### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Jun e 26, 200 3
ELIZ ABE TH D . O LIVE R v. MA RC L. OLIV ER Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 99D-757 M uriel Robins on, Jud ge

No. M2002- 02880-COA-R 3-CV - F iled April 26, 2004

Th is a pp e a l invo lve s a

fathe r’ s e ff

or t to ob ta in pr ima

ry phy sic a l c us tod

y of his no w t we lve -ye ar- old daug hter. Appr ox imately three months after the parties’ divorce , the father f i l ed a p eti tion in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to hold the mother in criminal contempt for

interfe ring with his visi tation and for alienating their daug hter. He late r ame nded his petition to seek primary phy sical custody

. Following a bench t rial, t he trial court held the mother in contempt but declined to chang e custody from the mother t o the father. The father has appea led. We have de termined that the trial cour

t did not err by

denying the fathe r’s pe tition t o chang e custody

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R

. , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined. Rosemary

E. Phill ips, Goodlettsvill e, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Marc L . Oliver.
Eliz abeth D. O liver, Na shville, Tennessee , Pro Se.
OP IN ION

I.
Marc L . Oliver a

nd Eliz abeth D. O liver we re divorc ed on May 22, 2000. The fina l divorce decr ee e ntered b y

the Circuit Court for Davidson County approve d and incor

porate d a mar ital dis so lut ion a g re e me nt pr ov idi ng that th e y wo uld have joi nt l e g a l c us tod

y of the ir the n n ine -ye ar- old daug hter but that Ms. Oliver would be the primary phy sical custo d i an
. The mar ital dissolut ion ag ree ment define d Dr. Oliver ’s visitation rights, and the final divorce decr ee c ontained standa rd prohibitions aga inst im pedingvisitation or alienating the child.

I mmediately

afte r the divorce , Ms. O liver beg an interfe ring with D r. Oliver’s visitation and making derog atory

rema rks about him to their child. Specifica lly , Ms. Oliver (1) denied Dr . Oliver his Wed ne sd ay night vis itatio ns fo r fi ve we e ks , ( 2) de liv e re d th e c hil d late and pic ke d h e r u

p e arl yT he m ari t al dis sol ut i o n agreem ent pro vi d ed t hat D r. O l i ver was t o be gi ven t he f i rs t op p o rt uni t y t o ba b y si t t he 1 part i es ’ daugh t er dur i ng t i mes whe n t he mo t her r equi r ed a babys i t t er and t hat M s
. O l i ver coul d u s e a not her baby s i t t er o n ly i f D r. O live r w a s n o t av a ilab le

.

B ot h of t h es e pr oce edi n g s w er e l at er di s mi s s ed. 2

-2- duringvisitation t imes, (3) re fused to provide Dr. Oliver with information reg ardingwhen to pick up the child for his July

1 throug h 9, 2000 visitation, (4) ref used to allow phone a cce ss to the child, (5 ) r e pe a te dly

ma de de ro g ator

y c omm e nts a

bo ut D r. Ol ive r i n th e c hil d’ s p re se nc e , a nd (6 ) f a ile d to offe r Dr. O liver the opportunity to baby sit the child. 1 On August 29, 2000, Dr. Oliver filed a petition in the t rial court seeking to hold Ms. Oliver in c on te mpt

and to m od if y the vis itatio n a

rr ang e me nts in t

he mari ta l di sso lut ion

a greeme nt. Ms. Oliver re sponded to this petition by swea ringout a war

rant for hara ssment ag ainst D r. Ol i v er a nd by seekingan order of protec tion. She also arbitra rily remove d the child from her eleme ntary school 2 and place d her in a

nother school to make it more difficult for Dr. Oliver

to have lunch w ith the child. Acc ording ly , on J anuar

y 9, 2001, Dr. Oliver amende d his petition to seek primar y phy sical custody of the pa rties’ da ug hter.
The trial c ourt conduc ted a be nch trial on F ebrua ry 26, 2002. The c ou rt found Ms. Oliver had set upon a

course of behavior t hat had succe ssfully alienate d the child from Dr. Oliver. Af ter concludingthat Ms. Olive r was guilty of thirteen w illful viol ations of the mar ital dissolut ion
a g re e me nt a

nd fi na l di vo rc e de c re e , th e tr ia l c ourt se nte nc e d h e r t o a

su sp e nd e d 1 30 -d ay

ja il sentenc e. Howe ver, the trial court de cl ined to awa rd Dr. O liver primar

y phy sical custody

of the parties’ daug hter. Dr . Oliver a ppeals the latter dec ision.

II. Custody and visitation decisions are amongthe most important decisions that courts make. Steen v . Steen , 61 S.W .3d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 484 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Their chief purpose is to promote t he child’s welfar e by cre ating an envir onment th at promotes a nur turing relationship wit h both pare nts. Aaby v . Strange , 924 S.W .2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996)

. Eac h pare nt ha s his or her own streng ths and wea knesses, Ga sk

ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), a nd it would be unrea listi c to measur e ea ch par ent aga inst the standard of per fec tion. Ea rls v . E

ar ls , 4 2 S.W.3 d 877 , 885 (T e nn . Ct. App . 2 00 0) ; Bu sh v . B us h , 684 S.W .2d 89, 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). There fore , custody decisions are not intended to re war d pare nts for prior virtuous conduct or to punish them for their human fra ilties or past misst eps. Ea rls v . E ar ls , 42 S.W. 3d

at 88 5; Ga sk

ill v . G as k ill , 93 6 S.W. 2d a t 63 0. Rathe r, takin g the pa re nts a s th e y

pr e se ntl y are , th e c ourt s mu st p ra g matic a lly de c ide wh e the r t

he pa re nts , e ve n th ou g h d ivo rc e d, wi ll b e a ble to sh are the re sp on sib ili tie s fo r ra isi ng the ir c hil d o r, if no t, whic h o f t

he tw o p are nts is c omp arativ e ly more fit to take on the primary pare nting r ole.O ver t he y ears, t he T enness ee S up rem e C o urt has co nsi st ent l y d ecl i ned t o revi ew t hi s co urt ’ s d eci si o ns ho l d i ng 3 tha t t h e c h a n g e d c irc u m sta n c e s tha t will t rig g e r a c o n sid e ra tio n o f a c h a n g e in c u sto d y m u st in v o lve c h a n g e s in th e c h ild ’s
c irc u m sta n c e s ra the r t h a n in eith e r o r b o th o f the p a re n ts’ c irc u m sta n c e s. St een v. St een , 6 1 S .W .3 d a t 3 2 7 ; H o a lc ra ft
v. Sm i t hs on , 19 S. W

. 3d at 829

. T he C our t ha s now deci ded t hat a c han ge i n ei t her pare nt ’ s ci r cums t anc es ca n a l s o t r i gg er a c han ge of

cu s t od y i f

t he cha ng e “ af

f ect s t he chi l d’ s wel l

- bei ng
. ” K endri ck v. Sho em ake , 90 S. W

. 3d at 570

. W hi l e a c h a n g e in the cus t o d i al pa rent ’ s ci rcum st ances necess ari l y af f ect s t he chi l d , a change i n t he no ncust o d i al pa ren t’s
c irc u m sta n c e s m a y no t. B e c a u se the c o u rt d id no t ex p licitly l im it K endri ck v. Sho em ake t o chang es i n t he cus t od i al p a re n t’s circ u m sta n c e s, w e m u s t p re su m e tha t t h e c o u rt n o w e n v isio n s tha t ch a n g e s in a no n c u sto d ia l p a re n t’s ci r cums t anc es can ju s t i f y a cha ng e o f

cus t od y i f

t he nonc us t od i al p ar ent can d emo ns t r at e t hat t he cha ng e i n h i s or her ci r cu ms t an ce s s omeh ow af f ec t s t h e ch i l d.
-3- Children thrive in s table envir onments. Aaby v . Strange , 924 S.W .2d at 627; National Interdisciplinary Colloqui um on C h i l dC u stody , Le ga l an d M

e nta l H e alt h P e rsp e c tiv es o n Ch ild Cus tod yLaw: A D esk

bo ok for J ud ge s § 5:1, at 51 (1998) ( “

Legal and M

ental Health Perspe ctives
on Child Custody Law ”). Acc ording ly , the courts favor exis ting custody arr ang ements. Taylor v. Taylor , 8 49 S.W. 2d

31 9, 33 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W.3 d 8 22 , 8 28 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1999). In fac t, a custody decision, once made a

nd implemented, is considere d res judicata upon the fa cts in exis tence or rea sonably fore seea ble when the de cision was made

. Y ou ng v . S mi th , 193 Te nn
. 48 0, 48 5, 24 6 S.W. 2d 93 , 95 (1952 ); Steen v . Steen , 6 1 S. W.3 d at 32 7; Solima v. Solima , 7 S.W .3d 30, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Despite a

pref er en ce fo r continuingexis ting c ustody arr ang ements, the c ourts have
rec og nized that the circumstanc es of c hildren an d their par ents cha ng e. Ac cording ly , our statutes and dec isions em p o wer

the cour ts to alter custody

arr ang ements whe n interveningcirc umstances require modifications. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101( a)( 1) (Supp. 2003). Thus, c ourts may modify an existi ngcustody

arr ang ement whe n require d by unanticipated fac t s or subseque ntly emer g ing conditions. Sm ith v . H

aa se , 5 21 S.W. 2d

49 , 5 0 ( Te nn .1 97 5) ; Ad el s p erger v. Adelsperge r , 970 S.W .2d at 485. In the intere sts of stability in the child’s life, a

court should not alter a

n exis ting custody arr ang ement until (1) it is satisfied either that the child’s circ umstances have chang ed in a materia l way

since the e ntry

of the pr es en t ly

opera tive custody

decr ee or

that a par ent’s
c ircum st ances hav e c ha

ng e d in a wa y tha t a ff e c ts the c hil d’ s w e ll- be ing , ( 2) it h a s c are fu lly compar ed the c urre nt fitness of the par ents to be the child’s custodi an, and (3) it has concluded that chang ing the exis ting c ustody arr ang ement is in t h e ch ild’s best interests. Kendrick v . Shoemak e , 90 S.W. 3d

56 6, 57 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002)

. There are no brig ht line rules for de t er m i n i n g when a chang e of c ircumstance s should be deeme d materia l enoug h to warr ant cha ng ing a n exis ting c ustody arr ang ement. Kendrick v

. Shoemak e , 9 0 S. W.3 d at 57 0; Taylor v. Taylor , 849 S.W. 2d a t 32 7; Solima v. Solima , 7 S.W .3d at 32. These de cisions turn on the unique fa cts of ea ch ca se. As a gen er al m att er, how ever , the following principles illuminate the inquiry . First, the c hang e of circ umstances must involve either the child’s cir cumstance s or a pa rent’s c ircumstance s that aff ect the child’s we ll-being

. Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 90 S.W .3d at 570. Second, the chang ed circ umstances must have arisen afte r the e ntry 3 of the c ustody order soug ht to be modified. Turner v. Turner , 776 S.W .2d 88, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Third, the c hang ed cir cumstance s must not have been r easona b l y anticipated when the underlying de cre e wa s entere d. Adelsperge r v. Ade lsperger , 9 7 0 S

. W

. 2 d at 4 8 5

. Fo urt h , th e c h an ge-4-

i nc i r c u m s t an c e s mu s ta f

f e c tth e c h i l d ’ s w e l l

- b e i n g i n s o m e m a t e r i a l w ay. Kendrick v . Shoemak e , 90 S.W. 3d

at 57 0; Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W. 3d at 15 0; Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W .3d at 829. The pe rson s eekingto chang e an e x isting custody arr ang ement has the burden of de mon str a tin g bo th t

hat th e c hil d’ s c ir c ums tanc e s h ave c ha ng e d mate ri a lly and that the be st i nte re sts of the child require a chang e in the existi ng custody arr ang ement. In re Bridges , 63 S.W .3d 346, 348 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 1) ; Muss e lm an v . A c uff , 826 S.W .2d 920, 922 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). T he thr e sh ol d qu e sti on

is whe the r t

he re ha s b e e n a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in t he c hil d’ s c ir c ums tanc e s. Kendrick v . Shoemak

e , 9 0 S. W.3 d at 57 0; Blair v. Badenhope , 7 7 S. W.3 d at 15 0; P l a ce n cia v. Plac e nc ia , 48 S.W .3d 732, 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I f the pe rson see king the chang e of c ustody cannot de monstrate that the c hild’s circumstanc es have chang ed in s ome m ater ial way , the trial cour t should not re-e x amine the c omparative fitness of the pa rents, Caudill

v. Foley , 21 S.W .3d 203, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), or enga g e in a “best interests of the child” ana ly sis. Rather, in the abse nce of pr oo f o f a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in t he c hil d’ s c ir c ums tanc e s, the tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld s imp ly

de c lin e to chang e custody

. Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W .3d at 828.
Cu st od y and vis itatio n d e c isi on s o ft e n h ing e on su btl e fa c tor s, inc lud ingthe pa re nts ’ demea nor and c redibility

duringthe divorce proce eding s themselves. Adelsperge r v. Ade lsperger , 970 S.W .2d at

4 8 5

. A c c o r d in g ly , a

p p e ll a te c o urts ar e r e lu c ta n t t o s e c o n d

- g u e s s a

tr ia l c o urt’ s de c isi on s. Tr ia l c ourt s mus t be pe rm itt e d to e xer c ise br oa d dis c re tio n in the se matte rs , but the y mus t still be re quired to base their dec isions on the evidence and upon the a ppropriate application of the rele vant leg al principles. D v. K , 917 S.W .2d 682, 685 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p
. 1995). Thus, we revie w these de cisions de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial cour t’s finding s of fa ct ar e corr ect unl ess the evide nce pr eponder ates other wise. Nic ho ls v . Ni c ho ls , 792 S.W .2d 713, 716 (T e nn . 1 99 0) ; Swe tt v . S

we tt , N o. M1 99 8- 00 96 1- CO A- R3- CV , 20 02 WL 13 89 61 4, a t *5 (T e nn . Ct

. App. J une 27, 2002) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

III
. Af te r h e ari nge xten siv e te sti mony fr om b oth pa

re nts , a te a c he r, tw o c o- wo rk e rs of Ms. Ol ive r, and the pa

rt ie s’ da ug hte r, the tr ia l c ourt fo un d that Ms. Ol ive r ha d a c tiv ely and wi llf

ull y int er fe re d wi t h Dr. Oliver ’s visitation. The court fur ther found that Ms. Oliver had a lienated the parties’ daug hter fr om Dr. Oliver. Without ex plaining spe cifica lly whether the alienation rose to the level of a materia l chang e in circ umstances or whether a cha ng e of c ustody

would be in the child’s best interests, the tria l court dec lined to chang e custody and ins tead sought to reme dy the alienating
e ff e c ts o f M s. Ol ive r’ s c on du c t by mod if ying the vis itatio n a g re e me nt a nd by str e ssi ngthat if

Ms. Oliver violated the new a g ree ment then the trial court would awa rd primar y phy sical custody

of the parties’ child to Dr. Oliver.
Dr. Oliver asser

ts that the trial court should have chang ed custody of the pa rties’ da ug hter to h im b e c a

us e the a lie natio n o f t

he c hil d r os e to t

he le ve l of

a mate ri a l ch ange in c ir c ums tanc e s. Ac c or din g to D r
. O l i v e r , a f i n d i n g o f a m a t e r i a l c h an g e i n c i r c u m s t a n c e i s a l l th a t i s n e c e s s a ry to war rant a chang e of c ustody . Dr. Oliver perc eives that the trial court’s disposition of the chang e of custody question was the r esult of its desire to conc lude the trial in a timely manner
.A p a re n t’s f a ilure to a d h e re to the re q u ire m e n ts o f a p a re n ting p la n c a n b e c o n sid e re d a m a te ria l ch a n g e in 4

c irc u m sta n c e s. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -6 -1 0 1 (a )( 2 )( B ).

See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 6 (a)( 1 0 ). 5

-5- We f ind su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to su

pp or t the tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t Ms

. O li v e r s e t u p o n a c o ur s e o f

c o n d u c t i n te n d e d

to a li e n a te th e p arti e s ’ d a u g h te r f r o m D r
. O li v e r
. We further find that the alienation sufficie ntly meets the thre e fa ctors set out in Kendrick v . Shoemak e to constitute a materia l chang e of c ircumstance s. The re cord r efle cts that the alienation occurr ed
a ft e r t he e ntr y of the or de r s ou g ht t o b e mod if ie d a nd that it w a s n e ith e r k

no wn no r r e a so na

bly anticipated when the or der w as ente red.

We now tu rn to the trial cour t’s conclusion that Ms. Oliver’ s conduct ha s undermined the
re latio ns hip be tw e e n D r. Ol ive r a nd the pa rt ie s’ da ug hte r. Th e tr ia l c ourt

ob se rv e d th a t th e c hil d

“ is b e c omi nga

c lon e of the mo th er” and that

the c hil d is bitte r a

nd a lie nate d a s a

re su lt o f M s. Oliver’s c onduct. Takingthe trial cour t’s finding of facts with a pre sumption of corre ctness, as w e must in the absenc e of a preponde ranc e of evidenc e to the contra ry , we f ind that the circ umstances of this case demonstrate a m ater ial chang e in both the circ umstances of the par ties’ daughter a

nd Dr. Oliver. 4 A findingof the e x istence of a mater ial chang e of c ircumstance s does not end the matter

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a ) (2001) a lso require s a dete rmination that chang ing a child’s custody is in the best interests of the c hild. Kendrick v . Shoemak e , 9 0 S.W.3 d at 57 0; se e als o Maybe rry v. Ma y be rry , No. M2002 -0 0 4 2 4 -C OA-R3-CV, 2003 WL21392193, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 17, 20 03 ) ( No Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a

pp lic atio n f

ile d) ; T ur ner v. Pur v is , N o
. M 2 0 02-00023-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 1826223, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2003) ( No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); Sp ata for e v . S pa taf or e , No. E2001-02459- COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL31728879, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec . 5, 2002) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed)

. Although Tenn. C ode Ann. § 36- 6-106(a ) lis ts m ult ipl e fa c tor s to con sid e r i n ma kin g thi s d e te rm inatio n, the ult imate purp os e of the ana ly sis is to promote t he child’s best interests by placingthe child in an envir onment that will best serve the child’s phy sical and emotional nee ds. Parker v . Parker , 9 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 5 5 7 , 5 6 2 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 9 )

. It fo llo ws that the fa ilure of the tr ia l court to und e rg o a f a c tor -b y -f a c tor ana ly sis a c c or din g to t

he statut e is n ot r e ve rs ibl e e rr or

pe r s e , a s lo nga s th e tr ia l cou rt re a c he d a re su lt that is in t

he c hil d’ s b e st in te r e sts. Mays v . Mays , No

. E 2 0 0 1 -0 2 6 3 0 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 2 W L3 1 6 4 0 5 6 5 , at* 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p. Nov. 22, 2002) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Ma

y 5, 2003).
The re cord r efle cts the alienation betw ee n Dr

. Ol iver a nd the par

ties’ daug hter, a s well as other distasteful, if not de plorable, conduct by Ms. O liver. The evidenc e casts serious do u bt
conce rningMs. Oliver’s a bility or incl in ation to perfor

m her pa rentingresponsibilities, including her willingness to fa cilitate and encour ag e a c lose and c ontinuing par ent-c hild relationship betwee n the pa rt ie s’ c hil d a

nd Dr . O liv e r. Ho we ve r, thi s c ir c ums tanc e a lon e is not su ffi cie nt i n th is c a se to

5 require a findingthat chang ing c ustody is curre ntly

in the child’s best intere sts.-6-

The trial c ourt proper ly

took a broa der vie w of the c ircumstance s of t his case
. Although D r. Oliver a sserts that M s
. Oliver’s ina ppropriate conduct r equire s a cha ng e of c ustody , chang ing custody “should neve r be use d to punish or re war d the par ents, but rather should promote [t he child’s] best interests.” Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d at 629. Consequently , the rig hts, desires, and int er est s of Dr. O liver bec ome sec ondary to the best interests of the parties’ child. W hitaker v. W hitaker , 9 57 S.W. 2d

83 4, 83 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App
. 19 97 ). We ho ld t hat D r. Ol ive r h a s n ot m e t hi s burd e n o f s ho wi ngto t

he c ourt ho w a c ha ng e of c us tod y is i n th e c hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts

. The re cord contains no evidenc e reg arding the effec t on the parties’ daug hter of being forc ed to move in w ith Dr

. Oliver. In addition, Dr. Oliver ha s not ex plained how he intended to addr ess and
reme diate the c urre ntly

soured r elationship betwee n him and his daug hter. He has not explained the
arr ang e me nts he ha s ma de fo r her care or th e pla nn e d a lte ratio ns in h is l if e and sc he du le he is prepared to ma

k e to ta k e o n th e r e s p o n s ib il it

y o f b e in g a c u s to d ia l p ar e n t. Wi th o u t th is s ort of
e vid e nc e , w e , li ke the tr ia l c ourt , h ave no re lia ble wa y of a sse ssi ngwh e the r c ha

ng ingc us tod

y wo uld ultimately

be in the child’s be st interests.
A cha ng e of custody is the most drastic reme dy to enforc ing visitation and must clea rly be in the best interests of the child. Consequently , it should only be used in e x treme situations. Legal and Mental He alth Perspective s on Child Custody Law § 1 9. 16 , at 23 5. I t is no surp ri se that mo st states’ laws discourag e judge s from chang ing c ustody unless all other mea

ns have be en exhausted. Legal and Mental He alth Perspective s on Child Custody Law § 20:5, at 246. Despite Ms. Oli ver’ s inappropriate conduc t, a cha ng e of c ustody

should be used only

as a la st resort.
In circ umstances whe re one pare nt has purposely s et o u t t o ali enate a child fr om the other pare n t, p r o f

e s s io n a l a s s is ta

n c e f r o m a p s y c h o lo g is t o r

p s y c h iatr is t m ay

b e r e qu ir e d

to li mi t t

he damag e and to p re v ent i t from bec oming imper vious to im proveme nt. This necessa rily involves counselingfor the c hild, and som etimes, the parent to addre ss the orig ins and history of the be havior. Requiring such counse ling in this case would cer tainly be an appropriate and less dr astic mea sure tha n c ha ng ingthe c ur

re nt c us tod

y arr ang e me nts

.

IV.
We affir m the portion of the orde r deny ing D r. Oliver’ s chang e of c ustody and re mand the
c a se to t he tr ia l c ourt

fo r f ur the r pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt wi th t his op ini on . We ta x the c os ts o f t his
a pp e a l in equ al pr op or

tio ns to E liza

be th D . O liv e r a

nd Marc L . O liv e r f

or wh ic h e xec uti on , if
nece ssary , may

issue.

_____________________________ W I L L I A M C

. K O C H , JR

. , J.