explicit legislative mandate for 

a research mission of the National Park Service." The organization's committee recommended 

separate funding and reporting autonomy for the science program, the appointment of a chief 

scientist for the agency, cooperation with external researchers, and an external science advisory 

board to provide continuing independent oversight. Second, the NPS released its own report 

called the "Vail Agenda" that endorsed the ideas of a legislative mandate for science research 

and use of the "best available science" for management. Recently-elected President William 

Clinton supported these recommendations.44

The third event of 1992 was the formation of the National Biological Survey by Secretary 

of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. Unfortunately, the transfer of most NPS scientists to the new 

agency which advises all branches of the department of the interior removed most of the people 

necessary to implement the recommendations. With their new responsibilities former park 

scientists had less time to devote to fixing the NPS's research agenda. This setback, as well as the 

findings of the two 1992 committees, occurred while NPS historian Richard West Sellars was 

researching his comprehensive review of natural resource management over the 120 years since 

Yellowstone became the first national park. The 1997 release of his book, Preserving Nature in 

the National Parks, brought attention from both the public and congress to the agency's record of 

managing for the appearance of resources rather than the science-based protection of natural 

processes. The following year congress passed the National Parks Omnibus Management Act 
267

which mandated that the secretary of the interior assure that the NPS manage its charges with the 

"highest quality science and information." It also ordered the agency to apply science to all 

management decisions, expand interagency and university coordination of research, and 

implement an Inventory and Monitoring Program (I & M) in order to establish baseline data and 

carry out oversight of resource conditions. The agency finally had a legal obligation to do what 

scientists from George Wright to Lowell Sumner to Bob Moon had long recommended.45 

The dramatic improvement of the NPS's science and research mission, backed by 

periodic special funding from congress, spread to Joshua Tree National Park and improved the 

programs of natural resource management begun under Bob Moon. By January 2014, the park 

employed highly trained specialists in wildlife, botanical, and geological sciences, more than a 

dozen other permanent or seasonal personnel, and up to sixteen Student Conservation 

Association interns. These numbers did not include members of the cultural resource 

management staff. Both fundamental research and direct management benefitted from funding 

attained through competitive grants and special NPS allocations. Advances in research plus 

inventory and monitoring of the park's ecosystems brought a better understanding of resource 

management needs and procedures. In 1996, Superintendent Quintana submitted an application 

for natural resource funds to support twenty-four specific programs. Wildlife included bighorn 

sheep, desert tortoise, deer, burros, bats, mountain lions, invertebrates, and migratory birds. 

Botanical programs included threatened and endangered plants, exotic vegetation, mosses and 

lichens, the creosote bush community, research on historic biota, and creation of a basic 

vegetation map for the park. Expansion of air quality monitoring, assessment of the effects of 

pollution, better management of water resources, development of a geographic information 

system, a review of the natural history collection, and research on the forbidding specter of 

global warming completed the list.

46

The recent history of the park has brought more information and a deeper understanding 

of the resources, but also the recognition that the larger staff and budget are still inadequate to 

cope with rising threats. Many of these threats originate outside Joshua Tree's boundaries 

including development plans for a pump-storage project at the site of the former Eagle Mountain 

Mine and a rash of solar and wind projects north, south, and east of the park. Three groups of 

interrelated problems exist and atmospheric conditions exacerbate them all: (1) the fate of park 

wildlife impacted by drought and extraordinary development schemes that will tip the ecological 

balance in the Eagle Mountain area, (2) invasive plants aided by nitrogen deposition and air 

pollution which contribute to larger and more frequent fires, and (3) the likelihood of climate 

change which may alter every aspect of the park's resource profile. 

In recent years the park staff has devoted much more time to researching smaller and less 

picturesque fauna, but six key animals still draw most of the attention and funding, bighorn 

sheep, desert tortoises, ravens, bats, coyotes, and feral burros. As discussed earlier, bighorn 

sheep continue to be the public's favorite and any action that affects them is open to riveted 

attention and potential criticism. Nevertheless, the desert tortoise has become the linchpin of 

environmentalists' challenges as the park's primary threatened species. The susceptibility of the 

desert tortoise to ravens that prey upon its young became a major factor in the fight against a 

plan to install a giant landfill at the Eagle Mountain Mine. Hikers' disturbance of other nesting

native birds has led the NPS to periodically close several areas along the northern edge of the 
268

park. Bat populations are declining in spite of measures taken to ensure their access to 

abandoned mines. Disease may be the cause, but scientists do not fully understand chiropteran 

biology. Coyotes that beg in and around campgrounds continue to present a nuisance and 

potential danger to visitors. Rangers have had to shoot particularly aggressive individuals in 

order to maintain visitor safety. Wildlife experts and rangers constantly monitor feral burros that

live around the park and cross into it periodically. Should any group decide to stay rangers will 

forcibly remove them. 

As a postscript to the wildlife story, in June 1996, Joshua Tree resource manager Pat 

McClenahan proposed a new study of the feasibility of returning pronghorn antelope to the park. 

Funding requests, data collection, and public comment followed over the next two years. Then,

in May 1998, Harley Shaw of the Juniper Institute, Inc. submitted a report that found the area 

unsuitable for the species. That seemed to curtail the excitement and scientific study for a while.

However, in March 2010, the Riverside Press-Enterprise reported on a study underway to 

reintroduce pronghorn antelope to Mojave National Preserve. If the NPS reintroduces the animal 

there, it is likely that this resilient yet forlorn hope will resurface at Joshua Tree.

47

 

In spite of long-range plans to increase air quality monitoring in Joshua Tree, the park 

still has only three stations at Black Rock, Cottonwood, and near its eastern boundary. Data from 

them and other standard weather stations in and around the park show two patterns. First, 

drought years are becoming more common which impacts all the biotic resources of the park. A 

1999 study by Harold DeLisle found that amphibian populations had declined due to the drier 

conditions. Later research suggested that the desert tortoise might also be negatively affected. 

The second pattern is a general stability in the amount of particulate pollution, but continued 

problems with the level of ozone. A 2011 news report stated that Joshua Tree had exceeded the 

federal health standard on fifty-three days the preceding year. Nitrogen deposition has stabilized, 

but at a level that continues to foster invasion by exotic grasses. Their density is increasing 

throughout the park, but especially in the Covington Flat area which led to the worst fire in 

Joshua Tree's history in 1999. Four lightning fires started on May 27 and over the next eight days 

burned 13,899 acres in the Covington and Quail Mountain areas. Joshua Tree lost a significant

amount of its densest vegetation only to have the foreign grasses speedily colonize the newly 

opened ground. The Juniper Fire, plus a number of other major fires in national parks, brought a 

rare appraisal of NPS fire management by its sister agency, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 

It also initiated an intense effort to develop a new fire management plan for Joshua Tree which 

included considerable input from fire specialists elsewhere in the park system. Completed in 

2005, it orders total suppression as the park's fundamental policy.48

The most insidious and uncontrollable threat to Joshua Tree affects the entire world. 

Despite pockets of denial, the evidence is overwhelming that the earth's atmosphere is warming. 

While scientists amass data and try to predict the future, land and resource managers must face 

the impacts. Joshua Tree National Park exists because of its diverse array of vegetation including 

its namesake species. The most popular portion of the park is the higher elevation Mojave Desert 

where Joshua trees, pinyon pines, junipers, and other species intolerant of higher annual 

temperatures grow. Park records already show an annual temperature increase of more than one 

degree Fahrenheit since 1936. A predicted increase of three degrees by 2050 will bring four 

types of changes to the park. First, the range of Joshua trees will shrink, although dire media 
269

predictions of its complete disappearance from the area may be premature. Two research studies 

suggested different outcomes for the park although they agreed that the species would contract 

its range substantially over the entire southwestern United States. In 2011, Kenneth Cole and 

others at the U. S. Geological Survey published evidence that a previous warming period 12,000 

years ago coincided with the extinction of the Shasta ground sloths which consumed Joshua trees 

and spread the seeds in their scat. Subsequently, packrats and other rodents have served as the 

primary seed dispersal mechanisms for the species. The fact that their range is so small compared 

to that of the sloth means that in the present rapid warming the seeds may not be dispersed to 

newly habitable areas quickly enough to survive over a large region. Another study by 

University of California, Riverside biologists Cameron Barrows and Michelle Murphy posits that 

the Joshua trees will survive in the park, but the distribution will contract and markedly change.49

A second outcome of dramatic warming may be decreased rainfall and increased drought 

conditions. Throughout the history of Joshua Tree water resources have declined. Warmer 

temperatures may result in fewer rain events and greater evaporation. A further decline in water 

availability may result as well as damage from flooding during more severe convection storms. 

This will not only affect all the plant species in the park but the animals as well. A third impact 

will be a greater invasion of exotic plants, especially weeds, which choke out native species and 

usurp the water. Finally, the continued proliferation of those exotics and other fire tolerant 

annuals will increase biomass leading to greater frequency and size of fires. The upshot of these 

changes will be a park in which the ecotone between the Mojave and Colorado deserts shifts and 

blurs. Joshua trees and other higher elevation species may shrink to a pattern of isolated pockets 

known as disjunct distribution. Such a situation hampers cross-fertilization and renders 

populations more susceptible to disease and pests. Loss of the park's signature species may be 

challenged by the public and force the NPS to deviate from its own mission by artificially 

maintaining Joshua trees where they cannot survive on their own. The answers to climate change 

lay in policy and lifestyle changes far beyond the control of a small agency trying to manage 

three percent of the nation's land.50 

Cultural Resources

Cultural resource management continues to demand extensive data collection, more informed 

management, and better funding. The "Natural and Cultural Resources Management Plan 1999" 

stated:

The park is rich in archaeological, historic, and ethnographic resources. Until we know 

and understand what we have, these resources will continue to be degraded to the point of 

total loss.51 

Fortunately, the program benefitted from more staff professionalism and research by agency and 

university specialists. The start of the Recreation Fee Demonstration Project in 1997 helped 

provide additional funds for cultural resource management from the entrance charges paid by 

visitors to the park. Over the three years from 1998 through 2000, Joshua Tree brought in 

$3,852,807, eighty percent of which it kept for use in the park. The 1999 plan identified fortynine cultural resource project goals for the park in four basic categories. Twelve projects focused

on archaeology including a deeper analysis of existing literature and artifacts, continued 

exploration for new sites throughout the park, assessments of specific areas like Keys Ranch, and 
270

the inventory, monitoring, and restoration of sites already identified. Another category of goals 

sought to better understand past and present Native American culture. Two project proposals 

concerned rock art, which in recent years had grown in public interest and, hence, endangerment. 

Cultural resource officials also proposed three ethnographic projects reflecting belated 

recognition of the important heritage of tribes whose descendents increasingly affect park 

management. A third group of fifteen projects focused on historic research and management. The 

plan proposed fundamental research, stabilization of structures, and identification and 

completion of National Register of Historic Places nominations including cultural landscapes. 

Finally, seventeen projects focused on the museum and archives recently installed in the new 

state-of-the-art facility.52 

Increased funding, especially from grants and programmed agency allocations, has 

enabled archaeological surveys aimed at a deeper understanding of Paleo-Indian environmental 

adaptations, the type of research the Campbells pioneered, rather than just clearances for road 

construction. In 2002, the park released a report on wilderness and backcountry archaeology that 

identified twenty-four sites but concluded that "hundreds of other known, but unrecorded, sites" 

existed and would require much more money to protect. In spite of this, the popular visitor areas 

continued to draw most attention. Major work took place along the roads in the western part of 

the park, as well as in the Keys Ranch and Oasis of Mara areas. The status of the park's 

prehistoric rock art received a substantial boost with the 2006 release of a "traditional use" study 

by Douglas Deur that relied heavily on ethnographic contributions from the Cahuilla, Serrano, 

Chemehuevi, and Mojave tribes. While research on the Native Americans continues to focus on 

ethnobotany and ethnozoology, improved consultation with local tribes proved important when 

park workers found human remains near a popular hiking trail. Superintendent Curt Sauer 

contacted ten identified tribal groups. Several claimed the skeletal remains as ancestral and 

carried out a formal ceremony with the re-internment of the remains at the site on November 5, 

2006.53 

Maintenance of historic structures continues to focus primarily on the three major historic 

attractions, Keys Ranch, the Wall Street Mill, and the Lost Horse Mine. Keys Ranch in particular 

came under increased scrutiny after a 1999 investigation found that mice, rats, ground squirrels, 

and bats had damaged several structures. This came at the same time as a decision to increase the 

number of public tours conducted at the estate. In 2005, the NPS approved a "Keys Ranch 

Comprehensive Plan" that included fourteen categories of recommendations including 

coordination and implementation of structural rehabilitation, inventory of all objects at the site, 

reintroduction of the historic orchard and other landscape features, a better fire management 

plan, and enhanced interpretation. Meanwhile, a February 2000 inspection by Michael Scott 

from the regional office concluded that stabilization of the stamp mill and cookhouse at the Lost 

Horse Mine, the Wall Street Mill, and several minor structures at other mine and mill sites would 

be necessary. After a fire occurred in the area, the NPS used lime to stabilize the Ryan Ranch 

Bunkhouse. It has significantly changed the original appearance of the structure.54 

Efforts to complete the official "list of classified structures" (LCS) and nominate worthy 

sites to the National Register of Historic Places led to the inspection of other former mines and 

mills in the park. By early 2014, the LCS included 140 buildings, mines, wells, and other 

structures primarily from the mining era. Joshua Tree requested an evaluation by the regional 
271

office of four sites, Samuelson's Well #2, Crown Prince Mine, Pine City Mine, and Silver Bell 

Mine, to determine their eligibility for the national register. Ralph B. Giles, Jr. completed the 

evaluation and concluded none were sufficiently significant. Two years later, another eligibility 

evaluation found the park's headquarters building and visitor center at the Oasis of Mara equally 

unqualified. Three other sites received attention and their status is still uncertain. The Oasis of 

Mara itself, the Cottonwood Oasis, and the Hayfield Rock Art District are apparently eligible but 

not yet listed on the national register. All three qualify because of their prehistoric resources 

unlike the rejected structures from the Euro-American era.55 

Joshua Tree is participating in a relatively young program in historical resource 

protection by identifying and managing cultural landscapes. Although landscape architecture has 

existed for centuries, it traditionally emphasized the deliberate creation of landscapes for those 

who could afford them. The concept of cultural landscape, as used in historic preservation and 

the national park system, stems from the discipline of geography. Many American scholars cite 

geographer Carl O. Sauer's influential 1925 article, "The Morphology of the Landscape," as the

definitive origin of the concept, but German geographer Otto Schlüter actually developed both 

the concept and the term earlier.56 The NPS defines a cultural landscape as:

a reflection of human adaptation and use of natural resources and is often expressed in 

the way land is organized and divided, patterns of settlement, land use, systems of 

circulation, and the types of structures that are built. The character of a cultural landscape 

is defined both by physical materials, such as roads, buildings, walls, and vegetation, and 

by use reflecting cultural values and traditions.57 

Cultural landscapes are significant and complex entities for two reasons. First, each is an 

accumulation of all the past activities in that place. Subsequent use has erased many impacts of 

previous human action, but some, although physically gone, shaped spatial patterns of 

organization and circulation that followed. These spatial patterns are not well-represented by the 

National Register of Historic Places. As with individual structures, an agency or organization 

that decides to preserve or restore a past landscape must choose what era to represent. Second, 

many cultural landscapes are both ecologically dynamic and still in use by people meaning they 

may evolve. The NPS must also decide whether to interrupt natural processes and human use to 

maintain or reintroduce modification representing a particular period. 

Inventories of cultural landscapes began at Joshua Tree National Park at Keys Ranch in 

the 1990s. Since that time the agency has identified and planned preservation for three other 

landscapes--Northern Piñon Historic Mining District, Hexie Mountains Historic Mining District, 

and Lost Horse Historic Mining District. The NPS is committed to preserving their visual 

appearance including abandoned equipment, roads and trails, and even tailings, as well as 

structures. Identification of a cultural landscape means a great deal to the park's historic 

preservation program because most of the individual structures do not qualify for the national 

register, but an entire landscape may be eligible. This is why the use of buried polyurethane foam 

to close mine shafts is preferable from a landscape point of view. However, this presents a 

classic conundrum for the agency as it must balance historic landscape preservation, visitor 

safety, and protection of endangered bats at each place.58 
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Completion of the new museum and archives building provided proper storage not only 

for the Campbell Collection, but also the park records, photos, library, and other material objects. 

Yet, only one person organizes, catalogs, stores, and preserves the full array of resources 

contained in the building. The museum objects are in excellent condition, especially the 

archaeological artifacts. The same cannot be said for the library and archival materials. In 2005, 

the regional office sent a team to evaluate the facility and develop a museum management plan. 

The team made five recommendations: (1) develop the protocols for orderly growth and 

management of the archives, library and museum, (2) improve information management tools 

and procedures, (3) develop partnerships with other park staff, (4) develop storage and study 

areas at work sites in the park, and (5) create a journeyman museum curator position. One major 

problem in 2014 is that many employees do not create written records or send anything to the 

archives. This is a service-wide problem identified by the agency's history office. Hence, a future 

administrative history will be difficult at best. The current archives are well-organized and 

protected through the late 1990s. Everything after that resides in various personal files around 

the park or in boxes and shelves of unprocessed material. The library is small, but maintaining its 

organization depends on a few volunteers. Many books and reports disappear into various work 

files and are returned late, if ever. The photo archives are at best scattered within the museum 

storage area or in the office of the curator. That single employee must cope with acquisition, 

proper storage, research access protocol, and the requests of both employees and others for use 

or provenance of everything. She is the only one who knows where all the various items or data 

are located. In early 2014, she is also the temporary chief of cultural resource management. The 

museum management team suggested the five goals for the museum/archives collection. It is 

difficult to imagine how the lone worker can find time to develop them.59 

Visitation and Interpretation 

Between 1997 and 2013, visitor numbers for the entire national park system rose less than three 

percent to 273,630,895. Some of the years were slightly higher, others lower. During the same 

period, visitation to Joshua Tree also fluctuated but grew overall at nearly fourteen percent. Over 

the years 2010 to 2013 the park averaged 1,400,000 visitors annually. The higher totals reflect 

the increase in the population living around the park, more troops at the marine base, and more 

interest in rock climbing.60 In 2001, the park served as a test case for a socio-economic atlas to 

map population and social characteristics of the surrounding region. The authors predicted that 

the region consisting of San Bernardino County southward in California, plus adjacent Arizona 

and Nevada counties, would increase its population by 35.7 percent by 2020. Riverside County 

ranked highest in predicted growth rate among the California counties. Both predicted rates are 

much higher than the likely increase in visitation to Joshua Tree. Senior NPS officials worry that 

the young, computer-internet generation of the future does not have the same interest in and 

support for the parks that earlier generations had. Demographers predict an even higher median 

age by 2020. Nevertheless, a follow-up visitor survey, conducted in 2006, showed that family 

groups as a percentage of total visitation rose by more than ten percent over the figure from the 

1991 study, while the portion of visitors from other countries declined from thirteen to eight 

percent. The latter was surprising given the fame of Joshua Tree among rock climbers around the 

world.61
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Historically, the NPS has used economic studies to predict what a proposed park may 

bring to an area. Recently studies also have focused on what economic impact existing parks 

have for their communities. Although the reasons for national parks are philosophical and 

cultural rather than economic, the reality in the American political scene is that they will garner 

more congressional and public support if they bring hard cash to their surrounding regions. A 

number of models exist for computing direct economic spending by visitors and park employees, 

as well as the multiplier effect of those dollars in lodging, food and other hospitality businesses 

and wages spent by their workers. Hence, it is somewhat difficult to compare figures from 

studies done by different researchers. Nevertheless, Joshua Tree National Park's economic 

impact is considerable. A 2004 study of multiple units in the park system, including Joshua Tree, 

found that visitors spent $49,300,000 at the park and added $36,600,000 in value to the region. 

The same study estimated that the ratio of economic benefit from park visitors plus the services 

required by the park outweighed the cost, computed by estimating other potential land uses, by 

7.5 to one. In a 2010 study specifically on Joshua Tree, the NPS found that visitors spent more 

than $60,000,000 and added $42,900,000 in value. In addition, this money supported some 800 

jobs.62

As suburbia closes on the western half of the park, Joshua Tree rangers face more 

rescues, searches, and crime, both petty and serious. They evacuate injured rock climbers and 

mount large-scale hunts for lost children and adults. The window of time to find a missing 

person during the summer months is a short one. Assaults, theft, and drug crimes continue. More 

common are traffic infractions, poaching, and willful vandalism. In 2009, rangers arrested a man 

for throwing more than 3,000 golf balls around the park as a tribute to dead golfers. More serious 

was a new prank of applying graffiti to Barker Dam and other sites in order to send photos of it 

on the internet. It proves that the same low mindset that burned Joshua trees in 1930 to send 

signals has flourished with new technology. In 2013, the park closed trails to Rattlesnake Canyon 

and Barker Dam to try and stop the vandalism.63

Increasing visitation, overcrowding at popular sites, and crime demand more education 

and interpretation from officials at Joshua Tree. Added to this is the need to inform students and 

the general public about the resources, opportunities, and meaning of national parks. Time and 

again, public support has turned back efforts by politicians and businesses to dilute the mission 

of the NPS. Coincident with the NPS soul-searching about science and natural resource 

management came a reappraisal of the agency's role in education. In 2001 the National Park 

Service Advisory Board described the park system as unparalleled educational institution for 

understanding biological and historical processes and the "interconnection of all living things 

and forces that shape the earth." It recommended that education should be a primary mission of 

the NPS. The agency responded in its 2006 "Management Policies" by elevating interpretation to 

a research-based educational mission that does not shy away from controversial topics. In 2009, 

the National Parks Conservation Association urged congress to "affirm in legislation that 

education is central to the success of the National Park Service mission, and that the Service has 

a fundamental role to play in American education over the next century."64

Joshua Tree's interpretation program stresses education by every means possible. Not 

only do the permanent and seasonal rangers lead walks and give presentations, but an increasing 

part of their workload is visiting schools or hosting classes in the park. Each year they average 
274

650 programs to more than 18,000 students within a 100-mile radius of the park. To further this 

program they pursue multiple grants from both government sources and private foundations to 

carry out face-to-face and internet communications. Popular programs that involve the public in 

new ways have also become de rigueur. In 2008, the park started an artist-in-residence program 

which draws support from school districts, museums, and the media.65

Occasionally the NPS asks consulting scholars to review the stories they tell. Three 

members of the Organization of American Historians traveled to Joshua Tree in June 2008 to 

review the park's program for history and its presentation to the public. They recommended more 

research on neglected topics, more integration of existing knowledge into a larger context, and 

more training for park employees. One gap they highlighted in the park's interpretation program 

was the Gram Parsons episode and the popular culture connection that stemmed from it. In 2011, 

for its seventy-fifth anniversary, the park hosted a concert in Indian Cove that in part 

commemorated the life and legacy of the influential rock star. The importance of the entire 

interpretation program cannot be overemphasized. Although law enforcement has drawn much of 

its funds and staff positions, the job of communicating the purpose and benefit of the national 

parks remains a critical priority in the face of apathy, ignorance, and mounting threats from 

outside park boundaries.66 

External Threats

Joshua Tree personnel face many threats to the resources within the park brought by 

underfunding and visitor impacts. Perception of the park as an area of sand and stone in an 

inhospitable wasteland by some NPS officials, and many in the public, does not help. Enhanced 

scientific management and supportive environmentalists counter many threats. Yet the park still 

may fall prey to the increasing intrusion of incompatible land uses surrounding the park. The 

more some people discredit the desert, the more it attracts others. Mining for gold and iron 

shaped the place in earlier decades. Now the hunt for residential and resort tracts, space for the 

effluence of urban development, and the country's insatiable demand for energy draw an ever 

tighter noose around Joshua Tree. Traditional qualities like native flora and fauna, open 

recreational space, inspirational scenery, and historic places are impacted by activities on the 

borders of a park. At even greater risk are air quality, dark skies at night, quiet, and the emotive 

quality of wilderness. As Joshua Tree National Park goes forward in the new millennium, its fate 

will be shaped by everything around it. 

Construction of housing, golf courses, and other facilities abutting the park's boundary is 

introducing light and noise pollution, adding litter, disrupting natural runoff, and spreading 

intense recreational pressure, including illegal off-highway vehicles, into the park on both the 

northern and southern boundaries. These "edge effects" have always been a problem on the 

northwester boundary. By 2006, Superintendent Curt Sauer began working with Twentynine 

Palms, Joshua Tree village, and Yucca Valley to coordinate their planning with the needs of the 

park. The three settlements willingly work with the NPS, but home construction continues on the 

very edge of the park wherever transportation access is available. The Twentynine Palms Band 

of the Mission Indians recently opened a large casino on their reservation where the NPS once 

considered building its headquarters complex. The Tortoise Rock Casino presumably will draw 

considerable crowds and more construction to the very boundary of the park.67
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On the southern boundary, between Interstate 10 and the park, open land has attracted a 

variety of subdivision schemes that promise to expand the heavy footprint of excessive water 

consumption right up to the park. Areas of ingress like Berdoo, Thermal, and Pushwalla canyons 

and the multiple parcels on the edge of the park held by the MWD likely will see more vehicle 

intrusion. In 2002, developer Richard Oliphant proposed an 8,800-acre project to be called 

Joshua Hills north of the town of Palm Desert. The new community would have abutted Joshua 

Tree and used land that many wanted for the recently established Coachella Valley Preserve. The 

plan for the huge project called for twelve golf courses, several retail centers, a world trade 

center, and at least 7,000 homes. Local opposition eventually killed the project and the Nature 

Conservancy purchased the land for the preserve. 

In 2014, another project, called Paradise Valley, appears to be moving ahead on both 

sides of Interstate-10 just west of the road leading to the Cottonwood Spring entrance. GLC 

Enterprises, LLC proposed the project in 1999 and has aggressively sought support from every 

park superintendent. The initial plan called for an area of 6,555 acres, a portion of which would 

be on land to be acquired from the BLM. The bureau refused to trade that land to the company, 

so the project is now projected to cover 5,275 acres with several golf courses and 8,000 homes. 

Like Oliphant before it, GLC Enterprises promises it will emphasize open space, wildlife 

corridors, and ecological responsibility. The community will feature schools, businesses, and 

medical facilities. Lying east of the Palm Springs to Coachella City agglomeration, it is certain to 

draw further sprawl over the intervening land. If it proves to be a successful investment, realestate developers are sure to push for more construction along Dillon Road north and west of the 

current Coachella Valley metropolitan zone. That will bring still more people and their lights, 

noise, and vehicular toys to the southern edge of the park.68 

Noise and light pollution disturb animals and also disrupt the visitor experience. Another 

source of noise pollution with a much longer history comes from aircraft passing overhead. 

Military jets are particularly obnoxious because they often fly faster than the speed of sound and 

some pilots fly lower than they should. When land managers complain, some military 

commanders ignore them or ask for identification of the specific jets breaking the rules, a task 

almost impossible with the speed and maneuvers of the offending pilots. Officers at the 

Twentynine Palms marine base generally have cooperated. However, the U. S. Navy chose a 

vector for planes from other bases that passed directly over eight of the park's nine campgrounds 

(Map 8-4).69 The CDPA addressed military overflights but did not change the pattern over 

Joshua Tree. As complaints from campers and hikers increased, park superintendents began 

trying to negotiate with officials at Lemoore Naval Air Station as early as the mid-1970s. In 

1986, Superintendent Anderson complained that for the last ten years Lemoore officials ignored 

the problem. Regional Director Howard Chapman sent James Hiatt to Joshua Tree to monitor the 

situation, but he only stayed for two days and then reported that the problem was not serious. 

After passage of the CDPA, the Sierra Club agitated to have the flight path over Joshua Tree 

changed. Negotiations between the Navy and the NPS resulted in a new route that passes over 

the Little San Bernardino Mountains south of the original route. It now only comes close to the 

Cottonwood Campground. The Navy adopted the new route in 2000 and complaints over low 

supersonic flights have decreased though not disappeared.70 
276

Map 8-4. The VR-1257 routes for military flights before and after agreement between the U. S. 

Navy and the National Park Service. Data source: Robert B. Pirie, Jr. to Dr. Dickson J. Hingson, 

February 10, 1997. JTNP Archives, Acc. 822, Cat. 30022, Box "EA of VR-1257," Folder 1c. 

Delta Cartography. 

Plans for the Eagle Mountain Mine

The encroachment of suburbia and commerce around the edges of Joshua Tree worries park 

officials for all the reasons cited above. However, the threat of industrialization and the world's 

largest solid waste dump galvanized local park officials and their allies to fight the biggest 

external threat ever posed for Joshua Tree National Park. The Eagle Mountain Mine, on land 

removed from the monument in 1950, became the site of a protracted battle that went to the U. S. 

Supreme Court and is still not settled. Lying barely a mile south of the current park boundary, it 

is a stark example of the dissonance of national parks with the common public perception of 

deserts as sacrifice zones. 

Mining for iron began on a small scale in the late nineteenth century in the Eagle 

Mountains. In 1943, the Bureau of Mines estimated that vast resources, possibly more than 

3,000,000 tons, existed at the site. The need for steel to build ships in World War II led Kaiser 

Industries to launch a southern California subsidiary to take advantage of the ready market. The 

company acquired and expanded a steel mill in Fontana in 1942 and purchased the Iron Chief 

Mine from the SPRR two years later. Kaiser paid $1,000,000 for the mine and 2,746 acres of 

patented land inside Joshua Tree National Monument. In January 1947, Kaiser Steel, Inc. 
277

requested a special use permit for monument land adjacent to the mine. The NPS granted the 

permit because they expected the land to be removed by boundary legislation. Kaiser built a 

railroad extension to the mine and began operations in1948. Two years later, the boundary 

change removed all but 191 acres of Kaiser land from the monument. In 1952, congress passed 

Private Law 82-790 patenting an additional 465 acres to the company and belatedly giving it a 

railroad right-of-way across other BLM territory. However, the law stipulated that if the mine 

and milling did not operate continuously for a period of seven years the land would revert to the 

United States.71

Through the next three decades, Kaiser Steel developed four interconnected pits, took 

millions of tons of iron ore from the site, and employed hundreds of workers. The company 

exported both iron ore and steel, much of it to Japan. However, two newspaper reports in 1967 

indicated that changes were coming. On January 25, the Riverside Daily Enterprise reported that 

many of the workers and other residents of Eagle Mountain, the company-owned town beside the 

mine, would move to a new development near the town of Desert Center. On the same day, the 

Los Angeles Times reported a temporary shutdown of the mine due to decreased demand for its 

ore. Competition from foreign mines and mills heralded a decline that depressed the entire steel 

industry of the United States. In 1975, a desperate Kaiser Steel furloughed 1,200 workers. Many 

never worked for the company again. The Los Angeles Times reported in March 1981 that the 

company had suffered losses for eighteen straight fiscal quarters. Finally, the news came the 

following November, Kaiser would end its operations at the Eagle Mountain Mine and Fontana 

steel mill. Two years later, the Los Angeles newspaper reported the poignant departure of the last 

students of the school in Eagle Mountain along with the rest of the 200 remaining residents.72

Kaiser Steel faced a decision about what to do with the massive mine and the 

scores of empty buildings in the abandoned town (Figure 8-2). The company declared 

bankruptcy and formed the Mine Reclamation Corporation (MRC) to find a use for its holdings. 

In 1986, a partial solution came when Kaiser leased part of the town to a company called the 

Management and Training Corporation for a private, 200-man jail for low-risk offenders and 

parole violators. Three years later, the facility expanded to hold 500 prisoners. Nevertheless, the 

pittance that Kaiser earned from the facility did little to solve the main issues of using the mine 

and bailing out the bankrupt retirement system for its former employees. But then the company 

found an answer that seemed brilliant. By 1987, Los Angeles and other southern California cities 

produced more than 72,000 tons of waste per day. Four local landfills had closed since 1980 and 

the rest were nearing capacity. Only one new landfill had opened during that time. Rapid 

increases in both population growth and per capita garbage production demanded a radical 

solution. Furthermore, the immense sprawl of suburbs and heavily congested roads meant viable 

solutions would have to be found at a distant site. What better place to put all that garbage than a 

giant hole in the ground far removed from population centers? Even better, a railroad line to the 

site already existed. A single train could move waste that would take 450 garbage trucks to 

carry.7

In 1988, the MRC announced its plan for the Eagle Mountain Landfill and began seeking 

permits from Riverside County. Joshua Tree received an official notice of the project from the 

Riverside County Planning Department on August 7, 1989 and a slightly amended one eight days 

later. The massive development would take place only three-quarters of a mile from the 
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monument’s southeastern boundary.74 MRC’s project overview explained the need for such a

large landfill, the advantages of the location, and the ways that it would improve the 

environmental quality of southern California. The landfill would accept 16,000 tons of waste per 

day for 100 years. The pits were underlain by solid rock, in an area with barely three inches of 

rain per year that was “several miles from any resident population.” In addition, past mining had 

left tailings that could be used to line the pit and cover the garbage. Trains with closed railroad 

cars would carry the trash to the landfill eliminating worries about windblown litter and 

offensive odors along the rail line. By vastly reducing both the garbage and the trucks in the 

major cities, the project would improve urban air quality and hence the health of the residents. 

The key to all of this was the removal of trash from the presence of the people who created it. 

The desert, with its harsh summer climate and low population density, seemed to offer the 

perfect solution.75 

As MRC developed its plan, several details became clear. First, it needed more land 

around the mine for treatment facilities and additional landfill space. Second, it needed a Federal 

Land Policy and Management Act right-of-way for the trash-hauling railroad to supersede the 

reversion clause established in Private Law 82-790. Up to that point, Kaiser avoided losing the 

land by periodically digging in the old pits. Third, it needed to redesign its road to accept 4,000 

tons of trash per day brought by truck from Riverside County. That waste material added to the 

rail deliveries brought the total amount to be accepted at the landfill to 20,000 tons per day. One 

of the interesting aspects of the plan was that the trash would initially be deposited in the side 

canyons around the mine, some of which consisted of undisturbed government land. The pits 

would not be filled until decades after the operation began.76

The huge project required two separate approvals by two unrelated agencies. First, the 

BLM had to approve the land trade and new rights-of-way for the landfill's rail and road routes. 

The company sought 3,481 acres surrounding the mine in exchange for ten parcels of Kaiser land 

totaling 2, 846 acres along the revised railroad right-of-way (Plate 6, Inset A). The latter would 

become substitute habitat for the desert tortoises displaced by the landfill. One parcel was 

already designated as critical habitat for the desert tortoise, three were within the Chuckwalla 

Bench Area of Critical Environmental Concern, but the remaining six had no recognized 

ecological value. The BLM would have to complete an environmental impact statement (EIS) to 

carry out these actions. Second, Riverside County had to approve the landfill itself which 

required an environmental impact report (EIR) to satisfy the California Environmental Quality 

Act (CEQA). That 1970 law is the state equivalent of the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) and also requires a public review. In addition, it extends to any private development that 

requires approval by a state agency. Fortunately for MRC, a single document could serve as both 

the EIS and the EIR. It had to satisfy concerned citizens and agencies that the land exchange and 

the project itself would not significantly harm air, water, and biological resources.77

 

In May 1989, Kaiser sent its first project overview to Joshua Tree. On September 1,

Superintendent Anderson and Robert Moon attended a scoping meeting on the plan in Riverside 

and submitted written comments eleven days later. Their concerns fell into four categories. First, 

the wilderness area of the Pinto Basin and surrounding territory made it a Class I air quality 

zone. The landfill would bring more of the coastal cities’ air pollution as well as the stink of the 

waste to the monument. Second was the impact on wildlife. Since closure of the mine, bighorn 
279

sheep had returned to pathways through the area and to water sources that would be affected by 

the dump. Two years earlier the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a report that 

concluded that all landfills leak. Of greater concern from a legal standpoint was the impact that 

ravens drawn to the landfill would have on the endangered desert tortoise. The wily birds 

Figure 8-2. An aerial view of the Eagle Mountain Mine less than two miles from Joshua Tree 

National Park. Proposals to convert the massive complex to the world's largest landfill or an 

energy producing pump storage project have threatened the park according to Joshua Tree 

officials and environmental groups. Photographer unknown. JTNP Natural Resource Division 

files. 

regularly prey upon young tortoises which have relatively soft shells (Figure 8-3). A much larger 

raven population could ravage the protected tortoise habitat in the Pinto Basin. Other predators 

including kit foxes and coyotes would also gather around the landfill seeking easy meals. A third 

category of problems included the airborne litter, noise, and light pollution from the landfill 

spilling into the Pinto Basin, the area of the monument that offered the most isolated wilderness 

experience. Finally, they challenged Kaiser’s vague plan to monitor and mitigate any potential 

threats. With vehicle access illegal, how would they monitor the adjacent 92,000-acre wilderness 

parcel on foot?78
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Figure 8-3. A raven looks for food near the Cholla Cactus Garden. Young desert tortoises are 

part of its prey. Photo by the author. 

Anderson explained all these issues to the Riverside Press-Enterprise in an interview 

published on December 7, 1989, but concluded with an odd statement:

We don’t want to be the bad guys here. We are not trying to prevent the project. We lived 

with the mine. But we want it to be as good an operation as it can get, so we don’t have 

any problems.79

At the time senior NPS officials were still hesitant about whether Joshua Tree was worthy of 

national park status as proposed in the California desert protection bills. Furthermore, the NPS

was part of a department that had a chain of command not always in complete agreement with 

the agency’s preservation philosophy. Without backing from the George H. W. Bush 

Administration, the NPS had to defer to the BLM. 

Public response to the landfill scheme varied locally and regionally. For southern 

California cities it offered many benefits with no obvious downsides. Many residents saw it as a 
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way to remove a big problem from the middle of where people lived. For locals in Riverside 

County there were a number of positive aspects to the plan. It would bring to the county up to six 

dollars per ton of trash in fees plus create jobs. Former employees of the mine faced a pension 

crisis due to the bankruptcy of Kaiser Steel. Notice of the landfill project had already raised 

Kaiser’s stock prices by more than 600 percent and promised to rescue its retirement system. 

Most environmentalists opposed the plan as did many people who lived near the site. Coachella 

Valley communities were split. The project would benefit local towns by trucking their waste to 

the site, but some feared that increased rail and truck traffic and potential train wrecks over the 

next century would prove unacceptable. The people who lived closest to the site worried about 

its impact of ground water, especially in the Chuckwalla Basin. Two people in particular 

despaired enough to legally challenge the entire project. Donna and Larry Charpied lived and 

farmed jojoba three miles from the mine site (Figure 8-4). Their operation and their quiet desert 

lifestyle would be completely disrupted if the massive landfill became a reality. After finding 

that lawyers’ fees were prohibitive, Donna Charpied decided to learn the legal procedures 

necessary to halt the project on her own. They would become the legal and public faces of the 

opposition, and the ultimate reason the landfill project failed.

80 

The first sign of trouble for MRC came when it began circulating a preliminary plan and 

EIR to various agencies that would be affected. The September 1990 draft included an “Ambient 

Air Quality Monitoring Plan” which the Air Quality Division of the NPS rejected. Agency 

scientists claimed that the landfill would increase ozone in a Class I area already suffering from 

serious pollution. After Riverside County and the BLM released their draft report to the public in 

July 1991, NPS scientists told The Fresno Bee that “dust and other particulate emissions from the 

project would contribute to the increase in desert haze which has been documented by the Park 

Service over the years.”81 In September, Joshua Tree submitted its concerns in writing and 

requested that the final statement address them. Yet nothing seemed to change as the review 

process went forward. On April13, 1992, Superintendent Moore wrote to Russell Kaldenberg of 

the BLM:

Throughout the comment period, we have reiterated our concern that the draft EIS did not 

adequately address the project’s proximity to a National Monument, International 

Biosphere Reserve and Class I airshed. Given our commitment to preserving all animal 

and plant species for future generations, the DEIS’s focus on specific threatened or 

endangered species does not adequately address our concerns.82

Moore reiterated that air quality specialists at the Denver Service Center (DSC) found the air 

quality models used for the document to be flawed. He again stressed the biological effects that 

adding the overabundance of nutrients to a nutrient-poor environment would have on the desert 

food web. Nevertheless, on June 3, 1992 Riverside County and the BLM issued their final 

EIS/EIR with only cosmetic changes. This would become a pattern over the ensuing years. The 

NPS supplied comments, usually backed with scientific data, only to have the BLM dismiss them 

as insignificant or ignore them entirely. This matched the BLM’s response to NPS comments 

about the California desert protection bills under review at the same time.83

Just before the release of the final environmental impact document, a new organization 

entered the controversy. The Eagle Mountain Energy Company (EMEC) proposed an entirely 

different use for the abandoned mine pits. The enormous growth of southern California cities 
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Figure 8-4. Donna and Larry Charpied led the fight against the Eagle Mountain Landfill 

proposal. Photographer unknown. Photo courtesy of Donna and Larry Charpied.

already taxed the power grid supplied by hydroelectric plants on the Colorado and northern 

California rivers as well as nuclear and other types of generating stations. The area had enough 

electricity most of the time, but during daylight and early evening hours, especially in summer, 

heightened demand threatened brownouts. The new company saw an opportunity to make the old 

mine into a battery of sorts for those high-use times. It would establish two reservoirs in upper 

and lower pits and turbines on the connecting pipeline. During the night, when the demand for 

electricity was low, the company would pump water from the low pit to the high one. During 

high demand times, it would release the water back to the lower pit passing through turbines to 

supply a surge of electricity to the power grid. On May 29, 1992, the energy company received a 

preliminary permit from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to plan its official 

application for the project (Plate 6, Inset B). Both the NPS and MRC took note and neither was 

happy about it. Joshua Tree officials opposed the idea because it threatened to lower water in the 

Chuckwalla Basin aquifer and then in the Pinto Basin aquifer. Like the landfill it also threatened 

to completely alter the ecosystem by enriching it artificially. The extra surface water might 

increase herbivore numbers and overtax the forage, while more numerous predators would 

reduce the threatened desert tortoise population. The landfill proponents saw it as direct 

competition for the same land. Although the two companies tried to negotiate, they wound up 

opposing each other in all the subsequent lawsuits and hearings.84
283

The Washington Office of the NPS remained quiet about the controversy brewing at its 

distant desert unit and ordered the regional office in San Francisco to do the same. However, the 

staff at Joshua Tree went public with its concerns. Opponents of the landfill held a rally in 

Riverside on June 16, 1992, and the monument sent ecologist Jerry Freilich. In uniform, he told 

the crowd and the media why the monument did not want the landfill to take place. The 

following day an article with a large picture of Freilich appeared in the Riverside PressEnterprise. This prompted an angry response from Patricia “Corky” Larson and others on the 

Riverside County Board of Supervisors who supported the project. In addition, the Washington 

Office reprimanded Joshua Tree leaders for taking such a public stance on the issue. The rally 

brought out other allies in the fight against the project including environmental organizations 

such as Greenpeace and the Sierra Club as well as California Assemblyman Steve Clute who 

questioned the whether the land exchange gave the government fair value, or was even legal.85

After release of the final landfill EIS/EIR, officials at all levels of the NPS pondered the 

implications of the project. It lay entirely outside the legal boundary of the monument so there 

were no easy legal methods to stop it. If Riverside County and the BLM approved it, the landfill 

would happen. The NPS had to make sure it influenced the project to make it as benign as 

possible for Joshua Tree. Hence, in August 1992, monument officials met with MRC leaders to 

discuss a memorandum of understanding that would enable a group of scientists to monitor 

landfill impacts and propose solutions to any problems that might occur. The program would be 

entirely supported by funds from the landfill, as would other research and land acquisition 

operations in Joshua Tree. This became the favorite option for the NPS leaders in Washington, 

D.C. even though their local and regional staffs still staunchly opposed the landfill. 

Superintendent Moore decided to delay signing a memorandum of understanding until the BLM

issued a final decision on the land exchange.86

As summer turned to fall, the battle over the Eagle Mountain mine grew heated. The EPA

reported that cracks in the bedrock underlying the mine meant it might not be possible to monitor 

ground water contamination. The BLM continued to ignore NPS warnings about the 

inadequacies of the project’s EIS. On October 6, 1992, after ten hearings, the Riverside County 

Board of Supervisors approved the project by a vote of three to two. Donna Charpied, already a 

leader of the opponents, yelled “shame on you” after the vote. The Riverside Press-Enterprise 

reported that supporters of the project “grinned broadly and offered back-slapping handshakes” 

while Richard A, Daniels, president of MRC, called the approval “a victory for the 

environment.” The vote was not a surprise because the positions of the five supervisors were 

well known by that time. Indeed, the Charpieds had prepared for this eventuality. 87

In March 1993, Kaiser and MRC filed requests with FERC to oppose the EMEC

application for a license to carry out its energy project. The following October, the BLM issued 

its “Record of Decision” approving the land exchange and new rights-of way for the landfill. 

Everything seemed to be falling into place for Kaiser and MRC. However, on December 2, the 

easy ride ended for the company. The Charpieds filed suit in Riverside County Superior Court 

claiming that the environmental review did not address many significant impacts that the project 

would have. A day later the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) along with the 

Eagle Mountain Landfill Opposition Coalition and Steven Clute filed a similar suit in the same 

court. The day after that, the EMEC filed a third suit. To top it off, a group of local citizens 
284

including the Citizens for the Chuckwalla Valley led by the Charpieds, Steven Clute, and the 

EMEC challenged the land exchange decision with the [Department of the] Interior Board of 

Land Appeals. The energy company believed it had the upper hand because FERC officials 

claimed that under the Federal Power Act their authority trumped that of the BLM. Regardless of 

the interagency debate, in January 1994 the Interior Board concluded that the land exchange 

warranted another look and it issued a stay on the BLM’s decision. At the same time, Riverside 

County ordered an inspection tour of the mine by state toxic waste officials to determine whether 

Kaiser had dumped hazardous materials. This dealt a blow to the publicity campaign that Kaiser 

and MRC were running on local media.88

Because Riverside County was one of the parties being sued the trial took place in the 

superior court of San Diego, California with Judge Judith McConnell presiding. The hearing 

took three days in late June 1994. Judge McConnell issued a ruling on the cases on July 26. She 

found the EIS/EIR deficient because it did not address the impact the growth of the town of 

Eagle Mountain would have on air and water quality or the effect of the landfill on the 

competing energy project. She also found the document inadequately addressed seismic threats 

to the lining of the pits, the impact of ravens on the desert tortoise, and the effects of windblown 

litter, dust, and biological changes on Joshua Tree. The Desert Sun reported that the landfill 

would not be supported at that time anyway because a change in the membership of the 

Riverside County Board of Supervisors placed those against the project in the majority. Kay 

Hazen, a representative of MRC, told reporters that this would only delay the project, not stop it. 

However, McConnell also ordered the company and Riverside County to pay all court costs for 

both sides, another blow in a pattern of financial attrition that weakened the project. 89 

During the rest of 1994, the various parties in the conflict maneuvered to reintroduce or 

finally bury the landfill plan. One of the primary financial backers for the project, BrowningFerris Industries (BFI), pulled out further stressing the economic status of MRC. In spite of this, 

the company and Kaiser announced in September that they would appeal Judge McConnell’s 

decision. In October, passage of the CDPA added lands east and west of the old iron mine to the 

park. In the final stages of that bruising legislative battle, the bill’s proponents made sure to add 

a statement that the expansion of Joshua Tree would not affect the debate about the landfill in 

any way. A bill that would pass by a single vote could not afford to become involved in what 

was becoming a national conservation issue. In November, the Riverside County supervisors 

decided not to appeal the court ruling and voided five of the permits it had issued for the project. 

However, an election approached and several new candidates promised to revive it.90 

The setbacks for the landfill offered encouragement to the EMEC. Yet it too faced

challenges from the NPS. On April 29, 1994, the company applied to FERC for a license to 

develop its hydroelectric generation project. The NPS criticized the proposal, forcing the 

company to issue an amended version in May. A month later agency officials submitted a 

response arguing that the modified document still did not answer concerns about the

environmental change the two reservoirs would bring, their effect on the ecology and wildlife of 

the region, the long term diversion of water from local aquifers, and the cumulative 

consequences of both this project and the landfill should both be approved. Although this 

reaction caused EMEC officials like President Arthur Lowe to pause, the troubles besetting the 

landfill renewed their enthusiasm. In December, Superintendent Quintana (Figure 8-5) requested 
285

Figure 8-5. Superintendent Ernest “Ernie” Quintana steadfastly opposed the landfill project in 

spite of orders from the upper echelons of the National Park Service to desist. Photographer 

unknown. Photo courtesy of Ernie Quintana.

an analysis by the Water Resources Branch of the NPS of the probable loss of water from the 

Pinto Basin Aquifer if the hydroelectric project went ahead. That office reported that ground 

water loss in the Chuckwalla Valley Aquifer would not significantly affect the Pinto Basin one.

91 

If the opponents of the landfill proposal at Eagle Mountain felt relieved by Judge 

McConnell’s ruling, 1995 brought a rude awakening. Kaiser rescued MRC from its financial 

troubles by purchasing seventy percent of the company. In January, the BLM signaled its support

for the landfill by informing FERC that it opposed giving the newly renamed Eagle Crest Energy 

Company any more than forty-seven acres, the maximum available if the land exchange with 

Kaiser/MRC succeeded. In April, Kaiser proposed a new landfill plan while the BLM appealed 

the stay on its land exchange. Kaiser also paid for a study showing that Eagle Crest would take 

too much water and therefore its project should be cancelled. On May 6, the Riverside County 

Planning Department, backed by new members on the board of supervisors, released a “notice of 

preparation” for a new EIS/EIR.

92
286

The BLM agreed to cosponsor the new study and asked Joshua Tree to join it. 

Superintendent Quintana initially refused and reiterated his strong opposition to the project. 

However, the regional and national offices of the agencies took a different point of view. The 

senior officials believed that the best way they could protect the park was to influence the study 

from within. They also had less faith in the project's opponents and sought to get the best deal

they could out of the situation. Coincident with this disagreement was a return to negotiations for 

a memorandum of agreement that would bring funds for monitoring park resources and 

additional research. Quintana discussed the options with Chief of Resources Management Pat 

McClenahan and other members of the park staff and solicited opinions from around the park 

system before relenting. On June 20, he notified the BLM that the NPS would cooperate. Nine 

days later he sent a detailed, twelve-page description of environmental issues that worried park 

personnel. Couched in courteous terms was the implicit warning that the list had better be taken 

seriously.93 

Kaiser/MRC hired engineering consultant CH2MHill and proceeded with the 

environmental review process through the rest of 1995. In the meantime, several attempts to 

derail projects at the old mine failed. Eagle Crest explained that it accepted the NPS as an 

intervener in its license application, but opposed input from the National Biological Survey, the

new agency under the U. S. Geological Survey that included some scientists who once worked 

for the NPS. Many of them led the academic debate on the impact of the water project on the 

desert tortoise and other regional fauna. The company slowly continued its application process 

amid uncertainty about the competing landfill. 

At the same time, Joshua Tree officials challenged the legality of the land exchange 

between the BLM and Kaiser/MRC on the grounds that the CDPA required the federal land 

agency to prioritize acquisition of private land in national parks and wilderness areas rather than 

supply a company with several thousand acres for commercial development. The challenge 

failed, however, as did a campaign by the Charpieds to block renewal of the Eagle Mountain 

prison permit. Closing the prison initially appeared possible because it had problems with the 

purity of its water system, and Superintendent Quintana had testified that light pollution from it

threatened the wilderness experience in Joshua Tree. One interesting development in September 

1995 was a unanimous vote by the Imperial County Board of Supervisors approving a plan to 

develop an equally large Mesquite Landfill well south of the park. The existence of a substitute 

for the Eagle Mountain Landfill, while also decried by environmentalists, offered more 

ammunition for opponents of the Riverside County project.94 

As Riverside County and the BLM developed the environmental review, it became 

apparent that they still ignored many questions and suggestions from Joshua Tree officials. 

Several meetings between the NPS, the BLM, Riverside County and CH2M Hill, as well as 

public hearings, did not persuade Quintana to sign the memorandum of agreement. If fact, his 

continued public criticism of the project brought angry inquiries from Congressman Jerry Lewis. 

He did not understand why a local NPS official continued his vocal opposition while his 

superiors seemed satisfied with the monitoring and financial support being offered by the 

company. He accused the superintendent of trying to establish a “buffer zone” around Joshua 

Tree which was contrary to the stipulations of the CDPA. Quintana began to hear periodic 
287

questions and occasional rebukes over his antagonism, but remained undaunted.95 Despite the 

danger to his career, he wrote:

The citing [sic] of a major landfill within one mile of Joshua Tree National Park will be 

viewed as an uncontrolled experiment. This garbage dump project proposes to implement 

the best in technology and safeguards, however, we don’t know, nor will we know for 

many years, what the outcome of that experiment will be. Should anything be discovered 

wrong, there is no way to stop the experiment...A desert is, by definition, a place with 

few nutrients, little water, long distances between resources, short time windows for 

breeding and above-ground foraging, and low densities of plant and animal life. It seems 

likely, from a scientific standpoint, that placing 20,000 tons of trash per day in a place 

whose natural ecology is characterized by sparsity [sic] would have far-reaching effects. 

Many of these effects will fall into the category of being subtle, long-term, and hard to 

detect.96 

In December, CH2M Hill summarized the many concerns over the project in a “draft 

significant criteria” report. By now the list had expanded to include thirteen issues, groundwater 

quantity and quality, public health and safety, the impact of increased traffic and transportation, 

air quality, adjacent land use, surface drainage and flooding, biological resources, the 

inducement to further growth and development brought by the project, geologic threats including

seismic activity, impact on visual and recreation experience, intrusions against wilderness purity 

and enjoyment, competition for utilities and services, effects on cultural resources, impact on 

local paleontology, and energy consumption. Joshua Tree criticized everything in the document 

except road and rail transport and the effects on mineral, cultural, and paleontological resources. 

As 1996 began, the NPS regional office publicly supported Joshua Tree’s position.97

In early February 1996, Kaiser/MRC submitted the new draft EIS/EIR to the NPS and 

asked for comments to be returned within three weeks. The document itself contained more than 

600 pages of information, some of it highly technical, plus two volumes of previous outside 

comments and company responses. Field Solicitor Ralph Mihan answered that, as a cooperating 

agency and under NEPA regulations, the NPS was not going to be rushed into a hasty and 

incomplete review. Even the agency's Washington Office rejected this corporate attempt to 

circumvent standard procedures and demanded an extension until March. On the fourteenth of 

that month Joshua Tree sent its comments to the BLM. Once again the agency challenged the 

Kaiser/MRC’s assessment of impacts on air quality and water resources, the intrusion of night 

light, noise and windblown litter in the wilderness, the threats to the desert tortoise and bighorn 

sheep, and the company’s plan to mitigate them. A research study by Jerry Freilich, validated by 

desert ecologists James McMahon and William Schlesinger, showed that the long-term, 

cumulative impact of nutrient enrichment in the area would be substantial and its effect 

immeasurable until it was too late. The NPS used the term “eutrophication” to describe this 

process. Kaiser/MRC, Riverside County and the BLM dismissed the NPS comments and 

maintained in a new publicity campaign that they more than adequately addressed any ecological 

problems associated with the landfill.98 

Meanwhile, all the non-government organizations and people who opposed the project 

were busy as well. Donna and Larry Charpied filed a freedom of information request with the 

NPS that turned up an e-mail from Kaiser/MRC lobbyist Anne Wexler to the agency's director,
288

Roger Kennedy. She argued that the final decision on the landfill was a state and local concern,

and that the agency would benefit from the still unsigned memorandum of agreement with the 

company. The Charpieds saw this as a conflict of interest because Wexler and Kennedy both 

served on the board of the National Park Foundation. After a two-week delay the agency’s Office 

of Public Affairs responded that Wexler had spoken to Director Kennedy several times about the 

landfill, that he was secretary ex officio of the foundation on which she served, but that he was 

not directly involved in any agency actions with respect to the project. This accusation of 

malfeasance by the director did not gain much credence, but it convinced the Charpieds to view 

the NPS, outside of Joshua Tree, as a foe rather than an ally.99 

In July, when Riverside County and the BLM released the massive draft environmental 

document to the public, an order from the NPS came down the chain of command. Thereafter,

the official position of the agency would come from the Washington Office. Superintendent 

Quintana would no longer represent the NPS in matters concerning Eagle Mountain. Michael 

Soukup, associate director for natural resources, would serve as the agency’s authority and 

contact. Soon, a new draft memorandum of understanding appeared. Officials from Joshua Tree 

and the regional office continued to criticize it and the draft EIS/EIR. Nevertheless, on December 

9, 1996, Acting Deputy Director Denis Galvin signed the agreement with Kaiser/MRC. The 

company promised to pay for a research center based in the Eagle Mountain town, provide 

$175,000 in advance payments, establish a trust to contribute ten percent of its funds to the 

National Park Foundation for its unrestricted use, and carry out multiple monitoring and 

mitigation measures at costs of up to $900,000 per year. One month later, the Riverside County 

and the BLM released their final environmental document. Superintendent Quintana told the 

press that he and his staff still opposed the landfill. In the meantime, Eagle Crest informed the 

FERC that its application for a license to build the hydroelectric complex remained active.100 

The shift of authority for the NPS to its distant headquarters weakened the influence of 

Quintana and the local authorities, but once again the Charpieds and several environmental 

organizations took action. In January 1997, the Charpieds tried to legally challenge the

agreement while the NPCA bitterly criticized Galvin’s decision to sign it. The conservation 

organization annually listed Joshua Tree as the most imperiled unit in the park system in its 

popular magazine. Former Park Service Director William Whalen agreed to review the 

agreement and the monitoring plan. He approved of both, further distancing the Washington 

hierarchy from the stance of its people in California. In September 1997, the Riverside Board of 

Supervisors approved the environmental study by a vote of four to one and the BLM officially 

approved the land exchange. Both agencies claimed that the plan to monitor and mitigate 

harmful effects from the landfill was sufficient to allow the project.101

On October 15, the NPCA presented the Stephen Tyng Mather Award to Superintendent 

Quintana. As she presented the association’s highest award, Executive Vice President Carol Aten 

described Quintana’s selfless dedication to protecting his park’s resources for future generations

at the risk to his own career. This no doubt embarrassed some of his NPS bosses. At the same 

time, the association filed another suit in San Diego Superior Court charging that the latest 

environmental impact document still did not adequately address the threats the landfill would 

bring to the park and surrounding desert. The Charpieds filed a similar suit with the court and 

appealed the land exchange with the Interior Board of Land Appeals.102
289

Once again Judge Judith McConnell heard the two cases on December 31, and she issued 

her decision on February 17, 1998. To the dismay and frustration of Riverside County and 

Kaiser/MRC, she agreed with the plaintiffs that the huge environmental review still left too many 

issues inadequately researched and, hence, unresolved. McConnell allowed that the new 

document satisfied doubts about the impact of growth at Eagle Mountain town and the effects of 

seismic events on the landfill’s liner. She also agreed that the land exchange had been 

sufficiently addressed. However, she rejected the new document’s claims that the project would 

have little impact on Joshua Tree National Park and on the desert tortoise. The decision was a 

grievous blow to Kaiser/MRC after it spent millions of dollars on the environmental 

investigation, lobbying, and public relations. Company executives and Riverside County 

supervisors pondered what course to take for two months before announcing in April that they 

would take the case to the state court of appeals.103

On May 7, 1999 the landfill project’s roller coaster ride twisted again when the appeals 

court overturned Judge McConnell’s decision. The panel of judges rejected the contention that 

Joshua Tree would be harmed, citing the disagreement between local NPS officials and their

Washington, D.C. leaders who signed the memorandum of understanding with Kaiser/MRC. If 

the senior officials in the agency believed the mitigation efforts would suffice, the judges 

reasoned, then why listen to the local doubters. The court also disagreed with McConnell’s 

reasoning on the tortoise issue. They found that provision of alternate habitat, especially along 

the railroad right-of-way in the Chuckwalla Bench Area of Critical Environmental Concern, 

would sufficiently compensate for the loss of the area surrounding the mine. A jubilant Kay 

Hazen of the MRC told reporters that the NPS as a whole formally approved the landfill and 

Superintendent Quintana’s concerns were merely his personal opinion. Regional Director John J. 

Reynolds immediately wrote to tell her that she was seriously mistaken, but the public relations 

damage was done. Landfill opponents petitioned the California Supreme Court to review the 

reversal, but in July the high court refused to hear the challenge. Thus ended litigation at the state 

level.104

On the following October 13, after the review board rejected the latest appeal, the BLM

again approved the land exchange and new rights-of-way for the road and railroad. The 

Charpieds immediately protested the project to state water and air pollution authorities, but to no 

avail. By November, the focus returned to the memorandum of understanding between the NPS

and Kaiser/MRC. A revised agreement promised an immediate contribution to the National Park 

Foundation of $75,000 plus ten cents per ton of trash to be used for the park in the future. Denis 

Galvin signed the new memorandum on July 10, 2000. The future looked grim for the landfill’s 

opponents, but they had not exhausted every means at their disposal. During December 1999, the 

Charpieds and the Desert Protection Society filed suit in federal court challenging the project’s 

NEPA compliance. At the same time the NPCA filed a federal suit against the land exchange. 

Legal obstacles once again stymied any action on the massive project. This time both suits 

included the NPS among the defendents.105

After more than eleven years, MRC had exhausted much of its capital and even Kaiser 

grew weary of the incessant delays and political hurdles. Then, in August 2000, the Los Angeles 

Sanitation Department, a consortium of seventy-eight cities and the county, jumped into the fray. 

It initiated purchase of the Kaiser/MRC project for $41,000,000. Kaiser announced that the 
290

proceeds would benefit the retirees of its bankrupt steel subsidiary. Completion of the sale 

hinged on successful conclusions to the federal lawsuits. The Riverside Press-Enterprise, 

essentially neutral up to that time, complained:

So here’s LA, the fabled Imperial City that drank the Owens River and bought the 

Ontario Airport, that prefers to put its prisoners and its trash on somebody else’s real 

estate, that gulps down great droughts of everyone’s transportation dollars for its 

overpriced subways. Yes, meet the neighbors. And then remind us again how it is in the 

Inland area’s long-term interests to help LA shrug off these natural constraints to 

growth.106

Superintendent Quintana questioned whether MRC had the right to sell to LA Sanitation 

according to the stipulations of the agreement it signed with the NPS which also held up 

completion of the sale. 

For a while events slowed as both sides prepared for the federal trials to come. In 

September 2002, the conservation group Center for Biological Diversity announced it would sue 

the project’s proponents over violations to the Endangered Species Act regarding the desert 

tortoise. In November 2003, the Charpieds began a public campaign to return the entire Eagle 

Mountain area to Joshua Tree National Park. They based their “Give it Back” campaign on 

Private Law 82-790 of 1952. They maintained that Kaiser/MRC had not continued regular 

mining at the site and therefore should forfeit all of its land. They suggested that the entire 

29,775 acres of land between the Coxcomb and Eagle Mountains be returned to the park and that 

the town should become a national historic landmark. Meanwhile, several other actions 

transpired. First, Superintendent Quintana left the park to become regional director of the 

Midwest region. Apparently his unflagging, almost rebellious, protection of Joshua Tree did not 

hurt his career. Curt Sauer replaced him and continued the park’s steady opposition to the 

landfill. Second, problems at the prison in Eagle Mountain forced its closure after a fatal riot in 

2003. Third, Eagle Crest, which had watched the unfolding drama over the Kaiser/MRC project 

with interest, received a new preliminary permit to develop a license application for its 

hydroelectric facility.107 

After landfill opponents filed the federal lawsuits, Kaiser/MRC warned its investors that 

further troubles might ensue. Most of their concern stemmed from the Los Angeles Sanitation 

District’s purchase of the competing Mesquite Landfill project in Imperial County. Then, on 

September 20, 2005, Judge Robert J. Timlin dealt a crushing blow to the landfill project. He 

ruled that under Federal Land Policy and Management Act regulations, Kaiser/MRC and the 

BLM failed to adequately assess eutrophication and its impact on bighorn sheep, and that it 

failed to consider the landfill as the highest and best use of the land. He overturned the land 

exchange calling the BLM’s Record of Decision “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 

and not in accordance with the law." The Mesquite Landfill had a projected opening date of 2010 

and would accept up to 20,000 tons of trash per day. However, by then the massive urban area 

would produce 40,000 tons of garbage per day. Eagle Mountain’s backers could still salvage the 

project if they could get past Timlin’s ruling.108

In spite of this near-fatal blow to the landfill project, the next several years brought more 

threats in the Eagle Mountain area. First, the Houston-based Cornell Companies, which operated 
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seventy-nine correctional facilities in seventeen states, applied to reopen the Eagle Mountain 

facility. The Charpieds filed protests and, after a well-publicized inspection of the moribund jail,

Riverside County decided not to issue a new permit. The Charpieds also opposed military 

training at the mine site but lost that appeal. After quietly maneuvering in the background, Eagle 

Crest filed a final license application on June 22, 2009. In January 2010, FERC issued a “Ready 

for Environmental Analysis Notice,” opening another controversial round of criticism from 

locals and park officials and responses from the company.109

Kaiser/MRC and the BLM appealed Judge Timlin’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals in January 2007. Judges Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez and Stephen S. Trott 

reviewed the case. On November 10, 2009, they issued a two to one ruling with Judge Trott 

dissenting. They reiterated Timlin’s opinion that the BLM failed to consider the landfill use as 

the “highest and best” use of the exchange lands, did not consider a full range of alternatives in 

the EIS, and inadequately analyzed the effects of eutrophication on the park. The following 

month Kaiser/MRC, the BLM, and a new entry, the Kaiser Voluntary Employee Benefit 

Association, filed for an en banc hearing. That would involve all the judges of the Ninth Circuit 

Court instead of just three. The retiree association also sought congressional help with an 

emotional plea that 4,000 of its 7,000 members had died during the twenty years the project had 

been delayed. Unfortunately for them, the congressmen could not influence the court. The en 

banc appeal failed and the BLM finally gave up. Kaiser/MRC had one option left, an appeal to 

the United States Supreme Court. The NPS, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service and a chastened 

BLM adopted opposing positions. On March 28, 2011, the Supreme Court refused to hear the 

case which meant the Ninth Circuit’s decision was final. In the meantime, the agreement signed 

by Kaiser/MRC and the NPS lapsed because the company did not start its project within the tenyear window of time stipulated in it. The following November, MRC filed for Chapter Eleven

bankruptcy.110 

In spite of this amazing sequence of rejections, some of the more than fifty investors in 

MRC would not surrender. Chief among them were Kaiser and the Los Angeles Sanitation 

District. Over the next two years, the companies and Riverside County periodically discussed 

restarting the entire project. However, incoming President Barack Obama signaled his opposition 

to a legislative solution and more than 100,000 people signed a petition to Secretary of the 

Interior Ken Salazar demanding protection for Joshua Tree National Park. Eventually, the Los 

Angeles agency adopted a new plan called “RENEW LA” in which it hopes to reclaim ninety 

percent of the municipal solid waste by 2025. Much of the rest will go to the Mesquite Landfill. 

On May 22, 2013 the district announced it would cease negotiations for the Eagle Mountain 

project.111 

The fight for the landfill appears at this time to finally be over. In January 2009, the 

Joshua Tree National Park Association presented Larry and Donna Charpied with its annual 

Minerva Hoyt Desert Conservation Award for their twenty years of leadership in the fight 

against the landfill. And yet, is the fight really over? Kaiser still controls the original mine and 

town although it is facing a challenge based on the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977 

which requires reclamation of large surface mines within a limited amount of time. On May 26, 

2011, the California Department of Conservation's Office of Mine Reclamation issued a fifteenday notice to Riverside County, the lead agency for this surface mining operation, to address 
292

matters of non-compliance with the law. The notice required Riverside County to notify 

Kaiser/MRC that the Eagle Mountain Quarry is abandoned, and reclamation is to begin and be 

completed in accordance with an approved plan. This in turn has raised the legal issue of whether 

this action triggers the conditions for the reversion of the land to the government under Private 

Law 82-790.112 

Even this legal question and the ongoing “Give It Back” campaign still face a serious 

obstacle. In January 2012, FERC approved Eagle Crest’s “Final Environmental Impact 

Statement for the Hydropower License.” During nearly two years of reviewing earlier drafts, the 

NPS and its allies identified threats such as subsidence under the reservoirs, groundwater 

depletion, eutrophication, negative impacts on biological resources and air quality, noise 

pollution, and deleterious effects from the transmission line. Eagle Crest dismissed all of them as 

overstated and insignificant. The federal commission decided solely on the basis of the low cost 

of this 1,300-megawatt project compared to generating equivalent energy elsewhere. On July 15, 

2013, the California State Water Resources Control Board approved the project clearing another 

major hurdle for Eagle Crest. Some Joshua Tree officials fear they may not be able to halt this 

project. The introduction of artificial lakes into the desert may become a test of the scientific 

predictions of catastrophic ecological consequences.113 

The NPS has not pursued the “Give It Back” campaign with the zeal of the Charpieds and 

others because it would bring massively disturbed land, hazardous substances, and hundreds of 

structures into the park necessitating a huge increase in both budget and personnel. Some 

members of the Joshua Tree staff personally oppose adding the former mine site to a park that, in 

2014, still has nearly 15,000 acres of inholdings. They maintain that the park is so short of funds 

and manpower that it can barely manage the property it already has. One member further insists 

that taking a part of a park unit away, allowing it to be environmentally trashed, and then taking

it back establishes a bad precedent for the entire park system. He suggests that this would make it 

easier for companies to secure park lands to exploit and return at will.114

Late in 2013, NPCA filed suit to overturn the land exchange that the BLM had not 

reversed despite the demise of the landfill project. The environmental group wants to prevent any 

industrialization around the defunct mine. The NPS wholly supports this initiative. Complicating 

the matter, however, is the fact that much of the land along its railroad that Kaiser traded to serve 

as desert tortoise habitat has been included in the Coachella Valley Multi-Species Habitat 

Conservation Plan. That may mean other land will have to be returned to Kaiser if the exchange 

is voided. The land around the mine is considered the most valuable because it serves as a 

migratory pathway for the tortoises and could become critical as the climate changes. Another 

factor in the Eagle Mountain Mine's future is the possibility that it could be listed on the National 

Register of Historic Places.115

Energy Developments

Although attention has necessarily focused on the Eagle Mountain Mine threats, another 

type of external development threatens to impact both natural resources and the visitor 

experience in Joshua Tree National Park. The intense search for clean and renewable energy has 

increased exploitation of deserts in California and the nation dramatically. Wind turbines, 

thermal power plants, and solar receptors all have decades of history in the United States and in 
293

the deserts of California, but political decisions have brought the hunt to an entirely new level. 

The federal government, especially under President Barack Obama, and the government of 

California have elevated the program far beyond anything contemplated in the past. Two actions 

triggered the hunt for pollution-free power. The first was an executive order, issued on 

November 17, 2008 by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, that challenged state 

utilities to generate one-third of the state's electricity from renewable sources by 2020. The 

second was the federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 which provided 

benefits for renewable energy projects begun before the end of 2010. On October 9, 2009 

Department of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar and Governor Schwarzenegger signed a 

memorandum of understanding to support fast-track approval of renewable energy projects. One 

year later they approved the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System just north of Mojave 

National Preserve. The facility, developed by Oakland, California-based BrightSource [sic] 

Energy, Inc., soon became the largest solar power facility in the world. It generates power by 

using the sun's rays to heat water which creates steam to turn its turbines. The demand for water 

in this desert environment led to questions from scientists and environmental groups.116 

To address the concern over the environmental impact of these huge projects, a 

consortium of agencies of the federal and state governments initiated a process to develop a 

Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP) in May 2010. The four principal 

agencies are the California Energy Commission, California Fish and Game, the BLM and U. S. 

Fish and Wildlife. The plan will designate areas deemed "low conflict" as open for development 

while protecting wildlife areas and corridors. As planning moved ahead, the CSLC and the BLM 

signed an agreement in May 2012 to foster the exchange of their lands to allow consolidation of 

properties for solar and wind power development. Over the last several years, utilities and private 

companies have submitted numerous power plant applications and the state and federal 

governments have approved a number of them. The Renewable Energy Action Team of 

DRECP released its draft plan with six alternatives for public review in 2013. In late 2014 the 

review process continues.117

Several areas in California have been identified where renewable energy projects are 

receiving fast-track approval. One is designated as the Riverside East Solar Energy Zone. It 

stretches from the Arizona border along the general route of Interstate-10 to the Chuckwalla 

Valley, literally to the very edge of the Eagle Mountain Mine property. One facility, the Desert 

Sunlight/First Solar Project, is nearly complete. The 4,410-acre photovoltaic plant lies 1.4 miles 

from the park boundary and adjacent to the jojoba farm of Larry and Donna Charpied (Plate 6). 

Noise and lights from its construction have disturbed their quiet lifestyle. Nearby EDF 

Renewable Energy is close to final approval for a solar facility of some 1,200 acres called the 

Desert Harvest Solar Project. Ten miles from the park's southeastern boundary, BrightSource 

Energy, Inc. is pursuing approval for its Palen Solar Power Project. Although its 2,790-acre 

footprint is smaller than that of Desert Sunlight/First Solar, it would consist of two towers at 

least 750 feet in height. This type of structure generates power by directing sunlight from 

heliostat mirrors to receivers. Any bird or bat that flies between these elements will die instantly. 

In addition, the facility will generate a bright light that can be seen easily from the park and for 

miles in every other direction. Furthermore, ten Native American tribes have identified the site as 

a traditional cultural property. Although the California Energy Commission approved the project, 
294

a committee of the commission disapproved an amendment requested by BrightSource in 

December 2013. The future of the project remains uncertain.118

While the Riverside East Solar Energy Zone draws most of the attention from Joshua 

Tree officials, it is not the only area with applications for solar projects. A truly enormous area 

known as the Iron Mountain Solar Energy Zone has been proposed for a 106,522-acre site ten 

miles northeast of the park. This project, if approved, would require transmission lines through 

the southeastern part of the park. Not all solar projects are huge. A variety of proposals for small 

acreage parcels north of Joshua Tree are also under consideration. Solar power is not the only 

kind of clean energy sought in the two California deserts. Other proposals would place so-called 

"wind farms" very close to the park's boundary. These giant wind propellers can be seen over 

long distances and also can destroy birdlife. One area being tested in early 2014 lies adjacent to 

the park's boundary close to the Eagle Mountain Mine and the Desert Sunlight/First Solar 

Project. A careful look at Plate 6 demonstrates the plight of the park as these projects close in on 

all sides. Environmental, Native American, and wildlife preservation groups have forced some 

projects to be abandoned. However, reminiscent of the problems the NPS faced with gold miners 

in 1936, it now faces better organized and government supported miners of energy. In the middle 

of it all sits the Pinto Basin with its broad flat surface and generous deep aquifer. Will the park 

resist future attempts to use its open land for the benefit of people who live elsewhere? 119 

Working at Joshua Tree National Park

The years following Joshua Tree's promotion to national park status have been marked by 

more popularity, a higher worldwide profile, improved scientific management of resources, and 

more respect from senior agency officials. Yet, the threats posed by intensifying use, criminal 

behavior, external threats, and global warming present greater challenges for the future. On 

October 1, 2013 many of the functions of the U. S. government ceased as the two political parties 

in congress wrangled over budget and health care issues. The shutdown lasted sixteen days. All 

the national parks closed and the agency's 750,000 websites became unavailable. Later, some 

conservative states used their own funds to reopen certain popular parks in order to avoid the 

wrath of the general public. For the second time in twenty years the American public grew very 

angry over their parks closing. They remain extraordinarily popular despite slightly declining 

visitation to the entire system. Predictably, soon after congress reopened, a conservative 

lawmaker introduced a bill to take the parks away from the federal government and turn them 

over to states or private companies. As the United States relentlessly looks for ways to cut taxes, 

this is a favorite solution of those who seek to minimize the federal budget and government 

workforce. 

In early 2014, the staff at Joshua Tree National Park coped with the results of another 

solution, freezing the budget and shrinking the workforce by attrition while increasing the tasks 

that burden the remaining workers. This, of course, is the new work environment in early twentyfirst century America. System-wide the backlog of maintenance is now more than double the 

annual budget for the NPS. In every park the workload increases as employees retire and are not 

replaced. The level of stress that park employees face is daunting, while greater use of consulting 

firms dilutes the traditional experience that guided NPS management for decades. More time is 

spent seeking grants for basic park programs. Higher visitation demands more visitor contact 

time. The plethora of threats, short term or continuous, divert rangers and resource managers 
295

from their regular duties. Demands by the public and by politicians must be handled as quickly 

as possible, even if unreasonable. Park employees are pulled away to serve on planning teams 

and training missions that used to be handled by larger regional and national offices. At no time 

during the research for this history did the author find any park employee who wasn't 

overwhelmed with work. After the 2013 government shutdown, the workload became even 

heavier. Joshua Tree, like most units of the park system relies heavily on volunteers to handle 

day-to-day tasks that rangers used to do. Protection of the nearly 800,000-acre park in a fragile 

environment and facing grave threats is an enormous job. The park's allies in the public and its 

cadre of volunteers will need to step up to some of these challenges to assure it will be protected 

"unimpaired" for future generations. 

Figure 8-6. The Park Service faces a future in which resource management, law enforcement, 

and public education are increasingly complex as urbanization closes around the western half of 

the park. Photo by the author.
296

Epilogue

On August 10, 2011, Joshua Tree National Park celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary as a unit 

of the national park system. Superintendent Mark Butler addressed a large crowd of park 

supporters, local dignitaries, and curious visitors. He thanked the chambers of commerce of 

Twentynine Palms, Yucca Valley, and Joshua Tree village, the National Parks Conservation 

Society, the Joshua Tree National Park Association, the Mojave Desert Land Trust, and several 

media and publishing groups for their support. He described the park and its importance:

The park's open spaces, unique vistas, deep skies and wilderness values provide 

increasingly rare opportunities for personal challenge, health and well being, artistic 

expression, personal reflection and a connection to the vastness of the larger world...In a 

land characterized by extremes--heat, dryness and intensity of light--the desert holds an 

astonishing array of life. California's deserts are recognized as a biodiversity hotspot, a 

place where the inventiveness, creativity and unbowed determination of life to exist never 

ceases to amaze.1

He cited the park’s educational benefits and highlighted the challenges that the National Park 

Service (NPS) faced in the future. The message was a clear appeal to citizens both local and 

distant to help the agency protect Joshua Tree and all other national park system units.

One and a half years later, Superintendent Butler addressed another crowd gathered to 

commemorate the person most responsible for the existence of the park, Minerva Hoyt. On 

March 27, 2013, the anniversary of her birthday, the park celebrated the naming of a 5,405-foot 

peak in the park as Mount Minerva Hoyt. A twenty-year campaign had finally succeeded in 

getting the U. S. Board of Geographic Names to designate the previously unnamed mountain 

after the park's first benefactor. The ensuing events included an actress playing Minerva Hoyt 

and a number of speeches relating the history of the campaign to create the original monument 

and Hoyt's central role in it. The occasion included the awarding of the annual Minerva Hoyt 

California Desert Conservation Award by the park's cooperating association to commemorate 

people who excelled in protecting desert lands.2

Both of these occasions showed how far Joshua Tree had come since 1936. When 

Minerva Hoyt first proposed a national park for the southern Mojave and northern Colorado 

deserts, the reaction of the NPS was tepid at best. Roger Toll pointed out many problems 

including extensive private property and mining claims, the superfluity of another desert 

protected area after the establishment of Death Valley National Monument, and his belief that 

the area had few nationally significant resources. Joshua Tree began in 1936 with four major 

problems to solve, (1) acquisition of the property in the monument, (2) a lack of knowledge 

about the resources and how to manage them, (3) a host of threats, both internal and external, and 

(4) a lack of respect for the desert and the unit by both the NPS and the general public. Over the 

first fifteen years it often appeared that the monument would completely fail. In 1950, it took a 

dramatic setback by losing a third of its land. Yet, it has survived and is now one of the most 

popular national parks in the system.

The original 1936 boundary of the monument reflected a difficult compromise forced by 

the existence of copious non-federal lands within the 1,100,000-acre area proposed by Minerva 
297

Hoyt and withdrawn from the public domain by President Franklin Roosevelt. More than 

300,000 acres had to be excluded. In 1950, the monument lost another 267,000 acres in a forlorn 

attempt to placate miners. Despite these adjustments, the monument still faced a massive 

problem of land acquisition with little money available from congress. The history of land 

acquisition in Joshua Tree shows how the NPS has eliminated inholdings in order to improve 

management. It moved from highly complicated tripartite exchanges to friendly condemnations 

to outright purchases and donations by non-government land trusts. Programs and laws like 

Mission 66, the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, and the California Desert Protection 

Act helped. But the key was slow and unrelenting progress, one parcel at a time, over the nearly 

eight decades of the unit’s existence. Developers came and went, and the agency used every ally 

and civil law to outlast them. And still thousands of acres of inholdings exist. The story 

continues.

The most common land use prior to 1936 was precious metal mining. Later the massive 

Eagle Mountain Iron Mine brought large scale development to the edge of the park. More than 

8,000 claims had to be evaluated by the NPS’s overworked sister agency the General Land 

Office/Bureau of Land Management. It is likely that much of the land lost in 1950 will never be 

reacquired by the park. The one seemingly unassailable land law from the nineteenth century is 

the Mining Act of 1872. But two 1976 laws eased the burden. The Federal Land Policy and 

Management Act strengthened the rules requiring claimants to prove that a “prudent” person can 

make a profit in order to hold an unpatented claim. The Mining in the National Parks Act forced 

miners in Joshua Tree to undertake expensive environmental protection and remediation in 

securing and transporting ore. For virtually all of them this has proven too complicated to pursue. 

Claims exist in the park, but not active mining. 

The early days of Joshua Tree saw numerous inspections and much debate over the 

resources and potential development of the unit. Critical to both was the input of James Cole. 

The park that exists today is as much his legacy as that of all the superintendents who followed. 

He developed the road and camping plans, determined the land to be excised or added in 1950, 

and coped with much of the abuse and personal challenges from existing residents and real-estate 

developers. However, Joshua Tree remained understaffed and underfunded for decades. Regional 

office and university experts like Lowell Sumner and Charles Douglas helped, but no welltrained scientists actually worked at the monument until the 1980s. An embarrassing 1976 

assessment of the unit added to the evidence that natural resource management still suffered 

neglect across the system, finally spurring the agency to get serious. At Joshua Tree, the 

appointment of Bob Moon, Jerry Freilich and Rosalie Pepito changed that dire situation. In 2014,

inventory and monitoring funds, a geographic information system, vigorous research studies, and 

volunteer workers help promote the park’s resource protection program. The resource 

management staff is still undersized, but it is competent, and the reputation of the unit is well 

enhanced.

Joshua Tree National Park has faced numerous threats throughout its history. Poaching, 

wood cutting, overgrazing by cattle, and the prospect of wide-open mining faced the early 

monument. Railroad land sales, developers, a steady decline in the availability of water, and 

concomitant worries about desert bighorn sheep troubled the monument staff for decades. 

Recently, invasion of exotic grasses, increased fire occurrence and size, serious air pollution, 
298

climate change, and the tightening grip of adjacent development mean the challenge of 

protecting the park is greater than ever. A staff under increasing financial constraints, workloads,

and stress must cope. The surrounding communities, especially Twentynine Palms, and 

advocates like the Mojave Desert Land Trust, the Joshua Tree National Park Association, Donna 

and Larry Charpied, and hundreds of park volunteers have helped. The uncomfortable reality 

faced by the NPS is that Joshua Tree and other parks are not islands. In protecting natural and 

cultural resources, combating irresponsible or criminal behavior, and keeping the public 

educated and safe, the agency faces the positives and negatives of society as a whole.

Thus we return to the concept of American perceptions of the desert. The Native 

Americans found the region habitable and life-sustaining. The early explorers, both Spanish and 

American, disagreed. Only mineral wealth and a certain lawlessness brought Americans to the 

future parkland. Both miners and ranchers fundamentally could not understand that the arid 

expanse could be used for any other purpose. Hearkening back to the biblical prophets who 

retreated to the “wilderness” for reflection and avoidance of society’s pressure, a few people 

turned to the desert for relaxation, exploration, and the search for knowledge. John Van Dyke, 

Edmund C. Jaeger, and Minerva Hoyt saw the fragility of the desert and inspirational 

opportunities for people who could accept its character. Patients with respiratory problems, Los 

Angeles auto-tourists, and small tract land owners soon followed. The mystique of the desert 

continues to capture people from rock climbers to rock music stars. 

So, what about the general public and Park Service attitudes towards the desert? 

Despite increasing popularity of and growing numbers visitors to Joshua Tree National Park, a 

strong negative impression persists. The NPS itself has not been immune. While few in the 

agency question the value of Yosemite, opinions about Joshua Tree have never been completely 

positive. Roger Toll did not think the area worthy of inclusion in the park system. When a 

boundary adjustment seemed inevitable, all the agency investigators except Lowell Sumner 

dismissed the Pinto Basin as just another featureless desert valley with no recreational value. 

Although sophisticated natural resource management lagged across much of the park system in 

the 1970s, Joshua Tree suffered an unusual amount of disdain from regional officials prior to the 

arrival of Bob Moon. Disrespect for the unit’s leadership, relegation of its general management 

planning program to secondary status, and the sneering reference to it as a “kitty-litter park” 

revealed uncertainty about the value of a desert park. Likewise, untutored or inexperienced 

members of the public still call the desert a wasteland. Why not put the giant energy schemes out 

there? There’s nothing else of value. As long as this attitude prevails, Joshua Tree will never 

receive the respect and support that the Sierra Nevada parks command. Pondering the future of 

Joshua Tree National Park raises a mixture of hopes and worries. The park is popular with 

visitors. It has considerable local and organizational support. Yet grievous threats surround and 

pervade it. It has survived more threats than most units for nearly eighty years. Will the public 

use the desert as a dump or a retreat? Time will tell what future generations will find when they 

visit California’s rugged and stark but sublime deserts.
299

Appendix A: List of Superintendents

James E. Cole 9/19/40 - 10/30/42

Duane D. Jacobs 12/9/42 - 3/26/44

Frank R. Givens, Acting 3/27/44 - 6/1/44

James E. Cole 5/6/44 - 3/1/47

Frank R. Givens 3/2/47 - 4/11/53

Samuel A. King 4/12/53 - 1/20/57

Elmer N. Fladmark 2/24/57 - 8/1/58

William R. Supernaugh 10/5/58 - 3/20/71

Peter L. Parry 4/18/71 - 7/7/73

Homer L. Rouse 7/8/73 - 8/14/76

Frederick T. Anderson 8/16/76 - 11/30/90

David Moore 6/30/91 - 12/2/93

Ernest Quintana 3/20/93 - 7/12/03

Curt Sauer 11/16/03 - 9/30/10

Mark Butler 1/30/11 - 3/1/14

David Smith 9/21/14 - present
300

Appendix B: Visitor Numbers 1941 to 2013

1941 31,285 1966 408,600 1991 1,145,458

1942 23,691 1967 416,500 1992 1,220,539

1943 17,414 1968 489,400 1993 1,252,401

1944 7,640 1969 550,300 1994 1,184,871

1945 18,275 1970 643,000 1995 1,235,702

1946 36,605 1971 576,000 1996 1,095,046

1947 57,801 1972 602,752 1997 1,226,273

1948 59,157 1973 589,600 1998 1,410,312

1949 66,991 1974 509,900 1999 1,316,340

1950 79,129 1975 552,200 2000 1,233,935

1951 93,615 1976 728,900 2001 1,280,917

1952 141,416 1977 745,600 2002 1,178,376

1953 172,423 1978 602,453 2003 1,283,346

1954 260,700 1979 590,543 2004 1,243,659

1955 280,600 1980 545,357 2005 1,375,111

1956 312,900 1981 612,966 2006 1,256,421

1957 320,300 1982 673,201 2007 1,298,979

1958 365,300 1983 671,426 2008 1,392,446

1959 299,600 1984 663,798 2009 1,304,471

1960 320,100 1985 641,172 2010 1,434,976

1961 301,500 1986 783,224 2011 1,396,237

1962 331,500 1987 830,085 2012 1,396,117

1963 346,300 1988 955,246 2013 1,383,340

1964 343,400 1989 990,214 2014 1,589,905

1965 336,000 1990 1,022,396
301

Appendix C: Legislation 

1. Proclamation (No. 2193) of August 10, 1936 

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHEREAS certain public lands in the State of California contain historic and prehistoric 

structures, and have situated thereon various objects of historic and scientific interest; and 

WHEREAS it appears that it would be in the public interest to reserve such lands as a national 

monument, to be known as the Joshua Tree National Monument: 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, under 

and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 2 of the act of June 8, 1906, ch. 3060, 34 

Stat. 225 (U. S. C., title 16, sec. 431), do proclaim that, subject to existing rights and prior 

withdrawals, the following-described lands in California are hereby reserved from all forms of 

appropriation under the public-land laws and set apart as the Joshua Tree National Monument: 

SAN BERNARDINO MERIDIAN 

T. I S., R. 5 E., sees. 19 to 36, inclusive. T. 2 S., R. 5 E., sees. I to 6, 11 to 13, inclusive, and 

those parts of secs. 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 24 lying north of the north boundary of the Colorado 

River Aqueduct right-of-way. T. I S., R. 6 E., sees. 19 to 36, inclusive; T. 2 S., R. 6 E., sees. I to 

18, 21 to 26, inclusive, and those parts of secs.19, 20, 27, 28, 34, 35 and 36 lying north of 

aqueduct right-of-way; T. 3 S., R. 6 E., that part of sec. 1 lying north if aqueduct right-of-way. 

Ts. 1 and 2 S., R. 7 E. (Partly unsurveyed); T. 3 S., R. 7 E., sees. 1 to 6, 8 to 16, 23 to 24, 

inclusive, and those parts of secs. 7, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25 and 26 lying north of aqueduct right-ofway; Ts. I and 2 S., R. 8 E. (partly unsurveyed); T. 3 S., R. 8 E., sees. 1 to 30, 33 to 36, inclusive, 

and those parts of secs. 31 and 32 lying north of aqueduct right-of-way; T. 4 S., R. 8 E., those 

parts of secs. 4 and 5 lying north of aqueduct right-of-way; T. 1 S., R. 9 E., secs. 5 to 9 and 16 to 

36, inclusive; Ts. 2 and 3 S., R. 9 E. (partly unsurveyed); Ts. I to 3 S., R. 10 E. (partly 

unsurveyed); T. 5 S., R. 10 E., secs. 1 to 30, inclusive, and those parts of secs. 31 to 36 lying

north of aqueduct right-of-way; Ts. I to 4 S., R. 11 E. (partly unsurveyed); T. 5 S., R. 11 E., secs. 

1 to 30 and 32 to 36, inclusive, and that part of sec. 31 lying north of aqueduct right-of-way; T. 6 

S., R 11 E., those parts of secs. I to 6 lying north of aqueduct right-of-way; Ts. 1 to 5 S., R. 12 E. 

(partly unsurveyed); T. 6 S., R. 12 E., those parts of secs. 1 to 6 lying north of aqueduct right- ofway; Ts. 1 to 4 S., R. 13 E. (partly unsurveyed); T. 5 S., R. 13 E., secs. I to 24, inclusive, and 

those parts of secs. 28, 29, 30 and 31 lying north of aqueduct right-of-way (partly unsurveyed);

Ts. 1 to 3 S., R. 14 E. (partly unsurveyed); T. 4 S., R. 14 E., secs. 1 to 11, 14 to 23, 27 to 34, 

inclusive, and those parts of secs. 12, 13, 24, 25, 26 and 35 lying west of aqueduct right-of-way 

(unsurveyed), Ss. I and 2 S., R. 15 E. (partly unsurveyed); T. 3 S., R. 15 E., secs. 1 to 19, 

inclusive, and sec. 24; those parts of secs. 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 31 lying north of 

aqueduct right-of-way (partly unsurveyed).; T. 4 S., R. 15 E., those parts of secs. 6 and 7 lying 

west of aqueduct right-of-way; containing approximately 825,340 acres. 

Warning is hereby expressly given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, destroy, 

or remove any feature of this monument and not to locate or settle upon any of the lands thereof. 
302

The Director of the National Park Service, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, 

shall have the supervision, management, and control of the monument as provided in the act of 

Congress entitled “An Act To establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes,” 

approved August 25, 1916 (ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535, U. S. C., title 16, secs. 1 and 2), and acts 

supplementary thereto or amendatory thereof. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States 

to be affixed. 

DONE at the City of Washington this 10th day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen 

hundred and thirty-six and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred 

and sixty-first. 

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. 

By the President: 

WILLIAM PHILLIPS, 

Acting Secretary of State

2. Boundary Revision of 1950 (Public Law 81-837)

An Act to reduce and revise the boundaries of the Joshua Tree National Monument in 

the State of California, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled, That Joshua Tree National Monument, in the 

State of California, established by Proclamation Numbered 2193, of August 10. 1936 (50 Stat. 

1760), hereafter shall comprise the folio wing -described area : 

San Bernardino Meridian 

Township 1 south, range 5 east, sections 22 to 27, inclusive, and sections 34 to 36, inclusive; 

township 2 south, range 5 east, portion of east half lying north of the north right-of-way line of 

the Colorado River aqueduct but excluding therefrom that portion of the Long Canyon Camp and 

dump area in section 27 ; township 1 south, range 6 east, sections 19 to 36, inclusive ; township 2 

south, range 6 east, sections 1 to 30, inclusive, that portion of section 31 lying north of the north 

right-of-way line of the Colorado River aqueduct, and sections 32 to 36, inclusive; township 3 

south, range 6 east, portion lying north of the north right-of-way line of the Colorado River 

aqueduct but excluding therefrom that portion of the Deception Camp and dump area in section 

14, that portion of the West Deception Camp and dump area in section 10, and the portions of the 

East Wide Canyon Camps and dump areas in sections 5 and 6 ; township 1 south, range 7 east, 

sections 1 to 4, inclusive, and 9 to 15, inclusive, unsurveyed, section 16, sections 19 to 23, 

inclusive, section 24, unsurveyed, and sections 25 to 36, inclusive; township 2 south, range 7 

east; township 3 south, range 7 east, portion lying north of the north right-of-way line of the 

Colorado River aqueduct but excluding therefrom that portion of the Fan Hill Camp and dump 

area in section 20 ; township 1 south, range 8 east, partly unsurveyed; townships 2 and 3 

south, range 8 east; township 1 south, range 9 east, sections 5 to 9, inclusive, sections 16 to 23, 

inclusive, and sections 26 to 35, inclusive; township 2 south, range 9 east, sections 2 to 11, 
303

inclusive, and sections 14 to 36, inclusive, partly unsurveyed ; township 3 south, range 9 east; 

township 4 south, range 9 east, sections 1 to 5, inclusive, and sections 11 to 14, inclusive ; 

township 2 south, range 10 east, sections 25 to 36, inclusive, unsurveyed; township 3 south, 

range 10 east, partly unsurveyed; township 4 south, range 10 east, sections 1 to 18, inclusive, 

sections 22 to 26, inclusive, and sections 35 and 36 ; township 5 south, range 10 east, section 1; 

township 2 south, range 11 east, sections 25 to 36, inclusive, unsurveyed; townships 3 and 4 

south, range 11 east, partly unsurveyed; township 5 south, range 11 east, sections 1 to 18, 

inclusive, sections 22 to 27, inclusive, and sections 34, 35, and 36; township 6 south, range 11 

east, portion of sections 1, 2, and 3 lying north or north transmission line right-of-way which is 

adjacent to the north right-of-way line of the Colorado River aqueduct but excluding therefrom 

the Aggregate Deposit in section 3; township 2 south, range 12 east, section 13 and sections 23 

to 36, inclusive, partly unsurveyed; townships 3 and 4 south, range 12 east, partly unsurveyed; 

township 5 south, range 12 east, sections 1 to 24, inclusive, and sections 26 to 34, inclusive, 

partly unsurveyed, and portions of sections 25 and 35 lying north of north transmission line 

right-of-way which is adjacent to the north right-of-way line of the Colorado River aqueduct; 

township 6 south, range 12 east, portions of sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10, lying north of north 

transmission line right-of-way which is adjacent to the north right-of-way line of the Colorado 

River aqueduct, but excluding therefrom the Bumpani's Aggregate Deposit in section 4; 

township 2 south, range 13 east, sections 1 and 2 and sections 7 to 36, inclusive, partly 

unsurveyed ; township 3 south, range 13 east, sections 1 to 18, inclusive, partly unsurveyed; 

township 5 south, range 13 east, sections 6, 7, 18, and 19, unsurveyed; township 1 south, range 

14 east, sections 33 to 36, inclusive, partly unsurveyed; township 2 south, range 14 east, partly 

unsurveyed; township 3 south, range 14 east, sections 1 to 18, inclusive, partly unsurveyed; 

township 1 south, range 15 east, sections 31 to 35, inclusive, partly unsurveyed ; township 2 

south, range 15 east, sections 2 to 36 inclusive, partly unsurveyed; township 3 south, range 15 

east, sections 1 to 12, inclusive, partly unsurveyed, and section 18, unsurveyed; township 2 

south, range 16 east, sections 18, 19, 30, and 31, unsurveyed; and township 3 south, 

range 16 east, sections 6 and 7 unsurveyed. 

Sec. 2. All public-domain lands heretofore included within the Joshua Tree National Monument 

which are eliminated from the National Monument by this Act are hereby opened to location, 

entry, and patenting under the United States mining laws: Provided, That such public-domain 

lands or portions thereof shall be restored to application and entry under other applicable public 

land laws, including the mineral leasing laws. 

Sec. 3. All leases, permits, and licenses issued or authorized by any department, establishment, 

or agency of the United States, with respect to the Federal lands excluded from the Joshua Tree 

National Monument by this Act, which are in effect on the date of the approval of this Act shall 

continue in effect, subject to compliance with the terms and conditions therein set forth, until 

terminated in accordance with the provisions thereof. 

Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed, through the Bureau of Mines, the 

Geological Survey, and the National Park Service, to cause a survey to be made of the area 

within the revised boundaries of the Joshua Tree National Monument with a view to determining 

to what extent the said area is more valuable for minerals than for the National Monument 

purposes for which it was created. Report of said survey shall be filed with the President 

of the United States Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on or before 

February 1, 1951. 

Approved September 25, 1950.
304

3. Addition of the Oasis of Mara 1961 (Public Law 87-81)

To Include within the boundaries of Joshua Tree National Monument, in the State of California, 

certain federally owned lands used in connection with said monument, and for other purposes 

approved June 30, 1961.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 

Congress assembled, That the Act of September 25, 1950, chapter 1030 (64 Stat. 1033; 16 

U.S.C. 450ii), is hereby amended by inserting after the period at the end of section 1the 

following : "Also, all that portion of the south half of the northeast quarter and of the north half 

of the southeast quarter of section 33, township 1 north, range 9 east, San Bernardino base and 

meridian, in the county of San Bernardino, State of California, shown on map titled 'Record of 

Survey' by H. F. Cameron, Junior, licensed engineer 6826, dated December 29, 1948, and James 

B. Hommon, licensed engineer 6916, dated October 5, 1949, and made for the National Park

Service, Department of the Interior, and recorded October 17, 1949, in volume 7, page 72, of the 

official records of the county of San Bernardino, said land being described as follows : 

"Beginning at the United States Government Land Office monument marked as the east quarter 

corner of said section 33, thence proceeding on a true bearing south 89 degrees 02 minutes 

10 seconds west a distance of 50.01 feet to the true point of beginning of the hereinafter 

described parcel of land;

"Thence north 0 degrees 02 minutes 55 seconds west a distance of 250.08 feet to a point of 

curve; thence along the arc of a curve to the left having a radius of 20.00 feet a distance of 31.73 

feet to a point of tangency; thence south 89 degrees 02 minutes 40 seconds west a distance of 

2.559.24 feet; thence south 0 degrees 19 minutes 50 seconds east a distance of 270.76 feet; 

"Thence south degrees 21 minutes 02 seconds east a distance of 409.32 feet to the beginning of a 

curve; thence along the arc of a curve to the left having a radius of 280.98 feet a distance of

275.93 feet to a point of compound curvature; thence along the arc of a curve to the left having a 

radius of 800.00 feet a distance of 753.98 feet to a point of tangency ; thence north 69 degrees 22 

minutes 58 seconds east a distance of 125.31 feet to the beginning of a curve; 

"Thence along the arc of a curve to the right having a radius of 1,400.00 feet a distance of 

1,042.74 feet to a point of tangency ; thence south 67 degrees 56 minutes 33 seconds east a 

distance of 94.55 feet to the beginning of a curve; thence along the arc of a curve to the left 

having a radius of 700.00 feet a distance of 366.52 feet to a point of compound curvature; 

"Thence along the arc of a curve to the left having a radius of 167.60 feet a distance of 240.17 

feet to a point of tangency ; thence north 0 degrees 02 minutes 55 seconds west a distance of 

648.91 feet to the point of beginning containing 57.839 acres, more or less." 

Approved June 30, 1961.

4. Designation of Wilderness 1976 (Public Law 94-567)

NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM-WILDERNESS DESIGNATED [Joshua Tree Portion]

An Act to designate certain lands within units of the National Park System as wilderness; to 

revise the boundaries of certain of those units; and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 

Congress assembled, That in accordance with section 3(c) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890; 
305

16 U.S.C. 1132(c)), the following q lands are hereby designated as wilderness, and shall be 

administered by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the 

Wilderness Act: 

(g) Joshua Tree National Monument, California, wilderness comprising four hundred and 

twenty-nine thousand six hundred and ninety acres, and potential wilderness additions 

comprising thirty- seven thousand five hundred and fifty acres, depicted on a map entitled

“Wilderness Plan, Joshua Tree National Monument, California”, numbered 156- 20,003-D and 

dated May 1976, to be known as the Joshua Tree Wilderness. 

Sec. 2. A map and description of the boundaries of the areas designated in this Act shall be on 

file and available for public inspection in the office of the Director of the National Park 

Service, Department of Interior, and in the office of the Superintendent of each area 

designated in the Act. As soon as practicable after this Act takes effect. maps of the 

wilderness areas and descriptions of their boundaries shall be filed with the Interior and 

Insular Affairs Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and 

such maps and descriptions shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act: 

Provided, That correction of clerical and typographical errors in such maps and 

descriptions may be made. 

Sec. 3. All lands which represent potential wilderness additions, upon publication in the Federal 

Register of a notice by the Secretary of the Interior that all uses thereon prohibited by the 

Wilderness Act have ceased, shall thereby be designated wilderness. 

Sec. 4. The boundaries of the following areas are hereby revised, and those lands depicted on the 

respective maps as wilderness or as potential wilderness addition are hereby so designated at 

such time and in such manner as provided for by this Act.

Approved October 20, 1976.

5. Designation of Joshua Tree National Park (Public Law 103-433)

California Desert Protection Act (Joshua Tree Portion)

TITLE IV - JOSHUA TREE NATIONAL PARK. 

SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

The Congress finds that a proclamation by President Franklin Roosevelt in1936 established 

Joshua Tree National Monument to protect various objects of historical and scientific interest; 

Joshua Tree National Monument today is recognized as a major unit of the National Park 

System, having extraordinary values enjoyed by millions of visitors; the monument boundaries 

as modified in 1950 and 1961 exclude and thereby expose to incompatible development and 

inconsistent management, contiguous Federal lands of essential and superlative natural, 

ecological, archeological, paleontological, cultural, historical, and wilderness values; Joshua 

Tree National Monument should be enlarged by the addition of contiguous Federal lands of 

national park caliber, and afforded full recognition and statutory protection as a National Park; 

and the non-designated wilderness within Joshua Tree should receive statutory protection by 

designation pursuant to the Wilderness Act. 
306

SEC. 402. ESTABLISHMENT OF JOSHUA TREE NATIONAL PARK. 

There is hereby established the Joshua Tree National Park, (hereinafter in this section referred to 

as the “park”), as generally depicted on a map entitled “Joshua Tree National Park Boundary –

Proposed”, dated May 1991, and four maps entitled “Joshua Tree National Park Boundary and 

wilderness”, numbered in the title one through four, and dated October 1991 or prior, which shall 

be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the Superintendent of the park and 

the Director of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior. The Joshua Tree National 

Monument is hereby abolished as such, the lands and interests therein are hereby incorporated 

within and made part of the new Joshua Tree National Park, and any funds available for purposes 

of the monument shall be available for purposes of the park. 

SEC. 403. TRANSFER AND ADMINISTRATION OF LANDS. 

Upon enactment of this title, the Secretary shall transfer the lands under the jurisdiction of the 

Bureau of Land Management depicted on the maps described in section 402 of this title, without 

consideration, to the administrative jurisdiction of the National Park Service for administration 

as part of the National Park System. The boundaries of the park shall be adjusted accordingly. 

The Secretary shall administer the areas added to the park by this title in accordance with the 

provisions of law generally applicable to units of the National Park System, including the Act 

entitled “An Act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes”, approved August 

25, 1916 (39 9 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4).

SEC. 404. MAPS AND LEGAL DESCRIPTION. 

Within six months after the date of enactment of this title, the Secretary shall file maps and legal 

description of the park with the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the United 

States Senate and the Committee on Natural Resources of the United States House of 

Representatives. Such maps and legal description shall have the same force and effect as if 

included in this title, except that the Secretary may correct clerical and typographical errors in 

such legal description and maps. The maps and legal description shall be on file and available for 

public inspection in the appropriate offices of the National Park Service, Department of the 

Interior. 

SEC. 405. WITHDRAWAL. 

Subject to valid existing rights, all Federal lands within the park are hereby withdrawn from all 

forms of entry, appropriation, or disposal under the public land laws; from location, entry, and 

patent under the United States mining laws; and from disposition under all laws pertaining to 

mineral and geothermal leasing, and mineral materials, and all amendments thereto. 

SEC. 406. UTILITY RIGHTS-OF-WAY. 

Nothing in this title shall have the effect of terminating any validly issued right-of-way or 

customary operation maintenance, repair, and replacement activities in such right-of-way, issued, 

granted, or permitted to the Metropolitan Water District pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project 

Act (43 U.S.C. 617-619b), which is located on lands included in the Joshua Tree National Park, 
307

but outside lands designated as wilderness under section 601(a)(2). Such activities shall be conducted in a manner which will minimize the impact on park resources. Nothing in this title shall 

have the effect of terminating the fee title to lands or customary operation, maintenance, repair, 

and replacement activities on or under such lands granted to the Metropolitan Water District 

pursuant to the Act on June 18, 1932 (47 Stat. 324), which are located on lands included in the 

Joshua Tree National Park, but outside lands designated as wilderness under section 601(a)(2). 

Such activities shall be conducted in a manner which will minimize the impact on park 

resources. The Secretary shall prepare within one hundred and eighty days after the date of 

enactment of this Act, in consultation with the Metropolitan Water District, plans for emergency 

access by the metropolitan Water District to its lands and rights-of-way.

Approved October 31, 1994.

6. Joshua Tree National Park Wilderness Additions (Public Law 111-11)

Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 (Joshua Tree portion)

TITLE I

(F) JOSHUA TREE NATIONAL PARK WILDERNESS ADDITIONS- In accordance with the 

Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.), certain land in Joshua Tree National Park, comprising 

approximately 36,700 acres, as generally depicted on the map numbered 156/80,055, and titled 

`Joshua Tree National Park Proposed Wilderness Additions’, and dated March 2008, is 

designated as wilderness and is incorporated in, and shall be deemed to be a part of, the Joshua 

Tree Wilderness designated by section 1(g) of Public Law 94-567 (90 Stat. 2692; 16 U.S.C. 1132 

note). 

(c) Joshua Tree National Park Potential Wilderness-

(1) DESIGNATION OF POTENTIAL WILDERNESS- Certain land in the Joshua Tree National 

Park, comprising approximately 43,300 acres, as generally depicted on the map numbered 

156/80,055, and titled `Joshua Tree National Park Proposed Wilderness Additions’, and dated 

March 2008, is designated potential wilderness and shall be managed by the Secretary of the 

Interior insofar as practicable as wilderness until such time as the land is designated as 

wilderness pursuant to paragraph (2). 

(2) DESIGNATION AS WILDERNESS- The land designated potential wilderness by paragraph 

(1) shall be designated as wilderness and incorporated in, and be deemed to be a part of, the 

Joshua Tree Wilderness designated by section 1(g) of Public Law 94-567 (90 Stat. 2692; 16 

U.S.C. 1132 note), effective upon publication by the Secretary of the Interior in the Federal 

Register of a notice that--

(A) all uses of the land within the potential wilderness prohibited by the Wilderness Act (16 

U.S.C. 1131 et seq.) have ceased; and 

(B) sufficient inholdings within the boundaries of the potential wilderness have been acquired to 

establish a manageable wilderness unit.

Approved March 30, 2009.
308

Endnotes

Abbreviations in the Notes

Abbreviations used in the endnotes:

Acc.--Accession number

BLM--Bureau of Land Management

Cat.--Catalog number

DOI--Department of the Interior

DRECP--Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan

DSC—Denver Service Center (of the National Park Service)

GLO--General Land Office

GPO--Government Printing Office

HFC--Harpers Ferry Center (Archives of the National Park Service)

JTNM--Joshua Tree National Monument

JTNP--Joshua Tree National Park

LG—National Archives Regional Branch, Laguna Niguel, California (moved to Riverside)

NARA--National Archives and Records Center, Maryland

NPS--National Park Service

RG79--Record Group 79, National Park Service records, National Archives

SB--National Archives Regional Branch, San Bruno, California

WASO—Washington Office (NPS Headquarters)

WRO--Western Regional Office
309

Introduction

1. Yi-Fu Tuan. 1993. "Desert and Ice: Ambivalent Aesthetics in Landscape." In: S. Kemal and I. 

Gaskell, eds. 1993. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts. (Cambridge, UK: University of 

Cambridge Press) 146-7; Patricia Nelson Limerick. 1985. Desert Passages: Encounters with the 

American Deserts. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press) 167-170.

2. Limerick 1985, Desert Passages, 167.

3. Ibid. 166-174; Diana Davis. 2014. "Wasteland: The Deep History of Defining Desert Wastes." 

Paper delivered at the annual conference of the American Society for Environmental History, 

San Francisco, March 13.

4. R. S. Williamson. 1854. "Report of Explorations and Surveys, to ascertain the most 

practicable and economical route for a railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, 

made under the direction of the Secretary of War, in 1853-4." Volume 5, Part 1, 38. 

http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/AFK4383.0005.001/74?rgn=full+text;view=image Accessed 

April 4, 2014.

5. Perrin Selcer. 2014. "Men Against the Desert: Arid Lands Research and the Growth of 

Development, 1948-1964." Paper delivered at the annual conference of the American Society for 

Environmental History, San Francisco, March 13. 

6. Limerick 1985, Desert Passages, 167-8; Charles C. Reith and Bruce M. Thomson, eds. 1992. 

Deserts as Dumps? The Disposal of Hazardous Materials in Arid Ecosystems. (Albuquerque: 

University of New Mexico Press) 5-6.

6. John C. Van Dyke. 1901. The Desert: Further Studies in Natural Appearances. (New York: C.

Scribner's Sons); Edna Brush Perkins. 1922. The White Heart of the Mojave: An Adventure with 

the Out-of-Doors of the Desert. (New York: Boni and Liveright); George Wharton James. 1906 

The Wonders of the Colorado Desert. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company).

7. Lary M. Dilsaver. 2003. "National Significance: Representation of the West in the National 

Park System." In: Gary Hausladen, ed. 2003. Western Places, American Myths. (Reno: 

University of Nevada Press) 111-132. 

9. Television commercial for a Chevy Silverado shown on September 4, 2013. 

Chapter One

1. D. D. Trent and Richard W. Hazlett. 2002. Joshua Tree National Park Geology. (Twentynine 

Palms, Calif: Joshua Tree National Park Association) 10-23; Camille A. Holmgren and Julio L. 

Betancourt. February 18, 2008. "A Long-Term Vegetation History of the Mojave-Colorado 

Desert Ecotone at Joshua Tree National Park." JTNP Library, 3-5; Don Dupras. September 1990. 

"Self-Guided Geologic Tour in Joshua Tree National Monument." California Geology, 44 (9), 

203-212.
310

2. Trent and Hazlett 2002, Joshua Tree Geology, 29-37; Robert P. Sharp. 1972. Geology Field 

Guide to Southern California. (Dubuque, Iowa: W. C. Brown Publishers) 11-16.

3. Trent and Hazlett 2002, Joshua Tree Geology, 24-29; Dupras 1990, Geology Field Guide,

206-207; Margaret R. Eggers and D.D. Trent. 2004. "Overview of the Landscape and Geology of 

Joshua Tree National Park." In: Margaret R. Eggers, ed. 2004. Mining History and Geology of 

Joshua Tree National Park. (San Diego, Calif: San Diego Association of Geologists) 9-27.

4. Edmund C. Jaeger. 1965. The California Deserts, 4th edition. (Palo Alto, Calif: Stanford 

University Press.) 34-41; Trent and Hazlett 2002, Joshua Tree Geology, 7-9; Harold F. De Lisle. 

2000. "Precipitation History for Joshua Tree National Park." JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, Cat. 

25175, Folder 100.

5. Holmgren and Betancourt 2008, “A Long-Term Vegetation History,” 3.

6. Ibid., 1.

7. Edmund Jaeger 1965, The California Deserts, 122-183; Patrick J. Leary. June 1977. 

"Investigation of the Vegetational Communities of Joshua Tree National Monument, California." 

Masters thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 1, 399-403; Holmgren and Betancourt 2008, 

“A Long-Term Vegetation History,” 3-5. 

8. Leary 1977, "Investigation of the Vegetational Communities,” 399-403; JTNP. 2014. "Plant 

Communities." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/plant_communities.htm Accessed March 

1, 2014.

9. Jane Rodgers. 2014. "Joshua Trees." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/jtrees.htm 

10.Harold DeLisle. 2014. "Creosote Bush." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/creosote.htm 

Accessed March 1, 2014. 

11. JTNP. 2014. "Fan Palm Oases." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/oases.htm Accessed 

March 1, 2014.

12. JTNP. 2014. "Animals." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/animals.htm Accessed 

March 2, 2014. 

13. JTNP. 2014. "Pinto Culture." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/historyculture/pintoculture.htm 

Accessed March 4, 2014; Lary Dilsaver, William Wyckoff, and William L. Preston. 2000. 

"Fifteen Events That Have Shaped California's Human Landscape." The California Geographer, 

40, 2-4; Michael A. Glassow, ed. December 2010. "Channel Islands National Park 

Archaeological Overview and Assessment." NPS, Channel Islands National Park. 2.1-2.10; 

Elizabeth W. Campbell and William H. Campbell. 1935. "The Pinto Basin Site." Southwest 

Museum Papers, 9, 1-53.

14. Native Languages.org. 2014. "Native Languages of the Americas--California." 

http://www.native-languages.org/california.htm Accessed March 5, 2014; Charlotte Hunter. 
311

2014. "Indians." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/historyculture/indians.htm Accessed February 28, 

2014; Douglas Deur. 2006. "The Rock Art of Joshua Tree National Park." NPS, JTNP Library, 

12-23.

15. Duer 2006, "The Rock Art,” 12-23

16 Ibid; Lowell Bean and Sylvia Vane. August 22, 2002. "The Native American Ethnography 

and Ethnohistory of Joshua Tree National Park: An Overview." Cultural Systems Research, Inc., 

JTNP Library, 1-5, 18-29.

17. Lowell Bean and Sylvia Vane. September 1997. "Ethnobotany of Joshua Tree National 

Park." Draft Report to JTNP, Reference No. 1054, JTNP Library, Archaeology/Anthropology 

Box, 3-4. 

18. Duer 2006, "The Rock Art,” 12-23; Bean and Vane 2002, "The Native American 

Ethnography,” 6-237.

19. Duer 2006, "The Rock Art,” 21-23; Hunter 2014, "Indians."; Bean and Vane 2002, "The 

Native American Ethnography,” 11-14, 20-21, 31, 37-38.

20. Bean and Vane 2002, "The Native American Ethnography,” 13-14, 20-21, 31, 37-38.

21. GPO. 1922. "Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations from July 1, 1912 to July 1, 

1922." Volume 2, JTNP Library, Box "Ephemera," Folder Interpretive Information Native 

Americans"; Linda W. Greene, 1983. "Historic Resource Study: A History of Land Use in 

Joshua Tree National Monument." DSC, JTNP Library, 35-52.

22. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 4-6; Warren A. Beck and Ynez D. Haase. 1974. 

Historical Atlas of California. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press) 15; John Francis 

Bannon. 1974. The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1513-1821. (Albuqueque: University of New

Mexico Press) 151-166; Center for Advanced Technology in Education, University of Oregon. 

1999. "An Interactive Study Environment on Spanish Exploration and Colonization of 'Alta 

California' 1774-1776." A collection of diaries, letters and maps of the De Anza expedition. 

http://anza.uoregon.edu Accessed April 11, 2014. 

23. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 4-6; Bannon 1974, 221-228.

24. K. Jack Bauer. 1974. The Mexican War1846-1848. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press). 

23-24; T. H. Watkins. 1983. California: An Illustrated History. (Tracy, Calif: American West 

Publishing Company) 35-46.

25. Neal Harlow. 1982. California Conquered: The Annexation of a Mexican Province 1846-

1850. (Berkeley: University of California Press) 303-337; Tom Gray. n. d. Teaching With 

Documents: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. NARA. 

http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/guadalupe-hidalgo/ Accessed April 11, 2014.
312

26. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 63-85.

27. Ibid., Samuel A. King. 1954. "A History of Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Library, 

23-24.

28. F. Ross Holland, Jr. December 1971. "Nomination of Cow Camp for the National Register of 

Historic Places." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H32, Folder 078.

29. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 25-29, 91; D. D. Trent. 2004. "Geology and 

History of Mines of Joshua Tree National Park." In: Eggers, ed. Mining History and Geology of 

Joshua Tree, 29-47.

30. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 91-306; Margaret R. Eggers and D. D. Trent. 2004. 

“Historic Mining Equipment and Processes within Joshua Tree National Park." In: Eggers, ed. 

Mining History and Geology of Joshua Tree, 49-64.

31. Eggers and Trent 2004, “Historic Mining Equipment,” In: Eggers, ed. Mining History and 

Geology of Joshua Tree, 49-64; Otis E. Young, Jr. 1970. Western Mining: An informal account 

of precious-metals prospecting, placering, lode mining, and milling on the American frontier 

from Spanish times to 1893. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press) 178-233, 283-284.

32. Rodman Paul and Elliott West. 2001. Mining Frontiers of the Far West 1848-1880.

(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press) 161-175; D. D. Trent 2004, 30.

33. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 255-261; Trent 2004, “Geology and History of 

Mines,” 38.

34. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 202-211; Trent 2004, “Geology and History of 

Mines,” In: Eggers, ed. Mining History and Geology of Joshua Tree, 31-34; NPS. 2009. 

"Cultural Landscapes Inventory Northern Piñon Mining District Joshua Tree National Park." 

JTNP Library, 14-17.

35. Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study,” 154-159; Larry M. Vredenburgh, Gary L. 

Shumway and Russell D. Hartill. 2005. "Desert Fever: An Overview of Mining History of the 

California Desert Conservation Area: Eagle Mountain." 

http://vredenburgh.org/desert_fever/pages/riverside_county_04.htm Accessed April, 9, 2014.

36. IT Corporation. July 2001. "Preliminary Assessments for the National Park Service Joshua 

Tree National Park." JTNP Library, Box "Uncatalogued materials."

37. Public Law 37-64.

38. U.S. Congress."The Pacific Railroad Act of 1862," 12 Stat. 489; James E. Vance. 1995. The 

North American Railroad: Its Origin, Evolution, and Geography (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 

University Press) 168-173; For more information on the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862 and the 

Southern Pacific Railroad see Richard Orsi. 2007. Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad 

and the Development of the American West, (Berkeley: University of California Press).
313

39. John C. Van Dyke. 1901. The Desert: Further Studies in Natural Appearances. (New York: 

C. Scribner's Sons).

40. "How Fabulous Coachella Valley Blossomed from Desert Wasteland." Los Angeles Times, 

July 26, 1959; Palm Springs Bureau of Tourism. 2014. "Palm Springs History." 

http://www.visitpalmsprings.com/page/palm-springs-history/8180 Accessed April 16, 2014.

41. The Planning Center/C&E. 2011. "Yucca Valley Community Profile,” 9. 

42. Frank Bagley interviewed by Sue Moore, Twentynine Palms, October 28, 1968. Transcript in 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H1815, Folder 027A; City of Twentynine Palms. 2011. 

"History of Twentynine Palms, California." http://www.ci.twentyninepalms.ca.us/History_of_29_Palms_California.77.0.html Accessed April 16, 2014; Vickie Waite, 

Al Gartner and Paul F. Smith. 2007. "Images of America: Twentynine Palms." (Charleston, S.C: 

Arcadia Publishing) 13-66.

43. "Pinto Basin Riverside County California." n.d. JTNP Archives, Acc. 00774, Cat. 27729, 

Box "Whatley and Flynn Land Tract," Folder 003.

44. Roy Harrod to Lake County Development Syndicate, Inc. n.d. Ibid; "Speculate! This is Your 

Chance at California Real Estate Profits." n.d. Ibid.

45. S. Moninger to W. H. Whatley. March 2, 1932. Ibid; R. E. Allen to Contract Purchasers of 

Pinto Basin Lands from the Security Land Corporation. April 25, 1932.Ibid; Pinto Basin Mutual 

Water Company vs. Security Land Corporation. July 25, 1932. California Superior Court No. 

332,581. Ibid. 

46. The Metropolitan Water District. 2011. "The Metropolitan Water District of Southern 

California History and First Annual Report Commemorative Edition." 

http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/pages/about/AR/AR1928.html Accessed April 19, 2014; The 

Metropolitan Water District. "The District at a Glance." 

www.mwdh2o/pages/news/at_a_glance/mwd.pdf accessed February 15, 2013; "Act of June 18, 

1932" (47 Stat. 324). 

Chapter Two

1. Presidential Proclamation 2193, August 10, 1936, 50 Stat. 1760.

2. Conner Sorenson, "Apostle of the Cacti, The Society Matron as Environmental Activist," 

Southern California Quarterly, 58 (3) 1976, 407-429, 411.

3. Ibid, 410-412.

4. George Wharton James. 1918. The Wonders of the Colorado Desert (Boston: Little, Brown, 

and Company) 477.
314

5. "Reward Offered For Slayer Of Giant Of Desert," South Pasadena Foothill Review, June 27,

1930.

6. Ibid. 

7. "Desert Parks Proposed," Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1930; Sorenson 1976, 418.

8. N. L. Britton, "The International Deserts Conservation League," August 1, 1930, JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 002. Early news 

reports listed the plural “Deserts” in the organization’s title, but its own letterhead carried the 

singular form "Desert." 

9. "Reward Offered," South Pasadena Foothill Review n. d.,1930.

10. Joint Parks Committee to William Spry, July 25, 1927, NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, 

Part 1, "March 1933-February 1934"; This letter and many others are summarized in Frank 

Givens, n.d. "Briefed Data on Joshua Tree National Monument--7/25/34 to 9/28/36," an 

unpublished chronology of correspondence (with some letters included) leading to the 

establishment of the monument, n.d., JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Folder 004, 1.

11. Sorenson 1976, "Apostle of the Cacti,” note 6.

12. The most detailed expression of the policies Mather and his lieutenants favored can be found 

in a speech by Superintendent John R. White of Sequoia National Park titled "Atmosphere in the 

National Parks," In Lary Dilsaver, America's National Park System: The Critical Documents

(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1994) 142-148.

13. W. H. Anderson to Harold Ickes, March 30, 1934. In Frank Givens, n.d. "Briefed Data," 4d.

14. H. C. Bryant to C. K. Edmunds, August 27, 1934. NARA, RG79. Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3.

15. For information on the progressive movement and conservation see Samuel P. Hays. 1999.

Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press); Roderick Nash. 2001. Wilderness and the American 

Mind, 4th Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press).

16. Alfred Runte. 2010. National Parks: The American Experience, 4th Edition (Lanham, MD: 

Taylor Trade Publishing).

17. Rebecca Conrad. 1997. “The National Conference on State Parks: Reflections on 

Organizational Genealogy,” The George Wright Forum, 14 (4) 28-43.

18. Camp Fire Club of America. 1929. "National Park Standards." NPS Archives, Harpers Ferry, 

WV, General Collection, Box K5410, "Policy and Philosophy to 1947. Republished in The 

National Parks Bulletin, Vol. 14 (December 1938) 5-7.

19. Lary Dilsaver. 2008. "Not of National Significance: Failed National Park Proposals in 

California," California History, 85 (2) 4-23, 66-68; NPS, “Proposed Areas Resumes,” NPS 
315

Archives, HFC, L58, “Proposed additions to the national park system,” Box 1, August 29, 1947; 

Presidential Proclamation 2028, February 11, 1933, 47 Stat. 2554.

20. Joseph Engbeck, Jr. 1980. State Parks of California from 1864 to the present (Portland, OR: 

Graphic Arts Center Publishing Company) 17-33, 50-55.

21. Frederick Law Olmsted. 1929. "Report of State Park Survey of California," (Sacramento: 

California State Printing Office) 3-13.

22. Ibid, 3-5, 69.

23. Ibid., 51-52.

24. Ibid., 3-5.

25. Ronald Foresta. 1984. America's National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington, DC: 

Resources for the Future) 30-43; Roger Toll. April 7, 1934. "Report on the Proposed Desert 

Plant National Park," submitted to Director Arno Cammerer. This large package of materials 

included maps, photographs, descriptions of the area, supporting data and expert opinions on the 

resources, as well as Toll's evaluation of the proposed area's significance, feasibility and 

suitability. A list of desert species is on page 27. JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, Cat. 25175, Folder 

13; Presidential Proclamation 2032, March 1, 1933, 47 Stat. 2557; Presidential Proclamation 

2232, April 13, 1937, 50 Stat. 1827

26. Rimo Bacigalupi to Roger Toll. April 3, 1934. JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box 

"Desert Plant National Park," Folder 002.

27. Ibid; Walter Taylor to Roger Toll, August 22, 1932. NARA, RG79, Appendix 16, Entry 63 

"Records of Roger Toll," Box 3, Folder "Joshua Trees." 

28. Dietmar Schneider-Hector. 2003. "Roger W. Toll Chief Investigator of Proposed National 

Parks and Monuments: Setting the Standards for America's National Park System," Journal of 

the West, 42 (1) 82-90; NPS, "Roger Wolcott Toll 1883-1936," 

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/sontag/toll.htm Accessed September 18, 2010.

29. Olmsted 1929, "Report of State Park Survey,” 69; Newton Drury to Roger Toll, January 31, 

1933. NARA, RG79, Appendix 16, Entry 63, "Records of Roger Toll," Box 3, Folder "Joshua 

Trees."

30. Philip Munz to W. B. McDougall, September 30, 1932. Ibid; Philip Munz. 1963. A 

California Flora, 2nd edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).

31. Newton Drury to W. B. McDougall, October 7, 1932. NARA, RG79, Appendix 16, Entry 63, 

"Records of Roger Toll," Folder "Joshua Trees."

32. W. L. Jepson to Dr. McDougall, July 18, 1932. Ibid; Thomas Vint to Roger Toll, February 4, 

1933. Ibid; Mary Beale. 1931. "The Road to Cima," Madroño, Vol.2, 42-44.
316

33. Clinton G. Abbott to Newton Drury, January 13, 1932. JTNP Library, Binder "Early Plans 

for Joshua Tree National Monument,” Manuscript "Desert Plants National Monument," 15.

34. Olmsted 1929, "Report of State Park Survey,” 69; Minerva Hoyt to Arno Cammerer, July 18, 

1933. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 1 "General Desert Plant, 1927-34." 

35. Charles Vorhies to Harold Bryant, April 9, 1935. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3; 

Harold Bryant to Charles Vorhies, April 18, 1935. Ibid.

36. Sorenson 1976, "Apostle of the Cacti,” 417.

37. California Assembly Bill 1292 introduced by Mr. Phillips, January 26, 1933. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 002; Horace Albright to Mrs. 

Sherman Hoyt, June 1, 1933. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 1.

38. Sorenson 1976, "Apostle of the Cacti,” 419-420.

39. Public Law 72-425; John Phillips to Harold Ickes, July 18, 1933. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, 

Box 2258, Part 1; California State Parks. 2004. "Planning Milestones," (Sacramento: California 

State Parks) 16, 47, 85; Diana Lindsay. 2001. Anza-Borrego A to Z: People, Places, and Things

(San Diego: Sunbelt Publication, Inc.) 35-36

40. Roger Toll. May 3, 1933. "Proposed Joshua Tree National Monument In California, Arizona 

or Nevada." Report to Horace Albright, NARA, RG 79, Appendix 16, Entry 63, Roger Toll 

papers, Box 3, Folder "Joshua Trees."

41. Roger Toll to NPS Director, April 17, 1933. JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box 

"Desert Plant National Park," Folder 001.

42. Sorenson 1976, "Apostle of the Cacti,” 419-420; James Rolph, Jr. to the President, June 2, 

1933. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Pt.1, Folder "General Desert Plant, 1927-34"; 

43. Minerva Hoyt to Conrad Wirth, July 8, 1933. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Pt. 1, 

Folder "General Desert Plant, 1927-34"; Minerva Hoyt to A. E. Dunaray [sic], July 10, 1933.

Ibid; Minerva Hoyt to Arno Cammerer, July 18, 1933. Ibid; Harold Ickes to Mrs. Hoyt, July 25, 

1933. Ibid.

44. Fred W. Johnson to NPS Director, July 28, 1933, Ibid.

45. Executive Order 6361, October 25, 1933; Minerva Hoyt to A. B. Cammerer, July 18, 1933.

NARA, RG79, Entry 10. Box 2258, Part 1, "General Desert Plant 1927-34"; A.E. Demaray to 

Mrs. A. Sherman Hoyt, June 27, 1933, Ibid. 

46. Frank Givens, "Briefed Data ," 2; A. Schleicher to Harold Ickes, December 14, 1933. NARA, 

RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 1 "General Desert Plant 1927-34." 

47. William Simpson to Harold Ickes, November 20, 1933. JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 

27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 002.
317

48. Harold Ickes to William Simpson, December 13, 1933. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, 

Part 1 "General Desert Plant 1927-34." 

49. James Rolfe to Franklin Roosevelt, March 1, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 

2, Folder 2; Arno Cammerer to Mrs. R. H. McCoy, March 15, 1934. Ibid. 

50. Joshua Green to Par Harrison, June 2, 1934. Ibid; Pat Harrison to Arno Cammerer, June 12, 

1934. Ibid; Mrs. Edwin S. Fuller to Arnold [sic] Cammerer, June 5, 1934. Ibid.

51. Benjamin Fenton to Arno Cammerer, June 16, 1934. Ibid; Arno Cammerer to Benjamin 

Fenton, June 20, 1934. Ibid.

52. Frank Givens, "Briefed Data," 5-6. 

53. Rachel Vordermark to Harold Ickes, September 15, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2258, Part 4; Harold Ickes to Arno Cammerer, March 26, 1936. Ibid; A. E. Demaray to the 

Secretary, March 27, 1936. Ibid; Harold Ickes to A. E. Demaray, March 31, 1936. Ibid; Arno 

Cammerer to Harold Ickes, April 1, 1936. Ibid; Minerva Hoyt to Harold Ickes, May 4, 1936.

Ibid. 

54. Hiram Johnson to Harold Ickes, March 10, 1934. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 2. 

This followed a letter from lawyer Flint MacKay to Johnson, March 7, 1934, urging him to 

intercede. Ibid; Roger Toll to the Director, February 23, 1934. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258 

Part 1, File "General Desert Plant 1927-34"; Roger Toll to Director NPS, May 29, 1930. NARA, 

RG79, Entry 20, Roger Toll Records, Box 13, Folder "Proposed National Parks." 

55. Camp Fire Club of America 1929, "National Park Standards." Editorial note accompanying 

republication of the preceding in the National Park Bulletin, 5; NPS, “Criteria for Parklands,” 

(1971) NPS Office of Planning, Washington, DC, Planning Files; NPS, “Criteria for Parklands” 

(2007) http://www.nps.gov/legacy/criteria.html Accessed May 20, 2005; William Everhart to 

the author, December 12, 1994; NPS, August 29, 1947. “Proposed Areas Resumes,” NPS 

Archives, Harpers Ferry WV, L58, “Proposed additions to the national park system,” Box 1.

56. Roger Toll, 1934. "Report on the Proposed Desert Plant National Park," 40-43.

57. Mrs. Campbell's letter to NPS archaeologist Jesse Nusbaum, dated March 30, 1934, is quoted 

in the latter's letter to the director of the NPS, February 23, 1955. WRO, Joshua Tree files, 

Folder "Joshua Tree National Monument 1968-1973." 

58. Roger Toll 1934, "Report on the Proposed Desert Plant National Park," 1.

59. Ibid., 35-36.

60. Roger Toll to the Director with attached correspondence and data from the Metropolitan

Water District, April 16, 1934. JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant 

National Park," Folder 1; Conrad Wirth review of the proposed Desert Plant National Monument 

returned with approval from Arno Cammerer, June 7, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, 

Part 3.
318

61. Donald Alexander to Mr. Wirth with attached draft, June 15, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2258, Part 2, Folder 2; Arno Cammerer to Mrs. A. Sherman Hoyt, July 2, 1934. NARA, 

RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3; Public Law 59-209.

62. Roger Toll to Forrest Shreve, April 10, 1934. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 2, 

Folder 2; Forrest Shreve to Roger Toll, April 19, 1934. Ibid.

63. J. H. Hoeppel et al. to Harold Ickes, June 5, 1934. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19340, 

Folder 001; H. I. Harriman to Mrs. A. Sherman Hoyt, June 6, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2259, Part 3. 

64. Frederick A. Speik to H. C. Bryant, August 8, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 

3; "Letter Suggested By Dr. P. A. Munz," n.d., Ibid. 

65. Minerva Hoyt to Harold Bryant, July 31, 1934. Ibid; NPS. "Dr. Harold C. Bryant." 

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/sontag/bryant.htm Accessed October 2, 2010.

66. "Desert Park Aims Told," Pasadena Star-News, August 11, 1934. 

67. H. C. Bryant to Mrs. A. Sherman Hoyt, October 9, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, 

Part 3.

68. Estella Carr to NPS, September 13, 1934. Ibid; Jenny White to the President, September 17, 

1934. Ibid; Faith E. Smith to Director, NPS, April 1, 1935. Ibid; Gordon Stewart to Department 

of the Interior, February 20, 1934. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 1, "General Desert 

Plant, 1927-34"; Arno Cammerer to Jennie White, November 14, 1934. NARA RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2259, Part 3.

69. C. A. Pinkham to W. C. Mendenhall, August 21, 1934 attached to a letter from W. C. 

Mendenhall to Arno Cammerer, September 5, 1934. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3; 

Arno Cammerer to Chester A. Pinkham, September 11, 1934, Ibid.

70. Chester Pinkham to Arno Cammerer, September 28, 1934. Ibid; H. C. Bryant to Mrs. A. 

Sherman Hoyt, October 9, 1934. Ibid; Chester Pinkham to Arno Cammerer, November 20, 1934, 

Ibid.

71. Chester Pinkham to Arno Cammerer, November 20, 1934. Ibid: Minerva Hoyt to H. C. 

Bryant, November 1, 1934. Ibid.

72. Edmund Jaeger and Philip Munz, "Memorandum on Proposed Desert National Monument," 

n.d; Loye Miller to Harold Bryant, January 21, 1935; Philip Munz to Harold Bryant, March 6, 

1935, all in Frank Givens, “Briefed Data,” 8-10.

73. Minerva Hoyt to H. C. Bryant, November 17, 1934. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 

3; W. P. Whitsett to Mrs. A. Sherman Hoyt, August 21, 1934. Ibid; James H. Howard to W. C. 

Mendenhall, October 25, 1934, Ibid.

74. J. Lee Brown to Mr. Wirth, February 8, 1935. Ibid.
319

75. H. C. Bryant to the Director, February 12, 1935. Ibid.

76. A. E. Demaray to the Secretary, February 8, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 

3.

77. Ibid; Paul Shoup to Henry Harriman, April 1, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 

3.

78. Public Law 73-482; Executive Order 6910, November 26, 1934; "Public Land Lists Clear," 

Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1935; Arno Cammerer to C. F. Impey, April 13, 1935. NARA, RG79. 

Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3.

79. C. F. Impey to Arno Cammerer, May 31, 1935. NARA, RG79. Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3; 

Arno Cammerer to C. F. Impey, June 12, 1935. Ibid; Arno Cammerer to Minerva Hoyt, June 21, 

1935. Ibid; Minerva Hoyt to Arno Cammerer, July 19, 1935. Ibid; Arno Cammerer to Harold 

Bryant, July 19, 1935, Ibid. The punctuation in the quote is supplied by this author to a verbatim 

transcript of the original telegram.

80. Harold Bryant to the Director, August 15, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 4.

81. Harold Bryant to Minerva Hoyt, October 18, 1935. Ibid.

82. Edmund A. Schofield. 2011. "A Life Redeemed: Susan Delano McKelvey and the Arnold 

Arboretum," Arnold Arboretum, Harvard University, 

http://arnoldia.arboretum.harvard.edu/pdf/articles/726.pdf Accessed December 10, 2011; Philip 

Munz to Mrs. McKelvey, December 17, 1935. JTNP Library, Box "History/Legislation"; Susan 

Delano McKelvey to Frederic A. Delano, December 14, 1935. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2258, Part 4; Susan Delano McKelvey to Henry W. de Forest, December 14, 1935. SB, RG79, 

Central Decimal Files, Box 303, Folder 605-01; H. W. de Forest to Susan Delano McKelvey, 

March 20, 1936. Ibid; A. E. Demaray to Frank Kittredge, July 15, 1936. Ibid.

83. Arno Cammerer to Commissioner, GLO, January 10, 1936. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2258, Part 4; Fred W. Johnson to Arno Cammerer, February 3, 1936. SB, RG 79, Central 

Decimal Files, Box 303, Folder 605-01; A. E. Demaray to C. F. Impey, February 26, 1936, Ibid; 

C. F. Impey to A. E. Demaray, March 31, 1936, Ibid; Conrad Wirth to the Director, January 13, 

1936, NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 4.

84. Everett Dick. 1970. The Lure of the Land (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press) 120; Paul 

W. Gates. 1968. History of Public Land Law Development (Washington, DC: Public Land Law 

Review Commission and Zenger Publishing Company) 285-291, 301-304; California Lands 

Commission. 2011. "School Lands," 

http://www.slc.ca.gov/About_The_CSLC/School_Lands.html Accessed December 11, 2011.

85. Harold Bryant to the Director, August 15, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 4; 

Frank Givens, "Briefed Data," 11-13A.

86. Arno Cammerer to Carl Sturzenacker, August 14, 1935. in Frank Givens, "Briefed Data," 

13A.
320

87. Carl B. Stenaker to Arno Cammerer, September 4, 1935, Ibid, 13e. It is uncertain why the 

later letter shows the name Stenaker but Carl Sturzenacker was the state lands chief according to 

Paul Sabin. 2005. Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900-1940 (Berkeley: University 

of California Press) 98; Public Law 74-838; A. E. Demaray to Frank Kittredge, July 15, 1936.

SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 303, Folder 605-01.

88. Arno Cammerer to the Secretary, April 23, 1936. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 303, 

Folder 605-01; Kim Stringfellow. 2009. Jackrabbit Homestead: Tracing the Small Tract Act in 

the Southern California Landscape, 1938-2008 (Chicago: Center for American Places) 12-31.

89. Public Law 72-188; L. V. Branch to Director NPS, May 17, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2259, Part 3; A. E. Demaray to Commissioner GLO, May 18, 1935. Ibid; P. T. Primm to 

Lawrence C. Merriam, May 18, 1935. Ibid, 

90. F. B. Weymouth to P. T. Primm, July 15, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 4; 

W. B. McDougall. August 5, 1935. "The Southern California Aqueduct Construction in its 

Relation to the Wild Life in the Proposed Desert National Monument." Ibid.

91. Fred Johnson to Arno Cammerer, April 30, 1935. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

Folder 004; Telephone call transcript J. Lee Brown to Conrad Wirth, May 6, 1935. NARA, 

RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 3; A. E. Demaray to Commissioner General Land Office, May 

10, 1935, Ibid; J. Lee Brown to Mr. Wirth, February 18, 1935, Ibid; M. I. Wilson to the Secretary 

of the Interior, July 20, 1935, Ibid.

92. John Phillips to Harold Ickes, February 14, 1934. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 1; 

Cammerer is quoted in A. E. Demaray to Harold Bryant, September 27, 1935. NARA, RG 79, 

Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 4; Faith E. Smith to Director, NPS, April 1, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 

10, Box 2259, Part 3; M. O. Hert to NPS, December 5, 1935. NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 

2258, Part 4; H. W. Stacey to the President, May 26, 1936. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, 

Part 3.

93. Minerva Hoyt to Arno Cammerer, January 30, 1935. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, 

Part 3.

94. Paul B. Witmer to Special Agent in Charge, GLO, September 18, 1935. NARA, RG 79, 

Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 4; J. H. Favorite to Louis R. Glavis, September 24, 1935. Ibid; William 

F. Keys to Secretary of the Interior, March 12, 1936. Ibid.

95. Arno Cammerer to Minerva Hoyt, February 5, 1936. In Frank Givens, "Briefed Data," 15.

96. Minerva Hoyt to Senator William G. McAdoo, February 10, 1936. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2258, Part 4.

97. Harold Bryant to the Director, February 17, 1936. SB. RG79, Central Decimal files, Box 

303, Folder 605-01.

98. William McAdoo to Arthur Demaray, February 19, 1936. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2258, Part 4; Harold Bryant to Minerva Hoyt, February 20, 1936. Ibid; Harold Bryant to Conrad 

Wirth, March 12, 1936. Ibid.
321

99. Arno Cammerer to the Secretary, April 23, 1936. Ibid.

100. Fred W. Johnson to Arno Cammerer, June 2, 1936. Ibid.

101. Public Law 59-209; J. Lee Brown to the Files, June 5, 1936. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2258, Part 4.

102. Arno Cammerer to Secretary Ickes, July 23, 1936. Ibid; G. A. Moskey to Acting Director, 

August 7, 1936, NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2258, Part 2.

103. Presidential Proclamation 2193. 

Chapter Three

1. The records in the Joshua Tree National Park (JTNP) Archives and San Bruno Branch of the 

National Archives (SB) contain these reports. There may have been other inspections for which 

there are no records. The provenance of each inspection is provided below.

2. C. G. Thomas to the Director, November 8, 1936. JTNP Archives, Linda Greene files, "Report 

to the Director, NPS." 

3. ”Colonel C. G. Thomson, Yosemite Park Superintendent, Dies Suddenly In The Valley.”

Mariposa Gazette, April 8, 1937.

4. Art Kidwell. September 1998. "Remembering James E. Cole: First Superintendent of Joshua 

Tree National Monument (1940)." The Sun Runner, 16-17.

5. Presidential Proclamation 2028, February 11, 1933; Public Law 73-49; Death Valley National 

Park. 2012. "Mining in Death Valley." http://www.nps.gov/deva/naturescience/mining-in-deathvalley.htm Accessed November 10, 2012.

6. "Miners May Seek Change in Joshua Tree Monument Act." Los Angeles Times, December 28, 

1936.

7. FJR to Mrs. Sherman Hoyt, February 13, 1937. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, 

Folder 104. The copy of this letter in the above files does not show the signature of the author, 

only the initials.

8. Superintendent JTNM to the Director, NPS, February 24, 1937. Ibid.

9. S. E. Guthrey to Director of Investigations, DOI, May 6, 1937. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat 

19430, L1417, Folder 024.

10. Ernest A. Davidson. April 19, 1937. "Landscape Features as Related to Development 

Program Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert 

Plant National Park," Folder 003; Frank Kittredge. April 27, 1937. "Report on Inspection Joshua 

Tree National Monument." Ibid. 
322

11. 75th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 7558. "A bill to extend the mining laws of the United 

States to the Joshua Tree National Monument in California." June 17, 1937; Arno Cammerer to 

Harry R. Sheppard, July 19, 1937. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 297, Folder "C. G. 

Thomson."

12. Harry R. Sheppard to A. B. Cammerer, July 26, 1937. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, 

Part 5; Frank A Kittredge to Files, August 13, 1937. Ibid; Arno B. Cammerer to Ben H. 

Thompson, August 20, 1937. Ibid.

13. Merel Sager to the Director with accompanying report, September 16, 1937. NARA, RG79, 

Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder "General Reports 1936-41."

14. "Plan Launched to Realign Park Area." Los Angeles Times, September 26, 1938; G. A. 

Moskey to Regional Director, March 21, 1939. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2260, Part 7; Linda 

Green. 1983. "Historic Resource Study: A History of Land Use in Joshua Tree National 

Monument." DSC. JTNP, Library 397.

15. "Report on Joshua Tree National Monument by Inspector P. T. Primm and Junior Park 

Naturalist James E. Cole." December 27, 1938. JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, Cat. 25125, Folder 4; 

Victor H. Cahalane to Mr. Wirth, February 23, 1939. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

N14, Folder 007; Frank R. Kittredge to the Director, April 11, 1939. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 020.

16. Green 1983, "Historic Resource Report," 397.

17. Lawrence Merriam to the Director, May 26, 1939. JTNP archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L1417, Folder 20; H. C. Bryant to Regional Director, March 14, 1940. Ibid; C. Leo Hitchcock to 

Arno B. Cammerer, June 5, 1939. Ibid; C. Marshall Finnan. 1939. "Report of Inspection of 

Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H2623, Folder 065; H. 

Maier, July 21, 1941. "Notes on Joshua Tree National Monument Boundary Adjustment 

Meeting." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20; Jerome A. Greene. 1977. 

"Historic Resource Study: Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument Arizona." DSC. 66-69.

18. O. A. Tomlinson to Messrs. Maier, Sumner, Lewis, Davidson, Superintendent Cole, July 17, 

1941. JTNP archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20; Superintendent, JTNM to 

Regional Director, September 7, 1941. Ibid; Herbert Maier to Major Tomlinson, September 30, 

1941. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 301, Folder 602. 

19. Lowell Sumner. October 6, 1941. "Report of the Regional Biologist on the Joshua Tree 

National Monument Boundary Study." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20; 

Ernest Davidson to Chairman Maier, September n.d., 1941. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files,

Box 301, Folder 602; Guy L. Flemming to Regional Director Tomlinson, September 30, 1941. 

Ibid; Superintendent to Regional Director, October 14, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 20.

20. Herbert Maier to the Regional Director, October 13, 1941. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, 

Box 301, Folder 602. 
323

21. Ibid.

22. G. E. Lavezzola to the Regional Director, November 19, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20; Superintendent, JTNM to the Regional Director, November 7, 

1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N1621, Folder 27; University of Nevada Oral 

History Program. 2012. "Mining and World War II." http://oralhistory.unr.edu/WWIIMine.html 

Accessed November 12, 2012.

23. James E. Cole. September 27, 1944. "Joshua Tree National Monument Proposed Monument 

Boundary Revision." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20.

24. James Cole to the Regional Director, January 11, 1945. Ibid; O. A. Tomlinson to Custodian, 

JTNM, January 19, 1945. Ibid; James Cole to the Regional Director, February 16, 1945. Ibid; 

Herbert Maier to the Director, March 22, 1945. Ibid.

25. James Cole to the Regional Director, October 24, 1945. Ibid; 79th Congress, 1st Session, H. 

R. 4703. "A bill to reduce and revise the boundaries of Joshua Tree National Monument in the 

State of California, and for other purposes." November 15, 1945.

26. Charles L. Stokes to J. A. Krug, March 25, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L1417, Folder 19; James Cole to the Director, April 3, 1946. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2260, 

Folder 120-01; Secretary of the Interior to Charles Stokes, April 19, 1946. NARA, RG79, Entry 

10, Box 2260, Folder 120-01.

27. Secretary of the Interior to Charles Stokes, April 19, 1946. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2260, Folder 120-01.

28. Director Drury to the Regional Director, March 11, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 20; "Death Takes Desert Life Protector," Pasadena Star News, December 

17, 1945.

29. James Cole to Victor Hayek, April 5, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, 

Folder 20.

30. Hillory Tolson to the Regional Director, April 12, 1946. Ibid.

31. Herbert Maier to the Regional Director, April 24, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 19; "Southern California Regional Mining Conference." April 17, 1946. 

California State Chamber of Commerce, Transcript in JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L3023, Folder 161, 4-20.

32. "Southern California Regional Mining Conference."1946, 20-25, 28-29; For more 

information on opposition to federal government management of land in the United States see 

McGreggor R. Cawley and R. McGreggor Cawley. 1993. Federal Land, Western Anger: The 

Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). For 

an international perspective see David Harmon and Allen D. Putney, eds. 2003. The Full Value 

of Parks: From Economics to the Intangible. (Lanham, Md: Rowman And Littlefield).

33. "Southern California Regional Mining Conference." 1946, 53. 
324

34. Ibid. 55-57, 60-61.

35. Ibid., 61-62.

35. Ibid., 62-63. 

37. Ibid., 69-71.

38. Ibid., 72

39. Ibid; Herbert Maier to the Regional Director, April 24, 1946.

40. A. E. Demaray to the Director, May 17, 1946. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2260, Folder 

120-01; 79th Congress, 1st Session. "Excerpt from hearing before House Public Lands 

Committee, May 22, 1946. H. R. 4703." Ibid.

41. Victor J. Hayek to Committee on Public Lands, June 10, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 019; Victor J. Hayek to James E. Cole, June 17, 1946. Ibid; A. E. 

Demaray to Henry J. Kaiser, July 18, 1946 Ibid; "Facts About the Sheppard Bill." Desert Views, 

August 24, 1946.

42. Raymond E. Hoyt to the Regional Director, February 27, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 029; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, March 17, 1947. 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 019.

43. 80th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 2795. "A bill to reduce and revise the boundaries of Joshua 

Tree National Monument in the State of California, and for other purposes." March 26, 1947; J. 

A. Krug to Richard J. Welch, May 8, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 

029; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, June 24, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 019.

44. H. L. Crowley to the Director, September 4, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L1417, Folder 019; Herbert Maier to Custodian, Joshua Tree, September 19, 1947. Ibid.

45. 80th Congress, 1st Session. "Hearing Before the Sub-Committee on Public Lands House of 

Representatives." San Bernardino, California, October 1, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, A5415, Folder 610.01, 49.

46. Ibid., 56.

47. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, November 4, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 019; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, November 6, 1947. Ibid.

48. "Sheppard Not to Refile Monument Bill." Desert Trail, February 16, 1949; 81st Congress, 

1st Session, H. R. 4116. "A bill to reduce and revise the boundaries of Joshua Tree National 

Monument in the State of California, and for other purposes." April 8, 1949; O. A. Tomlinson to 

the Director, May 11, 1949. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 016. 

49. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, H. R. 7934. " A bill to reduce and revise the boundaries of 

Joshua Tree National Monument in the State of California, and for other purposes." March 30, 
325

1950; Conrad Wirth to the Regional Director, April 20, 1950. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2260, Folder "H. R. 7934."

50. Public Law 81-837; Dale E. Doty to Frederick J. Lawton, September 22, 1950. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 016; Lawrence C. Merriam to Richard M. 

Leonard, April 9, 1952. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 104; Frank R. 

Givens to the Regional Director, May 9, 1951. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, 

Folder 016. 

51. C. L. Hinkleman to Clinton D. McKinnon, November 29, 1950. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 016; Dale E. Doty to the President, January 24, 1951. LG, RG49, 

Bureau of Land Management Investigations, Box 38, Folder 1817800; Edward M. MacKevett 

and Edward J. Matson. December 1950. "Mineral Survey Within the Revised Boundaries of 

Joshua Tree National Monument." SB, RG79, Central Files 1953-62, Acc. 79-92-001, Box 1, 

"L3023 JOTR Joint Survey of Mineral and National Monument Values."

52. Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, February 8, 1951. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L3023, Folder 104.

53. "Uranium Ore Found in Monument - Miners Urge opening Area for Prospecting." Indio 

News, May 6, 1952.

54. Ibid.

55. Ronald F. Lee to Dr. John C. Reed, June 6, 1952. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L3023, Folder 104; John C. Reed to Ronald F. Lee, July 1, 1952. Ibid; Ronald F. Lee to Alford 

Maxwell, August 26, 1952. Ibid; Herbert Maier to K. B. Tillman, May 6, 1952. Ibid.

56. M. O. Nordstrom to Douglas McKay, August 27, 1953. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 016.

57. Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, October 5, 1953. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L3023, Folder 104; The Trailfinders. August 15, 1952. "A Report of the Summer 

Meeting of June 8, 1952." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 016; Desert 

Protective Council. "Around the Campfire 1954..." 

http://protectdeserts.org/index.php/about/history/ Accessed November 23, 2012.

58. Orme Lewis to Colonel Nordstrom, October 14, 1953. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L3023, Folder 151; Joe R. Momyer to Sam King, June 28, 1954. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, H1415, Folder 002; Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, June 30, 1954. Ibid. 

59. "Summary of Hearing on Proposal that Joshua Tree National Monument be opened to 

Mining and heard before Board of Supervisors of San Bernardino County at County Health 

Building, San Bernardino, Calif. at 2:00 P.M. July 19, 1954." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, H1415, Folder 002. 

60. Ibid.

61. James Roosevelt to the Secretary of the Interior, February 3, 1955. Ibid. 
326

62. Orme Lewis to Mr. Roosevelt, March 22, 1955. Ibid; Harry C. James to Lawrence C. 

Merriam, May 9, 1955. Ibid; Ben H. Thompson to John Goodman, June 8, 1955. Ibid. 

63. Helen B. Bixel to Thomas Kuchel, July 24, 1956. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L3023, Folder 151; E. T. Scoyen to Thomas Kuchel, September 14, 1956. Ibid; Public Law 83-

703. 

Chapter Four

1. Thomas Vint. July 26, 1941. "Notes on Joshua Tree National Monument Trip May 9-12, 1941, 

accompanied by Superintendent Cole, Messrs. Davidson and Lange." NARA, RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2261, Folder "Reports, Joshua Tree Investigative."

2. Each section of land in the Township and Range Land Division System contains 640 acres or 

one square mile. Each township contains 36 sections. Ernest A. Davidson. April 19, 1937. 

"Landscape Features as related to Development Program Joshua Tree National Monument." 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 00805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 003; Frank 

Kittredge. April 27, 1937. "Report on Inspection Joshua Tree National Monument." Ibid.

3. James E. Cole. 1938. "Report on the Field Inspection Trip of Superintendent Lawrence C. 

Merriam and Junior Park Naturalist James E. Cole of Joshua Tree National Monument April 14 

and 15, 1938." NARA, RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder "Reports, General, 1937-41."

4. R. L. McKown. November 1, 1939. "Report on Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 452, Cat. 25175, Folder 5.

5. Thomas Vint to Mr. Cammerer, June 13, 1940. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2260, Part 7.

6. The apparent discrepancy between the 72,000 acres of indemnity lands reported by the 

Southern Pacific Railroad in chapter two and the total of more than 100,000 reported here by the

GLO may have come about due to an adjustment of the railroad’s distribution of unselected 

indemnity acreage resulting from land alienation outside the monument’s boundaries. 

7. Herbert Maier to the Files, January 23, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N14, 

Folder 007; Public Law 73-482; See Richard J. Orsi. 2005. Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific 

Railroad and the Development of the American West 1850-1930. (Berkeley: University of 

California Press) 128-9; Superintendent, JTNP to Director, NPS, August 15, 1941. JTNP 

Archives, Acc.651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20.

8. S. E. Guthrey, C.C. Smith, J.J. Brosnan to B.B. Smith, June 24, 1938. JOTR Arch., L1417, 

651-19430, Folder "General Land Office Reports 1940-41."

9. Public Law 73-482; P. T. Primm and James E. Cole. 1938. "Report on Joshua Tree National 

Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20.
327

10. D. G. Christen to Conrad Wirth, June 4, 1945. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Appendix 2, Box 

2266, Folder "610 Southern Pacific Lands"; James Cole to Regional Director, May 8, 1945. Ibid; 

O. A. Tomlinson to James F. Whitehorn, May 12, 1945. Ibid.

11. Christen to Wirth, June 4, 1945; Newton Drury to the Regional Director, July 5, 1945. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 20.

12. Newton Drury to Will Whittington, July 9, 1945. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Appendix 2, Box 

2266, Folder "610 Southern Pacific Lands"; Joshua Green to Will M. Whittington, June 15, 

1945. Ibid; Joshua Green to Harry S. Truman, June 15, 1945. Ibid; H. L. Earenfight to the Files, 

May 6, 1946. Ibid.

13. Herbert Maier to Custodian, JTNM, July 23, 1945. Ibid; Regional Director Tomlinson to the 

Director, NPS, October 10, 1945. Ibid.

14. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, July 27, 1945. Ibid; James E. Cole to the Regional 

Director, December 17, 1945. Ibid. 

15. O. A. Tomlinson to Allen L. Chickering, December 29, 1945. Ibid.

16. Mrs. Robert C. Wright to Mrs. Harry T. Peters, February 20, 1946. Ibid; Walter A. Starr. 

1958. "Allen L. Chickering." California Historical Society Quarterly, 37 (1) 86-88; Herbert 

Maier to the Custodian, Joshua Tree, March 27, 1946. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Appendix 2, Box 

2266, Folder "610 Southern Pacific Lands."

17. Herbert Maier to the Custodian, Joshua Tree, August 6, 1945. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, 

Appendix 2, Box 2266, Folder "610 Southern Pacific Lands.".

18. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. 2012. "The Story of the Los Angeles 

Aqueduct." http://wsoweb.ladwp.com/Aqueduct/historyoflaa/ Accessed March 3, 2013; For 

complete versions of the conflict see William L. Kahrl. 1983. Water and Power: The Conflict 

over Los Angeles Water Supply in the Owens Valley. (Berkeley: University of California Press) 

and Norris Hundley, Jr. 2001. The Great Thirst: Californians and Water: A History. (Berkeley; 

University of California Press) 139-171; Frank Kittredge to the Regional Director, February 12, 

1947. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 302, Folder 605-01 "City of Los Angeles."

19. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, April 22, 1946. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Appendix 

2, Box 2266, Folder "610 Southern Pacific Lands"; James E. Cole to the Regional Director, 

February 24, 1947. Ibid; Herbert Maier to the Regional Director, April 24, 1946. SB, RG79, 

Central Decimal Files, Box 302, Folder 605-01 "Dick Curtis"; Newton Drury to the 

Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, May 26, 1947. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 

302, Folder 605-01 "Seth Brady"; B. F. Manbey to Regional Director, February 4, 1948. Ibid.

20. O. A. Tomlinson to the Director, NPS, May 2, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L14, Folder 008.

21. Charles A. Richey to the Regional Director, August 11, 1947. SB, RG79, Central Decimal 

Files, Box 304, Folder "Exchange of Southern Pacific Lands."
328

22. Edgar I. Rowland to O. A. Tomlinson, February 3, 1948. Ibid; Jackson E. Price and Conrad 

L. Wirth to the Director, NPS, March 9, 1948. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Appendix 2, Box 2266, 

Folder “610 Southern Pacific Lands"; Roscoe E. Bell to Annetta Nesbit, May 9, 1949. SB, 

RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 304, Folder 605.1; Roscoe E. Bell. September 27, 1949. 

"Southern Pacific Railway Company: Section 8, Private Exchange." Bureau of Land 

Management Decision. Ibid.

23. Frank Givens to the Regional Director, June 17, 1948. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L14, Folder 009; Conrad Wirth to the Director, NPS, April 9, 1947. Ibid; Mastin G. White. 

December 13, 1948. "Appeal from the Bureau of Land Management, Los Angeles 067465 et al." 

Ibid. Folder 008; Specific data on NPS land acquisition by date and parcel comes from NPS. 

2009. "Digital Lands Files." available at the WRO in San Francisco. 

24. B. F. Manbey to the Director, NPS, July 12, 1951. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 

404, Folder 605.1.

25. "Monument Acquires More Private Land." The Desert Trail, March 27, 1952; Charles A. 

Richey to the Regional Director, June 24, 1952. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 304, 

Folder 605.1 "Southern Pacific"; NPS. 2009. "Digital Lands Files." 

26. Marion Clawson. 1971. The Bureau of Land Management. (New York: Praeger Publishers) 

178-179. 

27. Public Law 74-838, June 29, 1936.

28. Charles West to William McAdoo, March 24, 1937. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L14, Folder 007.

29. Frank Kittredge to the Director, 6/2/38. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 303, Folder 

605-01, "School Lands Part I"; E. K. Burlew to Carl B. Sturzenacker, August 4, 1938. Ibid; 

James E. Cole to the Regional Director, December 11, 1945. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L14, Folder 007.

30. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, December 11, 1945. 

31. J. D. Coffman to Regional Director, September 11, 1947. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, 

Box 303, Folder 605-01; Thomas C. Havell to Director NPS, March 12, 1948. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 007; O. A. Tomlinson to Director, NPS, May 27, 1948. Ibid; 

Herbert Maier to Director, NPS, September 22, 1948. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Appendix 2, Box 

2267, Folder 610.1 "Joshua Tree (Purchase of Land).

32. O. A. Tomlinson to Director, NPS, March 18, 1948. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L14, Folder 007; A. P. Ireland to BLM, March 26, 1948. Ibid; A. P. Ireland to BLM, July 15, 

1948. Ibid; Wesley Nelson to Marion Clawson, October 7, 1948. SB, RG79, Central Decimal 

Files, Box 303, Folder 605-01 "School Lands."

33. A. P. Ireland to BLM, July 15, 1948. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 007; 

Herbert Maier to Director, NPS, February 2, 1949. Ibid; Herbert Maier to Director, NPS, March 

29, 1949. Ibid.
329

34. R. A. Ellsworth to A. P. Ireland, August 6, 1949. Ibid; A. E. Demaray to R. A. Ellsworth, 

September 20, 1949. Ibid; Herbert Maier to A. P. Ireland, October 14, 1949. Ibid; Herbert Maier 

to R. A. Ellsworth, November 17, 1949, Ibid; Herbert Maier to A. P. Ireland, December 8, 1949. 

Ibid; L. T. Hoffman to R. A. Ellsworth, June 15, 1950. Ibid.

35. Frank Givens to the Regional Director, June 23, 1950. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L14, Folder 007; Herbert Maier to Director, NPS, July 10, 1950. Ibid; B. F. Manbey to A. P. 

Ireland, January 18, 1952. Ibid; A. P. Ireland to B. F. Manbey, January 25, 1952. Ibid.

36. Lawrence Merriam to the Director, NPS, January 29, 1952. Ibid.

37. R. T. Hicks to A. W. Burney, January 7, 1937. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 307, 

Folder 610.

38. B. F. Manbey to the Regional Director, December 22, 1941. Ibid; 

39. Sidney McClellan to the Regional Director, August 21, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L14, Folder 007.

40. Thomas H. Kuchel to O. A. Tomlinson, August 22, 1946. Ibid; Herbert Maier to C. F. 

Proctor, August 28, 1946. Ibid.

41. Newton B. Drury to the Regional Director, February 3, 1947. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L14,. Folder 009A; Herbert Maier to the Director, NPS, March 12, 1947. Ibid; Frank R. 

Givens to the Regional Director, April 17, 1947. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 307, 

Folder 610.

42. Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, April 17, 1947. . SB, RG79, Central Decimal 

Files, Box 307, Folder 610; Herbert Maier to the Director, NPS, December 9, 1949. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 007. 

43. Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, August 11, 1949. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L14, Folder 007; Herbert Maier to the Director, NPS, December 9, 1949. Ibid.

44. B. F. Manbey to Superintendent, October 18, 1950. SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 

307, Folder 610; Sanford Hill to the Director, NPS, May 3, 1951. Ibid.

45. "Mining Council Inquires Into Land Donation." Joshua Monument Desert Journal, August 

31, 1951; Frank R. Givens to Regional Director, October 10, 1951. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 007; "Riverside Refuses Park Request for Tax-Deeded Land." Joshua 

Monument Desert Journal, October 12, 1951; For information on the sagebrush rebellion see 

McGreggor R. Cawley and R. McGreggor Cawley, Federal Lands, Western Anger: The 

Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

46. "Riverside Refuses Park Request," October 12, 1951.

47. B. F. Manbey to C. F. Proctor, March 4, 1952. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, 

Folder 007; Frank R. Givens to Regional Director, April 29, 1952. Ibid; Sanford Hill to the 

Superintendent, May 2, 1952. Ibid; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, May 8, 1952. Ibid; 
330

Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, July 11, 1952. Ibid; Herbert Maier to Superintendent, 

June 9, 1953. Ibid.

48. Raymond E. Hoyt to the Superintendent, July 30, 1952. Ibid; Herbert Maier to 

Superintendent, June 9, 1953. Ibid; Conrad Wirth to the Regional Director, February 12, 1953. 

SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 307, Folder 610; Samuel A. King to the Regional 

Director, June 19, 1953. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 007; Clarence A. 

Davis to the Attorney General, October 2, 1953. Ibid.

49. Herbert Maier to the Superintendent, October 20, 1953. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L14, Folder 007; Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, October 28, 1953. Ibid; V. M.

Hyde to Samuel A. King, November 16, 1953. Ibid; J. Reuel Armstrong to the Attorney General, 

April 16, 1956. WRO, JTNP Land Files, Folder "Tax Deeded Lands"; "United States of America 

vs. 10,838.50 Acres of Land, More or Less, in the County of Riverside, California, et al." August 

15, 1958. WRO, JTNP Land Files, Folder "Tax Deeded Lands".

50. James Cole to the Regional Director, January 25, 1945. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L3031, Folder 230; "Act of June 18, 1932" (47 Stat. 324); The Metropolitan Water 

District. "The District at a Glance." www.mwdh2o/pages/news/at_a_glance/mwd.pdf Accessed 

February 15, 2013.

51. Timothy Babalis. n.d. "Draft Historical Context: The Pinyon Historic Mining District." 

Unpublished manuscript supplied by the author May 13, 2010, 8-14; Linda Greene. 1983. 

"Historic Resource Study: A History of Land Use in Joshua Tree National Monument." DSC. 

JTNP Library, 393-399; Jessica L. K. Smith. 2006. "A Land of Plenty: Depression-era Mining 

and Landscape Capital in the Mojave Desert, California." PhD. dissertation, University of 

Nevada, Reno, 1-27, 66-105, 169-194. 

52. Marion Clawson and Burnell Held. 1957. The Federal Lands: Their Use and Management.

(Baltimore, Md; The Johns Hopkins Press) 226-228.

53. Babalis n.d., 14; Marion Clawson to the Director, BLM, December 16, 1947. NARARiverside, RG49, "BLM Investigations," Box 38, Folder 1817800.

54. Linda Greene 1983, 395.

55. James E. Cole. June 30, 1941. "Superintendent's Annual Report." NARA RG79, Entry 10, 

Box 2261, Folder “Joshua Tree Superintendent's Annual Reports."

56. Superintendent James Cole later wrote that Keys had approximately 500 mining claims, all 

but twelve of which the GLO adversed by 1942. James E. Cole. August 22, 1942. "Report of 

Pertinent Factors Relative to Grazing in Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Library, Box 

"History/Trivia"; J. H. Favorite to James E. Cole, May 1, 1945. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L3023, Folder 095; Hillory A. Tolson to the Commissioner, GLO, October 23, 1945. 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 107; Fred W. Johnson to the Director, 

NPS, August 28, 1941. WRO, Land Files, JTNP, Folder L1425 "Keys Unpatented Mining 

Claims."
331

57. Albert L. Johnson to the Regional Director, June 23, 1943. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, H3015, Folder 005; Fred T. Johnston to Mr. R. R. Best, September 7, 1956. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 006; George H. Wheatley to Superintendent, 

JTNM, October 10, 1957. Ibid; U. S. Bureau of Land Management. November 3, 1961. "United 

States of America, "Hearing, Contestant v. Wm. F. Keys, F. M. Keys, Contestees," Contest No. 

6897, JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 095.

58. Marion Clawson to the Director, BLM, December 16, 1947; Marion Clawson to the Director,

BLM, February 13, 1948. NARA-Riverside, RG49, "BLM Investigations," Box 38, Folder 

1817800.

Chapter Five

1. Samuel King. 1954. "A History of Joshua Tree National Monument." Unpublished report, 

JTNP Library.

2. Ernest A. Davidson. 1937. "Landscape Features as Related to Development Program Joshua 

Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant National 

Park," Folder 003.

3. James E. Cole. 1938. "Report on Field Inspection Trip of Superintendent Lawrence C. 

Merriam and Junior Park Naturalist James E. Cole of Joshua Tree National Monument, April 14 

and 15, 1938." NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder "Reports, General, 1937-41."

4. J. Volney Lewis. 1942. "Ground Water Resources of the Joshua Tree National Monument 

California." WRO. JTNP Library.

5. Chester A. Pinkham to James E. Cole, July 20, 1945. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

H1417, Folder 005; Hillory A. Tolson to the Regional Director, December 22, 1944. SB, RG79, 

Central Decimal files, Box 297, Folder 208.

6. Norris Hundley, Jr. 2001. The Great Thirst: California and Water: A History. (Berkeley: 

University of California Press) 51-60, 69-75, 85-87.

7. Roderick E. Walston. 1986. "Western Water Law." Natural Resources and Environment, 1, 

(4), 48-52; California State Water Resources Control Board. 2012. "History of the Water 

Boards." http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/about_us/water_boards_structure/history_water_rights.shtml 

Accessed May 17, 2013.

8. James Cefalo. 2006. "Return of the Federal Non-Reserved Water Right." University of Denver 

Water Law Review, 10, (1) 45-71.

9. Benjamin H. Hibbard. 1924. A History of the Public Land Policies. (New York: the Macmillan 

Company) 509; James Muhn. 2001. Public Water Reserves: The Metamorphosis of Public Land

Policy. (Provo: University of Utah Press) 67-150; Linda Greene. 1983. "Historic Resource 

Study: A History of Land Use in Joshua Tree National Monument." DSC. JTNP Library 347-

349.
332

10. Norris Hundley, Jr. 2001, The Great Thirst, 360-364; Roderick E. Walston 1986, "Western 

Water Law,” 48-52; James Cefalo 2006, "Return of the Federal Non-Reserved Water Right," 67-

70; NPS. 1996. "Land Protection Plan for Joshua Tree National Park." JTNP Library.

11. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, July 3, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L54, Folder 245.

12. Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, August 9, 1948. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L3027, Folder 222; O. A. Tomlinson to the Custodian, JTNM, August 12, 1948. JTNP 

Library, Box "NARA Archives and Other Archives"; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, 

September 22, 1948. JTNP Library, Ibid; Conrad Wirth to the Regional Director, November 9, 

1948. JTNP Library, Ibid.

13. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, November 7, 1946. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1417, Folder 019; Julian Hinds to O. A. Tomlinson, October 28, 1947. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L54, Folder 244; A. E. Demaray to the Regional Director, January 8, 

1948. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L30, Folder 085A.

14. Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, December 10, 1954. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 031; George McMeans to E. S. King, December 27, 1954. Ibid.

15. Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, December 29, 1954. Ibid; Lawrence C. Merriam to 

the Director, January 6, 1955. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 032; Jackson 

E. Price to the Regional Director, January 25, 1955. Ibid.

16. Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, January 27, 1956. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1425, Folder 032; Lawrence C. Merriam to Donald E. Lee, December 20, 1957. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 034. 

17. Superintendent, JTNM to the Regional Director, February 7, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L54, Folder 247.

18. Linda Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study," 433-440.

19. Ibid; James E. Cole. August 22, 1942. "Report of Pertinent Factors Relative to Grazing in 

Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Library, History/Trivia box.

20. James E. Cole 1942, "Report of Pertinent Factors"; Kerwin L. Klein. 1991. "The William 

Keys Ranch: Settlement on the Twentieth-Century California Desert." Southern California 

Quarterly, 73 (4), 355-384; William F. Keys to Mr. Merriam, September 7, 1937. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 026.

21. Linda Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study," 433-440; Kerwin Klein 1991, "The William 

Keys Ranch"; Art Kidwell. 1979. Ambush: The Story of Bill Keys. (Twentynine Palms, Calif: 

Desert Moon Press, 7-12.

22. James E. Cole 1942, "Report of Pertinent Factors." 
333

23. Ibid; Linda Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study," 439-440; Newton B. Drury to John 

Phillips, January 6, 1943. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, A5615, Folder 038. 

24. James E. Cole 1942, Report of Pertinent Factors"; Frances M. Keys and William F. Keys to 

Harold Ickes, July 30, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 005.

25. William Keys to Mr. Merriam and Major O. A. Tomlinson, July 18, 1942. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 005.

26. Superintendent, JTNM to the Regional Director, August 10, 1942. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. James E. Cole to William F. Keys, August 17, 1942. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

H3015, Folder 005; James E. Cole to William F. Keys, August 18, 1942. Ibid; William F. Keys 

to Mr. J. E. Cole, August 19, 1942. Ibid.

30. Herbert Maier to James E. Cole, August 25, 1942. Ibid.

31. Superintendent, JTNM to the Regional Director, August n.d., 1942. Ibid.

32. Herbert Maier to the Files, October 29, 1942. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. William F. Keys to William Jeffers, December 3, 1942. Ibid; Herbert Maier to the Director, 

January 29, 1943. Ibid.

35. Duane Jacobs to the Files, January 9, 1943. Ibid.

36. Ibid; William F. Keys to the Regional Director, February 23, 1943. Ibid;. Mrs. Wm. F. Keys 

to United States Land Office, September 14, 1944. Ibid.

37. Gordon Chappell. January 25, 1975. "Keys' Desert Queen Ranch Joshua Tree National 

Monument Preservation Study," 1-14. Ibid; Art Kidwell, "Ambush," 3-144; Kerwin Klein 1991, 

"The William Keys Ranch."

38. Art Kidwell 1979, "Ambush," 147-180; Kerwin Klein 1991, "The William Keys Ranch." 

39. Gordon Chappell 1975, "Keys' Desert Queen Ranch." 

40. A. E. Demaray to Merel S. Sager, July 19, 1937. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 5; 

Merel Sager to the Director, September 16, 1937 with accompanying inspection report. NARA, 

RG79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder "General Reports 1937-41"; Chief Engineer Kittredge and 

Regional Landscape Architect E. A. Davidson. April 27, 1937. "Report on Inspection Joshua 

Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, Cat.27730, Box "Desert Plant National 

Park," Folder 003. 
334

41. Kittredge and Davidson April 27, 1937; Ernest A. Davidson. April 19, 1937. "Landscape 

Features as Related to Development Program Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 805, Cat.27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 003; Merel S. Sager to the Files, 

February 15, 1938. JTNP, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 006; Merel Sager to the Director, 

September 16, 1937. Ibid.

42. F. A. Kittredge to the Director, January 7, 1938. JTNP, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 

006; James E. Cole, 1938. "Report on Field Inspection Trip of Superintendent Lawrence C. 

Merriam and Junior Park Naturalist James E. Cole of Joshua Tree National Monument April 14 

and 15, 1938." NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder "General Reports 1937-41."

43. Ernest A. Davidson. April 17, 1941. "Report on Proposed Headquarters Sites Joshua Tree 

National Monument." NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder "General Reports 1937-41"; 

James E. Cole to the Superintendent, November 1, 1939. JTNP, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, 

Folder 006; Frank Rogers to James Cole, September 23, 1940. Ibid; James E. Cole to the 

Regional Director, May 16, 1941. Ibid.

44. B. F. Manbey to the Files, June 3, 1941. JTNP, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 006.

45. Superintendent, JTNM to the Regional Director, June 9, 1941. Ibid; Herbert Maier to the 

Superintendent, JTNM, June 19, 1941. Ibid; A. E. Demaray to the Regional Director, August 1, 

1941. Ibid.

46. David R. Faries to Herbert Maier, August 7, 1941. Ibid; Herbert Maier to Major Tomlinson, 

NARA-SB, RG79, Central Decimal Files, Box 301, Folder 602; Superintendent, JTNM to the 

Regional Director, January 19, 1942. JTNP, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 006; "29 Palms 

Gateway to Monument Proposed," Pasadena Star-News, February 12, 1942.

47. David R. Faries to the Director, January 14, 1943. JTNP, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L14, Folder 

006; Hillory A. Tolson to David R. Faries, January 27, 1943. Ibid.

48. Duane D. Jacobs to the Regional Director, June 8, 1943. Ibid; James E. Cole to the Regional 

Director, May 3, 1946. Ibid.

49. Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, April 10, 1947. Ibid; Herbert Maier to the 

Custodian, JTNM, January 22, 1948. Ibid. 

50. Frank R. Givens to Arthur H. Blake, April 26, 1948. Ibid; Carl King to Frank Givens, June 5, 

1948. Ibid; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, June 8, 1948. Ibid; O. A. Tomlinson to the 

Director, August 12, 1948. Ibid; A. E. Demaray to the Regional Director, September 1, 1948. 

Ibid; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, October 1, 1948. Ibid; Culbert W. Faries to Mr. 

Givens, October 16, 1948. Ibid; Herbert Maier to the Director, October 26, 1948. Ibid.

51. Dorr G. Yeager to the Regional Director, November 9, 1948. Ibid; Sidney McClellan to the 

Regional Director, November 9, 1948. Ibid; O. A. Tomlinson to the Director, November 10, 

1948. Ibid; Dorr Yeager to the Regional Director, November 19, 1948. Ibid; A. E. Demaray to 

the Regional Director, November 22, 1948. Ibid.
335

52. H. F. Cameron, Jr. to the Regional Engineer, January 5, 1949. Ibid; H. L. Crowley to the 

Superintendent, JTNM, February 18, 1949. Ibid; O. A. Tomlinson to the Director, March 8, 

1949. Ibid; H. L. Crowley to H. F. Cameron, Jr., May 16, 1949. Ibid; H. L. Crowley to the 

Director, October 31, 1949. Ibid; Hillory A. Tolson to the Regional Director, November 17, 

1949. Ibid; J. Howard McGrath to Oscar L. Chapman, March 16, 1950. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, L1417, Folder 27; Public Law 59-209; Public Law 87-80. 

53. C. G. Thomson to the Director, November 8, 1936. JTNP Archives, Linda Greene files, 

"Report to the Director, NPS." 

54. S. E. Guthrey to Director of Investigations, DOI, May 8, 1937. JTNP Archives, Acc. 805, 

Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 001; Frank Kittredge and Ernest Davidson. 

April 27, 1937. "Report on Inspection Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 

805, Cat. 27730, Box "Desert Plant National Park," Folder 003, 6-7.

55. Merel Sager to the Director with accompanying report, September 13, 1937. NARA, RG79, 

Entry 10, Box 2259, Part 5, 18-19; Lawrence Merriam to the Director, May 1, 1940. SB, RG79, 

Central Decimal Files, Box 297, Folder 207; Sanford Hill, n.d. "Report of Field Trip to Joshua 

Tree National Monument in company with Regional Engineer Crowley and Regional Architect 

De Long." Ibid, 2; R.L. McKown, November 1, 1939. "Report on Joshua Tree National 

Monument." JTNP Arch Acc. 452, Cat. 25175, Folder 5, 2-4; R. D. Waterhouse. n.d. "Report on 

JTNM Trip covering October 20-26, 1940." SB, RG 79, Central Decimal Files, Box 297, Folder 

207, 1-2.

56. T. R. Goodwin to the Regional Director with attached "Report on Joshua Tree National 

Monument." March 18, 1941. SB, RG 79, Central Decimal Files, Box 297, Folder 207, 1-4; 

Thomas Vint. July 26, 1941."Notes on Joshua Tree National Monument Trip May 9-12, 1941, 

accompanied by Superintendent Cole, Messrs. Davidson and Lange." NARA RG 79, Entry 10, 

Box 2261, Folder "Reports, Joshua Tree, Investigations." 2; NPS. 1941. "Master Plan Joshua 

Tree National Monument." JTNP Library, Digitally scanned version in Box "NARA Materials."

57. James E. Cole to the Regional Director, November 19, 1940. SB, RG79, Central Decimal 

Files, Box 300, Folder 600.

58. T. R. Goodwin, 1941, "Report on Joshua Tree National Monument," 1.

59. Major Stephen Long's dismissal of the Great Plains as the uninhabitable "Great American 

Desert" exemplified the northwestern European cultural response to dry lands. Although it is 

politically correct today to say all park systems units are equally valuable parts of a system, the 

modern drive to convert former national monuments to national parks belies it. See Hal 

Rothman. 1989. Preserving Different Pasts: The American National Monuments. (Urbana: 

University of Illinois Press). 

60. Conrad Wirth to H. C. Begole, February 12, 1954. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

D30, Folder 036.

61. Ibid.
336

62. California Assembly. March 25, 1954. "Assembly Joint Resolution No. 8--Relative to the 

construction of a road through Joshua Tree National Monument." Ibid; Bertha Fuller to 

Representative Cecil King, June n.d., 1954. Ibid; H. S. Shilko, July 2, 1954. "Proposed "Blue 

Cut" Road for Joshua Tree National Monument Reconnaissance Survey." JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 038. 

63. Lawrence C. Merriam to the Director, July 30, 1954. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

D30, Folder 036; E.E. Erhart. March n.d., 1955. "Reconnaissance Report of Proposed Blue Cut 

Route in Joshua Tree National Monument Riverside and San Bernardino Counties California."

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 038.

64. Samuel A. King to the Regional Director, April 22, 1956. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, D30, Folder 036; Conrad Wirth to Senator Thomas H. Kuchel, July 24, 1956. Ibid; 

Robert T. Andersen to the Regional Director, November 19, 1957. Ibid; "Officials Compare 

Freeway Expenses." The Desert Trail, November 27, 1957; "Kuchel Says No Hope for Blue Cut 

Highway." The Daily Enterprise, March 20, 1958; Hillory Tolson to Randall Henderson, March 

21, 1958. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 036.

65. Thomas E. Carpenter to the Regional Chief of Operations, July 7, 1958. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 035; E. T. Scoyen to D. S. Saund, July 25, 1958, Ibid.

66. City of Indio. 1958. "A Resolution of the City Council of the City of Indio, California, 

Requesting the National Parks [sic] Service to Provide an Entrance from the Coachella Valley to 

the Joshua Tree National Monument Through Blue Cut Canyon." Resolution No. 1015. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 036; "Blue Cut Road Study Due." Riverside Daily 

Press, April 3, 1959; George F. Whitworth to the Regional Director, March 2, 1959. SB, RG79, 

Central Files 1954-61, Box 2, Folder "A4067 Areas 1954-61 H-L"; Lawrence Merriam to the 

Superintendent, JTNM, March 4, 1959. Ibid.

67. 76th Congress, 3rd Session, H. R. 10632. "A bill to authorize the President temporarily to 

transfer jurisdiction over certain national-forest and national-park land to the War Department or 

the Navy Department." October 8, 1940; Izaak Walton League. November 26, 1940. "Izaak 

Walton League Protests Military Use of National Parks." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

H1415, Folder 001; Ernest A. Davidson. February 25, 1943. "Notes and Pictures Relative to 

Proposed Army Maneuver Road at Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 048; O. A. Tomlinson to Acting Superintendent Jacobs, May 21, 1943. 

NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 91, Folder 201.

68. Linda Greene 1983, "Historic Resource Study," 427.

69. NPS. February 1957. "Master Plan Development Outline, Joshua Tree National Monument, 

California--General Development." JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, A6423, Folder 046.

70. Charles G. Thompson to the Director, November 8, 1936. JTNP Archives, Linda Greene 

Files, Folder "Report to Director, NPS 11/8/36"; James E. Cole. 1938. "Report on Field 

Inspection Trip of Superintendent Lawrence C. Merriam and Junior Park Naturalist James E. 

Cole of Joshua Tree National Monument April 14 and 15, 1938." NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 

2261, Folder "Reports, General, 1937-41."
337

71. E. Lowell Sumner. March 28, 1940. "Special Report on the JTNM with Reference to 

Antelope and Bighorn," by E. Lowell Sumner, Jr. NARA RG79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder 

"Reports, Joshua Tree, Investigative," 9-10. 

72. Joseph S. Dixon. April 21, 1941. "Special Report on Wildlife Problems Joshua Tree National 

Monument California." JTNP Archives, Acc. 00752, Cat. 25175, Folder 044.

73. E. Lowell Sumner. October 6, 1941. "Report of the Regional Biologist on the Joshua Tree 

National Monument Boundary Study." JTNP Archives, Acc. 00752, Cat. 25175, Folder 031; E. 

Lowell Sumner to Victor H. Cahalane, October 24, 1941. Ibid.

74. "Annual Wildlife Report, Joshua Tree National Monument." 1941, 1944, 1946-51, 1953, 

1955, 1957. JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Box 1, Folder 01. 

75. Philip A. Munz to Mrs. McKelvey, May 8, 1942. JTNP Library, Box "Materials at NARA"; 

Superintendent JTNM to the Director, February 5, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

N14, Folder 007; Robert Moon, telephone interview by the author, March 25, 2013.

76. Burnett Sanford to Superintendent King, July 23, 1953. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, N50, Folder 146; Willis W. Wagener to Samuel A. King, May 2, 1956. Ibid.

77. JTNM. 1986. “Fire History-Human Caused Fires-Joshua Tree National Monument.” JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y14, Folder 001; Hesmel Earenfight interview with Susan

Husari, January 8, 1982. Transcript in JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Uncatalogued files, Folder 

“Fire Management Planning-Topside”; “It’s a Fact...” The Desert Trail, Progress Edition, 

September n.d., 1967.

78. Edmund C. Jaeger to Director, Biological Survey, September 20, 1939. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, N14, Folder 004; Biologist [Lowell Sumner] to A. A. Nichol, March 25, 1940. 

Ibid; Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, September 7, 1951. SB, RG79, Central Coded 

Files, Box 309, Folder 715-01. 

79. Ronald F. Lee to the Regional Director, April 29, 1954. SB, RG79, Central Coded Files, 

N16, Box 30, Folder "N16 Vol.2 1-1-54 to 12-31-54."

80. Lowell Sumner to Assistant Regional Director Maier, May 14, 1954. SB, RG79, Central 

Coded Files, N16, Box 30, Folder "N16 Vol. 1 5-1-53 to 12-31-57."

81. Herbert Maier to Helmut K. Buechner, July 26, 1954. Ibid. 

82. Dorr G. Yeager to Lowell Sumner, October 7, 1954. SB, RG79, Central Coded Files, N16, 

Box 30, Folder "N16 Vol.2 1-1-54 to 12-31-54"; Helmut K. Buechner to Dorr G. Yeager, 

November 9, 1954. Ibid. 

83. Lowell Sumner. September 1955. "Joshua Tree National Monument Bighorn Range and 

Water Survey." JTNP Archives, Acc. 796, Cat. 26851, Folder 023; Lowell Sumner to the 

Regional Director, April 26, 1956. SB, RG79, Central Coded Files, N16, Box 30, Folder "N16 

Vol. 1 5-1-53 to 12-31-57." 
338

84. John D. Goodman. n.d [1957]. "The Desert Bighorn Sheep of Joshua Tree National 

Monument." SB, RG79, Central Coded Files, N16, Box 30, Folder "N16 Vol. 1 5-1-53 to 12-31-

57"; Elmer N. Fladmark to John D. Goodman, March 13, 1957. Ibid.

85. Dorr G. Yeager to Superintendent, JTNM, October 2, 1957. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, N1621, Folder 029A; Lowell Sumner to the Regional Director, October 8, 1957. Ibid.

86. Ronald F. Lee to the Director, January 31, 1957. SB, RG79, Central Coded Files, N16, Box 

30, Folder "N16 Vol. 3 1-1-55 to 12-31-57."

87. Public Law 72-428 passed on March 3, 1933 enabling President Roosevelt to issue Executive 

Orders 6166 on June 10 and 6228 on July 28 in the same year to accomplish the reorganization; 

Public Law 74-292. 

88. Julian Steward. 1929. “Petroglyphs of California and Adjoining States.” University of 

California Publications in Archaeology and Ethnology, 24 (2) 47-238; Elizabeth W. C. 

Campbell and William H. Campbell. 1935. “The Pinto Basin Site: An Aboriginal Camping 

Ground in the California Desert.” Southwest Museum Papers, 9, 21-31.

89. James E. Cole. 1938. "Report on Field Inspection Trip."

90. C. Marshall Finnan. 1939. "Report on Inspection of Joshua Tree National Monument, 

California." JOTR Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H2623, Fold 065.

91. Joseph S. Dixon 1941, "Special Report on Wildlife Problems”; Regional Director to 

Archaeologist Nusbaum, December 12, 1941. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, 

Folder 090. 

92. Louis R. Laywood. February 23, 1951. “Preliminary Appraisals of the Archaeological 

Resources of Death Valley and Joshua Tree National Monuments.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 752, 

Cat. 25175, Folder 040; Samuel A. King to Mrs. Carl F. Janish, November 9, 1953. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 089.

93. Walter Rivers. June 1949. “Joshua Tree National Monument Museum Prospectus.” JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D6215, Folder 081; JTNM. April 1957. “Supplement to the 

Museum Prospectus Joshua Tree National Monument.” Ibid. 

94. JTNM. n.d. “Old Adobe.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H1417, Folder 005.

95. JTNP. 2009. "Joshua Tree National Park Annual Visitation 1941-2009." JTNP 

Superintendent's Files.

96. James E. Cole to the Director, December 10, 1940. NARA, RG79, Entry 10, Box 2260, Part 

7; R. E. Rothrock to Superintendent, JTNM, December 9, 1940. Ibid; Frank R. Givens to the 

Regional Director, November 7, 1947. SB, RG79, Central Decimal files, Box 300, Folder 600.

97. Art Kidwell and Jeff Ohlfs. 1992. "History of Joshua Tree National Monument." 

Unpublished chronology available in the JTNP Library. 
339

98. Thomas Vint. July 26, 1941. "Notes on JTNM Trip May 9-12, 1941, accompanied by 

Superintendent Cole, Messrs. Davidson and Lange." NARA RG 79, Entry 10, Box 2261, Folder 

"Reports, Joshua Tree, Investigations."

Chapter Six

1. Public Law 88-577.

2. Ross, Dennis M. 1988. The Wilderness Movement and the National Forests. College Station, 

Tex: Intaglio Press; The Wilderness Institute. 2012. "Wilderness Data Search." 

www.wilderness.net Accessed March 15, 2013.

3. Public Law 90-360; Environmental Protection Agency. "Clean Air Act." 

http://www.epa.gov/air/caa Accessed March 15, 2013.

4. Public Law 91-190. 

5. Public Law 93-205.

6. Jacques E. Crommelin to the Regional Director, January 6, 1956. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 058; B. F. Manbey to Richard Sporleder, April 18, 1957. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L7617, Folder 273. 

7. "Eisenhower Asks Congress to Approve $1 1/2 Million to Purchase Private Land Within 

Joshua Tree National Monument." The Desert Trail, June 9, 1960.

8. Public Law 88-578; Jeffrey Zinn. 2002. "Land and Water Conservation Fund: Current Status 

and Issues." CRS Report for Congress, Order Code: 97-792 ENR. 

9. NPS. 2009. "Digital Lands Files." available from the WRO Land Office; Manbey to 

Sporleder, April 18, 1957; Herbert Maier to the Director, NPS, September 2, 1960. WRO, Lands 

Files, Joshua Tree, Folder "L1425 Kaiser Steel"; Conrad Wirth to T. M. Price, June 19, 1961. 

WRO, Lands Files, Joshua Tree, Folder "L1425 Kaiser Steel."

10. B. F. Manbey to the Regional Director, March 9, 1956. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, A4027, Folder 033; "Digital Lands Files" 2009.

11. Harold G. Fowler to Regional Chief of Operations, June 6, 1960. SB RG79, Central Files 

1954-61, Box 2, Folder "A5427 Folder 5 H to L"; "Acquisition of Private Lands in Monument 

Asked by Supervisors." The Desert Trail. January 31, 1962; "Exchange Monument Inholdings 

Resumes, Supernaugh States." The Desert Trail. June 13, 1962; Public Law 87-80; Lawrence 

Merriam to the Director, January 9, 1962. NARA, RG79, Entry 11, Box 1741, Folder 1425.

12. "New Fund to Accept Donations for Buying Monument Inholdings." The Desert Trail. 

August 8, 1962; "Council Acts to Protect Joshua Tree Monument." The Desert Trail. March 14, 

1962; "Digital Lands Files" 2009. 

13. "Colorful Old Miner Sells Famed Joshua Tree Ranch." San Bernardino Daily Sun, October 

21, 1964; Henry E. Tubman to Senator George L. Murphy, April 13, 1965. JTNP Archives, 
340

Acc.822, Folder "Tubman Exchange"; Fred H. Johnson to Henry E. Tubman, April 8, 1966. Ibid; 

"Henry E. Tubman." Hi-Desert Star, October 9, 2004; “Rites Set for Desert Bill, ProspectorCowboy,” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1969.

14. "Joshua Tree Monument Adds 11,713 Acres Private Land." The Desert Trail. n.d. 1970. 

JTNP Library, Clippings File; "Digital Lands Files" 2009. 

15. Public Law 91-190; W. F. Herbert to Peter Parry, June 28, 1973. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L7617, Folder 273.

16. Peter L. Parry to W. F. Herbert, July 3, 1973. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L7617, 

Folder 273; "Digital Lands Files" 2009.

17. WRO. January 1976. “Management Consultation Report Joshua Tree National Monument 

California.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, A2623, Box 6, Folder 28A; JTNP, April 6, 

1976. "National Park Service Buys Jellystone Park." NPS news release. WRO, Cultural 

Resources, Mulherne Files, Box 24, Folder "Clippings." 

18. Leo J. Diederich, May 14, 1964. “Comments on Package Master Plan Joshua Tree N. M.” 

Technical Information Center, DSC, 156-MPNAR-Z1-339051.

19. Jens C. Jensen to James M. Siler, July 16, 1964. WRO, JTNP Files, Folder "Desert Queen 

Mine"; Thomas Clements. September 14, 1971. "Report on the Evaluation of the Mineral 

Interests in All or Part of 22 Sections in Joshua Tree National Monument, California." JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 220A; JTNM. April 1982. "Statement for 

Management Joshua Tree National Monument California." JTNP Library, 15.

20. Public Law 94-429; Draft of letter from Regional Director, WRO to State Director, BLM, 

n.d. [after October 10, 1984]. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 109-1.

21. Frank R. Givens to the Regional Director, April 14, 1949. SB, RG79, Central Files, Box 297, 

Folder 208-43.

22. Owen Tomlinson to the Superintendent, JTNM, April 28, 1949. Ibid.

23. John W. Wise to the Chief Ranger, July 19, 1967. JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Box "Lands and 

Mining," Folder "Hazardous Mine Report 1973"; Roy O. Curbow, November 5, 1973. "Mine 

Shaft Safety Devices Proposal." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D22, Folder 015; Homer 

L. Rouse to the Regional Director, August 22, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L3023, Folder 159; Stanley Albright to the Superintendent, JTNM, May 3, 1978. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651.1, Cat. 28859, Box D22, Folder 017.

24. "Digital Lands Files" 2009; Superintendent to the Regional Director, January 28, 1941.

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L54, Folder 247; Art Kidwell and Jeff Ohlfs. 1992. 

"History of Joshua Tree National Monument." Unpublished chronology available in the JTNP 

Library; James K. Baker to Manuel Morris, April 25, 1968. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, N3617, Folder 98; William L. Werrell to the Regional Chief of Water Resources, June 

27, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L54, Folder 260. 
341

25. George B. Wheatley to the Regional Director, August 4, 1958. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L54, Folder 245; Herbert Maier to the Director, June 15, 1959. Ibid; Richard 

Buddeke to the Director, August 27, 1959. Ibid; Joseph L. Chiriaco, Inc. 2012. ''Chiriaco Summit 

History." http://www.chiriacosummit.com/history.php Accessed April 2, 2013.

26. Keith H. Corrigall to C. F. Woolpert, March 19, 1964. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L54, Folder 245; James M. Siler to Superintendent, JTNM, April 6, 1964. Ibid; Scott Stonum to 

the Superintendent, JTNP, July 12, 1995. Acc. 651.1/004, Cat. 28859, L54, Folder 098; Armand 

B. Sansum to the Superintendent, JTNM, September 8, 1969. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L54, Folder 245; Kenneth M. Kasper to Chief, Office of Land Acquisition and Water 

Resources, Western Service Center, October 8, 1970. Ibid; Name Unclear. 1974. "Chiriaco 

Water Rights." WRO, Lands Files, JTNP, Folder "Chiriaco Water Rights," Docket No. AWR #3; 

David C. Hemstreet to Superintendent, JTNM, June 7, 1976. WRO, Lands Files, JTNP, Folder 

"Chiriaco Water Rights," Docket No. AWR #3.

27. Lawrence C. Merriam to Donald E. Lee, December 20, 1957. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1425, Folder 034.

28. Edward A. Hummel to the Regional Director, October 10, 1967. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 033.

29. Fred Kunkel. 1960. "Summary of Hydraulic Conditions at Joshua Tree National Monument, 

Riverside County, Calif., 1956-59." U. S. Geological Survey, Ground Water Branch, Long 

Beach, California. JTNP Library, 17.

30. J. E. Weir, Jr. and J. S. Bader. 1963. "Ground Water and Related Geology of Joshua Tree 

National Monument, California." U. S. Geological Survey, Ground Water Branch, Long Beach, 

California. JTNP Library, 35-39.

31. Edward A. Hummel to the Regional Director, October 10, 1967. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 033; C. F. Borden to Edward A. Hummel, September 3, 1968. Ibid; 

Homer L. Rouse to the Regional Director, June 17, 1976. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

L54, Folder 244. 

32. John H. Davis to Field Solicitor, San Francisco Office with attached 1968 field report, July 

14, 1976. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L54, Folder 259.

33. Conrad L. Wirth. 1980. Parks, Politics, and the People. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press) 234; For a full treatment of Mission 66 see Ethan Carr. 2007. Mission 66: Modernism and 

the National Park Dilemma. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press) 54-66.

34. Bernard De Voto. 1953. "Let's Close the National Parks." In: L. M. Dilsaver, America's 

National Park System: The Critical Documents. (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield 

Publishers) 183-189.

35. Conrad L. Wirth 1980, 237-238

36. NPS. May 1957. "Master Plan Development Outline, Joshua Tree National Monument, 

California--Buildings." JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, D3415, Box 16, Folder 055.
342

37. John B. Wosky to the Regional Director, June 28, 1960. SB RG79, Central Files 1954-61, 

Box 2, Folder "A5427 Folder 5 H to L"; George F. Whitworth to the Regional Chief of 

Operations, May 20, 1959. SB RG79, Central Files 1953-62, Box 2, Folder "A5427 #8 Various 

Areas"; Harold G. Fowler to Regional Chief of Operations, June 6, 1960. SB RG79, Central 

Files 1954-61, Box 2, Folder "A5427 Folder 5 H to L."

38. Ethan Carr 2007, Mission 66, 140-41.

39. NPS. January 1962. "Master Plan for the Preservation and Use of Joshua Tree National 

Monument, Volume III, General Park Information, Section H. Buildings Inventory." JTNP 

Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, A6423, Folder 043; DOI. December 22, 1971. "Proposed 

Master Plan for Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, D18, 

Folder 014E.

40. Peter L. Parry to the Regional Director, November 22, 1972. WRO, Planning Files, Joshua 

Tree National Park, Folder "Visitor Center Addition and Restroom Enlargement"; Jerry A. 

Moore. February 1972. "Individual Study Manual for the Twentynine Palms Oasis 

Environmental Study Area." JTNP Library.

41. George W. Norgard to the Regional Chief of Operations, March 30, 1959. SB RG79, Central 

Files 1953-62, Box 2, Folder "A5427 #8 Various Areas"; Regional Chief of Operations to the 

Regional Director, February 21, 1961. SB RG79, Central Files 1954-61, Box 2, Folder "A5427

Folder 5 H to L"; Linda Greene. 1983. "Historic Resource Study: A History of Land Use in 

Joshua Tree National Monument." DSC. JTNP Library, 422.

42. JTNP. 2013. Digital Maintenance Attributes Files--Buildings, Campgrounds, Roads, Trails. 

Maintenance Division; "Monument Trail Planned." The Desert Magazine, 20 (7), July 1957, 31; 

NPS. May 31, 1958. "Program Dedication of the Riding and Hiking Trail Joshua Tree National 

Monument, May 31, 1958." JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, A8215, Folder 057.

43. William R. Supernaugh to the Regional Director with attached discussion outline, September 

30, 1966. JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, D18, Folder 014E; Henry Hinz to the 

Superintendent, JTNM, August 4, 1967. Ibid; William R. Supernaugh to the Regional Director, 

December 24, 1968. JTNP Archives, Hollinger Box, Loose file; JTNP 2013, Digital 

Maintenance Files--Buildings; JTNM. n.d. "Listing of Major Questions to be Investigated by the 

Master Plan Team." JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, D18, Folder 014E.

44. DOI. December 22, 1971. "Draft Proposed Master Plan for Joshua Tree National 

Monument." JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, D18, Folder 014E; 

45. Ibid; John A. Rutter to the Superintendent JTNM with attached "Management Appraisal 

Report," July 19, 1967. JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, A5633, Folder 039, 28; "Joshua 

Tree National Monument Wilderness Hearing, February 16, 1972." Transcript in JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 00812/004, Cat. 28768, General Management Plan Files, Folder 006; Superintendent to the 

Regional Director, April 26, 1974. WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park, Folder 

"Master Plan." 
343

46. Homer L. Rouse to the Regional Director, April 26, 1974. WRO. Planning Files, Joshua Tree 

National Park File, Folder “Master Plan”; Nicholas E. Weeks to the Regional Director, July 15, 

1976. NPS, WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder "Black Rock Canyon 

Campground."

47. William R. Supernaugh to the Director, January 10, 1967. JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 

19430, L24, Folder 079; "Pettis Cemetery Bill Calls for County Site." Desert Trail, February 22, 

1967; "S. B. Economic Office Aids Legion Cemetery Site Plan." Unidentified newspaper 

clipping in JTNP Archives, Cat. 651, Acc. 19430, L24, Folder 079; James K. Baker. February 

n.d. 1967. "Joshua Tree National Monument--Its Significance to All of Us." Undated Desert 

Trail clipping, Ibid; George W. Nilsson to Wayne N. Aspinall, April 4, 1967. NARA RG79, 

Entry 11, Box 536, Folder A38; Harthon L. Bill to Wayne N. Aspinall, May 1, 1967. Ibid.

48. Alfred Runte. 1997. National Parks: The American Experience, 3rd edition. (Lincoln: 

University of Nebraska Press) 240-242; David Louter. 2006. Driven Wild: Cars, Roads, and 

Nature in Washington's National Parks. (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 121-125; 

Rosalie Edge. 1936. "Roads and More Roads in the National Parks and National Forests." In: 

Lary M. Dilsaver. 1994. America's National Park System: The Critical Documents. (Lanham, 

Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.) 137-141; Merle Stitt to Superintendents of Death 

Valley, Haleakala, et al., September 20, 1970. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L48, Folder 

241.

49. William R. Supernaugh to the Regional Director, October 2, 1970. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L48, Folder 241; Vince Hefti to the Deputy Director, Legislation, August 10, 1971. 

Ibid; NPS. August 1971. "Wilderness Study." JTNP Library.

50. JTNM. February 16, 1972. "Joshua Tree National Monument Wilderness Hearing." 

Transcript in JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 4, Folder 006.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Anon. February 16, 1972. "Notes on Wilderness Hearing 2-16-72." JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, L48, Folder 240. NPS. June 1972. "Wilderness Recommendation Joshua Tree 

National Monument California." JTNP Library; NPS. August 1972. "Wilderness 

Recommendation Joshua Tree National Monument California." JTNP Library.

54. Homer Rouse to JOTR Staff, December 6, 1973. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L48, 

Folder 242; Ronald H. Walker. March 25, 1974. "Statement before the Subcommittee on 

National Parks and Recreation, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, on H. R. 

13562..." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L48, Folder 238; JTNM. October 7, 1975. 

"Statement of Important Issues Concerning Wilderness Recommendations for Joshua Tree 

National Monument." WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder 

"Wilderness--Joshua Tree"; U. S. House of Representatives. May 21, 1975. H. R. 7190 "A bill 

to designate certain lands in Joshua Tree National Monument, Calif., as wilderness"; Howard H. 

Chapman to Superintendents, Chiricahua, Haleakala, Joshua Tree...with attached statement, 

November 19, 1975 JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L48, Folder 238; (Miss) Raye-Page. 
344

November 10, 1975. “Statement for the Wilderness Society on H. R. 7190." Ibid; Lyle K. 

Gaston. November 10, 1975. "Joshua Tree National Monument Wilderness Proposal HR 7190." 

Ibid..

55. Homer L. Rouse to Jim Howe, March 9, 1976. WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National 

Park File, Folder "Wilderness--Joshua Tree"; Keith G. Sebelius to Gary E. Everhardt, March 18, 

1976. Ibid; U. S. House of Representatives. April 9, 1976. H. R. 7190 "A bill to designate certain 

lands within units of the national park system as wilderness; to revise the boundaries of certain of 

those units, and for other purposes"; Homer L. Rouse to the Regional Director, June 30, 1976. 

WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder "Wilderness--Joshua Tree"; Public 

Law 94-567.

56. Quoted in Lowell Sumner. 1983. "Biological Research and Management in the National Park 

Service: A History." The George Wright Forum, 3 (4) 18.

57. Both the Leopold Report and the Robbins Report are partially reprinted in Lary M. Dilsaver. 

1994. America's National Park System: The Critical Documents. (Lanham, Md: Rowman and 

Littlefield Publishers) 237-262.

58. Hesmel L. Earenfight to the Regional Director, August 21, 1958. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, N1621, Folder 029A; Jane Ashdown. November 2002. "Joshua Tree Guzzlers 

Report and Inventory." JTNP Library, 6; Robert D. Powell. 1961. "Bighorn Sheep and Waterhole 

Report Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 796, Cat. 26863, Folder 028; 

Ralph E. Welles and Florence B. Welles. March 15, 1964. "Second Interim Report Bighorn 

Research Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Library, 6.

59. James K. Baker. n.d. "Recollections and Reminiscences: the JOTR 'Standoff.'" JTNP Library, 

Unsorted documents box; William R. Supernaugh to the Regional Director, June 11, 1965. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N14, Folder 006; James E. Cole to the Superintendent, JTNM, 

June 11, 1965. Ibid.

60. James K. Baker n.d., "Recollections and Reminiscences"; "Stubbe Spring Notes" 1969. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N3043, Folder 094B; William R. Supernaugh to the Regional 

Director, May 1, 1967. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N1621, Folder 029A.

61. James K. Baker n.d., "Recollections and Reminiscences"; Draft letter to Dr. Martin Prochnik, 

n.d. [1971]. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D5039, Folder 071; Charles G. Hansen to the 

Superintendent, JTNM, March 9, 1971. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N1427, Folder 

014A.

62. JTNM. October 1974. "Environmental Assessment Natural Resources Management Plan 

Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Library, 42-45, 105-106; Charles L Douglas. June 

1975. "Coordination of Bighorn Research and Management in Joshua Tree National Monument." 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Box 1, Folder 004, 2-3; Charles L. Douglas to Homer 

Rouse, September 5, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Box 1, Folder 004; Charles L. 

Douglas. July 12, 1976. "Bighorn Management." JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Folder 

008. 
345

63. Armand B. Sansum to Maintenance Supervisor, JTNM, July 30, 1971. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, N1427, Folder 10; Peter L. Parry to Clifford Matthews, June 16, 1971. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N14, Folder 007B.

64. JTNM 1974, "Environmental Assessment Natural Resources Management Plan"; Lynn 

Loetterle to Resource Management Specialist, JTNM, September 11, 1975. JTNP Archives, 

Uncatalogued resource management files, Folder "N16-21 Endangered Species”; Patrick James 

Leary. June 1977. "Investigation of the Vegetational Communities of Joshua Tree National 

Monument, California." Masters thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

65. William Dengler to District Ranger Wilburn, September 19, 1966. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, N2215, Folder 037. 

66. Plant Ecologist, WRO to the Regional Director, January 24, 1983. WRO, Planning Files, 

Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder "Oasis of Mara Plant Reduction."

67. JTNM. January 1984. "Oasis of Mara Action Plan for the Management of Natural 

Resources." Ibid. 1-15; JTNM. March 1, 1972. "Management Plan for Oasis of Mara." JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N2215, Folder 037; Jim Agee to Dr. Chuck Douglas, March 25, 

1974. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N2215, Folder 037A.

68. John M. Mahoney. August 1, 1963. "Park Acreage Statistical Summary." JTNP Archives,

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y26, Folder 052; JTNM 1974, "Environmental Assessment Natural 

Resources Management Plan." JTNP Library, 77-80; JTNM. 1977. "Outline of Planning 

Requirements." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D18, Folder 013; E. T. Scoyen to the 

Regional Directors, Regions One, Two, Three, Four and Five. August 15, 1956. NARA, RG79, 

Central Files 1953-62, Acc. 79-92-001, Box 1, Folder "L2435 Vol. 1 Region 4, 5-1-53 to 6-30-

57." 

69. See the text of both laws in Dilsaver 1994, America’s National Park System 302-308, 377-

379; Public Law 89-665. 

70. Executive Order 11593. May 13, 1971. 3 C.F R. 154.

71. Ronald F. Lee to the Regional Director, April 25, 1957. WASO, Park History Office Files, 

Folder “Joshua Tree National Park”; William J. Wallace to Dr. John Hussey, November 15, 

1957. Ibid.

72. Francis J. and Patricia H. Johnston to Elmer N. Fladmark, September 1, 1957. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 089; Homer L. Earenfight to Francis J. and 

Patricia H. Johnston, September 5, 1957. Ibid; Russell K. Grater to Superintendent, JTNM, 

September 23, 1957. Ibid; William J. Wallace. 1964. “An Archaeological Reconnaissance in 

Joshua Tree National Monument.” Journal of the West, 3 (1) 90-101; Thomas F. King. 

December 1975. “Fifty Years of Archaeology in the California Desert: An Archaeological 

Overview of Joshua Tree National Monument.” NPS, Western Archaeological Center, 47-56.

73. Leslie E. Wildesen. August 1969. “Archaeological Research Management Plan Joshua Tree 

National Monument.” WRO. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 084. 
346

74. King 1975, “Fifty Years of Archeaology,” 47-77; Homer L. Rouse to Keith Anderson, 

October 9, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 087.

75. Rouse to Anderson, October 9, 1975; Donald J. Colville to the Regional Director, September 

13, 1974. WRO, Mulhern Files, Box 26, Folder “JOTR Collections Management Plan”; Betsy 

Hunter to Chief, Division of Museum Services, February 10, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 013.

76. Benjamin Levy to the Chief Historian, February 5, 1969. WASO, Park History Files, Folder 

“Joshua Tree”; F. Ross Holland to the Superintendent, JTNM, February 4, 1972. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H32, Folder 078; The individual national register forms are found in 

several locations: Keys Ranch, Desert Queen Mine and Wall Street Mill are in JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H32, Folder 078; Lost Horse Mine, Oasis of Mara and Cottonwood Oasis 

are in an uncatalogued Hollinger box in the JTNP Archives, Folder “National Register”; Barker 

Dam and Cow Camp are in WRO Cultural Resources Files in folders of the same names; and 

Ryan House is in JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3417, Folder 099.

77. Alsen E. Inman to Chief Ranger, JTNM, November 18, 1964. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, H3015, Folder 071A; James E. Lynch to the Chief Ranger, JTNM, June 13, 1967. Ibid.

78. Robert V. Simmonds. September 1970. “Historic Structures Report Lost Horse Mine 

Complex.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H30, Folder 069B.

79. Kerwin L. Klein 1991, “The William Keys Ranch”; Benjamin Levy to the Chief Historian, 

February 5, 1969. WASO, Park History Files, Folder “Joshua Tree”; Director NPS to Mr. B. P. 

Mayer, September 24, 1971. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 042A; 

William Supernaugh to Mrs. Robert Garry, July 11, 1969. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

H3015, Folder 007. 

80. Glennie Murray to Staff Specialist, State and Private Liaison, July 29, 1971.WRO, Mulhern 

Files, Box 24, Folder “Joshua Tree NM Correspondence 1964-1974.”

81. Gordon Chappell et al., January 21, 1975. “Keys’ Desert Queen Ranch Joshua Tree National 

Monument Preservation Study.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 035. 

82. Patricia P. Hickman. 1976. "Country Nodes: An Anthropological Evaluation of William 

Keys' Desert Queen Ranch, Joshua Tree National Monument, California." JTNP Library; 

83. Gordon S. Chappell to Acting Chief, Division of Cultural Resources Management, Western 

Region, November 19, 1976. WRO, Cultural Resources Files, JTNP, Folder "JOTR Hickman 

Studies."

84. Keith M. Anderson to Chief, Western Archaeological Center, February 25, 1977. Ibid; 

Arthur C. Allen to the Regional Director, May 19, 1976. WRO, Cultural Resources Files, JTNP, 

Folder "Keys Ranch Artifacts"; Regional Historian, WRO to the Regional Director, August 5, 

1976. Ibid.

85. Patricia Hickman and Thomas King to Homer Rouse, July 10, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, H3015, Folder 013.
347

86. “Annual Visits Joshua Tree National Monument.” 

https://irma.nps.gov/Stats/Reports/ReportList; “Joshua Tree National Park Association.” 

http://www.joshua tree.org Both accessed June 7, 2013.

87. NPS. April 1957. "Master Plan Development Outline Joshua Tree National Monument, 

California-Interpretation." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, A6423, Folder 047; JTNM. 

1964-1970. "Annual Interpretive Services Reports." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

K2621, Folder 013.

88. JTNM. April 1972. "Interpretive Prospectus." WRO, Tom Mulhern Files, Box 24, Folder 

"Joshua Tree NM Correspondence 1964-1974."

89. "The Desert, How Long Will It Survive?" Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, April 25, 1971; 

Seasonal Park Technicians (Interpretation) to Resource Management Specialist, April 22, 1976.

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N22, Folder 032A; Public Law 91-357.

90. "Parsons' Stolen Casket." San Francisco Chronicle, July 2, 1991.

91. Ibid; Homer Rouse to the Regional Director, Incident Report, November 9. 1973. JTNP 

Archives, Miscellaneous Uncatalogued Files, Folder "Gram Parsons."

92. NPS, WRO. January 1976. “Management Consultation Report Joshua Tree National 

Monument California.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, A2623, Box 6, Folder 028A. 

Chapter Seven

1. JTNM. April 1978. “Statement for Management.” JTNP Library; Rick Anderson to the 

Regional Director, November 27, 1979. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L2621, Folder 

081.

2. NPS. 1977. "Listing of Acreages." WRO, Lands Files, JTNP File, Folder "Gross Acreage of 

Joshua Tree Monument by County."

3. NPS. 2009. "Digital Lands Files." available from WRO.

4. Rick Anderson to the Regional Director with attached excerpt from "Overview Report" by 

William E. Weidenhamer, March 17, 1978. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 

063.

5. Ibid.

6. Sondra Humphries to Doris C. Rennick with attached 1960 "Declaration of Restrictions," 

March 5, 2003. JTNM Land Files, Folder "Willing Sellers"; Joe Brown to the Regional Director, 

June 2, 1975. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 075; Rick T. Anderson to 

Chiefs of Interpretation, Maintenance, Protection, et al., February 14, 1978. Ibid; Rick T. 

Anderson to Loran E. Perry, March 17, 1980. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, 

Folder 045.
348

7. Rick T. Anderson to the Regional Director, August 10, 1978. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1425, Folder 075; Rick T. Anderson to the Files, October 6, 1978. Ibid; Rick T. 

Anderson to the Regional Director, June 14, 1979. Ibid; Rick T. Anderson to Assemblyman Bill 

Leonard, December 24, 1986. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 054.

8. NPS. 2009. "Digital Lands Files"; Edward R. Haberlin to Dixie Haldeman, December 31, 

1986. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 054.

9. John McMunn to the Regional Director, August 27, 1976. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L1425, Folder 033; Rick Anderson to the Regional Director, November 15, 1976. NPS, 

WRO, Lands Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder "Metropolitan Water District and 

Kaiser Steel." 

10. Rick Anderson to the Files, January 14, 1977. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, 

Folder 033; Charles T. Weiler. January 1975. "Appraisal of Mineral Interests Inherent in the 

Kaiser Steel corporation Properties in the Placer-Mystery Canyons Area Within the Joshua Tree 

National Monument Riverside, California." JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Box "Lands and Mining," 

Folder "Kaiser Appraisal Report"; John Englund to the Regional Director, June 29, 1978. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 063; NPS. 2004. "Director's Order 35A: Sale or 

Lease of Park Services, Resources, or Water in Support of Activities Outside the Boundaries of 

National Park Areas." http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/DOrder35A.html Accessed August 

8, 2013; John McMunn to the Regional Director, October 6, 1978. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L1425, Folder 033.

11. "Kaiser to Furlough 1,200" Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1975; "Arab is Buying Major 

Interest in Kaiser Steel for $57 Million." Ibid., March 24, 1981; "Kaiser to Close Fontana Steel 

Facility, Mine." Ibid., November 4, 1981. 

12. NPS, WRO. January 1976. “Management Consultation Report Joshua Tree National 

Monument California.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, A2623, Box 6, Folder 028A. 24-

25.

13. Public Law 97-424.

14. NPS and U. S. Federal Highway Administration. September 1984. “Transportation Study 

Road System Evaluation Joshua Tree National Monument.” JTNP Library; Rick T. Anderson to 

A. E. Newcomb, March 22, 1982. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 030; Rick 

T. Anderson to A. E. Newcomb, September 16, 1982. Ibid.

15. Anne M. LaRosa to WRO Kilgore/Huddleston, August 11, 1989. Copy of a fax in WRO, 

Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder “General Management Planning 

Correspondence”; JTNM. March 1990. “Environmental Assessment Reconstruction of Park 

Routes 12 and 13 and Associated Visitor Use Areas.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

D30, Folder 043.

16. Donald V. Lee et al. to Whom It May Concern, July 23, 1991. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, D30, Folder 046; Greg Epperson to Stanley T. Albright, April 5, 1991. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 044.
349

17. JTNM. August 1991. “Environmental Assessment Reconstruction of Park Routes 12 and 13 

and Associated Visitor Use Areas.” JTNP Library; “Seven mile loop road eyed for monument.” 

Hi-Desert Star, November 6, 1991; JTNM. “Reconstruction of Park Routes 12, 13, and 112 

Summary of Public Comments Received of [sic] the Environmental Assessment.” JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, GMP/Backcountry/Wilderness Box 3, Folder 022.

18. Traffic Engineers, Inc. June 1992. “Report of Traffic and Parking Data Joshua Tree National 

Monument.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 29958, D22, Folder 012.

19. WRO 1976, “Management Consultation Report.” 24-26; T. Scott Bryan to Superintendent, 

JTNM, May 24, 1982. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H1415, Folder 003; Rick Anderson 

to T. Scott Bryan, June 3, 1982. Ibid; JTNP 2013, Digital Maintenance Attributes Files—Trails.

20. JTNP 2013, Digital Maintenance Attributes Files—Buildings.

21. NPS Office of Science and Technology. 1980. "State of the Parks May 1980 A Report to 

Congress; WRO 1976, “Management Consultation Report.” 16.

22. WRO 1976, “Management Consultation Report.” Appendix B.

23. Robert Moon, telephone interview with the author, March 25, 2013.

24. Ibid; Jerry Freilich, telephone interview with the author, April 15, 2013.

25. Robert Moon, March 25, 2013.

26. Chief, Natural Resource Information Division to Superintendents, Natural Resource Park 

Units, July 30, 1996. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, N16, Folder 007; David E. Moore to 

the Regional Director, October 28, 1993. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, N16, Folder

005; David E. Moore to the Regional Director, October 1, 1993. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

28859, N16, Folder 003; JTNM. 1993. "Resources Management Plan 1993 Revision." JTNP 

Library.

27. Karen S. Frazier. May 1977. "An Ecological Study of the Fan Palm Oases of Joshua Tree 

National Monument." Master thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. JTNP Library; Howard 

H. Chapman to Superintendent, JTNM with attached environmental summary of proposed plant 

reduction at Oasis of Mara, April 25, 1977. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L7617, Folder 

282; JTNM. January 1984. "Oasis of Mara Action Plan for the Management of Natural 

Resources." JTNP Library, 1-57; Bruce M. Kilgore to the Regional Director, March 6, 1979. 

WRO, Tom Mulhern Files, Box 24, Folder "Joshua Tree NM Correspondence 1976."

28. JTNP. 1996. "Headquarters Landscape and Oasis of Mara Action Plan." JTNP Library, 1-12.

29. Ibid., 1-12, Appendix II.

30. Robert Moon. n.d. "Evolution of the Center for Arid Lands Restoration." Huntington Library, 

San Marino, California. Frank Wheat Papers, Box 12, Folder 7.
350

31. Ibid; Mark Holden and Carol Miller. April 1995. "New Arid Land Revegetation Techniques 

at Joshua Tree National Monument." In: U. S. Forest Service. "Proceedings: Wildland Shrub and 

Arid Land Restoration Symposium." General Technical Report INT-GTR-315; Ernest Quintana 

to Jennifer Haley, November 25, 1996. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, N16, Folder 007. 

32. Alice Turner to the Resource Management Division, JTNM, June 18, 1986. JTNP Archives, 

Uncatalogued Resource Management Files, Folder "N16-21 Endangered species"; JTNP. n.d. 

"NRCM Tamarisk Eradication in Joshua Tree National Park Phase II Implementation Plan." 

JTNP Resource Management Digital Files; George L. San Miguel to Bob Moon, December 19, 

1985. JTNP Archives, Acc. 796, Cat. 26909, N 1617, Folder 069. 

33. JTNP. "Nonnative Species." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/nonnativespecies.htm 

Accessed January 18, 2008; JTNP. n.d. "JoshuaTree N. P. Exotic Plant Management Plan." Draft 

in the Resource Management Digital Files; University of Georgia Center for Invasive Species 

and Ecosystem Health. "Invasive Plant Atlas of the United States." 

http://www.invasiveplantatlas.org/index.html Accessed September 4, 2013.

34. Don Cornell. August 28, 1978. "Preliminary National Assessment of Class I Related Values: 

Visibility Report Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

N3615, Folder 96D; Howard H. Chapman to James Mayfield, August 24, 1979. JTNP Archives, 

a loose report in unprocessed files Hollinger box; Robert Moon. August 25, 1980. "Integral Vista 

Identification." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N3615, Folder 96B.

35. James P. Bennett to Dr. Carl A. Fox, October 12, 1983. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, N3615, Folder 96; Kenneth W. Stolte to the Regional Director, May 17, 1984. Ibid; 

Patrick J. Temple. December 1985. "Assessment of Impacts of Oxidant Air Pollution on 

Vegetation of Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 796, Cat. 26890, Folder 

050.

36. JTNM. October 1993. "Management Plan for Natural and Cultural Resources Joshua Tree 

National Monument October 1993 Revision." JTNP Library, 169-173; David E. Moore to John 

Christiano, August 7, 1991. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N3615, Folder 96; JTNP. 

1998. "Project Statement: Study of Air Quality Effects on Rhus trilobata." JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, N2217, Folder 019.

37. Howard Gross. Spring 2004. "Air pollution in Joshua Tree National Park." The Sun Runner, 

30-31; JTNM. 1978. "Joshua Fire (JOTR 78-01)." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y1419, 

Folder 10.

38. Thomas M. Gavin to the Regional Director, January 24, 1983. JTNP Archives, a loose report 

in uncatalogued files. 

39. "Monument fires pose problems." The Desert Trail, August 7, 1982.

40. JTNM. n.d. "Fire History." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y14, Folder 001; Sue 

Husari to Bob Moon, February 23, 1982. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y14, Folder 

003; Rick Anderson to the Regional Director, December 16, 1982. Ibid. 
351

41. Bob Moon to the Superintendent, JTNM, March 8, 1983. JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, 

Uncatalogued files, Folder "Fire"; Tom Nichols to the Regional Director, March 28, 1985. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y1419, Folder 047; Pete Fielding to the Regional Director, July 

31, 1986. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y14, Folder 045; JTNM. 1992. "Fire 

Management Plan 1992 Revision." JTNP Library; NPS. October 26, 1992. "Finding of No 

Significant Impact for Environmental Assessment Fire Management Plan Joshua Tree National 

Monument." WRO. Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder "Fire Management."

42. Tom Patterson to Chief, Branch of Fire Management, WRO, March 17, 1995. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y1419, Folder 017; Name unreadable, approved by Ernest 

Quintana and Pat Cooney. August 5, 1995. "Fire Narrative: Covington Agency: National Park 

Service." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y1419, Folder 015; Pat Cooney. August 4, 

1995. "Daily Incident Cost Summary." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, Y1419, Folder 

014.

43. Jane Ashdown. November 2002. "Joshua Tree Guzzlers Report and Inventory." JTNP 

Library, 1-10.

44. Jane Ashdown 2002, "Joshua Tree Guzzlers," 2-3; Charles L. Douglas and Leslie D. White. 

November 1979. "Movements of Desert Bighorn Sheep in the Stubbe Spring Area, Joshua Tree 

National Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Box 1, Folder 004; Elena Robisch 

to Jerry Freilich et al. June 29, 1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Box 1, Folder 011.

45. Public Law 103-433; Jane Ashdown 2002, "Joshua Tree Guzzlers," 2-3. 

46. U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. June 1994. "Desert Tortoise Recovery Plan." JTNP Library, 

2-13; William I. Boarman. "Desert Tortoise-Gopherus agassizii." 

http://www.blm.gov/ca/pdfs/cdd_pdfs/data.pdf Accessed May 26, 2013.

47. JTNM. 1993. "Management Plan for Natural and Cultural Resources," 165-168; Jerry 

Freilich telephone interview with the author, April 15, 2013; Jerry Freilich to All Tortoise NRPP 

interested parties, May 11, 1995. JTNP Archives, Unprocessed files in Hollinger box, Folder 

"Jerry Freilich, 1995 Professional Papers."

48. DOI. February 8, 1994. "Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mojave Population of the 

Desert Tortoise; Final Rule." Federal Register, 59 (26) 5820-5846; JTNP. n.d. "Desert Tortoise." 

Briefing statement in JTNP Archives, Acc. 804, Cat. 28768, Box 4, Folder 003.

49. Ecologist, JTNP to T & E Coordinator, June 29, 1994. JTNP Archives, a loose report 

in uncatalogued resource management files; JTNP. 1999. "Joshua Tree National Park

Natural and Cultural Resources Management Plan." JTNP Library, 301-305.

50. Don Cornell. n.d. "Research in Coyote Abatement Joshua Tree National Monument." JTNP. 

Unprocessed resource management files, Folder "Coyote Management"; Kathy Billings to All 

Employees, April 13, 1994. Ibid; Ernest Quintana to Chief Ranger, September 29, 1997. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, Folder 009; Bob Moon to the Superintendent/Files, July 26, 

1982. JTNP. Uncatalogued resource management files, Folder "Pest & Weed Control 1978-

1985."
352

51. Laura Thompson to Bob Moon, October 25, 1984. JTNP. Uncatalogued resource 

management files, Folder "Burro Management"; JTNM. August 1994. "Burro Management 

Action Plan." Ibid.

52. U. S. Government. 2013. United States National Atlas. 

http://nationalatlas.gov/mld/afrbeep.html Accessed May 27, 2013; Jerry Freilich to the Files, 

August 6, 1993. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, N2219, Folder 064; Bruce Grubbs. 2006. 

Explore! Joshua Tree National Park: A Guide to Exploring the Great Outdoors (Guilford, 

Conn: Globe Pequot Publishers) 14.

53. JTNM 1989. "Natural Resource Project Statement: RM-17, Non-Native Aquatic Wildlife 

Control." JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued resource management files, Folder "Barker Dam 

Management Files"; JTNM. November 30, 1989. "Monument to Give Away Goldfish." Ibid.

54. NPS. "Partnerships." http://www.nps.gov/partnerships/ca_dmg.htm Accessed May 27, 2013; 

Desert Managers Group. "About Us." http://www.dmg.gov/about.php and "Projects" 

http://www.dmg.gov/projects.php Accessed May 27, 2013.

55. George Wright Society. "The UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program: What's It All 

About?" http://www.georgewright.org/mab.html Accessed May 27, 2013; Biosphere Reserve Ad 

Hoc Nomination Panel to United States Man and the Biosphere Directorate, November 28, 1983. 

JTNP Library; Today the wildlife area is part of the Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains 

National Monument and the biosphere reserve also includes Boyd Deep Canyon Desert Research 

Center of the University of California, Riverside. 

56. Sidney McClellan to Regional Solicitor, Sacramento, May 21, 1957. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 19430, L34, Folder 231; George D. Dysart to Leonard A. Webber, July 2, 1957. Ibid; 

Russell J. Hendrickson to the Regional Director, Southwest Region, March 16, 1971. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D6215, Folder 083; Regional Director to Superintendents, 

Western Region et al., January 26, 1973. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D6215, Folder 

077. 

57. Public Law 96-95; Public Law 101-601.

58. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. June 21, 1993. “Advisory Council on Historic 

Preservation Sets Policy for Native American, Native Hawaiian Consultation.” JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, GMP/Wilderness Box 2, Folder 030; Rosie Pepito to Thomas Mulhern, 

August 24, 1988. WRO, Thomas Mulhern Files, Box 24, Folder “Joshua Tree NM, CA General 

File 1988”;

59. Rick T. Anderson to the Regional Director with attached Draft Cultural Resources 

Management Plan, October 19, 1977. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, H2215, Folder 093; 

John H. Davis to Superintendent JTNM, March 21, 1979. Ibid; Rick Anderson to the Regional 

Director, March 20, 1979. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D18, Folder 013.

60. Carol A. Martin to the Superintendent, JTNM, September 15, 1987. JTNP Archives, 

Uncatalogued files in Hollinger Box, Folder “H92 Road Survey-Archaeological”; George A. 

Teague to Anthropologist, DSC, January 30, 1990. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 
353

H2215, Folder 053; D. Paul Henry Memorandum, October 22, 1990. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, H2215, Folder 085. 

61. Thomas Mulhern to the Associate Regional Director, Resource Management, August 24, 

1987. WRO, Thomas Mulhern Files, Box 26, Folder “JOTR-CR-RBI (RMP-UNLV)”; Rick 

Anderson to Honorable Jerry Lewis, February 22, 1989. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, 

H1817, Folder 034; “City Moves to Keep Collection,” Desert Trail, March 16, 1989; JTNM. 

January 14, 1991. “Congressional Add-on FY90 Appropriation.” Briefing Statement in JTNP 

Archives, Acc, 651, Cat. 28859, A8815, Folder 035. 

62. Regional Director to the Superintendent, JTNM, July 29, 1981. WRO, Thomas Mulhern 

Files, Box 24, Folder “Joshua Tree NM 1984-1985”; Linda W. Greene. 1983. “Historic Resource 

Study: A History of Land Use in Joshua Tree National Monument.” DSC. JTNP Library; Tom 

Mulhern to the Superintendent, JTNM, April 27, 1993. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Hollinger 

Box, Folder “National Register”; Harlan D. Unrau to Manager, Western team, DSC, March 30, 

1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Uncatalogued Files, Folder “Road Realignment National 

Register.”

63. John H. Davis to the Superintendent, JTNM, April 13, 1976. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, H3017, Folder 076; Rick T. Anderson to the Regional Director, June 30, 1977. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, D22, Folder 017; Tom Mulhern to Dan Olson, December 7, 

1990. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, D18, Box 3, Folder 001. 

64. “Century old landmark-preservation needed?” The Desert Trail, February 25, 1982; Thomas 

D. Mulhern, Jr. to the Regional Director, April 7, 1989. WRO, Thomas Mulhern Files, Box 26, 

Folder “JOTR-Lost Horse”; Mark Heuston. September 30, 1992. “Trip Report: A remote video 

exploration of the Lost Horse Mine.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Box “Lands and Mining,” 

Folder “Trip Report Heuston, Mark”; “Lost Horse Mine strikes gold.” The Desert Trail, 

September 25, 1996; JTNP. “Lost Horse Mine.” 

http://www.nps.gov/jotr/historyculture/lhmine/htm Accessed January 18, 2008. 

65. NPS. 2014. “Annual Visits Joshua Tree National Monument.” 

https://irma.nps.gov/Stats/Reports/ReportList Accessed January 10 2014; “Joshua Tree ‘loved to 

death.” Riverside Press-Enterprise, 1991 (full date not shown). JTNP Library, Clippings File.

66. Margaret Littlejohn. September 1991. “Visitor Services Project Joshua Tree National 

Monument.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, A8815, Folder 035; JTNP. April 8, 1999. 

“Joshua Tree National Park Generates Almost $240 Million For Local Economy.” JTNP Central 

Files, L14; William Truesdell, interviewed by the author, JTNP Visitor Center, January 19, 2013. 

67. JTNM. 1975. "Draft Backcountry Management Plan Joshua Tree National Monument." 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 4, Folder 007. 

68. JTNM. September 1988. "Draft Backcountry Management Plan Joshua Tree National 

Monument." JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 2, Folder 001.

69. JTNM. January 28, 1981 and February 2, 1982. Annual reports of the Interpretation Division. 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, K2621, Folder 014; Rick Anderson to the Regional 
354

Director. November 16, 1988. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, K1815, Folder 003; Curt 

Mossestad to the Regional Director, August 21, 1991. JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Unprocessed 

Files, Folder “Parks as Classrooms, 1991.”

70. David Moore to the Regional Director with attached “Interpretive Prospectus,” June 26, 

1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, D18, Folder 002.

71. JTNP. July 25, 1995. “Expedition Into The Parks.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859,

K38, Folder 009; Wilke E. Nelson and Patti Reilly to Ernest Quintana, June 26, 1996. JTNP

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, K18, Folder 002.

72. David E. Moore to John T. Ryfa, September 14, 1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, 

A9029, Folder 037; David E. Moore. June 17, 1993. “Editorial misses mark.” The Desert Trail.

73. JTNM. February 1990. “Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center.” 

WRO, JTNP Files, Folder “Briefing Statements Joshua Tree-1990”; Michael P. Ghiglieri and 

Thomas M. Myers. 2001. Over the Edge: Death in the Grand Canyon. (Flagstaff, Ariz: Puma 

Press) 304-308.

74. D. Paul Henry to the Western Regional Office, June 9, 1988. WRO, Planning Files, Joshua 

Tree National Park File, Folder “General Management Plan Correspondence”; “Drug arrests in 

JTNM highest in Park Service.” The Desert Trail, May 9, 1991.

75. JTNP. October 8, 1996. “Man Charged In Poaching Incident.” Briefing Statement in JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, K38, Folder 009; “Pioneer rancher’s grave robbed.” Hi-Desert 

Star, January 30, 1994.

76. See especially Frank Wheat. 1999. California Desert Miracle: The Fight for Desert Parks 

and Wilderness. (San Diego, Calif: Sunbelt Publications).

77. Ibid. 1-23; Congressman Robert B. Mathias introduced H. R. 5289 (93rd Congress, 1st 

Session) on March 7, 1973 to establish a California Desert Conservation Area. On January 28, 

1975 Congressman Jerry L. Pettis introduced H.R. 2271 (94th Congress, 1st Session) calling for 

the same conservation area with specifications for its management. Both congressmen had 

introduced earlier bills in 1971. 

78. Wheat 1999, California Desert Miracle, 21-22.

79. Ibid., xxiv; Public Law 94-579.

80. BLM. 1980. "The California Desert Conservation Area Plan." BLM State Office, 

Sacramento, California; Frank Wheat 1999, California Desert Miracle, xiv, 58-81.

81. Wheat 1999, California Desert Miracle, 83-116; 99th Congress, 1st Session, S. 2061. "The 

California Desert Protection Act of 1986. February 6, 1986.

82. Wheat 1999, California Desert Miracle; Robert Moon, telephone interview, March 25, 2013 
355

83. Robert Moon, telephone interview, March 25, 2013; WRO. January 1987. "Resource 

Assessment for Features Proposed in the California Desert Protection Act." NPS, 3-4. JTNP 

Library.

84. WRO 1987, "Resource Assessment," 4-8.

85. Wheat 1999, California Desert Miracle, 119-210; "Monument enlargement eyed." HiDesert Star (Yucca Valley, California) November 3, 1991; WRO 1987, "Resource Assessment," 

1-10.

86. Wheat, California Desert Miracle, 164-185; BLM. April 1989. "The Monuments: Final 

Environmental Impact Statement." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L76, Folder 268A; U.

S. House of Representatives. March 30, 1984. "Hearing on H. R. 1214, to provide for the transfer 

of administrative jurisdiction of certain public lands and for other purposes." 98th Congress, 1st 

Session, 25-27. 

87. Quoted in Wheat, California Desert Miracle, 184. 

88. Robert Moon, March 25, 2013; David Moore, telephone interview with the author, March 30, 

2013. 

89. Wheat, California Desert Miracle, 288-300.

90. P.L. 103-433.

91. Rick T. Anderson to the Regional Director, May 5, 1977. WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree 

National Park File, Folder “Outline of Planning Requirements.”

92. DSC. September 15, 1989. “Task Directive General Management Plan/Development Concept 

Plan Environmental Assessment Package No. 156 for Joshua Tree National Monument.” JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, GMP Files, Box 3, Folder 021; Rick Anderson. December 8, 

1989. “Close out Meeting with the GMP Team.” Ibid., Folder 024.

93. All three of the subsequent task directives carried the same title as the first--“Task Directive 

General Management Plan/Development Concept Plan Environmental Assessment Package No. 

156 for Joshua Tree National Monument.” The provenances for them are as follows: September 

1990, NPS, WRO Planning Files, JTNP, Folder “General Management Plan Correspondence; 

October 1991, JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D18, Folder 006; March 1992, JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, D18, Box 4, Folder 002.

94. David Moore to the Regional Director, January 27, 1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 

28768, GMP Files, Box 3, Folder 023.

95. David Moore to the Regional Director, April 2, 1993. Ibid., Folder 021.

96. DSC and WRO. July 1994. “General Management Plan Development Concept Plans 

Environmental Impact Statement Joshua Tree National Monument.” JTNP Library; DSC and 

WRO. May 1995. “Final General Management Plan Development Concept Plans Environmental 

Impact Statement Joshua Tree National Monument.” Ibid; NPS. September 7, 1995. “Record of 
356

Decision General Management Plan Development Concept Plans Environmental Impact 

Statement Joshua Tree National Monument.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, D18, Folder 

006.

Chapter Eight

1. Frank Buono to Ernest Quintana, January 18, 1996. JTNP, Management Assistant Digital 

Files.

2. Ernest Quintana to Manager, California Desert District (BLM), March 20, 1997. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L1425, Folder 065; Ernest Quintana to Heidi Porter, August 21, 

1996. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L1417, Folder 008; Ernest Quintana to Chief, Land 

Resources Program Center, WRO, April 9, 2001. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L1425, 

Folder 042; Karin Messaros. June 4, 2010. "Data-Tract no. 102-44 & 45." Management Assistant 

Digital Files. 

3. "The Wildlands Conservancy." 2013. http://www.wildlandsconservancy.org Accessed 

September 16, 2013; Dana Rochat telephone interview by the author, September 16, 2013; NPS. 

2013. "Digital Lands Files." available from the WRO Land Office; The Wildlands Conservancy. 

December 2, 1998. "Conservancy Makes Offer to Leverage Largest Conservation Acquisition in 

California History." JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L1425, Folder 064. 

4. Public Law 90-209; NPS. 2013. "Digital Lands Files."

5. Mojave Desert Land Trust. 2013. "Our History." 

http://www.mojavedesertlandtrust.org/history.php Accessed September 7, 2013; NPS. 2013. 

"Digital Lands Files." 

6. Karin Messaros, interview by the author at JTNP, April 17, 2013; Revised Statute 2477 (43 

CFR 1864.1-2 c (1)); Ernest Quintana to Janet Scott, February 10, 2000. JTNP Archives, Land 

Files, Folder "Whispering Pines"; BLM. 2003. "Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477) California 

Desert District Background: February 13, 2003." 

http//www.blm.gov/ca/dir/pdfs/2003/ib/CAIB2003-023ATT2.pdf Accessed September 7, 2013.

7. Karin Messaros interview, April 17, 2013. 

8. Ernest Quintana to Sondra Humphries, February 5, 1998. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

28859, L1425, Folder 004; NPS. August 28, 2003. "Joshua Tree National Park, CA: Boundary 

Revision To Include Adjacent Real Property." Federal Register, 68 (167) 51779. 

9. Mojave Desert Land Trust. 2013. "Our History"; Kristeen Penrod et al. December 2008. "A 

Linkage Design for the Joshua Tree-Twentynine Palms Connection."

http://www.scwildlands.org/reports/JT_TP_Connection.pdf Accessed September 8, 2013; JTNP 

May 21, 2007. "Recent Acquisition of 'Nolina Peak' by the Mojave Desert Land Trust-Pending 

Boundary Change." Management Assistant Digital Files.

10. 111th Congress, 1st Session, S. 2921. "California Desert Protection Act of 2010." December 

21, 2009; 112th Congress, 1st Session, S. 138. "California Desert Protection Act of 2011." 

January 5, 2011; JTNP. January 2012. "Justification for the NPS proposing to receive a transfer 
357

of administration of lands known as the "Saddle." JTNP Management Assistant Files, Folder 

LDSP-2008; RPI Consulting and the National Parks Conservation Association, May 2012. 

"Economic Effects of Saddle Transition on Joshua Tree National Park and the Morongo Basin." 

JTNP Management Assistant Files, unfiled report. 

11. Robert D. Higgins to the Regional Director, February 3, 1987. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 109-1; Russell Kaldenberg to Stephen Dwyer, April 24, 1992. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, Folder 082; United States v. Stephen Dwyer, March 5, 2007. 

Contest No. CACA 43807. JTNP Archives "Storm Jade Files," Box 2, Folder "Record of 

Decision, USA v. Stephen Dwyer," 4-6.

12. Stephen M. Dwyer to Congressman Sonny Bono, December 8, 1996. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 28859, Folder 078; Frank Buono to the Files, February 5, 1997. JTNP, Physical 

Science Files, Folder "NPS File (1) Dwyer"; "Dwyer Mine Claims" March 26, 1997. JTNP, 

Physical Science Files, Folder "NPS File (1) Dwyer"; Ernest Quintana to Stephen Dwyer, 

January 15, 1997. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L30, Folder 078. 

13. Ernest Quintana to Stephen Dwyer, June 16, 1997. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, 

L30, Folder 078.

14. Stephen Dwyer. September 14, 1997. "Joshua Tree policies bad." The Desert Sun.

15. Ernest Quintana to Stephen Dwyer, July 6, 1998. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, 

Folder 084.1; Interior Board of Land Appeals to Stephen Dwyer. May 9, 1997. JTNP, Physical 

Science Files, Folder "NPS File (1) Dwyer"; Ernest Quintana to Michael Brady, November 9, 

1999. JTNP, Physical Science Files, Folder "NPS File (1) Dwyer"; United States v. Stephen 

Dwyer, March 5, 2007. Contest No. CACA 43807. JTNP Archives "Storm Jade Files," Box 2,

Folder "Record of Decision, USA v. Stephen Dwyer"; United States v. Stephen Dwyer, July 3, 

2008. Contest No. CACA 43807. JTNP Archives "Storm Jade Files," Box 2, Folder "Appeal 

USA v. Stephen Dwyer 3 July 2008."

16. David B. Shaver to the Regional Director, December 5, 1988. JTNM Archives, Acc. 812, 

Cat. 28768, Box 4, Folder 027; Rick Anderson to the Regional Director, August 30, 1989. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L7617, Folder 272. 

17. W. C. Ehler to Chief, Division of Abandoned Mine Lands, November 15, 1992. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 856, Box "Lands and Mining," loose document.

18. Chris Holbeck. n.d. "Abandoned Mine Lands." JTNP, Physical Science Office, "Holbeck 

Files"; "Park Sees Bright Prospects for Ending Old Mine Shaft Perils." Los Angeles Times, 

December 22, 1999; NPS. April 23, 2001. "General Agreement Between Department of the 

Interior National Park Service and Bat Conservation International, Inc." JTNP, Physical Science 

Office, "Holbeck Files"; Tetra Tech EM, Inc. May 2003. "Park-wide Inspection of Inactive 

Historical Mills at Joshua Tree National Park Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, 

California." JTNP Library; JTNP. 2009. "Joshua Tree Will Close 22 Mines." 

http://www.nps.gov/jotr/parknews/recovery_mineclosures.htm Accessed December 28, 2009; 

Public Law 111-5. 
358

19. Luke Sabala, telephone interview with the author, January 23, 2014

20. G. Larson, S. E. Stonum, C. D. McIntire and R. Herrmann. April 1998. "Baseline Water 

Quality Survey-Joshua Tree National Park." JTNP Library; Ernest Quintana to Ralph Mihan, 

January 5, 2000. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L54, Folder 098; Margit F. ChiriacoRusche to Ernest Quintana, November 9, 1999. Ibid.

21. Black & Veatch and Woodward-Clyde. May 1998. "Phase I Technical Feasibility Report for 

Offstream Storage on the Colorado River Aqueduct." JTNP Library; Luke Sabala interview with 

the author at JTNP, January 15, 2013.

22. M. Jeff Ohlfs. January 1999. “Historical Listing of Open and Closed Roads and Jeep Trails 

of Joshua Tree National Park. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, L3027, Folder 089; JTNP. 

1995. “Road System.” Briefing Statement in JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, GMP Files, 

Box 4, Folder 003.

23. Public Law 102-240; JTNP. April 2005. “Environmental Assessment/ Assessment of Effect 

Keys View Road Reconstruction.” JTNP Library.

24. JTNP. 2013. Digital Maintenance Attributes Files—Buildings, Trails.

25. Ibid; Public Law 108-447; Marcella Wells. May 15, 2009. "Front-end Evaluation Report for 

Joshua Tree National Park Oasis of Mara Visitor Center Project." JTNP Library; JTNP. n.d. "The 

Oasis of Mara Cultural Center: A New Visitor Center for Joshua Tree National Park, A Fund 

Raising Prospectus." JTNP Library; Anderson Hallas Architects. January 31, 2013. "Value 

Analysis Study Joshua Tree National Park: Visitor Center Site Selection." JTNP Library; Mark 

Butler to the Files, August 5, 2013. JTNP Superintendent's Files; Mark Butler interviewed by the 

author, JTNP, December 6, 2013.

26. JTNP. January 2000. "Record of Decision: Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan." 

JTNP Library, 35; 107th Congress, 2nd Session, S. 2535. "California Wild Heritage Act of 

2002." http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/s2535 Accessed September 10, 2013; Public 

Law 109-362.

27. 111th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 146, "The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 

2009." http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr/146/text Accessed September 10, 2013; 

Public Law 111-11. 

28. JTNP. October 1996. "Joshua Tree National Park Backcountry/Wilderness Management 

Plan." JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 2, Folder 003; JTNP. November 1997. "Draft 

General Management Plan Amendment Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement 

Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan." WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National 

Park File, loose report; JTNP. October 1999. "General Management Plan Amendment 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan." 

JOTR Library, 128-129; William C. Walters to Chief, Administrative Services Division, NPS 

with attached Record of Decision, January 14, 2000. WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National 

Park File, Folder "Backcountry Management Plan." 
359

29. JoshuaTreeClimb.com. "Joshua Tree Climbing History 101." 

http://www.joshuatreeclimb.com/members/History/history101.htm Accessed September 9, 

2013.

30. The superintendent's compendium is a body of specific rules based on the Code of Federal 

Regulations and park policy that is published annually by each park's superintendent; Bob Moon 

to Brian Mattos, November 22, 1983. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, cat. 19430, L3423, Folder 236; 

Bob Moon. October 1993. "Climbing Management Joshua Tree National Monument: A Brief 

History." JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 018; Names Unreadable to Park 

Superintendent, April 1, 1989. Handwritten message on a visitor comment form at Indian Cove 

protesting climbers invading their campsite from 7:00 AM through the entire day. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3423, Folder 235; Brien F. Culhane to Jack Morehead, 

September 5, 1989. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 008; Randy K. Vogel 

to Rick Anderson, January 12, 1990. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, D30, Folder 044; 

Friends of Joshua Tree, Inc. "About." http://www.friends of josh.org/about/ Accessed September 

9, 2013.

31. Bob Moon 1993, "Climbing Management Joshua Tree," 6; JTNM. February 1993. "Joshua 

Tree National Monument Climbing Management Plan." JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, 

Box 3, Folder 005; Rich Roberts. 1993. "A Rocky Situation: Joshua Tree Superintendent and 

Climbers Are at Odds Over Recent Ban on Bolts." Los Angeles Times, exact date not shown. 

JOTR Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 010.

32. Bob Moon October 1993, "Climbing Management: A Brief History." 

33. Backcountry Ranger to the Superintendent, JTNP, April 6, 1994. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, 

Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 003. 

34. Richard Joseph Camp. 1995. "Impact of Rock Climbing on Bird and Plant Diversity in 

Joshua Tree National Park, California." Masters thesis, Colorado State University, iii-v; Richard 

J. Camp and Richard L. Knight. 1998. "Effects of Rock Climbing on Cliff Plant Communities at 

Joshua Tree National Park, California." Conservation Biology, 12 (6) 1302-1306; George N. 

Wallace and Kesia Trench. June 1996. "A Study of Rock Climbers in Joshua Tree National Park: 

Implications for the Visitor Experience and Resource Protection (VERP) Management 

Framework." JTNP Library.

35. JTNP. March 18, 1997. "Draft General Management Plan Amendment and Environmental 

Impact Statement, Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan, Joshua Tree National Park." 

WRO, Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder "Backcountry and Wilderness 

Management Plan"; Benjamin Marshall to Ernest Quintana, December 28, 1997. JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 1, Folder 001; Sam Davidson (The Access Fund) to Ernest Quintana, 

February 26, 1998. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 4, Folder 004; USDA Forest 

Service. June 1, 1998. "USDA Forest Service Bans Use of Fixed Anchors for Climbing in 

Wilderness." News release in JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28768, K38, Folder 009.

36. "Groups compromise on bolting suggestion." The Desert Trail, July 2, 1998; JTNP. January 

2000. "Record of Decision, Final General Management Plan Amendment and Environmental 
360

Impact Statement, Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan, Joshua Tree National Park."

JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 1, Folder 014.

37. Joan Taylor to Ernest Quintana, July 28, 1998. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 1, 

Folder 002; Eric Murdoch. August 20, 2004. "Joshua Tree National Park Rock Climbing 

Wilderness Study: Final Report." JTNP Library; Bernadette Regan. April 2009. "Status of 

Joshua Tree National Park Climbing Management." JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 

3, Folder 023; NPS. May 2013. "Director's Order 41." JTNP Superintendent's files.

38. National Park Foundation/Canon USA. December 1996. "Phase II Bighorn Sheep: 

Restoration and Conservation of Critical Habitat." JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 30023, Box 1, 

Folder 007; Darren D. Divine and Charles L. Douglas. July 1996. "Bighorn Sheep Monitoring 

Program for the Eagle Mountain Landfill Project Phase One." JTNP Archives, Acc. 852, Cat. 

30023, Box 1, Folder 017, 40-43.

39. NPS. November 1997. "Draft Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan." JTNP 

Library, 38-46; JTNP. 1999. "Joshua Tree National Park Natural and Cultural Resources 

Management Plan 1999." JTNP Library; "Bighorn Sheep Threatened by Climate Change." Earth 

Observatory, February 11, 2004. 

http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/MediaAlerts/2004/2004021116504.html; Andrea 

Compton, telephone interview with the author, May 20, 2013.

40. JTNP 1999, "Backcountry and Wilderness Management Plan," 31-36, 137-143; JTNP. 

"Horseback Riding." http://www.nps.gov/jotr/planyourvisit/horseback-riding.htm Accessed 

September 17, 2013. 

41. Patricia Close. June 1994. "The Way I See It: It's Time to Circle the Wagons." Western 

Horsemen, 59(6) 22-24; Special Programs Ranger to the Superintendent, JTNP, July 24, 1994.

JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 002; Jane de Helsby to Craig Faanes, June 

n.d., 1994. General form letter forwarded by de Helsby, Ibid. 

42. User Group Equestrian. July 25, 1994. "Proposal Back Country Management Plan (GMP for 

JTNM)." JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 002; "Group Size Limits." JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 3, Folder 009.

43. Dale J. Blahna and Kari S. Archibald. 1997. "Backcountry Llama Packing: What Do Other 

Wilderness Visitors Think?" Yellowstone Science, 5(3) 9-12; Shelly Abbott and Kori Abbott to 

Ernest Quintana, February 23, 1998. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 1, Folder 005; 

Walter D. Dabney to Files, Southeast Utah Group, July n.d., 1997. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, 

Cat. 28768, Box 1, Folder 005; Ernest Quintana to the Files, JTNP, September 5, 2002. JTNP 

Archives, Loose report in File "Manuscript Science Studies."

44. Relevant portions of the 1987 General Accounting Office report, the Vail Agenda, and the 

National Academy of Sciences report, "Science and the National Parks," are found in Lary 

Dilsaver, 1994. America's National Park System: The Critical Documents (Lanham, MD: 

Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1994) 414-417, 434-449; Robert B. Keiter. 2013. To 

Conserve Unimpaired: The Evolution of the National Park Idea (Washington, D.C: Island Press) 

148-154. 
361

45. Richard West Sellars. 1997. Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New 

Haven: Yale University Press); Keiter 2013, To Conserve Unimpaired, 152-154.

46. Ernest Quintana to Director, Pacific West Field Area, June 11, 1996. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

651, Cat. 28859, N16, Folder 007.

47. Walter H. Sakai and Norman D. Hogg. August 2000. "Animal Inventories in Joshua Tree 

National Park with Special Emphasis on Sensitive Species, Sensitive Areas and Lands Newly 

Added to the Park under the Desert Protection Act." JTNP Library, 26-62; Ernest Quintana to All 

Employees. April 2, 1998. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, N1621, Folder 014; Ernest 

Quintana to Chief Ranger, JTNP, September 29, 1997. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 28859, 

N1621, Folder 009; Michael Vamstad interview with the author at JTNP, December 4, 2013; 

Harley G. Shaw to Dr. Henry E. McCutchen with attached report by The Juniper Institute, May 

18, 1998. JTNP Archives, Unprocessed Resource Management Files Box, Folder "Pronghorn 

Research"; "Pronghorns, the second-fastest land animal in the world, could be re-introduced in 

the East Mojave." Riverside Press Enterprise, March 19, 2010.

48. Luke Sabala, telephone interview, January 23, 2014; Harold F. DeLisle. 1999. "Declining 

Amphibian Populations in Joshua Tree National Park." JTNP Archives, Unprocessed Resource 

Management Files Box, loose report; "Decline of desert tortoise in Joshua Tree linked to long 

droughts." Los Angeles Times, December 13, 2013; NPS. April 2001. "Assessment of Air 

Quality and Air Pollutant Impacts in Class 1 National Parks of California." JTNP Library, xxvixxvii; "Joshua Tree: Smog continues to plague national park." Riverside Press-Enterprise, 

February 13, 2011; JTNP. June 7, 1999. "Juniper Fire Complex Burned Area Emergency 

Rehabilitation Plan." JTNP Library; JTNP. April 2005. "Joshua Tree National Park Fire 

Management Plan Environmental Assessment." JTNP Library. 

49. JTNP. October 2012. "Climate Change." JTNP Briefing statement, Superintendent's File; 

"Joshua Trees Losing Ground Fast." 2011. KQED News. 

http://blogs.kqed.org/climatewatch/2011/03/24/joshua-trees-losing-ground-fast/?utm Accessed 

March 26, 2011; Kenneth Cole. Lara Schmit and Catherine Puckett. March 24, 2011. "Uncertain 

Future of Joshua Trees Projected with Climate Change." 

http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2723 Accessed September 19, 2013; Cameron 

W. Barrows and Michelle L. Murphy. March 2011. "Modeled shifts in the distribution of 

vegetation resulting from climate change simulations within Joshua Tree National Park." Center 

for Conservation Biology, University of California, Riverside, 16-20.

50. JTNP, 2012 "Climate Change"; Barrows and Murphy 2011, "Modeled shifts in the 

distribution of vegetation, 16-20."

51. JTNP 1999, "Joshua Tree National Park Natural and Cultural Resources Management Plan 

1999," 13.

52. DOI and U. S. Department of Agriculture. April, 2002. “Recreation Fee Demonstration 

Program Interim Report to Congress.” Appendix 2.1, JTNP Library; JTNP 1999, "Natural and 

Cultural Resources Management Plan," 53-207.
362

53. Jan Keswick. June 2002. "Backcountry and Wilderness Archaeological Site Recording 

Project, Joshua Tree National Park, California." WRO, Thomas Mulhern Files, Box 26, Folder 

"JOTR Archaeology"; Carolyn Orbann. July 21, 2006. "Summary Archaeological Test 

Excavation Report for CA-SBR-746/H: Results of a Limited Phase II Project." JTNP, Chief of 

Cultural Resources Files; Loy Neff and Ronald Beckwith. 2007. "Archaeological Testing at 

Thirteen Sites at Joshua Tree National Park, California." JTNP, Chief of Cultural Resources 

Files; Douglas Duer. 2006. "Joshua Tree National Park Traditional Use Study: The Rock Art of 

Joshua Tree National Park." WRO, JTNP Library; JTNP. November 9, 2006. "Report on Final 

Disposition of Remains Wall Street Mill Trail, Joshua Tree National Park." JTNP Archives, 

Unprocessed files in Hollinger Box, Folder "Wall Street Remains."

54. Park IPM Coordinator to Division Chiefs, JTNP with attached Hoddenbach Consulting 

Inspection Report. October n.d., 1999. JTNP Archives, Acc. 856, Unprocessed Files, Folder 

"IPM Inspection, 1999"; JTNP. January 22, 2005. "Finding of No Significant Impact Keys 

(Desert Queen) Ranch Comprehensive Plan Environmental Assessment." JTNP Library; Michael 

Scott to Branch Chief of Cultural Resources, February 2000 with attached trip report. JTNP 

Archives. Box "Miscellaneous uncatalogued files"; David Yubeta. February 27-28, 2007. 

"Joshua Tree National Park Condition Assessment/Statement of Work Pinyon Wells/Henson 

Well Mill Site[/] Keys Ranch/Ryan Ranch." JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Resource 

Management Files, loose report.

55. JTNP. January 2013. "List of Classified Structures." JTNP Cultural Resources Digital Files; 

Ralph B. Giles, Jr. August 1998. "Determination of Eligibility for Nomination to the National 

Register of Historic Places for Four Twentieth-Century Historic Sites Within Joshua Tree 

National Park." WRO, Thomas Mulhern Files, Box 24, Folder "Joshua Tree NM 1998"; Carey & 

Co., Inc. Architecture. October 13, 2000. "Determination of Eligibility Joshua Tree National 

Park Visitor Center, Twentynine Palms, California." JTNP Archives, Unprocessed files in 

Hollinger Box, Folder "Determination of Eligibility JTNP Visitor Center"; Jan Keswick 

interviewed by the author, JTNP Headquarters, January 12, 2013.

56. Carl O. Sauer. 1925. “The Morphology of Landscape.” University of California Publications 

in Geography 2 (2) 19–53; Walter Roubitschek and Günther Schoenfelder, "Otto Schlüter (1872-

1959): His work for the geography and the Leopoldina." Journal of the Saxon Academy of 

Sciences, 5, http://denkstroeme.de/heft-5/s_227-232_roubitschek-schoenfelder Accessed 

February 02, 2014; 

57. NPS. 1998. "NPS-28: Cultural Resource Management Guideline." 

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/nps28/28chap7.htm Accessed February 12, 

2014.

58. NPS. 2004. "Keys Ranch Historic District Cultural Landscape Inventory." JTNP Library; 

NPS. 2008. "Hexie Mountains Historic Mining District Cultural Landscape Inventory." Ibid; 

NPS. 2011. "Northern Pinon Historic Mining District Cultural Landscape Inventory." Ibid; NPS. 

2012. "Lost Horse Historic Mining District Cultural Landscape Inventory." Ibid.

59. NPS-PWR. 2005. "Joshua Tree National Park Museum Management Plan." Ibid. 

60. NPS. 2013. "Annual Recreation Visitation by Park Type or Region (1979-Last Calendar 

Year)." 
363

http://irma.nps.gov/Stats/SSRSReports/National%20Annual%20Recreation%20Visitation%20Re

port%20by%20Park%20Type%20or%20Region%20(1979%20-%20Last%20Calendar%20Year) 

Accessed February 15, 2014.

61. Jean E. McKendry, Kimberly L. Treadway, Gary E. Machlis, Robert B. Schlegel and Adam 

J. Novak. 2001. "A Socioeconomic Atlas for Joshua Tree National Park and its Region." NPS 

Social Science Program. JTNP Library, 16-20; Yen Le, Margaret A. Littlejohn and Stephen J. 

Hollenhorst. December 2004. "Joshua Tree National Park Visitor Study Spring 2004." University 

of Idaho Park Studies Units Visitor Services Project Report 152. JTNP Library.

62. Value added is the combination of the effect of spending by visitors on the two counties in 

which the park lies plus spending by employees of the park. The reason the spending total is 

higher is because much of the money goes out of the two counties to businesses based elsewhere. 

Daniel J. Stynes. June 2006. "Impacts of Visitor Spending on the Local Economy: Joshua Tree 

National Park, 2004." JTNP Library; Philip S. Cook. April 2012. ""Impacts of Visitor Spending 

on the Local Economy: Joshua Tree National Park, 2010." JTNP Library.

63. "Man litters national park with 3,000 golf balls." The Desert Sun, September 17, 2009; 

"Historic Joshua Tree sites are blighted by urban ills." Los Angeles Times, April 13, 2013.

64. Keiter 2013. To Conserve Unimpaired, 154-156. 

65. JTNP. October 2012. "Education Program." JTNP, Superintendent's Digital Files; JTNP. 

October 2012. "Artist-in-Residence." Ibid.

66. Cindy Ott, Laura Watt, and Raymond Rast. 2008. "Scholar's Reports by Cindy Ott, Laura 

Watt, and Raymond Rast of a visit to Joshua Tree National Park June 10-12, 2008." NPSOrganization of American Historians Report. JTNP Library.

67. Curt Sauer. February 2007. "Potential Impacts to Park Resources & Multi-Jurisdictional 

Efforts to Facilitate Preservation of these Resources through Open Space Planning near Joshua 

Tree National Park." JTNP Superintendent's Files; Cord Media Company. 2013. "Twenty-Nine 

Palms Band of Mission Indians to Break Ground on New Casino." 

http://www.tortoiserockcasino.com/pdf/trcpress_012813.pdf Accessed February 3, 2014; 

Author observation, December 4, 2013.

68. California Intelligent Communities. February 26, 2002. "California Intelligent Communities 

Announces Development Plans for 9,000-acre Joshua Hills Community." JTNP Archives, 

Uncatalogued materials; "Developer to unveil revised plan for 9,000-acre project." The Desert 

Sun, February 26, 2002; "$26-Million Deal Will Save 8,800 Acres of Fragile Desert." Los 

Angeles Times, September 30, 2004; GLC Enterprises, LLC. April 3, 2012. "Paradise Valley 

Specific Plan." JTNP Management Assistant Files.

69. U. S. Navy and NPS. March 2000. "Environmental Assessment for the Modification of VR1257." JTNP Library.

70. Ibid; Rick Anderson to the Regional Director, July 1, 1986. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, Y14, Folder 045; Jim Haitt to Bob Binnewies, October 29, 1986. JTNP Archives, 
364

Hollinger Box of Unprocessed Files, Loose report; JTNP Briefing Statement for Secretary Bruce 

Babbitt, February 8, 1995. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Folder "Eagle 

Mountain Landfill"; Robert B. Pirie, Jr. to Dr. Dickson J. Hingson, February 10, 1997. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 822, Cat. 30022, Box "EA of VR-1257," Folder 1c.

71. U. S. Bureau of Mines. 1943. “Eagle Mountains Iron District.” War Minerals Report 97, 

JTNP Archives, Acc. 797, Cat. 27731, Series 005, Box 7, Folder 019; “Kaiser Company Buys 

Iron Chief Mine in 29 Palms’ ‘Front Yard.'” The Desert Trail, February 25, 1944; O. A. 

Tomlinson to the Director, January 7, 1947. SB, RG 79, Central Decimal Files, Box 306, Folder 

609-01; Private Law 82-790, 66 Stat. A129. 

72. “Plan told to build mine workers a town of their own.” The Daily Enterprise, January 25, 

1967; “Mine Workers Hang On and Hope.” Los Angeles Times, January 25, 1967; “Kaiser Mine 

to Furlough 1,200.” Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1975; “Arab Is Buying Major Interest in Kaiser 

Steel for $57 Million.” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1981; “As Town Closes, Class Gets Tough 

Economics Lesson.” Los Angeles Times, May 29, 1983.

73. Riverside County. May 29, 1996. “Public Use Permit No. 585, Revised Permit No. 3 

Expanded Statement of Project.” JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, 

Folder “Prison”; Mine Reclamation Corporation. May 1989. “Eagle Mountain Project 

Overview.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L76, Folder 268. 

74. Mine Reclamation Corporation 1989, “Eagle Mountain Project Overview.” JTNP Archives, 

Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L76, Folder 268; Rick Anderson to David Mares, September 12, 1989. 

Ibid. 

75. RECON Environmental Consultants. July 1991. “Draft environmental impact statement,

environmental impact report for the Eagle Mountain Landfill Project.” JTNP Library.

76. Ibid.

77. BLM. March 12, 2004. “Eagle Mountain Land Exchange and Landfill.” Briefing statement in 

JTNP Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain 2008”; California Natural Resources 

Agency. 2012. “CEQA: California Environmental Quality Act.” 

http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/CEQA_Handbook_2012_wo.pdf Accessed October 6, 2013.

78. Mine Reclamation Corporation 1989, “Eagle Mountain Project Overview”; Anderson to 

Mares, September 12, 1989; “EPA Says All Landfills Leak, Even those Using Best Available 

Liners.” Rachel’s Hazardous Waste News #3. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, Box 2, 

Folder 029.

79. “Trash landfill has wilderness guard worried.” Riverside Press Enterprise, December 7, 

1989.

80. “Eagle Mountain plan to be debated.” Riverside Press Enterprise, November 11, 1991; 

“Kaiser Steel ties landfill to comeback.” Riverside Press Enterprise, n.d., 1991. JTNP Library, 

Clippings File; Paul F. Smith. November 2000 “The Eagle Mountain Sting Operation-Part 4.” 
365

The Sun Runner, 22; Donna Charpied interviewed by the author at Desert Center, California, 

January 24, 2013; Ernest Quintana, telephone interview with the author, September 25, 2013. 

81. “Park service fears proposed dump would worsen pollution in the desert.” The Fresno Bee, 

July 18, 1991.

82. David E. Moore to Russell Kaldenberg, April 13, 1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L7617, Folder 286.

83. Ibid.

84. Eagle Mountain Energy Company. February 7, 1994. “Proposed Eagle Mountain 

Hydroelectric Project.” WRO Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder “Briefing 

Statements 1994.”

85. Dr. Jerry Freilich, interview by the author, Olympic National Park Headquarters, June 24, 

2013; “Sierra Club, Greenpeace oppose regional landfill.” Riverside Press-Enterprise, June 17, 

1992; David E. Moore to Patricia (Corky) Larson, July 6, 1992. JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 

19430, L7617, Folder 286; Steve Clute to Henri Bisson, December 4, 1992. JTNP Archives, 

Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Legal Stuff”; “Legality of Eagle Mountain 

land deal questioned.” Riverside Press-Enterprise, September 29, 1992.

86. NPS. June 30, 1993. “Draft Memorandum of Understanding Among National Park Service, 

Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the County of Riverside and Mine 

Reclamation Corporation.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 797, Cat, 27731, Series 1, Box 1; JTNP. July 

23, 1995. “Joshua Tree National Park – Mine Reclamation Meeting Proposed Agenda.” JTNP

Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Meetings/Trip Reports 1994-

1999.”

87. “Bedrock poses testing problem.” Riverside Press-Enterprise, October 3, 1992; “Landfill 

wins county OK.” Riverside Press-Enterprise, October 7, 1992.

88. BLM. October 1993. “Record of Decision Eagle Mountain Landfill Project Riverside 

County, California.” JTNP Library; “Landfill Report ‘Flawed.’” The Desert Sun, July 27, 1994; 

Ernest Quintana to the Regional Director with attached background summary, May 9, 1994. 

JTNP Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain.”

89. Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. July 26, 1994. “Statement of Decision—

NPCA et al. v. County of Riverside et al., and Laurence and Donna Charpied v. County of 

Riverside et al. Case No. 662907.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, Cat. 19430, L3023, Folder 193; 

The Desert Sun. “Landfill Report ‘Flawed.’” 

90. “Kaiser joins MRC in appeal over landfill ruling.” The Desert Sun, September 23, 1994; 

“County rescinds landfill permits.” The Desert Sun, November 9, 1994; “County won’t appeal 

ruling against landfill plan.” Riverside Press-Enterprise, November 2, 1994; U. S. House of 

Representatives Report 103-498. October 9, 1994. “California Desert Protection Act Legislative 

History,” JTNP Archives, Acc. 797, Cat. 27731, Series 1, Box 1; “Candidates see merits of 

landfill.” The Desert Sun, October 26, 1994.
366

91. Clem Palevich to Stanley Albright, May 11, 1994. WRO Planning Files, Joshua Tree 

National Park File, Folder “Eagle Mountain Pump Storage”; Patricia L. Neubacher to Michael 

Spencer, June 29, 1994. WRO Planning Files, Joshua Tree National Park File, Folder “General 

Environmental Compliance”; Chief, Water Rights Branch to Superintendent, JTNP, December 2, 

1994. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, loose document.

92. Ed Hastey to Lois D. Cashell, January 6, 1995. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle 

Mountain Files, Box 1, loose document; Mine Reclamation Corporation and Kaiser Eagle 

Mountain, Inc. April 14, 1995. “Eagle Mountain Landfill and Recycling Center Project 

Description.” Ibid., Folder “MRC/Eagle Mountain”; GeoSyntec Consultants. March 1995.

“Evaluation of Ground-Water Impacts Proposed Eagle Mountain Pumped-Storage Hydroelectric 

Project Chuckwalla Aquifer Riverside County, California.” Ibid., loose report; Riverside County 

Planning Department. May 6, 1995. “Notice of Preparation for an Environmental Impact Report 

(EIR) for the Eagle Mountain Landfill and Recycling Center Riverside County, California.” 

Ibid., Folder “Correspondence.”

93. Julia Dougan to Ernest Quintana, May 12, 1995. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle 

Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “NPS-BLM Correspondence”; Kathy Billings for Ernest Quintana 

to Julia Dougan, June 20, 1995. Ibid; Ernest Quintana to Julia Dougan with attached “Issues 

Identification,” June 29, 1995. Ibid.

94. CH2M Hill began in the 1930s when an Oregon State University engineering professor and 

three of his students formed Cornell, Howland, Hayes and Merryfield which became known as 

CH2M. In 1971 the firm merged with Clair A. Hill and Associates to become CH2M Hill. 

http://www.ch2m.com/corporate/about_us/history.asp Accessed October 12, 2013; Office of the 

Solicitor to Ernie Quintana, May 10, 1995. Handwritten memo in JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued 

Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Superintendent Quintana Eagle Mountain”; Orlando H. 

Gonzales to Paul Clark, July 19, 1996. Ibid., Folder “Prison”; Ralph Raya to Gary Ollivier, 

August 12, 1996. Ibid; “More landfill delays costly.” The Desert Sun, September 8, 1995.

95. JTNP. July 21, 1995. “Eagle Mountain Landfill Scoping Meeting.” JTNP Archives, 

Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Meetings/Trip Reports 1994-1999”; Stanley 

Albright to Jerry Lewis, October 19, 1995. Ibid., Folder “Eagle Mountain Public Comments.” 

96. Ernest Quintana. n.d. Draft transcript of testimony about the landfill. JTNP Archives, Acc. 

797, Cat. 27731, Series 1, Box1, loose document.

97. Tom Peters to Joan Oxedine and Dave Mares, December 1, 1995. Ibid., Folder “Eagle 

Mountain Landfill”; Ernest Quintana, interview, September 25, 2013. Ibid., Folder 

“Meetings/Trip Reports 1994-1999.” 

98. Tom Peters to Ernest Quintana et al., February 2, 1996. WRO, Mulhern Files, Box 25, Folder 

“JOTR Eagle Mountain”; Ralph G. Mihan to Superintendent, JTNP, February 7, 1996. JTNP 

Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “NPS Internal Correspondence”; 

Frank Buono for Ernest Quintana to Henri Bisson, March 14, 1996. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, 

Cat. 28768, GMP Files, Box 2, Folder 029; National Parks and Conservation Association. n.d. 

“Briefing Sheet—Eagle Mountain impacts to Joshua Tree.” JTNP Archives, Land Files, Folder 

“Eagle Crest Project.”
367

99. Anne Wexler to Roger Kennedy, March 20, 1996. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle 

Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Correspondence”; David Barna to Donna Charpied, May 8, 

1996. Ibid.

100. Ernest Quintana, telephone interview, September 25, 2013; Michael Soukup to Ernest 

Quintana, August 2, 1996. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder 

“MOU with Mine Reclamation Corporation 1992-1999”; Stanley T. Albright to Julia Dougan 

with attached comments on the environmental impact report/statement, October 1, 1996. JTNP 

Archives, Acc. 797, Cat. 27731, Series 1, Box 1, loose document; NPS. December 9, 1996. 

“Agreement between the National Park Service and Mine Reclamation Corporation, Eagle 

Mountain Reclamation, inc., Kaiser Eagle Mountain, Inc. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle 

Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “MOU with Mine Reclamation Corporation 1992-1999”; 

“Agreement on landfill plan fails to silence critic.” Riverside Press-Enterpise, December 21, 

1996; Arthur W. Lowe to Fred Springer, September 6, 1996. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued 

Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, loose document.

101. Larry and Donna Charpied to Denis Galvin, January 6, 1997. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued 

Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “MOU with Mine Reclamation Corporation 1992-1999”; 

Brian Huse to Denis P. Galvin, January 8, 1997. JTNP Archives, Acc. 812, Cat. 28768, GMP 

Files, Box 4, Folder 0292; William J. Whalen. April 1997. “An Analysis of the Agreement and 

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions between the Mine Reclamation 

Corporation/Kaiser Eagle Mountain and the National Park Service.” JTNP Archives, Acc. 651, 

Cat. 28859, A44, Folder 020; “County gives Eagle Mountain landfill final OK.” Riverside PressEnterprise, September 10, 1997; BLM. September 25, 1997. “BLM Approves Eagle Mountain 

Land Exchange.” JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Eagle 

Mountain Pumped Storage Project.”

102. JTNP. October 15, 1997. “Joshua Tree Superintendent Ernie Quintana to Receive Stephen 

Mather Award.” JTNP Library, Clippings files.

103. “Judge blocks landfill.” The Desert Sun, February 19, 1998; “County will back Eagle 

Mountain effort.” The Desert Sun, April 15, 1998. 

104. California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1. May 7, 1999. “National Parks and 

Conservation Association et al. v. County of Riverside and Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. et al. and 

Lawrence Charpied et al. v. County of Riverside and Mine Reclamation Corporation et al.” No. 

D031056; John J. Reynolds to Kay Hazen, May 18, 1999. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle 

Mountain Files, Box 1, Folder “Internal Correspondence.”

105. BLM. October 13, 1999. “BLM and Kaiser Complete Land Exchange in Riverside County.” 

JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, loose document; Mine Reclamation 

Corporation et al. January 2000. “Amended and Restated Agreement Among the National Park 

Service and Mine Reclamation Corporation, Eagle Mountain Reclamation, Inc. [and] Kaiser 

Eagle Mountain, Inc.” JTNP Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain Pre-2000”; JTNP. 

June 2011. “Eagle Mountain Landfill Project Status.” Briefing statement in JTNP 

Superintendent’s Digital Files.
368

106. Quoted in Paul F. Smith. April 2001. “The Eagle Mountain Sting Operation—Part 9.” The 

Sun Runner, 20.

107. Mike Pool. March 12, 2004. “Eagle Mountain Land Exchange and Landfill.” BLM Briefing 

Statement. JTNP Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain 2008”; Margaret Adam to Amy 

Fesnock et al., January 30, 2004. JTNP Archives, Uncatalogued Eagle Mountain Files, Box 1, 

Folder “Information provided by the Charpieds”; “Plan filed to reopen prison.” Riverside PressEnterprise, September 15, 2006; Arthur W. Lowe to Magalie R. Salas, March 10, 2006. JTNP 

Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain—Proposed Jails.”

108. Kaiser Ventures, Inc. n.d. “Eagle Mountain Landfill Project.” 

http://www.kaiserventures.com/p_waste.htm Accessed March 10, 2005; United States District 

Court for the Central District of California-Eastern Division. September 20, 2005. “Donna 

Charpied v. U.S. Department of the Interior and National Parks et al. and Conservation 

Association v. Bureau of Land Management et al.” JTNP Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle 

Mountain 2005-2006”; JTNP. October 21, 2005. “Eagle Mountain Landfill.” JTNP Archives, 

Land files, Folder “Eagle Mountain-2007”; “Group rallies to stop landfill.” The Desert Sun, 

October 26, 2005.

109. “Report: Eagle Mountain ex-prison plans ‘ill advised.’” Riverside Press-Enterprise, August 

25, 2007; Donald H. Clarke to Kimberly Bose, April 23, 2010. JTNP Archives, Land Files, 

Folder “Eagle Crest Project.”

110. U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. January n.d., 2007. “National Parks and 

Conservation Association v. Bureau of Land Management; Department of the Interior and Kaiser 

Eagle Mountain, Inc., Mine Reclamation Corporation-Case 05-56814.” JTNP Archives, Land 

Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain-2007”; U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. November 

10, 2009. “National Parks and Conservation Association v. Bureau of Land Management; 

Department of the Interior and Kaiser Eagle Mountain, Inc.; Mine Reclamation CorporationCase 05-56814.” http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/11/10/05-56814.pdf 

Accessed October 15, 2013; Robert V. Abbey to Wilma A. Lewis, January 19, 2010. JTNP 

Archives, Land Files, Folder “Eagle Mountain 2008”; JTNP. April 2011. “Eagle Mountain 

Landfill Project Status.” Briefing statement in JTNP Management Assistant’s Digital Files.

111. “Obama Administration Recognizes Joshua Tree National Park’s Importance to the 

American People.” n.d. 2011, JTNP Management Assistant’s Digital Files; Sanitation Districts 

of Los Angeles County. May 22, 2013. “Sanitation Districts of Los Angeles County Cease 

Negotiations for Eagle Mountain Landfill Project and Look to Expand Evaluation of Long Term 

Waste Management Strategies.” JTNP Superintendent’s Digital Files. 

112. Deanne Stillman. January 7, 2009. “Guardians of Joshua Tree.” Plenty Magazine. 

http://www.plentymag.com/features/2009/01/guardians_of_joshua_tree_print.php Accessed 

January 13, 2009; Public Law 95-87; JTNP. June, 2011 “Eagle Mountain Landfill Project 

Status.” JTNP Superintendent’s Digital Files.

113. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. January 2012. “Final Environmental Impact 

Statement for the Hydropower License.” JTNP Superintendent’s Files; KCET. July 16, 2013. 

“CA Signs Off On Controversial Project Next to Joshua Tree Nat’ Park.” 
369

http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/the-grid/hydroelectric-energy-joshua-tree-national-park-eaglemountain.html Accessed October 4, 2013.

114. Comments of Joshua Tree officials to the author during January and April 2013 research 

visits to the park; Mark Butler interviewed by the author at JTNP, December 4, 2013.

115. Mark Butler. December 3, 2013. "Briefing Statement." JTNP Superintendent's Files.

116. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. November 17, 2008. "Executive Order S-14-08. 

http://gov38.ca.gov/index.php?/executive-order/11072/ Accessed February 5, 2014; Public Law 

111-5; Todd Woody. October 27, 2010. "In California's Mojave Desert, Solar-Thermal Projects 

Take Off." Yale Environment 360; California Energy Commission. 2014. "Ivanpah Solar Electric 

Generating System." http://www.energy.ca.gov/tour/ivanpah/ Accessed February 5, 2014; 

"Paving a fast lane for desert solar." San Diego Union-Tribune, January 1, 2013.

117. DRECP. 2013. "Background." http://www.drecp.org/whatisdrecp/ Accessed January 22, 

2014. The main website for DRECP has numerous documents that explain the organization, the 

plan and its alternatives.

118. Kevin Hendricks and Andrea Compton. January 6, 2011. "Renewable Energy Projects near 

Joshua Tree NP." JTNP Management Assistant's files; Solar Energy Development Information 

Center. 2012. "Solar Energy Development Programmatic EIS." 

http://solareis.anl.gov/sez/riverside_east/index.cfm Accessed February 5, 2014; BLM. 2014.

"Desert Sunlight Solar Farm." https://www.google.com/#q=desert+sunlight+solar+farm 

Accessed February 5, 2014; BLM. 2014. "Desert Harvest Solar Farm. 

http://www.blm.gov/ca/st/en/fo/palmsprings/Solar_Projects/Desert_Harvest_Solar_Project.html 

Accessed February 5, 2014; BrightSource Energy, Inc. 2014. "Palen." 

http://www.brightsourceenergy.com/palen#.UvK_rViYaM8 Accessed February 4, 2014; 

Renewable Energy World. Com. December 17, 2013."California Energy Commission Splits on 

Blythe and Palen Solar Projects." 

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/12/california-energy-commissionsplits -on-two-solar-projects Accessed February 5, 2014. 

119. Hendricks and Compton 2011.

Epilogue

1. Mark Butler. August 8, 2011. "75th Anniversary Presentation." JTNP Superintendent's Files.

2. Mark Butler. March 27, 2013. "Mt Minerva Hoyt Dedication / Minerva Hoyt California Desert 

Conservation Award Ceremony." Ibid.