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*********************************************** 
IN RE ANAISHALY C. ET AL.*

(AC 41830)

(AC 41889)

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent parents filed separate appeals to this court from the judgments of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect

to their minor children A and K. The trial court had found, inter alia, that

the children came into the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner

of Children and Families, because of the respondents’ problems with

marijuana use, domestic violence and transience. The court considered

the respondents’ refusal to submit to substance abuse testing, concerns

over domestic violence, and the lack of suitable housing when it concluded that the respondents had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of

personal rehabilitation since the Department of Children and Families

began providing reunification services to them. Held:

1. The respondents could not prevail on their claim that there was insufficient

evidence for the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence

that they had each failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation

as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, they could

assume a responsible position in the lives of the children: the respondents’ claim that there was no evidence that their use of marijuana

affected their ability to parent was unavailing, as they offered no authority to support their claim that the movement toward legalization of

marijuana was relevant to the law the court was required to apply in

evaluating the evidence in this case, the respondents’ personal history

of substance abuse, which had included the illegal use of marijuana, as

well as other substances, had properly informed and determined their

specific steps, which, in turn, were prerequisites to their own rehabilitation, the current movement and controversy over the legalization of

marijuana in the criminal justice context was irrelevant because there

is a vast difference in the purpose and application of criminal laws

designed to protect the general public as compared to specific steps

tailored to parents whose parenting issues are precisely why they had

come to the attention of the department and the child protection court

in the first instance, and the court properly found that the evidence

showed the respondents’ significant lack of insight about the correlation

between substance abuse and intimate partner violence, as well as their

failure to recognize how their use of illegal substances had harmed the

children; moreover, the respondents’ claim that there was insufficient

evidence for the trial court to conclude that they had failed to rehabilitate

on the basis of their problems with domestic violence was also unavailing, because although the court did not find that there were any instances

of domestic violence since 2016, it was reasonable for the court to infer

that the respondent father had not been able to control his temper or

anger, and the record indicated that the court did not base its determination regarding failure to rehabilitate solely on the respondents’ problems

with domestic violence; furthermore, the respondents could not prevail

on their claim that their housing situation did not support the trial

court’s ultimate conclusion that they had failed to rehabilitate, as the

respondents’ housing situation was one of multiple factors the court

considered when it made its decision, and although the respondents

were living with the father’s mother, there was evidence, which the

court credited, to support its conclusion that such housing was neither

suitable nor permissible.

2. The respondents could not prevail on their claim that the trial court

improperly determined that the termination of their parental rights was

in the best interests of the children, which was based on their claim

that the court’s conclusion was improper in light of its findings that

they had made progress in their rehabilitation and that they had a strong

bond with the children: that court found that the respondents, despite

receiving many supportive services during the lengthy pendency of this

matter, did not resolve the serious and chronic problems that resulted
in the children’s commitment to the custody of the commissioner, and

that the children required the security of a safe and stable, permanent

home, which their current placement in a foster home provided to

them, and which the respondents remained unable to provide; moreover,

although the court found that the respondents had made some progress

in their rehabilitation efforts, it also found that despite successfully

completing certain programs, the respondents were unsuccessful or

noncompliant with others since the department removed the children

from their care, and even when there is a finding of a bond between a

parent and a child, as the court found in the present case, it still may

be in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights.

Argued January 16—officially released June 10, 2019**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to certain of their minor children, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,

Juvenile Matters, and tried to the court, Dyer, J.; judgments terminating the respondents’ parental rights,

from which the respondents filed separate appeals with

this court. Affirmed.

David J. Reich, for the appellant in AC 41830 (respondent father).

Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the

appellant in AC 41889 (respondent mother).

Rosemarie T. Weber, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, former attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney

general, for the appellee in both cases (petitioner).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The respondent mother (mother) and the

respondent father (father)1 appeal from the judgments

of the trial court terminating their parental rights with

respect to their minor children, Anaishaly C. and Khrianalis C.,2 and appointing the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), as the

statutory parent.3 The respondents contend that the

court improperly concluded that (1) they failed to

achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation

required by General Statutes § 17a-112, and (2) termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of

the children. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts, which the trial court found by

clear and convincing evidence, and procedural history

are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On August

28, 2012, the father was arrested on charges of assault

in the third degree and disorderly conduct after he

punched and kicked the mother during an argument at

their residence, leaving a boot shaped imprint on her

back. The mother was transported to the hospital by

ambulance. Although the father told police officers that

he had consumed several drinks, the police report noted

his ability to articulate his thoughts clearly and calmly.

According to the police report, the mother told officers

that Anaishaly, who was born in June, 2011, and was

fourteen months old at the time, was living with the

respondents and had not witnessed the assault. Thereafter, a no contact protective order was issued by the

criminal court. The order barred the father from initiating any contact with the mother and required him to

vacate the home that they shared.

On October 21, 2014, the mother met with a Department of Children and Families (department) social

worker and its domestic violence consultant. At that

time, the mother indicated that she was afraid of the

father and informed the department about his ongoing

abuse. She told the department personnel about the

incident that occurred on August 28, 2012, and about

another occasion in which the father had choked and

had assaulted her, which left a scar on her forehead.

On October 22, 2014, after the mother signed a safety

plan in which she agreed to have no contact with the

father,4

the department brought her and Anaishaly to a

domestic violence shelter. During October, 2014, the

mother received drug treatment because she had rendered a positive urine test during a substance abuse

assessment.

On October 27, 2014, the department learned that the

mother and Anaishaly were no longer at the shelter

after a department worker called the cell phone number

provided by the mother and the father answered. He

stated that he was at work and that the mother was at

home with Anaishaly. Later that day, the mother spoke
with a department worker. She reported that she had

bipolar disorder, expressed her reluctance to return to

the shelter, and recanted the allegations that the father

had abused her physically. On that same date, the commissioner assumed temporary custody of Anaishaly,

who was then three years old, pursuant to an administrative ninety-six hour hold. On October 30, 2014, the

commissioner filed a neglect petition as to Anaishaly

and obtained an ex parte order of temporary custody.

That order was sustained at a hearing held on November

5, 2014.5

At 4:11 a.m. on January 1, 2015, police were called

to the respondents’ address. The police report indicated

that the father had kicked in the front door of the

apartment and attempted to punch the mother.

Responding officers observed the damaged door, overturned furniture, and other vandalism. The father was

not at the scene when the police arrived. The police

returned to the residence again at approximately 6 a.m.,

at which time the mother told the police that she had

received a telephone call from the father, who had

threatened to ‘‘kill her’’ and ‘‘burn down’’ the apartment.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The police discovered the father on the premises and arrested him on

charges of threatening, criminal mischief, disorderly

conduct, and possession of a hallucinogenic substance.

The police report noted that the father was ‘‘acting like

he had consumed some kind of drug(s) and alcohol.’’

Tablets, later identified as the illegal drug ecstasy, were

found on the father’s person. The police report also

noted that the father was combative during booking.

On January 2, 2015, another full no contact protective

order was issued against the father, which prohibited

him from having any contact with the mother and

required him to stay 100 yards away from her. He subsequently was convicted of threatening and received a

six month suspended jail sentence as a result of this

incident.

Anaishaly was adjudicated neglected and committed

to the commissioner’s custody on February 24, 2015.

Thereafter, the department referred both respondents

to various rehabilitative services in order to facilitate

their reunification with Anaishaly. During 2015, the

mother successfully completed an intimate partner violence course, substance abuse treatment, and a parenting education course.

The father’s progress reports revealed mixed results.

Although a department report received on March 18,

2015, indicated that he had attended all sessions in a

parenting education course, he did not appear to gain

insight about ‘‘how to effectively parent and display an

image of a good father to his child.’’ He also received

drug treatment, from which he was discharged on September 29, 2015. Although his drug tests were negative

on August 3, August 17 and September 28, 2015, he
tested positive for opiates on September 8, 2015, and

positive for oxycodone on September 14, 2015. The

father claimed that the positive urine tests resulted from

his use of his mother’s prescription pain killers to treat

a back injury. Following his completion of a family

violence program on November 17, 2015, the department believed that he made progress in that program.

Khrianalis was born in August, 2015. After being discharged from the hospital, she lived with the respondents. Approximately six months after Khrianalis was

born, the department referred the respondents to the

Village for Children & Families (Village) for reunification services in an effort to reunify Anaishaly with the

respondents and Khrianalis. The Village began providing reunification services on March 3, 2016. On the basis

of the respondents’ satisfactory participation with the

Village, the department returned Anaishaly to the

respondents’ home on a trial basis on May 31, 2016.

Approximately one month later, on June 28, 2016,

neighbors overheard the father cursing at the mother,

followed by loud noises coming from the respondents’

apartment. Several tenants were concerned that it

sounded like the father was physically abusing the

mother. A department social worker met with the

respondents the next day. Both respondents denied that

there had been any physical violence. They told the

department social worker that they had not argued but

had discussed an accusation that the father had been

seen with another woman earlier that day. The department social worker also learned that the mother was

pregnant. The department social worker spoke with

Anaishaly, who was five years old at the time. Anaishaly

reported to the department social worker that she and

Khrianalis had stayed the previous night at their paternal grandmother’s home. She also reported that she had

observed the mother and the father arguing and had

observed the father hit the mother. Anaishaly proceeded to describe verbally and physically where and

how the father hit the mother, pointing to her left cheek

when asked where the mother was hit. She showed an

open hand and performed a slapping motion when she

was asked how the father hit the mother. In response

to Anaishaly’s disclosure, ‘‘[t]he [respondents] openly

blamed Anaishaly for the current situation, saying she

has lied about witnessing violence and has lied on a

frequent basis.’’

As a result of this incident, the department returned

five year old Anaishaly to foster care on June 29, 2016.

On that same date, the commissioner assumed temporary custody of almost ten month old Khrianalis pursuant to an administrative ninety-six hour hold. On July

1, 2016, the commissioner filed a neglect petition as to

Khrianalis and obtained an ex parte order of temporary

custody. That order was sustained on July 8, 2016. Khrianalis was adjudicated neglected on September 8, 2016.
The children have remained in department foster care

continuously from June 29, 2016, to the time of trial

and have been placed with their paternal stepuncle,

Jose Q., and his domestic partner.

On July 1, 2016, the court issued amended specific

steps to the respondents. They were ‘‘ordered, inter

alia, to cooperate with counseling and gain insight about

how domestic violence affects their children; abstain

from illegal drugs; submit to random drug testing; submit to substance abuse evaluations and follow treatment recommendations; visit the children as often as

permitted; and obtain suitable housing.’’ To facilitate

their compliance with the treatment goals and reunification, the department referred the respondents to appropriate services and treatment that focused on their

problems with substance abuse, parenting skills, intimate partner violence, and lack of suitable housing.

On November 26, 2016, the mother gave birth to

another daughter, Knitzeyalis.6 Both the mother and

the child’s meconium tested positive for marijuana. On

November 30, 2016, the commissioner obtained an ex

parte order granting her temporary custody of Knitzeyalis. That order was sustained by the court at a hearing

held on December 9, 2016.7 Knitzeyalis was adjudicated

neglected and committed to the commissioner’s custody on January 3, 2017. She has remained in the commissioner’s custody and guardianship from the date of

her removal through the time of trial and lives with her

sisters in the foster home of Jose Q.

As the court indicated in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[e]xtensive evidence was presented during this

trial about the [respondents’] varying degrees of cooperation and involvement with services during the past

two years.’’ On September 29, 2016, prior to the birth

of Knitzeyalis, the department referred the respondents

to the Intimate Partner Violence-Family Assessment

Intervention Response (IPV-FAIR) program at Community Health Resources. The service provider informed

the department that the respondents were discharged

from the program on January 3, 2017, due to poor

attendance.

On May 5, 2017, the commissioner filed termination

of parental rights petitions as to the respondents on

behalf of the children. The department had been providing reunification services since October, 2014, when

Anaishaly was first placed into foster care at three years

old. At the time the petitions were filed, Anaishaly was

nearly six years old, and Khrianalis, who was placed

in foster care when she was almost ten months old,

was twenty months old.

The respondents subsequently reengaged in the IPVFAIR program on May 22, 2017, and successfully completed it on November 1, 2017. They attended the IPVFAIR program ‘‘regularly, participated consistently in
the sessions, were cooperative, and made progress in

the program.’’8

In a discharge summary dated November

11, 2017, an outreach therapist at Community Health

Resources ‘‘recommended that [the father] should

undergo a mental health assessment and follow treatment guidelines to deal with [the] underlying trauma

issues in his life that appear to cause his reactive behavior.’’ The father had not initiated this treatment as of

the conclusion of trial.

On October 24, 2017, while the termination of parental rights petitions were still pending, the department

referred the family to the Village for a reunification

readiness assessment to determine if the children could

be safely returned to the respondents’ care. Chastity

Chandler, who holds a master’s degree in social work

and is employed as a family support specialist at the

Village, was assigned to conduct the thirty day evaluation. She met with the family on eight occasions. She

observed four visits between the respondents and the

children and also visited the family home four times.

The court found that Chandler ‘‘credibly reported that

[the respondents] actively engaged with the children

during the visits and that [the respondents] were capable of meeting the children’s basic needs. . . . She

credibly testified that the respondents displayed love

and affection for the children during these contacts and

that a strong bond exists between the [respondents]

and their children. . . . Chandler testified credibly that

Anaishaly articulated her desire to live with [the respondents].’’ (Citations omitted.)

Chandler, however, did not recommend reunification. Notwithstanding the pendency of the termination

of parental rights petitions, both respondents were noncompliant with random drug testing. The father cooperated with only one out of twelve random drug screens.

He did not appear for his first random drug test on

September 8, 2017. He submitted a sample that was

negative for all illicit substances on September 19, 2017,

but he then failed to attend all subsequent random testing sessions. Further, the father told Chandler that he

would continue smoking marijuana after the children

were returned to his care because he did not believe

that using it was harmful. The mother refused to give

a urine sample when one was requested on October 25,

2017. Both respondents refused to submit to segmented

hair tests.

On November 21, 2017, Chandler held a ‘‘closing

meeting,’’ which was attended by the respondents and

department personnel, where she explained the outcome of the Village’s reunification assessment to the

respondents. During the meeting, the father became

upset, used profanity, made a threat to harm a department social worker, and threatened that he would ‘‘blow

up’’ the department office.

After the reunification assessment, in December,
2017, the department asked both respondents to submit

to segmented hair drug testing. The mother did not

attend scheduled appointments for hair testing on either

December 21 or December 26, 2017. A hair sample was

collected from the mother on January 2, 2018, which

came back negative. The mother admitted, however,

that she had used marijuana sometime between Christmas and New Year’s Day.9 The father appeared for testing on December 26, 2017, but because he had cut his

hair, he could not provide a testable sample. Between

that date and trial, the father had been scheduled for

four appointments for hair testing, and he had still not

been tested.

The court also found that the respondents failed to

secure adequate housing. At the time of the reunification assessment, in the fall of 2017, the respondents

were residing in a five bedroom apartment that was

leased by the father’s mother, who was the recipient

of section 8 housing benefits whereby program rules

prohibited the respondents from living with her in the

apartment. Consequently, the court found that ‘‘at the

time of the readiness reunification assessment, the

[respondents] lacked stable housing for [the children

and Knitzeyalis].’’ In making these findings, the court

also found relevant that in February, 2017, the mother

was dismissed from a supportive housing assistance

program, which provided her with rental assistance,

due to noncompliance with program rules. The program

allowed for two warnings of noncompliance, and the

mother was issued three warnings due to disturbances

at the home and her failure to attend meetings.

Through the date of trial, the children resided with

their foster parents, their foster parents’ two children,

and Knitzeyalis. The court found that the children have

bonded well with their foster parents and other family

members. Although Jose Q. and his domestic partner

initially told the department that they would not serve

as long-term placement resources, they have since

informed the department that they are willing to adopt

the children. The court credited a department social

study, which opined that the children ‘‘need permanent

and stable living arrangements in order to grow and

develop in a healthy manner.’’

A trial on the termination of parental rights was held

on January 11, April 12 and May 1, 2018. On May 22,

2018, the court terminated the respondents’ parental

rights and appointed the commissioner as the children’s

statutory parent. This appeal followed.

I

The respondents first claim that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find by clear and

convincing evidence that they have each failed to

achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would

encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, they
could assume a responsible position in the lives of the

children.10 We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard

of review and general principles. ‘‘The trial court is

required, pursuant to § 17a-112,11 to analyze the [parents’] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of

the particular child, and further . . . such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. . . .

Rehabilitate means to restore [a parent] to a useful and

constructive place in society through social rehabilitation. . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to

prove precisely when [he or she] will be able to assume

a responsible position in [his or her] child’s life. Nor

does it require [him or her] to prove that [he or she]

will be able to assume full responsibility for [his or her]

child, unaided by available support systems. It requires

the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that

the level of rehabilitation [he or she] has achieved, if

any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he or she] can

assume a responsible position in [his or her] child’s life.

. . . In addition, [i]n determining whether a parent has

achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may

consider whether the parent has corrected the factors

that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether

those factors were included in specific expectations

ordered by the court or imposed by the department.

. . .

‘‘When a child is taken into the commissioner’s custody, a trial court must issue specific steps to a parent

as to what should be done to facilitate reunification

and prevent termination of parental rights.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 585–86, 122 A.3d

1247 (2015). ‘‘Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be done to facilitate

reunification and prevent termination of rights. Their

completion or noncompletion, however, does not guarantee any outcome. A parent may complete all of the

specific steps and still be found to have failed to rehabilitate. . . . Conversely, a parent could fall somewhat

short in completing the ordered steps, but still be found

to have achieved sufficient progress so as to preclude

a termination of his or her rights based on a failure to

rehabilitate.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Elvin G., 310

Conn. 485, 507–508, 78 A.3d 797 (2013).

‘‘While . . . clear error review is appropriate for the

trial court’s subordinate factual findings . . . the trial

court’s ultimate conclusion of whether a parent has

failed to rehabilitate involves a different exercise by

the trial court. A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is

drawn from both the trial court’s factual findings and

from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether those

findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set

forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the
appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary

sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court could have

reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the

cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying this

standard, we construe the evidence in a manner most

favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court.’’

(Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M., supra, 318

Conn. 587–88.

‘‘An important corollary to these principles is that

the mere existence in the record of evidence that would

support a different conclusion, without more, is not

sufficient to undermine the finding of the trial court.

Our focus in conducting a review for evidentiary sufficiency is not on the question of whether there exists

support for a different finding—the proper inquiry is

whether there is enough evidence in the record to support the finding that the trial court made.’’ (Emphasis

altered.) In re Jayce O., 323 Conn. 690, 716, 150 A.3d

640 (2016).

The court found by clear and convincing evidence

that the department’s offer and provision of services

from 2015 through the end of the trial ‘‘constituted

reasonable and timely efforts by the department to

assist each parent’s rehabilitation and to reunify the

family.’’12 It also found by clear and convincing evidence

that the respondents had each ‘‘failed to achieve the

degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage

the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering

[the] ages and needs of [the children], they could

assume a responsible position in the lives of those children.’’ Our review of the record in light of the lengthy

recitation of the factual findings made by the court

convinces us that the extensive evidence credited by

the court supports its determination.

The court found that ‘‘[the children] came into [the

commissioner’s] custody because of [the respondents’]

problems with marijuana use, domestic violence and

transience. Anaishaly was twice removed from the custody of [the respondents]. She has been committed to

the [commissioner’s custody] since February 24, 2015.

Khrianalis followed her sister into the child protection

system on June 29, 2016. Both children have lived in

their current foster home since that date.’’ The court

concluded ‘‘[b]ased on all of the evidence presented

. . . that [the respondents] are unable or unwilling to

benefit from the extensive assistance that [the department] and other agencies have offered and provided to

them while the children’s cases have been pending.’’

As the court explained in its memorandum of decision:

‘‘[The department] has offered and provided multiple

reunification services to [the respondents] on an ongoing basis since October, 2014. These have included men-
tal health counseling, substance abuse evaluations,

counseling and testing, parenting education, intimate

partner violence programs, supervised visitation, case

management, supportive housing assistance, and reunification readiness assessments and services. The court

has found that these services were timely and constituted reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The

respondents successfully completed some programs,

but they were unsuccessful, or noncompliant, with others. One [department] witness offered an apt analogy

during her testimony when she likened the twists and

turns of this case to a roller coaster ride. There were

high points when [the respondents] appeared to be making progress, followed by low points when the [respondents], who were twice assessed for the return of the

children, engaged in negative behavior that stopped

reunification in its tracks.’’

In challenging these findings, both respondents argue

that there is no evidence that their use of marijuana

affected their ability to parent, and that ‘‘because the

law concerning [the criminalization of] marijuana has

changed, this change must also be reflected in the law

concerning child protection . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.

First, the respondents offer no authority to support

their claim that the movement toward legalization of

marijuana is relevant to the law the court was required

to apply in evaluating the evidence in this case. Indeed,

our Supreme Court has held otherwise. The court in

In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 596 n.23, found ‘‘unpersuasive the respondent’s claim that, even properly

drawn, [the] inference [that he had continued to use

marijuana based on his proven past marijuana use and

his refusal to submit to drug testing] did not prove that

he failed to rehabilitate because criminal penalties for

possession of marijuana have been reduced and the

legislature has approved the use of marijuana for palliative medical purposes.’’ Our Supreme Court reasoned

that, ‘‘regardless of marijuana’s recent limited legalized

status, the respondent was ordered to refrain from using

it due to his extensive personal history of substance

abuse.’’ Id. Similarly, in the present case, the respondents’ personal history of substance abuse, which has

included the illegal use of marijuana, as well as other

substances, has properly informed and determined their

specific steps, which, in turn, are prerequisites to their

own rehabilitation. See id.; see also In re Elvin G.,

supra, 310 Conn. 507–508 (‘‘[s]pecific steps provide

notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be

done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination

of rights’’).

Second, there is a vast difference in the purpose and

application of criminal laws designed to protect the

general public as compared to specific steps tailored

to parents whose parenting issues are precisely why
they have come to the attention of the department and

the child protection court in the first instance. In the

same way that the general public may legally consume

alcohol while those who are alcohol dependent may

not enjoy the same freedom, less restrictive laws around

marijuana use for the general public13 have no bearing

on respondents whose abuse of substances, including

marijuana, has required treatment and abstention. The

current movement and controversy over the legalization

of marijuana in the criminal justice context is simply

irrelevant.

Further, the respondents’ focus on the legalization

of marijuana operates on the assumption that their

admissions of marijuana use are credible evidence of

the extent of their rehabilitation. Understood in the

context of the respondents’ failure to cooperate with

drug testing, evidence amounting to the respondents’

self-report of marijuana use was simply that—a selfserving assessment of their own rehabilitative status—

which the court was free not to credit. In fact, the proper

measure of their compliance with the requirement that

they refrain from abusing substances is in their ability

to provide negative and randomized drug testing results

over a sustained period of time, which they failed to

do. The respondents knew full well that the failure

to submit to drug testing violated their specific steps,

which, in turn, would impede reunification with their

children. Understanding these consequences, and notwithstanding the pending termination petitions, the

respondents nevertheless chose not to comply, which

the court properly considered in finding that the respondents failed to rehabilitate. In observing that the mother

‘‘was also aware that her fitness to resume custody of

[the children and Knitzeyalis] was being evaluated when

she refused to submit to drug testing in October, 2017,’’

the court gave appropriate weight to this factor when

considering whether the respondents were willing and

able to reunify with the children.

We simply do not find fault in the court’s finding that

‘‘the [respondents’] refusal to comply with drug testing

during the assessment period, and the father’s attitude

about continued marijuana use, [was] particularly disturbing. This evidence reveals each parent’s significant

lack of insight about the correlation between substance

abuse and intimate partner violence, as well as their

failure to recognize how their use of illegal substances

has harmed [the children] and Knitzeyalis.’’

The respondents also argue that there was insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that they had

failed to rehabilitate on the basis of their problems with

domestic violence, noting that there were no incidents

of intimate partner violence since 2016, and that they

had each completed domestic violence programs.14 We

reiterate that, on review, we must determine ‘‘whether

the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon
the facts established and the reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 588.

The record indicates that the court did not base its

determination regarding failure to rehabilitate solely on

the respondents’ problems with domestic violence. The

court expressed its specific concern with the father’s

history of domestic violence and the link between at

least two of those instances and his use ‘‘of alcohol and/

or illegal controlled substances.’’ Although the court

did not find that there were any instances of domestic

violence since 2016, it was reasonable for the court to

infer that the father has not been able to control his

temper or anger. The court specifically noted ‘‘the similarity between [the father’s] conduct on January 1, 2015,

when he threatened to kill [the mother] and burn down

her apartment, and his behavior on November 21, 2017,

when he threatened to cause physical harm to [a department social worker] and blow up the [department]

office.’’ That November 21, 2017 incident occurred after

the respondents had completed the IPV-FAIR program.

The respondents also argue that their housing situation did not support the court’s ultimate conclusion

that they have failed to rehabilitate. We again note that

we must look at the cumulative effect of the evidence;

In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 588; and that the

respondents’ housing situation was but one of multiple

factors the court considered when it made its decision.

The court credited the evidence that the respondents

cannot legally stay with the children at the home of the

father’s mother. It concluded that, ‘‘[a]s a result, the

mother and the father are still without suitable housing

for the children . . . [and] this problem might have

been solved if the mother had not been discharged due

to noncompliance last year from the supportive housing

assistance program to which she had been referred by

[the department].’’ Neither respondent challenges the

court’s factual findings. See footnote 10 of this opinion.

Although the respondents were living with the father’s

mother, there was evidence, which the court credited,

to support its conclusion that such housing was neither

suitable nor permissible.

The court’s memorandum of decision plainly indicates that the court considered the respondents’ refusal

to submit to substance abuse testing, concerns over

domestic violence, and the lack of suitable housing

when it concluded that the respondents have failed to

achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation

since the department began providing reunification services to the respondents, beginning in October, 2014.

The record before us contains evidence that substantiates these findings. Accordingly, we conclude that the

court reasonably could have determined, on the basis
of its factual findings and the reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom, that the respondents failed to achieve

sufficient rehabilitation that would encourage the belief

that, within a reasonable time, they could assume a

responsible positon in the children’s lives.

II

The respondents next claim that the court improperly

determined that the termination of their parental rights

was in the best interests of the children. Specifically,

they argue that the court’s conclusion was improper

because the court found, among other things, that they

have made progress in their rehabilitation and that they

have a strong bond with the children.15 We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard

of review and general principles. ‘‘In the dispositional

phase of a termination of parental rights hearing,16 the

emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the

parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is well

settled that we will overturn the trial court’s decision

that the termination of parental rights is in the best

interest of the [child] only if the court’s findings are

clearly erroneous. . . . The best interests of the child

include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his

or her] environment. . . . In the dispositional phase of

a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court

must determine whether it is established by clear and

convincing evidence that the continuation of the

respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest

of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is

mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)].17

. . .

The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the

court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to

be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .

There is no requirement that each factor be proven by

clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Footnotes added and

altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph

M., 158 Conn. App. 849, 868–69, 120 A.3d 1271 (2015).

In the portion of its memorandum of decision where

it addressed the dispositional phase, the court reasoned:

‘‘The court has given careful consideration to the strong

feelings which the [respondents] and the children have

for each other. However, the court must examine and

weigh this evidence in conjunction with the evidence

about the length of time that both children have been

in foster care and each parent’s lack of progress toward

reunification. Anaishaly, who will turn seven in June,

[2018], has spent a total of more than three and [onehalf] years in the custody of [the commissioner]. Khrianalis, who will be three in August, [2018], has resided

for almost [twenty-three] months—or slightly less than

two thirds of her life—in a foster home. Based on each

parent’s inability to sufficiently recognize and remedy

the issues that caused the children’s removal, and their
failure to substantially benefit from services and treatment, it is impossible to predict when in the future [the

children] could be safely returned home. The evidence

also established that [the children] are both doing well

in their present placement, and that their caretakers

have committed to adopting them.’’ The court concluded: ‘‘Because of the strong bond that exists between

the [respondents] and [the children], it is very appropriate that [the mother] and [the father] were afforded

much help and many opportunities to achieve reunification. However, despite receiving many supportive services during the lengthy pendency of this matter, the

respondents have not resolved the serious and chronic

problems that resulted in the children’s commitment

to [the commissioner’s custody]. [The children] require

the security of a safe and stable, permanent home. Their

current placement provides this to them. Their biological parents remain unable to offer this to them. The

court finds that it would be detrimental to the well-being

of these children [to] delay permanency any longer in

order to afford the respondents additional time to pursue rehabilitative efforts which have thus far proven

unsuccessful.’’ The court also made additional findings

as to the seven factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k) and

those findings are supported by the record.

Although the respondents contend that certain positive facts found by the court outweigh the negatives,

‘‘we will not scrutinize the record to look for reasons

supporting a different conclusion than that reached by

the trial court.’’ In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 593.

The respondents point out that the court found that

they had made some progress in their rehabilitation

efforts. We will not, however, overlook the court’s finding that despite ‘‘successfully complet[ing] some programs,’’ the respondents were ‘‘unsuccessful, or

noncompliant, with others’’ since the department

removed Khrianalis and Anaishaly, for the second time,

from their care on June 29, 2016.

Moreover, as to the respondents’ contention that the

court found that they shared a bond with their children,

‘‘ ‘[o]ur courts consistently have held that even when

there is a finding of a bond between [a] parent and a

child, it still may be in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights.’ In re Rachel J., 97 Conn. App. 748,

761, 905 A.2d 1271, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 941, 912

A.2d 476 (2006); see also In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.

App. 528, 536, 857 A.2d 963 (2004) (‘The Appellate Court

has concluded that a termination of parental rights is

appropriate in circumstances where the children are

bonded with their parent if it is in the best interest of

the child to do so. . . . This is such a case.’ . . .); In

re Ashley S., 61 Conn. App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718 (‘[A]

parent’s love and biological connection . . . is simply

not enough. [The department] has demonstrated by

clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent]

cannot be a competent parent to these children because
she cannot provide them a nurturing, safe and structured environment.’), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769

A.2d 61 (2001).’’ In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 164,

962 A.2d 81 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds

by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014).

The existence of a bond, while relevant to the court’s

analysis, is not dispositive of the best interests determination.

On our careful review of all the evidence, we cannot

conclude that the trial court’s determination that the

termination of the respondents’ parental rights was in

the best interests of the children was clearly erroneous.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** June 10, 2019, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 We refer to the mother and the father collectively as the respondents.

2 The mother gave birth to two other children. See footnote 6 of this

opinion. We refer to all four children individually by their names, and we

refer to Anaishaly and Khrianalis collectively as the children.

3 We note that pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, the attorney for the

minor children filed a statement adopting the brief of the commissioner in

the mother’s appeal.

4 According to a department social worker affidavit, pursuant to the safety

plan, the mother agreed to go to the domestic violence shelter, follow the

shelter’s rules, and follow its recommendations, including those related to

advocacy and domestic violence education. The mother also agreed to have

no contact with the father and to file a restraining order against him. She

further agreed to request advocacy regarding her lease. The department

agreed to maintain communication with the mother and shelter staff. It also

agreed to continue its assessment and to provide case management services.

5 The file indicates that the respondents were issued specific steps filed

on October 30, 2014, and signed by the respondents on November 5, 2014,

which provided, inter alia, that they: participate in counseling and make

progress toward the identified treatment goals; not use illegal drugs or abuse

alcohol or medicine; submit to random drug testing; cooperate with service

providers’ recommendations for parenting/individual/family counseling, inhome support services, and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment; get

and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income; and learn about the

impact of domestic violence on children.

6 The respondents’ parental rights as to Knitzeyalis are not the subject of

this action. The mother also has an older child, Taisha R.G., who was born

on December 19, 2007. According to a department social study, from ‘‘March

19, 2008, to August, 2009, [the mother] had protective services involvement

in Massachusetts due to domestic violence and homelessness/transience.’’

Guardianship of Taisha was transferred from the mother to the child’s

paternal grandmother in May, 2008. Since that time, Taisha has remained

in her paternal grandmother’s care.

7

In its memorandum of decision, the court took judicial notice of the fact

that ‘‘the court issuing that order of temporary custody made a legal finding

that Knitzeyalis was in immediate danger of physical injury from [the] surroundings in the parental home at the time the order was signed.’’

8

In addition to the IPV-FAIR program, the mother also successfully completed an ‘‘Intimate Partner Violence Group’’ on September 17, 2016, and a

‘‘Positive Parenting & Support Group’’ on May 20, 2017. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) The mother also completed similar domestic violence programs known as ‘‘Integrated Family Violence Services’’ on dates not specified

and ‘‘Positive Parenting Education and Support Groups’’ on July 28, 2015,

and September 17, 2016. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

9 A clinician at the agency where the testing was conducted testified that
the mother’s use of marijuana would likely not have shown on the hair test

because of how recently the hair sample was collected relative to the time

frame of the mother’s reported use of the drug.

10 We note that the father does not argue that the court’s findings are

clearly erroneous and, in the mother’s appellate brief, she explicitly states

that she ‘‘does not by the present appeal challenge the trial court’s factual

findings.’’ Instead, both respondents argue that those findings are insufficient

to support the court’s ultimate conclusion.

11 General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior

Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear

and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families

has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child

with the parent . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and

(3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the

Probate Court to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior

proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected, abused or uncared for and has

been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the

parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate

the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has

failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage

the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of

the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the

child . . . .’’

12 We note that the respondents do not argue on appeal that the department

did not make reasonable and timely efforts to assist in their rehabilitation

and reunification with the children.

13 In her appellate brief, the mother specifically refers to the permitted

palliative use of marijuana; see General Statutes § 21a-408a et seq.; and the

decriminalization of possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana.

See General Statutes § 21a-279a.

14 The mother argues that the court cited to a department social study

written before she completed the IPV-FAIR program in November, 2017,

to support the following findings: ‘‘The court finds that the mother lacks

understanding about the dynamic of intimate partner violence that exists

in her relationship with the father, and how it is harmful to her children.

The court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that [the children]

would be exposed to acts of domestic violence, or other angry outbursts

by [the father] if they were returned to parental custody. The court also

finds that [the mother] has not demonstrated that she would be able to

shield [the children] from the potential physical and psychological dangers

associated with the father’s reactive behavior.’’ The mother, however, has

not distinctly raised a claim that the court’s factual findings were clearly

erroneous. To the contrary, she specifically states in her appellate brief

that she ‘‘does not by the present appeal challenge the trial court’s factual

findings.’’ Moreover, on the evidence before us, we do not conclude that

the court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. ‘‘In reviewing the trial

court’s decision, [b]ecause it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence . . . we give great deference to its findings.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 593 n.20.

We further note that the mother completed the IPV-FAIR program to

which she refers in November, 2017, subsequent to the May, 2017 filing of

the termination of parental rights petitions. Practice Book § 35a-7 (a) provides: ‘‘In the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence

of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except

where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its

determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental

rights.’’ This court ‘‘has expanded that rule to allow courts to consider events

subsequent to the filing date of the petitions in the adjudicatory phase of

termination proceedings. Practice Book § 33-3 (a) [now § 35a-7] limits the

time period reviewable by the court in the adjudicatory phase to the events

preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment. . . . In the

adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date

of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering

the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that

the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable

time.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn. App. 485, 494–95, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn.

917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003).

15 The mother also asserts ‘‘that there was absolutely no evidence adduced
suggesting that ongoing visits with the [respondents] while the children

remained in the sole relative foster placement [that they have] known since

removal was having any negative effect on them. . . . Indeed, there was

no evidence suggesting that the continuation of the [respondents’] legal

rights would affect the children’s well-being in any way.’’ (Citation omitted.)

This assertion, however, ignores established case law and the fundamental

underlying public policy that recognizes the importance of permanency in

a child’s life. Anaishaly was removed from the respondents’ care when she

was three years old. Khrianalis was almost ten months old when she was

removed from the respondents’ care. The children have been in legal limbo

since then. At the time the termination of parental rights petitions were

filed, Anaishaly was almost six years old and Khrianalis was almost two

years old. When the court rendered its decision, Anaishaly was almost seven

years old and Khrianalis was almost three years old.

Our appellate courts have ‘‘noted consistently the importance of permanency in children’s lives. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn.

638, 646, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further

delaying permanency would be inconsistent with his best interest); In re

Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 263, 829 A.2d 855 (2003) (trial court’s findings

were not clearly erroneous where much of child’s short life had been spent

in custody of [commissioner] and child needed stability and permanency

in her life); In re Teshea D., [9 Conn. App. 490, 493–94, 519 A.2d 1232 (1987)]

(child’s need for permanency in her life lends added support to the court’s

finding that her best interest warranted termination of the respondent’s

parental rights). Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home

environments.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 285

Conn. 483, 494, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). ‘‘Termination of a biological parent’s

rights, by preventing further litigation with that parent, can preserve the

stability a child has acquired in a successful foster placement and, furthermore, move the child closer toward securing permanence by removing

barriers to adoption. . . . Even if no adoption is forthcoming, termination

can aid stability and lessen disruption because a parent whose rights have

been terminated no longer may file a motion to revoke the commitment of

the child to the custody of the [commissioner] . . . or oppose an annual

permanency plan.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Nevaeh W., 317 Conn. 723, 733, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015).

Evidence before the court supported its findings that the children require

permanency, and the court properly considered their need for permanency

in its consideration of whether termination was in their best interests.

Accordingly, we reject the mother’s assertion.

16 ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by § 17a-112.

. . . Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights

consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase.

During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one

or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in

§ 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. . . . If the trial

court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it

proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial

court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the

child. . . . The best interest determination also must be supported by clear

and convincing evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 582–83 n.12.

17 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where

termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether

to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and

shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent

of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child

by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)

whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable

efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe

Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any

applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or

agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled

their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of

the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s

person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control

of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed

significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent

has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the

foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which

the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to

reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to

incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other

custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been

prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by

the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the

unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of

the parent.’’