IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00045-CV

IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF MICHAEL JASON CLAXTON

From the 40th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 100701

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Michael Jason Claxton, was found to be a sexually-violent predator 

under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§§ 841.001-.151. On appeal, Claxton contends that: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to 

exclude the opinion of a non-testifying expert under the statutory right to crossexamination provided in section 841.061 of the SVPA; (2) the trial court erred by refusing 

to exclude the opinion of a non-testifying expert under Texas Rule of Evidence 705; (3)

the trial court erred by refusing to exclude testimony about his non-sexually-relatedmurder conviction; and (4) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support 

the jury's finding that he is a sexually-violent predator. We affirm. 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 2

Issue One

In his first issue, Claxton argues that the trial court erred by refusing to exclude 

the opinion of Dr. Stephen Thorne, a forensic psychologist, under the statutory right to 

cross-examination provided in section 841.061 of the SVPA. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 

CODE ANN. § 841.061(d)(4). 

APPLICABLE LAW

In enacting the SVPA, the Texas legislature made specific findings that public 

safety and treatment are the primary statutory goals for the "small but extremely 

dangerous group of sexually[-]violent predators . . . [who] have a behavioral abnormality 

that is not amenable to traditional mental illness treatment modalities and that makes 

[them] likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of sexual violence." Id. § 841.001. 

The commitment procedure begins when the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice notifies an established multidisciplinary team (MDT) of the anticipated release 

date of a person who is serving a sentence for a sexually violent offense and "may be a 

repeat sexually violent offender." Id. § 841.021(a). The MDT must timely assess whether 

the person is a repeat sexually violent offender and is likely to commit a sexually violent 

offense after release, notify the Department of the assessment, and make a 

recommendation regarding whether to evaluate the person for a behavioral abnormality.

Id. § 841.022(c).
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 3

The Texas Supreme Court has determined that commitment under the SVPA is 

not punitive or criminal in nature and that a SVPA commitment proceeding is a civil 

matter to which the constitutional safeguards attendant to a criminal prosecution do not 

apply. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 645-53 (Tex. 2005). Section 841.146(b) 

of the SVPA provides that a civil commitment proceeding is subject to the rules of 

procedure and appeal for civil cases but that, to the extent of any conflict between this 

statute and the rules of procedure and appeal for civil cases, this statute controls. In re 

Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. 2020) (holding that a civil-commitment 

verdict that the defendant is a sexually-violent predator must be unanimous). Section

841.061(d) specifically sets out the rights of the person at the trial, including the right to 

cross-examine a witness who testifies against the person. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 

ANN. § 841.061(d)(4). 

DISCUSSION

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to any reference being 

made to the MDT report prepared by Dr. Stephen Thorne because Dr. Thorne would not 

be testifying at trial. Defense counsel contends that the MDT report is testimonial because 

it was prepared for litigation, and therefore, should not be allowed into evidence. The 

ground for defense counsel’s objection was that any reference to the MDT report would 

be “a direct violation of Section 841.061 of [the Texas Health & Safety Code], which 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 4

requires Mr. Claxton [have] the right to cross-examine a witness who testifies.”

1 See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.061(d)(4).

However, while in the presence of the jury, the State’s testifying expert, Dr. Turner,

was asked what records he reviewed and relied on in formulating his expert opinion. 

When Dr. Turner mentioned the MDT report, defense counsel only objected to hearsay, 

which was overruled. Defense counsel did not object before the jury that Claxton’s 

statutory right to cross-examine was being denied as previously contended.

Furthermore, the record reflects that defense counsel and the state later questioned Dr. 

Turner regarding Dr. Thorne’s MDT report without objection. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 

v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. 2004) (holding that error in the admission of testimony 

is deemed harmless and is waived if the objecting party subsequently permits the same 

or similar evidence to be introduced elsewhere without objection); State v. Cent. 

Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009) (stating that any error in the 

admission of evidence is likely harmless if it is cumulative of other evidence); see also In 

re Commitment of Brown, No. 05-16-01178-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1357, at *20 n. 3 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Feb. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, because the objection made 

at trial does not comport with the issue raised on appeal, we conclude that Claxton’s first 

1 Also outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel requested a running objection to, among other 

things, any reference to the MDT report by Dr. Thorne. The trial court specifically stated: “I’ll give you a 

running objection to all the matters that you referenced, but I think you are going to have to renew your 

objection to MDT matters.” Defense counsel responded, “[c]ontemporaneously, yes, Your Honor.” The 

trial court then stated, “I understand. There may be some of those that are objectionable. There may be 

some that are not, but we’ll cross that bridge.”
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 5

issue was not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31; In re T.B., 594 S.W.3d 

773, 779 (Tex. App. – Waco 2019, no pet.); see also In re Commitment Lucero, No. 09-14-

00157-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1098, at *11 (Tex. App. Beaumont, Feb. 5, 2015, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.) (“An issue on appeal that does not comport with an objection made 

at trial is waived.” (citations omitted)). We overrule Claxton’s first issue. 

Issue Two

In his second issue, Claxton argues that the trial court erred by refusing to exclude 

the opinion of Dr. Thorne under Texas Rule of Evidence 705. See TEX. R. EVID. 705.

APPLICABLE LAW

Rule 705 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that an expert may disclose on 

direct examination, or be required to disclose on cross-examination, the underlying facts 

or data supporting his or her opinion through trial testimony. See TEX. R. EVID. 705(a); In 

re Commitment of Polk, 187 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.). “When 

an expert relie[s] upon hearsay in forming his opinion, and it is of a type reasonably relied 

upon by such experts, the jury is generally permitted to hear it.” In re Commitment of 

Salazar, No. 09-07-345-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8856, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 

26, 2008, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 703; Decker v. Hatfield, 798 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. 

App. – Eastland 1990, writ. dism’d w.o.j.)). However, hearsay evidence that would be 

otherwise admissible may be excluded if its probative value in helping the jury evaluate 

the expert’s opinion is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See TEX. R. EVID. 705(d); see 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 6

also In re Commitment of Carr, No. 09-14-00156-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3492, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Apr. 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). If the court allows the jury to hear 

such evidence and the opponent of the evidence makes a timely request, the court must 

provide a limiting instruction to the jury, restricting the jury's use of the evidence. See

TEX. R. EVID. 705(d); see also In re Commitment of Salazar, No. 09-07-345-CV, 2008 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 8856, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 26, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

DISCUSSION

Unless offered for a reason other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the 

introduction of an expert's out-of-court opinion would be deemed inadmissible hearsay.

See TEX.R. EVID. 801; In re Commitment of Lares, 608 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2020, no pet.). The rules of evidence do allow an expert's out-of-court opinion if it helps 

to form the basis of a testifying expert's opinion. See TEX.R.EVID. 705(d); In re Commitment 

of Winkle, 434 S.W.3d 300, 315 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied). In a SVPA case, 

an expert's opinion regarding risk assessment is pivotal, and it is important for a jury to 

be able to consider and scrutinize how the testifying expert arrived at his opinion in order 

for the jury to arrive at its own conclusion. See In re Commitment of Winkle, 434 S.W.3d at 

315; In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. 

denied).

In this case, Dr. Turner described his methodology for arriving at a risk assessment

of Claxton, which included reviewing Dr. Thorne’s multidisciplinary team report. Dr. 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 7

Thorne’s report found Claxton to have a behavior abnormality, which indicated that 

Claxton “possesses a severe degree of psychopathic characteristics.” Dr. Turner 

explained that in assessing a behavior abnormality, psychologists are looking for a 

pattern of behavior. To do this, they have to look at past behaviors and prior sex offenses. 

Ultimately, any prejudicial effect of providing "basis" evidence is mitigated by a

trial court's limiting instruction, explaining the evidence's scope and purpose. See In re 

Commitment of Winkle, 434 S.W.3d at 315. Here, at the request of defense counsel, the trial 

court instructed the jury that testimony about a non-testifying expert's opinion, Dr. 

Thorne, may only be considered to show the basis of Dr. Turner's opinion and that the 

jury should not consider it for the truth of the matter asserted. In the absence of evidence 

to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the trial court's limiting instructions. See 

In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, 

pet. denied); In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d at 199; see also In re Commitment of S.D., 

No. 10-17-00129-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 101, at **16-17 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 8, 2020, 

no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was within its 

discretion when it allowed Dr. Turner to testify about the MDT report regarding the basis 

for his opinion. See In re Commitment of Talley, 522 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Tex. App. – Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (noting that an appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision 

to admit an out-of-court opinion for an abuse of discretion); see also In re Commitment of 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 8

Lares, No. 04-19-00240-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3917, at **10-11 (Tex. App. – San 

Antonio May 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op). We overrule Claxton’s second issue.

Issue Three

In his third issue, Claxton argues that the trial court erred by refusing to exclude 

testimony about his non-sexually-related-murder conviction. See TEX. R. EVID. 705.

APPLICABLE LAW

As stated earlier, the SVPA provides a civil-commitment procedure for the longterm supervision and treatment of sexually-violent predators. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 

CODE ANN. § 841.001; see also In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. 2020). 

“The commitment procedure begins when the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

notifies an established multidisciplinary team of the anticipated release date of a person 

who is serving a sentence for a sexually[-]violent offense and ‘may be a repeat sexually[-

]violent offender.’” Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.021(a)). “The team 

must timely assess whether the person is a repeat sexually[-]violent offender and is likely 

to commit a sexually[-]violent offense after release, notify the Department of the 

assessment, and make a recommendation regarding whether to evaluate the person for a 

behavioral abnormality.” Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.022(c)). 

“Upon receipt of a recommendation to do so, the Department must timely conduct the 

behavioral-abnormality assessment by utilizing an expert to examine the person and 

make a clinical assessment based on testing for psychopathy, a clinical interview, and 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 9

other appropriate . . . techniques.” Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 

841.023(a)).

We review evidentiary rulings using an abuse-of-discretion standard. See In re 

Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 554 (citing Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 

34 S.W.3d 887, 906 (Tex. 2000)).

As stated earlier, under Texas Rule of Evidence 705, an expert in a SVPA civil 

commitment proceeding may disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the expert 

bases his or her opinion if it is of a type of information relied on by experts in the field 

when forming opinions on the subject. See TEX. R. EVID. 705; see also In re Commitment of 

Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 554-55. However, the expert's disclosure of these facts and data 

is subject to the same relevancy constraints that govern the admission of other kinds of 

evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 705(d) ("If the underlying facts or data would otherwise be 

inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may not disclose them to the jury if their 

probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion is outweighed by their 

prejudicial effect.").

Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded “if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “‘Factors considered 

when applying the Rule 403 balancing test include the probative value of the evidence, 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 10

the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational way, the time needed

to develop the evidence, and the proponent’s need for the evidence.’” In re Commitment 

of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting In re Commitment of Anderson, 392 S.W.3d 878, 882 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied)).

Texas law presumes that relevant evidence is admissible. See In re Commitment of 

Winkle, 434 S.W.3d at 309 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 402). Although Rule 403 allows for the 

exclusion of relevant evidence on special grounds, it should be used sparingly. See id. 

Evidence of other offenses may be admissible in civil commitment cases when 

such evidence assists the jury in understanding an expert’s testimony that the person has 

a behavioral abnormality, which is the ultimate issue that the jury must determine. See 

In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 556. This evidence may also be helpful to the 

jury in weighing the expert’s opinion. Id.; see In re Commitment of Talley, 522 S.W.3d at 

749.

DISCUSSION

The case at bar is substantially similar to a case decided by the First Court of 

Appeals. See generally In re Commitment of Barrientos, No. 01-17-00649-CV, 2018 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 5261 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 12, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). There, 

Barrientos argued that evidence of his non-sexual criminal conduct should have been 

excluded as unduly prejudicial because the State did not need evidence of his nonsexual 

criminal conduct to explain the basis of Dr. Thorne’s, the State’s testifying expert, opinion 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 11

that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality, and because the State introduced other 

evidence supporting Dr. Thorne's opinion. Id. at **13-14. Dr. Thorne explained that

antisocial behavior is one of the two main risk factors that experts in his field look at when 

evaluating whether someone has a behavioral abnormality. Id. at *14. Dr. Thorne further 

stated that someone who is antisocial “breaks the law, violates the health, safety, the 

rights of other individuals, [and is] impulsive, rebellious, [and] irresponsible.” Id. The

First Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court could have reasonably concluded 

that this evidence “would be helpful to the jury in weighing Dr. Thorne’s testimony, and 

in explaining the basis for Dr. Thorne’s opinion that Barrientos suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality, based in party on his opinion that Barrientos has antisocial traits and an 

antisocial orientation.” Id. at *16.

Here, Dr. Turner reviewed Claxton’s murder conviction to form an opinion

concerning Claxton’s antisocial personality and behavioral traits. Dr. Turner used this 

finding of Claxton’s “serious and violent offense that occurred while he was on 

probation” as a factor in scoring the Static-99R, an antisocial personality disorder 

diagnosis. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the court gave a limiting instruction 

during trial and in the jury charge instructing the jury that they could only consider 

information derived from the records Dr. Turner reviewed and relied on for purposes of 

evaluating the basis of Dr. Turner's opinion and assessing the weight and credibility of 

his opinion. And there is nothing in the record indicating that the jury failed to follow 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 12

the judge's instructions. See In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d at 199 (stating that 

appellate courts presume the jury followed trial court's limiting instruction).

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the trial court could have reasonably found that 

evidence of Claxton’s extraneous bad acts would be helpful to the jury in weighing Dr. 

Turner's testimony and in explaining the basis for Dr. Turner's opinion that Claxton 

suffers from a behavioral abnormality. See In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 

554-55; see also In re Commitment of Barrientos, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5261, at *16. Given 

the purpose for admitting the evidence under Rule 705, and the trial court's limiting 

instruction, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 

exclude testimony about Claxton’s non-sexually-related murder conviction. See In re 

Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 554; see also In re Commitment of Winkle, 434 S.W.3d 

at 309. We overrule Claxton’s third issue.

Issues Four and Five

In his fourth and fifth issues, Claxton argues that the evidence is legally and 

factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he is a sexually-violent predator. 

We disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Proceedings under the SVPA are civil in nature, but because the State's burden of 

proof at trial is the same as in a criminal case, we review verdicts in cases brought under 

the SVPA using the standard of review applied in criminal cases. In re Commitment of 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 13

Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 551. When reviewing a legal-sufficiency challenge to the 

evidence in a sexually-violent-predator case, we assess all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational jury could find, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, each of the elements that the State must prove to support a judgment 

of civil commitment. In re Commitment of H.L.T., 549 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2017, pet. denied) (citing In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2002, pet. denied)). 

The Texas Supreme Court has articulated the proper standard for factualsufficiency review of a finding that a person is a sexually-violent predator as follows:

The appellate standard governing a factual-sufficiency review of a finding 

that a person is a sexually[-]violent predator is whether, in light of the entire 

record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have 

credited in favor of the verdict, along with undisputed facts contrary to the 

verdict, is so significant that the factfinder could not have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the statutory elements were met.

In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 677.

APPLICABLE LAW

A civil commitment proceeding under the SVPA incorporates the “beyond a 

reasonable doubt” burden of proof typically reserved for criminal cases. See In re 

Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 639-41. In a suit to commit a person as a sexuallyviolent predator, the State must prove that the person “(1) is a repeat sexually[-]violent 

offender” who “(2) suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to 

engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 14

841.003(a). A person is a “repeat sexually[-]violent offender” if he has been convicted of 

more than one sexually-violent offense and a sentence was imposed for at least one of the 

offenses. Id. § 841.003(b). As relevant here, sexual assault and attempted sexual assault, 

as outlined in section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code, are sexually-violent offenses. Id. § 

841.002(8)(A); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011.

The SVPA defines "behavioral abnormality" as “a congenital or acquired condition 

that, by affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to 

commit a sexually[-]violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to 

the health and safety of another person.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002(1).

A “predatory act” is “an act directed toward individuals, including family members for 

the primary purpose of victimization.” Id. § 841.002(5). Further, “[a] condition which 

affects either emotional capacity or volitional capacity to the extent that a person is 

predisposed to threaten the health and safety of others with acts of sexual violence is an 

abnormality which causes serious difficulty in behavior control.” In re Commitment of 

Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). 

DISCUSSION

In arguing that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the 

jury’s verdict, Claxton focuses on the reliability of Dr. Turner's testimony, arguing that it 

was misleading, conclusory, and speculative. Conclusory testimony cannot support a 

judgment because it is considered no evidence. Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 15

Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 222 (Tex. 2019). An expert's testimony is 

conclusory when the expert asserts a conclusion with no basis. Id. at 223. The expert 

must link her conclusions to the facts, explaining the basis of her assertions. Id. An 

expert's experience alone may be a sufficient basis for expert testimony. Id. at 227. 

However, asking the jury to take the expert's word for it because of her status as an expert 

will not suffice. Id. at 223. Therefore, a judgment may not be supported by conclusory 

expert testimony even if a party did not object to admission of such testimony. City of 

San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009) ("[W]hen expert testimony is 

speculative or conclusory on its face . . . then a party may challenge the legal sufficiency 

of the evidence even in the absence of any objection to is admissibility."); see In re 

Commitment of H.L.T., 549 S.W.3d at 661-62.

Dr. Turner has been a licensed clinical psychologist since 2013. He has conducted 

over two-hundred behavioral abnormality evaluations and testified regarding these 

evaluations nearly fifty times. In this case, Dr. Turner found Claxton to have a behavior 

abnormality that predisposes him to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Dr. 

Turner explained that he used the standard methodology that experts in Texas follow for 

these evaluations. Specifically, Dr. Turner conducted a face-to-face psychiatric 

evaluation of Claxton that lasted two-and-a-half hours and reviewed numerous 

documents, including the MDT report conducted by Dr. Thorne that also found Claxton 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 16

to have behavioral abnormality, offense reports, prison records, victim statements, and

other official documents.

Among the documents reviewed by Dr. Turner were Claxton’s prior sexuallyrelated convictions, which included a 1984 conviction for sexual assault of a child that 

resulted in a year spent in the Giddings State School and subsequent juvenile detention

until Claxton was eighteen years old, a 1991 conviction for attempted sexual assault that 

resulted in the assessment of a seven-year prison sentence that was probated for seven 

years with a $1,000 fine, and a 2011 conviction for sexual assault that resulted in a tenyear prison sentence. Claxton also received sexual-misconduct write-ups while in prison 

for masturbating toward a female officer and for consensual sex with another inmate.

Additionally, Claxton admitted to Dr. Turner that, when he was an adult, he impregnated 

the fifteen-year-old daughter of his deceased brother, although he was never convicted 

for this offense. Moreover, the record contains a statement from Claxton indicating that 

when he was twenty years old, he sexually offended against a nineteen-year-old woman 

by rubbing her breasts, forcefully removing her clothing, and rubbing his penis against 

her vagina and anus without consent. Claxton also threatened this woman with death.

Dr. Turner testified that he looks for a pattern of behavior, and in doing so, he has 

to look at past behaviors and prior offenses. According to Dr. Turner, Claxton’s history 

is very telling of Claxton’s behavioral abnormality, as Claxton has only spent short 

periods of time in free society before committing other sexual offenses. Dr. Turner also 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 17

found it concerning that Claxton does not see victims as victims. Dr. Turner explained 

that “when he doesn't see a victim as truly a victim and he sees the victim as someone 

who may, to a certain degree, want violent sexual acts perpetrated against them, then the 

likelihood of him engaging in that act again and again increases.”

Using the Diagnosis and Statistical Manual (DSM-V), Dr. Turner ultimately 

concluded that Claxton has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in 

predatory acts of sexual violence based on two risk factors – an unspecified paraphilic 

disorder with sadistic interests, “which is where someone gets sexual gratification from 

causing pain or fear in their partners,” and antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. 

Turner described as someone who puts themselves before others and lacks remorse. Dr. 

Turner noted, “we tend to see them very often engaging in illegal behaviors. They have 

a problem with authority. They tend to lie very easily. And then even when they're given 

a second chance or put on some kind of supervision, they tend not to be able to follow 

the rules and continue to get in trouble.”

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record provides support for Dr. 

Turner's opinions. Consequently, his opinions cannot be characterized as wholly 

conclusory or without any foundation. See In re Commitment of H.L.T., 549 S.W.3d at 661-

64 (concluding that expert testimony was not wholly conclusory or without any 

foundation based on facts from the person's past, reports from a psychologist who found 

the person to suffer from a behavioral abnormality, a face-to-face interview of the person, 
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 18

a consideration of various risk factors for sexually reoffending, a consideration of prior 

sexual offenses, and her knowledge and expertise to support her opinion, among other 

things); see also Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 817. Furthermore, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational jury could have found, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that Claxton is a repeat, sexually-violent offender and suffers from a 

behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual 

violence. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.002(2), 841.003(a); In re 

Commitment of H.L.T., 549 S.W.3d at 661-64; In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d at 

506. In other words, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 

jury's finding that Claxton is a sexually-violent predator. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 

ANN. § 841.003(a), 841.062; In re Commitment of H.L.T., 549 S.W.3d at 661-64; In re Mullens, 

92 S.W.3d at 885.

Additionally, in light of the entire record, the evidence is also factually sufficient 

to support the jury’s verdict.2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.003(a), 

841.062; see also In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 677 (citing In re A.C., 560 

2

In his issue regarding factual sufficiency, Claxton argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict because, with a flawed expert opinion, he has not been shown beyond a 

reasonable doubt to be “a member of the small group of extremely dangerous sex offenders” the SVPA was 

enacted to address. In making this argument Claxton relies heavily on the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’s 

opinion in In re Commitment of Stoddard. See In re Commitment of Stoddard, 601 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2019), rev’d, 619 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. 2020). However, while this case was pending in this Court, the 

Texas Supreme Court reversed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’s Stoddard opinion, holding that the “small 

but extremely dangerous group” language in the SVPA that the Fort Worth Court of Appeals relied on is 

not part of the statute’s definition of “sexually[-]violent predator” and, therefore, is not an element the jury 

had to find. See In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 677. Thus, we are not persuaded by this 

argument or Claxton’s reliance on the reversed Stoddard opinion from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals.
In re Commitment of Claxton Page 19

S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). The jury was 

entitled to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to determine ultimate facts, and 

to resolve conflicts and contradictions in the evidence by believing all, some, or none of 

the testimony. See In re Commitment of Barbee, 192 S.W.3d 835, 842 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 

2006, no pet.). The jury apparently chose to accept as credible Dr. Turner’s testimony. 

Accordingly, we overrule Claxton’s fourth and fifth issues. 

Conclusion

Having overruled all of Claxton’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court.

MATT JOHNSON

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson,

and Justice Smith

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed October 20, 2021

[CV06]