U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

71–036PDF 2011

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZIMBABWE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 2, 2011

Serial No. 112–109

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 6

Ms. Sharon Cromer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development ................................................ 15

Mr. Mark Schneider, senior vice president, International Crisis Group ............ 31

Mr. Paul Fagan, regional director for Africa, International Republican Institute ........................................................................................................................ 41

Mr. Dewa Mavhinga, regional coordinator, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition ......... 49

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 9

Ms. Sharon Cromer: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Mr. Mark Schneider: Prepared statement ............................................................. 34

Mr. Paul Fagan: Prepared statement .................................................................... 43

Mr. Dewa Mavhinga: Prepared statement ............................................................ 52

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 66

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri ................................... 67

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Material submitted for the record ................................... 68

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZIMBABWE 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. We will be joined in a moment by Ranking Member 

Payne, but I thought I might just start. 

I actually have to leave for about 1⁄2 hour. The Immigration Subcommittee of Judiciary is holding a hearing on one of my bills, H.R. 

2121, the China Democracy Promotion Act, and I am the witness. 

So, I will be where you are in 25 minutes. 

So, I think we ought to start, and when Don comes, we will just 

yield to him. 

Good afternoon. 

Our hearing today will examine the current U.S. Government 

policy toward the Republic of Zimbabwe and consider how our policy toward this southern African nation may develop in the years 

ahead. Zimbabwe is considering a new constitution that will lead 

to elections in 2012 that had been postponed from this year. 

There has been mutual hostility between the United States Government and Zimbabwe Government of Robert Mugabe since the 

country became independent in 1980. Mugabe and his supporters 

blame America for not supporting its liberation struggle, while the 

United States has criticized Mugabe’s government consistently for 

human rights abuses, especially against its political opponents. 

With U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Charles Ray encouraging 

U.S. businesses to invest in Zimbabwe last month, it would seem 

that U.S. policy is in the midst of a transformation. 

Following independence from Great Britain in 1980, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s policy of political reconciliation was generally successful during the next 2 years, as the former political 

and military competitors within the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front and rival Patriotic Front Zimbabwe 

African People’s Union began to work together. 

Splits, however, soon developed, as PF–ZAPU leader Joshua 

Nkomo was removed from government. When PF–ZAPU was accused of initiating a rebellion due to the removal of Nkomo from 

the Cabinet, government military forces began a pacification camVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Feb 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\110211\71036 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

paign, primarily in his base, which resulted in as many as 20,000 

civilian deaths. 

In part, through its control of the media, the huge parastatal sector of the economy and the security forces, the Mugabe government 

managed to keep organized political opposition to a minimum 

through most of the 1990s. Beginning in 1999, however, Zimbabwe 

experienced a period of considerable political and economic upheaval. Opposition to President Mugabe and the ZANU–PF government had grown, in part, due to the worsening economic governance issues. 

At one point, one U.S. dollar was worth more than 2.6 billion 

Zimbabwe dollars. Following the seizure of White-owned commercial farms beginning in the 1990s, food output capacity fell some 

45 percent, manufacturing output dropped 29 percent, and unemployment rose to 80 percent. 

The opposition was led by the Movement for Democratic Change, 

or the MDC, which was established in September 1999. The MDC 

led the campaign to handily defeat a referendum that would have 

permitted President Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office. 

Parliamentary elections held in June 2000 were marred by localized violence and claims of electoral irregularities and government 

intimidation of opposition supporters. Still, the MDC succeeded in 

capturing 57 of the 120 seats in the National Assembly. 

The last four national elections—the Presidential election in 

2002, parliamentary elections in 2005, harmonized Presidential 

and parliamentary elections in March 2008, and the Presidential 

runoff in June 2008—were judged to be not free and fair by observers. In the March 2008 elections, two factions of the opposition 

MDC, known as MDC–T to denote Morgan Tsvangirai’s faction and 

MDC–M for the group led by Arthur Mutambara, gained a combined parliamentary majority. Mugabe was declared the winner of 

the June 2008 runoff election after opposing candidate Tsvangirai 

withdrew due to ZANU–PF-directed violence that made a free and 

fair election impossible. 

Negotiations subsequently took place, and in September 2008 the 

three parties signed the Global Political Agreement, or GPA, a 

power-sharing agreement under which Mugabe would retain the 

presidency, Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister. In February 

2008, Tsvangirai was sworn in as Prime Minister and new Cabinet 

ministers and deputy ministers from the two MDC factions and the 

ruling party were also sworn in. 

There is serious contention within the ruling party for the right 

to succeed President Mugabe once he leaves office and added division within the opposition. Politics in Zimbabwe is in flux, to say 

the least. 

It is in this environment that the United States faces the extraordinary challenge of examining our current policy and determining how best it might be adjusted. I look forward to hearing 

from our very distinguished panel of witnesses today on how U.S. 

policy toward Zimbabwe may change to help that nation reach the 

desired goals of democracy and good governance. 

I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, Mr. Payne, 

for any opening comments. 

3

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for agreeing 

to hold this very important hearing on the policy toward Zimbabwe. 

This subcommittee has held a number of hearings on Zimbabwe 

over the years, and we must continue to focus strategically on this 

very important country. 

I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us 

today, Ambassador Carson and Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator Cromer, who both have been working on Africa issues for 

decades. Mr. Carson has been an Ambassador to Zimbabwe, actually, and has served with distinction, and Ms. Cromer’s record is 

outstanding, as we have had her testify before this committee before. I certainly look forward to your testimonies. 

I want to also thank International Crisis Group, IRI, and the 

Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, as well as Open Society Foundations 

and Freedom House, for all of their hard work on this issue. 

In previous hearings, I have discussed Zimbabwe’s rich and complex history. We know of the struggle for independence with Robert 

Mugabe and Josh Nkomo leading ZANU and ZAPU during the 

years of revolution, where Ian Smith and a quarter of a million 

Rhodesians held the entire nation of Zimbabwe, over 7 million 

Blacks, in a situation, as we all know, similar to South Africa, and 

the persons who struggled and fought for independence, even Mr. 

Mugabe and the late Josh Nkomo, should deserve a place in history. 

But it is that history, especially its relatively-recent independence and effort to overcome hundreds of years of colonialism and 

the pillaging of its rich natural resources by the West, that makes 

the current political crisis so difficult to witness today. Also, the 

outstanding education system that was put in place by the new 

Government of Zimbabwe, where even today throughout the continent Zimbabwean citizens tend to the highest-motivated in the 

educational area. 

After independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was prosperous and economic opportunities were abundant. But after years of poor economic policies, mismanagement, and corruption, political and economic upheaval began to take place in the early 2000s. 

Once a hub for young African visionaries, Zimbabwe lost millions 

of young adults to the crisis. Many have left the country for educational and economic opportunities. It is estimated 25 percent of 

Zimbabwe’s population lives now outside of the country. Those who 

remain behind are clamoring for change. 

Yet, Zimbabwe still has a robust and engaged civil society. They 

are active in groups like WAHSA and Zimbabwe Lawyers for 

Human Rights. Many of them face violence, intimidation, detention, and torture. Yet, they continue to stand up for democracy, for 

reform, and for civil and human rights. They are committed to 

holding the government of national unity accountable. Some of 

them are also working to hold SADC accountable. 

I am pleased to welcome Mr. Dewa Mavhinga of Crisis in 

Zimbabwe Coalition to represent the views of the Zimbabwean civil 

society to our panel today. 

In this time of civilian-led uprisings across Africa and the Arab 

world, which has led to the demise of such formidable strong men 

as Mubarak and Ghadafi, it is difficult to digest that just 3 years 

4

ago a compromise approach to regime change in Africa was deemed 

acceptable by some. Of course, the 2008 Global Political Agreement 

is far from perfect, but many believed that it was the most viable 

option for democratic change at the time. 

However, we saw with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 

Sudan, and we still see it, the signing of a political or a peace 

agreement does not automatically bring dramatic change and security, as we can see in Abyei and Southern Kordofan and other 

areas of Sudan. Rather, it is a starting point from which to build. 

The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as they say. 

Unfortunately, President Mugabe’s ZANU–PF and the aligned 

security sector leaders have used brutal force to obstruct the reform process and attempted to divert attention away from the GPA 

by calling for hasty elections in March of next year. Domestic, regional, and international stakeholders have all stressed that elections should not occur until the Southern African Development 

Community, SADC, can facilitate the necessary framework for free 

and fair elections. Rushing the process and failing to implement 

necessary reforms prior to the elections could result in increased violence and destabilization that would threaten the entire area. 

Nevertheless, Mugabe continues to campaign, claiming only God 

can remove him from the presidency. And his supporters in the security sector continue to use harassment and intimidation tactics 

to suppress the opposition. 

I was disturbed to learn that just yesterday police officers 

aligned with the ZANU–PF sealed off the MDC campaign headquarters and used tear gas on MDC supporters and bystanders. 

The guarantors of the political agreement, the Africa Union and 

the Southern African Development Community, SADC, have begun 

to tire of Mugabe’s obstructionist tactics. Earlier this year, South 

Africa’s President Jacob Zuma and SADC made it clear to Mugabe 

that ZANU–PF must adhere to the provisions of the GPA, end violence against MDC supporters, contemplate significant changes to 

the country’s governmental operation procedures, or else forfeit regional legitimacy. 

It is against this backdrop of intimidation and violence that we 

now consider U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe. Many observers believe 

that the new determination by South Africa and SADC to resolve 

the crisis presents the United States with a political opening to reinvigorate our engagement with SADC in order to help ensure orderly democratic transition in Zimbabwe. 

I agree that the United States and international community 

must do whatever we can to support SADC’s mediation efforts 

while also engaging reform-minded elements within Zimbabwe’s 

unity government. And, of course, we should also continue to engage and support Zimbabwe’s civil society leaders in their effort to 

press for reform. 

Beginning in 2003, under President Bush and continuing under 

President Obama, the United States has implemented targeted 

sanctions against leaders of the ZANU–PF party for their violations of the rights of the Zimbabwean people. In addition to sanctions, the U.S. has placed restrictions on the aid that can be granted to Zimbabwe. Due to defaults in its debt service to the U.S., the 

unity government is ineligible to receive direct assistance. 

5

While I certainly agree that we should mount significant pressure on any government officials who suppress the democratic will 

of the people, I want to ensure that our efforts to punish unjust 

leaders do not inadvertently harm innocent civilians. I am pleased 

that the State Department continues to review and revise the sanctions list to ensure that entities that do not belong on the list are 

removed. 

What’s more, in the case of Zimbabwe, we must be doing everything in our power to support reform-minded leaders in the unity 

government, such as MDC’s Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, who 

has implemented innovative and impactful reforms under extreme, 

difficult circumstances. 

That is why in the previous Congress I introduced H.R. 5971, the 

Zimbabwe Renewal Act of 2010. This act would authorize debt forgiveness with Zimbabwe by U.S. Government agencies. I have not 

yet reintroduced a bill for this Congress because I want to take the 

testimony we hear today into careful consideration before revising 

the legislation. 

I am particularly interested to hear from our witnesses on the 

assessment of the progress that Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai 

and the MDC formations have made in implementing critical reforms as well as recommendations on how the U.S. can best support those reforms and meaningful democratic transition in 

Zimbabwe. 

Thank you again, Chairman Smith, for agreeing to hold this important hearing. I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne. 

Without objection, the full bios of our distinguished witnesses 

will be made a part of the record. 

But, in short form, Ambassador Johnnie Carson currently serves 

as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs, a 

position he has held since May 2009. 

Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in public 

service, including 37 years in the Foreign Service, including serving 

as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and as Mr. Payne reminded 

us, to Zimbabwe itself. Ambassador Carson has also served as the 

staff director of the House Africa Subcommittee and as Peace Corps 

volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is also the recipient of 

numerous awards for his service from the U.S. Department of 

State. 

We will then hear from Ms. Sharon Cromer, who is currently 

Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Africa Bureau of 

USAID, a position she has held since May 2010. Ms. Cromer is a 

Senior USAID Foreign Service Officer with more than 20 years of 

experience in the international humanitarian and development assistance area. 

Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. Cromer served as 

Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance on a temporary basis before assuming 

the position as Deputy Administrator in the Bureau of Management. 

Ambassador Carson, if you could begin? 

6

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you very much. Chairman Smith 

and Ranking Member Payne, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you concerning the situation in Zimbabwe and about 

U.S./Zimbabwean relations. 

Zimbabwe is a country of enormous economic, agricultural, and 

mineral potential. Unfortunately, a history of fiscal mismanagement for governance and a culture of political violence have limited 

that potential for nearly 15 years. While some visible improvements have been made, serious challenges remain. 

After a deeply flawed and violent election in 2008, Zimbabwe’s 

former opposition parties are now part of a transitional coalitional 

government that has lasted nearly 3 years. This coalition government was established under the stewardship of the Southern African Development Community as a key element in the Global Political Agreement which was negotiated between the two opposing 

parties to end political violence and move past the contested elections. 

Although significant challenges remain on the political front, 

there has been some progress. A tripartisan parliamentary committee has sought input for a new draft constitution from millions 

of Zimbabweans. 

Zimbabwe’s economy, which was dollarized in 2009, has made a 

remarkable recovery. The International Monetary Fund estimated 

that Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product grew at approximately 9 

percent in 2010. 

Humanitarian need has decreased significantly since 2009, when 

7 million people received humanitarian aid. In January 2012, the 

number of people needing humanitarian assistance is projected to 

be just 1 million. Schools and health clinics previously closed due 

to a lack of staff and supplies have been reopened and are providing vital social services to the Zimbabwean people. 

At the same time, substantial progress has been impeded by censorship, weak rule of law, and the continued political manipulation 

of state institutions. Politically motivated harassment, intimidation, and violence continue, and state institutions are beholden to 

partisan agendas. 

The United States has always supported the aspirations of the 

people of Zimbabwe to create a country that would truly empower 

its citizens. In the 1960s and 1970s, we supported United Nations’ 

efforts to pressure Rhodesian authorities to accept majority rule. 

The United States was the first country to extend diplomatic relations to the newly-independent Zimbabwe in April 1980. We have 

also voiced our concern when the liberation era leadership has 

taken actions that have threatened Zimbabwe’s stability, prosperity, and development as a modern, democratic state. 

The United States sanctions program is the most visible manifestation of our concern. Today our sanctions target 121 individuals 

and 69 entities, pursuant to Executive orders issued to focus on 

those individuals and those institutions undermining democracy in 

Zimbabwe. These sanctions began in March 2003. 

7

Much has changed in Zimbabwe since then, and our sanctions regime has reflected those changes. Over the past year, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has modified 

the sanctions list, adding or deleting names on the list to reflect 

some of the political changes occurring in Zimbabwe itself. The administration will continue to ensure the targeted sanctions program remains meaningful and accurate and relevant. 

At the same time, the United States is working to help to develop a strong, democratic, market-oriented Zimbabwe and to respond to the country’s humanitarian needs. We have provided 

nearly $1 billion in assistance to Zimbabwe from Fiscal Year 2006 

through Fiscal Year 2011. 

I will defer to my USAID colleague, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator Sharon Cromer, to talk more in-depth about USAID 

programs. 

The next 2 years will be a test for Zimbabwe, and the world will 

be watching very carefully to see if its political leaders stick to the 

commitments that they made to hold free and fair elections according to a roadmap negotiated with the assistance of the Southern 

African Development Community. 

Zimbabwe’s future will not depend on the actions of any one individual or even one political party. It will depend on the collective 

decisions Zimbabwe’s people make to replace a legacy of political 

violence and one-party rule with a culture of tolerance, reconciliation, and the depoliticalization of state institutions. 

We are contributing to empowering Zimbabweans to build the 

markets and the institutions necessary to determine their own future. The United States values partnerships with nations whose 

leaders demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and the free 

flow of information. These features form the foundation of stable, 

growth-oriented democracies all over the world and will be a key 

factor governing our relationship with the Government of 

Zimbabwe in the years to come. 

If Zimbabwe’s political parties implement the commitments that 

they, themselves, have made in the Global Political Agreement and 

the electoral roadmap, there will be clear imperative for the United 

States to reconsider our current sanctions policy. 

Specifically, this would mean the holding of free, fair, and internationally monitored elections. It will also require state institutions 

to be delinked from ZANU–PF. The Department of State will continue to press for the protection of human rights and accountability 

for those who abuse them, while acknowledging progress where 

and when it is made. 

It would be a mistake if I did not mention Zimbabwe’s importance to the Southern African region. Zimbabwe shares borders 

with South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique. It is a 

critical transportation hub, a rich resource of talent, and a country 

with great economic potential and promise. 

Unfortunately, as we saw in 2008, the unstable political situation 

in Zimbabwe affects all the countries around it. Partisan influence 

over elements of the security sector and the use of these forces for 

violent actions and intimidation against political opponents has led 

to a darkening of the security sector’s reputation, both at home and 

abroad. Zimbabwe’s neighbors are still feeling the effects of the refVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Feb 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\110211\71036 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

ugee flows and the economic collapse that occurred in Zimbabwe 

earlier. 

It is important to note the areas of concern and also those of 

stalemate, as we often do, but also to recognize progress and 

change when it occurs in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is a young nation 

with a long colonial legacy to overcome. Social, political, and economic advances do not happen quickly, nor will they necessarily 

follow an American or Western model. 

Implementation of the Global Political Agreement has been problematic from the very beginning, but the Southern African Development Community takes its mediating role seriously. And I am confident that they will not allow elections to go forward if it appears 

that the prevailing conditions will lead to a repeat of the 2008 crisis. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Payne, I want to thank you 

for this opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to 

answer any questions that you may have. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

9


71036a-1.eps
10


71036a-2.eps
11


71036a-3.eps
12


71036a-4.eps
13


71036a-5.eps
14


71036a-6.eps
15

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for your testimony. 

Ms. Cromer? 

STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON CROMER, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking 

Member Payne, and members of the subcommittee. I would like to 

thank you for inviting me to speak today. 

I appreciate your continued interest in how U.S. policies and assistance programs can bring about positive change in Zimbabwe. 

I would also like to thank Assistant Secretary Carson for his continued commitment to this issue and his unyielding support of 

USAID. 

Today I would like to share three points. First, I will provide an 

update on USAID programs. Second, I would like to discuss how 

U.S. Government resources are carefully targeted to ensure they 

comply with policy and legal restrictions. And lastly, I would like 

to share how, in line with USAID reforms, we are strengthening 

capacity of local organizations. 

First, our program. In Zimbabwe, supporting the return of a stable, representative democracy is our number one priority. During 

the past decade, a country that was previously the bread basket of 

southern Africa has deteriorated into chronic food and security and 

abysmal health and nutrition conditions. It is clear that the backsliding we have seen in Zimbabwe is directly related to poor governance. 

For these reasons, Zimbabwe is a tragic, but notable example of 

the linkages between governance, food security, poverty, and 

health. Our program addresses these elements and makes these 

linkages. 

One of the most critical reform efforts that USAID supports is 

the parliamentary-led, constitution-making process. USAID has 

supported the Parliamentary Select Committee and civil society in 

their efforts to solicit public input and debate issues of national interest. This provides an important avenue for peaceful political participation, particularly among youth. 

As a result of USAID support, the parliamentary committees now 

regularly hold public hearings on key pieces of legislation, including those addressing human rights and electoral processes. In addition, parliamentary standing rules now allow the Prime Minister a 

question-and-answer period for the first time. 

Our work to support democracy in governance is a critical, standalone objective of our program, as well as the foundation for our 

work in other sectors. Under Administrator Shah, USAID as a 

whole is reemphasizing the importance of integrating democracy, 

human rights, and governance into the three Presidential initiatives being implemented worldwide. 

Through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, USAID 

assistance supports 80,000 HIV-positive individuals with lifesaving 

antiretroviral therapy, representing about one-quarter of all clients 

in the country, and counseling and testing for 350,000 individuals 

per year. 

16

We also provide education, social, and medical support for 60,000 

orphans and vulnerable children. Our maternal and health assistance programs not only strengthen routine immunization services, 

but will also introduce vaccines that prevent two major causes of 

child deaths, pneumonia and diarrhea. 

USAID works with small-holder farmers and small-scale traders 

and producers to increase agricultural production and marketing, 

enhance value-chain competitiveness, improve food security and 

nutrition, and increase rural incomes. USAID is also engaging the 

Government of Zimbabwe in important food security policy and 

strategy discussions. 

Zimbabwe has seen a decline in the need for humanitarian assistance, as the Assistant Secretary has said, over the past 3 years, 

from 7 million people requiring emergency food assistance in 2009 

to an estimated 1 million in 2012. 

USAID also supports activities that improve access to clean 

water, provide hygiene education, and mitigate the risk of waterborne diseases, such as cholera. 

It is important to acknowledge that while humanitarian needs 

have decreased rapidly, USAID may still need to provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable until the Government of 

Zimbabwe can do so. 

The second point is that USAID, in consultation with other donors and our Embassy in Harare, remains diligent in ensuring that 

none of our assistance is diverted or misused. U.S. Government 

sanctions against designated individuals and institutions are carefully observed in the award of contracts and grants and the designation of beneficiaries of assistance. All USAID funding in 

Zimbabwe is obligated through unilateral agreements with individual contractors and grantees. None of the funding is channeled 

through the Government of Zimbabwe, either directly or indirectly 

as a subawardee. The agency’s new requirement to conduct a security risk assessment prior to obligation also serves as a missionlevel control to keep U.S. foreign assistance funding out of the 

hands of the government as a whole and sanctioned individuals in 

particular. 

While some activities, such as technical assistance to strengthen 

ministries, are for the benefit of the Government of Zimbabwe, 

such funding will continue to be channeled through NGOs and possibly contractors, provided that they are given required waivers, 

until the Government of Zimbabwe demonstrates adequate 

progress on key benchmarks and legal restrictions are lifted. 

All of our activities are done in close consultation with Congress, 

the State Department and Treasury Department, and the national 

security staff, and are consistent with the U.S. Government’s overall strategy and policy for this period. 

The third and final point is that, in harmony with the letter and 

the spirit of restrictions on our assistance, we seek partnerships to 

strengthen local organizations that are providing key services and 

support to the local population. We are committed to building 

democratic African institutions, so that Africans can decide their 

own future. 

In this vein, we identify and work with organizations that can 

contribute technically to USAID program implementation and 

17

strengthen the sustainability of our efforts. But we also provide, in 

addition to this technical program assistance, we provide to these 

organizations training in business skills, strategy formulation, 

project implementation, and advocacy. 

Currently, Zimbabwe poses an extremely difficult operating environment for civil society organizations that are trying to improve 

health, livelihoods, freedom, and human rights for their fellow 

Zimbabweans. They face harassments and threats from the very 

government that should be their ally. 

U.S. support will continue to be flexible and responsive, emphasizing Zimbabwean efforts to establish participatory processes and 

capacity development of reform-minded and reform-oriented institutions, both at the national and local levels. This approach sets 

the foundation for Zimbabwe, when it eventually achieves a truly 

representative system, to be able to reclaim its previous successes. 

Change must come from within the country, and it will not happen overnight. At the same time, U.S. support has been able to 

make targeted gains toward improving health, economic sustainability, and democratic systems in Zimbabwe, while ensuring those 

subject to sanctions do not benefit from our assistance. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I welcome your questions and look forward to continuing our discussion. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cromer follows:]

18


71036b-1.eps
19


71036b-2.eps
20


71036b-3.eps
21


71036b-4.eps
22


71036b-5.eps
23

Mr. FORTENBERRY [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Cromer, for your 

testimony, and we appreciate your willingness to be here. 

I am quickly getting caught up. I am sorry I missed the first part 

of the hearing, but we will turn now to questions. 

Ambassador Carson, thank you as well for your testimony. I will 

start with you. 

The United States was the first country to extend diplomatic relations to Zimbabwe. You were once the Ambassador there. Could 

you go a little bit more into the history of why the relationship has 

been so contentious for so long, even predating our recent appropriate criticism of human rights and the political process or the 

breakdown of political process there? 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you very, very much for that question. 

The relationship with Zimbabwe has not always been contentious. It has had its ups and its downs. I would say that in early 

1980, as reflected by the fact that the United States was the first 

country to recognize Zimbabwe, that in the early years of that relationship we got along reasonably well with a new Zimbabwean 

Government, a Zimbabwean Government that benefitted from our 

diplomatic efforts along with British diplomatic efforts to lead to 

that country’s independence. 

The United States Congress, in the late 1970s, played a critical 

role in maintaining sanctions on the Smith regime. I believe the 

new Zimbabwean Government appreciated that greatly. 

Relations started to deteriorate somewhat in the mid-1980s because of the violence that was perpetrated by ZANU against its 

main rival, ZAPU, in which hundreds, tens of hundreds of people 

were killed in Matabeleland. We protested those human rights 

records and encouraged reconciliation. That reconciliation did, in 

fact, come and it resulted in the merger of ZANU and ZAPU into 

what we now have as ZANU–PF. 

Our relationship, fast-forward, started to deteriorate quite rapidly in the late 1990s, largely as a result of the government’s allowing of massive land invasions and undermining the legitimacy of 

land titles and human rights in that country. We also were 

alarmed at the increasing rise of corruption in the government and, 

also, the harassment of political opposition movements that were 

opposed to ZANU–PF. 

It has been an episodic up and down, but it has not always been 

a bad relationship. As I said, in 1980, if we had gone back and 

looked in time, half of the Cabinet that came in in 1980 was U.S.-

educated, educated as a result of scholarships given by the U.S. 

Government to many of those ministers. 

Let me say that one of the things that Mr. Mugabe constantly 

raises and criticizes the United States about is the fact that he believes, I think quite wrongly, that the United States promised to 

provide a massive amount of money to his government in order to 

help buy White Zimbabwean-owned farms and transfer them to 

Black Zimbabweans. The historical record on that has been examined many times. In fact, there was no commitment of the type 

that he suggests was made. 

I can go into some degree of detail because we have over time 

said to the Zimbabweans we were willing to help them engage in 

24

transparent, legitimate, and meaningful land reform, but it had to 

be transparent; it had to be based on a willing seller/a willing 

buyer basis; that government officials could not themselves be a 

part of the process, and that the transparency of this had to be 

done in a way that all were able to participate, knowing that there 

was no preference for those in one party or for part of the leadership. 

I think that is a quick summation, but it has been an episodic 

relationship. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, thank you for that and, also, for reminding us of the difficulty in terms of the undermining of the rule 

of law and legitimate land title issues that clearly are part of this 

episodic problem, as you rightly point out. Thank you. 

Ms. Cromer, let me turn to you and ask you a related question 

in this sense: In Zambia we saw an excellent example of fair and 

free elections and a peaceful transition from power, as you point 

out, and an effort that was led and determined by the Zambian 

people. 

Given the proximity and the neighborhood, explain why similar 

dynamics cannot seem to arise in Zimbabwe? 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you for that question. 

It is difficult for free and fair elections to arise in a country 

where the majority of the population aren’t allowed to voice opinion 

and participate in a democratic process. We are working very diligently with the Parliament and certain parts of the unity government to support reform-minded individuals and processes to allow 

the citizens of Zimbabwe to have such a voice, particularly the 

youth, to give them an opportunity for peaceful engagement and 

meaningful engagement. 

The mechanics of an election are important. That process, that 

democratic process is important, but we also believe that the daily 

opportunities of individuals to share in the decision making that 

goes on in their country is also a critical part of democracy. So, it 

is not a particular election that is important, but it is the entire 

democratic process. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, I would like to point out democracy cannot bring about the values upon which it rests. So, is this repression, fear, but also a structural problem in terms of civil society 

that does not empower the organization, the advancement of people, the willingness of people to come forward and promote this 

type of civil society structure? Is it all of the above? 

Ms. CROMER. You have a courageous civil society in Zimbabwe. 

There are civil society organizations, like the one I think you will 

hear from in the next panel, that are making courageous attempts 

to give voice to the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, and to 

provide basic services to those people. But they are constantly harassed and their efforts are diminished. 

So, under USAID’s reform efforts, we are putting a great deal of 

emphasis on building the capacity of local organizations to not only 

deliver technically, but to also serve as advocates for reform and 

change and to work more effectively. But, again, these organizations come under enormous pressure, and we appreciate their courageousness and their willingness to step forward. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

25

With that, I will turn to our ranking member, Mr. Payne of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask, Secretary Carson, what in your assessment of 

Zimbabwe’s coalition, what is your assessment of the coalition government, and how do you see the influence or lack of authority 

from Prime Minister Tsvangirai? Is there any kind of parity in the 

government in your opinion? 

Ambassador CARSON. The coalition government has worked only 

marginally well, marginally well. It has many more shortcomings 

than it does have positive assets and benefits. 

The most positive thing that can be said about the coalition is 

that it has brought all three parties together. They are working as 

a team, sometimes not very efficiently or well, but it has brought 

them together to enter into discussions and to debate and discuss 

public business. 

But to suggest that it has gone smoothly would be a great mistake. Over the last 3 years, there have been numerous occasions 

when Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has publicly stated that 

the Global Political Agreement has not been honored by President 

Mugabe, that President Mugabe has not consulted him on Cabinet 

appointments, on the selection of district administrators, on the appointment of Zimbabwean ambassadors abroad. And he has also 

not consulted him on policies in which the Prime Minister should 

be directly involved. 

There have been numerous occasions in which the Prime Minister has said that he was on the verge of leaving the coalition because of the failure to consult and to make progress on elements 

related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

There have been continued reports of harassment of MDC/

Tsvangirai political officials by ZANU–PF security personnel, both 

the police and the military. MDC has had great trouble organizing 

itself and protecting its constituents. 

Where we have seen some benefit is in the leadership of the Finance Minister, Mr. Tendai Biti. There is absolutely no question 

that he has brought a sense of management and fiscal responsibility and organization to the Ministry of Finance that was not previously there. There is a great deal of accountability, and he seeks 

to ensure that budgets are established in a transparent way, that 

funds coming into the treasury are distributed according to the 

manner in which Parliament has determined they should be, and 

that these funds get out to government ministries and officials. 

So, Tendai Biti has been successful. He has had difficulties working with the bank Governor, who remains very close and loyal to 

Mr. Mugabe. But he has done, given the constraints, an excellent 

job. 

Several of the other ministers who are a part of the MDC have 

also acquitted themselves extraordinarily well. But they have done 

this in very difficult situations, as I said, under political harassment in the field. You, yourself, mentioned in your opening remarks about a demonstration that occurred just in front of Harvest 

House, which wasn’t directed initially at the MDC. But there are 

these concerns that continue to linger. 

26

It has been a difficult and sometimes strained marriage that has 

been held together by the marriage counseling provided by South 

Africa and SADC. 

Mr. PAYNE. Just a quick point on that. As we remember, former 

President Mbeki was sort of non-decisive as it related to Zimbabwe. 

It seems like President Jacob Zuma has taken a stronger stand. Do 

you see a real difference in the new approach from President 

Zuma, and do you think this will push Mr. Mugabe to really consider reforms? 

Ambassador CARSON. I think that South Africa’s stewardship of 

the process of reconciliation or promoting reconciliation in 

Zimbabwe has been strengthened during the period in which President Zuma has been the head of state in South Africa. I think 

there have been two very good, recent SADC conferences in which 

SADC, under the leadership of South Africa, has placed some clear 

requirements for progress on Zimbabwe. We hope that the 

Zimbabwean Government will heed those requirements and criteria. 

First and foremost, clearly, has been the requirement that the 

new constitution be completed and that there be a referendum on 

that constitution prior to the holding of any new national elections. 

Mr. Mugabe would clearly like to have elections early, but it is 

clear from what we are hearing from SADC and from the South Africans that they want the ZANU–PF leadership to follow the roadmap that SADC has laid out, which is in line with a full implementation of the Global Political Agreement, a new constitution after 

consultations, a referendum, and then national elections. There are 

other things that are also required that have to be done as a part 

of the roadmap. 

Mr. PAYNE. My final question, as my time has about expired. 

Deputy Administrator Cromer, in your testimony you discussed the 

USAID’s democracy-in-governance efforts, including your role in facilitating civil society input in the formation of the new constitution 

and engaging reform-minded elements within the unity government. It is my understanding that USAID’s democracy-and-governance program for Zimbabwe is currently under review. 

Would you be kind enough to elaborate on the program, particularly any challenges you have faced in dealing with the unity government and what assistance, if any, is the U.S. providing to ensure Zimbabwe’s next election is fair and free, and maybe when it 

might be held in 2012, what portion of it, if you would? And the 

constitution review, are we involved in helping them on that constitutional review? 

Ms. CROMER. Thank you. 

Given the significant delay in finalizing a new constitution, and 

the need for a referendum, as the Assistant Secretary has said, in 

advance of the next elections, like the Assistant Secretary, we don’t 

believe that the groundwork has been laid for elections in the nearterm. We think late 2012 at the earliest, but a lot of work needs 

to be done. 

The overall goal of assistance in this area is to contribute to creating conditions for credible electoral processes in Zimbabwe, including the constitutional referendum, working on election administration, domestic observation, political party strengthening for 

27

Presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. It is a big order. 

Support to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission aims to develop 

a transparent and credible process for electoral administration. 

In a country-specific and tailor-made way, responses to the 

knowledge and capacity gaps in the Electoral Commission system 

in Zimbabwe have to be analyzed and the capacity-building efforts 

have to be focused on the needs specific to the Electoral Commission in Zimbabwe. We anticipate that training support, voter registration, civic and voter awareness, political finance, and voter dispute resolution are all things that need to be addressed. 

Lastly, domestic observation needs to focus on greater transparency and accountability in the Zimbabwe electoral process, and 

strengthening the civil society’s ability to serve as observers of the 

election process is going to be critical. 

So, all of this is what was seen in Zambia, I am sure, and what 

we don’t see at this point in Zimbabwe, and we will need to work 

hard to achieve this. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner from New York, did you have any questions? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, not at this time. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Let me ask a final quick question of you both. 

According to press reports, the international diamond regulators 

have agreed to allow Zimbabwe to trade up to $2 billion in diamonds. Does this have the potential to underwrite the ruling elite 

and undermine legitimate electoral process? 

Ambassador CARSON. Sir, let me, if I could, respond to that. Occurring right now in Kinshasa, the DRC, is one of the yearly intercessional meetings of the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process was established over a dozen years ago in order to prevent conflict minerals, and diamonds in particular, from getting into the 

marketplace, diamonds that were used by rebel groups to fund 

their criminal activities undermining governments and destroying 

the lives and human rights of citizens across the continent. 

The Kimberley Process has, in fact, been very effective in dealing 

with conflict diamonds in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central 

African Republic, Angola, and others. I say this as a preface because the Kimberley Process has been under enormous stress over 

the last 2 years, 3 years, because of the discovery of diamonds in 

an area called Marange in Zimbabwe, and the use of government 

elements to go in and exploit these diamonds in a way in which the 

human rights of artisanal miners and others have been undermined and destroyed. 

The Kimberley Process and we have been pushing very hard to 

try to come up with a way to ensure that the diamonds from 

Marange would, in fact, be brought under some kind of supervision, 

that there would be a monitoring of the diamonds taken out of 

these conflict areas in Zimbabwe, that civil society would have an 

opportunity to go in and view for themselves whether there were 

illegal or criminal activities going on there. 

We have been working very hard inside of the Kimberley Process 

to encourage greater respect. This has resulted, in the last 2 days, 

an agreement has been reached, an agreement that was pushed 

forward by the European Union. It is an agreement that has been 

endorsed by the Kimberley Process countries. 

28

The agreement is far from perfect. The United States did not 

vote for it. We abstained because we thought the barriers were a 

little bit too low. 

But it does represent an opportunity again for the international 

community to go in and ensure that diamonds coming out of 

Marange are not the result of human rights violations, and that 

they are monitored, the sales of these diamonds are monitored in 

a transparent fashion. 

Revenues from these diamonds will, in fact, go into the hands of 

a variety of individuals, including the government. But it does, in 

fact, establish a level of procedure that will ensure that human 

rights violations are not occurring and that some of the egregious 

activities that were undertaken by the Zimbabwe military several 

years ago will stop, and if they do occur, will be monitored and reported on. 

So, it is a step forward. It is not a perfect step because this is 

not a problem that was originally anticipated when the Kimberley 

Process was established. It was established to monitor the diamonds being sold by rebel groups, not diamonds which were being 

handled by a government. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, you answered one side of the coin in regards to a potential process to stop the exploitation of vulnerable 

people, but the other side of the coin as to where this revenue is 

going to go leaves us a little bit uncertain as to the answer to my 

question, whether this could potentially undermine legitimate electoral reforms. 

I just give you a sense of this based upon the quote from the 

Mining Minister who said, ‘‘We are going to shock the world. We 

are going to unleash our worthiness. Zimbabwe will no longer be 

begging for anything from anybody,’’ which suggests that this is not 

necessarily an attempt to join a responsible community of nations 

in some sort of organized trade fashion. 

So, I just submit that to you. I respect what you said in terms 

of this process being partially effective in preventing the type of exploitation of vulnerable folks, but, again, where is the money going 

to go? That is, I think, a very open-ended question here. 

Ambassador CARSON. If I could respond? The response is clearly 

this amount of money will be a shot of adrenaline, but it will not, 

in fact, be long-term sustenance. The Zimbabwe economy will take 

more than just Marange diamonds to recover from the low level in 

which it has been operating over the last decade and a half. 

Zimbabwe needs to rebuild its agriculture, reestablish its tourism, rebuild its mineral sector, and rebuild the financial basis on 

which it has been able to operate. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. All excellent points. 

Ambassador CARSON. It is a shot of adrenaline, but not very 

much——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. But can we be assured that these funds will 

actually go toward that capacity-building? I think that is perhaps 

a question that could be further explored, maybe even in the next 

panel. 

But Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Right, and I agree. There already have been some 

complaints by Mr. Biti, the Finance Minister, that the funds are 

29

not getting where they should be. But we certainly should encourage them to go to improve the quality of life for the people in the 

country, and not to bolster the government to strengthen the military or some other nefarious kind of activities that would not be 

beneficial. 

I have a quick sort of similar question to Ambassador Carson. 

You mention in your testimony that the State Department is doing 

what you can within the confines of the targeted sanctions program 

to promote Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and to highlight opportunities to invest for investments that will benefit U.S. and 

Zimbabwe businesses. 

Could you elaborate on that? What are we doing? And are we engaging small and medium-sized or minority businesses? Are we engaging Zimbabwe and the American diaspora community? 

And the other thing I wonder, how can U.S. businesses engage 

with Zimbabwean businesses while still complying with U.S. sanctions? Someone in my district said he was going to try to do a small 

business in some kind of stones, not diamonds or anything, but 

Zimbabwe means rock, actually. There is a certain kind of rock 

stone that is used in kitchens, or whatever, and he was interested 

in getting involved in that. So, I wonder, what is the stance that 

we have as it relates to small businesses or things of that nature? 

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

It is worth iterating again that we do not have comprehensive 

sanctions against Zimbabwe. We have very precise and targeted 

sanctions against those individuals in senior leadership positions 

who are most responsible for undermining the democracy of the 

country and the human rights of its citizens, 121 individuals and 

three dozen companies, companies that are owned by ZANU–PF, 

companies that are owned and run and operated by the military. 

There is no prohibition that would limit an American company 

from being able to go in and to effectively do business in Zimbabwe. 

If, for example, Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola or somebody like that has 

an operation there, they could continue to operate. If there were 

agricultural companies, Pioneer, Cargill, Monsanto, they can continue to operate there. They can sell seed and fertilizer. They can 

buy product. They can process product and sell it in-country. 

And so, it is not designed, these sanctions are not designed to 

hurt the Zimbabwe population, but to hurt those individuals in 

senior leadership positions in Zimbabwe who are most responsible 

for undermining the rule of law in that country. That is where we 

go. 

We have, through our USAID programs, been engaged in trying 

to help small-scale agriculture and agriculturalists in Zimbabwe, 

including establishing some new admittedly small programs since 

the MDC joined the government. We have given out small grants 

to farmers to help increase their agricultural production. We hope 

that some of this will be used not only for subsistence, but also surplus to be sold into the marketplace. 

So, there are programs and there are ways to work with smallscale operators through some agricultural programs and, also, 

through some micro finance and micro lending operations. And, 

yes, our Ambassador in Zimbabwe recently helped to bring a group 

30

of Zimbabwean businessmen here to try and promote business in 

Zimbabwe. None of that is against any law or against any sanction. 

I would be the first to say that, given the macroeconomic conditions in the country, given the way in which the government has 

talked about indigenization plans, the way in which the courts 

have operated inconsistently and unfairly in the protection of both 

civil liberties and corporate liberties, the companies will think more 

than once about going in there, but it is not against the law for 

them to think about it and to be able to exploit opportunities as 

they come up in the country. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

I think that will conclude our panel. Thank you, Ms. Cromer and 

Ambassador Carson, for coming today and for your insightful testimony. 

Mr. Ambassador, I learned something about you a moment ago. 

I understand that much earlier in your career you were staff director for this very subcommittee. We are very happy to see that we 

helped launch you into such a successful career trajectory. So, 

thank you for your service. 

Ambassador CARSON. Let me say that it is true; I can’t run away 

from my history. I spent 4 years here. I was, in fact, a Foreign 

Service officer at the time when I was asked to come up here. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, you wear the scars well. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador CARSON. Let me just say I learned a great deal from 

being up here. I hope that my Foreign Service career was well on 

a positive trajectory before I arrived. Maybe it got a little bit of a 

catalyst while I was here, but that is subject to debate as well. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you both for coming today. 

We will move now to our next panel. We welcome you all today. 

Thank you so much for joining us. 

Let me first introduce Mr. Mark Schneider of the International 

Crisis Group. Mr. Schneider joined the International Crisis Group 

in the spring of 2001 as senior vice president and special advisor 

on Latin America. He directs the Washington Advocacy Office, conveying Crisis Group analyses and recommendations to the White 

House, the State Department, the Department of Defense, Congress, as well as the World Bank. He also serves as special advisor 

on Latin America and on HIV/AIDS and security. 

Before joining the International Crisis Group, he served as Director of the Peace Corps and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Human Rights. 

Welcome, Mr. Schneider. 

I will introduce all of you, and then we will turn to you, Mr. 

Schneider, for your opening remarks. 

Mr. Paul Fagan is with the International Republican Institute. 

Welcome. 

Mr. Fagan began his career at the International Republican Institute in 1995. He currently serves as the regional director for Africa, where his duties include oversight of the program in 

Zimbabwe. He served as the first East Africa resident regional director based in Kenya and as IRI’s resident country director for 

Zimbabwe. He served in this position through Zimbabwe’s parliamentary elections in 2005. He later served as acting deputy diVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Feb 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\110211\71036 HFA PsN: SHIRL
31

rector for Africa and has served on election observation missions in 

African, European, and Asian countries. 

Welcome. 

Mr. Dewa Mavhinga is with the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. 

Mr. Mavhinga is a human rights lawyer and activist currently 

working as regional coordinator for the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, based in South Africa. Mr. Mavhinga has previously worked 

with Human Rights Watch, in London, in the African Division as 

a researcher on Zimbabwe. 

He has conducted extensive research on the human rights situation in that country and has lobbied at the Southern African Development Community, the Africa Union, and the United Nations 

Human Rights Council. 

Welcome as well. 

Mr. Schneider, would you care to begin, please? 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank the chairman and the subcommittee, the ranking member, 

and the other members for the opportunity to testify today. 

I think it is extremely important, the timing of this hearing. As 

we heard earlier, only yesterday the Zimbabwe security forces teargassed and invaded the headquarters of the opposition MDC party 

in Harare. 

Crisis Group is an independent, non-governmental, non-partisan 

organization that, through field-based analysis, policy recommendations, and advocacy, seeks to prevent conflict. We are active in 

some 62 countries around the world. In Africa, we have four subregion programs that focus on the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, 

West Africa, and Southern Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, Zimbabwe currently is in the midst of another national struggle. As we heard earlier, its first one was for independence. It is now in another struggle to move from what has been dictatorship to democracy. 

For 30 years, since its independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe has 

ruled uninterruptedly. His age and ill health now virtually guarantees new national leadership. It is that very prospect that has been 

the core of resistance to democratic change by his party, ZANU–

PF, and by Zimbabwe security forces. 

To some degree, what we have seen since 2000 is the obvious exhaustion of that de facto one-party state and the rejection by the 

population of efforts to sustain it. As a result, he has remained in 

power essentially through repression, flawed elections, and, unfortunately, economic measures that, as you have heard, have sent 

Zimbabwe basically into the lower ranges of global human development. The UNDP’s ranking for Zimbabwe now is in the 170–173 

range of the countries of the world. 

Just as one example, even today with a slight increase last year 

in GDP, there is somewhere between 90 and 95 percent unemployment in the country. As you have heard, since the violent and 

tainted electoral process in 2008, only massive diplomatic intervention by SADC and the African Union prevented a major implosion 

in the country. 

32

And the Global Political Agreement that was signed then and 

that set up this coalition government was aimed at doing two 

things fundamentally: One was normalizing political processes, and 

the other was fostering the conditions for free and fair elections. 

Unfortunately, I would even go further than the earlier testimony. 

Most of the major GPA reforms have not been achieved. Particularly, the ZANU–PF forces have impeded or ignored its implementation. Commissions have been named, but not staffed. Laws have 

been passed, but not enforced. 

And the building blocks of credible elections are yet to be put in 

place. I think that you have heard there has been an effort made 

to push through early elections, even in the absence of those building blocks, adequate voting rolls, a balance in the secretariat of the 

Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. The same people who ran the 

2008 election continue to staff that body, and that has been a 

major concern. 

SADC and the African Union were co-guarantors of the GPA and 

given the responsibility to monitor it. I will say that only this year 

have we seen the first really strong critique from SADC that came 

about in April of this year. There were promised deployments that 

have still not materialized in terms of support for a monitoring 

process. 

I think that the sine qua non for progress right now is the approval of a roadmap to elections. It was tentatively drafted in April 

with the support of SADC. In July, the negotiators said, ‘‘We agree 

to this.’’ There are still gaps, but the party leaders have not yet approved it. Until there is movement to put that roadmap into effect, 

we are not going to get to credible elections. The result could well 

be another violent experience that occurred in 2008. 

Just quickly, there are three key issues: One is an end to statesponsored violence; the second is achieving some degree of security 

sector reform; and a third is, as I said, altering the control by 

ZANU–PF of the Electoral Commission secretariat. That is the only 

way that we are going to see clear movement, get constitutional reform, the referendum, and then movement toward general elections. 

In addition to what you have heard today, the state-sponsored violence has also included not simply the attack yesterday and this 

tear-gassing, but several weeks ago, again, the invasion by a 

ZANU–PF militia of the head party headquarters. The rallies by 

MDC have been broken up by physical force. The members of the 

MDC who are members of the Cabinet, a half a dozen of them have 

been arrested since last April, then released, all on bogus charges. 

Just to give you some sense, about a third of the MDC members 

of Parliament who have come into the Parliament since 2008 have 

been arrested at least once by the security forces. 

Also, it wasn’t mentioned, but I think it is important to note that 

the former defense head, Solomon Mujuru, died in August at his 

farm under very questionable circumstances. Within the governing 

party, he had been a source of moderation, and his wife, as you 

know, is Vice President. They had been seen as elements that were 

looking for a compromise and for moving forward on GPA. So, it 

is of great concern that this has occurred. 

33

Second, I think that on security sector reform, there are key 

things that were in the roadmap that seemingly were agreed to 

that have not moved forward. As I said as well, the Zimbabwe Election Commission secretariat needs to be more balanced and more 

professionalized. 

I think the key outside actors are SADC and the African Union, 

but the United States does have a critical role to play. I will simply 

note here that the U.S. engagement needs to be done in lockstep, 

if you will, with SADC and with the efforts of the facilitator, President Jacob Zuma. That is the only way that we are going to be able 

to support a process in which the GPA and the roadmap will move 

forward. 

I think that it is clear from the earlier testimony that we see 

President Zuma as taking a much more active role now. The U.S. 

can play a significant role, but needs to support that process. And 

we can go into the details of my testimony, which I hope would be 

put into the record, about some of the elements in terms of support 

for the electoral process, the electoral observation, the effort to 

carry out some sort of countrywide dissemination of the constitutional reforms before the referendum. So, support for that process 

would be very important. 

Similarly, on the media reform, the U.S. can support the efforts 

by SADC to push that forward. These would be some of the areas 

where we believe it would be possible to strengthen the process of 

moving this situation from where it is today. If it continues on the 

current path, it is more likely to implode than to progress. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

34


71036c-1.eps
35


71036c-2.eps
36


71036c-3.eps
37


71036c-4.eps
38


71036c-5.eps
39


71036c-6.eps
40


71036c-7.eps
41

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Schneider. 

If there is no objection, all testimonies will be included in the 

record today. Hearing none. 

Mr. Fagan, we will recognize you now. 

I am going to try to expedite the hearing a little bit and put on 

our time clock here, so that we have ample time to unpack all the 

issues. So, if you could stay within the 5-minute limit, that would 

be helpful. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL FAGAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR 

AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. FAGAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Payne, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today. 

This is a summary of my statement. 

This testimony marks the third time since 2005 that a representative from IRI has come before this committee to talk about 

Zimbabwe. Looking back on the 6 years, what is striking is that, 

while much has changed, Zimbabwe’s democratic growth and U.S. 

policy toward it have remained rather static. 

This is perhaps due to the fact that Zimbabwe poses a difficult, 

but unique policy challenge to the United States. The very nature 

of Zimbabwe’s coalition government often shields Mugabe and 

ZANU–PF from action by the opposition. Further, overt condemnation of Mugabe, his party, and his government for things other 

than the most egregious of crimes has a potential to backfire. 

Mugabe has been successful at blaming Zimbabwe’s ills on external 

intervention. Finally, the coalition government has managed to 

bring just enough stability to Zimbabwe to enable it to be overshadowed by other emergencies on the African continent. 

It is time, however, to start paying more attention to Zimbabwe. 

The imminent constitutional referendum, the national elections, 

have the potential to graduate the crisis from a steady, but manageable simmer to boiling over. 

The merits of Zimbabwe’s power-sharing agreement have been 

debated from the start. On the one hand, the institutionalization 

of the MDC into government has resulted in some tangible 

progress for the country, particularly with regard to the economy. 

On the other hand, power-sharing agreements have become an oftconsidered diplomatic tool to put an end to rampant political violence in Africa. 

While ending violence is always a worthy and immediate goal, 

IRI and other democracy organizations rightly become concerned 

when the will of the people is ignored. Further, the government of 

national unity can generally be characterized as an unholy marriage of contradicting interests, with the constitutional reform process and the roadmap to national elections currently proving to be 

the greatest stumbling blocks to the Global Peace Agreement implementation. 

The constitutional reform process, while important, has been 

marred by difficulties from the start. Logistical difficulties and high 

levels of violence tarnish this opportunity for citizens to engage in 

the democratic process, leading Prime Minister Tsvangirai to publicly refer to the constitutional reform process as ‘‘a circus.’’ A draft 

42

of the revised constitution is now optimistically expected in December, pushing the referendum, originally scheduled for mid-2011, to 

sometime early next year. 

On numerous occasions, the government of national unity partners have looked to quick elections as only an escape from the difficult and often ineffective arrangement that binds them. This July, 

a SADC facilitation team was able to achieve consensus from all 

three party partners that elections should be held in late 2012, but 

President Mugabe made a public statement shortly thereafter declaring his intent to unilaterally call elections for next March. 

Assuming that the GPA partners can come to a final agreement 

on an election date, numerous conditions must also be met for free 

and fair elections to occur, which have been mentioned here previously, including the institution of an impartial election commission through creation of an accurate voters’ roll, the opening of 

space for independent media, meaningful electoral reform, and, 

most importantly, an end to tactics of violence and intimidation. 

As the U.S. Government reviews its policy for engagement with 

Zimbabwe, I would encourage the following recommendations to be 

taken into consideration: One, the U.S. should develop a more robust policy toward Zimbabwe that extends beyond targeted sanctions and involves a higher level of direct engagement with the ongoing crisis. Further, the U.S. must articulate that the only acceptable outcome for Zimbabwe is one reached through a peaceful, free, 

and fair democratic process. 

Two, SADC should be the leading force in resolving the 

Zimbabwe crisis. Southern African leaders have historically taken 

a soft position toward Mugabe, but this stance has steadily eroded. 

If there is something positive to be taken from the Zimbabwe crisis, it is the extent to which SADC has come to take seriously its 

role as the guarantor of the GPA, and any action taken by the U.S. 

should be done in a manner that complements and supports SADC 

efforts. 

Third, it has been long rumored that Mugabe is suffering from 

poor health and that ZANU–PF is plagued by internal conflict. A 

post-Mugabe era could spur the ascendency of moderate or hardline factions of ZANU–PF to party leadership positions and government positions. The U.S. should prepare contingency plans for both 

scenarios, as either would drastically alter the status quo with significant ramifications for U.S. engagement. 

Finally, the United States has at its disposal a number of key 

State Department officials who will prove great assets in the design of a cohesive, comprehensive policy, including Secretary Carson; of course, the U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Charles Ray; the 

U.S. Ambassador to Botswana, Michelle Gavin, who is also the 

United States representative to SADC; Under Secretary Maria 

Otero, and Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor, Michael Posner. To the greatest extent possible, these and 

other U.S. key government partners should play a more proactive 

and integrative role in the design and implementation of U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a pleasure. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fagan follows:]

43


71036d-1.eps
44


71036d-2.eps
45


71036d-3.eps
46


71036d-4.eps
47


71036d-5.eps
48


71036d-6.eps
49

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Fagan. 

Mr. Mavhinga? 

STATEMENT OF MR. DEWA MAVHINGA, REGIONAL 

COORDINATOR, CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE COALITION 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee. It is a singular honor for me to address this distinguished committee to give testimony on the U.S. policy toward 

Zimbabwe. I wish to thank you profoundly for taking time to reflect 

on the initiatives to support the people of Zimbabwe. 

My work as regional coordinator for Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, a grouping of civil society organizations that are working to 

help create a genuinely free and democratic Zimbabwe, keeps me 

in touch with the ongoing efforts to resolve the governance crisis 

in my country. 

Since the signing of the Global Political Agreement, the GPA, in 

September 2008, which created the inclusive government between 

the former ruling party ZANU–PF and the two factions of the 

MDC, some progress has been made to reverse the country’s catastrophic economic decline and restore normalcy to people’s lives. 

But several critical steps remain to be taken by both Zimbabwe 

and the members of the international community, including the 

U.S. Government, to guarantee sustainable peace and development. 

Mr. Chairman, largely due to President Robert Mugabe and 

ZANU–PF party’s unwillingness to institute fundamental reforms, 

Zimbabwe has failed to restore the rule of law, to ensure that the 

next elections are free and fair, and to provide justice for victims 

of abuses or to bring the perpetrators of those abuses, particularly 

the horrific electoral violence of 2008, to account and to create a 

viable roadmap that will pave the way toward a genuine transition 

to a free, democratic, and open society. 

But for the following reasons, among others, Zimbabwe is not 

ready to hold democratic elections: Key state institutions, particularly those responsible for the administration of elections, remain 

unreformed and partisan toward ZANU–PF. Although the inclusive 

government has appointed a new Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, 

its secretariat has not been reviewed to ensure independence and 

non-partisanship in the discharge of its mandate. 

Zimbabwe’s voters’ roll cannot be used for elections, as it remains 

outdated and largely inaccurate. A survey released earlier this year 

estimated that a third of the voters on the roll were dead. 

Senior leaders within the security sector continue to publicly, 

and unconstitutionally, proclaim partisanship toward ZANU–PF. 

For instance, on 27 May 2011, Brigadier General Douglas 

Nyikayaramba of the Zimbabwe National Army told a weekly 

paper that the military wants elections held in 2011, which will be 

won by ZANU–PF, adding that, ‘‘Truly speaking, I am in ZANU–

PF and ZANU–PF is in me and you cannot change that.’’

Uniformed members of the security forces have also been implicated in perpetrating violence against perceived ZANU–PF opponents and in directly campaigning for ZANU–PF. The security sector played a key role in preventing the MDC, which clearly won the 

2008 elections, from taking power, and there is little likelihood of 

50

a genuine and peaceful transition without the transformation of the 

security sector. 

While the government has lifted restrictions on print media, it 

has maintained tight control over ZANU–PF-aligned and stateowned radio and television stations. There are no private radio or 

television stations operating in Zimbabwe. 

The constitutional reform exercise is yet to be finalized. Some 

progress has been made in the area of drafting a new constitution 

under the GPA, but the constitutional review process is over a year 

behind and is taking place under difficult circumstances of extreme 

polarization, conflict, intolerance, and inadequate funding. There is 

the expectation that, now with legal drafters in place, there should 

be a national referendum for the constitution by March 2012. We 

demand that there be a new constitution in place before Zimbabwe 

can be ready to hold fresh elections that are credible, free, and fair, 

and where violence and intimidation play no part. 

Our regional bloc, SADC, has made a significant policy shift on 

Zimbabwe. Driven largely by its mediator, South Africa, SADC has 

condemned violence and intimidation in its resolution in March 

2011. SADC has also rejected ZANU–PF’s push for elections in 

2011 and has insisted on the full implementation of the GPA. 

SADC urged its Troika organ on defense, politics, and security to 

deploy representatives to participate in the monitoring of the implementation of the GPA and the election roadmap. 

The inclusive government has managed to restore a measure of 

stability to our economy by scrapping our local currency in favor 

of a multi-currency system driven by the U.S. dollar. Our agriculture and local industries are performing way below capacity, 

and for the ordinary Zimbabwean, life continues to be a huge struggle with unemployment. Well over 90 percent and at least 70 percent of our population lives on less than $1 per day. 

While there is economic growth that has been witnessed over the 

past few years, this economic gain is unsustainable if there is no 

solid political foundation. And the debate around the indigenization 

bill that seeks to take over 51 percent of shares from foreign-owned 

companies raises serious concerns and undermines possibilities for 

foreign direct investment. 

Most of the revenue from diamonds, which could play a pivotal 

role in boosting the state spending on key social sectors and supporting overall economic development, has largely bypassed the formal government structures controlled by Finance Minister Tendai 

Biti of the MDC. Lack of transparency and accountability for the 

vast diamond revenue raises serious risk that the money could be 

used to finance a violent election, if one is called prematurely in 

the absence of mechanisms to prevent state-sponsored violence. 

I wish to thank the U.S. Government for its humanitarian support to the people of Zimbabwe and support to civil society groups, 

and I wish to submit the following recommendations for your consideration: The U.S. Government should actively encourage and 

support the emerging SADC consensus on Zimbabwe relating to the 

need to establish a legitimate government through genuinely free 

and fair elections that are preceded by a new constitution and 

other necessary reforms. 

51

The U.S. Congress should avoid any legislative initiatives on 

Zimbabwe at the moment, including repealing ZDERA, the 

Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, or targeted 

sanctions, until after genuinely democratic elections have ushered 

in a legitimate government reflective of our people’s wishes. 

The people of Zimbabwe have benefitted greatly from the support 

rendered by the American people to civil society groups working in 

the fields of democracy and governance. We understand that support is being cut. I would urge the U.S. Government not only to reverse those cuts that are threatening to undermine the work of 

critical organizations, but also to consider increasing support to democracy and governance work through USAID at this vital stage 

in our transition. The key areas of work include: Finalizing the 

constitution review process; instituting and promoting electoral reforms; protecting human rights defenders; promoting human rights 

education and advocacy, and long-term monitoring and observation 

of elections. 

The U.S. Government should support the United Nations’ deployment of a human rights advisor based in Zimbabwe and long-term 

deployment of election observers in order to prevent state-sponsored violence and intimidation. 

Issues of transparency and accountability and the rule of law 

must be included in a prudent Kimberley Process mandate and 

must be used to assess the entire diamond production chain from 

the negotiation and signing of contracts to production, tax payment, and revenue management. The Kimberley Process mandate 

should be expanded to involve the monitoring and oversight of the 

investment and the disposition of revenues and from resource extraction. 

Thank you so much for this opportunity to address you. I welcome questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mavhinga follows:]

52


71036e-1.eps
53


71036e-2.eps
54


71036e-3.eps
55


71036e-4.eps
56

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Mavhinga. 

Let me go to you first, and along with Mr. Fagan, because I want 

to reconcile statements that each of you made, if that is possible. 

Mr. Fagan, you alluded to the fact that regional leaders have 

taken a soft position on Mugabe. And yet, Mr. Mavhinga, you spoke 

of an emerging southern consensus for a legitimate electoral process. I would like to understand that dynamic. 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our understanding is that over the years, particularly if we look 

at the role of South Africa from President Mbeki’s era where there 

was focus on building consensus among the political parties in 

Zimbabwe, and certainly within SADC, to the current arrangement 

for Zimbabwe, President Zuma is actively pushing for Zimbabwe to 

comply with electoral demands. It is due to the work of SADC and 

other additional players that ZANU–PF’s push for elections this 

year was defeated. So, for us, it is significant that SADC is now 

making the right kind of noises to stop elections in Zimbabwe and 

to insist on benchmarks before elections can be held, which include 

a new constitution. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Do you care to comment on this, Mr. Fagan? 

Mr. FAGAN. Sure. I think I agree. I think in the past what we 

saw, especially with President Mbeki, was this soft diplomacy that 

was characterized throughout his presidency, and it didn’t have 

much impact on the crisis in Zimbabwe. Now we see, I would say, 

a much more dramatic change in what President——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So, these aren’t irreconcilable positions? It is 

just a changing dynamic on a timeline? 

Mr. FAGAN. I believe so, yes. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Okay. Let me ask all of you a hard question 

because it is a question that the Representatives here have to constantly answer, and it is an important question that many Americans ask. Why should we be involved here? Now I will give a partial answer to it, but I would like to also hear yours. 

It is, first of all, very difficult for Americans to sit idly by while 

other people are being repressed or even killed or they are rendered hopeless because of their political situation. We have a great 

deal of heart in this country and a great deal of generosity for the 

cries of humanity. Second is we also like to benefit from mutual exchange, whether that is cultural or trade. And third is it is for our 

own national security interest. Those combinations of converging 

factors generally create the dynamic in which we have an active 

foreign policy. 

But I think it is important for you all to answer that question 

in the context of this specific country, where, using the Ambassador’s language, our relationship has been so episodic with its ups 

and downs. 

Mr. Schneider, do you want to try that? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will be happy to, but I will say, Mr. Chairman, 

that you gave a fairly good framework there for the response. But 

I think that it is not simply Zimbabwe. It is southern Africa, and 

that what happens in Zimbabwe, whether they succeed in moving 

toward political stability, a democratic process, and restoring what 

was a very dynamic economy, will affect the future of the entire reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Feb 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\110211\71036 HFA PsN: SHIRL
57

gion. There you are talking about a region that really does have 

not just significant economic but political security issues. 

To be frank, over the course of several decades, it is clear the 

United States is simply unable, nor should it, to remain unaffected 

when it sees an entire region, essentially, under threat, vulnerable, 

and possibly vulnerable to involvement by criminal or other organizations that do pose threats to the region as a whole and to this 

country. 

But I think the fundamental reason is the one you said earlier. 

If we have an opportunity to assist countries in moving in the right 

direction, it is important to do so. And, clearly, we do in this case. 

Second, the opportunity for Zimbabwe and southern Africa to increase their prosperity is very clear. If this moves in the right direction, Zimbabwe should be able to move back on a steadily-progressive slope to restore its economy. Remember, its economy declined 50 percent. GDP in Zimbabwe declined 50 percent since 

1998. 

And so, what you want to do is to see what you can do to help 

move that in the right direction. As you said, there is a security 

issue, and it is not just focused on Zimbabwe; it is focused on 

Southern Africa as a whole. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Fagan? 

Mr. FAGAN. Sir, I think that is a very difficult question to answer. I have an emotional attachment to Zimbabwe, so I might 

have a different response personally than I do maybe, you know, 

if you are coming from the American public side. 

I would probably just point to the fact that Zimbabwe is not 

maybe as strategically as important to American security interest 

as maybe Nigeria, Angola, because of oil issues and other natural 

resources. It might not be as important as Somalia with the issue 

of terrorism and Al-Shabaab, and how it really does pose a security 

risk to the United States. 

But I would liken it to the situation of Rwanda of 1994. Did the 

United States have as much of a security interest in Rwanda? But 

what did we deal with in the aftermath? Almost 1 million people 

died in a very short period of time. 

In Zimbabwe, we have a similar situation where a crisis has occurred over the past decade. I don’t think you will see a country 

on the continent that has changed so dramatically without an actual conflict. There hasn’t been war. There has been obviously constant violence and intimidation on behalf of ZANU–PF. 

But, as the United States, I believe we are a leader in the area 

of promoting democracy on these issues, and we can’t stand idly by 

just because Zimbabwe poses less of a security interest than, say, 

Angola, Nigeria, Somalia, and Kenya. But I would agree with Mr. 

Schneider it is a regional issue. If you continue to let Zimbabwe deteriorate, it has had a major implication on the economy of South 

Africa, if you look at their own unemployment numbers. There has 

been a dramatic backlash against Zimbabweans and other nationalities in South Africa. It poses a huge economic problem for Botswana and Mozambique, Zambia. So, economically, it poses——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, this is a tough situation because, clearly, it is coming out of a difficult post-colonial period in which things 

58

clearly had to change and put itself on a trajectory to potentially 

be a strong country. And yet, these self-inflicted wounds by the political leadership and the irrationality, it is simply hard to understand, basically creating implosion internally simply to hold onto 

power, or for whatever is the irrational motive that is going on 

there. It is very hard to understand. 

But I appreciate your insight, your answer. 

Mr. Mavhinga, do you live in Zimbabwe? 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, but I work out of South Africa. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yes. 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Only last week I was in——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So, what are conditions like for you? Are you 

free to speak in this way at home as you are to us? And thank you 

for your courage in doing so. 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Conditions are very difficult. We are living under serious difficulties economically. But perhaps to answer your first question, we believe in terms of the defense of values of human rights, good democracy values, that there isn’t enough for us to appeal to the U.S. 

Government to support the promotion of strong democratic institutions. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I find it very interesting, and I thank you for 

saying that. Again, when we are answering the hard question before the American people as to why we should put resources into 

any particular area, based upon the criteria which I laid out, the 

humanitarian cause, the opportunity for benefits of mutual exchange, or national security concerns, I am constantly amazed, and 

frankly refreshed, by the fact that so many other people who are 

struggling for the types of stability and liberties that we enjoy 

here, even though the United States’ reputation seems to be deteriorated internationally, yet there is a constant turning to us because of the fundamentals that are in place here and the ideals 

that we invest in, both philosophically and culturally; namely, that 

each person has inherent dignity and, therefore, rights. And that 

becomes a model for the proper use of authority in our country. 

So, you are asking the hard question, ‘‘Please continue to support 

us,’’ but I think in doing so it compliments who we are. I don’t 

mean to project on you what you are thinking, but I assume shaking your head means yes. 

Yes, thank you very much. 

Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, and thank you for coming all 

the way here to our hearing. We appreciate you, Mr. Mavhinga, for 

the work that you do and the struggle that you continue. 

Let me just maybe ask, and any of the panelists can certainly answer, do you think that the SADC troika now is really serious, and 

do you think that they will make a real difference? Anyone can answer. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think the honest answer is that we hope so. 

In recent discussions, as I said, since March, they have issued the 

first public critique of the failure of the political party leaders to 

move forward. 

59

Second, at the last meeting of SADC, they took this draft roadmap that had been negotiated supposedly in July and they went 

through it. It is our hope that they will, in fact, do some things like 

send staff to support the joint monitoring effort, send staff from 

SADC into Zimbabwe to help with the electoral machinery, and 

send staff in to set up very early, 6 months at least before the election, a nationwide observation process to support the national one. 

But it is crucial for SADC to be on the ground throughout 

Zimbabwe if there is to be any hope for this process to work successfully. 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Thank you for that. There is hope to believe that 

SADC is now much more focused and is clear about the challenges 

in Zimbabwe which relate to the central question of legitimacy of 

the state in that they have insisted on the need to have elections 

that meet SADC minimum conditions governing democratic elections. So, SADC is onsite. 

What we hope will happen is that the international community, 

including the U.S. Government, would then rally around the 

emerging consensus within SADC to support that move and to support mechanisms for free and fair elections. 

Mr. PAYNE. Right. I think that we want to be helpful. However, 

in many instances if the U.S. gets involved in front of the movement, then the people in power then use that as saying the U.S. 

is trying to dominate, sort of like we did in Libya. We let the Europeans take the lead, and then we were in a supportive role. Hopefully, we will be able to do that with SADC taking the leadership, 

but we could have the technical assistance, be in the background, 

have the financial resources that are important. 

I wonder, Mr. Mavhinga, how am I doing with your name? Pretty 

good or fair? Okay, you know who I am talking about, right? Okay. 

What do you think the hard-liners, do you think that Mr. 

Mugabe is partly a prisoner, people wanting him to stay because, 

if he leaves, some of the bad fellows feel that they have no more 

protection? I have heard that argument. 

And about the women there, are the WOZA women, who have 

been so strong by approaching military people with flowers as they 

are beaten sometimes by the police and by the military authorities, 

is their movement still moving forward? 

Finally, how is the teachers’ union holding up? Are they showing 

any resistance to Mr. Mugabe and his government? 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Thank you for that. On the question of hard-liners or whether President Mugabe is a prisoner, my considered view 

is that it is a complex situation, but President Mugabe is not certainly a prisoner, but perhaps he is prisoner of the circumstance 

of his own making, in the sense that he left ZANU–PF too late to 

make arrangements for legal transition and leadership renewal 

within his party and in government. So that now creates complications for him in terms of controlling the various factions within his 

party. 

Certainly, there are those within his inner circle around him 

from the military who fear prosecution, but not only that, they also 

wish to defend their economic interests. President Mugabe has had 

in place an elaborate system of patronage that has benefitted those 

around him. So, they need to keep that arrangement going, and 

60

this is one of the reasons why they would want to fight off any succession or to insist that President Mugabe should continue to be 

their Presidential election candidate next year, when he turns 88. 

In terms of WOZA, the Women of Zimbabwe Arise, movement 

going forward, the challenge that we have in Zimbabwe is that of 

a de facto military state in terms of the control of balance on the 

population and the use of fear. So, there is a lot of repression coming from sections of the military and the police that blocks the 

movement by WOZA and other civic groups to rally and demand 

change. The same applies with the teachers’ union and resistance 

from other quarters within the civic. 

We are trying very much, but, as we have heard in the last few 

days, even yesterday, the sections of the police loyal to President 

Mugabe continue to unleash violence on civilians, continue to unleash violence on civil society actors. So, these are the circumstances within which we are operating at the moment. 

Mr. PAYNE. I know that it is a tough question. I don’t want to 

get you in the middle of politics, but I think when Prime Minister 

Morgan Tsvangirai started MDC, he started with the local elections. They won overwhelmingly. There was so much support for 

MDC. Somehow it seems that his focus became lessened and MDC 

split off a little bit, and he sort of seemed to have lost some of the 

luster. 

Do you feel that Mr. Tsvangirai, the Prime Minister, still has 

that zeal that began or is there another candidate that could possibly topple Mr. Mugabe? 

Mr. MAVHINGA. I believe that Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai 

and the MDC have got truly a number of challenges over the last 

decade that they have been in existence and in political leadership 

of the opposition. Perhaps there were challenges around the decision to go into the inclusive government and the politics of appeasement, an approach that perhaps Prime Minister Tsvangirai 

took in the hope that to appease Mugabe would be to draw concessions out of him. 

This has not worked. The hard-liners and those around President 

Mugabe insisted that there would be no reforms. So, although we 

have the commitments on paper in terms of the Global Political 

Agreement, those reforms have not come into being. So, that has 

weakened the position of Prime Minister Tsvangirai and the MDC. 

But I am convinced that if we have a conducive environment, 

free and fair elections, and free political activity, then Prime Minister Tsvangirai will win the election overwhelmingly and will be 

able to deliver change. The challenge that is there is the continued 

control of the political and the electoral space by the military or the 

captains of the military who are loyal to President Mugabe and 

who are openly partisan to ZANU–PF. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. My time has expired. But, as you may or may 

not know, I was able to get a meeting with President Mugabe 

about 2 years ago, being the first American to really get him to 

meet. 

Of course, I had been in Rhodesia way back, and I, of course, 

knew about his—I was there when the Rhodesia military was out 

hunting down ZANU and ZAPU Freedom Fighters. And so, he was 

aware of that, and I had been an admirer of him and Joshua 

61

Nkomo for many years during the day of the struggle, which he 

knew, and I did relate after he talked a long time about the persecution of the West and how they were mistreating them. 

But in the last several-hour meeting, I did get an opportunity to 

talk about the legacy they left, the education that they had done, 

the struggle that he had won, the fact that they led the way even 

for South Africa to defeat, when they defeated Ian Smith, that P.W. 

Botha’s regime came down, and that they supported the arms 

struggle in South Africa; and that all of this is being lost on these 

years when you are having your officers beat women; you have 

judges who are giving decisions; you have people in your security 

force who torture. And how could you go from being such a revered 

leader to me as a young person, when he was in such leadership, 

to the position where he would allow these things to occur? And we 

really did have a frank discussion. 

But it is unfortunate that he has allowed himself to deteriorate 

to the point, and all that legacy of—as you know, the education of 

the Zimbabweans surpassed anyone in Africa, sub-Saharan Africa. 

As a matter of fact, it was part of a xenophobia problem in South 

Africa because of that situation of highly-educated Zimbabweans in 

South Africa, and their feeling they had taken their jobs, and so 

forth. 

So, I hope that one day he might once again just see the light 

and remember those days and come back to sanity. 

But thank you so much for coming. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. Turner of New York? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to think the United States is trying to help promote 

democracy, prosperity, the rule of law. To that end, next year there 

is a requested appropriation for over $100 million in non-humanitarian aid. 

In your opinion—and I can ask this collectively—will this be 

helping prop up a basically criminal regime? Are we working 

against our own purposes? And if we are to do this, are there recommended checks we can do, so that we are not working against 

ourselves or against the people of Zimbabwe? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much for the question. Actually, 

I think that when you look in detail at the kinds of programs, virtually none of the programs are going through the government. 

Most of the programs are going to non-governmental organizations 

and civil society organizations. There is a lot of focus on the human 

rights activist organizations. There is an effort to strengthen the 

capacity of micro-enterprise and small business. 

So, I think to some degree what they are trying to do through 

this program is to provide the building blocks ultimately of democracy. So that, if the political leadership moves in the direction that 

it should, that this kind of program can support civil society and 

activists participating in the next stage in Zimbabwe’s development. 

Also, they are primed, as I understand it, to work to strengthen 

the technical capacities of the Election Commission once they make 

the right decisions. 

62

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. FAGAN. I would go a step further and say I am not sure exactly what that money is going to be used for. But in the past, I 

would say a lot of the groups have benefitted from the U.S. support 

to democratic activists, whether they——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. FAGAN. I think it is. Sorry, I was stepping away. 

So, I don’t think the funding that has gone to and will go toward 

Zimbabwean activists helps support the regime. I think it helps 

support democratic activists, keeping the space open, whereby if 

the United States didn’t support these activists and organizations, 

you would see a much smaller democracy movement. You would 

see a much less vibrant opposition. 

I think it remains critical that the United States remain engaged 

in this way. I think we have done a fairly decent job in the past, 

but it is a difficult situation. It is a difficult country to operate in. 

So, the support is necessary and very helpful. It doesn’t go to support, I would say, ZANU–PF and the regime. 

Mr. MAVHINGA. Thank you. I would want to agree, yes, that the 

support has likely benefitted civil society groupings, and that in 

terms of supporting reforms, under the framework of the Global 

Political Agreement, there is a fairly accountable and transparent 

mechanism that is controlled by the Finance Minister, Tendai Biti, 

who is from the MDC, who has done a lot to clean up the system. 

Much of the support bypasses the central bank of Zimbabwe, where 

the leadership has politically been aligned to ZANU–PF and to 

President Mugabe. 

So, there are mechanisms that are in place to ensure accountability and transparency, and to prevent the money falling into the 

wrong hands. So, the support is appreciated. We believe that during this transitional period we really need to increase support to 

civil society groups and to supporting reforms in the area of electoral reforms, constitutional reforms, and also to support initiatives 

and a multilateral fund through the United Nations’ arrangements 

to support what is happening in Zimbabwe toward democratic transition. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yield back? 

Mr. TURNER. I yield back. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. One other point is that a significant portion of 

that, about $44 million, goes directly to non-governmental maternal/child health programs and HIV/AIDS prevention. So, again, it 

is going directly in that case for humanitarian and basic human 

needs. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. The first part of the testimony, before you 

were able to join us, Mr. Turner, covered some of that ground, but 

it is an appropriate question to re-ask. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for answering it. 

Well, that concludes our panel. I want to thank you all for joining us today and for your leadership on this important issue. 

With that, we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(63)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

64

f


71036n.eps
65

f


71036m.eps
66

f


71036f.eps
67

f


71036g.eps
68

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY


71036h-1.eps
69


71036h-2.eps
70


71036h-3.eps
71


71036h-4.eps
72

Æ


71036h-5.eps