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ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED

STATE OF SOMALIA

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 7, 2011

Serial No. 112–99

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(IV)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................................... 8

The Honorable Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs, U.S. Agency for International 

Development ......................................................................................................... 17

Reuben Brigety, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, 

Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State .......................................... 25

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic 

Council .................................................................................................................. 37

Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, fellow, One Earth Future Foundation .............................. 52

Martin Murphy, Ph.D., visiting fellow, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy, 

King’s College, London ........................................................................................ 62

David H. Shinn, Ph.D., adjunct professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University ................................................................. 72

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement ................................. 12

The Honorable Nancy Lindborg: Prepared statement .......................................... 20

Reuben Brigety, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 28

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 40

Ms. Bronwyn Bruton: Prepared statement ............................................................ 54

Martin Murphy, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 64

David H. Shinn, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 74

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 96

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 97

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 98

Written responses from the Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto to questions 

submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri ...................................................... 100

(1)

ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL

HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:30 p.m., in room 

2212 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. And good afternoon, everyone. We are holding today’s hearing for the purpose of 

examining U.S. policy regarding the failed state of Somalia, the 

possibility of recognizing breakaway areas such as Somaliland, and 

the continuing problem of Somali piracy around which the Obama 

administration has built a program. 

Somalia’s instability has encouraged other criminal activity beyond its borders, endangering the stability of the entire Horn of Africa. 

Somalia once again heads the annual list of failed states in the 

current issue of Foreign Policy Magazine. This eastern African 

country has held that dubious distinction for the past 4 years. 

Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

all have experienced horrific conditions during this period, but 

none of them could overtake Somalia at the top of the list of the 

world’s failed states. 

Since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991, the United States 

has been involved in addressing the consequences of Somalia having no functioning government in Mogadishu that effectively rules 

the entire country. This lack of governance has resulted in Somalia 

being engaged in a chaotic civil war that has abetted the growth 

of Islamic fundamentalism and piracy. 

Humanitarian, political and security conditions continue to deteriorate across south central Somalia. In the past 2 years, more 

than 22,000 civilians have been killed, an estimated 1.1 million 

people displaced, and at least 476,000 Somalis have fled to neighboring countries. 

Somalia is currently experiencing what is considered the worst 

drought in the Horn of Africa since the 1950s. As a result of this 

drought, and the continuing conflict, as Nancy Lindborg, Assistant 

Secretary for USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and HumanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:12 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\070711\67305 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

itarian Assistance will testify today, some 2.85 million Somalis are 

in need of humanitarian aid. 

Doctor Reuben Brigety, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration, will testify that 

Somalis comprise the largest refugee population in Africa. That 

represents more than 750,000 people in the greater Horn of Africa 

region, 120,000 of whom have arrived in refugee camps in the region since January of this year. 

In 2003, young leaders of al-Ittihad, a radical Islamic group that 

the Bush administration added to its list of terrorist organization, 

formed the organization known as al-Shabaab. 

The primary objective of this group was to establish a greater Somalia under Sharia. Since 2007, al-Shabaab has increasingly controlled territory in Somalia, and by late 2008 the Transitional Federal Government, or TFG, has lost control of most of south central 

Somalia to insurgent groups. 

U.S. officials are concerned that al-Qaeda and its allies in east 

Africa continue to pose serious threats. Al-Qaeda poses a direct 

threat against U.S. interests and allies in east Africa. 

While al-Shabaab appears more focused at this point on carrying 

out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and African Union 

peacekeeping forces in Somalia, it has, however, threatened to attack neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Kenya. 

For far too long, Somalia has been a cancer on the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere on the continent. Criminals from Somalia have 

not only plagued surrounding countries, but have been reportedly 

involved in drug and human trafficking as far south as South Africa. 

However, the most serious involvement of Somalia in international criminal activity is, by far, piracy. Pirate attacks in the 

waters off Somalia, and off the Horn of Africa, including those on 

U.S. flag vessels, have brought renewed international attention to 

the long-standing problem of maritime piracy. 

According to the International Maritime Bureau, at least 219 attacks occurred in the region in 2010, with 49 successful hijackings. 

Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia’s eastern coastline, and outward into the Indian Ocean. 

Using increasingly sophisticated tactics, these pirates now operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far south 

as the Mozambique Channel. 

Somalia’s pirate economy has grown substantially in the past 2 

years, with ransoms now averaging more than $5 million. The annual cost of piracy to the global economy ranges from some $7–12 

billion, by some estimates. 

Two years ago, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a 

four part plan to combat Somali piracy that includes building Somali capacity and will to rein in the pirates, coordination with the 

International Contact Group, and encouragement of cooperation between governments and shipping companies in defending vessels 

against Somali pirates. 

Yet the threat posed by Somalis is not confined to their territory 

or surrounding waters. In recent years, dozens of young Somalis, 

many of them from the Minneapolis area, have left the United 

States to return to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab. 

3

On August 5th, 2010, more than a dozen Somali-Americans, permanent residents, were arrested. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 14 people were being charged with providing support 

for al-Shabaab. Two indictments unsealed in Minnesota stated that 

Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan raised funds for alShabaab, detailing 12 money transfers in 2008 and 2009. 

The danger to America posed by al-Shabaab and its supporters 

in this country continues to be very serious. In his nomination 

hearing to become Secretary of Defense last month, CIA Director 

Leon Panetta noted that al-Shabaab’s threat ‘‘to the U.S. homeland 

is on the rise.’’ Mr. Panetta also expressed concern that as alQaeda leadership in Pakistan comes under pressure, that it is not 

able to find a safe haven in Somalia. 

Since the fall of the last national government in Somalia in 1991, 

Somaliland and Puntland, both now autonomous areas of Somalia, 

have been the only areas with effective governance. 

Somaliland seeks international recognition, while Puntland currently does not. The question of whether the United States and the 

international community fully recognizes Somaliland or supports 

its eventual integration into a greater Somalia at some future point 

requires ongoing examination and discussion. 

Consequently, today’s hearing offers a valuable opportunity to 

examine U.S. policy on a variety of issues involving Somalia. 

I would like to now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Payne, for 

any comments he might have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Let me thank you and Mr. 

Royce for calling this very important joint hearing on assessing the 

consequences of the failed state of Somalia. And it is a pleasure to 

see my good friend Mr. Royce back, who chaired the Africa Subcommittee at some point in the past, and has maintained a strong 

interest, as has Congressman Smith. 

So it is a pleasure to be here at this very important hearing. Unfortunately, I will have to leave a few minutes before 2 o’clock. I 

have been invited to be a part of the Presidential Delegation that 

will celebrate the new state of South Sudan, and must leave in an 

hour or so to Juba to be a part of that great achievement. 

But I will stay as long as I can, and I certainly look forward to 

your insights into the challenges facing Somalia, witnesses here, 

and how the United States can best address the root causes of 

these challenges. 

And let me also say that I really commend our witnesses, all of 

whom have distinguished backgrounds in dealing with Somalia and 

other difficult places in the world, especially the Honorable Donald 

Yamamoto, who has spent so much time in the area and has been 

responsible for so many achievements that we have seen in the 

very troubled parts of the world where he has served. 

I have had a long history of engagement with Somalia. My most 

recent trip to Mogadishu in April 2009 gained international attention because of the mortar attack on my plane as I left Mogadishu. 

But that was not my first visit to Mogadishu, nor was it the first 

attack on a plane that I was boarding. The first happening in early 

1992, when I attended—and the plane was fired on as we were getting ready to leave Mogadishu, but was not airborne, as was the 

4

recent attack in 2009. Of course, with my good luck, they didn’t 

shoot straight, and therefore I am here to give testimony. 

I first traveled to Mogadishu in the summer of 1993, just following the killing of the Pakistani peacekeepers. That was 2 years 

after Siad Barre had been overturned, and the country had devolved into a state of lawlessness and warfare. 

You may recall the United States and other U.N.-related countries went to see that the children could get the food that was 

being sent to Somalia, but the distribution was being prevented by 

the warlords. And there was food there, but children were dying 

because the warlords would not allow the food to be distributed. 

And so my first trip was then and I returned back again in late 

’93, because I am from the State of New Jersey. We have a large 

number of pharmaceutical corporations, and I asked them if they 

would participate in a pharmaceutical drive that UNICEF co-sponsored with me, to provide medications for children to help in the 

situation, since the children were suffering so much. 

And we had the 100 percent cooperation from the New Jersey 

pharmaceuticals to provide the medications that we needed. And as 

a matter of fact, in my recent trip 2 years ago it was noted by some 

of the participants that remembered the pharmaceutical drive that 

brought millions of dollars of donated products to the children of 

Somalia. 

After leaving Mogadishu on my first trip in ’93, I then went to 

one of the largest Somali refugee camps in Kenya. The camp was 

even larger than the Dadaab camp that we talk about today, which 

exists in Kenya, which I have also visited several times, most recently a year or so ago. 

The refugee situation of Somalis throughout the region has always been a very serious question and problem for the surrounding 

countries. The people continue to suffer in these rough conditions, 

but the spirit of the Somali people has always impressed me. 

Throughout the toughest times, Somalis remain hopeful, and find 

ways to run a business, to make the best of a situation in other 

ways. And I greatly admire their fortitude and stick-to-it-iveness, 

and even creativeness, really creating a new industry. 

As we know, about 4 years ago, actually back 4 years following 

my ’93 trip, in 1997, I went to Hargeisa for the first time. I met 

with former President of Somaliland—and we met also recently 

with the current President, Silanyo, most recently 1 year ago in 

Nairobi, before the elections. And speaking by phone to him recently—I was the original sponsor of a resolution on Somaliland in 

1990, which called on the United States to provide assistance to—

and give Somaliland observer status at the United Nations, and to 

recognize their accomplishments. 

As you know, Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu Somalia 

were all controlled by different colonial powers, and I think that 

the reason that some have succeeded—for example, Somaliland—

is because some colonial powers gave more autonomy to the locals, 

and provided them with the opportunity to govern, whereas in 

Mogadishu there was very little of that. This is the only resolution 

to be introduced in Congress that focused on Somaliland in two 

decades, at that time. 

5

I also met with President Farole of Puntland several times. He 

testified at a hearing I chaired on Somalia in 2009, where I encouraged the leaders of Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu to band 

together for the future of Somalia as a whole. 

Finally, it was in April 2009 that I travelled to Mogadishu after 

all the violence and upheaval that had occurred during the Ethiopian invasion. I met with President Sheikh, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, 

ministers, journalists, and a prominent coalition of women’s organizations who were very, very active at that time in Mogadishu. 

These were things that we did not hear about, but that were going 

on in spite of the violence. 

As a matter of fact, I was there the day following the U.S. Navy 

SEALs taking down three Somali pirates, and of course I was 

asked at a press conference by al-Jazeera what I thought about 

this. 

And I made it very clear that piracy is illegal, that the United 

States of America would not tolerate the intrusion on a U.S. ship, 

and that I totally supported President Obama and the U.S. Navy 

SEALs in the taking down of the three Somali pirates. I think that 

may have had something to do with al-Shabaab taking a shot at 

my plane when I left. 

In 2009, I introduced a resolution calling for the recognition of 

the Transitional Federal Government, the TFG, by the U.S., greater involvement, greater engagement on the political and humanitarian crisis, and for the establishment of a diplomatic presence in 

Mogadishu once conditions improved. 

As you know, the TFG remains a weak government, but despite 

recent shake-ups there are glimmers of hope. Last month, President Ahmed and Speaker of Parliament Sharif agreed to hold elections by August 20th, 2012. It was also decided that a new Prime 

Minister would be appointed. 

The TFG is planning a conference in Mogadishu, sponsored by 

the U.N., to bring together all of the Somali stakeholders. It is unclear whether Somaliland officials will attend. President Ahmed 

must be given support as he attempts to increase dialogue, promote 

stability, and fight off al-Shabaab, which continues to wreak havoc 

on the population. 

As you know, over the past several years more than 22,000 civilians have been attacked, an estimated 1.1 million people displaced, 

476,000 Somalis have fled to neighboring countries. 

This is simply unconscionable. Many people in Washington rightfully focus on the criminal aspects of piracy. I spoke with Secretary 

Clinton while travelling with her in Nairobi when she met with 

President Sharif, and she expressed the view that piracy was a 

symptom and not a cause of Somalia’s problem. 

We need to work on that strategy announced in October, the 

Dual Track strategy, which we will hear about. I think it’s something that needs to be discussed more. And just in conclusion, 

while the State Department has stated that it will not recognize 

Somaliland, State has commended the progress and stability both 

of Somaliland and Puntland in what they have achieved. This 

broadening of inclusion will allow a more flexible and effective dialogue. 

6

We have questions that we will be asking the panelists here, but 

in deference to time I will just simply conclude that we do have a 

problem with that one fourth of the country’s population is either 

refugee or internally displaced. This year, nearly 100,000 people 

have fled to neighboring countries. 20,000 of them did so just 2 

weeks’ period ago, because of the drought situation. 

And so I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And with 

that, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne. I would like to 

yield to my co-chairman of this hearing, and a good friend, the 

chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too held the gavel of the 

Africa Subcommittee once. I just wanted to say, in working with 

Don Payne in that capacity, over those years, his willingness to 

speak out was always very impressive. And I know he has to leave 

at some time today to speak out in terms of the situation in South 

Sudan, at a meeting there. 

But we were actually on a codel in Africa when we got the word 

that Don had done two things. One, he’d had a press conference. 

And minutes later, his plane was mortared as he was flying out of 

town. 

But it is because Don Payne was willing and has been willing to 

speak out, and because of you, Mr. Chairman, that we have got 

some light on this issue. 

And it is an issue, this situation in Somalia, that is not only a 

humanitarian crisis, it is also, frankly, a national security threat. 

And that is the aspect of it—I chair the Terrorism Subcommittee. 

This is the aspect of it that the State Department has been talking 

to us about, and the Defense Department. 

And this is something that we are going to look at today—because Somalia has been a failed state for an awfully long period of 

time. But nowhere are the consequences of Somalia more evident 

than when it comes to international terrorism and the threat from 

al-Shabaab, which is, as we designate it, a foreign terrorist organization. 

And in the past few years, al-Shabaab threat, of course, has 

grown dramatically to the U.S. We have seen in the theater of Somalia, the roadside bombs, the suicide blasts that come out of this 

organization. Militant compounds resemble, as the press reports it, 

‘‘Pakistan-style terror training camps.’’

And because of the influx of foreign fighters into this area, the 

neighborhoods around Mogadishu are referenced by locals there as 

‘‘Little Afghanistan.’’ A year ago, al-Shabaab conducted its first attacks outside of Somalia. They killed 76 people, including one 

American, in Kampala, Uganda. 

So there is a growing concern that al-Shabaab leaders are striving to strike targets, not just beyond Somalia now, but beyond Africa. A European plot was recently uncovered. It was in the works, 

and it was uncovered. 

So links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most active of all of the al-Qaeda franchises, are becoming 

clearer and clearer to us in the United States. They are communicating more about operations. They are working together on 

training. They are working together on tactics. 

7

The bomb-making capability that al-Qaeda has, the expertise 

that they have there, is being combined with al-Shabaab’s recruits. 

And these recruits frequently have western passports. Many of 

them have U.S. passports. This is quite a deadly combination. 

And that is why, last month, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta 

called al-Shabaab’s threat to the U.S. homeland, in his words, ‘‘significant and on the rise.’’

U.S. forces have gone on the offensive, of course, targeting alShabaab’s leaders from the sky. But we should have a diplomatic 

attack as well, and that is where I would like to focus my attention 

here. 

We should target al-Shabaab’s outside source of support. The 

Government of Eritrea’s support for al-Shabaab is well-documented. 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson testified 

to Congress about Eritrea’s supply of weapons to terrorists inside 

Somalia. The U.N. Security Council, acting at the urging of African 

neighbors, passed sanctions against Eritrea, demanding that the 

country—and I am going to read from the sanctions here—‘‘cease 

arming, cease training and equipping’’ al-Shabaab. 

With al-Shabaab under pressure, it is time to tackle its state 

sponsors, its state supporters, before this menace reaches the 

United States. We must have an honest recognition of the destructive role Eritrea is playing in the region, and designate it as a state 

sponsor of terrorism. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Royce, thank you very much. I understand 

Mr. Connolly has to leave, but I yield 1 minute to my friend from 

Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you, Mr. Payne and Mr. Royce, for holding this hearing. 

In picking up sort of where Mr. Royce left off, the inherent instability that has long dominated Somalia as a failed state has spillover effects that certainly affect the United States, national security, the shipping lanes off of the Gulf of Aden, and I think are of 

deep concern. 

I am particularly interested in this hearing in hearing the views 

of our panelists on the piracy aspect of this instability. There are 

lots of aspects, but we are seeing pirates who are more 

emboldened. It is a cash business. They are more and more successful in ransoming numerous ships. 

That is a critical shipping lane that simply has to be secured. 

And in American history, going back to Thomas Jefferson, we have 

always had an interest in that part of the world and putting an end 

to piracy. Here we are, over 200 years later, dealing with something similar. 

And so I would be very interested in hearing what you think our 

options are or should be, and what steps we can take to further enhance our capability to deter piracy in that part of the world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Connolly, thank you very much. Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Just very briefly, Mr. Chair. As Somalia continues to 

receive a rating of a failed country, our country must continue to 

8

remain active and expand our diplomatic commitment and support 

to restoring Somalia. 

And once again, I appreciate your leadership in this matter. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass, thank you very much. I would like to now 

introduce our very distinguished panel, beginning with Ambassador 

Donald Yamamoto. Ambassador Yamamoto is no stranger to the 

Africa Subcommittee, having testified before us in March at a hearing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

He has served since 2009 as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department of State. 

His prior assignments included serving as U.S. Ambassador to 

Ethiopia from November of ’06 to July 2009, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from ’03 to 

’06. 

We will then hear from Nancy Lindborg, who is the Assistant 

Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID. She has previously spent 14 years as 

president of Mercy Corps, where she focused on international relief 

and development during her time with Mercy Corps. 

Nancy Lindborg also served in a number of positions in non-governmental organizations, and in an advisory capacity to government agencies, where she worked on issues related to foreign relations and foreign assistance. 

We have full bios, which will be made a part of the record, because you are all very accomplished people. 

We will then hear from Dr. Reuben Brigety, who is currently 

serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration at State. In this capacity, he 

supervises U.S. refugee programs in Africa, manages U.S. humanitarian diplomacy with major international partners, and oversees 

the development of international migration policy. 

He previously worked for Human Rights Watch, and has been an 

active duty U.S. Naval officer. He recently returned from East Africa, where he worked on the ground with Somali refugees, and will 

be returning shortly to that area. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and Chairman Royce, and distinguished members of this committee. And I wanted to say especially, thank you 

very much Mr. Chairman and to you all for holding this very important hearing, and also for your very kind words for us. 

The problems of Somalia are not isolated, and the solutions to 

them are neither easy nor one-dimensional. There are signs of 

progress and improvement to fortify our outlook and encourage 

U.S. efforts. Most recently and significantly, Somali National Security Forces under the control of the Transitional Federal Government killed al-Qaeda terrorist Harun Fazul when the car he was 

in ran a checkpoint in Mogadishu. 

9

His death brings a sense of relief to the victims and their families of the 1998 Embassy bombings in Nairobi and in Dar. 

In October 2010, Assistant Secretary Carson announced the Dual 

Track approach to Somalia after careful consultation and review, 

and also listening to your advice, from this committee and others, 

on the approach to Somalia. Taking into consideration Somalia’s 

past and present, as well as its challenges and strengths, we continue to support the Djibouti Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government, its National Security Forces, and the African 

Union Mission to Somalia, or AMISOM. 

However, we recognized there are large pockets of stability in Somalia that merited greater U.S. engagement, and have broadened 

our outreach to include greater engagement with Somaliland, 

Puntland, and regional and local anti-al-Shabaab groups throughout south and central Somalia. 

We recognize the need to encourage grassroots support for stability in Somalia, and are reaching out to Diaspora communities 

and civil society to foster dialogue and peaceful reconciliation. 

In addition, we will continue to do everything we can to provide 

urgently needed humanitarian assistance. Thanks to the dedication 

and sacrifice of AMISOM and TFG Forces, al-Shabaab can no 

longer claim control of Mogadishu or free rein to operate in significant portions of the city. 

Since 2007, the United States has supported this development by obligating approximately $258 million of support to AMISOM’s 

training and logistical needs, as well as approximately $85 million 

to support and build the capacity of TFG forces. 

Over the next year, we will support new AMISOM troop contingents, as well as TFG and its needs for training, equipping, and 

logistical support. We will continue to focus on supporting the 

TFG’s political progress over the course of the next year. 

After 5 months of political infighting relating to the TFG’s tenure 

coming to a close in August 2011, TFG President Sheikh Sharif 

and Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan co-signed the Kampala 

Accord on June 9th, and rededicated themselves to finding an end 

to the transition period that has been in place since 2004. 

Ugandan President Museveni and U.N. Special Rep Augustine 

Mahiga witnessed the agreement, with President Museveni serving 

as its guarantor. 

Under the agreement, the TFG recommitted itself to the Djibouti 

Peace Process, and the Transitional Federal Charter, to completing 

a set of transitional tasks to be monitored by the international 

community, to the reform of the Parliament, and to holding elections for the President and Speaker by August 2012. 

Under the Kampala Accord, the TFG appointed and confirmed 

Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali on June 28th. The Kampala 

Accord is a sign that the TFG leadership realizes that neither the 

Somali people nor the international community have the patience 

to continue to accept incessant political infighting that serves no 

purpose other than maintaining access to the perks of office and influence for certain individuals. 

We and our international partners, under the Kampala Accord, 

will be pushing for timeliness, benchmarks over the next year, including completion of a national constitution, revenue transparency 

10

and accountability, meaningful engagement with Puntland, 

Galmuduug, Ahlu Sunna, ASWJ, and other Somalia stakeholders. 

We have expanded our diplomatic outreach with these regional 

authorities and partners, and have travelled to Hargeisa five times. 

We advocate for representation from the regions in conferences and 

other events, such as the U.N.’s counter-piracy focused mechanisms 

known as the Kampala Process, and the U.N.’s consultation in 

April, which focused on ending the transition, in the Joint Security 

Committee. 

The interaction between the U.S. and Somali interlocutors is critical as we work to advance peace and security throughout Somalia. 

We are reviewing how best to adapt our travel policy for Somalia 

to more robustly execute our Dual Track approach. 

The security of U.S. personnel is of paramount importance when 

considering travel inside Somalia, and we will not shrink from this 

obligation. 

The current budget environment will have an impact on our ability to effect positive changes in Somalia over the near- to mid-term. 

Demands for support to AMISOM troop contingents close to deployment and the needs of the fledgling TFG will continue for some 

time. 

On the development and peacebuilding side, in FY2011 Somalia received approximately $25 million in development support to assist our Dual Track approach. We are also providing $48 million in 

humanitarian assistance this year, as well as $8.3 million for humanitarian assistance for those who have fled Somalia. 

Even in the resource-constrained budget environment, the 

United States Government continues to do as much as possible to 

promote our core goal of building a peaceful and secure Somalia. 

During 2011, we have used funding to assist Somalis in clearing 

the streets of Mogadishu of garbage and sand, provided streetlights 

in Mogadishu, and provided technical assistance to the Ministry of 

Finance to combat corruption. 

The increasing piracy problem off the coast of Somalia stems 

from years of instability, lack of governance, and economic fragility 

on land. The tragic death of four innocent Americans this past February was tragic, and provided a sober demonstration of the need 

to do more to address this problem. 

My colleagues across the interagency, including in State’s Bureau 

of Political and Military Affairs at the Department of Defense, have 

been at the forefront of the U.S. Government’s counter-piracy efforts. We must also work with Somali authorities and other regional states to enhance their capacity to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted. 

Internationally, more focus should be placed on tracing financial 

flows in order to determine who benefits most from piracy, both 

within Somalia as well as externally. Though these efforts take 

place in the context of other challenges, we will continue to support 

efforts aimed at reducing the piracy threat. 

Al-Shabaab and its relationship to al-Qaeda is a significant concern for the United States and its partners in the region. With sustained military pressure from the TFG National Security Force and 

AMISOM, al-Shabaab’s hold on Mogadishu has dramatically decreased. 

11

The opening of additional fronts in Gedo and the middle and 

lower Juba region last February has also placed additional pressure on al-Shabaab’s ability to hold these areas. As more areas escape al-Shabaab’s control, the challenge is for Somalis to put into 

place effective administrations capable of providing governance and 

services in order to prevent al-Shabaab from returning. 

While we see signs of al-Shabaab’s control lessening in the western region of Somalia and in Mogadishu, we remain strongly concerned about the impact on Somalia and the region. 

We continue to monitor events in Somalia, including the influence of al-Qaeda on senior al-Shabaab leadership. However, as an 

organization, al-Shabaab includes multiple factions with competing 

objectives, and has lost significant areas of territorial control in the 

areas of south and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s leadership is increasingly fractured and divided, with questionable support from 

the Somali people in many areas. 

Somalia’s instability is a product of generations of neglect and 

corruption, but a solution will be the product of generations of concerted focus, legitimate engagement, and expectations of results. 

We will continue to focus efforts on Somalia in ways that grapple 

with its challenges effectively and flexibly. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions, and those of my colleagues. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Yamamoto, thank you very much for your testimony, for your insights. 

Assistant Administrator Lindborg. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NANCY LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members of 

the committee. And I particularly wish you a safer journey today, 

Congressman Payne, than your previous ones. 

Thanks very much for this opportunity to testify today on the humanitarian crisis of Somalia, and for your continued interest and 

leadership on this issue. I have submitted longer testimony for the 

record, and will just give you a brief——

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it is made a part of the record, and 

that of all our witnesses. 

Ms. LINDBORG. I am sorry, what? 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your full statement will be made 

a part of the record. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. And all of our witnesses, if you have a longer submission, it will also be made a part of the record. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Great. Thank you. So today I will give you a 

briefer update on the situation, as well as the U.S. Government’s 

assistance to help the 2.85 million people in need in Somalia. 

I want to emphasize that although we are focused today on Somalia, this really is a regional crisis, with more than 10 million 

people in the countries of the Horn, who are all deeply connected 

in an arc of drought, of crop failure, and high livestock mortality. 

The crisis is further complicated by the continuing conflict in Somalia, and our inability to fully and reliably reach more than 1.8 

million Somalis, primarily in the south and parts of central Somalia, and the outpouring of Somali refugees into the drought-stressed 

areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. 

There, as you know, have been cyclical droughts in the Horn for 

decades, and as a result we have very advanced early warning systems that we established and fund, including the Famine Early 

Warning System Network, or FEWS NET, and the Food Security 

and Nutritional Analysis Unit. They continually collect data and 

provide analysis that has enabled us to pre-position stocks in the 

region, to target our assistance where we can, and to look ahead. 

And according to FEWS NET, the drought that we are currently 

seeing in the region is the worst in the Horn of Africa since the 

1950s. 

In Somalia, the combined effect of consecutive seasons of poor or 

failed rainfall, coupled with the conflict, have resulted in rising inflation, severe crop failure, very high livestock mortality, and significant, even alarming, malnutrition rates. 

As a result, there are now 1.46 million Somalis who are internally displaced, and taken through the years now, 800,000 Somali 

refugees in the greater Horn. It takes, indeed, great resilience for 

the Somalis to continue forward. 

18

In January 2011, our early warning systems estimated that 2.4 

million people in Somalia were in crisis, and the latest data now 

indicate 2.85 million people are in need of life-saving assistance. 

This is a 19 percent increase in 6 months. And that means, of the 

estimated 9.9 million people in Somalia, one in four now needs 

international assistance to survive. 

In May, I traveled to Kenya and Somalia to ensure that we are 

able to respond as fully and responsibly as we are able to to this 

crisis, and also to express the commitment of the United States to 

the people of Somalia during this critical period. 

Along with U.S. Special Envoy Ambassador John Yates, I traveled to Hargeisa in the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland. We 

met with government officials, as well as local and international 

non-governmental associations while there. 

And we met with President Silanyo, who expressed his concern 

over the failed rains, the loss of livestock, and the need for assistance, while also expressing deep thanks to the United States for 

our response and continued assistance. 

I also spoke with the civil society leaders in Somaliland, who said 

that we are seeing the end of the pastoral lifestyle as we know it. 

With the drought and the conflict, continued lack of water and pasture, we are seeing nomads migrate increasingly into the urban 

areas, including to parts of Somaliland and Puntland, adding strain 

to an already stressed situation. 

The impact of the drought on the people in Somalia is most vividly illustrated in the refugee camps in Ethiopia and in Kenya. As 

a result of an inability to get into other parts of Somalia, I visited 

the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya, and talked to several families 

who had lost all of their livestock or sold their land, had no remaining assets, and thus began a long walk across Somalia to the 

Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya. 

In Dadaab, we are now seeing Somali refugee populations arriving with global acute malnutrition rates of 30 to 40 percent. This 

is more than double the World Health Organization’s emergency 

threshold number of 15 percent. And we are seeing severe acute 

malnutrition rates at 23 percent in new arrivals. That is seven to 

eight times higher than the 2 to 3 percent that is considered alarming. 

We are seeing a similar increase in Ethiopia, with even higher 

malnutrition data, which my colleague, Dr. Brigety, will discuss. 

But let me make this data very simple to remember. One out of 

two Somalis now arriving in Ethiopia is acutely malnourished. One 

out of three arriving in Kenya is acutely malnourished. 

Unfortunately in Somalia, we have significant challenges in providing humanitarian assistance, primarily in the south and central 

parts of Somalia, due to the presence of armed groups, especially 

al-Shabaab, which is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. 

General insecurity and lawlessness prevents aid workers from reliably reaching more than 60 percent of the people in Somalia who 

need life-saving assistance, again primarily in the south. 

In January 2010, the World Food Program suspended their operations in southern Somalia because of threats and unacceptable 

conditions created by these armed groups, particularly al-Shabaab. 

19

Many other international NGOs are also unable to operate safely 

in southern Somalia, and this lack of access has created a severe, 

unabated humanitarian crisis and contributed to the significant 

outflow of refugees. 

In order to deliver assistance to these areas where possible, we 

have developed a risk mitigation strategy with an emphasis on assuring our assistance reaches those most in need. We have put into 

place basic risk mitigation procedures, risk-based assessments, and 

special conditions for our grant agreements, and continue to work 

to ensure our programs in Somalia are appropriately and accountably managed and monitored, and reaching those areas that we 

can. 

As a result, we have now provided $40 million in humanitarian 

assistance inside Somalia this fiscal year. We have been pre-positioning supplies in the region since FEWS NET began warning of 

the crisis in August 2010. 

We are helping to feed 1.2 million people in the accessible areas 

of Somalia, and treat tens of thousands of severely malnourished 

people in Somalia country-wide. We are providing health care, 

clean water, rehabilitation of basic water infrastructure, proper 

sanitation, hygiene education and supplies. 

And we are also working to improve long-term opportunities with 

our development programs, with an emphasis on youth and women. 

We will continue to identify additional opportunities to meet the 

growing and concerning needs in Somalia. 

Just 2 weeks ago, we released 19,000 metric tons of food aid from 

our regionally pre-positioned stocks to support general food distribution, supplementary feeding, emergency school feeding, and 

mother and child feeding inside Somalia. To help refugees who are 

fleeing the country, we have provided over $76 million in life-saving assistance. Again, Dr. Brigety will describe more. 

In early June, we set up a Horn Drought Task Force in the region. We have elevated that just this week to a Disaster Assistance 

Response Team, with 20 members in the region. 

Looking ahead, and looking at the most recent data, we expect 

the perilous situation to worsen through the end of this year. Given 

limited labor opportunities, dwindling food stocks, sky-high cereal 

prices, we believe many households will continue to experience a 

severe situation and be unable to put food on the table. We will see 

an increased number of households that can no longer meet their 

food needs in the weeks and months ahead. 

As unfortunate as that is, we also expect the situation in Somalia 

to continue to decline, and will look for additional ways to provide 

aid to those in Somalia, while also providing assistance for those 

forced to flee. 

We are coordinating our emergency response programs with our 

ongoing development programs. We have an estimated budget of 

$21 million for 2011 in our development programs, which will continue to look at building economic and political stability in areas 

that we can. 

We consider this an extremely grave situation. We thank you for 

your support of our ongoing programs, and thank you for holding 

this important hearing today, as we continue to work this issue. 

Thank you. 

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[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]


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Mr. SMITH. Assistant Administrator Lindborg, thank you very 

much for your testimony, and for working so hard to meet the 

needs of so many suffering people. 

I would like to now ask Dr. Brigety if he would proceed. 

STATEMENT OF REUBEN BRIGETY, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BRIGETY. Good afternoon, Chairmen Smith and Royce, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much for including me on this panel to 

review the situation of Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa, which 

is one of the consequences of what many have called a failed state 

in Somalia. 

Today we are facing a critical emergency within what is a protracted Somali refugee situation dating back to 1988, when people 

in northern Somalia fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti to escape attacks 

by their own government. 

Somalis represent the largest refugee population in Africa, with 

over 750,000 just in the greater Horn of Africa region alone. Over 

120,000 of those have arrived just since January of this year. 

A few weeks ago, Ethiopia opened its sixth camp for Somali refugees, and it is already almost full. A seventh camp is currently in 

the works. Djibouti has announced a second camp as well, and the 

international community continues to press Kenya to permit expansion of the Dadaab three-camp complex, which is home to over 

370,000 refugees, almost all of which are Somalis. 

You already may be aware that the Dadaab camps were opened 

some 20 years ago to house about 90,000 Somali refugees, and now 

house over four times as many, making just the camp the fourth 

largest population center in Kenya, and the largest refugee camp 

in the world. 

Even in this overcrowded state, more than 1,000 refugees have 

arrived per day over the past few weeks in search of life-saving assistance. Indeed, the refugee situation has worsened dramatically 

in the last month, with reported new arrivals in June almost double in Ethiopia, and triple in Kenya, from what was reported in 

May. 

Ironically, this may be partly a result of the success in pushing 

back al-Shabaab that Ambassador Yamamoto has highlighted, freeing some who could still move to do so, though the main contributing factor remains the difficult conditions within Somalia. 

From a humanitarian perspective, what is most critical now is 

addressing the desperate and deplorable state of malnutrition, 

which threatens the lives of many newly-arriving refugee children. 

They have endured the ravages of ongoing conflict, and struggled 

to survive the consequences of al-Shabaab’s obstruction of international food aid in wide swathes of south central Somalia. 

These new arrivals have faced the latest devastating drought, as 

Assistant Administrator Lindborg noted, a drought affecting the 

entire Horn and rivalling those on record going back to the 1950s. 

Having sold all that they have owned to survive, they have made 

the arduous journey, mostly on foot, for days or even weeks, to 

26

reach safety and humanitarian assistance in camps in Kenya and 

Ethiopia. 

To illustrate the severity of this situation, the international humanitarian community considers it an emergency when the rate of 

global acute malnutrition within a population exceeds 15 percent. 

In Ethiopia, as Assistant Administrator Lindborg noted, global 

acute malnutrition rates close to 50 percent have been reported 

among newly arriving refugee children. In Kenya, global acute malnutrition rates of up to 40 percent have been reported among newly 

arriving refugee children. 

This situation is substantially worse than when I last visited the 

Dolo Odo refugee camps in Ethiopia in February of this year. 

Newly arriving children are now dying in the refugee camp at the 

rate of two to three children every day. 

During my most recent visit to the region just last week, a senior 

advisor of the Ethiopian Government’s refugee agency, and a veteran of UNHCR, told me of the condition of near-death of many 

children as they arrive in the camps, some so emaciated, and with 

skin lesions so deep, that you can see their bones in their skulls 

and in their arms through their translucent skin. 

In his words, ‘‘People are coming from Somalia to die in Ethiopia.’’ We must ensure that as many as possible of these children 

are saved through urgent and timely interventions, such as emergency therapeutic feeding programs and rapid registration to ensure prompt access of refugees to regular food distribution. 

Though some of these activities are already underway, the level 

is not yet adequate to meet the considerable needs of the population. Given the urgent nature of the situation, I will be traveling 

to the Horn again tomorrow, and plan to visit the camps in the 

southeast of Ethiopia, which are receiving the vast majority of new 

arrivals. And I will be accompanied by our Ambassador to Ethiopia, 

Ambassador Donald Booth. 

Speed is of the essence as we seek to prevent additional deaths. 

And yet, we cannot forget that this, too, is a regional crisis that 

will require the combined efforts of the international community, 

all the more so in that, as my colleague Ms. Lindborg testified, this 

drought disaster is putting some 10 million people at risk throughout the Horn. 

The appalling state of Somali refugees is a stark example of what 

the drought is doing to the people of the Horn, and emphasizes the 

importance of a comprehensive response to address the needs of all 

those suffering from this crisis. 

Regrettably, famine experts tell us that the worst of this regional 

drought crisis is still to come in the months before the next possible rains this fall. 

My bureau, the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, which supports all refugee protection and assistance efforts except for food aid, which is supported by my colleagues from USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, is in the process of 

programming over $63 million for the Horn, and will be providing 

additional funds next week, when we expect a new appeal from the 

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, to which we 

will be responding. 

27

There are clearly many challenges still ahead. Countries in the 

Horn are understandably weary of hosting hundreds of thousands 

of refugees. Some, such as Kenya in the early 1990s, have seen refugee inflows reach 1,000 per day, and would very much want to 

avoid repeating these experiences. 

Some, such as Yemen, are in great turmoil themselves. Events 

in Sudan could well generate more Sudanese refugees in coming 

months. Security inside much of south central Somalia is not conducive to mounting easily successful humanitarian operations that 

might reach those in need where they are. 

For example, I understand that the efforts of the U.N. humanitarian team this week to assess conditions and humanitarian access in areas along the border of Kenya and Ethiopia were derailed 

by the presence of roadside bombs and land mines. 

As a consequence, we must ensure that safe places of asylum in 

the countries neighboring Somalia continue to exist, and that refugees can find security as well as life-saving assistance. 

We will continue to work with our colleagues in the U.S. Government, and with our counterparts in other countries, to achieve 

these goals. We welcome your support, we are grateful for it, and 

I would welcome any questions you may have. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brigety follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Brigety. Let me begin—

we do have a recorded vote, one of the vital and necessary distractions that we face during the day. And it will be about an hour’s 

worth of voting. 

So I will ask some questions at the outset, rapid-fire, and ask my 

colleagues if we could all ask some questions. And hopefully we can 

get it done that way, and then go to our second panel when we return. 

Very quickly. Ms. Lindborg, the unmet food need—obviously, you 

have outlined an absolutely catastrophic situation of malnutrition. 

What is the lack of donor aid? What is the unmet need there, dollars and cents? And is there an inability to deliver it because of 

conflicts, just that we can’t get the security aid or the food aid to 

the people occupied by al-Shabaab and the like? 

FEWS NET, obviously, has given us a great insight as to what 

is coming on malnutrition. What are we looking at in terms of menacing diseases? We know many diseases are manifesting already. 

Are there others on their way? If you could just go through some 

of those diseases. 

To Dr. Brigety, you mentioned a UNHCR appeal. I was going to 

ask you about that. And if you might touch on what that unmet 

need—what you anticipate the needs will be, so we can hopefully 

meet our very significant obligations from a humanitarian point of 

view. 

And if you could maybe speak briefly about the relative security 

inside and outside, in proximity to the refugee camps. We know 

that camps all over the world are often menaced by threats, especially to women. Do you find that with these as well? 

And then, Ambassador Yamamoto, on AU peacekeepers. Their 

rules of engagement: Are they robust enough? There are some who 

suggest that their actual presence hurts the TFG’s ability to rule, 

primarily because of a Somali aversion to a sense of an occupying 

force, even if that force is benign, as the AU force obviously is. 

The resilience of al-Shabaab. Dr. Pham, in his testimony, talks 

about their resilience, their ability to adapt. What is our take on 

that? 

And what is the troop strength, if you want to call them troops, 

terrorist strength, of al-Shabaab? How big is it? 

And are weapons coming through Sudan, Eritrea? And are any 

of those weapons coming from China? 

With regards to the pirates, Dr. Murphy points out in his testimony—and others have pointed out in their testimony as well—

that there needs to be a land solution. And I think that is obvious, 

but if you briefly could touch on that. 

Chairman Royce? We’ll do all the questions, so that——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, and I will be very brief as well. Deputy Assistant Secretary Yamamoto, if I could ask you this question: When 

the last administration left office, there was an internal debate 

over whether Eritrea should be designated a state sponsor of terrorism for its support for al-Shabaab. It didn’t happen at that time, 

but just after she left government service, former Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer wrote a good piece in the Wall Street Journal, and the theme was Eritrea should be listed as a state sponsor 

of terrorism. 

31

We have got U.N. report after U.N. report citing their support for 

al-Shabaab. The case is pretty cut and dry. Assistant Secretary 

Carson testified flat-out that ‘‘the Government of Eritrea continues 

to supply weapons and munitions to extremist and terrorist elements.’’ We are trying to put them on defense. 

I think now is the time to press. We argue here that many of 

these problems can’t be solved by military means alone. Well, here 

is a chance for diplomacy to add teeth to this. 

So I put that question to you, and yield to Mr. Payne. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Chairman Royce. Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I would just like to ask, with 

the 12-month—and anyone can answer it—the 12 months that will 

be used now for elections in Somalia, do you think that the TFG 

will be able to handle it? What do you think the new move, with 

the new Prime Minister, the contention between the President and 

the Prime Minister, do you think we will be able to see the TFG 

be able to put elections on course? 

The strength of the AU forces. Do you feel that they have enough 

forces to contain al-Shabaab, who as you know is getting support 

from al-Qaeda? And do you see whether the government is being 

able to win that battle? 

And finally, on Eritrea. As you know, I was the last Member of 

Congress to visit there, several years ago, and have been able to 

talk to President Isaias. I wonder, in your opinion, as we are going 

to move for sanctions—and I have a lot of respect for Congressman 

Royce’s position—do you think that the designation—you know, 

once you get on that terrorist list, that is it forever. And that could 

close off any kind of possibility. 

Is there, in your opinion, a last-minute opportunity to see whether President Isaias—I mean, the President of Eritrea did write 

President Obama when he first came in, saying that he was interested in having some dialogue. Do you think that to shut it off totally—that ends it all, which I am not saying, Congressman Royce, 

that—absolutely everything points to the fact there should be 

something done—or do you think a last-minute shot at attempting 

to see if the Government of Eritrea could be convinced that it 

should try to cooperate? 

I am still at the point where—I know once that designation goes, 

it stays. I mean, President Mandela just was able to get off the terrorist list last year, because they said ANC was a terrorist organization in the ’60s and ’70s and ’80s. 

And for a birthday present, we were able to push the administration to take the President’s administration off the terrorist list, just 

last year. So once you get on that list, you are there forever. So I 

just wondered about your opinion. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. Ms. Bass, do you have any other questions? 

Ms. Lindborg? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. Just to reiterate, as unfortunate as 

it is, we do expect that the situation in Somalia will continue to 

decline, and famine conditions are possible. 

There is a concerted international effort to try to meet what are 

not just food needs, but they are water, clean drinking water needs, 

and the ability of people to access supplies that are still available 

to them. 

32

We are seeing about a $200-million funding gap, even with the $349 million that we along with, primarily, ECHO, Japan, UK, and 

Norway have provided toward the U.N. funding appeal. Again, to reiterate, we have currently provided about $48.4 million. We have more in the pipeline, and we are looking hard at how 

we can responsibly provide that assistance. 

Unfortunately, there is difficulty in reaching nearly 61 percent of 

those Somalis who live in the south and parts of central Somalia, 

because of the presence of armed terrorist groups and the inability 

to reliably and safely provide assistance. 

In terms of diseases, because of the ongoing programs that have 

been conducted by USAID and others, 93 to 95 percent of Somali 

children that we can reach have received polio immunizations, for 

example, just to show the power of those interventions. And we 

have been able to prevent reoccurrence of that. 

What we are most concerned about is—and what we are seeing 

as children come across the border is malnutrition, and diseases 

that are related to lack of sanitation and lack of clean drinking 

water. So respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal and malnutrition 

diseases. 

We are always alert for the possibility of those kinds of epidemics 

that are all-too-frequently common in these situations. And thus 

far, in the camps at least, we have been able to address that. 

The concern, of course, is as conditions continue to deteriorate in 

those areas that are difficult to reach. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Dr. Brigety? 

Mr. BRIGETY. Congressman, thank you very much for your questions. As you noted, in the interest of time, I will do my best to 

be brief, but I am happy to elaborate in a written response, if you 

would like that. 

With regard to the UNHCR appeal, we do not yet know exactly 

what the size of that shortfall is going to be. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Antonio Guterres, has publicly said 

that obviously there is a shortfall, not only for the Horn but indeed 

for the entirety of their African program. 

He has directed UNHCR earlier this week to immediately obligate $20 million out of their operational reserves to respond very, 

very quickly to the crisis. He is also, I should say, traveling to the 

region, and will be there tomorrow to go to the camps in both Ethiopia and Kenya. 

As I mentioned, we anticipate seeing their revised emergency appeal probably on Monday. We are prepared to respond generously. 

I suspect that we will respond as we have traditionally responded, 

with about 25 percent of the total of that appeal. Obviously, it will 

depend on exactly what the size of it is. But we will be able to let 

you know as soon as we do. 

With regard to security, camp security is always an issue at 

every refugee camp. I think it is fair to say it is particularly an 

issue in Kenya, and that is true probably for two reasons. 

One is the sheer size of the camp. I don’t know if you have had 

a chance to visit Dadaab. It is massive. It really, really is massive. 

There are security incidents within the camp with not a fair 

amount of infrequency. The Kenyan Interior Ministry does have 

some guards on the periphery, but it continues to be an issue. 

33

With regard to the camps inside Ethiopia, I think it is probably 

on a comparative basis, security is slightly better. But that is largely because it is even more remote than the camps in Dadaab are, 

frankly. And also, the nature of that population—it is at least 90 

percent women and children. Very few men there, in those camps 

in Ethiopia. 

But that is going to be one of the things that I will be looking 

at really intensely when I go to the region tomorrow. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could let us know what you find there, as well. 

Mr. BRIGETY. I will do that. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, and be safe. Yes? 

Ms. LINDBORG. With your permission, Chairman Smith, I would 

just add that, again, because this is a regional crisis, the totality 

of United States assistance in the region is currently $360 million. 

And that is just to underscore the stresses that the refugees are 

placing on the drought-affected communities in Kenya and Ethiopia 

as well. So there has been, where we are able to reliably reach people throughout the region, a generous response from the United 

States that has been critical, critical for saving lives throughout 

the region. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ambassador Yamamoto. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Congressman, on the AU forces, right now it is 

up to 10,000 troops. They are trying to get to the number that we 

in the United Nations agreed to, which is about 12,000 troops. 

They probably will not make that number. 

We are looking at other troop contributing countries from west 

Africa to southern and central, but again we want to say that we 

commend the Ugandans and the Burundians, who are doing a tremendous job. And a lot of sacrifices. Since they operation started, 

they have lost 200 troops. And we are trying to do the best we can 

to provide the assistance and support that they need. 

As I said, over the last 4 years—and this is 4 years—we have given about $258 million. Compared to other operations, obviously, 

it is not a lot of money. But we are trying to do the best we can 

to support the AMISOM as far as training, logistical support, and 

to give them the capacity and capability to protect their troops 

against al-Shabaab. 

The other issue, too, is $85 million to the TFG troops to get them 

trained to capacity so that they can fight the war. Ultimately, the 

AMISOM troops can only do so much, that this really has to be a 

fight, a war, conducted and executed, prosecuted by the Somalis 

themselves. And that is what we are trying to do, is to give them 

the support and the assistance. 

Right now, just something on the piracy. You know, the piracy 

is symptomatic of the instability within Somalia. When I was first 

the Ambassador in Djibouti, we saw the first cargo ship being hijacked, and we said, ‘‘That is not a good thing.’’

And so from that point on, we have seen the rates of hijackings 

and hostage-taking grow from about 11 ships, about 276 hostages, 

to earlier this year about 53 ships and over 500 hostages. And that 

has kind of gone down now, to 17 and 390 hostages, but that is because of the monsoon season. 

And this increase is taking place at a time when we are expanding the international presence of Task Force 150, 151. And so what 

34

it underscores is that the problem is basically not a piracy issue, 

but reflective of the instability in Somalia. 

And that is an issue that we need to target and to confront. As 

you know, the Secretary of State outlined and articulated several 

points that we need to do, and what we are trying to do is to prosecute, and some naval operations, and regional capacity-building. 

Looking at prosecution and incarcerations, as you know right 

now, the United States has taken 28 pirates. And of those, 17 have 

been convicted, and the others are still awaiting prosecution. The 

most recent one was, of course, Abdiwali, who has been taken to 

New York City. 

The other issue, too, is that we are looking at best practices. We 

are looking at how we can expand and communicate, and also disrupt piracy enterprises. 

And Congressmen Royce and Smith, you had stated quite clearly 

and articulately that we need to look at how we can disrupt all the 

financial assistance that is being accumulated by the pirates, and 

also the assistance coming in from outside into the pirates, as well 

as the arms flows and other issues. 

Going to your questions on the state sponsor of terrorism for Eritrea, that is a very difficult question. At the end of the last administration, Eritrea was designated as a country of concern, and 

therefore it was a country that we are looking at, not only because 

of its support for rebel groups not only aimed against Ethiopia, but 

also the regional—at Camp Sawa and other camps in Eritrea—we 

are also looking very carefully at also the arm flows, but not just 

Eritrea, but from all countries, in all areas. 

And one of the things that we have learned in Somalia is that 

we need to keep out the Eritreans, and all outsiders, and to give 

the Somalis an opportunity to resolve the problems themselves. Because ultimately this has to be a Somali approach and a Somali solution. 

The SST designation is a difficult one. It is an issue that we are 

discussing. We are trying to get as much evidence together, and to 

discuss this. 

Congressman Payne, you do raise a very cogent argument. The 

last U.S. official to visit Eritrea was——

Mr. SMITH. May I interrupt you, just very briefly? Greg 

Simpkins, our Chief Specialist for African Affairs on the subcommittee on the majority side will stay and hear the remainder 

of your comments. We are at zero on the House floor in terms of 

the votes, so I am going to run over. 

If you could respond, Dr. Martin did raise an issue—and then go 

back to your response—about the maritime—the ships at sea that 

are attacked. And talks about restrictive rules of engagement. If 

you could speak to that, as well. 

Because as he points out, being in the citadel is a harrowing experience, and he goes into great detail about the fact that the seas 

need to be controlled by the Navy. So if you could speak to that. 

I do thank you all for your extraordinary testimony, and your 

work. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. As far as the issue on rules of engagement for 

piracy, the International Task Force 151 was set up to address the 

piracy issue. The U.S. Navy, along with probably around 24 other 

35

countries, have contributed troop ships, around 48, over 48 ships, 

to look at an area that is extremely expansive and very difficult to 

monitor. 

And during the non-monsoon seasons, the pirates are able to use 

mother ships to go really far from their bases in Somalia, into 

other areas, the Red Sea, and then the Gulf area, to capture ships. 

It is a very difficult task. It is a very tremendous problem to get 

all these mother ships. But I think the rules of engagement, as the 

Secretariat articulated, is to coordinate with our allied countries, 

but also to coordinate with all the other countries within the region 

to address the piracy issue. 

We have talked to, and negotiated with, countries such as Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, to—and 

also Somaliland and Puntland—to look at how we can address the 

capturing of these pirates, how to handle these pirates. 

But more important is to work with these countries, as well as 

our international partners, that there has to be assured prosecution of all the pirates who are captured, and that they have to have 

assured prosecution, imprisonment, through the legal process and 

procedures. 

Going back to what Congressman Payne had said on the Eritrea 

issue, the last visit by a U.S. official, again, was last June 2010. 

And in that process, our message to President Isaias and the Eritrean leadership has been clear, and it has been clear ever since. 

It is that we extend a hand of discussion, negotiations, of opening, of discussion, of dialogue. But we have not received any response from Isaias or his government. In fact, since that time, my 

visa to return to Eritrea remains in the Eritrean Embassy, 

unacted-upon. 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson’s visa application has remained at the Eritrean Embassy for over a year and a half. And 

so our position is still to engage the Eritreans, to look at areas 

where we can engage with them. But again, the response from the 

Eritreans has been negative. 

Again on the SST, we continue to look at Eritrea on a wide variety of areas, from their gold mining factories run by a Canadian 

firm, Nevsun, which is probably producing profits in excess of several million dollars for the Eritreans this year, and in the future 

will probably be even more. 

We are looking at the tax collection that they obtain in the 

United States. We look also at the foreign exchange reserves that 

Eritreans send to Eritrea, and say, ‘‘Is this according to the U.S. 

and international financial laws and institutions?’’

So everything is being looked at and examined. We have—I do 

not wish to make any statements or comments at this point, because those things are still under research. And it is not just Eritrea. It is a lot of actors that are in Somalia that we are trying to 

prevent from playing a destructive or non-constructive role. 

The other question that you asked, one last thing, was that 

again, on the financing et cetera for the African Union and the 

Transitional Federal Government—again, we work very closely 

with the Transitional Government to ensure that they will address 

this 1-year period. 

36

As you know, the Kampala Accord, which was signed on June 

9th, really resolved a stalemate where we were headed into August 

2011 without any resolution to the Transitional Government. 

And so what we want to do is look at this agreement achieved 

in Kampala that in the next year, how can we push the government toward those elections? How can we act on and implement 

the agreements made by the Kampala Accord? Which is reform, 

electoral process, and to remove the TFG. And those are areas that 

we will continue to look at and look closely, not only with the TFG 

and AMISOM, and the United Nations, but also the regional states 

and our other donor countries. 

That is kind of a summary of the efforts that we will make. 

Mr. SIMPKINS [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And 

thanks to all the panel. And on behalf of the chairmen, we are in 

recess. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2:47 the same day.] 

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. The subcommittees will reconvene and 

consider they are sitting. I would like to now, first of all, apologize 

to our very distinguished witnesses for that long delay. There were 

13 votes on the House floor, and obviously it took some time to 

complete that business. 

But we will now complete this hearing. Our second panel, I welcome to the witness table. Dr. Peter Pham, who is the director of 

the Michael Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He is the incumbent vice president of the Association 

for the Study of Middle East and Africa, an academic organization 

which represents more than 1,000 scholars, and he is editor in 

chief of the organization’s Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 

Dr. Pham was the winner of the 2008 Nelson Mandela International Prize for African Security and Development. He has authored half a dozen book chapters concerning Somali piracy, terrorism, and stabilizing fragile states, as well as more than 80 articles in various journals, and has been over the years a very distinguished witness before our subcommittee. And I want to thank you 

for being here again today. 

We will then hear from Bronwyn Bruton, of the One Earth Future Foundation. Ms. Bruton is a democracy and governance specialist with extensive field experience in Africa. She has worked for 

the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and GAO as a 

2008/2009 international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Ms. Bruton offered a series of prominent reports and articles on 

Somalia, and has provided expert commentary on Somalia to various media outlets. She has traveled frequently to the northern regions of Somalia, and collaborated with hundreds of Somali community-based and non-governmental organizations. She is currently a fellow at the One Earth Future Foundation. 

Then we will hear from Dr. Martin Murphy, who is an internationally recognized expert on piracy and unconventional conflict 

at sea. 

He is a visiting fellow at the Corbett Center for Maritime Policy 

Studies at King’s College, a research fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, and was a senior fellow at the Center for StraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:12 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\070711\67305 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tegic and Budgetary Assessments between 2008 and 2010. He has 

authored a number of books, chapters, and articles on Somali piracy, international piracy laws, and related topics. 

And finally, we will hear from Dr. David Shinn, who has been 

a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George 

Washington University since 2001. 

Prior to that, he served 37 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, and 

held the following positions, among others: Ambassador to Ethiopia, Director of East African Affairs, Deputy Director of the Somalia Task Force, Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, and 

Desk Officer for Somalia and Djibouti. 

Moreover, he has served as the State Department Coordinator 

for Somalia during the international intervention in the early 

1990s. So thank you, Ambassador, as well for being here, and all 

of you for your patience. 

Dr. Pham, if you could begin your testimony? 

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. 

ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Chairman Smith. Thank you very much 

for this invitation to appear before you today, and to contribute to 

your assessment of the consequences of the failed state of Somalia 

in general, and in particular the policy of the United States toward 

the challenges that arise. I will just summarize my prepared testimony, which I have already submitted. 

As we meet, the situation in Somalia has reached a critical point. 

Two decades after the collapse of the last entity that could be possibly described as a Government of Somalia, and no fewer than 14 

failed attempts to reconstitute such a centralized authority later, 

the country is still fragmented, and is fragmenting into multiple 

fiefdoms. 

The current Transitional Federal Government, TFG, is limping 

toward the August 20th expiration of its already-extended mandate 

with little indication that it has made any progress toward the 

goals that were its reason for being and existing. 

And while the Islamist insurgency spearheaded by al-Shabaab 

has suffered a series of setbacks in the last 9 months or so at the 

hands of the African Union Mission in Somalia, to say nothing of 

recent air strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles, operated or at least 

coordinated by U.S. forces, it is far from defeated. 

Moreover, even allowing for the most optimistic interpretation of 

recent gains by the Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers fighting 

in Mogadishu, the fact remains that their commanders claim to 

have secured barely half of the 16 districts of the city, and the total 

area under the effective control of the AMISOM forces today is actually smaller than that which the departing Ethiopian forces relinquished just 2 years ago. 

Finally, the fate of Yemen is still very much undetermined. 

There is the specter of the existing links between al-Shabaab and 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, those links expanding and 

proving an even greater threat to international and regional security, to say nothing of the increased threat posed by maritime piracy in the waters of the Gulf of Aden between the two countries 

and beyond, as the Greek oil tanker Brillante Virtuoso, carrying 1 

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million barrels of fuel oil, which was set ablaze yesterday just 20 

miles off the port of Aden after a failed pirate attack, attests. 

Unfortunately, compounding its poor political and military prospects, Somalia currently also faces environmental challenges which 

only exacerbate the former. In this context, I would like to make 

five points. 

First, rather than being a solution to the challenge of state failure in Somalia, the TFG has clearly shown itself to be a part of 

the problem. What we are confronting is not just political incompetence, but outright criminality. 

Last year, the U.N. Security Council’s Sanctions Moderating 

Group for Somalia documented how senior TFG officials, including 

the Deputy Prime Minister and other members of the cabinet, were 

directly involved in visa fraud, including in one case facilitating the 

travel to Europe by two suspected al-Shabaab cadres. 

More recently, the TFG’s own auditors, reviewing the books for 

the years 2009/2010, revealed that while during the relevant period 

bilateral assistance to the regime totaled $75.6 million, only $2.87 

million could be accounted for. 

The auditors determined that the balance, more than 96 percent 

of international aid, was simply stole, and specifically recommended forensic investigations of the Office of the President, the 

Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Telecommunications. 

Anyway, is it any surprise that such an outfit has had little success in rallying even minimal public support behind it, much less 

accomplishing any of the basic tasks which are its reason for existence? 

There is perhaps no more telling indicator of the TFG’s dismal 

prospects than the fact that no fewer than three different western 

initiatives to train a military force for it have recruited and trained 

and armed more than 9,000 troops, yet fewer than 1,000 of these 

remain loyal. 

Two, AMISOM is neither sustainable as a military operation nor 

viable as a strategy. Despite its recent success in combat operations, the African Union force remains limited in the ways in 

which it can accomplish, due to lack of manpower and materiel. 

Even if the personnel could be found to bring the force up to the 

new ceiling authorized—and Ambassador Yamamoto testified earlier that that was unlikely—it would still be beyond delusional to 

think that a 12,000-strong contingent would succeed where infinitely more robust and better-trained U.N. forces failed just a little 

over a decade and a half ago. 

I would add, Mr. Chairman, that our reliance on AMISOM 

causes difficulties for our policy objectives elsewhere in Africa. 

Take, for example, the lamentably ham-fisted way in which the regime in Uganda has dealt with political opponents in recent 

months. 

President Museveni knows that as long as the United States and 

other members of the international community insist on backing 

the corrupt and ineffective TFG, American and its partners will be 

constrained insofar as their ability to bring any meaningful pressure on him with respect to human rights. 

39

Third, the resilience of al-Shabaab and other insurgent forces 

should not be underestimated, especially when the TFG and 

AMISOM continually fuel fires of local discontent. 

Fourth, the process of devolution in the one-time Somali state 

continues, and represents a trend which, after more than 20 years, 

has become irreversible. Without necessarily precluding any future 

confederal arrangement, it seems a foregone conclusion that the political momentum among the Somali is moving overwhelmingly in 

the direction of multiple divisions, and against a heavily centralized top-down arrangement. 

Fifth, a new approach is desperately needed if the worst consequences of Somalia’s state failure are to be mitigated. Encouragingly, there have been various signs that parts of the international 

community may be finally coming, however reluctantly, to this conclusion. 

Last fall, Assistant Secretary Carson announced a second-track 

strategy that would include greater engagement with government 

officials from Somaliland and Puntland, with an eye to looking to 

strengthen their capacity both to govern and deliver services. 

While the new U.S. policy has yet to be fully worked out, to say 

nothing of receiving adequate resources, it nonetheless represents 

a dramatic and long-overdue shift. The challenge now is to be 

equally creative in developing the appropriate vehicles for political, 

economic, and security engagement with the appropriate Somali 

partners. 

The forthcoming posting of Ambassador James Swan to Nairobi 

as the new coordinator of U.S. efforts on Somalia ought to be an 

occasion for a thorough review of our policy, its implementation, 

and the consequences thereof. 

Certainly, if pragmatism counsels that we must endure another 

year of the TFG’s existence for want of a ready alternative, then 

by all means let us ensure that this final year is exactly that, and 

avail ourselves of the time to carefully consider alternative paths 

for achieving what the Somali people deserve and our security interests demand. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Dr. Pham, thank you very much for your testimony 

and your insights. 

Ms. Bruton, the chair recognizes you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. BRONWYN BRUTON, FELLOW, ONE EARTH 

FUTURE FOUNDATION 

Ms. BRUTON. Thank you, Congressman Smith. I wish to thank 

the subcommittees for inviting me to testify today, and for allowing 

me to contribute to this assessment of the consequences of state 

failure in Somalia. 

My remarks will explore the pitfalls and possible benefits of the 

proposed U.S. engagement with alternative forms of governance in 

Somalia, in particular homegrown administrations at the local, municipal, or regional level. 

In the interest of time, I have summarized my views in a short 

prepared statement, which I would ask to be entered into the 

record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your testimony and that of all of 

our colleagues and witnesses will be made a part of the record, the 

longer versions. 

Ms. BRUTON. Since October 2010, al-Shabaab has suffered severe 

military setbacks at the hands of African Union troops. The movement appears increasingly weak and preoccupied with internal 

power struggles. No analyst would suggest, however, that alShabaab’s decline is related to the emergence of the Transitional 

Federal Government as a viable alternative to radical Islamist rule. 

On the contrary, al-Shabaab’s decline has occurred just as international support for the TFG has visibly begun to wane, as international attention has strayed elsewhere, to the surprising events 

in Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia, and perhaps precisely because the 

Somali conflict has settled into an interminable and fruitless stalemate between AU troops and the radical al-Shabaab. 

Washington’s measured response to the Kampala bombings, 

when it wisely refused to bow to regional pressure to pump additional money and troops into Mogadishu, has made it painfully 

clear that the Obama administration will not allow Somalia to become a quagmire for U.S. troops, or funds, or forces, that the utility 

of al-Qaeda investment there is therefore limited, and that the only 

real victim of the ongoing military stalemate is Somalia’s endlessly 

suffering civilian population. 

In light of this analysis, I wish to emphasize the following five 

points. 

First, bolstering AMISOM to the desired level of 20,000 troops 

will not end the stalemate, nor will it magically transform the TFG 

into a government worthy of international support. 

At best, aggressive U.S. backing of AMISOM could inadvertently 

refocus and re-energize al-Shabaab and its backers, and produce a 

new, more energetic, round of violence. The use of invasive and unpopular counterterror tactics could also have the same effect. 

Two, the State Department’s new Dual Track strategy better reflects the political reality on the ground in Somalia, and has the 

potential to do less harm than previous policies. If pursued cautiously, the Dual Track strategy could provide the space and reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:12 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\070711\67305 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sources for a much-needed period of stabilization, normalization, 

and economic growth in Somalia. 

Normalization is not as grand a goal as state-building, but it is 

not a modest policy goal either. It is the shortest path to reconciliation, and to the emergence of a truly homegrown solution to the 

Somali crisis. 

Third, though less risky than a top-down state-building approach, decentralized strategies are not a magic bullet. In fact, 

most of the pitfalls that have been associated with top-down statebuilding efforts can quickly reappear at the local or regional level. 

As international funding flows downwards, powerful spoilers will 

succeed in crowding out more legitimate voices, clan tensions can 

and will be aggravated, and the concerns of disempowered minority 

clans will often be drowned out. 

Fourth, the U.S. can minimize these risks of stoking clannism, 

corruption and conflict by actively pursuing stability, rather than 

governance, as a primary policy goal. A strategy of development 

without regard to governments will simply require the United 

States to prioritize the delivery of immediate benefits to communities over any attempt at institution-building or at picking political winners on the ground in Somalia. 

Fifth and last, in order for the Dual Track strategy to stand any 

chance of succeeding, the U.S. needs urgently to revisit its de facto 

decision to suspend humanitarian funding to the Somali territories 

controlled by al-Shabaab. Without a dramatic increase in humanitarian aid, tens of thousands of Somalis will die. 

But providing food to Somalia is not solely a humanitarian imperative. The failure to meet the most basic human requirements 

of Somalia’s population conflicts with every precept of counterinsurgency strategy, and will undoubtedly deliver some desperate communities into the hands of al-Shabaab. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bruton follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bruton, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Dr. Murphy, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MARTIN MURPHY, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW, 

CORBETT CENTRE FOR MARITIME POLICY, KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to give 

evidence on the issues confronting Somalia, and the implications of 

those issues for the United States and the wider international community. 

My expertise lies in the areas of piracy and maritime terrorism. 

I wish to focus on the problems of piracy in particular, and provide 

some insights into what is driving this economic crime, and its implications for U.S. Government policy. 

I have a prepared statement. I would like to summarize my 

views in eight points. 

First of all, piracy is a symptom, not a cause, of Somalia’s current predicament. Dealing with it requires engagement on land. 

This necessity is recognized widely, and equally widely rejected because of fears that the Black Hawk Down experience will be repeated in some form. 

Piracy, however, is an economic crime that requires political and 

economic engagement if it is to be controlled. The concern is that 

piracy will become endemic the longer engagement is delayed. The 

number of direct and indirect stakeholders will grow, thus making 

the problem increasingly difficult to eradicate. 

Secondly, to avoid this, piracy needs to be crowded out using political and economic engagements in the areas of Somalia that host 

piracy operations, such as Puntland. Pirate rewards need to be decreased; economic alternatives need to be increased. The aim must 

be to change the incentives away from piracy and toward legitimate economic activity. 

Thirdly, the costs of economic alternatives need not be great. 

Whatever the cost, it will almost certainly be less than maintaining 

even the moderately effective naval presence that is operating off 

the Somali coast currently. Delay in initiating land-based development will merely increase the eventual cost. 

My fourth point is that the approach must contain a substantial 

bottom-up element. Development assistance is not aid. Investment 

in judicial capacity will be necessary, but the primary objective 

must be to encourage international commercial and diaspora investment on business terms. Somalis are a proud and independent 

people, not all of whom are looking for handouts. 

Fifthly, we must work with the grain of Somalia’s messy and decentralized politics. It cannot be imposed. Local stakeholders need 

to take responsibility. Hopeless candidates should be discarded, but 

development providers should not aim on picking winners. 

Winners will emerge. Failure is to be expected. The successful 

will attract more support and will crowd out the less effective alternatives. 

Sixthly, the current policy of containment at sea is not politically 

and strategically risk-free for the United States. Piracy has a political significance that often exceeds its economic impact. 

63

The U.S. Navy is the ultimate guarantor of maritime security 

globally. When shipping comes under sustained attack without an 

effective response, as it has done off Somalia, then the U.S. commitment to maritime security is brought into question, and space 

is created for state and even non-state competitors to intervene to 

their political advantage. 

In a strategy paper published last December by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, anti-piracy 

operations were described as a way China could gain a foothold in 

a geostrategically vital region. 

Seventhly, in relation to containment, and possibly to avoid landward engagement, it has been suggested that the United States 

should outlaw the payment of ransom in cases of piracy, and to 

make this measure enforceable internationally by means of a 

United Nations Security Council resolution. 

Although it would eliminate piracy if it proved enforceable, which 

must be in doubt, it would take time to take effect, possibly as long 

as 2 or 3 years, during which time the hostages—currently there 

are in excess of 400—would be at risk. 

Most of those held come from developing countries which are 

America’s friends, such as India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and 

Indonesia. The outcry in those countries would be loud and politically damaging. 

So long as the U.S.-led international community is unwilling to 

either intervene or engage on land in Somalia, then the payment 

of ransom will remain the only way that hostages can be brought 

home. 

My final point is that if Yemen were to fail, maritime disorder 

in the region would likely worsen considerably. If both sides of the 

Gulf of Aden were to become launching sites for pirate and potentially terrorist attacks, it is possible that ship operators would demand a much higher level of naval protection. 

If that was not forthcoming, they may seek alternative routes, 

which would add to the costs of both finished goods and raw materials, including oil and gas. Economic development will crowd out 

Islamist extremism as effectively as it will undermine piracy. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be 

here today. I am happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Dr. Murphy, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Ambassador Shinn. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID H. SHINN, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, 

ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE 

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Ambassador SHINN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. The administration’s Dual Track policy is essentially sound. The TFG is the 

only entity other than al-Shabaab with any claim, albeit a weak 

one, to speak for the Somalis in that part of Somalia. 

It extended its mandate from August 2011 to August 2012, and 

if it cannot make significant progress by the end of the extended 

mandate it is difficult to imagine that there will be any support left 

for it in the international community. 

The United States should indeed devote more development resources to Somaliland and Puntland. I would also argue that U.S. 

Government personnel should have more flexibility in visiting 

Puntland and Somaliland. The hard part of the two-track policy is 

that which calls for reaching out to and supporting anti-Shabaab 

groups in south and central Somalia. 

The United States has not yet figured out how to reach these 

groups, because they are, after all, under al-Shabaab control. 

Whatever strategy is pursued, however, it must be Somali-driven 

and not have an outcome that, by supporting sub-clans and small 

groups, results in the permanent Balkanization of the region. 

The Somali diaspora can be an important part of the solution to 

Somalia, but it is not united on a solution. 

On the issue of counterterrorism and military strikes, following 

9/11 counterterrorism became the overwhelming U.S. policy in Somalia, and continues as a major factor. counterterrorism, while important, should not overwhelm U.S. and international community 

actions that might make a stronger contribution to diminishing the 

influence of al-Shabaab in the region. 

Military strikes need to be limited to high-value targets, where 

the intelligence is almost incontrovertible and the likelihood of collateral damage is virtually non-existent. 

It will be a mistake if these strikes become the U.S. default policy for countering al-Shabaab and other extremists in Somalia. A 

policy of military strikes in isolation does nothing to mitigate the 

root causes that led to the rise of and continues to generate support 

for al-Shabaab and similar organizations. 

On the issue of contact with al-Shabaab, a controversial topic, 

while there are rank and file members of al-Shabaab who have no 

ideological commitment and can be lured away. I just do not see 

anyone in a leadership position with whom representatives of the 

international community should be in dialogue. To the extent there 

is any role for a dialogue with al-Shabaab, it should be done by Somalis and not by foreigners. 

On the issue of piracy, I think probably as much has been said 

on that as is necessary, so I will pass over that. I would only add, 

though, that in addition to dealing with piracy per se, there is a 

Somali element of this that needs addressing, and that is for the 

international community to focus on ensuring that illegal fishing in 

73

the 200 mile economic zone of Somalia be dealt with, and the international community in the future not permit that to happen. There 

has been a bad history of that in the past. 

There have also been a few cases of toxic waste dumping in the 

waters off Somalia. I think there has been a lot of exaggeration on 

that point, but it is important that the international community do 

whatever it can to ensure that there not be toxic waste dumping. 

On the recognition of Somaliland, Somaliland should be rewarded for the relative stability that it has established and the fact 

that it has become the most democratic entity in the Horn of Africa. But I think any decision on the recognition of Somaliland 

should be led by the Africans, either the African Union collectively 

or individual African countries. 

And finally, I would like to make a plea for greater consideration 

of regional economic integration in the area. I think this is a longterm goal that has major implications for the future. 

Somalia is one of the most conflicted countries in the world and 

has been for a long time. I think if it is possible to identify ways 

to increase regional economic integration for all of the Horn and 

East African countries, it has the potential to mitigate significantly 

conflict in this part of Africa. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for hearing my views. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Shinn, thank you very much for your 

testimony and for your service. 

Let me just ask a few questions. You mentioned, Dr. Murphy, 

that there are some 400 hostages. I wonder if you could tell the 

subcommittees, how are they treated? What is the average stay of 

incarceration? I don’t know how else to explain it. Are they tortured, any of these individuals? 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, there are about 

450 hostages currently. The average stay has increased. It is probably around 5 to 6 months now, and that is all to do with the time 

it is now taking to negotiate the ransom payment. 

There have been a number of stories of bad treatment. I think 

it would be unfair to be that they have had pleasant treatment 

heretofore, but it has generally been safe. There has been all sorts 

of reports of their food being prepared correctly, and so on and so 

forth. 

But we have, as I said, had some reports over the last 6 months 

or so of pirates—of their being treated badly, a number instances 

of heads being submerged below the water, hostages being dragged 

behind ships, mock executions, and so on and so forth. 

What is difficult, really is to ascertain what the actual evidence 

for that is. We know it has occurred, but is it systematic? There 

doesn’t seem to be a systematic pattern behind it. It seems to be 

related to one or two cases. However, there is concern that, partially because of the drought and partially because of general migration within Somalia, the Somali pirates are attracting—or the 

Somali pirate enterprise, to put it that way, is attracting more people from the interior who don’t have an understanding of the sea, 

or possibly an understanding of the business model that has been 

heretofore so successful for the pirates, which is essentially a 

peaceful one. 

So it is a situation one has to keep under review. At this stage, 

I think it is important not to exaggerate it, but it does seem to be 

occurring, and what we need is better and more reliable information upon which to make a judgment. 

Mr. SMITH. Have there been reports of sexual abuse? And are 

women among those who have been detained? 

Mr. MURPHY. There was one woman detained. I think it was on 

a Ukrainian ship. There was no report of any sexual harassment. 

Mr. SMITH. Are shipping companies purposely keeping women off 

those ships? 

Mr. MURPHY. There are very few women in the international——

Mr. SMITH. But there are some? 

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. Crewing business. Yes. They tend to 

be officers, not in the crew, but it is a very, very small proportion. 

I don’t know if there is any particular policy to keep women out 

of the Arabian Sea theater. 

Mr. SMITH. With regards to when they are repatriated, what has 

been the experience of those men, and the woman, once they are 

back home? Are there any signs of PTSD, or is anybody monitoring 

their psychological or physical health once they are freed? 

Mr. MURPHY. Given the way that the international shipping industry works, I should imagine there is very little monitoring of 

what happens afterwards. There is no hard evidence as to what is 

81

happening to these people, and that is partly because of the way 

the international shipping industry does work, which is to say it 

tends not to want crew or officers to be interviewed. People tend 

to be kept away from the press. We don’t know, really, how these 

people are dealing with it. 

Historically speaking, the vast majority of people who have been 

pirated never went to sea again unless they had to, and that usually meant, clearly, the lowest-paid portions of the crew. 

Many of the officers, historically, did not go back to sea again because the trauma was so significant, but we don’t have particular 

surveys as to what has happened to the people who have been held 

in Somalia. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask Ambassador Shinn, if you could, you 

mentioned that the Somali Diaspora in America can be part of the 

solution in Somalia. But while remittance has maintained Somali 

families, young Somalis in some number are joining al-Shabaab on 

the battlefield. 

Do we have any sense as to how many Somali emigres have gone 

back and are now a part of the fighting? And those who are being 

radicalized here, what is their game plan? Do we have any sense 

of their hostility or lack of it toward the United States? 

Ambassador SHINN. Well, we have a fairly good idea of the numbers who have gone back and joined al-Shabaab. And the last figure I saw was around 30 from the United States. There are other 

members of the Somali Diaspora in other countries who have gone 

back. 

Larger numbers, I believe, have gone back from the United Kingdom. I saw a figure of around a dozen from Sweden, maybe five 

from Denmark, and small numbers from other European countries. 

So the total may very well be a couple of hundred by the time you 

add them all up. 

What I have not seen is any number of Somalis in the American 

Diaspora who have, as you say, been radicalized, or who might 

have sent money to al-Shabaab. 

The FBI may have some better numbers on money transfers, but 

that is very hard to follow, because most of that money is sent back 

by what is called the Hawala organization, where you literally can 

go into a large Somali mall in downtown Minneapolis, which I have 

done, and where there will be a little office where a Somali-American can deposit $100—actually, $105. There is a $5 commission. 

That $100 will just show up, almost miraculously, anywhere in 

Somalia several days later. Someone will literally deliver it to the 

intended person, and it is very, very hard to track this sort of 

thing. 

So I don’t think anyone really knows with any certainty the degree to which al-Shabaab has benefitted by financing from the Diaspora, but it definitely has. The numbers just aren’t there. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bruton, you had faint praise for the Dual Track. 

You said it was less harmful than the previous policies. And I am 

wondering if you and the other panelists might want to speak to 

how well you think the Dual Track, especially track two, is progressing. 

Ms. BRUTON. I think that the Dual Track policy has really yet 

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ified that I think that will require the U.S. to use a very light footprint, and not to use the Dual Track strategy as an opportunity to 

pursue political ends at the local level. If the U.S. pursues political 

ends on the ground, I think that the results will be very similar 

to what we have seen in Mogadishu. 

I believe that the Dual Track policy has been held up by the tremendous difficulties that are involved in formulating a decent 

strategy for engaging at the ground level, particularly in south central. And I know that USAID and other entities are working very 

hard to come up with such a strategy, given the evolving political 

situation, and I think particularly given the fear that some of this 

funding could ultimately go into the hands of al-Shabaab. 

But I think that the dialogue needs to move much more quickly. 

Most people who have worked in Somalia will tell you it is not anywhere near as difficult as people think it is. If you take a few precautions, it is possible to do amazing, amazing projects with relatively little funding. And I am personally very hopeful that Dual 

Track will be able to accomplish some of those things. 

Mr. SMITH. Would anybody else like to—Dr. Pham? 

Mr. PHAM. I would just add to that, I think that we need to also 

flesh out the Dual Track strategy. Conceptually, I think it makes 

a great deal of sense, and it certainly is a move in the right direction. 

But we need to flesh it out, both in terms of distinctions within 

the secondary track between entities that are approaching quasistate status, like Somaliland and Puntland, and more grassroots 

organizations which, although they may aspire to that, are a very 

long way from that. So I think we need to distinguish between 

that. 

And secondly, we need to be able to put resources—it is good to 

say, ‘‘We are having a Dual Track strategy,’’ but unless development assistance and other things flow to privilege that, it remains 

just a rhetorical concept. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Shinn. 

Ambassador SHINN. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, there are two 

particularly sensitive and important areas where one would like to 

see the Dual Track policy take root. One that I alluded to earlier, 

and that is south central Somalia, the areas that al-Shabaab controls. 

It clearly is very difficult to work there. One of the things we are 

going to find out in the coming weeks, as the United States Government tries to deal with this horrific drought that was talked 

about earlier today in this hearing, is the degree to which one can 

actually provide food in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. 

Interestingly, al-Shabaab has said in the last 48 hours or so that 

it will now let international organizations and non-governmental 

organizations into that area to provide food. They threw them all 

out earlier. 

But what we haven’t heard yet are the conditions for those organizations to go into al-Shabaab territory. In the past, al-Shabaab 

organization has tried to extract money from these groups, either 

assessing fees or taxes, or insisting that anyone who works in their 

area use al-Shabaab transportation companies. This is money that 

83

ultimately ends up in the coffers of an organization that is an 

enemy of the United States. 

So it is a very, very tricky situation. On the one hand, you don’t 

want Somalis to be dying in this area. On the other hand, you don’t 

want to be supporting, directly or indirectly, al-Shabaab. 

The other area where the whole Dual Track system is critical is 

in the pirate-held ports along the Puntland coast. I think this is 

an area where we need to be a little more innovative as to how we 

deal with it. Right now, we are entirely focused on spending between $1 billion and $2 billion a year on a huge naval effort in the 

Indian Ocean, and it clearly has not worked. 

Maybe it is time to see if there is any way of working with local 

communities—elders, religious leaders, community leaders, et 

cetera—in the existing pirate port areas, going in with some ideas 

for development assistance, the international community collectively, not just the United States, and seeing if there is any way 

to convince the elders that, look, there is another way here than 

just existing on the basis of pirate money. 

This would be hard to do, because there is no way to compete 

with the amount of money that the pirates obtain, but you might 

be able to find some good-minded local leaders who would be willing to look at another way of creating jobs and employment, and 

try to reconstruct the economy there. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Dr. Murphy? 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I obviously endorse my colleague’s 

comments about the need for economic development in the piracyprone areas. However, I think it is important that we do not couple 

development aid simply to the fact that you have been a bad boy 

as a pirate. The economic aid has to be spread much more evenhandedly, otherwise we are rewarding malfeasance. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you a couple of final questions, then 

I will yield to my good friend, the vice chairman of our subcommittee, Mr. Fortenberry. 

Ms. Bruton, you mentioned earlier that it is time to revisit the 

territories that are not getting the kind of humanitarian aid that 

they desperately need. As a matter of fact, Ms. Lindborg suggested 

that some 61 percent of the unmet need is in those areas. 

She also pointed out that there is about a $200-million gap in 

terms of what is needed and what is certainly not there yet. And 

I wonder if any of you might like to speak to that gap, and whether 

or not you are confident the U.S. and our other donors will stand 

up and provide the sufficient amounts of money. 

Let me also, if I could, address human trafficking. The human 

trafficking report, the TIP Report, has just been released a week 

ago. And it points out that, as in previous years, trafficking victims 

were primarily trafficked within the country, from Somalia’s south 

and central regions to Puntland and Somaliland regions. And it 

points out that the government made no known effort to prevent 

trafficking in persons. 

And I am wondering if the international community, the government, the TFG, in your view, are even aware that this problem is 

going unattended-to. And obviously, it is usually women and children who are the victims of human trafficking. 

84

And finally, Dr. Pham, you spoke about the African Union deployment, and pointed out that that is one of the rallying cries 

against the government. I am wondering, if not the AU troops, 

who? I mean, who would provide that necessary lifeline or protection, minimal as it may be, but certainly very hazardous for those 

troops who are deployed there. 

And I do have a question, if you could, about the whole issue of 

rules of engagement. Do the AU troops have a sufficiently robust 

mandate to protect? And secondly, on the high seas, is our Navy, 

are the navies of other interested parties sufficiently robust in their 

efforts, as well? 

So those questions. 

Ms. BRUTON. Thank you, Congressman Smith. I am very, very 

grateful to have the opportunity to address this question, because 

my memory of the suspension of U.S. humanitarian relief differs 

significantly from some of my colleagues. 

As I recall, it is certainly true that al-Shabaab was attempting 

to collect some fees from humanitarian agencies. Typically, those 

fees were about $20,000 every 6 months. Forty thousand dollars a 

year for every large humanitarian NGO. 

That is not a huge amount of money, particularly when you contrast this with the amount of funds and weaponry that al-Shabaab 

has derived from, for example, the sale of weapons by TFG troops, 

who have been trained by the United States and other European 

and western donors. 

Al-Shabaab can be very difficult to work with. They have always 

been difficult to work with. But the United Nations, ICRC, and 

other humanitarian agencies have almost always succeeded in 

gaining access to the territories after negotiations. 

There are some subsets of al-Shabaab that certainly will refuse 

to allow humanitarian actors into their territory if they perceive 

them as political rivals. But I think that those instances are fairly 

few and far between, and under the current circumstances, certainly, I think it is very important that the United States do everything possible to ensure that humanitarian relief flows to those 

many, many communities that are not receiving any aid at all. 

We can’t allow our political ideas about what al-Shabaab may or 

may not do in the future to allow people to starve today. 

Mr. PHAM. To pick up on the questions concerning the African 

Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, one has to acknowledge that 

its performance has improved a great deal in the last year, partially because of increased training by U.S. and European Union 

countries, partially because of a change in command. 

The current commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha from 

Uganda, certainly is making a valiant effort at it. The problem is 

in resources, both in personnel and ultimately in political resources. 

Currently, there are just shy of 10,000 African Union Forces out 

of an authorized strength of 12,000. Earlier we heard testimony 

from Ambassador Yamamoto that it seems unlikely anyone is going 

to come up with those 2,000 to make up the force. 

But even if the 2,000 were found, we would have 12,000 troops 

with a mandate to do something that a decade and a half ago, 

against an insurgency that was nowhere as ideologically committed 

85

or as well armed and trained as al-Shabaab and the Islamists, the 

U.N. failed with 37,000 troops. It is beyond delusional to think that 

12,000 is going to pull it off. 

And if you look at the numbers, right now AMISOM has roughly 

one soldier for every 500 people. The surge in Iraq, when that 

turned the tide, the ratio there in the counterinsurgency was one 

U.S. soldier for every 187 Iraqis. So they are woefully underresourced. 

Beyond mere troop strength, however, you also have the issue of 

political agenda. You may be able to gain space, as difficult as it 

is, but in order to hold that space, one has to have a political solution. 

The government has to be ready to offer services, goods to people 

to hold their loyalty. And what we have in the Transitional Federal 

Government is an outfit that is good for one thing, which is robbing, stealing the resources they have. 

In the last two fiscal years, the government offices have stolen 

96 percent of the bilateral assistance. We have a Prime Minister, 

until recently, who was a U.S. citizen. During the period when he 

was in office, the payroll account for his office was 864,000—he was 

only in office about 9 months—of which only 216,000 can be accounted for. 648,000 has simply disappeared just from one account. 

That is not the type of political figure or government that is 

going to inspire people to shift away and, as much as they dislike 

al-Shabaab, they are not going to shift their loyalty to an institution like this. 

And so we have to acknowledge what AMISOM is improving. It 

has certainly gotten better. But ultimately, it cannot hold without 

a political strategy. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY [presiding]. Let me intervene here, and thank 

you all for your patience. You have come at a difficult time, as we 

have got defense authorization and defense appropriations votes occurring, and we have got people in and out. 

So I apologize that I haven’t had the benefit of the fullness of the 

testimony today. But before we conclude, let me thank you all for 

coming, and also just pull back a little bit and ask a broader question, if you care to answer. 

When the people of the United States think about Somalia, they 

will have the recollection of a loss of, if I recall, 23 soldiers in the 

1990s. They will see piracy. They will have a notion that this is a, 

perhaps, ungoverned space, if you will, that is ripe for the potential 

for terroristic landing, engagement, and potentially expansion. 

Then, on top of that, there would be a broader concern, in terms 

of the humanitarian problems that some of you have addressed in 

the brief time that I am here. 

So I think it is important to step back and say, for a moment, 

why—or to point out, why is this strategic? Why is this important, 

that Somalia at least begin—at least we have a semblance of a vision for a transition of Somalia to a stabilized—a place with a stabilized government that has the potential to at least keep out the 

threats of those who would land there and expand for terroristic 

purposes, or affiliate with other terroristic organizations? 

Explain why this is important, please. 

86

Ambassador SHINN. Mr. Chairman, let me answer that question, 

if I may. I have worked on Somali affairs literally going back to the 

1960s, off and on. And I think what the United States is facing—

and I believe you quite aptly described the American perception of 

Somalia today. I think you are right on target. 

The problem is that you have an entity which has been a failed 

state since 1991. If that entity kept its problems entirely to itself, 

there probably wouldn’t be a great deal of concern in the United 

States about what was happening there. 

But it has gone far beyond that, now. Not only is it harming the 

Somali people themselves—and there are some Americans who inherently are interested in the Somali population, particularly the 

Somali-American population. So there is that direct interest. 

But now that it has gone so far beyond the borders of Somalia, 

with piracy, with terrorism that has extended outside, with even 

American links to terrorism in the form of Somali-Americans, some 

30 of them or so who have been directly implicated, and the fact 

that it is impacting the stability of neighboring countries which are 

allies of the United States, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya, it is 

an issue that I think is properly of concern to the United States 

Government. It is in our interest to try to do something to help create a government that can, in fact, control the country. 

And until that time comes, my guess is these problems are going 

to get worse, not get better. I think that, essentially, is the rationale for it. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. I approach the issue of Somalia very 

much from the sea, and my concerns about the International Maritime Commons, freedom of navigation, our ability as a nation to 

maintain, if you like, the way of life that we have had for the last 

200 or so years. 

I see the Somali pirates as presenting a major challenge to that 

international maritime security regime. I have argued that it possibly represents the most significant challenge to the peaceful use 

of the sea since the Second World War. 

How this affects the United States is, the United States is the 

ultimate guarantor of the maritime security system, and as I argued in my testimony, where that is challenged and is not responded to, that gives opportunities for competitor states. 

And I drew an example of a statement recently made by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which indicates 

that they are prepared to take advantage of weaknesses in this 

area specifically to gain advantage for themselves in what they 

view—and we should also be viewing—as a geostrategically very 

important area. 

In fact, if anything, I am more concerned about that than I am, 

necessarily, about the now-you-see-it, now-you-don’t changes in the 

terroristic threats in the region. 

Ms. BRUTON. I have argued many, many times over that the U.S. 

has a very limited set of reasons for engaging on the ground in Somalia. For a long time it has been common sense to assume that 

because it is a security vacuum, it is a terrorist threat. 

The reality is that after the U.S. pulled out of Somalia in 1995, 

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malia became more stable, more economically viable, and less 

threatening than it had ever been in the past. 

In 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, there was virtually 

no discernable terrorist threat in Somalia at all. In 2006, the 

Counter-Terrorism Center at West Point wrote a report in which 

it said that Somalia was—I think the term they used was ‘‘fundamentally inhospitable to foreign terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.’’ 

Basically arguing that it was an inherently bad place for terrorists 

to work. 

Obviously now there are terrorists in Somalia, but the thing that 

changed was not the Somalis. It was the level of U.S. engagement 

in the country, which dramatically increased starting in 2004. The 

reason for that stepped-up interest on the part of the United States 

was nothing to do with what was happening on the ground in Somalia, and everything to do with 9/11. 

I am all in favor of caution, and erring on the side of caution 

when we are talking about counterterrorism, but in Somalia our 

preemptive efforts have tended to backfire in really terrible ways, 

and I think that should be the source of most U.S. thinking on Somalia now. 

Not, ‘‘If we intervene, is there a chance that we can make things 

better?’’ but, ‘‘If we intervene, what are the odds that we will actually wind up making things significantly worse because of unforeseen consequences?’’

And when I look at the counterterror efforts that are taking 

place there now, I am equally concerned that they are being driven 

not by events on the ground in Somalia, which are actually more 

or less moving in our direction, but by things that are happening 

in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Yemen. 

And I simply urge this subcommittee, and these subcommittees, 

to let Somalia guide your Somalia policy, rather than any other 

country. 

Mr. PHAM. Mr. Vice Chairman, I echo my colleague’s sentiments. 

In answer to your question, I think we need to look at not only the 

threat that emanates from there, which does affect our way of life, 

the freedoms we enjoy, commerce, threats to navigation, the very 

real threat now that—irrespective of how they got there or when 

they got there, the fact that al-Shabaab has been hospitable to 

other terrorist movements and extremist groups, allowing them to 

operate in Somalia, becoming sort of a hodge podge of characters 

who have gathered there, introduced to you, including—I worry a 

great deal about—introduced to these 30 Americans and others 

with European and Australian passports, who now pass through 

there. 

For all those reasons, we need to be concerned. But we also need 

to be concerned because we take for granted the areas in Somalia—

the country itself as a whole is not that chaos that we often imagine. Rather, specific regions are, mainly the south central areas 

where the conflict is. 

The other regions—Somaliland has been actually, as Ambassador 

Shinn said earlier, the most democratic state actually in the region. 

Puntland has its problems, some of which are of its own making, 

because of the piracy, but relatively speaking it is stable. 

88

But we take that for granted at our own peril. Somaliland will 

not remain the way it is forever if it is left in this limbo, neither 

engaged by the international community nor part of Somalia. 

Puntland, their money buys a great number of things, including 

at times governments and elders and others who accommodate pirate action. But we have to avoid the moral hazard Dr. Murphy 

spoke about. We also need to realize that there is no solution to 

piracy, without some engagement there. 

So we need to hold what we have, even if we recognize the limits 

of the positive action we can do. Thank you. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, your answers are very helpful in terms 

of pulling back and seeing the larger picture, as to both the reasons 

for concern here, whether they manifest themselves in maritime 

stability, the potential spread of terrorist activity into the neighborhood in the Horn of Africa, as well as things that transcend that, 

such as humanitarian concerns for the people. 

It seems as though we have some contrarian views here. And 

again, not having the benefit of your full testimony earlier, I appreciate you raising some different perspectives in that regard. 

If we could, before I conclude, let us just go back to one key point 

that you raised, Ambassador Shinn, regarding the spread of alShabaab into the surrounding neighborhood, or its affiliation, potentially, with other groups who could leverage this—I don’t want 

to quite call it ungoverned space, but the semblance of governed 

space, for destabilization purposes, ideological and destabilization 

purposes. 

Ambassador SHINN. I would be happy to do that. I would agree 

with Bronwyn on one part of her comment on this, in that it is 

quite true that if you go back to the early 1990s, we have documentary evidence, that is documents from al-Qaeda that were collected 

by the United States Government, and they are now translated, declassified, and available at West Point. 

They do point out that al-Qaeda had a horrible time getting engaged in Somalia back in 1991/1992. They ran into the same problem that everyone runs into with Somalis. Somalis are very individualist; they are very hard to get along with, and it is very hard 

to get them to do anything. Al-Qaeda was tearing its hair out. But 

at some point along the way, al-Qaeda did make some recruits, did 

have some progress in Somalia, and——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Ms. Bruton pointed to events in 2006, specifically citing intensified U.S. engagement as the reason for that. Do 

you agree with that? 

Ambassador SHINN. Only partially. The next step in all of this 

is that you go to 1998, the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and it turns out that several of the key 

al-Qaeda actors had support from Somalia during that planning period, and they took refuge, three of them, in Somalia. 

All three happen to be dead now. It took a long time to track 

them down, but they are now all gone. The point is, that at some 

point between the very early 1990s and the late 1990s, there began 

to be a stronger connection between Somalia and the whole terrorist network. 

That was before the United States got off on its counterterrorism 

preoccupation after 9/11. I think I would agree with Bronwyn that 

89

after 9/11 there was an excessive focus on counterterrorism, and 

that did contribute, to some extent, to the problems that you have 

in Somalia today. 

But the problem was well underway before that, and I don’t 

think that part of it can be attributed to U.S. counterterrorism policy at that time. 

So moving it all the way up to the present, what you have is a 

clear link between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, not operational control of al-Shabaab but a link to it. There has been training provided. There has been, probably, minimal funding. 

Most of al-Shabaab is funded internally in south and central Somalia, by taxing and by controlling the port at Kismayo, where it 

makes tons of money with all the shipments going through 

Kismayo. 

But they do get some outside money. They have also clearly established in the last year or so rather close links with al-Qaeda in 

the Arab Peninsula, and this is a very scary organization; this linkage is of real concern to the United States. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Is that purely ideological? Is that religious 

ideology? 

Ambassador SHINN. It is hard to know whether it is strictly ideological, or whether it is a marriage of convenience, to some extent. 

There have always been long-term links between Yemen and Somalia. They go back centuries. So this is nothing new, that they are 

visiting each other’s countries. The fact that you now have the two 

terrorist groups linking up is different, and that is what is of great 

concern to the United States. 

I think there is a lot we don’t know about this link yet, because 

it is a relatively new connection. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Could you address the magnitude of this? 

Ambassador SHINN. I really can’t. I am afraid that I would be 

getting into an area that, since I don’t have access to classified information, that I may simply be getting it wrong. 

But I do know from the anecdotal information that is out there, 

including the announcement just the other day in the Washington 

Post and the New York Times of the Somali who has now been 

brought to the United States for trial, he was picked up commuting 

between Yemen and Somalia, and according to the press reports he 

was in contact with AQAP. 

This is a clear piece of evidence of it; but that in and of itself 

doesn’t prove a lot. I have also heard from African Union personnel 

that they are greatly concerned about the link between AQAP and 

al-Shabaab, and I think it is very worrisome. 

So this has gone beyond Somalia. We also have the bombing by 

al-Shabaab in Kampala, Uganda, just a year ago this month. There 

are links that are now starting to extend beyond the borders, and 

this is what should concern the United States. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, there is a refugee problem in Kenya 

now, as well. 

Ambassador SHINN. There is that also. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. One more question. Back to the strength and 

the potential for the African Union for stabilization purposes. Minimal? What is the trajectory here? 

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Mr. PHAM. I think the African Union Forces made—when they 

went in there, they went in without a clear strategy other than a 

broad mandate to be peacekeepers and to protect this government. 

For most of the last 4 years, until about maybe 9 or 10 months 

ago, their chief duty was literally the physical protection of this socalled government that was confined to the presidential villa and 

occasional mad dashes to the airport. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. But they are concentrated in one place? 

Mr. PHAM. In one place. Since then, they have made some expansion, but they don’t have enough to hold that. That presupposes a 

trained Somali national security force, but those have largely—

eight out of nine have deserted, so that is not coming. 

Secondly, you need a political strategy. That is clearly absent, 

whether you give them a year or what. Unless that develops, that 

is going to—so we have to rethink the political goals, because, you 

know, Clausewitz said, ‘‘War is the continuation of politics by other 

means.’’ We haven’t figured out what political objectives, achievable 

ones, we want these warriors to do. And I think it does them a disservice. 

If I could just return, sir, just one moment to the earlier discussion of al-Shabaab, the anecdotal evidence that Ambassador Shinn 

alluded to is there are quite a number of links going back, and it 

is both ideological and of convenience. 

Two years ago, we had the suicide bombing which took the lives 

of a number of South Korean tourists in the Hadramut. The fellow 

who carried out that attack, a Haramuti, we have from both intelligence and his martyrdom video, he went to Somalia, was trained 

there, came back, and carried out his attack. 

It goes both ways. Earlier, the Yemeni extremists had helped rescue al-Shabaab when they were on their last ropes after the Ethiopian invasion, when the Islamists made the mistake of engaging 

the Ethiopian defense forces out in the open, and were pretty much 

destroyed. 

So there has been a back and forth, it continues. And what is 

worrisome is al-Shabaab’s reach into the Diaspora community. 

Clearly it has that reach, and if it provides that facility, if you will, 

to the Yemenis and other al-Qaeda groups, I think we are in for 

some serious trouble. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Address that issue, though, of motivation. Is 

it religious ideology? Some strange nationalism that we are not 

able to identify clearly with? Or is it something else? Is it just convenience? 

When you are talking about it spreading to the Diaspora, then 

I assume it would have to be based on primarily religious ideology. 

Mr. PHAM. Yes. And it is a mixture of religion and nationalism 

on the Somali side, but the ideology is clearly there at the leadership of al-Shabaab. Most of them are veterans of jihad in South 

Asia. They have been to Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan. 

Some of the middle commanders are actually foreigners, so there 

is——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Do you have an idea of the magnitude, size, 

of this problem? 

Mr. PHAM. Well, the size of al-Shabaab shifts, because you have 

got the core group, and then you have got militias that—clan miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:12 Feb 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\070711\67305 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tias that switch allegiances very quickly depending on circumstance and happenstance. 

The number most analysts at least play around with, and it is 

only a guess, is probably in the low thousands, maybe up to five. 

But at times, they can capture the loyalty of certain clans or subclans, because each sub-clan has its own armed force, and those 

can be purchased. And at other times, they can purchase whole 

units, even from the Transitional Government’s own forces. 

Ambassador SHINN. Congressman Fortenberry, if I might just 

add to that, I have done a lot of research on the issue of particularly the foreign element in al-Shabaab, and the strength of the organization. 

No one knows, other than al-Shabaab, with certainty how many 

armed followers it has in the country. The low estimate is about 

4,000. The estimates go up to about 6,000 or 7,000 of armed persons at any given time in the country. 

The more interesting part of the equation, though, is the number 

of those who are not local Somalis from inside Somalia itself. And 

there is pretty much agreement that in terms of the true foreigners, that is those who have no Somali ethnic connection, not 

from the Somali Diaspora, the number is probably around 300. 

We used to say 200. We think it may have gone up a bit. Maybe 

200 or 300. So not a huge number of true foreigners, that is, Pakistanis, or folks from the Swahili coast. Actually, most of them do 

tend to be from the coast of Kenya and Tanzania, and other parts 

of Africa, from India, from Bangladesh, from the Arab countries. 

They will constitute that 200 or 300. 

Then there is another category of Somalis from outside Somalia 

who have a foreign passport, who have lived for either all or much 

of their life somewhere outside of Somalia, including the 30 from 

the United States that we talked about. 

And that number could be as high as 1,000 or so. Again, the 

numbers are very, very fuzzy, but it is a fairly significant number. 

And that is what we are facing with al-Shabaab. Primarily, Somalis from Somalia, and then this group of 1,000 or so from the Somali Diaspora, or with some Somali ethnic link. 

And then you have this real hardcore group, which is very ideological and very committed and ruthless. They are the folks who 

come from other jihad battles, or they come from the Swahili coast 

of Kenya, but they are not Somalis. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Is there complicity with al-Shabaab in the piracy issue, or is that random criminal activity? 

Mr. MURPHY. That has been searched for, and continues to be 

searched for. The links appear to be certainly not motivational. Pirates are criminals that are inspired simply by the need for money. 

Al-Shabaab, certainly in the core leadership, is certainly ideologically motivated. I think there is a penumbra around that that, as 

Dr. Pham has talked about, that they are allies of convenience, 

that they will come and go, and they are as likely to be motivated 

by access to money as anybody else. So the situation is not crystal 

clear. 

There seems to be—clearly some financial transactions have gone 

on between the pirates and al-Shabaab. Exactly how much money 

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is involved is unclear, but they are almost certainly going to be, 

really, a version of a shakedown, a version of extortion. 

In the same way that the pirates are paying, if you like, a fee 

or taxes to clan leaders or political figures in various parts of 

Puntland and the north of the south central region, al-Shabaab appears to have got in on the act and are squeezing some of the more 

southerly pirate groups. So some money is probably migrating 

across. 

Where exactly that money is going within al-Shabaab is unclear. 

Is it staying within some of these peripheral groups, or is it going 

into the center? Somebody might know; I certainly don’t. And it is 

not in the open sources. 

Ambassador SHINN. If I might just add, Congressman 

Fortenberry, I agree with everything that Dr. Murphy said. There 

is a fascinating reporting piece, a rather long piece, that Reuters 

did yesterday, that claims to document payments that al-Shabaab 

has extracted from various pirate organizations. 

It is about the most thorough, allegedly documented, piece of reporting that I have seen, and I would be happy to share it with 

your staff. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you very much. 

Ms. BRUTON. If I may point out——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yes. 

Ms. BRUTON [continuing]. It concerns me somewhat that we are 

using the word al-Shabaab as if it refers to a cohesive entity with 

a single ideology. I think it is very important to point out that 

probably 90 percent or more of the members of al-Shabaab, the 

people who call themselves al-Shabaab from day to day or once a 

week, are motivated by money. So far we think that the pirate connection is largely motivated by money. 

And it is also important to remember that al-Shabaab, in addition to having a money motive, has a local agenda, which so far has 

been shown to vastly supersede any international agenda that it 

has. 

When we talk about these 30 Americans who have gone from 

Minnesota and other parts of the U.S. to fight for al-Shabaab, the 

vast majority of them went in 2007, during the Ethiopian occupation, when there were rampant reports of Ethiopian troops raping 

Somali women. 

The number of recruits that have gone from the U.S. to join alShabaab since the Ethiopian invasion ended is quite small. 

I am also concerned when we talk about potential links with alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Of course it is a worry, but I 

think that there is a big difference between being worried and having actual proof. 

In 2006, the United States stated that the Union of Islamic 

Courts, which was then in control of Mogadishu, was being run by 

members of al-Qaeda. That turned out to be an absolutely inaccurate claim, but we used it to justify the Ethiopian invasion, 

which then triggered all of these migrations from the U.S. to Somalia. It brought al-Shabaab to power. 

Basically, the risks, I think, are much higher here than we are 

allowing. I think that the U.S. has had a much more direct role in 

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fortable admitting. And in particular, I think that we should really 

keep in mind that al-Shabaab has a motive to associate with alQaeda that has nothing to do with ideology and everything to do 

with dollar signs. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Clearly a complex situation in a place where 

governing structures are weak or collapsing, and other forces, 

whether that be nationalistic, religiously ideological motives, and 

criminal activity are filling the space, with the potential for exporting of those activities, which should be a worry, mitigated by some 

of the concerns that you raise that might round the edges of the 

conversation. 

So if you all accept that, I think that is as fair a summary as 

I can make of what has been said here. But it has been very helpful to me to hear your testimony on what clearly is a complex situation. 

But to raise awareness of this for the American people through 

this hearing, I think, has been an important outcome. And I appreciate your time and your willingness to testify here, as well as your 

background and expertise on these issues. 

So with that, if any members of the committee have further 

questions, they will submit that to you in writing. And the committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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